MEMOIRS OF THE UNION'S THREE GREAT CIVIL WAR GENERALS

CONTENTS: The Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant The Memoirs of William T. Sherman The Memoirs of Philip H. Sheridan

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT, complete

by U. S. Grant

PREFACE. 

"Man proposes and God disposes. " There are but few important events inthe affairs of men brought about by their own choice. 

Although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs I haddetermined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. Atthe age of nearly sixty-two I received an injury from a fall, whichconfined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect mygeneral health. This made study a pleasant pastime. Shortly after, therascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement ofa failure. This was followed soon after by universal depression of allsecurities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part ofthe income still retained, and for which I am indebted to the kindly actof friends. At this juncture the editor of the Century Magazine askedme to write a few articles for him. I consented for the money it gaveme; for at that moment I was living upon borrowed money. The work Ifound congenial, and I determined to continue it. The event is animportant one for me, for good or evil; I hope for the former. 

In preparing these volumes for the public, I have entered upon the taskwith the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether onthe National or Confederate side, other than the unavoidable injusticeof not making mention often where special mention is due. There must bemany errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too largeto be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all theofficers and men engaged. There were thousands of instances, during therebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds ofheroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. Thetroops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports oftheir individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. 

The first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written beforeI had reason to suppose I was in a critical condition of health. LaterI was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible forme to attend to anything for weeks. I have, however, somewhat regainedmy strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as aperson should devote to such work. I would have more hope of satisfyingthe expectation of the public if I could have allowed myself more time. I have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, F. D. Grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement offact given. The comments are my own, and show how I saw the matterstreated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. 

With these remarks I present these volumes to the public, asking nofavor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. 

U. S. GRANT. 

MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, July 1, 1885. 

CONTENTS

VOLUME I. 

CHAPTER I. ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD. 

CHAPTER II. WEST POINT--GRADUATION. 

CHAPTER III. ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY. 

CHAPTER IV. CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO--SUPPLYING TRANSPORTATION. 

CHAPTER V. TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND-LIEUTENANT--ARMY OFOCCUPATION. 

CHAPTER VI. ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE. 

CHAPTER VII. THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OFRESACA DE LA PALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ONCAMARGO. 

CHAPTER VIII. ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OFMONTEREY--SURRENDER OF THE CITY. 

CHAPTER IX. POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ. 

CHAPTER X. MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTTAND TAYLOR. 

CHAPTER XI. ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULTAT CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OFTHE MONTEZUMAS. 

CHAPTER XII. PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OFMEXICO--THE ARMY--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

CHAPTER XIII. TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTALQUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO. 

CHAPTER XIV. RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST--CROSSING THE ISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO. 

CHAPTER XV. SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THEPACIFIC COAST--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA. 

CHAPTER XVI. RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMINGCRISIS. 

CHAPTER XVII. OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING--MUSTERING OFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICESTENDERED TO THE GOVERNMENT. 

CHAPTER XVIII. APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THEREGIMENT--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS ATFLORIDA, MO. --GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO. 

CHAPTER XIX. COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO. --JEFFERSON CITY--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH--HEADQUARTERS AT CAIRO. 

CHAPTER XX. GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLEOF BELMONT--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE. 

CHAPTER XXI. GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OFCAIRO--MOVEMENT ON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. 

CHAPTER XXII. INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACKOF THE ENEMY--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT. 

CHAPTER XXIII. PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIEDTERRITORY--ADVANCE UPON NASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATERETREAT--RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERALSMITH. 

CHAPTER XXIV. THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THECONFEDERATE ATTACK AT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERALSHERMAN--CONDITION OF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THESECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 

CHAPTER XXV. STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THECONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ON SHILOH. 

CHAPTER XXVI. HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPONCORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED. 

CHAPTER XXVII. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTEDCOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURN TO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDEROF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCE UPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF AMICHIGAN REGIMENT. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLEOF IUKA. 

CHAPTER XXIX. VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THEDEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE. 

CHAPTER XXX. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OF HOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'SMOVEMENTS DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE AND FOOD. 

CHAPTER XXXI. HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL MCCLERNAND INCOMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONSAT YAZOO PASS. 

CHAPTER XXXII. THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THENORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS. 

CHAPTER XXXIII. ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OFGRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND. 

CHAPTER XXXV. MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTINGTHE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 

CHAPTER XXXVI. BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OF VICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 

CHAPTER XXXVII. SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES'S BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THEASSAULT--THE FLAG OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FORSURRENDER--ACCEPTING THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 

CHAPTER XXXIX. RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSEDMOVEMENT UPON MOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO. 

Volume one begins:

CHAPTER I. 

ANCESTRY--BIRTH--BOYHOOD. 

My family is American, and has been for generations, in all itsbranches, direct and collateral. 

Mathew Grant, the founder of the branch in America, of which I am adescendant, reached Dorchester, Massachusetts, in May, 1630. In 1635 hemoved to what is now Windsor, Connecticut, and was the surveyor for thatcolony for more than forty years. He was also, for many years of thetime, town clerk. He was a married man when he arrived at Dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. His eldest son, Samuel, took lands on the east side of the Connecticut River, opposite Windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. 

I am of the eighth generation from Mathew Grant, and seventh fromSamuel. Mathew Grant's first wife died a few years after theirsettlement in Windsor, and he soon after married the widow Rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and hisfirst wife, on the ship Mary and John, from Dorchester, England, in1630. Mrs. Rockwell had several children by her first marriage, andothers by her second. By intermarriage, two or three generations later, I am descended from both the wives of Mathew Grant. 

In the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, Noah Grant, andhis younger brother, Solomon, held commissions in the English army, in1756, in the war against the French and Indians. Both were killed thatyear. 

My grandfather, also named Noah, was then but nine years old. At thebreaking out of the war of the Revolution, after the battles of Concordand Lexington, he went with a Connecticut company to join theContinental army, and was present at the battle of Bunker Hill. Heserved until the fall of Yorktown, or through the entire Revolutionarywar. He must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as Ibelieve most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married inConnecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at theclose. Soon after this he emigrated to Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and settled near the town of Greensburg in that county. He took with him the younger of his two children, Peter Grant. Theelder, Solomon, remained with his relatives in Connecticut until oldenough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the British West Indies. 

Not long after his settlement in Pennsylvania, my grandfather, CaptainNoah Grant, married a Miss Kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, thistime to Ohio, and settled where the town of Deerfield now stands. Hehad now five children, including Peter, a son by his first marriage. Myfather, Jesse R. Grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the secondmarriage. 

Peter Grant went early to Maysville, Kentucky, where he was veryprosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned atthe mouth of the Kanawha River, Virginia, in 1825, being at the time oneof the wealthy men of the West. 

My grandmother Grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. This brokeup the family. Captain Noah Grant was not thrifty in the way of "layingup stores on earth, " and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son Peter, inMaysville. The rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood ofDeerfield, my father in the family of judge Tod, the father of the lateGovernor Tod, of Ohio. His industry and independence of character weresuch, that I imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of hismaintenance. 

There must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the Tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge Tod and his wife, withall the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead ofbenefactors. I have often heard him speak of Mrs. Tod as the mostadmirable woman he had ever known. He remained with the Tod family onlya few years, until old enough to learn a trade. He went first, Ibelieve, with his half-brother, Peter Grant, who, though not a tannerhimself, owned a tannery in Maysville, Kentucky. Here he learned histrade, and in a few years returned to Deerfield and worked for, andlived in the family of a Mr. Brown, the father of John Brown--"whosebody lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on. " Ihave often heard my father speak of John Brown, particularly since theevents at Harper's Ferry. Brown was a boy when they lived in the samehouse, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of greatpurity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanaticand extremist in whatever he advocated. It was certainly the act of aninsane man to attempt the invasion of the South, and the overthrow ofslavery, with less than twenty men. 

My father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery atRavenna, the county seat of Portage County. In a few years he removedfrom Ravenna, and set up the same business at Point Pleasant, ClermontCounty, Ohio. 

During the minority of my father, the West afforded but poor facilitiesfor the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and themajority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertionsfor whatever learning they obtained. I have often heard him say thathis time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of aneducation, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably whileliving with judge Tod. But his thirst for education was intense. Helearned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death inhis eightieth year. Books were scarce in the Western Reserve during hisyouth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood wherehe lived. This scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everythinghe read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything init. The habit continued through life. Even after reading the dailypapers--which he never neglected--he could give all the importantinformation they contained. He made himself an excellent Englishscholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constantcontributor to Western newspapers, and was also, from that time until hewas fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the West at that time. He always took an activepart in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, Ibelieve, that he was the first Mayor of Georgetown. He supportedJackson for the Presidency; but he was a Whig, a great admirer of HenryClay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office afterJackson. 

My mother's family lived in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, for severalgenerations. I have little information about her ancestors. Her familytook no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when Iwas sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. On the otherside, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in hisresearches, he found that there was an entailed estate in Windsor, Connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, Lawson Grant--still living--was the heir. He was so much interested in the subjectthat he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832or 1833, when I was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to Windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the ownersfor a consideration--three thousand dollars, I think. I remember thecircumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return thathe found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothingbeyond their homes. From these he refused to receive any recompense. 

My mother's father, John Simpson, moved from Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, to Clermont County, Ohio, about the year 1819, taking withhim his four children, three daughters and one son. My mother, HannahSimpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty yearsof age. Her oldest sister was at that time married, and had severalchildren. She still lives in Clermont County at this writing, October5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. Until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when theDemocratic party lost control in 1860. Her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled inKentucky before the war. He was the only one of the children whoentered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. 

Her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still livingin Clermont County, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is asactive in mind as ever. He was a supporter of the Government during thewar, and remains a firm believer, that national success by theDemocratic party means irretrievable ruin. 

In June, 1821, my father, Jesse R. Grant, married Hannah Simpson. I wasborn on the 27th of April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont County, Ohio. In the fall of 1823 we moved to Georgetown, the county seat ofBrown, the adjoining county east. This place remained my home, until atthe age of seventeen, in 1839, I went to West Point. 

The schools, at the time of which I write, were very indifferent. Therewere no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. They were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who wasoften a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they impartedall they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the A B C's up to the young lady of eighteenand the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the threeR's, "Reading, 'Riting, 'Rithmetic. " I never saw an algebra, or othermathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in Georgetown, until afterI was appointed to West Point. I then bought a work on algebra inCincinnati; but having no teacher it was Greek to me. 

My life in Georgetown was uneventful. From the age of five or six untilseventeen, I attended the subscription schools of the village, exceptduring the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. The former period was spent inMaysville, Kentucky, attending the school of Richardson and Rand; thelatter in Ripley, Ohio, at a private school. I was not studious inhabit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for theoutlay for board and tuition. At all events both winters were spent ingoing over the same old arithmetic which I knew every word of before, and repeating: "A noun is the name of a thing, " which I had also heardmy Georgetown teachers repeat, until I had come to believe it--but Icast no reflections upon my old teacher, Richardson. He turned outbright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuousplaces in the service of their States. Two of my contemporaries there--who, I believe, never attended any other institution of learning--haveheld seats in Congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; theseare Wadsworth and Brewster. 

My father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortablecircumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and thecommunity in which he lived. Mindful of his own lack of facilities foracquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for theeducation of his children. Consequently, as stated before, I nevermissed a quarter from school from the time I was old enough to attendtill the time of leaving home. This did not exempt me from labor. Inmy early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where myyouth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. It wasonly the very poor who were exempt. While my father carried on themanufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned andtilled considerable land. I detested the trade, preferring almost anyother labor; but I was fond of agriculture, and of all employment inwhich horses were used. We had, among other lands, fifty acres offorest within a mile of the village. In the fall of the year chopperswere employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. When I wasseven or eight years of age, I began hauling all the wood used in thehouse and shops. I could not load it on the wagons, of course, at thattime, but I could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one atthe house unload. When about eleven years old, I was strong enough tohold a plough. From that age until seventeen I did all the work donewith horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn andpotatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood forstoves, etc. , while still attending school. For this I was compensatedby the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by myparents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going tothe creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting mygrandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on theice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on theground. 

While still quite young I had visited Cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also Maysville, Kentucky, often, and onceLouisville. The journey to Louisville was a big one for a boy of thatday. I had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to Chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing toToledo, Ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, toFlat Rock, Kentucky, about seventy miles away. On this latter occasionI was fifteen years of age. While at Flat Rock, at the house of a Mr. Payne, whom I was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours inGeorgetown, I saw a very fine saddle horse, which I rather coveted, andproposed to Mr. Payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two I wasdriving. Payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brotherabout it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that I wasallowed to do as I pleased with the horses. I was seventy miles fromhome, with a carriage to take back, and Mr. Payne said he did not knowthat his horse had ever had a collar on. I asked to have him hitched toa farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. It was soonevident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed noviciousness, and I expressed a confidence that I could manage him. Atrade was at once struck, I receiving ten dollars difference. 

The next day Mr. Payne, of Georgetown, and I started on our return. Wegot along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dogthat frightened the horses and made them run. The new animal kicked atevery jump he made. I got the horses stopped, however, before anydamage was done, and without running into anything. After giving them alittle rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. That instant thenew horse kicked, and started to run once more. The road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the secondrunaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feetdeep on the opposite side of the pike. I got the horses stopped on thevery brink of the precipice. My new horse was terribly frightened andtrembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as mycompanion, Mr. Payne, who deserted me after this last experience, andtook passage on a freight wagon for Maysville. Every time I attemptedto start, my new horse would commence to kick. I was in quite a dilemmafor a time. Once in Maysville I could borrow a horse from an uncle wholived there; but I was more than a day's travel from that point. Finally I took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universaluse then--and with this blindfolded my horse. In this way I reachedMaysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of myfriend. Here I borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day weproceeded on our journey. 

About half my school-days in Georgetown were spent at the school of JohnD. White, a North Carolinian, and the father of Chilton White whorepresented the district in Congress for one term during the rebellion. Mr. White was always a Democrat in politics, and Chilton followed hisfather. He had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mineat their father's school--who did not go the same way. The secondbrother died before the rebellion began; he was a Whig, and afterwards aRepublican. His oldest brother was a Republican and brave soldierduring the rebellion. Chilton is reported as having told of an earlierhorse-trade of mine. As he told the story, there was a Mr. Ralstonliving within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which I verymuch wanted. My father had offered twenty dollars for it, but Ralstonwanted twenty-five. I was so anxious to have the colt, that after theowner left, I begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. My father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted I was to offertwenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give thetwenty-five. I at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. When Igot to Mr. Ralston's house, I said to him: "Papa says I may offer youtwenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, I am to offertwenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give youtwenty-five. " It would not require a Connecticut man to guess the pricefinally agreed upon. This story is nearly true. I certainly showedvery plainly that I had come for the colt and meant to have him. Icould not have been over eight years old at the time. This transactioncaused me great heart-burning. The story got out among the boys of thevillage, and it was a long time before I heard the last of it. Boysenjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that daydid, and in later life I have found that all adults are not free fromthe peculiarity. I kept the horse until he was four years old, when hewent blind, and I sold him for twenty dollars. When I went to Maysvilleto school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, I recognized my colt as oneof the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. 

I have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of thewhole. I did not like to work; but I did as much of it, while young, asgrown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at thesame time. I had as many privileges as any boy in the village, andprobably more than most of them. I have no recollection of ever havingbeen punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. But at schoolthe case was different. The rod was freely used there, and I was notexempt from its influence. I can see John D. White--the school teacher--now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. It was not alwaysthe same one, either. Switches were brought in bundles, from a beechwood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they wereintended. Often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. Inever had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attendingthe school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. Mr. White was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community inwhich he lived. He only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. 

CHAPTER II. 

WEST POINT--GRADUATION. 

In the winter of 1838-9 I was attending school at Ripley, only ten milesdistant from Georgetown, but spent the Christmas holidays at home. During this vacation my father received a letter from the HonorableThomas Morris, then United States Senator from Ohio. When he read it hesaid to me, "Ulysses, I believe you are going to receive theappointment. " "What appointment?" I inquired. "To West Point; I haveapplied for it. " "But I won't go, " I said. He said he thought I would, AND I THOUGHT SO TOO, IF HE DID. I really had no objection to going toWest Point, except that I had a very exalted idea of the acquirementsnecessary to get through. I did not believe I possessed them, and couldnot bear the idea of failing. There had been four boys from ourvillage, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from WestPoint, and never a failure of any one appointed from Georgetown, exceptin the case of the one whose place I was to take. He was the son of Dr. Bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. Young Bailey had beenappointed in 1837. Finding before the January examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, andremained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. Before the next examination he was dismissed. Dr. Bailey was a proudand sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that heforbade his return home. There were no telegraphs in those days todisseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the Alleghanies, and butfew east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into otherpeople's private affairs. Consequently it did not become generallyknown that there was a vacancy at West Point from our district until Iwas appointed. I presume Mrs. Bailey confided to my mother the factthat Bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden hisson's return home. 

The Honorable Thomas L. Hamer, one of the ablest men Ohio ever produced, was our member of Congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. He and my father had been members of the same debating society (wherethey were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personalfriends from their early manhood up to a few years before. In politicsthey differed. Hamer was a life-long Democrat, while my father was aWhig. They had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over someact of President Jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, Ithink--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. I knowboth of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been gladat any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make theadvance. Under these circumstances my father would not write to Hamerfor the appointment, but he wrote to Thomas Morris, United StatesSenator from Ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at West Pointfrom our district, and that he would be glad if I could be appointed tofill it. This letter, I presume, was turned over to Mr. Hamer, and, asthere was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. This healedthe breach between the two, never after reopened. 

Besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to WestPoint--that "he thought I would go"--there was another very stronginducement. I had always a great desire to travel. I was already thebest travelled boy in Georgetown, except the sons of one man, JohnWalker, who had emigrated to Texas with his family, and immigrated backas soon as he could get the means to do so. In his short stay in Texashe acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one wouldform going there now. 

I had been east to Wheeling, Virginia, and north to the Western Reserve, in Ohio, west to Louisville, and south to Bourbon County, Kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole countrywithin fifty miles of home. Going to West Point would give me theopportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, Philadelphia and New York. This was enough. When these places werevisited I would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroadcollision, or any other accident happen, by which I might have receiveda temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, toenter the Academy. Nothing of the kind occurred, and I had to face themusic. 

Georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. It is, andhas been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. There wasprobably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity couldhave been afforded, it would not have voted for Jefferson Davis forPresident of the United States, over Mr. Lincoln, or any otherrepresentative of his party; unless it was immediately after some ofJohn Morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through Ohio, spent a fewhours in the village. The rebels helped themselves to whatever theycould find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many orderedmeals to be prepared for them by the families. This was no doubt a farpleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render alike service for Union soldiers. The line between the Rebel and Unionelement in Georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in thechurches. There were churches in that part of Ohio where treason waspreached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to thegovernment, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far moreessential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the Bible. There were men in Georgetown who filled all the requirements formembership in these churches. 

Yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old andyoung, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for theorganization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearingarms--furnished the Union army four general officers and one colonel, West Point graduates, and nine generals and field officers ofVolunteers, that I can think of. Of the graduates from West Point, allhad citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, exceptpossibly General A. V. Kautz, who had remained in the army from hisgraduation. Two of the colonels also entered the service from otherlocalities. The other seven, General McGroierty, Colonels White, Fyffe, Loudon and Marshall, Majors King and Bailey, were all residents ofGeorgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive atthe close, returned there. Major Bailey was the cadet who had precededme at West Point. He was killed in West Virginia, in his firstengagement. As far as I know, every boy who has entered West Point fromthat village since my time has been graduated. 

I took passage on a steamer at Ripley, Ohio, for Pittsburg, about themiddle of May, 1839. Western boats at that day did not make regulartrips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length oftime, for passengers or freight. I have myself been detained two orthree days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. Onthis occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three daysPittsburg was reached. From Pittsburg I chose passage by the canal toHarrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. This gave abetter opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of Western Pennsylvania, and I had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. At thattime the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with thecomfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be morepleasant, when time was not an object. From Harrisburg to Philadelphiathere was a railroad, the first I had ever seen, except the one on whichI had just crossed the summit of the Alleghany Mountains, and over whichcanal boats were transported. In travelling by the road fromHarrisburg, I thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. We travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, andmade the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles anhour. This seemed like annihilating space. I stopped five days inPhiladelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited Girard College (which was then in course of construction), andgot reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. My sojourn in New York was shorter, but long enough to enable me to seethe city very well. I reported at West Point on the 30th or 31st ofMay, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. 

A military life had no charms for me, and I had not the faintest idea ofstaying in the army even if I should be graduated, which I did notexpect. The encampment which preceded the commencement of academicstudies was very wearisome and uninteresting. When the 28th of Augustcame--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--I felt asthough I had been at West Point always, and that if I staid tograduation, I would have to remain always. I did not take hold of mystudies with avidity, in fact I rarely ever read over a lesson thesecond time during my entire cadetship. I could not sit in my roomdoing nothing. There is a fine library connected with the Academy fromwhich cadets can get books to read in their quarters. I devoted moretime to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. Much ofthe time, I am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of atrashy sort. I read all of Bulwer's then published, Cooper's, Marryat's, Scott's, Washington Irving's works, Lever's, and many othersthat I do not now remember. Mathematics was very easy to me, so thatwhen January came, I passed the examination, taking a good standing inthat branch. In French, the only other study at that time in the firstyear's course, my standing was very low. In fact, if the class had beenturned the other end foremost I should have been near head. I neversucceeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any onestudy, during the four years. I came near it in French, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. 

Early in the session of the Congress which met in December, 1839, a billwas discussed abolishing the Military Academy. I saw in this anhonorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with muchinterest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for I wasselfish enough to favor the bill. It never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, I would have been sorry to haveseen it succeed. My idea then was to get through the course, secure adetail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at theAcademy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in somerespectable college; but circumstances always did shape my coursedifferent from my plans. 

At the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extendingfrom the close of the June examination to the 28th of August. This Ienjoyed beyond any other period of my life. My father had sold out hisbusiness in Georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which myday-dreams carried me back as my future home, if I should ever be ableto retire on a competency. He had moved to Bethel, only twelve milesaway, in the adjoining county of Clermont, and had bought a young horsethat had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddleduring my furlough. Most of my time was spent among my oldschool-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at West Point. 

Persons acquainted with the Academy know that the corps of cadets isdivided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. These companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent andcommandant selecting the officers for their military bearing andqualifications. The adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelvelieutenants are taken from the first, or Senior class; the sergeantsfrom the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, orSophomore class. I had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when Ireturned from furlough I found myself the last but one--about mystanding in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. The promotion wastoo much for me. That year my standing in the class--as shown by thenumber of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among thesergeants, and I was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. 

During my first year's encampment General Scott visited West Point, andreviewed the cadets. With his commanding figure, his quite colossalsize and showy uniform, I thought him the finest specimen of manhood myeyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. I could never resemblehim in appearance, but I believe I did have a presentiment for a momentthat some day I should occupy his place on review--although I had nointention then of remaining in the army. My experience in a horse-tradeten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in mymind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimatechum. The next summer Martin Van Buren, then President of the UnitedStates, visited West Point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impressme with the awe which Scott had inspired. In fact I regarded GeneralScott and Captain C. F. Smith, the Commandant of Cadets, as the two menmost to be envied in the nation. I retained a high regard for both upto the day of their death. 

The last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but theystill seemed about five times as long as Ohio years, to me. At last allthe examinations were passed, and the members of the class were calledupon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. I wasanxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, butthere was only one regiment of dragoons in the Army at that time, andattached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were atleast four brevet second lieutenants. I recorded therefore my firstchoice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. Again therewas a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for theclass were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of September. Again I went to Ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; andagain I found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besidesa horse and buggy that I could drive--but I was not in a physicalcondition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. Forsix months before graduation I had had a desperate cough ("Tyler's grip"it was called), and I was very much reduced, weighing but one hundredand seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though I had grown sixinches in stature in the mean time. There was consumption in myfather's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, whichmade my symptoms more alarming. The brother and sister next youngerthan myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and Iseemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. 

Having made alternate choice of two different arms of service withdifferent uniforms, I could not get a uniform suit until notified of myassignment. I left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not tomake the uniform until I notified him whether it was to be for infantryor dragoons. Notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then ittook at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor andtwo more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. This was a timeof great suspense. I was impatient to get on my uniform and see how itlooked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. 

The conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances thathappened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distastefor military uniform that I never recovered from. Soon after thearrival of the suit I donned it, and put off for Cincinnati onhorseback. While I was riding along a street of that city, imaginingthat every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when Ifirst saw General Scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirtyand ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's whatsuspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tubfor weeks, turned to me and cried: "Soldier! will you work? No, sir--ee; I'll sell my shirt first!!" The horse trade and its direconsequences were recalled to mind. 

The other circumstance occurred at home. Opposite our house in Bethelstood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, The stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. Onmy return I found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the colorof my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed downthe outside seams in imitation of mine. The joke was a huge one in themind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but I did notappreciate it so highly. 

During the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent invisiting friends in Georgetown and Cincinnati, and occasionally othertowns in that part of the State. 

CHAPTER III. 

ARMY LIFE--CAUSES OF THE MEXICAN WAR--CAMP SALUBRITY. 

On the 30th of September I reported for duty at Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, with the 4th United States infantry. It was the largest militarypost in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companiesof infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. Colonel Steven Kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commandedthe post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, butwithout vexatious rules or regulations. Every drill and roll-call hadto be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoythemselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, withoutmaking written application to state where they were going for how long, etc. , so that they were back for their next duty. It did seem to me, inmy early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they cameto command posts, made it a study to think what orders they couldpublish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. Inoticed, however, a few years later, when the Mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed ofdisabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. They had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. They were right; butthey did not always give their disease the right name. 

At West Point I had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he wasroom-mate also--F. T. Dent, whose family resided some five miles west ofJefferson Barracks. Two of his unmarried brothers were living at homeat that time, and as I had taken with me from Ohio, my horse, saddle andbridle, I soon found my way out to White Haven, the name of the Dentestate. As I found the family congenial my visits became frequent. There were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a schoolmiss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. There was still anolder daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years atboarding-school in St. Louis, but who, though through school, had notyet returned home. She was spending the winter in the city withconnections, the family of Colonel John O'Fallon, well known in St. Louis. In February she returned to her country home. After that I donot know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did becomemore enjoyable. We would often take walks, or go on horseback to visitthe neighbors, until I became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. Sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of theyounger sisters. If the 4th infantry had remained at Jefferson Barracksit is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued forsome years without my finding out that there was anything serious thematter with me; but in the following May a circumstance occurred whichdeveloped my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. 

The annexation of Texas was at this time the subject of violentdiscussion in Congress, in the press, and by individuals. Theadministration of President Tyler, then in power, was making the moststrenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the greatand absorbing question of the day. During these discussions the greaterpart of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, whichhad been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "DismountedRifles"--was stationed at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, some twenty-five mileseast of the Texas line, to observe the frontier. About the 1st of Maythe 3d infantry was ordered from Jefferson Barracks to Louisiana, to gointo camp in the neighborhood of Fort Jessup, and there await furtherorders. The troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way downthe Mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. About the time they started I obtained a leave of absence for twentydays to go to Ohio to visit my parents. I was obliged to go to St. Louis to take a steamer for Louisville or Cincinnati, or the firststeamer going up the Ohio River to any point. Before I left St. Louisorders were received at Jefferson Barracks for the 4th infantry tofollow the 3d. A messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; butbefore he could reach me I was off, totally ignorant of these events. Aday or two after my arrival at Bethel I received a letter from aclassmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of thecircumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter postmarked St. Louis or Jefferson Barracks, until the expiration of myleave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them alongfor me. His advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent tome. I now discovered that I was exceedingly anxious to get back toJefferson Barracks, and I understood the reason without explanation fromany one. My leave of absence required me to report for duty, atJefferson Barracks, at the end of twenty days. I knew my regiment hadgone up the Red River, but I was not disposed to break the letter of myleave; besides, if I had proceeded to Louisiana direct, I could not havereached there until after the expiration of my leave. Accordingly, atthe end of the twenty days, I reported for duty to Lieutenant Ewell, commanding at Jefferson Barracks, handing him at the same time my leaveof absence. After noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves ofabsence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will reportfor duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order tojoin my regiment in Louisiana. I then asked for a few days' leavebefore starting, which he readily granted. This was the same Ewell whoacquired considerable reputation as a Confederate general during therebellion. He was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the oldarmy, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars--both in my estimation unholy. 

I immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking nobaggage with me, of course. There is an insignificant creek--theGravois--between Jefferson Barracks and the place to which I was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to itsmouth. There is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to runa coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. On thisoccasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, Ifound the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. I looked atit a moment to consider what to do. One of my superstitions had alwaysbeen when I started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turnback, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. I havefrequently started to go to places where I had never been and to which Idid not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, andif I got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, Iwould go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, takethat, and come in by the other side. So I struck into the stream, andin an instant the horse was swimming and I being carried down by thecurrent. I headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. Iwent on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my--future--brother-in-law. We were not of the same size, but the clothesanswered every purpose until I got more of my own. 

Before I returned I mustered up courage to make known, in the mostawkward manner imaginable, the discovery I had made on learning that the4th infantry had been ordered away from Jefferson Barracks. The younglady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had neverlooked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable toher, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account forwhen the regiment left. Before separating it was definitely understoodthat at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let theremoval of a regiment trouble us. This was in May, 1844. It was the22d of August, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. My dutieskept me on the frontier of Louisiana with the Army of Observation duringthe pendency of Annexation; and afterwards I was absent through the warwith Mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by theannexation itself. During that time there was a constant correspondencebetween Miss Dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of fouryears and three months. In May, 1845, I procured a leave for twentydays, visited St. Louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for theunion, which had not been asked for before. 

As already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. Accordingly, soon after I was settled at Jefferson Barracks, I wrote a letter toProfessor Church--Professor of Mathematics at West Point--requesting himto ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to bemade. Assistant professors at West Point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particularbranch of study they are assigned to teach. The answer from ProfessorChurch was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt I should have beendetailed a year or two later but for the Mexican War coming on. Accordingly I laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued ingarrison, with regularity, if not persistency. I reviewed my West Pointcourse of mathematics during the seven months at Jefferson Barracks, andread many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. Tohelp my memory I kept a book in which I would write up, from time totime, my recollections of all I had read since last posting it. Whenthe regiment was ordered away, I being absent at the time, my effectswere packed up by Lieutenant Haslett, of the 4th infantry, and takenalong. I never saw my journal after, nor did I ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. Often since afear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall intothe hands of some malicious person who would publish it. I know itsappearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthfulhorse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. 

The 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at FortJessup, about midway between the Red River and the Sabine. Our ordersrequired us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await furtherinstructions. Those authorized to do so selected a place in the pinewoods, between the old town of Natchitoches and Grand Ecore, about threemiles from each, and on high ground back from the river. The place wasgiven the name of Camp Salubrity, and proved entitled to it. The campwas on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, infront and rear. The springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in thatregion in great multitudes and of great voracity. In the valley theyswarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. Theregiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. 

There was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4thregiments of infantry to the western border of Louisiana was occasionedin any way by the prospective annexation of Texas, but it was generallyunderstood that such was the case. Ostensibly we were intended toprevent filibustering into Texas, but really as a menace to Mexico incase she appeared to contemplate war. Generally the officers of thearmy were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; butnot so all of them. For myself, I was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the mostunjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. It was aninstance of a republic following the bad example of European monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additionalterritory. Texas was originally a state belonging to the republic ofMexico. It extended from the Sabine River on the east to the Rio Grandeon the west, and from the Gulf of Mexico on the south and east to theterritory of the United States and New Mexico--another Mexican state atthat time--on the north and west. An empire in territory, it had but avery sparse population, until settled by Americans who had receivedauthority from Mexico to colonize. These colonists paid very littleattention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into thestate almost from the start, though the constitution of Mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. Soon they set up anindependent government of their own, and war existed, between Texas andMexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities verynearly ceased upon the capture of Santa Anna, the Mexican President. Before long, however, the same people--who with permission of Mexico hadcolonized Texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then secededas soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and theState to the United States, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. Theoccupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of themovement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territoryout of which slave states might be formed for the American Union. 

Even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in whichthe subsequent war was forced upon Mexico cannot. The fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay anyclaim to, as part of the new acquisition. Texas, as an independentState, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between theNueces River and the Rio Grande. Mexico had never recognized theindependence of Texas, and maintained that, even if independent, theState had no claim south of the Nueces. I am aware that a treaty, madeby the Texans with Santa Anna while he was under duress, ceded all theterritory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande--, but he was a prisonerof war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. He knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the Texans, if theyshould ever capture him. The Texans, if they had taken his life, wouldhave only followed the example set by Santa Anna himself a few yearsbefore, when he executed the entire garrison of the Alamo and thevillagers of Goliad. 

In taking military possession of Texas after annexation, the army ofoccupation, under General Taylor, was directed to occupy the disputedterritory. The army did not stop at the Nueces and offer to negotiatefor a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparentlyin order to force Mexico to initiate war. It is to the credit of theAmerican nation, however, that after conquering Mexico, and whilepractically holding the country in our possession, so that we could haveretained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a roundsum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or waslikely to be, to Mexico. To us it was an empire and of incalculablevalue; but it might have been obtained by other means. The Southernrebellion was largely the outgrowth of the Mexican war. Nations, likeindividuals, are punished for their transgressions. We got ourpunishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. 

The 4th infantry went into camp at Salubrity in the month of May, 1844, with instructions, as I have said, to await further orders. At first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. As the summer heat increasedthese were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. The summerwas whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visitingthose stationed at, and near, Fort Jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the Red River, and the citizens of Natchitochesand Grand Ecore. There was much pleasant intercourse between theinhabitants and the officers of the army. I retain very agreeablerecollections of my stay at Camp Salubrity, and of the acquaintancesmade there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers livingwho were there at the time. I can call to mind only two officers of the4th infantry, besides myself, who were at Camp Salubrity with theregiment, who are now alive. 

With a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusualnumber of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, myhopes of being ordered to West Point as instructor vanished. At thetime of which I now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary'sand adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of thearmy, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until theirregimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. Generallylieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staffcorps. If they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrivedat a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they wouldretain. In the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers wereon duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from theregiment. Under these circumstances I gave up everything like a specialcourse of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, andnot very much for that, until the war was over. I kept a horse androde, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirelyrecovered from the cough which I had carried from West Point, and fromall indications of consumption. I have often thought that my life wassaved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by anadministrative act, and a war, both of which I disapproved. 

As summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, thetents. We were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and"further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy thehardship. Men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and ina very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well asofficers. The outlay by the government in accomplishing this wasnothing, or nearly nothing. The winter was spent more agreeably thanthe summer had been. There were occasional parties given by theplanters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the Red River werecalled. The climate was delightful. 

Near the close of the short session of Congress of 1844-5, the bill forthe annexation of Texas to the United States was passed. It reachedPresident Tyler on the 1st of March, 1845, and promptly received hisapproval. When the news reached us we began to look again for "furtherorders. " They did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of May followingI asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purposeof visiting--St. Louis. The object of this visit has been beforestated. 

Early in July the long expected orders were received, but they only tookthe regiment to New Orleans Barracks. We reached there before themiddle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. The yellow fever was raging in New Orleans during the time we remainedthere, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuouswell-observed Sunday. I recollect but one occasion when this observanceseemed to be broken by the inhabitants. One morning about daylight Ihappened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, I looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. I observed acouple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it wasnothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinionwith rifles, at twenty paces. " I do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settledsatisfactorily, and "honorably, " in the estimation of the partiesengaged. I do not believe I ever would have the courage to fight aduel. If any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing tokill him, I would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons withwhich it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separatingus, when I executed him. If I should do another such a wrong as tojustify him in killing me, I would make any reasonable atonement withinmy power, if convinced of the wrong done. I place my opposition toduelling on higher grounds than here stated. No doubt a majority of theduels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of thoseengaged to decline. 

At Camp Salubrity, and when we went to New Orleans Barracks, the 4thinfantry was commanded by Colonel Vose, then an old gentleman who hadnot commanded on drill for a number of years. He was not a man todiscover infirmity in the presence of danger. It now appeared that warwas imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. Accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took commandof the regiment at a battalion drill. Only two or three evolutions hadbeen gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go tohis own quarters, dropped dead. He had not been complaining of illhealth, but no doubt died of heart disease. He was a most estimableman, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. 

CHAPTER IV. 

CORPUS CHRISTI--MEXICAN SMUGGLING--SPANISH RULE IN MEXICO--SUPPLYINGTRANSPORTATION. 

Early in September the regiment left New Orleans for Corpus Christi, nowin Texas. Ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was madein sailing vessels. At that time there was not more than three feet ofwater in the channel at the outlet of Corpus Christi Bay; thedebarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at anisland in the channel called Shell Island, the ships anchoring somemiles out from shore. This made the work slow, and as the army was onlysupplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effectthe landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrisonequipage, etc. There happened to be pleasant weather while this wasgoing on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamerwere on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerabledistance apart. The men and baggage were let down to a point higherthan the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got intothe trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would bedrawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. 

After I had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at ShellIsland, quite six miles from the ship, I had occasion for some reason orother to return on board. While on the Suviah--I think that was thename of our vessel--I heard a tremendous racket at the other end of theship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes, "etc. In a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as hewas, and crying, that his men had mutinied. It was necessary to sustainthe captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailorscharged with mutiny were in irons. I rather felt for a time a wish thatI had not gone aboard just then. As the men charged with mutinysubmitted to being placed in irons without resistance, I always doubtedif they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. 

By the time I was ready to leave the ship again I thought I had learnedenough of the working of the double and single pulley, by whichpassengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamerbelow, and determined to let myself down without assistance. Withoutsaying anything of my intentions to any one, I mounted the railing, andtaking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, I put onefoot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as I did sosome one called out "hold on. " It was too late. I tried to "hold on"with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down sorapidly that my hold broke, and I plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me Inever would stop. When I came to the surface again, being a fairswimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, I swam around until abucket was let down for me, and I was drawn up without a scratch orinjury. I do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized withme in the least when they found me uninjured. I rather enjoyed the jokemyself. The captain of the Suviah died of his disease a few months later, and I believe before the mutineers were tried. I hope they got clear, because, as before stated, I always thought the mutiny was all in thebrain of a very weak and sick man. 

After reaching shore, or Shell Island, the labor of getting to CorpusChristi was slow and tedious. There was, if my memory serves me, butone small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantryarrived. Others were procured later. The distance from Shell Island toCorpus Christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. The channel to thebay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be draggedover the bottom when loaded. Not more than one trip a day could beeffected. Later this was remedied, by deepening the channel andincreasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. 

Corpus Christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed bythe entrance of the Nueces River into tide-water, and is on the westbank of that bay. At the time of its first occupancy by United Statestroops there was a small Mexican hamlet there, containing probably lessthan one hundred souls. There was, in addition, a small American tradingpost, at which goods were sold to Mexican smugglers. All goods were putup in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable forloading on pack mules. Two of these packages made a load for anordinary Mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. The bulk of thetrade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. TheMexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer inexchange except silver. The trade in tobacco was enormous, consideringthe population to be supplied. Almost every Mexican above the age often years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. Nearly everyMexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in thehands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. The cigarettes weremade by the smokers as they used them. 

Up to the time of which I write, and for years afterwards--I think untilthe administration of President Juarez--the cultivation, manufacture andsale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk ofthe revenue collected from internal sources. The price was enormouslyhigh, and made successful smuggling very profitable. The difficulty ofobtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. I know from my own experience that when I was atWest Point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, andthe mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority ofthe cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. Ifailed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but themajority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. 

Under Spanish rule Mexico was prohibited from producing anything thatthe mother-country could supply. This rule excluded the cultivation ofthe grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climatewere well adapted. The country was governed for "revenue only;" andtobacco, which cannot be raised in Spain, but is indigenous to Mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object ofgovernment. The native population had been in the habit of using "theweed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. Bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread morerapidly and universally than good ones, and the Spanish colonistsadopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. Spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in theseplaces farmed out the privilege at a very high price. The tobacco whenraised could only be sold to the government, and the price to theconsumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and thecapacity of the people to pay. 

All laws for the government of the country were enacted in Spain, andthe officers for their execution were appointed by the Crown, and sentout to the New El Dorado. The Mexicans had been brought up ignorant ofhow to legislate or how to rule. When they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world thatthey should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. The onlychange was, that Mexico became her own executor of the laws and therecipient of the revenues. The tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenueunder the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, ofthe obnoxious imposts to be repealed. Now, the citizens are allowed tocultivate any crops the soil will yield. Tobacco is cheap, and everyquality can be produced. Its use is by no means so general as when Ifirst visited the country. 

Gradually the "Army of Occupation" assembled at Corpus Christi. When itwas all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment ofdragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry--the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting asinfantry--not more than three thousand men in all. General ZacharyTaylor commanded the whole. There were troops enough in one body toestablish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers forall they were capable of in case of battle. The rank and file werecomposed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for sevendollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to theaverage volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, andalso to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the Union. The men engaged in the Mexican war were brave, and the officers of theregular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. A more efficient army for its number and armament, I do not believe everfought a battle than the one commanded by General Taylor in his firsttwo engagements on Mexican--or Texan soil. 

The presence of United States troops on the edge of the disputedterritory furthest from the Mexican settlements, was not sufficient toprovoke hostilities. We were sent to provoke a fight, but it wasessential that Mexico should commence it. It was very doubtful whetherCongress would declare war; but if Mexico should attack our troops, theExecutive could announce, "Whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc. , "and prosecute the contest with vigor. Once initiated there were but fewpublic men who would have the courage to oppose it. Experience provesthat the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, nomatter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life orhistory. Better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine, " than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. Thehistory of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared withthat of the Northern man who aided him by conspiring against hisgovernment while protected by it. The most favorable posthumous historythe stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. 

Mexico showing no willingness to come to the Nueces to drive theinvaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" toapproach to within a convenient distance to be struck. Accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the Rio Grande, to apoint near Matamoras. It was desirable to occupy a position near thelargest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutelyinvading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. 

The distance from Corpus Christi to Matamoras is about one hundred andfifty miles. The country does not abound in fresh water, and the lengthof the marches had to be regulated by the distance between watersupplies. Besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filledduring the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, whotravelled constantly between Corpus Christi and the Rio Grande, and someby the buffalo. There was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between Corpus Christiand Matamoras. It was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon trainsufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain forthe artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, wherethey had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. Thearmy was but indifferently supplied with transportation. Wagons andharness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horsescould not so readily be brought. The American traders and Mexicansmugglers came to the relief. Contracts were made for mules at fromeight to eleven dollars each. The smugglers furnished the animals, andtook their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. I doubtwhether the Mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars perhead for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paidanything but their own time in procuring them. Such is trade; such iswar. The government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulatedprice. 

Between the Rio Grande and the Nueces there was at that time a largeband of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band ofbuffalo roaming further north was before its rapid exterminationcommenced. The Mexicans used to capture these in large numbers andbring them into the American settlements and sell them. A picked animalcould be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken atwholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. Some ofthese were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. The horses were generally very strong, formed much like the Normanhorse, and with very heavy manes and tails. A number of officerssupplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as usefulservice as the northern animal in fact they were much better whengrazing was the only means of supplying forage. 

There was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in thenecessary preparations for a move. In the meantime the army was engagedin all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. Twice, that I remember, small trains were sent from Corpus Christi, withcavalry escorts, to San Antonio and Austin, with paymasters and funds topay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. GeneralTaylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. Iaccompanied one of them in December, 1845. The distance from CorpusChristi to San Antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. Now that roads exist it is probably less. From San Antonio to Austin wecomputed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latterplace back to Corpus Christi at over two hundred miles. I know thedistance now from San Antonio to Austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. 

There was not at the time an individual living between Corpus Christiand San Antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering Mexican settlements along the SanAntonio River. The people in at least one of these hamlets livedunderground for protection against the Indians. The country abounded ingame, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys alongthe streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. On the Nueces, about twenty-five miles up from Corpus Christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called San Patricio, but the inhabitants had allbeen massacred by the Indians, or driven away. 

San Antonio was about equally divided in population between Americansand Mexicans. From there to Austin there was not a single residenceexcept at New Braunfels, on the Guadalupe River. At that point was asettlement of Germans who had only that year come into the State. Atall events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers wouldhastily construct for temporary occupation. From Austin to CorpusChristi there was only a small settlement at Bastrop, with a few farmsalong the Colorado River; but after leaving that, there were nosettlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at theold town of Goliad. Some of the houses were still standing. Goliad hadbeen quite a village for the period and region, but some years beforethere had been a Mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had beenkilled or driven away. This, with the massacre of the prisoners in theAlamo, San Antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men inall, furnished the strongest justification the Texans had for carryingon the war with so much cruelty. In fact, from that time until theMexican war, the hostilities between Texans and Mexicans was so greatthat neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be insuperior numbers or possessed of superior arms. The man we found livingthere seemed like an old friend; he had come from near Fort Jessup, Louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2ddragoons had known him and his family. He had emigrated in advance ofhis family to build up a home for them. 

CHAPTER V. 

TRIP TO AUSTIN--PROMOTION TO FULL SECOND LIEUTENANT--ARMY OF OCCUPATION. 

When our party left Corpus Christi it was quite large, including thecavalry escort, Paymaster, Major Dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, exceptLieutenant Benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of Mexico--Lieutenant, now General, Augur, and myself, concluded to spend theirallotted time at San Antonio and return from there. We were all to beback at Corpus Christi by the end of the month. The paymaster wasdetained in Austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would haveexceeded our leave. We concluded, therefore, to start back at once withthe animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for theirfood, it was a good six days' journey. We had to sleep on the prairieevery night, except at Goliad, and possibly one night on the Colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, andprepared ourselves. The journey was hazardous on account of Indians, and there were white men in Texas whom I would not have cared to meet ina secluded place. Lieutenant Augur was taken seriously sick before wereached Goliad and at a distance from any habitation. To add to thecomplication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured fromthe band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity athis capture--gave out. It was absolutely necessary to get for ward toGoliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. By dint of patienceand exceedingly slow movements, Goliad was at last reached, and ashelter and bed secured for our patient. We remained over a day, hopingthat Augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. He didnot, however, and knowing that Major Dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with ourLouisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant untilthus relieved, and went on. 

I had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone insearch of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. On this tripthere was no minute of time while travelling between San Patricio andthe settlements on the San Antonio River, from San Antonio to Austin, and again from the Colorado River back to San Patricio, when deer orantelope could not be seen in great numbers. Each officer carried ashot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go outand soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entirecamp. I, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun;except, being detained over a day at Goliad, Benjamin and I concluded togo down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it thepecan--and bring back a few turkeys. We had scarcely reached the edgeof the timber when I heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in aninstant I saw two or three turkeys flying away. These were soonfollowed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirtyhad left from just over my head. All this time I stood watching theturkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and neveronce thought of levelling it at the birds. When I had time to reflectupon the matter, I came to the conclusion that as a sportsman I was afailure, and went back to the house. Benjamin remained out, and got asmany turkeys as he wanted to carry back. 

After the second night at Goliad, Benjamin and I started to make theremainder of the journey alone. We reached Corpus Christi just in timeto avoid "absence without leave. " We met no one not even an Indian--during the remainder of our journey, except at San Patricio. A newsettlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, inducedpossibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while theproximity of troops gave protection against the Indians. On the eveningof the first day out from Goliad we heard the most unearthly howling ofwolves, directly in our front. The prairie grass was tall and we couldnot see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. To myear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour ourparty, horses and all, at a single meal. The part of Ohio that I hailedfrom was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long beforeI left. Benjamin was from Indiana, still less populated, where the wolfyet roamed over the prairies. He understood the nature of the animaland the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited numberof them. He kept on towards the noise, unmoved. I followed in histrail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. I have no doubt that if Benjamin had proposed returning to Goliad, Iwould not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that itwas very hard-hearted in us to leave Augur sick there in the firstplace; but Benjamin did not propose turning back. When he did speak itwas to ask: "Grant, how many wolves do you think there are in thatpack?" Knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought I wouldover-estimate the number, I determined to show my acquaintance with theanimal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, andanswered: "Oh, about twenty, " very indifferently. He smiled and rodeon. In a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. Therewere just TWO of them. Seated upon their haunches, with their mouthsclose together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for thepast ten minutes. I have often thought of this incident since when Ihave heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had desertedtheir associates. There are always more of them before they arecounted. 

A week or two before leaving Corpus Christi on this trip, I had beenpromoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to fullsecond-lieutenant, 7th infantry. Frank Gardner, (*1) of the 7th, waspromoted to the 4th in the same orders. We immediately made applicationto be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. On myreturn, I found that our application had been approved at Washington. While in the 7th infantry I was in the company of Captain Holmes, afterwards a Lieutenant-general in the Confederate army. I never came incontact with him in the war of the Rebellion, nor did he render any veryconspicuous service in his high rank. My transfer carried me to thecompany of Captain McCall, who resigned from the army after the Mexicanwar and settled in Philadelphia. He was prompt, however, to volunteerwhen the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-generalin the Union army. I was not fortunate enough to meet him after heresigned. In the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier andgentleman. Our relations were always most pleasant. 

The preparations at Corpus Christi for an advance progressed as rapidlyin the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had beenthere. The principal business consisted in securing mules, and gettingthem broken to harness. The process was slow but amusing. The animalssold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. Usually anumber would be brought in by a company of Mexicans, partners in thedelivery. The mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. The Mexicans, --who were allexperienced in throwing the lasso, --would go into the corral onhorseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. Soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter thecorral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter withbranding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. A lasso was thenthrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to thelength of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. Whilehe was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown byanother Mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. This would bringthe mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsterswhile the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "U. S. "Ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tightenaround the throat if pulled. With a man on each side holding theseropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed torise. With more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picketrope outside and fastened there. The delivery of that mule was thencomplete. This process was gone through with every mule and wild horsewith the army of occupation. 

The method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. It isa well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specificpurposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as arule, subdued to the same uses. At that time in Northern Mexico themule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used exceptfor the saddle or pack. At all events the Corpus Christi mule resistedthe new use to which he was being put. The treatment he was subjectedto in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. 

The soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our largecities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it isnot probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competentteamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed thatmany had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever toharness. Numbers together can accomplish what twice their number actingindividually could not perform. Five mules were allotted to each wagon. A teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly thesame color and general appearance for his team. With a full corps ofassistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mulestogether. In two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. Two ropes would be put about theneck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked iftoo unruly. They were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched tothe wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. Two men remainedon either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and oneman retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. All being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. Thefirst motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backsbowed, hind feet extended to the rear. After repeating this movement afew times the leaders would start to run. This would bring thebreeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemedto regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resistby taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. In time allwere broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, butthere never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a Mexicanmule get entirely loose. Their drivers were all teamsters by the timethey got through. 

I recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under thesaddle, not only for some time at Corpus Christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite Matamoras, then to Camargo, wherehe got loose from his fastenings during the night. He did not run awayat first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming upsometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamsterhe always got out of the way. At last, growing tired of the constanteffort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. Nothing short of aMexican with his lasso could have caught him. Regulations would nothave warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lassoto catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule, " ona certificate that he had run away without any fault of thequartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase ofanother to take his place. I am a competent witness, for I wasregimental quartermaster at the time. 

While at Corpus Christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kepthorses. The animals cost but little in the first instance, and whenpicketed they would get their living without any cost. I had three notlong before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all atone time. A colored boy who gave them all the attention they got--besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate andfellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars permonth, was riding one to water and leading the other two. The ledhorses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. They never wereheard of afterwards. Shortly after that some one told Captain Bliss, General Taylor's Adjutant-General, of my misfortune. "Yes; I heardGrant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day, " hereplied. That was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when I gotthem and cost nearly twenty dollars. I never suspected the colored boyof malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had notescaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then inprospect. 

CHAPTER VI. 

ADVANCE OF THE ARMY--CROSSING THE COLORADO--THE RIO GRANDE. 

At last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for theadvance to begin on the 8th of March. General Taylor had an army of notmore than three thousand men. One battery, the siege guns and all theconvalescent troops were sent on by water to Brazos Santiago, at themouth of the Rio Grande. A guard was left back at Corpus Christi tolook after public property and to take care of those who were too sickto be removed. The remainder of the army, probably not more than twentyfive hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalryindependent. Colonel Twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and abattery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. He was followed by thethree infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. Thus the rear brigade did not move from Corpus Christi until the 11th ofMarch. In view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day overnarrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in ourlate war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousandmen should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day'smarch. 

General Taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, I doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as theaggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than hisinstructions from Washington demanded. His orders to the troopsenjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons andthe payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use ofthe army. 

All officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ridethem on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. As already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth ofhorses" but a short time before I determined not to get another, but tomake the journey on foot. My company commander, Captain McCall, had twogood American horses, of considerably more value in that country, wherenative horses were cheap, than they were in the States. He used onehimself and wanted the other for his servant. He was quite anxious toknow whether I did not intend to get me another horse before the marchbegan. I told him No; I belonged to a foot regiment. I did notunderstand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we wereabout to start, he said: "There, Grant, is a horse for you. " I foundthat he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long marchwhile his lieutenant went a-foot. He had found a mustang, a three-yearold colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of thecolored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. It wasprobably the only horse at Corpus Christi that could have been purchasedjust then for any reasonable price. Five dollars, sixty-six andtwo-thirds per cent. Advance, induced the owner to part with themustang. I was sorry to take him, because I really felt that, belongingto a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. But I saw theCaptain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for thetrip. The day we started was the first time the horse had ever beenunder saddle. I had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us asto which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. At no time during the day could I choose exactly the part of the columnI would march with; but after that, I had as tractable a horse as anywith the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. He neverate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pickwithin the length of his picket rope. 

A few days out from Corpus Christi, the immense herd of wild horses thatranged at that time between the Nueces and the Rio Grande was seendirectly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. It was the very band from which the horse I was riding had been capturedbut a few weeks before. The column was halted for a rest, and a numberof officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the rightto see the extent of the herd. The country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth'scurvature. As far as the eye could reach to our right, the herdextended. To the left, it extended equally. There was no estimating thenumber of animals in it; I have no idea that they could all have beencorralled in the State of Rhode Island, or Delaware, at one time. Ifthey had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage wouldhave given out the first day. People who saw the Southern herd ofbuffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of theTexas band of wild horses in 1846. 

At the point where the army struck the Little Colorado River, the streamwas quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. The water wasbrackish and the banks were fringed with timber. Here the whole armyconcentrated before attempting to cross. The army was not accompanied bya pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed inbridge building. To add to the embarrassment of the situation, the armywas here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. Buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the"assembly, " and other military calls. Like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient todevour General Taylor and his army. There were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the"invader. " A few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam thestream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. I do not remember that asingle shot was fired. 

The troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepestpart. Teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of thewagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side ofthe leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules inrear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. The bankdown to the water was steep on both sides. A rope long enough to crossthe river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, andmen behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mulesinto the water. This latter rope also served the purpose of bringingthe end of the forward one back, to be used over again. The water wasdeep enough for a short distance to swim the little Mexican mules whichthe army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled throughso fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was leftthem to show their obstinacy. In this manner the artillery andtransportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the Colorado River. 

About the middle of the month of March the advance of the army reachedthe Rio Grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, oppositethe city of Matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at thelower end of the town. There was not at that time a single habitationfrom Corpus Christi until the Rio Grande was reached. 

The work of fortifying was commenced at once. The fort was laid out bythe engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under thesupervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining generaldirections. The Mexicans now became so incensed at our near approachthat some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafefor small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. Theycaptured two companies of dragoons, commanded by Captains Thornton andHardee. The latter figured as a general in the late war, on theConfederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by botharmies. Lieutenant Theodric Porter, of the 4th infantry, was killedwhile out with a small detachment; and Major Cross, the assistantquartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. 

There was no base of supplies nearer than Point Isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the Rio Grande and twenty-five miles away. Theenemy, if the Mexicans could be called such at this time when no war hadbeen declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe tosend a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. I have already said that General Taylor's whole command on the RioGrande numbered less than three thousand men. He had, however, a fewmore troops at Point Isabel or Brazos Santiago. The supplies broughtfrom Corpus Christi in wagons were running short. Work was thereforepushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number oftroops to hold the fort. All the men who could be employed, were keptat work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. With all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew soshort that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. Bythe latter part of April the work was in a partially defensiblecondition, and the 7th infantry, Major Jacob Brown commanding, wasmarched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. All thesupplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of thearmy to Point Isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march wascommenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being takenwith the army. Early on the second day after starting the force reachedits destination, without opposition from the Mexicans. There was somedelay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the openroadstead. 

CHAPTER VII. 

THE MEXICAN WAR--THE BATTLE OF PALO ALTO--THE BATTLE OF RESACA DE LAPALMA--ARMY OF INVASION--GENERAL TAYLOR--MOVEMENT ON CAMARGO. 

While General Taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the littlegarrison up the river was besieged. As we lay in our tents upon thesea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the Rio Grande could bedistinctly heard. 

The war had begun. 

There were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, andinformation from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. WhatGeneral Taylor's feelings were during this suspense I do not know; butfor myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gunbefore, I felt sorry that I had enlisted. A great many men, when theysmell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. When they say sothemselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they areas anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approachdanger they become more subdued. This rule is not universal, for I haveknown a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was noenemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. But the number of such men is small. 

On the 7th of May the wagons were all loaded and General Taylor startedon his return, with his army reinforced at Point Isabel, but still lessthan three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the Rio Grande. The road from Point Isabel to Matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the RioGrande is reached. This river, like the Mississippi, flows through arich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards allpoints of the compass at times within a few miles. Formerly the riverran by Resaca de la Palma, some four or five miles east of the presentchannel. The old bed of the river at Resaca had become filled atplaces, leaving a succession of little lakes. The timber that hadformerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, wasstill standing. This timber was struck six or eight miles out from thebesieged garrison, at a point known as Palo Alto--"Tall trees" or"woods. "

Early in the forenoon of the 8th of May as Palo Alto was approached, anarmy, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up inline of battle just in front of the timber. Their bayonets andspearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. The force was composedlargely of cavalry armed with lances. Where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stockwas pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as adarning-needle. General Taylor halted his army before the head of columncame in range of the artillery of the Mexicans. He then formed a lineof battle, facing the enemy. His artillery, two batteries and twoeighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position atintervals along the line. A battalion was thrown to the rear, commandedby Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, of the artillery, as reserves. Thesepreparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each companyto stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, tofill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respectivecompanies. When the men were all back in their places in line, thecommand to advance was given. As I looked down that long line of aboutthree thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, I thought what a fearful responsibility General Taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. The Mexicansimmediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then withinfantry. At first their shots did not reach us, and the advance wascontinued. As we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going throughthe ranks. They hurt no one, however, during this advance, because theywould strike the ground long before they reached our line, andricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see themand open ranks and let them pass. When we got to a point where theartillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battleopened on both sides. 

The infantry under General Taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, andpaper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. At thedistance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day withoutyour finding it out. The artillery was generally six-pounder brass gunsthrowing only solid shot; but General Taylor had with him three or fourtwelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-poundersbefore spoken of, that had a long range. This made a powerful armament. The Mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry wasconcerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. We had greatlythe advantage in this arm. 

The artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and openedfire. The infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching theeffect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to stepout of their way. It could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and thehowitzers did a great deal of execution. On our side there was littleor no loss while we occupied this position. During the battle MajorRinggold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortallywounded, and Lieutenant Luther, also of the artillery, was struck. During the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it becameevident that the Mexicans were falling back. We again advanced, andoccupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by theenemy at the beginning. In this last move there was a brisk fire uponour troops, and some execution was done. One cannon-ball passed throughour ranks, not far from me. It took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of Captain Page of my regiment, while the splintersfrom the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knockeddown two or three others, including one officer, Lieutenant Wallen, --hurting them more or less. Our casualties for the day were nine killedand forty-seven wounded. 

At the break of day on the 9th, the army under Taylor was ready to renewthe battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left ourfront during the night. The chaparral before us was impenetrable exceptwhere there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spotsof small dimensions. A body of men penetrating it might easily beambushed. It was better to have a few men caught in this way than thewhole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river shouldbe relieved. To get to them the chaparral had to be passed. Thus Iassume General Taylor reasoned. He halted the army not far in advanceof the ground occupied by the Mexicans the day before, and selectedCaptain C. F. Smith, of the artillery, and Captain McCall, of mycompany, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find wherethe enemy had gone. This left me in command of the company, an honorand responsibility I thought very great. 

Smith and McCall found no obstruction in the way of their advance untilthey came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at Resaca. The Mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the oppositebank. This position they had strengthened a little by throwing up deadtrees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover theapproaches and open places. Smith and McCall deployed on each side ofthe road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. Word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at oncecommenced. As we came up we were deployed in like manner. I was withthe right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever apenetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot thatwould carry me towards the enemy. At last I got pretty close up withoutknowing it. The balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cuttingthe limbs of the chaparral right and left. We could not see the enemy, so I ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to beenforced. We kept our position until it became evident that the enemywere not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground toadvance upon. 

By this time some progress had been made on our left. A section ofartillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had beentaken. The Mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many ofthem had, no doubt, left early. I at last found a clear spaceseparating two ponds. There seemed to be a few men in front and Icharged upon them with my company. 

There was no resistance, and we captured a Mexican colonel, who had beenwounded, and a few men. Just as I was sending them to the rear with aguard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing backone of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where Iwas. The ground had been charged over before. My exploit was equal tothat of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one ofthe enemy. When asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied:"Some one had done that before. " This left no doubt in my mind but thatthe battle of Resaca de la Palma would have been won, just as it was, ifI had not been there. There was no further resistance. The evening ofthe 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the Fort, and thegarrison was relieved. The siege had lasted a number of days, but thecasualties were few in number. Major Jacob Brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort wasnamed. Since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on theground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. 

The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma seemed to us engaged, aspretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of theirmagnitude until they were fought over in the North by the Press and thereports came back to us. At the same time, or about the same time, welearned that war existed between the United States and Mexico, by theacts of the latter country. On learning this fact General Taylortransferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, andMatamoras was occupied. We then became the "Army of Invasion. "

Up to this time Taylor had none but regular troops in his command; butnow that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one yearcommenced arriving. The army remained at Matamoras until sufficientlyreinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. General Taylor wasnot an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, butwas inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. He felthis responsibility as going no further. If he had thought that he wassent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he wouldprobably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them todetermine what should be done. If the judgment was against him he wouldhave gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand withoutparading his grievance before the public. No soldier could face eitherdanger or responsibility more calmly than he. These are qualities morerarely found than genius or physical courage. 

General Taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform orretinue. In dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything inthe field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but hewas known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. I cancall to mind only one instance when I saw him in uniform, and one otherwhen I heard of his wearing it, On both occasions he was unfortunate. The first was at Corpus Christi. He had concluded to review his armybefore starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. ColonelTwiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given thecommand of the review. Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General Worth, afar different soldier from Taylor in the use of the uniform, was next toTwiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rankwhen the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had tocommand. Worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to Twiggsuntil the question was settled by the highest authority. This broke upthe review, and the question was referred to Washington for finaldecision. 

General Taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. He was assigned to duty, however, bythe President, with the rank which his brevet gave him. Worth was notso assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under thearmy regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. The question was submitted to Washington, and no response was receiveduntil after the army had reached the Rio Grande. It was decided againstGeneral Worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. This kepthim out of the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma. Either theresignation was not accepted, or General Worth withdrew it before actionhad been taken. At all events he returned to the army in time tocommand his division in the battle of Monterey, and served with it tothe end of the war. 

The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have donned hisuniform, was in order to receive a visit from the Flag Officer of thenaval squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande. While the army was onthat river the Flag Officer sent word that he would call on the Generalto pay his respects on a certain day. General Taylor, knowing thatnaval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on alloccasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive hisguest in the same style. His uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. The Flag Officer, knowing GeneralTaylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that itwould be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian'sdress, left off his uniform for this occasion. The meeting was said tohave been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principallyapologetic. 

The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at Matamoras, while we werewaiting for volunteers. It is probable that all the most importantpeople of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before wegot there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparentlyexisted. It was the policy of the Commanding General to allow nopillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual usewithout satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was affordedthan the people had ever known before. 

Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras was an Ohio regiment, ofwhich Thomas L. Hamer, the Member of Congress who had given me myappointment to West Point, was major. He told me then that he couldhave had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed abrigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. Ihave said before that Hamer was one of the ablest men Ohio everproduced. At that time he was in the prime of life, being less thanfifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising longlife. But he was taken sick before Monterey, and died within a fewdays. I have always believed that had his life been spared, he wouldhave been President of the United States during the term filled byPresident Pierce. Had Hamer filled that office his partiality for mewas such, there is but little doubt I should have been appointed to oneof the staff corps of the army--the Pay Department probably--and wouldtherefore now be preparing to retire. Neither of these speculations isunreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men controltheir own destiny. 

Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of August the movementcommenced from Matamoras to Camargo, the head of navigation on the RioGrande. The line of the Rio Grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade Mexico from the North. In that casethe most natural route to take was the one which General Taylorselected. It entered a pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains, at Monterey, through which the main road runs to the City of Mexico. Monterey itselfwas a good point to hold, even if the line of the Rio Grande covered allthe territory we desired to occupy at that time. It is built on a plaintwo thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and thesituation healthy. 

On the 19th of August the army started for Monterey, leaving a smallgarrison at Matamoras. The troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged, were moved up the river toCamargo on steamers. As there were but two or three of these, the boatshad to make a number of trips before the last of the troops wereup. Those who marched did so by the south side of the river. Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigadecommander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. One day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in themonth of August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly forNorthern men. The order of marching was changed and night marches weresubstituted with the best results. 

When Camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the Mexicanhamlet. I was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to theregiment. The teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transportall supplies from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande over the levelprairies of Texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of thereinforced army in a mountainous country. To obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with Mexicans to pack and drive them. I hadcharge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the packtrain to supplement them. There were not men enough in the army tomanage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned how. Asit was the difficulty was great enough. The troops would take up theirmarch at an early hour each day. After they had started, the tents andcooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could belashed to the backs of the mules. Sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles andmess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. Ittook several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the timewe were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standingso long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would start torun, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; otherswould lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get onthe top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part oftheir loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a saplingwhile they would take the other. I am not aware of ever having used aprofane expletive in my life; but I would have the charity to excusethose who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of Mexicanpack mules at the time. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY--SURRENDEROF THE CITY. 

The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September. The armywas divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day'smarch. The advance reached Cerralvo in four days and halted for theremainder of the troops to come up. By the 13th the rear-guard hadarrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed asbefore, a day separating the divisions. The forward division haltedagain at Marin, twenty-four miles from Monterey. Both this place andCerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seenrunning and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when thepeople returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which musthave given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos--"the Yankees. " FromMarin the movement was in mass. On the 19th General Taylor, with isarmy, was encamped at Walnut Springs, within three miles of Monterey. 

The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and isbacked by a range of hills of moderate elevation. To the north, betweenthe city and Walnut Springs, stretches an extensive plain. On thisplain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood astrong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of"Black Fort. " Its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the fullextent of their range. There were two detached spurs of hills ormountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were alsofortified. On one of these stood the Bishop's Palace. The road toSaltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire ofthe guns from these heights. The lower or eastern end was defended bytwo or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. To the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of thatthe range of foot-hills. The plaza in the centre of the city was thecitadel, properly speaking. All the streets leading from it were sweptby artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. Thehouse-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications bythe use of sand-bags for parapets. Such were the defences of Montereyin September, 1847. General Ampudia, with a force of certainly tenthousand men, was in command. 

General Taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, inthree divisions, under Generals Butler, Twiggs and Worth. The troopswent into camp at Walnut Springs, while the engineer officers, underMajor Mansfield--a General in the late war--commenced theirreconnoissance. Major Mansfield found that it would be practicable toget troops around, out of range of the Black Fort and the works on thedetached hills to the north-west of the city, to the Saltillo road. With this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off fromreceiving further supplies, if not from all communication with theinterior. General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, wasgiven the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo road, and ofcarrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. Hestarted on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. The divisionsunder Generals Butler and Twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east andnorth sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of themovement under General Worth. Worth's was regarded as the main attack onMonterey, and all other operations were in support of it. His marchthis day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavilyabout the Bishop's Palace and the other outside fortifications on theirleft. General Worth reached a defensible position just out of range ofthe enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouackedfor the night. The engineer officers with him--Captain Sanders andLieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the commander of the victoriousNational army at the battle of Gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to theSaltillo road under cover of night. 

During the night of the 20th General Taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon Black Fort. A naturaldepression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in itfrom the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established onthe crest nearest the enemy. The 4th infantry, then consisting of butsix reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists whilethey were intrenching themselves and their guns. I was regimentalquartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of campand the public property at Walnut Springs. It was supposed that theregiment would return to its camp in the morning. 

The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the workperformed without attracting the attention of the enemy. At daylightthe next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, whatseemed to me at that day, great fury. My curiosity got the better of myjudgment, and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what wasgoing on. I had been there but a short time when an order to charge wasgiven, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where I had beenordered to stay--I charged with the regiment As soon as the troops wereout of the depression they came under the fire of Black Fort. As theyadvanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. About one-third of the men engaged inthe charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. Weretreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward andperpendicular to the direct road running into the city from WalnutSprings. I was, I believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in thecharge who was on horseback. When we got to a lace of safety theregiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. Theadjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in robusthealth, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in thecharge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish thathe could be mounted also. I offered him my horse and he accepted theoffer. A few minutes later I saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. I ran to him, took his horse and was back withthe regiment in a few minutes. In a short time we were off again; andthe next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect ofbeing in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lowerbatteries. The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was killed, and Iwas designated to act in his place. 

This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. We belonged to thebrigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, and he had receivedorders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if hecould without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion infavor of Worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intendedshould be decisive. By a movement by the left flank Garland could haveled his men beyond the range of the fire from Black Fort and advancedtowards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire ascould be expected. There was no undue loss of life in reaching thelower end of Monterey, except that sustained by Garland's command. 

Meanwhile Quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, hadreached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of thehouses without much loss. Colonel Garland's brigade also arrived at thesuburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reachedhouse-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering theapproaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedilycaptured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. Anentrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the housesprotected our troops so long as they were inactive. On the west GeneralWorth had reached the Saltillo road after some fighting but withoutheavy loss. He turned from his new position and captured the forts onboth heights in that quarter. This gave him possession of the upper orwest end of Monterey. Troops from both Twiggs's and Butler's divisionswere in possession of the east end of the town, but the Black Fort tothe north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in thepossession of the enemy. Our camps at Walnut Springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. A regiment of Kentuckyvolunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against Black Fort. Practically Monterey was invested. 

There was nothing done on the 22d by the United States troops; but theenemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Black Fort and the batteriesstill in their possession at the east end of the city. During the nightthey evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we heldundisputed possession of the east end of Monterey. 

Twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well coveredfrom the fire of the enemy. But the streets leading to the plaza--allSpanish or Spanish-American towns have near their centres a squarecalled a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. Thehouses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about theplaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protectedfrom our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. All advances into the citywere thus attended with much danger. While moving along streets whichdid not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, andfrom the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these avolley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariablyencountered. The 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advancenearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. The loss of the 3dinfantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. There wereonly five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officerspresent, and five of these officers were killed. When within a squareof the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to ahalt. Placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, themen would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboringhouses. The exposure of a single head would bring a volley from oursoldiers. 

We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that ourammunition was growing low. I volunteered to go back (*2) to the pointwe had started from, report our position to General Twiggs, and ask forammunition to be forwarded. We were at this time occupying ground offfrom the street, in rear of the houses. My ride back was an exposedone. Before starting I adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthestfrom the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of thesaddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I started at fullrun. It was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, butthese I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I was past andunder cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. I gotout safely without a scratch. 

At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking in front of a house, andstopped to inquire what he was doing there. Finding that the house wasfull of wounded American officers and soldiers, I dismounted and wentin. I found there Captain Williams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded inthe head, probably fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly woundedhis bowels protruding from his wound. There were quite a number ofsoldiers also. Promising them to report their situation, I left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon withthe troops at the east end. Before ammunition could be collected, thetwo regiments I had been with were seen returning, running the samegauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but withcomparatively little loss. The movement was countermanded and thetroops were withdrawn. The poor wounded officers and men I had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. 

While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a smalldivision of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the oppositeend of the city. He resorted to a better expedient for getting to theplaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. Instead of moving by theopen streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways fromone to another. Without much loss of life, he got so near the plazaduring the night that before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. This stoppedall further hostilities. The terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses andpersonal property with them. 

My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of Montereymarching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling wasexperienced by most of our army who witnessed it. Many of the prisonerswere cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable littlehalf-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry theirriders out of town. The men looked in but little better condition. Ithought how little interest the men before me had in the results of thewar, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about. "

After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp life wasled until midwinter. As had been the case on the Rio Grande, the peoplewho remained at their homes fraternized with the "Yankees" in thepleasantest manner. In fact, under the humane policy of our commander, I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did notregret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. Propertyand person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for allthe products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. The educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they werein the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very smallpercentage of the whole population. 

CHAPTER IX. 

POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE ANDCAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ. 

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration conductingit desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott was at thehead of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professionalcapacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almostindisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk, orMarcy, his Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig and the administrationwas democratic. General Scott was also known to have politicalaspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civilpositions as military victories. It would not do therefore to give himcommand of the "army of conquest. " The plans submitted by Scott for acampaign in Mexico were disapproved by the administration, and hereplied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May, 1846. Fourdays later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico. General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to takethe field. Colonel Zachary Taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--wastherefore left in command. He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed toentertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall ofMonterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig papersat home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for thePresidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growingpopularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where allhis battles had been victories: the design would have been tootransparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico inchief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan:that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country. It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him toslaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet itwas hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to securethe prize. 

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. Itwas engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successfulissue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capableofficers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the manselected for his lack of political ambition had himself become aprominent candidate for the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy hischances promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss ofconquest and without permitting another general of the same politicalparty to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the administration ofMr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak morecorrectly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgracehimself. 

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande, Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was in command ofall the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regulartroops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold theline then in possession of the invading army. Indeed Scott did not deemit important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorizedTaylor to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protestedagainst the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement uponBuena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chiefin regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande. 

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required tocapture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, twohundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he askedand seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but hissincere good wishes. The promises were all broken. Only about half thetroops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material waswithheld and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the Presidentundertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H. Benton as lieutenant-general. This being refused by Congress, thePresident asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior ofthe same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to the rank ofmajor-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Congressfailed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained incommand: but every general appointed to serve under him was politicallyopposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. 

General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth ofthe Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up theriver to Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to meet him. Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico, for the purpose ofestablishing a post there. He had started on this march before he wasaware of General Scott being in the country. Under these circumstancesScott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawnfrom Taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to holdwith his subordinate. 

General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had notbeen in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a foregoneconclusion. He was nominated and elected in 1848. I believe that hesincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peaceafforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling thehighest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the UnitedStates. 

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in thedivision of General David Twiggs, in Taylor's command; but under the neworders my regiment was transferred to the division of General WilliamWorth, in which I served to the close of the war. The troops withdrawnfrom Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkationfor their destination. I found General Worth a different man from any Ihad before served directly under. He was nervous, impatient andrestless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confrontedhim. There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it wasknown that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the pointof our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved hisdivision with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he beengoing to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length of themarches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supplyof water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long andsometimes short. General Worth on one occasion at least, after havingmade the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops werein camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made themarch that night which had been intended for the next day. Somecommanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of themwithout fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days withoutaccomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class. Heenjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thusattached his officers and men to him. 

The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of themouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival oftransports to carry it to its new field of operations. The transportswere all sailing vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many ofthe troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation atthe mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of VeraCruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. Thetransports used were built for carrying freight and possessed butlimited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to thediscomfort of all. 

The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of AntonLizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, andthere awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunitionand supplies of all kinds from the North. With the fleet there was alittle steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind I hadever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one thenwith the army. At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what therewere were sidewheelers. This little vessel, going through the fleet sofast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. I recollect that Lieutenant SidneySmith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on thedeck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "Why, thething looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances. "

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelvethousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a population of sevenor eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possiblenatural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commencethe perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. 

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios, some three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels could not get anywherenear shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters orsurf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North. The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. Themen were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came toshallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, andtherefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans were very kindto us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing exceptan occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation oneshot took off the head of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reachedanywhere near the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops werelanded and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south ofthe city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. 

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walledcity. The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to thewater again on the north. There were fortifications at intervals alongthe line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island halfa mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosedfortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls wouldprove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the invadingarmy had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front ofthe line where the troops lay. These batteries were intrenched and theapproaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been made at anytime by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have beenquickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy'smain line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or todrive our troops away. 

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th ofMarch, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wallsurrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who was Governor ofboth the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence withGeneral Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott'sarmy. About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces ofartillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell intothe hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side duringthe siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. 

CHAPTER X. 

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT ANDTAYLOR. 

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He hadbeen promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimedthat he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a verysmall army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into anenemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, oflargely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line ofmarch that could be selected led through mountain passes easilydefended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruzto the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa andPerote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on thegreat plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range ofmountains is passed. 

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon aspossible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usuallyvisits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons notacclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, wasarriving very slowly. It was absolutely necessary to have enough tosupply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and abovethe fevers of the coast. At that point the country is fertile, and anarmy of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for anindefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisonsfor the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than tenthousand strong. This force was composed of three divisions, underGenerals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping thevomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be gottogether to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th ofApril, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soonby Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up the rearwith his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carrysix days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and campand garrison equipage. It was the 13th of April before this divisionleft Vera Cruz. 

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fiftymiles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio, about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reachedPlan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two werethen secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexicanforces. At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcementsand without molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott hadremained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to takepersonal supervision. He at once commenced his preparations for thecapture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it. 

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve tofifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point asthe easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to havebeen built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defendedat every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountainwalls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flankmovement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of thecommanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out tofind, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might bereached without a front attack. These reconnoissances were made underthe supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G. T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B. McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers whoattained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflictfor the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnoissance wascompleted, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank ofthe enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. This was accomplishedwithout the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground wherehe supposed it impossible. On the same day General Scott issued hisorder for the attack on the 18th. 

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle ofthe Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before anengagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards tookplace. Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been openedover chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men couldbarely climb them. Animals could not. These had been opened undercover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. Theengineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troopsfollowed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the menengaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the gunsdown, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground ontop, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the courseof the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up theopposite slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached their assignedposition in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hastyretreat, and those occupying them surrendered. On the left GeneralPillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held apart of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am notpretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of theportion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at otherpoints in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as herenarrated. 

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; somethree thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount ofordnance and ordnance stores. The prisoners were paroled, the artilleryparked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of BuenaVista was probably very important to the success of General Scott atCerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the greatplains reaching to the City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had toprotect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was theone he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that hewould have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United Statestroops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion furthersouth. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to BuenaVista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scottin the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor wasdisastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marchedhis army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand milesby the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well beforeScott got there. If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troopswould no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Hadthe battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had timeto move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army notdemoralized nor depleted by defeat. 

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was ina beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of thecoast. Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between thereand the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. Itwas important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway betweenthe sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves themountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortifyin our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure thisresult. The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far fromwhere the road debouches from the mountains. There is a low, strongfort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote. This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with itsarmament. 

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of VeraCruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their lineback to Vera Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the menwhose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fallinto the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the termfor which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined todischarge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their timewould have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season ofthe vomito. This reduced Scott's force in the field to about fivethousand men. 

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on toPuebla. The roads were wide and the country open except through onepass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which theroad runs. Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into twobodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of specialnote, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day'smarch east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or threethousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. Abattery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent againstthem and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of May we entered the cityof Puebla. 

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, whenGeneral Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, hisrestlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I wasattached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. On one occasionGeneral Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with threedays' cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one commandto another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an armyvastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene thelatter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna andhis myriads. There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hoveringaround to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodiesof troops, if they ventured too far out. These always withdrew on theapproach of any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrivalof General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train ofwagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. We had lessthan a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. We procuredfull loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easilyhave furnished as much more. 

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress forthe raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill wasbefore the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to beattached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February beforeit became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to bemade; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the wholetransported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott receivedreinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. His moving column, noteven now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commandedby Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman. There was also a cavalrycorps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and3d dragoons. The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs'sdivision in front. The remaining three divisions followed, with aninterval of a day between. The marches were short, to makeconcentration easier in case of attack. 

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conductingarmies in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked. General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely forcomfort. He moved about the field in which he was operating to seethrough his own eyes the situation. Often he would be without staffofficers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribedorder in which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horseside-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars. He always woreall the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected hislines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders inadvance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might beexpected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms tosalute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dressuniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. His staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc. , that could be spared--followed, also in uniformand in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great care andevidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. 

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrastedquite as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott wasprecise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud ofhis rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the thirdperson, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking aboutwithout the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be nomistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in thefewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to theconstruction of high-sounding sentences. But with their oppositecharacteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant toserve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more throughthe eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans weredeliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw forhimself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to howthey would read in history. 

CHAPTER XI. 

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT ATCHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMINGOF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THEMONTEZUMAS. 

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico wasover Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highestpoint, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass throughthis mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and theadvanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla. The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed byanother mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on thenorth and south. Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City ofMexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left andTexcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico. Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which thedirect road to the city runs. Xochimilco is also to the left of theroad, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected withLake Chalco by a narrow channel. There is a high rocky mound, called ElPenon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat grounddividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at itsbase and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. 

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points nearthe eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnoissances were made up to withingun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the southside of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the southand south-west. A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th ofAugust troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven milesdue south from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpamand the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village ofChurubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these points, except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, wherevolcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to SanAntonio. This made the approach to the city from the south verydifficult. 

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--wassent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. AugustinTlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. The groundon which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surfaceof the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, exceptto the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. Tothe south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--overwhich cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would makebut poor progress if confronted by an enemy. From the position occupiedby Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against thedefences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by theenemy's artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles west andsouth, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to theright flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and thecity. Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding ofthe front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. 

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam, Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advancedintrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by anartificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purposethan defense. General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring theworks about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to gettroops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the forceoccupying that place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and themountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy'sdefences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those naturalbulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. 

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which theofficers of the engineer corps won special distinction. In fact, inboth cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easierfor the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on anordinary field. The very strength of each of these positions was, bythe skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaultingparties while securing their positions for final attack. All the troopswith General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of thedivision of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade ofGarland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle ofContreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of theirchief, to reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on themorning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of theadvance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and largequantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded byGeneral Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the finalassault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. 

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progressmade at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rearof the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the way back to the citycould see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they didnot enjoy the sight. We moved out at once, and found them gone from ourimmediate front. Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved westover the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the northsufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causewayleading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approachedChurubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont atthat place and brought on an engagement. About an hour after, Garlandwas ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in timeto take part in the engagement. San Antonio was found evacuated, theevacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeingthe stars and stripes waving over Contreras. 

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on theirway to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallelto the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco. It was expected by thecommanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently farto flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turningeast to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in thevalley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the battle-field about thisjuncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turnthe right of the enemy. This Shields did, but not without hard fightingand heavy loss. The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our handsprisoners, artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway heldby the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. Irecollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood theirground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande. 

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in thesevarious engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as Ilook upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. As before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and ledthe different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that thechief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with allthe precision he could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to thepoints from which the attack was to commence. After that point isreached the enemy often induces a change of orders not beforecontemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quitethree to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession ofdefeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been enteredwithout much further bloodshed. In fact, Captain Philip Kearney--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadronof cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt haveentered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt. 

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, ashort time before the advance upon the capital commenced. He hadconsequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to thebattle of Contreras. By an unfortunate fall of his horse on theafternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. The next day, when hisbrigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was orderedagainst the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points ofthe road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attemptedto accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, andfainted. This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjustcriticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency. Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for thePresidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. I was not asupporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I didany other of the volunteer generals. 

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr. Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States tonegotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and eitherhe or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty wouldbe more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of thecapital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of aninvader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The armytook up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were at once entered into withSanta Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediatecommander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. A trucewas signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen itsposition, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of thearmistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his armyfrom the city in the meantime. 

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously betweenMr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, untilthe 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum. Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico andCalifornia ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to beafterwards determined. I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretionwhatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in theinterest of an institution, and the probabilities are that privateinstructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which newStates might be carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged atthe terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, withoutgiving notice of the termination of the armistice. The terms of thetruce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the cityto bring out supplies for the army. The first train entering the citywas very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized forby the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with theirescorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and thecitizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and negotiationscontinued. As soon as the news reached General Scott of the secondviolation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote avigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. 

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, avillage some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extendingfrom the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molinodel Rey. The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and severalhundred feet in length. At the period of which I speak General Scottsupposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the castingof guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable to theMexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building isflat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered thetop quite a formidable defence for infantry. Chapultepec is a moundspringing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundredfeet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the westernpart of the city. It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky andprecipitous sides. 

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting onstrong stone arches. One of these aqueducts draws its supply of waterfrom a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey, andruns north close to the west base of Chapultepec; thence along thecentre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into thecity by the Garita San Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and roadboth run east to the city. The second aqueduct starts from the eastbase of Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east tothe city. This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broadroad-way, thus leaving a space on each side. The arches supporting theaqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to thoseengaged defensively. At points on the San Cosme road parapets werethrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery ineach. At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right anglesfrom north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied byone gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the SanCosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back toChapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made ofsandbags. The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme and Belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. Such were the defences of the City of Mexico in September, 1847, on theroutes over which General Scott entered. 

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to GeneralWorth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, forsome reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief. Scott evidentlytook this coldness somewhat to heart. He did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan andexecute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or interferencefrom any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold andindifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. 

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of September. Thenight of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions forthe morrow. These orders contemplated a movement up to within strikingdistance of the Mills before daylight. The engineers had reconnoitredthe ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the informationnecessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. 

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged atMolino were all at the places designated. The ground in front of theMills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit ofChapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a chargewas made, and soon all was over. Worth's troops entered the Mills byevery door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec. Hadthis victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicanswould have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so near together thatthe place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. Thedefenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangeringtheir own men. This was not done, and five days later more valuablelives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in ourpossession on the 8th. I do not criticise the failure to captureChapultepec at this time. The result that followed the first assaultcould not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpectedadvantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and giventhe necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kepton without orders. It is always, however, in order to follow aretreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. The loss on ourside at Molino del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged. It wasespecially so among commissioned officers. 

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills. In passingthrough to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec, I happened tonotice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, onlya few feet from many of our men. Not seeing any stairway or ladderreaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had acart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing theshafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart couldnot back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within threeor four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me bysome other way. There were still quite a number of Mexicans on theroof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, whohad not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied thebuilding. They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentionedwas walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all byhimself. I halted the sentinel, received the swords from thecommissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of thesoldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them againstthe edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. 

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with theexception of an appropriate guard over the captured position andproperty, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya. Theengagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded werenumerous for the number of troops engaged. 

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could playupon the fortifications of Chapultepec. The bombardment commenced earlyon the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement duringthis day than that of the artillery. General Scott assigned the captureof Chapultepec to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to hisjudgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They werecommanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The assault wassuccessful, but bloody. 

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey andChapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. When theassaults upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west ofthem sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road abovementioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearertogether, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on theaqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec. In likemanner, the troops designated to act against Belen could have kept eastof Chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out ofrange of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both havebeen necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for theywould have been turned. 

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who stoodwell with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the columnacting against Belen. General Worth commanded the column against SanCosme. When Chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the twoaqueduct roads. I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most thattook place on that route. When opposition was encountered our troopssheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting theaqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no seriousobstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were onintersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueductturns at a right angle. I have described the defences of this positionbefore. There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, thatI can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position wasreached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the MarineCorps. I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. Our progress was stopped for the time by the singlepiece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupyingthe house-tops back from it. 

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying thesouth-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were movingupon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for aconsiderable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite ayard about the house. I watched my opportunity and skipped across theroad and behind the south wall. Proceeding cautiously to the westcorner of the enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. Ithen returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. All that wereclose to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched ouropportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wallbeyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of thearches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path andthe house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above theparapets they would fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicablewithout loss. 

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again tocarry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they wereordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosmeroad was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving thegun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. When wereached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I sawsome United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the company ofCaptain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. Iexplained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was aboutto do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on andhe would follow. As soon as we got on the road leading to the city thetroops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on thehouse-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such closepursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a secondline across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small aforce. It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. 

Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. Laterin the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of theroad, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground backof the garita San Cosme. I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with amountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. The road being inpossession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reachthe church. This took us over several ditches breast deep in water andgrown up with water plants. These ditches, however, were not over eightor ten feet in width. The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried bythe men to its destination. When I knocked for admission a priest cameto the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. With thelittle Spanish then at my command, I explained to him that he might saveproperty by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself frombecoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to goin whether he consented or not. He began to see his duty in the samelight that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if itgave him special pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfryand put together. We were not more than two or three hundred yards fromSan Cosme. The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy andcreated great confusion. Why they did not send out a small party andcapture us, I do not know. We had no infantry or other defences besidesour one gun. 

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was somarked that General Worth saw it from his position. (*3) He was sopleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton--laterLieutenant-General commanding the defences of Vicksburg--to bring me tohim. He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in thechurch steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, andordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer tobe placed along with the one already rendering so much service. I couldnot tell the General that there was not room enough in the steeple foranother gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statementas a contradiction from a second lieutenant. I took the captain withme, but did not use his gun. 

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under GeneralWorth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line confronting the generalline of the enemy across to Belen. The troops that I was with were inthe houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engagedduring the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to anothertowards the town. During the night Santa Anna, with his army--exceptthe deserters--left the city. He liberated all the convicts confined inthe town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injurybefore daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott to ask--if notdemand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizensand the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipalaffairs. General Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, butgave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would beprotected so long as they behaved themselves properly. 

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position atBelen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After the interview aboverelated between General Scott and the city council, orders were issuedfor the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. The troops underWorth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city. Quitman was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of thePalace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has itssessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are alllocated, the President resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. This is the building generally designated as the"Halls of the Montezumas. "

CHAPTER XII. 

PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO--THE ARMY--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. 

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the releasedconvicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. The streetswere deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of thedead, " except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. In this firing the lieutenant-colonel ofmy regiment, Garland, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. He died a few days after, andby his death I was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant. (*4) I hadgone into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant, andI entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and ina regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever hadpresent at any one engagement. My regiment lost four commissionedofficers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the Mexicanwar. The Mexicans were not so discriminating. They sometimes pickedoff my juniors. 

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. Iwonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he was not; at allevents he was not hurt. He took quarters at first in the "Halls of theMontezumas, " and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for thegovernment of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts ofliberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respectof all who study them. Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City ofMexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. The people beganto make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to thevillages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the southand south-west. 

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner inwhich it was brought about, I have no means of knowing. His orders totroops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regardfor the perpetuation of his own fame. On the other hand, GeneralTaylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administrationaccountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himselffurther than for the faithful performance of his duties. Both generalsdeserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in thegrateful memory of this people to the latest generation. 

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached afterpassing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Pueblaand Mexico. The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. Thispass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the Cityof Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have beensuccessfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. But bymoving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. The road from Perote tothe City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies inour West. Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have beendetached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west withthe rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered beforereaching the City of Mexico. It is true this road would have broughttroops in by Guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountainabout two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name--and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which wasfortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could havepassed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to thenorth-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on thesouth. 

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City ofMexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my laterexperience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seenplainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confidentcritics are generally those who know the least about the mattercriticised. I know just enough about the Mexican war to approveheartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have beenpassed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to itshould have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuationinsured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemyin intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexicocould have been approached without any danger of opposition, except inthe open field. 

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invadeda populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into theinterior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed tohim; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always onthe defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, andconquered the government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it istrue, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. 

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott andGeneral Taylor. The former divided his force of 10, 500 men into fourcolumns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital ofthe nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large ashis own stood ready to resist his coming. The road was broad and thecountry open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylorpursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. He moved even insmaller bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibilityof these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. Isupposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passedover a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessarytrains. Later I found the fallacy of this belief. The rebellion, whichfollowed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have beensuppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the sametime than was the custom under Scott and Taylor. 

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superiornumbers. There were two reasons for this. Both General Scott andGeneral Taylor had such armies as are not often got together. At thebattles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a smallarmy, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the bestof drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but inthe camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. The rank andfile were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war;but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out allthere was in them. A better army, man for man, probably never faced anenemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest twoengagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were ofbetter material, but without drill or discipline at the start. Theywere associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educatedofficers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidencethey would not have felt otherwise. They became soldiers themselvesalmost at once. All these conditions we would enjoy again in case ofwar. 

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. The privatesoldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants whenwanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, andseldom paid. He was turned adrift when no longer wanted. The officersof the lower grades were but little superior to the men. With all thisI have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as I have everseen made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army larger than thatof the United States. They have a military school modelled after WestPoint. Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. TheMexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. 

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we wouldimitate in part, but with more regard to truth. They celebrate theanniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very greatvictories. The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. Atthese two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, itwas at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicanssuffered. The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well asany troops ever did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of experienceamong the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their themewhen telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sumof money they forced us to pay in the end. With us, now twenty yearsafter the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers--who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that theUnion forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashedaround from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the Eastfrom Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out fromsheer exhaustion. There is no difference in the amount of romance inthe two stories. 

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, northose of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer;but I would like to see truthful history written. Such history will dofull credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of theAmerican citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. The justice of the cause which in the endprevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizenof the land, in time. For the present, and so long as there are livingwitnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who willnot be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. As time passes, people, even of the South, will begin to wonder how itwas possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justifiedinstitutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. 

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government ofMexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country fora long time might be necessary. General Scott at once began thepreparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. He contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of theoccupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon thepeople. His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, andcollect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. Fromthe beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either forthe use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. Thispolicy was to be pursued. There were not troops enough in the valley ofMexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized armyof the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the RioGrande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of Vera Cruz. Military possession was taken of Cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca, nearly as far west, and of Pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles tothe north-east. Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already inour possession. 

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of SantaAnna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United Statescommissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. Atemporary government, however, was soon established at Queretaro, andTrist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. Before terms werefinally agreed upon he was ordered back to Washington, but General Scottprevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearlyreached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded inmaking such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. Thetreaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by thegovernment at Washington. It is that known as the "Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo, " and secured to the United States the Rio Grande as theboundary of Texas, and the whole territory then included in New Mexicoand Upper California, for the sum of $15, 000, 000. 

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of GeneralsPillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott became very marked. Scott claimed that they had demanded of the President his removal. I donot know whether this is so or not, but I do know of their unconcealedhostility to their chief. At last he placed them in arrest, andpreferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. Thisact brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. He hadasserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him;that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that thePresident himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavorto procure the appointment of Benton: and the administration now gaveopen evidence of its enmity. About the middle of February orders cameconvening a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brigadier-GeneralTowson, the paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing andColonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and theaccuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from Washington, relieving Scott of the command of the army in the field and assigningMajor-General William O. Butler of Kentucky to the place. This orderalso released Pillow, Worth and Duncan from arrest. 

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was agreeableto every one concerned, so far as I remember to have heard expressionson the subject. There were many who regarded the treatment of GeneralScott as harsh and unjust. It is quite possible that the vanity of theGeneral had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausiblepretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it hadwanted to do from the start. The court tried the accuser quite as muchas the accused. It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meetin Frederick, Maryland. General Scott left the country, and never afterhad more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. Hecertainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline inhigh places. 

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, madethem both candidates for the Presidency. General Taylor was nominatedin 1848, and was elected. Four years later General Scott received thenomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died withhis defeat. (*5)

CHAPTER XIII. 

TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TOPOPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO. 

The treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by thecommissioners of each side early in February, 1848. It took aconsiderable time for it to reach Washington, receive the approval ofthe administration, and be finally ratified by the Senate. It wasnaturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, andofficers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing theremust be delay they contented themselves as best they could. EverySunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would paytheir fifty cents. I attended one of them--just one--not wishing toleave the country without having witnessed the national sport. Thesight to me was sickening. I could not see how human beings could enjoythe sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do onthese occasions. 

At these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. The audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition isgiven, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. When all is ready abull is turned into the ring. Three or four men come in, mounted on themerest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that theycould not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of fallingdown. The men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as aneedle. Other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags andexplosives about the size of a musket cartridge. To each of theseexplosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose ofattaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. Beforethe animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached tohim. The pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles isexasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence theanimal becomes frantic. As he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. He turns towards his last tormentor whena man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and isallowed to take it on his horns. The flag drops and covers the eyes ofthe animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him andthe torment is renewed. When the animal is worked into anuncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores--literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve oreighteen inches long, and sharp. The trick is to dodge an attack fromthe animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. If these efforts failthe bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knifeblade into the spinal column just back of the horns. He is then draggedout by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the sameperformance is renewed. 

On the occasion when I was present one of the bulls was not turned asideby the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc. , etc. , but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of ahorse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. The horsewas killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. The bull was thenlassoed and killed in the manner above described. Men came in andcarried the dead man off in a litter. When the slaughtered bull andhorse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. Conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out ona litter but a few minutes before. He was only dead so far as thatperformance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not foregothe chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren whomight not be so fortunate. There was a feeling of disgust manifested bythe audience to find that he had come to life again. I confess that Ifelt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. I did not stayfor the conclusion of the performance; but while I did stay, there wasnot a bull killed in the prescribed way. 

Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal District--embracing aterritory around the City of Mexico, somewhat larger than the Districtof Columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. During one of my recent visits to Mexico, bull fights were got up in myhonor at Puebla and at Pachuca. I was not notified in advance so as tobe able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases Icivilly declined to attend. 

Another amusement of the people of Mexico of that day, and one whichnearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest andlayman, was Monte playing. Regular feast weeks were held every year atwhat was then known as St. Augustin Tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. There were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. In manyof the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of themmaking six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in greatquantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could notbet more than a few pennies at a time. In other booths silver formedthe bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changedif there should be a run of luck against the bank. In some there was nocoin except gold. Here the rich were said to bet away their entireestates in a single day. All this is stopped now. 

For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. Myregiment was stationed in Tacubaya. I was regimental quartermaster andcommissary. General Scott had been unable to get clothing for thetroops from the North. The men were becoming--well, they neededclothing. Material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, andpeople employed to make it up into "Yankee uniforms. " A quartermasterin the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothingwas so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. A regimentwas glad to get a dozen suits at a time. I had to look after thismatter for the 4th infantry. Then our regimental fund had run down andsome of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for anumber of months. 

The regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from thegovernment, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. There wasauthority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. Somany could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the variousgrades, and the remainder the pay of privates. This would not secure aband leader, nor good players on certain instruments. In garrison thereare various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to giveextra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. Thebest device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiersinstead of flour. The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day ofeither flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make onehundred and forty pounds of bread. This saving was purchased by thecommissary for the benefit of the fund. In the emergency the 4thinfantry was laboring under, I rented a bakery in the city, hiredbakers--Mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and I also gota contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a largeamount of hard bread. In two months I made more money for the fund thanmy pay amounted to during the entire war. While stationed at Monterey Ihad relieved the post fund in the same way. There, however, was noprofit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. 

In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visitPopocatapetl, the highest volcano in America, and to take an escort. Iwent with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuouspositions before the country. Of those who "went south, " and attainedhigh rank, there was Lieutenant Richard Anderson, who commanded a corpsat Spottsylvania; Captain Sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt; CaptainGeorge Crittenden, a rebel general; S. B. Buckner, who surrendered FortDonelson; and Mansfield Lovell, who commanded at New Orleans before thatcity fell into the hands of the National troops. Of those who remainedon our side there were Captain Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone andLieutenant Z. B. Tower. There were quite a number of other officers, whose names I cannot recollect. 

At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Popocatapetl, where wepurposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack muleswith forage for our horses. High up on the mountain there was adeserted house of one room, called the Vaqueria, which had been occupiedyears before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. Thepasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were stillsome cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had nowbecome wild. It was possible to go on horseback as far as the Vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. Sometimes it was verynarrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to aroaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on theother side. At one of these places one of our mules loaded with twosacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to thebottom. The descent was steep but not perpendicular. The mule rolledover and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of coursethe poor animal was dashed to pieces. What was our surprise, not longafter we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and ownercoming up the ascent. The load had protected the animal from seriousinjury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to thepath leading up to the hut where we were to stay. 

The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant I ever knew. It was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. A little higher up therain ceased and snow began. The wind blew with great velocity. Thelog-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on theother it was hardly better then a sieve. There was little or no sleepthat night. As soon as it was light the next morning, we started tomake the ascent to the summit. The wind continued to blow with violenceand the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. The clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear spacebetween them. The wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sidesin such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. We labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not bereached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded toreturn. The descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we gotbelow the snow line. At the cabin we mounted our horses, and by nightwere at Ozumba. 

The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove usto bed early. Our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with ablanket under us. Soon all were asleep; but long before morning firstone and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciatingpain in the eyes. Not one escaped it. By morning the eyes of half theparty were so swollen that they were entirely closed. The otherssuffered pain equally. The feeling was about what might be expectedfrom the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. We remained inquarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. Thisrelieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. Theswelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had theireyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those whocould see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. We moved back to the village of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stoppedagain for the night. The next morning all were entirely well and freefrom pain. The weather was clear and Popocatapetl stood out in all itsbeauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us toreturn. About half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, andconcluded to do so. The remainder--I was with the remainder--concludedthat we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountainclimbing, and that we would visit the great caves of Mexico, some ninetymiles from where we then were, on the road to Acapulco. 

The party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded inreaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor theyencountered in their first attempt. Three of them--Anderson, Stone andBuckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at thetime. I made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about itsince, but it seems to me that I can see the whole of it as vividly asif it were but yesterday. I have been back at Ameca Ameca, and thevillage beyond, twice in the last five years. The scene had not changedmaterially from my recollection of it. 

The party which I was with moved south down the valley to the town ofCuantla, some forty miles from Ameca Ameca. The latter stands on theplain at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eightthousand feet above tide water. The slope down is gradual as thetraveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going toCuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change inthe climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. In themorning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits arethose common to the United States, we halted in the evening in atropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and thesugar-cane were flourishing. We had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. 

Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an armistice had beenagreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respectivearmies were not to go during its continuance. Our party knew nothingabout these limits. As we approached Cuantla bugles sounded theassembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of thetown towards us. Our party halted, and I tied a white pockethandkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded onto the town. Captains Sibley and Porter followed a few hundred yardsbehind. I was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could bedispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorizedthat I should be conducted to him. I had been with the general but afew minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. TheMexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for usto be there. However, as we had no special authority from our owncommanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for thenight, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to Cuernavacathe next morning. 

Cuernavaca is a town west of Guantla. The country through which wepassed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productionsand rich in scenery. At one point, about half-way between the twoplaces, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there isa very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearlyall full-blooded Indians. Very few of them even spoke Spanish. Thehouses were built of stone and generally only one story high. Thestreets were narrow, and had probably been paved before Cortez visitedthe country. They had not been graded, but the paving had been done onthe natural surface. We had with us one vehicle, a cart, which wasprobably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through thattown. 

On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; andit was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. We ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed noparticular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advancedcivilization. The next day we went into Cuernavaca. 

After a day's rest at Cuernavaca our party set out again on the journeyto the great caves of Mexico. We had proceeded but a few miles when wewere stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of theexisting armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. Upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekersdesirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country whichwe expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda nearby, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of thatdepartment could be communicated with and his decision obtained as towhether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. The guardpromised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. Atnight there was no response from the commanding general, but the captainof the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. Again in themorning there was no reply. The second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messengerto the department commander. We determined therefore to go on unlessstopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. 

After a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to theone at Cuantia occurred. The commanding officer sent a guide to conductour party around the village and to put us upon our road again. Thiswas the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffeeplantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. It must have been a Saturday night; the peons had been paid off, andspent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. Their coin was principally copper, and I do not believe there was a manamong them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. Theywere as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. Irecollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off hisshirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of acard. Monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near thewindow of the room occupied by the officers of our party. 

The next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. We explored to a distance ofabout three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambersof great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. Stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. Some of theformer were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor;some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but theformation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence thesestalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. Thestalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled withwater. The water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--oftenthe drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineralmatter. Evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. Thisin time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons inweight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. Irecollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of suchhuge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either sideof it. Some of our party became satisfied with their explorationsbefore we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed totake explorers, and started back without guides. Coming to the largecolumn spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commencedretracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without beingaware of the fact. When the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw thetorches of an approaching party. We could not conceive who these couldbe, for all of us had come in together, and there were none butourselves at the entrance when we started in. Very soon we found it wasour friends. It took them some time to conceive how they had got wherethey were. They were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth ofthe cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

RETURN OF THE ARMY--MARRIAGE--ORDERED TO THE PACIFIC COAST--CROSSING THEISTHMUS--ARRIVAL AT SAN FRANCISCO. 

My experience in the Mexican war was of great advantage to meafterwards. Besides the many practical lessons it taught, the warbrought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as tomake them personally acquainted. It also brought them in contact withvolunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. Then, in my particular case, I had been at West Point at about the righttime to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at thebreaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. Graduating in 1843, I was at the military academy from one to four yearswith all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. These classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards becamegenerals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holdinghigh commands. All the older officers, who became conspicuous in therebellion, I had also served with and known in Mexico: Lee, J. E. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, Holmes, Hebert and a number of others on theConfederate side; McCall, Mansfield, Phil. Kearney and others on theNational side. The acquaintance thus formed was of immense service tome in the war of the rebellion--I mean what I learned of the charactersof those to whom I was afterwards opposed. I do not pretend to say thatall movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference tothe characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. But my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by thisknowledge. The natural disposition of most people is to clothe acommander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhumanabilities. A large part of the National army, for instance, and most ofthe press of the country, clothed General Lee with just such qualities, but I had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it wasjust as well that I felt this. 

The treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of Mexicoby United States troops was ordered. Early in June the troops in theCity of Mexico began to move out. Many of them, including the brigadeto which I belonged, were assembled at Jalapa, above the vomito, toawait the arrival of transports at Vera Cruz: but with all thisprecaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in aJuly sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged withgreat virulence in Vera Cruz, not two miles away. I can call to mindonly one person, an officer, who died of the disease. My regiment wassent to Pascagoula, Mississippi, to spend the summer. As soon as it wassettled in camp I obtained a leave of absence for four months andproceeded to St. Louis. On the 22d of August, 1848, I was married toMiss Julia Dent, the lady of whom I have before spoken. We visited myparents and relations in Ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded tomy post at Sackett's Harbor, New York. In April following I was orderedto Detroit, Michigan, where two years were spent with but few importantincidents. 

The present constitution of the State of Michigan was ratified duringthis time. By the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of theUnited States residing within the State at the time of the ratificationbecame citizens of Michigan also. During my stay in Detroit there was anelection for city officers. Mr. Zachariah Chandler was the candidate ofthe Whigs for the office of Mayor, and was elected, although the citywas then reckoned democratic. All the officers stationed there at thetime who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. I did notoffer mine, however, as I did not wish to consider myself a citizen ofMichigan. This was Mr. Chandler's first entry into politics, a careerhe followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoyingthe friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. 

In the spring of 1851 the garrison at Detroit was transferred toSackett's Harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantrywas ordered to the Pacific Coast. It was decided that Mrs. Grant shouldvisit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her ownfamily at their St. Louis home until an opportunity offered of sendingfor her. In the month of April the regiment was assembled at Governor'sIsland, New York Harbor, and on the 5th of July eight companies sailedfor Aspinwall. We numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. Passage was securedfor us on the old steamer Ohio, commanded at the time by CaptainSchenck, of the navy. It had not been determined, until a day or twobefore starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the Ohio;consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. Theaddition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer mostuncomfortably, especially for the tropics in July. 

In eight days Aspinwall was reached. At that time the streets of thetown were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passedfrom place to place on raised foot-walks. July is at the height of thewet season, on the Isthmus. At intervals the rain would pour down instreams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer'ssun. These alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous inthe afternoons. I wondered how any person could live many months inAspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. 

In the summer of 1852 the Panama railroad was completed only to thepoint where it now crosses the Chagres River. From there passengerswere carried by boats to Gorgona, at which place they took mules forPanama, some twenty-five miles further. Those who travelled over theIsthmus in those days will remember that boats on the Chagres River werepropelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. Theseboats carried thirty to forty passengers each. The crews consisted ofsix men to a boat, armed with long poles. There were planks wide enoughfor a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boatfrom end to end. The men would start from the bow, place one end oftheir poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against theother end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. In thisway from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against thecurrent of the river. 

I, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property andhad also to look after the transportation. A contract had been enteredinto with the steamship company in New York for the transportation ofthe regiment to California, including the Isthmus transit. A certainamount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to befurnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. Theregiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the publicproperty--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers withfamilies, took boats, propelled as above described, for Gorgona. Fromthis place they marched to Panama, and were soon comfortably on thesteamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. I, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all thetents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to Cruces, a town a fewmiles higher up the Chagres River than Gorgona. There I found animpecunious American who had taken the contract to furnishtransportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred poundsfor the freight and so much for each saddle animal. But when we reachedCruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. The contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in themorning. In the morning he said that they were on the way from someimaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. This wenton until I saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the pricehe had promised to furnish them for. The unusual number of passengersthat had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight topack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. Some of thepassengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ridetwenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars inthat market at other times. Meanwhile the cholera had broken out, andmen were dying every hour. To diminish the food for the disease, Ipermitted the company detailed with me to proceed to Panama. Thecaptain and the doctors accompanied the men, and I was left alone withthe sick and the soldiers who had families. The regiment at Panama wasalso affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations forthe well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with thedisease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. There were also hospitaltents on shore on the island of Flamingo, which stands in the bay. 

I was about a week at Cruces before transportation began to come in. About one-third of the people with me died, either at Cruces or on theway to Panama. There was no agent of the transportation company atCruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuringtransportation at a price which would secure it. I therefore myselfdismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at morethan double the original price. Thus we finally reached Panama. Thesteamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and theregiment was detained still longer. Altogether, on the Isthmus and onthe Pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. About one-seventh of thosewho left New York harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of July, nowlie buried on the Isthmus of Panama or on Flamingo island in Panama Bay. 

One amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor inPanama Bay. In the regiment there was a Lieutenant Slaughter who wasvery liable to sea-sickness. It almost made him sick to see the wave ofa table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. Soon after hisgraduation, Slaughter was ordered to California and took passage by asailing vessel going around Cape Horn. The vessel was seven monthsmaking the voyage, and Slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place ofdestination. On landing in California he found orders which had come bythe Isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he shouldhave been ordered to the northern lakes. He started back by the Isthmusroute and was sick all the way. But when he arrived at the East he wasagain ordered to California, this time definitely, and at this date wasmaking his third trip. He was as sick as ever, and had been so for morethan a month while lying at anchor in the bay. I remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin betweenhis hands, and looking the picture of despair. At last he broke out, "Iwish I had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy;if I had done so, I should not have had to go to sea so much. " PoorSlaughter! it was his last sea voyage. He was killed by Indians inOregon. 

By the last of August the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safeto start. The disease did not break out again on the way to California, and we reached San Francisco early in September. 

CHAPTER XV. 

SAN FRANCISCO--EARLY CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCES--LIFE ON THE PACIFIC COAST--PROMOTED CAPTAIN--FLUSH TIMES IN CALIFORNIA. 

San Francisco at that day was a lively place. Gold, or placer diggingas it was called, was at its height. Steamers plied daily between SanFrancisco and both Stockton and Sacramento. Passengers and gold from thesouthern mines came by the Stockton boat; from the northern mines bySacramento. In the evening when these boats arrived, Long Wharf--therewas but one wharf in San Francisco in 1852--was alive with peoplecrowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" andto "have a time. " Of these some were runners for hotels, boardinghouses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecuniousadventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on thealert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in thehope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. Many were young menof good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. Their parentshad been able to support them during their minority, and to give themgood educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. From 1849 to 1853there was a rush of people to the Pacific coast, of the class described. All thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in thegold fields on the Pacific. Some realized more than their most sanguineexpectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many ofwhom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. Many of the real scenes in early California life exceed in strangenessand interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. 

Those early days in California brought out character. It was a long wayoff then, and the journey was expensive. The fortunate could go by CapeHorn or by the Isthmus of Panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed theplains with their ox-teams. This took an entire summer. They were verylucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. All othermeans were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the Missouri River. Theimmigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, farfrom friends. Time pressed, for the little means that could be realizedfrom the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a manlong at California prices. Many became discouraged. Others would takeoff their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. Thesesucceeded as a rule. There were many young men who had studiedprofessions before they went to California, and who had never done aday's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once andwent to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. Somesupplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, ormortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggagewagons, until they could do better. More became discouraged early andspent their time looking up people who would "treat, " or lounging aboutrestaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. They were welcomed at these places because they often brought in minerswho proved good customers. 

My regiment spent a few weeks at Benicia barracks, and then was orderedto Fort Vancouver, on the Columbia River, then in Oregon Territory. During the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of theColumbia River being taken from Oregon to make Washington Territory. 

Prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the Pacific coast from1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible forofficers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been thatauthority was given them to purchase from the commissary such suppliesas he kept, at New Orleans wholesale prices. A cook could not be hiredfor the pay of a captain. The cook could do better. At Benicia, in1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and otherarticles in proportion. In 1853 at Vancouver vegetables were a littlelower. I with three other officers concluded that we would raise a cropfor ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. Ibought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and werevery poor. They recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team tobreak up the ground with. I performed all the labor of breaking up theground while the other officers planted the potatoes. Our crop wasenormous. Luckily for us the Columbia River rose to a great height fromthe melting of the snow in the mountains in June, and overflowed andkilled most of our crop. This saved digging it up, for everybody on thePacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same timethat agriculture would be profitable. In 1853 more than three-quartersof the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to bethrown away. The only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. 

While I was stationed on the Pacific coast we were free from Indianwars. There were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinityof Portland in Oregon, and of Fort Vancouver in Washington Territory. They had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but noneof the virtues, except in individual cases. The Hudson's Bay Companyhad held the North-west with their trading posts for many years beforethe United States was represented on the Pacific coast. They stillretained posts along the Columbia River and one at Fort Vancouver, whenI was there. Their treatment of the Indians had brought out the betterqualities of the savages. Farming had been undertaken by the company tosupply the Indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattleand horses; and they had now taught the Indians to do the labor of thefarm and herd. They always compensated them for their labor, and alwaysgave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. 

Before the advent of the American, the medium of exchange between theIndian and the white man was pelts. Afterward it was silver coin. Ifan Indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, notan infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it forAmerican half dollars. These he could count. He would then commence hispurchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. He wouldnot trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. At thatday fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, werecommon on the Pacific coast. They were called slugs. 

The Indians, along the lower Columbia as far as the Cascades and on thelower Willamette, died off very fast during the year I spent in thatsection; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they hadacquired also their diseases. The measles and the small-pox were bothamazingly fatal. In their wild state, before the appearance of thewhite man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to werethose produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuitof game, and over-eating. Instinct more than reason had taught them aremedy for these ills. It was the steam bath. Something like abake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. Bushes werestuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two orthree feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. The topsof the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in thatposition; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until everyopening was filled. Just inside the open end of the oven the floor wasscooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two ofwater. These ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a bigspring, or pool of water. When a patient required a bath, a fire wasbuilt near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. The cavity at thefront was then filled with water. When the stones were sufficientlyheated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would bethrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until thepatient could stand it no longer. He was then withdrawn from his steambath and doused into the cold stream near by. This treatment may haveanswered with the early ailments of the Indians. With the measles orsmall-pox it would kill every time. 

During my year on the Columbia River, the small-pox exterminated onesmall remnant of a band of Indians entirely, and reduced othersmaterially. I do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the Hudson Bay Company took the matter in hand andestablished a hospital. Nearly every case he treated recovered. Inever, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. Thedecimation among the Indians I knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a Hudson's Bay building not a stone'sthrow from my own quarters. 

The death of Colonel Bliss, of the Adjutant General's department, whichoccurred July 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company thenstationed at Humboldt Bay, California. The notice reached me inSeptember of the same year, and I very soon started to join my newcommand. There was no way of reaching Humboldt at that time except totake passage on a San Francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. Redwood, a species of cedar, which on the Pacific coast takes the placefilled by white pine in the East, then abounded on the banks of HumboldtBay. There were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumberfor the San Francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it tomarket, furnished the only means of communication between Humboldt andthe balance of the world. 

I was obliged to remain in San Francisco for several days before I founda vessel. This gave me a good opportunity of comparing the SanFrancisco of 1852 with that of 1853. As before stated, there had beenbut one wharf in front of the city in 1852--Long Wharf. In 1853 thetown had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharfwhen I first saw it. Streets and houses had been built out on pileswhere the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay atanchor or tied to the wharf. There was no filling under the streets orhouses. San Francisco presented the same general appearance as the yearbefore; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuousfor their number and publicity. They were on the first floor, withdoors wide open. At all hours of the day and night in walking thestreets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, bythe sight of players at faro. Often broken places were found in thestreet, large enough to let a man down into the water below. I have butlittle doubt that many of the people who went to the Pacific coast inthe early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard fromsince, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, foundwatery graves beneath the houses or streets built over San FranciscoBay. 

Besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale incity lots. These were sold "On Change, " much as stocks are now sold onWall Street. Cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker;but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. He was charged at therate of two or three per cent. A month on the difference, besidescommissions. The sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible tofoot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--avara being a Spanish yard. These were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to manythousands of dollars. The brokers did a fine business, and so did manysuch purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the finalcrash came. As the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnishedmaterial for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and stillfurther out. The temporary houses, first built over the water in theharbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. The main business partof the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largestclass lay at anchor in the early days. I was in San Francisco again in1854. Gambling houses had disappeared from public view. The city hadbecome staid and orderly. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

RESIGNATION--PRIVATE LIFE--LIFE AT GALENA--THE COMING CRISIS. 

My family, all this while, was at the East. It consisted now of a wifeand two children. I saw no chance of supporting them on the Pacificcoast out of my pay as an army officer. I concluded, therefore, toresign, and in March applied for a leave of absence until the end of theJuly following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end ofthat time. I left the Pacific coast very much attached to it, and withthe full expectation of making it my future home. That expectation andthat hope remained uppermost in my mind until the Lieutenant-Generalcybill was introduced into Congress in the winter of 1863-4. The passageof that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming acitizen of the further West. 

In the late summer of 1854 I rejoined my family, to find in it a sonwhom I had never seen, born while I was on the Isthmus of Panama. I wasnow to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for oursupport. My wife had a farm near St. Louis, to which we went, but I hadno means to stock it. A house had to be built also. I worked veryhard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished theobject in a moderate way. If nothing else could be done I would load acord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. I managed tokeep along very well until 1858, when I was attacked by fever and ague. I had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in Ohio. It lasted now over a year, and, while it did notkeep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work Iwas able to perform. In the fall of 1858 I sold out my stock, crops andfarming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. 

In the winter I established a partnership with Harry Boggs, a cousin ofMrs. Grant, in the real estate agency business. I spent that winter atSt. Louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. Our business might have become prosperous if I had been able to wait forit to grow. As it was, there was no more than one person could attendto, and not enough to support two families. While a citizen of St. Louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, I was a candidatefor the office of county engineer, an office of respectability andemolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. Theincumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of fivemembers. My opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was acitizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. I now withdrew from theco-partnership with Boggs, and, in May, 1860, removed to Galena, Illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. 

While a citizen of Missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote ata Presidential election occurred. I had been in the army from beforeattaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although I was a Whig by education and a great admirer of Mr. Clay. Butthe Whig party had ceased to exist before I had an opportunity ofexercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the Know-Nothing party hadtaken its place, but was on the wane; and the Republican party was in achaotic state and had not yet received a name. It had no existence inthe Slave States except at points on the borders next to Free States. In St. Louis City and County, what afterwards became the Republicanparty was known as the Free-Soil Democracy, led by the Honorable FrankP. Blair. Most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the armywith Whig proclivities. They had been on the same side, and, on thedeath of their party, many had become Know-Nothings, or members of theAmerican party. There was a lodge near my new home, and I was invited tojoin it. I accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meetingjust one week later, and never went to another afterwards. 

I have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of theAmerican party; for I still think native-born citizens of the UnitedStates should have as much protection, as many privileges in theirnative country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. But allsecret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, nomatter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which firstbring them together. No political party can or ought to exist when oneof its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to theright to worship God "according to the dictate of one's own conscience, "or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. Nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the Statelaws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted andsuppressed at whatever cost. 

Up to the Mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, menwho carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from thosefor a justice of the peace up to the Presidency of the United States. They were noisy but not numerous. But the great majority of people atthe North, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. They did not hold the States where slavery existed responsible for it;and believed that protection should be given to the right of property inslaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of theinstitution. Opposition to slavery was not a creed of either politicalparty. In some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to theDemocratic party, and in others to the Whigs. But with the inaugurationof the Mexican war, in fact with the annexation of Texas, "theinevitable conflict" commenced. 

As the time for the Presidential election of 1856--the first at which Ihad the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to runhigh. The Republican party was regarded in the South and the borderStates not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoringthe compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to theowners. The most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to theminds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. Many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe thatemancipation meant social equality. Treason to the Government wasopenly advocated and was not rebuked. It was evident to my mind thatthe election of a Republican President in 1856 meant the secession ofall the Slave States, and rebellion. Under these circumstances Ipreferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent orpostpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end ofwhich no man could foretell. With a Democrat elected by the unanimousvote of the Slave States, there could be no pretext for secession forfour years. I very much hoped that the passions of the people wouldsubside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if itwas not, I believed the country would be better prepared to receive theshock and to resist it. I therefore voted for James Buchanan forPresident. Four years later the Republican party was successful inelecting its candidate to the Presidency. The civilized world haslearned the consequence. Four millions of human beings held as chattelshave been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schoolsof the country have been opened to their children. The nation stilllives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with theblacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. 

While living in Galena I was nominally only a clerk supporting myselfand family on a stipulated salary. In reality my position wasdifferent. My father had never lived in Galena himself, but hadestablished my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself incharge of the business, assisted by the youngest. When I went there itwas my father's intention to give up all connection with the businesshimself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who hadreally built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it wasnot thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. Helived until September, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious diseasewhich always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growingbetter up to the close of life. A more honorable man never transactedbusiness. In September, 1861, I was engaged in an employment whichrequired all my attention elsewhere. 

During the eleven months that I lived in Galena prior to the first callfor volunteers, I had been strictly attentive to my business, and hadmade but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged inthe same line with myself. When the election took place in November, 1860, I had not been a resident of Illinois long enough to gaincitizenship and could not, therefore, vote. I was really glad of thisat the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for StephenA. Douglas, who had no possible chance of election. The contest wasreally between Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Lincoln; between minority ruleand rule by the majority. I wanted, as between these candidates, to seeMr. Lincoln elected. Excitement ran high during the canvass, andtorch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quietstreets of Galena many nights during the campaign. I did not paradewith either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes"--Republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. It wasevident, from the time of the Chicago nomination to the close of thecanvass, that the election of the Republican candidate would be thesignal for some of the Southern States to secede. I still had hopesthat the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of aPresidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slaveryextension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cooldown; for the Southerners to think well before they took the awful leapwhich they had so vehemently threatened. But I was mistaken. 

The Republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people ofthe North-west, and I presume the same order of people throughout theentire North, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. Itwas very much discussed whether the South would carry out its threat tosecede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of whichshould be, protection to the "Divine" institution of slavery. For therewere people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as thereare now people who believe Mormonism and Polygamy to be ordained by theMost High. We forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbidtheir practice. It was generally believed that there would be a flurry;that some of the extreme Southern States would go so far as to passordinances of secession. But the common impression was that this stepwas so plainly suicidal for the South, that the movement would notspread over much of the territory and would not last long. 

Doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. Eachcolony considered itself a separate government; that the confederationwas for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention ofstrife and war among themselves. If there had been a desire on the partof any single State to withdraw from the compact at any time while thenumber of States was limited to the original thirteen, I do not supposethere would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much thedetermination might have been regretted. The problem changed on theratification of the Constitution by all the colonies; it changed stillmore when amendments were added; and if the right of any one State towithdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of theConstitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new States, atleast so far as the new States themselves were concerned. It was neverpossessed at all by Florida or the States west of the Mississippi, allof which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. Texas andthe territory brought into the Union in consequence of annexation, werepurchased with both blood and treasure; and Texas, with a domain greaterthan that of any European state except Russia, was permitted to retainas state property all the public lands within its borders. It wouldhave been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for thisState to withdraw from the Union after all that had been spent and doneto introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, Texas mustnecessarily have gone with the South, both on account of herinstitutions and her geographical position. Secession was illogical aswell as impracticable; it was revolution. 

Now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. When people areoppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy torelieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, eitherby withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting agovernment more acceptable. But any people or part of a people whoresort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and everyclaim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. Victory, orthe conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. 

In the case of the war between the States it would have been the exacttruth if the South had said, --"We do not want to live with you Northernpeople any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious toyou, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may atsome time in the future be endangered. So long as you permitted us tocontrol the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the Northto enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape ofour property, we were willing to live with you. You have beensubmissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did notintend to continue so, and we will remain in the Union no longer. "Instead of this the seceding States cried lustily, --"Let us alone; youhave no constitutional power to interfere with us. " Newspapers andpeople at the North reiterated the cry. Individuals might ignore theconstitution; but the Nation itself must not only obey it, but mustenforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the constructionput upon it by the Southerners themselves. The fact is the constitutiondid not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to1865. Its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. Ifthey had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctionedthe right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that there shouldbe war between brothers. 

The framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very bestpossible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also oftheir descendants to the latest days. It is preposterous to supposethat the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rulesof government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseencontingencies. At the time of the framing of our constitution the onlyphysical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do hislabor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. Rudemachinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propelships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but theapplication of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. Theinstantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means ofelectricity would probably at that day have been attributed towitchcraft or a league with the Devil. Immaterial circumstances hadchanged as greatly as material ones. We could not and ought not to berigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so differentfor emergencies so utterly unanticipated. The fathers themselves wouldhave been the first to declare that their prerogatives were notirrevocable. They would surely have resisted secession could they havelived to see the shape it assumed. 

I travelled through the Northwest considerably during the winter of1860-1. We had customers in all the little towns in south-westWisconsin, south-east Minnesota and north-east Iowa. These generallyknew I had been a captain in the regular army and had served through theMexican war. Consequently wherever I stopped at night, some of thepeople would come to the public-house where I was, and sit till a latehour discussing the probabilities of the future. My own views at thattime were like those officially expressed by Mr. Seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days. " I continued to entertainthese views until after the battle of Shiloh. I believe now that therewould have been no more battles at the West after the capture of FortDonelson if all the troops in that region had been under a singlecommander who would have followed up that victory. 

There is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment ofthe South would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, ifthere had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased bythreats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much asthat of any other. But there was no calm discussion of the question. Demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that theydid not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairsof state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly againstthe North; against its aggressions upon the South; its interference withSouthern rights, etc. , etc. They denounced the Northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one Southern man was equal tofive Northern men in battle; that if the South would stand up for itsrights the North would back down. Mr. Jefferson Davis said in a speech, delivered at La Grange, Mississippi, before the secession of that State, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of Mason andDixon's line if there should be a war. The young men who would have thefighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both inregard to the aggressiveness of the North and its cowardice. They, too, cried out for a separation from such people. The great bulk of thelegal voters of the South were men who owned no slaves; their homes weregenerally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educatingtheir children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were verylimited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the North; they tooneeded emancipation. Under the old regime they were looked down upon bythose who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, aspoor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast itaccording to direction. 

I am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individualtestimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballotwas as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; butin the face of any such contradiction I reassert the statement. Theshot-gun was not resorted to. Masked men did not ride over the countryat night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a classexisted in every State with a sort of divine right to control publicaffairs. If they could not get this control by one means they must byanother. The end justified the means. The coercion, if mild, wascomplete. 

There were two political parties, it is true, in all the States, bothstrong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to theinstitution which stood paramount in Southern eyes to all otherinstitutions in state or nation. The slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. Had politics ever divided the slave-holdersand the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged toyield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. I do notknow that the Southern people were to blame for this condition ofaffairs. There was a time when slavery was not profitable, and thediscussion of the merits of the institution was confined almostexclusively to the territory where it existed. The States of Virginiaand Kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one Statedefeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. Butwhen the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceasedwhere it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. The cotton-gin probably had muchto do with the justification of slavery. 

The winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-dayas one of great excitement. South Carolina promptly seceded after theresult of the Presidential election was known. Other Southern Statesproposed to follow. In some of them the Union sentiment was so strongthat it had to be suppressed by force. Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky andMissouri, all Slave States, failed to pass ordinances of secession; butthey were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-calledConfederate States. The Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of Missouri, in 1861, Jackson and Reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion andtook refuge with the enemy. The governor soon died, and thelieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governorof the State; was recognized as such by the Confederate Government, andcontinued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. The Southclaimed the sovereignty of States, but claimed the right to coerce intotheir confederation such States as they wanted, that is, all the Stateswhere slavery existed. They did not seem to think this courseinconsistent. The fact is, the Southern slave-owners believed that, insome way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent ofnobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes ofthose who did not hold such property. They convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particularinstitution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators butthemselves. 

Meanwhile the Administration of President Buchanan looked helplessly onand proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere;that the Nation had no power to save its own life. Mr. Buchanan had inhis cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mildterm--in the cause of secession as Mr. Davis or any Southern statesman. One of them, Floyd, the Secretary of War, scattered the army so thatmuch of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, anddistributed the cannon and small arms from Northern arsenals throughoutthe South so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. The navy wasscattered in like manner. The President did not prevent his cabinetpreparing for war upon their government, either by destroying itsresources or storing them in the South until a de facto government wasestablished with Jefferson Davis as its President, and Montgomery, Alabama, as the Capital. The secessionists had then to leave thecabinet. In their own estimation they were aliens in the country whichhad given them birth. Loyal men were put into their places. Treason inthe executive branch of the government was estopped. But the harm hadalready been done. The stable door was locked after the horse had beenstolen. 

During all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the Southerners were sodefiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression ofa sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who couldstand up and proclaim his loyalty to the Union. On the other hand menat the North--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no powerto coerce the South into submission to the laws of the land; that if theNorth undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have tomarch over the dead bodies of the speakers. A portion of the press ofthe North was constantly proclaiming similar views. When the timearrived for the President-elect to go to the capital of the Nation to besworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as aPresident-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. Instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of hisconstituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stopon the way and to be smuggled into the capital. He disappeared frompublic view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrivalwas announced at the capital. There is little doubt that he would havebeen assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout hisjourney. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

OUTBREAK OF THE REBELLION--PRESIDING AT A UNION MEETING--MUSTERINGOFFICER OF STATE TROOPS--LYON AT CAMP JACKSON--SERVICES TENDERED TO THEGOVERNMENT. 

The 4th of March, 1861, came, and Abraham Lincoln was sworn to maintainthe Union against all its enemies. The secession of one State afteranother followed, until eleven had gone out. On the 11th of April FortSumter, a National fort in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, wasfired upon by the Southerners and a few days after was captured. TheConfederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarredthemselves of all right to claim protection under the Constitution ofthe United States. We did not admit the fact that they were aliens, butall the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect bettertreatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon anindependent nation. Upon the firing on Sumter President Lincoln issuedhis first call for troops and soon after a proclamation conveningCongress in extra session. The call was for 75, 000 volunteers forninety days' service. If the shot fired at Fort Sumter "was heardaround the world, " the call of the President for 75, 000 men was heardthroughout the Northern States. There was not a state in the North of amillion of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire numberfaster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had beennecessary. 

As soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached Galena, posterswere stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-housein the evening. Business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for atime there were no party distinctions; all were Union men, determined toavenge the insult to the national flag. In the evening the court-housewas packed. Although a comparative stranger I was called upon topreside; the sole reason, possibly, was that I had been in the army andhad seen service. With much embarrassment and some prompting I made outto announce the object of the meeting. Speeches were in order, but itis doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other thanpatriotic ones. There was probably no one in the house, however, whofelt like making any other. The two principal speeches were by B. B. Howard, the post-master and a Breckinridge Democrat at the Novemberelection the fall before, and John A. Rawlins, an elector on the Douglasticket. E. B. Washburne, with whom I was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, Iunderstood afterwards, a little surprise that Galena could not furnish apresiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. Hecame forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to thepatriotism of the meeting. 

After the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form acompany. The quota of Illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and itwas supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted fromGalena. The company was raised and the officers and non-commissionedofficers elected before the meeting adjourned. I declined the captaincybefore the balloting, but announced that I would aid the company inevery way I could and would be found in the service in some position ifthere should be a war. I never went into our leather store after thatmeeting, to put up a package or do other business. 

The ladies of Galena were quite as patriotic as the men. They could notenlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company tothe field uniformed. They came to me to get a description of the UnitedStates uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material;procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. In a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at theState capital for assignment. The men all turned out the morning aftertheir enlistment, and I took charge, divided them into squads andsuperintended their drill. When they were ready to go to Springfield Iwent with them and remained there until they were assigned to aregiment. 

There were so many more volunteers than had been called for that thequestion whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, RichardYates. The legislature was in session at the time, however, and came tohis relief. A law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept theservices of ten additional regiments, one from each congressionaldistrict, for one month, to be paid by the State, but pledged to go intothe service of the United States if there should be a further callduring their term. Even with this relief the governor was still verymuch embarrassed. Before the war was over he was like the Presidentwhen he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something hecould give to all who wanted it. "

In time the Galena company was mustered into the United States service, forming a part of the 11th Illinois volunteer infantry. My duties, Ithought, had ended at Springfield, and I was prepared to start home bythe evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. Up to that time I do notthink I had been introduced to Governor Yates, or had ever spoken tohim. I knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the samehotel and I often saw him at table. The evening I was to quit thecapital I left the supper room before the governor and was standing atthe front door when he came out. He spoke to me, calling me by my oldarmy title "Captain, " and said he understood that I was about leavingthe city. I answered that I was. He said he would be glad if I wouldremain over-night and call at the Executive office the next morning. I complied with his request, and was asked to go into theAdjutant-General's office and render such assistance as I could, thegovernor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. I accepted the proposition. 

My old army experience I found indeed of very great service. I was noclerk, nor had I any capacity to become one. The only place I everfound in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a sidecoat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful thanmyself. But I had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in thefield. The army forms were familiar to me and I could direct how theyshould be made out. There was a clerk in the office of theAdjutant-General who supplied my deficiencies. The ease with which theState of Illinois settled its accounts with the government at the closeof the war is evidence of the efficiency of Mr. Loomis as an accountanton a large scale. He remained in the office until that time. 

As I have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept theservices of ten additional regiments. I had charge of mustering theseregiments into the State service. They were assembled at the mostconvenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. I detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered threein the southern part of the State myself. One of these was to assembleat Belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of St. Louis. When I gotthere I found that only one or two companies had arrived. There was noprobability of the regiment coming together under five days. This gaveme a few idle days which I concluded to spend in St. Louis. 

There was a considerable force of State militia at Camp Jackson, on theoutskirts of St. Louis, at the time. There is but little doubt that itwas the design of Governor Claiborn Jackson to have these troops readyto seize the United States arsenal and the city of St. Louis. Why theydid not do so I do not know. There was but a small garrison, twocompanies I think, under Captain N. Lyon at the arsenal, and but for thetimely services of the Hon. F. P. Blair, I have little doubt that St. Louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with allits arms and ammunition. 

Blair was a leader among the Union men of St. Louis in 1861. There wasno State government in Missouri at the time that would sanction theraising of troops or commissioned officers to protect United Statesproperty, but Blair had probably procured some form of authority fromthe President to raise troops in Missouri and to muster them into theservice of the United States. At all events, he did raise a regimentand took command himself as Colonel. With this force he reported toCaptain Lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. It waswhispered that Lyon thus reinforced intended to break up Camp Jacksonand capture the militia. I went down to the arsenal in the morning tosee the troops start out. I had known Lyon for two years at West Pointand in the old army afterwards. Blair I knew very well by sight. I hadheard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but Ihad never spoken to him. As the troops marched out of the enclosurearound the arsenal, Blair was on his horse outside forming them intoline preparatory to their march. I introduced myself to him and had afew moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. This was my first personal acquaintance with the Honorable--afterwardsMajor-General F. P. Blair. Camp Jackson surrendered without a fight andthe garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. 

Up to this time the enemies of the government in St. Louis had been boldand defiant, while Union men were quiet but determined. The enemies hadtheir head-quarters in a central and public position on Pine Street, near Fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. The Unionmen had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, I did not know where, and I doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the governmentby placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. As soon asthe news of the capture of Camp Jackson reached the city the conditionof affairs was changed. Union men became rampant, aggressive, and, ifyou will, intolerant. They proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and wereimpatient at anything like disrespect for the Union. The secessionistsbecame quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. They had beenplaying the bully. The Union men ordered the rebel flag taken down fromthe building on Pine Street. The command was given in tones ofauthority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in St. Louis. 

I witnessed the scene. I had heard of the surrender of the camp andthat the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. I had seen the troopsstart out in the morning and had wished them success. I now determinedto go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. Istepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and Pine streets, and sawa crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, whowere there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. There were squadsof other people at intervals down the street. They too were quiet butfilled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insultto, what they called, "their" flag. Before the car I was in hadstarted, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day--stepped in. He was in a great state of excitement and used adjectivesfreely to express his contempt for the Union and for those who had justperpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. There wasonly one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young manentered. He evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he gotaway from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pulldown a flag they adored. He turned to me saying: "Things have come toa ---- pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. Where I came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the Union wehang him to a limb of the first tree we come to. " I replied that "afterall we were not so intolerant in St. Louis as we might be; I had notseen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty ofthem who ought to be, however. " The young man subsided. He was socrestfallen that I believe if I had ordered him to leave the car hewould have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "More Yankeeoppression. "

By nightfall the late defenders of Camp Jackson were all within thewalls of the St. Louis arsenal, prisoners of war. The next day I leftSt. Louis for Mattoon, Illinois, where I was to muster in the regimentfrom that congressional district. This was the 21st Illinois infantry, the regiment of which I subsequently became colonel. I mustered oneregiment afterwards, when my services for the State were about closed. 

Brigadier-General John Pope was stationed at Springfield, as UnitedStates mustering officer, all the time I was in the State service. Hewas a native of Illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominentmen in the State. I was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. While I was on duty at Springfield the senators, representatives inCongress, ax-governors and the State legislators were nearly all at theState capital. The only acquaintance I made among them was with thegovernor, whom I was serving, and, by chance, with Senator S. A. Douglas. The only members of Congress I knew were Washburne and PhilipFoulk. With the former, though he represented my district and we werecitizens of the same town, I only became acquainted at the meeting whenthe first company of Galena volunteers was raised. Foulk I had known inSt. Louis when I was a citizen of that city. I had been three years atWest Point with Pope and had served with him a short time during theMexican war, under General Taylor. I saw a good deal of him during myservice with the State. On one occasion he said to me that I ought togo into the United States service. I told him I intended to do so ifthere was a war. He spoke of his acquaintance with the public men ofthe State, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position andthat he would do all he could for me. I declined to receive endorsementfor permission to fight for my country. 

Going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with GeneralPope, I wrote from Galena the following letter to the Adjutant-Generalof the Army. 

GALENA, ILLINOIS, May 24, 1861. 

COL. L. THOMAS Adjt. Gen. U. S. A. , Washington, D. C. 

SIR:--Having served for fifteen years in the regular army, includingfour years at West Point, and feeling it the duty of every one who hasbeen educated at the Government expense to offer their services for thesupport of that Government, I have the honor, very respectfully, totender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as maybe offered. I would say, in view of my present age and length ofservice, I feel myself competent to command a regiment, if thePresident, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. 

Since the first call of the President I have been serving on the staffof the Governor of this State, rendering such aid as I could in theorganization of our State militia, and am still engaged in thatcapacity. A letter addressed to me at Springfield, Illinois, will reachme. 

I am very respectfully, Your obt. Svt. , U. S. GRANT. 

This letter failed to elicit an answer from the Adjutant-General of theArmy. I presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could nothave been submitted to higher authority. Subsequent to the war GeneralBadeau having heard of this letter applied to the War Department for acopy of it. The letter could not be found and no one recollected everhaving seen it. I took no copy when it was written. Long after theapplication of General Badeau, General Townsend, who had becomeAdjutant-General of the Army, while packing up papers preparatory to theremoval of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. It had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. 

I felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of aregiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether I would be equal to theposition. But I had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered infrom the State of Illinois, and some from Indiana, and felt that if theycould command a regiment properly, and with credit, I could also. 

Having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regimentsauthorized by the State legislature, I asked and obtained of thegovernor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in Covington, Kentucky, immediately opposite Cincinnati. General McClellan had beenmade a major-general and had his headquarters at Cincinnati. In realityI wanted to see him. I had known him slightly at West Point, where weserved one year together, and in the Mexican war. I was in hopes thatwhen he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. I called ontwo successive days at his office but failed to see him on eitheroccasion, and returned to Springfield. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

APPOINTED COLONEL OF THE 21ST ILLINOIS--PERSONNEL OF THE REGIMENT--GENERAL LOGAN--MARCH TO MISSOURI--MOVEMENT AGAINST HARRIS AT FLORIDA, MO. --GENERAL POPE IN COMMAND--STATIONED AT MEXICO, MO. 

While I was absent from the State capital on this occasion thePresident's second call for troops was issued. This time it was for300, 000 men, for three years or the war. This brought into the UnitedStates service all the regiments then in the State service. These hadelected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted withtheir organizations as they were, except in two instances. A Chicagoregiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to thecolonelcy. When it came to taking the field the regiment asked to haveanother appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen madelieutenant-colonel. The 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me atMattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of theirselection in any position. While I was still absent Governor Yatesappointed me colonel of this latter regiment. A few days after I was incharge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near Springfield. 

My regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good socialposition as any in their section of the State. It embraced the sons offarmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers andministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positionsthemselves. There were also men in it who could be led astray; and thecolonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fullycapable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. It wassaid that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from theirposts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. When there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have someone else to lead them. I found it very hard work for a few days tobring all the men into anything like subordination; but the greatmajority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regulararmy punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. 

The ten regiments which had volunteered in the State service for thirtydays, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into theNational service if called upon within that time. When they volunteeredthe government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. Men werecalled now for three years or the war. They felt that this change ofperiod released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. When I wasappointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the State service. About the time they were to be mustered into the United States service, such of them as would go, two members of Congress from the State, McClernand and Logan, appeared at the capital and I was introduced tothem. I had never seen either of them before, but I had read a greatdeal about them, and particularly about Logan, in the newspapers. Bothwere democratic members of Congress, and Logan had been elected from thesouthern district of the State, where he had a majority of eighteenthousand over his Republican competitor. His district had been settledoriginally by people from the Southern States, and at the breaking outof secession they sympathized with the South. At the first outbreak ofwar some of them joined the Southern army; many others were preparing todo so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the Union, andmade it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which Nationaltroops had to pass in southern Illinois, as it was in Kentucky or any ofthe border slave states. Logan's popularity in this district wasunbounded. He knew almost enough of the people in it by their Christiannames, to form an ordinary congressional district. As he went inpolitics, so his district was sure to go. The Republican papers hadbeen demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questionswhich at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. Some werevery bitter in their denunciations of his silence. Logan was not a manto be coerced into an utterance by threats. He did, however, come outin a speech before the adjournment of the special session of Congresswhich was convened by the President soon after his inauguration, andannounced his undying loyalty and devotion to the Union. But I had nothappened to see that speech, so that when I first met Logan myimpressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. McClernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for themaintenance of the Union and had been praised accordingly by theRepublican papers. The gentlemen who presented these two members ofCongress asked me if I would have any objections to their addressing myregiment. I hesitated a little before answering. It was but a few daysbefore the time set for mustering into the United States service such ofthe men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. I hadsome doubt as to the effect a speech from Logan might have; but as hewas with McClernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions ofthe day were well known, I gave my consent. McClernand spoke first; andLogan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for forceand eloquence. It breathed a loyalty and devotion to the Union whichinspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered toremain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to beararms against it. They entered the United States service almost to aman. 

General Logan went to his part of the State and gave his attention toraising troops. The very men who at first made it necessary to guardthe roads in southern Illinois became the defenders of the Union. Loganentered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose tothe rank of major-general. His district, which had promised at first togive much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it fortroops, without resorting to the draft. There was no call made whenthere were not more volunteers than were asked for. That congressionaldistrict stands credited at the War Department to-day with furnishingmore men for the army than it was called on to supply. 

I remained in Springfield with my regiment until the 3d of July, when Iwas ordered to Quincy, Illinois. By that time the regiment was in agood state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in thecompany drill. There was direct railroad communication betweenSpringfield and Quincy, but I thought it would be good preparation forthe troops to march there. We had no transportation for our camp andgarrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3dof July we started. There was no hurry, but fair marches were madeevery day until the Illinois River was crossed. There I was overtakenby a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had beenchanged to Ironton, Missouri, and ordering me to halt where I was andawait the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the IllinoisRiver to take the regiment to St. Louis. The boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. Weremained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an Illinois regiment wassurrounded by rebels at a point on the Hannibal and St. Joe Railroadsome miles west of Palmyra, in Missouri, and I was ordered to proceedwith all dispatch to their relief. We took the cars and reached Quincyin a few hours. 

When I left Galena for the last time to take command of the 21stregiment I took with me my oldest son, Frederick D. Grant, then a lad ofeleven years of age. On receiving the order to take rail for Quincy Iwrote to Mrs. Grant, to relieve what I supposed would be her greatanxiety for one so young going into danger, that I would send Fred homefrom Quincy by river. I received a prompt letter in reply decidedlydisapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowedto accompany me. It came too late. Fred was already on his way up theMississippi bound for Dubuque, Iowa, from which place there was arailroad to Galena. 

My sensations as we approached what I supposed might be "a field ofbattle" were anything but agreeable. I had been in all the engagementsin Mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not incommand. If some one else had been colonel and I had beenlieutenant-colonel I do not think I would have felt any trepidation. Before we were prepared to cross the Mississippi River at Quincy myanxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment camestraggling into town. I am inclined to think both sides got frightenedand ran away. 

I took my regiment to Palmyra and remained there for a few days, untilrelieved by the 19th Illinois infantry. From Palmyra I proceeded toSalt River, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by theenemy. Colonel John M. Palmer at that time commanded the 13th Illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuildingthis bridge. Palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments aslong as we remained together. The bridge was finished in about twoweeks, and I received orders to move against Colonel Thomas Harris, whowas said to be encamped at the little town of Florida, some twenty-fivemiles south of where we then were. 

At the time of which I now write we had no transportation and thecountry about Salt River was sparsely settled, so that it took some daysto collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrisonequipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week'ssupply of provision and some ammunition. While preparations for themove were going on I felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the roadand found every house deserted I was anything but easy. In thetwenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossedours. As soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horsescould carry them. I kept my men in the ranks and forbade their enteringany of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. We halted atnight on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. Harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being nearwater. The hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerableheight, possibly more than a hundred feet. As we approached the brow ofthe hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, andpossibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept gettinghigher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. Iwould have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I hadnot the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. When we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view Ihalted. The place where Harris had been encamped a few days before wasstill there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. My heart resumed its place. It occurred tome at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been ofhim. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; but itwas one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of thewar, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though Ialways felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that he had as muchreason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable. 

Inquiries at the village of Florida divulged the fact that ColonelHarris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation wasbeing collected took time by the forelock and left Florida before I hadstarted from Salt River. He had increased the distance between us byforty miles. The next day I started back to my old camp at Salt Riverbridge. The citizens living on the line of our march had returned totheir houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet usnow. They had evidently been led to believe that the National troopscarried death and devastation with them wherever they went. 

In a short time after our return to Salt River bridge I was ordered withmy regiment to the town of Mexico. General Pope was then commanding thedistrict embracing all of the State of Missouri between the Mississippiand Missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of Mexico. Iwas assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops inthe immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and asection of artillery. There was one regiment encamped by the side ofmine. I assumed command of the whole and the first night sent thecommander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. Not wishingto be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign forhis regiment for the night. When he was informed that the countersignsent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it wasdifficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarrantedinterference of one colonel over another. No doubt he attributed it forthe time to the presumption of a graduate of West Point over a volunteerpure and simple. But the question was soon settled and we had nofurther trouble. 

My arrival in Mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regimentsin which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had beenin the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helpingthemselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. They carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man theyfound take the oath of allegiance to the government. I at oncepublished orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private housesunless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating privateproperty to their own or to government uses. The people were no longermolested or made afraid. I received the most marked courtesy from thecitizens of Mexico as long as I remained there. 

Up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of thesoldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received sometraining on the march from Springfield to the Illinois River. There wasnow a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. While Iwas at West Point the tactics used in the army had been Scott's and themusket the flint lock. I had never looked at a copy of tactics from thetime of my graduation. My standing in that branch of studies had beennear the foot of the class. In the Mexican war in the summer of 1846, Ihad been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had notbeen at a battalion drill since. The arms had been changed since thenand Hardee's tactics had been adopted. I got a copy of tactics andstudied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first dayto the commands I had thus learned. By pursuing this course from day today I thought I would soon get through the volume. 

We were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scatteringsuburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when I got my regiment inline and rode to the front I soon saw that if I attempted to follow thelesson I had studied I would have to clear away some of the houses andgarden fences to make room. I perceived at once, however, that Hardee'stactics--a mere translation from the French with Hardee's name attached--was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age appliedto Scott's system. The commands were abbreviated and the movementexpedited. Under the old tactics almost every change in the order ofmarch was preceded by a "halt, " then came the change, and then the"forward march. " With the new tactics all these changes could be madewhile in motion. I found no trouble in giving commands that would takemy regiment where I wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. I do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered thatI had never studied the tactics that I used. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

COMMISSIONED BRIGADIER-GENERAL--COMMAND AT IRONTON, MO. --JEFFERSON CITY--CAPE GIRARDEAU--GENERAL PRENTISS--SEIZURE OF PADUCAH--HEADQUARTERS ATCAIRO. 

I had not been in Mexico many weeks when, reading a St. Louis paper, I found the President had asked the Illinois delegation in Congressto recommend some citizens of the State for the position ofbrigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as firston a list of seven. I was very much surprised because, as I have said, my acquaintance with the Congressmen was very limited and I did not knowof anything I had done to inspire such confidence. The papers of thenext day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to theSenate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. 

When appointed brigadier-general I at once thought it proper that one ofmy aides should come from the regiment I had been commanding, and soselected Lieutenant C. B. Lagow. While living in St. Louis, I had had adesk in the law office of McClellan, Moody and Hillyer. Difference inviews between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, andgeneral hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. Hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. I asked him to accept a place on my staff. I also wanted to take oneman from my new home, Galena. The canvass in the Presidential campaignthe fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of John A. Rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the State. Hewas also a candidate for elector on the Douglas ticket. When Sumter wasfired upon and the integrity of the Union threatened, there was no manmore ready to serve his country than he. I wrote at once asking him toaccept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank ofcaptain, on my staff. He was about entering the service as major of anew regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the State; buthe threw this up and accepted my offer. 

Neither Hillyer nor Lagow proved to have any particular taste or specialqualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resignedduring the Vicksburg campaign; the latter I relieved after the battle ofChattanooga. Rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose tothe rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the General of theArmy--an office created for him--before the war closed. He was an ableman, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically toa request which he thought should not be granted that the person he wasaddressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressingthe matter. General Rawlins was a very useful officer in other waysthan this. I became very much attached to him. 

Shortly after my promotion I was ordered to Ironton, Missouri, tocommand a district in that part of the State, and took the 21stIllinois, my old regiment, with me. Several other regiments wereordered to the same destination about the same time. Ironton is on theIron Mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of St. Louis, andsituated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. When Ireached there, about the 8th of August, Colonel B. Gratz Brown--afterwards Governor of Missouri and in 1872 Vice-Presidential candidate--was in command. Some of his troops were ninety days' men and theirtime had expired some time before. The men had no clothing but whatthey had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it wouldhardly stay on. General Hardee--the author of the tactics I did notstudy--was at Greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it wassaid, with five thousand Confederate troops. Under these circumstancesColonel Brown's command was very much demoralized. A squadron ofcavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. Brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever hasbeen since. I relieved him and sent all his men home within a day ortwo, to be mustered out of service. 

Within ten days after reading Ironton I was prepared to take theoffensive against the enemy at Greenville. I sent a column east out ofthe valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and westand come into the Greenville road ten miles south of Ironton. Anothercolumn marched on the direct road and went into camp at the pointdesignated for the two columns to meet. I was to ride out the nextmorning and take personal command of the movement. My experienceagainst Harris, in northern Missouri, had inspired me with confidence. But when the evening train came in, it brought General B. M. Prentisswith orders to take command of the district. His orders did not relieveme, but I knew that by law I was senior, and at that time even thePresident did not have the authority to assign a junior to command asenior of the same grade. I therefore gave General Prentiss thesituation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, andstarted for St. Louis the same day. The movement against the rebels atGreenville went no further. 

From St. Louis I was ordered to Jefferson City, the capital of theState, to take command. General Sterling Price, of the Confederatearmy, was thought to be threatening the capital, Lexington, Chillicotheand other comparatively large towns in the central part of Missouri. Ifound a good many troops in Jefferson City, but in the greatestconfusion, and no one person knew where they all were. ColonelMulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated asyet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. I found that volunteers had obtained permission from the departmentcommander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; somebattalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according tothe number of men they brought into the service. There were recruitingstations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over thedoors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for whichrecruits at that station would be received. The law required allvolunteers to serve for three years or the war. But in Jefferson Cityin August, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and ondifferent conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for ayear, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, otherswere not to be sent out of the State. The recruits were principally menfrom regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound forthree years if the war lasted that long. 

The city was filled with Union fugitives who had been driven by guerillabands to take refuge with the National troops. They were in adeplorable condition and must have starved but for the support thegovernment gave them. They had generally made their escape with a teamor two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. Alittle bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown intothe wagon. All else of their worldly goods were abandoned andappropriated by their former neighbors; for the Union man in Missouriwho staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately underthe protection of the National troops, was at perpetual war with hisneighbors. I stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troopsabout the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. Orderwas soon restored. 

I had been at Jefferson City but a few days when I was directed fromdepartment headquarters to fit out an expedition to Lexington, Booneville and Chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in thosecities all the funds they had and send them to St. Louis. The westernarmy had not yet been supplied with transportation. It became necessarytherefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers withthe rebellion or to hire those of Union men. This afforded anopportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within ourlines as had teams suitable for our purposes. They accepted the servicewith alacrity. As fast as troops could be got off they were moved westsome twenty miles or more. In seven or eight days from my assumingcommand at Jefferson City, I had all the troops, except a smallgarrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself thenext day. 

But my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, Isaw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be Colonel JeffersonC. Davis. I had never met him before, but he introduced himself byhanding me an order for him to proceed to Jefferson City and relieve meof the command. The orders directed that I should report at departmentheadquarters at St. Louis without delay, to receive important specialinstructions. It was about an hour before the only regular train of theday would start. I therefore turned over to Colonel Davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry outthe department instructions already described. I had at that time butone staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed byan adjutant-general. In an hour after being relieved from the command Iwas on my way to St. Louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) tofollow the next day with our horses and baggage. 

The "important special instructions" which I received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in Missouri, as well asall southern Illinois. At first I was to take personal command of acombined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of ColonelJeff. Thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who wasdisputing with us the possession of south-east Missouri. Troops hadbeen ordered to move from Ironton to Cape Girardeau, sixty or seventymiles to the south-east, on the Mississippi River; while the forces atCape Girardeau had been ordered to move to Jacksonville, ten miles outtowards Ironton; and troops at Cairo and Bird's Point, at the junctionof the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readinessto go down the Mississippi to Belmont, eighteen miles below, to be movedwest from there when an officer should come to command them. I was theofficer who had been selected for this purpose. Cairo was to become myheadquarters when the expedition terminated. 

In pursuance of my orders I established my temporary headquarters atCape Girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer atJackson, to inform me of the approach of General Prentiss from Ironton. Hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rationsto Jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. NeitherGeneral Prentiss nor Colonel Marsh, who commanded at Jackson, knew theirdestination. I drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until I should hear of the junction of ourtroops at Jackson. Two or three days after my arrival at CapeGirardeau, word came that General Prentiss was approaching that place(Jackson). I started at once to meet him there and to give him hisorders. As I turned the first corner of a street after starting, I sawa column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. I turnedand rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of thecolumn. I found there General Prentiss himself, with a large escort. He had halted his troops at Jackson for the night, and had come onhimself to Cape Girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow himin the morning. I gave the General his orders--which stopped him atJackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under anotherbrigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. He had been a brigadier, in command at Cairo, while I was musteringofficer at Springfield without any rank. But we were nominated at thesame time for the United States service, and both our commissions boredate May 17th, 1861. By virtue of my former army rank I was, by law, the senior. General Prentiss failed to get orders to his troops toremain at Jackson, and the next morning early they were reported asapproaching Cape Girardeau. I then ordered the General veryperemptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to Jackson. He obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them toJackson, and went to St. Louis and reported himself. This broke up theexpedition. But little harm was done, as Jeff. Thompson moved light andhad no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. He was as much athome in Arkansas as he was in Missouri and would keep out of the way ofa superior force. Prentiss was sent to another part of the State. 

General Prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that hewould not have committed later in the war. When I came to know himbetter, I regretted it much. In consequence of this occurrence he wasoff duty in the field when the principal campaign at the West was goingon, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could beobtained. He would have been next to myself in rank in the district ofsouth-east Missouri, by virtue of his services in the Mexican war. Hewas a brave and very earnest soldier. No man in the service was moresincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; nonemore ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. 

On the 4th of September I removed my headquarters to Cairo and foundColonel Richard Oglesby in command of the post. We had never met, atleast not to my knowledge. After my promotion I had ordered mybrigadier-general's uniform from New York, but it had not yet arrived, so that I was in citizen's dress. The Colonel had his office full ofpeople, mostly from the neighboring States of Missouri and Kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. He evidently did not catch my namewhen I was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the tablewhere he was seated and writing the order assuming command of thedistrict of south-east Missouri, Colonel Richard J. Oglesby to commandthe post at Bird's Point, and handing it to him, he put on an expressionof surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some oneidentify me. But he surrendered the office without question. 

The day after I assumed command at Cairo a man came to me who said hewas a scout of General Fremont. He reported that he had just come fromColumbus, a point on the Mississippi twenty miles below on the Kentuckyside, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, toseize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee. There was no time fordelay; I reported by telegraph to the department commander theinformation I had received, and added that I was taking steps to get offthat night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that importantpoint. There was a large number of steamers lying at Cairo and a goodmany boatmen were staying in the town. It was the work of only a fewhours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. Troopswere also designated to go aboard. The distance from Cairo to Paducahis about forty-five miles. I did not wish to get there before daylightof the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchorout in the stream until the time to start. Not having received ananswer to my first dispatch, I again telegraphed to departmentheadquarters that I should start for Paducah that night unless Ireceived further orders. Hearing nothing, we started before midnightand arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy byprobably not over six or eight hours. It proved very fortunate that theexpedition against Jeff. Thompson had been broken up. Had it not been, the enemy would have seized Paducah and fortified it, to our very greatannoyance. 

When the National troops entered the town the citizens were taken bysurprise. I never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces ofthe people. Men, women and children came out of their doors lookingpale and frightened at the presence of the invader. They were expectingrebel troops that day. In fact, nearly four thousand men from Columbuswere at that time within ten or fifteen miles of Paducah on their way tooccupy the place. I had but two regiments and one battery with me, butthe enemy did not know this and returned to Columbus. I stationed mytroops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, leftgunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on myreturn to Cairo. Before leaving, however, I addressed a short printedproclamation to the citizens of Paducah assuring them of our peacefulintentions, that we had come among them to protect them against theenemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue theirusual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. This was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have muchpreferred the presence of the other army. I reinforced Paducah rapidlyfrom the troops at Cape Girardeau; and a day or two later General C. F. Smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at Cairo and was assignedto the command of the post at the mouth of the Tennessee. In a shorttime it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupySmithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland. 

The State government of Kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the North and theSouth, and the governor really seemed to think the State had a perfectright to maintain a neutral position. The rebels already occupied twotowns in the State, Columbus and Hickman, on the Mississippi; and at thevery moment the National troops were entering Paducah from the Ohiofront, General Lloyd Tilghman--a Confederate--with his staff and a smalldetachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as Ihave already said, nearly four thousand Confederate troops were onKentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. But, in theestimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this didnot justify the National authorities in invading the soil of Kentucky. I informed the legislature of the State of what I was doing, and myaction was approved by the majority of that body. On my return to CairoI found authority from department headquarters for me to take Paducah"if I felt strong enough, " but very soon after I was reprimanded fromthe same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warnedagainst a repetition of the offence. 

Soon after I took command at Cairo, General Fremont entered intoarrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at Camp Jacksonin the month of May. I received orders to pass them through my lines toColumbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. Quite anumber of these prisoners I had been personally acquainted with beforethe war. Such of them as I had so known were received at myheadquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was notdisturbed by their presence. On one occasion when several were presentin my office my intention to visit Cape Girardeau the next day, toinspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. Something transpiredwhich postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government waspassing a point some twenty or more miles above Cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. Amajor, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, cameat once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for mydelivery. It was hard to persuade him that I was not there. Thisofficer was Major Barrett, of St. Louis. I had been acquainted with hisfamily before the war. 

CHAPTER XX. 

GENERAL FREMONT IN COMMAND--MOVEMENT AGAINST BELMONT--BATTLE OF BELMONT--A NARROW ESCAPE--AFTER THE BATTLE. 

From the occupation of Paducah up to the early part of November nothingimportant occurred with the troops under my command. I was reinforcedfrom time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatoryfor the service which was sure to come. By the 1st of November I hadnot fewer than 20, 000 men, most of them under good drill and ready tomeet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in anengagement. They were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almostin hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fightagainst. I asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move againstColumbus. It could have been taken soon after the occupation ofPaducah; but before November it was so strongly fortified that it wouldhave required a large force and a long siege to capture it. 

In the latter part of October General Fremont took the field in personand moved from Jefferson City against General Sterling Price, who wasthen in the State of Missouri with a considerable command. About thefirst of November I was directed from department headquarters to make ademonstration on both sides of the Mississippi River with the view ofdetaining the rebels at Columbus within their lines. Before my troopscould be got off, I was notified from the same quarter that there weresome 3, 000 of the enemy on the St. Francis River about fifty miles west, or south-west, from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force againstthem. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops sufficient tocompete with the reported number of the enemy. On the 5th word camefrom the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large forcefrom Columbus to be moved by boats down the Mississippi and up the WhiteRiver, in Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed toprevent this movement if possible. I accordingly sent a regiment fromBird's Point under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace to overtake and reinforceOglesby, with orders to march to New Madrid, a point some distance belowColumbus, on the Missouri side. At the same time I directed General C. F. Smith to move all the troops he could spare from Paducah directlyagainst Columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town toawait further orders from me. Then I gathered up all the troops atCairo and Fort Holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down theriver on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. My force consisted of a little over 3, 000 men and embraced fiveregiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. Wedropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of Columbus, debarked a few men on the Kentucky side and established pickets toconnect with the troops from Paducah. 

I had no orders which contemplated an attack by the National troops, nordid I intend anything of the kind when I started out from Cairo; butafter we started I saw that the officers and men were elated at theprospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they hadvolunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. I did not seehow I could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to Cairo without an effort to do something. Columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison muchmore numerous than the force I had with me. It would not do, therefore, to attack that point. About two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, Ilearned that the enemy was crossing troops from Columbus to the westbank to be dispatched, presumably, after Oglesby. I knew there was asmall camp of Confederates at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus, and I speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the Missouriside, capture Belmont, break up the camp and return. Accordingly, thepickets above Columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight theboats moved out from shore. In an hour we were debarking on the westbank of the Mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at Columbus. 

The ground on the west shore of the river, opposite Columbus, is low andin places marshy and cut up with sloughs. The soil is rich and thetimber large and heavy. There were some small clearings between Belmontand the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered withthe native forests. We landed in front of a cornfield. When thedebarkation commenced, I took a regiment down the river to post it as aguard against surprise. At that time I had no staff officer who couldbe trusted with that duty. In the woods, at a short distance below theclearing, I found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high waterbecame a slough or bayou. I placed the men in the hollow, gave themtheir instructions and ordered them to remain there until they wereproperly relieved. These troops, with the gunboats, were to protect ourtransports. 

Up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. From Columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transportsloaded with troops. But the force from Paducah was threatening themfrom the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if Columbuswas our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. Theydoubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assaulton Columbus before their divided command could be united. 

About eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marchingby the flank. After moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, I halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth oftimber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force asskirmishers. By this time the enemy discovered that we were moving uponBelmont and sent out troops to meet us. Soon after we had started inline, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. Thiscontinued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemybeing forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. Early inthis engagement my horse was shot under me, but I got another from oneof my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river wasreached. 

The officers and men engaged at Belmont were then under fire for thefirst time. Veterans could not have behaved better than they did up tothe moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point they becamedemoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. Theenemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear groundon which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the riverbank, which protected him from our shots and from view. Thisprecipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the National forces topick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the onlyartificial defence the enemy had. The moment the camp was reached ourmen laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick uptrophies. Some of the higher officers were little better than theprivates. They galloped about from one cluster of men to another and atevery halt delivered a short eulogy upon the Union cause and theachievements of the command. 

All this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, laycrouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrenderif summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, theyworked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and ourtransports. I saw at the same time two steamers coming from theColumbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--withsoldiers from boiler-deck to roof. Some of my men were engaged infiring from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out ofrange, cheering at every shot. I tried to get them to turn their gunsupon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. My efforts were invain. At last I directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. This drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights ofColumbus. They had abstained from firing before, probably because theywere afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, untilthe camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of theirfriends. About this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank wereseen in line up the river between us and our transports. The alarm"surrounded" was given. The guns of the enemy and the report of beingsurrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. At firstsome of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to beplaced in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do butsurrender. But when I announced that we had cut our way in and couldcut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers andsoldiers. They formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. The enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. Again the Confederates sought shelter under the river banks. We couldnot stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seencrossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer ourtransports than we were. It would be prudent to get them behind us; butwe were not again molested on our way to the boats. 

From the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to thehouses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. I now set the troopsto bringing their wounded to the boats. After this had gone on for somelittle time I rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visitthe guard I had stationed over the approach to our transports. I knewthe enemy had crossed over from Columbus in considerable numbers andmight be expected to attack us as we were embarking. This guard wouldbe encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, wouldbe able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. My surprise wasgreat to find there was not a single man in the trench. Riding back tothe boat I found the officer who had commanded the guard and learnedthat he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. At firstI ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some timeto get the men together and march them back to their position, Icountermanded the order. Then fearing that the enemy we had seencrossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, I rode out inthe field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether theenemy was passing. The field was grown up with corn so tall and thickas to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directlyalong the rows. Even in that direction, owing to the overhanging bladesof corn, the view was not extensive. I had not gone more than a fewhundred yards when I saw a body of troops marching past me not fiftyyards away. I looked at them for a moment and then turned my horsetowards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when I thoughtmyself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse couldcarry me. When at the river bank I still had to ride a few hundredyards to the point where the nearest transport lay. 

The cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of adense forest. Before I got back the enemy had entered this forest andhad opened a brisk fire upon the boats. Our men, with the exception ofdetails that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now eitheraboard the transports or very near them. Those who were not aboard soongot there, and the boats pushed off. I was the only man of the Nationalarmy between the rebels and our transports. The captain of a boat thathad just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered theengineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. My horse seemed to take in the situation. There was no path down thebank and every one acquainted with the Mississippi River knows that itsbanks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from theperpendicular. My horse put his fore feet over the bank withouthesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid downthe bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, overa single gang plank. I dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. 

The Mississippi River was low on the 7th of November, 1861, so that thebanks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks ofthe steamers. The rebels were some distance back from the river, sothat their fire was high and did us but little harm. Our smoke-stackwas riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on theboats, two of whom were soldiers. When I first went on deck I enteredthe captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on asofa. I did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on thedeck to observe what was going on. I had scarcely left when a musketball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through itand lodged in the foot. 

When the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned itwith vigor. They were well out in the stream and some distance down, sothat they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clearthe banks of the river. Their position very nearly enfiladed the lineof the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. The executionwas very great, as we could see at the time and as I afterwards learnedmore positively. We were very soon out of range and went peacefully onour way to Cairo, every man feeling that Belmont was a great victory andthat he had contributed his share to it. 

Our loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About 125 ofour wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We returned with 175prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. The loss of theenemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about 2, 500 men, exclusive of the guard left with thetransports. The enemy had about 7, 000; but this includes the troopsbrought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first defence ofBelmont. 

The two objects for which the battle of Belmont was fought were fullyaccomplished. The enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops fromColumbus. His losses were very heavy for that period of the war. Columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, totake them home for medical treatment or burial. I learned later, when Ihad moved further south, that Belmont had caused more mourning thanalmost any other battle up to that time. The National troops acquired aconfidence in themselves at Belmont that did not desert them through thewar. 

The day after the battle I met some officers from General Polk'scommand, arranged for permission to bury our dead at Belmont and alsocommenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. When our men wentto bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conductedbelow the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. Some of theofficers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request wasrefused with the statement that we had no dead there. 

While on the truce-boat I mentioned to an officer, whom I had known bothat West Point and in the Mexican war, that I was in the cornfield neartheir troops when they passed; that I had been on horseback and had worna soldier's overcoat at the time. This officer was on General Polk'sstaff. He said both he and the general had seen me and that Polk hadsaid to his men, "There is a Yankee; you may try your marksmanship onhim if you wish, " but nobody fired at me. 

Belmont was severely criticised in the North as a wholly unnecessarybattle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from thebeginning. If it had not been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probablyhave been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. Then Ishould have been culpable indeed. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

GENERAL HALLECK IN COMMAND--COMMANDING THE DISTRICT OF CAIRO--MOVEMENTON FORT HENRY--CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY. 

While at Cairo I had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebelofficers of the Columbus garrison. They seemed to be very fond ofcoming up on steamers under flags of truce. On two or three occasions Iwent down in like manner. When one of their boats was seen coming upcarrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery atFort Holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come nofarther. I would then take a steamer and, with my staff andoccasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. Therewere several officers among them whom I had known before, both at WestPoint and in Mexico. Seeing these officers who had been educated for theprofession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a farmore efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the Southpossessed over the North at the beginning of the rebellion. They hadfrom thirty to forty per cent. Of the educated soldiers of the Nation. They had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers hadto find employment with the troops from their own States. In this waywhat there was of military education and training was distributedthroughout their whole army. The whole loaf was leavened. 

The North had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but thebulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally withtheir old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. Inthe Army of the Potomac there was what was known as the "regularbrigade, " in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngestsecond lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. So, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in numberto each, were men educated for their profession. Some of these wentinto battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirelywithout military training. This state of affairs gave me an idea whichI expressed while at Cairo; that the government ought to disband theregular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify thedisbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the warlasted except as volunteers. The register should be kept up, but thenames of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at theclose, should be stricken from it. 

On the 9th of November, two days after the battle of Belmont, Major-General H. W. Halleck superseded General Fremont in command of theDepartment of the Missouri. The limits of his command took in Arkansasand west Kentucky east to the Cumberland River. From the battle ofBelmont until early in February, 1862, the troops under my command didlittle except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be beforethem. 

The enemy at this time occupied a line running from the MississippiRiver at Columbus to Bowling Green and Mill Springs, Kentucky. Each ofthese positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on theTennessee and Cumberland rivers near the Tennessee state line. Theworks on the Tennessee were called Fort Heiman and Fort Henry, and thaton the Cumberland was Fort Donelson. At these points the two riversapproached within eleven miles of each other. The lines of rifle pitsat each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so thatthe garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. These positionswere of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondinglyimportant for us to possess ourselves of. With Fort Henry in our handswe had a navigable stream open to us up to Muscle Shoals, in Alabama. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee at Eastport, Mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to theshoals. This road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to beof use to them for through traffic the moment Fort Henry became ours. Fort Donelson was the gate to Nashville--a place of great military andpolitical importance--and to a rich country extending far east inKentucky. These two points in our possession the enemy wouldnecessarily be thrown back to the Memphis and Charleston road, or to theboundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would belost to them for through communication. 

The designation of my command had been changed after Halleck's arrival, from the District of South-east Missouri to the District of Cairo, andthe small district commanded by General C. F. Smith, embracing themouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, had been added to myjurisdiction. Early in January, 1862, I was directed by GeneralMcClellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance infavor of Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, who commanded theDepartment of the Ohio, with headquarters at Louisville, and who wasconfronting General S. B. Buckner with a larger Confederate force atBowling Green. It was supposed that Buell was about to make some moveagainst the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent thesending of troops from Columbus, Fort Henry or Donelson to Buckner. Iat once ordered General Smith to send a force up the west bank of theTennessee to threaten forts Heiman and Henry; McClernand at the sametime with a force of 6, 000 men was sent out into west Kentucky, threatening Columbus with one column and the Tennessee River withanother. I went with McClernand's command. The weather was very bad;snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, wereintolerable. We were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. The object of theexpedition was accomplished. The enemy did not send reinforcements toBowling Green, and General George H. Thomas fought and won the battle ofMill Springs before we returned. 

As a result of this expedition General Smith reported that he thought itpracticable to capture Fort Heiman. This fort stood on high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry on the opposite side of the river, andits possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure thecapture of Fort Henry. This report of Smith's confirmed views I hadpreviously held, that the true line of operations for us was up theTennessee and Cumberland rivers. With us there, the enemy would becompelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the State ofKentucky. On the 6th of January, before receiving orders for thisexpedition, I had asked permission of the general commanding thedepartment to go to see him at St. Louis. My object was to lay thisplan of campaign before him. Now that my views had been confirmed by soable a general as Smith, I renewed my request to go to St. Louis on whatI deemed important military business. The leave was granted, but notgraciously. I had known General Halleck but very slightly in the oldarmy, not having met him either at West Point or during the Mexican war. I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated theobject of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I hadnot uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan waspreposterous. I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen. 

Flag-officer Foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in theneighborhood of Cairo and, though in another branch of the service, wassubject to the command of General Halleck. He and I consulted freelyupon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to thefeasibility of the campaign up the Tennessee. Notwithstanding therebuff I had received from my immediate chief, I therefore, on the 28thof January, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, Icould take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee. " This time I wasbacked by Flag-officer Foote, who sent a similar dispatch. On the 29thI wrote fully in support of the proposition. On the 1st of February Ireceived full instructions from department headquarters to move uponFort Henry. On the 2d the expedition started. 

In February, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up atCairo for want of employment, the Mississippi River being closed againstnavigation below that point. There were also many men in the town whoseoccupation had been following the river in various capacities, fromcaptain down to deck hand But there were not enough of either boats ormen to move at one time the 17, 000 men I proposed to take with me up theTennessee. I loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent General McClernand in command. I followed with one of thelater boats and found McClernand had stopped, very properly, nine milesbelow Fort Henry. Seven gunboats under Flag-officer Foote hadaccompanied the advance. The transports we had with us had to return toPaducah to bring up a division from there, with General C. F. Smith incommand. 

Before sending the boats back I wanted to get the troops as near to theenemy as I could without coming within range of their guns. There was astream emptying into the Tennessee on the east side, apparently at aboutlong range distance below the fort. On account of the narrow water-shedseparating the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers at that point, the streammust be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, inFebruary, it was a torrent. It would facilitate the investment of FortHenry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. Totest whether this could be done I boarded the gunboat Essex andrequested Captain Wm. Porter commanding it, to approach the fort to drawits fire. After we had gone some distance past the mouth of the streamwe drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. Inconsequence I had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to theupper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gunthat sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. One shot passedvery near where Captain Porter and I were standing, struck the deck nearthe stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into theriver. We immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked belowthe mouth of the creek. 

When the landing was completed I returned with the transports to Paducahto hasten up the balance of the troops. I got back on the 5th with theadvance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carrythem. At ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was notyet up. Being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible beforethe enemy could reinforce heavily, I issued my orders for an advance at11 A. M. On the 6th. I felt sure that all the troops would be up by thattime. 

Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the waterbattery a direct fire down the stream. The camp outside the fort wasintrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road toDonelson and Dover. The garrison of the fort and camp was about 2, 800, with strong reinforcements from Donelson halted some miles out. Therewere seventeen heavy guns in the fort. The river was very high, thebanks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. A portion of the ground on which Fort Henry stood was two feet deep inwater. Below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yardsback from the bank on the east side. On the west bank Fort Heiman stoodon high ground, completely commanding Fort Henry. The distance fromFort Henry to Donelson is but eleven miles. The two positions were soimportant to the enemy, AS HE SAW HIS INTEREST, that it was natural tosuppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from whichthey could be got. Prompt action on our part was imperative. 

The plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. The troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack thefort at close quarters. General Smith was to land a brigade of hisdivision on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rearof Heiman. 

At the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. General Smithfound Fort Heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. Thegunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, butthe troops which were to invest Fort Henry were delayed for want ofroads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what wouldin dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. This delay madeno difference in the result. On our first appearance Tilghman had senthis entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left toman the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to Dover andDonelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; andbefore any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on Donelson. He stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solelyto give his troops time to make their escape. 

Tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as thearmament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. Our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards Donelson and picked uptwo guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, thatthe pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. 

All the gunboats engaged were hit many times. The damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, wasslight, except to the Essex. A shell penetrated the boiler of thatvessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteenof whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. Onseveral occasions during the war such details were made when thecomplement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty beforethem. After the fall of Fort Henry Captain Phelps, commanding theiron-clad Carondelet, at my request ascended the Tennessee River andthoroughly destroyed the bridge of the Memphis and Ohio Railroad. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

INVESTMENT OF FORT DONELSON--THE NAVAL OPERATIONS--ATTACK OF THE ENEMY--ASSAULTING THE WORKS--SURRENDER OF THE FORT. 

I informed the department commander of our success at Fort Henry andthat on the 8th I would take Fort Donelson. But the rain continued tofall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagontrains. Then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed withoutthe gunboats. At least it would have been leaving behind a valuablepart of our available force. 

On the 7th, the day after the fall of Fort Henry, I took my staff andthe cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to withinabout a mile of the outer line of works at Donelson. I had knownGeneral Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter howsmall, I could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he wasgiven to hold. I said this to the officers of my staff at the time. Iknew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged thathe would yield to Pillow's pretensions. I met, as I expected, noopposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning thetopography of the country on the way and around Fort Donelson, foundthat there were two roads available for marching; one leading to thevillage of Dover, the other to Donelson. 

Fort Donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from Dover. Thefort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. Onthe east it fronted the Cumberland; to the north it faced Hickman'screek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because ofthe back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, orrather a ravine, opening into the Cumberland. This also was filled withback-water from the river. The fort stood on high ground, some of it asmuch as a hundred feet above the Cumberland. Strong protection to theheavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting awayplaces for them in the bluff. To the west there was a line of riflepits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. Thisline ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one placecrossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and thefort. The ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was verybroken and generally wooded. The trees outside of the rifle-pits hadbeen cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so thattheir tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. The limbs had beentrimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greaterpart of the line. Outside of this intrenched line, and extending abouthalf the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south andopening into Hickman creek at a point north of the fort. The entireside of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis. 

General Halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to getreinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from Cairo. General Hunter sent men freely from Kansas, and a large division underGeneral Nelson, from Buell's army, was also dispatched. Orders went outfrom the War Department to consolidate fragments of companies that werebeing recruited in the Western States so as to make full companies, andto consolidate companies into regiments. General Halleck did notapprove or disapprove of my going to Fort Donelson. He said nothingwhatever to me on the subject. He informed Buell on the 7th that Iwould march against Fort Donelson the next day; but on the 10th hedirected me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly to the landside, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. Ireceived this dispatch in front of Fort Donelson. 

I was very impatient to get to Fort Donelson because I knew theimportance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce itrapidly. I felt that 15, 000 men on the 8th would be more effective than50, 000 a month later. I asked Flag-officer Foote, therefore, to orderhis gunboats still about Cairo to proceed up the Cumberland River andnot to wait for those gone to Eastport and Florence; but the others gotback in time and we started on the 12th. I had moved McClernand out afew miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. 

Just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me ontransports. It was a brigade composed of six full regiments commandedby Colonel Thayer, of Nebraska. As the gunboats were going around toDonelson by the Tennessee, Ohio and Cumberland rivers, I directed Thayerto turn about and go under their convoy. 

I started from Fort Henry with 15, 000 men, including eight batteries andpart of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction todetain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. Thatafternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make theinvestment as complete as possible. General Smith had been directed toleave a portion of his division behind to guard forts Henry and Heiman. He left General Lew. Wallace with 2, 500 men. With the remainder of hisdivision he occupied our left, extending to Hickman creek. McClernandwas on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west fromDover. His right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening intothe Cumberland south of the village. The troops were not intrenched, butthe nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protectedfrom the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. Ourline was generally along the crest of ridges. The artillery wasprotected by being sunk in the ground. The men who were not serving theguns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little backfrom the crest. The greatest suffering was from want of shelter. Itwas midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing andfreezing alternately. It would not do to allow camp-fires except fardown the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allowmany of the troops to remain there at the same time. In the march overfrom Fort Henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets andovercoats. There was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. 

During the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of Wallace and Thayer onthe 14th, the National forces, composed of but 15, 000 men, withoutintrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21, 000, without conflictfurther than what was brought on by ourselves. Only one gunboat hadarrived. There was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by themovement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there wasno actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in frontof McClernand's command. That general had undertaken to capture abattery of the enemy which was annoying his men. Without orders orauthority he sent three regiments to make the assault. The battery wasin the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole armypresent. Of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss onour side was great for the number of men engaged. In this assaultColonel William Morrison fell badly wounded. Up to this time thesurgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the housesnear our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals wereovercrowded. Owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons thesuffering was not so great as it might have been. The hospitalarrangements at Fort Donelson were as complete as it was possible tomake them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack oftents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally ofbut one or two rooms. 

On the return of Captain Walke to Fort Henry on the 10th, I hadrequested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on hisexpedition up the Tennessee, and get possession of the Cumberland as farup towards Donelson as possible. He started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the Carondelet, towed by the steamerAlps. Captain Walke arrived a few miles below Donelson on the 12th, alittle after noon. About the time the advance of troops reached a pointwithin gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the waterbatteries at long range. On the 13th I informed him of my arrival theday before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requestinghim at the same time to attack again that day so that I might takeadvantage of any diversion. The attack was made and many shots fellwithin the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. Theinvestment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troopsengaged would admit of. 

During the night of the 13th Flag-officer Foote arrived with theiron-clads St. Louis, Louisville and Pittsburg and the wooden gunboatsTyler and Conestoga, convoying Thayer's brigade. On the morning of the14th Thayer was landed. Wallace, whom I had ordered over from FortHenry, also arrived about the same time. Up to this time he had beencommanding a brigade belonging to the division of General C. F. Smith. These troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, andGeneral Lew. Wallace was assigned to the command of a division composedof the brigade of Colonel Thayer and other reinforcements that arrivedthe same day. This new division was assigned to the centre, giving thetwo flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a strongerline. 

The plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, whilethe gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters andsilence his guns if possible. Some of the gunboats were to run thebatteries, get above the fort and above the village of Dover. I hadordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to theriver above Dover in case they should be needed there. That positionattained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--anda very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled tosurrender. 

By three in the afternoon of the 14th Flag-officer Foote was ready, andadvanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. After comingin range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but aconstant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bearupon the fort. I occupied a position on shore from which I could seethe advancing navy. The leading boat got within a very short distance ofthe water battery, not further off I think than two hundred yards, and Isoon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visiblydisabled. Then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed forthe day. The gunboat which Flag-officer Foote was on, besides havingbeen hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through nearthe waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. Thetiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, droppedhelplessly back. Two others had their pilot-houses so injured that theyscarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. 

The enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but theywere jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the riverentirely out of the control of the men on board. Of course I onlywitnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at thetime over the repulse. Subsequent reports, now published, show that theenemy telegraphed a great victory to Richmond. The sun went down on thenight of the 14th of February, 1862, leaving the army confronting FortDonelson anything but comforted over the prospects. The weather hadturned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep upfires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, manyhad thrown away their overcoats and blankets. Two of the strongest ofour gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility ofrendering any present assistance. I retired this night not knowing butthat I would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for themen or build huts under the cover of the hills. 

On the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messengerfrom Flag-officer Foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see meon the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before somuch that he could not come himself to me. I at once made mypreparations for starting. I directed my adjutant-general to notifyeach of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to donothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. From the heavy rains that had fallen fordays and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads betweenthe troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads hadbecome cut up so as to be hardly passable. The intense cold of thenight of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. This made travel onhorseback even slower than through the mud; but I went as fast as theroads would allow. 

When I reached the fleet I found the flag-ship was anchored out in thestream. A small boat, however, awaited my arrival and I was soon onboard with the flag-officer. He explained to me in short the conditionin which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, andsuggested that I should intrench while he returned to Mound City withhis disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could havethe necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. I saw the absolutenecessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but Ishould be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. But theenemy relieved me from this necessity. 

When I left the National line to visit Flag-officer Foote I had no ideathat there would be any engagement on land unless I brought it onmyself. The conditions for battle were much more favorable to us thanthey had been for the first two days of the investment. From the 12thto the 14th we had but 15, 000 men of all arms and no gunboats. Now wehad been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division oftroops under General L. Wallace and 2, 500 men brought over from FortHenry belonging to the division of C. F. Smith. The enemy, however, hadtaken the initiative. Just as I landed I met Captain Hillyer of mystaff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safetyof the National troops. He said the enemy had come out of his lines infull force and attacked and scattered McClernand's division, which wasin full retreat. The roads, as I have said, were unfit for making fasttime, but I got to my command as soon as possible. The attack had beenmade on the National right. I was some four or five miles north of ourleft. The line was about three miles long. In reaching the point wherethe disaster had occurred I had to pass the divisions of Smith andWallace. I saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held bySmith; Wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part init. He had, at an opportune time, sent Thayer's brigade to the supportof McClernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within hislines. 

I saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. When I came to the right appearances were different. The enemy had comeout in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. McClernand'sdivision had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. His men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in theircartridge-boxes gave out. There was abundance of ammunition near bylying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was notall of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who hadbeen educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantlysupplied with ammunition during an engagement. When the men foundthemselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops whoseemed to have plenty of it. The division broke and a portion fled, butmost of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of rangeof the fire of the enemy. It must have been about this time that Thayerpushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops thatwere without ammunition. At all events the enemy fell back within hisintrenchments and was there when I got on the field. 

I saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. Noofficer seemed to be giving any directions. The soldiers had theirmuskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. I heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. They seemed to think this indicateda determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as theprovisions held out. I turned to Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "Some of our men are pretty badlydemoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted toforce his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first nowwill be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he getsahead of me. " I determined to make the assault at once on our left. Itwas clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with hisentire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made onthe left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. I directed Colonel Webster to ride with me and call out to the men as wepassed: "Fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemyis trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so. " This actedlike a charm. The men only wanted some one to give them a command. Werode rapidly to Smith's quarters, when I explained the situation to himand directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his wholedivision, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a verythin line to contend with. The general was off in an incredibly shorttime, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while theywere working their way through the abatis intervening between them andthe enemy. The outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night ofthe 15th General Smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within thelines of the enemy. There was now no doubt but that the Confederatesmust surrender or be captured the next day. 

There seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in Dover during the nightof the 15th. General Floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man oftalent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, didnot possess the elements of one. He was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made himafraid. As Secretary of War he had taken a solemn oath to maintain theConstitution of the United States and to uphold the same against all itsenemies. He had betrayed that trust. As Secretary of War he wasreported through the northern press to have scattered the little armythe country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail whensecession occurred. About a year before leaving the Cabinet he hadremoved arms from northern to southern arsenals. He continued in theCabinet of President Buchanan until about the 1st of January, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacymade out of United States territory. Well may he have been afraid tofall into the hands of National troops. He would no doubt have beentried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had hebeen captured. General Pillow, next in command, was conceited, andprided himself much on his services in the Mexican war. He telegraphedto General Johnston, at Nashville, after our men were within the rebelrifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that theSouthern troops had had great success all day. Johnston forwarded thedispatch to Richmond. While the authorities at the capital were readingit Floyd and Pillow were fugitives. 

A council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it wouldbe impossible to hold out longer. General Buckner, who was third inrank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to haveregarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding thedepartment, A. S. Johnston, should get back to his headquarters atNashville. Buckner's report shows, however, that he considered Donelsonlost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at thesacrifice of the command. Being assured that Johnston was already inNashville, Buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, who declined it. It thendevolved upon Buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. Floyd and Pillow took possession of all the river transports at Doverand before morning both were on their way to Nashville, with the brigadeformerly commanded by Floyd and some other troops, in all about 3, 000. Some marched up the east bank of the Cumberland; others went on thesteamers. During the night Forrest also, with his cavalry and someother troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passingbetween our right and the river. They had to ford or swim over theback-water in the little creek just south of Dover. 

Before daylight General Smith brought to me the following letter fromGeneral Buckner:

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862. 

SIR:--In consideration of all the circumstances governing the presentsituation of affairs at this station, I propose to the CommandingOfficer of the Federal forces the appointment of Commissioners to agreeupon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, andin that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A. 

To Brigadier-General U. S. Grant, Com'ding U. S. Forces, Near FortDonelson. 

To this I responded as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD, Camp near Donelson, February 16, 1862. 

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army. 

SIR:--Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment ofCommissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. Noterms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, Your ob't se'v't, U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen. 

To this I received the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE, February 16, 1862. 

To Brig. Gen'l U. S. GRANT, U. S. Army. 

SIR:--The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to anunexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under yourcommand, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of theConfederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrousterms which you propose. 

I am, sir, Your very ob't se'v't, S. B. BUCKNER, Brig. Gen. C. S. A. 

General Buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the aboveletters, sent word to his different commanders on the line ofrifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to thesurrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify National troopsin their front so that all fighting might be prevented. White flagswere stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over thefort. As soon as the last letter from Buckner was received I mounted myhorse and rode to Dover. General Wallace, I found, had preceded me anhour or more. I presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of GeneralBuckner. 

I had been at West Point three years with Buckner and afterwards servedwith him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. In thecourse of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me thatif he had been in command I would not have got up to Donelson as easilyas I did. I told him that if he had been in command I should not havetried in the way I did: I had invested their lines with a smaller forcethan they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigadefull 5, 000 strong, around by water; I had relied very much upon theircommander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. I asked General Buckner about what force he had to surrender. Hereplied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all thesick and weak had been sent to Nashville while we were about Fort Henry;that Floyd and Pillow had left during the night, taking many men withthem; and that Forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during thepreceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but hesaid I would not find fewer than 12, 000, nor more than 15, 000. 

He asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury hisdead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. I gavedirections that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. Ihave no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but itfamiliarized our guards so much with the sight of Confederates passingto and fro that I have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobservedand went on. The most of the men who went in that way no doubt thoughtthey had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out ofthe army. Some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that theywere tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and Ibade them go. 

The actual number of Confederates at Fort Donelson can never be givenwith entire accuracy. The largest number admitted by any writer on theSouthern side, is by Colonel Preston Johnston. He gives the number at17, 000. But this must be an underestimate. The commissary general ofprisoners reported having issued rations to 14, 623 Fort Donelsonprisoners at Cairo, as they passed that point. General Pillow reportedthe killed and wounded at 2, 000; but he had less opportunity of knowingthe actual numbers than the officers of McClernand's division, for mostof the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of thatdivision, and were buried or cared for by Buckner after the surrenderand when Pillow was a fugitive. It is known that Floyd and Pillowescaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than3, 000 men. Forrest escaped with about 1, 000 and others were leavingsingly and in squads all night. It is probable that the Confederateforce at Donelson, on the 15th of February, 1862, was 21, 000 in roundnumbers. 

On the day Fort Donelson fell I had 27, 000 men to confront theConfederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. During the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. 

During the siege General Sherman had been sent to Smithland, at themouth of the Cumberland River, to forward reinforcements and supplies tome. At that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority oflaw to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. But everyboat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note ofencouragement from Sherman, asking me to call upon him for anyassistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service atthe front I might send for him and he would waive rank. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

PROMOTED MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS--UNOCCUPIED TERRITORY--ADVANCE UPONNASHVILLE--SITUATION OF THE TROOPS--CONFEDERATE RETREAT--RELIEVED OF THECOMMAND--RESTORED TO THE COMMAND--GENERAL SMITH. 

The news of the fall of Fort Donelson caused great delight all over theNorth. At the South, particularly in Richmond, the effect wascorrespondingly depressing. I was promptly promoted to the grade ofMajor-General of Volunteers, and confirmed by the Senate. All three ofmy division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonelswho commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteerservice. My chief, who was in St. Louis, telegraphed hiscongratulations to General Hunter in Kansas for the services he hadrendered in securing the fall of Fort Donelson by sending reinforcementsso rapidly. To Washington he telegraphed that the victory was due toGeneral C. F. Smith; "promote him, " he said, "and the whole country willapplaud. " On the 19th there was published at St. Louis a formal orderthanking Flag-officer Foote and myself, and the forces under ourcommand, for the victories on the Tennessee and the Cumberland. Ireceived no other recognition whatever from General Halleck. ButGeneral Cullum, his chief of staff, who was at Cairo, wrote me a warmcongratulatory letter on his own behalf. I approved of General Smith'spromotion highly, as I did all the promotions that were made. 

My opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of FortDonelson the way was opened to the National forces all over theSouth-west without much resistance. If one general who would have takenthe responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of theAlleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis andVicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going onrapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at allthese centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy thatmight be found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition ofrebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so thatreinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could havebeen obtained to carry them to their destination. On the other handthere were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still attheir homes in the South-western States, who had not gone into theConfederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire togo. If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of themnever would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was giventhe enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twiceafterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the OhioRiver. 

I promptly informed the department commander of our success at FortDonelson and that the way was open now to Clarksville and Nashville; andthat unless I received orders to the contrary I should take Clarksvilleon the 21st and Nashville about the 1st of March. Both these places areon the Cumberland River above Fort Donelson. As I heard nothing fromheadquarters on the subject, General C. F. Smith was sent to Clarksvilleat the time designated and found the place evacuated. The capture offorts Henry and Donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken fromColumbus to Bowling Green, and it was known that he was falling backfrom the eastern point of this line and that Buell was following, or atleast advancing. I should have sent troops to Nashville at the time Isent to Clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there weremany prisoners to be forwarded north. 

None of the reinforcements from Buell's army arrived until the 24th ofFebruary. Then General Nelson came up, with orders to report to me withtwo brigades, he having sent one brigade to Cairo. I knew General Buellwas advancing on Nashville from the north, and I was advised by scoutsthat the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all thesupplies they could. Nashville was, at that time, one of the bestprovisioned posts in the South. I had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking Buell would like to have his troops again, I ordered Nelsonto proceed to Nashville without debarking at Fort Donelson. I sent agunboat also as a convoy. The Cumberland River was very high at thetime; the railroad bridge at Nashville had been burned, and all rivercraft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. Nashvilleis on the west bank of the Cumberland, and Buell was approaching fromthe east. I thought the steamers carrying Nelson's division would beuseful in ferrying the balance of Buell's forces across. I orderedNelson to put himself in communication with Buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from Nashville to returnbelow the city and await orders. Buell, however, had already arrived inperson at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, and Mitchell's division of hiscommand reached there the same day. Nelson immediately took possessionof the city. 

After Nelson had gone and before I had learned of Buell's arrival, Isent word to department headquarters that I should go to Nashvillemyself on the 28th if I received no orders to the contrary. Hearingnothing, I went as I had informed my superior officer I would do. Onarriving at Clarksville I saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the samethat had taken Nelson's division--and troops going aboard. I landed andcalled on the commanding officer, General C. F. Smith. As soon as hesaw me he showed an order he had just received from Buell in thesewords:

NASHVILLE, February 25, 1862. 

GENERAL C. F. SMITH, Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville. 

GENERAL:--The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to myintentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold thisside at every hazard. If the enemy should assume the offensive, and Iam assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is hisintention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only15, 000 men. I have to request you, therefore, to come forward with allthe available force under your command. So important do I consider theoccasion that I think it necessary to give this communication all theforce of orders, and I send four boats, the Diana, Woodford, John Rain, and Autocrat, to bring you up. In five or six days my force willprobably be sufficient to relieve you. 

Very respectfully, your ob't srv't, D. C. BUELL, Brigadier-GeneralComd'g. 

P. S. --The steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. 

General Smith said this order was nonsense. But I told him it wasbetter to obey it. The General replied, "of course I must obey, " andsaid his men were embarking as fast as they could. I went on up toNashville and inspected the position taken by Nelson's troops. I didnot see Buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that I hadbeen in Nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. On myreturn to the boat we met. His troops were still east of the river, andthe steamers that had carried Nelson's division up were mostly atClarksville to bring Smith's division. I said to General Buell myinformation was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. General Buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelvemiles away. I said: "Quite probably; Nashville contained valuablestores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probablytrying to carry away all he can. The fighting is doubtless with therear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting awaywith. " Buell spoke very positively of the danger Nashville was in of anattack from the enemy. I said, in the absence of positive information, I believed my information was correct. He responded that he "knew. ""Well, " I said, "I do not know; but as I came by Clarksville GeneralSmith's troops were embarking to join you. "

Smith's troops were returned the same day. The enemy were trying to getaway from Nashville and not to return to it. 

At this time General Albert Sidney Johnston commanded all theConfederate troops west of the Alleghany Mountains, with the exceptionof those in the extreme south. On the National side the forcesconfronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separatedepartments. Johnston had greatly the advantage in having supremecommand over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon onepoint, while the forces similarly situated on the National side, dividedinto independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious actionexcept by orders from Washington. 

At the beginning of 1862 Johnston's troops east of the Mississippioccupied a line extending from Columbus, on his left, to Mill Springs, on his right. As we have seen, Columbus, both banks of the TennesseeRiver, the west bank of the Cumberland and Bowling Green, all werestrongly fortified. Mill Springs was intrenched. The National troopsoccupied no territory south of the Ohio, except three small garrisonsalong its bank and a force thrown out from Louisville to confront thatat Bowling Green. Johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferiorto that of the National troops; but this was compensated for by theadvantage of being sole commander of all the Confederate forces at theWest, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care ofhis rear without any detail of soldiers. But when General George H. Thomas moved upon the enemy at Mill Springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts Henry andHeiman fell into the hands of the National forces, with their armamentsand about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten theConfederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreatfrom Bowling Green on Nashville. He reached this latter place on the14th of February, while Donelson was still besieged. Buell followedwith a portion of the Army of the Ohio, but he had to march and did notreach the east bank of the Cumberland opposite Nashville until the 24thof the month, and then with only one division of his army. 

The bridge at Nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed ordisabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against anyNational troops that could have been brought against it within ten daysafter the arrival of the force from Bowling Green. Johnston seemed tolie quietly at Nashville to await the result at Fort Donelson, on whichhe had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in theStates of Kentucky and Tennessee. It is true, the two generals seniorin rank at Fort Donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, evenclaiming great Confederate victories up to the night of the 16th whenthey must have been preparing for their individual escape. Johnston madea fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to Floyd, who hemust have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. Pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. If these officers hadbeen forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then heshould have left Nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to Donelson himself. If he hadbeen captured the result could not have been worse than it was. 

Johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of National troops. He wrote to Richmond on the 8th of February, "I think the gunboats ofthe enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity ofemploying their land force in cooperation. " After the fall of thatplace he abandoned Nashville and Chattanooga without an effort to saveeither, and fell back into northern Mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. 

From the time of leaving Cairo I was singularly unfortunate in notreceiving dispatches from General Halleck. The order of the 10th ofFebruary directing me to fortify Fort Henry strongly, particularly tothe land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for thatpurpose, reached me after Donelson was invested. I received nothingdirect which indicated that the department commander knew we were inpossession of Donelson. I was reporting regularly to the chief ofstaff, who had been sent to Cairo, soon after the troops left there, toreceive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to theSt. Louis headquarters. Cairo was at the southern end of the telegraphwire. Another line was started at once from Cairo to Paducah andSmithland, at the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland respectively. My dispatches were all sent to Cairo by boat, but many of thoseaddressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancingwire and he failed to forward them. This operator afterwards proved tobe a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went southtaking his dispatches with him. A telegram from General McClellan to meof February 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report infull the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d ofMarch. 

On the 2d of March I received orders dated March 1st to move my commandback to Fort Henry, leaving only a small garrison at Donelson. FromFort Henry expeditions were to be sent against Eastport, Mississippi, and Paris, Tennessee. We started from Donelson on the 4th, and the sameday I was back on the Tennessee River. On March 4th I also received thefollowing dispatch from General Halleck:

MAJ. -GEN. U. S. GRANT, Fort Henry:

You will place Maj. -Gen. C. F. Smith in command of expedition, andremain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to reportstrength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

I was surprised. This was the first intimation I had received thatGeneral Halleck had called for information as to the strength of mycommand. On the 6th he wrote to me again. "Your going to Nashvillewithout authority, and when your presence with your troops was of theutmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return. " This wasthe first I knew of his objecting to my going to Nashville. That placewas not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expresslydeclared in orders, were "not defined. " Nashville is west of theCumberland River, and I had sent troops that had reported to me for dutyto occupy the place. I turned over the command as directed and thenreplied to General Halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved fromfurther duty under him. 

Later I learned that General Halleck had been calling lustily for moretroops, promising that he would do something important if he could onlybe sufficiently reinforced. McClellan asked him what force he then had. Halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my commandwas concerned, but I received none of his dispatches. At last Halleckreported to Washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give thestrength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that I had goneto Nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at BullRun had been by defeat. General McClellan, on this information, orderedthat I should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should bemade into any charges against me. He even authorized my arrest. Thusin less than two weeks after the victory at Donelson, the two leadinggenerals in the army were in correspondence as to what dispositionshould be made of me, and in less than three weeks I was virtually inarrest and without a command. 

On the 13th of March I was restored to command, and on the 17th Hallecksent me a copy of an order from the War Department which stated thataccounts of my misbehavior had reached Washington and directed him toinvestigate and report the facts. He forwarded also a copy of adetailed dispatch from himself to Washington entirely exonerating me;but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had createdall the trouble. On the contrary, he wrote to me, "Instead of relievingyou, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assumeimmediate command, and lead it to new victories. " In consequence I feltvery grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had setme right with the government. I never knew the truth until GeneralBadeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of mycampaigns. 

General Halleck unquestionably deemed General C. F. Smith a much fitterofficer for the command of all the forces in the military district thanI was, and, to render him available for such command, desired hispromotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. It is probable that the general opinion was that Smith's long servicesin the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper personfor such command. Indeed I was rather inclined to this opinion myselfat that time, and would have served as faithfully under Smith as he haddone under me. But this did not justify the dispatches which GeneralHalleck sent to Washington, or his subsequent concealment of them fromme when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. 

On receipt of the order restoring me to command I proceeded to Savannahon the Tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. General Smithwas delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of thetreatment I had received. He was on a sick bed at the time, from whichhe never came away alive. His death was a severe loss to our westernarmy. His personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment andprofessional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidenceof those he commanded as well as of those over him. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

THE ARMY AT PITTSBURG LANDING--INJURED BY A FALL--THE CONFEDERATE ATTACKAT SHILOH--THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT AT SHILOH--GENERAL SHERMAN--CONDITIONOF THE ARMY--CLOSE OF THE FIRST DAY'S FIGHT--THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT--RETREAT AND DEFEAT OF THE CONFEDERATES. 

When I reassumed command on the 17th of March I found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the Tennessee at Savannah, whileone division was at Crump's landing on the west bank about four mileshigher up, and the remainder at Pittsburg landing, five miles aboveCrump's. The enemy was in force at Corinth, the junction of the twomost important railroads in the Mississippi valley--one connectingMemphis and the Mississippi River with the East, and the other leadingsouth to all the cotton states. Still another railroad connects Corinthwith Jackson, in west Tennessee. If we obtained possession of Corinththe enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies orsupplies until that running east from Vicksburg was reached. It was thegreat strategic position at the West between the Tennessee and theMississippi rivers and between Nashville and Vicksburg. 

I at once put all the troops at Savannah in motion for Pittsburglanding, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at Corinth and collectingan army there under Johnston. It was my expectation to march againstthat army as soon as Buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me withthe Army of the Ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river wasthe place to start from. Pittsburg is only about twenty miles fromCorinth, and Hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mileor two nearer. I had not been in command long before I selected Hamburgas the place to put the Army of the Ohio when it arrived. The roadsfrom Pittsburg and Hamburg to Corinth converge some eight miles out. This disposition of the troops would have given additional roads tomarch over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance ofeach other. 

Before I arrived at Savannah, Sherman, who had joined the Army of theTennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made anexpedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood ofEastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroadeast of Corinth. The rains had been so heavy for some time before thatthe low-lands had become impassable swamps. Sherman debarked his troopsand started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but theriver was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributariesthreatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, andthe expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. The gunshad to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. 

On the 17th of March the army on the Tennessee River consisted of fivedivisions, commanded respectively by Generals C. F. Smith, McClernand, L. Wallace, Hurlbut and Sherman. General W. H. L. Wallace wastemporarily in command of Smith's division, General Smith, as I havesaid, being confined to his bed. Reinforcements were arriving daily andas they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into adivision, and the command given to General Prentiss, who had beenordered to report to me. General Buell was on his way from Nashvillewith 40, 000 veterans. On the 19th of March he was at Columbia, Tennessee, eighty-five miles from Pittsburg. When all reinforcementsshould have arrived I expected to take the initiative by marching onCorinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though thissubject was taken into consideration. McPherson, my only militaryengineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. He did so, butreported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampmentas it then ran. The new line, while it would be nearer the river, wasyet too far away from the Tennessee, or even from the creeks, to beeasily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would bein the hands of the enemy. The fact is, I regarded the campaign we wereengaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy wouldleave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he wouldbe attacked where he was if he remained. This view, however, did notprevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keepadvised of all movements of the enemy. 

Johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, andoccasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. On the 1stof April this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing thatan advance of some kind was contemplated. On the 2d Johnston leftCorinth in force to attack my army. On the 4th his cavalry dashed downand captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed somefive miles out from Pittsburg on the Corinth road. Colonel Bucklandsent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with anentire regiment, and General Sherman followed Buckland taking theremainder of a brigade. The pursuit was kept up for some three milesbeyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and afternightfall Sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what hadoccurred. 

At this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. My apprehension wasmuch greater for the safety of Crump's landing than it was forPittsburg. I had no apprehension that the enemy could really captureeither place. But I feared it was possible that he might make a rapiddash upon Crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of whichwere kept at that point, and then retreat before Wallace could bereinforced. Lew. Wallace's position I regarded as so well chosen thathe was not removed. 

At this time I generally spent the day at Pittsburg and returned toSavannah in the evening. I was intending to remove my headquarters toPittsburg, but Buell was expected daily and would come in at Savannah. I remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than I otherwiseshould have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. The skirmishingin our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of Aprilthat I did not leave Pittsburg each night until an hour when I feltthere would be no further danger before the morning. 

On Friday the 4th, the day of Buckland's advance, I was very muchinjured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while I was trying toget to the front where firing had been heard. The night was one ofimpenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing wasvisible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes oflightning. Under these circumstances I had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. I had not gone far, however, when Imet General W. H. L. Wallace and Colonel (afterwards General) McPhersoncoming from the direction of the front. They said all was quiet so faras the enemy was concerned. On the way back to the boat my horse's feetslipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. Theextreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the fewpreceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protractedlameness. As it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that myboot had to be cut off. For two or three days after I was unable towalk except with crutches. 

On the 5th General Nelson, with a division of Buell's army, arrived atSavannah and I ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to bein a position where he could be ferried over to Crump's landing orPittsburg as occasion required. I had learned that General Buellhimself would be at Savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on hisarrival. Affairs at Pittsburg landing had been such for several daysthat I did not want to be away during the day. I determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet Buell, and thus savetime. He had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised meof the fact and I was not aware of it until some time after. While Iwas at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction ofPittsburg landing, and I hastened there, sending a hurried note to Buellinforming him of the reason why I could not meet him at Savannah. Onthe way up the river I directed the dispatch-boat to run in close toCrump's landing, so that I could communicate with General Lew. Wallace. I found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and Idirected him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders hemight receive. He replied that his troops were already under arms andprepared to move. 

Up to that time I had felt by no means certain that Crump's landingmight not be the point of attack. On reaching the front, however, abouteight A. M. , I found that the attack on Pittsburg was unmistakable, andthat nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports andstores, was needed at Crump's. Captain Baxter, a quartermaster on mystaff, was accordingly directed to go back and order General Wallace tomarch immediately to Pittsburg by the road nearest the river. CaptainBaxter made a memorandum of this order. About one P. M. , not hearingfrom Wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, I sent two moreof my staff, Colonel McPherson and Captain Rowley, to bring him up withhis division. They reported finding him marching towards Purdy, Bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from Pittsburg by severalmiles than when he started. The road from his first position toPittsburg landing was direct and near the river. Between the two pointsa bridge had been built across Snake Creek by our troops, at whichWallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at thetwo places to support each other in case of need. Wallace did notarrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. General Wallacehas since claimed that the order delivered to him by Captain Baxter wassimply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which hemarched would have taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy whereit crosses Owl Creek on the right of Sherman; but this is not where Ihad ordered him nor where I wanted him to go. 

I never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary furtherthan to direct him to come to Pittsburg landing, without specifying bywhat route. His was one of three veteran divisions that had been inbattle, and its absence was severely felt. Later in the war GeneralWallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th ofApril, 1862. I presume his idea was that by taking the route he did hewould be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thusperform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of hiscommand, as well as to the benefit of his country. 

Some two or three miles from Pittsburg landing was a log meeting-housecalled Shiloh. It stood on the ridge which divides the waters of Snakeand Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Tennessee just north ofPittsburg landing, and the latter south. This point was the key to ourposition and was held by Sherman. His division was at that time whollyraw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but I thought thisdeficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. McClernand was on Sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged atforts Henry and Donelson and were therefore veterans so far as westerntroops had become such at that stage of the war. Next to McClernandcame Prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, Stuart withone brigade of Sherman's division. Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. The division ofGeneral C. F. Smith was on the right, also in reserve. General Smithwas still sick in bed at Savannah, but within hearing of our guns. Hisservices would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his healthpermitted his presence. The command of his division devolved uponBrigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, a most estimable and able officer; aveteran too, for he had served a year in the Mexican war and had beenwith his command at Henry and Donelson. Wallace was mortally wounded inthe first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thusnecessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of hisdivision was much weakened. 

The position of our troops made a continuous line from Lick Creek on theleft to Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek, on the right, facing nearlysouth and possibly a little west. The water in all these streams wasvery high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. The enemywas compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. This he did withgreat vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the National side, but sufferingmuch heavier on his own. 

The Confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses ontheir own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. Theground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timberedwith scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troopson both sides. There was also considerable underbrush. A number ofattempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where Shermanwas posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. But thefront attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success ofthese attempts to get on our flanks, the National troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer Pittsburg landing. When the firing ceased at night the National line was all of a mile inrear of the position it had occupied in the morning. 

In one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded byGeneral Prentiss did not fall back with the others. This left hisflanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2, 200 ofhis officers and men. General Badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th asabout the time this capture took place. He may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. General Prentisshimself gave the hour as half-past five. I was with him, as I was witheach of the division commanders that day, several times, and myrecollection is that the last time I was with him was about half-pastfour, when his division was standing up firmly and the General was ascool as if expecting victory. But no matter whether it was four orlater, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured intheir camps is without any foundation whatever. If it had been true, ascurrently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that Prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, therewould not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousandskilled and wounded on the Confederate side. 

With the single exception of a few minutes after the capture ofPrentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day fromSnake Creek or its tributaries on the right to Lick Creek or theTennessee on the left above Pittsburg. 

There was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing andgenerally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at allpoints at the same time. It was a case of Southern dash againstNorthern pluck and endurance. Three of the five divisions engaged onSunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received theirarms on the way from their States to the field. Many of them hadarrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load theirmuskets according to the manual. Their officers were equally ignorantof their duties. Under these circumstances it is not astonishing thatmany of the regiments broke at the first fire. In two cases, as I nowremember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearingthe whistle of the enemy's bullets. In these cases the colonels wereconstitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so theofficers and men led out of danger by them. Better troops never wentupon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwardsproved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle ofbullets and shell at Shiloh. 

During the whole of Sunday I was continuously engaged in passing fromone part of the field to another, giving directions to divisioncommanders. In thus moving along the line, however, I never deemed itimportant to stay long with Sherman. Although his troops were thenunder fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presencewith them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled themto render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best ofveterans. McClernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest fighting wasin front of these two divisions. McClernand told me on that day, the6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. A casualty to Sherman that would have taken him from the field that daywould have been a sad one for the troops engaged at Shiloh. And hownear we came to this! On the 6th Sherman was shot twice, once in thehand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making aslight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. In addition tothis he had several horses shot during the day. 

The nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used infront; I therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--ofwhom there were many. When there would be enough of them to make ashow, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sentto reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regardto their companies, regiments or brigades. 

On one occasion during the day I rode back as far as the river and metGeneral Buell, who had just arrived; I do not remember the hour, but atthat time there probably were as many as four or five thousandstragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most ofwhom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, beforethey would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protectthemselves. This meeting between General Buell and myself was on thedispatch-boat used to run between the landing and Savannah. It wasbrief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. As we left the boat together, Buell's attention was attracted by the menlying under cover of the river bank. I saw him berating them and tryingto shame them into joining their regiments. He even threatened themwith shells from the gunboats near by. But it was all to no effect. Most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of thosewho saved the battle from which they had deserted. I have no doubt thatthis sight impressed General Buell with the idea that a line of retreatwould be a good thing just then. If he had come in by the front insteadof through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and feltdifferently. Could he have come through the Confederate rear, he wouldhave witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. The distantrear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which tojudge correctly what is going on in front. Later in the war, whileoccupying the country between the Tennessee and the Mississippi, Ilearned that the panic in the Confederate lines had not differed muchfrom that within our own. Some of the country people estimated thestragglers from Johnston's army as high as 20, 000. Of course this wasan exaggeration. 

The situation at the close of Sunday was as follows: along the top ofthe bluff just south of the log-house which stood at Pittsburg landing, Colonel J. D. Webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more piecesof artillery facing south or up the river. This line of artillery wason the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into theTennessee. Hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of thisartillery, extending west and possibly a little north. McClernand camenext in the general line, looking more to the west. His division wascomplete in its organization and ready for any duty. Sherman came next, his right extending to Snake Creek. His command, like the other two, wascomplete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any serviceit might be called upon to render. All three divisions were, as amatter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers fromthe terrible battle of the day. The division of W. H. L. Wallace, asmuch from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigadecommanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost itsorganization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. Prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members havingbeen killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant servicesbefore its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to thedefence of Shiloh. 

The right of my line rested near the bank of Snake Creek, a shortdistance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for thepurpose of connecting Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing. Shermanhad posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlookedboth the bridge over which Wallace was expected and the creek above thatpoint. In this last position Sherman was frequently attacked beforenight, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advancein order to make room for Lew. Wallace, who came up after dark. 

There was, as I have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. TheTennessee River was very high and there was water to a considerabledepth in the ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort toturn our flank, but was repelled. The gunboats Tyler and Lexington, Gwin and Shirk commanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided thearmy and effectually checked their further progress. Before any ofBuell's troops had reached the west bank of the Tennessee, firing hadalmost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of theenemy to advance had absolutely ceased. There was some artillery firingfrom an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but I do notremember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. Ashis troops arrived in the dusk General Buell marched several of hisregiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired brisklyfor some minutes, but I do not think a single man engaged in this firingreceived an injury. The attack had spent its force. 

General Lew. Wallace, with 5, 000 effective men, arrived after firing hadceased for the day, and was placed on the right. Thus night came, Wallace came, and the advance of Nelson's division came; but none--unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men whosaved Shiloh on that first day against large odds. Buell's loss on the6th of April was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36thIndiana infantry. The Army of the Tennessee lost on that day at least7, 000 men. The presence of two or three regiments of Buell's army onthe west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect inpreventing the capture of Pittsburg landing. 

So confident was I before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next daywould bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that I visited each division commander in person before anyreinforcements had reached the field. I directed them to throw outheavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, andpush them forward until they found the enemy, following with theirentire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soonas found. To Sherman I told the story of the assault at Fort Donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at Shiloh. Victory was assuredwhen Wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. I wasglad, however, to see the reinforcements of Buell and credit them withdoing all there was for them to do. 

During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell'sarmy crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, formingthe left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came upthe river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bankearly on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person. My command was thusnearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. 

During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed tothe storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a fewhundred yards back from the river bank. My ankle was so much swollenfrom the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise wasso painful, that I could get no rest. 

The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep withoutthis additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing restive underthe storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house underthe bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded menwere being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputatedas the case might require, and everything being done to save life oralleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encounteringthe enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain. 

The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the campsoccupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile backfrom the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before. It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell'scommand. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tentsduring the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were droppedupon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. 

The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was asfollows: General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his left; thenMcClernand and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army, was on ourextreme left, next to the river. 

Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right, McCookfollowed and formed the extreme right of Buell's command. My oldcommand thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly underBuell constituted the left wing of the army. These relative positionswere retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven fromthe field. 

In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. Thisday everything was favorable to the Union side. We had now become theattacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been theday before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last pointheld by him was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, onthe left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About three o'clock, beingnear that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhereelse, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, fromtroops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. Atthis point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable forcharging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to break andonly wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join theirfriends who had started earlier. After marching to within musket-rangeI stopped and let the troops pass. The command, CHARGE, was given, andwas executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemybroke. (*7)

CHAPTER XXV. 

STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ONSHILOH. 

During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right toleft and back, to see for myself the progress made. In the early partof the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson and Major Hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. We weremoving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward theriver above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to ourright, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from theedge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells andballs whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. I do notthink it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did notstop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position wehalted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting asif ready to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struckhim forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirelythrough. In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given nosign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the metalscabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off;before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. There werethree of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one asword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no worse. 

After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains forsome days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemycarrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, madethem still worse for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had notthe heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feeldisposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, topursue. Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only afew weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time past, a departmentcommander, while I commanded only a district. I did not meet Buell inperson until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; buthad I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at leastrequested him to follow. 

I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found thatthe enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, someammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening theirloads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out wefound their field hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must haveresulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners andprobably some guns. 

Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, andbut few in the East equalled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw anopen field, in our possession on the second day, over which theConfederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered withdead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, inany direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching theground. On our side National and Confederate troops were mingledtogether in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the fieldnearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not beenploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, busheshad grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not oneof these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were allcut down. 

Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience ofthe army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We werewithout intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more thanhalf the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drillas soldiers. The officers with them, except the division commanders andpossibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equallyinexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the menwho achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. 

The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroyan army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavyloss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged andconvinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. 

After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders tolet the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detailparties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury theConfederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers soburied. The latter part of these instructions was not carried out byall; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some ofthe parties sent out by McClernand. The heaviest loss sustained by theenemy was in front of these two divisions. 

The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have beenintrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and spade had been butlittle resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subjectunder consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, asalready stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besidesthis, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drillmore than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that hadbeen hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments ofincomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline wereworth more to our men than fortifications. 

General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as muchprofessional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. Ihad been two years at West Point with him, and had served with himafterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more. Hewas not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimateacquaintances. He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidenceand respect of all who knew him. He was a strict disciplinarian, andperhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who"enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. Onesystem embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men ofsocial standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in anyother occupation. General Buell became an object of harsh criticismlater, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. No one who knewhim ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing couldbe more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war andthen betray the trust. When I came into command of the army in 1864, Irequested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty. 

After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerablythrough the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had beenconducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every worddropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did notconfirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the waror the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurredfor me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjustcharges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the verycharge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty. This brought from GeneralBuell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York World some timebefore I received the letter itself. I could very well understand hisgrievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustainedby an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I repliedto him, but not through the press. I kept no copy of my letter, nor didI ever see it in print; neither did I receive an answer. 

General Albert Sidney Johnston, who commanded the Confederate forces atthe beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon ofthe first day. This wound, as I understood afterwards, was notnecessarily fatal, or even dangerous. But he was a man who would notabandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger andconsequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted bythe loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon afterdied. The news was not long in reaching our side and I suppose wasquite an encouragement to the National soldiers. 

I had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican war and later as an officerin the regular army. He was a man of high character and ability. Hiscontemporaries at West Point, and officers generally who came to knowhim personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to provethe most formidable man to meet that the Confederacy would produce. 

I once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army toprove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon hismilitary ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches ofJohnston I am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer'squalifications as a soldier. My judgment now is that he was vacillatingand undecided in his actions. 

All the disasters in Kentucky and Tennessee were so discouraging to theauthorities in Richmond that Jefferson Davis wrote an unofficial letterto Johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, andsaying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. The letter was nota reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as thoughit had been one. General Johnston raised another army as rapidly as hecould, and fortified or strongly intrenched at Corinth. He knew theNational troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. But he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of hisoperations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign whichwould restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish stillmore. We have the authority of his son and biographer for saying thathis plan was to attack the forces at Shiloh and crush them; then tocross the Tennessee and destroy the army of Buell, and push the waracross the Ohio River. The design was a bold one; but we have the sameauthority for saying that in the execution Johnston showed vacillationand indecision. He left Corinth on the 2d of April and was not ready toattack until the 6th. The distance his army had to march was less thantwenty miles. Beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to theattack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the Nationaltroops would attack the Confederates in their intrenchments; second, wewere in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. Johnston not only listened to the objection of Beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. Onthe evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of hisgenerals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. During this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the National troops opening fire on the enemy. Thisseemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battleof Shiloh. It also seems to me to settle the question as to whetherthere was a surprise. 

I do not question the personal courage of General Johnston, or hisability. But he did not win the distinction predicted for him by manyof his friends. He did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. 

General Beauregard was next in rank to Johnston and succeeded to thecommand, which he retained to the close of the battle and during thesubsequent retreat on Corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. His tactics have been severely criticised by Confederate writers, but Ido not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under thecircumstances. Some of these critics claim that Shiloh was won whenJohnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me wouldhave been annihilated or captured. IFS defeated the Confederates atShiloh. There is little doubt that we would have been disgracefullybeaten IF all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlesslyover the enemy and IF all of theirs had taken effect. Commandinggenerals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact thatwhen he was shot Johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make acharge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there wasneither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unboundedconfidence on theirs which has been claimed. There was, in fact, nohour during the day when I doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although I was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did notarrive at an earlier hour. 

The description of the battle of Shiloh given by Colonel Wm. PrestonJohnston is very graphic and well told. The reader will imagine that hecan see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of Unionsoldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towardsthe Tennessee River, which was a little more than two miles away at thebeginning of the onset. If the reader does not stop to inquire why, withsuch Confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the National troops were not all killed, captured or driven into theriver, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. But I witnessed thefight from the National side from eight o'clock in the morning untilnight closed the contest. I see but little in the description that Ican recognize. The Confederate troops fought well and deservecommendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of April, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more thantheir just dues. 

The reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of thefirst day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had beenvery heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on theNational side, with the difference that those of the enemy left thefield entirely and were not brought back to their respective commandsfor many days. On the Union side but few of the stragglers fell backfurther than the landing on the river, and many of these were in linefor duty on the second day. The admissions of the highest Confederateofficers engaged at Shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. The victory was not to either party until the battle was over. It wasthen a Union victory, in which the Armies of the Tennessee and the Ohioboth participated. But the Army of the Tennessee fought the entirerebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and nightalone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of Nelson'sdivision. 

The Confederates fought with courage at Shiloh, but the particular skillclaimed I could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing tocriticise except the claims put forward for it since. But theConfederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority ingeneralship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to theUnion troops engaged at Shiloh as are many Northern writers. The troopson both sides were American, and united they need not fear any foreignfoe. It is possible that the Southern man started in with a little moredash than his Northern brother; but he was correspondingly lessenduring. 

The endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their menagainst ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at severalpoints at once. This they did with daring and energy, until at nightthe rebel troops were worn out. Our effort during the same time was tobe prepared to resist assaults wherever made. The object of theConfederates on the second day was to get away with as much of theirarmy and material as possible. Ours then was to drive them from ourfront, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of theirmen and material. We were successful in driving them back, but not sosuccessful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. Asit was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as muchartillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one greatcapture of Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday than the enemygained from us on Sunday. On the 6th Sherman lost seven pieces ofartillery, McClernand six, Prentiss eight, and Hurlbut two batteries. On the 7th Sherman captured seven guns, McClernand three and the Army ofthe Ohio twenty. 

At Shiloh the effective strength of the Union forces on the morning ofthe 6th was 33, 000 men. Lew. Wallace brought 5, 000 more afternightfall. Beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40, 955. According to the custom of enumeration in the South, this numberprobably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard ornurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry amusket or serve a cannon. With us everybody in the field receiving payfrom the government is counted. Excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a timeduring the 6th when we had more than 25, 000 men in line. On the 7thBuell brought 20, 000 more. Of his remaining two divisions, Thomas's didnot reach the field during the engagement; Wood's arrived before firinghad ceased, but not in time to be of much service. 

Our loss in the two days' fight was 1, 754 killed, 8, 408 wounded and2, 885 missing. Of these, 2, 103 were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of 10, 699, of whom 1, 728 were killed, 8, 012 wounded and 957 missing. This estimate must be incorrect. Weburied, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of thedivisions of McClernand and Sherman alone than here reported, and 4, 000was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. Beauregardreports the Confederate force on the 6th at over 40, 000, and their totalloss during the two days at 10, 699; and at the same time declares thathe could put only 20, 000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. 

The navy gave a hearty support to the army at Shiloh, as indeed italways did both before and subsequently when I was in command. Thenature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it coulddo nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. Thecountry was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of thebattle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger fromfire from the gunboats as the foe. But about sundown, when the Nationaltroops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was nearthe river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which wasdelivered with vigor and effect. After nightfall, when firing hadentirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea ofdropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutesduring the night. This was done with effect, as is proved by theConfederate reports. 

Up to the battle of Shiloh I, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the Government would collapsesuddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of itsarmies. Donelson and Henry were such victories. An army of more than21, 000 men was captured or destroyed. Bowling Green, Columbus andHickman, Kentucky, fell in consequence, and Clarksville and Nashville, Tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell intoour hands. The Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, from their mouths tothe head of navigation, were secured. But when Confederate armies werecollected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, fromMemphis to Chattanooga, Knoxville and on to the Atlantic, but assumedthe offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had beenlost, then, indeed, I gave up all idea of saving the Union except bycomplete conquest. Up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property ofthe citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to theirsentiments, whether Union or Secession. After this, however, I regardedit as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found attheir homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support orsupply armies. Protection was still continued over such supplies aswere within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold;but such supplies within the reach of Confederate armies I regarded asmuch contraband as arms or ordnance stores. Their destruction wasaccomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as thedestruction of armies. I continued this policy to the close of the war. Promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. Instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under thedirection of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermasteror commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our Northerndepots. But much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when itcould not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone tothe support of secession and rebellion. 

This policy I believe exercised a material influence in hastening theend. 

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg landing, has been perhaps lessunderstood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistentlymisunderstood, than any other engagement between National andConfederate troops during the entire rebellion. Correct reports of thebattle have been published, notably by Sherman, Badeau and, in a speechbefore a meeting of veterans, by General Prentiss; but all of theseappeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after publicopinion had been most erroneously formed. 

I myself made no report to General Halleck, further than was containedin a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that anengagement had been fought and announcing the result. A few daysafterwards General Halleck moved his headquarters to Pittsburg landingand assumed command of the troops in the field. Although next to him inrank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, I wasignored as much as if I had been at the most distant point of territorywithin my jurisdiction; and although I was in command of all the troopsengaged at Shiloh I was not permitted to see one of the reports ofGeneral Buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they werepublished by the War Department long after the event. For this reason Inever made a full official report of this engagement. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

HALLECK ASSUMES COMMAND IN THE FIELD--THE ADVANCE UPON CORINTH--OCCUPATION OF CORINTH--THE ARMY SEPARATED. 

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of April andimmediately assumed command in the field. On the 21st General Popearrived with an army 30, 000 strong, fresh from the capture of IslandNumber Ten in the Mississippi River. He went into camp at Hamburglanding five miles above Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: theArmy of the Ohio, Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Popecommanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided thecombined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. Major-General George H. Thomas, who had been in Buell's army, wastransferred with his division to the Army of the Tennessee and givencommand of the right wing, composed of all of that army exceptMcClernand's and Lew. Wallace's divisions. McClernand was assigned tothe command of the reserve, composed of his own and Lew. Wallace'sdivisions. Buell commanded the centre, the Army of the Ohio; and Popethe left wing, the Army of the Mississippi. I was named second incommand of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of theright wing and reserve. 

Orders were given to all the commanders engaged at Shiloh to send intheir reports without delay to department headquarters. Those fromofficers of the Army of the Tennessee were sent through me; but from theArmy of the Ohio they were sent by General Buell without passing throughmy hands. General Halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but I positively declined on the ground that he had received the reportsof a part of the army engaged at Shiloh without their coming through me. He admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, butexplained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving thecommand, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it toWashington. 

Preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander foran advance on Corinth. Owl Creek, on our right, was bridged, andexpeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if ourposition was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towardsCorinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were alsoconstructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by differentroutes could reinforce each other. All commanders were cautionedagainst bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that itwould be better to retreat than to fight. By the 30th of April allpreparations were complete; the country west to the Mobile and Ohiorailroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to Corinth as far asMonterey twelve miles from Pittsburg. Everywhere small bodies of theenemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force tofight battles. 

Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from Pittsburglanding and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, butprobably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. It is about four milessouth of the line dividing the States of Tennessee and Mississippi, andat the junction of the Mississippi and Chattanooga railroad with theMobile and Ohio road which runs from Columbus to Mobile. From Pittsburgto Corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevationthat makes high hills to pass over. In 1862 the greater part of thecountry was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. Underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passingthrough with ease. There are two small creeks running from north of thetown and connecting some four miles south, where they form Bridge Creekwhich empties into the Tuscumbia River. Corinth is on the ridge betweenthese streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. The creeksare insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widensout in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of anenemy. On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy wasstrongly intrenched. 

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, andconsequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. We ought tohave seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then itshould have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops atPittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival ofPope should not have been awaited. There was no time from the battle ofShiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not haveleft if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from theirdefeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green, Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact fromhaving been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that astand for the time would have been impossible. Beauregard madestrenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. Heappealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and receiveda few. A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the samequarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He hadnegroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooksand laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into theranks. The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, werenot willing to part with their negroes. It is only fair to state thatthey probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and forthe families left at home. 

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shilohwith 17, 000 men. Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted toadd to the strength at Corinth. With these reinforcements and the newregiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large forceon paper, but probably not much over 50, 000 effective men. We estimatedhis strength at 70, 000. Our own was, in round numbers, 120, 000. Thedefensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made50, 000 then enough to maintain their position against double that numberfor an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. 

On the 30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shilohupon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the close. The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except of coursethe small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way foran advance. Even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "notto bring on an engagement. " "It is better to retreat than to fight. "The enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simplyobservers there were but few engagements that even threatened to becomebattles. All the engagements fought ought to have served to encouragethe enemy. Roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; aline was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. Cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troopsto concentrate in case of attack. The National armies were thoroughlyintrenched all the way from the Tennessee River to Corinth. 

For myself I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent directto the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made fromone line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. My positionwas so embarrassing in fact that I made several applications during thesiege to be relieved. 

General Halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. Pope being on the extreme left did not see so muchof his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. On the 3dof May he was at Seven Mile Creek with the main body of his command, butthrew forward a division to Farmington, within four miles of Corinth. His troops had quite a little engagement at Farmington on that day, butcarried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. There would thenhave been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to forma new line well up to the enemy, but Pope was ordered back to conformwith the general line. On the 8th of May he moved again, taking hiswhole force to Farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to therebel line. Again he was ordered back. By the 4th of May the centreand right wing reached Monterey, twelve miles out. Their advance wasslow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. Theleft wing moved up again on the 25th of May and intrenched itself closeto the enemy. The creek with the marsh before described, separated thetwo lines. Skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained eitherline at this point. 

Our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right ofthe right wing was probably five miles from Corinth and four from theworks in their front. The creek, which was a formidable obstacle foreither side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on ourright. Here the enemy occupied two positions. One of them, as much astwo miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation anddefended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. A heavy woodintervened between this work and the National forces. In rear to thesouth there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of thisclearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied byinfantry. Sherman's division carried these two positions with some lossto himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of May, and on that day the investment of Corinth was complete, or as completeas it was ever made. Thomas' right now rested west of the Mobile andOhio railroad. Pope's left commanded the Memphis and Charleston railroadeast of Corinth. 

Some days before I had suggested to the commanding general that Ithought if he would move the Army of the Mississippi at night, by therear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, Pope wouldfind no natural obstacle in his front and, I believed, no seriousartificial one. The ground, or works, occupied by our left could beheld by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. Tothe right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. I wassilenced so quickly that I felt that possibly I had suggested anunmilitary movement. 

Later, probably on the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command wasthen on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had beenevacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into Corinthwith his brigade. Trains of cars were heard coming in and going out ofCorinth constantly. Some of the men who had been engaged in variouscapacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, byputting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains weremoving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. They saidloaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones comingin. Subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. Beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the26th of May and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and onthe 30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared forbattle and announced in orders that there was every indication that ourleft was to be attacked that morning. Corinth had already beenevacuated and the National troops marched on and took possession withoutopposition. Everything had been destroyed or carried away. TheConfederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on thearrival of every train to create the impression among the Yankees thatreinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or wounded man leftby the Confederates, nor stores of any kind. Some ammunition had beenblown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels ofwagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. 

The possession of Corinth by the National troops was of strategicimportance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. Itwas nearly bloodless. It is a question whether the MORALE of theConfederate troops engaged at Corinth was not improved by the immunitywith which they were permitted to remove all public property and thenwithdraw themselves. On our side I know officers and men of the Army ofthe Tennessee--and I presume the same is true of those of the othercommands--were disappointed at the result. They could not see how themere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effectiverebel armies existed. They believed that a well-directed attack wouldat least have partially destroyed the army defending Corinth. Formyself I am satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a twodays' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements afterthe battle of Shiloh. 

General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around Corinthon a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took thewhole National army to do it. All commanding points two or three milesto the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. It wasexpected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. They were laid out on a scale that would have required 100, 000 men tofully man them. It was probably thought that a final battle of the warwould be fought at that point. These fortifications were never used. Immediately after the occupation of Corinth by the National troops, General Pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and GeneralBuell soon followed. Buell was the senior of the two generals andcommanded the entire column. The pursuit was kept up for some thirtymiles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war orprisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and werewilling captives. On the 10th of June the pursuing column was all backat Corinth. The Army of the Tennessee was not engaged in any of thesemovements. 

The Confederates were now driven out of West Tennessee, and on the 6thof June, after a well-contested naval battle, the National forces tookpossession of Memphis and held the Mississippi river from its source tothat point. The railroad from Columbus to Corinth was at once put ingood condition and held by us. We had garrisons at Donelson, Clarksville and Nashville, on the Cumberland River, and held theTennessee River from its mouth to Eastport. New Orleans and Baton Rougehad fallen into the possession of the National forces, so that now theConfederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication withRichmond to the single line of road running east from Vicksburg. Todispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the firstimportance. The possession of the Mississippi by us from Memphis toBaton Rouge was also a most important object. It would be equal to theamputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. 

After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80, 000 men, besidesenough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motionfor the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of therebellion. In addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swellthe effective force. But the work of depletion commenced. Buell withthe Army of the Ohio was sent east, following the line of the Memphisand Charleston railroad. This he was ordered to repair as he advanced--only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops assoon as he was out of the way. If he had been sent directly toChattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisionsalong the line of the railroad from Nashville forward, he could havearrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the lossof life which was afterwards incurred in gaining Chattanooga. Braggwould then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possessionof middle and east Tennessee and Kentucky; the battles of Stone Riverand Chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; Burnside wouldnot have been besieged in Knoxville without the power of helping himselfor escaping; the battle of Chattanooga would not have been fought. These are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after Corinthfell into the possession of the National forces. The positive resultsmight have been: a bloodless advance to Atlanta, to Vicksburg, or toany other desired point south of Corinth in the interior of Mississippi. 

CHAPTER XXVII. 

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO MEMPHIS--ON THE ROAD TO MEMPHIS--ESCAPING JACKSON--COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS--HALLECK APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF--RETURNTO CORINTH--MOVEMENTS OF BRAGG--SURRENDER OF CLARKSVILLE--THE ADVANCEUPON CHATTANOOGA--SHERIDAN COLONEL OF A MICHIGAN REGIMENT. 

My position at Corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that I asked permission of Halleck to remove myheadquarters to Memphis. I had repeatedly asked, between the fall ofDonelson and the evacuation of Corinth, to be relieved from duty underHalleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation ofthe town. I then obtained permission to leave the department, butGeneral Sherman happened to call on me as I was about starting and urgedme so strongly not to think of going, that I concluded to remain. Myapplication to be permitted to remove my headquarters to Memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of June I started for that point withmy staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. There wasa detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles westto be stationed as a guard to the railroad. I went under cover of thisescort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to LaGrange with no convoy but the few cavalry men I had with me. 

From La Grange to Memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. There wereno troops stationed between these two points, except a small forceguarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. Not knowing where this party would be found I halted at La Grange. General Hurlbut was in command there at the time and had hisheadquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious countryhouse. The proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, heinvited General Hurlbut and me to dine with him. I accepted theinvitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was athorough Southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. After dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with arecital of the services he was rendering the cause. He was too old tobe in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but hismeans enabled him to be useful in other ways. In ordinary times thehomestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supplythe slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of Mississippi. Nowhe raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have thatyear a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men whohad gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the"patriotism" of those better off. The crops around me looked fine, andI had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to begathered the "Yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvestthem for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of therebellion instead of its support. I felt, however, the greatest respectfor the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughlybelieved in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible toconceive. 

The 23d of June, 1862, on the road from La Grange to Memphis was verywarm, even for that latitude and season. With my staff and small escortI started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twentymiles of Memphis. At this point I saw a very comfortable-lookingwhite-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a littledistance from the road. I let my staff and escort ride ahead while Ihalted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. I was invited atonce to dismount and come in. I found my host very genial andcommunicative, and staid longer than I had intended, until the lady ofthe house announced dinner and asked me to join them. The host, however, was not pressing, so that I declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. 

About a mile west from where I had been stopping a road comes up fromthe southeast, joining that from La Grange to Memphis. A mile west ofthis junction I found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shadeof forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet backfrom the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of theroad. I, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of theafternoon, and then rode into Memphis. 

The gentleman with whom I had stopped twenty miles from Memphis was aMr. De Loche, a man loyal to the Union. He had not pressed me to tarrylonger with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a Dr. Smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch asif something had hit him. Mr. De Loche knew that the rebel GeneralJackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. Hisneighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was Mr. De Loche inthat of the Union. The exact location of Jackson was entirely unknownto Mr. De Loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it andwould give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasantto him after the call of Dr. Smith. 

I have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guardingworkmen who were repairing the railroad east of Memphis. On the day Ientered Memphis, Jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which hadbeen sent east for the troops so engaged. The drovers were not enlistedmen and he released them. A day or two after one of these drovers cameto my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, saidJackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that hewas six or seven miles south of the Memphis and Charleston railroad whenhe learned that I was stopping at the house of Mr. De Loche, and hadridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with thatfrom La Grange and Memphis, where he learned that I had passedthree-quarters of an hour before. He thought it would be useless topursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. Had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me withmy party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even armsin our hands with which to defend ourselves. 

General Jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at notcapturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among thesoldiers the facts related were learned. A day or two later Mr. DeLoche called on me in Memphis to apologize for his apparent incivilityin not insisting on my staying for dinner. He said that his wifeaccused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of hisneighbor, he had felt restless until I got away. I never met GeneralJackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at hisvery comfortable summer home at Manitou Springs, Colorado. I remindedhim of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that hewas thankful now he had not captured me. I certainly was very thankfultoo. 

My occupation of Memphis as district headquarters did not last long. The period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel tome. Up to that time I had not occupied any place in the South where thecitizens were at home in any great numbers. Dover was within thefortifications at Fort Donelson, and, as far as I remember, everycitizen was gone. There were no people living at Pittsburg landing, andbut very few at Corinth. Memphis, however, was a populous city, andthere were many of the citizens remaining there who were not onlythoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thoughtthat even the "Yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if theycould only be induced to make an honest confession. It took hours of mytime every day to listen to complaints and requests. The latter weregenerally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaintswere not always, or even often, well founded. Two instances will markthe general character. First: the officer who commanded at Memphisimmediately after the city fell into the hands of the National troopshad ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to thesoldiers. Army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. Second:at the beginning of the war the Confederate Congress had passed a lawconfiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the South, including thedebts of Southerners to Northern men. In consequence of this law, whenMemphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all theevidences he could obtain of such debts. 

Almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. Thegentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own highstanding as a lawyer, a citizen and a Christian. He was a deacon in thechurch which had been defiled by the occupation of Union troops, and bya Union chaplain filling the pulpit. He did not use the word "defile, "but he expressed the idea very clearly. He asked that the church berestored to the former congregation. I told him that no order had beenissued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. He said ofcourse the congregation could not hear a Northern clergyman who differedso radically with them on questions of government. I told him thetroops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and thatthey would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimedfrom the pulpit. This closed the argument on the first point. 

Then came the second. The complainant said that he wanted the papersrestored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal underprotest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the"Confederate States Government" had been the attorney for a number oflarge business houses at the North; that "his government" hadconfiscated all debts due "alien enemies, " and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the"government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had beenpermitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officialsknowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollarreceived. He said that his "government, " when it came in possession ofall its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claimshe had surrendered to the provost-marshal. His impudence was so sublimethat I was rather amused than indignant. I told him, however, that ifhe would remain in Memphis I did not believe the Confederate governmentwould ever molest him. He left, no doubt, as much amazed at myassurance as I was at the brazenness of his request. 

On the 11th of July General Halleck received telegraphic ordersappointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters inWashington. His instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field ofduty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety andinterests of his previous command. I was next in rank, and hetelegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters atCorinth. I was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had beenordered to a different field and did not know whether to move myheadquarters or not. I telegraphed asking if I was to take my staffwith me, and received word in reply: "This place will be yourheadquarters. You can judge for yourself. " I left Memphis for my newfield without delay, and reached Corinth on the 15th of the month. General Halleck remained until the 17th of July; but he was veryuncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what I had been calledto Corinth for. 

When General Halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief Iremained in command of the district of West Tennessee. Practically Ibecame a department commander, because no one was assigned to thatposition over me and I made my reports direct to the general-in-chief;but I was not assigned to the position of department commander until the25th of October. General Halleck while commanding the Department of theMississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from Chattanooganorth. My district only embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west ofthe Cumberland River. Buell, with the Army of the Ohio, had, aspreviously stated, been ordered east towards Chattanooga, withinstructions to repair the Memphis and Charleston railroad as headvanced. Troops had been sent north by Halleck along the line of theMobile and Ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as Columbus. Othertroops were stationed on the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to GrandJunction, and still others on the road west to Memphis. 

The remainder of the magnificent army of 120, 000 men which enteredCorinth on the 30th of May had now become so scattered that I was putentirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile tothe Union. One of the first things I had to do was to constructfortifications at Corinth better suited to the garrison that could bespared to man them. The structures that had been built during themonths of May and June were left as monuments to the skill of theengineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in designbut suited to the command available to defend them. 

I disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with thesituation as rapidly as possible. The forces at Donelson, Clarksvilleand Nashville, with those at Corinth and along the railroad eastward, Iregarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. The Mobile and Ohio railroad was guarded from Rienzi, south of Corinth, to Columbus; and the Mississippi Central railroad from Jackson, Tennessee, to Bolivar. Grand Junction and La Grange on the Memphisrailroad were abandoned. 

South of the Army of the Tennessee, and confronting it, was Van Dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five toforty thousand men, after being reinforced by Price from Missouri. Thismovable force could be thrown against either Corinth, Bolivar orMemphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be toweaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. Nothing could be gained on the National side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force presentcould guard. The most anxious period of the war, to me, was during thetime the Army of the Tennessee was guarding the territory acquired bythe fall of Corinth and Memphis and before I was sufficiently reinforcedto take the offensive. The enemy also had cavalry operating in ourrear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back toColumbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all oursupplies. Headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points ofthe command except Memphis and the Mississippi below Columbus. Withthese points communication was had by the railroad to Columbus, thendown the river by boat. To reinforce Memphis would take three or fourdays, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would havetaken at least two days. Memphis therefore was practically isolatedfrom the balance of the command. But it was in Sherman's hands. Thentoo the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuableauxiliary. 

During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there wasmuch fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but theseencounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to benow almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. Some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican warwhich attracted so much of the attention of the public when theyoccurred. About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to bereinforced from Jackson and Corinth. On the 27th there was skirmishingon the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learnedfrom Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Braggin person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by wayof Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to joinhim at Rome. Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, witha large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost. I proposed tothe general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informedthat, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troopsWAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell. 

The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanoogaacross country, while his troops were transported over a longround-about road to the same destination, without need of guards exceptwhen in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troopsenjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. Buellwas marching through a hostile region and had to have his communicationsthoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. More men were requiredthe farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country. I, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purelyon the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force farinferior to my own. 

On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon thecountry, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so faras practicable. I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lineswithout gloves, " to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes andfrom our lines. I do not recollect having arrested and confined acitizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. I am aware that agreat many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet, Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was myorder. I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who wassaid to be confined by my order. There were many citizens at home whodeserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity wasafforded to inflict an injury to the National cause. This class was notof the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that afew guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones shouldsuffer. 

On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell. They were sent the same day by way of Decatur. On the 22d ColonelRodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment. 

Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments offthe field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh. He was bynature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at hisaction when the battle was over. He came to me with tears in his eyesand begged to be allowed to have another trial. I felt great sympathyfor him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville andDonelson. He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubtbecause he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, hisconstitutional weakness overcame him. He inquired the number of men theenemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than hisown he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and havingsatisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrenderedand informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to dothe same. The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved uponDonelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meetthem and drove them away. 

Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was thefact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible fromthe South and directed me to give every facility toward that end. Payin gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on therailroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would bereceived. This opened to the enemy not only the means of convertingcotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which theyso much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate andintelligent information in regard to our position and strength. It wasalso demoralizing to the troops. Citizens obtaining permits from thetreasury department had to be protected within our lines and givenfacilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not liketo be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of anenemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who sharednone of their dangers. 

On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20thand 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to beabout 4, 000 strong. The enemy was driven away with a loss of more thanone hundred men. On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon wasattacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on thefield dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteenwounded. On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy instrong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with greatloss. Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of thebattlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. Our loss, asreported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. On the 2d ofSeptember I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell. Jacksonand Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements. On the4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also toLouisville, Kentucky. 

General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march uponChattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent onedivision from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place. This gaveBuell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repairthe railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteendays at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by theNational forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. Theroad between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put inrepair by other troops, so that communication with the North would havebeen opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by theNational troops. If Buell had been permitted to move in the firstinstance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of theArmy of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrownfour divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair andguard it. 

Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September. I was atthe station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and foundGeneral P. H. Sheridan with them. I expressed surprise at seeing himand said that I had not expected him to go. He showed decideddisappointment at the prospect of being detained. I felt a littlenettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. 

Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had servedeleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast whenthe war broke out. He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, andbefore the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, toget East. He went to Missouri. Halleck had known him as a verysuccessful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians onthe Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-westMissouri. There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward whileSheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with hisimmediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing theuse of public transportation for private purposes. He asked to berelieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged andhis request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April, 1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. During the advance onCorinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry. Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him tosuggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying hewould appoint a good man without reference to his State. Sheridan wasnamed; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reachedhe was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of theMississippi. He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July withtwo small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three timesas numerous as his own. By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness ofattack he completely routed the enemy. For this he was made abrigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army aboutCorinth. On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me. Hisdeparture was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished servicesin his new field. 

Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and onthe night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up worksaround the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came fromthe front. 

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA. 

At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of theMississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville. Therewere at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. This force constituted my left wing, ofwhich Rosecrans was in command. General Ord commanded the centre, fromBethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson toBolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River. General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of hisbrigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River bythe Memphis and Ohio railroad. This made the most convenientarrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces uponany threatened point. All the troops of the command were withintelegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman. Bybringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point therewas a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be hadwith that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. In case it became necessary to reinforce Corinth, by this arrangementall the troops at Bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by railby the way of Jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troopsfrom Brownsville could march up to Bolivar to take their place. 

On the 7th of September I learned of the advance of Van Dorn and Price, apparently upon Corinth. One division was brought from Memphis toBolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of theenemy. I was much concerned because my first duty, after holding theterritory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcingof Bragg in Middle Tennessee. Already the Army of Northern Virginia haddefeated the army under General Pope and was invading Maryland. In theCentre General Buell was on his way to Louisville and Bragg marchingparallel to him with a large Confederate force for the Ohio River. 

I had been constantly called upon to reinforce Buell until at this timemy entire force numbered less than 50, 000 men, of all arms. Thisincluded everything from Cairo south within my jurisdiction. If I tooshould be driven back, the Ohio River would become the line dividing thebelligerents west of the Alleghanies, while at the East the line wasalready farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening ofthe war. It is true Nashville was never given up after its firstcapture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there wouldhave been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in WestTennessee had been compelled to fall back. To say at the end of thesecond year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the East waspushed north of Maryland, a State that had not seceded, and at the Westbeyond Kentucky, another State which had been always loyal, would havebeen discouraging indeed. As it was, many loyal people despaired in thefall of 1862 of ever saving the Union. The administration at Washingtonwas much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. But Ibelieve there was never a day when the President did not think that, insome way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. 

Up to the 11th of September Rosecrans still had troops on the railroadeast of Corinth, but they had all been ordered in. By the 12th all werein except a small force under Colonel Murphy of the 8th Wisconsin. Hehad been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yetbeen brought in to Corinth. 

On the 13th of September General Sterling Price entered Iuka, a townabout twenty miles east of Corinth on the Memphis and Charlestonrailroad. Colonel Murphy with a few men was guarding the place. Hemade no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. I was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troopsinto Tennessee to reinforce Bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained tobe. The authorities at Washington, including the general-in-chief ofthe army, were very anxious, as I have said, about affairs both in Eastand Middle Tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their accountas for any danger threatening my command. I had not force enough atCorinth to attack Price even by stripping everything; and there wasdanger that before troops could be got from other points he might be faron his way across the Tennessee. To prevent this all spare forces atBolivar and Jackson were ordered to Corinth, and cars were concentratedat Jackson for their transportation. Within twenty-four hours from thetransmission of the order the troops were at their destination, althoughthere had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward traingetting off the track and stopping all the others. This gave areinforcement of near 8, 000 men, General Ord in command. GeneralRosecrans commanded the district of Corinth with a movable force ofabout 9, 000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be leftbehind. It was known that General Van Dorn was about a four days' marchsouth of us, with a large force. It might have been part of his plan toattack at Corinth, Price coming from the east while he came up from thesouth. My desire was to attack Price before Van Dorn could reachCorinth or go to his relief. 

General Rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at Iuka, where hiscommand was spread out along the Memphis and Charleston railroadeastward. While there he had a most excellent map prepared showing allthe roads and streams in the surrounding country. He was alsopersonally familiar with the ground, so that I deferred very much to himin my plans for the approach. We had cars enough to transport all ofGeneral Ord's command, which was to go by rail to Burnsville, a point onthe road about seven miles west of Iuka. From there his troops were tomarch by the north side of the railroad and attack Price from thenorth-west, while Rosecrans was to move eastward from his position southof Corinth by way of the Jacinto road. A small force was to hold theJacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main forcemoved on the Fulton road which comes into Iuka further east. This planwas suggested by Rosecrans. 

Bear Creek, a few miles to the east of the Fulton road, is a formidableobstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all ofwhich, in September, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. TheTennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidableobstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. Ord was on thenorth-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in thatdirection it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would havecarried Price's army to the rear of the National forces and isolated itfrom all support. It looked to me that, if Price would remain in Iukauntil we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. 

On the morning of the 18th of September General Ord moved by rail toBurnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part ofthe programme. He was to get as near the enemy as possible during theday and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the nextmorning. Rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the tworoads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarterssimultaneously. Troops enough were left at Jacinto and Rienzi to detainany cavalry that Van Dorn might send out to make a sudden dash intoCorinth until I could be notified. There was a telegraph wire along therailroad, so there would be no delay in communication. I detained carsand locomotives enough at Burnsville to transport the whole of Ord'scommand at once, and if Van Dorn had moved against Corinth instead ofIuka I could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7, 000 or8, 000 before he could have arrived. I remained at Burnsville with adetachment of about 900 men from Ord's command and communicated with mytwo wings by courier. Ord met the advance of the enemy soon afterleaving Burnsville. Quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove therebels back with considerable loss, including one general officerkilled. He maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylightthe next morning. I was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatchfrom Rosecrans after midnight from Jacinto, twenty-two miles from Iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear ofhis column was not yet up as far as Jacinto. He said, however, that hewould still be at Iuka by two o'clock the next day. I did not believethis possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles arenot in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. Itmight do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to makean assault. I immediately sent Ord a copy of Rosecrans' dispatch andordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the soundof guns to the south or south-east. He was instructed to notify hisofficers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. During the19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound eithertowards the point where Ord was, or to Burnsville where I had remained. 

A couple of hours before dark on the 19th Rosecrans arrived with thehead of his column at garnets, the point where the Jacinto road to Iukaleaves the road going east. He here turned north without sending anytroops to the Fulton road. While still moving in column up the Jacintoroad he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten anddriven back upon the main road. In this short engagement his loss wasconsiderable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. The wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmitsounds towards either Ord or me. Neither he nor I nor any one in eithercommand heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. After theengagement Rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. This wasbrought by a courier. There was no road between Burnsville and theposition then occupied by Rosecrans and the country was impassable for aman on horseback. The courier bearing the message was compelled to movewest nearly to Jacinto before he found a road leading to Burnsville. This made it a late hour of the night before I learned of the battlethat had taken place during the afternoon. I at once notified Ord ofthe fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. The nextmorning Rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into Iuka with butlittle resistance. Ord also went in according to orders, withouthearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops comingfrom the south-west must be up by that time. Rosecrans, however, hadput no troops upon the Fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage ofthis neglect and retreated by that road during the night. Word was soonbrought to me that our troops were in Iuka. I immediately rode intotown and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. I ordered pursuit by the whole of Rosecrans' command and went on withhim a few miles in person. He followed only a few miles after I lefthim and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. I was disappointed at the result of the battle of Iuka--but I had sohigh an opinion of General Rosecrans that I found no fault at the time. 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

VAN DORN'S MOVEMENTS--BATTLE OF CORINTH--COMMAND OF THE DEPARTMENT OFTHE TENNESSEE. 

On the 19th of September General Geo. H. Thomas was ordered east toreinforce Buell. This threw the army at my command still more on thedefensive. The Memphis and Charleston railroad was abandoned, except atCorinth, and small forces were left at Chewalla and Grand Junction. Soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and Bolivarbecame our most advanced position on the Mississippi Central railroad. Our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions weresent out to watch the movements of the enemy. We were in a countrywhere nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us andfriendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. It was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. We, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and thenoften returned without it. 

On the 22d Bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of GrandJunction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry andartillery. I reinforced Bolivar, and went to Jackson in person tosuperintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might bemade upon. The troops from Corinth were brought up in time to repel thethreatened movement without a battle. Our cavalry followed the enemysouth of Davis' mills in Mississippi. 

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strikethe Mississippi River above Memphis. At the same time other pointswithin my command were so threatened that it was impossible toconcentrate a force to drive him away. There was at this juncture alarge Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within mycommand, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break upthe Mississippi Central railroad far to the south. This would not onlyhave called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of alarge rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raidson the enemy's line of supplies. Geographical lines between thecommands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they weretoo rigidly adhered to. 

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as hadapparently been his intention. He was simply covering a deeper design;one much more important to his cause. By the 1st of October it wasfully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force anddetermination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust hadjoined their strength for this purpose. There was some skirmishingoutside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebelsmassed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and theMobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinthand all possible reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must come by acircuitous route. 

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, whowas at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements pickedup along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut had beenordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dornwas coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in withthe advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening ofthe 3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, tocapture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. In that casethe enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and heldat bay all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could have takenthe offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times theirnumber and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about Corinthto hold them. He came near success, some of his troops penetrating theNational lines at least once, but the works that were built afterHalleck's departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until thetroops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel frontand rear. The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: alltheir charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. The loss onour side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn's. McPhersoncame up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemyas was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support ofRosecrans just after the repulse. His approach, as well as that ofHurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. GeneralRosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I hadgiven specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue themoment the enemy was repelled. He did not do so, and I repeated theorder after the battle. In the first order he was notified that theforce of 4, 000 men which was going to his assistance would be in greatperil if the enemy was not pursued. 

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took commandof his troops. This force encountered the head of Van Dorn's retreatingcolumn just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten milesout from Corinth. The bottom land here was swampy and bad for theoperations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. Ordattacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in apanic. Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed offthe bridge in their hurried retreat. Ord followed and met the mainforce. He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridgeand compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higherup the stream. Ord was wounded in this engagement and the commanddevolved on Hurlbut. 

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and thentook the wrong road. Moving in the enemy's country he travelled with awagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. His march wastherefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards hissupplies. Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, withoutanything except what the men carried on their persons, would have beenworth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possiblybeen. Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route takenby the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a streamin front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leadingnorth and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched asfar as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far frombattle as when he started. Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any suchforce as Van Dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and hemight have been in great peril. 

I now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after Rosecrans reached Jonesboro, I ordered him to return. He kept onto Ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. Ithereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to thegeneral-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" Upon this I ordered Rosecrans back. Hadhe gone much farther he would have met a greater force than Van Dorn hadat Corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and theprobabilities are he would have lost his army. 

The battle of Corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1, 812wounded and 232 missing. The enemy lost many more. Rosecrans reported1, 423 dead and 2, 225 prisoners. We fought behind breastworks, whichaccounts in some degree for the disparity. Among the killed on our sidewas General Hackelman. General Oglesby was badly, it was for some timesupposed mortally, wounded. I received a congratulatory letter from thePresident, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. 

This battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though notso complete as I had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as I now thinkwas within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at Corinth. Sincethe war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow tothe enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at theNorth. The battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safetyof the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receivingreinforcements I suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movementagainst Vicksburg. 

On the 23d of October I learned of Pemberton's being in command at HollySprings and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from Alabama andTexas. The same day General Rosecrans was relieved from duty with mycommand, and shortly after he succeeded Buell in the command of the armyin Middle Tennessee. I was delighted at the promotion of GeneralRosecrans to a separate command, because I still believed that whenindependent of an immediate superior the qualities which I, at thattime, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. As asubordinate I found that I could not make him do as I wished, and haddetermined to relieve him from duty that very day. 

At the close of the operations just described my force, in roundnumbers, was 48, 500. Of these 4, 800 were in Kentucky and Illinois, 7, 000 in Memphis, 19, 200 from Mound City south, and 17, 500 at Corinth. General McClernand had been authorized from Washington to go north andorganize troops to be used in opening the Mississippi. These new levieswith other reinforcements now began to come in. 

On the 25th of October I was placed in command of the Department of theTennessee. Reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the2d of November I was prepared to take the initiative. This was a greatrelief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a largedistrict of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy readyto give information of our every move. I have described veryimperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place duringthis time. To describe all would take more space than I can allot tothe purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops whodistinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9)

CHAPTER XXX. 

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST VICKSBURG--EMPLOYING THE FREEDMEN--OCCUPATION OFHOLLY SPRINGS--SHERMAN ORDERED TO MEMPHIS--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS DOWN THEMISSISSIPPI--VAN DORN CAPTURES HOLLY SPRINGS--COLLECTING FORAGE ANDFOOD. 

Vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first highground coming close to the river below Memphis. From there a railroadruns east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of theSouthern States. A railroad also starts from the opposite side of theriver, extending west as far as Shreveport, Louisiana. Vicksburg wasthe only channel, at the time of the events of which this chaptertreats, connecting the parts of the Confederacy divided by theMississippi. So long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigationof the river was prevented. Hence its importance. Points on the riverbetween Vicksburg and Port Hudson were held as dependencies; but theirfall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. 

The campaign against Vicksburg commenced on the 2d of November asindicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words:"I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisionsfrom Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here [Jackson, Tennessee]to-morrow, and take command in person. If found practicable, I will goto Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad andtelegraph as I go. "

At this time my command was holding the Mobile and Ohio railroad fromabout twenty-five miles south of Corinth, north to Columbus, Kentucky;the Mississippi Central from Bolivar north to its junction with theMobile and Ohio; the Memphis and Charleston from Corinth east to BearCreek, and the Mississippi River from Cairo to Memphis. My entirecommand was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardlythat if kept on the defensive. By moving against the enemy and into hisunsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large forcefor field operations. My moving force at that time was about 30, 000men, and I estimated the enemy confronting me, under Pemberton, at aboutthe same number. General McPherson commanded my left wing and GeneralC. S. Hamilton the centre, while Sherman was at Memphis with the rightwing. Pemberton was fortified at the Tallahatchie, but occupied HollySprings and Grand Junction on the Mississippi Central railroad. On the8th we occupied Grand Junction and La Grange, throwing a considerableforce seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. Theroad from Bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as thetroops advanced. 

Up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that largebodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they alwayscovered and guarded in all forward movements. There was delay thereforein repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies tothe front. 

By my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions fromWashington, all the forage within reach was collected under thesupervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under thechief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to takethem; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as governmentstores. The stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of thepossibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from thecountry itself. 

It was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "Freedman'sBureau" took its origin. Orders of the government prohibited theexpulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they camein voluntarily. Humanity forbade allowing them to starve. With such anarmy of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about GrandJunction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. There was no special authority for feeding them unless they wereemployed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but onlyable-bodied young men were suitable for such work. This labor wouldsupport but a very limited percentage of them. The plantations were alldeserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children aboveten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. To do thiswork with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under acompetent chief was necessary. On inquiring for such a man ChaplainEaton, now and for many years the very able United States Commissionerof Education, was suggested. He proved as efficient in that field as hehas since done in his present one. I gave him all the assistants andguards he called for. We together fixed the prices to be paid for thenegro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. Thecotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers toreceive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half centsper pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shippingthe cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. Citizensremaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of havingtheir crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. 

At once the freedmen became self-sustaining. The money was not paid tothem directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. Theygave me no trouble afterwards. 

Later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the MississippiRiver to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. A goodprice was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of governmentsteamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply withfuel). Those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. Inthis way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they hadnever known before. 

At this stage of the campaign against Vicksburg I was very muchdisturbed by newspaper rumors that General McClernand was to have aseparate and independent command within mine, to operate againstVicksburg by way of the Mississippi River. Two commanders on the samefield are always one too many, and in this case I did not think thegeneral selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fithim for so important a position. I feared for the safety of the troopsintrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. But on the 12th I received a dispatchfrom General Halleck saying that I had command of all the troops sent tomy department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where I pleased. The next day my cavalry was in Holly Springs, and the enemy fell backsouth of the Tallahatchie. 

Holly Springs I selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from Columbus, Kentucky, exceptthe few stores collected about La Grange and Grand Junction. This was along line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in anenemy's country. On the 15th of November, while I was still at HollySprings, I sent word to Sherman to meet me at Columbus. We were butforty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet wasfor me to take the rail to Columbus and Sherman a steamer for the sameplace. At that meeting, besides talking over my general plans I gavehim his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down theMississippi Central railroad if he could. Sherman, who was alwaysprompt, was up by the 29th to Cottage Hill, ten miles north of Oxford. He brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only fourregiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a smalldetachment of cavalry. Further reinforcements he knew were on their wayfrom the north to Memphis. About this time General Halleck orderedtroops from Helena, Arkansas (territory west of the Mississippi was notunder my command then) to cut the road in Pemberton's rear. Theexpedition was under Generals Hovey and C. C. Washburn and wassuccessful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damagedone was very slight and was soon repaired. 

The Tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroadbridge destroyed and Pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. Acrossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. I sentthe cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. Thiscaused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possiblyaccelerated by the expedition of Hovey and Washburn. The enemy wasfollowed as far south as Oxford by the main body of troops, and someseventeen miles farther by McPherson's command. Here the pursuit washalted to repair the railroad from the Tallahatchie northward, in orderto bring up supplies. The piles on which the railroad bridge rested hadbeen left standing. The work of constructing a roadway for the troopswas but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. 

During the delay at Oxford in repairing railroads I learned that anexpedition down the Mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to havea competent commander in charge, I ordered Sherman on the 8th ofDecember back to Memphis to take charge. The following were his orders:

Headquarters 13th Army Corps, Department of the Tennessee. OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862. 

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Right Wing:

You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. Onyour arrival at Memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of theMississippi River, and organize them into brigades and divisions in yourown army. As soon as possible move with them down the river to thevicinity of Vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleetunder command of Flag-officer Porter proceed to the reduction of thatplace in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, maydictate. 

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc. , necessary totake, will be left entirely with yourself. The Quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30, 000 men;should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will beauthorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may comeinto the port of Memphis. 

On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with AdmiralPorter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. 

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you willembark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold the forceshere in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movementsof the enemy may make necessary. 

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, andwhatever cavalry may be there. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

This idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d ofDecember I asked Halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy southof the Yallabusha and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg. On the 5th again I suggested, from Oxford, to Halleck that if the Helenatroops were at my command I though it would be possible to take them andthe Memphis forces south of the mouth of the Yazoo River, and thussecure Vicksburg and the State of Mississippi. Halleck on the same day, the 5th of December, directed me not to attempt to hold the countrysouth of the Tallahatchie, but to collect 25, 000 troops at Memphis bythe 20th for the Vicksburg expedition. I sent Sherman with twodivisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and askedwhether I should command the expedition down the river myself or sendSherman. I was authorized to do as I though best for the accomplishmentof the great object in view. I sent Sherman and so informed GeneralHalleck. 

As stated, my action in sending Sherman back was expedited by a desireto get him in command of the forces separated from my directsupervision. I feared that delay might bring McClernand, who was hissenior and who had authority from the President and Secretary of War toexercise that particular command, --and independently. I doubtedMcClernand's fitness; and I had good reason to believe that inforestalling him I was by no means giving offence to those whoseauthority to command was above both him and me. 

Neither my orders to General Sherman, nor the correspondence between usor between General Halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my goingfurther south than the Yallabusha. Pemberton's force in my front was themain part of the garrison of Vicksburg, as the force with me was thedefence of the territory held by us in West Tennessee and Kentucky. Ihoped to hold Pemberton in my front while Sherman should get in his rearand into Vicksburg. The further north the enemy could be held thebetter. 

It was understood, however, between General Sherman and myself that ourmovements were to be co-operative; if Pemberton could not be held awayfrom Vicksburg I was to follow him; but at that time it was not expectedto abandon the railroad north of the Yallabusha. With that point as asecondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the Yazoountil communications could be opened with the Mississippi wascontemplated. 

It was my intention, and so understood by Sherman and his command, thatif the enemy should fall back I would follow him even to the gates ofVicksburg. I intended in such an event to hold the road to Grenada onthe Yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a newbase of supplies on the Yazoo, or at Vicksburg itself, with Grenada tofall back upon in case of failure. It should be remembered that at thetime I speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operatein an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. A haltwas called at Oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, tobring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. 

On the 18th of December I received orders from Washington to divide mycommand into four army corps, with General McClernand to command one ofthem and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operatedown the Mississippi. This interfered with my plans, but probablyresulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. McClernand wasat that time in Springfield, Illinois. The order was obeyed without anydelay. Dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. 

On the 20th General Van Dorn appeared at Holly Springs, my secondarybase of supplies, captured the garrison of 1, 500 men commanded byColonel Murphy, of the 8th Wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all ourmunitions of war, food and forage. The capture was a disgraceful one tothe officer commanding but not to the troops under him. At the sametime Forrest got on our line of railroad between Jackson, Tennessee, andColumbus, Kentucky, doing much damage to it. This cut me off from allcommunication with the north for more than a week, and it was more thantwo weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtainedin the regular way. This demonstrated the impossibility of maintainingso long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving inan enemy's country. I determined, therefore, to abandon my campaigninto the interior with Columbus as a base, and returned to La Grange andGrand Junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road toMemphis, making the Mississippi river the line over which to drawsupplies. Pemberton was falling back at the same time. 

The moment I received the news of Van Dorn's success I sent the cavalryat the front back to drive him from the country. He had start enough tomove north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack severalsmall garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. All these hefound warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. Van Dorn didnot succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at HollySprings, which was larger than all the others attacked by him puttogether. Murphy was also warned of Van Dorn's approach, but made nopreparations to meet him. He did not even notify his command. 

Colonel Murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuatedIuka on the approach of the enemy. General Rosecrans denounced him forthe act and desired to have him tried and punished. I sustained thecolonel at the time because his command was a small one compared withthat of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and I thought he had donewell to get away without falling into their hands. His leaving largestores to fall into Price's possession I looked upon as an oversight andexcused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. He should, however, have destroyed them. This last surrender demonstrated to mymind that Rosecrans' judgment of Murphy's conduct at Iuka was correct. The surrender of Holly Springs was most reprehensible and showed eitherthe disloyalty of Colonel Murphy to the cause which he professed toserve, or gross cowardice. 

After the war was over I read from the diary of a lady who accompaniedGeneral Pemberton in his retreat from the Tallahatchie, that the retreatwas almost a panic. The roads were bad and it was difficult to move theartillery and trains. Why there should have been a panic I do not see. No expedition had yet started down the Mississippi River. Had I knownthe demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that centralMississippi abounded so in all army supplies, I would have been inpursuit of Pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in myrear. 

After sending cavalry to drive Van Dorn away, my next order was todispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect andbring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen mileseast and west of the road from our front back to Grand Junction, leavingtwo months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. I was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. Itshowed that we could have subsisted off the country for two monthsinstead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. Thistaught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaignwhen our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days'rations by the commissary. Our loss of supplies was great at HollySprings, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from thecountry and by the lesson taught. 

The news of the capture of Holly Springs and the destruction of oursupplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in Oxford. They came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, toask what I was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. I told them that I was not disturbed; that I had already sent troops andwagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteenmiles on each side of the road. Countenances soon changed, and so didthe inquiry. The next was, "What are WE to do?" My response was thatwe had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resourceswhile visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enoughto destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected thatmen, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. Iadvised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist ineating up what we left. 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO HOLLY SPRINGS--GENERAL M'CLERNAND IN COMMAND--ASSUMING COMMAND AT YOUNG'S POINT--OPERATIONS ABOVE VICKSBURG--FORTIFICATIONS ABOUT VICKSBURG--THE CANAL--LAKE PROVIDENCE--OPERATIONS AT YAZOO PASS. 

This interruption in my communications north--I was really cut off fromcommunication with a great part of my own command during this time--resulted in Sherman's moving from Memphis before McClernand couldarrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach McClernand. Pembertongot back to Vicksburg before Sherman got there. The rebel positionswere on a bluff on the Yazoo River, some miles above its mouth. Thewaters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leavingonly narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and thehigh bluffs. These were fortified and defended at all points. Therebel position was impregnable against any force that could be broughtagainst its front. Sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. Hisefforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, werenecessarily unavailing. 

Sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but I had no opportunity ofcommunicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraphto my rear on the 20th. He did not know but what I was in the rear ofthe enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for thetroops with me. I had, before he started from Memphis, directed him totake with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of theYazoo, not knowing but that I might want them to supply me after cuttingloose from my base at Grenada. 

On the 23d I removed my headquarters back to Holly Springs. The troopswere drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, findingsupplies abundant and no enemy following. The road was not damagedsouth of Holly Springs by Van Dorn, at least not to an extent to causeany delay. As I had resolved to move headquarters to Memphis, and torepair the road to that point, I remained at Holly Springs until thiswork was completed. 

On the 10th of January, the work on the road from Holly Springs to GrandJunction and thence to Memphis being completed, I moved my headquartersto the latter place. During the campaign here described, the losses(mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with theirHolly Springs capture, which they could not hold. 

When Sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20, 000 men, taken from Memphis, and was reinforced by 12, 000 more at Helena, Arkansas. The troops on the west bank of the river had previously beenassigned to my command. McClernand having received the orders for hisassignment reached the mouth of the Yazoo on the 2d of January, andimmediately assumed command of all the troops with Sherman, being a partof his own corps, the 13th, and all of Sherman's, the 15th. Sherman, and Admiral Porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the Yazoo. Afterconsultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could renderservice to the cause where they were, and learning that I had withdrawnfrom the interior of Mississippi, they determined to return to theArkansas River and to attack Arkansas Post, about fifty miles up thatstream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. Sherman hadlearned of the existence of this force through a man who had beencaptured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and othersupplies intended for his command. The man had made his escape. McClernand approved this move reluctantly, as Sherman says. No obstaclewas encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range ofthe fort. After three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was madeby the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and intaking 5, 000 prisoners and 17 guns. I was at first disposed todisapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having noespecial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result wasunderstood I regarded it as very important. Five thousand Confederatetroops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss ofproperty while navigating the Mississippi. 

Immediately after the reduction of Arkansas Post and the capture of thegarrison, McClernand returned with his entire force to Napoleon, at themouth of the Arkansas River. From here I received messages from bothSherman and Admiral Porter, urging me to come and take command inperson, and expressing their distrust of McClernand's ability andfitness for so important and intricate an expedition. 

On the 17th I visited McClernand and his command at Napoleon. It washere made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustfulof McClernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all theycould to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. Itwould have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances intosuch danger. By this time I had received authority to relieveMcClernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the riverexpedition, or to assume command in person. I felt great embarrassmentabout McClernand. He was the senior major-general after myself withinthe department. It would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assigna junior over him. Nothing was left, therefore, but to assume thecommand myself. I would have been glad to put Sherman in command, togive him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the Decemberbefore; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he wasjunior to McClernand. Sherman's failure needs no apology. 

On the 20th I ordered General McClernand with the entire command, toYoung's Point and Milliken's Bend, while I returned to Memphis to makeall the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind mesecure. General Hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. TheMemphis and Charleston railroad was held, while the Mississippi Centralwas given up. Columbus was the only point between Cairo and Memphis, onthe river, left with a garrison. All the troops and guns from the postson the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. 

On the 29th of January I arrived at Young's Point and assumed commandthe following day. General McClernand took exception in a mostcharacteristic way--for him. His correspondence with me on the subjectwas more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. It was highlyinsubordinate, but I overlooked it, as I believed, for the good of theservice. General McClernand was a politician of very considerableprominence in his State; he was a member of Congress when the secessionwar broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished allthe opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for savingthe Union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the Union atall hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration ofwhere he stood in the contest before the country. He also gave up hisseat in Congress to take the field in defence of the principles he hadproclaimed. 

The real work of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg now began. Theproblem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of theriver from which the troops could operate against Vicksburg. TheMississippi River, from Cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valleyof many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty upto two or more hundred feet above the river. On the west side thehighest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highestwater. Through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. At places it runs tothe very foot of the bluffs. After leaving Memphis, there are no suchhighlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until Vicksburgis reached. 

The intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in highwater--many of them navigable for steamers. All of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making itimpossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. Marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible;navigating it proved equally impracticable. The strategical wayaccording to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to Memphis;establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehousescould be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line ofrailroad, repairing as we advanced, to the Yallabusha, or to Jackson, Mississippi. At this time the North had become very much discouraged. Many strong Union men believed that the war must prove a failure. Theelections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for theprosecution of the war to save the Union if it took the last man and thelast dollar. Voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greaterpart of the North, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up ourranks. It was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movementas long as that from Vicksburg to Memphis, would be interpreted, by manyof those yet full of hope for the preservation of the Union, as adefeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and thepower to capture and punish deserters lost. There was nothing left to bedone but to go FORWARD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY. This was in my mind fromthe moment I took command in person at Young's Point. 

The winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in theMississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. To get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took manymiles of river front. We had to occupy the levees and the groundimmediately behind. This was so limited that one corps, the 17th, underGeneral McPherson, was at Lake Providence, seventy miles aboveVicksburg. 

It was in January the troops took their position opposite Vicksburg. The water was very high and the rains were incessant. There seemed nopossibility of a land movement before the end of March or later, and itwould not do to lie idle all this time. The effect would bedemoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. Friends inthe North would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in thesame section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation ofthe cause and those engaged in it. 

I always admired the South, as bad as I thought their cause, for theboldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, bypress or by individuals, within their control. War at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or betweennations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. But, once enteredinto, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within theirranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section ornation. 

Vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to theriver's edge, below that on which Memphis stands. The bluff, or highland, follows the left bank of the Yazoo for some distance and continuesin a southerly direction to the Mississippi River, thence it runs alongthe Mississippi to Warrenton, six miles below. The Yazoo River leavesthe high land a short distance below Haines' Bluff and empties into theMississippi nine miles above Vicksburg. Vicksburg is built on this highland where the Mississippi washes the base of the hill. Haines' Bluff, eleven miles from Vicksburg, on the Yazoo River, was strongly fortified. The whole distance from there to Vicksburg and thence to Warrenton wasalso intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pitsconnecting them. 

From Young's Point the Mississippi turns in a north-easterly directionto a point just above the city, when it again turns and runssouth-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before theywere in range of the upper batteries. Since then the river has made acut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. North of the Yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up withbayous, and much overflowed. A front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. The problem thenbecame, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the Mississippiwithout an apparent retreat. Then commenced a series of experiments toconsume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops andof the public generally. I, myself, never felt great confidence thatany of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. NeverthelessI was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. 

In 1862 General Thomas Williams had come up from New Orleans and cut aditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across fromYoung's Point to the river below. The distance across was a little overa mile. It was Williams' expectation that when the river rose it wouldcut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy fromboth ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the risewithout doing any execution in the way of cutting. Mr. Lincoln hadnavigated the Mississippi in his younger days and understood well itstendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. He setmuch store accordingly by this canal. General McClernand had been, therefore, directed before I went to Young's Point to push the work ofwidening and deepening this canal. After my arrival the work wasdiligently pushed with about 4, 000 men--as many as could be used toadvantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke adam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water outuntil the excavation was completed. This was on the 8th of March. 

Even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable forsteamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. It runs in adirection almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the oppositeside, or east bank, of the river. As soon as the enemy discovered whatwe were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughoutits length. This battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. Had the canal beencompleted it might have proven of some use in running transportsthrough, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet haveto run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. 

While this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, tryingto find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of theriver, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding thebatteries. 

On the 30th of January, the day after my arrival at the front, I orderedGeneral McPherson, stationed with his corps at Lake Providence, to cutthe levee at that point. If successful in opening a channel fornavigation by this route, it would carry us to the Mississippi Riverthrough the mouth of the Red River, just above Port Hudson and fourhundred miles below Vicksburg by the river. 

Lake Providence is a part of the old bed of the Mississippi, about amile from the present channel. It is six miles long and has its outletthrough Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Washita and RedRivers. The last three are navigable streams at all seasons. BayousBaxter and Macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered withdense forests overhanging the channel. They were also filled withfallen timber, the accumulation of years. The land along theMississippi River, from Memphis down, is in all instances highest nextto the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form theboundary of the valley through which it winds. Bayou Baxter, as itreaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in acypress swamp before it reaches the Macon. There was about two feet ofwater in this swamp at the time. To get through it, even with vesselsof the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavytimber wide enough to make a passage way. As the trees would have to becut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of greatmagnitude. 

On the 4th of February I visited General McPherson, and remained withhim several days. The work had not progressed so far as to admit thewater from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded indrawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. With this we were able to explore thelake and bayou as far as cleared. I saw then that there was scarcely achance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troopsthrough an enemy's country. The distance from Lake Providence to thepoint where vessels going by that route would enter the Mississippiagain, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. Thedistance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through whichthis new route would carry us. The enemy held Port Hudson, below wherethe Red River debouches, and all the Mississippi above to Vicksburg. The Red River, Washita and Tensas were, as has been said, all navigablestreams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstructour passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. I let thework go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. Then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a betterprospect of success. This work was abandoned after the canal proved afailure. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson of my staff was sent to Helena, Arkansas, toexamine and open a way through Moon Lake and the Yazoo Pass if possible. Formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the Mississippi Riverinto Moon Lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through Yazoo Passto Coldwater, along the latter to the Tallahatchie, which joins theYallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below Moon Lake and formsthe Yazoo River. These were formerly navigated by steamers trading withthe rich plantations along their banks; but the State of Mississippi hadbuilt a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving theonly entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of themouth of the Yazoo several hundreds of miles below. 

On the 2d of February this dam, or levee, was cut. The river being highthe rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short timethe entire obstruction was washed away. The bayous were soon filled andmuch of the country was overflowed. This pass leaves the MississippiRiver but a few miles below Helena. On the 24th General Ross, with hisbrigade of about 4, 500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. The rebels had obstructed the navigation of Yazoo Pass and the Coldwaterby felling trees into them. Much of the timber in this region being ofgreater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, theirremoval was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of March Ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboatsunder the command of Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith, confronting afortification at Greenwood, where the Tallahatchie and Yallabusha uniteand the Yazoo begins. The bends of the rivers are such at this point asto almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of theriver. This island was fortified and manned. It was named FortPemberton after the commander at Vicksburg. No land approach wasaccessible. The troops, therefore, could render no assistance towardsan assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece ofground which was discovered above water. The gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of March. Both efforts werefailures and were not renewed. One gunboat was disabled and we lost sixmen killed and twenty-five wounded. The loss of the enemy was less. 

Fort Pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that arise of two feet would drive the enemy out. In hope of enlisting theelements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the Mississippi levee, this time directlyopposite Helena, or six miles above the former cut. It did notaccomplish the desired result, and Ross, with his fleet, started back. On the 22d he met Quinby with a brigade at Yazoo Pass. Quinby was thesenior of Ross, and assumed command. He was not satisfied withreturning to his former position without seeing for himself whetheranything could be accomplished. Accordingly Fort Pemberton wasrevisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this timewithout an attack. Quinby, with his command, returned with but littledelay. In the meantime I was much exercised for the safety of Ross, notknowing that Quinby had been able to join him. Reinforcements were ofno use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain onboard of their transports. Relief had to come from another quarter. SoI determined to get into the Yazoo below Fort Pemberton. 

Steel's Bayou empties into the Yazoo River between Haines' Bluff and itsmouth. It is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavygrowth of timber, but it is deep. It approaches to within one mile ofthe Mississippi at Eagle Bend, thirty miles above Young's Point. Steel's Bayou connects with Black Bayou, Black Bayou with Deer Creek, Deer Creek with Rolling Fork, Rolling Fork with the Big Sunflower River, and the Big Sunflower with the Yazoo River about ten miles above Haines'Bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by thewinding of the river. All these waterways are of about the same natureso far as navigation is concerned, until the Sunflower is reached; thisaffords free navigation. 

Admiral Porter explored this waterway as far as Deer Creek on the 14thof March, and reported it navigable. On the next day he started withfive gunboats and four mortar-boats. I went with him for some distance. The heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did alsothe short turns in so narrow a stream. The gunboats, however, ploughedtheir way through without other damage than to their appearance. Thetransports did not fare so well although they followed behind. The roadwas somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. In the evening Ireturned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. Sherman went inperson on the 16th, taking with him Stuart's division of the 15th corps. They took large river transports to Eagle Bend on the Mississippi, wherethey debarked and marched across to Steel's Bayou, where theyre-embarked on the transports. The river steamers, with their tallsmokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded thatthe gunboats got far ahead. Porter, with his fleet, got within a fewhundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free fromthe obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when heencountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed byobstructions in his front. He could do nothing with gunboats againstsharpshooters. The rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4, 000men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. 

Sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out BlackBayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. On thenight of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had beenattacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. Sherman at oncereturned through Black Bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met asteamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. Theytried to force their way through Black Bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. It was night when they landed, and intensely dark. There was but anarrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrushor cane. The troops lighted their way through this with candles carriedin their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an openplantation. Here the troops rested until morning. They made twenty-onemiles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time torescue the fleet. Porter had fully made up his mind to blow up thegunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. Morewelcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on thisoccasion. The vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvouson the Mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to getin rear of Vicksburg. 

CHAPTER XXXII. 

THE BAYOUS WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--CRITICISMS OF THE NORTHERN PRESS--RUNNING THE BATTERIES--LOSS OF THE INDIANOLA--DISPOSITION OF THETROOPS. 

The original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of March. Theeffort to make a waterway through Lake Providence and the connectingbayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. 

At Milliken's Bend, and also at Young's Point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing Richmond, Louisiana, enterthe Mississippi at Carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above GrandGulf. The Mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from thesebayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at thesepoints, is carried through these same channels to the river below. Incase of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find itsoutlet through the same channels. The dredges and laborers from thecanal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, Idetermined to open these other channels, if possible. If successful theeffort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for ourtransports. There was a good road back of the levees, along thesebayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over wheneverthe water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. Accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching abase heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. 

As early as the 4th of February I had written to Halleck about thisroute, stating that I thought it much more practicable than the otherundertaking (the Lake Providence route), and that it would have beenaccomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had gotall over the country. 

The upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, furtherthan the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber fora distance of several miles from their source. It was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. This work was continued until the waters of the river began to recedeand the road to Richmond, Louisiana, emerged from the water. One smallsteamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no furtheruse could be made of it because of the fall in the river. Beyond this itwas no more successful than the other experiments with which the winterwas whiled away. All these failures would have been very discouragingif I had expected much from the efforts; but I had not. From the firstthe most I hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be usedbelow Vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteriesdefending that city. 

This long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged aboutVicksburg. The river was higher than its natural banks from December, 1862, to the following April. The war had suspended peaceful pursuitsin the South, further than the production of army supplies, and inconsequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and thewhole country was covered with water. Troops could scarcely find dryground on which to pitch their tents. Malarial fevers broke out amongthe men. Measles and small-pox also attacked them. The hospitalarrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that theloss of life was much less than might have been expected. Visitors tothe camps went home with dismal stories to relate; Northern papers cameback to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. Because I wouldnot divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored formy removal. They were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simpleremoval, but named who my successor should be. McClernand, Fremont, Hunter and McClellan were all mentioned in this connection. I took nosteps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as Iunderstood it, to the best of my ability. Every one has hissuperstitions. One of mine is that in positions of great responsibilityevery one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assignedby competent authority, without application or the use of influence tochange his position. While at Cairo I had watched with very greatinterest the operations of the Army of the Potomac, looking upon that asthe main field of the war. I had no idea, myself, of ever having anylarge command, nor did I suppose that I was equal to one; but I had thevanity to think that as a cavalry officer I might succeed very well inthe command of a brigade. On one occasion, in talking about this to mystaff officers, all of whom were civilians without any militaryeducation whatever, I said that I would give anything if I werecommanding a brigade of cavalry in the Army of the Potomac and Ibelieved I could do some good. Captain Hillyer spoke up and suggestedthat I make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. I then told him that I would cut my right arm off first, and mentionedthis superstition. 

In time of war the President, being by the ConstitutionCommander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is responsible for theselection of commanders. He should not be embarrassed in making hisselections. I having been selected, my responsibility ended with mydoing the best I knew how. If I had sought the place, or obtained itthrough personal or political influence, my belief is that I would havefeared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probablyhave awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. Persons obtainingimportant commands by application or political influence are apt to keepa written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which areshown in case of disaster. Somebody must be responsible for theirfailures. 

With all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both President Lincolnand General Halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. I had nevermet Mr. Lincoln, but his support was constant. 

At last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsulabehind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; thetroops were all concentrated from distant points at Milliken's Bendpreparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious anddiscouraging labors with success. 

I had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to apoint below Vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to thepossible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resortedto for the purpose of giving us a different base. This could not beundertaken until the waters receded. I did not therefore communicatethis plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary tomake preparations for the start. My recollection is that Admiral Porterwas the first one to whom I mentioned it. The co-operation of the navywas absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) ofsuch an enterprise. I had no more authority to command Porter than hehad to command me. It was necessary to have part of his fleet belowVicksburg if the troops went there. Steamers to use as ferries werealso essential. The navy was the only escort and protection for thesesteamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen milesof batteries. Porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that hehad better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to runthe batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better thansoldiers. I was glad to accept his proposition, not only because Iadmitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from theenemy a little longer our designs. Porter's fleet was on the east sideof the river above the mouth of the Yazoo, entirely concealed from theenemy by the dense forests that intervened. Even spies could not getnear him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. Suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. Our river guardsdiscovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up theriver near the east shore, from the direction of Vicksburg, towards thefleet. On overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not muchlarger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as aflag of truce in case of discovery. The boat, crew and passengers werebrought ashore to me. The chief personage aboard proved to be JacobThompson, Secretary of the Interior under the administration ofPresident Buchanan. After a pleasant conversation of half an hour ormore I allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return toVicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in mymind as to the good faith of Mr. Thompson and his flag. 

Admiral Porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for theirhazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. The great essential was toprotect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the firesunder the boilers from view. This he accomplished by loading thesteamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to thedeck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of theboilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. The hay and grain wouldbe wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity bythe muddy roads over which we expected to march. 

Before this I had been collecting, from St. Louis and Chicago, yawls andbarges to be used as ferries when we got below. By the 16th of AprilPorter was ready to start on his perilous trip. The advance, flagshipBenton, Porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed atintervals of a few minutes by the Lafayette with a captured steamer, thePrice, lashed to her side, the Louisville, Mound City, Pittsburgh andCarondelet--all of these being naval vessels. Next came the transports--Forest Queen, Silver Wave and Henry Clay, each towing barges loadedwith coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers whenbelow the batteries. The gunboat Tuscumbia brought up the rear. Soonafter the start a battery between Vicksburg and Warrenton opened fireacross the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, andthen by batteries all along the line. The gunboats ran up close underthe bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probablywithout much effect. They were under fire for more than two hours andevery vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to thegunboats. The transports did not fare so well. The Henry Clay wasdisabled and deserted by her crew. Soon after a shell burst in thecotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned herto the water's edge. The burning mass, however, floated down toCarthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. 

The enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready tolight up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firinghouses on the point of land opposite the city on the Louisiana side. The sight was magnificent, but terrible. I witnessed it from the deckof a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as lowdown as it was prudent to go. My mind was much relieved when I learnedthat no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. During the running of the batteries men were stationed in theholds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes thatmight be made in the hulls. All damage was afterwards soon repairedunder the direction of Admiral Porter. 

The experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. Admiral Farragut had run the batteries at Port Hudsonwith the flagship Hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from belowVicksburg. The 13th of February Admiral Porter had sent the gunboatIndianola, Lieutenant-Commander George Brown commanding, below. She metColonel Ellet of the Marine brigade below Natchez on a captured steamer. Two of the Colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producingthe greatest consternation among the people along the Mississippi fromVicksburg (*10) to the Red River. 

The Indianola remained about the mouth of the Red River some days, andthen started up the Mississippi. The Confederates soon raised the Queenof the West, (*11) and repaired her. With this vessel and the ram Webb, which they had had for some time in the Red River, and two othersteamers, they followed the Indianola. The latter was encumbered withbarges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speedagainst the rapid current of the Mississippi. The Confederate fleetovertook her just above Grand Gulf, and attacked her after dark on the24th of February. The Indianola was superior to all the others inarmament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. As it was she fought them for an hour and ahalf, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram andother vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinkingcondition. The armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. Officers and crew then surrendered. 

I had started McClernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th ofMarch, by way of Richmond, Louisiana, to New Carthage, hoping that hemight capture Grand Gulf before the balance of the troops could getthere; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. Somemiles from New Carthage the levee to Bayou Vidal was broken in severalplaces, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. Boats werecollected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spotfrom such material as could be collected, to transport the troops acrossthe overflowed interval. By the 6th of April McClernand had reached NewCarthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried throughthe woods by these boats. On the 17th I visited New Carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we weredoing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. The waterwas falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to useboats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. McClernand hadalready found a new route from Smith's plantation where the crevasseoccurred, to Perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below NewCarthage. This increased the march from Milliken's Bend fromtwenty-seven to nearly forty miles. Four bridges had to be built acrossbayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about twothousand feet of bridging in all. The river falling made the current inthese bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building andpermanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "Yankeesoldier" was equal to any emergency. The bridges were soon built ofsuch material as could be found near by, and so substantial were theythat not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army withartillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun(a thirty-two pounder). This, if my memory serves me correctly, brokethrough the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across thepeninsula. These bridges were all built by McClernand's command, underthe supervision of Lieutenant Hains of the Engineer Corps. 

I returned to Milliken's Bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20thissued the following final order for the movement of troops:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, MILLIKEN'S BEND, LOUISIANA, April 20, 1863. 

Special Orders, No. 110. * * * * * ** VIII. The following orders are published for the information andguidance of the "Army in the Field, " in its present movement to obtain afoothold on the east bank of the Mississippi River, from which Vicksburgcan be approached by practicable roads. 

First. --The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernandcommanding, will constitute the right wing. 

Second. --The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Shermancommanding, will constitute the left wing. 

Third. --The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPhersoncommanding, will constitute the centre. 

Fourth. --The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left. 

Fifth. --Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity mayrequire. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division willremain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. 

Sixth. --Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities canbe afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. 

Seventh. --In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to eachcompany for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for eachregimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters;and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commandershaving the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but notto exceed the number allowed by General Orders No. 160, A. G. O. , seriesof 1862. 

Eighth. --All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediatecharge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, willconstitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorizedcamp equipage of the army. 

Ninth. --As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeentharmy corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed inlike manner by the Fifteenth army corps. 

Tenth. --Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corpscommanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage. 

Eleventh. --General hospitals will be established by the medical directorbetween Duckport and Milliken's Bend. All sick and disabled soldierswill be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge of hospitals willreport convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. Each corpscommander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remainbehind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps;officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge intosquads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to;and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to commandthem, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. The force soorganized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport toMilliken's Bend. They will furnish all the guards and details requiredfor general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about thecamps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. 

Twelfth. --The movement of troops from Milliken's Bend to New Carthagewill be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supplyof rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previousorders. 

Thirteenth. --Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all thebeef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; butwanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for militarypurposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses withoutproper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. Allsuch irregularities must be summarily punished. 

Fourteenth. --Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to thecommand of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line fromhere to New Carthage. His particular attention is called to GeneralOrders, No. 69, from Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, of dateMarch 20, 1863. 

By order of MAJOR-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. 

McClernand was already below on the Mississippi. Two of McPherson'sdivisions were put upon the march immediately. The third had not yetarrived from Lake Providence; it was on its way to Milliken's Bend andwas to follow on arrival. 

Sherman was to follow McPherson. Two of his divisions were at Duckportand Young's Point, and the third under Steele was under orders to returnfrom Greenville, Mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebelbattery that had been annoying our transports. 

It had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagontrain over the single narrow and almost impassable road betweenMilliken's Bend and Perkins' plantation. Accordingly six more steamerswere protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded withsupplies. They took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. Onthe night of the 22d of April they ran the batteries, five gettingthrough more or less disabled while one was sunk. About half the bargesgot through with their needed freight. 

When it was first proposed to run the blockade at Vicksburg with riversteamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing toaccompany their vessels, and but one crew. Volunteers were called forfrom the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigatingthe western rivers. Captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-handsenough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels wewere moving through this dangerous ordeal. Most of them were fromLogan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part ofIllinois and from Missouri. All but two of the steamers were commandedby volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. In thisinstance, as in all others during the war, I found that volunteers couldbe found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet everycall for aid whether mechanical or professional. Colonel W. S. Oliverwas master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. 

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

ATTACK ON GRAND GULF--OPERATIONS BELOW VICKSBURG. 

On the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at Perkins'plantation. Reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whetherthere was high land on the east shore of the river where we might landabove Grand Gulf. There was none practicable. Accordingly the troopswere set in motion for Hard Times, twenty-two miles farther down theriver and nearly opposite Grand Gulf. The loss of two steamers and sixbarges reduced our transportation so that only 10, 000 men could be movedby water. Some of the steamers that had got below were injured in theirmachinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those lessseverely injured. All the troops, therefore, except what could betransported in one trip, had to march. The road lay west of Lake St. Joseph. Three large bayous had to be crossed. They were rapidlybridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12)

On the 27th McClernand's corps was all at Hard Times, and McPherson'swas following closely. I had determined to make the attempt to effect alanding on the east side of the river as soon as possible. Accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, McClernand was directed to embark all thetroops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. About10, 000 men were so embarked. The plan was to have the navy silence theguns at Grand Gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debarkin the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy andcarry the works by storm. The following order was issued:

PERKINS PLANTATION, LA. , April 27, 1863. 

MAJOR-GENERAL J. A. MCCLERNAND, Commanding 13th A. C. 

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it asthere is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery and everyarticle authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and holdthem in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment'swarning. 

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, sendto a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you see, by special ordersof this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division. 

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence allthe batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below thepromontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best theground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. Thefirst object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintainthemselves until such time as preparations can be made and troopscollected for a forward movement. 

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicatedto you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may bebelow the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. 

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, outof range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past GrandGulf and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signalwill be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to startwith this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, butnot the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to bebrought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches tobelow Grand Gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that thetransports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, thatthe transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that thetransports can run by with the troops on board. 

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left torun the blockade. 

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations intheir haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

At 8 o'clock A. M. , 29th, Porter made the attack with his entire strengthpresent, eight gunboats. For nearly five and a half hours the attackwas kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. All this timeMcClernand's 10, 000 men were huddled together on the transports in thestream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. I occupied a tug fromwhich I could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within rangeof the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was notcalculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were beingassailed themselves. About half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeingtheir efforts were entirely unavailing. The enemy ceased firing as soonas we withdrew. I immediately signalled the Admiral and went aboard hisship. The navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-sixwounded. A large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's sideand exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. Thesight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as I boarded theship was sickening. 

Grand Gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot ofit. It is as defensible upon its front as Vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. Itherefore requested Porter to run the batteries with his fleet thatnight, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would bewanted below. 

There is a long tongue of land from the Louisiana side extending towardsGrand Gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three milesabove and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about thesame distance below. The land was so low and wet that it would not havebeen practicable to march an army across but for a levee. I had hadthis explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain ifthere was a possible point of debarkation north of Rodney. It was foundthat the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. 

Porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in theplan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. I hadintended to make this request, but he anticipated me. At dusk, whenconcealed from the view of the enemy at Grand Gulf, McClernand landedhis command on the west bank. The navy and transports ran the batteriessuccessfully. The troops marched across the point of land under cover ofnight, unobserved. By the time it was light the enemy saw our wholefleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly movingdown the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, withNational troops. 

When the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected thatwe would have to go to Rodney, about nine miles below, to find alanding; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that agood landing would be found at Bruinsburg, a few miles above Rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to Port Gibson sometwelve miles in the interior. The information was found correct, andour landing was effected without opposition. 

Sherman had not left his position above Vicksburg yet. On the morningof the 27th I ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps upthe Yazoo and threatening an attack on Haines' Bluff. 

My object was to compel Pemberton to keep as much force about Vicksburgas I could, until I could secure a good footing on high land east of theriver. The move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about Vicksburg and doubts about our realdesign. Sherman moved the day of our attack on Grand Gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which Porter hadleft above Vicksburg. 

He debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attackthe enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at Haines' Bluff. This move was made without a single casualty in either branch of theservice. On the first of May Sherman received orders from me (sent fromHard Times the evening of the 29th of April) to withdraw from the frontof Haines' Bluff and follow McPherson with two divisions as fast as hecould. 

I had established a depot of supplies at Perkins' plantation. Now thatall our gunboats were below Grand Gulf it was possible that the enemymight fit out boats in the Big Black with improvised armament andattempt to destroy these supplies. McPherson was at Hard Times with aportion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of hiscommand. The night of the 29th I directed him to arm one of thetransports with artillery and send it up to Perkins' plantation as aguard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved thereand put in position. 

The embarkation below Grand Gulf took place at De Shroon's, Louisiana, six miles above Bruinsburg, Mississippi. Early on the morning of 30thof April McClernand's corps and one division of McPherson's corps werespeedily landed. 

When this was effected I felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalledsince. Vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defendersdemoralized by any of our previous moves. I was now in the enemy'scountry, with a vast river and the stronghold of Vicksburg between meand my base of supplies. But I was on dry ground on the same side ofthe river with the enemy. All the campaigns, labors, hardships andexposures from the month of December previous to this time that had beenmade and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. 

I had with me the 13th corps, General McClernand commanding, and twobrigades of Logan's division of the 17th corps, General McPhersoncommanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence thecampaign with. These were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade ofLogan's division and Crocker's division of the 17th corps. On the 7thof May I was further reinforced by Sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. My total force was then about thirty-three thousandmen. 

The enemy occupied Grand Gulf, Haines' Bluff and Jackson with a force ofnearly sixty thousand men. Jackson is fifty miles east of Vicksburg andis connected with it by a railroad. My first problem was to captureGrand Gulf to use as a base. 

Bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. The bottom at that point ishigher than most of the low land in the valley of the Mississippi, and agood road leads to the bluff. It was natural to expect the garrisonfrom Grand Gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, ourreaching this solid base. Bayou Pierre enters the Mississippi justabove Bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at thetime, in order to intercept us they had to go by Port Gibson, thenearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. This more thandoubled the distance from Grand Gulf to the high land back ofBruinsburg. No time was to be lost in securing this foothold. Ourtransportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the riverat one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and onedivision of the 17th was effected during the day, April 30th, and earlyevening. McClernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days'rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. The bluffs werereached an hour before sunset and McClernand was pushed on, hoping toreach Port Gibson and save the bridge spanning the Bayou Pierre beforethe enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of anenemy is always difficult. Port Gibson, too, is the starting point ofroads to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg and Jackson. 

McClernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of Port Gibsonat Thompson's plantation. There was some firing during the night, butnothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. The enemy hadtaken a strong natural position with most of the Grand Gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under General Bowen. Hishope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under Loring couldreach him from Vicksburg; but Loring did not come in time to render muchassistance south of Port Gibson. Two brigades of McPherson's corpsfollowed McClernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13thcorps could be got out of the way. 

The country in this part of Mississippi stands on edge, as it were, theroads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass fromone ridge to another. Where there are no clearings the sides of thehills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and withundergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. This makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. 

Near the point selected by Bowen to defend, the road to Port Gibsondivides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or twoat the widest point. These roads unite just outside the town. Thismade it necessary for McClernand to divide his force. It was not onlydivided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character abovedescribed. One flank could not reinforce the other except by marchingback to the junction of the roads. McClernand put the divisions ofHovey, Carr and A. J. Smith upon the right-hand branch and Osterhaus onthe left. I was on the field by ten A. M. , and inspected both flanks inperson. On the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at leastnot repulsing our advance. On the left, however, Osterhaus was notfaring so well. He had been repulsed with some loss. As soon as theroad could be cleared of McClernand's troops I ordered up McPherson, whowas close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of Logan'sdivision. This was about noon. I ordered him to send one brigade(General John E. Smith's was selected) to support Osterhaus, and to moveto the left and flank the enemy out of his position. This movementcarried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, whenSmith's troops were seen well through the ravine, Osterhaus was directedto renew his front attack. It was successful and unattended by heavyloss. The enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their leftfollowed before sunset. While the movement to our left was going on, McClernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests forreinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. Ihad been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging allthe men he had. We followed up our victory until night overtook usabout two miles from Port Gibson; then the troops went into bivouac forthe night. 

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

CAPTURE OF PORT GIBSON--GRIERSON'S RAID--OCCUPATION OF GRAND GULF--MOVEMENT UP THE BIG BLACK--BATTLE OF RAYMOND. 

We started next morning for Port Gibson as soon as it was light enoughto see the road. We were soon in the town, and I was delighted to findthat the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at thebridge, which he had burned. The troops were set to work at once toconstruct a bridge across the South Fork of the Bayou Pierre. At thistime the water was high and the current rapid. What might be called araft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from woodenbuildings, stables, fences, etc. , which sufficed for carrying the wholearmy over safely. Colonel J. H. Wilson, a member of my staff, plannedand superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the waterand working as hard as any one engaged. Officers and men generallyjoined in this work. When it was finished the army crossed and marchedeight miles beyond to the North Fork that day. One brigade of Logan'sdivision was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebelbattery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to preventour repairing the burnt railroad bridge. Two of his brigades were sentup the bayou to find a crossing and reach the North Fork to repair thebridge there. The enemy soon left when he found we were building abridge elsewhere. Before leaving Port Gibson we were reinforced byCrocker's division, McPherson's corps, which had crossed the Mississippiat Bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days'rations. McPherson still had one division west of the MississippiRiver, guarding the road from Milliken's Bend to the river below untilSherman's command should relieve it. 

On leaving Bruinsburg for the front I left my son Frederick, who hadjoined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, andhoped to get away without him until after Grand Gulf should fall intoour hands; but on waking up he learned that I had gone, and being guidedby the sound of the battle raging at Thompson's Hill--called the Battleof Port Gibson--found his way to where I was. He had no horse to rideat the time, and I had no facilities for even preparing a meal. He, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached Grand Gulf. Mr. C. A. Dana, then an officer of the War Department, accompanied me onthe Vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. He was inthe same situation as Fred so far as transportation and messarrangements were concerned. The first time I call to mind seeingeither of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormoushorses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles andbridles. 

Our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectlyequipped. 

My son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused noanxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. He looked outfor himself and was in every battle of the campaign. His age, then notquite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain arecollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. 

When the movement from Bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagontrain. The train still west of the Mississippi was carried around withproper escort, by a circuitous route from Milliken's Bend to Hard Timesseventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after thebattle of Port Gibson. My own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what I had on, was with thistrain. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburgwhich I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further thanstirrups. I had no other for nearly a week. 

It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions couldbe taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried onthe person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draftanimals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should becollected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a trainwas collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it couldbe found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes ofcartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules withplough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc. ; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything thatcould be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either foruse or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped forthe time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a positionwas secured when the time could be spared to observe them. 

It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of thecomplete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid throughcentral Mississippi. He had started from La Grange April 17th withthree regiments of about 1, 700 men. On the 21st he had detached ColonelHatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus andMacon and then return to La Grange. Hatch had a sharp fight with theenemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it atOkalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26. Griersoncontinued his movement with about 1, 000 men, breaking the Vicksburg andMeridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving atBaton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson hadattracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement againstVicksburg. 

During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork wasrepaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy froma commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evidentthat the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg. Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson'sferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay ourprogress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across andseveral miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction of theroad going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond andJackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the lefttowards Grand Gulf. I went with him a short distance from thisjunction. McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since thebattle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's rightflank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to holdHankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as toguard the line back down the bayou. I did not want to take the chancesof having an enemy lurking in our rear. 

On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes intothe one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, Ilearned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place ontheir way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition ofhis troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort ofabout twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already arrived with hisfleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. 

When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage sincethe 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers andget a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to thegeneral-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to betelegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding aboveVicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About twelveo'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson'sferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard fromBanks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be atPort Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15, 000 men. Up tothis time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base ofsupplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him inthe reduction of Port Hudson. 

The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from theone intended. To wait for his co-operation would have detained me atleast a month. The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousandmen after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all highpoints close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy wouldhave strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men thanBanks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independentlyof Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear ofVicksburg and invest or capture the city. 

Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities atWashington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would leadhim to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave anychance of success. The time it would take to communicate withWashington and get a reply would be so great that I could not beinterfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan waspracticable. Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of suppliesother than what were afforded by the country while marching through fourStates of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mineat this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of theimpossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, andthen act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure aslife. " To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility ofsupplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will beimpossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect isto get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and makethe country furnish the balance. " We started from Bruinsburg with anaverage of about two days' rations, and received no more from our ownsupplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. A delaywould give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. 

McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as theywere on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give themthree days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry and foragewere found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses wasalso secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not beobtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn forthe owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we werestopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, atall plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by thetroops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined togo without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo aboveVicksburg. 

While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I orderedreconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view ofleading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black andattack the city at once. 

On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command thatnight and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up fromGrand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. Orders were givenfor a forward movement the next day. Sherman was directed to order upBlair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bendto Hard Times with two brigades. 

The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundredwagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. 

On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to sendfour regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair'sdivision, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division inaddition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regimentswere to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be nodelay. 

During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of theBig Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via RockySprings, Utica and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both atRocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry. McPherson remainedthere during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Shermanmarched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry. The 9th, McPherson movedto a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Shermanremained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Shermanto Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th, McClernandwas at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advancedfrom Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman atFourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle. 

After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburgcould have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is notprobable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a closebesiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him tohold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to theBig Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. Itwas my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, andapproach from that direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that hadcrossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jacksoncommenced. 

As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roadsgenerally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallelto the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand'scorps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all thecrossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel withthe railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand andSherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman, extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance inreconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find themost practicable routes from one command to another so they couldsupport each other in case of an attack. In making this move Iestimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteenthousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson. Itwould not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops atone place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight himin detail. This was done with success, but I found afterwards that Ihad entirely under-estimated Pemberton's strength. 

Up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. My line was now nearly parallel with the Jackson and Vicksburg railroadand about seven miles south of it. The right was at Raymond eighteenmiles from Jackson, McPherson commanding; Sherman in the centre onFourteen Mile Creek, his advance thrown across; McClernand to the left, also on Fourteen Mile Creek, advance across, and his pickets within twomiles of Edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated aconsiderable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. McClernand's left was on the Big Black. In all our moves, up to thistime, the left had hugged the Big Black closely, and all the ferries hadbeen guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. 

McPherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteriesunder General Gregg, about two miles out of Raymond. This was about twoP. M. Logan was in advance with one of his brigades. He deployed andmoved up to engage the enemy. McPherson ordered the road in rear to becleared of wagons, and the balance of Logan's division, and Crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. Theorder was obeyed with alacrity. Logan got his division in position forassault before Crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carryingthe enemy's position easily, sending Gregg flying from the field not toappear against our front again until we met at Jackson. 

In this battle McPherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing--nearly or quite all from Logan's division. The enemy's loss was 100killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. 

I regarded Logan and Crocker as being as competent division commandersas could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much highercommand. Crocker, however, was dying of consumption when hevolunteered. His weak condition never put him on the sick report whenthere was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. He died not long after the close of the rebellion. 

CHAPTER XXXV. 

MOVEMENT AGAINST JACKSON--FALL OF JACKSON--INTERCEPTING THE ENEMY--BATTLE OF CHAMPION'S HILL. 

When the news reached me of McPherson's victory at Raymond about sundownmy position was with Sherman. I decided at once to turn the wholecolumn towards Jackson and capture that place without delay. 

Pemberton was now on my left, with, as I supposed, about 18, 000 men; infact, as I learned afterwards, with nearly 50, 000. A force was alsocollecting on my right, at Jackson, the point where all the railroadscommunicating with Vicksburg connect. All the enemy's supplies of menand stores would come by that point. As I hoped in the end to besiegeVicksburg I must first destroy all possibility of aid. I thereforedetermined to move swiftly towards Jackson, destroy or drive any forcein that direction and then turn upon Pemberton. But by moving againstJackson, I uncovered my own communication. So I finally decided to havenone--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole forceeastward. I then had no fears for my communications, and if I movedquickly enough could turn upon Pemberton before he could attack me inthe rear. 

Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements onthe 13th were annulled by new ones. McPherson was ordered at daylightto move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of mydetermination to capture Jackson and work from there westward. He wasordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond. McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon's toRaymond. One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black. 

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, askingreinforcements. Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of hisfleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position anddeclining to send any troops. I looked upon side movements as long asthe enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time andmaterial. 

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13thfrom Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederatetroops in Mississippi. I knew he was expecting reinforcements from thesouth and east. On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:"Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy arebringing forces from Tullahoma. "

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of eachother, as far as the nature of the country would admit. Reconnoissanceswere constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaintthemselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in casea union became necessary. 

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th andimmediately set to work destroying the railroad. Sherman's advancereached Raymond before the last of McPherson's command had got out ofthe town. McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward'sstation, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position forthe night in good order. On the night of the 13th, McPherson wasordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away. Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct roadfrom Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on anddoes not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossedthe line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman'sline, and a third to Raymond. He was also directed to send his siegeguns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs. McClernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. With onedivision at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, atJackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond MississippiSprings was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymondcould take either road. He still had two other divisions farther backnow that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson. If thislast command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already oneday's march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three differentroads leading to the latter city. But the most important considerationin my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should comeout to attack my rear. This I expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by Johnston to make this very move. 

I notified General Halleck that I should attack the State capital on the14th. A courier carried the dispatch to Grand Gulf through anunprotected country. 

Sherman and McPherson communicated with each other during the night andarranged to reach Jackson at about the same hour. It rained in torrentsduring the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. The roads were intolerable, and in some places on Sherman's line, wherethe land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. But the troops never murmured. By nine o'clock Crocker, of McPherson'scorps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets andspeedily drove them in upon the main body. They were outside of theintrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that hadbeen driven out of Raymond. Johnston had been reinforced; during thenight by Georgia and South Carolina regiments, so that his forceamounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. 

Sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from thetown, but speedily drove them in. He was now on the south andsouth-west of Jackson confronting the Confederates behind theirbreastworks, while McPherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the Vicksburg railroad. Artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to anassault. McPherson brought up Logan's division while he deployedCrocker's for the assault. Sherman made similar dispositions on theright. By eleven A. M. Both were ready to attack. Crocker moved hisdivision forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. These troops atonce encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole divisioncharged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this mainline. This stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside ofhis main fortifications. McPherson followed up with his command untilwithin range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when hehalted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine thenext move. It was now about noon. 

While this was going on Sherman was confronting a rebel battery whichenfiladed the road on which he was marching--the Mississippi Springsroad--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had topass. By detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemyflanked and speedily driven within the main line. This brought ourwhole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuouson the north, west and south sides from the Pearl River north of thecity to the same river south. I was with Sherman. He was confronted bya force sufficient to hold us back. Appearances did not justify anassault where we were. I had directed Sherman to send a force to theright, and to reconnoitre as far as to the Pearl River. This force, Tuttle's division, not returning I rode to the right with my staff, andsoon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. Tuttle'smovement or McPherson's pressure had no doubt led Johnston to order aretreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he wasgetting away. Tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lineswithout resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confrontingSherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. I rodeimmediately to the State House, where I was soon followed by Sherman. About the same time McPherson discovered that the enemy was leaving hisfront, and advanced Crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that theycould not move their guns or destroy them. He captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the National flag over the rebel capital ofMississippi. Stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. 

Our loss in this engagement was: McPherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded;Sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. The enemy lost 845killed, wounded and captured. Seventeen guns fell into our hands, andthe enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a largeamount of commissary stores. 

On this day Blair reached New Auburn and joined McClernand's 4thdivision. He had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, theonly commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. 

I slept that night in the room that Johnston was said to have occupiedthe night before. 

About four in the afternoon I sent for the corps commanders and directedthe dispositions to be made of their troops. Sherman was to remain inJackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, andmanufacturing city of military supplies. He did the work mosteffectually. Sherman and I went together into a manufactory which hadnot ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of Yankeetroops. Our presence did not seem to attract the attention of eitherthe manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. We looked onfor a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of thelooms, with "C. S. A. " woven in each bolt. There was an immense amountof cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thoughtthey had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leaveand take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cottonand factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while Iwas President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it wasprivate. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that hisproperty had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use itwith Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. Ideclined. 

On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch toPemberton at Edward's station: "I have lately arrived, and learn thatMajor-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. Itis important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. Ifpracticable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachmentwould be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assembleshould be brought. Time is all-important. " This dispatch was sent intriplicate, by different messengers. One of the messengers happened tobe a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before byHurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was agood deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning tothose who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and theexpelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston'sdispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me. 

Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptlyin the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston couldreach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I alsoinformed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the followingorder: "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us andcross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow themto do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make alldispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road fromwherever they may be on the receipt of this order. "

And to Blair I wrote: "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Blackand pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. Wemust beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all thetrains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so asto divide your troops and train. "

Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, thenight of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatchesannouncing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:

"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to therest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may beable to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himselffrom the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him. "

The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character ofthe country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near therailroad. McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the roadMcPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus)was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other nearChampion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road withOsterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detainedby it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn witha different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and movedpromptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine inthe morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. 

The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were aboutthree miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymondwith Blair in his rear. 

McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just inHovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with two divisions, was inJackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and militaryfactories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I orderedMcClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioninghim to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he feltvery certain of success. 

I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders ofhis superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make theattempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he haddecided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequentlydetermined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and mybase. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a weekbefore. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward'sstation, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to crossso much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a goodbridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching untilmidnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition ofhis order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent adispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might beexpected. 

About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employedon the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. Theyreported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, andthat it was still marching east. They reported him to have eightyregiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-fivethousand men. 

I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order tocomplete his work; but getting the above information I sent him ordersto move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with anammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commanderto march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Withinan hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to movewith all speed to Edward's station. McClernand was directed to embraceBlair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part ofthe 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join itscorps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced aboutand were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on ourextreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the wayof the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward'sstation, over which to march his troops. Hovey's division of his corpshad the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions bythe southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middleroad. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front tofeel for the enemy. 

Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounterthe enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on themiddle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, foundthe enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. About thesame time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagonroad from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to joinHovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I wasstill back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, andexpressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on the roadand proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were infront of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishingamounted almost to a battle. 

McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distanceto march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him wordby a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders wererepeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand'sadvance. 

Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one ofthe highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground inrange. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is aravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making itdifficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridgeoccupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turnswesterly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south atthis point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradualand is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when wewere there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. 

From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some threemiles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From thislatter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a halfmiles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. Itwas along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps, and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on theroad from Bolton direct to Edward's station. The middle road comes intothe northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west anddescends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several milessouth and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward'sstation. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formedparallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. 

By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contestedbattle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold hisposition and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up histroops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the rightof Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey withone brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther westto make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roadswould admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling onme for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteriesto be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and theydid good execution. 

From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him overopen fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. Hedid make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through thebelt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey where we were the mostheavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by ourright around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near theroad leading down to Baker's Creek. He was actually in command of theonly road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reinforced by twobrigades from McPherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand two hoursbefore, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with twodivisions, and the two divisions, Blair's and A. J. Smith's, wereconfronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur'sdivision of the 17th corps (McPherson's), had crossed the river at GrandGulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. NeitherLogan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just atthis juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for morereinforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to moveMcPherson's command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncoveredthe rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by theenemy. 

During all this time, Hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade fromLogan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up withtwo other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last oneabout the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fledprecipitately. This was between three and four o'clock. I rodeforward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the northroad, and found the skirmishers of Carr's division just coming in. Osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishersadvanced in like manner. Hovey's division, and McPherson's twodivisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were notin the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders toOsterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, Iexplained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far asthe Big Black, and to cross it if he could; Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark. 

The battle of Champion's Hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost roseto the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey's division and ofMcPherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other partof my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. Osterhaus's and A. J. Smith's divisions had encountered the rebeladvanced pickets as early as half-past seven. Their positions wereadmirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. McClernand, with twodivisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noonand in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff officers fullycompetent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the woodseparating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but hedid not come. It is true, in front of McClernand there was a smallforce of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravineobstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road mystaff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back orbeen cut off. Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged tohis corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the bruntof the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pullout from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand hadto advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. Of course I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediatesuperior. 

We had in this battle about 15, 000 men absolutely engaged. Thisexcludes those that did not get up, all of McClernand's command exceptHovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1, 844 wounded and 187 missing. Hoveyalone lost 1, 200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of hisdivision. 

Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known theground as I did afterwards, I cannot see how Pemberton could haveescaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over three thousandkilled and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and inpursuit. Loring's division, which was the right of Pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. Histroops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before thegeneral retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned totheir homes. Logan alone captured 1, 300 prisoners and eleven guns. Hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1, 200. 

McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill theircartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuitwas continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The nightof the 16th of May found McPherson's command bivouacked from two to sixmiles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edward's station, and Blair was about threemiles south-east; Hovey remained on the field where his troops hadfought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned bythe enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces ofartillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff and keptin advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped andtook possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back amile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouacon the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house whichhad been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with woundedand dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. 

While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by thethousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after thebattle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to doas much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. 

CHAPTER XXXVI. 

BATTLE OF BLACK RIVER BRIDGE--CROSSING THE BIG BLACK--INVESTMENT OFVICKSBURG--ASSAULTING THE WORKS. 

We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton mighthave made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned toJohnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have beenhis proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had hebeen in Pemberton's place. In fact it would have been in conformitywith Johnston's orders to Pemberton. 

Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16thand reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear guarddid not get in until two A. M. The 17th, but renewed their march bydaylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leavehis own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. At Bolton he wasinformed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march earlynext day, and to diverge from the road he was on to Bridgeport on theBig Black River, some eleven miles above the point where we expected tofind the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoontrain as early as possible. 

This movement brought Sherman's corps together, and at a point where Ihoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected and Sherman's corpsused to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening acrossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I wouldendeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. 

The advance division, Carr's (McClernand's corps), resumed the pursuitat half-past three A. M. On the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus, McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemywas found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six milesfrom that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached atan early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washedclose up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimesoverflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. Abayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. Whenthe river is full water runs through it, converting the point of landinto an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy hadfelled into the ditch. At this time there was a foot or two of water init. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of thisbayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwingdirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height westof the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip ofuncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr'sdivision was deployed on our right, Lawler's brigade forming his extremeright and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus'division was deployed to the left of Carr and covered the enemy's entirefront. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready tocome in wherever he could be of assistance. 

While the troops were standing as here described an officer from Banks'staff came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, datedthe 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks tobe forwarded to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf and toco-operate from there with Banks against Port Hudson, and then to returnwith our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer thatthe order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it now if heknew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought toobey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when Iheard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in thatdirection, saw Lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon theenemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of thecharge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; Ithink not even to this day. 

The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemyfled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him andleaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Manytried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some weredrowned in the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured and 1, 751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. The enemy probablylost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for thesuccessful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but littledoubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to preventhis occupying his defences around Vicksburg. 

As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had tobe built. It was but little after nine o'clock A. M. When the capturetook place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given forthe construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of byLieutenant Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPhersonhimself and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligentvolunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft bridge;McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons;and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cuttingonly on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their topsinterlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed fromtheir stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support theroadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and whereverfound, for this purpose. By eight o'clock in the morning of the 18thall three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. 

Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found Blair withthe pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched onthe west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night and the third the followingmorning. 

On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troopsand as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to securea base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman's lineof march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemythe December before when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxiouswith myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column andwell up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached worksalong the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, orelse the garrison from Haines' Bluff had not all got past on their wayto Vicksburg. At all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thickand fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure oflooking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before onthe ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positiveassurance of success. This, however, he said was the end of one of thegreatest campaigns in history and I ought to make a report of it atonce. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling whatmight happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this wasa complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman'slanguage; but the substance only. My reason for mentioning thisincident will appear further on. 

McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson andVicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived atnight near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand movedby the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned tothe left and put his troops on the road from Baldwin's ferry toVicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my threecorps up the works built for the defence of Vicksburg, on three roads--one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. By the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limitednumber of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right, and covered thehigh ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as histroops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupiedground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the groundto his left and extended as far towards Warrenton as he could, keeping acontinuous line. 

On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we weregetting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized byhis defeats at Champion's Hill and the Big Black, and I believed hewould not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly, at twoo'clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advancedpositions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fireof the enemy. 

The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in makingroads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River or Chickasaw Bayou. Most ofthe army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rationsissued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, butbegan to feel the want of bread. I remember that in passing around tothe left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said inrather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, "Hard tack. " In amoment the cry was taken up all along the line, "Hard tack! Hard tack!"I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since thearrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them witheverything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. Bythe night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated. 

I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, onlyfifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one Ihad with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of hiscoming to the assistance of Pemberton, and after all he might defeat myanticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not preventthe capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would savesending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, andwould set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. Butthe first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carrythe works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in thetrenches if they had not been allowed to try. 

The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at teno'clock A. M. On the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery inposition. All the corps commanders set their time by mine so that allmight open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to thevery parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them;but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported thathe had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wantedreinforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could seeas well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see thesuccess he reported. But his request for reinforcements being repeatedI could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby's division of the 17th corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as adiversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served toincrease our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. As soon asit was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and beenobliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thusended the last assault upon Vicksburg. 

CHAPTER XXXVII

SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 

I now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy, " as itwere, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convincedofficers and men that this was best, and they went to work on thedefences and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river, the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold ourposition the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions ofwar to what they had on hand. These could not last always. 

The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18thof May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty daysafter the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault hadbeen made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) hadbeen fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State hadfallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything usefulfor military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about onehundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; butfive days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousandprisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had beenkilled or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieceshad fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, fromVicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that hadcrossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than forty-threethousand men. One division of these, Blair's, only arrived in time totake part in the battle of Champion's Hill, but was not engaged there;and one brigade, Ransom's of McPherson's corps, reached the field afterthe battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on theroads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in theirown country, where no rear guards were necessary. The country isadmirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensivecampaign. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to saythe least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson seven or eightthousand; at Raymond, five thousand; at Jackson, from eight to eleventhousand; at Champion's Hill, twenty-five thousand; at the Big Black, four thousand. A part of those met at Jackson were all that was left ofthose encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a forcesmaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this timewas:

 KILLED WOUNDED MISSING

 Port Gibson..... 131 719 25 South Fork Bayou Pierre..... .. 1 .. Skirmishes, May 3 ..... 1 9 .. Fourteen Mile Creek..... 6 24 .. Raymond............... 66 339 39 Jackson..... 42 251 7 Champion's Hill..... 410 1, 844 187 Big Black..... 39 237 3 Bridgeport..... .. 1 .. Total..... 695 3, 425 259

Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Nothalf of them were disabled for any length of time. 

After the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siegebegan. Sherman occupied the right starting from the river aboveVicksburg, McPherson the centre (McArthur's division now with him) andMcClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman'sdivision arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of theline. 

In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had beencompleted from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear ofthe army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition;ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to beencamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troopshad been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up tothis time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. Prentiss andHurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receivingreinforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would makethe most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk oflosing ground elsewhere. 

My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haines' Bluffto Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was aboutseven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, inour rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second lineof defence facing the other way. I had not troops enough under mycommand to man these. General Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possibledispatch. 

The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defence. On the north it isabout two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest pointand very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown upwith cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with adense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and wasin cultivation. But here, too, it was cut up by ravines and smallstreams. The enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge fromthe river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to theJackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in asouthwesterly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the descriptiongiven lay in front of these defences. As there is a succession ofgullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line wasnecessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs withintrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would havelengthened their line very much. Generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight tothe head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generallyopen in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in thisouter work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. 

The work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy ashis was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated byour wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had butfour engineer officers with us. Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line Idirected that all officers who had graduated at West Point, where theyhad necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition totheir other duties assist in the work. 

The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. Thechief commissary, now the Commissary-General of the Army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was goodfor unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rationswhile working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, andas we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I lethim off. The general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twentypounds, and is not tall. 

We had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were noneat the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with abattery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the fieldartillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to dowas to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commandingpositions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of theenemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits andcovered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. Theenemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry waskept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and readyto fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. 

In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more thanthe ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enoughapart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. The enemy used in theirdefence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting overour men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do notremember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one ofthese shells. When they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound wasterrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Theiruse is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without anycorresponding advantage to those using them. 

The enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, becausewe had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used itfreely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the menbehind. 

There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had infront of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of thetoughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelvepound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered ascochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into thetrenches of the enemy. 

The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done bythe pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who werepaid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advancedposition was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy thebatteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were two hundred andtwenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery ofheavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. We were nowas strong for defence against the garrison of Vicksburg as they wereagainst us; but I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receivingconstant reinforcements from the east. He had at this time a largerforce than I had had at any time prior to the battle of Champion's Hill. 

As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburgreached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came togratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed throughthe terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Associationscame to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often thosecoming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. Many of thesoldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without breadduring the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good. 

Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois, with most ofthe State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was ofmost interest. In Sherman's front the ground was the most broken andmost wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore tookthem to Sherman's headquarters and presented them. Before starting outto look at the lines--possibly while Sherman's horse was being saddled--there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about whichthe North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knotaround Sherman and another around me, and I heard Sherman repeating, inthe most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first lookeddown from Walnut Hills upon the land below on the 18th of May, adding:"Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; Iopposed it. I wrote him a letter about it. " But for this speech it isnot likely that Sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. Hisuntiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him toa full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not havedone more if the plan had been his own. (*13)

On the 26th of May I sent Blair's division up the Yazoo to drive out aforce of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven infor the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by ourtroops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and theroads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-fivemiles and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. Irequested Porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floatingnondescript force which had been assigned to his command and whichproved very useful, up to Haines' Bluff to hold it until reinforcementscould be sent. 

On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reinforcehim with ten thousand men at Port Hudson. Of course I could not complywith his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no dangerof an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no armyorganizing in his rear to raise the siege. 

On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut's command arrived, GeneralKimball commanding. It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-eastof Haines' Bluff and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, onBlair's return from the Yazoo, been sent to the same place withinstructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroythe roads in his (Blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. 

On the 7th of June our little force of colored and white troops acrossthe Mississippi, at Milliken's Bend, were attacked by about 3, 000 menfrom Richard Taylor's trans-Mississippi command. With the aid of thegunboats they were speedily repelled. I sent Mower's brigade over withinstructions to drive the enemy beyond the Tensas Bayou; and we had nofurther trouble in that quarter during the siege. This was the firstimportant engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. These men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning ofthe siege, but they behaved well. 

On the 8th of June a full division arrived from Hurlbut's command, underGeneral Sooy Smith. It was sent immediately to Haines' Bluff, andGeneral C. C. Washburn was assigned to the general command at thatpoint. 

On the 11th a strong division arrived from the Department of theMissouri under General Herron, which was placed on our left. This cutoff the last possible chance of communication between Pemberton andJohnston, as it enabled Lauman to close up on McClernand's left whileHerron intrenched from Lauman to the water's edge. At this point thewater recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. Through thisopening no doubt the Confederate commanders had been able to getmessengers under cover of night. 

On the 14th General Parke arrived with two divisions of Burnside'scorps, and was immediately dispatched to Haines' Bluff. These lattertroops--Herron's and Parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken ofsent by Halleck in anticipation of their being needed. They arrivednone too soon. 

I now had about seventy-one thousand men. More than half were disposedacross the peninsula, between the Yazoo at Haines' Bluff and the BigBlack, with the division of Osterhaus watching the crossings of thelatter river farther south and west from the crossing of the Jacksonroad to Baldwin's ferry and below. 

There were eight roads leading into Vicksburg, along which and theirimmediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced;but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. 

On the 17th I received a letter from General Sherman and one on the 18thfrom General McPherson, saying that their respective commands hadcomplained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published byGeneral McClernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to theother troops engaged in the campaign. This order had been sent Northand published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. Theorder had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outsideof McClernand's command until brought in this way. I at once wrote toMcClernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. He did so, and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps andordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his orderin the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THEMINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAGOF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTINGTHE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG. 

On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston hadcrossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, toraise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence betweenJohnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburghad by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately orderedSherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the BigBlack River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg. Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to holdthemselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines' Bluff had beenstrongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points fromthere to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had beenconstructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was notalready done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. 

We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were alsolooking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston. But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantiallyprotected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and northwe were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidentlytook in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making anassault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sideswithout accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have takenthe offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any riskof losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced atthe opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston. 

From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward ourposition nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At threepoints on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was runup to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it underminedand the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed inreaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebelwork stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of theenemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also our protection. Thesoldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across thisbarrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiersfor the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw overhand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returnedthem. 

Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequentlywhen it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroyit. On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine wasexploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered toopen with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill offand make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient toenable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy havingfailed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where mostof the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in thecountermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that werethere were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground atwork when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He wasnot much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high hehad gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile, " was hisreply. General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored manto his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. 

As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by tworegiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they hadbeen placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effortto expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. Fromhere, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. Thecompliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. Theenemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided thecontestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had tobe thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. Duringthe night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater againstthe missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base oftheir parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing theirgrenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses ofwhich they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into ourranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine wasconsequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroyingan entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of itsoccupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt tocharge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. Theenemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in thefirst. We lost none in the second. 

From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our positionnearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined toexplode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number atdifferent points and assault immediately after. We were up now at threedifferent points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapetof the enemy divided us. 

At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informedme that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in orderto relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make noformidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close toeach other--where there was space enough between the lines to postpickets--that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I wasinformed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, bycrossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he hademployed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had beencanvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" tocut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, becausetheir commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, andhad only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would befinished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also saidthat houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to buildthese boats with. Afterwards this story was verified: on entering thecity we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. 

All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attemptabortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, sothat the river might be more closely watched; material was collected onthe west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river ifthe attempt was made; and batteries were established along the leveecrossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been madethe garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners onthe Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the westbank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, norcould he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. TheMississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We hadnearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence toopposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to drawsupplies over for any considerable force. 

By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at anumber of places. At ten points we could move under cover to withinfrom five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to makeall preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches wereordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also tobe widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank, andbags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, toenable the troops to cross the ditches. 

On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and theBig Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of themonth an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him tocut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reachedhim. 

On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed thefollowing letter to each of his four division commanders:

"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, itwill become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see noprospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperableobstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested toinform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of yourtroops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatiguesnecessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. "

Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practicallydid the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuatewould fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnstonsuggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of thegarrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be aconfession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton touse his name in making such an arrangement. 

On the 3d about ten o'clock A. M. White flags appeared on a portion ofthe rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased atonce. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing awhite flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, andColonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the followingletter to me:

"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view toarranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, ifagreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a likenumber to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you mayfind convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusionof blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feelingmyself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, byMajor-General John S. Bowen. "

It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where thesewhite flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of thecommand. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hardfighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to thegibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all theirsuffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at lastat an end and the Union sure to be saved. 

Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and asked to see me. I hadbeen a neighbor of Bowen's in Missouri, and knew him well and favorablybefore the war; but his request was refused. He then suggested that Ishould meet Pemberton. To this I sent a verbal message saying that, ifPemberton desired it, I would meet him in front of McPherson's corps atthree o'clock that afternoon. I also sent the following written replyto Pemberton's letter:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice forseveral hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulationthrough commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion ofblood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time youmay choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now inVicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I canassure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrangethe terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than thoseindicated above. "

At three o'clock Pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbalmessage, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter ofthe morning. Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan and A. J. Smith, andseveral officers of my staff, accompanied me. Our place of meeting wason a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. Near bystood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. Itwas but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limbhad disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. Since then the sametree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as"The True Cross. "

Pemberton and I had served in the same division during part of theMexican War. I knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an oldacquaintance. He soon asked what terms I proposed to give his army ifit surrendered. My answer was the same as proposed in my reply to hisletter. Pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "The conference mightas well end, " and turned abruptly as if to leave. I said, "Very well. "General Bowen, I saw, was very anxious that the surrender should beconsummated. His manner and remarks while Pemberton and I were talking, showed this. He now proposed that he and one of our generals shouldhave a conference. I had no objection to this, as nothing could be madebinding upon me that they might propose. Smith and Bowen accordingly hada conference, during which Pemberton and I, moving a short distance awaytowards the enemy's lines were in conversation. After a while Bowensuggested that the Confederate army should be allowed to march out withthe honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. Thiswas promptly and unceremoniously rejected. The interview here ended, Iagreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clockthat night. 

Word was sent to Admiral Porter soon after the correspondence withPemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part ofboth army and navy. It was agreed on my paging with Pemberton that theyshould not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. 

When I returned to my headquarters I sent for all the corps and divisioncommanders with the army immediately confronting Vicksburg. Half thearmy was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for Johnston. Iinformed them of the contents of Pemberton's letters, of my reply andthe substance of the interview, and that I was ready to hear anysuggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my ownhands. This was the nearest approach to a "council of war" I ever held. Against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council I sentthe following letter:

"In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit thefollowing proposition for the surrender of the City of Vicksburg, publicstores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in onedivision as a guard, and take possession at eight A. M. To-morrow. Assoon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers andmen, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers takingwith them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalryofficers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all theirclothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, anyamount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the storesyou now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparingthem. Thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers andsoldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for theselatter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorizedto sign the roll of prisoners. "

By the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by eitherarmy were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either Aiken'slanding below Dutch Gap on the James River, or to Vicksburg, there to beexchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. There was aConfederate commissioner at Vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. I did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free toperform the functions of his office. Had I insisted upon anunconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand mento transport to Cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on theMississippi. Thence the prisoners would have had to be transported byrail to Washington or Baltimore; thence again by steamer to Aiken's--allat very great expense. At Aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the Confederates did not have Union prisoners to give inexchange. Then again Pemberton's army was largely composed of men whosehomes were in the South-west; I knew many of them were tired of the warand would get home just as soon as they could. A large number of themhad voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested tobe sent north where they could get employment until the war was over andthey could go to their homes. 

Late at night I received the following reply to my last letter:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication ofthis date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honorand spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I haveto submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, willperfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock A. M. To-morrow, Ipropose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrenderthe city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colorsand arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. After which youwill take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personalproperty, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected. "

This was received after midnight. My reply was as follows:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3dJuly. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. Itwill be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signedby himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, willnecessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations withregard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While Ido not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannotconsent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. Theproperty which officers will be allowed to take with them will be asstated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will beallowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers onehorse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to marchto the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at teno'clock A. M. , and then return to the inside and there remain asprisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms bynine o'clock A. M. I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shallact accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should bedisplayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not havebeen notified, from firing upon your men. "

Pemberton promptly accepted these terms. 

During the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring betweenthe soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were closetogether. All rebels were known as "Johnnies, " all Union troops as"Yanks. " Often "Johnny" would call: "Well, Yank, when are you cominginto town?" The reply was sometimes: "We propose to celebrate the 4thof July there. " Sometimes it would be: "We always treat our prisonerswith kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "We are holding you asprisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves. " The garrison, fromthe commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on thefourth. They knew from the temper of their men it would be successfulwhen made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. Besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. 

The Vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy ofthe rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "Yankee"boast that they would take dinner in Vicksburg that day, that the bestreceipt for cooking a rabbit was "First ketch your rabbit. " The paperat this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side ofwall paper. The last number was issued on the fourth and announced thatwe had "caught our rabbit. "

I have no doubt that Pemberton commenced his correspondence on the thirdwith a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knewwould be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place onthe great national holiday, the anniversary of the Declaration ofAmerican Independence. Holding out for better terms as he did hedefeated his aim in the latter particular. 

At the appointed hour the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of theirworks and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in goodorder. Our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. Logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was thefirst to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his divisionwas soon floating over the court-house. Our soldiers were no soonerinside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. Our men hadhad full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. Theenemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself sawour men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemythey had so recently been engaged in starving out. It was accepted withavidity and with thanks. 

Pemberton says in his report:

"If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day forsurrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day Ishould obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foe, I knewthey would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of Julyinto the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify theirnational vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted fromthem at any other time. "

This does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day hedid for surrendering. But it must be recollected that his first letterasking terms was received about 10 o'clock A. M. , July 3d. It then couldhardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect asurrender. He knew that Johnston was in our rear for the purpose ofraising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as hecould. He knew his men would not resist an assault, and one wasexpected on the fourth. In our interview he told me he had rationsenough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. It wasthis statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was todraw rations for his men from his own supplies. 

On the 4th of July General Holmes, with an army of eight or ninethousand men belonging to the trans-Mississippi department, made anattack upon Helena, Arkansas. He was totally defeated by GeneralPrentiss, who was holding Helena with less than forty-two hundredsoldiers. Holmes reported his loss at 1, 636, of which 173 were killed;but as Prentiss buried 400, Holmes evidently understated his losses. The Union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40missing. This was the last effort on the part of the Confederacy toraise the siege of Vicksburg. 

On the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, I notified Shermanand directed him to be ready to take the offensive against Johnston, drive him out of the State and destroy his army if he could. Steele andOrd were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join Sherman assoon as the surrender took place. Of this Sherman was notified. 

I rode into Vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchangecongratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. At that time Ifound that many of the citizens had been living under ground. Theridges upon which Vicksburg is built, and those back to the Big Black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. Where roads andstreets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as wellas if composed of stone. The magazines of the enemy were made byrunning passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deepcuts. Many citizens secured places of safety for their families bycarving out rooms in these embankments. A door-way in these cases wouldbe cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carvedout of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. In someinstances I saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, witha door-way in the clay wall separating them. Some of these werecarpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. In these theoccupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which weredropped into the city night and dav without intermission. 

I returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did notmove into the town until the sixth. On the afternoon of the fourth Isent Captain Wm. M. Dunn of my staff to Cairo, the nearest point wherethe telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. It was as follows:

"The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is theirparole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us atthis moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, andleaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, witha large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from theState. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the 9tharmy corps to Burnside. "

This news, with the victory at Gettysburg won the same day, lifted agreat load of anxiety from the minds of the President, his Cabinet andthe loyal people all over the North. The fate of the Confederacy wassealed when Vicksburg fell. Much hard fighting was to be doneafterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the MORALEwas with the supporters of the Union ever after. 

I at the same time wrote to General Banks informing him of the fall andsending him a copy of the terms; also saying I would send him all thetroops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemynow had on the Mississippi River. General Banks had a number of copiesof this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon acopy fell into the hands of General Gardner, who was then in command ofPort Hudson. Gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of theNational forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender ofVicksburg and telling how the information reached him. He added that ifthis was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. General Banksgave him assurances that Vicksburg had been surrendered, and GeneralGardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of July. Port Hudsonwith nearly 6, 000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5, 000 small-arms and other storesfell into the hands of the Union forces: from that day to the close ofthe rebellion the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the National troops. 

Pemberton and his army were kept in Vicksburg until the whole could beparoled. The paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy foreach, Federals and Confederates), and signed by the commanding officersof the companies or regiments. Duplicates were also made for eachsoldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by thesoldier signing and one to be retained by us. Several hundred refusedto sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the North as prisonersto being sent back to fight again. Others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. 

Pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign theirparoles, but I declined. It also leaked out that many of the men whohad signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes assoon as they got out of our lines. Pemberton hearing this, againappealed to me to assist him. He wanted arms for a battalion, to act asguards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp ofinstruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. Thisrequest was also declined. It was precisely what I expected and hopedthat they would do. I told him, however, that I would see that theymarched beyond our lines in good order. By the eleventh, just one weekafter the surrender, the paroles were completed and the Confederategarrison marched out. Many deserted, and fewer of them were everreturned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case hadthe surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the JamesRiver to be paroled. 

As soon as our troops took possession of the city guards wereestablished along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to theriver below. The prisoners were allowed to occupy their old campsbehind the intrenchments. No restraint was put upon them, except bytheir own commanders. They were rationed about as our own men, and fromour supplies. The men of the two armies fraternized as if they had beenfighting for the same cause. When they passed out of the works they hadso long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their lateantagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would givepain. Really, I believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in thebreasts of most of the Union soldiers at seeing the dejection of theirlate antagonists. 

The day before the departure the following order was issued:

"Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They will beauthorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there toEdward's Ferry, (*14) and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands tobe orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensiveremarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they havepassed. "

CHAPTER XXXIX. 

RETROSPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS--PROPOSED MOVEMENT UPONMOBILE--A PAINFUL ACCIDENT--ORDERED TO REPORT AT CAIRO. 

The capture of Vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnancestores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave newspirit to the loyal people of the North. New hopes for the finalsuccess of the cause of the Union were inspired. The victory gained atGettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. Now theMississippi River was entirely in the possession of the National troops;for the fall of Vicksburg gave us Port Hudson at once. The army ofnorthern Virginia was driven out of Pennsylvania and forced back toabout the same ground it occupied in 1861. The Army of the Tennesseeunited with the Army of the Gulf, dividing the Confederate Statescompletely. 

The first dispatch I received from the government after the fall ofVicksburg was in these words:

"I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actualdelivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of thecartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men willimmediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the caseelsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you willdetain them until further orders. "

Halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the handsof Major Watts, Confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. 

At Vicksburg 31, 600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannonabout 60, 000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. The small-armsof the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. Up to this time ourtroops at the West had been limited to the old United States flint-lockmuskets changed into percussion, or the Belgian musket imported early inthe war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimedat--and a few new and improved arms. These were of many differentcalibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunitionduring an engagement. The enemy had generally new arms which had runthe blockade and were of uniform caliber. After the surrender Iauthorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferiormuskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace themwith the latter. A large number of arms turned in to the OrdnanceDepartment as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by theUnion army in the capture of Vicksburg. 

In this narrative I have not made the mention I should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. Neitherhave I made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. Suffice it to say, the close of the siege of Vicksburg found us with anarmy unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole ofofficers and men. A military education was acquired which no otherschool could have given. Men who thought a company was quite enough forthem to command properly at the beginning, would have made goodregimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders wereequal to the command of a division, and one, Ransom, would have beenequal to the command of a corps at least. Logan and Crocker ended thecampaign fitted to command independent armies. 

General F. P. Blair joined me at Milliken's Bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. He commanded a division in thecampaign. I had known Blair in Missouri, where I had voted against himin 1858 when he ran for Congress. I knew him as a frank, positive andgenerous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. I dreaded his coming; I knew from experience that it was more difficultto command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to commandone army officered intelligently and with subordination. It affords methe greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment inrespect to his character. There was no man braver than he, nor wasthere any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with moreunquestioning alacrity. He was one man as a soldier, another as apolitician. 

The navy under Porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. Without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfullymade with twice the number of men engaged. It could not have been madeat all, in the way it was, with any number of men without suchassistance. The most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms ofthe service. There never was a request made, that I am aware of, eitherof the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptlycomplied with. 

The campaign of Vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. The elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. Voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resortedto; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have madeits execution impossible. A forward movement to a decisive victory wasnecessary. Accordingly I resolved to get below Vicksburg, unite withBanks against Port Hudson, make New Orleans a base and, with that baseand Grand Gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces againstVicksburg. Upon reaching Grand Gulf, after running its batteries andfighting a battle, I received a letter from Banks informing me that hecould not be at Port Hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteenthousand men. The time was worth more than the reinforcements; Itherefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. 

With a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapidmovements were essential to success. Jackson was captured the day aftera new commander had arrived, and only a few days before largereinforcements were expected. A rapid movement west was made; thegarrison of Vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, anddriven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. Itlooks now as though Providence had directed the course of the campaignwhile the Army of the Tennessee executed the decree. 

Upon the surrender of the garrison of Vicksburg there were three thingsthat required immediate attention. The first was to send a force todrive the enemy from our rear, and out of the State. The second was tosend reinforcements to Banks near Port Hudson, if necessary, to completethe triumph of opening the Mississippi from its source to its mouth tothe free navigation of vessels bearing the Stars and Stripes. The thirdwas to inform the authorities at Washington and the North of the goodnews, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence inthe ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. 

Soon after negotiations were opened with General Pemberton for thesurrender of the city, I notified Sherman, whose troops extended fromHaines' Bluff on the left to the crossing of the Vicksburg and Jacksonroad over the Big Black on the right, and directed him to hold hiscommand in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the State assoon as Vicksburg surrendered. Steele and Ord were directed to be inreadiness to join Sherman in his move against General Johnston, andSherman was advised of this also. Sherman moved promptly, crossing theBig Black at three different points with as many columns, allconcentrating at Bolton, twenty miles west of Jackson. 

Johnston heard of the surrender of Vicksburg almost as soon as itoccurred, and immediately fell back on Jackson. On the 8th of JulySherman was within ten miles of Jackson and on the 11th was close up tothe defences of the city and shelling the town. The siege was kept upuntil the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy hadevacuated during the night. The weather was very hot, the roads dustyand the water bad. Johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had somuch the start that pursuit was useless; but Sherman sent one division, Steele's, to Brandon, fourteen miles east of Jackson. 

The National loss in the second capture of Jackson was less than onethousand men, killed, wounded and missing. The Confederate loss wasprobably less, except in captured. More than this number fell into ourhands as prisoners. 

Medicines and food were left for the Confederate wounded and sick whohad to be left behind. A large amount of rations was issued to thefamilies that remained in Jackson. Medicine and food were also sent toRaymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as Ithought it only fair that we should return to these people some of thearticles we had taken while marching through the country. I wrote toSherman: "Impress upon the men the importance of going through the Statein an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutelynecessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try tocreate as favorable an impression as possible upon the people. "Provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all thepeople, from Bruinsburg to Jackson and back to Vicksburg, whoseresources had been taken for the supply of our army. Very largequantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. 

Sherman was ordered back to Vicksburg, and his troops took much the sameposition they had occupied before--from the Big Black to Haines' Bluff. Having cleaned up about Vicksburg and captured or routed all regularConfederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, Ifelt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do morebefore the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and whileimportant points might be captured without bloodshed. I suggested tothe General-in-chief the idea of a campaign against Mobile, startingfrom Lake Pontchartrain. Halleck preferred another course. Thepossession of the trans-Mississippi by the Union forces seemed topossess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of theMississippi. I am well aware that the President was very anxious tohave a foothold in Texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreigngovernments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in thewar, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to theConfederate States. This, however, could have been easily done withoutwasting troops in western Louisiana and eastern Texas, by sending agarrison at once to Brownsville on the Rio Grande. 

Halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against Mobile, so that Iwas obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive asI had been a year before in west Tennessee. It would have been an easything to capture Mobile at the time I proposed to go there. Having thatas a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interiorto operate against General Bragg's army. This would necessarily havecompelled Bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. If hehad not done this the troops from Mobile could have inflictedinestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army andLee's were yet receiving their supplies. I was so much impressed withthis idea that I renewed my request later in July and again about the1st of August, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, askingonly the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops ator near Mobile. I also asked for a leave of absence to visit NewOrleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against Mobile should beapproved. Both requests were refused. So far as my experience withGeneral Halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favorthan to grant one. But I did not regard this as a favor. It was simplyin line of duty, though out of my department. 

The General-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of anarmy, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as hadbeen the case the year before after the fall of Corinth when the armywas sent where it would do the least good. By orders, I sent to Banks aforce of 4, 000 men; returned the 9th corps to Kentucky and, whentransportation had been collected, started a division of 5, 000 men toSchofield in Missouri where Price was raiding the State. I alsodetached a brigade under Ransom to Natchez, to garrison that placepermanently. This latter move was quite fortunate as to the time whenRansom arrived there. The enemy happened to have a large number, about5, 000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from Texas to feed theEastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which hadprobably come through Texas from the Rio Grande and which were on theway to Lee's and other armies in the East. 

The troops that were left with me around Vicksburg were very busily andunpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands andsmall detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and indestroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. Theguerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, andtherefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. 

The country back of Vicksburg was filled with deserters from Pemberton'sarmy and, it was reported, many from Johnston's also. The mendetermined not to fight again while the war lasted. Those who livedbeyond the reach of the Confederate army wanted to get to their homes. Those who did not, wanted to get North where they could work for theirsupport till the war was over. Besides all this there was quite a peacefeeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part ofMississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. It is not probable thatPemberton got off with over 4, 000 of his army to the camp where heproposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. 

On the 7th of August I further depleted my army by sending the 13thcorps, General Ord commanding, to Banks. Besides this I received ordersto co-operate with the latter general in movements west of theMississippi. Having received this order I went to New Orleans to conferwith Banks about the proposed movement. All these movements came tonaught. 

During this visit I reviewed Banks' army a short distance aboveCarrollton. The horse I rode was vicious and but little used, and on myreturn to New Orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in thestreet, fell, probably on me. I was rendered insensible, and when Iregained consciousness I found myself in a hotel near by with severaldoctors attending me. My leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along thebody up to the arm-pit. The pain was almost beyond endurance. I lay atthe hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself inbed. I had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and wascarried to it on a litter. I was then taken to Vicksburg, where Iremained unable to move for some time afterwards. 

While I was absent General Sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be madein my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. No orderswere issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except uponconsultation with and approval of Sherman. 

On the 13th of September, while I was still in New Orleans, Hallecktelegraphed to me to send all available forces to Memphis and thence toTuscumbia, to co-operate with Rosecrans for the relief of Chattanooga. On the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go toRosecrans. This was received on the 27th. I was still confined to mybed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but I at once orderedSherman to send one division to Memphis as fast as transports could beprovided. The division of McPherson's corps, which had got off and wason the way to join Steele in Arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to Hurlbut at Memphis. Hurlbut was directed to forward thesetwo divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also tosend any other troops that might be returning there. Halleck suggestedthat some good man, like Sherman or McPherson, should be sent to Memphisto take charge of the troops going east. On this I sent Sherman, asbeing, I thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. Hewas directed to take with him another division of his corps. This leftone back, but having one of McPherson's divisions he had still theequivalent. 

Before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of Chickamauga hadbeen fought and Rosecrans forced back into Chattanooga. Theadministration as well as the General-in-chief was nearly frantic at thesituation of affairs there. Mr. Charles A. Dana, an officer of the WarDepartment, was sent to Rosecrans' headquarters. I do not know what hisinstructions were, but he was still in Chattanooga when I arrived thereat a later period. 

It seems that Halleck suggested that I should go to Nashville as soon asable to move and take general direction of the troops moving from thewest. I received the following dispatch dated October 3d: "It is thewish of the Secretary of War that as soon as General Grant is able hewill come to Cairo and report by telegraph. " I was still very lame, butstarted without delay. Arriving at Columbus on the 16th I reported bytelegraph: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d directing me to reportfrom Cairo was received at 11. 30 on the 10th. Left the same day withstaff and headquarters and am here en route for Cairo. "

END OF VOLUME I. 

PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT

VOLUME II. 

CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER XL. FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDING MILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL AT CHATTANOOGA. 

CHAPTER XLI. ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OFSUPPLIES--BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE. 

CHAPTER XLII. CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERALBURNSIDE'S SITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'SPOSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS. 

CHAPTER XLIII. PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OFTHE ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT. 

CHAPTER XLIV. BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OFTHE ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ONCHATTANOOGA. 

CHAPTER XLV. THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING KNOXVILLE--CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS. 

CHAPTER XLVI. OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITEDSTATES--FIRST INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

CHAPTER XLVII. THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDANASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORTPILLOW--GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THEWILDERNESS CAMPAIGN. 

CHAPTER XLVIII. COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'SPOSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. 

CHAPTER XLIX. SHERMAN S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OFGENERAL MCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 

CHAPTER L. GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THERAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 

CHAPTER LI. AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BYTHE LEFT FLANK. 

CHAPTER LII. BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OFWARREN'S AND WRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROMBUTLER AND SHERIDAN. 

CHAPTER LIII. HANCOCK'S ASSAULT--LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONSRECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK--REDUCING THEARTILLERY. 

CHAPTER LIV. MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--ANINCIDENT OF THE MARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY. 

CHAPTER LV. ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OFCOLD HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE RETROSPECTIVE. 

CHAPTER LVI. LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OF PETERSBURG. 

CHAPTER LVII. RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDONRAILROAD--EARLY'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFOREPETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THESHENANDOAH VALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD. 

CHAPTER LVIII. SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORYIN THE SHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGNFOR THE WINTER. 

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WARANECDOTES--THE MARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OFSAVANNAH. 

CHAPTER LX. THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE

CHAPTER LXI. EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILUREOF THE EXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORTFISHER. 

CHAPTER LXII. SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS. 

CHAPTER LXIII. ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACECOMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKERECAPTURES THE LINE--THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD. 

CHAPTER LXIV. INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THEPOTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKEAND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG. 

CHAPTER LXV. THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN INPETERSBURG--THE CAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TOSHERIDAN AND MEADE. 

CHAPTER LXVI. BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY. 

CHAPTER LXVII. NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE ATMCLEAN'S HOUSE--THE TERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITHLEE AFTER THE SURRENDER. 

CHAPTER LXVIII. MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THENORTH AND SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL ATWASHINGTON--PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'SPOLICY. 

CHAPTER LXIX. SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE OF MOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--GENERAL THOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY. 

CHAPTER LXX. THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OFLINCOLN'S ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OFLINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS. 

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTER XL. 

FIRST MEETING WITH SECRETARY STANTON--GENERAL ROSECRANS--COMMANDINGMILITARY DIVISION OF MISSISSIPPI--ANDREW JOHNSON'S ADDRESS--ARRIVAL ATCHATTANOOGA. 

The reply (to my telegram of October 16, 1863, from Cairo, announcing myarrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me toproceed immediately to the Galt House, Louisville, where I would meet anofficer of the War Department with my instructions. I left Cairo withinan hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail viaIndianapolis. Just as the train I was on was starting out of the depotat Indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying theSecretary of War was coming into the station and wanted to see me. 

I had never met Mr. Stanton up to that time, though we had held frequentconversations over the wires the year before, when I was in Tennessee. Occasionally at night he would order the wires between the WarDepartment and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold aconversation for an hour or two. On this occasion the Secretary wasaccompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, whom I had never met, though heand my father had been old acquaintances. Mr. Stanton dismissed thespecial train that had brought him to Indianapolis, and accompanied meto Louisville. 

Up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after Ileft Vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of Halleck's dispatchesthat I had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation oftroops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after we started the Secretaryhanded me two orders, saying that I might take my choice of them. Thetwo were identical in all but one particular. Both created the"Military Division of Mississippi, " (giving me the command) composed ofthe Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and allthe territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north ofBanks's command in the south-west. One order left the departmentcommanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assignedThomas to his place. I accepted the latter. We reached Louisvilleafter night and, if I remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. TheSecretary of War told me afterwards that he caught a cold on thatoccasion from which he never expected to recover. He never did. 

A day was spent in Louisville, the Secretary giving me the military newsat the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results ofsome of the campaigns. By the evening of the day after our arrival allmatters of discussion seemed exhausted, and I left the hotel to spendthe evening away, both Mrs. Grant (who was with me) and myself havingrelatives living in Louisville. In the course of the evening Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, then in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, andadvising peremptory orders against his doing so. 

As stated before, after the fall of Vicksburg I urged strongly upon thegovernment the propriety of a movement against Mobile. GeneralRosecrans had been at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, with a large andwell-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with Bragg confrontinghim with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was onthe defensive. But after the investment of Vicksburg Bragg's army waslargely depleted to strengthen Johnston, in Mississippi, who was beingreinforced to raise the siege. I frequently wrote General Hallecksuggesting that Rosecrans should move against Bragg. By so doing hewould either detain the latter's troops where they were or layChattanooga open to capture. General Halleck strongly approved thesuggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly orderedRosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed tocomply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight twodecisive battles at the same time. " If true, the maxim was notapplicable in this case. It would be bad to be defeated in two decisivebattles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. I, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of Vicksburg had drawnfrom Rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victorywere much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege wasover, when these troops could be returned. Rosecrans was ordered tomove against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. Finally he did move, on the 24th of June, but ten days afterwardsVicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from Bragg were free toreturn. 

It was at this time that I recommended to the general-in-chief themovement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberlandwas in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, butalso by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending lineover which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantlybeing strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in theabsence of a threatening force was guarded by little else thanartillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same timethe prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to itsdefence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgmentwas overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated overother parts of the country where it was thought they could render themost service. 

Soon it was discovered in Washington that Rosecrans was in trouble andrequired assistance. The emergency was now too immediate to allow us togive this assistance by making an attack in rear of Bragg upon Mobile. It was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sentfrom every available point. 

Rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred Bragg south of the TennesseeRiver, and through and beyond Chattanooga. If he had stopped andintrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right andthe mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. But he pushedon, with his forces very much scattered, until Bragg's troops fromMississippi began to join him. Then Bragg took the initiative. Rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his armytogether at Chickamauga, some miles south-east of Chattanooga, beforethe main battle was brought on. The battle was fought on the 19th and20th of September, and Rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy lossin artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. The corps under Major-General George H. Thomas stood its ground, whileRosecrans, with Crittenden and McCook, returned to Chattanooga. Thomasreturned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. Braggfollowed and took possession of Missionary Ridge, overlookingChattanooga. He also occupied Lookout Mountain, west of the town, whichRosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and theriver road as far back as Bridgeport. The National troops were nowstrongly intrenched in Chattanooga Valley, with the Tennessee Riverbehind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east andwest, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with Chattanooga Creek, for a large part of the way, in front oftheir line. 

On the 29th Halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed allthe forces that could be spared from my department to be sent toRosecrans. Long before this dispatch was received Sherman was on hisway, and McPherson was moving east with most of the garrison ofVicksburg. 

A retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. It wouldnot only have been the loss of a most important strategic position tous, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillerystill left with the Army of the Cumberland and the annihilation of thatarmy itself, either by capture or demoralization. 

All supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. Therailroad between this base and the army was in possession of thegovernment up to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to thesouth side of the Tennessee River; but Bragg, holding Lookout andRaccoon mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the riverand the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of theTennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance betweenthese two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to theposition of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by acircuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. 

This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly tenthousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to drawa single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across thecountry. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for thecattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in thecondition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift. " Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, witha faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hardbread and BEEF DRIED ON THE HOOF. "

Nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were withoutsufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. What they had was well worn. The fuel within the Federal lines wasexhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw itfrom the opposite bank, where it was abundant. The only way ofsupplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut treeson the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landingon the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. Itwould then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. 

If a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any ofthe army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, iffollowed by the enemy. 

On the receipt of Mr. Dana's dispatch Mr. Stanton sent for me. Findingthat I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every personhe met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. About eleveno'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparentlypartaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to the room of theSecretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. Saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. Iimmediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division ofthe Mississippi, and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I thentelegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to thecommand of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must holdChattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that I wouldbe at the front as soon as possible. A prompt reply was received fromThomas, saying, "We will hold the town till we starve. " I appreciatedthe force of this dispatch later when I witnessed the condition ofaffairs which prompted it. It looked, indeed, as if but two courseswere open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. 

On the morning of the 20th of October I started, with my staff, andproceeded as far as Nashville. At that time it was not prudent totravel beyond that point by night, so I remained in Nashville until thenext morning. Here I met for the first time Andrew Johnson, MilitaryGovernor of Tennessee. He delivered a speech of welcome. His composureshowed that it was by no means his maiden effort. It was long, and Iwas in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would beexpected from me in response. I was relieved, however, the peopleassembled having apparently heard enough. At all events they commenceda general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much ofit, was a great relief to me in this emergency. 

From Nashville I telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so thatthey could be held with the least number of men; to Admiral Porter atCairo, that Sherman's advance had passed Eastport, Mississippi, thatrations were probably on their way from St. Louis by boat for supplyinghis army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and toThomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on thewagon-road then in use back to Bridgeport. 

On the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reachingStevenson Alabama, after dark. Rosecrans was there on his way north. He came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he describedvery clearly the situation at Chattanooga, and made some excellentsuggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he hadnot carried them out. We then proceeded to Bridgeport, where we stoppedfor the night. From here we took horses and made our way by Jasper andover Waldron's Ridge to Chattanooga. There had been much rain, and theroads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and fromwash-outs on the mountain sides. I had been on crutches since the timeof my fall in New Orleans, and had to be carried over places where itwas not safe to cross on horseback. The roads were strewn with thedebris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mulesand horses. At Jasper, some ten or twelve miles from Bridgeport, therewas a halt. General O. O. Howard had his headquarters there. From thispoint I telegraphed Burnside to make every effort to secure five hundredrounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. We stopped forthe night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. Thenext day we reached Chattanooga a little before dark. I went directlyto General Thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, untilI could establish my own. 

During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay theirrespects and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed outon the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecranshad contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved themove they did not say so to me. I found General W. F. Smith occupyingthe position of chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland. I hadknown Smith as a cadet at West Point, but had no recollection of havingmet him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. He explained thesituation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainlythat I could see it without an inspection. I found that he hadestablished a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an oldengine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the northside of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoonsand roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being therealready. He was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructingthe boats for a third bridge. In addition to this he had far under waya steamer for plying between Chattanooga and Bridgeport whenever wemight get possession of the river. This boat consisted of a scow, madeof the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheelattached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop orfactory. 

I telegraphed to Washington this night, notifying General Halleck of myarrival, and asking to have General Sherman assigned to the command ofthe Army of the Tennessee, headquarters in the field. The request wasat once complied with. 

CHAPTER XLI. 

ASSUMING THE COMMAND AT CHATTANOOGA--OPENING A LINE OF SUPPLIES--BATTLEOF WAUHATCHIE--ON THE PICKET LINE. 

The next day, the 24th, I started out to make a personal inspection, taking Thomas and Smith with me, besides most of the members of mypersonal staff. We crossed to the north side of the river, and, movingto the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the Tennessee atBrown's Ferry, some three miles below Lookout Mountain, unobserved bythe enemy. Here we left our horses back from the river and approachedthe water on foot. There was a picket station of the enemy on theopposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were withineasy range. They did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by ourpresence. They must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. But, I suppose, they looked upon the garrison of Chattanooga asprisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it wouldbe inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. 

That night I issued orders for opening the route to Bridgeport--acracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. They had been solong on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of aline over which food might reach them. 

Chattanooga is on the south bank of the Tennessee, where that river runsnearly due west. It is at the northern end of a valley five or sixmiles in width, through which Chattanooga Creek runs. To the east ofthe valley is Missionary Ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feetabove the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or morebefore reaching the Tennessee. On the west of the valley is LookoutMountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. Just below the townthe Tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of LookoutMountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. TheMemphis and Charleston Railroad passes this point, where the mountainstands nearly perpendicular. East of Missionary Ridge flows the SouthChickamauga River; west of Lookout Mountain is Lookout Creek; and westof that, Raccoon Mountains. Lookout Mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in agentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in apalisade thirty or more feet in height. On the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. 

The intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end ofMissionary Ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across Chattanooga valley to Lookout Mountain. Lookout Mountainwas also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops inLookout valley west, and on Raccoon Mountain, with pickets extendingdown the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render ituseless to us. In addition to this there was an intrenched line inChattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to LookoutMountain, to make the investment complete. Besides the fortificationson Mission Ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, withoccasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. The enemy'spickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that thepickets of the two armies could converse. At one point they wereseparated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valleyand town, and from which both sides drew water. The Union lines wereshorter than those of the enemy. 

Thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified tothe east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. Practically, the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The enemy had stopped with hiscavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunitionand medical supplies. The Union army was short of both, not havingammunition enough for a day's fighting. 

General Halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, orderedparts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by GeneralsHoward and Slocum, Hooker in command of the whole, from the Army of thePotomac to reinforce Rosecrans. It would have been folly to send themto Chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. They wereconsequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought tothem. Before my arrival, Thomas ordered their concentration atBridgeport. 

General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the movewhich I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about themanner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he shouldhave command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although hewas then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. 

On the 24th of October, after my return to Chattanooga, the followingdetails were made: General Hooker, who was now at Bridgeport, wasordered to cross to the south side of the Tennessee and march up byWhitesides and Wauhatchie to Brown's Ferry. General Palmer, with adivision of the 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland, was ordered to movedown the river on the north side, by a back road, until oppositeWhitesides, then cross and hold the road in Hooker's rear after he hadpassed. Four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act underGeneral Smith directly from Chattanooga. Eighteen hundred of them, underGeneral Hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover ofnight float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of Lookout, down to Brown's Ferry, then land on the south side and capture or driveaway the pickets at that point. Smith was to march with the remainderof the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the riverto Brown's Ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridgeas soon as the crossing was secured. 

On the 26th, Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport and commenced hiseastward march. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, Hazenmoved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred braveand well-equipped men. Smith started enough in advance to be near theriver when Hazen should arrive. There are a number of detached spurs ofhills north of the river at Chattanooga, back of which is a good roadparallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of Lookout. It was over this road Smith marched. At five o'clock Hazen landed atBrown's Ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. Byseven o'clock the whole of Smith's force was ferried over and inpossession of a height commanding the ferry. This was speedilyfortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. By ten o'clockthe bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in Lookout valley, wasfortified and connected with the rest of the army. The two bridges overthe Tennessee River--a flying one at Chattanooga and the new one atBrown's Ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both thefire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. Hookerfound but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28themerged into Lookout valley at Wauhatchie. Howard marched on to Brown'sFerry, while Geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stoppedthree miles south. The pickets of the enemy on the river below were nowcut off, and soon came in and surrendered. 

The river was now opened to us from Lookout valley to Bridgeport. Between Brown's Ferry and Kelly's Ferry the Tennessee runs through anarrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as toincrease the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stemit. To get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulledup by ropes from the shore. But there is no difficulty in navigatingthe stream from Bridgeport to Kelly's Ferry. The latter point is onlyeight miles from Chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the Raccoon Mountains on the south sideof the river to Brown's Ferry, thence on the north side to the riveropposite Chattanooga. There were several steamers at Bridgeport, andabundance of forage, clothing and provisions. 

On the way to Chattanooga I had telegraphed back to Nashville for a goodsupply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been solong deprived of. Hooker had brought with him from the east a fullsupply of land transportation. His animals had not been subjected tohard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. Infive days from my arrival in Chattanooga the way was open to Bridgeportand, with the aid of steamers and Hooker's teams, in a week the troopswere receiving full rations. It is hard for any one not an eye-witnessto realize the relief this brought. The men were soon reclothed andalso well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and acheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. Neitherofficers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. The weakand languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared atonce. I do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assumeit must have been correspondingly depressing. Mr. Davis had visitedBragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition tobe about as Bragg described it in his subsequent report. "Thesedispositions, " he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy'sspeedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessedof the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcementsmust reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only aquestion of time. " But the dispositions were not "faithfullysustained, " and I doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to"sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. There was no time duringthe rebellion when I did not think, and often say, that the South wasmore to be benefited by its defeat than the North. The latter had thepeople, the institutions, and the territory to make a great andprosperous nation. The former was burdened with an institutionabhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one whichdegraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. With the outside world at war with this institution, they could not haveextended their territory. The labor of the country was not skilled, norallowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becomingdegraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash. " Thesystem of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the peoplepoor. The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the smallslaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. Soon theslaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathywith them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. Thewar was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in bloodand treasure, but it was worth all it cost. 

The enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line ofsupplies. He appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recoverthe line from us. His strength on Lookout Mountain was not equal toHooker's command in the valley below. From Missionary Ridge he had tomarch twice the distance we had from Chattanooga, in order to reachLookout Valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was madeon Geary at Wauhatchie by Longstreet's corps. When the battlecommenced, Hooker ordered Howard up from Brown's Ferry. He had threemiles to march to reach Geary. On his way he was fired upon by rebeltroops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the roadwas commanded. Howard turned to the left, charged up the hill andcaptured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking manyprisoners. Leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on toreinforce Geary. Before he got up, Geary had been engaged for aboutthree hours against a vastly superior force. The night was so dark thatthe men could not distinguish one from another except by the light ofthe flashes of their muskets. In the darkness and uproar Hooker'steamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. The mules alsobecame frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampededdirectly towards the enemy. The latter, no doubt, took this for acharge, and stampeded in turn. By four o'clock in the morning thebattle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterwarddisturbed. 

In securing possession of Lookout Valley, Smith lost one man killed andfour or five wounded. The enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. In the night engagement of the 28th-9th Hooker lost 416killed and wounded. I never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troopsburied over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than ahundred. 

After we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring oursupplies to the army, I made a personal inspection to see the situationof the pickets of the two armies. As I have stated, Chattanooga Creekcomes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter ofthe town of Chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the Tennessee River at the foot of Lookout Mountain. Thiscreek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the twolines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water fromthe same stream. As I would be under short-range fire and in an opencountry, I took nobody with me, except, I believe, a bugler, who stayedsome distance to the rear. I rode from our right around to our left. When I came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, I heard thecall, "Turn out the guard for the commanding general. " I replied, "Never mind the guard, " and they were dismissed and went back to theirtents. Just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the Confederate pickets. The sentinel on their postcalled out in like manner, "Turn out the guard for the commandinggeneral, " and, I believe, added, "General Grant. " Their line in amoment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which Ireturned. 

The most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of thetwo armies. At one place there was a tree which had fallen across thestream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawingwater for their camps. General Longstreet's corps was stationed thereat the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. Seeing a soldier in blue on this log, I rode up to him, commencedconversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. He was verypolite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to GeneralLongstreet's corps. I asked him a few questions--but not with a view ofgaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and I rodeoff. 

CHAPTER XLII. 

CONDITION OF THE ARMY--REBUILDING THE RAILROAD--GENERAL BURNSIDE'SSITUATION--ORDERS FOR BATTLE--PLANS FOR THE ATTACK--HOOKER'S POSITION--SHERMAN'S MOVEMENTS. 

Having got the Army of the Cumberland in a comfortable position, I nowbegan to look after the remainder of my new command. Burnside was inabout as desperate a condition as the Army of the Cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. He was a hundred miles from the nearestpossible base, Big South Fork of the Cumberland River, and much fartherfrom any railroad we had possession of. The roads back were overmountains, and all supplies along the line had long since beenexhausted. His animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasseslined the road from Cumberland Gap, and far back towards Lexington, Ky. East Tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, butit did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or smallrations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. 

Sherman had started from Memphis for Corinth on the 11th of October. His instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order tobring up supplies. The distance was about three hundred and thirtymiles through a hostile country. His entire command could not havemaintained the road if it had been completed. The bridges had all beendestroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. A hostile communitylived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more orless of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the West. Often Sherman'swork was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distanceaway. 

The Memphis and Charleston Railroad strikes the Tennessee River atEastport, Mississippi. Knowing the difficulty Sherman would have tosupply himself from Memphis, I had previously ordered supplies sent fromSt. Louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him atEastport. These he got. I now ordered him to discontinue his work ofrepairing roads and to move on with his whole force to Stevenson, Alabama, without delay. This order was borne to Sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the Tennessee in a canoe and floated over MuscleShoals; it was delivered at Iuka on the 27th. In this Sherman wasnotified that the rebels were moving a force towards Cleveland, EastTennessee, and might be going to Nashville, in which event his troopswere in the best position to beat them there. Sherman, with hischaracteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon andpushed on at once. On the 1st of November he crossed the Tennessee atEastport, and that day was in Florence, Alabama, with the head ofcolumn, while his troops were still crossing at Eastport, with Blairbringing up the rear. 

Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, andtrains, all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. Allindications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplyingBurnside's command in East Tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by thesame route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, anorder to Sherman to halt General G. M. Dodge's command, of about eightthousand men, at Athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrangehis troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville, andto rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over abroken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them ofconsiderable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. All thebridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up andtwisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off hadbeen destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. Allbridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson, where the Memphis and Charleston and theNashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this roadwould give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply thearmy. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the riversupplements the road. 

General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experiencedrailroad builder. He had no tools to work with except those of thepioneers--axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrenchhis men and protect them against surprises by small parties of theenemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completedback to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his menwas the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. Hehad his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or allthey needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as couldbe found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills alongthe line of the army. When these were not near enough to the troops forprotection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were movedup in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making thetools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put towork getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotiveswhen the road should be completed. Car-builders were set to workrepairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroadbuilding, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen withfood, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic orlaborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and carsthe men could not make without material, and there was not enoughrolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its fullcapacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply thesedeficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had atVicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river andon the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotivesand rails from all the railroads except the Memphis and Charleston toNashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed tofurnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days afterreceiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundredand eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length ofroad repaired was one hundred and two miles. 

The enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving againstBurnside or were going to Nashville, went no farther than Cleveland. Their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at Washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at Chattanooga, caused me muchuneasiness. Dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to dosomething for Burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance ofholding East Tennessee; saying the President was much concerned for theprotection of the loyal people in that section, etc. We had not atChattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less asupply train. Reinforcements could not help Burnside, because he hadneither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. There was no relief possible for himexcept by expelling the enemy from Missionary Ridge and aboutChattanooga. 

On the 4th of November Longstreet left our front with about fifteenthousand troops, besides Wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to goagainst Burnside. The situation seemed desperate, and was moreaggravating because nothing could be done until Sherman should get up. The authorities at Washington were now more than ever anxious for thesafety of Burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster thanever, urging that something should be done for his relief. On the 7th, before Longstreet could possibly have reached Knoxville, I orderedThomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force thereturn of the troops that had gone up the valley. I directed him totake mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them tomove the necessary artillery. But he persisted in the declaration thathe could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how hecould possibly comply with the order. Nothing was left to be done butto answer Washington dispatches as best I could; urge Sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourageBurnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should berelieved. All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidencein his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he heldsouth and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from hisbase and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga whenthe battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside'ssuggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14thI telegraphed him:

"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will beready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can holdLongstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling backcan avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able toforce the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet andBragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passesby every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would havebeen here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him somethirty miles up that river to cross. "

And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, asfollows:

"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tellbetter how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With yourshowing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save themost productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now madeto throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouthof Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on hisleft at the same time, and together it is expected to carry MissionaryRidge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Clevelandand Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carryLookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack onhis left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman'sadvance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. Theremainder of his force will pass over a new road just made fromWhiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, andleave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley. Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will onlyreach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliestday for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you thinkyou can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of theenemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If theyshould, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas hasordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I willascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely outof the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot bespared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east fromhere?"

Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th. That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probablehe was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a positionthreatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be broughtback speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon, Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me thatevening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day. 

My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to beengaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of nospecial advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard'scorps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills onthe north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with theremainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwardsappointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lowerpalisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley. 

The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River soas to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force himeither to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with hisbase at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on ourright. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valleyin the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly toRossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line thereacross the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended toChickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rearon that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, withthe Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assaultwhile the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. 

To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown'sFerry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end ofMission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out ofsight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams calledChickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--NorthChickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptyinginto the river some seven or eight miles east; while the SouthChickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, andempties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town. There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North ChickamaugaRiver, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. 

At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at twoo'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in eachboat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the twobanks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of theTennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and asufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north sideto ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on thesouth side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his linesfacing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against anattack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge, Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him toChattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He wasthen to move out to the right to Rossville. 

Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us solong as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line forsupplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy wasdispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose wasbegun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force pastLookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. Bycrossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come intoChattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across thevalley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders wereaccordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battlebegan the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of actionwere all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult oneto make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as tolose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where theywere more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of thesame name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to becrossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep LookoutMountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. Bymarching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any namedtime; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behindhim, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause theevacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on LookoutMountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explainedelsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a floodin the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for thepassage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring allthe troops together against Missionary Ridge. 

The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomasand Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showedthem the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed outgenerally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities inWashington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety. Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in thisanxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troopswere up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Shermanstarted for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, Ibelieve, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the nightof the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made theabove-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started backthe same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating theimportance of time. 

His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and seasonwould admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with thehead of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression thatLookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders atthe ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault thefollowing morning. News had been received that the battle had beencommenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphiccommunications. The President, the Secretary of War, and GeneralHalleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, butmore endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relievethe situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for thenext day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make theassault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on thatdate. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep thepontoons in place. 

General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was atthis time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with theNorth. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatenedfrom the east. The following was sent in reply:

"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that ourattack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such amove will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can holdout. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not causealarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose histransportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meetsuch a force before he got through, that he could not return. "

Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast ashis troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in fullview of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountainor Missionary Ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike thebank of the river. But when Sherman's advance reached a point oppositethe town of Chattanooga, Howard, who, it will be remembered, had beenconcealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of marchto join the troops on the south side. His crossing was in full viewboth from Missionary Ridge and the top of Lookout, and the enemy ofcourse supposed these troops to be Sherman's. This enabled Sherman toget to his assigned position without discovery. 

CHAPTER XLIII. 

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE--THOMAS CARRIES THE FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY--SHERMAN CARRIES MISSIONARY RIDGE--BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN--GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT. 

On the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling soheavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at Brown'sFerry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming ofa battle raging at Knoxville; of Willcox being threatened by a forcefrom the east--a letter was received from Bragg which contained thesewords: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, Ideem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their earlywithdrawal. " Of course, I understood that this was a device intended todeceive; but I did not know what the intended deception was. On the22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that Bragg was leavingour front, and on that day Buckner's division was sent to reinforceLongstreet at Knoxville, and another division started to follow but wasrecalled. The object of Bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way todetain me until Knoxville could be captured, and his troops there bereturned to Chattanooga. 

During the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in NorthChickamauga. The material for the roadway over these was deposited outof view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of theTennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. 

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing much of the distress inWashington on his account, I could no longer defer operations for hisrelief. I determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the Army of theCumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. 

The position occupied by the Army of the Cumberland had been made verystrong for defence during the months it had been besieged. The line wasabout a mile from the town, and extended from Citico Creek, a smallstream running near the base of Missionary Ridge and emptying into theTennessee about two miles below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, onthe left, to Chattanooga Creek on the right. All commanding points onthe line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. Theimportant elevations within the line had all been carefully fortifiedand supplied with a proper armament. Among the elevations so fortifiedwas one to the east of the town, named Fort Wood. It owed itsimportance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town andMissionary Ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. FortWood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reachthe nearer points of the enemy's line. On the morning of the 23dThomas, according to instructions, moved Granger's corps of twodivisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood commanding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Citico Creek. Palmer, commandingthe 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. He supported Sheridan with one division (Baird's), while his otherdivision under Johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to bemoved to any point. Howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. Thepicket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. At twoo'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. By this time theclouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated positionall that was going on. The signal for advance was given by a booming ofcannon from Fort Wood and other points on the line. The rebel picketswere soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor anddetached heights between the main ridge and our lines. These too werecarried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce theiradvance guards. But it was not without loss on both sides. Thismovement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one weoccupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up tothis time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the otherway. During the following night they were made strong. We lost in thispreliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while theenemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that werecaptured. With the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up fromMissionary Ridge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this ended thefighting for the first day. 

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and if I could only have beenassured that Burnside could hold out ten days longer I should haverested more easily. But we were doing the best we could for him and thecause. 

By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (Osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river atBrown's Ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had rendered itimpossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops tocross; but I was determined to move that night even without thisdivision. Orders were sent to Osterhaus accordingly to report toHooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the24th. Because of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were againchanged, but this time only back to those first given to him. 

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty as Chief Engineer of theMilitary Division. To him were given the general direction of movingtroops by the boats from North Chickamauga, laying the bridge after theyreached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to hisoffice of chief engineer. During the night General Morgan L. Smith'sdivision was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and thebrigade of Giles A. Smith was selected for the delicate duty of manningthe boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of theriver. During this night also General J. M. Brannan, chief ofartillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of theCumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as tocommand the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to thepoint where the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had to useSherman's artillery horses for this purpose, Thomas having none. 

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, Giles A. Smith pushed outfrom the North Chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, eachloaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. The boats with theirprecious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoidattracting the attention of any one who could convey information to theenemy, until arriving near the mouth of South Chickamauga. Here a fewboats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon thepicket guard known to be at that point. The guard were surprised, andtwenty of their number captured. The remainder of the troops effected alanding at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally goodresults. The work of ferrying over Sherman's command from the northside of the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for thepurpose. A steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. Therest of M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were put to work intrenching theirposition. By daylight the two entire divisions were over, and wellcovered by the works they had built. 

The work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery andcavalry, was now begun. The ferrying over the infantry was continuedwith the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fastas they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. By a littlepast noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the SouthChickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comradesbelow, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of theTennessee. 

Sherman at once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. Byone o'clock he started with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly thecourse of Chickamauga River; J. E. Smith next to the right and a littleto the rear; and Ewing still farther to the right and also a little tothe rear of J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to theright if an enemy should come from that direction. A good skirmish linepreceded each of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was reached;the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. By half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height withouthaving sustained much loss. A brigade from each division was nowbrought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of thehill was gained. There had been a drizzling rain during the day, andthe clouds were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of MissionaryRidge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. But now theenemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts withtheir skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. Later in theday a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, andSherman was left to fortify what he had gained. 

Sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge wascompleted, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridgesand on its way to strike the enemy's communications at ChickamaugaStation. All of Sherman's command was now south of the Tennessee. During the afternoon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded andcarried from the field. 

Thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen hisposition. Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek and ajunction with Sherman, and was directed to report to him. With two orthree regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banksof the Tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw Sherman superintending the work from the north side and movinghimself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadwayput upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across the chasm betweenthem, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. 

While these operations were going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hookerwas engaged on the west. He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 12th corps, Army of thePotomac; and Cruft's, 14th corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary was onthe right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the centre, and Osterhaus near Brown'sFerry. These troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy had theeast bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and threebrigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. Thesebrigades occupied the summit of the mountain. General Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole. Why any troops, except artillerywith a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, I do notsee. A hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade formore than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of menfrom the position Hooker occupied. 

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advancewith troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. Farther up, theground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. On the eastside the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzaggingup it, connects the town of Chattanooga with the summit. 

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up Lookout Creek, to effect acrossing. The remainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridgeover the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. Osterhaus was to moveup to the bridge and cross it. The bridge was seized by Gross's brigadeafter a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. This attractedthe enemy so that Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavymist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of themountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured thepicket of over forty men on guard near by. He then commenced ascendingthe mountain directly in his front. By this time the enemy was seencoming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing intotheir rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. By eleveno'clock the bridge was complete. Osterhaus was up, and after some sharpskirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killedand captured. 

While the operations at the bridge were progressing, Geary was pushingup the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in hisfront, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. The enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed byCruft and Osterhaus. Soon these were up abreast of Geary, and the wholecommand pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. By noon Gearyhad gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with hisright close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strongfortifications in his front. The rest of the command coming up, a linewas formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth ofChattanooga Creek. 

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now madeour line a continuous one. It was in full view, extending from theTennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up Chickamauga River to thebase of Mission Ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge toChattanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slopeof Lookout Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The day washazy, so that Hooker's operations were not visible to us except atmoments when the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery andmusketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was partiallyfortified, but was soon driven out of his works. During the afternoonthe clouds, which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day as to hidewhatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down andmade it so dark where Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. Atfour o'clock Hooker reported his position as impregnable. By a littleafter five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troopswas sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These troops had to crossChattanooga Creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, General Carlin, reported to Hooker and wasassigned to his left. I now telegraphed to Washington: "The fightto-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of MissionaryRidge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at ChickamaugaCreek. Troops from Lookout Valley carried the point of the mountain, andnow hold the eastern slope and a point high up. Hooker reports twothousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen intoour hands from Missionary Ridge. " The next day the President replied:"Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. Welldone. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside. " And Halleck alsotelegraphed: "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay mayprove fatal. I know you will do all in your power to relieve him. "

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the Cumberland, had beensent to the North Chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they weredeposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress ofcitizens. On the night of the 24th his division, having crossed withSherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plainto the north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued to a late hourin the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. 

CHAPTER XLIV. 

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA--A GALLANT CHARGE--COMPLETE ROUT OF THE ENEMY--PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES--GENERAL BRAGG--REMARKS ON CHATTANOOGA. 

At twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, I began to give ordersfor the next day, and sent a dispatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside. Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker was ordered to moveat the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if hestill remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to Rossville andoperate against the left and rear of the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. As Iwas with him on Orchard Knob, he would not move without further ordersfrom me. 

The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field wasin full view from the top of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staffofficers--could be seen coming and going constantly. 

The point of ground which Sherman had carried on the 24th was almostdisconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, overwhich there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is arailroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. The problem now wasto get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on the point; and backfarther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortificationcommanding the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough tosee, and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held thehill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base ofMissionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, supported by two brigadesof John E. Smith's division; and Corse with his brigade was between thetwo, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. The ridge issteep and heavily wooded on the east side, where M. L. Smith's troopswere advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the westside. The troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of therebel works. Morgan L. Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemyoff from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies byrail from Chickamauga Station, where the main depot was located. Theenemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from theposition we had gained, but without success. The contest lasted for twohours. Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded inthis assault. Sherman now threatened both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line tostrengthen his right. From the position I occupied I could see columnafter column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. EveryConfederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces wasconcentrated upon him. J. E. Smith, with two brigades, charged up thewest side of the ridge to the support of Corse's command, over openground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, butthe enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he wascompelled to fall back, followed by the foe. A few hundred yardsbrought Smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to hisintrenchments. 

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of J. E. Smith from theposition I occupied, I directed Thomas to send a division to reinforcehim. Baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of OrchardKnob. It had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye ofthe enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once commenced massing in thesame direction. This was what I wanted. But it had now got to be latein the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker crossingthe ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and compelling Bragg to massin that direction also. 

The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expectedhe would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over ChattanoogaCreek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. Hookerwas off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distanceand the destruction above named. He was detained four hours crossingChattanooga Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expectedfrom his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extending across it wasto be the signal for Thomas's assault of the ridge. But Sherman'scondition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief couldnot be delayed any longer. 

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying under arms from earlymorning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. I now directedThomas to order the charge at once (*16). I watched eagerly to see theeffect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of anycharge being made. The centre of the line which was to make the chargewas near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by anintervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanderswho was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to GeneralWood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. Hereplied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, butthat he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told himto make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in anincredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and Sheridan weredriving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge. TheConfederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in frontof us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. Ourmen drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits sorapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and Union troops wentover the first line of works almost at the same time. Many rebels werecaptured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higherup the hill. Those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused theenemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. In fact, on thatoccasion the Union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. Without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troopswent to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thuseffectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the24th (*17) for this charge. 

I watched their progress with intense interest. The fire along therebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: butthe damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. Thepursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men wereseen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in frontof both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy alongmost of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg andhis officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, andthousands threw away their arms in their flight. 

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at apoint above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troopsoccupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to coverthe retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It wasnow getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushedhis men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting theattention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the rightand left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movementbefore these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. ToSheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, andsmall-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this waywould not have been accomplished. 

While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomaswith staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making theassault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which theentire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen goingover the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join hiscommand, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas leftabout the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already inpursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded thedivision to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback inthe charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, inBaird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, theresistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I orderedGranger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so muchexcited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemyhad taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had gotwell out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeingeverything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, wasnot aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when hereceived orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. 

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front hedirected his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and tomove forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up thestream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it duringthe night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was stillheld. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylightin the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville. 

Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destructionof the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exceptionof the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he cameupon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced aretreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could makebut little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as manyof them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker'sposition during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending eastof the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville. 

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could holdout; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed himthat forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside. 

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for therelief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas wasdirected to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanoogaloaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps wasto move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of theHolston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In additionto the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty roundsof ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations inhaversacks. 

In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, fromthe Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberlandparticipated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains andthe sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that theorganizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of theCumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corpsfrom the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of theArmy of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact ofthis intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end wasaccomplished. 

The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering theadvantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easilythan was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twentythousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eveof battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front ofhis impregnable position. 

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on MissionaryRidge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported andbelieved that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference betweenBragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned thecampaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. Ihad known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter verywell. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after mygraduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together inthe Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionallysubsequently. I could well understand how there might be anirreconcilable difference between them. 

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionallyand otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed ofan irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of thehighest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old armyhe was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on thelookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; asa post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightestneglect, even of the most trivial order. 

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commandedby a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies andat the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He wasfirst lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on otherduty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon thequartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. As quartermaster hedeclined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it hisreasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urgingthat his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, andthat it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermasterhe still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairsBragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, justand kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which hehad the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect aslight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. 

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reasonstated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own militarygenius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with onestone. " On several occasions during the war he came to the relief ofthe Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS. 

I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his militarycapacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice ofhis nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals havesaid so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy. 

My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanoogawere as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweepacross Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge nearRossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of theCumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come toChattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in theriver, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown'sFerry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossingtroops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed bytelegraph back to what they were originally. ------

NOTE. --From this point on this volume was written (with the exception ofthe campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) byGeneral Grant, after his great illness in April, and the presentarrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and18th of July, 1885. 

CHAPTER XLV. 

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITINGKNOXVILLE-CIPHER CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS. 

Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, Iimmediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about thesituation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious. Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to therelief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securingChattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built andfitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded withrations and ammunition and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth ofthe Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. General Granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousandmen, was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was carried, and under nocircumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. With theprovisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, itwas supposed he could hold out until Longstreet was driven away, afterwhich event East Tennessee would furnish abundance of food forBurnside's army and his own also. 

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the27th, part of the time by the road to Ringgold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not to start Granger until he received further orders from me;advising him that I was going to the front to more fully see thesituation. I was not right sure but that Bragg's troops might be overtheir stampede by the time they reached Dalton. In that case Braggmight think it well to take the road back to Cleveland, move thencetowards Knoxville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden dash uponBurnside. 

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the 27th, I saw that the retreatwas most earnest. The enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons andsmall-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be movinglike a disorganized mob, with the exception of Cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. 

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward Ringgold Palmer's division tookthe road to Graysville, and Sherman moved by the way of ChickamaugaStation toward the same point. As soon as I saw the situation atRinggold I sent a staff officer back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas ofthe condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start Grangerat once. Feeling now that the troops were already on the march for therelief of Burnside I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at Ringgoldthrough the day to prepare for the return of our troops. 

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between EastChickamauga Creek and Taylor's Ridge, and about twenty miles south-eastfrom Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that Hooker had leftbehind at Chattanooga Creek got up. His men were attacking Cleburne'sdivision, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so asto cover the retreat of the Confederate army through a narrow gorgewhich presents itself at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valleyis narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a greatmany times in the course of the first mile. This attack wasunfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel deadwere left upon the field. 

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and wheat in theneighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy themills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but notto make any wanton destruction. 

At this point Sherman came up, having reached Graysville with histroops, where he found Palmer had preceded him. Palmer had picked upmany prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. I went back inthe evening to Graysville with Sherman, remained there over night anddid not return to Chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. Ithen found that Thomas had not yet started Granger, thus having lost afull day which I deemed of so much importance in determining the fate ofKnoxville. Thomas and Granger were aware that on the 23d of the monthBurnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelvedays and during that time he could hold out against Longstreet, but ifnot relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrenderor attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would have been animpossibility. He was already very low in ammunition, and with an armypursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. 

Finding that Granger had not only not started but was very reluctant togo, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, Isent word to General Sherman of the situation and directed him to marchto the relief of Knoxville. I also gave him the problem that we had tosolve--that Burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, andthat he must be relieved within that time. 

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from Graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from Dalton toCleveland and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and thesetroops had not yet returned to camp. I was very loath to send Sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from Memphis and hardfighting at Chattanooga. But I had become satisfied that Burnside wouldnot be rescued if his relief depended upon General Granger's movements. 

Sherman had left his camp on the north side of the Tennessee River, nearChattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cookedrations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back in their tents bythat time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with themneither overcoats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, and atnight they must have suffered more or less. The two days' rations hadalready lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a countrywhich had been run over so much by Confederate troops that there was butlittle probability of finding much food. They did, however, succeed incapturing some flour. They also found a good deal of bran in some ofthe mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other waysthey eked out an existence until they could reach Knoxville. 

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get news of the steps beingtaken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer ifit became necessary, that I determined to send a message to him. Itherefore sent a member of my staff, Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get intoKnoxville if he could report to Burnside the situation fully, and givehim all the encouragement possible. Mr. Charles A. Dana was atChattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before I assumedcommand. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany Colonel Wilson, and didaccompany him. I put the information of what was being done for therelief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or otherit must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into thehands of General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; GeneralLongstreet did learn of Sherman's coming in advance of his reachingthere, and Burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time ifit had been necessary. 

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Holston River to catch scowsand flats as they floated down. On these, by previous arrangements withthe loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed flour and corn, withforage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use ofthe Union troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by the eastside, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrivedBurnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. 

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all these engagementsamounted to 757 killed, 4, 529 wounded and 330 missing. We captured6, 142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. More than the enemy reported fortheir total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages andcaissons and over 7, 000 stands of small-arms. The enemy's loss in armswas probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up agreat many that were found abandoned. 

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60, 000 men. Bragg hadabout half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. It was his own fault that he did not have more men present. He had sentLongstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to overtwenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third anddepriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. He did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication byway of Brown's and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing fullrations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcementswere coming to me. Knoxville was of no earthly use to him whileChattanooga was in our hands. If he should capture Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without astruggle. I have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. 

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when Bragg knew that he was onthe north side of the Tennessee River, he sent Buckner's division toreinforce Longstreet. He also started another division a day later, butour attack having commenced before it reached Knoxville Bragg ordered itback. It had got so far, however, that it could not return toChattanooga in time to be of service there. It is possible this latterblunder may have been made by Bragg having become confused as to whatwas going on on our side. Sherman had, as already stated, crossed tothe north side of the Tennessee River at Brown's Ferry, in full view ofBragg's troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before the attack. They then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view ofthe troops on Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. Bragg knewit was Sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out ofview, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of theTennessee River to the relief of Knoxville and that Longstreet wastherefore in danger. But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. If he had capturedChattanooga, East Tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. Itwould have been a victory for us to have got our army away fromChattanooga safely. It was a manifold greater victory to drive away thebesieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosenground and nearly annihilate it. 

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as wewere the attacking party. The enemy reported his loss in killed at 361:but as he reported his missing at 4, 146, while we held over 6, 000 ofthem as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousandswho deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. Therewas certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on the part of thesoldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get awayif they could. Then, too, Chattanooga, following in the same half yearwith Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in the West, there was muchthe same feeling in the South at this time that there had been in theNorth the fall and winter before. If the same license had been allowedthe people and press in the South that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for thepreservation of the Union. 

General William F. Smith's services in these battles had been such thatI thought him eminently entitled to promotion. I was aware that he hadpreviously been named by the President for promotion to the grade ofmajor-general, but that the Senate had rejected the nomination. I wasnot aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore stronglyrecommended him for a major-generalcy. My recommendation was heeded andthe appointment made. 

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville I, of course, informed theauthorities at Washington--the President and Secretary of War--of thefact, which caused great rejoicing there. The President especially wasrejoiced that Knoxville had been relieved (*18) without furtherbloodshed. The safety of Burnside's army and the loyal people of EastTennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the President forseveral months, during which time he was doing all he could to relievethe situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troopsby the way of Cumberland Gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember Burnside, " "do something for Burnside, " and other appealsof like tenor. He saw no escape for East Tennessee until after ourvictory at Chattanooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside might beout of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and hisanxiety was still intense until he heard that Longstreet had been drivenfrom the field. 

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry Plains, some twentymiles or more east, and then stopped, believing that Longstreet wouldleave the State. The latter did not do so, however, but stopped only ashort distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winteroff East Tennessee. Foster now relieved Burnside. Sherman madedisposition of his troops along the Tennessee River in accordance withinstructions. I left Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about the20th of December, moved my headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee. 

Nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with myentire military division, and also with the authorities at Washington. While remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my telegraphiccommunications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both mycommand and Washington. 

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20)so I set myself to the task of having troops in positions from whichthey could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary suppliesso as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon theappearance of the first good weather in the spring. I expected toretain the command I then had, and prepared myself for the campaignagainst Atlanta. I also had great hopes of having a campaign madeagainst Mobile from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to occupythat place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the West by wayof the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. Iwas preparing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison, and it was myexpectation to push through to Mobile if that city was in ourpossession: if not, to Savannah; and in this manner to get possessionof the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign against Mobile was not made. 

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies over Cumberland Gap untiltheir animals had nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself tosee if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. Accordingly I left Nashville in the latterpart of December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chattanooga I took one ofthe little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the Clinchwith the Tennessee. From that point the railroad had been repaired upto Knoxville and out east to Strawberry Plains. I went by railtherefore to Knoxville, where I remained for several days. General JohnG. Foster was then commanding the Department of the Ohio. It was anintensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero everymorning for more than a week while I was at Knoxville and on my way fromthere on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the first point where I couldreach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at Nashville. 

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris ofbroken wagons and dead animals, much as I had found it on my first tripto Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had been cut up to asgreat a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in thatcondition frozen; so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains toLexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerlessone, and very disagreeable. 

I found a great many people at home along that route, both in Tennesseeand Kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. They wouldcollect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. The peoplenaturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person inthe party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my medical directorwas gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. The crowdswould generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity ofquietly dismounting and getting into the house. It also gave me anopportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to anotherabout their general. Those remarks were apt to be more complimentary tothe cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to hisbeing muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we wereall in after a hard day's ride. I was back in Nashville by the 13th ofJanuary, 1864. 

When I started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some personalong who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read thecipher dispatches which I was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton hadtaken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph anddetermining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, aswell as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanderswhom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the WarDepartment through General Stager all the dispatches which they receivedor forwarded. 

I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at Nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, tobe forwarded from there. As I have said, it was necessary for me alsoto have an operator during this inspection who had possession of thiscipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the WarDepartment without my dispatches being read by all the operators alongthe line of wires over which they were transmitted. Accordingly Iordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Corps of Engineers, whom I had selected as a wise anddiscreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if theoperator at my headquarters could. 

The operator refused point blank to turn over the key to CaptainComstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the WarDepartment were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or anyone else. I told him I would see whether he would or not. He said thatif he did he would be punished. I told him if he did not he mostcertainly would be punished. Finally, seeing that punishment was certainif he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (evenif he was not protected altogether from the consequences of hisdisobedience to his orders) from the War Department, he yielded. When Ireturned from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The operator hadbeen reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. I informedthe Secretary of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of thetelegraph, Stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had onlyobeyed my orders. It was absolutely necessary for me to have thecipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he hadnot delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punishedanybody, or words to that effect. 

This was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable differencebetween the Secretary of War and myself that occurred until the war wasover, when we had another little spat. Owing to his natural dispositionto assume all power and control in all matters that he had anythingwhatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, whileissuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going outof the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. This wasdone by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came fromme to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examinedthem and given his approval. He never disturbed himself, either, inexamining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so thatorders which I had prepared would often lie there three or four daysbefore he would sanction them. I remonstrated against this in writing, and the Secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position ofGeneral-in-Chief of the Army. But he soon lapsed again and took controlmuch as before. 

After the relief of Knoxville Sherman had proposed to Burnside that heshould go with him to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnsideassured him that with the troops which had been brought by Granger, andwhich were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose ofLongstreet without availing himself of this offer. As before statedSherman's command had left their camps north of the Tennessee, nearChattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coatsor blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their campsby the end of that time. The weather was now cold and they weresuffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, hadit been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them intoservice. Sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the Tennessee River. 

CHAPTER XLVI. 

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI--LONGSTREET IN EAST TENNESSEE--COMMISSIONEDLIEUTENANT-GENERAL--COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--FIRSTINTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 

Soon after his return from Knoxville I ordered Sherman to distribute hisforces from Stevenson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville; Shermansuggested that he be permitted to go back to Mississippi, to the limitsof his own department and where most of his army still remained, for thepurpose of clearing out what Confederates might still be left on theeast bank of the Mississippi River to impede its navigation by ourboats. He expected also to have the co-operation of Banks to do thesame thing on the west shore. Of course I approved heartily. 

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in Memphis, where Hurlbutcommanded, and got together his Memphis men, or ordered them collectedand sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg and out to whereMcPherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so asto give him about 20, 000 men in all. 

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was occupying Meridian with hisheadquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerableforce of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, therefore, tomove directly upon Meridian. 

I had sent some 2, 500 cavalry under General Sooy Smith to Sherman'sdepartment, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman got to Memphis. Hurlbut had 7, 000 cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce Smith soas to give the latter a force of about 7, 000 with which to go againstForrest, who was then known to be south-east from Memphis. Smith wasordered to move about the 1st of February. 

While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the arrival of Hurlbut withhis surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position andstrength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they couldgather. When these scouts returned it was through them that he got theinformation of General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the strength anddisposition of his command. 

Forrest had about 4, 000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughlywell-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. Smith's command was nearly double that of Forrest, but not equal, man toman, for the lack of a successful experience such as Forrest's men hadhad. The fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, andfollowed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to anextent that can hardly be counted by percentage. The difference inresult is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. Thissame difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, andfor the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had carried on neitherarmy could present a more effective officer than he was. 

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the Big Black, andwith no great deal of opposition after that until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon onthe 8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he moved in two columnsto enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc. , and expedite themarch. Here, however, there were indications of the concentration ofConfederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army closetogether. He had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemywho destroyed a few of his wagons about Decatur, Mississippi, where, bythe way, Sherman himself came near being picked up. 

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreatedtoward Demopolis, Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian inthoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also forthe purpose of hearing from Sooy Smith, who he supposed had met Forrestbefore this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of asuperiority of numbers. Hearing nothing of him, however, he started onhis return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that Smith, whilewaiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was decidedly in Forrest'sfavor. 

Sherman had written a letter to Banks, proposing a co-operative movementwith him against Shreveport, subject to my approval. I disapproved ofSherman's going himself, because I had other important work for him todo, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. We must have themfor the spring campaign. The trans-Mississippi movement provedabortive. 

My eldest son, who had accompanied me on the Vicksburg campaign andsiege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until hehad grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of January I obtainedpermission to go to St. Louis, where he was staying at the time, to seehim, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I waspermitted to go, I was not permitted to turn over my command to any oneelse, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and tocommunicate regularly with all parts of my division and with Washington, just as though I had remained at Nashville. 

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, having gone there againto make preparations to have the troops of Thomas in the southern partof Tennessee co-operate with Sherman's movement in Mississippi. Idirected Thomas, and Logan who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up athreatening movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, who had againrelieved Bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops aspossible there. 

I learned through Confederate sources that Johnston had already sent twodivisions in the direction of Mobile, presumably to operate againstSherman, and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Tennessee. Seeingthat Johnston had depleted in this way, I directed Thomas to send atleast ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division which was already tothe east, into East Tennessee, and notified Schofield, who was now incommand in East Tennessee, of this movement of troops into hisdepartment and also of the reinforcements Longstreet had received. Myobject was to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee as a part of thepreparations for my spring campaign. 

About this time General Foster, who had been in command of theDepartment of the Ohio after Burnside until Schofield relieved him(*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keepLongstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in EastTennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equippedarmy would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most fortheir cause. I thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of Longstreet. 

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to take Dalton and hold it, ifpossible; and I directed him to move without delay. Finding that he hadnot moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, telling him howimportant it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate withSherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. Then again onthe 21st, he not yet having started, I asked him if he could not startthe next day. He finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fellback from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite asstrong and farther to the rear. Thomas reported that he could not goany farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearlystarved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. He soonfell back. 

Schofield also had to return for the same reason. He could not carrysupplies with him, and Longstreet was between him and the supplies stillleft in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would be movingtowards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be recedingfrom theirs. On the 2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman'ssuccess, which eased my mind very much. The next day, the 3d, I wasordered to Washington. 

The bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army hadpassed through Congress and became a law on the 26th of February. Mynomination had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of March and confirmedthe next day (the 2d). I was ordered to Washington on the 3d to receivemy commission, and started the day following that. The commission washanded to me on the 9th. It was delivered to me at the ExecutiveMansion by President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, my eldestson, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. 

The President in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he haddrawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that I might prepare a few lines ofreply. The President said:

"General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and itsreliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing greatstruggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting youlieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this highhonor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As thecountry herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. Iscarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goesmy own hearty personal concurrence. "

To this I replied: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, withgratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noblearmies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, itwill be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feelthe full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I knowthat if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, tothe favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men. "

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac atBrandy Station; then returned to Washington, and pushed west at once tomake my arrangements for turning over the commands there and givinggeneral directions for the preparations to be made for the springcampaign. 

It had been my intention before this to remain in the West, even if Iwas made lieutenant-general; but when I got to Washington and saw thesituation it was plain that here was the point for the commandinggeneral to be. No one else could, probably, resist the pressure thatwould be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans andpursue others. I determined, therefore, before I started back to haveSherman advanced to my late position, McPherson to Sherman's in commandof the department, and Logan to the command of McPherson's corps. Thesechanges were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. Mycommission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following day, as already stated, I visited General Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his headquarters at BrandyStation, north of the Rapidan. I had known General Meade slightly inthe Mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. I was astranger to most of the Army of the Potomac, I might say to all exceptthe officers of the regular army who had served in the Mexican war. There had been some changes ordered in the organization of that armybefore my promotion. One was the consolidation of five corps intothree, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. Meade evidently thought that I might want to make still one more changenot yet ordered. He said to me that I might want an officer who hadserved with me in the West, mentioning Sherman specially, to take hisplace. If so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. Heurged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the wholenation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in theway of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he wouldserve to the best of his ability wherever placed. I assured him that Ihad no thought of substituting any one for him. As to Sherman, he couldnot be spared from the West. 

This incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of Meade than didhis great victory at Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait tobe selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect themost efficient service. 

Meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. Hewas commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my takingcommand of all the armies, was in supreme command of the Army of thePotomac--except from the authorities at Washington. All other generalofficers occupying similar positions were independent in their commandsso far as any one present with them was concerned. I tried to makeGeneral Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have beenif I had been in Washington or any other place away from his command. Itherefore gave all orders for the movements of the Army of the Potomacto Meade to have them executed. To avoid the necessity of having togive orders direct, I established my headquarters near his, unless therewere reasons for locating them elsewhere. This sometimes happened, andI had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. On the11th I returned to Washington and, on the day after, orders werepublished by the War Department placing me in command of all the armies. I had left Washington the night before to return to my old command inthe West and to meet Sherman whom I had telegraphed to join me inNashville. 

Sherman assumed command of the military division of the Mississippi onthe 18th of March, and we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I hadSherman accompany me that far on my way back to Washington so that wecould talk over the matters about which I wanted to see him, withoutlosing any more time from my new command than was necessary. The firstpoint which I wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operationof his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. Therewere also other and minor points, minor as compared with the greatimportance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--therestoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from importantcommands, namely McClellan, Burnside and Fremont in the East, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the West. 

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been invited by thegeneral-in-chief to give my views of the campaign I thought advisablefor the command under me--now Sherman's. General J. E. Johnston wasdefending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia with an army, the largestpart of which was stationed at Dalton, about 38 miles south ofChattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the railroad from Clevelandwith the one from Chattanooga to Atlanta. 

There could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty ofthe armies of the military division of the Mississippi. Johnston's armywas the first objective, and that important railroad centre, Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General Halleck giving my views of theapproaching campaign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it wasexpected that General Banks would be through with the campaign which hehad been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all thearmies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of theMississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon Mobile by landwhile the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of itsability. (*22) The plan therefore was for Sherman to attack Johnston anddestroy his army if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and withhis troops and those of Banks to hold a line through to Mobile, or atleast to hold Atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important pointson the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left inthe possession of the enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in twoagain, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi River had donebefore. Banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, andcircumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign whichwas afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resoundedthroughout all lands. 

In regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from importantcommands to duty again, I left Sherman to look after those who had beenremoved in the West while I looked out for the rest. I directed, however, that he should make no assignment until I could speak to theSecretary of War about the matter. I shortly after recommended to theSecretary the assignment of General Buell to duty. I received theassurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards theSecretary told me that he had offered Buell an assignment and that thelatter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to acceptthe assignment offered. I understood afterwards that he refused toserve under either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked them both. Both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. Shermanranked him as a brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the oldarmy, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. The worst excuse asoldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked thecommander he is ordered to report to. 

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, and on the 26th took up myheadquarters at Culpeper Court-House, a few miles south of theheadquarters of the Army of the Potomac. 

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State of the President, Inever met Mr. Lincoln until called to the capital to receive mycommission as lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well andfavorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the West whohad known him all their lives. I had also read the remarkable series ofdebates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years before, when they wererival candidates for the United States Senate. I was then a resident ofMissouri, and by no means a "Lincoln man" in that contest; but Irecognized then his great ability. 

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he stated to me that he hadnever professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should beconducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but thatprocrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from thepeople at the North and Congress, WHICH WAS ALWAYS WITH HIM, forced himinto issuing his series of "Military Orders"--one, two, three, etc. Hedid not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of themwere. All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take theresponsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in renderingsuch assistance. Assuring him that I would do the best I could with themeans at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the WarDepartment, our first interview ended. 

The Secretary of War I had met once before only, but felt that I knewhim better. 

While commanding in West Tennessee we had occasionally heldconversations over the wires, at night, when they were not beingotherwise used. He and General Halleck both cautioned me against givingthe President my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would besure to get from him all he knew. I should have said that in ourinterview the President told me he did not want to know what I proposedto do. But he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wantedme to hear and then do as I pleased about. He brought out a map ofVirginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by theFederal and Confederate armies up to that time. He pointed out on themap two streams which empty into the Potomac, and suggested that thearmy might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of thesestreams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies, and thetributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. I listenedrespectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protectLee's flanks while he was shutting us up. 

I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to theSecretary of War or to General Halleck. 

March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at Culpeper, and thework of preparing for an early campaign commenced. 

CHAPTER XLVII. 

THE MILITARY SITUATION--PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN--SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TOCOMMAND OF THE CAVALRY--FLANK MOVEMENTS--FORREST AT FORT PILLOW--GENERALBANKS'S EXPEDITION--COLONEL MOSBY--AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESSCAMPAIGN. 

When I assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this:the Mississippi River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth; the lineof the Arkansas was held, thus giving us all the North-west north ofthat river. A few points in Louisiana not remote from the river wereheld by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held substantially all north of the Memphisand Charleston Railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along theline of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, taking in nearly all of theState of Tennessee. West Virginia was in our hands; and that part ofold Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue Ridge we alsoheld. On the sea-coast we had Fortress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia;Plymouth, Washington and New Berne in North Carolina; Beaufort, Follyand Morris islands, Hilton Head, Port Royal and Fort Pulaski in SouthCarolina and Georgia; Fernandina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacolain Florida. The balance of the Southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. 

Sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division ofthe Mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of theAlleghanies and north of Natchez, with a large movable force aboutChattanooga. His command was subdivided into four departments, but thecommanders all reported to Sherman and were subject to his orders. Thisarrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines ofcommunication through the acquired territory, for the reason that thesedifferent department commanders could act promptly in case of a suddenor unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions withoutawaiting the orders of the division commander. 

In the East the opposing forces stood in substantially the samerelations towards each other as three years before, or when the warbegan; they were both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. Itis true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in Virginiaand North Carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had beengained by either side. Battles had been fought of as great severity ashad ever been known in war, over ground from the James River andChickahominy, near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, inPennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to theNational army, sometimes to the Confederate army; but in every instance, I believe, claimed as victories for the South by the Southern press ifnot by the Southern generals. The Northern press, as a whole, did notdiscourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel successand belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest intheir desire for the preservation of the Union and the overwhelmingsuccess of the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally expressdissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they werenot more complete. 

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not engaged in guarding lines ofcommunication was on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army ofNorthern Virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest generalin the Confederate army. The country back to the James River is cut upwith many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross exceptwhere bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all theway back to Richmond, so that when driven from one fortified positionthey would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. 

To provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe throughsuch a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System anddiscipline were both essential to its accomplishment. 

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though fourof them in the West had been concentrated into a single militarydivision. The Army of the Potomac was a separate command and had noterritorial limits. There were thus seventeen distinct commanders. Before this time these various armies had acted separately andindependently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often ofdepleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more activelyengaged. I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded the Army ofthe Potomac as the centre, and all west to Memphis along the linedescribed as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing;the Army of the James, under General Butler, as the left wing, and allthe troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. Some of these latterwere occupying positions from which they could not render serviceproportionate to their numerical strength. All such were depleted tothe minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard againstblockade runners; where they could not do this their positions wereabandoned altogether. In this way ten thousand men were added to theArmy of the James from South Carolina alone, with General Gillmore incommand. It was not contemplated that General Gillmore should leave hisdepartment; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for activeservice, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order ofthe day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliestmoment the roads would permit was the problem. 

As a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or to act in support ofit, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under GeneralBurnside, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Maryland. This was anadmirable position for such a reinforcement. The corps could be broughtat the last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, or itcould be thrown on the sea-coast, south of Norfolk, in Virginia or NorthCarolina, to operate against Richmond from that direction. In factBurnside and the War Department both thought the 9th corps was intendedfor such an expedition up to the last moment. 

My general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible againstthe Confederate armies in the field. There were but two such, as wehave seen, east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The Army ofNorthern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee commanding, was on the southbank of the Rapidan, confronting the Army of the Potomac; the second, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, Georgia, opposed toSherman who was still at Chattanooga. Beside these main armies theConfederates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great storehouse tofeed their armies from, and their line of communications from Richmondto Tennessee. Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in theWest with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold whatwe had gained in Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon anyterritory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay theNorthern States open to invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac wasthe principal garrison for the protection of Washington even while itwas moving on Lee, so all the forces to the west, and the Army of theJames, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well aswhen remaining at them. Better indeed, for they forced the enemy toguard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, andwith a greater force. Little expeditions could not so well be sent outto destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn astorehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I arrangedfor a simultaneous movement all along the line. Sherman was to movefrom Chattanooga, Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objectivepoints. (*23) Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was to move from themouth of the Gauley River with a cavalry force and some artillery, theVirginia and Tennessee Railroad to be his objective. Either the enemywould have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or seethem destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they somuch needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in command in the Valley ofVirginia. He was to advance up the valley, covering the North from aninvasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remainingnear Harper's Ferry. Every mile he advanced also gave us possession ofstores on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as his objective. 

Before the advance commenced I visited Butler at Fort Monroe. This wasthe first time I had ever met him. Before giving him any order as tothe part he was to play in the approaching campaign I invited his views. They were very much such as I intended to direct, and as I did direct(*24), in writing, before leaving. 

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-generalshortly after the battle of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had notyet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice against hisconfirmation by a majority of the Senate, but I insisted that hisservices had been such that he should be rewarded. My wishes were nowreluctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the command of one ofthe corps under General Butler. I was not long in finding out that theobjections to Smith's promotion were well founded. 

In one of my early interviews with the President I expressed mydissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by thecavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable ofaccomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. Isaid I wanted the very best man in the army for that command. Halleckwas present and spoke up, saying: "How would Sheridan do?" I replied:"The very man I want. " The President said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assignedto the command of the cavalry corps with the Army of the Potomac. Thisrelieved General Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on thatofficer, however, for I did not know but that he had been as efficientas any other cavalry commander. 

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered to assemble all thetroops he had at New Orleans in time to join in the general move, Mobileto be his objective. 

At this time I was not entirely decided as to whether I should move theArmy of the Potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. Each plan presented advantages. (*25) If by his right--my left--thePotomac, Chesapeake Bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy haulingdistance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to theJames River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole armynorth on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take infollowing. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; butall that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunitionwe started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandonedwhen the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us wasconsidered. The country over which we would have to pass was soexhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carryeverything with us. 

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northernborder, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at UnionCity, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banksof the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capturethe forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence ofForrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry againsthim, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he gotmy order. 

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at FortPillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of theMississippi River. The garrison consisted of a regiment of coloredtroops, infantry, and a detachment of Tennessee cavalry. These troopsfought bravely, but were overpowered. I will leave Forrest in hisdispatches to tell what he did with them. 

"The river was dyed, " he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered fortwo hundred yards. The approximate loss was upward of five hundredkilled, but few of the officers escaping. My loss was about twentykilled. It is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the Northernpeople that negro soldiers cannot cope with Southerners. " SubsequentlyForrest made a report in which he left out the part which shockshumanity to read. 

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had said to Halleck thatPlymouth and Washington, North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. Itwould be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to Butler'scommand. If success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. These places had been occupied byFederal troops before I took command of the armies, and I knew that theExecutive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained myviews; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured thegarrison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandonment of Washington, butdirected the holding of New Berne at all hazards. This was essentialbecause New Berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. 

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before mypromotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. Bydirection of Halleck I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about tenthousand men from Sherman's command. This reinforcement was wanted backbadly before the forward movement commenced. But Banks had got so farthat it seemed best that he should take Shreveport on the Red River, andturn over the line of that river to Steele, who commanded in Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkansas. Orders were givenaccordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be endedin time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command to where it belongedand get back to New Orleans himself in time to execute his part in thegeneral plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did not get backin time to take part in the programme as laid down. Nor was Smithreturned until long after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun. The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the numberrequired to hold all that was necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say that hisexpedition was ordered from Washington and he was in no way responsibleexcept for the conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. Heopposed the expedition. 

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced as to justify me infixing a day for the great move. On that day Burnside left Annapolis tooccupy Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rappahannock. Meadewas notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. On the following day Butler was notified of my intended advance on the4th of May, and he was directed to move the night of the same day andget as far up the James River as possible by daylight, and push on fromthere to accomplish the task given him. He was also notified thatreinforcements were being collected in Washington City, which would beforwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches atRichmond. The same day Sherman was directed to get his forces up readyto advance on the 5th. Sigel was in Winchester and was notified to movein conjunction with the others. 

The criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the Rapidanto the James River that all the loss of life could have been obviated bymoving the army there on transports. Richmond was fortified andintrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more thanequal to five outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession ofLee's army was the first great object. With the capture of his armyRichmond would necessarily follow. It was better to fight him outsideof his stronghold than in it. If the Army of the Potomac had been movedbodily to the James River by water Lee could have moved a part of hisforces back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the south to reinforceit, and with the balance moved on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered amove, simultaneous with that of the Army of the Potomac, up the JamesRiver by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. 

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from the 26th of March to the4th of May, I generally visited Washington once a week to confer withthe Secretary of War and President. On the last occasion, a few daysbefore moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing mypart in the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby had for a longtime been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated inthe rear of the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the field on thisoccasion, as the train approached Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud ofdust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry ona charge. Arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiriesmade as to the cause of the dust. There was but one man at the station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed a few minutes before at fullspeed in pursuit of Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, nodoubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. Iwas on a special train, if I remember correctly, without any guard. 

Since the close of the war I have come to know Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. He is a different man entirely from what I hadsupposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he couldendure any amount of physical exercise. He is able, and thoroughlyhonest and truthful. There were probably but few men in the South whocould have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear ofan opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as hedid without losing his entire command. 

On this same visit to Washington I had my last interview with thePresident before reaching the James River. He had of course becomeacquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered allalong the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. Iexplained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troopsto guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to preventincursions into the Northern States. These troops could perform thisservice just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and byadvancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold themback, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. His answer was:"Oh, yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man can't skin he musthold a leg while somebody else does. "

There was a certain incident connected with the Wilderness campaign ofwhich it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digressionfurther on I will mention it here. 

A few days before my departure from Culpeper the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for somedistance south, through the battle in the Wilderness and, I think, toSpottsylvania. He was accompanied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented asa literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view ofwriting a history of the war when it was over. He assured me--and Ihave no doubt Swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present asa correspondent of the press. I expressed an entire willingness to havehim (Swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so asa correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of theinformation he could give. We received Richmond papers with about asmuch regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our paperswere received with equal regularity by the Confederates. It wasdesirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spiesof the enemy within our lines. 

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. At all eventshe was not invited, and soon I found that he was corresponding with somepaper (I have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word eitherexpressed or implied. He knew of the assurance Washburne had given asto the character of his mission. I never saw the man from the day ofour introduction to the present that I recollect. He accompanied us, however, for a time at least. 

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the night of the 5th ofMay) Colonel W. R. Rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer atmy headquarters. A short time before midnight I gave him verbalinstructions for the night. Three days later I read in a Richmond papera verbatim report of these instructions. 

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after thesecond, day's fighting in the Wilderness) General Meade came to my tentfor consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. Bothhis staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of thetent, thinking our conversation should be private. There was a stump alittle to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bowers, saw what he took to be a manseated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to theconversation between Meade and myself. He called the attention ofColonel Rowley to it. The latter immediately took the man by theshoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what hewas doing there. The man proved to be Swinton, the "historian, " and hisreplies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he waswarned against further eaves-dropping. 

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold Harbor. General Meade cameto my headquarters saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered himto be shot that afternoon. I promptly ordered the prisoner to bereleased, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not toreturn again on pain of punishment. 

CHAPTER XLVIII. 

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN--GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION--SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID. 

The armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a singleobject. They were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possibleover such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the Confederacy, wasthe main end to which all were working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was animportant obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. It was of lessimportance only because the capture of Johnston and his army would notproduce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion aswould the possession of Richmond, Lee and his army. All other troopswere employed exclusively in support of these two movements. This wasthe plan; and I will now endeavor to give, as concisely as I can, themethod of its execution, outlining first the operations of minordetached but co-operative columns. 

As stated before, Banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to doon the Red River, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veteranswhose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousandwith Sherman and thirty thousand against Mobile. 

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when I was hoping to hear of good workbeing done in the valley I received instead the following announcementfrom Halleck: "Sigel is in full retreat on Strasburg. He will donothing but run; never did anything else. " The enemy had interceptedhim about New Market and handled him roughly, leaving him short sixguns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. 

The plan had been for an advance of Sigel's forces in two columns. Though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the otherproved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell his western columnadvanced from the Gauley in West Virginia at the appointed time, andwith more happy results. They reached the Virginia and TennesseeRailroad at Dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing upseveral miles of road and burning the bridge over New River. Havingaccomplished this they recrossed the Alleghanies to Meadow Bluffs andthere awaited further orders. 

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his command, except the cavalryand some artillery which moved up the south bank of the James River. His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and York River as ifthreatening the rear of Lee's army. At midnight they turned back, andButler by daylight was far up the James River. He seized City Point andBermuda Hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very muchto the surprise of the enemy. 

This was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in myinstructions to Butler. He was to act from here, looking to Richmond ashis objective point. I had given him to understand that I should aim tofight Lee between the Rapidan and Richmond if he would stand; but shouldLee fall back into Richmond I would follow up and make a junction of thearmies of the Potomac and the James on the James River. He was directedto secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could atas early a date as possible. 

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had begun intrenching, andon the 7th he sent out his cavalry from Suffolk to cut the WeldonRailroad. He also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad betweenPetersburg and Richmond, but no great success attended these latterefforts. He made no great effort to establish himself on that road andneglected to attack Petersburg, which was almost defenceless. About the11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, about half way between Bermuda Hundred and Richmond. In the mean timeBeauregard had been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he attackedButler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit verymaterially the further usefulness of the Army of the James as a distinctfactor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion of it to join theArmy of the Potomac, leaving a sufficient force with Butler to man hisworks, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain athreatening front toward the rear of the Confederate capital. 

The position which General Butler had chosen between the two rivers, theJames and Appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where alarge area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a singleintrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extentof territory which it thoroughly protected. His right was protected bythe James River, his left by the Appomattox, and his rear by theirjunction--the two streams uniting near by. The bends of the two streamsshortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while itincreased the area which the line inclosed. 

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I sent my chief engineer, General Barnard, from the Army of the Potomac to that of the James toinspect Butler's position and ascertain whether I could again safelymake an order for General Butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I could not, whether hisposition was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of histroops and having them brought round by water to White House to join meand reinforce the Army of the Potomac. General Barnard reported theposition very strong for defensive purposes, and that I could do thelatter with great security; but that General Butler could not move fromwhere he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. He said that thegeneral occupied a place between the James and Appomattox rivers whichwas of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold itfor an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he coulddo nothing offensively. I then asked him why Butler could not move outfrom his lines and push across the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad tothe rear and on the south side of Richmond. He replied that it wasimpracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line acrossthe neck of land that General Butler had. He then took out his penciland drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was likea bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neckrepresented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong lineimmediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as ifButler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with asmall force could hold the cork in its place. This struck me as beingvery expressive of his position, particularly when I saw the hastysketch which General Barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequentreport I used that expression without adding quotation marks, neverthinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--asthis did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of General Butler and, Iknow, very much to my own. I found afterwards that this was mentionedin the notes of General Badeau's book, which, when they were shown tome, I asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, thoughagainst my wishes. 

I make this statement here because, although I have often made itbefore, it has never been in my power until now to place it where itwill correct history; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I mayhave done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantlyserving their country during the trying period of the war for thepreservation of the Union. General Butler certainly gave his veryearnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personallyto the suppression of the rebellion. 

The further operations of the Army of the James can best be treated ofin connection with those of the Army of the Potomac, the two being sointimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body inwhich the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. 

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's great Atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movementspreparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, Iwill briefly mention Sheridan's first raid upon Lee's communicationswhich, though an incident of the operations on the main line and notspecifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliantexecution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be able to more perfectlyobserve the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when Ishall have undertaken to describe our advance from the Rapidan. 

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the Wilderness and when wewere moving on Spottsylvania I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loosefrom the Army of the Potomac, pass around the left of Lee's army andattack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west throughGordonsville, Charlottesville and Lynchburg, the other to Richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on tothe James River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This move tookhim past the entire rear of Lee's army. These orders were also given inwriting through Meade. 

The object of this move was three-fold. First, if successfullyexecuted, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line ofsupplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his ownuse supplies in store in the rear and coming up. Second, he would drawthe enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rearand trains than by remaining with the army. Third, his absence wouldsave the trains drawing his forage and other supplies fromFredericksburg, which had now become our base. He started at daylightthe next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. It wassixteen days before he got back to the Army of the Potomac. 

The course Sheridan took was directly to Richmond. Before night Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. But the advance kept on, crossed the North Anna, and at Beaver Dam, astation on the Virginia Central Railroad, recaptured four hundred Unionprisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the road and used anddestroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. 

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards Richmond, abandonedthe pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and anexhausting march, interposed between Sheridan and Richmond at YellowTavern, only about six miles north of the city. Sheridan destroyed therailroad and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th arrived inStuart's front. A severe engagement ensued in which the losses wereheavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortallywounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. 

Sheridan passed through the outer defences of Richmond, and could, nodoubt, have passed through the inner ones. But having no supports nearhe could not have remained. After caring for his wounded he struck forthe James River below the city, to communicate with Butler and to resthis men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. 

He moved first between the Chickahominy and the James, but in themorning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. Hethen turned to cross to the north side of the Chickahominy by MeadowBridge. He found this barred, and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. The panic created by hisfirst entrance within the outer works of Richmond having subsided troopswere sent out to attack his rear. 

He was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals couldhave extricated themselves. The defences of Richmond, manned, were tothe right, the Chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining andthe opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from Richmond. Thisforce was attacked and beaten by Wilson's and Gregg's divisions, whileSheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastilybuilt a bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forceda crossing and soon dispersed the Confederates he found there. The enemywas held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged inbridge building. 

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, over the Chickahominy. Onthe 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on theJames River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself intocommunication with General Butler, who directed all the supplies hewanted to be furnished. 

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at Spottsylvania, but did notknow where either this or Lee's army was now. Great caution thereforehad to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, after resting hiscommand for three days, he started on his return. He moved by the wayof White House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been burned by theenemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossedover it. On the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Matapony, where helearned the position of the two armies. On the 24th he joined us on themarch from North Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chesterfield. 

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around Lee's army:encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all;recaptured four hundred Union prisoners and killed and captured many ofthe enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war;destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyanceby the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. 

CHAPTER XLIX. 

SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SIEGE OF ATLANTA--DEATH OF GENERALMCPHERSON--ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE ANDERSONVILLE--CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 

After separating from Sherman in Cincinnati I went on to Washington, asalready stated, while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties ofhis new command. His military division was now composed of fourdepartments and embraced all the territory west of the AlleghanyMountains and east of the Mississippi River, together with the State ofArkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The most easterly of these was theDepartment of the Ohio, General Schofield commanding; the next was theDepartment of the Cumberland, General Thomas commanding; the third theDepartment of the Tennessee, General McPherson commanding; and GeneralSteele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, or Department of Arkansas. The last-named department was so far away that Sherman could notcommunicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to thatof the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved General Banks, was incommand. 

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in a former chapter, wereto be simultaneous, I fixing the day to start when the season should befar enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a conditionfor the troops to march. 

General Sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task whichwas assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson lay atHuntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points ofTennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; Thomas, with oversixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, was at Chattanooga;and Schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at Knoxville. Withthese three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, Sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with aview of destroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta. He visitedeach of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and itwas found to be, speaking generally, good. 

One of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of suppliesforward to Chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. Hefound, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-trackrailroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops withoutbringing forward any surplus of any kind. He found, however, thattrains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for thecavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. He atonce changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, andused the road exclusively for transporting supplies. In this way he wasable to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon forthe move, the 4th of May. 

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, which was nearlyone-fourth of the way between Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country ismountainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, someof them of considerable volume. Dalton is on ground where water drainstowards Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east fromthere and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which allthe main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries enteringinto them. Johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign duringthe entire winter. The best positions for defence had been selected allthe way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; sothat, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he wouldhave another to fall into in his rear. His position at Dalton was sovery strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold Sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. With aless skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, I have no doubtthat he would have succeeded. 

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was farthest back, a few daysin advance from Knoxville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton. Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been Sherman's intention tocross McPherson over the Tennessee River at Huntsville or Decatur, andmove him south from there so as to have him come into the road runningfrom Chattanooga to Atlanta a good distance to the rear of the pointJohnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped thatMcPherson alone would have troops enough to cope with Johnston, if thelatter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of thearmy. In this he was disappointed. Two of McPherson's veterandivisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were tohave a furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and they were notback. 

Then, again, Sherman had lent Banks two divisions under A. J. Smith, thewinter before, to co-operate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and thiswith the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, soas to be prepared for this very campaign. It is hardly necessary to saythey were not returned. That department continued to absorb troops tono purpose to the end of the war. This left McPherson so weak that thepart of the plan above indicated had to be changed. He was thereforebrought up to Chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right ofThomas--the two coming together about Dalton. The three armies wereabreast, all ready to start promptly on time. 

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly fortified that it wasuseless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry itby regular approaches was impracticable. There was a narrowing up inthe mountain, between the National and Confederate armies, through whicha stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. Besides, the stream had beendammed so that the valley was a lake. Through this gorge the troopswould have to pass. McPherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek Gap into the rear of the enemy. This was a surprise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided toabandon his position at Dalton. 

On the 15th there was very hard fighting about Resaca; but our cavalryhaving been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy'srear. Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The pursuit wascontinued to Kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very littlefighting, except that Newton's division overtook the rear of Johnston'sarmy and engaged it. Sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose ofbringing up his railroad trains. He was depending upon the railroad forall of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyedas Johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushedforward night and day, and caused much less delay than most personswould naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so manybridges to be rebuilt. 

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, theenemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. It is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting--some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very importantbattles--neither were single positions gained in a day. On thecontrary, weeks were spent at some; and about Atlanta more than a monthwas consumed. 

It was the 23d of May before the road was finished up to the rear ofSherman's army and the pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up tothe vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very strongly intrenched, andnaturally a very defensible position. An assault upon it was not thoughtof, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. This wasdone by sending a large force around our right, by the way of Dallas, toreach the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, however, they foundthe enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting forabout a week at a place called New Hope Church. On the left our troopsalso were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. They kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. This was the case more particularly with the cavalry. By the 4th ofJune Johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drewoff and Allatoona was left in our possession. 

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched foroccupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondarybase of supplies. The railroad was finished up to that point, theintrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army gotin readiness for a further advance. The rains, however, were falling insuch torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roadswhich they would have to move upon in order to turn Johnston out of hisnew position. 

While Sherman's army lay here, General F. P. Blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been onfurlough. 

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, where strongintrenchments awaited him. At this latter place our troops made anassault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up closeto him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. But during theprogress of the battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; and thecavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. These operations were completed by the 3d of July, when it was foundthat Johnston had evacuated the place. He was pursued at once. Shermanhad made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strongguard in his intrenchments. He had intended, moving out with twentydays' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad againat the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this plan by himselfstarting back as above stated. This time he fell back to theChattahoochee. 

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, Sherman getting easypossession of the Chattahoochee River both above and below him. Theenemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened byflanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across theriver. 

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when Sherman's old tacticsprevailed again and the final movement toward Atlanta began. Johnstonwas now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded him. 

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with muchfavor, either in the eyes of the administration at Richmond, or of thepeople of that section of the South in which he was commanding. Thevery fact of a change of commanders being ordered under suchcircumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now theywould become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. 

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics were right. Anythingthat could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it didfinally close, would probably have exhausted the North to such an extentthat they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to aseparation. 

Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circleabout a mile and a half outside of the city. In addition to this, therewere advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siegecould be commenced. 

Sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy wasabout to assume the offensive. On the 20th he came out and attacked theArmy of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's corps, and Newton's andJohnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the Confederates were then forced tofall back inside their main lines. The losses were quite heavy on bothsides. On this day General Gresham, since our Postmaster-General, wasvery badly wounded. During the night Hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. The investment had not been relinquishedfor a moment during the day. 

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out again, passing by our leftflank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear ofhim, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the22d. At first the battle went very much in favor of the Confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. While our troops were advancingthey were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. But they hadbecome too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion byan unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in orderand engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where theirantagonist was. The field of battle continued to expand until itembraced about seven miles of ground. Finally, however, and beforenight, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). 

It was during this battle that McPherson, while passing from one columnto another, was instantly killed. In his death the army lost one of itsablest, purest and best generals. 

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad eastof Atlanta and to cut it in the direction of Augusta. He was successfulin this, and returned about the time of the battle. Rousseau had alsocome up from Tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossedthe Tennessee River about Decatur and made a raid into Alabama. Finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear ofSherman, and reported to him about this time. 

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the Battle of Atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of September. Preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. The work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were verylong. Our troops were gradually worked around to the east until theystruck the road between Decatur and Atlanta. These lines were stronglyfortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as closeup to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with thesmallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army tomove by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south ofAtlanta. 

On the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. On the 28th theenemy struck our right flank, General Logan commanding, with greatvigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabledto resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon theenemy. These assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. The enemy's losses inthese unsuccessful assaults were fearful. 

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front withdrew into the town. This now left Sherman's army close up to the Confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north andwest of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this linebeing intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. 

In the latter part of July Sherman sent Stoneman to destroy therailroads to the south, about Macon. He was then to go east and, ifpossible, release our prisoners about Andersonville. There were painfulstories current at the time about the great hardships these prisonershad to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in whichthey were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. Great sympathywas felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turnedloose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. But theattempt proved a failure. McCook, who commanded a small brigade, wasfirst reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicteda good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also taken some prisoners;but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he wasobliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with whatmen he had left. He had lost several hundred men out of his smallcommand. On the 4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a littlebrigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting Stoneman and all buthimself as lost. I myself had heard around Richmond of the capture ofStoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he received. The rumor wasconfirmed there, also, from other sources. A few days after ColonelAdams's return Colonel Capron also got in with a small detachment andconfirmed the report of the capture of Stoneman with something less thana thousand men. 

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all his force wasimpossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. Hecovered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force ofabout seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and thisdetachment to the commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, muchdamage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. 

On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to ourright, where Schofield was in command, but these attempts failedutterly. General Palmer was charged with being the cause of thisfailure, to a great extent, by both General Sherman and GeneralSchofield; but I am not prepared to say this, although a question seemsto have arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any right tocommand him. If he did raise this question while an action was goingon, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. 

About the same time Wheeler got upon our railroad north of Resaca anddestroyed it nearly up to Dalton. This cut Sherman off fromcommunication with the North for several days. Sherman responded tothis attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. 

Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of August to reach the Maconroad about Jonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely aroundthe Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was back again in his formerposition on our left by the 22d. These little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. They annoyed, it istrue, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expeditionis soon repaired. 

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, fora flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to somepoint in the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last movement on the25th of August, and on the 1st of September was well up towards therailroad twenty miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardeeintrenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but he was unable todrive Hardee away before night set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up hismilitary works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, anddecamped. 

The next morning at daylight General H. W. Slocum, who was commandingnorth of the city, moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and notifiedSherman. Sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days toreach the city, and occupied a line extending from Decatur on the leftto Atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city forsome distance to the right. 

The campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the mostmemorable in history. There was but little if anything in the wholecampaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing tocriticise severely. It was creditable alike to the general whocommanded and the army which had executed it. Sherman had on thiscampaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whosealertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. 

The troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoya little rest after their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta wasturned into a military base. The citizens were all compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army ofsutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in thefield, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and gettingthe money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, andfor which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He limited thenumber of these traders to one for each of his three armies. 

The news of Sherman's success reached the North instantaneously, and setthe country all aglow. This was the first great political campaign forthe Republicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed later bySheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley; and these two campaignsprobably had more effect in settling the election of the followingNovember than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the paradingwith banners and bands of music in the North. 

CHAPTER L. 

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--CROSSING THE RAPIDAN--ENTERING THE WILDERNESS--BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 

Soon after midnight, May 3d-4th, the Army of the Potomac moved out fromits position north Rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the Confederate capital and thearmy defending it. This was not to be accomplished, however, without asdesperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to beconsummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. The lossesinflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies nowconfronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a periodof three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progressaccomplishing the final end. It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. Butpreviously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capturePhiladelphia, New York, and the National Capital, and had made severalattempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near makingtheir boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyalNorth. They had also come near losing their own capital on at least oneoccasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign now begun was destinedto result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than anypreviously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at thebeginning in that time. We had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The two armies had been confronting each other so long, without anydecisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. 

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken inwagons. Beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered aswanted. Three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty roundsof cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. 

The country over which the army had to operate, from the Rapidan to thecrossing of the James River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerousstreams which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The crossings ofthese streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance oftroops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. The countryroads were narrow and poor. Most of the country is covered with a denseforest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. Allbridges were naturally destroyed before the National troops came tothem. 

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalrycorps, commanded respectively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, (*27) John Sedgwick and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery was commanded byGeneral Henry J. Hunt. This arm was in such abundance that the fourthof it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we weredestined to pass through. The surplus was much in the way, taking up asit did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of theforage and other stores brought up by the trains. 

The 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for Germania Ford, preceded by one division ofcavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedgwick followed Warrenwith the 6th corps. Germania Ford was nine or ten miles below the rightof Lee's line. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon Ely's Ford, six miles below Germania, preceded by Gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. Torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the Rapidan, for thetime, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing andgetting into our rear. The cavalry seized the two crossings beforedaylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by sixo'clock A. M. Had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of theinfantry and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to Lee. Thefact that the movement was unopposed proves this. 

Burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at Warrenton, guarding therailroad from Bull Run forward to preserve control of it in case ourcrossing the Rapidan should be long delayed. He was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and adispatch was sent to him a little after one P. M. Giving the informationthat our crossing had been successful. 

The country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. The battle-field from thecrossing of the Rapidan until the final movement from the Wildernesstoward Spottsylvania was of the same character. There were someclearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field;but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. The roadswere narrow and bad. All the conditions were favorable for defensiveoperations. 

There are two roads, good for that part of Virginia, running from OrangeCourt House to the battle-field. The most southerly of these roads isknown as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the northern one as theOrange Turnpike. There are also roads from east of the battle-fieldrunning to Spottsylvania Court House, one from Chancellorsville, branching at Aldrich's; the western branch going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by the Brock Road to Spottsylvania; the east branch goesby Gates's, thence to Spottsylvania. The Brock Road runs from GermaniaFord through the battle-field and on to the Court House. AsSpottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect thefarms with roads going there. 

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. From there toFredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described runningnearly parallel to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. Theseroads strike the road from Germania Ford in the Wilderness. 

As soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushedforward, Wilson's division by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's store, onthe Orange Plank Road; Gregg to the left towards Chancellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached the Wilderness Tavern by noon, tookposition there and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He was acrossthe river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of Warren, bysundown. Hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with Warren andcamped about six miles east of him. Before night all the troops, and bythe evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. 

There never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster'scorps with the Army of the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train thatwould have extended from the Rapidan to Richmond, stretched along insingle file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelvedays' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. To overcome alldifficulties, the chief quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had markedon each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number ofthe brigade. At a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagonbelonged could be told. The wagons were also marked to note thecontents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. Empty wagons were never allowedto follow the army or stay in camp. As soon as a wagon was empty itwould return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the samearticle that had been taken from it. Empty trains were obliged to leavethe road free for loaded ones. Arriving near the army they would beparked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. By this systemthe hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensedwith. They consumed theirs at the depots. 

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the Rapidan in advance ofSedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon andnight in a deserted house near the river. 

Orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down thebaggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper toGermania Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away bythe troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence I had neverwitnessed before. 

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a veryearly hour on the morning of the 4th of May, that the Army of thePotomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock inthe afternoon by what route we would confront his army. This I judgefrom the fact that at 1. 15 P. M. , an hour and a quarter after Warren hadreached Old Wilderness Tavern, our officers took off rebel signalswhich, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupytheir intrenchments at Mine Run. 

Here at night dispatches were received announcing that Sherman, Butlerand Crook had moved according to programme. 

On discovering the advance of the Army of the Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell and Longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right toattack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet to follow on thesame road. Longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--atGordonsville, twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered by theOrange Pike. He was near by and arrived some four miles east of MineRun before bivouacking for the night. 

My orders were given through General Meade for an early advance on themorning of the 5th. Warren was to move to Parker's store, and Wilson'scavalry--then at Parker's store--to move on to Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, closing in on his right. The Army of thePotomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to thesouth, except when facing the enemy. Hancock was to move south-westwardto join on the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove Church. 

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's store, Warren discovered theenemy. He sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt andprepare to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division of Sedgwick'scorps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to Warren'sright, and Getty with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, wasordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get on his left. This wasthe speediest way to reinforce Warren who was confronting the enemy onboth the Orange plank and turnpike roads. 

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the Armyof the Potomac had safely crossed the Rapidan. By making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the5th. Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilderness Tavern, fourmiles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see theroad. I remained to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him inposition. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's command, and washis senior in rank. Getting information of the proximity of the enemy, I informed Meade, and without waiting to see Burnside, at once movedforward my headquarters to where Meade was. 

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take theinitiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments ifwe were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not yet reached the pointwhere he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. Neitherparty had any advantage of position. Warren was, therefore, ordered toattack as soon as he could prepare for it. At nine o'clock Hancock wasordered to come up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived atGetty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. Getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. About this hour Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though notdecisive results. Getty was somewhat isolated from Warren and was in aprecarious condition for a time. Wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. At twoo'clock Hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was orderedto join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy timber and narrowroads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly ashe generally did when receiving such orders. At four o'clock he againreceived his orders to attack, and General Getty received orders fromMeade a few minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready or not. He met the enemy under Heth within a few hundred yards. 

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by Birney and Mott, and later two brigades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty. This was timely and saved Getty. During the battle Getty and Carrollwere wounded, but remained on the field. One of Birney's most gallantbrigade commanders--Alexander Hays--was killed. 

I had been at West Point with Hays for three years, and had served withhim through the Mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command whereverordered. With him it was "Come, boys, " not "Go. "

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sentto reinforce Hancock and Getty; but the density of the interveningforest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did notget up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where theywere without getting into position. 

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's division of cavalry to Todd'sTavern in search of Wilson. This was fortunate. He found Wilsonengaged with a superior force under General Rosser, supported byinfantry, and falling back before it. Together they were strong enoughto turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. They soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's Bridge. 

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued until night put a close toit. Neither side made any special progress. 

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my orders were given forthe following morning. We knew Longstreet with 12, 000 men was on hisway to join Hill's right, near the Brock Road, and might arrive duringthe night. I was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiativein the morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make an assault at 4. 30o'clock. Meade asked to have the hour changed to six. Deferring to hiswishes as far as I was willing, the order was modified and five wasfixed as the hour to move. 

Hancock had now fully one-half of the Army of the Potomac. Wadsworthwith his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a lineperpendicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of Hancock. He wasdirected to move at the same time, and to attack Hill's left. 

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get inbetween Warren and Wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get inposition to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make attacks in theirfront, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to takeadvantage of any attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burnsidewas ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, toswing around to the left and envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancockwas informed of all the movements ordered. 

Burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--wassent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until July. 

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on hisright until Longstreet got up. This is evident from the fact thatnotwithstanding the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, bothfor the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike beforeLongstreet got up, Lee was ahead in his assault on our right. Hispurpose was evident, but he failed. 

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in timethat Longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin Road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commandedby General Barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches bywhich Longstreet was expected. This disposition was made in time toattack as ordered. Hancock moved by the left of the Orange Plank Road, and Wadsworth by the right of it. The fighting was desperate for aboutan hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. 

I believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that ifthe country had been such that Hancock and his command could have seenthe confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have beentaken advantage of so effectually that Lee would not have made anotherstand outside of his Richmond defences. 

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was notable to accomplish much. 

On the morning of the 6th Sheridan was sent to connect with Hancock'sleft and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our leftand rear. He met them at the intersection of the Furnace and Brockroads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated them at both places. Later hewas attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. 

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and Stuart, and thinking theenemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his positionguarding the entrance to the Brock Road. Another incident happenedduring the day to further induce Hancock to weaken his attacking column. Word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from thedirection of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's brigade was detached to meetthis new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundredconvalescents coming from Chancellorsville, by the road Hancock hadadvanced upon, to join their respective commands. At 6. 50 o'clock A. M. , Burnside, who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, was orderedto send a division to the support of Hancock, but to continue with theremainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. Thedifficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented Burnsidefrom getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of thesixth. 

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile ormore. He maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came upon him. The retreating column of Hill meetingreinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged andreturned with them. They were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before beingdiscovered. Falling upon a brigade of Hancock's corps thrown to theadvance, they swept it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up hisadvantage and soon came upon Mott's division, which fell back in greatconfusion. Hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, butafter holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he hadheld in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. In this engagementthe intrepid Wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortallywounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. 

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and Longstreet seriouslywounded in this engagement. Longstreet had to leave the field, not toresume command for many weeks. His loss was a severe one to Lee, andcompensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. 

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee took command of his rightin person. He was not able, however, to rally his men to attackHancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose ofreforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnantsthat might be left of Longstreet's or Hill's commands. This brigadehaving been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held byHancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left toright. A brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but itbroke and disappeared without a contest. 

Firing was continued after this, but with less fury. Burnside had notyet been able to get up to render any assistance. But it was now onlyabout nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on Hancock'sright. 

At 4. 15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. His line moved up towithin a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. This status wasmaintained for about half an hour. Then a part of Mott's division andWard's brigade of Birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. The enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of this and pushed throughour line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not onfire. But owing to the efforts of Hancock, their success was buttemporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, moved at a double quick withhis brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fightinghad continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. The ground fought over had varied inwidth, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. The killed, and many ofthe severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it wasimpossible to reach them. The woods were set on fire by the burstingshells, and the conflagration raged. The wounded who had not strengthto move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. Finallythe fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. Beingconstructed of wood, they burned with great fury. But the battle stillraged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot toremain longer. 

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confusion, and his personalefforts failed to restore order. These facts, however, were learnedsubsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and nodoubt gained a decisive success. His troops were withdrawn now, but Irevoked the order, which I had given previously to this assault, forHancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition anddid not have time to replenish from the train, which was at somedistance. 

Burnside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept up an assault during allthis time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent theenemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. 

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the Rapidan to be takenup except one at Germania Ford. 

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. Thisleft our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off fromall present base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his right andintrenched it for protection against attack. But late in the afternoonof the 6th Early came out from his lines in considerable force and gotin upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, andcreated considerable confusion. Early captured several hundredprisoners, among them two general officers. The defence, however, wasvigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as muchconfusion as our troops, engaged, were. Early says in his Memoirs thatif we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have broughtfresh troops to his great discomfort. Many officers, who had not beenattacked by Early, continued coming to my headquarters even afterSedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with newsof the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy waspushing on and would soon be upon me. 

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. On the morning of the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry fromCatharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets and skirmishers were sentalong our entire front to find the position of the enemy. Some went asfar as a mile and a half before finding him. But Lee showed nodisposition to come out of his Works. There was no battle during theday, and but little firing except in Warren's front; he being directedabout noon to make a reconnoissance in force. This drew some sharpfiring, but there was no attempt on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended the Battle of the Wilderness. 

CHAPTER LI. 

AFTER THE BATTLE--TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SERVICE--MOVEMENT BY THE LEFTFLANK. 

More desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent thanthat of the 5th and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in havingsuccessfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of anenemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. We gained anadvantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. In the evening the enemy gained anadvantage; but was speedily repulsed. As we stood at the close, the twoarmies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other aswhen the river divided them. But the fact of having safely crossed wasa victory. 

Our losses in the Wilderness were very severe. Those of theConfederates must have been even more so; but I have no means ofspeaking with accuracy upon this point. The Germania Ford bridge wastransferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the transportation of thewounded to Washington. 

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected withall movements of the Army of the Potomac: first, in every change ofposition or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. For thispurpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could befound in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on thetimber. Thus the digging they did counted in making a depression tostand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. It waswonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences ofconsiderable strength. When a halt was made with the view of assaultingthe enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or theirpositions changed under the direction of engineer officers. The secondwas, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could bemore complete than the organization and discipline of this body of braveand intelligent men. Insulated wires--insulated so that they wouldtransmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were woundupon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. Two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The pack-saddle onwhich this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placedcrosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with itswire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon, supplied with atelegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. There were wagonsalso loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tentpole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires upwhen laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. Themules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with thecommand they were assigned to. The operators were also assigned toparticular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. 

The moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the menconnected with this branch of service would proceed to put up theirwires. A mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear ofthe nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in aline parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire anduncoil it as the mule was led off. When he had walked the length of thewire the whole of it would be on the ground. This would be done in rearof every brigade at the same time. The ends of all the wires would thenbe joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. Themen, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at onceraising the wires with their telegraph poles. This was done by making aloop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to aperpendicular position. At intervals the wire would be attached totrees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficientat a place. In the absence of such a support two poles would have to beused, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm inits place. While this was being done the telegraph wagons would taketheir positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to beestablished, and would connect with the wire. Thus, in a few minuteslonger time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquartersof the army. No orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. 

The signal service was used on the march. The men composing this corpswere assigned to specified commands. When movements were made, theywould go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points ofground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or wouldclimb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and oftenthe movements of the enemy. They would also take off the signals of theenemy and transmit them. It would sometimes take too long a time tomake translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive anybenefit from them. But sometimes they gave useful information. 

On the afternoon of the 7th I received news from Washington announcingthat Sherman had probably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butlerhad reached City Point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. Ihad given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that Leemight move rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could get there. 

My order for this movement was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S. , May 7, 1864, 6. 30 A. M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P. 

Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take positionat Spottsylvania C. H. With one army corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvaniaroad with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If this move ismade the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the NyRiver. 

I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hancockwhere he is until Warren passes him. He could then follow and becomethe right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to hisdestination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersectionof it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then followSedgwick to his place of destination. 

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troopsmove, and then move off quietly. 

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attackon Hancock this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared toresist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our wholeforce. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. 

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd'sTavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that wereto go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from thefront of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren's marchcarried him immediately behind the works where Hancock's command lay onthe Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I precededthe troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatestenthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men as we passed by. No doubt itwas inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated tothem that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in thebattle just fought. The cheering was so lusty that the enemy must havetaken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furiousfusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. 

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed but a little way beyond ourleft when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which roadSheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be theright-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct ofthe engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us intothe lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at arapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reportedthat Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us intohis lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren's columnwhen it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern, where we arrived after midnight. 

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did notwant Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butlerbefore I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army andRichmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. ButLee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had beenordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before themovement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Armyof the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government. Accordingly he ordered Longstreet's corps--now commanded by Anderson--tomove in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods beingstill on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directlyon to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possessionof Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been theresult if Lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain thatwe would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies tosee which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac wouldhave had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan wecame near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, fromthe Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure wascaused by our not following up the success gained over Hill's corps onthe morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when firescaused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night ofthe 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. But accident often decides the fate of battle. 

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon ofthe 7th, lasting at Todd's Tavern until after night, with the field hisat the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvaniaand holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee's troops would haveto cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's ordersto Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry;but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had notbeen detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but forthe unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had he been permitted toexecute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding withtwo brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson hadto cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren toreinforce Wilson and hold the town. 

Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were notalready made--immediately across Warren's front. Warren was not aware ofhis presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt hadengaged earlier in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. Hesoon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and madea second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeededin gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where heintrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford's, thelatter Wadsworth's, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back somedistance. 

At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to hissupport. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, wasordered to Warren's support. Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, wasnotified of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness tocome up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich's on ourextreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow ingetting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was neverat fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near nightbefore the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all ofSedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the lastassault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. 

Warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to doanything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of thearmy should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideaswere generally good, but he would forget that the person giving himorders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligentinstructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movementsin person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute anorder without his presence. His difficulty was constitutional andbeyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quickperceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could bedone with a small command. 

Lee had ordered Hill's corps--now commanded by Early--to move by thevery road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in themorning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, butstill thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg. Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession ofSpottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession ofSpottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only foundthat he had been following us when he ran against Hancock at Todd'sTavern. His coming detained Hancock from the battle-field ofSpottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back andforced him to move by another route. 

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, itwould have put Hancock in the lead. It would also have given us an houror earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head ofhis column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out oftheir line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity touse his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him tocrush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made wastactical. It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by theenemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to theright passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would havefound the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while stillpassing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got byit would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learnedthe special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At thattime my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeedMeade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him fromthe field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an ableman; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity andimportance of the duty he had to perform. 

CHAPTER LII. 

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANCOCK'S POSITION--ASSAULT OF WARREN'S ANDWRIGHT'S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER ANDSHERIDAN. 

The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Poand the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. Ittakes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the WildernessTavern. The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where theyare but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania withoutcrossing either of these streams. Lee's army coming up by the CatharpinRoad, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hancock came bythe Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnsidecoming by Aldrich's to Gates's house, had to cross the Ny near theenemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off bya brigade of Willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. Thisbrigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division comingup, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. 

About the time I received the news of this attack, word came fromHancock that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to theCatharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupyon the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. Thesemovements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make theattempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. Imade arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmondif he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intentionit was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny. 

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abruptbanks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time wewere there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. The countryabout was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. Itwas a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than anoffensive one. 

By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: Leeoccupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosingthe town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell camenext, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock andother roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left andBurnside on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at Todd's Tavern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hancock's front thelatter was ordered up to Warren's right. He formed a line with threedivisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and wasordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy's flank. The fourthdivision of Hancock's corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd's whenthe corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up andplaced to the left of Sedgwick's--now Wright's--6th corps. In themorning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of hisintrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to theArmy of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G. Wright succeededhim in the command of his corps. 

Hancock was now, nine P. M. Of the 9th of May, across the left flank ofLee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder ofMeade's army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and thedarkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river againat Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with bothfriend and foe. 

The Po at the points where Hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--itturns due south, and after passing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes amore easterly direction. During the night this corps built threebridges over the Po; but these were in rear. 

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced Lee to reinforce his leftduring the night. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hancockrenewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himselfconfronted by some of Early's command, which had been brought from theextreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effectinga crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenchedin his front, no more were crossed. 

Hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the viewof forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could begained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high groundoverlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, forHancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side ofthe stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate himfrom it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of theenemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was thereforeabandoned. 

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement ofHancock's, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in themorning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centreby Warren's and Wright's corps, Hancock to command all the attackingforce. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po. Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as areserve. Barlow's division was left south of the stream, and Mott ofthe same corps was still to the left of Wright's corps. Burnside wasordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunitypresented, to attack with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow's divisionisolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerableloss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossingsbuilt by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second assault wasrepulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawnwithout further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in thismove. 

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to take place, there was aravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almostimpenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with aheavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his fronttwice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. Hewas repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of theground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. 

Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advancedposition from the one he started from. He then organized a stormingparty, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel Emory Upton, of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About fouro'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, Warren's and Wright'scorps, with Mott's division of Hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of strugglesbegan. The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that butlittle could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meadeand I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren. 

Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among thekilled. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was therebyenabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns ofthe enemy. To the left our success was decided, but the advantage waslost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting partypushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. Turning to theright and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. Mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. So much time waslost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position toreinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men ofhis command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gainedthat I withdrew the order. To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of theassault. By this time Hancock, who had gone with Birney's division torelieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corpswas now joined with Warren's and Wright's in this last assault. It wasgallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of theenemy; but they were not able to hold them. At night they werewithdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he hadcaptured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an importantadvantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by himlost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized topromote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By thisauthority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on thespot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badlywounded in this fight. 

Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards ofSpottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee's right. He was notaware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, beingwith the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at thetime. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almostwithout loss. Burnside's position now separated him widely fromWright's corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered tojoin on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us animportant advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I doto myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to mehis position. 

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to followup his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow. Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entirecorps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presenceof this force. 

On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except byMott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point inthe enemy's line. 

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. , May 11, 1864--8. 30 A. M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. 

We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result up tothis time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as wellas those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven generalofficers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over fourthousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few excepta few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagonsfor a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight itout on this line if it takes all summer. 

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as greatnumbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use themas an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to sendthem out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain orFredericksburg, send them so. 

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to themark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and bykeeping them intrenched in every position they take. 

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee's armybeing detached for the defence of Richmond. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

And also, I received information, through the War Department, fromGeneral Butler that his cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad southof Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, and had whippedHill, killing, wounding and capturing many. Also that he wasintrenched, and could maintain himself. On this same day came news fromSheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroadand telegraph between Lee and Richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. 

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose from the Armyof the Potomac and pass around the left of Lee's army and attack hiscavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in themanner I have already described. 

CHAPTER LIII. 

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT-LOSSES OF THE CONFEDERATES--PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED--DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY--EWELL'S ATTACK-REDUCING THE ARTILLERY. 

In the reconnoissance made by Mott on the 11th, a salient was discoveredat the right centre. I determined that an assault should be made at thatpoint. (*28) Accordingly in the afternoon Hancock was ordered to movehis command by the rear of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, toWright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the nextmorning. The night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road wasdifficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where hewas to halt. It took most of the night to get the men in position fortheir advance in the morning. The men got but little rest. Burnsidewas ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. I sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance ofpushing forward vigorously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren andWright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in theassault if circumstances made it advisable. I occupied a centralposition most convenient for receiving information from all points. Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, and Birney to hisright. Mott followed Birney, and Gibbon was held in reserve. 

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than halfan hour. 

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, wasascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of theenemy's intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also a marsh tocross. But, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushedon in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or fivehundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with arush went up to and over the breastworks. Barlow and Birney enteredalmost simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict tookplace. The men of the two sides were too close together to fire, butused their guns as clubs. The hand conflict was soon over. Hancock'scorps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and abrigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, andammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of theenemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. About sixo'clock I ordered Warren's corps to the support of Hancock's. Burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet ofthe enemy. Potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but wasnot able to remain there. However, he inflicted a heavy loss upon theenemy; but not without loss in return. 

This victory was important, and one that Lee could not afford to leaveus in full possession of. He made the most strenuous efforts to regainthe position he had lost. Troops were brought up from his left andattacked Hancock furiously. Hancock was forced to fall back: but hedid so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. These he turned, facingthem the other way, and continued to hold. Wright was ordered up toreinforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He was wounded soonafter coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. Ateight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making hisdispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and withemphasis. At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to relieveWarren from his command if he failed to move promptly. Hancock placedbatteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. 

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, butnegatively a great deal. He kept Lee from reinforcing his centre fromthat quarter. If the 5th corps, or rather if Warren, had been as promptas Wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have beenobtained. 

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. Five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodgingour troops from their new position. His losses must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. In oneplace a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down bymusket balls. All the trees between the lines were very much cut topieces by artillery and musketry. It was three o'clock next morningbefore the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had then been twentyhours under fire. In this engagement we did not lose a singleorganization, not even a company. The enemy lost one division with itscommander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losseselsewhere. (*30) Our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole companywas captured. At night Lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. 

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, Cutler's division sent toWright, and Griffin's to Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, General Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the remaining division, andauthorized him to give it orders in his name. 

During the day I was passing along the line from wing to wingcontinuously. About the centre stood a house which proved to beoccupied by an old lady and her daughter. She showed such unmistakablesigns of being strongly Union that I stopped. She said she had not seena Union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look uponit again. She said her husband and son, being, Union men, had had toleave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the Union army, ifalive. She was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations issuedto her, and promised to find out if I could where the husband and sonwere. 

There was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishingbetween Mott's division and the enemy. I was afraid that Lee might bemoving out, and I did not want him to go without my knowing it. Theindications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was onlytaking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. Our dead were buried this day. Mott's division was reduced to abrigade, and assigned to Birney's division. 

During this day I wrote to Washington recommending Sherman and Meade(*31) for promotion to the grade of Major-General in the regular army;Hancock for Brigadier-General; Wright, Gibbon and Humphreys to beMajor-Generals of Volunteers; and Upton and Carroll to be Brigadiers. Upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to beconfirmed by the Senate on the nomination of the President. 

The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were moved by the rear to theleft of Burnside. The night was very dark and it rained heavily, theroads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the roada part of the way, to get through. It was midnight before they got tothe point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops couldbe organized to advance to their position in line. They gained theirposition in line, however, without any fighting, except a little inWright's front. Here Upton had to contend for an elevation which wewanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. Upton first drovethe enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to his supportwith his brigade (of Griffin's division, Warren's corps), the positionwas secured and fortified. There was no more battle during the 14th. This brought our line east of the Court House and running north andsouth and facing west. 

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to cover this new front. This left Hancock without an enemy confronting him. He was brought tothe rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he mightbe wanted. 

On the 15th news came from Butler and Averill. The former reported thecapture of the outer works at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, andthat his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of Richmond onthe Danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot ofsupplies at Dublin, West Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridgeon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. The next day news came fromSherman and Sheridan. Sherman had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and was following him south. The report from Sheridan embracedhis operations up to his passing the outer defences of Richmond. Theprospect must now have been dismal in Richmond. The road and telegraphwere cut between the capital and Lee. The roads and wires were cut inevery direction from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city was cutoff from all communication with the outside except by courier. Thiscondition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. 

I wrote Halleck:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. , May 16, 1864, 8 A. M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :

We have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet ofit clearing up. The roads have now become so impassable that ambulanceswith wounded men can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. Alloffensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-fourhours of dry weather. The army is in the best of spirits, and feel thegreatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * ** * You can assure the President and Secretary of War that theelements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no mannerdue to weakness or exhaustion on our part. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

The condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. But that night Hancock and Wright were to make a night march back totheir old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in themorning. Lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so theassault was unsuccessful. On this day (18th) the news was almost asdiscouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and Wright's corps had made an unsuccessfulassault. News came that Sigel had been defeated at New Market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. Not two hours before, I had sentthe inquiry to Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to stopsupplies coming from there to Lee. I asked at once that Sigel might berelieved, and some one else put in his place. Hunter's name wassuggested, and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler reportedhim driven from Drury's Bluff, but still in possession of the Petersburgroad. Banks had been defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put inhis place. This change of commander was not on my suggestion. All thisnews was very discouraging. All of it must have been known by the enemybefore it was by me. In fact, the good news (for the enemy) must havebeen known to him at the moment I thought he was in despair, and hisanguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposeddiscomfiture, But this was no time for repining. I immediately gaveorders for a movement by the left flank, on towards Richmond, tocommence on the night of the 19th. I also asked Halleck to secure thecooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies fromFredericksburg to Port Royal, on the Rappahannock. 

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, except six thousandraw troops under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. Theyhad not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but were on ourright. This corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready tomove in any direction. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved Ewell's corps about fiveo'clock in the afternoon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us inthat quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, and had beenhalted on the road to the right of our line, near Kitching's brigade ofWarren's corps. Tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and theymaintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy ofveterans. 

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier todo it without waiting to make dispositions. Birney was thrown toTyler's right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a reserve; andEwell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. 

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank and in his rear, to cuthim off from his intrenchments. But his efforts were so feeble thatunder the cover of night Ewell got back with only the loss of a fewhundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. The army beingengaged until after dark, I rescinded the order for the march by ourleft flank that night. 

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, Inaturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. Thewithdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered one road fromSpottsylvania to Fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by GeneralFerrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Ferrero was therefore promptlynotified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south andbe prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat todo so towards Fredericksburg. The enemy did detach as expected, andcaptured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. 

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past fewdays, Lee could be reinforced largely, and I had no doubt he would be. Beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard theConfederate capital when it was in danger. Butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed inNorth Carolina; and Sigel's troops having gone back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. 

The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had moreartillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. Itoccupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringingup forage. Artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. Beforeleaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back to the defences ofWashington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses andcaissons. This relieved the roads over which we were to march of morethan two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery thancould be advantageously used. In fact, before reaching the James RiverI again reduced the artillery with the army largely. 

I believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road toRichmond, and at a distance from the main army, Lee would endeavor toattack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in whichcase the main army could follow Lee up and attack him before he had timeto intrench. So I issued the following orders:

NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. , VA. , May 18, 1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

Before daylight to-morrow morning I propose to draw Hancock and Burnsidefrom the position they now hold, and put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and Burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemyas they can get without a general engagement, or with a generalengagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, andintrench. Hancock should march and take up a position as if in supportof the two left corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, hewill be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as canbe given to him, to get as far towards Richmond on the line of theFredericksburg Railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whateverforce he can find him. If the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, andattacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. 

Suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplusartillery to conform to this movement. 

U. S. GRANT. 

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orderswere renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. 

CHAPTER LIV. 

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK--BATTLE OF NORTH ANNA--AN INCIDENT OF THEMARCH--MOVING ON RICHMOND--SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY--POSITION OF THENATIONAL ARMY. 

We were now to operate in a different country from any we had beforeseen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country wellcultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the blackman having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and wehad neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or wherethey led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous dutyof supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring theywere enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that directionwhich would not separate the army too widely. 

Hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney's Station, onthe Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green andMilford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met adetachment of Pickett's division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warrenfollowed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney's Station thatnight without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained atSpottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and tohold Lee, if possible, while Hancock and Warren should get start enoughto interpose between him and Richmond. 

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either byattacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the TelegraphRoad and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself ofeither opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; butmoved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keepingbetween his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again hadsuch an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. 

The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed byWright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but findingStanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east tothe road taken by Hancock and Warren without an attempt to dislodge theenemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at Guiney's Station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock. There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's corps as they movedout of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably wasonly to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon therear of the Confederates. 

By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously forseveral days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. Theywere, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren waspushed to Harris's Store, directly west of Milford, and connected withit by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright'scorps was still back at Guiney's Station. 

I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the nextday:

NEW BETHEL, VA. , May 22, 1864

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march atfive A. M. To-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalryand infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads toBeaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roadsreaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can befound. 

The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will bedirected to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only showstwo roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use ofplantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to giveone for each corps. 

The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. Thetrains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station. 

Headquarters will follow the 9th corps. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to Jericho Ford, Wright'sfollowing. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and byfive o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enoughtroops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artilleryand the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almostperpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next tothe river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee wasfound intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill'scorps was sent against Warren's right before it had got in position. Abrigade of Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, butassistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trencheswith heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisonersleft in our hands. By night Wright's corps was up ready to reinforceWarren. 

On the 23d Hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spansthe North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroadcrosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found thebridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hancock senttwo brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, and whenproperly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carriedquickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shovedinto the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundredprisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hancock did notcross until next morning. 

Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between thosedescribed above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midwaybetween Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival wastoo late to cross that night. 

On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the riverwithout opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad inrear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright'scorps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to theright of Warren's corps, extending south of the Virginia CentralRailroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear(west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating themover the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside's corpscould not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre onthe river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line makingan acute angle where it overlooked the river. 

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's line was accuratelyknown, I directed Hancock and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Fordby the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong tojustify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford andJericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, andto send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was crossed by thisnewly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect withCrawford's left. Potter joined Hancock by way of the wooden bridge. Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill's corps on hiscrossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren's corps hewas no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the northside. 

Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines coveredhis front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but asingle division. To get from one wing to the other the river would haveto be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from allpoints of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of itwherever he might choose to assault. We were, for the time, practicallytwo armies besieging. 

Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About thistime the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or werecoming in. Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke fromNorth Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there: inall probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attemptto drive us from the field. 

On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying thatSherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancinginto Georgia. 

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waitingfor Burnside's corps to pass. Meade and his staff, besides my ownstaff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and anelderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hatpolitely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had neverseen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly ladyspoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more. " "Where?" saidBurnside. "In Richmond. " Prisoners, of course, was understood. 

I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the youngerlady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I supposeit was the information generally in circulation through the South) wasthat Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized conditionand that in the South-west our troops were but little better thanprisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof thata part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my newsfrom Sherman was true. I assured her that there was no doubt about it. I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troopsshould have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was inhiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But Ipresume he was in the Confederate army. 

On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relievedSigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge toCharlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon thecountry and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. After doingthis he could find his way back to his base, or join me. 

On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond. This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we wereunless Lee would assume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to drawout of our present position and make one more effort to get between himand Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this;but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach theJames River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of thePotomac. 

On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position ofthe two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of themove I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of suppliesshould be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train andguards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies movedaround by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. Thisorder was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should belanded on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joinedthe Army of the Potomac. 

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomacfrom its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy. To accomplish it, I issued the following order:

QUARLES' MILLS, VA. , May 25, 1864. 

MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P. 

Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams andartillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. Send that belonging to General Wright's corps as far on the road toHanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. Send with it Wright's best division or division under his ablestcommander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible theenemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrowafternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch andseize, if they can, Littlepage's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remainon one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry andartillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start thedivision which you withdraw first from Wright's corps to make a forcedmarch to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them forthe same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now withHancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they willbe handy to support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on theirroad to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hancock should hold his commandin readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow itwill leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should getall his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he willhave to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should getpossession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I thinkit would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy'sleft, to-morrow afternoon, also. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved byour right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to give theimpression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's army. 

Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side ofthe river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson's feint. On theafternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and Torbert'scavalry to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords towards Hanover. As soon asit was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving smallguards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to beattempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division ofinfantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossingwas effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey. 

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to HanoverTown. Here Barringer's, formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry wasencountered, but it was speedily driven away. 

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the rear of Burnside's andHancock's corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking upthe pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. 

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest toand north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followedby Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farthernorth, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, andhad to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossedthe Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the restof the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach thecrossing that had been secured for them. 

Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for onthe morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed tonorth side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town. " Thetroops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. 

The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. Thestreams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out intoswamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. Thebanks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult toapproach except where there were roads and bridges. 

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond. There are two roadsleading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing theChickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, thesecond going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few miles out from HanoverTown there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. NewCold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered theroads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roadssouth-east over which we would have to pass to get to the James Riverbelow the Richmond defences. 

On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon allhad crossed except Burnside's corps. This was left on the north sidetemporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line was at once formedextending south from the river, Wright's corps on the right, Hancock'sin the centre, and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if heshould come. 

At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towardsMechanicsville to find Lee's position. At Hawes' Shop, just where themiddle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered theConfederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attackedwith his division, but was unable to move the enemy. In the eveningCuster came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalrydismounting and charging as infantry. This time the assault wassuccessful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But ourtroops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Unionsoldiers had been killed. The position was easily held, because ourinfantry was near. 

On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position ofLee. Wright's corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corpspushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren's corps to the left on the ShadyGrove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance waspushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. Therewas now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridanwas sent to meet it. 

On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopotomoy, where he found the enemystrongly fortified. Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps, and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to theleft of Hancock. Warren moved up near Huntley Corners on the ShadyGrove Church Road. There was some skirmishing along the centre, and inthe evening Early attacked Warren with some vigor, driving him back atfirst, and threatening to turn our left flank. As the best means ofreinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered to attack in his front. Hecarried and held the rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got hismen up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than a mile. 

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the pontoons in Washingtonto be sent to City Point. 

In the evening news was received of the arrival of Smith with his corpsat White House. I notified Meade, in writing, as follows:

NEAR HAWES' SHOP, VA. , 6. 40 P. M. , May 30, 1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P. 

General Smith will debark his force at the White House tonight and startup the south bank of the Pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 A. M. In the morning. It is not improbable that the enemy, being aware ofSmith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for thepurpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get backbefore we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to be notified to watch theenemy's movements well out towards Cold Harbor, and also on theMechanicsville road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock'sright, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of thelatter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the Totopotomoy ifnecessary. 

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, ifnot a whole brigade, at 5 A. M. In the morning, to communicate with Smithand to return with him. I will send orders for Smith by the messengeryou send to Sheridan with his orders. 

U. S. GRANT. 

I also notified Smith of his danger, and the precautions that would betaken to protect him. 

The night of the 30th Lee's position was substantially from Atlee'sStation on the Virginia Central Railroad south and east to the vicinityof Cold Harbor. Ours was: The left of Warren's corps was on the ShadyGrove Road, extending to the Mechanicsville Road and about three milessouth of the Totopotomoy. Burnside to his right, then Hancock, andWright on the extreme right, extending towards Hanover Court House, sixmiles south-east of it. Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry waswatching our left front towards Cold Harbor. Wilson with his divisionon our right was sent to get on the Virginia Central Railroad anddestroy it as far back as possible. He got possession of Hanover CourtHouse the next day after a skirmish with Young's cavalry brigade. Theenemy attacked Sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up andthe attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distancetowards Cold Harbor. 

CHAPTER LV. 

ADVANCE ON COLD HARBOR--AN ANECDOTE OF THE WAR--BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR--CORRESPONDENCE WITH LEE--RETROSPECTIVE. 

On the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old Cold Harbor. He found itintrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight ensuedbut the place was carried. The enemy well knew the importance of ColdHarbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. Hereturned with such a large force that Sheridan was about withdrawingwithout making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about thetime he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place atall hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. He speedilyturned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men inposition for defence. Night came on before the enemy was ready forassault. 

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly toCold Harbor passing by the rear of the army. It was expected to arriveby daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, sothat it was nine o'clock the 1st of June before it reached itsdestination. Before the arrival of Wright the enemy had made twoassaults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to theenemy. Wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on ColdHarbor. 

Smith, who was coming up from White House, was also directed to marchdirectly to Cold Harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the1st of June; but by some blunder the order which reached Smith directedhim to Newcastle instead of Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith didnot reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and thenwith tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. He landedtwelve thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, but a divisionwas left at White House temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranksin their long march. 

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our right, after dark on the31st, the two lines, Federal and Confederate, were so close together atthat point that either side could detect directly any movement made bythe other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left his front, Leeevidently divined that he had gone to our left. At all events, soonafter light on the 1st of June Anderson, who commanded the corps onLee's left, was seen moving along Warren's front. Warren was ordered toattack him vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to move outand get on his front. Warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lostso much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clockhe reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besideshis lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. Heseemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselveswhile their defenders are fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitredsome distance to his front: but the enemy finding Old Cold Harboralready taken had halted and fortified some distance west. 

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith were ready to make anassault. In front of both the ground was clear for several hundredyards and then became wooded. Both charged across this open space andinto the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of theenemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. 

While this was going on, the enemy charged Warren three separate timeswith vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. There was no officermore capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than Warren when the enemyforced him to it. There was also an attack upon Hancock's andBurnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably onlyintended to relieve Anderson who was being pressed by Wright and Smith. 

During the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view ofdispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but withouteffecting their object. 

Hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered tothe left of Wright. I expected to take the offensive on the morning ofthe 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive andthe roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column onlyreached Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7. 30 A. M. Preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not takeplace until the next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the left toconnect with Smith: Hancock's corps was got into position to the leftof Wright's, and Burnside was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. WhileWarren and Burnside were making these changes the enemy came out severaltimes and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. Theattacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. Iwas so annoyed at this that I directed Meade to instruct his corpscommanders that they should seize all such opportunities when theyoccurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made forthe very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. 

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon the Virginia CentralRailroad, having damaged it considerably. But, like ourselves, therebels had become experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, in hismemoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to Atlanta that wellillustrates this point. The rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burnbridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted athearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge hadbeen burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. One of them said, "No use, boys, Old Sherman carries duplicate tunnelswith him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; bettersave your powder. "

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the Chickahominy, tofind crossings and the condition of the roads. He reported favorably. 

During the night Lee moved his left up to make his line correspond toours. His lines extended now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor. Mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor to the Chickahominy, with adivision of cavalry guarding our right. An assault was ordered for the3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, Wright and Smith; butWarren and Burnside were to support it by threatening Lee's left, and toattack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce morethreatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorableopportunity should present itself. 

The corps commanders were to select the points in their respectivefronts where they would make their assaults. The move was to commenceat half-past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow and Gibbonforward at the appointed hour, with Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushedforward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery andmusketry, through thickets and swamps. Notwithstanding all theresistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, hecarried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line wherethe road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter fortroops as if it had been made for that purpose. Three pieces ofartillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. Theguns were immediately turned against the men who had just been usingthem. No (*33) assistance coming to him, he (Barlow) intrenched underfire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon was not so fortunate inhis front. He found the ground over which he had to pass cut up withdeep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his men struggled onuntil some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, andhere he intrenched and held fast. 

Wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits intheir front, but accomplished nothing more. Smith's corps also gainedthe outer rifle-pits in its front. The ground over which this corps(18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges weremade. An open plain intervened between the contending forces at thispoint, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deepto protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put Martindale's division in it, and with Brooks supporting him on theleft and Devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probablypicket--rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also advanced and gainedground--which brought the whole army on one line. 

This assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate:but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to inducehim to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the battle of theWilderness did Lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behindhim. 

Fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. Ateleven o'clock I started to visit all the corps commanders to see formyself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of thepracticability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. 

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong tomake any further assault promise success. Wright thought he could gainthe lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation ofHancock's and Smith's corps. Smith thought a lodgment possible, but wasnot sanguine: Burnside thought something could be done in his front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that alloffensive action should cease. 

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864. -12. 30 P. M. MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P. 

The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case anassault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance forthe present. Hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right ifpracticable. 

Reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances madeto advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expeditionunder General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the armynow with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To dothis effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of theintrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there. 

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy shouldbreak through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resistan assault. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

The remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we nowheld. By night we were as strong against Lee as he was against us. 

During the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some oftheir wounded, and without burying their dead. These we were able tocare for. But there were many dead and wounded men between the lines ofthe contending forces, which were now close together, who could not becared for without a cessation of hostilities. 

So I wrote the following:

COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 5, 1864. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Confederate Army. 

It is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of botharmies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupiedrespectively by the two armies. Humanity would dictate that someprovision should be made to provide against such hardships. I wouldpropose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, eitherparty be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmishlines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. Any other method, equallyfair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired willbe accepted by me. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead tomisunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wishedto remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. I answeredthis immediately by saying:

COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 6, 1864. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va. 

Your communication of yesterday's date is received. I will sendimmediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between thelines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed todo the same. I propose that the time for doing this be between thehours of 12 M. And 3 P. M. To-day. I will direct all parties going outto bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have deador wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the deadand removal of the wounded in the way I proposed, but when either partydesired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and hehad directed that any parties I may have sent out, as mentioned in myletter, to be turned back. I answered:

COLD HARBOR, VA, June 6, 1864. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE. Commanding Army, N. Va. 

The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilitiesfor sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. Permit me to saythat the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, andthe same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish tosend out on the same duty without further application. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondencebrought it to the 7th of June--forty-eight hours after it commenced--before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. In the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. And I wrote toLee:

COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 7, 1864. 10. 30 A. M. 

GEN. R. E. LEE, Commanding Army of N. Va. 

I regret that your note of seven P. M. Yesterday should have beenreceived at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead andwounded had expired; 10. 45 P. M. Was the hour at which it was received atcorps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached myheadquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood by the troops ofthis army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose ofcollecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. Two officersand six men of the 8th and 25th North Carolina Regts. , who were out insearch of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, werecaptured and brought into our lines, owing to this want ofunderstanding. I regret this, but will state that as soon as I learnedthe fact, I directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but mustbe returned to their commands. These officers and men having beencarelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determinedwhether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they willbe sent by some other route. 

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of woundedmen left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, I remain, &c. , U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was evermade. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained tocompensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantagesother than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that, the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired awholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualitiesgenerally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted to fightthem "one Confederate to five Yanks. " Indeed, they seemed to have givenup any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the openfield. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to theArmy of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopestemporarily; but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army ofthe Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared. 

There was more justification for the assault at Vicksburg. We were in aSouthern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. The Army of theTennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison ofVicksburg in the three preceding weeks. They had driven a portion ofthat army from Port Gibson with considerable loss, after having flankedthem out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They had attacked anotherportion of the same army at Raymond, more than fifty miles farther inthe interior of the State, and driven them back into Jackson with greatloss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large andsmall arms: they had captured the capital of the State of Mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. Only a fewdays before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town firstat Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, inflicting upon hima loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off fromreturning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The Army of theTennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonistunder any circumstances. There was no telling how long a regular siegemight last. As I have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season ina Southern climate. There was no telling what the casualties might beamong Northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surfacewater filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. IfVicksburg could have been carried in May, it would not only have savedthe army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets ofthe enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped andofficered, to operate elsewhere with. These are reasons justifying theassault. The only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for sogreat a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenchesafter that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. Had the assaultnot been made, I have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in thesiege of Vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it wouldhave proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. 

CHAPTER LVI. 

LEFT FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES--GENERAL LEE--VISIT TO BUTLER--THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG--THE INVESTMENT OFPETERSBURG. 

Lee's position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps ofthe Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in theface of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank movecarry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. (*34)Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardousone to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavilytimbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east ofLee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads totravel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervenedbetween me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with boththe James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army ofthe Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards fromthe enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over theChickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him beforethe army with me could come to his relief. Then too he might sparetroops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunitionfurther than what he carried with him. 

But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing mydanger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the JamesRiver and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safetywould be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederategovernment, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took allthe precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers. 

Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and tobreak up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35). Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley thatSheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, andthe regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. Of all the supplies for theArmy of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridangot off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advanceto Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place onthe 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed. On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnsideon our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birneyreturned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy, and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to sendtwo divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream toBottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones'sBridge. 

On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who hadbeen in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from thestart--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad andput it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point. 

On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bankoverlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. 

On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troopsarriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, toreport to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send allreinforcements to City Point. 

On the 11th I wrote:

COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 11, 1864. 

MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. And N. C. 

The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James Riverwill commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your positionsecure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of hisforce against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river weshould reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable toreach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock hasnot yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as Iwould wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short inwhich to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goesto the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leaveits position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, aspossible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where itshould reach by ten A. M. The following morning. This corps numbers now15, 300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; theselatter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. Theremainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and atJones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing belowCity Point. 

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army shouldbe sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, butsuppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith willalso reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond. 

The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unlessdetained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strongenough. 

I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineerand your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of allthe means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If thereis a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, haveit laid. 

Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem itpracticable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, youmay prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your presentlines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree ofconfidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops shouldtake nothing with them except what they can carry, depending uponsupplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent shouldnot succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

P. S. --On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House. The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter toenable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty ofnavigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided. 

U. S. GRANT. 

COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 11, 1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose ofascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march thearmy has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that allpreparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waitinglonger. 

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18thcorps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons andartillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing orFerry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest untilthey reach the latter point. 

The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long BridgeRoad to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy. 

The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, oneof them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After thecrossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reachabout Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes noopposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage ofthe balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps whichcrosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should bekept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or madelower down than Jones's they should take it. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

P. S. --In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and theuncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, thedirection of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They shouldbe directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loadedwithout waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to gotogether. 

U. S. GRANT. 

About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This, with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was nodoubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with twodivisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee'scommunications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent afterSheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley. Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which todraw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour intoRichmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reignedthere. 

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not tostop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. 

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossingby wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving theirhorses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge wasspeedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passedand pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance thatmight be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and bythe morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followedWarren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright. Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by WindowShades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. 

It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These mightrun down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could besunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loadedsome vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channelin an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as highup the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by theenemy. 

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out andjoined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the armypassed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in theirfront. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles CityCourt House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were onthe Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and thecavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge wasalready at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding theengineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. 

When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of Maywhen it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116, 000 men. During the progress of the campaign about 40, 000 reinforcements werereceived. At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the armynumbered about 115, 000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to acampaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, aboutone-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men weredischarged by reason of the expiration of their term of service. * Inestimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissionedofficer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick infield hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. Operatingin an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not onlyto guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roadsleading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a countryunknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roadsaccurately. 

The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns ofthe artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. Generally thelatter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any onefield. Officers and details of enlisted men are not included. In theNorthern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connectedwith the army and drawing pay. 

Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had not less than 80, 000 menat the start. His reinforcements were about equal to ours during thecampaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. He was onthe defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, everyobstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence wasfamiliar to him and his army. The citizens were all friendly to him andhis cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of ourevery move. Rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always arailroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. Allcircumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. 

General Lee, who had led the Army of Northern Virginia in all thesecontests, was a very highly estimated man in the Confederate army andStates, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of thepeople and press of the Northern States. His praise was soundedthroughout the entire North after every action he was engaged in: thenumber of his forces was always lowered and that of the National forcesexaggerated. He was a large, austere man, and I judge difficult ofapproach to his subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of theSouth after every engagement, and by a portion of the press North withequal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of histroops and to make him feared by his antagonists. It was not anuncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from Eastern officers, "Well, Grant has never met Bobby Lee yet. " There were good and trueofficers who believe now that the Army of Northern Virginia was superiorto the Army of the Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except asthe advantages spoken of above made them so. Before the end I believethe difference was the other way. The Army of Northern Virginia becamedespondent and saw the end. It did not please them. The National armysaw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. 

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached the James on the 14th ofJune. Preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoonbridges and crossing the river. As already stated, I had previouslyordered General Butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carriedup the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where thechannel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage andprevent Confederate gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had hadthese boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk beforemy arrival. I ordered this done, and also directed that he should turnover all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used inferrying the troops across. 

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to Bermuda Hundred to seeGeneral Butler for the purpose of directing a movement againstPetersburg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac were crossing. 

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Harbor by the way of WhiteHouse, thence on steamers to City Point for the purpose of givingGeneral Butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. General Butler was ordered to send Smith with his troops reinforced, asfar as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the Army ofthe James. He gave Smith about six thousand reinforcements, includingsome twenty-five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty-fivehundred colored infantry under Hinks. 

The distance which Smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines wasabout six miles, and the Confederate advance line of works was but twomiles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move under cover of night, upclose to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could afterdaylight. I believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg couldhave been easily captured at that time. It only had about 2, 500 men inthe defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens andemployees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. Smithstarted as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel forceintrenched between City Point and their lines outside of Petersburg. This position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was somuch delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off fromthere. While there I informed General Butler that Hancock's corps wouldcross the river and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case thelatter was successful, and that I could reinforce there more rapidlythan Lee could reinforce from his position. 

I returned down the river to where the troops of the Army of the Potomacnow were, communicated to General Meade, in writing, the directions Ihad given to General Butler and directed him (Meade) to cross Hancock'scorps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning toPetersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until theycould hear from Smith. I also informed General Meade that I had orderedrations from Bermuda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired him toissue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutelynecessary. The rations did not reach him, however, and Hancock, whilehe got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past tenin the hope of receiving them. He then moved without them, and on theroad received a note from General W. F. Smith, asking him to come on. This seems to be the first information that General Hancock had receivedof the fact that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything particularwas expected of him. Otherwise he would have been there by four o'clockin the afternoon. 

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening inreconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. The enemy's lineconsisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pitsconnecting them. To the east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattoxback, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance ofseveral miles, probably three. If they had been properly manned theycould have held out against any force that could have attacked them, atleast until reinforcements could have got up from the north of Richmond. 

Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. By nineo'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, ofcourse, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them containedartillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came up and proposed totake any part assigned to him; and Smith asked him to relieve his menwho were in the trenches. 

Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in command, and capturedanother redan. Meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps onaccount of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received atGettysburg. During the day Meade assaulted and carried one more redanto his right and two to his left. In all this we lost very heavily. The works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them whichfell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in theeffort to repel these assaults. 

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded south of Richmond, hadreceived no reinforcements, except Hoke's division from Drury'sBluff, (*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he hadurged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. 

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; andat night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupiedin the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured byPotter during the day. During the night, however, Beauregard fell backto the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifyingit. Our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of theenemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. 

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the 20th Maine, was wounded on the 18th. He was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been inthe habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previouslybeen engaged. He had several times been recommended for abrigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On thisoccasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy ofmy order to the War Department, asking that my act might be confirmedand Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for confirmation without anydelay. This was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officerreceived partial justice at the hands of his government, which he hadserved so faithfully and so well. 

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have beenupon the ground around Petersburg as early as four o'clock in theafternoon of the 15th. The days were long and it would have given himconsiderable time before night. I do not think there is any doubt thatPetersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, atleast, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have beenestablished very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. This would have given us control of both the Weldon and South Siderailroads. This would also have saved an immense amount of hardfighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would havegiven us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. 

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of therest which they had so long needed. They remained quiet, except thatthere was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when GeneralMeade ordered an advance towards the Weldon Railroad. We were veryanxious to get to that road, and even round to the South Side Railroadif possible. 

Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded by Birney, to the left, witha view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his ownline. General Wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farthersouth, to march directly for the Weldon road. The enemy passed inbetween these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very seriousresults to the National troops, who were then withdrawn from theiradvanced position. 

The Army of the Potomac was given the investment of Petersburg, whilethe Army of the James held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground wepossessed north of the James River. The 9th corps, Burnside's, wasplaced upon the right at Petersburg; the 5th, Warren's, next; the 2d, Birney's, next; then the 6th, Wright's, broken off to the left andsouth. Thus began the siege of Petersburg. 

CHAPTER LVII. 

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD--RAID ON THE WELDON RAILROAD--EARLY 'S MOVEMENT UPON WASHINGTON--MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG--EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE PETERSBURG--CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAHVALLEY--CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD. 

On the 7th of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had as already indicatedsent Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as hecould of the Virginia Central Railroad. General Hunter had beenoperating up the Shenandoah Valley with some success, having fought abattle near Staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besideskilling and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed ajunction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from theKanawha, or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that GeneralHunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridancould get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. 

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet himabout Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of thePotomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, startedBreckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan'sgoing with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions ofcavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's. 

Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, andlearned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the samestream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get toTrevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On thenight of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east ofTrevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Stationand Hampton but a few miles away. 

During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, nodoubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by acounter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the twodivisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, sothat at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself atthe same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in someconfusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killedand wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners andsent them to City Point. 

During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, andthe following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. Therewas considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work ofdestruction went on. In the meantime, at night, the enemy had takenpossession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to gonorth when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some ofthe prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was aboutLynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on toCharlottesville with a view to meet him. 

Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his waynorth and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House, and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of foragefor his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He hadbeen obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospitalwhich he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell intothe hands of the enemy. 

White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troopswere all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store ofsupplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which hedid on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon trainwith him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month, and Sheridan ready to follow. 

In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroythe Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hamptonfree to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position becameprecarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over theriver to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damagedone was soon repaired. 

After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until latein July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening theintrenchments and making our position generally more secure against asudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of mycommand, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as Icould have wished. 

General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the ShenandoahValley immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5thof June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junctionwith Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct onLynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Upto this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty oftaking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, througha hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. Thedestruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been verygreat. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sentEarly with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to awant of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route forhis return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence upthe Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore andOhio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement. Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in thatquarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of thiscondition of affairs and moved on Washington. 

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters atBaltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. Hissurplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small innumber. Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior toour veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but thesituation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved withcommendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He couldhardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple anddelay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation forhis reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send adivision to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences ofWashington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding thatWallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediatelytook the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division. They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; butthey succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle tookplace. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital ofthe Nation, arriving before it on the 11th. 

Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade toalso order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington forthe relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day thatEarly arrived before it. The 19th corps, which had been stationed inLouisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies aboutRichmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their wayto join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which placethey reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The 19thcorps was commanded by Major-General Emory. 

Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the followingmorning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat, Wright following. There is no telling how much this result wascontributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well beconsidered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlierhe might have entered the capital before the arrival of thereinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battleamounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the causethan often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to renderby means of a victory. 

Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time before, Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippiand handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut theroads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantlyable to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of hismilitary division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was myplace to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Twodivisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana somemonths before. Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attackForrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed thatSmith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by allmeans his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman hadanticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it. 

On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine fromabout the centre of his front under the Confederate works confrontinghim. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of thePennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted thescheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means ofkeeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carryingon this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow itscompletion. The position of the two lines at that point were only abouta hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. Inthe bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position wasunfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point wasre-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both tothe right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back ofthe Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumablethat the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished readyfor charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we wereready for it. 

On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there wasgreat consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make anattack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that hemight detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman wasoperating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the armycommanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was notmade. 

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way ofoffensive movement myself, having in view something of the same objectthat Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, andwith this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared sometroops from the defences to send West. I had other objects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed andready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carryPetersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many ofLee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible. Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corpsand Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom, where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was tolet the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Armyof the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could ofthe Virginia Central Railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry wasto move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat backwhen they should have got through with their work. We were successfulin drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the James as Iexpected. The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the30th of July was the time fixed for its explosion. I gave Meade minuteorders (*38) on the 24th directing how I wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance ofthe troops that were to be engaged. 

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved most heartily, wereall that I can see now was necessary. The only further precaution whichhe could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been tohave different men to execute them. 

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where itentered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running undertheir lines. Eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powdereach to charge them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed; and onthe 29th Hancock and Sheridan were brought back near the James Riverwith their troops. Under cover of night they started to recross thebridge at Deep Bottom, and to march directly for that part of our linesin front of the mine. 

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number ofmen and concentrate the balance on the right next to Burnside's corps, while Ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under Meade, wasto form in the rear of Burnside to support him when he went in. Allwere to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as toleave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the momentthe mine had been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. Burnside'scorps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of thehill, supported on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps. 

Warren and Ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as makingready was concerned. Burnside seemed to have paid no attention whateverto the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front forhis troops to get over in the best way they could. The four divisionsof his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie andFerrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it tomake the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then tookLedlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. Infact, Potter and Willcox were the only division commanders Burnside hadwho were equal to the occasion. Ledlie besides being otherwiseinefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common amongsoldiers. 

There was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did notgo off until about five o'clock in the morning. When it did explode itwas very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something likea hundred feet in length. Instantly one hundred and ten cannon andfifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positionscovering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were toenter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. Ledlie's division marchedinto the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the menstopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; theircommander having found some safe retreat to get into before theystarted. There was some delay on the left and right in advancing, butsome of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carryingthe rifle-pits as I expected they would do. 

There had been great consternation in Petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. They knew we weremining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, thoughBeauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments tothe rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see thatour men were at work. We had learned through deserters who had come inthat the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on ourside. They said that we had undermined the whole of Petersburg; thatthey were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at whatmoment they might expect an eruption. I somewhat based my calculationsupon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was explodedthe troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and thatour troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthenthemselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the truesituation. It was just as I expected it would be. We could see the menrunning without any apparent object except to get away. It was half anhour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon ourmen in the crater. It was an hour before the enemy got artillery up toplay upon them; and it was nine o'clock before Lee got up reinforcementsfrom his right to join in expelling our troops. 

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us about four thousandmen, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the partof the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commanderwho was sent to lead the assault. 

After being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding thatmost of that part of Lee's army which had been drawn north of the JamesRiver were still there, I gave Meade directions to send a corps ofinfantry and the cavalry next morning, before Lee could get his forcesback, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon Railroad. Butmisfortunes never come singly. I learned during that same afternoonthat Wright's pursuit of Early was feeble because of the constant andcontrary orders he had been receiving from Washington, while I was cutoff from immediate communication by reason of our cable acrossChesapeake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not aware of the factthat Wright was not pursuing until he had reached Strasburg. Findingthat he was not pursued he turned back to Winchester, where Crook wasstationed with a small force, and drove him out. He then pushed northuntil he had reached the Potomac, then he sent McCausland across toChambersburg, Pa. , to destroy that town. Chambersburg was a purelydefenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yetMcCausland, under Early's orders, burned the place and left about threehundred families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of July. Irescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the WeldonRailroad, and directed them to embark for Washington City. Afterburning Chambersburg McCausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley anddriven into Virginia. 

The Shenandoah Valley was very important to the Confederates, because itwas the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies aboutRichmond. It was well known that they would make a desperate struggleto maintain it. It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to usheretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of theincompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because ofinterference from Washington. 

It seemed to be the policy of General Halleck and Secretary Stanton tokeep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving rightand left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generallyspeaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of thewhereabouts of the enemy was lost. They were left, therefore, free tosupply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as theycould carry away from Western Maryland and Pennsylvania. I determinedto put a stop to this. I started Sheridan at once for that field ofoperation, and on the following day sent another division of hiscavalry. 

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned to that command, butMr. Stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for soimportant a command. On the 1st of August when I sent reinforcementsfor the protection of Washington, I sent the following orders:

CITY POINT, VA. , August 1, 1864, 11. 30 A. M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington D. C. 

I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy isbeing expelled from the border. Unless General Hunter is in the fieldin person, I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in thefield, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and followhim to the death. Wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. Oncestarted up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possessionof the Virginia Central Railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give Sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. Allthe cavalry, I presume, will reach Washington in the course ofto-morrow. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

The President in some way or other got to see this dispatch of minedirecting certain instructions to be given to the commanders in thefield, operating against Early, and sent me the following verycharacteristic dispatch:

OFFICE U. S. MILITARY TELEGRAPH, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. , August 3, 1864. 

Cypher. 6 P. M. , LT. GENERAL GRANT, City Point, Va. 

I have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put incommand of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himselfsouth of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemygoes, let our troops go also. " This, I think, is exactly right, as tohow our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you mayhave received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of"putting our army south of the enemy, " or of "following him to thedeath" in any direction. I repeat to you it will neither be done norattempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. 

A. LINCOLN. 

I replied to this that "I would start in two hours for Washington, " andsoon got off, going directly to the Monocacy without stopping atWashington on my way. I found General Hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the Monocacy, with manyhundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore and OhioRailroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect atthat point. I asked the general where the enemy was. He replied thathe did not know. He said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed withorders from Washington moving him first to the right and then to theleft that he had lost all trace of the enemy. 

I then told the general that I would find out where the enemy was, andat once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions topush for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's Ferry, in theShenandoah Valley. The cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, butall the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in thatway. I knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a veryshort time be found in front of our troops moving south. 

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions. (*39) I told him thatSheridan was in Washington, and still another division was on its way;and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department atany point that would suit him best, Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, and give Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The generalreplied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. Hesaid that General Halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for theposition he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. Hedid not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing apatriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not manymajor-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of adepartment taken from them on the supposition that for some particularreason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. Itold him, "very well then, " and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to cometo the Monocacy, and suggested that I would wait and meet him there. 

Sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after thetroops were all off. I went to the station and remained there until hearrived. Myself and one or two of my staff were about all the Unionpeople, except General Hunter and his staff, who were left at theMonocacy when Sheridan arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had beendone and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, thewritten instructions which had been prepared for General Hunter anddirected to that officer. 

Sheridan now had about 30, 000 men to move with, 8, 000 of them beingcavalry. Early had about the same number, but the superior ability ofthe National commander over the Confederate commander was so great thatall the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more thancounterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had predicted, Early wassoon found in front of Sheridan in the valley, and Pennsylvania andMaryland were speedily freed from the invaders. The importance of thevalley was so great to the Confederates that Lee reinforced Early, butnot to the extent that we thought and feared he would. 

To prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent outfrom Richmond, I had to do something to compel Lee to retain his forcesabout his capital. I therefore gave orders for another move to thenorth side of the James River, to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under Birney, and Gregg's division of cavalrywere crossed to the north side of the James during the night of the13th-14th of August. A threatening position was maintained for a numberof days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hardfighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anythinglike a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should presentthemselves which would insure great success. General Meade was left incommand of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly intrenched; andwas instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, andhimself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through aneffort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. There wasno particular victory gained on either side; but during that time nomore reinforcements were sent to the valley. 

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcementsbeing sent from Richmond against him, and also that the efforts we hadmade had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone tothe valley was still at Richmond, because we had captured six or sevenhundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades havingcontributed to our list of captures. I also informed him that but onedivision had gone, and it was possible that I should be able to preventthe going of any more. 

To add to my embarrassment at this time Sherman, who was now nearAtlanta, wanted reinforcements. He was perfectly willing to take theraw troops then being raised in the North-west, saying that he couldteach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they wouldlearn in a week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked that alltroops in camps of instruction in the North-west be sent to him. Sherman also wanted to be assured that no Eastern troops were moving outagainst him. I informed him of what I had done and assured him that Iwould hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, andthat up to that time none had gone. I also informed him that his realdanger was from Kirby Smith, who commanded the trans-MississippiDepartment. If Smith should escape Steele, and get across theMississippi River, he might move against him. I had, therefore, askedto have an expedition ready to move from New Orleans against Mobile incase Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a tendency to drawhim to the defence of that place, instead of going against Sherman. 

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments Halleck informed me thatthere was an organized scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from thefield to put it down. He also advised taking in sail, and not going toofast. 

The troops were withdrawn from the north side of the James River on thenight of the 20th. Before they were withdrawn, however, and while mostof Lee's force was on that side of the river, Warren had been sent withmost of the 5th corps to capture the Weldon Railroad. He took up hisline of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while thetroops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part ofthe line which he had vacated by moving out. From our left, near theold line, it was about three miles to the Weldon Railroad. A divisionwas ordered from the right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the James Riverto take its place. 

This road was very important to the enemy. The limits from which hissupplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and I knewthat he must fight desperately to protect it. Warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. He fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line toconnect with his new one. Lee made repeated attempts to dislodgeWarren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. 

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troopswere sent south to destroy the bridges on the Weldon Railroad; and withsuch success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance ofabout thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from thatsource. It was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up the WeldonRailroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th hemade renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with veryheavy losses to him as compared with ours. 

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the James werewithdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg were sent south to destroy the WeldonRailroad. They were attacked on the 25th at Reams's Station, and afterdesperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces ofartillery. But the Weldon Railroad never went out of our possessionfrom the 18th of August to the close of the war. 

CHAPTER LVIII. 

SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE--VISIT TO SHERIDAN--SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THESHENANDOAH--SHERIDAN'S RIDE TO WINCHESTER--CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOR THEWINTER. 

We had our troops on the Weldon Railroad contending against a largeforce that regarded this road of so much importance that they couldafford to expend many lives in retaking it; Sherman just getting throughto Atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges anddetachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear ofhim; Washington threatened but a short time before, and now Early beingstrengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. Itkept me pretty active in looking after all these points. 

On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced on Early up the ShenandoahValley, Early falling back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Leehad sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and aconsiderable cavalry force to strengthen Early. It was important thatSheridan should be informed of this, so I sent the information toWashington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there toget the message to Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energyand reached Sheridan just in time. The officer went through by way ofSnicker's Gap, escorted by some cavalry. He found Sheridan just makinghis preparations to attack Early in his chosen position. Now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. 

On the 15th of September I started to visit General Sheridan in theShenandoah Valley. My purpose was to have him attack Early, or drivehim out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for Lee'sarmy. I knew it was impossible for me to get orders through Washingtonto Sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and suchorders as Halleck's caution (and that of the Secretary of War) wouldsuggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory tomine. I therefore, without stopping at Washington, went directlythrough to Charlestown, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and waitedthere to see General Sheridan, having sent a courier in advance toinform him where to meet me. 

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a map showing the positionsof his army and that of the enemy. He at once drew one out of his sidepocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. He said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing outhow) against the Confederates, and that he could "whip them. " Beforestarting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I hadbrought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in hisviews and so confident of success, I said nothing about this and did nottake it out of my pocket. 

Sheridan's wagon trains were kept at Harper's Ferry, where all of hisstores were. By keeping the teams at that place, their forage did nothave to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, provisions andrations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver thestores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at Winchester. Knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, wouldhave to bring up wagons trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him if hecould be ready to get off by the following Tuesday. This was on Friday. "O Yes, " he said, he "could be off before daylight on Monday. " I toldhim then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan;and I immediately started to return to the army about Richmond. Aftervisiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jersey, I arrived at City Pointon the 19th. 

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met Mr. Robert Garrett, Presidentof the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He seemed very anxious to know whenworkmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and putit in shape for running. It was a large piece of property to havestanding idle. I told him I could not answer then positively but wouldtry and inform him before a great while. On my return Mr. Garrett metme again with the same and I told him I thought that by the Wednesday hemight send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no furtherinformation however, and he had no suspicion of how I expected to havethe road cleared for his workmen. 

Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. He met Early at thecrossing of Opequon Creek, a most decisive victory--one which thecountry. Early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalshipand made the victory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division eastof the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's Ferry; and about the time Iarrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in theircamps) to march to Martinsburg for the purpose destroying the Baltimoreand Ohio Railroad at that point. Early here learned that I had beenwith Sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, startedback as soon as he got the information. But his forces were separatedand, as I have said, he was very badly defeated. He fell back toFisher's Hill, Sheridan following. 

The valley is narrow at that point, and Early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. But Sheridan turned both his flanksand again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. The pursuit was continued up the valley to Mount Jackson and New Market. Sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. Thehouses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled withEarly's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. Finally, on the 25th, Early turned from the valley eastward, leaving Sheridan atHarrisonburg in undisputed possession. 

Now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. Sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops;and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. What he couldnot take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited tocome back there. I congratulated Sheridan upon his recent great victoryand had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns beingaimed at the enemy around Petersburg. I also notified the othercommanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor ofhis victory. 

I had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid tohave a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us andhave a bad effect on the November elections. The convention which hadmet and made its nomination of the Democratic candidate for thepresidency had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked as boldlyin Chicago at that convention as ever been in Charleston. It was aquestion whether the government would then have had the power to makearrests and punish those who talked treason. But this decisive victorywas the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. 

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him inWashington, and the President became very much frightened about him. Hewas afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of GeneralCass was said to have been, in one of our Indian wars, when he was anofficer of army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely that thefirst thing he knew he found himself in front, and the Indians pursuinghim. The President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the other sideof Early and that Early was in behind him. He was afraid that Sheridanwas getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out fromRichmond to enable Early to beat him. I replied to the President that Ihad taken steps to prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, byattacking the former where he was. 

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his position, I sent Ord withthe 18th corps and Birney with the 10th corps to make an advance onRichmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the left wing up to Chaffin'sBluff; Birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while Kautzwith the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther to the north. Theygot across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprisethe enemy. In that, however, they were unsuccessful. 

The enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. Stannard'sdivision of the 18th corps with General Burnham's brigade leading, triedan assault against Fort Harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and agood many prisoners. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel Stevenswho succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in thesame way. Some works to the right and left were also carried with theguns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. Birney's troopsto the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but wereunsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. 

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing Fort Harrison into thenew line and extending it to the river. This brought us pretty close tothe enemy on the north side of the James, and the two opposing linesmaintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. 

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. Ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolvedupon General Heckman, and later General Weitzel was assigned to thecommand of the 18th corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troopsabout Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort Harrison, by eightadditional brigades from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the workswhich we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. Alltheir efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavyloss. In one of these assaults upon us General Stannard, a gallantofficer who was defending Fort Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualtiesduring these operations amounted to 394 killed, I, 554 wounded and 324missing. 

Whilst this was going on General Meade was instructed to keep up anappearance of moving troops to our extreme left. Parke and Warren werekept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving theirenclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the otherintrenchments. The object of this was to prevent reinforcements fromgoing to the north side of the river. Meade was instructed to watch theenemy closely and, if Lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. 

On the 30th these troops moved out, under Warren, and captured anadvanced intrenched camp at Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to themain line. Our troops followed and made an attack in the hope ofcarrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful andlost a large number of men, mostly captured. The number of killed andwounded was not large. The next day our troops advanced again andestablished themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front ofthe enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the Weldon Railroad veryconsiderably. 

Sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken theproductions of the valley so that instead of going there for suppliesthe enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he againentered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to besent where it could be of more use. I approved of his suggestion, andordered him to send Wright's corps back to the James River. I furtherdirected him to repair the railroad up the Shenandoah Valley towards theadvanced position which we would hold with a small force. The troopswere to be sent to Washington by the way of Culpeper, in order to watchthe east side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting intothe rear of Sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. 

The valley was so very important, however, to the Confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent therefore to Early, and this before any of ourtroops had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike Sheridan atHarrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. 

On the 6th of October Sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattlebefore him, Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned hiscavalry back on that of Early, which, under the lead of Rosser, waspursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven gunsand a large number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about sixty men. His cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. On the 10thof October the march down the valley was again resumed, Early againfollowing. 

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity ifafforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move backagain and cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central Railroad. Butthis order had to go through Washington where it was intercepted; andwhen Sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what I wantedhim to do it was something entirely different. Halleck informedSheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as abase from which to act against Charlottesville and Gordonsville; that heshould fortify this position and provision it. 

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and I was impelled totelegraph him, on the 14th, as follows:

CITY POINT, VA. , October 14, 1864. --12. 30 P. M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va. 

What I want is for you to threaten the Virginia Central Railroad andcanal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourselfready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. If you make theenemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of thosethoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. If you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send hereall the force you can. I deem a good cavalry force necessary for youroffensive, as well as defensive operations. You need not therefore sendhere more than one division of cavalry. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

Sheridan having been summoned to Washington City, started on the 15thleaving Wright in command. His army was then at Cedar Creek, sometwenty miles south of Winchester. The next morning while at FrontRoyal, Sheridan received a dispatch from Wright, saying that a dispatchfrom Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. It directed the latterto be ready to move and to crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the cavalry upthe valley to join Wright. 

On the 18th of October Early was ready to move, and during the nightsucceeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, whichfled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losingeighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. Theright under General Getty maintained a firm and steady front, fallingback to Middletown where it took a position and made a stand. Thecavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to Winchester andheld them for the use of our troops in falling back, General Wrighthaving ordered a retreat back to that place. 

Sheridan having left Washington on the 18th, reached Winchester thatnight. The following morning he started to join his command. He hadscarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic fromthe front and also heard heavy firing to the south. He immediatelyordered the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across the valley tostop the stragglers. Leaving members of his staff to take care ofWinchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escortdirectly for the scene of battle. As he met the fugitives he orderedthem to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. His presence soon restored confidence. Finding themselves worsefrightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. Many of those whohad run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallantsoldiers before night. 

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and Custer still holdingtheir ground firmly between the Confederates and our retreating troops. Everything in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once proceeded tointrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. Thiswas made with vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. By oneo'clock the attack was repulsed. Early was so badly damaged that heseemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrenchhimself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. Hethought, no doubt, that Sheridan would be glad enough to leave himunmolested; but in this he was mistaken. 

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan advanced. He sent hiscavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. Thecontest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. Early tried torally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to giveway very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. Ourcavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the Confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had beenlost in the morning. This victory pretty much closed the campaigning inthe Valley of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent back toRichmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a littlecavalry. Wright's corps was ordered back to the Army of the Potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. Early had lostmore men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than Sheridan hadcommanded from first to last. 

On more than one occasion in these engagements General R. B. Hayes, whosucceeded me as President of the United States, bore a very honorablepart. His conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry aswell as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of merepersonal daring. This might well have been expected of one who couldwrite at the time he is said to have done so: "Any officer fit for dutywho at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat inCongress, ought to be scalped. " Having entered the army as a Major ofVolunteers at the beginning of the war, General Hayes attained bymeritorious service the rank of Brevet Major-General before its close. 

On the north side of the James River the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalryon the 7th of October, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. This wasfollowed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but wasrepulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnoissance was sentout by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some newworks he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. 

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt to get possession of theSouth Side Railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. Theattempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops notgetting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing theimpossibility of its accomplishment I ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. 

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side ofthe James River in order to support this move, by detaining there theConfederate troops who were on that side. He succeeded in this, butfailed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left beforeturning in on the Darby road and by reason of simply coming up againsttheir lines in place. 

This closed active operations around Richmond for the winter. Of coursethere was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battlewas fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It would prolong thiswork to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to dayaround Petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would notinterest the general reader if given. All these details can be found bythe military student in a series of books published by the Scribners, Badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of theWar Department, including both the National and Confederate reports. 

In the latter part of November General Hancock was relieved from thecommand of the 2d corps by the Secretary of War and ordered toWashington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to bedesignated the 1st corps. It was expected that this would give him alarge command to co-operate with in the spring. It was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations Hancock should move either upthe valley, or else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg; the idea beingto make the spring campaign the close of the war. I expected, withSherman coming up from the South, Meade south of Petersburg and aroundRichmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee with depots of suppliesestablished in the eastern part of that State, to move from thedirection of Washington or the valley towards Lynchburg. We would thenhave Lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. 

General Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, wasassigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed Hancock. 

CHAPTER LIX. 

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA--SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA--WAR ANECDOTES--THEMARCH ON SAVANNAH--INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH--CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH. 

Let us now return to the operations in the military division of theMississippi, and accompany Sherman in his march to the sea. 

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy verymaterially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from eastto west. 

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis visited Palmetto andMacon and made speeches at each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20thof September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch as he had relievedJohnston and appointed Hood, and Hood had immediately taken theinitiative, it is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disappointedwith General Johnston's policy. My own judgment is that Johnston actedvery wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory ashe could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. As Sherman advanced, as I have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it indetail. I know that both Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard ofthe change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and notdestitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight theenemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences ofdefeat. 

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor Brown, of Georgia, andGeneral Johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that theirloyalty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far as General Johnstonis concerned, I think Davis did him a great injustice in thisparticular. I had know the general before the war and strongly believedit would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for thepurpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. There, as I have said, I think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued bythe whole South--protract the war, which was all that was necessary toenable them to gain recognition in the end. The North was alreadygrowing weary, as the South evidently was also, but with thisdifference. In the North the people governed, and could stophostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. The South was amilitary camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers toback it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to whatextent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of thesoldiers themselves. Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to thepeople of Georgia and that portion of the South to come to their relief. He tried to assure his frightened hearers that the Yankees were rapidlydigging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cutthem off from supplies from the North; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of ahostile people. Papers containing reports of these speeches immediatelyreached the Northern States, and they were republished. Of course, thatcaused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up withSherman. 

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta he moved to the south-westand was followed by a portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared uponthe railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroyingthe road. At the same time also the work was begun in Tennessee andKentucky which Mr. Davis had assured his hearers at Palmetto and Maconwould take place. He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry generalin the South) north for this purpose; and Forrest and Wheeler carriedout their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking upa garrison. Forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat ofcapturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. Hood's army had been weakened by Governor Brown's withdrawing theGeorgia State troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's cropsfor the use of the people and for the use of the army. This not onlydepleted Hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose ingathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in itssubsequent march. Sherman was obliged to push on with his force and gohimself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearlydemonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would beimpossible to hold the line from Atlanta back and leave him any forcewhatever with which to take the offensive. Had that plan been adheredto, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and Mr. Davis'sprediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, orelse Sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, whichMr. Davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous thanNapoleon's retreat from Moscow. 

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in reaching Sherman. He tookadvantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparationpossible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts tobreak his communications. Something else had to be done: and toSherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawningupon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what thatsomething else should be. 

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA. , Sept. 10, 1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia. 

So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can bemade, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. Wewant to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. If wegive him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Nowthat we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not know but itwill be the best move to transfer Canby's troops to act upon Savannah, whilst you move on Augusta. I should like to hear from you, however, inthis matter. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

Sherman replied promptly:

"If I could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at Augusta, orColumbus, Georgia, I can march to Milledgeville, and compel Hood to giveup Augusta or Macon, and then turn on the other. * * * If you canmanage to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, or theChattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep the whole State ofGeorgia. "

On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with aletter inviting Sherman's views about the next campaign. 

CITY POINT, VA. , Sept. 12, 1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Division of theMississippi. 

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. Colonel Porterwill explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than Ican do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enoughfor offensive operations, I am holding on quietly to get advantage ofrecruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. Mylines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom north of theJames across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, andsouth of the Appomattox to the Weldon Road. This line is very stronglyfortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from itsgreat length takes many in the aggregate. I propose, when I do move, toextend my left so as to control what is known as the South Side, orLynchburg and Petersburg Road, then if possible to keep the DanvilleRoad cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to send a force offrom six to ten thousand men against Wilmington. 

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a large naval fleet will beassembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they didat Mobile. This will give us the same control of the harbor ofWilmington that we now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to dowith the forces at your command, I do not see. The difficulties ofsupplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond whereyou are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price's movements Canbywould have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your commandon the Mississippi an equal number could have been taken. With theseforces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half toMobile and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposedin your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a newbase of supplies. My object now in sending a staff officer is not somuch to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plansmatured by the time everything can be got ready. It will probably bethe 5th of October before any of the plans herein indicated will beexecuted. 

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and Iwill approve them. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

This reached Sherman on September 20th. 

On the 25th of September Sherman reported to Washington that Hood'stroops were in his rear. He had provided against this by sending adivision to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, which was inthe rear of Hood, supposing that Hood would fall back in the directionfrom which he had come to reach the railroad. At the same time Shermanand Hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arrangedbetween hostile commanders in the field. On the 27th of September Itelegraphed Sherman as follows:

CITY POINT, VA. , September 27, 1864--10. 30 A. M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN:

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the Western States tobe sent to Nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * *

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chattanooga, and afterwards toNashville, with another division (Morgan's) of the advanced army. Sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements shouldtake place against Milledgeville and then to Savannah. His expectationat that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up hissupplies. Hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light sothat he could make two miles to Sherman's one. He depended upon thecountry to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. 

As I have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, Mobilehad been looked upon as the objective point of Sherman's army. It hadbeen a favorite move of mine from 1862, when I first suggested to thethen commander-in-chief that the troops in Louisiana, instead offrittering away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should moveagainst Mobile. I recommended this from time to time until I came intocommand of the army, the last of March 1864. Having the power in my ownhands, I now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a moveagainst Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armiesoperating in the field. Before I came into command, these troops hadbeen scattered over the trans-Mississippi department in such a way thatthey could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part inthe original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused Mobileto be selected as the objective point for Sherman's army to find hisnext base of supplies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longerexisted. 

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badlywounded, had to leave the army about the first of October. He was incommand of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. Sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the rightcommanded by General O. O. Howard and the left by General Slocum. General Dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. Howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and Slocum's the 14thand 20th corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. Davis and A. S. Williams. Generals Logan and Blair commanded the two corps composing the rightwing. About this time they left to take part in the presidentialelection, which took place that year, leaving their corps to Osterhausand Ransom. I have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnestsolicitation of the War Department. General Blair got back in time toresume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to thesea and back to the grand review at Washington. General Logan did notreturn to his command until after it reached Savannah. 

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of General Howard fromthat portion of the Army of the Potomac which was then with the WesternArmy, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, with which armyGeneral Logan had served from the battle of Belmont to the fall ofAtlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonelcommanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and armycorps, until upon the death of McPherson the command of the entire Armyof the Tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contestedbattle. He conceived that he had done his full duty as commander inthat engagement; and I can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions whichhe had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to question the motivewhich actuated Sherman in taking an officer from another army tosupersede General Logan. I have no doubt, whatever, that he did thisfor what he considered would be to the good of the service, which wasmore important than that the personal feelings of any individual shouldnot be aggrieved; though I doubt whether he had an officer with him whocould have filled the place as Logan would have done. Differences ofopinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. The officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers underhim, unless he is very manifestly wrong. 

Sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousandeffective men. All weak men had been left to hold the rear, and thoseremaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he hadsixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than anyEuropean soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but themachine thought. European armies know very little what they are fightingfor, and care less. Included in these sixty thousand troops, there weretwo small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousandmen. Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent ofForrest, whose forces were operating in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr. Davis had promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's military planwas admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could havedone, according to my judgment. I say this because I have criticised hismilitary judgment in the removal of Johnston, and also in theappointment of Hood. I am aware, however, that there was high feelingexisting at that time between Davis and his subordinate, whom I regardedas one of his ablest lieutenants. 

On the 5th of October the railroad back from Atlanta was again verybadly broken, Hood having got on the track with his army. Sherman sawafter night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. The defenceof the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not holdpoints between their intrenched positions against Hood's whole army; infact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenchedpositions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located atthem. Allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of menunder the command of General Corse, one of the very able and efficientvolunteer officers produced by the war. He, with a small force, was cutoff from the remainder of the National army and was attacked with greatvigor by many times his own number. Sherman from his high position couldsee the battle raging, with the Confederate troops between him and hissubordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, butthe time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching Corse, would beso great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. Corse wasa man who would never surrender. From a high position some of Sherman'ssignal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the blockhouse at Allatoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot through theface, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of hisdetermination to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this pointprobably, that Sherman first realized that with the forces at hisdisposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the Northwould be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which tooperate offensively beyond Atlanta. He proposed, therefore, to destroythe roads back to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave thelatter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning the railroad, it wasnecessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the roaduntil he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and smallrations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and toreturn to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to movelight and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage onthe field. 

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare forthe contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was movingsouth, by making Thomas strong enough to hold Tennessee and Kentucky. I, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman authorizing him definitelyto move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loosefrom his base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stanley (4th corps) back, and also orderedSchofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve thousand strong, toreport to him. In addition to this, A. J. Smith, who, with twodivisions of Sherman's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in drivingthe enemy from that State, was under orders to return to Thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrivethere long before Hood could reach Nashville. 

In addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised inthe North-west went to Thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. Thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison atChattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons atBridgeport, Stevenson, Decatur, Murfreesboro, and Florence. There werealready with him in Nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and otherdepartments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of Nashville, for its defence. Also, Wilson was there with ten thousand dismountedcavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. Thomas had at thistime about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcementshere above enumerated. These reinforcements gave him altogether aboutseventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the newlevies already spoken of. 

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede Hoodin command, but to take general charge over the entire district in whichHood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. He made the most franticappeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: bysending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march ofthe invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have tocross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. Butit was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroyingsupplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hopedthat his own possessions might escape. 

Hood soon started north, and went into camp near Decatur, Alabama, wherehe remained until the 29th of October, but without making an attack onthe garrison of that place. 

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats, from Muscle Shoals east;and, also, below the second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, withthe troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the riverat any point where Hood might choose to attempt to cross, made itimpossible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place where it wasnavigable. But Muscle Shoals is not navigable, and below them again isanother shoal which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore moveddown to a point nearly opposite Florence, Alabama, crossed over andremained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage andammunition. All of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, withsmall valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced hadlong since been exhausted. On the 1st of November I suggested toSherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroyingHood before he started on his campaign. 

On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved definitely his making hisproposed campaign through Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tendermercy of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sherman fixed the 10thof November as the day of starting. 

Sherman started on that day to get back to Atlanta, and on the 15th thereal march to the sea commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and thecavalry went to Jonesboro, Milledgeville, then the capital of Georgia, being Sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to Savannah. Theleft wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads much farther east thanthose taken by the right wing. Slocum was in command, and threatenedAugusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off andmeet the right wing at Milledgeville. 

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for militarypurposes before starting, Sherman himself remaining over a day tosuperintend the work, and see that it was well done. Sherman's ordersfor this campaign were perfect. Before starting, he had sent back allsick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. His artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carriedwith them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. Small rations weretaken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapidmovement. The army was expected to live on the country, and to alwayskeep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delayof a few days. 

The troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advancealong the line of railroads, which they destroyed. The method adoptedto perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges andculverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track andbend the rails. Soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along oneside of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the railsand, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. Theties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they wereloosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. When asufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would beset on fire. This would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so thatthey would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, toincrease the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end ofthe rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist itaround, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees ofGeorgia. All this work was going on at the same time, there being asufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logsand built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others wouldbend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the lastbit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certainplace, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. 

The organization for supplying the army was very complete. Each brigadefurnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for thecommand to which they belonged. Strict injunctions were issued againstpillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; buteverything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. Thesupplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the sameas if they had been purchased. The captures consisted largely ofcattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, andoccasionally coffee or other small rations. 

The skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers, " incollecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. When they started out in the morning, they were alwayson foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without beingmounted on a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the general useof the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and returnagain in the evening mounted. 

Many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance;indeed, I am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, theromance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little ofthe foundation is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly ofthe fiction added to make the stories better. In one instance it wasreported that a few men of Sherman's army passed a house where theydiscovered some chickens under the dwelling. They immediately proceededto capture them, to add to the army's supplies. The lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of otherparties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. The soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickensagain they were tempted and one of them replied: "The rebellion must besuppressed if it takes the last chicken in the Confederacy, " andproceeded to appropriate the last one. 

Another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. The South, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves whotook refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. Orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. Onone occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of itsmistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made astrong appeal to him to spare it. The soldier replied, "Madam, ourorders are to kill every bloodhound. " "But this is not a bloodhound, "said the lady. "Well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into ifwe leave it behind, " said the soldier as he went off with it. 

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they wouldseem to imply, I do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillagingconsidering that we were in the enemy's territory and without anysupplies except such as the country afforded. 

On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached Milledgeville. The rightwing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards Savannahdestroying the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville remainedover a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc. , before resuming its march. 

The governor, who had been almost defying Mr. Davis before this, nowfled precipitately, as did the legislature of the State and all theState officers. The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry awayeven his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the State tofall into our hands. The only military force that was opposed toSherman's forward march was the Georgia militia, a division under thecommand of General G. W. Smith, and a battalion under Harry Wayne. Neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient toeven retard the progress of Sherman's army. 

The people at the South became so frantic at this time at the successfulinvasion of Georgia that they took the cadets from the military collegeand added them to the ranks of the militia. They even liberated theState convicts under promise from them that they would serve in thearmy. I have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributedto Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by otherSouthern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people ascould be found in every community, North and South--who took advantageof their country being invaded to commit crime. They were in but littledanger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. 

The Southern papers in commenting upon Sherman's movements pictured himas in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men werestarving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost withoutobject, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protectionof our navy. These papers got to the North and had more or less effectupon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal personsparticularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with Sherman. Mr. Lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if Icould give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that wouldcomfort them. I told him there was not the slightest occasion foralarm; that with 60, 000 such men as Sherman had with him, such acommanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. He might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had startedout to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally getto his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he couldreturn North. I heard afterwards of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those whowould inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of Sherman'sarmy, that Sherman was all right: "Grant says they are safe with such ageneral, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they cancrawl back by the hole they went in at. "

While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the State House, organized alegislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were thelegislative body belonging to the State of Georgia. The debates wereexciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the South was in atthat time, particularly the State of Georgia. They went so far as torepeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance ofsecession. 

The next day (24th) Sherman continued his march, going by the way ofWaynesboro and Louisville, Millen being the next objective and where thetwo columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. The left wingmoved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther offso as to make it look as though Augusta was the point they were aimingfor. They moved on all the roads they could find leading in thatdirection. The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope ofsurprising Millen before the Union prisoners could be carried away; butthey failed in this. 

The distance from Milledgeville to Millen was about one hundred miles. At this point Wheeler, who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived andswelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting Sherman. Hardee, a native of Georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. It was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible withwhich to intercept Sherman's march. He did succeed in raising sometroops, and with these and those under the command of Wheeler and Wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. Our cavalry and Wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in whichWheeler was driven towards Augusta, thus giving the idea that Shermanwas probably making for that point. 

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and the march was resumed thefollowing day for Savannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been sentto Augusta with some troops. Wade Hampton was there also trying toraise cavalry sufficient to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised aforce it was too late to do the work expected of it. Hardee's wholeforce probably numbered less than ten thousand men. 

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords butvery little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. Thisanswered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was anaddition to the soldier's rations. No further resistance worthy of notewas met with, until within a few miles of Savannah. This place wasfound to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sherman proceeded at once on hisarrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placedtorpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man orbeast. One of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing theanimal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badlythat it had to be amputated. Sherman at once ordered his prisoners tothe front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explodethe torpedoes or dig them up. No further explosion took place. 

On the 10th of December the siege of Savannah commenced. Sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of theplace, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the fortsof the enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he encountered FortMcAllister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies hemight find on shipboard could be made available. Fort McAllister wassoon captured by an assault made by General Hazen's division. Communication was then established with the fleet. The capture ofSavannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss oflife. The garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape bycrossing the river and moving eastward. 

When Sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there asteamer, which I had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mailsfor his army, also supplies which I supposed he would be in need of. General J. G. Foster, who commanded all the troops south of NorthCarolina on the Atlantic sea-board, visited General Sherman before hehad opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertainingwhat assistance he could be to him. Foster returned immediately to hisown headquarters at Hilton Head, for the purpose of sending Shermansiege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies ofclothing, hard bread, etc. , thinking that these articles might not befound outside. The mail on the steamer which I sent down, had beencollected by Colonel A. H. Markland of the Post Office Department, whowent in charge of it. On this same vessel I sent an officer of my staff(Lieutenant Dunn) with the following letter to General Sherman:

CITY POINT, VA. , Dec. 3, 1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Armies near Savannah, Ga. 

The little information gleaned from the Southern press, indicating nogreat obstacle to your progress, I have directed your mails (which hadbeen previously collected at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, SpecialAgent of the Post Office Department) to be sent as far as the blockadingsquadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from onthe coast. 

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain fromcongratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has beenstruck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result. 

Since you left Atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. Theenemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detachingagainst you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelveor fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragg has gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of thatplace. Owing to some preparations Admiral Porter and General Butler aremaking to blow up Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I donot believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expeditionoff. I hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg willnot have started back by that time. 

In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like directions forfuture action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get yourviews after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. With yourveteran army I hope to get control of the only two through routes fromeast to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. Thecondition will be filled by holding Savannah and Augusta, or by holdingany other port to the east of Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmingtonfalls, a force from there can co-operate with you. 

Thomas has got back into the defences of Nashville, with Hood close uponhim. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except themain one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this falling back wasundoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. It did not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas far outnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry, Hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. I hope yetthat Hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. The general news youwill learn from the papers better than I could give it. 

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there islikely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will run down thecoast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go withme. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of theevents of that period. 

Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah to complete its investmentand insure the surrender of the garrison. The country about Savannah islow and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above tothe river below; and assaults could not be made except along acomparatively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults must haveresulted in serious destruction of life to the Union troops, with thechance of failing altogether. Sherman therefore decided upon a completeinvestment of the place. When he believed this investment completed, hesummoned the garrison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such asSherman had described. He said he was in full communication with hisdepartment and was receiving supplies constantly. 

Hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with thewest side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. On the South Carolina side the country was all rice fields, throughwhich it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that Hardee hadno possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidatedplank road starting from the west bank of the river. Sherman, receivingthis reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where GeneralFoster had troops stationed under General Hatch, for the purpose ofmaking arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of thenumerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of SouthCarolina, to the plank road which General Hardee still possessed, andthus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, ifnot of communication. 

While arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute theplan had been commenced, Sherman received information through one of hisstaff officers that the enemy had evacuated Savannah the night before. This was the night of the 21st of December. Before evacuating the placeHardee had blown up the navy yard. Some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but heleft an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and severalthousand stands of small arms. 

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of Savannah, whichSherman relates in his Memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. Savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. Shortlyafter the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailingup serenely, not doubting but the Confederates were still in possession. It was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake untilhe had tied up and gone to the Custom House, where he found a newoccupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of hisvessel and cargo than he had expected. 

As there was some discussion as to the authorship of Sherman's march tothe sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, Iwant to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raisedbetween General Sherman and myself. Circumstances made the plan on whichSherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces henecessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise ofsuccess: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroadback to Chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, ashe did, from Atlanta forward. His suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in Washington. Even whenit came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to thepropriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of thePresident, induced no doubt by his advisers. This went so far as tomove the President to ask me to suspend Sherman's march for a day or twountil I could think the matter over. My recollection is, though I findno record to show it, that out of deference to the President's wish Idid send a dispatch to Sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or elsethe connections between us were already cut so that I could not do so. However this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march fromAtlanta to Savannah is easily answered: it was clearly Sherman, and tohim also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. It was hardlypossible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised anew plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40)

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted tome. My chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, asI learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealedto the authorities at Washington to stop it. 

CHAPTER LX. 

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN--THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE. 

As we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the Tennessee River betweenMuscle Shoals and the lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomassent Schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigadesof Wilson's cavalry to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th of NovemberHood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid Schofield, therebyturning his position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, commandedrespectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stewart and Cheatham. These, with hiscavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. Schofield had, of allarms, about thirty thousand. Thomas's orders were, therefore, forSchofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battleif he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance onNashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard theenemy's movements until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. Assoon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, he sent his trains to therear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only toColumbia. At Columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. Fromthis place Schofield then retreated to Franklin. He had sent his wagonsin advance, and Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protectthem. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army pursued the wagon train and wentinto camp at Spring Hill, for the night of the 29th. 

Schofield retreating from Columbia on the 29th, passed Spring Hill, where Cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the Confederates were encamped. Onthe morning of the 30th he had arrived at Franklin. 

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in time to make an attack thesame day. The fight was very desperate and sanguinary. The Confederategenerals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among themwas of unusual proportions. This fighting continued with great severityuntil long after the night closed in, when the Confederates drew off. General Stanley, who commanded two divisions of the Union troops, andwhose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, butmaintained his position. 

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to Thomas's report, was 1, 750buried upon the field by our troops, 3, 800 in the hospital, and 702prisoners besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189killed, 1, 033 wounded, and 1, 104 captured and missing. 

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at Franklin, as it seemedto me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. He simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to Nashville, whichthe latter did during that night and the next day. 

Thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive Hood. The road to Chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons atMurfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport and Chattanooga. Thomas hadpreviously given up Decatur and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's twodivisions just returned from Missouri. He also had Steedman's divisionand R. S. Granger's, which he had drawn from the front. Hisquartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organizedand armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, General J. L. Donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the generalsupervision of General Z. B. Tower, of the United States Engineers. 

Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and to invest that place almostwithout interference. Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, sothat he would have been safe against the attack of Hood. He had troopsenough even to annihilate him in the open field. To me his delay wasunaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, sothat, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemystrongly posted behind fortifications. It is true the weather was verybad. The rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the groundwas covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. But I was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude Thomasand manage to get north of the Cumberland River. If he did this, Iapprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and wasafraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him offif he got there, General Thomas's movements being always so deliberateand so slow, though effective in defence. 

I consequently urged Thomas in frequent dispatches sent from CityPoint(*41) to make the attack at once. The country was alarmed, theadministration was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very thing wouldtake place which I have just described that is, Hood would get north. It was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from Thomassaying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that hewas making preparations, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomasthat I should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. Hereplied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. 

General Logan happening to visit City Point about that time, and knowinghim as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, I gave him an order toproceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed him, however, not todeliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if Thomashad moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me bytelegraph. After Logan started, in thinking over the situation, Ibecame restless, and concluded to go myself. I went as far asWashington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomasannouncing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time ofhis movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move, and wassuccessful from the start. This was on the 15th of December. GeneralLogan was at Louisville at the time this movement was made, andtelegraphed the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther himself. 

The battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the Uniontroops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. The nextday the battle was renewed. After a successful assault upon Hood's menin their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers onthe field, besides the wounded that were captured. Our cavalry hadfought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so thatthey were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemyretreated. They sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored toget to Franklin ahead of Hood's broken army by the Granny White Road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. They had got but afew miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy'scavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on whichthey were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our men dismounting andfighting on foot, in which the Confederates were again routed and drivenin great disorder. Our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed thepursuit on the following morning. They were too late. The enemyalready had possession of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now became achase in which the Confederates had the lead. 

Our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of Columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well asall other bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a few days beforehad swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order orotherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out toFranklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone towardChattanooga. There was, consequently, a delay of some four days inbuilding bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. Ofcourse Hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit wasuseless, although it was continued for some distance, but without comingupon him again. 

CHAPTER LXI. 

EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER--ATTACK ON THE FORT--FAILURE OF THEEXPEDITION--SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT--CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER. 

Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth ofCape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was ofimmense importance to the Confederates, because it formed theirprincipal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought infrom abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produceat home. It was equally important to us to get possession of it, notonly because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insurea speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the British Government, were constantly threatening thatunless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should ceaseto recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with theconcurrence of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expeditionagainst Fort Fisher for the purpose of capturing it. 

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, I willmention a circumstance that took place at Fort Fisher after its fall. Two English blockade runners came in at night. Their commanders, notsupposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleetand got into the river unobserved. They then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. There was a colored man in the fort who hadbeen there before and who understood these signals. He informed GeneralTerry what reply he should make to have them come in, and Terry did ashe advised. The vessels came in, their officers entirely unconsciousthat they were falling into the hands of the Union forces. Even afterthey were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversationfor some little time before suspecting that the Union troops wereoccupying the fort. They were finally informed that their vessels andcargoes were prizes. 

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the James, to go with theexpedition, but gave instructions through General Butler. He commandedthe department within whose geographical limits Fort Fisher wassituated, as well as Beaufort and other points on that coast held by ourtroops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out theexpedition against Fort Fisher. 

General Butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily withpowder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, itwould create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. AdmiralPorter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in withthe idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington; the navy wastherefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. Ihad no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself;but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authoritiesat Washington seemed desirous to have it tried, I permitted it. Thesteamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, and was there loaded withpowder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction ofFort Fisher. 

General Butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and wasall ready to sail by the 9th of December (1864). Very heavy stormsprevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, andprevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. His advancearrived off Fort Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been alreadyassembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into Beaufortfor munitions, coal, etc. ; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fullyprepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but Butler, whohad remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himselfout of coal, fresh water, etc. , and had to put into Beaufort toreplenish. Another storm overtook him, and several days more were lostbefore the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. 

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat asnear to the fort as it was safe to run. She was then propelled by herown machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. Therethe clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even the vessels putout to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. At twoo'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no moreeffect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of aboiler anywhere on the Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed when thetroops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was thebursting of a boiler in one of the Yankee gunboats. 

Fort Fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of Cape FearRiver. The soil is sandy. Back a little the peninsula is very heavilywooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran across thispeninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the seacoast about thirteen hundred yards. The fort had an armament of 21 gunsand 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. At thattime it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one lightbattery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred menwith a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. General Whiting of the Confederate army was in command, and GeneralBragg was in command of the force at Wilmington. Both commenced callingfor reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. The Governorof North Carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapetand shoot a gun, to join them. In this way they got two or threehundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and Hoke's division, five orsix thousand strong, was sent down from Richmond. A few of these troopsarrived the very day that Butler was ready to advance. 

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentriccircles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearestthe shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vesselscould fire between them. Porter was thus enabled to throw one hundredand fifteen shells per minute. The damage done to the fort by theseshells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in thefort. But the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for themen to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seekshelter in the bomb-proofs. 

On the next day part of Butler's troops under General Adelbert Ameseffected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. Thiswas accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. Theyformed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north andpart toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. Curtis pushedforward and came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small garrison atwhat was called the Flag Pond Battery. Weitzel accompanied him towithin a half a mile of the works. Here he saw that the fort had notbeen injured, and so reported to Butler, advising against an assault. Ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. These prisoners reported to Butler that sixteen hundred of Hoke'sdivision of six thousand from Richmond had already arrived and the restwould soon be in his rear. 

Upon these reports Butler determined to withdraw his troops from thepeninsula and return to the fleet. At that time there had not been aman on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards of the works. Some of his men hadsnatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken ahorse from the inside of the stockade. At night Butler informed Porterof his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced hispurpose as soon as his men could embark to start for Hampton Roads. Porter represented to him that he had sent to Beaufort for moreammunition. He could fire much faster than he had been doing, and wouldkeep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twentyyards of the fort, and he begged that Butler would leave some bravefellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and takenthe horse from the fort. 

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops aboard, except Curtis'sbrigade, and started back. In doing this, Butler made a fearfulmistake. My instructions to him, or to the officer who went in commandof the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect alanding would be of itself a great victory, and if one should beeffected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, aregular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard againstinterference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid inas soon as they could be got on shore. But General Butler seems to havelost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at Fort Monroeon the 28th. 

I telegraphed to the President as follows:

CITY POINT, VA. , Dec. 28, 1864. --8. 30 P. M. 

The Wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. Manyof the troops are back here. Delays and free talk of the object of theexpedition enabled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat it. After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three days of fine weatherwere squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protecthimself. Who is to blame will, I hope, be known. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

Porter sent dispatches to the Navy Department in which he complainedbitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort wasnearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent backagain to cooperate, but with a different commander. As soon as I heardthis I sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him to hold on. I assured him that I fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that I would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. I told him it would take some little time to get transportation for theadditional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be ontheir way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. I selected A. H. Terry to command. 

It was the 6th of January before the transports could be got ready andthe troops aboard. They sailed from Fortress Monroe on that day. Theobject and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept asecret to all except a few in the Navy Department and in the army towhom it was necessary to impart the information. General Terry had notthe slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. Hesimply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders withhim, which were to be opened when out at sea. 

He was instructed to communicate freely with Porter and have entireharmony between army and navy, because the work before them wouldrequire the best efforts of both arms of service. They arrived offBeaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, however, prevented a landing atForth Fisher until the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack aboutas before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this timefive miles away. Only iron-clads fired at first; the object being todraw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. This object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick andfast. Very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evidentsigns of being much injured. 

Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, andat two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of thefort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. His artillery wasall landed on that day, the 14th. Again Curtis's brigade of Ame'sdivision had the lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished work lessthan a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the otherway. 

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. The two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicatewith each other from time to time as they might have occasion. At daylight the fleet commenced its firing. The time agreed upon for theassault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames who commanded theassaulting column moved at 3. 30. Porter landed a force of sailors andmarines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with Ames'sassault. They were under Commander Breese of the navy. These sailorsand marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yardsof the fort before the assault. The signal was given and the assaultwas made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badlyhandled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. 

Curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, someof the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reachthe fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soonreached the palisades. These they cut away, and pushed on through. Theother troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Curtis, and Bell, whocommanded the 3d brigade of Ames's division, following Pennypacker. Butthe fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. 

The works were very extensive. The large parapet around the work wouldhave been but very little protection to those inside except when theywere close up under it. Traverses had, therefore, been run until reallythe work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. Therebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be drivenfrom these traverses one by one. The fight continued till long afternight. Our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10o'clock at night the place was carried. During this engagement thesailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, renderedthe best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thusenabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleetkept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was stilloccupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed whereto direct their shots. 

During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on theopposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works onSmith's Island in the river. 

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with fullsupplies of ammunition, and 2, 083 prisoners. In addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110killed and 536 wounded. 

In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, waskilled, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded. 

Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived offFort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promotedall the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuousgallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not beenconfirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for abrigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him forthis victory. 

CHAPTER LXII. 

SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TOMOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OFCOLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS. 

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Amongothers who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at theresult of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of NewYork, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the publicproperty that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turnedover to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have hisown entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with thegeneral, and when he returned brought back letters, one of whichcontained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done inco-operation with him, when he should have started upon his marchnorthward. 

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originallyof having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to NorthCarolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything exceptsuch an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such amove. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports tocarry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and soinformed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately toprepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time tocollect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up norththrough the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for ifsuccessful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia hadthoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and hadcompletely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west ofit. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far ascapacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrisonat Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although thatsection of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted ofboth forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore atonce. 

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load thewagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Shermanwould now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisionsthan that he had previously been operating in during his march to thesea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of theenemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on theirprevious march; and the territory through which he had to pass had nowbecome of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederatearmy, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order tosave it. 

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to startwith, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that partof the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on thesea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood ofCharleston. 

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onwardprogress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what hewould like to have done in support of his movement farther north. Thisletter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when Ihappened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st ofJanuary. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operatewith Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than bygiving my reply to this letter. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , Jan. 21, 1865. 

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. Of the Mississippi. 

GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at CityPoint, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, Icannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points ofrecommendation. As I arrived here at one P. M. , and must leave at sixP. M. , having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretaryand General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to haveThomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had orderedSchofield to Annapolis, Md. , with his corps. The advance (six thousand)will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidlyas railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corpsnumbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this becauseI did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. Hispursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he wouldnever do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advanceof the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed farbehind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit hadreached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, fromwhence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He ispossessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he isnot good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that itwas necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give theenemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. 

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selmaunder an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whetherhe could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensivelyfrom the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of histroops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby willhave a moving column of twenty thousand men. 

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there ofeight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It isrumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I aminclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemywere blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18thTerry moved on Wilmington. 

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will besent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the twopoints will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation withyour movements. From either point, railroad communications can be runout, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge ofthose roads. 

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington isnot held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken abouttwo thousand. 

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communicationwith them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I willwatch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts toevacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to ahalt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men toyour support, from the troops about Richmond. 

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force oftwenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bernor Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements. 

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will returnwith any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do foryou in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on thesea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him thenews of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas forpermitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole Stateof Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however, as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter. 

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman andhis army passed by Congress were approved. 

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, sothat it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January allhis work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence hismovement with. 

He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along bythe river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his rightwing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water. Thiscolumn, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was notdetermined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the Southfor secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision ofthe question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that therewas, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largelyentertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have aheavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive resultsthat followed, deterred the radical portion of the people fromcondemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out. To passinto the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of thecity, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is sosituated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could haveheld it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. Sherman therefore passed it by. 

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the finalmarch, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective;Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, orneighborhood, the final one, unless something further should bedetermined upon. The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left fromabout Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a prettydirect route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, were to threatenCharleston on the right, and Augusta on the left. 

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman hadreceived before starting out on his march. We already had New Bern andhad soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as didother points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now inreadiness to co-operate with Sherman's advance when he had passedFayetteville. 

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, tomove against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose ofdestroying roads, machine shops, etc. On the 8th of February I orderedSheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon asthe weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at orabout Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg assoon as the roads would permit, saying: "As soon as it is possible totravel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburgwith a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroadand canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to therebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one starting from EastTennessee under Stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry;one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; Canby, from MobileBay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latterpushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery; and Sherman with a largearmy eating out the vitals of South Carolina--is all that will be wantedto leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you toovercome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuatedon Tuesday last. "

On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received hisorders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious tohear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, that I had sentGrierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficientofficer. I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage andcapacity whom it would be difficult to get by. I still further informedhim that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force intoMississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter. This force did not get off however. 

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman's march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leavingthere. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time. I hadsome time before depleted Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for thereason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had beenordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might dosomething. Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of hismovements. I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send adetachment under another officer. General Granger had got down to NewOrleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not puthim in command of troops. In spite of this he asked the War Departmentto assign Granger to the command of a corps. 

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause inthat quarter, I said to Canby: "I am in receipt of a dispatch * * *informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corpsand material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have directed thatnone be sent. Thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to youthat they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detainthe force the enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea ofrepairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North, where we already had the troops. I expected your movements to beco-operative with Sherman's last. This has now entirely failed. Iwrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon thecountry, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc. , not to build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--toMontgomery and to Selma. Destroy railroads, rolling stock, andeverything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. By this means aloneyou can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interiorcan be kept broken. "

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render anyservice in the direction for which they were designed. 

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee's troopsand Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all;but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would bethe case, to retard Sherman's movements. Everything possible was beingdone to raise troops in the South. Lee dispatched against Sherman thetroops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, includingthose of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. After Thomas's victory at Nashville whatremained, of Hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidlyas possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the Souththough not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and SouthCarolina. 

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but beforesending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast tosee the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions afterbeing on the ground than I could very well have given without. We soonreturned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both NewBern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which uniteat Goldsboro. Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near themouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure theWilmington and Charlotteville Railroad. This column took their pontoonbridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south ofthe city of Wilmington. A large body was sent by the north side toco-operate with them. They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d ofFebruary. I took the precaution to provide for Sherman's army, in casehe should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reachingNorth Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he wasliable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. Ialso sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, nowthat we were not operating the roads in Virginia. The gauge of theNorth Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads hadbeen altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use therewithout any change. 

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas tomove south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his forceby sending a portion of it to Terry. ) I directed in lieu of thismovement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and pushhim well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman. Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when Ihad supposed he was on his march in support of Sherman I heard of hisbeing in Louisville, Kentucky. I immediately changed the order, anddirected Thomas to send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on the12th of March, he did push down through the north-western end of SouthCarolina, creating some consternation. I also ordered Thomas to sendthe 4th corps (Stanley's) to Bull Gap and to destroy no more roads eastof that. I also directed him to concentrate supplies at Knoxville, witha view to a probable movement of his army through that way towardLynchburg. 

Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah. Sherman'smarch was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17thof February. He was detained in his progress by having to repair andcorduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. There was constantskirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but thisdid not retard the advance of the infantry. Four days, also, were lostin making complete the destruction of the most important railroads southof Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and thedestruction of the bridges on the line of the road. A formidable riverhad to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a smallgarrison under General Wade Hampton. There was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. Hamptonleft as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. 

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussionsof the question as to who set Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on thepart of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of theConfederates. One thing is certain: as soon as our troops tookpossession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the bestof their ability with the limited means at hand. In any case, theexample set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa. , a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence ofthe act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsiblefor the conflict then raging, not imperative. 

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor tookpossession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the Nationalforces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for theprotection of property, etc. Sherman paid no attention at all to theoverture, but pushed forward and took the town without making anyconditions whatever with its citizens. He then, however, co-operatedwith the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the peoplewho were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. When heleft there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to bedistributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangementcould be made for their future supplies. He remained in Columbia untilthe roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could beuseful to the enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia, Sherman learnedfor the first time that what remained of Hood's army was confrontinghim, under the command of General Beauregard. 

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisonedthe place. Wilmington was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cherawfarther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthypeople of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuableproperty to these two points to be stored. Among the goods sent therewere valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture. I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. These, of course were among thearticles destroyed. While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston'srestoration to command. The latter was given, as already stated, alltroops in North and South Carolina. After the completion of thedestruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on hismarch and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and withoutincident to relate. The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyedon the way. Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, onthe 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straightfor Fayetteville. Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped. Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March. He had dispatchedscouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, askinghim to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and otherarticles which he enumerated. The scouts got through successfully, anda boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman hadasked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, thosestores did not contain clothing. 

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro. The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he wasapproaching Lee's army and nearing the country that still remained opento the enemy. Besides, he was confronting all that he had had toconfront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by thegarrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood's army. Franticappeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell theranks of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in allover 35, 000 or 40, 000 men. The people had grown tired of the war, anddesertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than thevoluntary accessions. 

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston'stroops and Sherman's, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morningof the 22d. Sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's troops atlast reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac;and there his men were destined to have a long rest. Schofield wasthere to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington. 

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johnston confronting him; butwith an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. Hehad Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I washolding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape andgotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements henow had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold theConfederates at bay for an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shorewith his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. He had arailroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughlyprotected by streams, which intersect that part of the country anddeepen as they approach the sea. Then, too, Sherman knew that if Leeshould escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson togetherwould be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. Withthe loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee's army would haveamounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina. Johnston'sarmy was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made anoffensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain onduty. The men of both Lee's and Johnston's armies were, like theirbrethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so bravethat he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him anddampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. 

CHAPTER LXIII. 

ARRIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS--AN ANECDOTE OF LINCOLN--THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG--SHERIDAN DESTROYSTHE RAILROAD--GORDON CARRIES THE PICKET LINE--PARKE RECAPTURES THE LINE--THE LINE OF BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD. 

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-calledConfederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point. Theyproved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerlyUnited States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate. 

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at onceconducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which wasvery comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. I at oncecommunicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary ofWar and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and thattheir object was to negotiate terms of peace between he United Statesand, as they termed it, the Confederate Government. I was instructed toretain them at City Point, until the President, or some one whom hewould designate, should come to meet them. They remained several daysas guests on board the boat. I saw them quite frequently, though I haveno recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on thesubject of their mission. It was something I had nothing to do with, and I therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. Formy own part I never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, thatthey were the representatives of a GOVERNMENT. There had been too greata waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. As longas they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and I foundthem all very agreeable gentlemen. I directed the captain to furnishthem with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfortin every way possible. No guard was placed over them and no restrictionwas put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that theywould not abuse the privileges extended to them. They were permitted toleave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bankand visiting me at my headquarters. 

I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew themwell by reputation and through their public services, and I had been aparticular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always supposed that he was avery small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was verymuch surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. When he gotdown on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollenovercoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South duringthe rebellion. The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I hadever seen, even in Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being anaverage-sized man. He took this off when he reached the cabin of theboat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat andout of it. 

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch fromWashington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads tomeet the President and a member of the cabinet. Mr. Lincoln met themthere and had an interview of short duration. It was not a great whileafter they met that the President visited me at City Point. He spoke ofhis having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that therewould be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they wouldrecognize, first: that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. If they were willing toconcede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiationsand was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with hissignature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they werewilling to live with us in the Union and be one people. He alwaysshowed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and Inever heard him abuse an enemy. Some of the cruel things said aboutPresident Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to theheart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful dispositionand I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to getaway from the cares and anxieties of the capital. 

Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln. It was on theoccasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peacecommissioners at Hampton Roads. After a little conversation, he askedme if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's. I replied that I had. "Well, " said he, "did you see him take it off?" I said yes. "Well, "said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest earthat ever you did see?" Long afterwards I told this story to theConfederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate. He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens laughedimmoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln. 

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three littleincidents. On one occasion during this period, while I was visitingWashington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme leftand then going to the south, got in east of us. Before their presencewas known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that weregrazing in that section. It was a fair capture, and they weresufficiently needed by the Confederates. It was only retaliating forwhat we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out ofsupplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten. As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured fivethousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River nearPort Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army inthe East. 

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellionwas the last few weeks before Petersburg. I felt that the situation ofthe Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape atthe earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that Iwould awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothingwas left but a picket line. He had his railroad by the way of Danvillesouth, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all storesand ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him forhis immediate defence. I knew he could move much more lightly and morerapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behindso that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and thewar might be prolonged another year. 

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it waspossible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were. There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much soonerthan it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-calledConfederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army. When itwas evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at oncebegan to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions were takingplace, not only among those who were with General Lee in theneighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole Confederacy. Iremember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior tothis, General Butler remarked that the Confederates would find greatdifficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though Iam not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave. "

The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied manbetween the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed alaw for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to becalled the senior reserves. The latter were to hold the necessarypoints not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that theywere thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave, " an expression which Iafterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn. 

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits theywere losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entirearmy, by desertions alone. Then by casualties of war, sickness, andother natural causes, their losses were much heavier. It was a merequestion of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out whilethat rate of depletion was going on. Of course long before their armywould be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the fieldwould have been able to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the greatnumber of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, sogallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and asearnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which theywere fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. Many of them weremaking application to be sent North where they might get employmentuntil the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes. 

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the timeto come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughlybelieved would close the war. 

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and whichdetained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavyrains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It wasnecessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to movethe wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an armyoperating in the enemy's country. The other consideration was thatGeneral Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac wasoperating on the north side of the James River, having come down fromthe Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of theJames River. 

Let us now take account of what he was doing. 

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early betweenStaunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly hisentire command. Early and some of his officers escaped by findingrefuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. 

On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come toWhite House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rainshad been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. Hehad a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way acrosssome of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would haveto get over in going south as first ordered. 

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depotthere open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon it because theJames River had now become our base of supplies. 

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into twodivisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merrittwas acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very light, carryingonly four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroadback toward Lynchburg. He also sent a division along the James RiverCanal to destroy locks, culverts etc. All mills and factories along thelines of march of his troops were destroyed also. 

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a marchto White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined therefore tofight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near toRichmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. He did this, destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point asnear Richmond as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroeshad joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and theyassisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and thecanal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He had captured mostof Early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. When hereached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. He resistedtheir assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the Southand North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th. 

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the timehe could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to begot up to him which would last him through a long march, as there wouldprobably not be much to be obtained in the country through which hewould pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start fromwhere he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, theearliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. 

Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could comeup, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon asthe roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied downsomewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to joinme, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry werenecessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However, having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled tomake my plans. 

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I wasaware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to joinwith Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops aroundPetersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement shouldnot escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it wasundertaken. 

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and GeneralLee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about andPetersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, werewaiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make itpossible to move. 

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider openingto enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than hewould have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon anassault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg. The night of the24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon wasassigned to the execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedmanand Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selectedas the point of his attack. The attack was to be made at night, and thetroops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear wherethey supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract mylines. Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him anopportunity of escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution ofit very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of ourline. 

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point atwhich they were to make their charge, and got possession of ourpicket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of ourmain line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have tocharge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before thedeserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing theirarms with them, and this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantageof this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping throughto ours as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once tookpossession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the mainline our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. This planwas to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but thetroops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the northside of the James River and, by some accident on the railroad on theirway over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got tobe nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. 

The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemypassing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Thenturning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they alsocarried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turnedtoward City Point. 

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in hisline cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that thegeneral was away, assumed command himself and with commendablepromptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. GeneralTidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted themin rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of groundbetween the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with hisdivision, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breachheaded the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back intoFort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into theintrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelvewere retaken by Willcox early in the morning. 

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort andbatteries, and communication was once more established. The artilleryfire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for theConfederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements tojoin them. They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. Thiseffort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in theirkilling, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. 

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, ourtroops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but a shortdistance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few dayslater. 

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th ofMarch) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was tomove in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of theJames River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold BermudaHundred and the north of the James River. The engineer brigade was tobe left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg. (*42)

Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on ourextreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on thearrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, tocross Hatcher's Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the objectbeing to get into a position from which we could strike the South SideRailroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad. There was considerablefighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, inwhich the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and thelosses were quite severe. 

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road. 

CHAPTER LXIV. 

INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN--GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC--SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--PARKE ANDWRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINE--BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG. 

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March. His horses, ofcourse, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. A few days ofrest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shodand put in condition for moving. Immediately on General Sheridan'sarrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which Ihad decided upon. The movement was to commence on the 29th of themonth. 

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out ofmy tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself--not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. Inpreparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that isto say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg andRichmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at theprolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminateexcept by compromise. Knowing that unless my plan proved an entiresuccess it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided inthese instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from theArmy of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon thecountry proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding thatroad, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with thesecombined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman alreadyhad received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburgand Richmond. 

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhatdisappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again fromthe Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armiesof the enemy. I said to him: "General, this portion of yourinstructions I have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reasonfor doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as a matter offact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, andthat he should go no farther. His face at once brightened up, andslapping his hand on his leg he said: "I am glad to hear it, and we cando it. "

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks untilhe got further instructions from me. 

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, andwhen his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, atDabney's Mills. He met some of my staff officers outside, and washighly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why hebelieved this would prove the final and successful effort. Although mychief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our positionabout City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridanto come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had notbeen asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan hadwhat they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him. I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he wasimbued. Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value thatfeeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make amovement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallenafter I had started out the roads were still very heavy. Orders weregiven accordingly. 

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a fewdays free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, givingindications that the time had come when we could move. On that date Imoved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force tohold the line about Petersburg. It soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable forteams, and almost so for cavalry. Sometimes a horse or mule would bestanding apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot wouldsink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet wouldsink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands socommon in that part of Virginia and other southern States. It becamenecessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as weadvanced, to move our artillery upon. The army had become so accustomedto this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was donevery rapidly. The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progressto the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalryover by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leadingnorth-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee's line. 

This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to thewest as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or FiveForks. The column moving detached from the army still in the trencheswas, excluding the cavalry, very small. The forces in the trenches werethemselves extending to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme leftwhen the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later andthrown into line between him and Five Forks. 

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on theenemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre toprotect their right so that an assault in the centre might besuccessfully made. General Wright's corps had been designated to makethis assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reachedme of Sheridan's success. He was to move under cover as close to theenemy as he could get. 

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be toget up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, assoon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. These roadswere so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmondand Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case ofretreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defendthem. He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforceFive Forks. He also sent around to the right of his army some two orthree other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held inreadiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call. Hecame over himself to superintend in person the defence of his rightflank. 

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks. He had only hiscavalry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with avery stout resistance. He gradually drove them back however until inthe neighborhood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter other troopsbesides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. 

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place andstated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assistance. I replied to himthat it was impossible to send Wright's corps because that corps wasalready in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assaultwhen the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; butthe 2d (Humphreys's) and 5th (Warren's) corps were on our extreme leftand a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flankof the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren. 

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication withSheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. He was very slow inmoving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock nextmorning. When he did move it was done very deliberately, and onarriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recentrains so that he regarded it as not fordable. Sheridan of course knewof his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon aspossible, sent orders to him to hasten. He was also hastened or atleast ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade. He now felt that hecould not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changedto move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in theirrear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to moveforward without him. However, Ayres's division of Warren's corpsreached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the timeseparated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directlyunder Sheridan. 

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the wholeof his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in theafternoon. Griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of asevere cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from thefighting. This did not continue long, however; the division was broughtback and with Ayres's division did most excellent service during theday. Crawford's division of the same corps had backed still fartheroff, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it waslate before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. Once there it did very excellent service. 

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, inadvancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault uponFive Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the assault and haveit all over before night, because the ground he occupied would beuntenable for him in bivouac during the night. Unless the assault wasmade and was successful, he would be obliged to return to DinwiddieCourt-House, or even further than that for the night. 

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to getCrawford's division in hand, and he also wanted Warren. He sent staffofficer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that generalto report to him, but they were unable to find him. At all eventsSheridan was unable to get that officer to him. Finally he wenthimself. He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin tothe command of the 5th corps. The troops were then brought up and theassault successfully made. 

I was so much dissatisfied with Warren's dilatory movements in thebattle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would failSheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quickperception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had beforediscovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was veryprejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just beforeus. He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which mightoccur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should dowhile he was executing his move. 

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention tothese defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, nowwas not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one standin the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, notto hesitate. It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removedWarren. I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted stillmore that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to anotherfield of duty. 

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of theenemy. The two armies were mingled together there for a time in suchmanner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand thesurrender of the other. Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in everydirection; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-armsin large quantities, falling into our hands. The flying troops werepursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps underSheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. 

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when Sheridanhalted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of theenemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corpsacross Hatcher's Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing themtoward it. Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west ofFive Forks. 

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st ofApril. I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at fouro'clock on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the 2d corps, GeneralHumphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, tohold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be takenfrom weakening in their front. 

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in factI had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, becausehe was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted torelieve his mind as much as I could. I notified Weitzel on the northside of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to theenemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there topromptly enter the city of Richmond. 

I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of somuch importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. It was for thisreason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon asI had received the news of the capture of Five Forks. The corpscommanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could notsee to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. But wekept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole lineincluding that north of the James River, until it was light enough tomove, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. 

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved out as directed, brushedthe abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire ofmusketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till theymounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a veryconsiderable length of line in that direction, but at that point theouter was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city ofPetersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had avery serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defenceof his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. 

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher's Run, sweepingeverything before him. The enemy had traverses in rear of his capturedline, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one toanother, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. Asyou proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much fartherfrom the inner one, and along about Hatcher's Run they must be nearlytwo miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount ofartillery and some prisoners--Wright about three thousand of them. 

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions theyhad received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and beforeWright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside ofthe enemy's intrenchments. The second corps soon followed; and theouter works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops, never to be wrenched from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher'sRun, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outsideof the city. 

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. As soon as I receivedthe news of Wright's success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact toall points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred andthose on the north side of the James, and to the President at CityPoint. Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent theadditional news to these points. Finding at length that they were allin, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright'sthree thousand prisoners were coming out. I was soon joined inside byGeneral Meade and his staff. 

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the JamesRiver thus bringing the bulk of Lee's army around to the support of hisextreme right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel anddirected him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if theyfound any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for thiswould separate Richmond and Petersburg. 

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg, coming in on our left. This gave us a continuous line from theAppomattox River below the city to the same river above. At eleveno'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with twobrigades from City Point. With this additional force he completed hiscaptured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so asto protect his flank. He also carried in and made an abatis betweenhimself and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops and artilleryagainst Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults withvery heavy losses. 

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up toPetersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and FortWhitworth. We thought it had now become necessary to carry them byassault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted byFoster's division of the 24th corps (Gibbon's), supported by twobrigades from Ord's command. The battle was desperate and the Nationaltroops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, andimmediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. The gunsof Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commandingofficer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered. 

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan. In moving toexecute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of theWhite Oak Road and the Claiborne Road. The enemy fell back toSutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles. This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also stronglyintrenched. Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him tomake the assault, which Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had gotthrough the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumedcommand over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps. I had sentan order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg. This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone. Thelatter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall backa few hundred yards. 

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreysto send a division back to his relief. He went himself. 

Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merrittwith his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that hadassembled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River. Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse sidefrom where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with alarge number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put theremainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridanfollowed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan hadcarried so handsomely by assault. I cannot explain the situation herebetter than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening:

BOYDTON ROAD, NEAR PETERSBURG, April 2, 1865. --4. 40 P. M. 

COLONEL T. S. BOWERS, City Point. 

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hourswill be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the riverabove. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were notcaptured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part orbecause they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corpsis above them. Miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the White OakRoad to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he metthem, and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not knowing whetherSheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with anotherdivision from here. The whole captures since the army started outgunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probablyfifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the number of men and gunsaccurately however. * * * I think the President might come out and payus a visit tomorrow. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the riverabove to the river below. I ordered a bombardment to be commenced thenext morning at five A. M. , to be followed by an assault at six o'clock;but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning. 

CHAPTER LXV. 

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBURG--MEETING PRESIDENT LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG--THECAPTURE OF RICHMOND--PURSUING THE ENEMY--VISIT TO SHERIDAN AND MEADE. 

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and tooka position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy'smusketry which was flying thick and fast there. As we wouldoccasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and theAppomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with theConfederate army. I did not have artillery brought up, because I wassure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediatelyin pursuit. At all events I had not the heart to turn the artilleryupon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capturethem soon. 

Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came inwho represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of NorthernVirginia. He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing astrong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself whenforced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he wasactually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond, and falling backinto this prepared work. This statement was made to General Meade andmyself when we were together. I had already given orders for themovement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of headingoff Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man's story that hethought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move againstLee in his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would havebeen to have put himself and his army between two formidable streamslike the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies asthose of the Potomac and the James. Then these streams coming togetheras they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close upin the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies orpossibility of reinforcement. It would only have been a question ofdays, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to himby the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrenderhis army. Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive yourantagonist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuateRichmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to followthe Danville Road. Accordingly my object was to secure a point on thatroad south of Lee, and I told Meade this. He suggested that if Lee wasgoing that way we would follow him. My reply was that we did not wantto follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if hewould only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at thattime, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of theDanville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we stillfound him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastwardand close him up. That we would then have all the advantage we couldpossibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if heremained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. 

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as tostart them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing thatLee would be gone during the night. During the night I strengthenedSheridan by sending him Humphreys's corps. 

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during theday, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossiblefor him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. Davis was at church when he received Lee's dispatch. The congregationwas dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. The rebel government left Richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon ofthe 2d. 

At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, hisobject being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crushSherman before I could get there. As soon as I was sure of this Inotified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroadto the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. Hereplied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. I thenordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow thesame road in the morning. Parke's corps followed by the same road, andthe Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ranalongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke's Station, and to repairthe railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. That road was a 5 feetgauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge;consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken upthroughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge ofour cars and locomotives. 

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days. I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt astrong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it mightnot prove so; and then I would have only added another to the manydisappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. Butwhen we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, andbidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result. 

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await hisarrival. I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so thatafter the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. There was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. Wehad selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until thePresident arrived. 

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warmcongratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to thearmy which had accomplished it, was: "Do you know, general, that I havehad a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to dosomething like this. " Our movements having been successful up to thispoint, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President allmy movements, and the objects I had in view. He remained for some daysnear City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully bytelegraph. 

Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at afixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee's army. I told himthat I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish theirold enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallantattempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. The Westernarmies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all theterritory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, andwere now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, askingadmittance. I said to him that if the Western armies should be evenupon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would begiven to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants fromthe section of country which those troops hailed from. It might lead todisagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East andthose of the West in some of their debates. Western members might bethrowing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of therebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish muchin the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until theWestern armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had beenengaged with. 

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid camefrom so the work was done. 

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years'record in the suppression of the rebellion. The army it had to fightwas the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting tofound a nation upon the territory of the United States. Its loss wouldbe the loss of the cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by theConfederacy to protect and maintain their capital. Everything elsewould go if it went. Lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it tomaintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from theSouth in another quarter. 

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between thesoldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been nonebetween the politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought of theliability of such a state of things in advance. 

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse andstarted on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started tojoin the army, now a good many miles in advance. Up to this time I hadnot received the report of the capture of Richmond. 

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from GeneralWeitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond atabout 8. 15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he hadfound the city on fire in two places. The city was in the most utterconfusion. The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all theliquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which theConfederate government had left, for the people to gather up. The cityhad been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without anynotice whatever that they were about to leave. In fact, up to the veryhour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee hadgained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg. 

Weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. Thecity was on fire. Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. The fire had been started by someone connected with the retreating army. All authorities deny that itwas authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who wereleaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that itwas better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of theirenemy. Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. 

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great many of them, were cutoff from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalryso hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed alongup the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over. 

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join thecommand, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out. Wehad still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but theroads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blockedup the road so that it was impossible to get on. Then, again, ourcavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and theorders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry wheneverthey appeared. This caused further delay. 

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were leftback, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and tryingto get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that whenthey did start they would be uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was farahead, was also out of rations. They did not succeed in getting them upthrough the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, wereso elated by the reflection that at last they were following up avictory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations torunning a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. So the marchwas resumed at three o'clock in the morning. 

Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven themnorth to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced tocross. 

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up fromDanville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him atFarmville. This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea offollowing the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to gofarther west, by the way of Farmville. I notified Sheridan of this anddirected him to get possession of the road before the supplies couldreach Lee. He responded that he had already sent Crook's division toget upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to facenorth and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thoughtCrook must be there now. The bulk of the army moved directly forJetersville by two roads. 

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was onthe Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced marchwith the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's corps across from theroad they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of theArmy of the James and to protect the railroad which that army wasrepairing as it went along. 

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred thousand rationsfrom Danville. The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent aspecial messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded fromthere. In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources hadreached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line ofthe road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. 

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off betweenthe road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and theAppomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank. They picked upa great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. 

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance northof Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. The countrywas very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers scattered agreat deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many othersnever returned to the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation. I again ordered Meade upwith all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with alittle cavalry confronting Lee's entire army. Meade, always prompt inobeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he washimself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I havesaid, the wagons being far in the rear. 

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the South Side Railroad. Onthe morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade wasmaking, and suggested that he might now attack Lee. We had now no otherobjective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close thething up at once. 

On the 5th I marched again with Ord's command until within about tenmiles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass. I thenreceived from Sheridan the following dispatch:

"The whole of Lee's army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on thisside of it. General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on theirright flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can bethrown to this point, and then advance upon it. My cavalry was atBurkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, lastnight. General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person. They are out ofrations, or nearly so. They were advancing up the railroad towardsBurkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point. "

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to hisprovisions. 

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towardsFarmville, moved Davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. Daviesfound the movement had already commenced. He attacked and drove awaytheir cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing andburning 180 wagons. He also captured five pieces of artillery. TheConfederate infantry then moved against him and probably would havehandled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades ofcavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time. A sharpengagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and theenemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. 

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. The head of Humphreys's corpsfollowed in about an hour afterwards. Sheridan stationed the troops asthey came up, at Meade's request, the latter still being very sick. Heextended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to theleft of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right. The cavalry bythis time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to theleft, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which theenemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, feeling that if time wasgiven, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring towait till his troops were all up. 

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to himby a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I wasthere myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, andsigned by Colonel Taylor. It was to his mother, and showed thedemoralization of the Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me theinformation as here related of the movements of that day. I received asecond message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged moreemphatically the importance of my presence. This was brought to me by ascout in gray uniform. It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped upin tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. This was a precautiontaken so that if the scout should be captured he could take thistin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. Itwould cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate soldier chewingtobacco. It was nearly night when this letter was received. I gave Orddirections to continue his march to Burkesville and there intrenchhimself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off allthe roads between there and Farmville. 

I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort ofcavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade's army. Thedistance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progresswas slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. However, wegot to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after somelittle parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conductedin to where Sheridan was bivouacked. We talked over the situation forsome little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee wastrying to do, and that Meade's orders, if carried out, moving to theright flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us andputting us in rear of him. 

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters aboutmidnight. I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow theenemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allowthe enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee wasmoving right then. Meade changed his orders at once. They were nowgiven for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in themorning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across therailroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung outstill farther to the left. 

CHAPTER LXVI. 

BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--ENGAGEMENT AT FARMVILLE--CORRESPONDENCE WITHGENERAL LEE--SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY. 

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-westfrom the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, andthen trends north-westerly. Sailor's Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridgeand Jetersville. Near the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg toLynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge. The railroadruns on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, andfrom there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. The roadscoming up from the south-east to Farmville cross the Appomattox Riverthere on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg andPetersburg Railroad well to the left. 

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all theroads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon, andnever permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fightingthat might be going on in his rear. In this way he came very nearsucceeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with atleast part of his army. 

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the night before, and ourarmy in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them. There wasa good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was reached. Our cavalrycharged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train inorder to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued, in which wecaptured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates inthese little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. 

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a heavy engagement tookplace, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought intoaction. Our men on the right, as they were brought in against theenemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us everyadvantage to be derived from the lay of the country. Our firing wasalso very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreatwestward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time hefired. The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and woundedas in captures. Some six general officers fell into our hands in thisengagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. This engagementwas commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreatand pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouackedupon the ground where the night had overtaken them. 

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, Iordered Wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved tothe left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin's, andordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on theright. The object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniouslyand so efficiently in the valley of Virginia. 

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan's directcommand until after the surrender. 

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southwardbetween Burkesville and the High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th hesent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions todestroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and heprepared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after Washburn hadstarted Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent ColonelRead, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him andbring him back. Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee'scolumn had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could notget through. Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. Herode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found hisreturn cut off, and Washburn confronting apparently the advance of Lee'sarmy. Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force nowconsisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rodealong their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with thesame enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then gave the order to charge. This little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, butinflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entirenumber. Colonel Read fell mortally wounded, and then Washburn; and atthe close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and mostof the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. The remainderthen surrendered. The Confederates took this to be only the advance ofa larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench;so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of astrong detachment of the Confederate army. 

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the HighBridge, and attempted to destroy it. He did set fire to it, but theflames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corpsand drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while itwas being burned up. Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmvillewith the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held a position which was verystrong, naturally, besides being intrenched. Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but wasnot assaulted in return. 

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward's CourtHouse, along with the 5th corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in betweenGriffin and the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry and Wright'scorps pushed on west of Farmville. When the cavalry reached Farmvillethey found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and hadalready got their trains of provisions back to that point; but ourtroops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we didnot get them for some time. These troops retreated to the north side ofthe Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge afterthem. Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright's corps and aportion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalryforded the stream and drove them away. Wright built a foot-bridge forhis men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of theroads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night. I had stoppedthe night before at Burkesville Junction. Our troops were then prettymuch all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and Ord'scommand was extended from that point towards Farmville. 

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of theprisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had gotacross the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the dutyof their authorities to make the best terms they could while they stillhad a right to claim concessions. The authorities thought differently, however. Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claimanything. He said further, that for every man that was killed afterthis in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very littlebetter than murder. He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrenderhis army without being able to consult with the President, but he hopedhe would. 

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south. Meade wasback towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as beforestated. After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were atAppomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and aforced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee's army couldsecure them. He wrote me a note telling me this. This fact, togetherwith the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me theidea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of thesurrender of his army. I therefore wrote to him on this day, asfollows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S. , 5 P. M. , April 7, 1865. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE Commanding C. S. A. 

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness offurther resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in thisstruggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift frommyself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking ofyou the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army knownas the Army of Northern Virginia. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows:

April 7, 1865. 

GENERAL: I have received your note of this day. Though notentertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of furtherresistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocateyour desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore beforeconsidering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on conditionof its surrender. 

R. E. LEE, General. 

LIEUT. -GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the U. S. 

This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letterand wrote him as follows:

April 8, 1865. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A. 

Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking thecondition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of NorthernVirginia is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being mygreat desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely:that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for takingup arms again against the Government of the United States until properlyexchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet anyofficers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable toyou, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which thesurrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his soldiers had enlistedfrom that part of the State where they now were, and were continuallydropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I know that Ioccupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which hadprobably been used as a Confederate hospital. The next morning when Icame out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me andsaid that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonelof a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. He said thatwhen he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of theregiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just dropped out, and nowwanted to surrender himself. I told him to stay there and he would notbe molested. That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee'sforce by this crumbling process. 

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved withalacrity and without any straggling. They began to see the end of whatthey had been fighting four years for. Nothing seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest untilthe end. Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rivalfor the front. The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalrycould. 

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of AppomattoxStation, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to getwest of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. They got therethe night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train menhad just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in runningoff three of the trains. The other four were held by Custer. 

The head of Lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near. The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession ofthe trains. However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hopingto recover them. In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning oneof the trains, but not in getting anything from it. Custer then orderedthe other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the fightcontinued. 

So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's army were engaged. Soon, however, Lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubtexpecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our infantryhad pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up theyfound Griffin's corps and the Army of the James confronting them. Asharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag. 

CHAPTER LXVII. 

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AT MCLEAN'S HOUSE--THETERMS OF SURRENDER--LEE'S SURRENDER--INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER THESURRENDER. 

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee. I wassuffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouseon the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. I spentthe night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and puttingmustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to becured by morning. During the night I received Lee's answer to my letterof the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the followingmorning. (*43) But it was for a different purpose from that ofsurrendering his army, and I answered him as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE U. S. , April 9, 1865. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A. 

Your note of yesterday is received. As I have no authority to treat onthe subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A. M. To-day couldlead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equallyanxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the samefeeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. Bythe South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirableevent, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions ofproperty not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficultiesmay be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc. , U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with theheadache, to get to the head of the column. I was not more than two orthree miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct Iwould have to pass through Lee's army, or a portion of it. I hadtherefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up fromanother direction. 

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was inthis way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and consequently couldnot be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee haddone. Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and oneto the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me forthe purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of hisarmy, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could becommunicated with. As they had heard nothing of this until the fightinghad got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commandershesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. Theywere afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of NorthernVirginia where it could not escape except by some deception. They, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hoursto give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, ifpossible. It was found that, from the route I had taken, they wouldprobably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer backwithin the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebellines. 

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this messagethrough his lines to me. 

April 9, 1865. 

GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket-linewhither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms wereembraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrenderof this army. I now request an interview in accordance with the offercontained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. 

R. E. LEE, General. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT Commanding U. S. Armies. 

When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sickheadache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured. Iwrote the following note in reply and hastened on:

April 9, 1865. 

GENERAL R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. Armies. 

Your note of this date is but this moment (11. 50 A. M. ) received, inconsequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road tothe Farmville and Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four mileswest of Walker's Church and will push forward to the front for thepurpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road where you wishthe interview to take place will meet me. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troopsdrawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by. Theywere very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all aruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away. They said theybelieved that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Leewas moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they nowwere in five minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had no doubtabout the good faith of Lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where hewas. I found him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox CourtHouse, with Colonel Marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting myarrival. The head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion ofwhich was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated itfrom that on the crest of which Sheridan's forces were drawn up in lineof battle to the south. 

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I willgive all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. 

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until theyare believed to be true. The war of the rebellion was no exception tothis rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictionsbased on a slight foundation of fact. As I have said, there was an appleorchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces. Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, onthat side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first metGeneral Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in theroad below and his back resting against the tree. The story had noother foundation than that. Like many other stories, it would be verygood if it was only true. 

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in theMexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age andrank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally rememberhim distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott inthe Mexican War. 

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the resultthat was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. I waswithout a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, andwore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rankto indicate to the army who I was. When I went into the house I foundGeneral Lee. We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took ourseats. I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the roomduring the whole of the interview. 

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. As he was a man of muchdignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether hefelt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over theresult, and was too manly to show it. Whatever his feelings, they wereentirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which hadbeen quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad anddepressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfallof a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so muchfor a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst forwhich a people ever fought, and one for which there was the leastexcuse. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass ofthose who were opposed to us. 

General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, andwas wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword whichhad been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was anentirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn inthe field. In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private withthe straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted verystrangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and offaultless form. But this was not a matter that I thought of untilafterwards. 

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times. He remarked thathe remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as amatter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference inour rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in ourages), I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted hisattention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a longinterval. Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot theobject of our meeting. After the conversation had run on in this stylefor some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of ourmeeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purposeof getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I said that Imeant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take themup again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properlyexchanged. He said that he had so understood my letter. 

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreignto the subject which had brought us together. This continued for somelittle time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of theconversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his armyought to be written out. I called to General Parker, secretary on mystaff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the followingterms:

APPOMATTOX C. H. , VA. , Ap 19th, 1865. 

GEN. R. E. LEE, Comd'g C. S. A. 

GEN: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8thinst. , I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. On thefollowing terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be madein duplicate. One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, theother to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up armsagainst the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the menof their commands. The arms, artillery and public property to be parkedand stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receivethem. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor theirprivate horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will beallowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United Statesauthority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in forcewhere they may reside. 

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Lt. Gen. 

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that Ishould make use of in writing the terms. I only knew what was in mymind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be nomistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that theofficers had their own private horses and effects, which were importantto them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessaryhumiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. 

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. Heappeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he hada point to make against them he wished to wait until they were inwriting to make it. When he read over that part of the terms about sidearms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, withsome feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon hisarmy. 

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to meagain that their army was organized a little differently from the armyof the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were twocountries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists ownedtheir own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men whoso owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. I told himthat as the terms were written they would not; that only the officerswere permitted to take their private property. He then, after readingover the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. 

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle ofthe war--I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I took it that most ofthe men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole country had been soraided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be ableto put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the nextwinter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. The UnitedStates did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the officers Ileft behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of theConfederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal tohis home. Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. 

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865. 

GENERAL:--I received your letter of this date containing the terms ofthe surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. Asthey are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the8th inst. , they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the properofficers to carry the stipulations into effect. 

R. E. LEE, General. LIEUT. -GENERAL U. S. GRANT. 

While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generalspresent were severally presented to General Lee. 

The much talked of surrendering of Lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. The word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until Iwrote it in the terms. There was no premeditation, and it did not occurto me until the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it inthe terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiersretaining their horses. 

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, andthat they were without forage; that his men had been living for somedays on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me forrations and forage. I told him "certainly, " and asked for how many menhe wanted rations. His answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and Iauthorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster toAppomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out ofthe trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. As for forage, wehad ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. 

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to carry intoeffect the paroling of Lee's troops before they should start for theirhomes--General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton forthem to confer with in order to facilitate this work. Lee and I thenseparated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, andall went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox. 

Soon after Lee's departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows:

HEADQUARTERS APPOMATTOX C. H. , VA. , April 9th, 1865, 4. 30 P. M. 

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington. 

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon onterms proposed by myself. The accompanying additional correspondencewill show the conditions fully. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commencedfiring a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. I at oncesent word, however, to have it stopped. The Confederates were now ourprisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. 

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting astop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other uselessoutlay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought I (*44) would liketo see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our linestowards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officercarrying a white flag. 

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. We had therebetween the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation ofover half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the Southwas a big country and that we might have to march over it three or fourtimes before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to doit as they could no longer resist us. He expressed it as his earnesthope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss andsacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. I thensuggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacywhose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great ashis, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies Ihad no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. But Lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the President first. Iknew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas ofwhat was right. 

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed tohave a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines. They finallyasked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of theirold army friends, and the permission was granted. They went over, had avery pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them backwith them when they returned. 

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to thehouse of Mr. McLean. Here the officers of both armies came in greatnumbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had beenfriends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the sameflag. For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of thewar had escaped their minds. After an hour pleasantly passed in thisway I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by thistime been repaired. 

CHAPTER LXVIII. 

MORALE OF THE TWO ARMIES--RELATIVE CONDITIONS OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH--PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND--ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON--PRESIDENTLINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION--PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY. 

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac and theJames were in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the Nationaltroops had greatly improved. There was no more straggling, no more rearguards. The men who in former times had been falling back, were now, asI have already stated, striving to get to the front. For the first timein four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time whenthey could return to their homes with their country saved. On the otherhand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. Theirdespondency increased with each returning day, and especially after thebattle of Sailor's Creek. They threw away their arms in constantlyincreasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves tothe woods in the hope of reaching their homes. I have already instancedthe case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel I metat Farmville. As a result of these and other influences, when Leefinally surrendered at Appomattox, there were only 28, 356 officers andmen left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. It wasprobably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimesmade, North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller number of men thanwhat the official figures show. As a matter of official record, and inaddition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between March29th and the date of surrender 19, 132 Confederates, to say nothing ofLee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series ofdesperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. The same record shows the number of cannon, including those atAppomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. 

There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number oftroops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought betweenthe sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engagedand belittling their own. Northern writers have fallen, in manyinstances, into the same error. I have often heard gentlemen, who werethoroughly loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the Southhad made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, withtheir twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelvefour being colored slaves, non-combatants. I will add to theirargument. We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteeredunder great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South. 

But the South had rebelled against the National government. It was notbound by any constitutional restrictions. The whole South was amilitary camp. The occupation of the colored people was to furnishsupplies for the army. Conscription was resorted to early, and embracedevery male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only thosephysically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number ofcivil officers of State and intended National government. The old andphysically disabled furnished a good portion of these. The slaves, thenon-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in thefield without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. Childrenfrom the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were notmuch older when they began to hold the plough. The four million ofcolored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their numberin the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from thesoil to support armies. Women did not work in the fields in the North, and children attended school. 

The arts of peace were carried on in the North. Towns and cities grewduring the war. Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery toincrease the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had beenset up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellionhad been successful. No rear had to be protected. All the troops inservice could be brought to the front to contest every inch of groundthreatened with invasion. The press of the South, like the people whoremained at home, were loyal to the Southern cause. 

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented about thesame appearance they do in time of peace. The furnace was in blast, theshops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only tosupply the population of the North and the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. In theNorth the press was free up to the point of open treason. The citizencould entertain his views and express them. Troops were necessary inthe Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army beingreleased by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire ourNorthern cities. Plans were formed by Northern and Southern citizens toburn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infectionby importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river andlake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. Thecopperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the Union army. It was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army. The North would have been muchstronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranksand the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentimentwas in the South, than we were as the battle was fought. 

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp. The coloredpeople, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the fieldand took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were atthe front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. The cause waspopular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. Theconscription took all of them. Before the war was over, furtherconscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age asjunior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as seniorreserves. It would have been an offence, directly after the war, andperhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, whowas between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the Confederate army. He would assert that hehad, or account for his absence from the ranks. Under suchcircumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such asuperiority of force in every battle fought. I know they did not. 

During 1862 and '3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no militaryeducation, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rearof the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. He had no base ofsupplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. The armyoperating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its linesof communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come tothe front. Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed atconvenient distances apart. These guards could not render assistancebeyond the points where stationed. Morgan Was foot-loose and couldoperate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe hecould do the greatest damage. During the time he was operating in thisway he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever hadunder his command at any one time. He destroyed many millions ofproperty in addition. Places he did not attack had to be guarded as ifthreatened by him. Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the National front quite as many men as could be sparedfor offensive operations. It is safe to say that more than half theNational army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were onleave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate armyconfronted them. I deem it safe to say that there were no largeengagements where the National numbers compensated for the advantage ofposition and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. 

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond incompany with Admiral Porter, and on board his flagship. He found thepeople of that city in great consternation. The leading citizens amongthe people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious thatsomething should be done to relieve them from suspense. General Weitzelwas not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboringvillages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagrationwhich they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital. The President sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview washad on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen ofVirginia being also present. After this interview the President wrote anorder in about these words, which I quote from memory: "General Weitzelis authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature ofVirginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops fromthe Confederate armies. "

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a callfor a meeting and had it published in their papers. This call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did notsay the "Legislature of Virginia" but "the body which called itself theLegislature of Virginia. " Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in theNorthern papers the very next issue and took the liberty ofcountermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, orany other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President wasnearer the spot than he was. 

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was a man who neverquestioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what hewanted to do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but theConstitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. In thislatter particular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held. TheConstitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of1861-5. While it did not authorize rebellion it made no provisionagainst it. Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is asinherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of anindividual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. The Constitution wastherefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any wayaffected the progress and termination of the war. 

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were notrestricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the actsof their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for whichthe South was then fighting. It would be a hard case when one-third ofa nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, isentirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts tomaintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitutionprepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring thepermanency of the confederation of the States. 

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff anda few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington. The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired and the groundbeing soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, itwas after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point. As soonas possible I took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City. 

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing thenecessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with mydifferent commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to beable to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school. Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, andwe were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to thetheatre on the evening of that day. I replied to the President's verbalinvitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would takegreat pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to getaway and visit my children, and if I could get through my work duringthe day I should do so. I did get through and started by the eveningtrain on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would notbe at the theatre. 

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on BroadStreet; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informingme of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of theprobable assassination of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, andrequesting my immediate return. 

It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame meat the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassinationof the President. I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, hisyielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above allhis desire to see all the people of the United States enter again uponthe full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. I knew alsothe feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversationagainst the Southern people, and I feared that his course towards themwould be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if theybecame such they would remain so for a long while. I felt thatreconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. 

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to WashingtonCity; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after midnight and Burlingtonwas but an hour away. Finding that I could accompany her to our houseand return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from thePhiladelphia station, I went up with her and returned immediately by thesame special train. The joy that I had witnessed among the people inthe street and in public places in Washington when I left there, hadbeen turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. Ihave stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and myjudgment now is that I was right. I believe the South would have beensaved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered byMr. Johnson's course towards them during the first few months of hisadministration. Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln's assassination wasparticularly unfortunate for the entire nation. 

Mr. Johnson's course towards the South did engender bitterness offeeling. His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "Treason is a crime and must be made odious, " was repeated to all thosemen of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety sothat they might go to work at something with the feeling that what theyobtained would be secure to them. He uttered his denunciations withgreat vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances ofsafety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. 

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought tobe, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those overwhom he presides; and the Southerners who read the denunciations ofthemselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that heuttered the sentiments of the Northern people; whereas, as a matter offact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the greatmajority of the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, wouldhave been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be theleast humiliating to the people who had rebelled against theirgovernment. They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that besidesbeing the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. 

The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into theUnion, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. Naturallythe nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had notrebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their oldantagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had ayoke around their necks. 

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that timewere in favor of negro suffrage. They supposed that it would naturallyfollow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time ofprobation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for theprivileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; butMr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regardthe South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people bestentitled to consideration of any of our citizens. This was more thanthe people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union wereprepared for, and they became more radical in their views. TheSoutherners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnsonhaving gone to their side; and with a compact South, and such sympathyand support as they could get from the North, they felt that they wouldbe able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted asif they thought they were entitled to do so. 

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and receiving thesupport of the South on the other, drove Congress, which wasoverwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and thenanother to restrict his power. There being a solid South on one sidethat was in accord with the political party in the North which hadsympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congressand of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessaryto enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. In this work, I shallnot discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in thisparticular proved a wise one. It became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of theSouthern people to their own interest. As to myself, while stronglyfavoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the peoplewho had been in rebellion, I gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement. 

CHAPTER LXIX. 

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON--JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO SHERMAN--CAPTURE OFMOBILE--WILSON'S EXPEDITION--CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS--GENERALTHOMAS'S QUALITIES--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL CANBY. 

When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed leisurely backto Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of theJames, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. GeneralJohnston, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina confrontingGeneral Sherman. It could not be known positively, of course, whetherJohnston would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, though Isupposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was thenatural point from which to move to attack him. The army which I couldhave sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Shermanconfronted him was also superior; and between the two he wouldnecessarily have been crushed, or driven away. With the loss of theircapital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whetherJohnston's men would have the spirit to stand. My belief was that hewould make no such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precautionagainst what might happen, however improbable. 

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a messenger toNorth Carolina by boat with dispatches to General Sherman, informing himof the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I hadgiven him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnstonif the latter chose to accept them. The country is familiar with theterms that Sherman agreed to CONDITIONALLY, because they embraced apolitical question as well as a military one and he would therefore haveto confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. 

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting thereto confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincolnhad said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads, viz. : that before he could enter into negotiations with them they wouldhave to agree to two points: one being that the Union should bepreserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if theywere ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign hisname to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balanceof the terms upon which we would live together. He had also seennotices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Richmond, and hadread in the same papers that while there he had authorized the conveningof the Legislature of Virginia. 

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made withgeneral Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President ofthe United States. But seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. They signedthem with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the termscould be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the properauthorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then hewould give due notice, before resuming hostilities. As the world knows, Sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land(Congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for asecond lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to thatgrade), was denounced by the President and Secretary of War in verybitter terms. Some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor--a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so muchservice as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting suchterms as he did to Johnston and his army. If Sherman had takenauthority to send Johnston with his army home, with their arms to be putin the arsenals of their own States, without submitting the question tothe authorities at Washington, the suspicions against him might havesome foundation. But the feeling against Sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullestconfidence of the American people. 

When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson and theSecretary of war received the terms which General Sherman had forwardedfor approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sentfor. There seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest Sherman wouldcommit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede toand which he had no right to grant. A message went out directing thetroops in the South not to obey General Sherman. I was ordered toproceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matter theremyself. Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon aspossible. I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly aspossible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of mypresence. 

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, and we were at oncecloseted together. I showed him the instruction and orders under whichI visited him. I told him that I wanted him to notify General Johnstonthat the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not beenapproved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the sameterms I had given General Lee. I sent Sherman to do this himself. Idid not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the armygenerally; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of thesurrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I wasanywhere near the field. As soon as possible I started to get away, toleave Sherman quite free and untrammelled. 

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, containing the lastnewspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in theNorth over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and harsh orders thathad been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War. I knew thatSherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what greatindignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelingscould have been more excited than were my own. But like the true andloyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had givenhim, obtained the surrender of Johnston's army, and settled down in hiscamp about Raleigh, to await final orders. 

There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not becommunicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgmentof their respective commanders. With these it was impossible to tellhow the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they musthave heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. 

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from thecommands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off: one under Canbyhimself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from EastTennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March. They were all eminently successful, but without any good result. Indeed much valuable property was destroyedand many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. The war was practically over before their victories were gained. Theywere so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troopsaway that otherwise would have been operating against the armies whichwere gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender. The onlypossible good that we may have experienced from these raids was byStoneman's getting near Lynchburg about the time the armies of thePotomac and the James were closing in on Lee at Appomattox. 

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike theVirginia and Tennessee Railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed itsbridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemyup to within a few miles of Lynchburg. His approach caused theevacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and wasthe cause of a commotion we heard of there. He then pushed south, andwas operating in the rear of Johnston's army about the time thenegotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter'ssurrender. In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amountof stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners werethe trophies of his success. 

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March. The city of Mobilewas protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city. Theseforts were invested. On the night of the 8th of April, the Nationaltroops having carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish Fort wasevacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee's surrender, Blakely wascarried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th thecity was evacuated. 

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent againstMobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. Itfinally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into ourhands without any bloodshed whatever. 

Wilson moved out with full 12, 000 men, well equipped and well armed. Hewas an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest wasin his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-timeprestige. He now had principally conscripts. His conscripts weregenerally old men and boys. He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson'scavalry. Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number ofprisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc. , tobe disposed of by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Pointfell in quick succession. These were all important points to the enemyby reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, andbecause of their manufactories of war material. They were fortified orintrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they werecaptured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. Here news wasreceived of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and ofcourse was bound by his terms. This stopped all fighting. 

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officerstill at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May hesurrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department onthe 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty tocontinue the war. 

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of thedefunct confederacy before he got out of the country. This occurred atIrwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: I feared that if notcaptured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there setup a more contracted confederacy. The young men now out of homes andout of employment might have rallied under his standard and protractedthe war yet another year. The Northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgageupon their homes. 

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he did notwish to deal with the matter of his punishment. He knew there would bepeople clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate president, forhigh treason. He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atonefor our wickedness as a nation. At all events he did not wish to be thejudge to decide whether more should be shed or not. But his own lifewas sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president ofthe Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which hehad lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. 

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest ofall concerned. This reflection does not, however, abate in theslightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good andgreat a man as Abraham Lincoln. 

He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, and savedmuch of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out byreconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himselfupon Southern men of better social standing than himself, but who stillsought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea andadvanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantlyout of all their difficulties. 

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period tostay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the peopleto be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it washoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before thequestion of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and adecision obtained. These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "adead letter" upon the statute books of the United States, no one takinginterest enough in them to give them a passing thought. 

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when hewas captured. I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge ofthe facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given tome by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davislearned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressedin a gentleman's dressing gown. Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted toescape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplishedprovided it might be done successfully. If captured, he would be noordinary prisoner. He represented all there was of that hostility tothe government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and themost costly in other respects of which history makes any record. Everyone supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that hewould be executed. Had he succeeded in making his escape in anydisguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by hisadmirers. 

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as myremarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhatupon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I givemy estimate of him as a soldier. The same remark will apply also in thecase of General Canby. I had been at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. He was a man of commandingappearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honestand brave. He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminentdegree. He gained the confidence of all who served under him, andalmost their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is aquality which calls out the most efficient services of the troopsserving under the commander possessing it. 

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He couldnot be driven from a point he was given to hold. He was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do not believe that he couldever have conducted Sherman's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta againstthe defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. On the otherhand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried tohold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer could havedone it better. 

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the greattragedy of 1861-5. 

General Canby was an officer of great merit. He was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. There have been in the army but very few, ifany, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting everyact of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army ashe. His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staffofficer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were renderedup to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of theGulf. He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent andlearning. I presume his feelings when first called upon to command alarge army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own whenmarching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861. Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going intobattle with some one else commanding. Had Canby been in otherengagements afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced withoutany fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. He was afterwardskilled in the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of thehostile Modoc Indians. His character was as pure as his talent andlearning were great. His services were valuable during the war, butprincipally as a bureau officer. I have no idea that it was from choicethat his services were rendered in an office, but because of hissuperior efficiency there. 

CHAPTER LXX. 

THE END OF THE WAR--THE MARCH TO WASHINGTON--ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANECDOTES--GRAND REVIEW AT WASHINGTON--CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN AND STANTON--ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT CORPS COMMANDERS. 

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be nomore armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina andVirginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go intocamp there until mustered out. Suitable garrisons were left at theprominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the lawsthat might be enacted for the government of the several States, and toinsure security to the lives and property of all classes. I do not knowhow far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. I think now that these garrisonswere continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it isnot to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between thesections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many seriousapprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. 

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on thesouth side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them incamp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation wasthere. 

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issuedorders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the papers on his return, containingthis order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Shermanreceived an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be hisguest. This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. He also stated that he was coming up totake command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probablybe as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) wouldnot be responsible for what some rash person might do throughindignation for the treatment he had received. Very soon after that, Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to gointo camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of thetroops. 

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward fromGoldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City. The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in allthe battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through theSouthern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence toWashington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Armyof the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any otherbody of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for thepreservation of the Union. 

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to the sea and north toGoldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that wasanticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificentin the way it was conducted. It had an important bearing, in variousways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. Georgia, and South Carolina, andalmost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt frominvasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, thatthe people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees hadbeen whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, andthat now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than tofind a way out of the war with honor to themselves. 

Even during this march of Sherman's the newspapers in his front wereproclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men whowere frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to tryto get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southernpeople. As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, theminds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state ofaffairs. In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad tosubmit without compromise. 

Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which wascalculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse ofGeorgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. As the troopsadvanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in SouthCarolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off theirresources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolinadependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already verymuch exhausted of food and forage. 

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the otherfrom the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went intocamp near the Capital, as directed. The troops were hardy, being inuredto fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fitfor duty as they had ever been in their lives. I doubt whether an equalbody of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a greatbattle. 

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officerscapable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations ofEurope are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent andwho have very little interest in the contest in which they are calledupon to take part. Our armies were composed of men who were able toread, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be inducedto serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of thenation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equalto men who fought merely because they were brave and because they werethoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. 

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the timethese troops were in camp before starting North. 

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdotecharacteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It occurred a day after I reachedWashington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville withthe army. Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with theConfederate States government, and had gone to Danville. Supposing Iwas necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter tome there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the Stateof Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmondto Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform thefunctions of his office there without molestation by the Federalauthorities. I give this letter only in substance. He also inquired ofme whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of hisoffice, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the countryand go abroad without interference. General Meade being informed that aflag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sentout and had the letter brought in without informing the officer whobrought it that I was not present. He read the letter and telegraphedme its contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiving thisdispatch, I repeated its contents to him. Mr. Lincoln, supposing I wasasking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of Governor Smith'sletter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permittedto leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of acertain Irishman (giving the name) he knew in Springfield who was verypopular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very muchliked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and hisfriends could see that the habit was growing on him. These friendsdetermined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up apledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. They asked Pat to jointhem in signing the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long outof the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted tosoda-water as a substitute. After a few days this began to growdistasteful to him. So holding the glass behind him, he said: "Doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself. "

I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, butI know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties ofhis office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, therewould have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving thecountry who desired to do so. He would have been equally willing topermit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had timeto repent of their choice. 

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for agrand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman's and Meade'sarmies. The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. Meade'sarmy occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand standwhich had been erected in front of the President's house. Shermanwitnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by thePresident and his cabinet. Here he showed his resentment for the crueland harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him bythe Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand. 

Sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac. During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far fromthe Capitol. Promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, histroops commenced to pass in review. Sherman's army made a differentappearance from that of the Army of the Potomac. The latter had beenoperating where they received directly from the North full supplies offood and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was thereview of a body of 65, 000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderlysoldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without theexperience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy'scountry, and of being ever on the watch. Sherman's army was not sowell-dressed as the Army of the Potomac, but their marching could notbe excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughlydrilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches orthrough exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. They exhibited also some of the order of march through Georgia where the"sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as Sherman's army wentmarching through. In the rear of a company there would be a capturedhorse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens andother food picked up for the use of the men. Negro families who hadfollowed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the motherleading it. 

The sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass oforderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. The National flagwas flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filledwith spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with coloredpeople and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quartersfrom which to get a view of the grand armies. The city was about asfull of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is oninauguration day when a new President takes his seat. 

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and theSecretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures inthe executive branch of the government. There is no great difference ofopinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of thePresident. With Mr. Stanton the case is different. They were the veryopposite of each other in almost every particular, except that eachpossessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men bymaking them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. He preferredyielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist uponhaving his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In mattersof public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the leastoffensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority tocommand, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others. In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or inacting without advising with him. If his act was not sustained, hewould change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he didso. 

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complementof each other. The Secretary was required to prevent the President'sbeing imposed upon. The President was required in the more responsibleplace of seeing that injustice was not done to others. I do not knowthat this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority ofthe people. It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. Mr. Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of apublic trust. 

Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals inmaking and executing their plans. The Secretary was very timid, and itwas impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering thecapital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement againstthe army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would nothave been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field. Thesecharacteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly afterEarly came so near getting into the capital. 

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the warbetween the States, and who attracted much public attention, but ofwhose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker. There were others ofgreat merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie. Of thosefirst named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of thePotomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio. Hooker also commanded theArmy of the Potomac for a short time. 

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to hisusefulness that were beyond his control. He had been an officer of theengineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served withtroops until he was over forty-six years of age. He never had, Ibelieve, a command of less than a brigade. He saw clearly anddistinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the countryin front of his own position. His first idea was to take advantage ofthe lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction wewanted to move afterwards. He was subordinate to his superiors in rankto the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own planswith the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all whoknew him. He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond hiscontrol, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in themost offensive manner. No one saw this fault more plainly than hehimself, and no one regretted it more. This made it unpleasant attimes, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even withinformation. In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer anddeserves a high place in the annals of his country. 

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. He was not, however, fitted to command an army. No one knew this betterthan himself. He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those ofofficers under him beyond what they were entitled to. It was hardly hisfault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. 

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I had known him very wellbefore, however. Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievementin bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and intoChattanooga Valley was brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as adangerous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. He wasambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. Hisdisposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the mainbody of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to hisstandard all he could of his juniors. 

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officerswho did not exercise a separate command. He commanded a corps longerthan any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committedin battle a blunder for which he was responsible. He was a man of veryconspicuous personal appearance. Tall, well-formed and, at the time ofwhich I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearancethat would attract the attention of an army as he passed. His genialdisposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presencewith his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidenceof troops serving under him. No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corpsalways felt that their commander was looking after them. 

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity offorming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personalobservation. I had known him in Mexico when both of us werelieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of uswould ever be equal to the command of a brigade. He stood very high inthe army, however, as an officer and a man. He was brave andconscientious. His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dreadresponsibility. He was willing to do any amount of battling, but alwayswanted some one else to direct. He declined the command of the Army ofthe Potomac once, if not oftener. 

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without amilitary education. His way was won without political influence up toan important separate command--the expedition against Fort Fisher, inJanuary, 1865. His success there was most brilliant, and won for himthe rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-generalof volunteers. He is a man who makes friends of those under him by hisconsideration of their wants and their dues. As a commander, he wontheir confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness ofperception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at anygiven time. 

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but cameinto that position so near to the close of the war as not to attractpublic attention. All three served as such, in the last campaign of thearmies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at AppomattoxCourt House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden collapse of therebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everythingelse. I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in thearmy. Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year ofthe war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before itsclose. This he did upon his own merit and without influence. 

CONCLUSION. 

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Statuswill have to be attributed to slavery. For some years before the warbegan it was a trite saying among some politicians that "A state halfslave and half free cannot exist. " All must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. I took no part myself in any such view ofthe case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the wholequestion, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. 

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for itssecurity wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where thelarger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent andwell-to-do population, the people would naturally have but littlesympathy with demands upon them for its protection. Hence the people ofthe South were dependent upon keeping control of the general governmentto secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. They wereenabled to maintain this control long after the States where slaveryexisted had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistancethey received from odd men here and there throughout the NorthernStates. They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach uponthe prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enactingsuch laws as the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every Northern manwas obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehendthe runaway slave of a Southern man. Northern marshals becameslave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the supportand protection of the institution. 

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer thanuntil they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statutebooks. Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority ofthe people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so longas they were not forced to have it themselves. But they were notwilling to play the role of police for the South in the protection ofthis particular institution. 

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphsand steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the States wereeach almost a separate nationality. At that time the subject of slaverycaused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. But the countrygrew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between theStates got to be so much greater than before, that the power of theNational government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, hadto be enlisted in the cause of this institution. 

It is probably well that we had the war when we did. We are better offnow than we would have been without it, and have made more rapidprogress than we otherwise should have made. The civilized nations ofEurope have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of differentnationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the fewwho had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their owncountry or who knew anything about other people. Then, too, ourrepublican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breakingout of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that ourrepublic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slighteststrain was brought upon it. Now it has shown itself capable of dealingwith one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people haveproven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. 

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity ofavoiding wars in the future. 

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows thelack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not comeupon a single individual. Seeing a nation that extended from ocean toocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we weregrowing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nationsthought it would be well to give us a check. We might, possibly, aftera while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of theirinstitutions. Hence, England was constantly finding fault with theadministration at Washington because we were not able to keep up aneffective blockade. She also joined, at first, with France and Spain insetting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totallydisregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as anindependent power. It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. 

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give thatprotection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have likedto give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans fromthem. Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seizedupon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon ourcontinent, thus threatening our peace at home. I, myself, regarded thisas a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat itas such when their hands were free to strike. I often spoke of thematter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard anyspecial views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or feltabout it. I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but wereunwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon ourhands. 

All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armedintervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throneof Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to theclose of the war to throw obstacles in our way. After the surrender ofLee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridanwith a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez inexpelling the French from Mexico. These troops got off before theycould be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributedthem up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops inthe quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream. This soon led to arequest from France that we should withdraw our troops from the RioGrande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. FinallyBazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government. From that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was then able tomaintain her independence without aid from us. 

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States. I didnot blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon theruins of the Mexican Republic. That was the scheme of one man, animitator without genius or merit. He had succeeded in stealing thegovernment of his country, and made a change in its form against thewishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play the part of thefirst Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. He sought bynew conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failureof his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. 

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was anexpensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people. Itwas the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The beginning waswhen he landed troops on this continent. Failing here, the prestige ofhis name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. He must achieve asuccess or fall. He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia--andfell. 

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize hisgreat genius. His work, too, has left its impress for good on the faceof Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a goodor just act. 

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the lastone, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, inpopulation, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nationswhich led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unlesswe are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement beingsome day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty years after thewar, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going onas if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasionby the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we couldprepare for them. 

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put inthe finest possible condition. Neither of these cost much when it isconsidered where the money goes, and what we get in return. Moneyexpended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends toprevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce withforeign nations in the meantime. Money spent upon sea-coast defences isspent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling ofsecurity. 

England's course towards the United States during the rebellionexasperated the people of this country very much against the mothercountry. I regretted it. England and the United States are naturalallies, and should be the best of friends. They speak one language, andare related by blood and other ties. We together, or even eitherseparately, are better qualified than any other people to establishcommerce between all the nationalities of the world. 

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracingthe people of different races from her own, better than any othernation. She is just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes themself-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. Shedoes not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which sheis at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the homegovernment. 

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion wasnot so much real as it was apparent. It was the hostility of theleaders of one political party. I am told that there was no time duringthe civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstrationin favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up infavor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North. Evenin Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut offfrom her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the Northat the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. 

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come upin the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. Thecondition of the colored man within our borders may become a source ofanxiety, to say the least. But he was brought to our shores bycompulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right toremain here as any other class of our citizens. It was looking to asettlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of SantoDomingo during the time I was President of the United States. 

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. The island is upon ourshores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millionsof people. The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in herfields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go thereto quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took it that the coloredpeople would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent statesgoverned by their own race. They would still be States of the Union, and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizenswould be almost wholly colored. 

By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territoryalmost equal in extent to that we already possessed. It was seen thatthe volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers tosettle up the Pacific coast country. Their numbers, however, werescarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the importantpoints of the territory acquired by that war. After our rebellion, whenso many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they foundthey were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop ofthe villages, but wanted larger fields. The mines of the mountainsfirst attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys andproductive grazing and farming lands were there. This territory, thegeography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, isnow as well mapped as any portion of our country. Railroads traverse itin every direction, north, south, east, and west. The mines are worked. The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agriculturallands are found in many of the valleys. This is the work of thevolunteer. It is probable that the Indians would have had control ofthese lands for a century yet but for the war. We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. 

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied toremain near the scenes of their birth. In fact an immense majority ofthe whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should theymove among entire strangers. So much was the country divided into smallcommunities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almosttell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. Before, newterritories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact withothers; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. Their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their breadand vegetables. All the streams abounded with fish. Trapping wouldfurnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay fornecessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. Occasionally some little articles ofluxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and ifanything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. 

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlementsof these frontiersmen. This is all changed now. The war begot a spiritof independence and enterprise. The feeling now is, that a youth mustcut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in theworld. There is now such a commingling of the people that particularidioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent;the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea";railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished thestudent of geography. 

The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. We havebut little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. Our experience ought to teach us thenecessity of the first; our power secures the latter. 

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be greatharmony between the Federal and Confederate. I cannot stay to be aliving witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it withinme that it is to be so. The universally kind feeling expressed for meat a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemedto me the beginning of the answer to "Let us have peace. "

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a sectionof the country, nor to a division of the people. They came fromindividual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--theProtestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies ofthe land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. Politics didnot enter into the matter at all. 

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be givenbecause I was the object of it. But the war between the States was avery bloody and a very costly war. One side or the other had to yieldprinciples they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to anend. I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victoriousside. I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representativeof that side of the controversy. It is a significant and gratifyingfact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneousmove. I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. 

APPENDIX. 

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE UNITED STATES ARMIES1864-65. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , July 22, 1865. 

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operationsof the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment tocommand the same. 

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the ideathat active and continuous operations of all the troops that could bebrought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessaryto a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy and hisnumerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, togarrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications toprotect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. 

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy touse to great advantage his interior lines of communication fortransporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army mostvigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons ofinactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work ofproducing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whetherour numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced bythese disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. 

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be hadthat would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, bothNorth and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirelybroken. 

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troopspracticable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him fromusing the same force at different seasons against first one and thenanother of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting andproducing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, tohammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and hisresources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should benothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section ofour common country to the constitution and laws of the land. 

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given andcampaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been betterin conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss offriends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All Ican say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to thebest of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interestsof the whole country. 

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contendingforces was about as follows: The Mississippi River was stronglygarrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possessionof all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points inSouthern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, togetherwith a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All thebalance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was inthe almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probablynot less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have beenbrought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to havebrought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force sothat probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present ingarrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, withthe bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and alongthe Mississippi River, and the disloyal character of much of thepopulation, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keepnavigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to thewest of it. To the east of the Mississippi we held substantially withthe line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward toinclude nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, asmall foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect EastTennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with theexception of the northern border, the Potomac River, a small area aboutthe mouth of James River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and FortMonroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying alongthe Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coastfootholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Bern, inNorth Carolina; Beaufort, Folly and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, FortPulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in ourpossession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman andother commanders in March, 1864, shows by red lines the territoryoccupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening ofthe campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it wasproposed to occupy. 

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a largepopulation disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guardevery foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boycapable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms inthe field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into thefield. 

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of theMississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Leeoccupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Runwestward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, therebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnstonoccupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering anddefending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroadcentre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. Inaddition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, inNorth-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in theShenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extremeeastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. 

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were themain objective points of the campaign. 

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of theMilitary Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies andterritory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and theDepartment of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediatecommand of the armies operating against Johnston. 

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army ofthe Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movementsof all our armies. 

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to breakit up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as hecould, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. Ifthe enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up tothe full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentrationof Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to doso. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reasonthat I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and wassatisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullestextent possible. 

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River againstShreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to myappointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of theimportance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliestpossible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupyfrom ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given histroops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at thetime specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment ofthe main object of the Red River expedition, for this force wasnecessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should hisexpedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red Riverwith such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance ofhis troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move forthe further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that thenheld by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the springcampaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troopsenough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing othermovements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such anexpedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real movefrom Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of ademonstration, as Steele thought advisable. 

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification anddirections, he was instructed as follows:

"1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that youturn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy. 

"2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your holdupon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if theywill turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. Atleast one-half of the force required for this service might be takenfrom the colored troops. 

"3d. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force toguard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousandmen, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all therest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations canagain be resumed west of the river. According to your last return, thiswould give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with whichto move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men fromMissouri. If however, you think the force here stated too small to holdthe territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would sayconcentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present commandfor operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I cangive you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to befollowed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will beordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong navalfleet with which to co-operate. You can make your own arrangements withthe admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best aboutthe matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operativewith movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All Iwould now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces atonce. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and startat the earliest possible moment. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL N. P. BANKS. "

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be hisobjective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For hismovement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan belowLee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoringRichmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route, all wedid would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out;besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directedhow to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could beused as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York orJames rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lowerroute. 

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F. Butler:

"FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA, April 2, 1864. 

"GENERAL:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commenceat as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperativeaction of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can beaccomplished. 

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three largeones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holdingon to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generallyspeaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving tothe interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have toguard. By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemyand the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary toguard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part ofthe enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army andRichmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must bedirected in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force wecan against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army ofthe Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes itimpossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. Ipropose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seemspracticable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forcesfrom your command that can be spared from garrison duty--I should saynot less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the southside of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the forceyou already have will be added about ten thousand men from SouthCarolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command thetroops sent into the field from your own department. 

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soonthereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that timeto move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces asyou may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move tobe made. 

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force aspossible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate allyour troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Pointdirections cannot be given at this time for your further movements. 

"The fact that has already been stated--that is, that Richmond is to beyour objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between yourforce and the Army of the Potomac--must be your guide. This indicatesthe necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James Riveras you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchmentsin Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means oftransports the two armies would become a unit. 

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to yourdirection. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalrysouth of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the timeof the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. 

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicableday, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for theexecution of this order. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER. "

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that ofGeneral Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from FortMonroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper. The exacttime I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it wouldnot be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fightLee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junctionwith his (General Butler's) army on the James River; that, could I becertain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as tohave his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form thejunction there; that circumstances might make this course advisableanyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far upthe south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible afterthe receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, heshould at least detain as large a force there as possible. 

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I wasdesirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departmentsremote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept inthe background for the protection of our extended lines between theloyal States and the armies operating against them. 

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was soheld for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Marylandand Pennsylvania. Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distantfields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively smallbodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and givebetter protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movementthey would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protectionof his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available forceinto two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under commandof Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and VirginiaRailroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his ownrequest, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give upthe expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under GeneralCrook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on theShenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on theShenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and theinfantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry ascould be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in theShenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crookwould take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move downthe Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying theNew River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va. 

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations weredelayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness andthe roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all thearmies not later than the 4th of May. 

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, andcapture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that GeneralButler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that wouldtend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the East. If he failed, it was mydetermination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or toso cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, andstill retain enough for the defence of Richmond. It was wellunderstood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on thecampaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of theJames River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it. 

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at FortMonroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance ofgetting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communicationas far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability ofcapturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objectivepoint of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to movesimultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence ofthe city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River. 

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, asfar as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of theArmy of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all throughhim, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and theexecution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be theright man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence ofan officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of thatpublic attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which hewould otherwise have received. 

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morningof the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders ofMajor-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night, the wholearmy was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing atGermania Ford, and the second corps at Ely's Ford, the cavalry, underMajor-General Sheridan, moving in advance, ) with the greater part of itstrains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slightopposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day wasabout twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removedfrom my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that ofcrossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, andably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried througha hostile country, and protected. Early on the 5th, the advance corps(the fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged theenemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle ragedfuriously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fastas the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the densityof the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendablepromptness. 

General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of thePotomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of theRappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back toBull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that acrossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon assuch notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on theafternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he wasleading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of histroops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both theRappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. 

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on themorning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness setin, each army holding substantially the same position that they had onthe evening of the 5th. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt toturn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creatingconsiderable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who waspersonally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed itand restored order. On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showedthat the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets tothe front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it wasevident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of hisinability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait anattack behind his works. I therefore determined to push on and put mywhole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued fora movement by his right flank. On the night of the 7th, the march wascommenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving onthe most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of ourmovement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sentout to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the linetaken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on themain force, within the recently constructed works, after considerablefighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the9th, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines ofcommunication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent inmanoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed onthe 9th was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General JohnSedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. Major-General H. G. Wrightsucceeded him in command. Early on the morning of the 12th a generalattack was made on the enemy in position. The second corps, Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnson's division of Ewell's corps and twenty piecesof artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantagegained did not prove decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival ofreinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make anyfurther attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court House, orders wereissued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, tocommence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in theafternoon of the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on ourextreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavyloss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the21st, when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorterline, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reachthe North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The fifthcorps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closelyfollowed by the sixth corps. The second and ninth corps got up about thesame time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lyingbetween that and Jericho Ford. General Warren effected a crossing thesame afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. Soon aftergetting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemywith great slaughter. On the 25th, General Sheridan rejoined the Armyof the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, fourtrains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles ofrailroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way toRichmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry atYellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (butfinding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossedto the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where hecommunicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawingoff the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easyto guard our trains. 

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance ofinstructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him withthe tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eighthundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with himwherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south ofPetersburg and Richmond. On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a completesurprise. On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, andcommenced intrenching. On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against thePetersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after somefighting. On the 9th he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS, NEAR BERMUDA LANDING, May 9, 1864. 

"HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousandseven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced theChickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance picketstowards Richmond. 

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the sameday with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned therailroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting intoBeauregard's force at that point. 

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles ofrailroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can holdout against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies. 

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by thecutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reachedPetersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. 

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements toLee from Beauregard's force. 

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General. "

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portionof the enemy's first line of defences at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us thebenefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North andSouth Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. On the16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front ofDrury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchmentsbetween the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemyintrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, thecity, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though ina position of great security, was as completely shut off from furtheroperations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottlestrongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of theenemy to hold it there. 

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raidagainst the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freighttrains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissaryand other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it atWilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and White's Stations, destroying theroad and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which hereached on the 18th. 

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, theenemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C. , commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and ourgunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried byassault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboatSmithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled. 

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealeditself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregardagainst the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, avery considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, wasobtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from thewestern part of Virginia. 

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it wasdifficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to securewhat had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that theybe sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join theArmy of the Potomac. 

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this timeforward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command. 

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either ofhis previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bankof the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy'sposition by his right. 

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River atHanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the twodivisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with theenemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavyskirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, anddeveloped the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on theevening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, butwas repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediatelyordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted indriving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. 

On the 31st, General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroadbridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held ituntil relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith's command, which hadjust arrived, via White House, from General Butler's army. 

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P. M. By the 6th corpsand the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held inreadiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in ourcarrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of theright of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith. During theattack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engagedin the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in theday, but failed. The 2d was spent in getting troops into position foran attack on the 3d. On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy'sworks, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attemptour loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from theRapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses tocompensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying thatall previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplishedas much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemysevere losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow ofthe rebellion. 

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it wasimpossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and thecity. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, andinvest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his rightflank to the south side of the James. While the former might have beenbetter as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the groundsatisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north andeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, andthat would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave opento the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of theJames. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north ofRichmond, if possible. Then, after destroying his lines ofcommunication north of the James River, to transfer the army to thesouth side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if heshould retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident thatthe enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with thearmy he then had. He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, incase of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greatersacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not beaccomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I thereforedetermined to continue to hold substantially the ground we thenoccupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that mightpresent themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesvilleand Gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection betweenRichmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when the cavalrygot well off, to move the army to the south side of the James River, bythe enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources ofsupply, except by the canal. 

On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off onthe expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructionsto Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join hisforces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them wasthoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid downin Sheridan's instructions. 

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, underGeneral Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capturePetersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridgesacross the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, anddeeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred withoutattempting one. 

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent backto Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith's command by water, viathe White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before theenemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. 

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White OakSwamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corpsreached James River, at Wilcox's Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th. 

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginiahad been confronting each other. In that time they had fought moredesperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of twoarmies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground ofeither. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than wasdisplayed in the North, finding that they had failed to captureWashington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had beenfought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories forthem. Their army believed this. It produced a morale which could onlybe overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles ofthe Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna and Cold Harbor, bloody andterrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking theoffensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to thefact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably theattacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. Thedetails of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part ofthe soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report ofMajor-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. 

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the JamesRiver, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, bywagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lackof wharves at each new base from which to conveniently dischargevessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to thequartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiencydisplayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chiefquartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made tooccupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, andbut little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. 

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who had the immediatecommand of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed themountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and VirginiaRailroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River andChristiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges anddepots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook atUnion on the 15th. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, metthe enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, wasdefeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regardingthe operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removalfrom command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him. Hisinstructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-GeneralH. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army:

"NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, VA. "May 20, 1864. 

* * * * * * * "The enemy areevidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over thebranch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I thinkit would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reachStaunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet toomuch opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, hewill be doing good service. * * *

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. "

"JERICHO FORD, VA. , May 25, 1864. 

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he shoulddo so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should bedestroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, hecould find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsvillejoin this army. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK. "

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up theShenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on thefield of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces ofartillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of thesame month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, fromwhich place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place hereached and invested on the 16th day of June. Up to this time he wasvery successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with himsufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostilecountry, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories wasvery great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Leesent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reachedLynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to givebattle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want ofammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way ofKanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks fromthe defence of the North. 

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead ofLexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in aposition to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, shouldthe force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he wouldhave been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the mainline of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for itsdefence. I have never taken exception to the operations of GeneralHunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have nodoubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of hisinstructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of hismovements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation ofhis country. 

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The 2d corps commenced crossingthe James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox'sLanding. The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnightof the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidlypushed forward by both bridge and ferry. 

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to BermudaHundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture ofPetersburg. 

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to sendGeneral Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could givehim without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that Iwould return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing andthrow it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could bedone, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than theenemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight nextmorning, but for some reason that I have never been able tosatisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main linesuntil near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made theassault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from theAppomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturingfifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was aboutseven P. M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were noother works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforcedPetersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clearthe moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. GeneralHancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith justafter dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) mightwish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposedknew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. Butinstead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, herequested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the capturedworks, which was done before midnight. 

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. An attackwas ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops underSmith and the 2d and 9th corps. It required until that time for the 9thcorps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, andthe fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clockthe next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some ofthe main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previouslycaptured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over fourhundred prisoners. 

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted inwith great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing theenemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. Theadvantages of position gained by us were very great. The army thenproceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as faras possible without attacking fortifications. 

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part ofhis intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, toget troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawnbefore we could discover it. General Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it Iordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, thatwere embarking at Wilcox's Landing, under orders for City Point, toreport to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler wasnotified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of hispresent line urged upon him. 

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to theline the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, withhis two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to holdthem, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear ofhis own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemyattacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. 

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effectedby General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank ofthe James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with BermudaHundred. 

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition againstthe Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as theenemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. Theresult of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy'scavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whomhe attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field incomplete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in ourhands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. Onthe 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to LouisaCourt House. This occupied until three o'clock P. M. , when he advancedin the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced byinfantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from thelatter place and too strong to successfully assault. On the extremeright, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, andwas twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the contest. Nothaving sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animalsbeing without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), andhearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to thenorth side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reachingWhite House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot atthat place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely afterheavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac. 

On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Armyof the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army ofthe James moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams's Station, destroying the depotand several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteenmiles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met anddefeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He reached Burkesville Stationon the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the DanvilleRailroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where hefound the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could notdislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th metthe enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of StonyCreek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence hemade a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams's Station(supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by theenemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with theloss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, GeneralKautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his wayinto our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on ourleft and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more thancompensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection byrailroad with Richmond for several weeks. 

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to theAnna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in theShenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage ofhis necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a minethat had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy'slines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps andtwo divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed tothe north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butlerhad there. On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenchedposition, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the 28th ourlines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in gettingthis position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fightinglasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very largeforce thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of thediversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his forceback there. One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night ofthe 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, torelieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in theassault to be made. The other two divisions of the 2d corps andSheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and movedin front of Petersburg. On the morning of the 30th, between four andfive o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of aregiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9thcorps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and adetached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advancepromptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reasonto believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops wereimmediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them upenabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thusheld being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops werewithdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster whatpromised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. 

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter wasretreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying theShenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, hereturned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movementof the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached theKanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by riverand railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty ofnavigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, greatdelay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For thispurpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating againstRichmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginningto arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issuedimmediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red Riverexpedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this timemade up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachmentsfrom the invalid corps. One division under command of General Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisionsof the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent toWashington. On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated acrossthe Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper'sFerry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towardsFrederick City. General Wallace, with Rickett's division and his owncommand, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out fromBaltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on theMonocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was notsufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, andalthough it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with twodivision of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, beforehim. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advancereaching Rockville on the evening of the 10th. On the 12th areconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain theenemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lostabout two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's losswas probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested bytelegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven P. M. , on the 12th, theassignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all thetroops that could be made available to operate in the field against theenemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with allthe force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wrightcommenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtakenat Snicker's Ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred;and on the 20th, General Averell encountered and defeated a portion ofthe rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery andseveral hundred prisoners. 

Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armiesoperating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movementagainst Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley;and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping betweenany force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as muchas possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, thefact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leaveWashington. Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order toreturn to the James. 

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing uponMaryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, wasordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moveddown the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelley, andwith diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently downbetween Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmitmessages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four tothirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would bereceived showing a different state of facts from those on which theywere based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders thatmust have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, andrendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwisewould have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind thatsome person should have the supreme command of all the forces in theDepartment of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the MiddleDepartment, and I so recommended. 

On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person toMajor-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to hisassignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this timethe enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while ourforces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at thecrossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemyWestern Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, Ihesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces atMonocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine formyself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and afterconsultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the followinginstructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MARYLAND, August 5, 1864--8 P. M. 

"GENERAL:--Concentrate all your available force without delay in thevicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards andgarrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in thisconcentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. FromHarper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of thePotomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking himwherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long asit is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but asmall force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look afterthe raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockvillemay be taken into account. 

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the bestcavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will beinstructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the southside of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. Inpushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have togo first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invitethe enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted forthe use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is notdesirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather beprotected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an armycan subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, andwe are determined to stop them at all hazards. 

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do thisyou want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by thecourse he takes. 

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regularvouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the countrythrough which you march. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER. "

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reachedHalltown that night. 

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness tobe relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, thenat Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with ordersto take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call onGeneral Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter ofinstructions. I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, onthe morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation tomilitary affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way ofWashington. 

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of WestVirginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the "MiddleMilitary Division, " and Major-General Sheridan was assigned totemporary command of the same. 

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, weresent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him atHarper's Ferry about the 11th of August. 

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of Septemberwere both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in manysevere skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we weregenerally successful, but no general engagement took place. The twoarmies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the OpequonCreek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville--thateither could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay opento the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distancesbefore another army could be interposed to check him. Under thesecircumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeakeand Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became soindispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relievingPennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion sogreat, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing totelegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did ofGeneral Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, Ileft City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at hisheadquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each armylay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed suchconfidence of success, that I saw there were but two words ofinstructions necessary--Go in! For the conveniences of forage, theteams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked himif he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack onthe ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could beforedaylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add, that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary tovisit General Sheridan before giving him orders. 

Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked GeneralEarly at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinaryand bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeatedhim with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek toWinchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces ofartillery. The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position atFisher's Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy losson the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him with great energy throughHarrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After strippingthe upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebelarmy, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side ofCedar Creek. 

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early againreturned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalryencountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, withthe loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fiftyprisoners. On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountainswhich separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness andthe fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batterieswhich enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy lossand in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown andNewtown. At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester whenthe battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just intime to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assumingthe offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy wasdefeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery andtrains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck ofhis army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Stauntonand Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, theenemy's last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. Iwas now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, andto send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, andanother to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on thesea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his forcefor that purpose. 

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy haddetached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in theShenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg's divisionof cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler'sarmy, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from thenorth side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured sixpieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops thatwere under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division(Kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. 

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist thismovement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad. During the day he hadconsiderable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy maderepeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with greatloss. On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of theJames were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front atPetersburg. On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Reams's Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, andafter desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five piecesof artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. 

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the CityPoint and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us tosupply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front ofPetersburg. 

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled theenemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troopsnorth of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed tothe north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments belowChaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces ofartillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments. This success wasfollowed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in frontof the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavyloss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right ofthis, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but wasunable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was sothreatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it. The enemy madeseveral desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which wereunsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th, General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking theenemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal oftroops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and heldthe enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon, troopsmoving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemyin heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forcesholding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. 

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of theJames, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, andprisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. Thishe followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but wasrepulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sentout by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some newworks he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. 

On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men tohold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 2dcorps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry inadvance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's Run, and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, untilthe 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Roadwhere it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this point we were six miles distantfrom the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement toreach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of theenemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successfulassault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined towithdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connectedwith General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I leftthe enemy moved out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap between GeneralsHancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made adesperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancockimmediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drovethe enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. 

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on thenorth side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the WilliamsburgRoad, and also on the York River Railroad. In the former he wasunsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which wasafterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their formerpositions. 

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg andRichmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to thedefence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements forcrippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent hisdetaching any considerable force to send south. By the 7th of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon Railroad hadbeen destroyed to Hicksford. 

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with theArmies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively, by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston's army atDalton; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's Roost, coveringDalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent throughSnake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened itin front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortifiedposition at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, andheavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had againdisappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassvilleon the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis'sdivision of Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its fortsand artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it inmotion on the 23d, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult passat Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under GeneralHooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New HopeChurch, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted GeneralMcPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. 

On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at NewHope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, andLost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, andconcentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas andMcPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night ofthe 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence ofthis movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across theChattahoochee. 

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest andget up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad toAugusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hoodsucceeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assumingthe offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Shermanin the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of whichwas on the 22d of July. About one P. M. Of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logansucceeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through thisdesperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterizedhim in the command of a corps or division. 

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding itimpossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securinghis line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his mainforce round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Maconroads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, andLovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of Septemberoccupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. 

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attemptedto cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, anddriven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of theTennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. 

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joinedGeneral Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made asuccessful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and itsbranches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication withAtlanta. The first two were successful the latter, disastrous. 

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battlesduring that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interestunsurpassed by anything in history. 

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanyingit, give the details of that most successful campaign. 

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-trackrailroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. Thispassed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot ofit had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy underForrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman toadvance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreatdisastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibilityof further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what hesupposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in WestTennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to sendBrigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy nearGuntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter routand confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotlypursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in hisdesigns upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency withwhich he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season forrest and repairs necessary. In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent byGeneral Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their returnfrom Red River, where they had done most excellent service. He wasdirected by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive againstForrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which hascharacterized his whole military career. On the 14th of July, he metthe enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fightingcontinued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that ofthe enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, GeneralSmith returned to Memphis. 

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrestannoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commandedby Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers. Colonel H. , havingbut a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where herepulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. 

On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel GeneralBuford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, butreceived for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to holdhis post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of thequestion. 

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st RegimentAlabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison foughtbravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemycarried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. 

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared beforePaducah, but was again driven off. 

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the Statethrough Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the 11th of June theyattacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the 12thhe was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavyloss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerillawas afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and hiscommand captured and dispersed by General Gillem. 

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red Riverexpedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sentby General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give thedate of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising twodivisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, leftVicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on RedRiver one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebelforces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying theenemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fortde Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it withits garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces ofartillery, and many small-arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15thhe pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. Onthe 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's Hill, inwhich he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and fourpieces of artillery. 

On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebelGeneral Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th, General Banks had assembledhis whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On themorning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove himfrom the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eightmiles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked anddefeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and animmense amount of transportation and stores. During the night, GeneralBanks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night, GeneralBanks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence toAlexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a seriousdifficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet which accompanied theexpedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since theypassed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (nowBrigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams wereconstructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleetpassed down the rapids in safety. 

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerableskirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia and PointCoupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of thisexpedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable thecarrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure thecapture of Mobile. 

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7tharmy corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedition on the RedRiver, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On the 16th of April, afterdriving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, inWashita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle ofApril. 

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on RedRiver, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark's Mill, in DallasCounty, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2dof May. On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossingSaline River at Jenkins's Ferry, but was repulsed with considerableloss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. 

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the"Military Division of the West Mississippi, " was therefore directed tosend the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might benecessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he thenoccupied. 

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, GeneralCanby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that wascollecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and defeatedthis force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June. Our loss was aboutforty killed and seventy wounded. 

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General GordonGranger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate withAdmiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay. On the 8th ofAugust, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned. 

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to one thousandfour hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four piecesof artillery. 

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel GeneralPrice, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then enroute from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalryforce was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command ofColonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans's forces superior to thoseof Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Priceand drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the 26th day of September, Price attackedPilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north tothe Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas. GeneralCurtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected suchforces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while GeneralRosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. 

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with theloss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number ofprisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. Theimpunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missourifor a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to howlittle purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason whyGeneral Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beatenand driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob. 

September 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed theTennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrisonat Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, andafter a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed therailroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same daycut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th, one column of Forrest's command, underBuford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of thegarrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in thevicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned itssurrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. Hewithdrew in the direction of Athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but withoutsuccess. On the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but washandsomely repulsed. 

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning ofthe 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the 3d he movedtowards Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, everyexertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrestbefore he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent hisescape to Corinth, Mississippi. 

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroythe saltworks at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the 2d ofOctober, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him intohis strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which hewas unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his commandand returned to Kentucky. 

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armiesin camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refittingand supplying them for future service. The great length of road fromAtlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. 

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, whichwas reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to thewhole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling GeneralSherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing thatan army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attemptat the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against thearmy that had so often defeated it. 

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported tothe south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeededin reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it. 

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder ofhis army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing theconstant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if heattempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment anddestruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, andtelegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GEORGIA", October 10--noon. 

"Dispatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile andOhio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent byColonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now inTennessee to defend the State? He will have an ample force when thereinforcements ordered reach Nashville. 

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT. "

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, Iquote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter:

"I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should bereinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike forSavannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the MississippiRiver, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way ofthe Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and putmy army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the cityof Savannah is in our possession. " This was in reply to a letter ofmine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containingsubstantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of aproposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, etc. 

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11, 1864--11 A. M. 

"Your dispatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hoodwas going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobileand Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on theTennessee River, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he oughtto be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. Ifyou were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, butwould be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and suchrailroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strikefor Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greaterdamage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If thereis any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I musttrust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a forcefrom here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, willbe independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, couldnot prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with allyour cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensivethan heretofore. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN. "

"KINGSTON, GEORGIA, "October 11--11 A. M. 

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas andCedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome. He threw onecorps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlantawith the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. Thisreduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remainhere on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the boldcavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitelyprefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanoogato Atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded andworthless, and with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashingthings, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but Ibelieve he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on thedefensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what hemeans to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in waris full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or themouth of the Chattahoochee. 

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long. 

"W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT. "

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, "October 11, 1864--11. 30 P. M. 

"Your dispatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to thesea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton orChattanooga, as you think best. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN. "

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through tothe coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading eastand west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it hadbeen cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River. General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object. 

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposedmovement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across SandMountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanleycommanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, backto Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom hehad placed in command of all the troops of his military division, savethe four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move withthrough Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there waslittle doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate andbeat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Shermanshould start for the sea-coast. 

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, hecommenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-outpoint could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence ashe marched through the country, it was not impossible that a forceinferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he couldreach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army, the onlyconsiderable force he had west of Richmond and east of the MississippiRiver, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice. 

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, thecondition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture ofFort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannahon the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman'sadmirable report. 

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, twoexpeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's lines ofcommunication with Mobile and detain troops in that field. GeneralFoster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, viaBroad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-GeneralE. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, onthe 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroadbridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty milesof the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. Theexpedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. Theexpedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate commandof Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousandmen of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up BroadRiver and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th of November, from where itmoved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, aboutthree miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in astrongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, inour repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering theCharleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie andTulifinny rivers. 

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, whichseemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had Ihad the power to command both armies, I should not have changed theorders under which he seemed to be acting. On the 26th of October, theadvance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, butfailing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side ofthe Tennessee River, near Florence. On the 28th, Forrest reached theTennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eighttransports. On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboatsbecoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, toprevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million anda half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and instorehouses was consumed by fire. On the 5th the enemy disappeared andcrossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnsonville, moving towards Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night ofthe 5th, General Schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reachedJohnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, andwas put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watchthe movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a generalengagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command fromMissouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted. 

On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for thepurpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival ofreinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded byGeneral Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our worksrepeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in everyinstance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand sevenhundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and threethousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six generalofficers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was twothousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemymet with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville. Thisleft the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarilyabandoned--so that General Thomas's whole force might be broughttogether. The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of hisline in front of Nashville on the 2d of December. 

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the TennesseeRiver, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans wasordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith'scommand, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of thisreinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November. 

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood inposition, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him fromthe field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of hisartillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. 

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as itappeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increasedupon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across theCumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army andgive us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas thenecessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West tosuperintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, Ireceived General Thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied butthat General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood beforeNashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out withhis whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount hiscavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made itimpracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat ofHood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of thatdistinguished officer's judgment. 

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued bycavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandonmany pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 28th ofDecember our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good hisescape to the south side of the river. 

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and NorthAlabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the TennesseeRiver. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15thPennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy'spontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be foundclearly set forth in General Thomas's report. 

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started fromMemphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised and capturedForrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and OhioRailroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons andpontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English carbines, and largeamounts of public stores. On the morning of the 28th he attacked andcaptured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train offourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck theMississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories andlarge amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and publicproperty at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th. 

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force underGeneral Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 13th of Novemberhe attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery andseveral hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved tonear Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentratedthe commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's Station tooperate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia--destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginiaas far as he could go without endangering his command. On the 12th ofDecember he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy'sforces wherever he met them. On the 16th he struck the enemy, underVaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eightprisoners; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, andthe extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a forceunder Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison ofSaltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements toattack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. Hethen moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-worksat that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces ofartillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, hereturned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville. 

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port leftto the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cottonand other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place ofgreat strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions toseal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The natureof the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching forso great a distance that, without possession of the land north of NewInlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely closethe harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. 

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of aland force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced theassemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the mostformidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as thatof the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, andvery likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object ofthe expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapersboth North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part ofNovember, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, AssistantSecretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, andwent myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force requiredand the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men wasregarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitelyarranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had goneto Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, Ideemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach itsdestination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler tomake all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, whohad been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy mightnot be detained one moment. 

On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864. 

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel isto close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonablegrounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence ofthe greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after Sherman inGeorgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment ofthe expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of wherethey embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The objectof the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main landbetween Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance tothe river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holdsFort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, thenthe troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with thenavy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in ourhands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington wouldbe sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it isbuilt fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then itwill be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march andsurprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first object of theexpedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. 

"The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officerimmediately in command of the troops. 

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at ornear Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating againstRichmond without delay. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL B. F. BUTLER. "

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken forthis enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should gothrough him. They were so sent, but General Weitzel has sinceofficially informed me that he never received the foregoinginstructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read GeneralButler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with myindorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of GeneralButler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got offfrom Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzelhad received all the instructions, and would be in command. I ratherformed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witnessthe effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition wasdetained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of thepowder-boat. 

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without anydelay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon GeneralButler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter. 

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived atthe place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the eveningof the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, havingput in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becomingrough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water andcoal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort toreplenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return tothe place of rendezvous until the 24th. The powder-boat was exploded onthe morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler fromBeaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southernnewspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object ofthe explosion until they were informed by the Northern press. 

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and areconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towardsthe fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of thisreconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructionsgiven, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of theexpedition. The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the27th. 

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them BrevetMajor-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers, First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant GeorgeSimpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that whenrecalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it couldhave been taken without much loss. 

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from theSecretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing methat the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the convictionthat, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The naturalsupposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered onthe 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that Iwould send a force and make another attempt to take the place. Thistime I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry tocommand the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the samethat composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. Thelatter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct tothe commander of the expedition the following instructions:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 3, 1865. 

"GENERAL: The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted outto renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C. , and Wilmingtonultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as littledelay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, andreport the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

"It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding shouldexist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the partto be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there maybe unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laiddown in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that youcan rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. Iwould, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your ownresponsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firmposition on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from whichyou can operate against that fort. You want to look to thepracticability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourselfagainst superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left opento the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of FortFisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, oranother plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. 

"My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run aportion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of itoperates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cutit off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possessionof the enemy. 

"A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, inreadiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can bedrawn from Beaufort as you need them. 

"Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them asyou can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders. 

"In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back toBeaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed. 

"General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops toBaltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will bebrought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heardfrom. Should you require them, they will be sent to you. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL A. H. TERRY. "

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevetbrigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. 

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially fromthose given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance wasthere an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirelyto the discretion of the commanding officer. 

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing tothe difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. Undercover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on themorning of the 13th, and by three o'clock P. M. Was completed withoutloss. On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundredyards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of andturned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made fromthe fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of thework had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon ofthe 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting wascaptured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, bythe combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most importantsuccesses of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten;wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the 16th and the 17th theenemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith'sIsland, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entirecontrol of the mouth of the Cape Fear River. 

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, andMajor-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia andNorth Carolina. 

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the forcewhich had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas'ssurplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with othermovements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness fororders. On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he wasassured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send GeneralSchofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. Thisdirection was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corpsreached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent toFort Fisher and New Bern. On the 26th he was directed to send GeneralA. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to GeneralCanby. By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for itsdestination. 

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the ordersof Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VA. , January 31, 1865. 

"GENERAL:-- * * * Your movements are intended as co-operativewith Sherman's through the States of South and North Carolina. Thefirst point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' willthen be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that placewith the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behindyou. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to giveGeneral Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington orNew Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and foragefor sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get ofthese as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interioras you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has receivedsome instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securingsupplies for his army. You will learn what steps he has taken, and begoverned in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance storeswill also be necessary. 

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departmentsin the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by everyopportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send aspecial boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate bytelegraph. 

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of thoserequired for your own command. 

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperativeduty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aidSherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waitingfor instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left toyou. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are alreadyfully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may belooked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d tothe 28th of February; this limits your time very materially. 

"If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can besupplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have alreadybeen sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in aday or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL J. M. SCHOFIELD. "

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myselfthe condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terryand Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done. 

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his armyentirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, theSouthern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months tore-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the captureof Lee's army as the most important operation towards closing therebellion--I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, thatafter establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, toinclude all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Pointwith the balance of his command. 

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat andutter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to thegreat difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take overtwo months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he mightnot contribute as much towards the desired result by operating fromwhere he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his viewsas to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received acommunication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledgingthe receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparationsto carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Alsothat he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march toColumbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me;but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall ofSavannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle ofJanuary. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able tomarch up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to myletter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to makepreparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up therailroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operatingagainst Richmond as soon as he could. 

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numberedabout twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eightthousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington wascaptured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent toNew Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both pointswould move to the interior towards Goldsboro', in co-operation with hismovement; that from either point railroad communication could be runout; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he cameinto communication with them. 

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduceWilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under AdmiralPorter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River. FortAnderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, wasoccupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it afterour appearance before it. 

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on themorning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro' duringthe night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro'in two columns--one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern--and torepair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supplyGeneral Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it becamenecessary. The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundredprisoners. On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenchedposition, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during thenight. On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmingtonreached Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', onthe 22d. 

By the 1st of February, General Sherman's whole army was in motion fromSavannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thencemoved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching thelatter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with GeneralSchofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 15th he resumed his marchon Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after asevere fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in thisengagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving itback upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advanceascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaitedreinforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st theenemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in ourhands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had beenoccupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River tenmiles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General Terry had gotpossession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming ajunction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington. 

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17thof February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. 

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed tosend a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy therailroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he wasable, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasingour prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had nodoubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy couldcollect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was solate in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passedout of the State of South Carolina), on the 27th of February I directedGeneral Thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid oflast fall, destroying the railroad towards Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and theenemy. I regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemybeing driven from Richmond, he might fall back to Lynchburg and attempta raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of February thefollowing communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA. , February 14, 1865. 

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobileand the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twentythousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sentto Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalryalready in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gaveit in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now bythe withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a largeportion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in theRichmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few dayssince in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to SouthCarolina to oppose Sherman. ) This being true, or even if it is nottrue, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, andleave the advance from your standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold:first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insuresuccess to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communicationsand military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forcesbrought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be thepoints to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be soimportant as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretionshould be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure theobjects named above. 

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know whatnumber of men you can put into the field. If not more than fivethousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. Itis not desirable that you should start this expedition until the oneleaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I donot know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon asI learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing fromme, you can act on the information received. 

"To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train aspossible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reducethe number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put theextra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken withless than eight horses. 

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you thinkyou will be able to send under these directions. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS. "

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the20th as he could get it off. 

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of thearmies operating against Richmond, that all communications with thecity, north of James River, should be cut off. The enemy havingwithdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent itsouth, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforceSherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbersto that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possiblythe latter of the objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan asfollows:

"CITY POINT, VA. , February 20, 1865--1 P. M. 

"GENERAL:--As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have nodifficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. Fromthere you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so asto be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should beleft behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if informationyou might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading thestreams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and joinGeneral Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting fromEast Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one fromEastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latterpushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a largearmy eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wantedto leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you toovercome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuatedon Tuesday 1st. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN. "

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring whereSherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information asto the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer, the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA. , February 25, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--Sherman's movements will depend on the amount of oppositionhe meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly haveto fall back to Georgetown, S. C. , and fit out for a new start. Ithink, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point haspassed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville onhis way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to beguided in your after movements by the information you obtain. Beforeyou could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving fromGoldsboro' towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at oneor the other of these places, with railroad communications opened fromhis army to Wilmington or New Bern. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN. "

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with twodivisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the 1st ofMarch he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and enteredStaunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro'. Thencehe pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in anintrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make areconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horsesand caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded withsubsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually therailroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Herehe remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond andLynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and southforks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains. Thisnecessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sentone to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to NewMarket, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, toobtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burnedthe bridge across the river at Hardwicksville. The other column moveddown the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as AmherstCourt House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, hispontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed thebridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the SouthSide Railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court House, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a baseat the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Markethe took up his line of march, following the canal towards Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks whereverpracticable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating thewhole force at Columbia on the 10th. Here he rested one day, and sentthrough by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and arequest for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on thenight of the 12th. An infantry force was immediately sent to getpossession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving fromColumbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges andmany miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of thePamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the 19th. 

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 7, 1865--9. 30 A. M. 

"GENERAL:--I think it will be advisable now for you to repair therailroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap andfortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward asrequired. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts aboutall of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of youin the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into NorthCarolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he getsinto Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may becaught west of that. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL G. H. THOMAS. "

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving anadequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under GeneralDick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalryexpeditions--one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilsonagainst the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from EastTennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg--andassembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory tocommence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan'scavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James wereconfronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond andPetersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that ofGeneral Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was makingpreparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smithand Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock wasconcentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guardagainst invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. 

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, itwas necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this time thegreatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy wouldleave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose ofuniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, orI was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River atJones's Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac infront of Petersburg on the 27th. During this move, General Ord sentforces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy. 

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movementof the armies operating against Richmond were issued:

"CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 24, 1865. 

"GENERAL: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmondwill be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemyout of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the successof the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the sametime, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danvillerailroads. Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at firstin two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearestwhere the present line held by us strikes that stream, both movingtowards Dinwiddie Court House. 

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now underGeneral Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and theJerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing theNottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructionswhich will be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Armyof the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle MilitaryDivision not required for guarding property belonging to their arm ofservice, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to thedefences of City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command ofall the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of thePotomac. The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the presentline of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. If, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then theleft of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position heldby the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road. All troops to theleft of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortestnotice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. 

"General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, orso much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for thepresent left of the Army of the Potomac. In the absence of furtherorders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions willfollow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the coloreddivision the right column. During the movement Major-General Weitzelwill be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Armyof the James. 

"The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on thenight of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimumnumber of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the mainarmy. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also bestarted from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad aboutHicksford. This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, andtherefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. Theyshould, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be sparedfrom Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crossesthe Blackwater. The crossing should probably be at Uniten. ShouldColonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will beinstructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roadsbetween Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad bridge at Weldonbeing fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable todestroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected southof the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' rations inhaversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much hauling aspossible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days'supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct hiscommissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered atthe terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds ofammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as thetransportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount ofother supplies. The densely wooded country in which the army has tooperate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount takenwith the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, atthe option of the army commanders. 

"All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operationmay be commenced at once. The reserves of the 9th corps should bemassed as much as possible. While I would not now order anunconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be readyand should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. In case they carry the line, then the wholeof the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with thebalance of the army. To prepare for this, the 9th corps will haverations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. GeneralWeitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at allpracticable to break through at any point, he will do so. A successnorth of the James should be followed up with great promptness. Anattack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy hasdetached largely. In that case it may be regarded as evident that theenemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defenceof Richmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line northof the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, aftera break is made in the lines of the enemy. 

"By these instructions a large part of the armies operating againstRichmond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an onlychance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope ofadvantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against themoving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly uponcommanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occurwithout taking advantage of it. The very fact of the enemy coming outto attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusiveevidence of such a weakening of his lines. I would have it particularlyenjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from theenemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commandingofficer of the army to which they belong, but that they will movepromptly, and notify the commander of their action. I would also enjointhe same action on the part of division commanders when other parts oftheir corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge the importance offollowing up a repulse of the enemy. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERALS MEADE, ORD, AND SHERIDAN. "

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in frontof the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards ourleft), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right andleft of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fortagainst us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until thereserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavyloss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. General Meade at once ordered theother corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenchedpicket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred andthirty-four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake thisline, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-twokilled, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and sevenmissing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. 

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp aboutGoldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to themperfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and statedthat he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it shouldbecome necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee's army, inco-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg. General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston orthereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond and DanvilleRailroad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, or join the armiesoperating against Richmond, as might be deemed best. This plan he wasdirected to carry into execution, if he received no further directionsin the meantime. I explained to him the movement I had ordered tocommence on the 29th of March. That if it should not prove as entirelysuccessful as I hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy theDanville and South Side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of furthersupplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of Lee's andJohnston's armies. 

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the reportthat the enemy had retreated the night before. I was firmly convincedthat Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee toleave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensivecampaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. Bymoving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, andwould at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard theconcentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemyto abandon much material that he might otherwise save. I thereforedetermined not to delay the movement ordered. 

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie'scavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoinginstructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher's Runon the morning of the 29th. On the 28th the following instructions weregiven to General Sheridan:

"CITY POINT, VA. , March 28, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A. M. To-morrow morning. The 2d moves at about nine A. M. , having but aboutthree miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on theright of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House. Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without beingconfined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by the nearestroads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to orthrough Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as youcan. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenchedposition, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out andattack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with yourentire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the armywill engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on thefield, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I notdo so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenchedline, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find itpracticable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, betweenPetersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. I would notadvise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, whichI would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Makeyour destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can thenpass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that inlike manner. 

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, whichare now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to thisarmy, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into NorthCarolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may sendorders to meet you at Goldsboro'. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN. "

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night the cavalrywas at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extendedto the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road. The position of the troops from left to right was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke. 

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the captureof Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I thereforeaddressed the following communication to General Sheridan, havingpreviously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raidcontemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Roadto Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. Aftergetting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find theenemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the QuakerRoad intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturingabout one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushingon when last heard from. 

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, beforegoing back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after theenemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if youcan, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalrymay, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as onearmy here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. Thesignal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A. M. , that acavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN. "

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell insuch torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, exceptas corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridanadvanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he foundthe enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his lineacross the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view ofgetting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his frontand extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, andfortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his mainline on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, andParke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility ofan assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to ourextreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could bepenetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce GeneralSheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose andturn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault theenemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the weekbefore, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. Theenemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw thelines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points thatit was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were atonce made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to GeneralSheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to gettingpossession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. Toaccomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced backupon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2dcorps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back withheavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridanadvanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the FiveForks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforcedthe rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced himback towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayedgreat generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on themain army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployedhis cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge ofthe horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent ofwooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncturehe dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping backslowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and onedivision of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys couldhold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisionsof the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, andprecipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April, General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back onFive Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried hisstrongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and betweenfive and six thousand prisoners. 

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffinrelieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The reportof this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mindlest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by fallingupon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him fromhis position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in themorning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweepingeverything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturingmany guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed bytwo divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other divisionof General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines nearHatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, whileGeneral Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined GeneralWright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy'smain line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry hisinner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy'slines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon'scorps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--themost salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materiallyshortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. Theenemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagementensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatenedby the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Stationtowards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the frontof Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in ourhands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the mainroad along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemyevacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. Onthe morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushedfor the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by GeneralMeade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved forBurkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched alongthat road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the DanvilleRoad near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia CourtHouse. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival ofGeneral Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reachedBurkesville on the evening of the 5th. 

On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman thefollowing communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865. 

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reachDanville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with himlast night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, attwenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this numberone-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made atDanville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the jobwith Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you tostrike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better ableto judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategicpoints to strike at. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN. "

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving westof Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with hiscavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on hisreaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandonseveral hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ordadvanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments ofinfantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-GeneralTheodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met thehead of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked anddetained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord toget well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemyimmediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridanstruck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces ofartillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6thcorps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, amongwhom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps andGeneral Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. 

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, exceptone division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, onFarmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon foundthat the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but soclose was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the commonbridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediatelycrossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed atFarmville to its support. 

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, Iaddressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865. 

"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of thehopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of NorthernVirginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as myduty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion ofblood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the ConfederateStates army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "GENERAL R. E. LEE. "

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmvillethe following:

"April 7, 1865. 

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though notentertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of furtherresistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocateyour desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, beforeconsidering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on conditionof its surrender. 

"R. E. LEE, General. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. "

To this I immediately replied:

"April 8, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army ofNorthern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that peacebeing my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon--namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified fortaking up arms again against the Government of the United States untilproperly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meetany officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeableto you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which thesurrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "GENERAL R. E. LEE. "

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. General Meadefollowed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all thecavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed byGeneral Ord's command and the 5th corps. During the day General Meade'sadvance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but wasunable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening GeneralSheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy fromthere, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. Duringthis day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnightreceived the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine ofyesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army ofNorthern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To befrank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrenderof this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole objectof all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Armyof Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect theConfederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restorationof peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A. M. To-morrow on theold stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. 

"R. E. LEE, General. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. "

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, andimmediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox:

"April 9, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority totreat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A. M. To-daycould lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I amequally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertainsthe same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are wellunderstood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten thatmost desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds ofmillions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all ourdifficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, Isubscribe myself, etc. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "GENERAL R. E. LEE. "

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord's command and the 5th corpsreached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperateeffort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrownin. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension ofhostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. 

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received thefollowing from General Lee:

"April 9, 1865. 

"GENERAL:--I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms wereembraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrenderof this army. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offercontained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. 

"R. E. LEE, General. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. "

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which isset forth in the following correspondence:

APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, Virginia, April 9, 1865. 

"GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of NorthernVirginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers andmen to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to bedesignated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officersas you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles notto take up arms against the Government of the United States untilproperly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a likeparole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and publicproperty to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officersappointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms ofthe officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, eachofficer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to bedisturbed by United States authority so long as they observe theirparoles and the laws in force where they may reside. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "GENERAL R. E. LEE. "

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, April 9, 1865. 

"GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date containing the termsof surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. Asthey are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the properofficers to carry the stipulations into effect. 

"R. E. LEE, General. "LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. "

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at AppomattoxCourt-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the armyimmediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville. 

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused hisexample to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies latelyunder his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, andtheir arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. 

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directlyagainst Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. Theday preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him atSmithfield. 

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman andGeneral Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for asuspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subjectto the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by thePresident on the 21st, which disapproval, together with yourinstructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on themorning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to yourorders. Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for thetermination of the truce that had been entered into. On the 25thanother meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's armyupon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee. 

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck therailroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force strikingit at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroyingthe important bridges, while with the main force he effectuallydestroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned forGreensboro', on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road anddestroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and betweenGreensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies alongit, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked anddefeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteenpieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-fourprisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place hedestroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville. 

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations fora movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March. The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water toFish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, movedfrom Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both movingthence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-GeneralSteele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading fromTensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partiallyinvested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, apart of its line was carried on the 8th of April. During the night theenemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. Thesesuccesses practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us toapproach Mobile from the north. On the night of the 11th the city wasevacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning ofthe 12th. 

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consistingof twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains untilMarch 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest nearEbenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundredprisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over theCahawba River. On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city ofSelma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vastquantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4thhe captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed theAlabama River, and after sending information of his operations toGeneral Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the14th, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and fivesteamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct onColumbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaultedand captured on the 16th. At the former place we got one thousand fivehundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, thenavy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other publicproperty. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, fourguns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, onethousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by GeneralHowell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying tomake his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing himon the morning of May 11th. 

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canbyall the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi. 

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under KirbySmith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but onthe 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, GeneralKirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. Thissurrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of therebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited offirst disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminateplunder of public property. 

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against thegovernment had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with themarms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had beensurrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who hadsurrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the RioGrande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed. 

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements todefeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflectinggreat credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our finaltriumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be found clearlyset forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams andbrief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have notas yet been officially reported. 

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfullyrefer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they haveoccurred. 

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the Eastfight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no differencein their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do inbattle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles inthe Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnantof the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies ofthe East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of thePotomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their oldantagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia. The splendidachievements of each have nationalized our victories removed allsectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced toomuch), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might havefollowed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proudrecord, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each otherfor having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law overevery foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hopefor perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, howevermistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. 

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

THE END

 __________ FOOTNOTES

 (*1) Afterwards General Gardner, C. S. A. 

 (*2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. Deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. Lieutenant Grant offered his services, which were accepted. --PUBLISHERS. 

 (*3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and General Worth. --PUBLISHERS. 

 (*4) NOTE. --It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a great many years before the Mexican war to have established in the United States a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France. He recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any hearing. Now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. In addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc. , sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220, 000. Portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118, 000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. After the war was over and the troops all home, General Scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the Treasury of the United States, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. This fund was the foundation of the Soldiers' Home at Washington City, and also one at Harrodsburgh, Kentucky. 

 The latter went into disuse many years ago. In fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold. 

 (*5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott, Taylor and Pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. It made also governors of States, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. The rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the Union side. On the other side, the side of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. 

 (*6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me. 

 (*7) NOTE. --Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs. W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from General Lew. Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. At the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump's landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near Shiloh. This letter shows that at that time General Lew. Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his position, extending from Crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg landing and Purdy road. These two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our right rested. In this letter General Lew. Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "April 5th, " which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps. "

 This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew. Wallace at the battle of Shiloh. It shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. 

 The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. This falling back had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. But my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am not competent to say just what order the General actually received. 

 General Wallace's division was stationed, the First brigade at Crump's landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and a half miles out. Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the Second. If the position of our front had not changed, the road which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the River road. 

 U. S. GRANT. 

 MOUNT MACGREGOR, NEW YORK, June 21, 1885. 

 (*8) NOTE: In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD. McCook, who commanded a division of Buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because of the condition of his troops. General Badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. Out of justice to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the 6th. From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. The division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. It was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. General McCook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. I refer to these circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. I am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I am always willing to make the fullest admission. 

 (*9) NOTE. --For gallantry in the various engagements, from the time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri, M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers. 

 (*10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats, the De Soto. Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg. 

 (*11) One of Colonel Ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River. 

 (*12) NOTE. --On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to Carthage. I furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the State officers who accompanied him. 

 (*13) NOTE. --When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to make, he called to see me about it. I recollect that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. I was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman came up. After a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. We passed into the house together and shut the door after us. Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. I was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. He pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. This was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. I said this would take us back to Memphis. Sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. To this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the North and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as Memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. The problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. No progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. 

 Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I did not see any reason for changing my plans. The letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I remember of. I did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. General Sherman furnished a copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. I did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. I make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. 

 (*14) Meant Edward's Station. 

 (*15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN:

 Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas. You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. 

 I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts. 

 U. S. GRANT Maj. -Gen'l. 

 CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS, Chattanooga:

 All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will co-operate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. 

 U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

 (*16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. 

 (*17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24, 1863. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL. CEO. H. THOMAS, Chattanooga

 General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. 

 U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

 (*18) WASHINGTON, D. C. , December 8, 1863, 10. 2 A. M. 

 MAJ. -GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

 Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all, A. LINCOLN, President U. S. 

 (*19) General John G. Foster. 

 (*20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill. , subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword. The scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which General Grant had participated. 

 Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and Chattanooga. All such things are now in the possession of the government at Washington. 

 (*21) WASHINGTON, D. C. December 29, 1863. 

 MAJ. -GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

 General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. Should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? It is possible that Schofield will be sent to your command. 

 H. W. HALLECK General-in-Chief. (OFFICIAL. )

 (*22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant's report, Appendix. 

 (*23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. ]

 HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , April 4, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi. 

 GENERAL:--It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. For your information I now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. 

 I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand men from Missouri. With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. It will be impossible for him to commence too early. 

 Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River. This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore the left wing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found. 

 Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. 

 Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. 

 You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. 

 I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. 

 As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst. , or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel is concentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst. , if possible. But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it. 

 From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. 

 I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 (*24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant's report, Appendix. 

 (*25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H. , VA. , April 9, 1864. 

 MAJ. -GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE Com'd'g Army of the Potomac. 

 For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. 

 So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25, 000 men, to move on Mobile. This he is to do without reference to other movements. From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon. Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo. Johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks. 

 Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. Two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, Va. , principally cavalry, under Brig. -General Crook. The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you. The other will strike at Saltville, Va. , and come eastward to join Ord. The cavalry from Ord's command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following. A movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. 

 While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio. While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. On the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. 

 Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River. The garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and South-west. 

 Gillmore will join Butler with about 10, 000 men from South Carolina. Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23, 000 men into the field directly to his front. The force will be commanded by Maj. -General W. F. Smith. With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river. His movement will be simultaneous with yours. 

 Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point upon which I am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid. But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers. 

 These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them. 

 Burnside with a force of probably 25, 000 men will reinforce you. Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst. , I will give him the defence of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it. This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front. 

 There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. Two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. 

 Should by Lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on the Pamunkey. Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere. 

 If Lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. I would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. By the other, half the amount would be sufficient. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 (*26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3, 521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10, 000: and General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "The disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy. "

 (*27) UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864. 

 [COMPILED. ]

 LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

 MAJ. -GEN. W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps. 

 First Division, Brig. -Gen. Francis C. Barlow. First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles. Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth. Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke. 

 Second Division, Brig. -Gen. John Gibbon. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Alex. S. Webb. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Joshua T. Owen. Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll. 

 Third Division, Maj. -Gen. David B. Birney. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. J. H. H. Ward. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Alexander Hays. 

 Fourth Divisin, Brig. -Gen. Gershom Mott. First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister. Second Brigade, Col. Wm. R. Brewster. 

 Artillery Brigade, Col. John C. Tidball. 

 MAJ. -GEN. G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps. 

 First Division, Brig. -Gen. Charles Griffin. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. Third Brigade, Brig. -Gen. J. J. Bartlett. 

 Second Division, Brig. -Gen. John C. Robinson. First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Henry Baxter. Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison. 

 Third Division, Brig. -Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. First Brigade, Col. Wm McCandless. Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher. 

 Fourth Division, Brig. -Gen. James S. Wadsworth. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Lysander Cutler. Second Brigade Brig. -Gen. James C. Rice. Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone

 Artillery Brigade, Col. S. S. Wainwright. 

 MAJ. -GEN. JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps. 

 First Division, Brig. -Gen. H. G. Wright. First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown. Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton. Third Brigade, Brig. -Gen. D. A. Russell. Fourth Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Alexander Shaler. 

 Second Division, Brig. -Gen. George W. Getty. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Frank Wheaton. Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant. Third Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Thos. H. Neill. Fourth Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Henry L. Eustis. 

 Third Division, Brig. -Gen. James Ricketts. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Wm. H. Morris. Second Brigade, Brig. -Gen. T. Seymour. 

 Artillery Brigade, Col. C. H. Tompkins

 MAJ. -GEN. P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps. 

 First Division, Brig. -Gen. A. T. A. Torbert. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. G. A. Custer. Second Brigade, Col. Thos. C. Devin. Reserve Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Wesley Merritt

 Second Division, Brig. -Gen. D. McM. Gregg. First Brigade, Brig. -Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg. 

 Third Division, Brig. -Gen. J. H. Wilson. First Brigade, Col. T. M. Bryan, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. Geo. H. Chapman. 

 MAJ. -GEN. A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps. 

 First Division, Brig. -Gen. T. G. Stevenson. First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth. Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure. 

 Second Division, Brig. -Gen. Robert B. Potter. First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss. Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin. 

 Third Division, Brig. -Gen. Orlando Willcox. First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft. Second Brigade, Col. Benj. C. Christ. 

 Fourth Division, Brig. -Gen. Edward Ferrero. First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried. Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas. 

 Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall. 

 BRIG. -GEN. HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery. 

 Reserve, Col. H. S. Burton. First Brigade, Col. J. H. Kitching. Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins. First Brig. Horse Art. , Capt. J. M. Robertson. Second Brigade, Horse Art. , Capt. D. R. Ransom. Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh. 

 GENERAL HEADQUARTERS....... Provost Guard, Brig. -Gen. M. R. Patrick. Volunteer Engineers, Brig. -Gen. H. W. Benham. 

 CONFEDERATE ARMY. 

 Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834. 

 First Army Corps: LIEUT. -GEN. R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding. 

 MAJ. -GEN. GEO. E. PICKETT'S Division. Brig. -Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade. (a) Brig. -Gen. M. D. Corse's " " Eppa Hunton's " " Wm. R. Terry's "

 MAJ. -GEN. C. W. FIELD'S Division. (b) Brig. -Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade " E. M. Law's (c) " " John Bratton's "

 MAJ. -GEN. J. B. KERSHAW'S Division. (d) Brig. -Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade " B. G. Humphreys' " " Goode Bryan's " " Kershaw's (Old) "

 Second Army Corps: MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

 MAJ. -GEN. JOHN B. GORDON'S Division. Brig. -Gen. H. T. Hays' Brigade. (e) " John Pegram 's " (f) " Gordon's " (g) Brig. -Gen. R. F. Hoke's "

 MAJ. -GEN. EDWARD JOHNSON'S Division. Stonewall Brig. (Brig. -Gen. J. A. Walker). (h) Brig. -Gen. J M Jones' Brigade. (h) " Geo H. Stewart's " (h) " L. A. Stafford's " (e)

 MAJ. -GEN. R. E. RODES' Division. Brig. -Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade. (i) " Geo. Dole's " (k) " S. D. Ramseur's Brigade. " C. A. Battle's " " R. D. Johnston's " (f)

 Third Army Corps: LIEUT. -GEN. A. P. HILL, Commanding. 

 MAJ. -GEN. WM. MAHONE'S Division. (l) Brig. -Gen. J. C. C. Sanders' Brigade. Mahone's " Brig. -Gen. N. H. Harris's " (m) " A. R. Wright's " " Joseph Finegan's "

 MAJ. -GEN. C. M. WILCOX'S Division. Brig. -Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade (n) " James H. Lane's " " Sam'l McCowan's " " Alfred M. Scale's "

 MAJ. -GEN. H. HETH'S Division. (o) Brig. -Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade. " John R. Cooke's " " D. McRae's " " J. J. Archer's " " H. H. Walker's "

 _unattached_: 5th Alabama Battalion. 

 Cavalry Corps: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding. (p)

 MAJ. -GEN. FITZHUGH LEE'S Division Brig. -Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade " L. L. Lomax's "

 MAJ. -GEN. M. C. BUTLER'S Division. Brig. -Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade. " P. M. B. Young's " " Thomas L. Rosser's "

 MAJ. -GEN. W. H. F. LEE'S Division. Brig. -Gen. Rufus Barringer's Brigade. " J. R. Chambliss's "

 Artillery Reserve: BRIG. -GEN. W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding. 

 BRIG. -GEN. E. P. ALEXANDER'S DIVISION. * Cabell's Battalion. Manly's Battery. 1st Co. Richmond Howitzers. Carleton's Battery. Calloway's Battery. 

 Haskell's Battalion. Branch's Battery. Nelson's " Garden's " Rowan "

 Huger's Battalion. Smith's Battery. Moody " Woolfolk " Parker's " Taylor's " Fickling's " Martin's "

 Gibb's Battalion. Davidson's Battery. Dickenson's " Otey's "

 BRIG. -GEN. A. L. LONG'S DIVISION. 

 Braxton's Battalion. Lee Battery. 1st Md. Artillery. Stafford " Alleghany "

 Cutshaw's Battalion. Charlotteville Artillery. Staunton " Courtney "

 Carter's Battalion. Morris Artillery. Orange " King William Artillery. Jeff Davis "

 Nelson's Battalion. Amherst Artillery. Milledge " Fluvauna "

 Brown's Battalion. Powhatan Artillery. 2d Richmond Howitzers. 3d " " Rockbridge Artillery. Salem Flying Artillery. 

 COL R. L. WALKER'S DIVISION. 

 Cutt's Battalion. Ross's Battery. Patterson's Battery. Irwin Artillery. 

 Richardson's Battalion. Lewis Artillery. Donaldsonville Artillery. Norfolk Light " Huger "

 Mclntosh 's Battalion. Johnson's Battery. Hardaway Artillery. Danville " 2d Rockbridge Artillery. 

 Pegram's Battalion. Peedee Artillery. Fredericksburg Artillery. Letcher " Purcell Battery. Crenshaw's Battery. 

 Poague's Battalion. Madison Artillery. Albemarle " Brooke " Charlotte "

 NOTE. (a) COL. W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Benning's and Gregg's Brigades. (c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles. (d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. 

 Organization of the Army of the Valley District. (e) Constituting York's Brigade. (f) In Ramseur's Division. (g) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and containing 12th Georgia Battalion. (h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's Brigade, Gordon's Division. (i) Grimes' Brigade. (k) Cook's "

 (l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding. (n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's, Fitz-Lee's, and W. H. F. Lee's Division, and Dearing's Brigade. 

 *But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander's name not on the original. 

 (*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S. , May II, 1864. --3 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

 Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock A. M. To-morrow. Will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott's division and the 9th corps. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S. , May 11, 1864. -4 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE, Commanding 9th Army Corps. 

 Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock A. M. To-morrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock A. M. To-morrow the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. 

 I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock, in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and General Hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S. , May 12, 1864, 6. 30 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

 The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. , May 13, 1864. 

 HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C. 

 I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S. S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphreys to the rank of Major-General. 

 General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*32) QUARLES' MILLS, VA. , May 26, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

 The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee's right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers the right wing of Lee's army. One division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and near to the enemy. 

 To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. 

 During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. Lee's army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. 

 We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P. 

 The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C. 

 A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. 

 I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:

 I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. 

 Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. 

 The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 (*35) COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 6, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

 Commanding Dept. W. Va. 

 General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va. , and to commence there the destruction of the Va. Cen. R. R. , destroying this way as much as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of the canal on James River is of great importance to us. According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day. But that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If you have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. The direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. From thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions. 

 If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back. 

 If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE. 

 FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. | KILLED. | WOUNDED. | MISSING. | AGGREGATE. |

 Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2, 261 | 8, 785 | 2, 902 |13, 948 | Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2, 271 | 9, 360 | 1, 970 | 13, 601| North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1, 143 | Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1, 769 | 6, 752 | 1, 537 |10, 058 | Total ................ | 6, 586 | 26, 047 | 6, 626 | 39, 259 |

 (*37) CITY POINT, VA. , June 17, 1864. 11 A. M. 

 MAJOR-GEN. HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

 * * * * * * *

 The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred. They no doubt expected troops from north of the James River to take their place before we discovered it. General Butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain possession of. 

 Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. Day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. 

 (*38) CITY POINT, VA. , July 24, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding, etc. 

 The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. The chances they think will be better on Burnside's front. If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. 

 To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. Their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. The field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. If they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James rivers, as may be deemed best. 

 This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all. If not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if possible. 

 * * * * * * *

 Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at Petersburg, Burnside's mine will be blown up.... 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 (*39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix. 

 (*40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th. 

 (*41) CITY POINT, VA. , December 2, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville Tenn. 

 If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 CITY POINT, VA. , December 2, 1864. --1. 30 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. 

 With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily disposed of. Put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. Should you get him to retreating give him no peace. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 CITY POINT, VA. , December 5, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. 

 Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 CITY POINT, VA. , December 6, 1864--4 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. 

 Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 CITY POINT, VA. , December 8, 1864. --8. 30 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. 

 Your dispatch of yesterday received. It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the governors of States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed he never can replace it. Use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 CITY POINT, VA. , December 11, 1864. --4 P. M. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. 

 If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further delay. Hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 WASHINGTON, D. C. , December 15, 1864. 

 MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Nashville, Tenn. 

 I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further. Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now expected. 

 U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

 (*42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan, March 24th, Appendix. 

 (*43) See Appendix. 

 (*44) NOTE. --The fac-simile of the terms of Lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S. Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant's staff at the time of the surrender. 

 Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of General Grant. After such alteration it was handed to General Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to General Grant. The original was then transcribed by General Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General Lee. 

 The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. 

 There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and Lee each signed the articles of surrender. The document in the form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor of McLean's house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to General Grant. 

............................................................... 

MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman

GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

HIS COMRADES IN ARMS, VOLUNTEERS AND REGULARS. 

Nearly ten years have passed since the close of the civil war inAmerica, and yet no satisfactory history thereof is accessible tothe public; nor should any be attempted until the Government haspublished, and placed within the reach of students, the abundantmaterials that are buried in the War Department at Washington. These are in process of compilation; but, at the rate of progressfor the past ten years, it is probable that a new century will comebefore they are published and circulated, with full indexes toenable the historian to make a judicious selection of materials. 

What is now offered is not designed as a history of the war, oreven as a complete account of all the incidents in which the writerbore a part, but merely his recollection of events, corrected by areference to his own memoranda, which may assist the futurehistorian when he comes to describe the whole, and account for themotives and reasons which influenced some of the actors in thegrand drama of war. 

I trust a perusal of these pages will prove interesting to thesurvivors, who have manifested so often their intense love of the"cause" which moved a nation to vindicate its own authority; and, equally so, to the rising generation, who therefrom may learn thata country and government such as ours are worth fighting for, anddying for, if need be. 

If successful in this, I shall feel amply repaid for departing fromthe usage of military men, who seldom attempt to publish their owndeeds, but rest content with simply contributing by their acts tothe honor and glory of their country. 

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, General

St. Louis, Missouri, January 21, 1875. 

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

Another ten years have passed since I ventured to publish myMemoirs, and, being once more at leisure, I have revised them inthe light of the many criticisms public and private. 

My habit has been to note in pencil the suggestions of critics, andto examine the substance of their differences; for critics mustdiffer from the author, to manifest their superiority. 

Where I have found material error I have corrected; and I haveadded two chapters, one at the beginning, another at the end, bothof the most general character, and an appendix. 

I wish my friends and enemies to understand that I disclaim thecharacter of historian, but assume to be a witness on the standbefore the great tribunal of history, to assist some future Napier, Alison, or Hume to comprehend the feelings and thoughts of theactors in the grand conflicts of the recent past, and thereby tolessen his labors in the compilation necessary for the futurebenefit of mankind. 

In this free country every man is at perfect liberty to publish hisown thoughts and impressions, and any witness who may differ fromme should publish his own version of facts in the truthfulnarration of which he is interested. I am publishing my ownmemoirs, not theirs, and we all know that no three honest witnessesof a simple brawl can agree on all the details. How much morelikely will be the difference in a great battle covering a vastspace of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment, andeven company, naturally and honestly believes that it was the focusof the whole affair! Each of them won the battle. None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded. 

In this edition I give the best maps which I believe have ever beenprepared, compiled by General O. M. Poe, from personal knowledgeand official surveys, and what I chiefly aim to establish is thetrue cause of the results which are already known to the wholeworld; and it may be a relief to many to know that I shall publishno other, but, like the player at cards, will "stand;" not that Ihave accomplished perfection, but because I can do no better withthe cards in hand. Of omissions there are plenty, but of wilfulperversion of facts, none. 

In the preface to the first edition, in 1875, I used these words:"Nearly ten years have passed since the close of the civil war inAmerica, and yet no satisfactory history thereof is accessible tothe public; nor should any be attempted until the Government haspublished, and placed within the reach of students, the abundantmaterials that are buried in the War Department at Washington. These are in process of compilation; but, at the rate of progressfor the past ten years, it is probable that a new century will comebefore they are published and circulated, with full indexes toenable the historian to make a judicious selection of materials"

Another decade is past, and I am in possession of all thesepublications, my last being Volume XI, Part 3, Series 1, the lastdate in which is August 30, 1862. I am afraid that if I assumeagain the character of prophet, I must extend the time deep intothe next century, and pray meanwhile that the official records ofthe war, Union and Confederate, may approach completion before the"next war, " or rather that we, as a people, may be spared anotherwar until the last one is officially recorded. Meantime the risinggeneration must be content with memoirs and histories compiled fromthe best sources available. 

In this sense I offer mine as to the events of which I was aneye-witness and participant, or for which I was responsible. 

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, General (retired). 

St. Louis, Missouri, March 30, 1885. 

MEMOIRS OF GENERAL WILLIAM T. SHERMAN. 

CHAPTER I. 

FROM 1820 TO THE MEXICAN WAR. 

1820-1846. 

According to Cothren, in his "History of Ancient Woodbury, Connecticut, " the Sherman family came from Dedham, Essex County, England. The first recorded name is of Edmond Sherman, with histhree sons, Edmond, Samuel, and John, who were at Boston before1636; and farther it is distinctly recorded that Hon. SamuelSherman, Rev. John, his brother, and Captain John, his firstcousin, arrived from Dedham, Essex County, England, in 1634. Samuel afterward married Sarah Mitchell, who had come (in the sameship) from England, and finally settled at Stratford, Connecticut. The other two (Johns) located at Watertown, Massachusetts. 

From Captain John Sherman are descended Roger Sherman, the signerof the Declaration of Independence, Hon. William M. Evarts, theMessrs. Hoar, of Massachusetts, and many others of national fame. Our own family are descended from the Hon. Samuel Sherman and hisson; the Rev. John, who was born in 1650-'51; then another John, born in 1687; then Judge Daniel, born in 1721; then Taylor Sherman, our grandfather, who was born in 1758. Taylor Sherman was a lawyerand judge in Norwalk, Connecticut, where he resided until hisdeath, May 4, 1815; leaving a widow, Betsey Stoddard Sherman, andthree children, Charles R. (our father), Daniel, and Betsey. 

When the State of Connecticut, in 1786, ceded to the United Statesher claim to the western part of her public domain, as defined byher Royal Charter, she reserved a large district in what is nownorthern Ohio, a portion of which (five hundred thousand acres)composed the "Fire-Land District, " which was set apart to indemnifythe parties who had lost property in Connecticut by the raids ofGenerals Arnold, Tryon, and others during the latter part of theRevolutionary War. 

Our grandfather, Judge Taylor Sherman, was one of the commissionersappointed by the State of Connecticut to quiet the Indian title, and to survey and subdivide this Fire-Land District, which includesthe present counties of Huron and Erie. In his capacity ascommissioner he made several trips to Ohio in the early part ofthis century, and it is supposed that he then contracted thedisease which proved fatal. For his labor and losses he received atitle to two sections of land, which fact was probably the primecause of the migration of our family to the West. My fatherreceived a good education, and was admitted to the bar at Norwalk, Connecticut, where, in 1810, he, at twenty years of age, marriedMary Hoyt, also of Norwalk, and at once migrated to Ohio, leavinghis wife (my mother) for a time. His first purpose was to settleat Zanesville, Ohio, but he finally chose Lancaster, FairfieldCounty, where he at once engaged in the practice of hisprofession. In 1811 he returned to Norwalk, where, meantime, wasborn Charles Taylor Sherman, the eldest of the family, who with hismother was carried to Ohio on horseback. 

Judge Taylor Sherman's family remained in Norwalk till 1815, whenhis death led to the emigration of the remainder of the family, viz. , of Uncle Daniel Sherman, who settled at Monroeville, Ohio, asa farmer, where he lived and died quite recently, leaving childrenand grandchildren; and an aunt, Betsey, who married Judge Parker, of Mansfield, and died in 1851, leaving children and grandchildren;also Grandmother Elizabeth Stoddard Sherman, who resided with herdaughter, Mrs. Betsey Parker, in Mansfield until her death, August1, 1848. 

Thus my father, Charles R. Sherman, became finally established atLancaster, Ohio, as a lawyer, with his own family in the year 1811, and continued there till the time of his death, in 1829. I have nodoubt that he was in the first instance attracted to Lancaster bythe natural beauty of its scenery, and the charms of its alreadyestablished society. He continued in the practice of hisprofession, which in those days was no sinecure, for the ordinarycircuit was made on horseback, and embraced Marietta, Cincinnati, and Detroit. Hardly was the family established there when the Warof 1812 caused great alarm and distress in all Ohio. The Englishcaptured Detroit and the shores of Lake Erie down to the MaumeeRiver; while the Indians still occupied the greater part of theState. Nearly every man had to be somewhat of a soldier, but Ithink my father was only a commissary; still, he seems to havecaught a fancy for the great chief of the Shawnees, "Tecumseh. "

Perry's victory on Lake Erie was the turning-point of the Westerncampaign, and General Harrison's victory over the British andIndians at the river Thames in Canada ended the war in the West, and restored peace and tranquillity to the exposed settlers ofOhio. My father at once resumed his practice at the bar, and wassoon recognized as an able and successful lawyer. When, in 1816, my brother James was born, he insisted on engrafting the Indianname "Tecumseh" on the usual family list. My mother had alreadynamed her first son after her own brother Charles; and insisted onthe second son taking the name of her other brother James, and whenI came along, on the 8th of February, 1820, mother having no morebrothers, my father succeeded in his original purpose, and named meWilliam Tecumseh. 

The family rapidly increased till it embraced six boys and fivegirls, all of whom attained maturity and married; of these six arestill living. 

In the year 1821 a vacancy occurred in the Supreme Court of Ohio, and I find this petition:

Somerset, Ohio, July 6, 1821. 

May it please your Excellency:

We ask leave to recommend to your Excellency's favorable noticeCharles R. Sherman, Esq. , of Lancaster, as a man possessing in aneminent degree those qualifications so much to be desired in aJudge of the Supreme Court. 

From a long acquaintance with Mr. Sherman, we are happy to be ableto state to your Excellency that our minds are led to theconclusion that that gentleman possesses a disposition noble andgenerous, a mind discriminating, comprehensive, and combining aheart pure, benevolent and humane. Manners dignified, mild, andcomplaisant, and a firmness not to be shaken and of unquestionedintegrity. 

But Mr. Sherman's character cannot be unknown to your Excellency, and on that acquaintance without further comment we might safelyrest his pretensions. 

We think we hazard little in assuring your Excellency that hisappointment would give almost universal satisfaction to thecitizens of Perry County. 

With great consideration, we have the honor to be

Your Excellency's most obedient humble servants, CHARLES A. HOOD, GEORGE TREAT, PETER DITTOR, P. ODLIN, J. B. ORTEN, T. BECKWITH, WILLIAM P. DORST, JOHN MURRAY, JACOB MOINS, B. EATON, DANIEL GRIGGS, HENRY DITTOE, NICHOLAS McCARTY. 

His Excellency ETHAN A. BROWN, Governor of Ohio, Columbus. 

He was soon after appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court, andserved in that capacity to the day of his death. 

My memory extends back to about 1827, and I recall him, returninghome on horseback, when all the boys used to run and contend forthe privilege of riding his horse from the front door back to thestable. On one occasion, I was the first, and being mounted rodeto the stable; but "Old Dick" was impatient because the stable-doorwas not opened promptly, so he started for the barn of our neighborMr. King; there, also, no one was in waiting to open the gate, and, after a reasonable time, "Dick" started back for home somewhat in ahurry, and threw me among a pile of stones, in front of preacherWright's house, where I was picked up apparently a dead boy; but mytime was not yet, and I recovered, though the scars remain to thisday. 

The year 1829 was a sad one to our family. We were then tenchildren, my eldest brother Charles absent at the State University, Athens, Ohio; my next brother, James, in a store at Cincinnati; andthe rest were at home, at school. Father was away on the circuit. One day Jane Sturgeon came to the school, called us out, and whenwe reached home all was lamentation: news had come that father wasill unto death, at Lebanon, a hundred miles away. Mother startedat once, by coach, but met the news of his death about Washington, and returned home. He had ridden on horseback from Cincinnati toLebanon to hold court, during a hot day in June. On the next dayhe took his seat on the bench, opened court in the forenoon, but inthe afternoon, after recess, was seized with a severe chill and hadto adjourn the court. The best medical aid was called in, and forthree days with apparent success, but the fever then assumed a moredangerous type, and he gradually yielded to it, dying on the sixthday, viz. , June 24, 1829. 

My brother James had been summoned from Cincinnati, and was presentat his bedside, as was also Henry Stoddard, Esq. , of Dayton, Ohio, our cousin. Mr. Stoddard once told me that the cause of myfather's death was cholera; but at that time, 1829, there was noAsiatic cholera in the United States, and the family, attributedhis death to exposure to the hot sun of June, and a consequentfever, "typhoid. "

From the resolutions of the bench, bar, and public generally, nowin my possession, his death was universally deplored; moreespecially by his neighbors in Lancaster, and by the Society ofFreemasons, of which he was the High-Priest of Arch Chapter No. 11. 

His death left the family very poor, but friends rose up withproffers of generous care and assistance; for all the neighborsknew that mother could not maintain so large a family without help. My eldest brother, Charles, had nearly completed his education atthe university at Athens, and concluded to go to his uncle, JudgeParker, at Mansfield, Ohio, to study law. My eldest sister, Elizabeth, soon after married William J. Reese, Esq. ; James wasalready in a store at Cincinnati; and, with the exception of thethree youngest children, the rest of us were scattered. I fell tothe charge of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, who took me to his family, andever after treated me as his own son. 

I continued at the Academy in Lancaster, which was the best in theplace; indeed, as good a school as any in Ohio. We studied all thecommon branches of knowledge, including Latin, Greek, and French. At first the school was kept by Mr. Parsons; he was succeeded byMr. Brown, and he by two brothers, Samuel and Mark How. These wereall excellent teachers, and we made good progress, first at the oldacademy and afterward at a new school-house, built by Samuel How, in the orchard of Hugh Boyle, Esq. 

Time passed with us as with boys generally. Mr. Ewing was in theUnited States Senate, and I was notified to prepare for West Point, of which institution we had little knowledge, except that it wasvery strict, and that the army was its natural consequence. In1834 I was large for my age, and the construction of canals was therage in Ohio. A canal was projected to connect with the great OhioCanal at Carroll (eight miles above Lancaster), down the valley ofthe Hock Hocking to Athens (forty-four miles), and thence to theOhio River by slack water. 

Preacher Carpenter, of Lancaster, was appointed to make thepreliminary surveys, and selected the necessary working party outof the boys of the town. From our school were chosen ____Wilson, Emanuel Geisy, William King, and myself. Geisy and I were therod-men. We worked during that fall and next spring, marking twoexperimental lines, and for our work we each received a silverhalf-dollar for each day's actual work, the first money any of ushad ever earned. 

In June, 1835, one of our school-fellows, William Irvin, wasappointed a cadet to West Point, and, as it required sixteen yearsof age for admission, I had to wait another year. During theautumn of 1835 and spring of 1836 I devoted myself chiefly tomathematics and French, which were known to be the chief requisitesfor admission to West Point. 

Some time in the spring of 1836 I received through Mr. Ewing, thenat Washington, from the Secretary of War, Mr. Poinsett, the letterof appointment as a cadet, with a list of the articles of clothingnecessary to be taken along, all of which were liberally providedby Mrs. Ewing; and with orders to report to Mr. Ewing, atWashington, by a certain date, I left Lancaster about the 20th ofMay in the stage-coach for Zanesville. There we transferred to thecoaches of the Great National Road, the highway of travel from theWest to the East. The stages generally travelled in gangs of fromone to six coaches, each drawn by four good horses, carrying ninepassengers inside and three or four outside. 

In about three days, travelling day and night, we reachedFrederick, Maryland. There we were told that we could takerail-cars to Baltimore, and thence to Washington; but there wasalso a two-horse hack ready to start for Washington direct. Nothaving full faith in the novel and dangerous railroad, I stuck tothe coach, and in the night reached Gadsby's Hotel in WashingtonCity. 

The next morning I hunted up Mr. Ewing, and found him boarding witha mess of Senators at Mrs. Hill's, corner of Third and C Streets, and transferred my trunk to the same place. I spent a week inWashington, and think I saw more of the place in that time than Iever have since in the many years of residence there. GeneralJackson was President, and was at the zenith of his fame. I recalllooking at him a full hour, one morning, through the wood railingon Pennsylvania Avenue, as he paced up and down the gravel walk onthe north front of the White House. He wore a cap and an overcoatso full that his form seemed smaller than I had expected. I alsorecall the appearance of Postmaster-General Amos Kendall, ofVice-President Van Buren, Messrs. Calhoun, Webster, Clay, Cass, Silas Wright, etc. 

In due time I took my departure for West Point with Cadets Belt andBronaugh. These were appointed cadets as from Ohio, althoughneither had ever seen that State. But in those days there werefewer applicants from Ohio than now, and near the close of the termthe vacancies unasked for were usually filled from applicants onthe spot. Neither of these parties, however, graduated, so theState of Ohio lost nothing. We went to Baltimore by rail, theretook a boat up to Havre de Grace, then the rail to Wilmington, Delaware, and up the Delaware in a boat to Philadelphia. I staidover in Philadelphia one day at the old Mansion House, to visit thefamily of my brother-in-law, Mr. Reese. I found his father a finesample of the old merchant gentleman, in a good house in ArchStreet, with his accomplished daughters, who had been to Ohio, andwhom I had seen there. From Philadelphia we took boat toBordentown, rail to Amboy, and boat again to New York City, stopping at the American Hotel. I staid a week in New York City, visiting my uncle, Charles Hoyt, at his beautiful place on BrooklynHeights, and my uncle James, then living in White Street. Myfriend William Scott was there, the young husband of my cousin, Louise Hoyt; a neatly-dressed young fellow, who looked on me as anuntamed animal just caught in the far West--"fit food forgunpowder, " and good for nothing else. 

About June 12th I embarked in the steamer Cornelius Vanderbilt forWest Point; registered in the office of Lieutenant C. F. Smith, Adjutant of the Military Academy, as a new cadet of the class of1836, and at once became installed as the "plebe" of myfellow-townsman, William Irvin, then entering his Third Class. 

Colonel R. E. De Russy was Superintendent; Major John Fowle, SixthUnited States Infantry, Commandant. The principal Professors were:Mahan, Engineering; Bartlett, Natural Philosophy; Bailey, Chemistry; Church, Mathematics; Weir, Drawing; and Berard, French. 

The routine of military training and of instruction was then fullyestablished, and has remained almost the same ever since. To givea mere outline would swell this to an inconvenient size, and Itherefore merely state that I went through the regular course offour years, graduating in June, 1840, number six in a class offorty-three. These forty-three were all that remained of more thanone hundred which originally constituted the class. At the AcademyI was not considered a good soldier, for at no time was I selectedfor any office, but remained a private throughout the whole fouryears. Then, as now, neatness in dress and form, with a strictconformity to the rules, were the qualifications required foroffice, and I suppose I was found not to excel in any of these. Instudies I always held a respectable reputation with the professors, and generally ranked among the best, especially in drawing, chemistry, mathematics, and natural philosophy. My averagedemerits, per annum, were about one hundred and fifty, which. Reduced my final class standing from number four to six. 

In June, 1840, after the final examination, the class graduated andwe received our diplomas. Meantime, Major Delafield, United StatesEngineers, had become Superintendent; Major C. F. Smith, Commandantof Cadets; but the corps of professors and assistants remainedalmost unchanged during our whole term. We were all granted theusual furlough of three months, and parted for our homes, there toawait assignment to our respective corps and regiments. In dueseason I was appointed and commissioned second-lieutenant, ThirdArtillery, and ordered to report at Governor's Island, New YorkHarbor, at the end of September. I spent my furlough mostly atLancaster and Mansfield, Ohio; toward the close of Septemberreturned to New York, reported to Major Justin Dimock, commandingthe recruiting rendezvous at Governor's Island, and was assigned tocommand a company of recruits preparing for service in Florida. Early in October this company was detailed, as one of four, toembark in a sailing-vessel for Savannah, Georgia, under command ofCaptain and Brevet Major Penrose. We embarked and sailed, reachingSavannah about the middle of October, where we transferred to asmall steamer and proceeded by the inland route to St. Augustine, Florida. We reached St. Augustine at the same time with the EighthInfantry, commanded by Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General WilliamJ. Worth. At that time General Zachary Taylor was in chief commandin Florida, and had his headquarters at Tampa Bay. My regiment, the Third Artillery, occupied the posts along the Atlantic coast ofFlorida, from St. Augustine south to Key Biscayne, and my owncompany, A, was at Fort Pierce, Indian River. At St. Augustine Iwas detached from the company of recruits, which was designed forthe Second Infantry, and was ordered to join my proper company atFort Pierce. Colonel William Gates commanded the regiment, withLieutenant William Austine Brown as adjutant of the regiment. Lieutenant Bragg commanded the post of St. Augustine with his owncompany, E, and G (Garner's), then commanded by Lieutenant Judd. In, a few days I embarked in the little steamer William Gaston downthe coast, stopping one day at New Smyrna, held by John R. Vinton'scompany (B), with which was serving Lieutenant William H. Shover. 

In due season we arrived off the bar of Indian River and anchored. A whale-boat came off with a crew of four men, steered by acharacter of some note, known as the Pilot Ashlock. I transferredself and baggage to this boat, and, with the mails, was carriedthrough the surf over the bar, into the mouth of Indian RiverInlet. It was then dark; we transferred to a smaller boat, and thesame crew pulled us up through a channel in the middle of MangroveIslands, the roosting-place of thousands of pelicans and birds thatrose in clouds and circled above our heads. The water below wasalive with fish, whose course through it could be seen by thephosphoric wake; and Ashlock told me many a tale of the Indian warthen in progress, and of his adventures in hunting and fishing, which he described as the best in the world. About two miles fromthe bar, we emerged into the lagoon, a broad expanse of shallowwater that lies parallel with the coast, separated from it by anarrow strip of sand, backed by a continuous series of islands andpromontories, covered with a dense growth of mangrove andsaw-palmetto. Pulling across this lagoon, in about three moremiles we approached the lights of Fort Pierce. Reaching asmall wharf, we landed, and were met by the officers of thepost, Lieutenants George Taylor and Edward J. Steptoe, andAssistant-Surgeon James Simons. Taking the mail-bag, we walked upa steep sand-bluff on which the fort was situated, and across theparade-ground to the officers' quarters. These were six or sevenlog-houses, thatched with palmetto-leaves, built on high posts, with a porch in front, facing the water. The men's quarters werealso of logs forming the two sides of a rectangle, open toward thewater; the intervals and flanks were closed with log stockades. Iwas assigned to one of these rooms, and at once began service withmy company, A, then commanded by Lieutenant Taylor. 

The season was hardly yet come for active operations against theIndians, so that the officers were naturally attracted to Ashlock, who was the best fisherman I ever saw. He soon initiated us intothe mysteries of shark-spearing, trolling for red-fish, and takingthe sheep's-head and mullet. These abounded so that we could atany time catch an unlimited quantity at pleasure. The companiesalso owned nets for catching green turtles. These nets had meshesabout a foot square, were set across channels in the lagoon, theends secured to stakes driven into the mad, the lower line sunkwith lead or stone weights and the upper line floated with cork. We usually visited these nets twice a day, and found from one tosix green turtles entangled in the meshes. Disengaging them, theywere carried to pens, made with stakes stuck in the mud, where theywere fed with mangrove-leaves, and our cooks had at all times anample supply of the best of green turtles. They were so cheap andcommon that the soldiers regarded it as an imposition whencompelled to eat green turtle steaks, instead of poor Florida beef, or the usual barrelled mess-pork. I do not recall in my wholeexperience a spot on earth where fish, oysters, and green turtlesso abound as at Fort Pierce, Florida. 

In November, Major Childs arrived with Lieutenant Van Vliet and adetachment of recruits to fill our two companies, and preparationswere at once begun for active operations in the field. At thattime the Indians in the Peninsula of Florida were scattered, andthe war consisted in hunting up and securing the small fragments, to be sent to join the others of their tribe of Seminoles alreadyestablished in the Indian Territory west of Arkansas. Ourexpeditions were mostly made in boats in the lagoons extending fromthe "Haul-over, " near two hundred miles above the fort, down toJupiter Inlet, about fifty miles below, and in the many streamswhich emptied therein. Many such expeditions were made during thatwinter, with more or less success, in which we succeeded in pickingup small parties of men, women, and children. On one occasion, near the "Haul-over, " when I was not present, the expedition wasmore successful. It struck a party of nearly fifty Indians, killedseveral warriors, and captured others. In this expedition myclassmate, lieutenant Van Vliet, who was an excellent shot, killeda warrior who was running at full speed among trees, and one of thesergeants of our company (Broderick) was said to have dispatchedthree warriors, and it was reported that he took the scalp of oneand brought it in to the fort as a trophy. Broderick was so elatedthat, on reaching the post, he had to celebrate his victory by abig drunk. 

There was at the time a poor, weakly soldier of our company whosewife cooked for our mess. She was somewhat of a flirt, and ratherfond of admiration. Sergeant Broderick was attracted to her, andhung around the mess-house more than the husband fancied; so hereported the matter to Lieutenant Taylor, who reproved Broderickfor his behavior. A few days afterward the husband again appealedto his commanding officer (Taylor), who exclaimed: "Haven't you gota musket? Can't you defend your own family?" Very soon after ashot was heard down by the mess-house, and it transpired that thehusband had actually shot Broderick, inflicting a wound whichproved mortal. The law and army regulations required that the manshould be sent to the nearest civil court, which was at St. Augustine; accordingly, the prisoner and necessary witnesses weresent up by the next monthly steamer. Among the latter werelieutenant Taylor and the pilot Ashlock. 

After they had been gone about a month, the sentinel on the roof-topof our quarters reported the smoke of a steamer approaching the bar, and, as I was acting quartermaster, I took a boat and pulled down toget the mail. I reached the log-but in which the pilots lived, andsaw them start with their boat across the bar, board the steamer, and then return. Ashlock was at his old post at the steering-oar, with two ladies, who soon came to the landing, having passed througha very heavy surf, and I was presented to one as Mrs. Ashlock, andthe other as her sister, a very pretty little Minorcan girl of aboutfourteen years of age. Mrs. Ashlock herself was probably eighteenor twenty years old, and a very handsome woman. I was hurriedlyinformed that the murder trial was in progress at St. Augustine;that Ashlock had given his testimony, and had availed himself of thechance to take a wife to share with him the solitude of his desolatehut on the beach at Indian River. He had brought ashore his wife, her sister, and their chests, with the mail, and had orders toreturn immediately to the steamer (Gaston or Harney) to bring ashoresome soldiers belonging to another company, E (Braggs), which hadbeen ordered from St. Augustine to Fort Pierce. Ashlock left hiswife and her sister standing on the beach near the pilot-hut, andstarted back with his whale-boat across the bar. I also took themail and started up to the fort, and had hardly reached the wharfwhen I observed another boat following me. As soon as this reachedthe wharf the men reported that Ashlock and all his crew, with theexception of one man, had been drowned a few minutes after I hadleft the beach. They said his surf-boat had reached the steamer, hadtaken on board a load of soldiers, some eight or ten, and hadstarted back through the surf, when on the bar a heavy breaker upsetthe boat, and all were lost except the boy who pulled the bow-oar, who clung to the rope or painter, hauled himself to the upset boat, held on, drifted with it outside the breakers, and was finallybeached near a mile down the coast. They reported also that thesteamer had got up anchor, run in as close to the bar as she could, paused awhile, and then had started down the coast. 

I instantly took a fresh crew of soldiers and returned to the bar;there sat poor Mrs. Ashlock on her chest of clothes, a weepingwidow, who had seen her husband perish amid sharks and waves; sheclung to the hope that the steamer had picked him up, but, strangeto say, he could not swim, although he had been employed on thewater all his life. 

Her sister was more demonstrative, and wailed as one lost to allhope and life. She appealed to us all to do miracles to save thestruggling men in the waves, though two hours had already passed, and to have gone out then among those heavy breakers, with aninexperienced crew, would have been worse than suicide. All Icould do was to reorganize the guard at the beach, take the twodesolate females up to the fort, and give them the use of my ownquarters. Very soon their anguish was quieted, and they began tolook, for the return of their steamer with Ashlock and his rescuedcrew. The next day I went again to the beach with Lieutenant Ord, and we found that one or two bodies had been washed ashore, tornall to pieces by the sharks, which literally swarmed the inlet atevery new tide. In a few days the weather moderated, and thesteamer returned from the south, but the surf was so high that sheanchored a mile off. I went out myself, in the whale or surf boat, over that terrible bar with a crew of soldiers, boarded thesteamer, and learned that none other of Ashlock's crew except theone before mentioned had been saved; but, on the contrary, thecaptain of the steamer had sent one of his own boats to theirrescue, which was likewise upset in the surf, and, out of the threemen in her, one had drifted back outside the breakers, clinging tothe upturned boat, and was picked up. This sad and fatalcatastrophe made us all afraid of that bar, and in returning to theshore I adopted the more prudent course of beaching the boat belowthe inlet, which insured us a good ducking, but was attended withless risk to life. 

I had to return to the fort and bear to Mrs. Ashlock the absolutetruth, that her husband was lost forever. 

Meantime her sister had entirely recovered her equilibrium, andbeing the guest of the officers, who were extremely courteous toher, she did not lament so loudly the calamity that saved them along life of banishment on the beach of Indian River. By the firstopportunity they were sent back to St. Augustine, the possessors ofall of Ashlock's worldly goods and effects, consisting of a goodrifle, several cast-nets, hand-lines, etc. , etc. , besides somethree hundred dollars in money, which was due him by thequartermaster for his services as pilot. I afterward saw theseladies at St. Augustine, and years afterward the younger one cameto Charleston, South Carolina, the wife of the somewhat famousCaptain Thistle, agent for the United States for live-oak inFlorida, who was noted as the first of the troublesome class ofinventors of modern artillery. He was the inventor of a gun that"did not recoil at all, " or "if anything it recoiled a littleforward. "

One day, in the summer of 1841, the sentinel on the housetop atFort Pierce called out, "Indians! Indians!" Everybody sprang tohis gun, the companies formed promptly on the parade-ground, andsoon were reported as approaching the post, from the pine-woods inrear, four Indians on horseback. They rode straight up to thegateway, dismounted, and came in. They were conducted by theofficer of the day to the commanding officer, Major Childs, who saton the porch in front of his own room. After the usual pause, oneof them, a black man named Joe, who spoke English, said they hadbeen sent in by Coacoochee (Wild Cat), one of the most noted of theSeminole chiefs, to see the big chief of the post. He graduallyunwrapped a piece of paper, which was passed over to Major Childs, who read it, and it was in the nature of a "Safe Guard" for "WildCat" to come into Fort Pierce to receive provisions and assistancewhile collecting his tribe, with the purpose of emigrating to theirreservation west of Arkansas. The paper was signed by GeneralWorth, who had succeeded General Taylor, at Tampa Bay, in commandof all the troops in Florida. Major Childs inquired, "Where isCoacoochee?" and was answered, "Close by, " when Joe explained thathe had been sent in by his chief to see if the paper was all right. Major Childs said it was "all right, " and that Coacoochee ought tocome in himself. Joe offered to go out and bring him in, whenMajor Childs ordered me to take eight or ten mounted men and go outto escort him in. Detailing ten men to saddle up, and taking Joeand one Indian boy along on their own ponies, I started out undertheir guidance. 

We continued to ride five or six miles, when I began to suspecttreachery, of which I had heard so much in former years, and hadbeen specially cautioned against by the older officers; but Joealways answered, "Only a little way. " At last we approached oneof those close hammocks, so well known in Florida, standing like anisland in the interminable pine-forest, with a pond of water nearit. On its edge I noticed a few Indians loitering, which Joepointed out as the place. Apprehensive of treachery, I halted theguard, gave orders to the sergeant to watch me closely, and rodeforward alone with the two Indian guides. As we neared thehammock, about a dozen Indian warriors rose up and waited for us. When in their midst I inquired for the chief, Coacoochee. Heapproached my horse and, slapping his breast, said, "MeCoacoochee. " He was a very handsome young Indian warrior, not morethan twenty-five years old, but in his then dress could hardly bedistinguished from the rest. I then explained to him, through Joe, that I had been sent by my "chief" to escort him into the fort. Hewanted me to get down and "talk" I told him that I had no "talk" inme, but that, on his reaching the post, he could talk as much as hepleased with the "big chief, " Major Childs. They all seemed to beindifferent, and in no hurry; and I noticed that all their gunswere leaning against a tree. I beckoned to the sergeant, whoadvanced rapidly with his escort, and told him to secure therifles, which he proceeded to do. Coacoochee pretended to be veryangry, but I explained to him that his warriors were tired and minewere not, and that the soldiers would carry the guns on theirhorses. I told him I would provide him a horse to ride, and thesooner he was ready the better for all. He then stripped, washedhimself in the pond, and began to dress in all his Indian finery, which consisted of buckskin leggins, moccasins, and several shirts. He then began to put on vests, one after another, and one of themhad the marks of a bullet, just above the pocket, with the stain ofblood. In the pocket was a one-dollar Tallahassee Bank note, andthe rascal had the impudence to ask me to give him silver coin forthat dollar. He had evidently killed the wearer, and wasdisappointed because the pocket contained a paper dollar instead ofone in silver. In due time he was dressed with turban andostrich-feathers, and mounted the horse reserved for him, and thuswe rode back together to Fort Pierce. Major Childs and all theofficers received him on the porch, and there we had a regular"talk. " Coacoochee "was tired of the war. " "His people werescattered and it would take a 'moon' to collect them foremigration, " and he "wanted rations for that time, " etc. , etc. 

All this was agreed to, and a month was allowed for him to getready with his whole band (numbering some one hundred and fifty orone hundred and sixty) to migrate. The "talk" then ceased, andCoacoochee and his envoys proceeded to get regularly drunk, whichwas easily done by the agency of commissary whiskey. They staid atFort Pierce daring the night, and the next day departed. Severaltimes during the month there came into the post two or more ofthese same Indians, always to beg for something to eat or drink, and after a full month Coacoochee and about twenty of his warriorscame in with several ponies, but with none of their women orchildren. Major Childs had not from the beginning the least faithin his sincerity; had made up his mind to seize the whole party andcompel them to emigrate. He arranged for the usual council, andinstructed Lieutenant Taylor to invite Coacoochee and his uncle(who was held to be a principal chief) to his room to take somegood brandy, instead of the common commissary whiskey. At a signalagreed on I was to go to the quarters of Company A, to dispatch thefirst-sergeant and another man to Lieutenant Taylor's room, thereto seize the two chiefs and secure them; and with the company I wasto enter Major Childs's room and secure the remainder of the party. Meantime Lieutenant Van Vliet was ordered to go to the quarters ofhis company, F, and at the same signal to march rapidly to the rearof the officers' quarters, so as to catch any who might attempt toescape by the open windows to the rear. 

All resulted exactly as prearranged, and in a few minutes the wholeparty was in irons. At first they claimed that we had actedtreacherously, but very soon they admitted that for a monthCoacoochee had been quietly removing his women and children towardLake Okeechobee and the Everglades; and that this visit to our postwas to have been their last. It so happened that almost at theinstant of our seizing these Indians a vessel arrived off the barwith reenforcements from St. Augustine. These were brought up toFort Pierce, and we marched that night and next day rapidly, somefifty miles, to Lake Okeechobee, in hopes to capture the balance ofthe tribe, especially the families, but they had taken the alarmand escaped. Coacoochee and his warriors were sent by Major Childsin a schooner to New Orleans en route to their reservation, butGeneral Worth recalled them to Tampa Bay, and by sending outCoacoochee himself the women and children came in voluntarily, andthen all were shipped to their destination. This was a heavy lossto the Seminoles, but there still remained in the Peninsula a fewhundred warriors with their families scattered into very smallparcels, who were concealed in the most inaccessible hammocks andswamps. These had no difficulty in finding plenty of food anywhereand everywhere. Deer and wild turkey were abundant, and as forfish there was no end to them. Indeed, Florida was the Indian'sparadise, was of little value to us, and it was a great pity toremove the Seminoles at all, for we could have collected there allthe Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws, in addition to theSeminoles. They would have thrived in the Peninsula, whereas theynow occupy lands that are very valuable, which are coveted by theirwhite neighbors on all sides, while the Peninsula, of Florida stillremains with a population less than should make a good State. 

During that and preceding years General W. S. Harney had penetratedand crossed through the Everglades, capturing and hanging Chekikaand his band, and had brought in many prisoners, who were alsoshipped West. We at Fort Pierce made several other excursions toJupiter, Lake Worth, Lauderdale, and into the Everglades, pickingup here and there a family, so that it was absurd any longer tocall it a "war. " These excursions, however, possessed to us apeculiar charm, for the fragrance of the air, the abundance of gameand fish, and just enough of adventure, gave to life a relish. Ihad just returned to Lauderdale from one of these scouts withLieutenants Rankin, Ord, George H. Thomas, Field, Van Vliet, andothers, when I received notice of my promotion to be firstlieutenant of Company G, which occurred November 30, 1841, and Iwas ordered to return to Fort Pierce, turn over the public propertyfor which I was accountable to Lieutenant H. S. Burton, and then tojoin my new company at St. Augustine. 

I reached St. Augustine before Christmas, and was assigned tocommand a detachment of twenty men stationed at Picolata, on theSt. John's River, eighteen miles distant. At St. Augustine werestill the headquarters of the regiment, Colonel William Gates, withCompany E, Lieutenant Bragg, and Company G, Lieutenant H. B. Judd. The only buildings at Picolata were the one occupied by mydetachment, which had been built for a hospital, and the dwellingof a family named Williams, with whom I boarded. On the otherhand, St. Augustine had many pleasant families, among whom wasprominent that of United States Judge Bronson. I was half my timein St. Augustine or on the road, and remember the old place withpleasure. In February we received orders transferring the wholeregiment to the Gulf posts, and our company, G, was ordered toescort Colonel Gates and his family across to the Suwanee River, enroute for Pensacola. The company, with the colonel and his family, reached Picolata (where my detachment joined), and we embarked in asteamboat for Pilatka. Here Lieutenant Judd discovered that he hadforgotten something and had to return to St. Augustine, sothat I commanded the company on the march, having with meSecond-Lieutenant George B. Ayres. Our first march was to FortRussell, then Micanopy, Wacahoota, and Wacasassee, all which postswere garrisoned by the Second or Seventh Infantry. At Wacasassee wemet General Worth and his staff, en route for Pilatka. LieutenantJudd overtook us about the Suwanee, where we embarked on a smallboat for Cedar Keys, and there took a larger one for Pensacola, where the colonel and his family landed, and our company proceededon in the same vessel to our post--Fort Morgan, Mobile Point. 

This fort had not been occupied by troops for many years, was verydirty, and we found little or no stores there. Major Ogden, of theengineers, occupied a house outside the fort. I was quartermasterand commissary, and, taking advantage of one of the engineerschooners engaged in bringing materials for the fort, I went up toMobile city, and, through the agency of Messrs. Deshon, Taylor, and Myers, merchants, procured all essentials for the troops, andreturned to the post. In the course of a week or ten days arrivedanother company, H, commanded by Lieutenant James Ketchum, withLieutenants Rankin and Sewall L. Fish, and an assistant surgeon(Wells. ) Ketchum became the commanding officer, and LieutenantRankin quartermaster. We proceeded to put the post in as goodorder as possible; had regular guard-mounting and parades, butlittle drill. We found magnificent fishing with the seine on theouter beach, and sometimes in a single haul we would take ten orfifteen barrels of the best kind of fish, embracing pompinos, red-fish, snappers, etc. 

We remained there till June, when the regiment was ordered toexchange from the Gulf posts to those on the Atlantic, extendingfrom Savannah to North Carolina. The brig Wetumpka was chartered, and our company (G) embarked and sailed to Pensacola, where we tookon board another company (D) (Burke's), commanded by Lieutenant H. S. Burton, with Colonel Gates, the regimental headquarters, andsome families. From Pensacola we sailed for Charleston, SouthCarolina. The weather was hot, the winds light, and we made a longpassage but at last reached Charleston Harbor, disembarked, andtook post in Fort Moultrie. 

Soon after two other companies arrived, Bragg's (B) and Keyes's(K). The two former companies were already quartered inside ofFort Moultrie, and these latter were placed in gun-sheds, outside, which were altered into barracks. We remained at Fort Moultrienearly five years, until the Mexican War scattered us forever. Ourlife there was of strict garrison duty, with plenty of leisure forhunting and social entertainments. We soon formed many and mostpleasant acquaintances in the city of Charleston; and it sohappened that many of the families resided at Sullivan's Island inthe summer season, where we could reciprocate the hospitalitiesextended to us in the winter. 

During the summer of 1843, having been continuously on duty forthree years, I applied for and received a leave of absence forthree months, which I spent mostly in Ohio. In November I startedto return to my post at Charleston by way of New Orleans; took thestage to Chillicothe, Ohio, November 16th, having Henry Stanberry, Esq. , and wife, as travelling companions, We continued by stage. Next day to Portsmouth, Ohio. 

At Portsmouth Mr. Stanberry took a boat up the river, and I onedown to Cincinnati. There I found my brothers Lampson and Hoytemployed in the "Gazette" printing-office, and spent much time withthem and Charles Anderson, Esq. , visiting his brother Larz, Mr. Longworth, some of his artist friends, and especially Miss SallieCarneal, then quite a belle, and noted for her fine voice, On the 20th I took passage on the steamboat Manhattan for St. Louis; reached Louisville, where Dr. Conrad, of the army, joinedme, and in the Manhattan we continued on to St. Louis, with a mixedcrowd. We reached the Mississippi at Cairo the 23d, and St. Louis, Friday, November 24, 1843. At St. Louis we called on Colonel S. W. Kearney and Major Cooper, his adjutant-general, and found myclassmate, Lieutenant McNutt, of the ordnance, stationed at thearsenal; also Mr. Deas, an artist, and Pacificus Ord, who wasstudying law. I spent a week at St. Louis, visiting the arsenal, Jefferson Barracks, and most places of interest, and then becameimpressed with its great future. It then contained about fortythousand people, and my notes describe thirty-six good steamboatsreceiving and discharging cargo at the levee. 

I took passage December 4th in the steamer John Aull for NewOrleans. As we passed Cairo the snow was falling, and the countrywas wintery and devoid of verdure. Gradually, however, as weproceeded south, the green color came; grass and trees showed thechange of latitude, and when in the course of a week we had reachedNew Orleans, the roses were in full bloom, the sugar-cane justripe, and a tropical air prevalent. We reached New OrleansDecember 11, 1843, where I spent about a week visiting thebarracks, then occupied by the Seventh Infantry; the theatres, hotels, and all the usual places of interest of that day. 

On the 16th of December I continued on to Mobile in the steamerFashion by way of Lake Pontchartrain; saw there most of my personalfriends, Mr. And Mrs. Bull, Judge Bragg and his brother Dunbar, Deshon, Taylor, and Myers, etc. , and on the 19th of December tookpassage in the steamboat Bourbon for Montgomery, Alabama, by way ofthe Alabama River. We reached Montgomery at noon, December 23d, and took cars at 1 p. M. For Franklin, forty miles, which we reachedat 7 p. M. , thence stages for Griffin, Georgia, via La Grange andGreenville. This took the whole night of the 23d and the day ofthe 24th. At Griffin we took cars for Macon, and thence toSavannah, which we reached Christmas-night, finding LieutenantsRidgley and Ketchum at tea, where we were soon joined by Rankin andBeckwith. 

On the 26th I took the boat for Charleston, reaching my post, andreported for duty Wednesday morning, December 27, 1843. 

I had hardly got back to my post when, on the 21st of January, 1844, I received from Lieutenant R. P. Hammond, at Marietta, Georgia, an intimation that Colonel Churchill, Inspector-General ofthe Army, had applied for me to assist him in taking depositions inupper Georgia and Alabama; concerning certain losses by volunteersin Florida of horses and equipments by reason of the failure of theUnited States to provide sufficient forage, and for which Congresshad made an appropriation. On the 4th of February the order camefrom the Adjutant-General in Washington for me to proceed toMarietta, Georgia, and report to Inspector-General Churchill. Iwas delayed till the 14th of February by reason of being on acourt-martial, when I was duly relieved and started by rail toAugusta, Georgia, and as far as Madison, where I took themail-coach, reaching Marietta on the 17th. There I reported forduty to Colonel Churchill, who was already engaged on his work, assisted by Lieutenant R. P. Hammond, Third Artillery, and acitizen named Stockton. The colonel had his family with him, consisting of Mrs. Churchill, Mary, now Mrs. Professor Baird, andCharles Churchill, then a boy of about fifteen years of age. 

We all lived in a tavern, and had an office convenient. The dutyconsisted in taking individual depositions of the officers and menwho had composed two regiments and a battalion of mountedvolunteers that had served in Florida. An oath was administered toeach man by Colonel Churchill, who then turned the claimant over toone of us to take down and record his deposition according tocertain forms, which enabled them to be consolidated and tabulated. We remained in Marietta about six weeks, during which time Irepeatedly rode to Kenesaw Mountain, and over the very ground whereafterward, in 1864, we had some hard battles. 

After closing our business at Marietta the colonel ordered us totransfer our operations to Bellefonte, Alabama. As he proposed totake his family and party by the stage, Hammond lent me hisriding-horse, which I rode to Allatoona and the Etowah River. Hearing of certain large Indian mounds near the way, I turned toone side to visit them, stopping a couple of days with ColonelLewis Tumlin, on whose plantation these mounds were. We struck upsuch an acquaintance that we corresponded for some years, and as Ipassed his plantation during the war, in 1864, I inquired for him, but he was not at home. From Tumlin's I rode to Rome, and by wayof Wills Valley over Sand Mountain and the Raccoon Range to theTennessee River at Bellefonte, Alabama. We all assembled there inMarch, and continued our work for nearly two months, when, havingcompleted the business, Colonel Churchill, with his family, wentNorth by way of Nashville; Hammond, Stockton, and I returning Southon horseback, by Rome, Allatoona, Marietta, Atlanta, and Madison, Georgia. Stockton stopped at Marietta, where he resided. Hammondtook the cars at Madison, and I rode alone to Augusta, Georgia, where I left the horse and returned to Charleston and Fort Moultrieby rail. 

Thus by a mere accident I was enabled to traverse on horseback thevery ground where in after-years I had to conduct vast armies andfight great battles. That the knowledge thus acquired was ofinfinite use to me, and consequently to the Government, I havealways felt and stated. 

During the autumn of 1844, a difficulty arose among the officers ofCompany B, Third Artillery (John R. Yinton's), garrisoning AugustaArsenal, and I was sent up from Fort Moultrie as a sort ofpeace-maker. After staying there some months, certain transfers ofofficers were made, which reconciled the difficulty, and I returnedto my post, Fort Moultrie. During that winter, 1844-'45, I wasvisiting at the plantation of Mr. Poyas, on the east branch of theCooper, about fifty miles from Fort Moultrie, hunting deer with hisson James, and Lieutenant John F. Reynolds, Third Artillery. Wehad taken our stands, and a deer came out of the swamp near that ofMr. James Poyas, who fired, broke the leg of the deer, which turnedback into the swamp and came out again above mine. I could followhis course by the cry of the hounds, which were in close pursuit. Hastily mounting my horse, I struck across the pine-woods to headthe deer off, and when at full career my horse leaped a fallen logand his fore-foot caught one of those hard, unyielding pineknotsthat brought him with violence to the ground. I got up as quick aspossible, and found my right arm out of place at the shoulder, caused by the weight of the double-barrelled gun. 

Seeing Reynolds at some distance, I called out lustily and broughthim to me. He soon mended the bridle and saddle, which had beenbroken by the fall, helped me on my horse, and we followed thecoarse of the hounds. At first my arm did not pain me much, but itsoon began to ache so that it was almost unendurable. In aboutthree miles we came to a negro hut, where I got off and rested tillReynolds could overtake Poyas and bring him back. They came atlast, but by that time the arm was so swollen and painful that Icould not ride. They rigged up an old gig belonging to the negro, in which I was carried six miles to the plantation of Mr. Poyas, Sr. A neighboring physician was sent for, who tried the usualmethods of setting the arm, but without success; each time makingthe operation more painful. At last he sent off, got a set ofdouble pulleys and cords, with which he succeeded in extending themuscles and in getting the bone into place. I then returned toFort Moultrie, but being disabled, applied for a short leave andwent North. 

I started January 25, 1845; went to Washington, Baltimore, andLancaster, Ohio, whence I went to Mansfield, and thence back byNewark to Wheeling, Cumberland, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and NewYork, whence I sailed back for Charleston on the ship Sullivan, reaching Fort Moultrie March 9, 1845. 

About that time (March 1, 1845) Congress had, by a jointresolution, provided for the annexation of Texas, then anindependent Republic, subject to certain conditions requiring theacceptance of the Republic of Texas to be final and conclusive. Weall expected war as a matter of course. At that time GeneralZachary Taylor had assembled a couple of regiments of infantry andone of dragoons at Fort Jessup, Louisiana, and had orders to extendmilitary protection to Texas against the Indians, or a "foreignenemy, " the moment the terms of annexation were accepted. Hereceived notice of such acceptance July 7th, and forthwithproceeded to remove his troops to Corpus Christi, Texas, where, during the summer and fall of 1845, was assembled that force withwhich, in the spring of 1846, was begun the Mexican War. 

Some time during that summer came to Fort Moultrie orders forsending Company E, Third Artillery, Lieutenant Bragg, to NewOrleans, there to receive a battery of field-guns, and thence tothe camp of General Taylor at Corpus Christi. This was the firstcompany of our regiment sent to the seat of war, and it embarked onthe brig Hayne. This was the only company that left Fort Moultrietill after I was detached for recruiting service on the 1st of May, 1846. 

Inasmuch as Charleston afterward became famous, as the spot wherebegan our civil war, a general description of it, as it was in1846, will not be out of place. 

The city lies on a long peninsula between the Ashley and CooperRivers--a low, level peninsula, of sand. Meeting Street is itsBroadway, with King Street, next west and parallel, the street ofshops and small stores. These streets are crossed at right anglesby many others, of which Broad Street was the principal; and theintersection of Meeting and Broad was the heart of the city, markedby the Guard-House and St. Michael's Episcopal Church. TheCustom-House, Post-Office, etc. , were at the foot of Broad Street, near the wharves of the Cooper River front. At the extremity ofthe peninsula was a drive, open to the bay, and faced by some ofthe handsomest houses of the city, called the "Battery. " Lookingdown the bay on the right, was James Island, an irregular triangleof about seven miles, the whole island in cultivation withsea-island cotton. At the lower end was Fort Johnson, then simplythe station of Captain Bowman, United States Engineers, engaged inbuilding Fort Sumter. This fort (Sumter) was erected on anartificial island nearly in mid-channel, made by dumping rocks, mostly brought as ballast in cotton-ships from the North. As therock reached the surface it was levelled, and made the foundationof Fort Sumter. In 1846 this fort was barely above the water. Still farther out beyond James Island, and separated from it by awide space of salt marsh with crooked channels, was Morris Island, composed of the sand-dunes thrown up by the wind and the sea, backed with the salt marsh. On this was the lighthouse, but nopeople. 

On the left, looking down the bay from the Battery of Charleston, was, first, Castle Pinckney, a round brick fort, of two tiers ofguns, one in embrasure, the other in barbette, built on a marshisland, which was not garrisoned. Farther down the bay a point ofthe mainland reached the bay, where there was a group of houses, called Mount Pleasant; and at the extremity of the bay, distant sixmiles, was Sullivan's Island, presenting a smooth sand-beach to thesea, with the line of sand-hills or dunes thrown up by the wavesand winds, and the usual backing of marsh and crooked salt-waterchannels. 

At the shoulder of this island was Fort Moultrie, an irregularfort, without ditch or counterscarp, with a brick scarp wall abouttwelve feet high, which could be scaled anywhere, and this wassurmounted by an earth parapet capable of mounting about fortytwenty-four and thirty-two pounder smooth-bore iron guns. Insidethe fort were three two-story brick barracks, sufficient to quarterthe officers and men of two companies of artillery. 

At sea was the usual "bar, " changing slightly from year to year, but generally the main ship-channel came from the south, parallelto Morris Island, till it was well up to Fort Moultrie, where itcurved, passing close to Fort Sumter and up to the wharves of thecity, which were built mostly along the Cooper River front. 

Charleston was then a proud, aristocratic city, and assumed aleadership in the public opinion of the South far out of proportionto her population, wealth, or commerce. On more than one occasionpreviously, the inhabitants had almost inaugurated civil war, bytheir assertion and professed belief that each State had, in theoriginal compact of government, reserved to itself the right towithdraw from the Union at its own option, whenever the peoplesupposed they had sufficient cause. We used to discuss thesethings at our own mess-tables, vehemently and sometimes quiteangrily; but I am sure that I never feared it would go further thanit had already gone in the winter of 1832-'33, when the attempt at"nullification" was promptly suppressed by President Jackson'sfamous declaration, "The Union must and shall be preserved!" and bythe judicious management of General Scott. 

Still, civil war was to be; and, now that it has come and gone, wecan rest secure in the knowledge that as the chief cause, slavery, has been eradicated forever, it is not likely to come again. 

CHAPTER II. 

EARLY RECOLLECTIONS of CALIFORNIA. 

1846-1848. 

In the spring of 1846 I was a first lieutenant of Company C, 1, Third Artillery, stationed at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. Thecompany was commanded by Captain Robert Anderson; Henry B. Judd wasthe senior first-lieutenant, and I was the junior first-lieutenant, and George B. Ayres the second-lieutenant. Colonel William Gatescommanded the post and regiment, with First-Lieutenant WilliamAustine as his adjutant. Two other companies were at the post, viz. , Martin Burke's and E. D. Keyes's, and among the officers wereT. W. Sherman, Morris Miller, H. B. Field, William Churchill, Joseph Stewart, and Surgeon McLaren. 

The country now known as Texas had been recently acquired, and warwith Mexico was threatening. One of our companies (Bragg's), withGeorge H. Thomas, John F. Reynolds, and Frank Thomas, had gone theyear previous and was at that time with General Taylor's army atCorpus Christi, Texas. 

In that year (1846) I received the regular detail for recruitingservice, with orders to report to the general superintendent atGovernor's Island, New York; and accordingly left Fort Moultrie inthe latter part of April, and reported to the superintendent, Colonel R. B. Mason, First Dragoons, at New York, on the 1st day ofMay. I was assigned to the Pittsburg rendezvous, whither Iproceeded and relieved Lieutenant Scott. Early in May I took up myquarters at the St. Charles Hotel, and entered upon the dischargeof my duties. There was a regular recruiting-station alreadyestablished, with a sergeant, corporal, and two or three men, witha citizen physician, Dr. McDowell, to examine the recruits. Thethreatening war with Mexico made a demand for recruits, and Ireceived authority to open another sub-rendezvous at Zanesville, Ohio, whither I took the sergeant and established him. This wasvery handy to me, as my home was at Lancaster, Ohio, onlythirty-six miles off, so that I was thus enabled to visit myfriends there quite often. 

In the latter part of May, when at Wheeling, Virginia, on my wayback from Zanesville to Pittsburg, I heard the first news of thebattle of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, which occurred on the8th and 9th of May, and, in common with everybody else, feltintensely excited. That I should be on recruiting service, when mycomrades were actually fighting, was intolerable, and I hurriedon to my post, Pittsburg. At that time the railroad did notextend west of the Alleghanies, and all journeys were made bystage-coaches. In this instance I traveled from Zanesville toWheeling, thence to Washington (Pennsylvania), and thence toPittsburg by stage-coach. On reaching Pittsburg I found manyprivate letters; one from Ord, then a first-lieutenant in CompanyF, Third Artillery, at Fort McHenry, Baltimore, saying that hiscompany had just received orders for California, and asking me toapply for it. Without committing myself to that project, I wroteto the Adjutant-General, R. Jones, at Washington, D. C. , asking himto consider me as an applicant for any active service, and sayingthat I would willingly forego the recruiting detail, which I wellknew plenty of others would jump at. Impatient to approach thescene of active operations, without authority (and I supposewrongfully), I left my corporal in charge of the rendezvous, andtook all the recruits I had made, about twenty-five, in a steamboatto Cincinnati, and turned them over to Major N. C. McCrea, commanding at Newport Barracks. I then reported in Cincinnati, tothe superintendent of the Western recruiting service, ColonelFanning, an old officer with one arm, who inquired by whatauthority I had come away from my post. I argued that I took itfor granted he wanted all the recruits he could get to forward tothe army at Brownsville, Texas; and did not know but that he mightwant me to go along. Instead of appreciating my volunteer zeal, hecursed and swore at me for leaving my post without orders, and toldme to go back to Pittsburg. I then asked for an order that wouldentitle me to transportation back, which at first he emphaticallyrefused, but at last he gave the order, and I returned toPittsburg, all the way by stage, stopping again at Lancaster, whereI attended the wedding of my schoolmate Mike Effinger, and alsovisited my sub-rendezvous at Zanesville. R. S. Ewell, of my class, arrived to open a cavalry rendezvous, but, finding my depot there, he went on to Columbus, Ohio. Tom Jordan afterward was orderedto Zanesville, to take charge of that rendezvous, underthe general War Department orders increasing the number ofrecruiting-stations. I reached Pittsburg late in June, and foundthe order relieving me from recruiting service, and detailing myclassmate H. B. Field to my place. I was assigned to Company F, then under orders for California. By private letters fromLieutenant Ord, I heard that the company had already started fromFort McHenry for Governor's Island, New York Harbor, to take passagefor California in a naval transport. I worked all that night, madeup my accounts current, and turned over the balance of cash to thecitizen physician, Dr. McDowell; and also closed my clothing andproperty returns, leaving blank receipts with the same gentleman forField's signature, when he should get there, to be forwarded to theDepartment at Washington, and the duplicates to me. These I did notreceive for more than a year. I remember that I got my orders about8 p. M. One night, and took passage in the boat for Brownsville, thenext morning traveled by stage from Brownsville to Cumberland, Maryland, and thence by cars to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and NewYork, in a great hurry lest the ship might sail without me. I foundCompany F at Governor's Island, Captain C. Q. Tompkins in command, Lieutenant E. O. C. Ord senior first-lieutenant, myselfjunior first-lieutenant, Lucien Loeser and Charles Minor thesecond-lieutenants. 

The company had been filled up to one hundred privates, twelvenon-commissioned officers, and one ordnance sergeant (Layton), making one hundred and thirteen enlisted men and five officers. Dr. James L. Ord had been employed as acting assistant surgeon toaccompany the expedition, and Lieutenant H. W. Halleck, of theengineers, was also to go along. The United States store-shipLexington was then preparing at the Navy-Yard, Brooklyn, to carryus around Cape Horn to California. She was receiving on board thenecessary stores for the long voyage, and for service after ourarrival there. Lieutenant-Commander Theodorus Bailey was incommand of the vessel, Lieutenant William H. Macomb executiveofficer, and Passed-Midshipmen Muse, Spotts, and J. W. A. Nicholson, were the watch-officers; Wilson purser, and Abernethysurgeon. The latter was caterer of the mess, and we all made anadvance of cash for him to lay in the necessary mess-stores. Toenable us to prepare for so long a voyage and for an indefinitesojourn in that far-off country, the War Department had authorizedus to draw six months' pay in advance, which sum of money weinvested in surplus clothing and such other things as seemed to usnecessary. At last the ship was ready, and was towed down abreastof Fort Columbus, where we were conveyed on board, and on the 14thof July, 1846, we were towed to sea by a steam-tug, and cast off:Colonel R. B. Mason, still superintendent of the general recruitingservice, accompanied us down the bay and out to sea, returning withthe tug. A few other friends were of the party, but at last theyleft us, and we were alone upon the sea, and the sailors were busywith the sails and ropes. The Lexington was an old ship, changedfrom a sloop-of-war to a store-ship, with an after-cabin, a"ward-room, " and "between-decks. " In the cabin were CaptainsBailey and Tompkins, with whom messed the purser, Wilson. In theward-room were all the other officers, two in each state-room; andMinor, being an extra lieutenant, had to sleep in a hammock slungin the ward-room. Ord and I roomed together; Halleck and Loeserand the others were scattered about. The men were arranged inbunks "between-decks, " one set along the sides of the ship, andanother, double tier, amidships. The crew were slung in hammockswell forward. Of these there were about fifty. We at oncesubdivided the company into four squads, under the four lieutenantsof the company, and arranged with the naval officers that our menshould serve on deck by squads, after the manner of their watches;that the sailors should do all the work aloft, and the soldiers ondeck. 

On fair days we drilled our men at the manual, and generally keptthem employed as much as possible, giving great attention to thepolice and cleanliness of their dress and bunks; and so successfulwere we in this, that, though the voyage lasted nearly two hundreddays, every man was able to leave the ship and march up the hill tothe fort at Monterey, California, carrying his own knapsack andequipments. 

The voyage from New York to Rio Janeiro was without accident or anything to vary the usual monotony. We soon settled down to thehumdrum of a long voyage, reading some, not much; playing games, but never gambling; and chiefly engaged in eating our mealsregularly. In crossing the equator we had the usual visit ofNeptune and his wife, who, with a large razor and a bucket ofsoapsuds, came over the sides and shaved some of the greenhorns;but naval etiquette exempted the officers, and Neptune was notpermitted to come aft of the mizzen-mast. At last, after sixtydays of absolute monotony, the island of Raza, off Rio Janeiro, wasdescried, and we slowly entered the harbor, passing a fort on ourright hand, from which came a hail, in the Portuguese language, from a huge speaking-trumpet, and our officer of the deck answeredback in gibberish, according to a well-understood custom of theplace. Sugar-loaf Mountain, on the south of the entrance, is veryremarkable and well named; is almost conical, with a slight lean. The man-of-war anchorage is about five miles inside the heads, directly in front of the city of Rio Janeiro. Words will notdescribe the beauty of this perfect harbor, nor the delightfulfeeling after a long voyage of its fragrant airs, and the entirecontrast between all things there and what we had left in New York. 

We found the United Staten frigate Columbia anchored there, andafter the Lexington was properly moored, nearly all the officerswent on shore for sight-seeing and enjoyment. We landed at a wharfopposite which was a famous French restaurant, Farroux, and afterordering supper we all proceeded to the Rua da Ouvador, where mostof the shops were, especially those for making feather flowers, asmuch to see the pretty girls as the flowers which they soskillfully made; thence we went to the theatre, where, besides someopera, we witnessed the audience and saw the Emperor Dom Pedro, andhis Empress, the daughter of the King of Sicily. After thetheatre, we went back to the restaurant, where we had an excellentsupper, with fruits of every variety and excellence, such as we hadnever seen before, or even knew the names of. Supper being over, we called for the bill, and it was rendered in French, withBrazilian currency. It footed up some twenty-six thousand reis. The figures alarmed us, so we all put on the waiters' plate variouscoins in gold, which he took to the counter and returned thechange, making the total about sixteen dollars. The millreis isabout a dollar, but being a paper-money was at a discount, so asonly to be worth about fifty-six cents in coin. 

The Lexington remained in Rio about a week, during which we visitedthe Palace, a few miles in the country, also the Botanic Gardens, aplace of infinite interest, with its specimens of tropical fruits, spices; etc. , etc. , and indeed every place of note. The thing Ibest recall is a visit Halleck and I made to the Corcovado, a highmountain whence the water is conveyed for the supply of the city. We started to take a walk, and passed along the aqueduct, whichapproaches the city by a aeries of arches; thence up the point ofthe hill to a place known as the Madre, or fountain, to which allthe water that drips from the leaves is conducted by tile gutters, and is carried to the city by an open stone aqueduct. 

Here we found Mr. Henry A. Wise, of Virginia, the United Statesminister to Brazil, and a Dr. Garnett, United States Navy, hisintended son-in-law. We had a very interesting conversation, inwhich Mr. Wise enlarged on the fact that Rio was supplied from the"dews of heaven, " for in the dry season the water comes from themists and fogs which hang around the Corcovado, drips from theleaves of the trees, and is conducted to the Madre fountain bymiles of tile gutters. Halleck and I continued our ascent of themountain, catching from points of the way magnificent views of thescenery round about Rio Janeiro. We reached near the summit whatwas called the emperor's coffee-plantation, where we sawcoffee-berries in their various stages, and the scaffolds on whichthe berries were dried before being cleaned. The coffee-treereminded me of the red haw-tree of Ohio, and the berries weresomewhat like those of the same tree, two grains of coffee beinginclosed in one berry. These were dried and cleaned of the husk byhand or by machinery. A short, steep ascent from this placecarried us to the summit, from which is beheld one of the mostpicturesque views on earth. The Organ Mountains to the west andnorth, the ocean to the east, the city of Rio with its red-tiledhouses at our feet, and the entire harbor like a map spread out, with innumerable bright valleys, make up a landscape that cannot bedescribed by mere words. This spot is universally visited bystrangers, and has often been described. After enjoying itimmeasurably, we returned to the city by another route, tired butamply repaid by our long walk. 

In due time all had been done that was requisite, and the Lexingtonput to sea and resumed her voyage. In October we approached CapeHorn, the first land descried was Staten Island, white with snow, and the ship seemed to be aiming for the channel to its west, straits of Le Maire, but her course was changed and we passedaround to the east. In time we saw Cape Horn; an island roundedlike an oven, after which it takes its name (Ornos) oven. Here weexperienced very rough weather, buffeting about under stormstay-sails, and spending nearly a month before the wind favored ourpassage and enabled the course of the ship to be changed forValparaiso. One day we sailed parallel with a French sloop-of-war, and it was sublime to watch the two ships rising and falling inthose long deep swells of the ocean. All the time we were followedby the usual large flocks of Cape-pigeons and albatrosses of everycolor. The former resembled the common barn-pigeon exactly, butare in fact gulls of beautiful and varied colors, mostlydove-color. We caught many with fishing-lines baited with pork. We also took in the same way many albatrosses. The white ones arevery large, and their down is equal to that of the swan. At lastCape Horn and its swelling seas were left behind, and we reachedValparaiso in about sixty days from Rio. We anchored in the openroadstead, and spent there about ten days, visiting all the usualplaces of interest, its foretop, main-top, mizzen-top, etc. Halleck and Ord went up to Santiago, the capital of Chili, somesixty miles inland, but I did not go. Valparaiso did not impressme favorably at all. Seen from the sea, it looked like a longstring of houses along the narrow beach, surmounted with red banksof earth, with little verdure, and no trees at all. Northward thespace widened out somewhat, and gave room for a plaza, but the massof houses in that quarter were poor. We were there in November, corresponding to our early spring, and we enjoyed the largestrawberries which abounded. The Independence frigate, CommodoreShubrick, came in while we were there, having overtaken us, boundalso for California. We met there also the sloop-of-war levant, from California, and from the officers heard of many of the eventsthat had transpired about the time the navy, under Commodore Sloat, had taken possession of the country. 

All the necessary supplies being renewed in Valparaiso, the voyagewas resumed. For nearly forty days we had uninterrupted favorablewinds, being in the "trades, " and, having settled down to sailorhabits, time passed without notice. We had brought with us all thebooks we could find in New York about California, and had read themover and over again: Wilkes's "Exploring Expedition;" Dana's "TwoYears before the Mast;" and Forbes's "Account of the Missions. " Itwas generally understood we were bound for Monterey, then thecapital of Upper California. We knew, of course, that GeneralKearney was enroute for the same country overland; that Fremont wastherewith his exploring party; that the navy had already takenpossession, and that a regiment of volunteers, Stevenson's, wasto follow us from New York; but nevertheless we were impatient toreach our destination. About the middle of January the ship beganto approach the California coast, of which the captain was dulycautious, because the English and Spanish charts differed somefifteen miles in the longitude, and on all the charts a current oftwo miles an hour was indicated northward along the coast. At lastland was made one morning, and here occurred one of those accidentsso provoking after a long and tedious voyage. Macomb, the masterand regular navigator, had made the correct observations, butNicholson during the night, by an observation on the north star, put the ship some twenty miles farther south than was the case bythe regular reckoning, so that Captain Bailey gave directions toalter the course of the ship more to the north, and to follow thecoast up, and to keep a good lookout for Point Pinos that marks thelocation of Monterey Bay. The usual north wind slackened, so thatwhen noon allowed Macomb to get a good observation, it was foundthat we were north of Ano Nuevo, the northern headland of MontereyBay. The ship was put about, but little by little arose one ofthose southeast storms so common on the coast in winter, and webuffeted about for several days, cursing that unfortunateobservation on the north star, for, on first sighting the coast, had we turned for Monterey, instead of away to the north, we wouldhave been snugly anchored before the storm. But the southeasterabated, and the usual northwest wind came out again, and we sailedsteadily down into the roadstead of Monterey Bay. This is shapedsomewhat like a fish hook, the barb being the harbor, the pointbeing Point Pinos, the southern headland. Slowly the land came outof the water, the high mountains about Santa Cruz, the low beach ofthe Saunas, and the strongly-marked ridge terminating in the sea ina point of dark pine-trees. Then the line of whitewashed houses ofadobe, backed by the groves of dark oaks, resembling oldapple-trees; and then we saw two vessels anchored close to thetown. One was a small merchant-brig and another a large shipapparently dismasted. At last we saw a boat coming out to meet us, and when it came alongside, we were surprised to find LieutenantHenry Wise, master of the Independence frigate, that we had left atValparaiso. Wise had come off to pilot us to our anchorage. Whilegiving orders to the man at the wheel, he, in his peculiar fluentstyle, told to us, gathered about him, that the Independence hadsailed from Valparaiso a week after us and had been in Monterey aweek; that the Californians had broken out into an insurrection;that the naval fleet under Commodore Stockton was all down thecoast about San Diego; that General Kearney had reached thecountry, but had had a severe battle at San Pascual, and had beenworsted, losing several officers and men, himself and otherswounded; that war was then going on at Los Angeles; that the wholecountry was full of guerrillas, and that recently at Yerba Buenathe alcalde, Lieutenant Bartlett, United States Navy, while outafter cattle, had been lassoed, etc. , etc. Indeed, in the shortspace of time that Wise was piloting our ship in, he told us morenews than we could have learned on shore in a week, and, beingunfamiliar with the great distances, we imagined that we shouldhave to debark and begin fighting at once. Swords were broughtout, guns oiled and made ready, and every thing was in a bustlewhen the old Lexington dropped her anchor on January 26, 1847, inMonterey Bay, after a voyage of one hundred and ninety-eight daysfrom New York. Every thing on shore looked bright and beautiful, the hills covered with grass and flowers, the live-oaks so sereneand homelike, and the low adobe houses, with red-tiled roofs andwhitened walls, contrasted well with the dark pine-trees behind, making a decidedly good impression upon us who had come so far tospy out the land. Nothing could be more peaceful in its looks thanMonterey in January, 1847. We had already made the acquaintance ofCommodore Shubrick and the officers of the Independence inValparaiso, so that we again met as old friends. Immediatepreparations were made for landing, and, as I was quartermaster andcommissary, I had plenty to do. There was a small wharf and anadobe custom-house in possession of the navy; also a barrack of twostories, occupied by some marines, commanded by Lieutenant Maddox;and on a hill to the west of the town had been built a two-storyblock-house of hewed logs occupied by a guard of sailors undercommand of Lieutenant Baldwin, United States Navy. Not a singlemodern wagon or cart was to be had in Monterey, nothing but the oldMexican cart with wooden wheels, drawn by two or three pairs ofoxen, yoked by the horns. A man named Tom Cole had two or more ofthese, and he came into immediate requisition. The United Statesconsul, and most prominent man there at the time, was Thomas O. Larkin, who had a store and a pretty good two-story house occupiedby his family. It was soon determined that our company was to landand encamp on the hill at the block-house, and we were also to havepossession of the warehouse, or custom-house, for storage. Thecompany was landed on the wharf, and we all marched in full dresswith knapsacks and arms, to the hill and relieved the guard underLieutenant Baldwin. Tents and camp-equipage were hauled up, andsoon the camp was established. I remained in a room at thecustomhouse, where I could superintend the landing of the storesand their proper distribution. I had brought out from New Yorktwenty thousand dollars commissary funds, and eight thousanddollars quartermaster funds, and as the ship contained about sixmonths' supply of provisions, also a saw-mill, grist-mill, andalmost every thing needed, we were soon established comfortably. We found the people of Monterey a mixed set of Americans, nativeMexicans, and Indians, about one thousand all told. They were kindand pleasant, and seemed to have nothing to do, except such asowned ranches in the country for the rearing of horses and cattle. Horses could be bought at any price from four dollars up tosixteen, but no horse was ever valued above a doubloon or Mexicanounce (sixteen dollars). Cattle cost eight dollars fifty cents forthe best, and this made beef net about two cents a pound, but atthat time nobody bought beef by the pound, but by the carcass. 

Game of all kinds--elk, deer, wild geese, and ducks--was abundant;but coffee, sugar, and small stores, were rare and costly. 

There were some half-dozen shops or stores, but their shelves wereempty. The people were very fond of riding, dancing, and of showsof any kind. The young fellows took great delight in showing offtheir horsemanship, and would dash along, picking up a half-dollarfrom the ground, stop their horses in full career and turn about onthe space of a bullock's hide, and their skill with the lasso wascertainly wonderful. At full speed they could cast their lassoabout the horns of a bull, or so throw it as to catch anyparticular foot. These fellows would work all day on horseback indriving cattle or catching wildhorses for a mere nothing, but allthe money offered would not have hired one of them to walk a mile. The girls were very fond of dancing, and they did dance gracefullyand well. Every Sunday, regularly, we had a baile, or dance, andsometimes interspersed through the week. 

I remember very well, soon after our arrival, that we were allinvited to witness a play called "Adam and Eve. " Eve waspersonated by a pretty young girl known as Dolores Gomez, who, however, was dressed very unlike Eve, for she was covered with apetticoat and spangles. Adam was personated by her brother--thesame who has since become somewhat famous as the person on whom isfounded the McGarrahan claim. God Almighty was personated, andheaven's occupants seemed very human. Yet the play was pretty, interesting, and elicited universal applause. All the month ofFebruary we were by day preparing for our long stay in the country, and at night making the most of the balls and parties of the mostprimitive kind, picking up a smattering of Spanish, and extendingour acquaintance with the people and the costumbrea del pais. Ican well recall that Ord and I, impatient to look inland, gotpermission and started for the Mission of San Juan Bautista. Mounted on horses, and with our carbines, we took the road by ElToro, quite a prominent hill, around which passes the road to thesouth, following the Saunas or Monterey River. After about twentymiles over a sandy country covered with oak-bushes and scrub, weentered quite a pretty valley in which there was a ranch at thefoot of the Toro. Resting there a while and getting someinformation, we again started in the direction of a mountain to thenorth of the Saunas, called the Gavillano. It was quite dark whenwe reached the Saunas River, which we attempted to pass at severalpoints, but found it full of water, and the quicksands were bad. Hearing the bark of a dog, we changed our course in that direction, and, on hailing, were answered by voices which directed us where tocross. Our knowledge of the language was limited, but we managedto understand, and to founder through the sand and water, andreached a small adobe-house on the banks of the Salinas, where wespent the night: The house was a single room, without floor orglass; only a rude door, and window with bars. Not a particle offood but meat, yet the man and woman entertained us with thelanguage of lords put themselves, their house, and every thing, atour "disposition, " and made little barefoot children dance for ourentertainment. We made our supper of beef, and slept on abullock's hide on the dirt-floor. In the morning we crossed theSalinas Plain, about fifteen miles of level ground, taking a shotoccasionally at wild-geese, which abounded there, and entering thewell-wooded valley that comes out from the foot of the Gavillano. We had cruised about all day, and it was almost dark when wereached the house of a Senor Gomez, father of those who at Montereyhad performed the parts of Adam and Eve. His house was a two-storyadobe, and had a fence in front. It was situated well up among thefoot-hills of the Gavillano, and could not be seen until within afew yards. We hitched our horses to the fence and went in just asGomez was about to sit down to a tempting supper of stewed hare andtortillas. We were officers and caballeros and could not beignored. After turning our horses to grass, at his invitation wejoined him at supper. The allowance, though ample for one, wasrather short for three, and I thought the Spanish grandiloquentpoliteness of Gomez, who was fat and old, was not over-cordial. However, down we sat, and I was helped to a dish of rabbit, withwhat I thought to be an abundant sauce of tomato. Taking a goodmouthful, I felt as though I had taken liquid fire; the tomato waschile colorado, or red pepper, of the purest kind. It nearlykilled me, and I saw Gomez's eyes twinkle, for he saw that hisshare of supper was increased. --I contented myself with bits ofthe meat, and an abundant supply of tortillas. Ord was bettercase-hardened, and stood it better. We staid at Gomez's thatnight, sleeping, as all did, on the ground, and the next morning wecrossed the hill by the bridle-path to the old Mission of San JuanBautista. The Mission was in a beautiful valley, very level, andbounded on all sides by hills. The plain was covered withwild-grasses and mustard, and had abundant water. Cattle andhorses were seen in all directions, and it was manifest that thepriests who first occupied the country were good judges of land. It was Sunday, and all the people, about, a hundred, had come tochurch from the country round about. Ord was somewhat of aCatholic, and entered the church with his clanking spars andkneeled down, attracting the attention of all, for he had on theuniform of an American officer. As soon as church was out, allrushed to the various sports. I saw the priest, with his grayrobes tucked up, playing at billiards, others were cock fighting, and some at horse-racing. My horse had become lame, and I resolvedto buy another. As soon as it was known that I wanted a horse, several came for me, and displayed their horses by dashing past andhauling them up short. There was a fine black stallion thatattracted my notice, and, after trying him myself, I concluded apurchase. I left with the seller my own lame horse, which he wasto bring to me at Monterey, when I was to pay him ten dollars forthe other. The Mission of San Juan bore the marks of highprosperity at a former period, and had a good pear-orchard justunder the plateau where stood the church. After spending the day, Ord and I returned to Monterey, about thirty-five miles, by ashorter route, Thus passed the month of February, and, though therewere no mails or regular expresses, we heard occasionally fromYerba Buena and Sutter's Fort to the north, and from the army andnavy about Los Angeles at the south. We also knew that a quarrelhad grown up at Los Angeles, between General Kearney, ColonelFremont, and Commodore Stockton, as to the right to control affairsin California. Kearney had with him only the fragments of the twocompanies of dragoons, which had come across from New Mexico withhim, and had been handled very roughly by Don Andreas Pico, at SanPascual, in which engagement Captains Moore and Johnson, andLieutenant Hammond, were killed, and Kearney himself wounded. There remained with him Colonel Swords, quartermaster; Captain H. S. Turner, First Dragoons; Captains Emory and Warner, TopographicalEngineers; Assistant Surgeon Griffin, and Lieutenant J. W. Davidson. Fremont had marched down from the north with a battalionof volunteers; Commodore Stockton had marched up from San Diego toLos Angeles, with General Kearney, his dragoons, and a battalion ofsailors and marines, and was soon joined there by Fremont, and theyjointly received the surrender of the insurgents under AndreasPico. We also knew that General R. B. Mason had been ordered toCalifornia; that Colonel John D. Stevenson was coming out toCalifornia with a regiment of New York Volunteers; that CommodoreShubrick had orders also from the Navy Department to controlmatters afloat; that General Kearney, by virtue of his rank, hadthe right to control all the land-forces in the service of theUnited States; and that Fremont claimed the same right by virtue ofa letter he had received from Colonel Benton, then a Senator, and aman of great influence with Polk's Administration. So that amongthe younger officers the query was very natural, "Who the devil isGovernor of California?" One day I was on board the Independencefrigate, dining with the ward-room officers, when a war-vessel wasreported in the offing, which in due time was made out to be theCyane, Captain DuPont. After dinner we were all on deck to watchthe new arrival, the ships meanwhile exchanging signals, which wereinterpreted that General Kearney was on board. As the Cyaneapproached, a boat was sent to meet her, with Commodore Shubrick'sflag-officer, Lieutenant Lewis, to carry the usual messages, and toinvite General Kearney to come on board the Independence as theguest of Commodore Shubrick. Quite a number of officers were ondeck, among them Lieutenants Wise, Montgomery Lewis, WilliamChapman, and others, noted wits and wags of the navy. In due timethe Cyane anchored close by, and our boat was seen returning with astranger in the stern-sheets, clothed in army blue. As the boatcame nearer, we saw that it was General Kearney with an old dragooncoat on, and an army-cap, to which the general had added the broadvizor, cut from a full-dress hat, to shade his face and eyesagainst the glaring sun of the Gila region. Chapman exclaimed:"Fellows, the problem is solved; there is the grand-vizier (visor)by G-d! He is Governor of California. "

All hands received the general with great heartiness, and he soonpassed out of our sight into the commodore's cabin. BetweenCommodore Shubrick and General Kearney existed from that timeforward the greatest harmony and good feeling, and no furthertrouble existed as to the controlling power on the Pacific coast. General Kearney had dispatched from San Diego his quartermaster, Colonel Swords, to the Sandwich Islands, to purchase clothing andstores for his men, and had come up to Monterey, bringing with himTurner and Warner, leaving Emory and the company of dragoons below. He was delighted to find a full strong company of artillery, subject to his orders, well supplied with clothing and money in allrespects, and, much to the disgust of our Captain Tompkins, he tookhalf of his company clothing and part of the money held by me forthe relief of his worn-out and almost naked dragoons left behind atLos Angeles. In a few days he moved on shore, took up his quartersat Larkin's house, and established his headquarters, with CaptainTurner as his adjutant general. One day Turner and Warner were atmy tent, and, seeing a store-bag full of socks, drawers, and calicoshirts, of which I had laid in a three years' supply, and of whichthey had none, made known to me their wants, and I told them tohelp themselves, which Turner and Warner did. The latter, however, insisted on paying me the cost, and from that date to this Turnerand I have been close friends. Warner, poor fellow, was afterwardkilled by Indians. Things gradually came into shape, asemi-monthly courier line was established from Yerba Buena to SanDiego, and we were thus enabled to keep pace with events throughoutthe country. In March Stevenson's regiment arrived. Colonel Masonalso arrived by sea from Callao in the store-ship Erie, and P. St. George Cooke's battalion of Mormons reached San Luis Rey. A. J. Smith and George Stoneman were with him, and were assigned to thecompany of dragoons at Los Angeles. All these troops and the navyregarded General Kearney as the rightful commander, though Fremontstill remained at Los Angeles, styling himself as Governor, issuingorders and holding his battalion of California Volunteers inapparent defiance of General Kearney. Colonel Mason and MajorTurner were sent down by sea with a paymaster, with muster-rolls andorders to muster this battalion into the service of the UnitedStates, to pay and then to muster them out; but on their reachingLos Angeles Fremont would not consent to it, and the controversybecame so angry that a challenge was believed to have passed betweenMason and Fremont, but the duel never came about. Turner rode up byland in four or five days, and Fremont, becoming alarmed, followedhim, as we supposed, to overtake him, but he did not succeed. OnFremont's arrival at Monterey, he camped in a tent about a mile outof town and called on General Kearney, and it was reported that thelatter threatened him very severely and ordered him back to LosAngeles immediately, to disband his volunteers, and to cease theexercise of authority of any kind in the country. Feeling a naturalcuriosity to see Fremont, who was then quite famous by reason of hisrecent explorations and the still more recent conflicts with Kearneyand Mason, I rode out to his camp, and found him in a conical tentwith one Captain Owens, who was a mountaineer, trapper, etc. , butoriginally from Zanesville, Ohio. I spent an hour or so with Fremontin his tent, took some tea with him, and left, without being muchimpressed with him. In due time Colonel Swords returned from theSandwich Islands and relieved me as quartermaster. Captain WilliamG. Marcy, son of the Secretary of War, had also come out in one ofStevenson's ships as an assistant commissary of subsistence, and wasstationed at Monterey and relieved me as commissary, so that Ireverted to the condition of a company-officer. While acting as astaff officer I had lived at the custom-house in Monterey, but whenrelieved I took a tent in line with the other company-officers onthe hill, where we had a mess. 

Stevenson'a regiment reached San Francisco Bay early in March, 1847. Three companies were stationed at the Presidio under MajorJames A. Hardier one company (Brackett's) at Sonoma; three, underColonel Stevenson, at Monterey; and three, under Lieutenant-ColonelBurton, at Santa Barbara. One day I was down at the headquartersat Larkin's horse, when General Kearney remarked to me that he wasgoing down to Los Angeles in the ship Lexington, and wanted me togo along as his aide. Of course this was most agreeable to me. Two of Stevenson's companies, with the headquarters and thecolonel, were to go also. They embarked, and early in May wesailed for San Pedro. Before embarking, the United Statesline-of-battle-ship Columbus had reached the coast from China withCommodore Biddle, whose rank gave him the supreme command of thenavy on the coast. He was busy in calling in--"lassooing "--fromthe land-service the various naval officers who under Stockton hadbeen doing all sorts of military and civil service on shore. Knowing that I was to go down the coast with General Kearney, hesent for me and handed me two unsealed parcels addressed toLieutenant Wilson, United States Navy, and Major Gillespie, UnitedStates Marines, at Los Angeles. These were written orders prettymuch in these words: "On receipt of this order you will repair atonce on board the United States ship Lexington at San Pedro, and onreaching Monterey you will report to the undersigned. -JAMESBIDDLE. " Of course, I executed my part to the letter, and theseofficers were duly "lassooed. " We sailed down the coast with afair wind, and anchored inside the kelp, abreast of Johnson'shouse. Messages were forthwith dispatched up to Los Angeles, twenty miles off, and preparations for horses made for us to rideup. We landed, and, as Kearney held to my arm in ascending thesteep path up the bluff, he remarked to himself, rather than to me, that it was strange that Fremont did not want to return north bythe Lexington on account of sea-sickness, but preferred to go byland over five hundred miles. The younger officers had beendiscussing what the general would do with Fremont, who was supposedto be in a state of mutiny. Some, thought he would be tried andshot, some that he would be carried back in irons; and all agreedthat if any one else than Fremont had put on such airs, and hadacted as he had done, Kearney would have shown him no mercy, for hewas regarded as the strictest sort of a disciplinarian. We had apleasant ride across the plain which lies between the seashore andLos Angeles, which we reached in about three hours, the infantryfollowing on foot. We found Colonel P. St. George Cooke living atthe house of a Mr. Pryor, and the company of dragoons, with A. J. Smith, Davidson, Stoneman, and Dr. Griffin, quartered in anadobe-house close by. Fremont held his court in the only two-storyframe-house in the place. After sometime spent at Pryor's house, General Kearney ordered me to call on Fremont to notify him of hisarrival, and that he desired to see him. I walked round to thehouse which had been pointed out to me as his, inquired of a man atthe door if the colonel was in, was answered "Yea, " and wasconducted to a large room on the second floor, where very soonFremont came in, and I delivered my message. As I was on the pointof leaving, he inquired where I was going to, and I answered that Iwas going back to Pryor's house, where the general was, when heremarked that if I would wait a moment he would go along. Ofcourse I waited, and he soon joined me, dressed much as aCalifornian, with the peculiar high, broad-brimmed hat, with afancy cord, and we walked together back to Pryor's, where I lefthim with General Kearney. We spent several days very pleasantly atLos Angeles, then, as now, the chief pueblo of the south, famousfor its grapes, fruits, and wines. There was a hill close to thetown, from which we had a perfect view of the place. Thesurrounding country is level, utterly devoid of trees, except thewillows and cotton-woods that line the Los Angeles Creek and theacequias, or ditches, which lead from it. The space of groundcultivated in vineyards seemed about five miles by one, embracingthe town. Every house had its inclosure of vineyard, whichresembled a miniature orchard, the vines being very old, ranged inrows, trimmed very close, with irrigating ditches so arranged thata stream of water could be diverted between each row of vines. TheLos Angeles and San Gabriel Rivers are fed by melting snows from arange of mountains to the east, and the quantity of cultivated landdepends upon the amount of water. This did not seem to be verylarge; but the San Gabriel River, close by, was represented tocontain a larger volume of water, affording the means of greatlyenlarging the space for cultivation. The climate was so moderatethat oranges, figs, pomegranates, etc.... Were generally to befound in every yard or inclosure. 

At the time of our visit, General Kearney was making hispreparations to return overland to the United States, and hearranged to secure a volunteer escort out of the battalion ofMormons that was then stationed at San Luis Rey, under ColonelCooke and a Major Hunt. This battalion was only enlisted for oneyear, and the time for their discharge was approaching, and it wasgenerally understood that the majority of the men wanted to bedischarged so as to join the Mormons who had halted at Salt Lake, but a lieutenant and about forty men volunteered to return toMissouri as the escort of General Kearney. These were mounted onmules and horses, and I was appointed to conduct them to Montereyby land. Leaving the party at Los Angeles to follow by sea in theLexington, I started with the Mormon detachment and traveled byland. We averaged about thirty miles a day, stopped one day atSanta Barbara, where I saw Colonel Burton, and so on by the usuallytraveled road to Monterey, reaching it in about fifteen days, arriving some days in advance of the Lexington. This gave me thebest kind of an opportunity for seeing the country, which was verysparsely populated indeed, except by a few families at the variousMissions. We had no wheeled vehicles, but packed our food andclothing on mules driven ahead, and we slept on the ground in theopen air, the rainy season having passed. Fremont followed me byland in a few days, and, by the end of May, General Kearney was allready at Monterey to take his departure, leaving to succeed him incommand Colonel R. B. Mason, First Dragoons. Our Captain(Tompkins), too, had become discontented at his separation from hisfamily, tendered his resignation to General Kearney, and availedhimself of a sailing-vessel bound for Callao to reach the East. Colonel Mason selected me as his adjutant-general; and on the verylast day of May General Kearney, with his Mormon escort, withColonel Cooke, Colonel Swords (quartermaster), Captain Turner, anda naval officer, Captain Radford, took his departure for the Eastoverland, leaving us in full possession of California and its fate. Fremont also left California with General Kearney, and with himdeparted all cause of confusion and disorder in the country. Fromthat time forth no one could dispute the authority of Colonel Masonas in command of all the United States forces on shore, while thesenior naval officer had a like control afloat. This was CommodoreJames Biddle, who had reached the station from China in theColumbus, and he in turn was succeeded by Commodore T. Ap CatesbyJones in the line-of-battle-ship Ohio. At that time Monterey wasour headquarters, and the naval commander for a time remainedthere, but subsequently San Francisco Bay became the chief navalrendezvous. 

Colonel R. B. Mason, First Dragoons, was an officer of greatexperience, of stern character, deemed by some harsh and severe, but in all my intercourse with him he was kind and agreeable. Hehad a large fund of good sense, and, during our long period ofservice together, I enjoyed his unlimited confidence. He had beenin his day a splendid shot and hunter, and often entertained mewith characteristic anecdotes of Taylor, Twiggs, Worth, Harvey, Martin Scott, etc. , etc, who were then in Mexico, gaining anational fame. California had settled down to a condition ofabsolute repose, and we naturally repined at our fate in beingso remote from the war in Mexico, where our comrades werereaping large honors. Mason dwelt in a house not far from theCustom-House, with Captain Lanman, United States Navy; I had a smalladobe-house back of Larkin's. Halleck and Dr. Murray had a smalllog-house not far off. The company of artillery was still on thehill, under the command of Lieutenant Ord, engaged in building afort whereon to mount the guns we had brought out in the Lexington, and also in constructing quarters out of hewn pine-logs for the men. Lieutenant Minor, a very clever young officer, had taken violentlysick and died about the time I got back from Los Angeles, leavingLieutenants Ord and Loeser alone with the company, withAssistant-Surgeon Robert Murray. Captain William G. Marcy was thequartermaster and commissary. Naglee's company of Stevenson'sregiment had been mounted and was sent out against the Indians inthe San Joaquin Valley, and Shannon's company occupied the barracks. Shortly after General Kearney had gone East, we found an order ofhis on record, removing one Mr. Nash, the Alcalde of Sonoma, andappointing to his place ex-Governor L. W. Boggs. A letter came toColonel and Governor Mason from Boggs, whom he had personally knownin Missouri, complaining that, though he had been appointed alcalde, the then incumbent (Nash) utterly denied Kearney's right to removehim, because he had been elected by the people under theproclamation of Commodore Sloat, and refused to surrender his officeor to account for his acts as alcalde. Such a proclamation had beenmade by Commodore Sloat shortly after the first occupation ofCalifornia, announcing that the people were free and enlightenedAmerican citizens, entitled to all the rights and privileges assuch, and among them the right to elect their own officers, etc. The people of Sonoma town and valley, some forty or fifty immigrantsfrom the United States, and very few native Californians, hadelected Mr. Nash, and, as stated, he refused to recognize the rightof a mere military commander to eject him and to appoint another tohis place. Neither General Kearney nor Mason had much respect forthis land of "buncombe, " but assumed the true doctrine thatCalifornia was yet a Mexican province, held by right of conquest, that the military commander was held responsible to the country, andthat the province should be held in statu quo until a treaty ofpeace. This letter of Boggs was therefore referred to CaptainBrackett, whose company was stationed at Sonoma, with orders tonotify Nash that Boggs was the rightful alcalde; that he mustquietly surrender his office, with the books and records thereof, and that he must account for any moneys received from the sale oftown-lots, etc. , etc. ; and in the event of refusal he (CaptainBrackett) must compel him by the use of force. In due time we gotBrackett's answer, saying that the little community of Sonoma was ina dangerous state of effervescence caused by his orders; that Nashwas backed by most of the Americans there who had come across fromMissouri with American ideas; that as he (Brackett) was a volunteerofficer, likely to be soon discharged, and as he designed to settlethere, he asked in consequence to be excused from the execution ofthis (to him) unpleasant duty. Such a request, coming to an oldsoldier like Colonel Mason, aroused his wrath, and he would haveproceeded rough-shod against Brackett, who, by-the-way, was a WestPoint graduate, and ought to have known better; but I suggested tothe colonel that, the case being a test one, he had better send meup to Sonoma, and I would settle it quick enough. He then gave mean order to go to Sonoma to carry out the instructions already givento Brackett. 

I took one soldier with me, Private Barnes, with four horses, twoof which we rode, and the other two we drove ahead. The first daywe reached Gilroy's and camped by a stream near three or fouradobe-huts known as Gilroy's ranch. The next day we passedMurphy's, San Jose, and Santa Clara Mission, camping some fourmiles beyond, where a kind of hole had been dug in the ground forwater. The whole of this distance, now so beautifully improved andsettled, was then scarcely occupied, except by poor ranchesproducing horses and cattle. The pueblo of San Jose was a stringof low adobe-houses festooned with red peppers and garlic; and theMission of Santa Clara was a dilapidated concern, with its churchand orchard. The long line of poplar-trees lining the road fromSan Jose to Santa Clara bespoke a former period when the priestshad ruled the land. Just about dark I was lying on the ground nearthe well, and my soldier Barnes had watered our horses and picketedthem to grass, when we heard a horse crushing his way through thehigh mustard-bushes which filled the plain, and soon a man came tous to inquire if we had seen a saddle-horse pass up the road. Weexplained to him what we had heard, and he went off in pursuit ofhis horse. Before dark he came back unsuccessful, and gave hisname as Bidwell, the same gentleman who has since been a member ofCongress, who is married to Miss Kennedy, of Washington City, andnow lives in princely style at Chico, California. 

He explained that he was a surveyor, and had been in the lowercountry engaged in surveying land; that the horse had escaped himwith his saddle-bags containing all his notes and papers, and somesix hundred dollars in money, all the money he had earned. Hespent the night with us on the ground, and the next morning we lefthim there to continue the search for his horse, and I afterwardheard that he had found his saddle-bags all right, but neverrecovered the horse. The next day toward night we approached theMission of San Francisco, and the village of Yerba Buena, tired andweary--the wind as usual blowing a perfect hurricane, and a moredesolate region it was impossible to conceive of. Leaving Barnesto work his way into the town as best he could with the tiredanimals, I took the freshest horse and rode forward. I fell inwith Lieutenant Fabius Stanley, United States Navy, and we rodeinto Yerba Buena together about an hour before sundown, there beingnothing but a path from the Mission into the town, deep and heavywith drift-sand. My horse could hardly drag one foot after theother when we reached the old Hudson Bay Company's house, which wasthen the store of Howard and Mellus. There I learned where CaptainFolsom, the quartermaster, was to be found. He was staying with afamily of the name of Grimes, who had a small horse back ofHoward's store, which must have been near where Sacramento Streetnow crosses Kearney. Folsom was a classmate of mine, had come outwith Stevenson's regiment as quartermaster, and was at the time thechief-quartermaster of the department. His office was in the oldcustom-horse standing at the northwest corner of the Plaza. He hadhired two warehouses, the only ones there at the time, of oneLiedsdorff, the principal man of Yerba Buena, who also owned theonly public-house, or tavern, called the City Hotel, on KearneyStreet, at the southeast corner of the Plaza. I stopped withFolsom at Mrs. Grimes's, and he sent my horse, as also the otherthree when Barnes had got in after dark, to a coral where he had alittle barley, but no hay. At that time nobody fed a horse, but hewas usually turned out to pick such scanty grass as he could findon the side-hills. The few government horses used in town wereusually sent out to the Presidio, where the grass was somewhatbetter. At that time (July, 1847), what is now called SanFrancisco was called Yerba Buena. A naval officer, LieutenantWashington A. Bartlett, its first alcalde, had caused it to besurveyed and laid out into blocks and lots, which were being soldat sixteen dollars a lot of fifty vuras square; the understandingbeing that no single person could purchase of the alcalde more thanone in-lot of fifty varas, and one out-lot of a hundred varas. Folsom, however, had got his clerks, orderlies, etc. , to buy lots, and they, for a small consideration, conveyed them to him, so thathe was nominally the owner of a good many lots. Lieutenant Halleckhad bought one of each kind, and so had Warner. Many navalofficers had also invested, and Captain Folsom advised me to buysome, but I felt actually insulted that he should think me such afool as to pay money for property in such a horrid place as YerbaBuena, especially ridiculing his quarter of the city, then calledHappy Valley. At that day Montgomery Street was, as now, thebusiness street, extending from Jackson to Sacramento, the water ofthe bay leaving barely room for a few houses on its east side, andthe public warehouses were on a sandy beach about where the Bank ofCalifornia now stands, viz. , near the intersection of Sansome andCalifornia, Streets. Along Montgomery Street were the stores ofHoward & Mellus, Frank Ward, Sherman & Ruckel, Ross & Co. , and itmay be one or two others. Around the Plaza were a few houses, among them the City Hotel and the Custom-House, single-story adobeswith tiled roofs, and they were by far the most substantial andbest houses in the place. The population was estimated at aboutfour hundred, of whom Kanakas (natives of the Sandwich Islands)formed the bulk. 

At the foot of Clay Street was a small wharf which small boatscould reach at high tide; but the principal landing-place was wheresome stones had fallen into the water, about where Broadway nowintersects Battery Street. On the steep bluff above had beenexcavated, by the navy, during the year before, a bench, whereinwere mounted a couple of navy-guns, styled the battery, which, Isuppose, gave name to the street. I explained to Folsom the objectof my visit, and learned from him that he had no boat in which tosend me to Sonoma, and that the only, chance to get there was toborrow a boat from the navy. The line-of-battle-ship Columbus wasthen lying at anchor off the town, and he said if I would get upearly the next morning I could go off to her in one of themarket-boats. 

Accordingly, I was up bright and early, down at the wharf, found aboat, and went off to the Columbus to see Commodore Biddle. Onreaching the ship and stating to the officer of the deck mybusiness, I was shown into the commodore's cabin, and soon madeknown to him my object. Biddle was a small-sized man, butvivacious in the extreme. He had a perfect contempt for allhumbug, and at once entered into the business with extremealacrity. I was somewhat amused at the importance he attached tothe step. He had a chaplain, and a private secretary, in a smallroom latticed off from his cabin, and he first called on them to goout, and, when we were alone, he enlarged on the folly of Sloat'sproclamation, giving the people the right to elect their ownofficers, and commended Kearney and Mason for nipping that idea inthe bud, and keeping the power in their own hands. He then sentfor the first lieutenant (Drayton), and inquired if there wereamong the officers on board any who had ever been in the Upper Bay, and learning that there was a midshipman (Whittaker) he was sentfor. It so happened that this midshipman had been on a frolic onshore a few nights before, and was accordingly much frightened whensummoned into the commodore's presence, but as soon as he wasquestioned as to his knowledge of the bay, he was sensiblyrelieved, and professed to know every thing about it. 

Accordingly, the long boat was ordered with this midshipman andeight sailors, prepared with water and provisions for several daysabsence. Biddle then asked me if I knew any of his own officers, and which one of them I would prefer to accompany me. I knew mostof them, and we settled down on Louis McLane. He was sent for, andit was settled that McLane and I were to conduct this importantmission, and the commodore enjoined on us complete secrecy, so asto insure success, and he especially cautioned us against beingpumped by his ward-room officers, Chapman, Lewis, Wise, etc. , whileon board his ship. With this injunction I was dismissed to thewardroom, where I found Chapman, Lewis, and Wise, dreadfullyexercised at our profound secrecy. The fact that McLane and I hadbeen closeted with the commodore for an hour, that orders for theboat and stores had been made, that the chaplain and clerk had beensent out of the cabin, etc. , etc. , all excited their curiosity; butMcLane and I kept our secret well. The general impression was, that we had some knowledge about the fate of Captain Montgomery'stwo sons and the crew that had been lost the year before. In 1846Captain Montgomery commanded at Yerba Buena, on board the St. Marysloop-of-war, and he had a detachment of men stationed up atSonoma. Occasionally a boat was sent up with provisions orintelligence to them. Montgomery had two sons on board his ship, one a midshipman, the other his secretary. Having occasion to sendsome money up to Sonoma, he sent his two sons with a good boat andcrew. The boat started with a strong breeze and a very large sail, was watched from the deck until she was out of sight, and has neverbeen heard of since. There was, of coarse, much speculation as totheir fate, some contending that the boat must have been capsizedin San Pablo Bay, and that all were lost; others contending thatthe crew had murdered the officers for the money, and then escaped;but, so far as I know, not a man of that crew has ever been seen orheard of since. When at last the boat was ready for us, westarted, leaving all hands, save the commodore, impressed with thebelief that we were going on some errand connected with the loss ofthe missing boat and crew of the St. Mary. We sailed directlynorth, up the bay and across San Pablo, reached the month of SonomaCreek about dark, and during the night worked up the creek sometwelve miles by means of the tide, to a landing called theEmbarcadero. To maintain the secrecy which the commodore hadenjoined on us, McLane and I agreed to keep up the delusion bypretending to be on a marketing expedition to pick up chickens, pigs, etc. , for the mess of the Columbus, soon to depart for home. 

Leaving the midshipman and four sailors to guard the boat, westarted on foot with the other four for Sonoma Town, which we soonreached. It was a simple open square, around which were someadobe-houses, that of General Vallejo occupying one side. Onanother was an unfinished two-story adobe building, occupied as abarrack by Bracken's company. We soon found Captain Brackett, andI told him that I intended to take Nash a prisoner and convey himback to Monterey to answer for his mutinous behavior. I got an oldsergeant of his company, whom I had known in the Third Artillery, quietly to ascertain the whereabouts of Nash, who was a bachelor, stopping with the family of a lawyer named Green. The sergeantsoon returned, saying that Nash had gone over to Napa, but would beback that evening; so McLane and I went up to a farm of somepretensions, occupied by one Andreas Hoepner, with a pretty Sitkawife, who lived a couple of miles above Sonoma, and we bought ofhim some chickens, pigs, etc. We then visited Governor Boggs'sfamily and that of General Vallejo, who was then, as now, one ofthe most prominent and influential natives of California. Aboutdark I learned that Nash had come back, and then, giving Brackettorders to have a cart ready at the corner of the plaza, McLane andI went to the house of Green. Posting an armed sailor on each sideof the house, we knocked at the door and walked in. We foundGreen, Nash, and two women, at supper. I inquired if Nash were in, and was first answered "No, " but one of the women soon pointed tohim, and he rose. We were armed with pistols, and the family wasevidently alarmed. I walked up to him and took his arm, and toldhim to come along with me. He asked me, "Where?" and I said, "Monterey. " "Why?" I would explain that more at leisure. Greenput himself between me and the door, and demanded, in theatricalstyle, why I dared arrest a peaceable citizen in his house. Isimply pointed to my pistol, and told him to get out of the way, which he did. Nash asked to get some clothing, but I told him heshould want for nothing. We passed out, Green following us withloud words, which brought the four sailors to the front-door, whenI told him to hush up or I would take him prisoner also. Aboutthat time one of the sailors, handling his pistol carelessly, discharged it, and Green disappeared very suddenly. We took Nashto the cart, put him in, and proceeded back to our boat. The nextmorning we were gone. 

Nash being out of the way, Boggs entered on his office, and theright to appoint or remove from civil office was never againquestioned in California during the military regime. Nash was anold man, and was very much alarmed for his personal safety. He hadcome across the Plains, and had never yet seen the sea. While onour way down the bay, I explained fully to him the state of thingsin California, and he admitted he had never looked on it in thatlight before, and professed a willingness to surrender his office;but, having gone so far, I thought it best to take him to Monterey. On our way down the bay the wind was so strong, as we approachedthe Columbus, that we had to take refuge behind Yerba Buena Island, then called Goat Island, where we landed, and I killed a gray seal. The next morning, the wind being comparatively light, we got outand worked our way up to the Columbus, where I left my prisoner onboard, and went on shore to find Commodore Biddle, who had gone todine with Frank Ward. I found him there, and committed Nash to hischarge, with the request that he would send him down to Monterey, which he did in the sloop-of-war Dale, Captain Selfridgecommanding. I then returned to Monterey by land, and, when theDale arrived, Colonel Mason and I went on board, found poor old Mr. Nash half dead with sea-sickness and fear, lest Colonel Mason wouldtreat him with extreme military rigor. But, on the contrary, thecolonel spoke to him kindly, released him as a prisoner on hispromise to go back to Sonoma, surrender his office to Boggs, andaccount to him for his acts while in office. He afterward came onshore, was provided with clothing and a horse, returned to Sonoma, and I never have seen him since. 

Matters and things settled down in Upper California, and all movedalong with peace and harmony. The war still continued in Mexico, and the navy authorities resolved to employ their time with thecapture of Mazatlan and Guaymas. Lower California had already beenoccupied by two companies of Stevenson's regiment, underLieutenant-Colonel Burton, who had taken post at La Paz, and asmall party of sailors was on shore at San Josef, near Cape SanLucas, detached from the Lexington, Lieutenant-Commander Bailey. The orders for this occupation were made by General Kearney beforehe left, in pursuance of instructions from the War Department, merely to subserve a political end, for there were few or no peoplein Lower California, which is a miserable, wretched, dried-uppeninsula. I remember the proclamation made by Burton and CaptainBailey, in taking possession, which was in the usual florid style. Bailey signed his name as the senior naval officer at the station, but, as it was necessary to put it into Spanish to reach theinhabitants of the newly-acquired country, it was interpreted, "Elmas antiguo de todos los oficiales de la marina, " etc. , which, literally, is "the most ancient of all the naval officers, " etc. , a translation at which we made some fun. 

The expedition to Mazatlan was, however, for a different purpose, viz. , to get possession of the ports of Mazatlan and Guaymas, as apart of the war against Mexico, and not for permanent conquest. 

Commodore Shubrick commanded this expedition, and took Halleckalong as his engineer-officer. They captured Mazatlan and Guaymas, and then called on Colonel Mason to send soldiers down to holdpossession, but he had none to spare, and it was found impossibleto raise other volunteers either in California or Oregon, and thenavy held these places by detachments of sailors and marines tillthe end of the war. Burton also called for reenforcements, andNaglee'a company was sent to him from Monterey, and these threecompanies occupied Lower California at the end of the Mexican War. Major Hardie still commanded at San Francisco and above; Company F, Third Artillery, and Shannon's company of volunteers, were atMonterey; Lippett's company at Santa Barbara; Colonel Stevenson, with one company of his regiment, and the company of the FirstDragoons, was at Los Angeles; and a company of Mormons, reenlistedout of the Mormon Battalion, garrisoned San Diego--and thus matterswent along throughout 1847 into 1848. I had occasion to makeseveral trips to Yerba Buena and back, and in the spring of 1848Colonel Mason and I went down to Santa Barbara in the sloop-of-warDale. 

I spent much time in hunting deer and bear in the mountains back ofthe Carmel Mission, and ducks and geese in the plains of theSalinas. As soon as the fall rains set in, the young oats wouldsprout up, and myriads of ducks, brant, and geese, made theirappearance. In a single day, or rather in the evening of one dayand the morning of the next, I could load a pack-mule with geeseand ducks. They had grown somewhat wild from the increased numberof hunters, yet, by marking well the place where a flock lighted, Icould, by taking advantage of gullies or the shape of the ground, creep up within range; and, giving one barrel on the ground, andthe other as they rose, I have secured as many as nine at onedischarge. Colonel Mason on one occasion killed eleven geese byone discharge of small shot. The seasons in California are wellmarked. About October and November the rains begin, and the wholecountry, plains and mountains, becomes covered with a bright-greengrass, with endless flowers. The intervals between the rains givethe finest weather possible. These rains are less frequent inMarch, and cease altogether in April and May, when gradually thegrass dies and the whole aspect of things changes, first to yellow, then to brown, and by midsummer all is burnt up and dry as anashheap. 

When General Kearney first departed we took his office at Larkin's;but shortly afterward we had a broad stairway constructed to leadfrom the outside to the upper front porch of the barracks. Bycutting a large door through the adobe-wall, we made the upper roomin the centre our office; and another side-room, connected with itby a door, was Colonel Mason's private office. 

I had a single clerk, a soldier named Baden; and William E. P. Hartnell, citizen, also had a table in the same room. He was thegovernment interpreter, and had charge of the civil archives. After Halleck's return from Mazatlan, he was, by Colonel Mason, made Secretary of State; and he then had charge of the civilarchives, including the land-titles, of which Fremont first hadpossession, but which had reverted to us when he left the country. 

I remember one day, in the spring of 1848, that two men, Americans, came into the office and inquired for the Governor. I asked theirbusiness, and one answered that they had just come down fromCaptain Sutter on special business, and they wanted to see GovernorMason in person. I took them in to the colonel, and left themtogether. After some time the colonel came to his door and calledto me. I went in, and my attention was directed to a series ofpapers unfolded on his table, in which lay about half an ounce ofplacer gold. Mason said to me, "What is that?" I touched it andexamined one or two of the larger pieces, and asked, "Is it gold?"Mason asked me if I had ever seen native gold. I answered that, in1844, I was in Upper Georgia, and there saw some native gold, butit was much finer than this, and that it was in phials, or intransparent quills; but I said that, if this were gold, it could beeasily tested, first, by its malleability, and next by acids. Itook a piece in my teeth, and the metallic lustre was perfect. Ithen called to the clerk, Baden, to bring an axe and hatchet fromthe backyard. When these were brought, I took the largest pieceand beat it out flat, and beyond doubt it was metal, and a puremetal. Still, we attached little importance to the fact, for goldwas known to exist at San Fernando, at the south, and yet was notconsidered of much value. Colonel Mason then handed me a letterfrom Captain Sutter, addressed to him, stating that he (Sutter) wasengaged in erecting a saw-mill at Coloma, about forty miles up theAmerican Fork, above his fort at New Helvetia, for the generalbenefit of the settlers in that vicinity; that he had incurredconsiderable expense, and wanted a "preemption" to thequarter-section of land on which the mill was located, embracing thetail-race in which this particular gold had been found. Masoninstructed me to prepare a letter, in answer, for his signature. Iwrote off a letter, reciting that California was yet a Mexicanprovince, simply held by us as a conquest; that no laws of theUnited States yet applied to it, much less the land laws orpreemption laws, which could only apply after a public survey. Therefore it was impossible for the Governor to promise him (Sutter)a title to the land; yet, as there were no settlements within fortymiles, he was not likely to be disturbed by trespassers. ColonelMason signed the letter, handed it to one of the gentlemen who hadbrought the sample of gold, and they departed. That gold was thefirst discovered in the Sierra Nevada, which soon revolutionized thewhole country, and actually moved the whole civilized world. Aboutthis time (May and June, 1848), far more importance was attached toquicksilver. One mine, the New Almaden, twelve miles south of SanJose, was well known, and was in possession of the agent of a Scotchgentleman named Forties, who at the time was British consul atTepic, Mexico. Mr. Forties came up from San Blas in a small brig, which proved to be a Mexican vessel; the vessel was seized, condemned, and actually sold, but Forties was wealthy, and boughther in. His title to the quicksilver-mine was, however, neverdisputed, as he had bought it regularly, before our conquest of thecountry, from another British subject, also named Forties, aresident of Santa Clara Mission, who had purchased it of thediscoverer, a priest; but the boundaries of the land attached to themine were even then in dispute. Other men were in search ofquicksilver; and the whole range of mountains near the New Almadenmine was stained with the brilliant red of the sulphuret of mercury(cinnabar). A company composed of T. O. Larkin, J. R. Snyder, andothers, among them one John Ricord (who was quite a character), alsoclaimed a valuable mine near by. Ricord was a lawyer from aboutBuffalo, and by some means had got to the Sandwich Islands, where hebecame a great favorite of the king, Kamehameha; was hisattorney-general, and got into a difficulty with the Rev. Mr. Judd, who was a kind of prime-minister to his majesty. One or the otherhad to go, and Ricord left for San Francisco, where he arrived whileColonel Mason and I were there on some business connected with thecustoms. Ricord at once made a dead set at Mason with flattery, andall sorts of spurious arguments, to convince him that our militarygovernment was too simple in its forms for the new state of facts, and that he was the man to remodel it. I had heard a good deal tohis prejudice, and did all I could to prevent Mason taking him, intohis confidence. We then started back for Monterey. Ricord wasalong, and night and day he was harping on his scheme; but hedisgusted Colonel Mason with his flattery, and, on reachingMonterey, he opened what he called a law-office, but there wereneither courts nor clients, so necessity forced him to turn histhoughts to something else, and quicksilver became his hobby. Inthe spring of 1848 an appeal came to our office from San Jose, whichcompelled the Governor to go up in person. Lieutenant Loeser and I, with a couple of soldiers, went along. At San Jose the Governorheld some kind of a court, in which Ricord and the alcalde had awarm dispute about a certain mine which Ricord, as a member of theLarkin Company, had opened within the limits claimed by the NewAlmaden Company. On our way up we had visited the ground, and weretherefore better prepared to understand the controversy. We hadfound at New Almaden Mr. Walkinshaw, a fine Scotch gentleman, theresident agent of Mr. Forbes. He had built in the valley, near asmall stream, a few board-houses, and some four or five furnaces forthe distillation of the mercury. These were very simple in theirstructure, being composed of whalers' kettles, set in masonry. These kettles were filled with broken ore about the size ofMcAdam-stone, mingled with lime. Another kettle, reversed, formedthe lid, and the seam was luted with clay. On applying heat, themercury was volatilized and carried into a chimney-stack, where itcondensed and flowed back into a reservoir, and then was led inpipes into another kettle outside. After witnessing this process, we visited the mine itself, which outcropped near the apex of thehill, about a thousand feet above the furnaces. We found wagonshauling the mineral down the hill and returning empty, and in themines quite a number of Sonora miners were blasting and driving forthe beautiful ore (cinnabar). It was then, and is now, a mostvaluable mine. The adit of the mine was at the apex of the hill, which drooped off to the north. We rode along this hill, and sawwhere many openings had been begun, but these, proving of little orno value, had been abandoned. Three miles beyond, on the west faceof the bill, we came to the opening of the "Larkin Company. " Therewas evidence of a good deal of work, but the mine itself was filledup by what seemed a land-slide. The question involved in thelawsuit before the alcalde at San Jose was, first, whether the minewas or was not on the land belonging to the New Almaden property;and, next, whether the company had complied with all the conditionsof the mite laws of Mexico, which were construed to be still inforce in California. 

These laws required that any one who discovered a valuable mine onprivate land should first file with the alcalde, or judge of thedistrict, a notice and claim for the benefits of such discovery;then the mine was to be opened and followed for a distance of atleast one hundred feet within a specified time, and the claimantsmust take out samples of the mineral and deposit the same with thealcalde, who was then required to inspect personally the mine, tosee that it fulfilled all the conditions of the law, before hecould give a written title. In this case the alcalde had been tothe mine and had possession of samples of the ore; but, as themouth of the mine was closed up, as alleged, from the act of God, by a land-slide, it was contended by Ricord and his associates thatit was competent to prove by good witnesses that the mine had beenopened into the hill one hundred feet, and that, by no negligenceof theirs, it had caved in. It was generally understood thatRobert J. Walker, United States Secretary of the Treasury, was thena partner in this mining company; and a vessel, the bark GrayEagle, was ready at San Francisco to sail for New York with thetitle-papers on which to base a joint-stock company for speculativeuses. I think the alcalde was satisfied that the law had beencomplied with, that he had given the necessary papers, and, as atthat time there was nothing developed to show fraud, the Governor(Mason) did not interfere. At that date there was no public houseor tavern in San Jose where we could stop, so we started towardSanta Cruz and encamped about ten miles out, to the west of thetown, where we fell in with another party of explorers, of whomRuckel, of San Francisco, was the head; and after supper, as we sataround the camp-fire, the conversation turned on quicksilver ingeneral, and the result of the contest in San Jose in particular. Mason was relating to Ruckel the points and the arguments ofRicord, that the company should not suffer from an act of God, viz. , the caving in of the mouth of the mine, when a man namedCash, a fellow who had once been in the quartermaster's employ as ateamster, spoke up: "Governor Mason, did Judge Ricord say that?""Yes, " said the Governor; and then Cash related how he and anotherman, whose name he gave, had been employed by Ricord to undermine aheavy rock that rested above the mouth of the mine, so that ittumbled down, carrying with it a large quantity of earth, andcompletely filled it up, as we had seen; "and, " said Cash, "it tookus three days of the hardest kind of work. " This was the act ofGod, and on the papers procured from the alcalde at that time, Iunderstand, was built a huge speculation, by which thousands ofdollars changed hands in the United States and were lost. Thishappened long before the celebrated McGarrahan claim, which hasproduced so much noise, and which still is being prosecuted in thecourts and in Congress. 

On the next day we crossed over the Santa Cruz Mountains, fromwhich we had sublime views of the scenery, first looking easttoward the lower Bay of San Francisco, with the bright plains ofSanta Clara and San Jose, and then to the west upon the ocean, thetown of Monterey being visible sixty miles off. If my memory iscorrect, we beheld from that mountain the firing of a salute fromthe battery at Monterey, and counted the number of guns from thewhite puffs of smoke, but could not hear the sound. That night weslept on piles of wheat in a mill at Soquel, near Santa Cruz, and, our supplies being short, I advised that we should make an earlystart next morning, so as to reach the ranch of Don Juan AntonioVallejo, a particular friend, who had a large and valuablecattle-ranch on the Pajaro River, about twenty miles on our way toMonterey. Accordingly, we were off by the first light of day, andby nine o'clock we had reached the ranch. It was on a high pointof the plateau, overlooking the plain of the Pajaro, on which weregrazing numbers of horses and cattle. The house was of adobe, witha long range of adobe-huts occupied by the semi-civilized Indians, who at that time did all the labor of a ranch, the herding andmarking of cattle, breaking of horses, and cultivating the littlepatches of wheat and vegetables which constituted all the farmingof that day. Every thing about the house looked deserted, and, seeing a small Indian boy leaning up against a post, I approachedhim and asked him in Spanish, "Where is the master?" "Gone to thePresidio" (Monterey). "Is anybody in the house?" "No. " "Is itlocked up?" "Yes. " "Is no one about who can get in?" "No. ""Have you any meat?" "No. " "Any flour or grain?" "No. " "Anychickens?" "No. " "Any eggs?" "No. " "What do you live on?""Nada" (nothing). The utter indifference of this boy, and thetone of his answer "Nada, " attracted the attention of ColonelMason, who had been listening to our conversation, and whoknew enough of Spanish to catch the meaning, and he exclaimedwith some feeling, "So we get nada for our breakfast. " I feltmortified, for I had held out the prospect of a splendidbreakfast of meat and tortillas with rice, chickens, eggs, etc. , atthe ranch of my friend Josh Antonio, as a justification fortaking the Governor, a man of sixty years of age, more thantwenty miles at a full canter for his breakfast. But there wasno help for it, and we accordingly went a short distance to apond, where we unpacked our mules and made a slim breakfast; onsome scraps of hard bread and a bone of pork that remained in ouralforjas. This was no uncommon thing in those days, when manya ranchero with his eleven leagues of land, his hundreds ofhorses and thousands of cattle, would receive us with all thegrandiloquence of a Spanish lord, and confess that he had nothingin his house to eat except the carcass of a beef hung up, fromwhich the stranger might cut and cook, without money or price, whathe needed. That night we slept on Salinas Plain, and the nextmorning reached Monterey. All the missions and houses at thatperiod were alive with fleas, which the natives looked on aspleasant titillators, but they so tortured me that I always gavethem a wide berth, and slept on a saddle-blanket, with the saddlefor a pillow and the serape, or blanket, for a cover. We neverfeared rain except in winter. As the spring and summer of 1848advanced, the reports came faster and faster from the gold-mines atSutter's saw-mill. Stories reached us of fabulous discoveries, andspread throughout the land. Everybody was talking of "Gold!gold!" until it assumed the character of a fever. Some of oursoldiers began to desert; citizens were fitting out trains ofwagons and packmules to go to the mines. We heard of men earningfifty, five hundred, and thousands of dollars per day, and for atime it seemed as though somebody would reach solid gold. Some ofthis gold began to come to Yerba Buena in trade, and to disturb thevalue of merchandise, particularly of mules, horses, tin pans, andarticles used in mining: I of course could not escape theinfection, and at last convinced Colonel Mason that it was our dutyto go up and see with our own eyes, that we might report the truthto our Government. As yet we had no regular mail to any part ofthe United States, but mails had come to us at long intervals, around Cape Horn, and one or two overland. I well remember thefirst overland mail. It was brought by Kit Carson in saddle-bagsfrom Taos in New Mexico. We heard of his arrival at Los Angeles, and waited patiently for his arrival at headquarters. His famethen was at its height, from the publication of Fremont's books, and I was very anxious to see a man who had achieved such feats ofdaring among the wild animals of the Rocky Mountains, and stillwilder Indians of the Plains. At last his arrival was reported atthe tavern at Monterey, and I hurried to hunt him up. I cannotexpress my surprise at beholding a small, stoop-shouldered man, with reddish hair, freckled face, soft blue eyes, and nothing toindicate extraordinary courage or daring. He spoke but little, andanswered questions in monosyllables. I asked for his mail, and hepicked up his light saddle-bags containing the great overland mail, and we walked together to headquarters, where he delivered hisparcel into Colonel Mason's own hands. He spent some days inMonterey, during which time we extracted with difficulty some itemsof his personal history. He was then by commission a lieutenant inthe regiment of Mounted Rifles serving in Mexico under ColonelSumner, and, as he could not reach his regiment from California, Colonel Mason ordered that for a time he should be assigned to dutywith A. J. Smith's company, First Dragoons, at Los Angeles. Heremained at Los Angeles some months, and was then sent back to theUnited Staten with dispatches, traveling two thousand miles almostalone, in preference to being encumbered by a large party. 

Toward the close of June, 1848, the gold-fever being at its height, by Colonel Mason's orders I made preparations for his trip to thenewly-discovered gold-mines at Sutter's Fort. I selected four goodsoldiers, with Aaron, Colonel Mason's black servant, and a goodoutfit of horses and pack-mules, we started by the usually traveledroute for Yerba Buena. There Captain Fulsom and two citizensjoined our party. The first difficulty was to cross the bay toSaucelito. Folsom, as quartermaster, had a sort of scow with alarge sail, with which to discharge the cargoes of ships, thatcould not come within a mile of the shore. It took nearly thewhole day to get the old scow up to the only wharf there, and thenthe water was so shallow that the scow, with its load of horses, would not float at the first high tide, but by infinite labor onthe next tide she was got off and safely crossed over to Saucelito. We followed in a more comfortable schooner. Having safely landedour horses and mules, we picked up and rode to San Rafael Mission, stopping with Don Timoteo Murphy. The next day's journey took usto Bodega, where lived a man named Stephen Smith, who had the onlysteam saw-mill in California. He had a Peruvian wife, and employeda number of absolutely naked Indians in making adobes. We spent aday very pleasantly with him, and learned that he had come toCalifornia some years before, at the personal advice of DanielWebster, who had informed him that sooner or later the UnitedStates would be in possession of California, and that inconsequence it would become a great country. From Bodega wetraveled to Sonoma, by way of Petaluma, and spent a day withGeneral Vallejo. I had been there before, as related, in thebusiness of the alcalde Nash. From Sonoma we crossed over by wayof Napa, Suisun, and Vaca's ranch, to the Puta. In the rainyseason, the plain between the Puta and Sacramento Rivers isimpassable, but in July the waters dry up; and we passed withouttrouble, by the trail for Sutter's Embarcadero. We reached theSacramento River, then full of water, with a deep, clear current. The only means of crossing over was by an Indian dugout canoe. Webegan by carrying across our packs and saddles, and then ourpeople. When all things were ready, the horses were driven intothe water, one being guided ahead by a man in the canoe. Ofcourse, the horses and mules at first refused to take to the water, and it was nearly a day's work to get them across, and even thensome of our animals after crossing escaped into the woods andundergrowth that lined the river, but we secured enough of them toreach Sutter's Fort, three miles back from the embcarcadero, wherewe encamped at the old slough, or pond, near the fort. Onapplication, Captain Butter sent some Indians back into the bushes, who recovered and brought in all our animals. At that time therewas not the sign of a habitation there or thereabouts, except thefort, and an old adobe-house, east of the fort, known as thehospital. The fort itself was one of adobe-walls, about twentyfeet high, rectangular in form, with two-story block houses atdiagonal corners. The entrance was by a large gate, open by dayand closed at night, with two iron ship's guns near at hand. Inside there was a large house, with a good shingle-roof, used as astorehouse, and all round the walls were ranged rooms, the fortwall being the outer wall of the house. The inner wall also was ofadobe. These rooms were used by Captain Sutter himself and by hispeople. He had a blacksmith's shop, carpenter's shop, etc. , andother rooms where the women made blankets. Sutter was monarch ofall he surveyed, and had authority to inflict punishment even untodeath, a power he did not fail to use. He had horses, cattle, andsheep, and of these he gave liberally and without price to all inneed. He caused to be driven into our camp a beef and some sheep, which were slaughtered for our use. Already the goldmines werebeginning to be felt. Many people were then encamped, some goingand some coming, all full of gold-stories, and each surpassing theother. We found preparations in progress for celebrating theFourth of July, then close at hand, and we agreed to remain over toassist on the occasion; of course, being the high officials, wewere the honored guests. People came from a great distance toattend this celebration of the Fourth of July, and the tables werelaid in the large room inside the storehouse of the fort. A man ofsome note, named Sinclair, presided, and after a substantial mealand a reasonable supply of aguardiente we began the toasts. Allthat I remember is that Folsom and I spoke for our party; others, Captain Sutter included, made speeches, and before the celebrationwas over Sutter was enthusiastic, and many others showed theeffects of the aguardiente. The next day (namely, July 5, 1848) weresumed our journey toward the mines, and, in twenty-five miles ofas hot and dusty a ride as possible, we reached Mormon Island. Ihave heretofore stated that the gold was first found in thetail-race of the stew-mill at Coloma, forty miles above Sutter'sFort, or fifteen above Mormon Island, in the bed of the AmericanFork of the Sacramento River. It seems that Sutter had employed anAmerican named Marshall, a sort of millwright, to do this work forhim, but Marshall afterward claimed that in the matter of thesaw-mill they were copartners. At all events, Marshall and thefamily of Mr. Wimmer were living at Coloma, where the pine-treesafforded the best material for lumber. He had under him four whitemen, Mormons, who had been discharged from Cooke's battalion, andsome Indians. These were engaged in hewing logs, building amill-dam, and putting up a saw-mill. Marshall, as the architect, had made the "tub-wheel, " and had set it in motion, and had alsofurnished some of the rude parts of machinery necessary for anordinary up-and-down saw-mill. 

Labor was very scarce, expensive, and had to be economized. Themill was built over a dry channel of the river which was calculatedto be the tail-race. After arranging his head-race, dam andtub-wheel, he let on the water to test the goodness of hismachinery. It worked very well until it was found that thetail-race did not carry off the water fast enough, so he put hismen to work in a rude way to clear out the tail-race. Theyscratched a kind of ditch down the middle of the dry channel, throwing the coarser stones to one side; then, letting on the wateragain, it would run with velocity down the channel, washing awaythe dirt, thus saving labor. This course of action was repeatedseveral times, acting exactly like the long Tom afterward resortedto by the miners. As Marshall himself was working in this ditch, he observed particles of yellow metal which he gathered up in hishand, when it seemed to have suddenly flashed across his mind thatit was gold. After picking up about an ounce, he hurried down tothe fort to report to Captain Sutter his discovery. Captain Sutterhimself related to me Marshall's account, saying that, as he sat inhis room at the fort one day in February or March, 1848, a knockwas heard at his door, and he called out, "Come in. " In walkedMarshall, who was a half-crazy man at best, but then lookedstrangely wild. "What is the matter, Marshall!" Marshallinquired if any one was within hearing, and began to peer about theroom, and look under the bed, when Sutter, fearing that somecalamity had befallen the party up at the saw-mill, and thatMarshall was really crazy, began to make his way to the door, demanding of Marshall to explain what was the matter. At last herevealed his discovery, and laid before Captain Sutter thepellicles of gold he had picked up in the ditch. At first, Sutterattached little or no importance to the discovery, and toldMarshall to go back to the mill, and say nothing of what he hadseen to Mr. Wimmer, or any one else. Yet, as it might add value tothe location, he dispatched to our headquarters at Monterey, as Ihave already related, the two men with a written application for apreemption to the quarter-section of land at Coloma. Marshallreturned to the mill, but could not keep out of his wonderfulditch, and by some means the other men employed there learned hissecret. They then wanted to gather the gold, and Marshallthreatened to shoot them if they attempted it; but these men hadsense enough to know that if "placer"-gold existed at Coloma, itwould also be found farther down-stream, and they gradually"prospected" until they reached Mormon Island, fifteen miles below, where they discovered one of the richest placers on earth. Thesemen revealed the fact to some other Mormons who were employed byCaptain Sutter at a grist-mill he was building still lower down theAmerican Fork, and six miles above his fort. All of them struckfor higher wages, to which Sutter yielded, until they asked tendollars a day, which he refused, and the two mills on which he hadspent so much money were never built, and fell into decay. 

In my opinion, when the Mormons were driven from Nauvoo, Illinois, in 1844, they cast about for a land where they would not bedisturbed again, and fixed on California. In the year 1845 a ship, the Brooklyn, sailed from New York for California, with a colony ofMormons, of which Sam Brannan was the leader, and we found themthere on our arrival in January, 1847. When General Kearney, atFort Leavenworth, was collecting volunteers early in 1846, for theMexican War, he, through the instrumentality of Captain JamesAllen, brother to our quartermaster, General Robert Allen, raisedthe battalion of Mormons at Kanesville, Iowa, now Council Bluffs, on the express understanding that it would facilitate theirmigration to California. But when the Mormons reached Salt Lake, in 1846, they learned that they had been forestalled by the UnitedStates forces in California, and they then determined to settledown where they were. Therefore, when this battalion of fivecompanies of Mormons (raised by Allen, who died on the way, and wassucceeded by Cooke) was discharged at Los Angeles, California, inthe early summer of 1847, most of the men went to their people atSalt Lake, with all the money received, as pay from the UnitedStates, invested in cattle and breeding-horses; one companyreenlisted for another year, and the remainder sought work in thecountry. As soon as the fame of the gold discovery spread throughCalifornia, the Mormons naturally turned to Mormon Island, so thatin July, 1848, we found about three hundred of them there at work. Sam Brannan was on hand as the high-priest, collecting the tithes. Clark, of Clark's Point, an early pioneer, was there also, andnearly all the Mormons who had come out in the Brooklyn, or who hadstaid in California after the discharge of their battalion, hadcollected there. I recall the scene as perfectly to-day as thoughit were yesterday. In the midst of a broken country, all parchedand dried by the hot sun of July, sparsely wooded with live-oaksand straggling pines, lay the valley of the American River, withits bold mountain-stream coming out of the Snowy Mountains to theeast. In this valley is a fiat, or gravel-bed, which in high wateris an island, or is overflown, but at the time of our visit wassimply a level gravel-bed of the river. On its edges men weredigging, and filling buckets with the finer earth and gravel, whichwas carried to a machine made like a baby's cradle, open at thefoot, and at the head a plate of sheet-iron or zinc, punctured fullof holes. On this metallic plate was emptied the earth, and waterwas then poured on it from buckets, while one man shook the cradlewith violent rocking by a handle. On the bottom were nailed cleatsof wood. With this rude machine four men could earn from forty toone hundred dollars a day, averaging sixteen dollars, or a goldounce, per man per day. While the' sun blazed down on the heads ofthe miners with tropical heat, the water was bitter cold, and allhands were either standing in the water or had their clothes wetall the time; yet there were no complaints of rheumatism or cold. We made our camp on a small knoll, a little below the island, andfrom it could overlook the busy scene. A few bush-huts near byserved as stores, boardinghouses, and for sleeping; but all handsslept on the ground, with pine-leaves and blankets for bedding. Assoon as the news spread that the Governor was there, persons cameto see us, and volunteered all kinds of information, illustratingit by samples of the gold, which was of a uniform kind, "scale-gold, " bright and beautiful. A large variety, of everyconceivable shape and form, was found in the smaller gulches roundabout, but the gold in the river-bed was uniformly "scale-gold. " Iremember that Mr. Clark was in camp, talking to Colonel Mason aboutmatters and things generally, when he inquired, "Governor, whatbusiness has Sam Brannan to collect the tithes here?" Clarkadmitted that Brannan was the head of the Mormon church inCalifornia, and he was simply questioning as to Brannan's right, ashigh-priest, to compel the Mormons to pay him the regular tithes. Colonel Mason answered, "Brannan has a perfect right to collect thetax, if you Mormons are fools enough to pay it. " "Then, " saidClark, "I for one won't pay it any longer. " Colonel Mason added:"This is public land, and the gold is the property of the UnitedStates; all of you here are trespassers, but, as the Government isbenefited by your getting out the gold, I do not intend tointerfere. " I understood, afterward, that from that time thepayment of the tithes ceased, but Brannan had already collectedenough money wherewith to hire Sutter's hospital, and to open astore there, in which he made more money than any merchant inCalifornia, during that summer and fall. The understanding was, thatthe money collected by him as tithes was the foundation of hisfortune, which is still very large in San Francisco. That eveningwe all mingled freely with the miners, and witnessed the process ofcleaning up and "panning" out, which is the last process forseparating the pure gold from the fine dirt and black sand. 

The next day we continued our journey up the valley of the AmericanFork, stopping at various camps, where mining was in progress; andabout noon we reached Coloma, the place where gold had been firstdiscovered. The hills were higher, and the timber of betterquality. The river was narrower and bolder, and but few minerswere at work there, by reason of Marshall's and Sutter's claim tothe site. There stood the sawmill unfinished, the dam andtail-race just as they were left when the Mormons ceased work. Marshall and Wimmer's family of wife and half a dozen children werethere, guarding their supposed treasure; living in a house made ofclapboards. Here also we were shown many specimens of gold, of acoarser grain than that found at Mormon Island. The next day wecrossed the American River to its north side, and visited manysmall camps of men, in what were called the "dry diggings. " Littlepools of water stood in the beds of the streams, and these wereused to wash the dirt; and there the gold was in every conceivableshape and size, some of the specimens weighing several ounces. Some of these "diggings" were extremely rich, but as a whole theywere more precarious in results than at the river. Sometimes alucky fellow would hit on a "pocket, " and collect several thousanddollars in a few days, and then again he would be shifting aboutfrom place to place, "prospecting, " and spending all he had made. Little stores were being opened at every point, where flour, bacon, etc. , were sold; every thing being a dollar a pound, and a mealusually costing three dollars. Nobody paid for a bed, for he slepton the ground, without fear of cold or rain. We spent nearly aweek in that region, and were quite bewildered by the fabuloustales of recent discoveries, which at the time were confined to theseveral forks of the American and Yuba Rivers. ' All this time ourhorses had nothing to eat but the sparse grass in that region, andwe were forced to work our way down toward the Sacramento Valley, or to see our animals perish. Still we contemplated a visit to theYuba and Feather Rivers, from which we had heard of more wonderful"diggings;" but met a courier, who announced the arrival of a shipat Monterey, with dispatches of great importance from Mazatlan. Weaccordingly turned our horses back to Sutter's Fort. Crossing theSacramento again by swimming our horses, and ferrying their loadsin that solitary canoe, we took our back track as far as the Napa, and then turned to Benicia, on Carquinez Straits. We found there asolitary adobe-house, occupied by Mr. Hastings and his family, embracing Dr. Semple, the proprietor of the ferry. This ferry wasa ship's-boat, with a latteen-sail, which could carry across at onetime six or eight horses. 

It took us several days to cross over, and during that time we gotwell acquainted with the doctor, who was quite a character. He hadcome to California from Illinois, and was brother to SenatorSemple. He was about seven feet high, and very intelligent. Whenwe first reached Monterey, he had a printing-press, which belongedto the United States, having been captured at the custom-house, andhad been used to print custom-house blanks. With this Dr. Semple, as editor, published the Californian, a small sheet of news, once aweek; and it was a curiosity in its line, using two v's for a w, and other combinations of letters, made necessary by want of type. After some time he removed to Yerba Buena with his paper, and itgrew up to be the Alta California of today. Foreseeing, as hethought, the growth of a great city somewhere on the Bay of SanFrancisco, he selected Carquinez Straits as its location, andobtained from General Vallejo a title to a league of land, oncondition of building up a city thereon to bear the name ofVallejo's wife. This was Francisca Benicia; accordingly, the newcity was named "Francisca. " At this time, the town near the mouthof the bay was known universally as Yerba Buena; but that name wasnot known abroad, although San Francisco was familiar to the wholecivilized world. Now, some of the chief men of Yerba Buena, Folsom, Howard, Leidesdorf, and others, knowing the importance of aname, saw their danger, and, by some action of the ayuntamiento, ortown council, changed the name of Yerba Buena to "San Francisco. "Dr. Semple was outraged at their changing the name to one so likehis of Francisca, and he in turn changed his town to the other nameof Mrs. Vallejo, viz. , "Benicia;" and Benicia it has remained tothis day. I am convinced that this little circumstance was bigwith consequences. That Benicia has the best natural site for acommercial city, I am, satisfied; and had half the money and halfthe labor since bestowed upon San Francisco been expended atBenicia, we should have at this day a city of palaces on theCarquinez Straits. The name of "San Francisco, " however, fixed thecity where it now is; for every ship in 1848-'49, which clearedfrom any part of the world, knew the name of San Francisco, but notYerba Buena or Benicia; and, accordingly, ships consigned toCalifornia came pouring in with their contents, and were anchoredin front of Yerba Buena, the first town. Captains and crewsdeserted for the gold-mines, and now half the city in front ofMontgomery Street is built over the hulks thus abandoned. But Dr. Semple, at that time, was all there was of Benicia; he was captainand crew of his ferry boat, and managed to pass our party to thesouth side of Carquinez Straits in about two days. 

Thence we proceeded up Amador Valley to Alameda Creek, and so on tothe old mission of San Jose; thence to the pueblo of San Jose, where Folsom and those belonging in Yerba Buena went in thatdirection, and we continued on to Monterey, our party all the waygiving official sanction to the news from the gold-mines, andadding new force to the "fever. "

On reaching Monterey, we found dispatches from Commodore Shubrick, at Mazatlan, which gave almost positive assurance that the war withMexico was over; that hostilities had ceased, and commissionerswere arranging the terms of peace at Guadalupe Hidalgo. It waswell that this news reached California at that critical time; forso contagious had become the "gold-fever" that everybody wasbound to go and try his fortune, and the volunteer regiment ofStevenson's would have deserted en masse, had the men not beenassured that they would very soon be entitled to an honorabledischarge. 

Many of our regulars did desert, among them the very men who hadescorted us faithfully to the mines and back. Our servants alsoleft us, and nothing less than three hundred dollars a month wouldhire a man in California; Colonel Mason's black boy, Aaron, aloneof all our then servants proving faithful. We were forced toresort to all manner of shifts to live. First, we had a mess witha black fellow we called Bustamente as cook; but he got the fever, and had to go. We next took a soldier, but he deserted, andcarried off my double-barreled shot-gun, which I prized veryhighly. To meet this condition of facts, Colonel Mason orderedthat liberal furloughs should be given to the soldiers, andpromises to all in turn, and he allowed all the officers to drawtheir rations in kind. As the actual valve of the ration was verylarge, this enabled us to live. Halleck, Murray, Ord, and I, boarded with Dona Augustias, and turned in our rations as pay forour board. 

Some time in September, 1848, the official news of the treaty ofpeace reached us, and the Mexican War was over. This treaty wassigned in May, and came to us all the way by land by a courier fromLower California, sent from La Paz by Lieutenant-Colonel Burton. On its receipt, orders were at once made for the muster-out of allof Stevenson's regiment, and our military forces were thus reducedto the single company of dragoons at Los Angeles, and the onecompany of artillery at Monterey. Nearly all business had ceased, except that connected with gold; and, during that fall, ColonelMason, Captain Warner, and I, made another trip up to Sutter'sFort, going also to the newly-discovered mines on the Stanislaus, called "Sonora, " named from the miners of Sonora, Mexico, who hadfirst discovered them. We found there pretty much the same stateof facts as before existed at Mormon Island and Coloma, and wedaily received intelligence of the opening of still other minesnorth and south. 

But I have passed over a very interesting fact. As soon as we hadreturned from our first visit to the gold-mines, it becameimportant to send home positive knowledge of this valuablediscovery. The means of communication with the United States werevery precarious, and I suggested to Colonel Mason that a specialcourier ought to be sent; that Second-Lieutenant Loeser had beenpromoted to first-lieutenant, and was entitled to go home. He wasaccordingly detailed to carry the news. I prepared with great carethe letter to the adjutant-general of August 17, 1848, whichColonel Mason modified in a few Particulars; and, as it wasimportant to send not only the specimens which had been presentedto us along our route of travel, I advised the colonel to allowCaptain Folsom to purchase and send to Washington a large sample ofthe commercial gold in general use, and to pay for the same out ofthe money in his hands known as the "civil fund, " arising fromduties collected at the several ports in California. He consentedto this, and Captain Folsom bought an oyster-can full at tendollars the ounce, which was the rate of value at which it was thenreceived at the custom house. Folsom was instructed further tocontract with some vessel to carry the messenger to South America, where he could take the English steamers as far east as Jamaica, with a conditional charter giving increased payment if the vesselcould catch the October steamer. Folsom chartered the bark LaLambayecana, owned and navigated by Henry D. Cooke, who has sincebeen the Governor of the District of Columbia. In due time thisvessel reached Monterey, and Lieutenant Loeser, with his report andspecimens of gold, embarked and sailed. He reached the SouthAmerican Continent at Payta, Peru, in time; took the Englishsteamer of October to Panama, and thence went on to Kingston, Jamaica, where he found a sailing vessel bound for New Orleans. Onreaching New Orleans, he telegraphed to the War Department hisarrival; but so many delays had occurred that he did not reachWashington in time to have the matter embraced in the President'sregular message of 1848, as we had calculated. Still, thePresident made it the subject of a special message, and thus became"official" what had before only reached the world in a veryindefinite shape. Then began that wonderful development, and thegreat emigration to California, by land and by sea, of 1849 and1850. 

As before narrated, Mason, Warner, and I, made a second visit tothe mines in September and October, 1848. As the winter seasonapproached, Colonel Mason returned to Monterey, and I remained fora time at Sutter's Fort. In order to share somewhat in the richesof the land, we formed a partnership in a store at Coloma, incharge of Norman S. Bestor, who had been Warner's clerk. Wesupplied the necessary money, fifteen hundred dollars (five hundreddollars each), and Bestor carried on the store at Coloma for hisshare. Out of this investment, each of us realized a profit ofabout fifteen hundred dollars. Warner also got a regular leave ofabsence, and contracted with Captain Sutter for surveying andlocating the town of Sacramento. He received for this sixteendollars per day for his services as surveyor; and Sutter paid allthe hands engaged in the work. The town was laid off mostly upabout the fort, but a few streets were staked off along the riverbank, and one or two leading to it. Captain Sutter alwayscontended, however, that no town could possibly exist on theimmediate bank of the river, because the spring freshets rose overthe bank, and frequently it was necessary to swim a horse to reachthe boat-landing. Nevertheless, from the very beginning the townbegan to be built on the very river-bank, viz. , First, Second, andThird Streets, with J and K Streets leading back. Among theprincipal merchants and traders of that winter, at Sacramento, wereSam Brannan and Hensley, Reading & Co. For several years the sitewas annually flooded; but the people have persevered in buildingthe levees, and afterward in raising all the streets, so thatSacramento is now a fine city, the capital of the State, and standswhere, in 1848, was nothing but a dense mass of bushes, vines, andsubmerged land. The old fort has disappeared altogether. 

During the fall of 1848, Warner, Ord, and I, camped on the bank ofthe American River, abreast of the fort, at what was known as the"Old Tan-Yard. " I was cook, Ord cleaned up the dishes, and Warnerlooked after the horses; but Ord was deposed as scullion because hewould only wipe the tin plates with a tuft of grass, according tothe custom of the country, whereas Warner insisted on having themwashed after each meal with hot water. Warner was in consequencepromoted to scullion, and Ord became the hostler. We drew ourrations in kind from the commissary at San Francisco, who sent themup to us by a boat; and we were thus enabled to dispense a generoushospitality to many a poor devil who otherwise would have hadnothing to eat. 

The winter of 1848 '49 was a period of intense activity throughoutCalifornia. The rainy season was unfavorable to the operations ofgold-mining, and was very hard upon the thousands of houseless menand women who dwelt in the mountains, and even in the towns. Mostof the natives and old inhabitants had returned to their ranchesand houses; yet there were not roofs enough in the country toshelter the thousands who had arrived by sea and by land. The newshad gone forth to the whole civilized world that gold in fabulousquantities was to be had for the mere digging, and adventurers camepouring in blindly to seek their fortunes, without a thought ofhouse or food. Yerba Buena had been converted into San Francisco. Sacramento City had been laid out, lots were being rapidly sold, and the town was being built up as an entrepot to the mines. Stockton also had been chosen as a convenient point for tradingwith the lower or southern mines. Captain Sutter was the soleproprietor of the former, and Captain Charles Weber was the ownerof the site of Stockton, which was as yet known as "French Camp. "

CHAPTER III. 

EARLY RECOLLECTIONS OF CALIFORNIA--(CONTINUED). 

1849-1850. 

The department headquarters still remained at Monterey, but, withthe few soldiers, we had next to nothing to do. In midwinter weheard of the approach of a battalion of the Second Dragoons, underMajor Lawrence Pike Graham, with Captains Rucker, Coutts, Campbell, and others, along. So exhausted were they by their long march fromUpper Mexico that we had to send relief to meet them as theyapproached. When this command reached Los Angeles, it was leftthere as the garrison, and Captain A. J. Smith's company of theFirst Dragoons was brought up to San Francisco. We were alsoadvised that the Second Infantry, Colonel B. Riley, would be sentout around Cape Horn in sailing-ships; that the Mounted Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Loring, would march overland to Oregon;and that Brigadier-General Persifer F. Smith would come out inchief command on the Pacific coast. It was also known that acontract had been entered into with parties in New York and NewOrleans for a monthly line of steamers from those cities toCalifornia, via Panama. Lieutenant-Colonel Burton had come up fromLower California, and, as captain of the Third Artillery, he wasassigned to command Company F, Third Artillery, at Monterey. Captain Warner remained at Sacramento, surveying; and Halleck, Murray, Ord, and I, boarded with Dona Augustias. The season wasunusually rainy and severe, but we passed the time with the usualround of dances and parties. The time fixed for the arrival of themail-steamer was understood to be about January 1, 1849, but theday came and went without any tidings of her. Orders were given toCaptain Burton to announce her arrival by firing a nationalsalute, and each morning we listened for the guns from the fort. The month of January passed, and the greater part of February, too. As was usual, the army officers celebrated the 22d of February witha grand ball, given in the new stone school-house, which AlcaldeWalter Colton had built. It was the largest and best hall then inCalifornia. The ball was really a handsome affair, and we kept itup nearly all night. The next morning we were at breakfast:present, Dona Augustias, and Manuelita, Halleck, Murray, andmyself. We were dull and stupid enough until a gun from the fortaroused us, then another and another. "The steamer" exclaimed all, and, without waiting for hats or any thing, off we dashed. Ireached the wharf hatless, but the dona sent my cap after me by aservant. The white puffs of smoke hung around the fort, mingledwith the dense fog, which hid all the water of the bay, and wellout to sea could be seen the black spars of some unknown vessel. At the wharf I found a group of soldiers and a small row-boat, which belonged to a brig at anchor in the bay. Hastily ordering acouple of willing soldiers to get in and take the oars, and Mr. Larkin and Mr. Hartnell asking to go along, we jumped in and pushedoff. Steering our boat toward the spars, which loomed up above thefog clear and distinct, in about a mile we came to the black hullof the strange monster, the long-expected and most welcome steamerCalifornia. Her wheels were barely moving, for her pilot could notsee the shore-line distinctly, though the hills and Point of Pinescould be clearly made out over the fog, and occasionally a glimpseof some white walls showed where the town lay. A "Jacob's ladder"was lowered for us from the steamer, and in a minute I scrambled upon deck, followed by Larkin and Hartnell, and we found ourselvesin the midst of many old friends. There was Canby, theadjutant-general, who was to take my place; Charley Hoyt, my cousin;General Persifer F. Smith and wife; Gibbs, his aide-de-camp; MajorOgden, of the Engineers, and wife; and, indeed, many oldCalifornians, among them Alfred Robinson, and Frank Ward with hispretty bride. By the time the ship was fairly at anchor we hadanswered a million of questions about gold and the state of thecountry; and, learning that the ship was out of fuel, had informedthe captain (Marshall) that there was abundance of pine-wood, but nowilling hands to cut it; that no man could be hired at less than anounce of gold a day, unless the soldiers would volunteer to do itfor some agreed-upon price. As for coal, there was not a pound inMonterey, or anywhere else in California. Vessels with coal wereknown to be en route around Cape Horn, but none had yet reachedCalifornia. 

The arrival of this steamer was the beginning of a new epoch on thePacific coast; yet there she lay, helpless, without coal or fuel. The native Californians, who had never seen a steamship, stood fordays on the beach looking at her, with the universal exclamation, "Tan feo!"--how ugly!--and she was truly ugly when compared withthe clean, well-sparred frigates and sloops-of-war that hadhitherto been seen on the North Pacific coast. It was firstsupposed it would take ten days to get wood enough to prosecute hervoyage, and therefore all the passengers who could took up theirquarters on shore. Major Canby relieved me, and took the place Ihad held so long as adjutant-general of the Department ofCalifornia. The time seemed most opportune for me to leave theservice, as I had several splendid offers of employment and ofpartnership, and, accordingly, I made my written resignation; butGeneral Smith put his veto upon it, saying that he was to commandthe Division of the Pacific, while General Riley was to have theDepartment of California, and Colonel Loring that of Oregon. Hewanted me as his adjutant-general, because of my familiarity withthe country, and knowledge of its then condition: At the time, hehad on his staff Gibbs as aide-de-camp, and Fitzgerald asquartermaster. He also had along with him quite a retinue ofservants, hired with a clear contract to serve him for a whole yearafter reaching California, every one of whom deserted, except ayoung black fellow named Isaac. Mrs. Smith, a pleasant butdelicate Louisiana lady, had a white maid-servant, in whosefidelity she had unbounded confidence; but this girl was married toa perfect stranger, and off before she had even landed in SanFrancisco. It was, therefore, finally arranged that, on theCalifornia, I was to accompany General Smith to San Francisco ashis adjutant-general. I accordingly sold some of my horses, andarranged for others to go up by land; and from that time I becamefairly enlisted in the military family of General Persifer F. Smith. 

I parted with my old commander, Colonel Mason, with sincere regret. To me he had ever been kind and considerate, and, while stern, honest to a fault, he was the very embodiment of the principle offidelity to the interests of the General Government. He possesseda native strong intellect, and far more knowledge of the principlesof civil government and law than he got credit for. In private andpublic expenditures he was extremely economical, but not penurious. In cases where the officers had to contribute money for parties andentertainments, he always gave a double share, because of hisallowance of double rations. During our frequent journeys, I wasalways caterer, and paid all the bills. In settling with him herequired a written statement of the items of account, but neverdisputed one of them. During our time, California was, as now, full of a bold, enterprising, and speculative set of men, who wereengaged in every sort of game to make money. I know thatColonel-Mason was beset by them to use his position to make afortune for himself and his friends; but he never bought land ortown-lots, because, he said, it was his place to hold the publicestate for the Government as free and unencumbered by claims aspossible; and when I wanted him to stop the public-land sales in SanFrancisco, San Jose, etc. , he would not; for, although he did notbelieve the titles given by the alcaldes worth a cent, yet theyaided to settle the towns and public lands, and he thought, on thewhole, the Government would be benefited thereby. The same thingoccurred as to the gold-mines. He never took a title to a town lot, unless it was one, of no real value, from Alcalde Colton, inMonterey, of which I have never heard since. He did take a share inthe store which Warner, Beator, and I, opened at Coloma, paid hisshare of the capital, five hundred dollars, and received his shareof the profits, fifteen hundred dollars. I think also he took ashare in a venture to China with Larkin and others; but, on leavingCalifornia, he was glad to sell out without profit or loss. In thestern discharge of his duty he made some bitter enemies, among themHenry M. Naglee, who, in the newspapers of the day, endeavored todamage his fair name. But, knowing him intimately, I am certainthat he is entitled to all praise for having so controlled theaffairs of the country that, when his successor arrived, all thingswere so disposed that a civil form of government was an easy matterof adjustment. Colonel Mason was relieved by General Riley sometime in April, and left California in the steamer of the 1st May forWashington and St. Louis, where he died of cholera in the summer of1850, and his body is buried in Bellefontaine Cemetery. His widowafterward married Major (since General) Don Carlos Buell, and is nowliving in Kentucky. 

In overhauling the hold of the steamer California, as she lay atanchor in Monterey Bay, a considerable amount of coal was foundunder some heavy duplicate machinery. With this, and such wood ashad been gathered, she was able to renew her voyage. The usualsignal was made, and we all went on board. About the 1st of Marchwe entered the Heads, and anchored off San Francisco, near theUnited States line-of-battle-ship Ohio, Commodore T. Catesby Jones. As was the universal custom of the day, the crew of the Californiadeserted her; and she lay for months unable to make a trip back toPanama, as was expected of her. As soon as we reached SanFrancisco, the first thing was to secure an office and a house tolive in. The weather was rainy and stormy, and snow even lay onthe hills back of the Mission. Captain Folsom, the quartermaster, agreed to surrender for our office the old adobe custom house, onthe upper corner of the plaza, as soon as he could remove hispapers and effects down to one of his warehouses on the beach; andhe also rented for us as quarters the old Hudson Bay Company houseon Montgomery Street, which had been used by Howard & Mellua as astore, and at that very time they were moving their goods into alarger brick building just completed for them. As these changeswould take some time, General Smith and Colonel Ogden, with theirwives, accepted the hospitality offered by Commodore Jones on boardthe Ohio. I opened the office at the custom house, and Gibbs, Fitzgerald, and some others of us, slept in the loft of the HudsonBay Company house until the lower part was cleared of Howard'sstore, after which General Smith and the ladies moved in. There wehad a general mess, and the efforts at house-keeping were simplyludicrous. One servant after another, whom General Smith hadbrought from New Orleans, with a solemn promise to stand by him forone whole year, deserted without a word of notice or explanation, and in a few days none remained but little Isaac. The ladies hadno maid or attendants; and the general, commanding all the mightyforces of the United States on the Pacific coast, had to scratch toget one good meal a day for his family! He was a gentleman of finesocial qualities, genial and gentle, and joked at every thing. Poor Mrs. Smith and Mrs. Ogden did not bear it so philosophically. Gibbs, Fitzgerald, and I, could cruise around and find a meal, which cost three dollars, at some of the many restaurants which hadsprung up out of red-wood boards and cotton lining; but the generaland ladies could not go out, for ladies were rara aves at that dayin California. Isaac was cook, chamber-maid, and everything, thoughtless of himself, and struggling, out of the slimmest means, to compound a breakfast for a large and hungry family. Breakfastwould be announced any time between ten and twelve, and dinneraccording to circumstances. Many a time have I seen General Smith, with a can of preserved meat in his hands, going toward the house, take off his hat on meeting a negro, and, on being asked the reasonof his politeness, he would answer that they were the only realgentlemen in California. I confess that the fidelity of ColonelMason's boy "Aaron, " and of General Smith's boy "Isaac, " at a timewhen every white man laughed at promises as something made to bebroken, has given me a kindly feeling of respect for the negroes, and makes me hope that they will find an honorable "status" in thejumble of affairs in which we now live. 

That was a dull hard winter in San Francisco; the rains were heavy, and the mud fearful. I have seen mules stumble in the street, anddrown in the liquid mud! Montgomery Street had been filled up withbrush and clay, and I always dreaded to ride on horseback along it, because the mud was so deep that a horse's legs would becomeentangled in the bushes below, and the rider was likely to bethrown and drowned in the mud. The only sidewalks were made ofstepping-stones of empty boxes, and here and there a few plankswith barrel-staves nailed on. All the town lay along MontgomeryStreet, from Sacramento to Jackson, and about the plaza. Gamblingwas the chief occupation of the people. While they were waitingfor the cessation of the rainy season, and for the beginning ofspring, all sorts of houses were being put up, but of the mostflimsy kind, and all were stores, restaurants, or gambling-saloons. Any room twenty by sixty feet would rent for a thousanddollars a month. I had, as my pay, seventy dollars a month, and noone would even try to hire a servant under three hundred dollars. Had it not been for the fifteen hundred dollars I had made in thestore at Coloma, I could not have lived through the winter. Aboutthe 1st of April arrived the steamer Oregon; but her captain(Pearson) knew what was the state of affairs on shore, and ran hissteamer alongside the line-of-battle-ship Ohio at Saucelito, andobtained the privilege of leaving his crew on board as "prisoners"until he was ready to return to sea. Then, discharging hispassengers and getting coal out of some of the ships which hadarrived, he retook his crew out of limbo and carried the firstregular mail back to Panama early in April. In regular orderarrived the third steamer, the Panama; and, as the vessels werearriving with coal, The California was enabled to hire a crew andget off. From that time forward these three ships constituted theregular line of mail-steamers, which has been kept up ever since. By the steamer Oregon arrived out Major R. P. Hammond, J. M. Williams, James Blair, and others; also the gentlemen who, withMajor Ogden, were to compose a joint commission to select the sitesfor the permanent forts and navyyard of California. Thiscommission was composed of Majors Ogden, Smith, and Leadbetter, of, the army, and Captains Goldsborough, Van Brunt, and Blunt, of thenavy. These officers, after a most careful study of the wholesubject, selected Mare Island for the navy-yard, and "Benicia" forthe storehouses and arsenals of the army. The Pacific MailSteamship Company also selected Benicia as their depot. Thus wasagain revived the old struggle for supremacy of these two pointsas the site of the future city of the Pacific. Meantime, however, San Francisco had secured the name. About six hundred ships wereanchored there without crews, and could not get away; and there thecity was, and had to be. 

Nevertheless, General Smith, being disinterested and unprejudiced, decided on Benicia as the point where the city ought to be, andwhere the army headquarters should be. By the Oregon there arrivedat San Francisco a man who deserves mention here--BaronSteinberger. He had been a great cattle-dealer in the UnitedStates, and boasted that he had helped to break the United StatesBank, by being indebted to it five million dollars! At all events, he was a splendid looking fellow, and brought with him fromWashington a letter to General Smith and another for CommodoreJones, to the effect that he was a man of enlarged experience inbeef; that the authorities in Washington knew that there existed inCalifornia large herds of cattle, which were only valuable fortheir hides and tallow; that it was of great importance to theGovernment that this beef should be cured and salted so as to be ofuse to the army and navy, obviating the necessity of shippingsalt-beef around Cape Horn. I know he had such a letter from theSecretary of War, Marcy, to General Smith, for it passed into mycustody, and I happened to be in Commodore Jones's cabin when thebaron presented the one for him from the Secretary of the Navy. The baron was anxious to pitch in at once, and said that all heneeded to start with were salt and barrels. After some inquiriesof his purser, the commodore promised to let him have the barrelswith their salt, as fast as they were emptied by the crew. Thenthe baron explained that he could get a nice lot of cattle from DonTimoteo Murphy, at the Mission of San Rafael, on the north aide ofthe bay, but he could not get a boat and crew to handle them. Under the authority from the Secretary of the Navy, the commodorethen promised him the use of a boat and crew, until he (the baron)could find and purchase a suitable one for himself. Then the baronopened the first regular butcher-shop in San Francisco, on thewharf about the foot of Broadway or Pacific Street, where we couldbuy at twenty-five or fifty cents a pound the best roasts, steaks, and cuts of beef, which had cost him nothing, for he never paidanybody if he could help it, and he soon cleaned poor Don Timoteoout. At first, every boat of his, in coming down from the SanRafael, touched at the Ohio, and left the best beefsteaks androasts for the commodore, but soon the baron had enough money todispense with the borrowed boat, and set up for himself, and fromthis small beginning, step by step, he rose in a few months to beone of the richest and most influential men in San Francisco; butin his wild speculations he was at last caught, and becamehelplessly bankrupt. He followed General Fremont to St. Louis in1861, where I saw him, but soon afterward he died a pauper in oneof the hospitals. When General Smith had his headquarters in SanFrancisco, in the spring of 1849, Steinberger gave dinners worthyany baron of old; and when, in after-years, I was a banker there, he used to borrow of me small sums of money in repayment for myshare of these feasts; and somewhere among my old packages I holdone of his confidential notes for two hundred dollars, but on thewhole I got off easily. I have no doubt that, if this man'shistory could be written out, it would present phases as wonderfulas any of romance; but in my judgment he was a dangerous man, without any true-sense of honor or honesty. 

Little by little the rains of that season grew less and less, andthe hills once more became green and covered with flowers. Itbecame perfectly evident that no family could live in San Franciscoon such a salary as Uncle Sam allowed his most favored officials;so General Smith and Major Ogden concluded to send their familiesback to the United States, and afterward we men-folks could take tocamp and live on our rations. The Second Infantry had arrived, andhad been distributed, four companies to Monterey, and the restsomewhat as Stevenson's regiment had been. A. J. Smith's companyof dragoons was sent up to Sonoma, whither General Smith hadresolved to move our headquarters. On the steamer which sailedabout May 1st (I think the California), we embarked, the ladies forhome and we for Monterey. At Monterey we went on shore, andColonel Mason, who meantime had been relieved by General Riley, went on board, and the steamer departed for Panama. Of all thatparty I alone am alive. 

General Riley had, with his family, taken the house which ColonelMason had formerly used, and Major Canby and wife had secured roomsat Alvarado's. Captain Bane was quartermaster, and had his familyin the house of a man named Garner, near the redoubt. Burton andCompany F were still at the fort; the four companies of the SecondInfantry were quartered in the barracks, the same building in whichwe had had our headquarters; and the company officers werequartered in hired buildings near by. General Smith and his aide, Captain Gibbs, went to Larkin's house, and I was at my old rooms atDona Augustias. As we intended to go back to San Francisco by landand afterward to travel a good deal, General Smith gave me thenecessary authority to fit out the party. There happened to beseveral trains of horses and mules in town, so I purchased about adozen horses and mules at two hundred dollars a head, on account ofthe Quartermaster's Department, and we had them kept under guard inthe quartermaster's corral. 

I remember one night being in the quarters of Lieutenant AlfredSully, where nearly all the officers of the garrison wereassembled, listening to Sully's stories. Lieutenant Derby, "Squibob, " was one of the number, as also Fred Steele, "Neighbor"Jones, and others, when, just after "tattoo, " the orderly-sergeantscame to report the result of "tattoo" roll-call; one reported fivemen absent, another eight, and so on, until it became certain thattwenty-eight men had deserted; and they were so bold and open intheir behavior that it amounted to defiance. They had deliberatelyslung their knapsacks and started for the gold-mines. Dr. Murrayand I were the only ones present who were familiar with thecountry, and I explained how easy they could all be taken by aparty going out at once to Salinas Plain, where the country was soopen and level that a rabbit could not cross without being seen;that the deserters could not go to the mines without crossing thatplain, and could not reach it before daylight. All agreed that thewhole regiment would desert if these men were not brought back. Several officers volunteered on the spot to go after them; and, asthe soldiers could not be trusted, it was useless to send any butofficers in pursuit. Some one went to report the affair to theadjutant-general, Canby, and he to General Riley. I waited sometime, and, as the thing grew cold, I thought it was given up, andwent to my room and to bed. 

About midnight I was called up and informed that there were sevenofficers willing to go, but the difficulty was to get horses andsaddles. I went down to Larkin's house and got General Smith toconsent that we might take the horses I had bought for our trip. It was nearly three o'clock a. M. Before we were all mounted andready. I had a musket which I used for hunting. With this I ledoff at a canter, followed by the others. About six miles out, bythe faint moon, I saw ahead of us in the sandy road some bluecoats, and, fearing lest they might resist or escape into the densebushes which lined the road, I halted and found with me PaymasterHill, Captain N. H. Davis, and Lieutenant John Hamilton. We waitedsome time for the others, viz. , Canby, Murray, Gibbs, and Sully, tocome up, but as they were not in sight we made a dash up the roadand captured six of the deserters, who were Germans, with heavyknapsacks on, trudging along the deep, sandy road. They had notexpected pursuit, had not heard our horses, and were accordinglyeasily taken. Finding myself the senior officer present, I orderedLieutenant Hamilton to search the men and then to march them backto Monterey, suspecting, as was the fact, that the rest of ourparty had taken a road that branched off a couple of miles back. Daylight broke as we reached the Saunas River, twelve miles out, and there the trail was broad and fresh leading directly out on theSaunas Plain. This plain is about five miles wide, and then theground becomes somewhat broken. The trail continued very plain, and I rode on at a gallop to where there was an old adobe-ranch onthe left of the road, with the head of a lagoon, or pond, close by. I saw one or two of the soldiers getting water at the pond, andothers up near the house. I had the best horse and wasconsiderably ahead, but on looking back could see Hill and Daviscoming up behind at a gallop. I motioned to them to hurry forward, and turned my horse across the head of the pond, knowing the groundwell, as it was a favorite place for shooting geese and ducks. Approaching the house, I ordered the men who were outside to go in. They did not know me personally, and exchanged glances, but I hadmy musket cocked, and, as the two had seen Davis and Hill coming uppretty fast, they obeyed. Dismounting, I found the house full ofdeserters, and there was no escape for them. They naturallysupposed that I had a strong party with me, and when I ordered themto "fall in" they obeyed from habit. By the time Hill and Daviscame up I had them formed in two ranks, the front rank facingabout, and I was taking away their bayonets, pistols, etc. Wedisarmed them, destroying a musket and several pistols, and, oncounting them, we found that we three had taken eighteen, which, added to the six first captured, made twenty-four. We made themsling their knapsacks and begin their homeward march. It was nearnight when we got back, so that these deserters had traveled nearlyforty miles since "tattoo" of the night before. The other partyhad captured three, so that only one man had escaped. I doubt notthis prevented the desertion of the bulk of the Second Infantrythat spring, for at that time so demoralizing was the effect of thegold-mines that everybody not in the military service justifieddesertion, because a soldier, if free, could earn more money in aday than he received per month. Not only did soldiers and sailorsdesert, but captains and masters of ships actually abandoned theirvessels and cargoes to try their luck at the mines. Preachersand professors forgot their creeds and took to trade, andeven to keeping gambling-houses. I remember that one of ourregular soldiers, named Reese, in deserting stole a favoritedouble-barreled gun of mine, and when the orderly-sergeant of thecompany, Carson, was going on furlough, I asked him when he cameacross Reese to try and get my gun back. When he returned he toldme that he had found Reese and offered him a hundred dollars for mygun, but Reese sent me word that he liked the gun, and would nottake a hundred dollars for it. Soldiers or sailors who could reachthe mines were universally shielded by the miners, so that it wasnext to useless to attempt their recapture. In due season GeneralPersifer Smith, Gibbs, and I, with some hired packers, started backfor San Francisco, and soon after we transferred our headquarters toSonoma. About this time Major Joseph Hooker arrived from the East--the regular adjutant-general of the division--relieved me, and Ibecame thereafter one of General Smith's regular aides-de-camp. 

As there was very little to do, General Smith encouraged us to gointo any business that would enable us to make money. R. P. Hammond, James Blair, and I, made a contract to survey for ColonelJ. D. Stevenson his newly-projected city of "New York of thePacific, " situated at the month of the San Joaquin River. Thecontract embraced, also, the making of soundings and the markingout of a channel through Suisun Bay. We hired, in San Francisco, asmall metallic boat, with a sail, laid in some stores, andproceeded to the United States ship Ohio, anchored at Saucelito, where we borrowed a sailor-boy and lead-lines with which to soundthe channel. We sailed up to Benicia, and, at General Smith'srequest, we surveyed and marked the line dividing the city ofBenicia from the government reserve. We then sounded the bay backand forth, and staked out the best channel up Suisun Bay, fromwhich Blair made out sailing directions. We then made thepreliminary surveys of the city of "New York of the Pacific, " allof which were duly plotted; and for this work we each received fromStevenson five hundred dollars and ten or fifteen lots. I soldenough lots to make up another five hundred dollars, and let thebalance go; for the city of "New York of the Pacific" never came toany thing. Indeed, cities at the time were being projected byspeculators all round the bay and all over the country. 

While we were surveying at "New York of the Pacific, " occurred oneof those little events that showed the force of the gold-fever. Wehad a sailor-boy with us, about seventeen years old, who cooked ourmeals and helped work the boat. Onshore, we had the sail spread soas to shelter us against the wind and dew. One morning I awokeabout daylight, and looked out to see if our sailor-boy was at workgetting breakfast; but he was not at the fire at all. Getting up, I discovered that he had converted a tule-bolsa into a sail boat, and was sailing for the gold-mines. He was astride this bolsa, with a small parcel of bread and meat done up in a piece ofcloth; another piece of cloth, such as we used for making oursignal-stations, he had fixed into a sail; and with a paddle he wasdirecting his precarious craft right out into the broad bay, tofollow the general direction of the schooners and boats that heknew were ascending the Sacramento River. He was about a hundredyards from the shore. I jerked up my gun, and hailed him to comeback. After a moment's hesitation, he let go his sheet and beganto paddle back. This bolsa was nothing but a bundle of tule, orbullrush, bound together with grass-ropes in the shape of a cigar, about ten feet long and about two feet through the butt. Withthese the California Indiana cross streams of considerable size. When he came ashore, I gave him a good overhauling for attemptingto desert, and put him to work getting breakfast. In due time wereturned him to his ship, the Ohio. Subsequently, I made a bargainwith Mr. Hartnell to survey his ranch at Cosnmnes River, SacramentoValley. Ord and a young citizen, named Seton, were associated withme in this. I bought of Rodman M. Price a surveyor's compass, chain, etc. , and, in San Francisco, a small wagon and harness. Availing ourselves of a schooner, chartered to carry Major Millerand two companies of the Second Infantry from San Francisco toStockton, we got up to our destination at little cost. I recall anoccurrence that happened when the schooner was anchored inCarquinez Straits, opposite the soldiers' camp on shore. We werewaiting for daylight and a fair wind; the schooner lay anchored atan ebb-tide, and about daylight Ord and I had gone ashore forsomething. Just as we were pulling off from shore, we heard theloud shouts of the men, and saw them all running down toward thewater. Our attention thus drawn, we saw something swimming in thewater, and pulled toward it, thinking it a coyote; but we soonrecognized a large grizzly bear, swimming directly across thechannel. Not having any weapon, we hurriedly pulled for theschooner, calling out, as we neared it, "A bear! a bear!" It sohappened that Major Miller was on deck, washing his face and hands. He ran rapidly to the bow of the vessel, took the musket from thehands of the sentinel, and fired at the bear, as he passed but ashort distance ahead of the schooner. The bear rose, made a growlor howl, but continued his course. As we scrambled up theport-aide to get our guns, the mate, with a crew, happened to havea boat on the starboard-aide, and, armed only with a hatchet, theypulled up alongside the bear, and the mate struck him in the headwith the hatchet. The bear turned, tried to get into the boat, butthe mate struck his claws with repeated blows, and made him let go. After several passes with him, the mate actually killed the bear, got a rope round him, and towed him alongside the schooner, wherehe was hoisted on deck. The carcass weighed over six hundredpounds. It was found that Major Miller's shot had struck the bearin the lower jaw, and thus disabled him. Had it not been for this, the bear would certainly have upset the boat and drowned all in it. As it was, however, his meat served us a good turn in our trip upto Stockton. At Stockton we disembarked our wagon, provisions, andinstruments. There I bought two fine mules at three hundreddollars each, and we hitched up and started for the Coaumnes River. About twelve miles off was the Mokelumne, a wide, bold stream, witha canoe as a ferry-boat. We took our wagon to pieces, and ferriedit and its contents across, and then drove our mules into thewater. In crossing, one mule became entangled in the rope of theother, and for a time we thought he was a gone mule; but at last herevived and we hitched up. The mules were both pack-animals;neither had ever before seen a wagon. Young Seton also was aboutas green, and had never handled a mule. We put on the harness, andbegan to hitch them in, when one of the mules turned his head, sawthe wagon, and started. We held on tight, but the beast did notstop until he had shivered the tongue-pole into a dozen fragments. The fact was, that Seton had hitched the traces before he had puton the blind-bridle. There was considerable swearing done, butthat would not mend the pole. There was no place nearer thanSutter's Fort to repair damages, so we were put to our wits' end. We first sent back a mile or so, and bought a raw-hide. Gatheringup the fragments of the pole and cutting the hide into strips, wefinished it in the rudest manner. As long as the hide was green, thepole was very shaky; but gradually the sun dried the hide, tightened it, and the pole actually held for about a month. Thiscost us nearly a day of delay; but, when damages were repaired, weharnessed up again, and reached the crossing of the Cosumnes, whereour survey was to begin. The expediente, or title-papers, of theranch described it as containing nine or eleven leagues on theCosumnes, south side, and between the San Joaquin River and SierraNevada Mountains. We began at the place where the road crosses theCosumnes, and laid down a line four miles south, perpendicular tothe general direction of the stream; then, surveying up the stream, we marked each mile so as to admit of a subdivision of one mile byfour. The land was dry and very poor, with the exception of hereand there some small pieces of bottom land, the great bulk of thebottom-land occurring on the north side of the stream. Wecontinued the survey up some twenty miles into the hills above themill of Dailor and Sheldon. It took about a month to make thissurvey, which, when finished, was duly plotted; and for it wereceived one-tenth of the land, or two subdivisions. Ord and Itook the land, and we paid Seton for his labor in cash. By thesale of my share of the land, subsequently, I realized threethousand dollars. After finishing Hartnell's survey, we crossedover to Dailor's, and did some work for him at five hundred dollarsa day for the party. Having finished our work on the Cosumnes, weproceeded to Sacramento, where Captain Sutter employed us toconnect the survey of Sacramento City, made by Lieutenant Warner, and that of Sutterville, three miles below, which was then beingsurveyed by Lieutenant J. W. Davidson, of the First Dragoons. AtSutterville, the plateau of the Sacramento approached quite nearthe river, and it would have made a better site for a town than thelow, submerged land where the city now stands; but it seems to be alaw of growth that all natural advantages are disregarded whereveronce business chooses a location. Old Sutter's embarcadero becameSacramento City, simply because it was the first point used forunloading boats for Sutter's Fort, just as the site for SanFrancisco was fixed by the use of Yerba Buena as the hide-landingfor the Mission of "San Francisco de Asis. "

I invested my earnings in this survey in three lots in SacramentoCity, on which I made a fair profit by a sale to one McNulty, ofMansfield, Ohio. I only had a two months' leave of absence, duringwhich General Smith, his staff, and a retinue of civil friends, were making a tour of the gold-mines, and hearing that he was enroute back to his headquarters at Sonoma, I knocked off my work, sold my instruments, and left my wagon and mules with my cousinCharley Hoyt, who had a store in Sacramento, and was on the pointof moving up to a ranch, for which he had bargained, on Bear Creek, on which was afterward established Camp "Far West. " He afterwardsold the mules, wagon, etc. , for me, and on the whole I think Icleared, by those two months' work, about six thousand dollars. Ithen returned to headquarters at Sonoma, in time to attend myfellow aide-de-camp Gibbs through a long and dangerous sickness, during which he was on board a store-ship, guarded by CaptainGeorge Johnson, who now resides in San Francisco. General Smithhad agreed that on the first good opportunity he would send me tothe United States as a bearer of dispatches, but this he could notdo until he had made the examination of Oregon, which was also inhis command. During the summer of 1849 there continued to pourinto California a perfect stream of people. Steamers came, and aline was established from San Francisco to Sacramento, of which theSenator was the pioneer, charging sixteen dollars a passage, andactually coining money. Other boats were built, out of materialswhich had either come around Cape Horn or were brought from theSandwich Islands. Wharves were built, houses were springing upas if by magic, and the Bay of San Francisco presented as busy ascene of life as any part of the world. Major Allen, of theQuartermaster's Department, who had come out as chief-quartermasterof the division, was building a large warehouse at Benicia, with arow of quarters, out of lumber at one hundred dollars per thousandfeet, and the work was done by men at sixteen dollars a day. Ihave seen a detailed soldier, who got only his monthly pay of eightdollars a month, and twenty cents a day for extra duty, nailing onweather-boards and shingles, alongside a citizen who was paidsixteen dollars a day. This was a real injustice, made thesoldiers discontented, and it was hardly to be wondered at that somany deserted. 

While the mass of people were busy at gold and in mammothspeculations, a set of busy politicians were at work to secure theprizes of civil government. Gwin and Fremont were there, and T. Butler King, of Georgia, had come out from the East, scheming foroffice. He staid with us at Sonoma, and was generally regarded asthe Government candidate for United States Senator. General Rileyas Governor, and Captain Halleck as Secretary of State, had issueda proclamation for the election of a convention to frame a Stateconstitution. In due time the elections were held, and theconvention was assembled at Monterey. Dr. Semple was electedpresident; and Gwin, Sutter, Halleck, Butler King, Sherwood, Gilbert, Shannon, and others, were members. General Smith took nopart in this convention, but sent me down to watch the proceedings, and report to him. The only subject of interest was the slaveryquestion. There were no slaves then in California, save a few whohad come out as servants, but the Southern people at that timeclaimed their share of territory, out of that acquired by thecommon labors of all sections of the Union in the war with Mexico. Still, in California there was little feeling on the subject. Inever heard General Smith, who was a Louisianian, express anyopinion about it. Nor did Butler King, of Georgia, ever manifestany particular interest in the matter. A committee was named todraft a constitution, which in due time was reported, with theusual clause, then known as the Wilmot Proviso, excluding slavery;and during the debate which ensued very little opposition was madeto this clause, which was finally adopted by a large majority, although the convention was made up in large part of men from ourSouthern States. This matter of California being a free State, afterward, in the national Congress, gave rise to angry debates, which at one time threatened civil war. The result of theconvention was the election of State officers, and of theLegislature which sat in San Jose in October and November, 1849, and which elected Fremont and Gwin as the first United StatesSenators in Congress from the Pacific coast. 

Shortly after returning from Monterey, I was sent by General Smithup to Sacramento City to instruct Lieutenants Warner andWilliamson, of the Engineers, to push their surveys of the SierraNevada Mountains, for the purpose of ascertaining the possibilityof passing that range by a railroad, a subject that then eliciteduniversal interest. It was generally assumed that such a roadcould not be made along any of the immigrant roads then in use, andWarner's orders were to look farther north up the Feather River, orsome one of its tributaries. Warner was engaged in this surveyduring the summer and fall of 1849, and had explored, to the veryend of Goose Lake, the source of Feather River. Then, leavingWilliamson with the baggage and part of the men, he took about tenmen and a first-rate guide, crossed the summit to the east, and hadturned south, having the range of mountains on his right hand, withthe intention of regaining his camp by another pass in themountain. The party was strung out, single file, with wide spacesbetween, Warner ahead. He had just crossed a small valley andascended one of the spurs covered with sage-brush and rocks, when aband of Indians rose up and poured in a shower of arrows. The muleturned and ran back to the valley, where Warner fell off dead, punctured by five arrows. The mule also died. The guide, who wasnear to Warner, was mortally wounded; and one or two men had arrowsin their bodies, but recovered. The party gathered about Warner'sbody, in sight of the Indians, who whooped and yelled, but did notventure away from their cover of rocks. This party of men remainedthere all day without burying the bodies, and at night, by a widecircuit, passed the mountain, and reached Williamson's camp. Thenews of Warner's death cast a gloom over all the old Californians, who knew him well. He was a careful, prudent, and honest officer, well qualified for his business, and extremely accurate in all hiswork. He and I had been intimately associated during our fouryears together in California, and I felt his loss deeply. Theseason was then too far advanced to attempt to avenge his death, and it was not until the next spring that a party was sent out togather up and bury his scattered bones. 

As winter approached, the immigrants overland came pouring intoCalifornia, dusty and worn with their two thousand miles of wearytravel across the plains and mountains. Those who arrived inOctober and November reported thousands still behind them, withoxen perishing, and short of food. Appeals were made for help, andGeneral Smith resolved to attempt relief. Major Rucker, who hadcome across with Pike. Graham's Battalion of Dragoons, hadexchanged with Major Fitzgerald, of the Quartermaster's Department, and was detailed to conduct this relief. General Smith ordered himto be supplied with one hundred thousand dollars out of the civilfund, subject to his control, and with this to purchase atSacramento flour, bacon, etc. , and to hire men and mules to sendout and meet the immigrants. Major Rucker fulfilled this dutyperfectly, sending out pack-trains loaded with food by the manyroutes by which the immigrants were known to be approaching, wentout himself with one of these trains, and remained in the mountainsuntil the last immigrant had got in. No doubt this expeditionsaved many a life which has since been most useful to the country. I remained at Sacramento a good part of the fall of 1849, recognizing among the immigrants many of my old personalfriends--John C. Fall, William King, Sam Stambaugh, Hugh Ewing, Hampton Denman, etc. I got Rucker to give these last two employmentalong with the train for the relief of the immigrants. They hadproposed to begin a ranch on my land on the Cosumnes, but afterwardchanged their minds, and went out with Rucker. 

While I was at Sacramento General Smith had gone on hiscontemplated trip to Oregon, and promised that he would be back inDecember, when he would send me home with dispatches. Accordingly, as the winter and rainy season was at hand, I went to SanFrancisco, and spent some time at the Presidio, waiting patientlyfor General Smith's return. About Christmas a vessel arrived fromOregon with the dispatches, and an order for me to deliver them inperson to General Winfield Scott, in New York City. General Smithhad sent them down, remaining in Oregon for a time. Of course Iwas all ready, and others of our set were going home by the sameconveyance, viz. , Rucker, Ord, A. J. Smith--some under orders, andthe others on leave. Wanting to see my old friends in Monterey, Iarranged for my passage in the steamer of January 1, 1850, payingsix hundred dollars for passage to New York, and went down toMonterey by land, Rucker accompanying me. The weather wasunusually rainy, and all the plain about Santa Clara was underwater; but we reached Monterey in time. I again was welcomed by myfriends, Dona Augustias, Manuelita, and the family, and it wasresolved that I should take two of the boys home with me and putthem at Georgetown College for education, viz. , Antonio andPorfirio, thirteen and eleven years old. The dona gave me a bag ofgold-dust to pay for their passage and to deposit at the college. On the 2d day of January punctually appeared the steamer Oregon. 

We were all soon on board and off for home. At that time thesteamers touched at San Diego, Acapulco, and Panama. Ourpassage down the coast was unusually pleasant. Arrived atPanama, we hired mules and rode across to Gorgona, on theCruces River, where we hired a boat and paddled down to themouth of the river, off which lay the steamer Crescent City. Itusually took four days to cross the isthmus, every passenger takingcare of himself, and it was really funny to watch the efforts ofwomen and men unaccustomed to mules. It was an old song to us, andthe trip across was easy and interesting. In due time we were rowedoff to the Crescent City, rolling back and forth in the swell, andwe scrambled aboard by a "Jacob's ladder" from the stern. Some ofthe women had to be hoisted aboard by lowering a tub from the endof a boom; fun to us who looked on, but awkward enough to the poorwomen, especially to a very fat one, who attracted much notice. General Fremont, wife and child (Lillie) were passengers with usdown from San Francisco; but Mrs. Fremont not being well, theyremained over one trip at Panama. 

Senator Gwin was one of our passengers, and went through to NewYork. We reached New York about the close of January, after a safeand pleasant trip. Our party, composed of Ord, A. J. Smith, andRucker, with the two boys, Antonio and Porfirio, put up atDelmonico's, on Bowling Green; and, as soon as we had cleaned upsomewhat, I took a carriage, went to General Scott's office inNinth Street, delivered my dispatches, was ordered to dine with himnext day, and then went forth to hunt up my old friends andrelations, the Scotts, Hoyts, etc. , etc. 

On reaching New York, most of us had rough soldier's clothing, butwe soon got a new outfit, and I dined with General Scott's family, Mrs. Scott being present, and also their son-in-law and daughter(Colonel and Mrs. H. L. Scott). The general questioned me prettyclosely in regard to things on the Pacific coast, especially thepolitics, and startled me with the assertion that "our country wason the eve of a terrible civil war. " He interested me by anecdotesof my old army comrades in his recent battles around the city ofMexico, and I felt deeply the fact that our country had passedthrough a foreign war, that my comrades had fought great battles, and yet I had not heard a hostile shot. Of course, I thought itthe last and only chance in my day, and that my career as a soldierwas at an end. After some four or five days spent in New York, Iwas, by an order of General Scott, sent to Washington, to laybefore the Secretary of War (Crawford, of Georgia) the dispatcheswhich I had brought from California. On reaching Washington, Ifound that Mr. Ewing was Secretary of the Interior, and I at oncebecame a member of his family. The family occupied the house ofMr. Blair, on Pennsylvania Avenue, directly in front of the WarDepartment. I immediately repaired to the War Department, andplaced my dispatches in the hands of Mr. Crawford, who questionedme somewhat about California, but seemed little interested in thesubject, except so far as it related to slavery and the routesthrough Texas. I then went to call on the President at the WhiteHouse. I found Major Bliss, who had been my teacher in mathematicsat West Point, and was then General Taylor's son-in-law and privatesecretary. He took me into the room, now used by the President'sprivate secretaries, where President Taylor was. I had never seenhim before, though I had served under him in Florida in 1840-'41, and was most agreeably surprised at his fine personal appearance, and his pleasant, easy manners. He received me with greatkindness, told me that Colonel Mason had mentioned my name withpraise, and that he would be pleased to do me any act of favor. Wewere with him nearly an hour, talking about California generally, and of his personal friends, Persifer Smith, Riley, Canby, andothers: Although General Scott was generally regarded by the armyas the most accomplished soldier of the Mexican War, yet GeneralTaylor had that blunt, honest, and stern character, that endearedhim to the masses of the people, and made him President. Bliss, too, had gained a large fame by his marked skill and intelligenceas an adjutant-general and military adviser. His manner was veryunmilitary, and in his talk he stammered and hesitated, so as tomake an unfavorable impression on a stranger; but he waswonderfully accurate and skillful with his pen, and his orders andletters form a model of military precision and clearness. 

CHAPTER IV. 

MISSOURI, LOUISIANA, AND CALIFORNIA

1850-1855. 

Having returned from California in January, 1850, with dispatchesfor the War Department, and having delivered them in person firstto General Scott in New York City, and afterward to the Secretaryof War (Crawford) in Washington City, I applied for and received aleave of absence for six months. I first visited my mother, thenliving at Mansfield, Ohio, and returned to Washington, where, onthe 1st day of May, 1850, I was married to Miss Ellen Boyle Ewing, daughter of the Hon. Thomas Ewing, Secretary of the Interior. Themarriage ceremony was attended by a large and distinguishedcompany, embracing Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, T. H. Benton, President Taylor, and all his cabinet. This occurred at the houseof Mr. Ewing, the same now owned and occupied by Mr. F. P. Blair, senior, on Pennsylvania Avenue, opposite the War Department. Wemade a wedding tour to Baltimore, New York, Niagara, and Ohio, andreturned to Washington by the 1st of July. General Taylorparticipated in the celebration of the Fourth of July, a very hotday, by hearing a long speech from the Hon. Henry S. Foote, at thebase of the Washington Monument. Returning from the celebrationmuch heated and fatigued, he partook too freely of his favoriteiced milk with cherries, and during that night was seized with asevere colic, which by morning had quite prostrated him. It wassaid that he sent for his son-in-law, Surgeon Wood, United StatesArmy, stationed in Baltimore, and declined medical assistance fromanybody else. Mr. Ewing visited him several times, and wasmanifestly uneasy and anxious, as was also his son-in-law, MajorBliss, then of the army, and his confidential secretary. Herapidly grew worse, and died in about four days. 

At that time there was a high state of political feeling pervadingthe country, on account of the questions growing out of the newTerritories just acquired from Mexico by the war. Congress was insession, and General Taylor's sudden death evidently created greatalarm. I was present in the Senate-gallery, and saw the oath ofoffice administered to the Vice-President, Mr. Fillmore, a man ofsplendid physical proportions and commanding appearance; but on thefaces of Senators and people could easily be read the feelings ofdoubt and uncertainty that prevailed. All knew that a change inthe cabinet and general policy was likely to result, but at thetime it was supposed that Mr. Fillmore, whose home was in Buffalo, would be less liberal than General Taylor to the politicians of theSouth, who feared, or pretended to fear, a crusade against slavery;or, as was the political cry of the day, that slavery would beprohibited in the Territories and in the places exclusively underthe jurisdiction of the United States. Events, however, proved thecontrary. 

I attended General Taylor's funeral as a sort of aide-decamp, atthe request of the Adjutant-General of the army, Roger Jones, whosebrother, a militia-general, commanded the escort, composed ofmilitia and some regulars. Among the regulars I recall the namesof Captains John Sedgwick and W. F. Barry. 

Hardly was General Taylor decently buried in the CongressionalCemetery when the political struggle recommenced, and it becamemanifest that Mr. Fillmore favored the general compromise thenknown as Henry Clay's "Omnibus Bill, " and that a general change ofcabinet would at once occur: Webster was to succeed Mr. Clayton asSecretary of State, Corwin to succeed Mr. Meredith as Secretary ofthe Treasury, and A. H. H. Stuart to succeed Mr. Ewing as Secretaryof the Interior. Mr. Ewing, however, was immediately appointed bythe Governor of the State to succeed Corwin in the Senate. These changes made it necessary for Mr. Ewing to discontinuehouse-keeping, and Mr. Corwin took his home and furniture off hishands. I escorted the family out to their home in Lancaster, Ohio;but, before this had occurred, some most interesting debates tookplace in the Senate, which I regularly attended, and heard Clay, Benton, Foots, King of Alabama, Dayton, and the many real orators ofthat day. Mr. Calhoun was in his seat, but he was evidentlyapproaching his end, for he was pale and feeble in the extreme. Iheard Mr. Webster's last speech on the floor of the Senate, undercircumstances that warrant a description. It was publicly knownthat he was to leave the Senate, and enter the new cabinet of Mr. Fillmore, as his Secretary of State, and that prior to leaving hewas to make a great speech on the "Omnibus Bill. " Resolved to hearit, I went up to the Capitol on the day named, an hour or soearlier than usual. The speech was to be delivered in the oldSenate-chamber, now used by the Supreme Court. The galleries weremuch smaller than at present, and I found them full to overflowing, with a dense crowd about the door, struggling to reach the stairs. Icould not get near, and then tried the reporters' gallery, but foundit equally crowded; so I feared I should lose the only possibleopportunity to hear Mr. Webster. 

I had only a limited personal acquaintance with any of theSenators, but had met Mr. Corwin quite often at Mr. Ewing's house, and I also knew that he had been extremely friendly to my father inhis lifetime; so I ventured to send in to him my card, "W. T. S. , First-Lieutenant, Third Artillery. " He came to the door promptly, when I said, "Mr. Corwin, I believe Mr. Webster is to speakto-day. " His answer was, "Yes, he has the floor at one o'clock. "I then added that I was extremely anxious to hear him. "Well, "said he, "why don't you go into the gallery?" I explained that itwas full, and I had tried every access, but found all jammed withpeople. "Well, " said he, "what do you want of me?" I explainedthat I would like him to take me on the floor of the Senate; that Ihad often seen from the gallery persons on the floor, no betterentitled to it than I. He then asked in his quizzical way, "Areyou a foreign embassador?" "No. " "Are you the Governor of aState?" "No. " "Are you a member of the other House?" "Certainlynot" "Have you ever had a vote of thanks by name?" "No!" "Well, these are the only privileged members. " I then told him he knewwell enough who I was, and that if he chose he could take me in. He then said, "Have you any impudence?" I told him, "A reasonableamount if occasion called for it. " "Do you think you could becomeso interested in my conversation as not to notice the door-keeper?"(pointing to him). I told him that there was not the least doubtof it, if he would tell me one of his funny stories. He then tookmy arm, and led me a turn in the vestibule, talking about someindifferent matter, but all the time directing my looks to his lefthand, toward which he was gesticulating with his right; and thus weapproached the door-keeper, who began asking me, "Foreignambassador? Governor of a State? Member of Congress?" etc. ; but Icaught Corwin's eye, which said plainly, "Don't mind him, payattention to me, " and in this way we entered the Senate-chamber bya side-door. Once in, Corwin said, "Now you can take care ofyourself, " and I thanked him cordially. 

I found a seat close behind Mr. Webster, and near General Scott, and heard the whole of the speech. It was heavy in the extreme, and I confess that I was disappointed and tired long before it wasfinished. No doubt the speech was full of fact and argument, butit had none of the fire of oratory, or intensity of feeling, thatmarked all of Mr. Clay's efforts. 

Toward the end of July, as before stated, all the family went hometo Lancaster. Congress was still in session, and the bill addingfour captains to the Commissary Department had not passed, but wasreasonably certain to, and I was equally sure of being one of them. At that time my name was on the muster-roll of (Light) Company C, Third Artillery (Bragg's), stationed at Jefferson Barracks, nearSt. Louis. But, as there was cholera at St. Louis, on application, I was permitted to delay joining my company until September. Earlyin that month, I proceeded to Cincinnati, and thence by steamboatto St. Louis, and then to Jefferson Barracks, where I reportedfor duty to Captain and Brevet-Colonel Braxton Bragg, commanding(Light) Company C, Third Artillery. The other officers of thecompany were First-Lieutenant James A. Hardie, and afterwardHaekaliah Brown. New horses had just been purchased for thebattery, and we were preparing for work, when the mail brought theorders announcing the passage of the bill increasing the CommissaryDepartment by four captains, to which were promoted CaptainsShiras, Blair, Sherman, and Bowen. I was ordered to take post atSt. Louis, and to relieve Captain A. J. Smith, First Dragoons, whohad been acting in that capacity for some months. My commissionbore date September 27, 1850. I proceeded forthwith to the city, relieved Captain Smith, and entered on the discharge of the dutiesof the office. 

Colonel N. S. Clarke, Sixth Infantry, commanded the department;Major D. C. Buell was adjutant-general, and Captain W. S. Hancockwas regimental quartermaster; Colonel Thomas Swords was the depotquartermaster, and we had our offices in the same building, on thecorner of Washington Avenue and Second. Subsequently Major S. VanVliet relieved Colonel Swords. I remained at the Planters' Houseuntil my family arrived, when we occupied a house on ChouteauAvenue, near Twelfth. 

During the spring and summer of 1851, Mr. Ewing and Mr. HenryStoddard, of Dayton, Ohio, a cousin of my father, were much in St. Louis, on business connected with the estate of Major AmosStoddard, who was of the old army, as early as the beginning ofthis century. He was stationed at the village of St. Louis at thetime of the Louisiana purchase, and when Lewis and Clarke madetheir famous expedition across the continent to the Columbia River. Major Stoddard at that early day had purchased a small farm back ofthe village, of some Spaniard or Frenchman, but, as he was abachelor, and was killed at Fort Meigs, Ohio, during the War of1812, the title was for many years lost sight of, and the farm wascovered over by other claims and by occupants. As St. Louis beganto grow, his brothers and sisters, and their descendants, concludedto look up the property. After much and fruitless litigation, theyat last retained Mr. Stoddard, of Dayton, who in turn employed Mr. Ewing, and these, after many years of labor, established the title, and in the summer of 1851 they were put in possession by the UnitedStates marshal. The ground was laid off, the city survey extendedover it, and the whole was sold in partition. I made somepurchases, and acquired an interest, which I have retained more orless ever since. 

We continued to reside in St. Louis throughout the year 1851, andin the spring of 1852 I had occasion to visit Fort Leavenworth onduty, partly to inspect a lot of cattle which a Mr. Gordon, of CassCounty, had contracted to deliver in New Mexico, to enable ColonelSumner to attempt his scheme of making the soldiers in New Mexicoself-supporting, by raising their own meat, and in a measure theirown vegetables. I found Fort Leavenworth then, as now, a mostbeautiful spot, but in the midst of a wild Indian country. Therewere no whites settled in what is now the State of Kansas. Weston, in Missouri, was the great town, and speculation in town-lots thereand thereabout burnt the fingers of some of the army-officers, whowanted to plant their scanty dollars in a fruitful soil. I rode onhorseback over to Gordon's farm, saw the cattle, concluded thebargain, and returned by way of Independence, Missouri. AtIndependence I found F. X. Aubrey, a noted man of that day, who hadjust made a celebrated ride of six hundred miles in six days. Thatspring the United States quartermaster, Major L. C. Easton, at FortUnion, New Mexico, had occasion to send some message east by acertain date, and contracted with Aubrey to carry it to the nearestpost-office (then Independence, Missouri), making his compensationconditional on the time consumed. He was supplied with a goodhorse, and an order on the outgoing trains for an exchange. Thoughthe whole route was infested with hostile Indians, and not a houseon it, Aubrey started alone with his rifle. He was fortunate inmeeting several outward-bound trains, and there, by made frequentchanges of horses, some four or five, and reached Independence insix days, having hardly rested or slept the whole way. Of course, he was extremely fatigued, and said there was an opinion among thewild Indians that if a man "sleeps out his sleep, " after suchextreme exhaustion, he will never awake; and, accordingly, heinstructed his landlord to wake him up after eight hours of sleep. When aroused at last, he saw by the clock that he had been asleeptwenty hours, and he was dreadfully angry, threatened to murder hislandlord, who protested he had tried in every way to get him up, but found it impossible, and had let him "sleep it out" Aubrey, indescribing his sensations to me, said he took it for granted he wasa dead man; but in fact he sustained no ill effects, and was offagain in a few days. I met him afterward often in California, andalways esteemed him one of the best samples of that bold race ofmen who had grown up on the Plains, along with the Indians, in theservice of the fur companies. He was afterward, in 1856, killed byR. C. Weightman, in a bar-room row, at Santa Fe, New Mexico, wherehe had just arrived from California. 

In going from Independence to Fort Leavenworth, I had to swim MilkCreek, and sleep all night in a Shawnee camp. The next day Icrossed the Kaw or Kansas River in a ferry boat, maintained by theblacksmith of the tribe, and reached the fort in the evening. Atthat day the whole region was unsettled, where now exist many richcounties, highly cultivated, embracing several cities of from tento forty thousand inhabitants. From Fort Leavenworth I returned bysteamboat to St. Louis. 

In the summer of 1852, my family went to Lancaster, Ohio; but Iremained at my post. Late in the season, it was rumored that I wasto be transferred to New Orleans, and in due time I learned thecause. During a part of the Mexican War, Major Seawell, of theSeventh Infantry, had been acting commissary of subsistence at NewOrleans, then the great depot of supplies for the troops in Texas, and of those operating beyond the Rio Grande. Commissaries at thattime were allowed to purchase in open market, and were notrestricted to advertising and awarding contracts to the lowestbidders. It was reported that Major Seawell had purchased largelyof the house of Perry Seawell & Co. , Mr. Seawell being a relativeof his. When he was relieved in his duties by Major Waggman, ofthe regular Commissary Department, the latter found Perry Seawell &Co. So prompt and satisfactory that he continued the patronage;for which there was a good reason, because stores for the use ofthe troops at remote posts had to be packed in a particular way, tobear transportation in wagons, or even on pack-mules; and this firmhad made extraordinary preparations for this exclusive purpose. Some time about 1849, a brother of Major Waggaman, who had beenclerk to Captain Casey, commissary of subsistence, at Tampa Bay, Florida, was thrown out of office by the death of the captain, andhe naturally applied to his brother in New Orleans for employment;and he, in turn, referred him to his friends, Messrs. PerrySeawell & Co. These first employed him as a clerk, and afterwardadmitted him as a partner. Thus it resulted, in fact, that MajorWaggaman was dealing largely, if not exclusively, with a firm ofwhich his brother was a partner. 

One day, as General Twiggs was coming across Lake Pontchartrain, hefell in with one of his old cronies, who was an extensive grocer. This gentleman gradually led the conversation to the downwardtendency of the times since he and Twiggs were young, saying that, in former years, all the merchants of New Orleans had a chance atgovernment patronage; but now, in order to sell to the armycommissary, one had to take a brother in as a partner. GeneralTwiggs resented this, but the merchant again affirmed it, and gavenames. As soon as General Twiggs reached his office, he instructedhis adjutant-general, Colonel Bliss--who told me this--to address acategorical note of inquiry to Major Waggaman. The major veryfrankly stated the facts as they had arisen, and insisted that thefirm of Perry Seawell & Co. Had enjoyed a large patronage, butdeserved it richly by reason of their promptness, fairness, andfidelity. The correspondence was sent to Washington, and theresult was, that Major Waggaman was ordered to St. Louis, and I wasordered to New Orleans. 

I went down to New Orleans in a steamboat in the month ofSeptember, 1852, taking with me a clerk, and, on arrival, assumedthe office, in a bank-building facing Lafayette Square, in whichwere the offices of all the army departments. General D. Twiggswas in command of the department, with Colonel W. W. S. Bliss(son-in-law of General Taylor) as his adjutant-general. Colonel A. C. Myers was quartermaster, Captain John F. Reynolds aide-de-camp, and Colonel A. J. Coffee paymaster. I took rooms at the St. LouisHotel, kept by a most excellent gentleman, Colonel Mudge. 

Mr. Perry Seawell came to me in person, soliciting a continuance ofthe custom which he had theretofore enjoyed; but I told him franklythat a change was necessary, and I never saw or heard of himafterward. I simply purchased in open market, arranged for theproper packing of the stores, and had not the least difficulty insupplying the troops and satisfying the head of the department inWashington. 

About Christmas, I had notice that my family, consisting of Mrs. Sherman, two children, and nurse, with my sister Fanny (now Mrs. Moulton, of Cincinnati, Ohio), were en route for New Orleans bysteam-packet; so I hired a house on Magazine Street, and furnishedit. Almost at the moment of their arrival, also came from St. Louis my personal friend Major Turner, with a parcel of documents, which, on examination, proved to be articles of copartnership for abank in California under the title of "Lucas, Turner & Co. , " inwhich my name was embraced as a partner. Major Turner was, at thetime, actually en route for New York, to embark for San Francisco, to inaugurate the bank, in the nature of a branch of the firmalready existing at St. Louis under the name of "Lucas & Symonds. "We discussed the matter very fully, and he left with me the papersfor reflection, and went on to New York and California. 

Shortly after arrived James H. Lucas, Esq. , the principal of thebanking-firm in St. Louis, a most honorable and wealthy gentleman. He further explained the full programme of the branch inCalifornia; that my name had been included at the insistence ofMajor Turner, who was a man of family and property in St. Louis, unwilling to remain long in San Francisco, and who wanted me tosucceed him there. He offered me a very tempting income, with aninterest that would accumulate and grow. He also disclosed to methat, in establishing a branch in California, he was influenced bythe apparent prosperity of Page, Bacon & Co. , and further that hehad received the principal data, on which he had founded thescheme, from B. R. Nisbet, who was then a teller in the firm ofPage, Bacon & Co. , of San Francisco; that he also was to be takenin as a partner, and was fully competent to manage all the detailsof the business; but, as Nisbet was comparatively young, Mr. Lucaswanted me to reside in San Francisco permanently, as the head ofthe firm. All these matters were fully discussed, and I agreed toapply for a six months' leave of absence, go to San Francisco, seefor myself, and be governed by appearances there. I accordingly, with General Twiggs's approval, applied to the adjutant-general fora six months' leave, which was granted; and Captain John F. Reynolds was named to perform my duties during my absence. 

During the stay of my family in New Orleans, we enjoyed the societyof the families of General Twiggs, Colonel Myers, and ColonelBliss, as also of many citizens, among whom was the wife of Mr. Day, sister to my brother-in-law, Judge Bartley. General Twiggswas then one of the oldest officers of the army. His historyextended back to the War of 1812, and he had served in early dayswith General Jackson in Florida and in the Creek campaigns. He hadfine powers of description, and often entertained us, at hisoffice, with accounts of his experiences in the earlier settlementsof the Southwest. Colonel Bliss had been General Taylor's adjutantin the Mexican War, and was universally regarded as one of the mostfinished and accomplished scholars in the army, and his wife was amost agreeable and accomplished lady. 

Late in February, I dispatched my family up to Ohio in thesteamboat Tecumseh (Captain Pearce); disposed of my house andfurniture; turned over to Major Reynolds the funds, property, andrecords of the office; and took passage in a small steamer forNicaragua, en route for California. We embarked early in March, and in seven days reached Greytown, where we united with thepassengers from New York, and proceeded, by the Nicaragua River andLake, for the Pacific Ocean. The river was low, and the littlesteam canal-boats, four in number, grounded often, so that thepassengers had to get into the water, to help them over the bare. In all there were about six hundred passengers, of whom about sixtywere women and children. In four days we reached Castillo, wherethere is a decided fall, passed by a short railway, and above thisfall we were transferred to a larger boat, which carried us up therest of the river, and across the beautiful lake Nicaragua, studdedwith volcanic islands. Landing at Virgin Bay, we rode on mulesacross to San Juan del Sur, where lay at anchor the propeller S. S. Lewis (Captain Partridge, I think). Passengers were carriedthrough the surf by natives to small boats, and rowed off to theLewis. The weather was very hot, and quite a scramble followed forstate-rooms, especially for those on deck. I succeeded in reachingthe purser's office, got my ticket for a berth in one of the beststate-rooms on deck, and, just as I was turning from the window, alady who was a fellow-passenger from New Orleans, a Mrs. D-, calledto me to secure her and her lady friend berths on deck, saying thatthose below were unendurable. I spoke to the purser, who, at themoment perplexed by the crowd and clamor, answered: "I must puttheir names down for the other two berths of your state-room; but, as soon as the confusion is over, I will make some change wherebyyou shall not suffer. " As soon as these two women were assigned toa state-room, they took possession, and I was left out. Theirnames were recorded as "Captain Sherman and ladies. " As soon asthings were quieted down I remonstrated with the purser, who atlast gave me a lower berth in another and larger state-room ondeck, with five others, so that my two ladies had the state-roomall to themselves. At every meal the steward would come to me, andsay, "Captain Sherman, will you bring your ladies to the table?"and we had the best seats in the ship. 

This continued throughout the voyage, and I assert that "my ladies"were of the most modest and best-behaved in the ship; but some timeafter we had reached San Francisco one of our fellow-passengerscame to me and inquired if I personally knew Mrs. D---, with flaxentresses, who sang so sweetly for us, and who had come out under myespecial escort. I replied I did not, more than the chanceacquaintance of the voyage, and what she herself had told me, viz. , that she expected to meet her husband, who lived about MokelumneHill. He then informed me that she was a woman of the town. Society in California was then decidedly mixed. In due season thesteamship Lewis got under weigh. She was a wooden ship, long andnarrow, bark-rigged, and a propeller; very slow, moving not overeight miles an hour. We stopped at Acapulco, and, in eighteendays, passed in sight of Point Pinoa at Monterey, and at the speedwe were traveling expected to reach San Francisco at 4 A. M. Thenext day. The cabin passengers, as was usual, bought of thesteward some champagne and cigars, and we had a sort of ovation forthe captain, purser, and surgeon of the ship, who were all veryclever fellows, though they had a slow and poor ship. Late atnight all the passengers went to bed, expecting to enter the portat daylight. I did not undress, as I thought the captain could andwould run in at night, and I lay down with my clothes on. About 4A. M. I was awakened by a bump and sort of grating of the vessel, which I thought was our arrival at the wharf in San Francisco; butinstantly the ship struck heavily; the engines stopped, and therunning to and fro on deck showed that something was wrong. In amoment I was out of my state-room, at the bulwark, holding fast toa stanchion, and looking over the side at the white and seethingwater caused by her sudden and violent stoppage. The sea wascomparatively smooth, the night pitch-dark, and the fog deep andimpenetrable; the ship would rise with the swell, and come downwith a bump and quiver that was decidedly unpleasant. Soon thepassengers were out of their rooms, undressed, calling for help, and praying as though the ship were going to sink immediately. Ofcourse she could not sink, being already on the bottom, and theonly question was as to the strength of hull to stand the bumpingand straining. Great confusion for a time prevailed, but soon Irealized that the captain had taken all proper precautions tosecure his boats, of which there were six at the davits. These arethe first things that steerage-passengers make for in case ofshipwreck, and right over my head I heard the captain's voice sayin a low tone, but quite decided: "Let go that falls, or, damn you, I'll blow your head off!" This seemingly harsh language gave megreat comfort at the time, and on saying so to the captainafterward, he explained that it was addressed to a passenger whoattempted to lower one of the boats. Guards, composed of the crew, were soon posted to prevent any interference with the boats, andthe officers circulated among the passengers the report that therewas no immediate danger; that, fortunately, the sea was smooth;that we were simply aground, and must quietly await daylight. 

They advised the passengers to keep quiet, and the ladies andchildren to dress and sit at the doors of their state-rooms, thereto await the advice and action of the officers of the ship, whowere perfectly cool and self-possessed. Meantime the ship wasworking over a reef-for a time I feared she would break in two;but, as the water gradually rose inside to a level with the seaoutside, the ship swung broadside to the swell, and all her keelseemed to rest on the rock or sand. At no time did the sea breakover the deck--but the water below drove all the people up to themain-deck and to the promenade-deck, and thus we remained for aboutthree hours, when daylight came; but there was a fog so thick thatnothing but water could be seen. The captain caused a boat to becarefully lowered, put in her a trustworthy officer with aboat-compass, and we saw her depart into the fog. During herabsence the ship's bell was kept tolling. Then the fires were allout, the ship full of water, and gradually breaking up, wrigglingwith every swell like a willow basket--the sea all round us full ofthe floating fragments of her sheeting, twisted and torn into aspongy condition. In less than an hour the boat returned, sayingthat the beach was quite near, not more than a mile away, and had agood place for landing. All the boats were then carefully lowered, and manned by crews belonging to the ship; a piece of the gangway, on the leeward side, was cut away, and all the women, and a few ofthe worst-scared men, were lowered into the boats, which pulled forshore. In a comparatively short time the boats returned, took newloads, and the debarkation was afterward carried on quietly andsystematically. No baggage was allowed to go on shore except bagsor parcels carried in the hands of passengers. At times the foglifted so that we could see from the wreck the tops of the hills, and the outline of the shore; and I remember sitting on, the upperor hurricane deck with the captain, who had his maps and compassbefore him, and was trying to make out where the ship was. Ithought I recognized the outline of the hills below the mission ofDolores, and so stated to him; but he called my attention to thefact that the general line of hills bore northwest, whereas thecoast south of San Francisco bears due north and south. Hetherefore concluded that the ship had overrun her reckoning, andwas then to the north of San Francisco. He also explained that, the passage up being longer than usual, viz. , eighteen days, thecoal was short; that at the time the firemen were using some cut-upspars along with the slack of coal, and that this fuel had mademore than usual steam, so that the ship must have glided alongfaster than reckoned. This proved to be the actual case, for, infact, the steamship Lewis was wrecked April 9, 1853, on "DuckworthReef, " Baulinas Bay, about eighteen miles above the entrance to SanFrancisco. 

The captain had sent ashore the purser in the first boat, withorders to work his way to the city as soon as possible, to reportthe loss of his vessel, and to bring back help. I remained on thewreck till among the last of the passengers, managing to get a canof crackers and some sardines out of the submerged pantry, a thingthe rest of the passengers did not have, and then I went quietlyashore in one of the boats. The passengers were all on the beach, under a steep bluff; had built fires to dry their clothes, but hadseen no human being, and had no idea where they were. Taking alongwith me a fellow-passenger, a young chap about eighteen years old, I scrambled up the bluff, and walked back toward the hills, inhopes to get a good view of some known object. It was then themonth of April, and the hills were covered with the beautifulgrasses and flowers of that season of the year. We soon foundhorse paths and tracks, and following them we came upon a drove ofhorses grazing at large, some of which had saddle-marks. At abouttwo miles from the beach we found a corral; and thence, followingone of the strongest-marked paths, in about a mile more wedescended into a valley, and, on turning a sharp point, reached aboard shanty, with a horse picketed near by. Four men were insideeating a meal. I inquired if any of the Lewis's people had beenthere; they did not seem to understand what I meant when Iexplained to them that about three miles from them, and beyond theold corral, the steamer Lewis was wrecked, and her passengers wereon the beach. I inquired where we were, and they answered, "AtBaulinas Creek;" that they were employed at a saw-mill just above, and were engaged in shipping lumber to San Francisco; that aschooner loaded with lumber was then about two miles down thecreek, waiting for the tide to get out, and doubtless if we wouldwalk down they would take us on board. 

I wrote a few words back to the captain, telling him where he was, and that I would hurry to the city to send him help. My companionand I their went on down the creek, and soon descried the schooneranchored out in the stream. On being hailed, a small boat came inand took us on board. The "captain" willingly agreed for a smallsum to carry us down to San Francisco; and, as his whole crewconsisted of a small boy about twelve years old, we helped him toget up his anchor and pole the schooner down the creek and out overthe bar on a high tide. This must have been about 2 P. M. Once overthe bar, the sails were hoisted, and we glided along rapidly with astrong, fair, northwest wind. The fog had lifted, so we could seethe shores plainly, and the entrance to the bay. In a couple ofhours we were entering the bay, and running "wing-and-wing. "Outside the wind was simply the usual strong breeze; but, as itpasses through the head of the Golden Gate, it increases, andthere, too, we met a strong ebb-tide. 

The schooner was loaded with lumber, much of which was on deck, lashed down to ring bolts with raw-hide thongs. The captain wassteering, and I was reclining on the lumber, looking at thefamiliar shore, as we approached Fort Point, when I heard a sort ofcry, and felt the schooner going over. As we got into the throatof the "Heads, " the force of the wind, meeting a strong ebb-tide, drove the nose of the schooner under water; she dove like a duck, went over on her side, and began, to drift out with the tide. Ifound myself in the water, mixed up with pieces of plank and ropes;struck out, swam round to the stern, got on the keel, and clamberedup on the side. Satisfied that she could not sink, by reason ofher cargo, I was not in the least alarmed, but thought twoshipwrecks in one day not a good beginning for a new, peacefulcareer. Nobody was drowned, however; the captain and crew werebusy in securing such articles as were liable to float off, and Ilooked out for some passing boat or vessel to pick us up. We weredrifting steadily out to sea, while I was signaling to a boat aboutthree miles off, toward Saucelito, and saw her tack and standtoward us. I was busy watching this sail-boat, when I heard aYankee's voice, close behind, saying, "This is a nice mess you'vegot yourselves into, " and looking about I saw a man in a smallboat, who had seen us upset, and had rowed out to us from aschooner anchored close under the fort. Some explanations weremade, and when the sail-boat coming from Saucelito was near enoughto be spoken to, and the captain had engaged her to help hisschooner, we bade him good by, and got the man in the small boat-tocarry us ashore, and land us at the foot of the bluff, just belowthe fort. Once there, I was at home, and we footed it up to thePresidio. Of the sentinel I inquired who was in command of thepost, and was answered, "Major Merchant. " He was not then in, buthis adjutant, Lieutenant Gardner, was. I sent my card to him; hecame out, and was much surprised to find me covered with sand, anddripping with water, a good specimen of a shipwrecked mariner. Afew words of explanation sufficed; horses were provided, and werode hastily into the city, reaching the office of the NicaraguaSteamship Company (C. K. Garrison, agent) about dark, just as thepurser had arrived; by a totally different route. It was too lateto send relief that night, but by daylight next morning twosteamers were en route for and reached the place of wreck in timeto relieve the passengers and bring them, and most of the baggage. I lost my carpet-bag, but saved my trunk. The Lewis went to piecesthe night after we got off, and, had there been an average seaduring the night of our shipwreck, none of us probably would haveescaped. That evening in San Francisco I hunted up Major Turner, whom I found boarding, in company with General E. A. Hitchcock, ata Mrs. Ross's, on Clay Street, near Powell. I took quarters withthem, and began to make my studies, with a view to a decisionwhether it was best to undertake this new and untried scheme ofbanking, or to return to New Orleans and hold on to what I thenhad, a good army commission. 

At the time of my arrival, San Francisco was an the top wave ofspeculation and prosperity. Major Turner had rented at six hundreddollars a month the office formerly used and then owned by Adams &Co. , on the east side of Montgomery Street, between Sacramento andCalifornia Streets. B. R. Nisbet was the active partner, and JamesReilly the teller. Already the bank of Lucas, Turner & Co. Wasestablished, and was engaged in selling bills of exchange, receiving deposits, and loaning money at three per cent. A month. 

Page, Bacon & Co. , and Adams & Co. , were in full blast across thestreet, in Parrott's new granite building, and other bankers weredoing seemingly a prosperous business, among them Wells, Fargo &Co. ; Drexel, Sather & Church; Burgoyne & Co. ; James King of Win. ;Sanders & Brenham; Davidson & Co. ; Palmer, Cook & Co. , and others. Turner and I had rooms at Mrs. Ross's, and took our meals atrestaurants down-town, mostly at a Frenchman's named Martin, on thesouthwest corner of Montgomery and California Streets. GeneralHitchcock, of the army, commanding the Department of California, usually messed with us; also a Captain Mason, and LieutenantWhiting, of the Engineer Corps. We soon secured a small share ofbusiness, and became satisfied there was room for profit. Everybody seemed to be making money fast; the city was beingrapidly extended and improved; people paid their three per cent. Amonth interest without fail, and without deeming it excessive. Turner, Nisbet, and I, daily discussed the prospects, and graduallysettled down to the conviction that with two hundred thousanddollars capital, and a credit of fifty thousand dollars in NewYork, we could build up a business that would help the St. Louishouse, and at the same time pay expenses in California, with areasonable profit. Of course, Turner never designed to remain longin California, and I consented to go back to St. Louis, confer withMr. Lucas and Captain Simonds, agree upon further details, and thenreturn permanently. 

I have no memoranda by me now by which to determine the fact, butthink I returned to New York in July, 1853, by the Nicaragua route, and thence to St. Louis by way of Lancaster, Ohio, where my familystill was. Mr. Lucas promptly agreed to the terms proposed, andfurther consented, on the expiration of the lease of the Adams &Co. Office, to erect a new banking-house in San Francisco, to costfifty thousand dollars. I then returned to Lancaster, explained toMr. Ewing and Mrs. Sherman all the details of our agreement, and, meeting their approval, I sent to the Adjutant-General of the armymy letter of resignation, to take effect at the end of the sixmonths' leave, and the resignation was accepted, to take effectSeptember 6, 1853. Being then a citizen, I engaged a passage outto California by the Nicaragua route, in the steamer leaving NewYork September 20th, for myself and family, and accordinglyproceeded to New York, where I had a conference with Mr. Meigs, cashier of the American Exchange Bank, and with Messrs. Wadsworth& Sheldon, bankers, who were our New York correspondents; and onthe 20th embarked for San Juan del Norte, with the family, composedof Mrs. Sherman, Lizzie, then less than a year old, and her nurse, Mary Lynch. Our passage down was uneventful, and, on the boats upthe Nicaragua River, pretty much the same as before. On reachingVirgin Bay, I engaged a native with three mules to carry us acrossto the Pacific, and as usual the trip partook of the ludicrous--Mrs. Sherman mounted on a donkey about as large as a Newfoundlanddog; Mary Lynch on another, trying to carry Lizzie on a pillowbefore her, but her mule had a fashion of lying down, which scaredher, till I exchanged mules, and my California spurs kept that muleon his legs. I carried Lizzie some time till she was fast asleep, when I got our native man to carry her awhile. The child woke up, and, finding herself in the hands of a dark-visaged man, she yelledmost lustily till I got her away. At the summit of the pass, therewas a clear-running brook, where we rested an hour, and bathedLizzie in its sweet waters. We then continued to the end of ourjourney, and, without going to the tavern at San Juan del Sur, wepassed directly to the vessel, then at anchor about two miles out. To reach her we engaged a native boat, which had to be kept outsidethe surf. Mrs. Sherman was first taken in the arms of two stoutnatives; Mary Lynch, carrying Lizzie, was carried by two others;and I followed, mounted on the back of a strapping fellow, whilefifty or a hundred others were running to and fro, cackling likegeese. 

Mary Lynch got scared at the surf, and began screaming like a fool, when Lizzie became convulsed with fear, and one of the nativesrushed to her, caught her out of Mary's arms, and carried herswiftly to Mrs. Sherman, who, by that time, was in the boat, butLizzie had fainted with fear, and for a long time sobbed as thoughpermanently injured. For years she showed symptoms that made usbelieve she had never entirely recovered from the effects of thescare. In due time we reached the steamer Sierra Nevada, and got agood state-room. Our passage up the coast was pleasant enough; wereached San Francisco; on the 15th of October, and took quarters atan hotel on Stockton Street, near Broadway. 

Major Turner remained till some time in November, when he alsodeparted for the East, leaving me and Nisbet to manage the bank. Iendeavored to make myself familiar with the business, but of courseNisbet kept the books, and gave his personal attention to theloans, discounts, and drafts, which yielded the profits. I soonsaw, however, that the three per cent. Charged as premium on billsof exchange was not all profit, but out of this had to come one anda fourth to one and a half for freight, one and a third forinsurance, with some indefinite promise of a return premium; then, the cost of blanks, boxing of the bullion, etc. , etc. Indeed, Isaw no margin for profit at all. Nisbet, however, who had longbeen familiar with the business, insisted there was a profit, inthe fact that the gold-dust or bullion shipped was more valuablethan its cost to us. We, of course, had to remit bullion to meetour bills on New York, and bought crude gold-dust, or bars refinedby Kellogg & Humbert or E. Justh & Co. , for at that time the UnitedStates Mint was not in operation. But, as the reports of ourshipments came back from New York, I discovered that I was right, and Nisbet was wrong; and, although we could not help selling ourchecks on New York and St. Louis at the same price as otherbankers, I discovered that, at all events, the exchange business inSan Francisco was rather a losing business than profitable. Thesame as to loans. We could loan, at three per cent. A month, allour own money, say two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, and apart of our deposit account. This latter account in California wasdecidedly uncertain. The balance due depositors would run down toa mere nominal sum on steamer-days, which were the 1st and 15th ofeach month, and then would increase till the next steamer-day, sothat we could not make use of any reasonable part of this balancefor loans beyond the next steamer-day; or, in other words, we hadan expensive bank, with expensive clerks, and all the machinery fortaking care of other people's money for their benefit, withoutcorresponding profit. I also saw that loans were attended withrisk commensurate with the rate; nevertheless, I could not attemptto reform the rules and customs established by others before me, and had to drift along with the rest toward that Niagara that noneforesaw at the time. 

Shortly after arriving out in 1853, we looked around for a site forthe new bank, and the only place then available on MontgomeryStreet, the Wall Street of San Francisco, was a lot at the cornerof Jackson Street, facing Montgomery, with an alley on the north, belonging to James Lick. The ground was sixty by sixty-two feet, and I had to pay for it thirty-two thousand dollars. I then made acontract with the builders, Keyser, & Brown, to erect a three-storybrick building, with finished basement, for about fifty thousanddollars. This made eighty-two thousand instead of fifty thousanddollars, but I thought Mr. Lucas could stand it and would approve, which he did, though it resulted in loss to him. After the civilwar, he told me he had sold the building for forty thousanddollars, about half its cost, but luckily gold was then at 250, sothat he could use the forty thousand dollars gold as the equivalentof one hundred thousand dollars currency. The building waserected; I gave it my personal supervision, and it was strongly andthoroughly built, for I saw it two years ago, when severalearthquakes had made no impression on it; still, the choice of sitewas unfortunate, for the city drifted in the opposite direction, viz. , toward Market Street. I then thought that all the heavybusiness would remain toward the foot of Broadway and JacksonStreet, because there were the deepest water and best wharves, butin this I made a mistake. Nevertheless, in the spring of 1854, thenew bank was finished, and we removed to it, paying rentsthereafter to our Mr. Lucas instead of to Adams & Co. A man namedWright, during the same season, built a still finer building justacross the street from us; Pioche, Bayerque & Co. Were alreadyestablished on another corner of Jackson Street, and the newMetropolitan Theatre was in progress diagonally opposite us. During the whole of 1854 our business steadily grew, our averagedeposits going up to half a million, and our sales of exchange andconsequent shipment of bullion averaging two hundred thousanddollars per steamer. I signed all bills of exchange, and insistedon Nisbet consulting me on loans and discounts. Spite of everycaution, however, we lost occasionally by bad loans, and worse bythe steady depreciation of real estate. The city of San Franciscowas then extending her streets, sewering them, and planking them, with three-inch lumber. In payment for the lumber and the work ofcontractors, the city authorities paid scrip in even sums of onehundred, five hundred, one thousand, and five thousand dollars. These formed a favorite collateral for loans at from fifty to sixtycents on the dollar, and no one doubted their ultimate value, either by redemption or by being converted into city bonds. The notes also of H. Meiggs, Neeley Thompson & Co. , etc. , lumber-dealers, were favorite notes, for they paid their interestpromptly, and lodged large margins of these street-improvementwarrants as collateral. At that time, Meiggs was a prominent man, lived in style in a large house on Broadway, was a member of theCity Council, and owned large saw-mills up the coast aboutMendocino. In him Nisbet had unbounded faith, but, for somereason, I feared or mistrusted him, and remember that I cautionedNisbet not to extend his credit, but to gradually contract hisloans. On looking over our bills receivable, then about sixhundred thousand dollars, I found Meiggs, as principal or indorser, owed us about eighty thousand dollars--all, however, secured bycity warrants; still, he kept bank accounts elsewhere, and wasgenerally a borrower. I instructed Nisbet to insist on hisreducing his line as the notes matured, and, as he found itindelicate to speak to Meiggs, I instructed him to refer him to me;accordingly, when, on the next steamer-day, Meiggs appealed at thecounter for a draft on Philadelphia, of about twenty thousanddollars, for which he offered his note and collateral, he wasreferred to me, and I explained to him that our draft was the sameas money; that he could have it for cash, but that we were alreadyin advance to him some seventy-five or eighty thousand dollars, andthat instead of increasing the amount I must insist on itsreduction. He inquired if I mistrusted his ability, etc. Iexplained, certainly not, but that our duty was to assist those whodid all their business with us, and, as our means were necessarilylimited, I must restrict him to some reasonable sum, say, twenty-five thousand dollars. Meiggs invited me to go with him to arich mercantile house on Clay Street, whose partners belonged inHamburg, and there, in the presence of the principals of the house, he demonstrated, as clearly as a proposition in mathematics, thathis business at Mendocino was based on calculations that could notfail. The bill of exchange which he wanted, he said would make thelast payment on a propeller already built in Philadelphia, whichwould be sent to San Francisco, to tow into and out of port theschooners and brigs that were bringing his lumber down the coast. Iadmitted all he said, but renewed my determination to limit hiscredit to twenty-five thousand dollars. The Hamburg firm thenagreed to accept for him the payment of all his debt to us, exceptthe twenty-five thousand dollars, payable in equal parts for thenext three steamer-days. Accordingly, Meiggs went back with me toour bank, wrote his note for twenty-five thousand dollars, andsecured it by mortgage on real estate and city warrants, andsubstituted the three acceptances of the Hamburg firm for theoverplus. I surrendered to him all his former notes, except one forwhich he was indorser. The three acceptances duly matured and werepaid; one morning Meiggs and family were missing, and it wasdiscovered they had embarked in a sailing-vessel for South America. This was the beginning of a series of failures in San Francisco, that extended through the next two years. As soon as it was knownthat Meiggs had fled, the town was full of rumors, and everybody wasrunning to and fro to secure his money. His debts amounted tonearly a million dollars. The Hamburg house which, had beenhumbugged, were heavy losers and failed, I think. I took possessionof Meiggs's dwelling-house and other property for which I held hismortgage, and in the city warrants thought I had an overplus; but ittranspired that Meiggs, being in the City Council, had issuedvarious quantities of street scrip, which was adjudged a forgery, though, beyond doubt, most of it, if not all, was properly signed, but fraudulently issued. On this city scrip our bank must have lostabout ten thousand dollars. Meiggs subsequently turned up in Chili, where again he rose to wealth and has paid much of his San Franciscodebts, but none to us. He is now in Peru, living like a prince. With Meiggs fell all the lumber-dealers, and many persons dealing incity scrip. Compared with others, our loss was a trifle. In ashort time things in San Francisco resumed their wonted course, andwe generally laughed at the escapade of Meiggs, and the cursing ofhis deluded creditors. 

Shortly after our arrival in San Francisco, I rented of a Mr. Marryat, son of the English Captain Marryat, the author, a smallframe-house on Stockton Street, near Green, buying of him hisfurniture, and we removed to it about December 1, 1853. Close by, around on Green Street, a man named Dickey was building two smallbrick-houses, on ground which he had leased of Nicholson. I boughtone of these houses, subject to the ground-rent, and moved into itas soon as finished. Lieutenant T. H. Stevens, of the UnitedStates Navy, with his family, rented the other; we lived in thishouse throughout the year 1854, and up to April 17, 1855. 

CHAPTER V. 

CALIFORNIA

1855-1857

During the winter of 1854-'55, I received frequent intimations inmy letters from the St. Louis house, that the bank of Page, Bacon &Co. Was in trouble, growing out of their relations to the Ohio &Mississippi Railroad, to the contractors for building which theyhad made large advances, to secure which they had been compelled totake, as it were, an assignment of the contract itself, and finallyto assume all the liabilities of the contractors. Then they had toborrow money in New York, and raise other money from time to time, in the purchase of iron and materials for the road, and to pay thehands. The firm in St. Louis and that in San Francisco weredifferent, having different partners, and the St. Louis housenaturally pressed the San Francisco firm to ship largely of"gold-dust, " which gave them a great name; also to keep as large abalance as possible in New York to sustain their credit. Mr. Pagewas a very wealthy man, but his wealth consisted mostly of land andproperty in St. Louis. He was an old man, and a good one; had beena baker, and knew little of banking as a business. This part ofhis general business was managed exclusively by his son-in-law, Henry D. Bacon, who was young, handsome, and generally popular. How he was drawn into that affair of the Ohio & Mississippi road Ihave no means of knowing, except by hearsay. Their business in NewYork was done through the American Exchange Bank, and throughDuncan, Sherman & Co. As we were rival houses, the St. Louispartners removed our account from the American Exchange Bank to theMetropolitan Bank; and, as Wadsworth & Sheldon had failed, I wasinstructed to deal in time bills, and in European exchange, withSchnchardt & Gebhard, bankers in Nassau Street. 

In California the house of Page, Bacon & Co. Was composed of thesame partners as in St. Louis, with the addition of Henry Haight, Judge Chambers, and young Frank Page. The latter had charge of the"branch" in Sacramento. Haight was the real head-man, but he wastoo fond of lager-beer to be in trusted with so large a business. Beyond all comparison, Page, Bacon & Co. Were the most prominentbankers in California in 1853-'55. Though I had notice of dangerin that quarter, from our partners in St. Louis, nobody inCalifornia doubted their wealth and stability. They must have had, during that winter, an average deposit account of nearly twomillion dollars, of which seven hundred thousand dollars was in"certificates of deposit, " the most stable of all accounts in abank. Thousands of miners invested their earnings in suchcertificates, which they converted into drafts on New York, whenthey were ready to go home or wanted to send their "pile" to theirfamilies. Adams & Co. Were next in order, because of theirnumerous offices scattered throughout the mining country. Agentleman named Haskell had been in charge of Adams & Co. In SanFrancisco, but in the winter of 1854-'55 some changes were made, and the banking department had been transferred to a magnificentoffice in Halleck's new Metropolitan Block. James King of Wm. Haddiscontinued business on his own account, and been employed byAdams & Co. As their cashier and banker, and Isaiah C. Wood hadsucceeded Haskell in chief control of the express department. Wells, Fargo & Co. Were also bankers as well as expressmen, andWilliam J. Pardee was the resident partner. 

As the mail-steamer came in on February 17, 1855, according to hercustom, she ran close to the Long Wharf (Meiggs's) on North Beach, to throw ashore the express-parcels of news for speedy delivery. Some passenger on deck called to a man of his acquaintance standingon the wharf, that Page & Bacon had failed in New York. The newsspread like wild-fire, but soon it was met by the newspaperaccounts to the effect that some particular acceptances of Page &Bacon, of St. Louis, in the hands of Duncan, Sherman & Co. , in NewYork, had gone to protest. All who had balances at Page, Bacon &Co. 's, or held certificates of deposit, were more or less alarmed, wanted to secure their money, and a general excitement pervaded thewhole community. Word was soon passed round that the matteradmitted of explanation, viz. , that the two houses were distinctand separate concerns, that every draft of the California house hadbeen paid in New York, and would continue to be paid. It wasexpected that this assertion would quiet the fears of theCalifornia creditors, but for the next three days there was asteady "run" on that bank. Page, Bacon & Co. Stood the first day'srun very well, and, as I afterward learned, paid out about sixhundred thousand dollars in gold coin. On the 20th of FebruaryHenry Height came to our bank, to see what help we were willing togive him; but I was out, and Nisbet could not answer positively forthe firm. Our condition was then very strong. The deposit accountwas about six hundred thousand dollars, and we had in our vaultabout five hundred thousand dollars in coin and bullion, besides anequal amount of good bills receivable. Still I did not like toweaken ourselves to help others; but in a most friendly spirit, that night after bank-hours, I went down to Page, Bacon & Co. , andentered their office from the rear. I found in the cashier's roomFolsom, Parrott, Dewey and Payne, Captain Ritchie, Donohue, andothers, citizens and friends of the house, who had been called infor consultation. Passing into the main office, where all thebook-keepers, tellers, etc. , with gas-lights, were busy writing upthe day's work, I found Mr. Page, Henry Height, and Judge Chambers. I spoke to Height, saying that I was sorry I had been out when hecalled at our bank, and had now come to see him in the mostfriendly spirit. Height had evidently been drinking, and saidabruptly that "all the banks would break, " that "no bank couldinstantly pay all its obligations, " etc. I answered he could speakfor himself, but not for me; that I had come to offer to buy withcash a fair proportion of his bullion, notes, and bills; but, ifthey were going to fail, I would not be drawn in. Height's mannerwas extremely offensive, but Mr. Page tried to smooth it over, saying they had had a bad day's run, and could not answer for theresult till their books were written up. 

I passed back again into the room where the before-named gentlemenwere discussing some paper which lay before them, and was going topass out, when Captain Folsom, who was an officer of the army, aclass-mate and intimate friend of mine, handed me the paper thecontents of which they were discussing. It was very short, and inHenry Haight's handwriting, pretty much in these terms: "We, theundersigned property-holders of San Francisco, having personallyexamined the books, papers, etc. , of Page, Bacon & Co. , do herebycertify that the house is solvent and able to pay all its debts, "etc. Height had drawn up and asked them to sign this paper, withthe intention to publish it in the next morning's papers, foreffect. While I was talking with Captain Folsom, Height came intothe room to listen. I admitted that the effect of such apublication would surely be good, and would probably stave offimmediate demand till their assets could be in part converted orrealized; but I naturally inquired of Folsom, "Have you personallyexamined the accounts, as herein recited, and the assets, enough towarrant your signature to this paper?" for, "thereby you in effectbecome indorsers. " Folsom said they had not, when Height turnedon me rudely and said, "Do you think the affairs of such a house asPage, Bacon & Co. Can be critically examined in an hour?" Ianswered: "These gentlemen can do what they please, but they havetwelve hours before the bank will open on the morrow, and if theledger is written up" (as I believed it was or could be bymidnight), "they can (by counting the coin, bullion on hand, andnotes or stocks of immediate realization) approximate near enoughfor them to indorse for the remainder. " But Height pooh-poohed me, and I left. Folsom followed me out, told me he could not afford toimperil all he had, and asked my advice. I explained to him thatmy partner Nisbet had been educated and trained in that very houseof Page, Bacon & Co. ; that we kept our books exactly as they did;that every day the ledger was written up, so that from it one couldsee exactly how much actual money was due the depositors andcertificates; and then by counting the money in the vault, estimating the bullion on hand, which, though not actual money, could easily be converted into coin, and supplementing theseamounts by "bills receivable, " they ought to arrive at anapproximate-result. After Folsom had left me, John Parrott alsostopped and talked with me to the same effect. Next morning Ilooked out for the notice, but no such notice appeared in themorning papers, and I afterward learned that, on Parrott and Folsomdemanding an actual count of the money in the vault, Haight angrilyrefused unless they would accept his word for it, when one afterthe other declined to sign his paper. 

The run on Page, Bacon & Co. Therefore continued throughout the21st, and I expected all day to get an invitation to close our bankfor the next day, February 22, which we could have made a holidayby concerted action; but each banker waited for Page, Bacon & Co. To ask for it, and, no such circular coming, in the then state offeeling no other banker was willing to take the initiative. On themorning of February 22, 1855, everybody was startled by receiving asmall slip of paper, delivered at all the houses, on which wasprinted a short notice that, for "want of coin, " Page, Bacon & Co. Found it necessary to close their bank for a short time. Ofcourse, we all knew the consequences, and that every other bank inSan Francisco would be tried. During the 22d we all kept open, andwatched our depositors closely; but the day was generally observedby the people as a holiday, and the firemen paraded the streets ofSan Francisco in unusual strength. But, on writing up our booksthat night, we found that our deposit account had diminished aboutsixty-five thousand dollars. Still, there was no run on us, or anyother of the banks, that day; yet, observing little knots of men onthe street, discussing the state of the banks generally, andoverhearing Haight's expression quoted, that, in case of thefailure of Page, Bacon & Co. , "all the other banks would break, " Ideemed it prudent to make ready. For some days we had refused allloans and renewals, and we tried, without, success, some of ourcall-loans; but, like Hotspur's spirits, they would not come. 

Our financial condition on that day (February 22, 1855) was: Duedepositors and demand certificates, five hundred and twentythousand dollars; to meet which, we had in the vault: coin, threehundred and eighty thousand dollars; bullion, seventy-five thousanddollars; and bills receivable, about six hundred thousand dollars. Of these, at least one hundred thousand dollars were on demand, with stock collaterals. Therefore, for the extent of our business, we were stronger than the Bank of England, or any bank in New YorkCity. 

Before daylight next morning, our door-bell was rung, and I wascalled down-stairs by E. Casserly, Esq. (an eminent lawyer of theday, since United States Senator), who informed me he had just comeup from the office of Adams & Co. , to tell me that their affairswere in such condition that they would not open that morning atall; and that this, added to the suspension of Page, Bacon & Co. , announced the day before, would surely cause a general run on allthe banks. I informed him that I expected as much, and wasprepared for it. 

In going down to the bank that morning, I found Montgomery Streetfull; but, punctually to the minute, the bank opened, and in rushedthe crowd. As usual, the most noisy and clamorous were men andwomen who held small certificates; still, others with largeraccounts were in the crowd, pushing forward for their balances. All were promptly met and paid. Several gentlemen of my personalacquaintance merely asked my word of honor that their money wassafe, and went away; others, who had large balances, and noimmediate use for coin, gladly accepted gold-bars, whereby we paidout the seventy-five thousand dollars of bullion, relieving thecoin to that amount. 

Meantime, rumors from the street came pouring in that Wright & Co. Had failed; then Wells, Fargo & Co. ; then Palmer, Cook & Co. , andindeed all, or nearly all, the banks of the city; and I was toldthat parties on the street were betting high, first, that we wouldclose our doors at eleven o'clock; then twelve, and so on; but wedid not, till the usual hour that night. We had paid every demand, and still had a respectable amount left. 

This run on the bank (the only one I ever experienced) presentedall the features, serious and comical, usual to such occasions. Atour counter happened that identical case, narrated of others, ofthe Frenchman, who was nearly squeezed to death in getting to thecounter, and, when he received his money, did not know what to dowith it. "If you got the money, I no want him; but if you no gothim, I want it like the devil!"

Toward the close of the day, some of our customers deposited, rather ostentatiously, small amounts, not aggregating more thaneight or ten thousand dollars. Book-keepers and tellers were keptat work to write up the books; and these showed:

Due depositors and certificates, about one hundred and twentythousand dollars, for which remained of coin about fifty thousanddollars. I resolved not to sleep until I had collected from thoseowing the bank a part of their debts; for I was angry with themthat they had stood back and allowed the panic to fall on the banksalone. Among these were Captain Folsom, who owed us twenty-fivethousand dollars, secured by a mortgage on the American Theatre andTehama Hotel; James Smiley, contractor for building theCustom-House, who owed us two notes of twenty thousand and sixteenthousand dollars, for which we held, as collateral, two acceptancesof the collector of the port, Major R. P. Hammond, for twentythousand dollars each; besides other private parties that I neednot name. The acceptances given to Smiley were for work done onthe Custom-House, but could not be paid until the work was actuallylaid in the walls, and certified by Major Tower, United StatesEngineers; but Smiley had an immense amount of granite, brick, iron, etc. , on the ground, in advance of construction, and theseacceptances were given him expressly that he might raise moneythereon for the payment of such materials. 

Therefore, as soon as I got my dinner, I took my saddle-horse, androde to Captain Folsom's house, where I found him in great pain anddistress, mental and physical. He was sitting in a chair, andbathing his head with a sponge. I explained to him the object ofmy visit, and he said he had expected it, and had already sent hisagent, Van Winkle, down-town, with instructions to raise what moneyhe could at any cost; but he did not succeed in raising a cent. Sogreat was the shock to public confidence, that men slept on theirmoney, and would not loan it for ten per cent. A week, on anysecurity whatever--even on mint certificates, which were as good asgold, and only required about ten days to be paid in coin by theUnited States Mint. I then rode up to Hammond's house, on RinconHill, and found him there. I explained to him exactly Smiley'saffairs, and only asked him to pay one of his acceptances. Heinquired, "Why not both?" I answered that was so much the better;it would put me under still greater obligations. He then agreed tomeet me at our bank at 10 P. M. I sent word to others that Idemanded them to pay what they could on their paper, and thenreturned to the bank, to meet Hammond. In due time, he came downwith Palmer (of Palmer, Cook & Co. ), and there he met Smiley, whowas, of course, very anxious to retire his notes. We therediscussed the matter fully, when Hammond said, "Sherman, give me upmy two acceptances, and I will substitute therefor my check offorty thousand dollars, " with "the distinct understanding that, ifthe money is not needed by you, it shall be returned to me, and thetransaction then to remain statu quo. " To this there was a generalassent. Nisbet handed him his two acceptances, and he handed mehis check, signed as collector of the port, on Major J. R. Snyder, United States Treasurer, for forty thousand dollars. I afterwardrode out, that night, to Major Snyder's house on North Beach, sawhim, and he agreed to meet me at 8 a. M. Next day, at the UnitedStates Mint, and to pay the check, so that I could have the moneybefore the bank opened. The next morning, as agreed on, we met, and he paid me the check in two sealed bags of gold-coin, eachmarked twenty thousand dollars, which I had carried to the bank, but never opened them, or even broke the seals. 

That morning our bank opened as usual, but there was no appearanceof a continuation of the "run;" on the contrary, money began tocome back on deposit, so that by night we had a considerableincrease, and this went on from day to day, till nearly the oldcondition of things returned. After about three days, finding Ihad no use for the money obtained on Hammond's check, I took theidentical two bags back to the cashier of the Custom-House, andrecovered the two acceptances which had been surrendered asdescribed; and Smiley's two notes were afterward paid in their duecourse, out of the cash received on those identical acceptances. But, years afterward, on settling with Hammond for the Custom-Housecontract when completed, there was a difference, and Smiley suedLucas, Turner & Co. For money had and received for his benefit, being the identical forty thousand dollars herein explained, but helost his case. Hammond, too, was afterward removed from office, and indicted in part for this transaction. He was tried before theUnited States Circuit Court, Judge McAlister presiding, for aviolation of the sub-Treasury Act, but was acquitted. Our bank, having thus passed so well through the crisis, took at once a firstrank; but these bank failures had caused so many mercantile losses, and had led to such an utter downfall in the value of real estate, that everybody lost more or less money by bad debts, bydepreciation of stocks and collaterals, that became unsalable, ifnot worthless. 

About this time (viz. , February, 1855) I had exchanged my house onGreen, street, with Mr. Sloat, for the half of a fifty-vara lot onHarrison Street, between Fremont and First, on which there was asmall cottage, and I had contracted for the building of a newframe-house thereon, at six thousand dollars. This house wasfinished on the 9th of April, and my family moved into it at once. 

For some time Mrs. Sherman had been anxious to go home toLancaster, Ohio, where we had left our daughter Minnie, with hergrandparents, and we arranged that S. M. Bowman, Esq. , and wife, should move into our new house and board us, viz. , Lizzie, Williewith the nurse Biddy, and myself, for a fair consideration. It sohappened that two of my personal friends, Messrs. Winters andCunningham of Marysville, and a young fellow named Eagan, now acaptain in the Commissary Department, were going East in thesteamer of the middle of April, and that Mr.. William H. Aspinwall, of New York, and Mr. Chauncey, of Philadelphia, werealso going back; and they all offered to look to the personalcomfort of Mrs. Sherman on the voyage. They took passage in thesteamer Golden Age (Commodore Watkins), which sailed on April 17, 1855. Their passage down the coast was very pleasant till within aday's distance of Panama, when one bright moonlit night, April29th, the ship, running at full speed, between the Islands Quiboand Quicara, struck on a sunken reef, tore out a streak in herbottom, and at once began to fill with water. Fortunately she didnot sink fast, but swung off into deep water, and Commodore Watkinshappening to be on deck at the moment, walking with Mr. Aspinwall, learning that the water was rushing in with great rapidity, gaveorders for a full head of steam, and turned the vessel's bowstraight for the Island Quicara. The water rose rapidly in thehold, the passengers were all assembled, fearful of going down, thefires were out, and the last revolution of the wheels made, whenher bow touched gently on the beach, and the vessel's stern sank indeep water. Lines were got out, and the ship held in an uprightposition, so that the passengers were safe, and but littleincommoded. I have often heard Mrs. Sherman tell of the boy Eagan, then about fourteen years old, coming to her state-room, andtelling to her not to be afraid, as he was a good swimmer; but oncoming out into the cabin, partially dressed, she felt moreconfidence in the cool manner, bearing, and greater strength of Mr. Winters. There must have been nearly a thousand souls on board atthe time, few of whom could have been saved had the steamer gonedown in mid-channel, which surely would have resulted, had notCommodore Watkins been on deck, or had he been less prompt in hisdetermination to beach his ship. A sailboat was dispatched towardPanama, which luckily met the steamer John T. Stephens, just comingout of the bay, loaded with about a thousand passengers bound forSan Francisco, and she at once proceeded to the relief of theGolden Age. Her passengers were transferred in small boats to theStephens, which vessel, with her two thousand people crowdedtogether with hardly standing-room, returned to Panama, whence thepassengers for the East proceeded to their destination withoutfurther delay. Luckily for Mrs. Sherman, Purser Goddard, an oldOhio friend of ours, was on the Stephens, and most kindly gave uphis own room to her, and such lady friends as she included in herparty. The Golden Age was afterward partially repaired at Quicara, pumped out, and steamed to Panama, when, after further repairs, sheresumed her place in the line. I think she is still in existence, but Commodore Watkins afterward lost his life in China, by fallingdown a hatchway. 

Mrs. Sherman returned in the latter part of November of the sameyear, when Mr. And Mrs. Bowman, who meantime had bought a lot nextto us and erected a house thereon, removed to it, and we thuscontinued close neighbors and friends until we left the country forgood in 1857. 

During the summer of 1856, in San Francisco, occurred one of thoseunhappy events, too common to new countries, in which I becameinvolved in spite of myself. 

William Neely Johnson was Governor of California, and resided atSacramento City; General John E. Wool commanded the Department ofCalifornia, having succeeded General Hitchcock, and had hisheadquarters at Benicia; and a Mr. Van Ness was mayor of the city. Politics had become a regular and profitable business, andpoliticians were more than suspected of being corrupt. It wasreported and currently believed that the sheriff (Scannell) hadbeen required to pay the Democratic Central Committee a hundredthousand dollars for his nomination, which was equivalent to anelection, for an office of the nominal salary of twelve thousanddollars a year for four years. In the election all sorts ofdishonesty were charged and believed, especially of "ballot-boxstuffing, " and too generally the better classes avoided theelections and dodged jury-duty, so that the affairs of the citygovernment necessarily passed into the hands of a low set ofprofessional politicians. Among them was a man named James Casey, who edited a small paper, the printing office of which was in aroom on the third floor of our banking office. I hardly knew himby sight, and rarely if ever saw his paper; but one day Mr. Sather, of the excellent banking firm of Drexel, Sather & Church, came tome, and called my attention to an article in Casey's paper so fullof falsehood and malice, that we construed it as an effort toblack-mail the banks generally. At that time we were all laboringto restore confidence, which had been so rudely shaken by thepanic, and I went up-stairs, found Casey, and pointed out to himthe objectionable nature of his article, told him plainly that Icould not tolerate his attempt to print and circulate slanders inour building, and, if he repeated it, I would cause him and hispress to be thrown out of the windows. He took the hint and movedto more friendly quarters. I mention this fact, to show myestimate of the man, who became a figure in the drama I am about todescribe. James King of Wm. , as before explained, was in 1853 abanker on his own account, but some time in 1854 he had closed outhis business, and engaged with Adams & Co. As cashier. When thisfirm failed, he, in common with all the employees, was thrown outof employment, and had to look around for something else. Hesettled down to the publication of an evening paper, called theBulletin, and, being a man of fine manners and address, he at onceconstituted himself the champion of society against the public andprivate characters whom he saw fit to arraign. 

As might have been expected, this soon brought him into the usualnewspaper war with other editors, and especially with Casey, andepithets a la "Eatanswill" were soon bandying back and forthbetween them. One evening of May, 1856, King published, in theBulletin, copies of papers procured from New York, to show thatCasey had once been sentenced to the State penitentiary at SingSing. Casey took mortal offense, and called at the Bulletinoffice, on the corner of Montgomery and Merchant Streets, where hefound King, and violent words passed between them, resulting inCasey giving King notice that he would shoot him on sight. Kingremained in his office till about 5 or 6 p. M. , when he startedtoward his home on Stockton Street, and, as he neared the corner ofWashington, Casey approached him from the opposite direction, called to him, and began firing. King had on a short cloak, and inhis breast-pocket a small pistol, which he did not use. One ofCasey's shots struck him high up in the breast, from which hereeled, was caught by some passing friend, and carried into theexpress-office on the corner, where he was laid on the counter; anda surgeon sent for. Casey escaped up Washington Street, went tothe City Hall, and delivered himself to the sheriff (Scannell), whoconveyed him to jail and locked him in a cell. Meantime, the newsspread like wildfire, and all the city was in commotion, for grogwas very popular. Nisbet, who boarded with us on Harrison Street, had been delayed at the bank later than usual, so that he happenedto be near at the time, and, when he came out to dinner, he broughtme the news of this affair, and said that there was everyappearance of a riot down-town that night. This occurred towardthe evening of May 14, 1856. 

It so happened that, on the urgent solicitation of Van Winkle andof Governor Johnson; I had only a few days before agreed to acceptthe commission of major-general of the Second Division of Militia, embracing San Francisco. I had received the commission, buthad not as yet formally accepted it, or even put myself incommunication with the volunteer companies of the city. Of these, at that moment of time, there was a company of artillery with fourguns, commanded by a Captain Johns, formerly of the army, and twoor three uniformed companies of infantry. After dinner I went downtown to see what was going on; found that King had been removed toa room in the Metropolitan Block; that his life was in great peril;that Casey was safe in jail, and the sheriff had called to hisassistance a posse of the city police, some citizens, and one ofthe militia companies. The people were gathered in groups on thestreets, and the words "Vigilance Committee" were freely spoken, but I saw no signs of immediate violence. The next morning, Iagain went to the jail, and found all things quiet, but the militiahad withdrawn. I then went to the City Hall, saw the mayor, VanNess, and some of the city officials, agreed to do what I could tomaintain order with such militia as were on hand, and then formallyaccepted the commission, and took the "oath. "

In 1851 (when I was not in California) there had been a VigilanceCommittee, and it was understood that its organization stillexisted. All the newspapers took ground in favor of the VigilanceCommittee, except the Herald (John Nugent, editor), and nearly allthe best people favored that means of redress. I could see theywere organizing, hiring rendezvous, collecting arms, etc. , withoutconcealment. It was soon manifest that the companies of volunteerswould go with the "committee, " and that the public authoritiescould not rely on them for aid or defense. Still, there were agood many citizens who contended that, if the civil authoritieswere properly sustained by the people at large, they could andwould execute the law. But the papers inflamed the public mind, and the controversy spread to the country. About the third dayafter the shooting of King, Governor Johnson telegraphed me that hewould be down in the evening boat, and asked me to meet him onarrival for consultation. I got C. H. Garrison to go with me, andwe met the Governor and his brother on the wharf, and walked up tothe International Hotel on Jackson Street, above Montgomery. Wediscussed the state of affairs fully; and Johnson, on learning thathis particular friend, William T. Coleman, was the president of theVigilance Committee, proposed to go and see him. En route westopped at King's room, ascertained that he was slowly sinking, andcould not live long; and then near midnight we walked to theTurnverein Hall, where the committee was known to be sitting inconsultation. This hall was on Bush Street, at about theintersection of Stockton. It was all lighted up within, but thedoor was locked. The Governor knocked at the door, and on inquiryfrom inside "Who's there?"--gave his name. After some delay wewere admitted into a sort of vestibule, beyond which was a largehall, and we could hear the suppressed voices of a multitude. Wewere shown into a bar-room to the right, when the Governor asked tosee Coleman. The man left us, went into the main hall, and soonreturned with Coleman, who was pale and agitated. After shakinghands all round, the Governor said, "Coleman, what the devil is thematter here?" Coleman said, "Governor, it is time this shooting onour streets should stop. " The Governor replied, "I agree with youperfectly, and have come down, from Sacramento to assist. " Colemanrejoined that "the people were tired of it, and had no faith in theofficers of the law. " A general conversation then followed, inwhich it was admitted that King would die, and that Casey must beexecuted; but the manner of execution was the thing to be settled, Coleman contending that the people would do it without trusting thecourts or the sheriff. It so happened that at that time JudgeNorton was on the bench of the court having jurisdiction, and hewas universally recognized as an able and upright man, whom no onecould or did mistrust; and it also happened that a grand-jury wasthen in session. Johnson argued that the time had passed inCalifornia for mobs and vigilance committees, and said if Colemanand associates would use their influence to support the law, he(the Governor) would undertake that, as soon as King died, thegrand-jury should indict, that Judge Norton would try the murderer, and the whole proceeding should be as speedy as decency wouldallow. Then Coleman said "the people had no confidence inScannell, the sheriff, " who was, he said, in collusion with therowdy element of San Francisco. Johnson then offered to bepersonally responsible that Casey should be safely guarded, andshould be forthcoming for trial and execution at the proper time. I remember very well Johnson's assertion that he had no right tomake these stipulations, and maybe no power to fulfill them; but hedid it to save the city and state from the disgrace of a mob. Coleman disclaimed that the vigilance organization was a "mob, "admitted that the proposition of the Governor was fair, and all heor any one should ask; and added, if we would wait awhile, he wouldsubmit it to the council, and bring back an answer. 

We waited nearly an hour, and could hear the hum of voicesin the hall, but no words, when Coleman came back, accompanied by acommittee, of which I think the two brothers Arrington, ThomasSmiley the auctioneer, Seymour, Truett, and others, were members. The whole conversation was gone over again, and the Governor'sproposition was positively agreed to, with this further condition, that the Vigilance Committee should send into the jail a smallforce of their own men, to make certain that Casey should not becarried off or allowed to escape. 

The Governor, his brother William, Garrison, and I, then went up tothe jail, where we found the sheriff and his posse comitatus ofpolice and citizens. These were styled the "Law-and-Order party, "and some of them took offense that the Governor should have heldcommunication with the "damned rebels, " and several of them leftthe jail; but the sheriff seemed to agree with the Governor thatwhat he had done was right and best; and, while we were there, someeight or ten armed men arrived from the Vigilance Committee, andwere received by the sheriff (Scannell) as a part of his regularposse. 

The Governor then, near daylight, went to his hotel, and I to myhouse for a short sleep. Next day I was at the bank, as usual, when, about noon the Governor called, and asked me to walk with himdown-street He said he had just received a message from theVigilance Committee to the effect that they were not bound byColeman's promise not to do any thing till the regular trial byjury should be had, etc. He was with reason furious, and asked meto go with him to Truett's store, over which the ExecutiveCommittee was said to be in session. We were admitted to afront-room up-stairs, and heard voices in the back-room. TheGovernor inquired for Coleman, but he was not forthcoming. Anotherof the committee, Seymour, met us, denied in toto the promise ofthe night before, and the Governor openly accused him of treacheryand falsehood. 

The quarrel became public, and the newspapers took it up, bothparties turning on the Governor; one, the Vigilantes, denying thepromise made by Coleman, their president; and the other, the"Law-and-Order party, " refusing any farther assistance, becauseJohnson had stooped to make terms with rebels. At all events, hewas powerless, and had to let matters drift to a conclusion. 

King died about Friday, May 20th, and the funeral was appointed forthe next Sunday. Early on that day the Governor sent for me at myhouse. I found him on the roof of the International, from which welooked down on the whole city, and more especially the face ofTelegraph Hill, which was already covered with a crowd of people, while others were moving toward the jail on Broadway. Parties ofarmed men, in good order, were marching by platoons in the samedirection; and formed in line along Broadway, facing the jail-door. Soon a small party was seen to advance to this door, and knock; aparley ensued, the doors were opened, and Casey was led out. In afew minutes another prisoner was brought out, who, proved to beCora, a man who had once been tried for killing Richardson, theUnited States Marshal, when the jury disagreed, and he was awaitinga new trial. These prisoners were placed in carriages, andescorted by the armed force down to the rooms of the VigilanceCommittee, through the principal streets of the city. The day wasexceedingly beautiful, and the whole proceeding was orderly in theextreme. I was under the impression that Casey and Cora werehanged that same Sunday, but was probably in error; but in a veryfew days they were hanged by the neck--dead--suspended from beamsprojecting from the windows of the committee's rooms, without othertrial than could be given in secret, and by night. 

We all thought the matter had ended there, and accordingly theGovernor returned to Sacramento in disgust, and I went about mybusiness. But it soon became manifest that the Vigilance Committeehad no intention to surrender the power thus usurped. They took abuilding on Clay Street, near Front, fortified it, employed guardsand armed sentinels, sat in midnight council, issued writs ofarrest and banishment, and utterly ignored all authority but theirown. A good many men were banished and forced to leave thecountry, but they were of that class we could well spare. YankeeSullivan, a prisoner in their custody, committed suicide, and afeeling of general insecurity pervaded the city. Business wasderanged; and the Bulletin, then under control of Tom King, abrother of James, poured out its abuse on some of our best men, aswell as the worst. Governor Johnson, being again appealed to, concluded to go to work regularly, and telegraphed me about the 1stof June to meet him at General Wool's headquarters at Benicia thatnight. I went up, and we met at the hotel where General Wool wasboarding. Johnson had with him his Secretary of State. Wediscussed the state of the country generally, and I had agreed thatif Wool would give us arms and ammunition out of the United StatesArsenal at Benicia, and if Commodore Farragat, of the navy, commanding the navy-yard on Mare Island, would give us a ship, Iwould call out volunteers, and, when a sufficient number hadresponded, I would have the arms come down from Benicia in theship, arm my men, take possession of a thirty-two-pound-gun batteryat the Marine Hospital on Rincon Point, thence command a dispersionof the unlawfully-armed force of the Vigilance Committee, andarrest some of the leaders. 

We played cards that night, carrying on a conversation, in whichWool insisted on a proclamation commanding the Vigilance Committeeto disperse, etc. , and he told us how he had on some occasion, asfar back as 1814, suppressed a mutiny on the Northern frontier. Idid not understand him to make any distinct promise of assistancethat night, but he invited us to accompany him on an inspection ofthe arsenal the next day, which we did. On handling some rifledmuskets in the arsenal storehouse he asked me how they would answerour purpose. I said they were the very things, and that we did notwant cartridge boxes or belts, but that I would have the cartridgescarried in the breeches-pockets, and the caps in the vestpockets. I knew that there were stored in that arsenal four thousandmuskets, for I recognized the boxes which we had carried out in theLexington around Cape Horn in 1846. Afterward we all met at thequarters of Captain D. R. Jones of the army, and I saw theSecretary of State, D. F. Douglass, Esq. , walk out with GeneralWool in earnest conversation, and this Secretary of State afterwardasserted that Wool there and then promised us the arms andammunition, provided the Governor would make his proclamation forthe committee to disperse, and that I should afterward call out themilitia, etc. On the way back to the hotel at Benicia, GeneralWool, Captain Callendar of the arsenal, and I, were walking side byside, and I was telling him (General Wool) that I would also needsome ammunition for the thirty-two-pound guns then in position atRineon Point, when Wool turned to Callendar and inquired, "Did Inot order those guns to be brought away?" Callendar said "Yes, general. I made a requisition on the quartermaster fortransportation, but his schooner has been so busy that the guns arestill there. " Then said Wool: "Let them remain; we may have use forthem. " I therefrom inferred, of course, that it was all agreed toso far as he was concerned. 

Soon after we had reached the hotel, we ordered a buggy, andGovernor Johnson and I drove to Vallejo, six miles, crossed over toMare Island, and walked up to the commandant's house, where wefound Commodore Farragut and his family. We stated our businessfairly, but the commodore answered very frankly that he had noauthority, without orders from his department, to take any part incivil broils; he doubted the wisdom of the attempt; said he had noship available except the John Adams, Captain Boutwell, and thatshe needed repairs. But he assented at last, to the proposition tolet the sloop John Adams drop down abreast of the city aftercertain repairs, to lie off there for moral effect, which afterwardactually occurred. 

We then returned to Benicia, and Wool's first question was, "Whatluck?" We answered, "Not much, " and explained what CommodoreFarragut could and would do, and that, instead of having a navalvessel, we would seize and use one of the Pacific Mail Company'ssteamers, lying at their dock in Benicia, to carry down to SanFrancisco the arms and munitions when the time came. 

As the time was then near at hand for the arrival of the eveningboats, we all walked down to the wharf together, where I toldJohnson that he could not be too careful; that I had not heardGeneral Wool make a positive promise of assistance. 

Upon this, Johnson called General Wool to one side, and we threedrew together. Johnson said: "General Wool, General Sherman isvery particular, and wants to know exactly what you propose to do. "Wool answered: "I understand, Governor, that in the first place awrit of Habeas corpus will be issued commanding the jailers of theVigilance Committee to produce the body of some one of theprisoners held by them (which, of course, will be refused); thatyou then issue your proclamation commanding them to disperse, and, failing this, you will call out the militia, and command GeneralSherman with it to suppress the Vigilance Committee as an unlawfulbody;" to which the Governor responded, "Yes. " "Then, " said Wool, "on General Sherman's making his requisition, approved by you, Iwill order the issue of the necessary arms and ammunition. " Iremember well that I said, emphatically: "That is all I want. --Now, Governor, you may go ahead. " We soon parted; Johnson andDouglas taking the boat to Sacramento, and I to San Francisco. 

The Chief-Justice, Terry, came to San Francisco the next day, issued a writ of habeas corpus for the body of one Maloney, whichwrit was resisted, as we expected. The Governor then issued hisproclamation, and I published my orders, dated June 4, 1855. TheQuartermaster-General of the State, General Kibbe, also came to SanFrancisco, took an office in the City Hall, engaged several roomsfor armories, and soon the men began to enroll into companies. Inmy general orders calling out the militia, I used the expression, "When a sufficient number of men are enrolled, arms and ammunitionwill be supplied. " Some of the best men of the "Vigilantes" cameto me and remonstrated, saying that collision would surely result;that it would be terrible, etc. All I could say in reply was, thatit was for them to get out of the way. "Remove your fort; ceaseyour midnight councils; and prevent your armed bodies frompatrolling the streets. " They inquired where I was to get arms, and I answered that I had them certain. But personally I wentright along with my business at the bank, conscious that at anymoment we might have trouble. Another committee of citizens, aconciliatory body, was formed to prevent collision if possible, andthe newspapers boiled over with vehement vituperation. This secondcommittee was composed of such men as Crockett, Ritchie, Thornton, Bailey Peyton, Foote, Donohue, Kelly, and others, a class of themost intelligent and wealthy men of the city, who earnestly andhonestly desired to prevent bloodshed. They also came to me, and Itold them that our men were enrolling very fast, and that, when Ideemed the right moment had come, the Vigilance Committee mustdisperse, else bloodshed and destruction of property wouldinevitably follow. They also had discovered that the better men ofthe Vigilance Committee itself were getting tired of the business, and thought that in the execution of Casey and Cora, and thebanishment of a dozen or more rowdies, they had done enough, andwere then willing to stop. It was suggested that, if ourLaw-and-Order party would not arm, by a certain day near at handthe committee would disperse, and some of their leaders wouldsubmit to an indictment and trial by a jury of citizens, which theyknew would acquit them of crime. One day in the bank a man calledme to the counter and said, "If you expect to get arms of GeneralWool, you will be mistaken, for I was at Benicia yesterday, andheard him say he would not give them. " This person was known to meto be a man of truth, and I immediately wrote to General Wool aletter telling him what I had heard, and how any hesitation on hispart would compromise me as a man of truth and honor; adding that Idid not believe we should ever need the arms, but only the promiseof them, for "the committee was letting down, and would soondisperse and submit to the law, " etc. I further asked him toanswer me categorically that very night, by the Stockton boat, which would pass Benicia on its way down about midnight, and Iwould sit up and wait for his answer. I did wait for his letter, but it did not come, and the next day I got a telegraphic dispatchfrom Governor Johnson, who, at Sacramento, had also heard ofGeneral Wool's "back-down, " asking me to meet him again at Beniciathat night. 

I went up in the evening boat, and found General Wool'saide-de-camp, Captain Arnold, of the army, on the wharf, with aletter in his hand, which he said was for me. I asked for it, buthe said he knew its importance, and preferred we should go toGeneral Wool's room together, and the general could hand it to me inperson. We did go right up to General Wool's, who took the sealedparcel and laid it aside, saying that it was literally a copy of onehe had sent to Governor Johnson, who would doubtless give me a copy;but I insisted that I had made a written communication, and wasentitled to a written answer. 

At that moment several gentlemen of the "Conciliation party, " whohad come up in the same steamer with me, asked for admission andcame in. I recall the names of Crockett, Foote, Bailey Peyton, Judge Thornton, Donohue, etc. , and the conversation became general, Wool trying to explain away the effect of our misunderstanding, taking good pains not to deny his promise made to me personally onthe wharf. I renewed my application for the letter addressed tome, then lying on his table. On my statement of the case, BaileyPeyton said, "General Wool, I think General Sherman has a right toa written answer from you, for he is surely compromised. " Uponthis Wool handed me the letter. I opened and read it, and itdenied any promise of arms, but otherwise was extremely evasive andnon-committal. I had heard of the arrival at the wharf of theGovernor and party, and was expecting them at Wool's room, but, instead of stopping at the hotel where we were, they passed toanother hotel on the block above. I went up and found there, in aroom on the second floor over the bar-room, Governor Johnson, Chief-Justice Terry, Jones, of Palmer, Cooke & Co. , E. D. Baker, Volney E. Howard, and one or two others. All were talkingfuriously against Wool, denouncing him as a d---d liar, and notsparing the severest terms. I showed the Governor General Wool'sletter to me, which he said was in effect the same as the oneaddressed to and received by him at Sacramento. He was so offendedthat he would not even call on General Wool, and said he wouldnever again recognize him as an officer or gentleman. We discussedmatters generally, and Judge Terry said that the VigilanceCommittee were a set of d---d pork-merchants; that they weregetting scared, and that General Wool was in collusion with them tobring the State into contempt, etc. I explained that there were noarms in the State except what General Wool had, or what were in thehands of the Vigilance Committee of San Francisco, and that thepart of wisdom for us was to be patient and cautious. About thattime Crockett and his associates sent up their cards, but Terry andthe more violent of the Governor's followers denounced them as nobetter than "Vigilantes, " and wanted the Governor to refuse even toreceive them. I explained that they were not "Vigilantes, " thatJudge Thornton was a "Law-and-Order" man, was one of the first torespond to the call of the sheriff, and that he went actually tothe jail with his one arm the night we expected the first attemptat rescue, etc. Johnson then sent word for them to reduce theirbusiness to writing. They simply sent in a written request for anaudience, and they were then promptly admitted. After some generalconversation, the Governor said he was prepared to hear them, whenMr. Crockett rose and made a prepared speech embracing a clear andfair statement of the condition of things in San Francisco, concluding with the assertion of the willingness of the committeeto disband and submit to trial after a certain date not veryremote. All the time Crockett was speaking, Terry sat with his haton, drawn over his eyes, and with his feet on a table. As soon asCrockett was through, they were dismissed, and Johnson began toprepare a written answer. This was scratched, altered, andamended, to suit the notions of his counselors, and at last wascopied and sent. This answer amounted to little or nothing. Seeing that we were powerless for good, and that violent counselswould prevail under the influence of Terry and others, I sat downat the table, and wrote my resignation, which Johnson accepted in acomplimentary note on the spot, and at the same time he appointedto my place General Volney E. Howard, then present, a lawyer whohad once been a member of Congress from Texas, and who was expectedto drive the d---d pork-merchants into the bay at short notice. Iwent soon after to General Wool's room, where I found Crockett andthe rest of his party; told them that I was out of the fight, having resigned my commission; that I had neglected business thathad been intrusted to me by my St. Louis partners; and that I wouldthenceforward mind my own business, and leave public affairsseverely alone. We all returned to San Francisco that night by theStockton boat, and I never after-ward had any thing to do withpolitics in California, perfectly satisfied with that shortexperience. Johnson and Wool fought out their quarrel of veracityin the newspapers and on paper. But, in my opinion, there is not ashadow of doubt that General Wool did deliberately deceive us; thathe had authority to issue arms, and that, had he adhered to hispromise, we could have checked the committee before it became afixed institution, and a part of the common law of California. Major-General Volney E. Howard came to San Francisco soon after;continued the organization of militia which I had begun; succeededin getting a few arms from the country; but one day the VigilanceCommittee sallied from their armories, captured the arms of the"Law-and-Order party, " put some of their men into prison, whileGeneral Howard, with others, escaped to the country; after whichthe Vigilance Committee had it all their own way. Subsequently, inJuly, 1856, they arrested Chief-Justice Terry, and tried him forstabbing one of their constables, but he managed to escape atnight, and took refuge on the John Adams. In August, they hangedHetherington and Brace in broad daylight, without any jury-trial;and, soon after, they quietly disbanded. As they controlled thepress, they wrote their own history, and the world generally givesthem the credit of having purged San Francisco of rowdies androughs; but their success has given great stimulus to a dangerousprinciple, that would at any time justify the mob in seizing allthe power of government; and who is to say that the VigilanceCommittee may not be composed of the worst, instead of the best, elements of a community? Indeed, in San Francisco, as soon as itwas demonstrated that the real power had passed from the City Hallto the committee room, the same set of bailiffs, constables, androwdies that had infested the City Hall were found in theemployment of the "Vigilantes;" and, after three monthsexperience, the better class of people became tired of the midnightsessions and left the business and power of the committee in thehands of a court, of which a Sydney man was reported to be the heador chief-justice. 

During the winter of 1855-'56, and indeed throughout the year 1856, all kinds of business became unsettled in California. The minescontinued to yield about fifty millions of gold a year; but littleattention was paid to agriculture or to any business other thanthat of "mining, " and, as the placer-gold was becoming worked out, the miners were restless and uneasy, and were shifting about fromplace to place, impelled by rumors put afloat for speculativepurposes. A great many extensive enterprises by joint-stockcompanies had been begun, in the way of water-ditches, to bringwater from the head of the mountain-streams down to the richeralluvial deposits, and nearly all of these companies becameembarrassed or bankrupt. Foreign capital, also, which had beenattracted to California by reason of the high rates of interest, was being withdrawn, or was tied up in property which could not besold; and, although our bank's having withstood the panic gave usgreat credit, still the community itself was shaken, and loans ofmoney were risky in the extreme. A great many merchants, of thehighest name, availed themselves of the extremely liberal bankruptlaw to get discharged of their old debts, without sacrificing much, if any, of their stocks of goods on hand, except a lawyer's fee;thus realizing Martin Burke's saying that "many a clever fellow hadbeen ruined by paying his debts. " The merchants and business-menof San Francisco did not intend to be ruined by such a course. Iraised the rate of exchange from three to three and a half, whileothers kept on at the old rate; and I labored hard to collect olddebts, and strove, in making new loans, to be on the safe side. The State and city both denied much of their public debt; in fact, repudiated it; and real estate, which the year before had beenfirst-class security, became utterly unsalable. 

The office labor and confinement, and the anxiety attending thebusiness, aggravated my asthma to such an extent that at times itdeprived me of sleep, and threatened to become chronic and serious;and I was also conscious that the first and original cause whichhad induced Mr. Lucas to establish the bank in California hadceased. I so reported to him, and that I really believed that hecould use his money more safely and to better advantage in St. Louis. This met his prompt approval, and he instructed megradually to draw out, preparatory to a removal to New York City. Accordingly, early in April, 1857, I published an advertisement inthe San Francisco papers, notifying our customers that, on the 1stday of May, we would discontinue business and remove East, requiring all to withdraw their accounts, and declaring that, if any remained on that day of May, their balances would betransferred to the banking-house of Parrott & Co. Punctually to theday, this was done, and the business of Lucas, Turner & Co. , of SanFrancisco, was discontinued, except the more difficult anddisagreeable part of collecting their own moneys and selling thereal estate, to which the firm had succeeded by purchase orforeclosure. One of the partners, B. R. Nisbet, assisted by ourattorney, S. M. Bowman, Esq. , remained behind to close up thebusiness of the bank. 

CHAPTER VI. 

CALIFORNIA, NEW YORK, AND KANSAS. 

1857-1859. 

Having closed the bank at San Francisco on the 1st day of May, 1857, accompanied by my family I embarked in the steamer Sonora forPanama, crossed the isthmus, and sailed to New York, whence weproceeded to Lancaster, Ohio, where Mrs. Sherman and the familystopped, and I went on to St. Louis. I found there that somechanges had been made in the parent, house, that Mr. Lucas hadbought out his partner, Captain Symonds, and that the firm's namehad been changed to that of James H. Lucas & Co. 

It had also been arranged that an office or branch was to beestablished in New York City, of which I was to have charge, onpretty much the same terms and conditions as in the previous SanFrancisco firm. 

Mr. Lucas, Major Turner, and I, agreed to meet in New York, soonafter the 4th of July. We met accordingly at the MetropolitanHotel, selected an office, No. 12 Pall Street, purchased thenecessary furniture, and engaged a teller, bookkeeper, and porter. The new firm was to bear the same title of Lucas, Turner & Co. , with about the same partners in interest, but the nature of thebusiness was totally different. We opened our office on the 21stof July, 1857, and at once began to receive accounts from the Westand from California, but our chief business was as the residentagents of the St. Louis firm of James H. Lucas & Co. Personally Itook rooms at No. 100 Prince Street, in which house were alsoquartered Major J. G. Barnard, and Lieutenant J. B. McPherson, United States Engineers, both of whom afterward attained great famein the civil war. 

My business relations in New York were with the Metropolitan Bankand Bank of America; and with the very wealthy and most respectablefirm of Schuchhardt & Gebhard, of Nassau Street. Every thing wentalong swimmingly till the 21st of August, when all Wall Street wasthrown into a spasm by the failure of the Ohio Life and TrustCompany, and the panic so resembled that in San Francisco, that, having nothing seemingly at stake, I felt amused. But it soonbecame a serious matter even to me. Western stocks and securitiestumbled to such a figure, that all Western banks that held suchsecurities, and had procured advances thereon, were compelled topay up or substitute increased collaterals. Our own house wasnot a borrower in New York at all, but many of our Westerncorrespondents were, and it taxed my tune to watch their interests. In September, the panic extended so as to threaten the safety ofeven some of the New York banks not connected with the West; andthe alarm became general, and at last universal. 

In the very midst of this panic came the news that the steamerCentral America, formerly the George Law, with six hundredpassengers and about sixteen hundred thousand dollars of treasure, coming from Aspinwall, had foundered at sea, off the coast ofGeorgia, and that about sixty of the passengers had beenprovidentially picked up by a Swedish bark, and brought intoSavannah. The absolute loss of this treasure went to swell theconfusion and panic of the day. 

A few days after, I was standing in the vestibule of theMetropolitan Hotel, and heard the captain of the Swedish bark tellhis singular story of the rescue of these passengers. He was ashort, sailor-like-looking man, with a strong German or Swedishaccent. He said that he was sailing from some port in Honduras forSweden, running down the Gulf Stream off Savannah. The weather hadbeen heavy for some days, and, about nightfall, as he paced hisdeck, he observed a man-of-war hawk circle about his vessel, gradually lowering, until the bird was as it were aiming at him. He jerked out a belaying-pin, struck at the bird, missed it, whenthe hawk again rose high in the air, and a second time began todescend, contract his circle, and make at him again. The secondtime he hit the bird, and struck it to the deck.... This strangefact made him uneasy, and he thought it betokened danger; he wentto the binnacle, saw the course he was steering, and without anyparticular reason he ordered the steersman to alter the course onepoint to the east. 

After this it became quite dark, and he continued to promenade thedeck, and had settled into a drowsy state, when as in a dream hethought he heard voices all round his ship. Waking up, he ran tothe side of the ship, saw something struggling in the water, andheard clearly cries for help. Instantly heaving his ship to, andlowering all his boats, he managed to pick up sixty or more personswho were floating about on skylights, doors, spare, and whateverfragments remained of the Central America. Had he not changed thecourse of his vessel by reason of the mysterious conduct of thatman-of-war hawk, not a soul would probably have survived the night. It was stated by the rescued passengers, among whom was BillyBirch, that the Central America had sailed from Aspinwall with thepassengers and freight which left San Francisco on the 1st ofSeptember, and encountered the gale in the Gulf Stream somewhereoff Savannah, in which she sprung a leak, filled rapidly, and wentdown. The passengers who were saved had clung to doors, skylights, and such floating objects as they could reach, and were thusrescued; all the rest, some five hundred in number, had gone downwith the ship. 

The panic grew worse and worse, and about the end of Septemberthere was a general suspension of the banks of New York, and amoney crisis extended all over the country. In New York, Lucas, Turner & Co. Had nothing at risk. We had large cash balances inthe Metropolitan Bank and in the Bank of America, all safe, and weheld, for the account of the St. Louis house, at least two hundredthousand dollars, of St. Louis city and county bonds, and ofacceptances falling due right along, none extending beyond ninetydays. I was advised from St. Louis that money matters wereextremely tight; but I did not dream of any danger in that quarter. I knew well that Mr. Lucas was worth two or three million dollarsin the best real estate, and inferred from the large balances totheir credit with me that no mere panic could shake his credit;but, early on the morning of October 7th, my cousin, James M. Hoyt, came to me in bed, and read me a paragraph in the morning paper, tothe effect that James H. Lucas & Co. , of St. Louis, had suspended. I was, of course, surprised, but not sorry; for I had alwayscontended that a man of so much visible wealth as Mr. Lucas shouldnot be engaged in a business subject to such vicissitudes. Ihurried down to the office, where I received the same informationofficially, by telegraph, with instructions to make properdisposition of the affairs of the bank, and to come out to St. Louis, with such assets as would be available there. I transferredthe funds belonging to all our correspondents, with lists ofoutstanding checks, to one or other of our bankers, and with thecash balance of the St. Louis house and their available assetsstarted for St. Louis. I may say with confidence that no man losta cent by either of the banking firms of Lucas, Turner & Co. , ofSan Francisco or New York; but, as usual, those who owed us werenot always as just. I reached St. Louis October 17th, and foundthe partners engaged in liquidating the balances due depositors asfast as collections could be forced; and, as the panic began tosubside, this process became quite rapid, and Mr. Lucas, by makinga loan in Philadelphia, was enabled to close out all accountswithout having made any serious sacrifices, Of course, no personever lost a cent by him: he has recently died, leaving an estate ofeight million dollars. During his lifetime, I had opportunities toknow him well, and take much pleasure in bearing testimony to hisgreat worth and personal kindness. On the failure of his bank, heassumed personally all the liabilities, released his partners ofall responsibility, and offered to assist me to engage in business, which he supposed was due to me because I had resigned my armycommission. I remained in St. Louis till the 17th of December, 1857, assisting in collecting for the bank, and in controlling allmatters which came from the New York and San Francisco branches. B. R. Nisbet was still in San Francisco, but had married a MissThornton, and was coming home. There still remained in Californiaa good deal of real estate, and notes, valued at about two hundredthousand dollars in the aggregate; so that, at Mr. Lucas's request, I agreed to go out again, to bring matters, if possible, nearer afinal settlement. I accordingly left St. Louis, reached Lancaster, where my family was, on the 10th, staid there till after Christmas, and then went to New York, where I remained till January 5th, whenI embarked on the steamer Moles Taylor (Captain McGowan) forAspinwall; caught the Golden Gate (Captain Whiting) at Panama, January 15, 1858; and reached San Francisco on the 28th of January. I found that Nisbet and wife had gone to St. Louis, and that we hadpassed each other at sea. He had carried the ledger and books toSt. Louis, but left a schedule, notes, etc. , in the hands of S. M. Bowman, Esq. , who passed them over to me. 

On the 30th of January I published a notice of the dissolution ofthe partnership, and called on all who were still indebted to thefirm of Lucas, Turner & Co. To pay up, or the notes would be soldat auction. I also advertised that all the real property, was forsale. 

Business had somewhat changed since 1857. Parrott & Co. ; Garrison, Fritz & Ralston; Wells, Fargo & Co. ; Drexel, Sather & Church, andTallant & Wilde, were the principal bankers. Property continuedalmost unsalable, and prices were less than a half of what theyhad been in 1853-'54. William Blending, Esq. , had rented my houseon Harrison Street; so I occupied a room in the bank, No. 11, andboarded at the Meiggs House, corner of Broadway and Montgomery, which we owned. Having reduced expenses to a minimum, I proceeded, with all possible dispatch, to collect outstanding debts, in someinstances making sacrifices and compromises. I made some fewsales, and generally aimed to put matters in such a shape that timewould bring the best result. Some of our heaviest creditors wereJohn M. Rhodes & Co. , of Sacramento and Shasta; Langton & Co. , ofDownieville; and E. M. Stranger of Murphy's. In trying to putthese debts in course of settlement, I made some arrangement inDownieville with the law-firm of Spears & Thornton, to collect, bysuit, a certain note of Green & Purdy for twelve thousand dollars. Early in April, I learned that Spears had collected three thousandseven hundred dollars in money, had appropriated it to his own use, and had pledged another good note taken in part payment of threethousand and fifty-three dollars. He pretended to be insane. Ihad to make two visits to Downieville on this business, and there, made the acquaintance of Mr. Stewart, now a Senator from Nevada. He was married to a daughter of Governor Foote; was living in asmall frame house on the bar just below the town; and his littledaughter was playing about the door in the sand. Stewart was thena lawyer in Downieville, in good practice; afterward, by some luckystroke, became part owner of a valuable silver-mine in Nevada, andis now accounted a millionaire. I managed to save something out ofSpears, and more out of his partner Thornton. This affair ofSpears ruined him, because his insanity was manifestly feigned. 

I remained in San Francisco till July 3d, when, having collectedand remitted every cent that I could raise, and got all theproperty in the best shape possible, hearing from St. Louisthat business had revived, and that there was no need offurther sacrifice; I put all the papers, with a full letter ofinstructions, and power of attorney, in the hands of WilliamBlending, Esq. , and took passage on the good steamer Golden Gate, Captain Whiting, for Panama and home. I reached Lancaster on July28, 1858, and found all the family well. I was then perfectlyunhampered, but the serious and greater question remained, what wasI to do to support my family, consisting of a wife and fourchildren, all accustomed to more than the average comforts of life?

I remained at Lancaster all of August, 1858, during which time Iwas discussing with Mr. Ewing and others what to do next. MajorTurner and Mr. Lucas, in St. Louis, were willing to do any thing toaid me, but I thought best to keep independent. Mr. Ewing hadproperty at Chauncey, consisting of salt-wells and coal-mines, butfor that part of Ohio I had no fancy. Two of his sons, Hugh and T. E. , Jr. , had established themselves at Leavenworth, Kansas, wherethey and their father had bought a good deal of land, some near thetown, and some back in the country. Mr. Ewing offered to confideto me the general management of his share of interest, and Hugh andT. E. , Jr. , offered me an equal copartnership in their law-firm. 

Accordingly, about the 1st of September, I started for Kansas, stopping a couple of weeks in St. Louis, and reached Leavenworth. I found about two miles below the fort, on the river-bank, where in1851 was a tangled thicket, quite a handsome and thriving city, growing rapidly in rivalry with Kansas City, and St. Joseph, Missouri. After looking about and consulting with friends, amongthem my classmate Major Stewart Van Vliet, quartermaster at thefort, I concluded to accept the proposition of Mr. Ewing, andaccordingly the firm of Sherman & Ewing was duly announced, and ourservices to the public offered as attorneys-at-law. We had anoffice on Main Street, between Shawnee and Delaware, on the secondfloor, over the office of Hampton Denman, Esq. , mayor of the city. This building was a mere shell, and our office was reached by astairway on the outside. Although in the course of my militaryreading I had studied a few of the ordinary law-books, such asBlackstone, Kent, Starkie, etc. , I did not presume to be a lawyer;but our agreement was that Thomas Ewing, Jr. , a good and thoroughlawyer, should manage all business in the courts, while I gaveattention to collections, agencies for houses and lands, and suchbusiness as my experience in banking had qualified me for. Yet, asmy name was embraced in a law-firm, it seemed to me proper to takeout a license. Accordingly, one day when United States JudgeLecompte was in our office, I mentioned the matter to him; he toldme to go down to the clerk of his court, and he would give me thelicense. I inquired what examination I would have to submit to, and he replied, "None at all;" he would admit me on the ground ofgeneral intelligence. 

During that summer we got our share of the business of theprofession, then represented by several eminent law-firms, embracing names that have since flourished in the Senate, and inthe higher courts of the country. But the most lucrative singlecase was given me by my friend Major Van Vliet, who employed me togo to Fort Riley, one hundred and thirty-six miles west of FortLeavenworth, to superintend the repairs to the military road. Forthis purpose he supplied me with a four-mule ambulance and driver. The country was then sparsely settled, and quite as many Indianswere along the road as white people; still there were embryo townsall along the route, and a few farms sprinkled over the beautifulprairies. On reaching Indianola, near Topeka, I found everybodydown with the chills and fever. My own driver became so shaky thatI had to act as driver and cook. But in due season I reconnoitredthe road, and made contracts for repairing some bridges, and forcutting such parts of the road as needed it. I then returned toFort Leavenworth, and reported, receiving a fair compensation. Onmy way up I met Colonel Sumner's column, returning from theirsummer scout on the plains, and spent the night with the officers, among whom were Captains Sackett, Sturgis, etc. Also at Fort RileyI was cordially received and entertained by some old army-friends, among them Major Sedgwick, Captains Totted, Eli Long, etc. 

Mrs. Sherman and children arrived out in November, and we spent thewinter very comfortably in the house of Thomas Ewing, Jr. , on thecorner of Third and Pottawottamie Streets. On the 1st of January, 1859, Daniel McCook, Esq. , was admitted to membership in our firm, which became Sherman, Ewing & McCook. Our business continued togrow, but, as the income hardly sufficed for three such expensivepersonages, I continued to look about for something more certainand profitable, and during that spring undertook for the Hon. Thomas Ewing, of Ohio, to open a farm on a large tract of land heowned on Indian Creek, forty miles west of Leavenworth, for thebenefit of his grand-nephew, Henry Clark, and his grand-niece, Mrs. Walker. These arrived out in the spring, by which time I hadcaused to be erected a small frame dwelling-house, a barn, andfencing for a hundred acres. This helped to pass away time, butafforded little profit; and on the 11th of June, 1859, I wrote toMajor D. C. Buel, assistant adjutant-general, on duty in the WarDepartment with Secretary of War Floyd, inquiring if there was avacancy among the army paymasters, or any thing in his line that Icould obtain. He replied promptly, and sent me the printedprogramme for a military college about to be organized inLouisiana, and advised me to apply for the superintendent's place, saying that General G. Mason Graham, the half-brother of my oldcommanding-general, R. B. Mason, was very influential in thismatter, and would doubtless befriend me on account of the relationsthat had existed between General Mason and myself in California. Accordingly, I addressed a letter of application to the Hon. R. C. Wickliffe, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, asking the answer to be sent tome at Lancaster, Ohio, where I proposed to leave my family. But, before leaving this branch of the subject, I must explain a littlematter of which I have seen an account in print, complimentary orotherwise of the firm of Sherman, Ewing & McCook, more especiallyof the senior partner. 

One day, as I sat in our office, an Irishman came in and said hehad a case and wanted a lawyer. I asked him to sit down and giveme the points of his case, all the other members of the firm beingout. Our client stated that he had rented a lot of an Irishlandlord for five dollars a month; that he had erected thereon asmall frame shanty, which was occupied by his family; that he had, paid his rent regularly up to a recent period, but to his house hehad appended a shed which extended over a part of an adjoiningvacant lot belonging to the same landlord, for which he was chargedtwo and a half dollars a month, which he refused to pay. Theconsequence was, that his landlord had for a few months declinedeven his five dollars monthly rent until the arrears amounted toabout seventeen dollars, for which he was sued. I told him wewould undertake his case, of which I took notes, and a fee of fivedollars in advance, and in due order I placed the notes in thehands of McCook, and thought no more of it. 

A month or so after, our client rushed into the office and said hiscase had been called at Judge Gardner's (I think), and he wantedhis lawyer right away. I sent him up to the Circuit Court, JudgePettit's, for McCook, but he soon returned, saying he could notfind McCook, and accordingly I hurried with him up to JudgeGardner's office, intending to ask a continuance, but I found ourantagonist there, with his lawyer and witnesses, and Judge Gardnerwould not grant a continuance, so of necessity I had to act, hopingthat at every minute McCook would come. But the trial proceededregularly to its end; we were beaten, and judgment was enteredagainst our client for the amount claimed, and costs. As soon asthe matter was explained to McCook, he said "execution" could notbe taken for ten days, and, as our client was poor, and had nothingon which the landlord could levy but his house, McCook advised himto get his neighbors together, to pick up the house, and carry iton to another vacant lot, belonging to a non-resident, so that eventhe house could not be taken in execution. Thus the graspinglandlord, though successful in his judgment, failed in theexecution, and our client was abundantly satisfied. 

In due time I closed up my business at Leavenworth, and went toLancaster, Ohio, where, in July, 1859, I received notice fromGovernor Wickliffe that I had been elected superintendent of theproposed college, and inviting me to come down to Louisiana asearly as possible, because they were anxious to put the collegeinto operation by the 1st of January following. For this honorableposition I was indebted to Major D. C. Buell and General G. MasonGraham, to whom I have made full and due acknowledgment. Duringthe civil war, it was reported and charged that I owed my positionto the personal friendship of Generals Bragg and Beauregard, andthat, in taking up arms against the South, I had been guilty of abreach of hospitality and friendship. I was not indebted toGeneral Bragg, because he himself told me that he was not evenaware that I was an applicant, and had favored the selection ofMajor Jenkins, another West Point graduate. General Beauregard hadnothing whatever to do with the matter. 

CHAPTER VII. 

LOUISIANA

1859-1861. 

In the autumn of 1859, having made arrangements for my family toremain in Lancaster, I proceeded, via Columbus, Cincinnati, andLouisville, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where I reported for duty toGovernor Wickliffe, who, by virtue of his office, was the presidentof the Board of Supervisors of the new institution over which I wascalled to preside. He explained to me the act of the Legislatureunder which the institution was founded; told me that the buildingwas situated near Alexandria, in the parish of Rapides, and wassubstantially finished; that the future management would rest witha Board of Supervisors, mostly citizens of Rapides Parish, wherealso resided the Governor-elect, T. O. Moore, who would soonsucceed him in his office as Governor and president ex officio; andadvised me to go at once to Alexandria, and put myself incommunication with Moore and the supervisors. Accordingly I took aboat at Baton Rouge, for the mouth of Red River. 

The river being low, and its navigation precarious, I there tookthe regular mail-coach, as the more certain conveyance, andcontinued on toward Alexandria. I found, as a fellow-passenger inthe coach, Judge Henry Boyce, of the United States District Court, with whom I had made acquaintance years before, at St. Louis, and, as we neared Alexandria, he proposed that we should stop atGovernor Moore's and spend the night. Moore's house and plantationwere on Bayou Robert, about eight miles from Alexandria. We foundhim at home, with his wife and a married daughter, and spent thenight there. He sent us forward to Alexandria the next morning, inhis own carriage. On arriving at Alexandria, I put up at an inn, or boarding-house, and almost immediately thereafter went about tenmiles farther up Bayou Rapides, to the plantation and house ofGeneral G. Mason Graham, to whom I looked as the principal man withwhom I had to deal. He was a high-toned gentleman, and his wholeheart was in the enterprise. He at once put me at ease. We actedtogether most cordially from that time forth, and it was at hishouse that all the details of the seminary were arranged. We firstvisited the college-building together. It was located on an oldcountry place of four hundred acres of pineland, with numeroussprings, and the building was very large and handsome. Acarpenter, named James, resided there, and had the general chargeof the property; but, as there was not a table, chair, black-board, or any thing on hand, necessary for a beginning, I concluded toquarter myself in one of the rooms of the seminary, and board withan old black woman who cooked for James, so that I might personallypush forward the necessary preparations. There was an oldrail-fence about the place, and a large pile of boards in front. Iimmediately engaged four carpenters, and set them at work to makeout of these boards mess-tables, benches, black-boards, etc. Ialso opened a correspondence with the professors-elect, and withall parties of influence in the State, who were interested in ourwork: At the meeting of the Board of Supervisors, held atAlexandria, August 2, 1859, five professors had been elected:1. W. T. Sherman, Superintendent, and Professor of Engineering, etc. ;2. Anthony Vallas, Professor of Mathematics, Philosophy, etc. ;3. Francis W. Smith, Professor of Chemistry, etc. ;4. David F. Boyd, Professor of Languages, English and Ancient;5. E. Berti St. Ange, Professor of French and Modern Languages. 

These constituted the Academic Board, while the general supervisionremained in the Board of Supervisors, composed of the Governor ofthe State, the Superintendent of Public Education, and twelvemembers, nominated by the Governor, and confirmed by the Senate. The institution was bound to educate sixteen beneficiary students, free of any charge for tuition. These had only to pay for theirclothing and books, while all others had to pay their entireexpenses, including tuition. 

Early in November, Profs. Smith, Yallas, St. Ange, and I, met acommittee of the Board of Supervisors, composed of T. C. Manning, G. Mason Graham, and W. W. Whittington, at General Graham's house, and resolved to open the institution to pupils on the 1st day ofJanuary, 1860. We adopted a series of bylaws for the government ofthe institution, which was styled the "Louisiana Seminary ofLearning and Military Academy. " This title grew out of theoriginal grant, by the Congress of the United States, of a certaintownship of public land, to be sold by the State, and dedicated tothe use of a "seminary of learning. " I do not suppose thatCongress designed thereby to fix the name or title; but the subjecthad so long been debated in Louisiana that the name, thoughawkward, had become familiar. We appended to it "MilitaryAcademy, " as explanatory of its general design. 

On the 17th of November, 1859, the Governor of the State, Wickliffe, issued officially a general circular, prepared by us, giving public notice that the "Seminary of Learning" would open onthe 1st day of January, 1860; containing a description of thelocality, and the general regulations for the proposed institution;and authorizing parties to apply for further information to the"Superintendent, " at Alexandria, Louisiana. 

The Legislature had appropriated for the sixteen beneficiaries atthe rate of two hundred and eighty-three dollars per annum, towhich we added sixty dollars as tuition for pay cadets; and, thoughthe price was low, we undertook to manage for the first year onthat basis. 

Promptly to the day, we opened, with about sixty cadets present. Major Smith was the commandant of cadets, and I the superintendent. I had been to New Orleans, where I had bought a supply ofmattresses, books, and every thing requisite, and we started verymuch on the basis of West Point and of the Virginia MilitaryInstitute, but without uniforms or muskets; yet with roll-calls, sections, and recitations, we kept as near the standard of WestPoint as possible. I kept all the money accounts, and gave generaldirections to the steward, professors, and cadets. The otherprofessors had their regular classes and recitations. We all livedin rooms in the college building, except Vallas, who had a family, and rented a house near by. A Creole gentleman, B. Jarrean, Esq. , had been elected steward, and he also had his family in a house notfar off. The other professors had a mess in a room adjoining themess-hall. A few more cadets joined in the course of the winter, so that we had in all, during the first term, seventy-three cadets, of whom fifty-nine passed the examination on the 30th of July, 1860. During our first term many defects in the original act ofthe Legislature were demonstrated, and, by the advice of the Boardof Supervisors, I went down to Baton Rouge during the session ofthe Legislature, to advocate and urge the passage of a new bill, putting the institution on a better footing. Thomas O. Moors wasthen Governor, Bragg was a member of the Board of Public Works, andRichard Taylor was a Senator. I got well acquainted with all ofthese, and with some of the leading men of the State, and wasalways treated with the greatest courtesy and kindness. Inconjunction with the proper committee of the Legislature, weprepared a new bill, which was passed and approved on the 7th ofMarch, 1860, by which we were to have a beneficiary cadet for eachparish, in all fifty-six, and fifteen thousand dollars annually fortheir maintenance; also twenty thousand dollars for the general useof the college. During that session we got an appropriation offifteen thousand dollars for building two professors' houses, forthe purchase of philosophical and chemical apparatus, and for thebeginning of a college library. The seminary was made a StateArsenal, under the title of State Central Arsenal, and I wasallowed five hundred dollars a year as its superintendent. Thesematters took me several times to Baton Rouge that winter, and Irecall an event of some interest, which most have happened inFebruary. At that time my brother, John Sherman, was a candidate, in the national House of Representatives, for Speaker, againstBocock, of Virginia. In the South he was regarded as an"abolitionist, " the most horrible of all monsters; and many peopleof Louisiana looked at me with suspicion, as the brother of theabolitionist, John Sherman, and doubted the propriety of having meat the head of an important State institution. By this time I waspretty well acquainted with many of their prominent men, wasgenerally esteemed by all in authority, and by the people ofRapides Parish especially, who saw that I was devoted to myparticular business, and that I gave no heed to the politicalexcitement of the day. But the members of the State Senate andHouse did not know me so well, and it was natural that they shouldbe suspicions of a Northern man, and the brother of him who was the"abolition" candidate for Speaker of the House. 

One evening, at a large dinner-party at Governor Moore's, at whichwere present several members of the Louisiana Legislature, Taylor, Bragg, and the Attorney-General Hyams, after the ladies had leftthe table, I noticed at Governor Moore's end quite a livelydiscussion going on, in which my name was frequently used; atlength the Governor called to me, saying: "Colonel Sherman, you canreadily understand that, with your brother the abolitionistcandidate for Speaker, some of our people wonder that you should behere at the head of an important State institution. Now, you areat my table, and I assure you of my confidence. Won't you speakyour mind freely on this question of slavery, that so agitates theland? You are under my roof, and, whatever you say, you have myprotection. "

I answered: "Governor Moors, you mistake in calling my brother, John Sherman, an abolitionist. We have been separated sincechildhood--I in the army, and he pursuing his profession oflaw in Northern Ohio; and it is possible we may differ ingeneral sentiment, but I deny that he is considered at home anabolitionist; and, although he prefers the free institutions underwhich he lives to those of slavery which prevail here, he would notof himself take from you by law or force any property whatever, even slaves. "

Then said Moore: "Give us your own views of slavery as you see ithere and throughout the South. "

I answered in effect that "the people of Louisiana were hardlyresponsible for slavery, as they had inherited it; that I found twodistinct conditions of slavery, domestic and field hands. Thedomestic slaves, employed by the families, were probably bettertreated than any slaves on earth; but the condition of thefield-hands was different, depending more on the temper anddisposition of their masters and overseers than were those employedabout the house;" and I went on to say that, "were I a citizen ofLouisiana, and a member of the Legislature, I would deem it wise tobring the legal condition of the slaves more near the status ofhuman beings under all Christian and civilized governments. In thefirst place, I argued that, in sales of slaves made by the State, Iwould forbid the separation of families, letting the father, mother, and children, be sold together to one person, instead ofeach to the highest bidder. And, again, I would advise the repealof the statute which enacted a severe penalty for even the owner toteach his slave to read and write, because that actually qualifiedproperty and took away a part of its value; illustrating theassertion by the case of Henry Sampson, who had been the slave ofColonel Chambers, of Rapides Parish, who had gone to California asthe servant of an officer of the army, and who was afterwardemployed by me in the bank at San Francisco. At first he could notwrite or read, and I could only afford to pay him one hundreddollars a month; but he was taught to read and write by Reilley, our bank-teller, when his services became worth two hundred andfifty dollars a month, which enabled him to buy his own freedom andthat of his brother and his family. "

What I said was listened to by all with the most profoundattention; and, when I was through, some one (I think it was Mr. Hyams) struck the table with his fist, making the glasses jingle, and said, "By God, he is right!" and at once he took up the debate, which went on, for an hour or more, on both sides with ability andfairness. Of course, I was glad to be thus relieved, because atthe time all men in Louisiana were dreadfully excited on questionsaffecting their slaves, who constituted the bulk of their wealth, and without whom they honestly believed that sugar, cotton, andrice, could not possibly be cultivated. 

On the 30th and 31st of July, 1860, we had an examination at theseminary, winding up with a ball, and as much publicity as possibleto attract general notice; and immediately thereafter we allscattered--the cadets to their homes, and the professors whereverthey pleased--all to meet again on the 1st day of the nextNovember. Major Smith and I agreed to meet in New York on acertain day in August, to purchase books, models, etc. I wentdirectly to my family in Lancaster, and after a few days proceededto Washington, to endeavor to procure from the General Governmentthe necessary muskets and equipments for our cadets by thebeginning of the next term. I was in Washington on the 17thday of August, and hunted up my friend Major Buell, of theAdjutant-General's Department, who was on duty with the Secretary ofWar, Floyd. I had with me a letter of Governor Moore's, authorizingme to act in his name. Major Buell took me into Floyd's room at theWar Department, to whom I explained my business, and I was agreeablysurprised to meet with such easy success. Although the State ofLouisiana had already drawn her full quota of arms, Floyd promptlypromised to order my requisition to be filled, and I procured thenecessary blanks at the Ordnance-Office, filled them with twohundred cadet muskets, and all equipments complete, and was assuredthat all these articles would be shipped to Louisiana in season forour use that fall. These assurances were faithfully carried out. 

I then went on to New York, there met Major Smith according toappointment, and together we selected and purchased a good supplyof uniforms, clothing, and text books, as well as a fair number ofbooks of history and fiction, to commence a library. 

When this business was completed, I returned to Lancaster, andremained with my family till the time approached for me to returnto Louisiana. I again left my family at Lancaster, until assuredof the completion of the two buildings designed for the marriedprofessors for which I had contracted that spring with Mr. Mills, of Alexandria, and which were well under progress when I left inAugust. One of these was designed for me and the other for Vallas. Mr. Ewing presented me with a horse, which I took down the riverwith me, and en route I ordered from Grimsley & Co. A fullequipment of saddle, bridle, etc. , the same that I used in the war, and which I lost with my horse, shot under me at Shiloh. 

Reaching Alexandria early in October, I pushed forward theconstruction of the two buildings, some fences, gates, and allother work, with the object of a more perfect start at the openingof the regular term November 1, 1860. 

About this time Dr. Powhatan Clark was elected Assistant Professorof Chemistry, etc. , and acted as secretary of the Board ofSupervisors, but no other changes were made in our small circle ofprofessors. 

November came, and with it nearly if not quite all our first set ofcadets, and others, to the number of about one hundred and thirty. We divided them into two companies, issued arms and clothing, andbegan a regular system of drills and instruction, as well as theregular recitations. I had moved into my new house, but prudentlyhad not sent for my family, nominally on the ground of waitinguntil the season was further advanced, but really because of thestorm that was lowering heavy on the political horizon. Thepresidential election was to occur in November, and the nominationshad already been made in stormy debates by the usual conventions. Lincoln and Hamlin (to the South utterly unknown) were the nomineesof the Republican party, and for the first time both thesecandidates were from Northern States. The Democratic partydivided--one set nominating a ticket at Charleston, and the otherat Baltimore. Breckenridge and Lane were the nominees of theSouthern or Democratic party; and Bell and Everett, a kind ofcompromise, mostly in favor in Louisiana. Political excitement wasat its very height, and it was constantly asserted that Mr. Lincoln's election would imperil the Union. I purposely kept alooffrom politics, would take no part, and remember that on the day ofthe election in November I was notified that it would be advisablefor me to vote for Bell and Everett, but I openly said I would not, and I did not. The election of Mr. Lincoln fell upon us all like aclap of thunder. People saw and felt that the South had threatenedso long that, if she quietly submitted, the question of slavery inthe Territories was at an end forever. I mingled freely with themembers of the Board of Supervisors, and with the people of RapidesParish generally, keeping aloof from all cliques and parties, and Icertainly hoped that the threatened storm would blow over, as hadso often occurred before, after similar threats. At our seminarythe order of exercises went along with the regularity of theseasons. Once a week, I had the older cadets to practise reading, reciting, and elocution, and noticed that their selections werefrom Calhoun, Yancey, and other Southern speakers, all treating ofthe defense of their slaves and their home institutions as the veryhighest duty of the patriot. Among boys this was to be expected;and among the members of our board, though most of them declaimedagainst politicians generally, and especially abolitionists, aspests, yet there was a growing feeling that danger was in the wind. I recall the visit of a young gentleman who had been sent fromJackson, by the Governor of Mississippi, to confer with GovernorMoore, then on his plantation at Bayou Robert, and who had comeover to see our college. He spoke to me openly of secession as afixed fact, and that its details were only left open fordiscussion. I also recall the visit of some man who was said to bea high officer in the order of "Knights of the Golden Circle, " ofthe existence of which order I was even ignorant, until explainedto me by Major Smith and Dr. Clark. But in November, 1860, no manever approached me offensively, to ascertain my views, or myproposed course of action in case of secession, and no man in orout of authority ever tried to induce me to take part in stepsdesigned to lead toward disunion. I think my general opinions werewell known and understood, viz. , that "secession was treason, waswar;" and that in no event would the North and West permit theMississippi River to pass out of their control. But some men atthe South actually supposed at the time that the NorthwesternStates, in case of a disruption of the General Government, would bedrawn in self-interest to an alliance with the South. What I nowwrite I do not offer as any thing like a history of the importantevents of that time, but rather as my memory of them, the effectthey had on me personally, and to what extent they influenced mypersonal conduct. 

South Carolina seceded December 20, 1860, and Mississippi soonafter. Emissaries came to Louisiana to influence the Governor, Legislature, and people, and it was the common assertion that, ifall the Cotton States would follow the lead of South Carolina, itwould diminish the chances of civil war, because a bold anddetermined front would deter the General Government from anymeasures of coercion. About this time also, viz. , early inDecember, we received Mr. Buchanan's annual message to Congress, inwhich he publicly announced that the General Government had noconstitutional power to "coerce a State. " I confess this staggeredme, and I feared that the prophecies and assertions of Alison andother European commentators on our form of government were right, and that our Constitution was a mere rope of sand, that would breakwith the first pressure. 

The Legislature of Louisiana met on the 10th of December, andpassed an act calling a convention of delegates from the people, tomeet at Baton Rouge, on the 8th of January, to take intoconsideration the state of the Union; and, although it wasuniversally admitted that a large majority of the voters of theState were opposed to secession, disunion, and all the steps of theSouth Carolinians, yet we saw that they were powerless, and thatthe politicians would sweep them along rapidly to the end, prearranged by their leaders in Washington. Before the ordinanceof secession was passed, or the convention had assembled, on thefaith of a telegraphic dispatch sent by the two Senators, Benjaminand Slidell, from their seats in the United States Senate atWashington, Governor Moore ordered the seizure of all the UnitedStates forts at the mouth of the Mississippi and LakePontchartrain, and of the United States arsenal at Baton Rouge. The forts had no garrisons, but the arsenal was held by a smallcompany of artillery, commanded by Major Haskins, a most worthy andexcellent officer, who had lost an arm in Mexico. I remember wellthat I was strongly and bitterly impressed by the seizure of thearsenal, which occurred on January 10, 1861. 

When I went first to Baton Rouge, in 1859, en route to Alexandria, I found Captain Rickett's company of artillery stationed in thearsenal, but soon after there was somewhat of a clamor on the Texasfrontier about Brownsville, which induced the War Department toorder Rickett's company to that frontier. I remember that GovernorMoore remonstrated with the Secretary of War because so muchdangerous property, composed of muskets, powder, etc. , had beenleft by the United States unguarded, in a parish where the slavepopulation was as five or six to one of whites; and it was on hisofficial demand that the United States Government ordered Haskinsscompany to replace Rickett's. This company did not number fortymen. In the night of January 9th, about five hundred New Orleansmilitia, under command of a Colonel Wheat, went up from New Orleansby boat, landed, surrounded the arsenal, and demanded itssurrender. Haskins was of course unprepared for such a step, yethe at first resolved to defend the post as he best could with hissmall force. But Bragg, who was an old army acquaintance of his, had a parley with him, exhibited to him the vastly superior forceof his assailants, embracing two field-batteries, and offered toprocure for him honorable terms, to march out with drums andcolors, and to take unmolested passage in a boat up to St. Louis;alleging, further, that the old Union was at an end, and that ajust settlement would be made between the two new fragments for allthe property stored in the arsenal. Of course it was Haskins'sduty to have defended his post to the death; but up to that timethe national authorities in Washington had shown suchpusillanimity, that the officers of the army knew not what to do. The result, anyhow, was that Haskins surrendered his post, and atonce embarked for St. Louis. The arms and munitions stored in thearsenal were scattered--some to Mississippi, some to New Orleans, some to Shreveport; and to me, at the Central Arsenal, wereconsigned two thousand muskets, three hundred Jager rifles, and alarge amount of cartridges and ammunition. The invoices weresigned by the former ordnance-sergeant, Olodowski, as a captain ofordnance, and I think he continued such on General Bragg's staffthrough the whole of the subsequent civil war. These arms, etc. , came up to me at Alexandria, with orders from Governor Moore toreceipt for and account for them. Thus I was made the receiver ofstolen goods, and these goods the property of the United States. This grated hard on my feelings as an ex-army-officer, and oncounting the arms I noticed that they were packed in the oldfamiliar boxes, with the "U. S. " simply scratched off. General G. Mason Graham had resigned as the chairman of the ExecutiveCommittee, and Dr. S. A. Smith, of Alexandria, then a member of theState Senate, had succeeded him as chairman, and acted as head ofthe Board of Supervisors. At the time I was in most intimatecorrespondence with all of these parties, and our letters must havebeen full of politics, but I have only retained copies of a few ofthe letters, which I will embody in this connection, as they willshow, better than by any thing I can now recall, the feelings ofparties at that critical period. The seizure of the arsenal atBaton Rouge occurred January 10, 1861, and the secession ordinancewas not passed until about the 25th or 26th of the same month. Atall events, after the seizure of the arsenal, and before thepassage of the ordinance of secession, viz. , on the 18th ofJanuary, I wrote as follows:

Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military AcademyJanuary 18, 1861

Governor THOMAS O. MOORE, Baton, Rouge, Louisiana. 

Sir: As I occupy a quasi-military position under the laws of theState, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted suchposition when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when themotto of this seminary was inserted in marble over the main door:"By the liberality of the General Government of the United States. The Union--esto perpetua. "

Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men tochoose. If Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer tomaintain my allegiance to the Constitution as long as a fragment ofit survives; and my longer stay here would be wrong in every senseof the word. 

In that event, I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agentto take charge of the arms and munitions of war belonging to theState, or advise me what disposition to make of them. 

And furthermore, as president of the Board of Supervisors, I begyou to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent, themoment the State determines to secede, for on no earthly accountwill I do any act or think any thought hostile to or in defiance ofthe old Government of the United States. 

With great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Superintendent. 

[PRIVATE. ]

January 18, 1861. 

To Governor Moore:

My Dear Sir: I take it for granted that you have been expecting forsome days the accompanying paper from me (the above officialletter). I have repeatedly and again made known to General Grahamand Dr. Smith that, in the event of a severance of the relationshitherto existing between the Confederated States of this Union, Iwould be forced to choose the old Union. It is barely possible allthe States may secede, South and North, that new combinations mayresult, but this process will be one of time and uncertainty, and Icannot with my opinions await the subsequent development. 

I have never been a politician, and therefore undervalue theexcited feelings and opinions of present rulers, but I do think, ifthis people cannot execute a form of government like the present, that a worse one will result. 

I will keep the cadets as quiet as possible. They are nervous, butI think the interest of the State requires them here, guarding thisproperty, and acquiring a knowledge which will be useful to yourState in after-times. 

When I leave, which I now regard as certain, the present professorscan manage well enough, to afford you leisure time to find asuitable successor to me. You might order Major Smith to receiptfor the arms, and to exercise military command, while the academicexercises could go on under the board. In time, some gentlemanwill turn up, better qualified than I am, to carry on the seminaryto its ultimate point of success. I entertain the kindest feelingstoward all, and would leave the State with much regret; only ingreat events we must choose, one way or the other. 

Truly, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN

January 19, 1881--Saturday. 

Dr. S. A. Smith, President Board of Supervisors, Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 

Dear Sir: I have just finished my quarterly reports to the parentsof all the cadets here, or who have been here. All my books ofaccount are written up to date. All bills for the houses, fences, etc. , are settled, and nothing now remains but the daily tontine ofrecitations and drills. I have written officially and unofficiallyto Governor Moore, that with my opinions of the claimed right ofaccession, of the seizure of public forts, arsenals, etc. , and theignominious capture of a United States garrison, stationed in yourmidst, as a guard to the arsenal and for the protection of your ownpeople, it would be highly improper for me longer to remain. Nogreat inconvenience can result to the seminary. I will be thechief loser. I came down two months before my pay commenced. Imade sacrifices in Kansas to enable me thus to obey the call ofGovernor Wickliffe, and you know that last winter I declined a mostadvantageous offer of employment abroad; and thus far I havereceived nothing as superintendent of the arsenal, though I went toWashington and New York (at my own expense) on the faith of thefive hundred dollars salary promised. 

These are all small matters in comparison with those involved inthe present state of the country, which will cause sacrifices bymillions, instead of by hundreds. The more I think of it, the moreI think I should be away, the sooner the better; and therefore Ihope you will join with Governor Moors in authorizing me to turnover to Major Smith the military command here, and to the academicboard the control of the daily exercises and recitations. 

There will be no necessity of your coming up. You can let MajorSmith receive the few hundreds of cash I have on hand, and I canmeet you on a day certain in New Orleans, when we can settle thebank account. Before I leave, I can pay the steward Jarrean hisaccount for the month, and there would be no necessity for otherpayments till about the close of March, by which time the board canmeet, and elect a treasurer and superintendent also. 

At present I have no class, and there will be none ready till aboutthe month of May, when there will be a class in "surveying. " Evenif you do not elect a superintendent in the mean time, Major Smithcould easily teach this class, as he is very familiar with thesubject-matter: Indeed, I think you will do well to leave thesubject of a new superintendent until one perfectly satisfactoryturns up. 

There is only one favor I would ask. The seminary has plenty ofmoney in bank. The Legislature will surely appropriate for mysalary as superintendent of this arsenal. Would you not let memake my drafts on the State Treasury, send them to you, let theTreasurer note them for payment when the appropriation is made, andthen pay them out of the seminary fund? The drafts will be paid inMarch, and the seminary will lose nothing. This would be just tome; for I actually spent two hundred dollars and more in going toWashington and New York, thereby securing from the United States, in advance, three thousand dollars' worth of the very best arms;and clothing and books, at a clear profit to the seminary of overeight hundred dollars. I may be some time in finding newemployment, and will stand in need of this money (five hundreddollars); otherwise I would abandon it. 

I will not ask you to put the Board of Supervisors to the troubleof meeting, unless you can get a quorum at Baton Rouge. 

With great respect, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN. 

By course of mail, I received the following answer from GovernorMoore, the original of which I still possess. It is all in GeneralBraggs handwriting, with which I am familiar--

Executive Office, BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA, January 23, 1861

MY DEAR SIR: It is with the deepest regret I acknowledge receipt ofyour communication of the 18th inst. In the pressure of officialbusiness, I can now only request you to transfer to Prof. Smith thearms, munitions, and funds in your hands, whenever you conclude towithdraw from the position you have filled with so muchdistinction. You cannot regret more than I do the necessity whichdeprives us of your services, and you will bear with you therespect, confidence, and admiration, of all who have beenassociated with you. Very truly, your friend, Thomas O. Moore. 

Colonel W. T. SHERMAN, Superintendent Military Academy, Alexandria. 

I must have received several letters from Bragg, about this time, which have not been preserved; for I find that, on the 1st ofFebruary, 1861, I wrote him thus:

Seminary of LearningAlexandria, LOUISIANA, February 1, 1881. 

Colonel Braxton BRAGG, Baton, Rouge, Louisiana. 

Dear Sir: Yours of January 23d and 27th are received. I thank youmost kindly, and Governor Moors through you, for the kind manner inwhich you have met my wishes. 

Now that I cannot be compromised by political events, I will soshape my course as best to serve the institution, which has astrong hold on my affections and respect. 

The Board of Supervisors will be called for the 9th instant, and Iwill cooperate with them in their measures to place matters here ona safe and secure basis. I expect to be here two weeks, and willmake you full returns of money and property belonging to the StateCentral Arsenal. All the arms and ammunition are safely storedhere. Then I will write you more at length. With sincere respect, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN. 

Major Smith's receipt to me, for the arms and property belongingboth to the seminary and to the arsenal, is dated February 19, 1861. I subjoin also, in this connection, copies of one or twopapers that may prove of interest

BATON ROUGE, January 28, 1881. To Major SHERMAN, Superintendent, Alexandria. 

My DEAR SIR: Your letter was duly receive, and would have beenanswered ere this time could I have arranged sooner the matter ofthe five hundred dollars. I shall go from here to New Orleansto-day or tomorrow, and will remain there till Saturday after next, perhaps. I shall expect to meet you there, as indicated in yournote to me. 

I need not tell you that it is with no ordinary regret that I viewyour determination to leave us, for really I believe that thesuccess of our institution, now almost assured, is jeopardizedthereby. I am sore that we will never have a superintendent withwhom I shall have more pleasant relations than those which haveexisted between yourself and me. 

I fully appreciate the motives which have induced you to give up aposition presenting so many advantages to yourself, and sincerelyhope that you may, in any future enterprise, enjoy the successwhich your character and ability merit and deserve. 

Should you come down on the Rapides (steamer), please look after mywife, who will, I hope, accompany you on said boat, or some othergood one. 

Colonel Bragg informs me that the necessary orders have been givenfor the transfer and receipt by Major Smith of the public property. 

I herewith transmit a request to the secretary to convene the Boardof Supervisors, that they may act as seems best to them in thepremises. 

In the mean time, Major Smith will command by seniority the cadets, and the Academic Board will be able to conduct the scientificexercises of the institution until the Board of Supervisors canhave time to act. Hoping to meet you soon at the St. Charles, Iam, Most truly, your friend and servant, S. A. Smith

P. S. Governor Moors desires me to express his profound regret thatthe State is about to lose one who we all fondly hoped had cast hisdestinies for weal or for woe among us; and that he is sensiblethat we lose thereby an officer whom it will be difficult, if notimpossible, to replace. 

S. A. S. 

BATON ROUGE, February 11, 1881. To Major Sherman, Alexandria. 

Dear Sir: I have been in New Orleans for ten days, and on returninghere find two letters from you, also your prompt answer to theresolution of the House of Representatives, for which I am muchobliged. 

The resolution passed the last day before adjournment. I waspurposing to respond, when your welcome reports came to hand. Ihave arranged to pay you your five hundred dollars. 

I will say nothing of general politics, except to give my opinionthat there is not to be any war. 

In that event, would it not be possible for you to become a citizenof our State? Everyone deplores your determination to leave us. Atthe same time, your friends feel that you are abandoning a positionthat might become an object of desire to any one. 

I will try to meet you in New Orleans at any time you may indicate;but it would be best for you to stop here, when, if possible, Iwill accompany you. Should you do so, you will find me just abovethe State-House, and facing it. 

Bring with you a few copies of the "Rules of the Seminary. "

Yours truly, S. A. Smith

Colonel W. T. SHERMAN. 

Sir: I am instructed by the Board of Supervisors of thisinstitution to present a copy of the resolutions adopted by them attheir last meeting. 

"Resolved, That the thanks of the Board of Supervisors are due, andare hereby tendered, to Colonel William T. Sherman for the able andefficient manner in which he has conducted the affairs of theseminary during the time the institution has been under hiscontrol--a period attended with unusual difficulties, requiring onthe part of the superintendent to successfully overcome them a highorder of administrative talent. And the board further bear willingtestimony to the valuable services that Colonel Sherman hasrendered them in their efforts to establish an institution oflearning in accordance with the beneficent design of the State andFederal Governments; evincing at all times a readiness to adapthimself to the ever-varying requirements of an institution oflearning in its infancy, struggling to attain a position of honorand usefulness. 

"Resolved, further, That, in accepting the resignation of ColonelSherman as Superintendent of the State Seminary of Learning andMilitary Academy, we tender to him assurances of our high personalregard, and our sincere regret at the occurrence of causes thatrender it necessary to part with so esteemed and valued a friend, as well as co-laborer in the cause of education. "

Powhatan Clarke, Secretary of the Board. 

A copy of the resolution of the Academic Board, passed at theirsession of April 1, 1861:

"Resolved, That in the resignation of the late superintendent, Colonel W. T. Sherman, the Academic Board deem it not improper toexpress their deep conviction of the loss the institution hassustained in being thus deprived of an able head. They cannot failto appreciate the manliness of character which has always markedthe actions of Colonel Sherman. While he is personally endeared tomany of them as a friend, they consider it their high pleasure totender to him in this resolution their regret on his separation, and their sincere wish for his future welfare. "

I have given the above at some length, because, during the civilwar, it was in Southern circles asserted that I was guilty of abreach of hospitality in taking up arms against the South. Theywere manifestly the aggressors, and we could only defend our own byassailing them. Yet, without any knowledge of what the future hadin store for me, I took unusual precautions that the institutionshould not be damaged by my withdrawal. About the 20th ofFebruary, having turned over all property, records, and money, onhand, to Major Smith, and taking with me the necessary documents tomake the final settlement with Dr. S. A. Smith, at the bank in NewOrleans, where the funds of the institution were deposited to mycredit, I took passage from Alexandria for that city, and arrivedthere, I think, on the 23d. Dr. Smith met me, and we went to thebank, where I turned over to him the balance, got him to audit allmy accounts, certify that they were correct and just, and thatthere remained not one cent of balance in my hands. I charged inmy account current for my salary up to the end of February, at therate of four thousand dollars a year, and for the five hundreddollars due me as superintendent of the Central Arsenal, all ofwhich was due and had been fairly earned, and then I stood free anddischarged of any and every obligation, honorary or business, thatwas due by me to the State of Louisiana, or to any corporation orindividual in that State. 

This business occupied two or three days, during which I staid atthe St. Louis Hotel. I usually sat at table with Colonel and Mrs. Bragg, and an officer who wore the uniform of the State ofLouisiana, and was addressed as captain. Bragg wore a colonel'suniform, and explained to me that he was a colonel in the Stateservice, a colonel of artillery, and that some companies of hisregiment garrisoned Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and the arsenalat Baton Rouge. 

Beauregard at the time had two sons at the Seminary of Learning. Ihad given them some of my personal care at the father's request, and, wanting to tell him of their condition and progress, I went tohis usual office in the Custom-House Building, and found him in theact of starting for Montgomery, Alabama. Bragg said afterward thatBeauregard had been sent for by Jefferson Davis, and that it wasrumored that he had been made a brigadier-general, of which fact heseemed jealous, because in the old army Bragg was the senior. 

Davis and Stephens had been inaugurated President andVice-President of the Confederate States of America, February 18, 1860, at Montgomery, and those States only embraced the sevencotton States. I recall a conversation at the tea-table, oneevening, at the St. Louis Hotel. When Bragg was speaking ofBeauregard's promotion, Mrs. Bragg, turning to me, said, "You knowthat my husband is not a favorite with the new President. " My mindwas resting on Mr. Lincoln as the new President, and I said I didnot know that Bragg had ever met Mr. Lincoln, when Mrs. Bragg said, quite pointedly, "I didn't mean your President, but our President. "I knew that Bragg hated Davis bitterly, and that he had resignedfrom the army in 1855, or 1856, because Davis, as Secretary of War, had ordered him, with his battery, from Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, to Fort Smith or Fort Washita, in the Indian country, asBragg expressed it, "to chase Indians with six-pounders. "

I visited the quartermaster, Colonel A. C. Myers, who had resignedfrom the army, January 28, 1861, and had accepted service under thenew regime. His office was in the same old room in the LafayetteSquare building, which he had in 1853, when I was there acommissary, with the same pictures on the wall, and the letters "U. S. " on every thing, including his desk, papers, etc. I asked himif he did not feel funny. "No, not at all. The thing wasinevitable, secession was a complete success; there would be nowar, but the two Governments would settle all matters of businessin a friendly spirit, and each would go on in its allotted sphere, without further confusion. " About this date, February 16th, General Twiggs, Myers's father-in-law, had surrendered his entirecommand, in the Department of Texas, to some State troops, with allthe Government property, thus consummating the first serious stepin the drama of the conspiracy, which was to form a confederacy ofthe cotton States, before working upon the other slave or borderStates, and before the 4th of March, the day for the inaugurationof President Lincoln. 

I walked the streets of New Orleans, and found business going alongas usual. Ships were strung for miles along the lower levee, andsteamboats above, all discharging or receiving cargo. The Pelicanflag of Louisiana was flying over the Custom House, Mint, CityHall, and everywhere. At the levee ships carried every flag onearth except that of the United States, and I was told that duringa procession on the 22d of February, celebrating their emancipationfrom the despotism of the United States Government, only onenational flag was shown from a house, and that the houses ofCuthbert Bullitt, on Lafayette Square. He was commanded to take itdown, but he refused, and defended it with his pistol. 

The only officer of the army that I can recall, as being there atthe time, who was faithful, was Colonel C. L. Kilburn, of theCommissary Department, and he was preparing to escape North. 

Everybody regarded the change of Government as final; thatLouisiana, by a mere declaration, was a free and independent State, and could enter into any new alliance or combination she chose. 

Men were being enlisted and armed, to defend the State, and therewas not the least evidence that the national Administrationdesigned to make any effort, by force, to vindicate the nationalauthority. I therefore bade adieu to all my friends, and about the25th of February took my departure by railroad, for Lancaster, viaCairo and Cincinnati. 

Before leaving this subject, I will simply record the fate of someof my associates. The seminary was dispersed by the war, and allthe professors and cadets took service in the Confederacy, exceptYallas, St. Ange, and Cadet Taliaferro. The latter joined a Unionregiment, as a lieutenant, after New Orleans was retaken by theUnited States fleet under Farragut. I think that both Yallas andSt. Ange have died in poverty since the war. Major Smith joinedthe rebel army in Virginia, and was killed in April, 1865, as hewas withdrawing his garrison, by night, from the batteries atDrury's Bluff, at the time General Lee began his final retreat fromRichmond. Boyd became a captain of engineers on the staff ofGeneral Richard Taylor, was captured, and was in jail at Natchez, Mississippi, when I was on my Meridian expedition. He succeeded ingetting a letter to me on my arrival at Vicksburg, and, on my waydown to New Orleans, I stopped at Natchez, took him along, andenabled him to effect an exchange through General Banks. As soonas the war was over, he returned to Alexandria, and reorganized theold institution, where I visited him in 1867; but, the next winter, the building took fire end burned to the ground. The students, library, apparatus, etc. , were transferred to Baton Rouge, wherethe same institution now is, under the title of the LouisianaUniversity. I have been able to do them many acts of kindness, andam still in correspondence, with Colonel Boyd, its president. 

General G. Mason Graham is still living on his plantation, on BayouRapides, old and much respected. 

Dr. S. A. Smith became a surgeon in the rebel army, and at theclose of the war was medical director of the trans-MississippiDepartment, with General Kirby Smith. I have seen him since thewar, at New Orleans, where he died about a year ago. 

Dr. Clark was in Washington recently, applying for a place asUnited States consul abroad. I assisted him, but with no success, and he is now at Baltimore, Maryland. 

After the battle of Shiloh, I found among the prisoners CadetBarrow, fitted him out with some clean clothing, of which he was inneed, and from him learned that Cadet Workman was killed in thatbattle. 

Governor Moore's plantation was devastated by General Banks'stroops. After the war he appealed to me, and through theAttorney-General, Henry Stanbery, I aided in having hisland restored to him, and I think he is now living there. 

Bragg, Beauregard, and Taylor, enacted high parts in the succeedingwar, and now reside in Louisiana or Texas. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

MISSOURI

APRIL AND MAY, 1861. 

During the time of these events in Louisiana, I was in constantcorrespondence with my brother, John Sherman, at Washington; Mr. Ewing, at Lancaster, Ohio; and Major H. S. Turner, at St. Louis. Ihad managed to maintain my family comfortably at Lancaster, but wasextremely anxious about the future. It looked like the end of mycareer, for I did not suppose that "civil war" could give me anemployment that would provide for the family. I thought, and mayhave said, that the national crisis had been brought about by thepoliticians, and, as it was upon us, they "might fight it out"Therefore, when I turned North from New Orleans, I felt moredisposed to look to St. Louis for a home, and to Major. Turner tofind me employment, than to the public service. 

I left New Orleans about the 1st of March, 1861, by rail to Jacksonand Clinton, Mississippi, Jackson, Tennessee, and Columbus, Kentucky, where we took a boat to Cairo, and thence, by rail, toCincinnati and Lancaster. All the way, I heard, in the cars andboats, warm discussions about polities; to the effect that, if Mr. Lincoln should attempt coercion of the seceded States, the otherslave or border States would make common cause, when, it wasbelieved, it would be madness to attempt to reduce them tosubjection. In the South, the people were earnest, fierce andangry, and were evidently organizing for action; whereas, inIllinois, Indiana, and Ohio, I saw not the least sign ofpreparation. It certainly looked to me as though the people of theNorth would tamely submit to a disruption of the Union, and theorators of the South used, openly and constantly, the expressionsthat there would be no war, and that a lady's thimble would holdall the blood to be shed. On reaching Lancaster, I found lettersfrom my brother John, inviting me to come to Washington, as hewanted to see me; and from Major Tamer, at St. Louis, that he wastrying to secure for me the office of president of the Fifth StreetRailroad, with a salary of twenty-five hundred dollars; that Mr. Lucas and D. A. January held a controlling interest of stock, wouldvote for me, and the election would occur in March. This suited meexactly, and I answered Turner that I would accept, with thanks. But I also thought it right and proper that I should first go toWashington, to talk with my brother, Senator Sherman. 

Mr. Lincoln had just been installed, and the newspapers were filledwith rumors of every kind indicative of war; the chief act ofinterest was that Major Robert Anderson had taken by night intoFort Sumter all the troops garrisoning Charleston Harbor, and thathe was determined to defend it against the demands of the State ofSouth Carolina and of the Confederate States. I must have reachedWashington about the 10th of March. I found my brother there, justappointed Senator, in place of Mr. Chase, who was in the cabinet, and I have no doubt my opinions, thoughts, and feelings, wrought upby the events in Louisiana; seemed to him gloomy and extravagant. About Washington I saw but few signs of preparation, though theSouthern Senators and Representatives were daily sounding theirthreats on the floors of Congress, and were publicly withdrawing tojoin the Confederate Congress at Montgomery. Even in the WarDepartment and about the public offices there was open, unconcealedtalk, amounting to high-treason. 

One day, John Sherman took me with him to see Mr. Lincoln. Hewalked into the room where the secretary to the President now sits, we found the room full of people, and Mr. Lincoln sat at the end ofthe table, talking with three or four gentlemen, who soon left. John walked up, shook hands, and took a chair near him, holding inhis hand some papers referring to, minor appointments in the Stateof Ohio, which formed the subject of conversation. Mr. Lincolntook the papers, said he would refer them to the proper heads ofdepartments, and would be glad to make the appointments asked for, if not already promised. John then turned to me, and said, "Mr. President, this is my brother, Colonel Sherman, who is just up fromLouisiana, he may give you some information you want. " "Ah!" saidMr. Lincoln, "how are they getting along down there?" I said, "Theythink they are getting along swimmingly--they are preparing forwar. " "Oh, well!" said he, "I guess we'll manage to keep house. "I was silenced, said no more to him, and we soon left. I was sadlydisappointed, and remember that I broke out on John, d--ning thepoliticians generally, saying, "You have got things in a hell of afig, and you may get them out as you best can, " adding that thecountry was sleeping on a volcano that might burst forth at anyminute, but that I was going to St. Louis to take care of myfamily, and would have no more to do with it. John begged me to bemore patient, but I said I would not; that I had no time to wait, that I was off for St. Louis; and off I went. At Lancaster I foundletters from Major Turner, inviting me to St. Louis, as the placein the Fifth Street Railroad was a sure thing, and that Mr. Lucaswould rent me a good house on Locust Street, suitable for myfamily, for six hundred dollars a year. 

Mrs. Sherman and I gathered our family and effects together, started for St. Louis March 27th, where we rented of Mr. Lucas thehouse on Locust Street, between Tenth and Eleventh, and occupied iton the 1st of April. Charles Ewing and John Hunter had formed alaw-partnership in St. Louis, and agreed to board with us, takingrooms on the third floor In the latter part of March, I was dulyelected president of the Fifth Street Railroad, and entered on thedischarge of my duties April 1, 1861. We had a central office onthe corner of Fifth and Locust, and also another up at the stablesin Bremen. The road was well stocked and in full operation, andall I had to do was to watch the economical administration ofexisting affairs, which I endeavored to do with fidelity and zeal. But the whole air was full of wars and rumors of wars. Thestruggle was going on politically for the border States. Even inMissouri, which was a slave State, it was manifest that theGovernor of the State, Claiborne Jackson, and all the leadingpoliticians, were for the South in case of a war. The house on thenorthwest corner of Fifth and Pine was the rebel headquarters, where the rebel flag was hung publicly, and the crowds about thePlanters' House were all more or less rebel. There was also a campin Lindell's Grove, at the end of Olive, Street, under command ofGeneral D. M. Frost, a Northern man, a graduate of West Point, inopen sympathy with the Southern leaders. This camp was nominally aState camp of instruction, but, beyond doubt, was in the interestof the Southern cause, designed to be used against the nationalauthority in the event of the General Government's attempting tocoerce the Southern Confederacy. General William S. Harvey was incommand of the Department of Missouri, and resided in his ownhouse, on Fourth Street, below Market; and there were five or sixcompanies of United States troops in the arsenal, commanded byCaptain N. Lyon; throughout the city, there had been organized, almost exclusively out of the German part of the population, fouror five regiments of "Home Guards, " with which movement FrankBlair, B. Gratz Brown, John M. Schofield, Clinton B. Fisk, andothers, were most active on the part of the national authorities. Frank Blair's brother Montgomery was in the cabinet of Mr. Lincolnat Washington, and to him seemed committed the general managementof affairs in Missouri. 

The newspapers fanned the public excitement to the highest pitch, and threats of attacking the arsenal on the one hand, and the mobof d--d rebels in Camp Jackson on the other, were bandied about. Itried my best to keep out of the current, and only talked freelywith a few men; among them Colonel John O'Fallon, a wealthygentleman who resided above St. Louis. He daily came down to myoffice in Bremen, and we walked up and down the pavement by thehour, deploring the sad condition of our country, and the seemingdrift toward dissolution and anarchy. I used also to go down tothe arsenal occasionally to see Lyon, Totten, and other of my armyacquaintance, and was glad to see them making preparations todefend their post, if not to assume the offensive. 

The bombardment of Fort Sumter, which was announced by telegraph, began April 12th, and ended on the 14th. We then knew that the warwas actually begun, and though the South was openly, manifestly theaggressor, yet her friends and apologists insisted that she wassimply acting on a justifiable defensive, and that in the forcibleseizure of, the public forts within her limits the people wereacting with reasonable prudence and foresight. Yet neither partyseemed willing to invade, or cross the border. Davis, who orderedthe bombardment of Sumter, knew the temper of his people well, andforesaw that it would precipitate the action of the border States;for almost immediately Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, andTennessee, followed the lead of the cotton States, and conventionswere deliberating in Kentucky and Missouri. 

On the night of Saturday, April 6th, I received the following, dispatch:

Washington, April 6, 1861. 

Major W. T. Sherman:

Will you accept the chief clerkship of the War Department? We willmake you assistant Secretary of War when Congress meets. 

M. Blair, Postmaster-General. 

To which I replied by telegraph, Monday morning; "I cannot accept;"and by mail as follows:

Monday, April 8, 1861. Office of the St. Louis Railroad Company. 

Hon. M. Blair, Washington, D. C. 

I received, about nine o'clock Saturday night, your telegraphdispatch, which I have this moment answered, "I cannot accept. "

I have quite a large family, and when I resigned my place inLouisiana, on account of secession, I had no time to lose; and, therefore, after my hasty visit to Washington, where I saw nochance of employment, I came to St. Louis, have accepted a place inthis company, have rented a house, and incurred other obligations, so that I am not at liberty to change. 

I thank you for the compliment contained in your offer, and assureyou that I wish the Administration all success in its almostimpossible task of governing this distracted and anarchical people. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN

I was afterward told that this letter gave offense, and that someof Mr. Lincoln's cabinet concluded that I too would prove false tothe country. 

Later in that month, after the capture of Fort Sumter by theConfederate authorities, a Dr. Cornyn came to our house on LocustStreet, one night after I had gone to bed, and told me he had beensent by Frank Blair, who was not well, and wanted to see me thatnight at his house. I dressed and walked over to his house onWashington Avenue, near Fourteenth, and found there, in thefront-room, several gentlemen, among whom I recall Henry T. Blow. Blair was in the back-room, closeted with some gentleman, who soonleft, and I was called in. He there told me that the Governmentwas mistrustful of General Harvey, that a change in the command ofthe department was to be made; that he held it in his power toappoint a brigadier-general, and put him in command of thedepartment, and he offered me the place. I told him I had onceoffered my services, and they were declined; that I had madebusiness engagements in St. Louis, which I could not throw off atpleasure; that I had long deliberated on my course of action, andmust decline his offer, however tempting and complimentary. Hereasoned with me, but I persisted. He told me, in that event, heshould appoint Lyon, and he did so. 

Finding that even my best friends were uneasy as to my politicalstatus, on the 8th of May I addressed the following official letterto the Secretary of War:

Office of the St. Louis Railroad Company, May 8, 1881. 

Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

Dear Sir: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve mycountry in the capacity for which I was trained. I did not andwill not volunteer for three months, because I cannot throw myfamily on the cold charity of the world. But for the three-yearscall, made by the President, an officer can prepare his command anddo good service. 

I will not volunteer as a soldier, because rightfully or wrongfullyI feel unwilling to take a mere private's place, and, having formany years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not wellenough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place. 

Should my services be needed, the records of the War Departmentwill enable you to designate the station in which I can render mostservice. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN. 

To this I do not think I received a direct answer; but, on the 10thof the same month, I was appointed colonel of the ThirteenthRegular Infantry. 

I remember going to the arsenal on the 9th of May, taking mychildren with me in the street-cars. Within the arsenal wall weredrawn up in parallel lines four regiments of the "Home Guards, " andI saw men distributing cartridges to the boxes. I also saw GeneralLyon running about with his hair in the wind, his pockets full ofpapers, wild and irregular, but I knew him to be a man of vehementpurpose and of determined action. I saw of course that it meantbusiness, but whether for defense or offense I did not know. Thenext morning I went up to the railroad-office in Bremen, as usual, and heard at every corner of the streets that the "Dutch" weremoving on Camp Jackson. People were barricading their houses, andmen were running in that direction. I hurried through my businessas quickly as I could, and got back to my house on Locust Street bytwelve o'clock. Charles Ewing and Hunter were there, and insistedon going out to the camp to see "the fun. " I tried to dissuadethem, saying that in case of conflict the bystanders were morelikely to be killed than the men engaged, but they would go. Ifelt as much interest as anybody else, but staid at home, took mylittle son Willie, who was about seven years old, and walked up anddown the pavement in front of our house, listening for the sound ofmusketry or cannon in the direction of Camp Jackson. While soengaged Miss Eliza Dean, who lived opposite us, called me acrossthe street, told me that her brother-in-law, Dr. Scott, was asurgeon in Frost's camp, and she was dreadfully afraid he would bekilled. I reasoned with her that General Lyon was a regularofficer; that if he had gone out, as reported, to Camp Jackson, hewould take with him such a force as would make resistanceimpossible; but she would not be comforted, saying that the campwas made up of the young men from the first and best families ofSt. Louis, and that they were proud, and would fight. I explainedthat young men of the best families did not like to be killedbetter than ordinary people. Edging gradually up the street, I wasin Olive Street just about Twelfth, when I saw a man running fromthe direction of Camp Jackson at full speed, calling, as he went, "They've surrendered, they've surrendered!" So I turned back andrang the bell at Mrs. Dean's. Eliza came to the door, and Iexplained what I had heard; but she angrily slammed the door in myface! Evidently she was disappointed to find she was mistaken inher estimate of the rash courage of the best families. 

I again turned in the direction of Camp Jackson, my boy Willie withme still. At the head of Olive Street, abreast of Lindell's Grove, I found Frank Blair's regiment in the street, with ranks opened, and the Camp Jackson prisoners inside. A crowd of people wasgathered around, calling to the prisoners by name, some hurrahingfor Jeff Davis, and others encouraging the troops. Men, women, andchildren, were in the crowd. I passed along till I found myselfinside the grove, where I met Charles Ewing and John Hunter, and westood looking at the troops on the road, heading toward the city. A band of music was playing at the head, and the column made one ortwo ineffectual starts, but for some reason was halted. Thebattalion of regulars was abreast of me, of which Major RufusSaxton was in command, and I gave him an evening paper, which I hadbought of the newsboy on my way out. He was reading from it somepiece of news, sitting on his horse, when the column again began tomove forward, and he resumed his place at the head of his command. At that part of the road, or street, was an embankment about eightfeet high, and a drunken fellow tried to pass over it to the peopleopposite. 

One of the regular sergeant file-closers ordered him back, but heattempted to pass through the ranks, when the sergeant barred hisprogress with his musket "a-port. " The drunken man seized hismusket, when the sergeant threw him off with violence, and herolled over and over down the bank. By the time this man hadpicked himself up and got his hat, which had fallen off, and hadagain mounted the embankment, the regulars had passed, and the headof Osterhaus's regiment of Home Guards had come up. The man had inhis hand a small pistol, which he fired off, and I heard that theball had struck the leg of one of Osterhaus's staff; the regimentstopped; there was a moment of confusion, when the soldiers of thatregiment began to fire over our heads in the grove. I heard theballs cutting the leaves above our heads, and saw several men andwomen running in all directions, some of whom were wounded. Ofcourse there was a general stampede. Charles Ewing threw Willie onthe ground and covered him with his body. Hunter ran behind thehill, and I also threw myself on the ground. The fire ran backfrom the head of the regiment toward its rear, and as I saw the menreloading their pieces, I jerked Willie up, ran back with him intoa gully which covered us, lay there until I saw that the fire hadceased, and that the column was again moving on, when I took upWillie and started back for home round by way of Market Street. Awoman and child were killed outright; two or three men were alsokilled, and several others were wounded. The great mass of thepeople on that occasion were simply curious spectators, though menwere sprinkled through the crowd calling out, "Hurrah for JeffDavis!" and others were particularly abusive of the "damned Dutch"Lyon posted a guard in charge of the vacant camp, and marched hisprisoners down to the arsenal; some were paroled, and others held, till afterward they were regularly exchanged. 

A very few days after this event, May 14th, I received a dispatchfrom my brother Charles in Washington, telling me to come on atonce; that I had been appointed a colonel of the Thirteenth RegularInfantry, and that I was wanted at Washington immediately. 

Of course I could no longer defer action. I saw Mr. Lucas, MajorTurner, and other friends and parties connected with the road, whoagreed that I should go on. I left my family, because I was underthe impression that I would be allowed to enlist my own regiment, which would take some time, and I expected to raise the regimentand organize it at Jefferson Barracks. I repaired to Washington, and there found that the Government was trying to rise to a levelwith the occasion. Mr. Lincoln had, without the sanction of law, authorized the raising of ten new regiments of regulars, eachinfantry regiment to be composed of three battalions of eightcompanies each; and had called for seventy-five thousand Statevolunteers. Even this call seemed to me utterly inadequate; stillit was none of my business. I took the oath of office, and wasfurnished with a list of officers, appointed to my regiment, whichwas still, incomplete. I reported in person to General Scott, athis office on Seventeenth Street, opposite the War Department, andapplied for authority to return West, and raise my regiment atJefferson Barracks, but the general said my lieutenant-colonel, Burbank, was fully qualified to superintend the enlistment, andthat he wanted me there; and he at once dictated an order for me toreport to him in person for inspection duty. 

Satisfied that I would not be permitted to return to St. Louis, Iinstructed Mrs. Sherman to pack up, return to Lancaster, and trustto the fate of war. 

I also resigned my place as president of the Fifth Street Railroad, to take effect at the end of May, so that in fact I received payfrom that road for only two months' service, and then began my newarmy career. 

CHAPTER IX. 

FROM THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN TO PADUCAH KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI

1861-1862. 

And now that, in these notes, I have fairly reached the period ofthe civil war, which ravaged our country from 1861 to 1865--anevent involving a conflict of passion, of prejudice, and of arms, that has developed results which, for better or worse, have lefttheir mark on the world's history--I feel that I tread on delicateground. 

I have again and again been invited to write a history of the war, or to record for publication my personal recollections of it, withlarge offers of money therefor; all of which I have heretoforedeclined, because the truth is not always palatable, and should notalways be told. Many of the actors in the grand drama still live, and they and their friends are quick to controversy, which shouldbe avoided. The great end of peace has been attained, with littleor no change in our form of government, and the duty of all goodmen is to allow the passions of that period to subside, that we maydirect our physical and mental labor to repair the waste of war, and to engage in the greater task of continuing our hithertowonderful national development. 

What I now propose to do is merely to group some of my personalrecollections about the historic persons and events of the day, prepared not with any view to their publication, but rather forpreservation till I am gone; and then to be allowed to follow intooblivion the cords of similar papers, or to be used by somehistorian who may need them by way of illustration. 

I have heretofore recorded how I again came into the militaryservice of the United States as a colonel of the Thirteenth RegularInfantry, a regiment that had no existence at the time, and that, instead of being allowed to enlist the men and instruct them, asexpected, I was assigned in Washington City, by an order ofLieutenant-General Winfield Scott, to inspection duty near him onthe 20th of June, 1861. 

At that time Lieutenant-General Scott commanded the army in chief, with Colonel E. D. Townsend as his adjutant-general, Major G. W. Cullum, United States Engineers, and Major SchuylerHamilton, as aides. -de-camp. The general had an office up stairson Seventeenth Street, opposite the War Department, and resided ina house close by, on Pennsylvania Avenue. All fears for theimmediate safety of the capital had ceased, and quite a large forceof regulars and volunteers had been collected in and aboutWashington. Brigadier-General J. K. Mansfield commanded in thecity, and Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell on the other side of thePotomac, with his headquarters at Arlington House. His troopsextended in a semicircle from Alexandria to above Georgetown. Several forts and redoubts were either built or in progress, andthe people were already clamorous for a general forward movement. Another considerable army had also been collected in Pennsylvaniaunder General Patterson, and, at the time I speak of, had movedforward to Hagerstown and Williamsport, on the Potomac River. Mybrother, John Sherman, was a volunteer aide-de-camp to GeneralPatterson, and, toward the end of June, I went up to Hagerstown tosee him. I found that army in the very act of moving, and we rodedown to Williamsport in a buggy, and were present when the leadingdivision crossed the Potomac River by fording it waist-deep. Myfriend and classmate, George H. Thomas, was there, in command of abrigade in the leading division. I talked with him a good deal, also with General Cadwalader, and with the staff-officers ofGeneral Patterson, viz. , Fitz-John Porter, Belger, Beckwith, andothers, all of whom seemed encouraged to think that the war was tobe short and decisive, and that, as soon as it was demonstratedthat the General Government meant in earnest to defend its rightsand property, some general compromise would result. 

Patterson's army crossed the Potomac River on the 1st or 2d ofJuly, and, as John Sherman was to take his seat as a Senator in thecalled session of Congress, to meet July 4th, he resigned his placeas aide-de-camp, presented me his two horses and equipment, and wereturned to Washington together. 

The Congress assembled punctually on the 4th of July, and themessage of Mr. Lincoln was strong and good: it recognized the factthat civil war was upon us, that compromise of any kind was at anend; and he asked for four hundred thousand men, and four hundredmillion dollars, wherewith to vindicate the national authority, andto regain possession of the captured forts and other property ofthe United States. 

It was also immediately demonstrated that the tone and temper ofCongress had changed since the Southern Senators and members hadwithdrawn, and that we, the military, could now go to work withsome definite plans and ideas. 

The appearance of the troops about Washington was good, but it wasmanifest they were far from being soldiers. Their uniforms were asvarious as the States and cities from which they came; their armswere also of every pattern and calibre; and they were so loadeddown with overcoats, haversacks, knapsacks, tents, and baggage, that it took from twenty-five to fifty wagons to move the camp of aregiment from one place to another, and some of the camps hadbakeries and cooking establishments that would have done credit toDelmonico. 

While I was on duty with General Scott, viz. , from June 20th toabout June 30th, the general frequently communicated to those abouthim his opinions and proposed plans. He seemed vexed with theclamors of the press for immediate action, and the continuedinterference in details by the President, Secretary of War, andCongress. He spoke of organizing a grand army of invasion, ofwhich the regulars were to constitute the "iron column, " and seemedto intimate that he himself would take the field in person, thoughhe was at the time very old, very heavy, and very unwieldy. Hisage must have been about seventy-five years. 

At that date, July 4, 1861, the rebels had two armies in front ofWashington; the one at Manassas Junction, commanded by GeneralBeauregard, with his advance guard at Fairfax Court House, andindeed almost in sight of Washington. The other, commanded byGeneral Joe Johnston, was at Winchester, with its advance atMartinsburg and Harper's Ferry; but the advance had fallen backbefore Patterson, who then occupied Martinsburg and the line of theBaltimore & Ohio Railroad. 

The temper of Congress and the people would not permit the slow andmethodical preparation desired by General Scott; and the cry of "Onto Richmond!" which was shared by the volunteers, most of whom hadonly engaged for ninety days, forced General Scott to hasten hispreparations, and to order a general advance about the middle ofJuly. McDowell was to move from the defenses of Washington, andPatterson from Martinsburg. In the organization of McDowell's armyinto divisions and brigades, Colonel David Hunter was assigned tocommand the Second Division, and I was ordered to take command ofhis former brigade, which was composed of five regiments inposition in and about Fort Corcoran, and on the ground oppositeGeorgetown. I assumed command on the 30th of June, and proceededat once to prepare it for the general advance. My commandconstituted the Third Brigade of the First Division, which divisionwas commanded by Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, a graduate of WestPoint, but who had seen little or no actual service. I applied toGeneral McDowell for home staff-officers, and he gave me, asadjutant-general, Lieutenant Piper, of the Third Artillery, and, asaide-de-camp, Lieutenant McQuesten, a fine young cavalry-officer, fresh from West Point. 

I selected for the field the Thirteenth New York, Colonel Quinby;the Sixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; the Seventy-ninth NewYork, Colonel Cameron; and the Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck. These were all good, strong, volunteer regiments, pretty well commanded; and I had reason to believe that I had oneof the best brigades in the whole army. Captain Ayres's battery ofthe Third Regular Artillery was also attached to my brigade. Theother regiment, the Twenty-ninth New York, Colonel Bennett, wasdestined to be left behind in charge of the forts and camps duringour absence, which was expected to be short. Soon after I hadassumed the command, a difficulty arose in the Sixty-ninth, anIrish regiment. This regiment had volunteered in New York, earlyin April, for ninety days; but, by reason of the difficulty ofpassing through Baltimore, they had come via Annapolis, had beenheld for duty on the railroad as a guard for nearly a month beforethey actually reached Washington, and were then mustered in about amonth after enrollment. Some of the men claimed that they wereentitled to their discharge in ninety days from the time ofenrollment, whereas the muster-roll read ninety days from the dateof muster-in. One day, Colonel Corcoran explained this matter tome. I advised him to reduce the facts to writing, and that I wouldsubmit it to the War Department for an authoritative decision. Hedid so, and the War Department decided that the muster-roll was theonly contract of service, that it would be construed literally; andthat the regiment would be held till the expiration of three monthsfrom the date of muster-in, viz. , to about August 1, 1861. GeneralScott at the same time wrote one of his characteristic letters toCorcoran, telling him that we were about to engage in battle, andhe knew his Irish friends would not leave him in such a crisis. Corcoran and the officers generally wanted to go to the expectedbattle, but a good many of the men were not so anxious. In theSecond Wisconsin, also, was developed a personal difficulty. Theactual colonel was S. P. Coon, a good-hearted gentleman, who knewno more of the military art than a child; whereas his lieutenant-colonel, Peck, had been to West Point, and knew the drill. Preferring that the latter should remain in command of theregiment, I put Colonel Coon on my personal staff, which reconciledthe difficulty. 

In due season, about July 15th, our division moved forwardleaving our camps standing; Keyes's brigade in the lead, thenSchenck's, then mine, and Richardson's last. We marched viaVienna, Germantown, and Centreville, where all the army, composedof five divisions, seemed to converge. The march demonstratedlittle save the general laxity of discipline; for with all mypersonal efforts I could not prevent the men from straggling forwater, blackberries, or any thing on the way they fancied. 

At Centreville, on the 18th, Richardson's brigade was sent byGeneral Tyler to reconnoitre Blackburn's Ford across Bull Run, andhe found it strongly guarded. From our camp, at Centreville, weheard the cannonading, and then a sharp musketry-fire. I receivedorders from General Tyler to send forward Ayres's battery, and verysoon after another order came for me to advance with my wholebrigade. We marched the three miles at the double-quick, arrivedin time to relieve Richardson's brigade, which was just drawingback from the ford, worsted, and stood for half an hour or so undera fire of artillery, which killed four or five of my men. GeneralTyler was there in person, giving directions, and soon afterhe ordered us all back to our camp in Centreville. Thisreconnoissance had developed a strong force, and had been madewithout the orders of General McDowell; however, it satisfied usthat the enemy was in force on the other side of Bull Run, and hadno intention to leave without a serious battle. We lay in camp atCentreville all of the 19th and 20th, and during that night beganthe movement which resulted in the battle of Bull Run, on July21st. Of this so much has been written that more would besuperfluous; and the reports of the opposing commanders, McDowelland Johnston, are fair and correct. It is now generally admittedthat it was one of the best-planned battles of the war, but one ofthe worst-fought. Our men had been told so often at home that allthey had to do was to make a bold appearance, and the rebels wouldrun; and nearly all of us for the first time then heard the soundof cannon and muskets in anger, and saw the bloody scenes common toall battles, with which we were soon to be familiar. We had goodorganization, good men, but no cohesion, no real discipline, norespect for authority, no real knowledge of war. Both armies werefairly defeated, and, whichever had stood fast, the other wouldhave run. Though the North was overwhelmed with mortification andshame, the South really had not much to boast of, for in the threeor four hours of fighting their organization was so broken up thatthey did not and could not follow our army, when it was known to bein a state of disgraceful and causeless flight. It is easy tocriticise a battle after it is over, but all now admit that noneothers, equally raw in war, could have done better than we did atBull Run; and the lesson of that battle should not be lost on apeople like ours. 

I insert my official report, as a condensed statement of my sharein the battle:

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISIONFORT CORCORAN, July 25, 1861

To Captain A. BAIRD, Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division(General Tyler's). 

Sir: I have the honor to submit this my report of the operations ofmy brigade during the action of the 21st instant. The brigade iscomposed of the Thirteenth New York Volunteers, Colonel Quinby'sSixty-ninth New York, Colonel Corcoran; Seventy-ninth New York, Colonel Cameron; Second Wisconsin, Lieutenant-Colonel Peck; andCompany E, Third Artillery, under command of Captain R. B. Ayres, Fifth Artillery. 

We left our camp near Centreville, pursuant to orders, at half-past2 A. M. , taking place in your column, next to the brigade ofGeneral Schenck, and proceeded as far as the halt, before theenemy's position, near the stone bridge across Bull Run. Here thebrigade was deployed in line along the skirt of timber to the rightof the Warrenton road, and remained quietly in position till after10 a. M. The enemy remained very quiet, but about that time we sawa rebel regiment leave its cover in our front, and proceed indouble-quick time on the road toward Sudley Springs, by which weknew the columns of Colonels Hunter and Heintzelman wereapproaching. About the same time we observed in motion a largemass of the enemy, below and on the other side of the stone bridge. I directed Captain Ayres to take position with his battery near ourright, and to open fire on this mass; but you had previouslydetached the two rifle-guns belonging to this battery, and, findingthat the smooth-bore guns did not reach the enemy's position, weceased firing, and I sent a request that you would send to me thethirty-pounder rifle-gun attached to Captain Carlisle's battery. At the same time I shifted the New York Sixty-ninth to the extremeright of the brigade. Thus we remained till we heard themusketry-fire across Bull Run, showing that the head of ColonelHunter's column was engaged. This firing was brisk, and showed thatHunter was driving before him the enemy, till about noon, when itbecame certain the enemy had come to a stand, and that our forces onthe other side of Bull Run were all engaged, artillery and infantry. 

Here you sent me the order to cross over with the whole brigade, tothe assistance of Colonel Hunter. Early in the day, whenreconnoitring the ground, I had seen a horseman descend from abluff in our front, cross the stream, and show himself in the openfield on this aide; and, inferring that we could cross over at thesame point, I sent forward a company as skirmishers, and followedwith the whole brigade, the New York Sixty-ninth leading. 

We found no difficulty in crossing over, and met with no oppositionin ascending the steep bluff opposite with our infantry, but it wasimpassable to the artillery, and I sent word back to Captain Ayresto follow if possible, otherwise to use his discretion. CaptainAyres did not cross Bull Run, but remained on that side, with therest of your division. His report herewith describes hisoperations during the remainder of the day. Advancing slowly andcautiously with the head of the column, to give time for theregiments in succession to close up their ranks, we firstencountered a party of the enemy retreating along a cluster ofpines; Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, of the Sixty-ninth, withoutorders, rode out alone, and endeavored to intercept their retreat. One of the enemy, in full view, at short range, shot Haggerty, andhe fell dead from his horse. The Sixty-ninth opened fire on thisparty, which was returned; but, determined to effect our junctionwith Hunter's division, I ordered this fire to cease, and weproceeded with caution toward the field where we then plainly sawour forces engaged. Displaying our colors conspicuously at thehead of our column, we succeeded in attracting the attention of ourfriends, and soon formed the brigade in rear of Colonel Porter's. Here I learned that Colonel Hunter was disabled by a severe wound, and that General McDowell was on the field. I sought him out, andreceived his orders to join in pursuit of the enemy, who wasfalling back to the left of the road by which the army hadapproached from Sudley Springs. Placing Colonel Quinby's regimentof rifles in front, in column, by division, I directed the otherregiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of theWisconsin Second, New York Seventy-ninth, and New York Sixty-ninth. Quinby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made anotherstand on ground very favorable to him, and the regiment continuedadvancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the columnreached the point near which Rickett's battery was so severely cutup. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonade; and, the ground affording comparativeshelter from the enemy's artillery, they changed direction, by theright flank, and followed the road before mentioned. At the pointwhere this road crosses the ridge to our left front, the ground wasswept by a most severe fire of artillery, rifles, and musketry, andwe saw, in succession, several regiments driven from it; among themthe Zouaves and battalion of marines. Before reaching the crest ofthis hill, the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, andI kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but whenthe Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of MajorWadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave theroadway, by the left flank, and to attack the enemy. 

This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, receivedthe severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, andadvanced, delivering its fire. This regiment is uniformed in graycloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of thesecession army; and, when the regiment fell into confusion andretreated toward the road, there was a universal cry that they werebeing fired on by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passedthe brow of the hill a second time, but was again repulsed indisorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and in like manner it was ordered to cross the brow of, the hill, and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a goodview of this ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and theground was very irregular with small clusters of pines, affordingshelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire ofrifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed byits colonel, Cameron, charged across the hill, and for a short timethe contest was severe; they rallied several times under fire, butfinally broke, and gained the cover of the hill. 

This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, ColonelCorcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest; andhad in full, open view the ground so severely contested; the firewas very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles, incessant; it was manifest the enemy was here in great force, farsuperior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground forsome time, but finally fell back in disorder. 

All this time Quinby's regiment occupied another ridge, to ourleft, overlooking the same field of action, and similarly engaged. Here, about half-past 3 p. M. , began the scene of confusion anddisorder that characterized the remainder of the day. Up to thattime, all had kept their places, and seemed perfectly cool, andused to the shell and shot that fell, comparatively harmless, allaround us; but the short exposure to an intense fire of small-arms, at close range, had killed many, wounded more, and had produceddisorder in all of the battalions that had attempted to encounterit. Men fell away from their ranks, talking, and in greatconfusion. Colonel Cameron had been mortally wounded, was carriedto an ambulance, and reported dying. Many other officers werereported dead or missing, and many of the wounded were making theirway, with more or less assistance, to the buildings used ashospitals, on the ridge to the west. We succeeded in partiallyreforming the regiments, but it was manifest that they would notstand, and I directed Colonel Corcoran to move along the ridge tothe rear, near the position where we had first formed the brigade. General McDowell was there in person, and need all possible effortsto reassure the men. By the active exertions of Colonel Corcoran, we formed an irregular square against the cavalry which were thenseen to issue from the position from which we had been driven, andwe began our retreat toward the same ford of Bull Run by which wehad approached the field of battle. There was no positive order toretreat, although for an hour it had been going on by the operationof the men themselves. The ranks were thin and irregular, and wefound a stream of people strung from the hospital across Bull Run, and far toward Centreville. After putting in motion the irregularsquare in person, I pushed forward to find Captain Ayres's batteryat the crossing of Bull Run. I sought it at its last position, before the brigade had crossed over, but it was not there; thenpassing through the woods, where, in the morning, we had firstformed line, we approached the blacksmith's shop, but there found adetachment of the secession cavalry and thence made a circuit, avoiding Cub Run Bridge, into Centreville, where I found GeneralMcDowell, and from him understood that it was his purpose to rallythe forces, and make a stand at Centreville. 

But, about nine o'clock at night, I received from General Tyler, inperson, the order to continue the retreat to the Potomac. Thisretreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men ofdifferent regiments mingled together, and some reached the river atArlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned totheir former camp, at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this pointat noon the next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing overthe aqueduct and ferries.. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, Iat once commanded the guard to be increased, and all personsattempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced itseffect; men sought their proper companies and regiments. Comparative order was restored, and all were posted to the bestadvantage. 

I herewith inclose the official report of Captain Belly, commandingofficer of the New York Sixty-ninth; also, fall lists of thekilled, wounded, and missing. 

Our loss was heavy, and occurred chiefly at the point near whereRickett's battery was destroyed. Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty waskilled about noon, before we had effected a junction with ColonelHunter's division. Colonel Cameron was mortally wounded leadinghis regiment in the charge, and Colonel Corcoran has been missingsince the cavalry-charge near the building used as a hospital. 

For names, rank, etc. , of the above, I refer to the lists herewith. 

Lieutenants Piper and McQuesten, of my personal staff, were underfire all day, and carried orders to and fro with as much coolnessas on parade. Lieutenant Bagley, of the New York Sixty-ninth, avolunteer aide, asked leave to serve with his company, during theaction, and is among those reported missing. I have intelligencethat he is a prisoner, and slightly wounded. 

Colonel Coon, of Wisconsin, a volunteer aide, also rendered goodservice during the day. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Colonel commanding Brigade. 

This report, which I had not read probably since its date till now, recalls to me vividly the whole scene of the affair at Blackburn'sFord, when for the first time in my life I saw cannonballs strikemen and crash through the trees and saplings above and around us, and realized the always sickening confusion as one approaches afight from the rear; then the night-march from Centreville, on theWarrenton road, standing for hours wondering what was meant; thedeployment along the edge of the field that sloped down toBull-Run, and waiting for Hunter's approach on the other aide fromthe direction of Sudley Springs, away off to our right; theterrible scare of a poor negro who was caught between our lines;the crossing of Bull Run, and the fear lest we should be fired onby our own men; the killing of Lieutenant-Colonel Haggerty, whichoccurred in plain sight; and the first scenes of a field strewedwith dead men and horses. Yet, at that period of the battle, wewere the victors and felt jubilant. At that moment, also, mybrigade passed Hunter's division; but Heintzelman's was still aheadof us, and we followed its lead along the road toward ManassasJunction, crossing a small stream and ascending a long hill, at thesummit of which the battle was going on. Here my regiments cameinto action well, but successively, and were driven back, each inits turn. For two hours we continued to dash at the woods on ourleft front, which were full of rebels; but I was convinced theirorganization was broken, and that they had simply halted there andtaken advantage of these woods as a cover, to reach which we had topass over the intervening fields about the Henry House, which wereclear, open, and gave them a decided advantage. After I had put ineach of my regiments, and had them driven back to the cover of theroad, I had no idea that we were beaten, but reformed the regimentsin line in their proper order, and only wanted a little rest, whenI found that my brigade was almost alone, except Syke's regulars, who had formed square against cavalry and were coming back. I thenrealized that the whole army was "in retreat, " and that my own menwere individually making back for the stone bridge. Corcoran and Iformed the brigade into an irregular square, but it fell to pieces;and, along with a crowd, disorganized but not much scared, thebrigade got back to Centreville to our former camps. Corcoran wascaptured, and held a prisoner for some time; but I got safe toCentreville. I saw General McDowell in Centreville, and understoodthat several of his divisions had not been engaged at all, that hewould reorganize them at Centreville, and there await the enemy. Igot my four regiments in parallel lines in a field, the same inwhich we had camped before the battle, and had lain down to sleepunder a tree, when I heard some one asking for me. I called outwhere I was, when General Tyler in person gave me orders to marchback to our camps at Fort Corcoran. I aroused my aides, gave themorders to call up the sleeping men, have each regiment to leave thefield by a flank and to take the same road back by which we hadcome. It was near midnight, and the road was full of troops, wagons, and batteries. We tried to keep our regiments separate, but all became inextricably mixed. Toward morning we reachedVienna, where I slept some hours, and the next day, about noon, wereached Fort Corcoran. 

A slow, mizzling rain had set in, and probably a more gloomy daynever presented itself. All organization seemed to be at an end;but I and my staff labored hard to collect our men into theirproper companies and into their former camps, and, on the 23d ofJuly, I moved the Second Wisconsin and Seventy-ninth New Yorkcloser in to Fort Corcoran, and got things in better order than Ihad expected. Of course, we took it for granted that the rebelswould be on our heels, and we accordingly prepared to defend ourposts. By the 25th I had collected all the materials, made myreport, and had my brigade about as well governed as any in thatarmy; although most of the ninety-day men, especially theSixty-ninth, had become extremely tired of the war, and wanted togo home. Some of them were so mutinous, at one time, that I hadthe battery to unlimber, threatening, if they dared to leave campwithout orders, I would open fire on them. Drills and the dailyexercises were resumed, and I ordered that at the three principalroll-calls the men should form ranks with belts and muskets, andthat they should keep their ranks until I in person had receivedthe reports and had dismissed them. The Sixty-ninth still occupiedFort Corcoran, and one morning, after reveille, when I had justreceived the report, had dismissed the regiment, and was leaving, Ifound myself in a crowd of men crossing the drawbridge on their wayto a barn close by, where they had their sinks; among them was anofficer, who said: "Colonel, I am going to New York today. Whatcan I do for you?" I answered: "How can you go to New York? I donot remember to have signed a leave for you. " He said, "No; he didnot want a leave. He had engaged to serve three months, and hadalready served more than that time. If the Government did notintend to pay him, he could afford to lose the money; that he was alawyer, and had neglected his business long enough, and was thengoing home. " I noticed that a good many of the soldiers had pausedabout us to listen, and knew that, if this officer could defy me, they also would. So I turned on him sharp, and said: "Captain, this question of your term of service has been submitted to therightful authority, and the decision has been published in orders. You are a soldier, and must submit to orders till you are properlydischarged. If you attempt to leave without orders, it will bemutiny, and I will shoot you like a dog! Go back into the fortnow, instantly, and don't dare to leave without my consent. " I hadon an overcoat, and may have had my hand about the breast, for helooked at me hard, paused a moment, and then turned back into thefort. The men scattered, and I returned to the house where I wasquartered, close by. 

That same day, which must have been about July 26th, I was near theriver-bank, looking at a block-house which had been built for thedefense of the aqueduct, when I saw a carriage coming by the roadthat crossed the Potomac River at Georgetown by a ferry. I thoughtI recognized in the carriage the person of President Lincoln. Ihurried across a bend, so as to stand by the road-side as thecarriage passed. I was in uniform, with a sword on, and wasrecognized by Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward, who rode side by side inan open hack. I inquired if they were going to my camps, and Mr. Lincoln said: "Yes; we heard that you had got over the big scare, and we thought we would come over and see the 'boys. '" The roadshad been much changed and were rough. I asked if I might givedirections to his coachman, he promptly invited me to jump in andto tell the coachman which way to drive. Intending to begin on theright and follow round to the left, I turned the driver into aside-road which led up a very steep hill, and, seeing a soldier, called to him and sent him up hurriedly to announce to the colonel(Bennett, I think) that the President was coming: As we slowlyascended the hill, I discovered that Mr. Lincoln was full offeeling, and wanted to encourage our men. I asked if he intendedto speak to them, and he said he would like to. I asked him thento please discourage all cheering, noise, or any sort of confusion;that we had had enough of it before Bull Run to ruin any set ofmen, and that what we needed were cool, thoughtful, hard-fightingsoldiers--no more hurrahing, no more humbug. He took my remarks inthe most perfect good-nature. Before we had reached the firstcamp, I heard the drum beating the "assembly, " saw the men runningfor their tents, and in a few minutes the regiment was in line, arms presented, and then brought to an order and "parade rest!"

Mr. Lincoln stood up in the carriage, and made one of the neatest, best, and most feeling addresses I ever listened to, referring toour late disaster at Bull Run, the high duties that still devolvedon us, and the brighter days yet to come. At one or two points thesoldiers began to cheer, but he promptly checked them, saying:"Don't cheer, boys. I confess I rather like it myself, but ColonelSherman here says it is not military; and I guess we had betterdefer to his opinion. " In winding up, he explained that, asPresident, he was commander-in-chief; that he was resolved that thesoldiers should have every thing that the law allowed; and hecalled on one and all to appeal to him personally in case they werewronged. The effect of this speech was excellent. 

We passed along in the same manner to all the camps of my brigade;and Mr. Lincoln complimented me highly for the order, cleanliness, and discipline, that he observed. Indeed, he and Mr. Seward bothassured me that it was the first bright moment they had experiencedsince the battle. 

At last we reached Fort Corcoran. The carriage could not enter, soI ordered the regiment, without arms, to come outside, and gatherabout Mr. Lincoln, who would speak to them. He made to them thesame feeling address, with more personal allusions, because oftheir special gallantry in the battle under Corcoran, who was stilla prisoner in the hands of the enemy; and he concluded with thesame general offer of redress in case of grievances. In the crowd Isaw the officer with whom I had had the passage at reveille thatmorning. His face was pale, and lips compressed. I foresaw ascene, but sat on the front seat of the carriage as quiet as alamb. This officer forced his way through the crowd to thecarriage, and said: "Mr. President, I have a cause of grievance. This morning I went to speak to Colonel Sherman, and he threatenedto shoot me. " Mr. Lincoln, who was still standing, said, "Threatened to shoot you?" "Yes, sir, he threatened to shoot me. "Mr. Lincoln looked at him, then at me, and stooping his tall, spareform toward the officer, said to him in a loud stage-whisper, easily heard for some yards around: "Well, if I were you, and hethreatened to shoot, I would not trust him, for I believe he woulddo it. " The officer turned about and disappeared, and the menlaughed at him. Soon the carriage drove on, and, as we descendedthe hill, I explained the facts to the President, who answered, "Ofcourse I didn't know any thing about it, but I thought you knewyour own business best. " I thanked him for his confidence, andassured him that what he had done would go far to enable me tomaintain good discipline, and it did. 

By this time the day was well spent. I asked to take my leave, andthe President and Mr. Seward drove back to Washington. This spiritof mutiny was common to the whole army, and was not subdued tillseveral regiments or parts of regiments had been ordered to FortJefferson, Florida, as punishment. 

General McDowell had resumed his headquarters at the ArlingtonHouse, and was busily engaged in restoring order to his army, sending off the ninety-days men, and replacing them by regimentswhich had come under the three-years call. We were all tremblinglest we should be held personally accountable for the disastrousresult of the battle. General McClellan had been summoned from theWest to Washington, and changes in the subordinate commands wereannounced almost daily. I remember, as a group of officers weretalking in the large room of the Arlington House, used as theadjutant-general's office, one evening, some young officer came inwith a list of the new brigadiers just announced at the WarDepartment, which-embraced the names of Heintzehvan, Keyes, Franklin, Andrew Porter, W. T. Sherman, and others, who had beencolonels in the battle, and all of whom had shared the commonstampede. Of course, we discredited the truth of the list; andHeintzehvan broke out in his nasal voice, "Boys, it's all a lie!every mother's son of you will be cashiered. " We all felt he wasright, but, nevertheless, it was true; and we were all announced ingeneral orders as brigadier-generals of volunteers. 

General McClellan arrived, and, on assuming command, confirmedMcDowell's organization. Instead of coming over the river, as weexpected, he took a house in Washington, and only came over fromtime to time to have a review or inspection. 

I had received several new regiments, and had begun two new fortson the hill or plateau, above and farther out than Fort Corcoran;and I organized a system of drills, embracing the evolutions of theline, all of which was new to me, and I had to learn the tacticsfrom books; but I was convinced that we had a long, hard war beforeus, and made up my mind to begin at the very beginning to preparefor it. 

August was passing, and troops were pouring in from all quarters;General McClellan told me he intended to organize an army of ahundred thousand men, with one hundred field-batteries, and I stillhoped he would come on our side of the Potomac, pitch his tent, andprepare for real hard work, but his headquarters still remained ina house in Washington City. I then thought, and still think, thatwas a fatal mistake. His choice as general-in-chief at the timewas fully justified by his high reputation in the army and country, and, if he then had any political views or ambition, I surely didnot suspect it. 

About the middle of August I got a note from Brigadier-GeneralRobert Anderson, asking me to come and see him at his room atWillard's Hotel. I rode over and found him in conversation withseveral gentlemen, and he explained to me that events in Kentuckywere approaching a crisis; that the Legislature was in session, andready, as soon as properly backed by the General Government, totake open sides for the Union cause; that he was offered thecommand of the Department of the Cumberland, to embrace Kentucky, Tennessee, etc. , and that he wanted help, and that the Presidenthad offered to allow him to select out of the new brigadiers fourof his own choice. I had been a lieutenant in Captain Anderson'scompany, at Fort Moultrie, from 1843 to 1846, and he explained thathe wanted me as his right hand. He also indicated George H. Thomas, D. C. Buell, and Burnside, as the other three. Of course, I always wanted to go West, and was perfectly willing to go withAnderson, especially in a subordinate capacity: We agreed to callon the President on a subsequent day, to talk with him about it, and we did. It hardly seems probable that Mr. Lincoln should havecome to Willard's Hotel to meet us, but my impression is that hedid, and that General Anderson had some difficulty in prevailing onhim to appoint George H. Thomas, a native of Virginia, to bebrigadier-general, because so many Southern officers, had alreadyplayed false; but I was still more emphatic in my indorsement ofhim by reason of my talk with him at the time he crossed thePotomac with Patterson's army, when Mr. Lincoln promised to appointhim and to assign him to duty with General Anderson. In thisinterview with Mr. Lincoln, I also explained to him my extremedesire to serve in a subordinate capacity, and in no event to beleft in a superior command. He promised me this with promptness, making the jocular remark that his chief trouble was to find placesfor the too many generals who wanted to be at the head of affairs, to command armies, etc. 

The official order is dated:

[Special Order No. 114. ]HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWashington, August 24, 1881. 

The following assignment is made of the general officers of thevolunteer service, whose appointment was announced in GeneralOrders No. 82, from the War Department

To the Department of the Cumberland, Brigadier-General RobertAnderson commanding:

Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, Brigadier-General George H. Thomas. 

By command of Lieutenant-General Scott:E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant adjutant-General. 

After some days, I was relieved in command of my brigade and postby Brigadier General Fitz-John Porter, and at once took mydeparture for Cincinnati, Ohio, via Cresson, Pennsylvania, whereGeneral Anderson was with his family; and he, Thomas, and I, met byappointment at the house of his brother, Larz Anderson, Esq. , inCincinnati. We were there on the 1st and 2d of September, whenseveral prominent gentlemen of Kentucky met us, to discuss thesituation, among whom were Jackson, Harlan, Speed, and others. Atthat time, William Nelson, an officer of the navy, had beencommissioned a brigadier-general of volunteers, and had his camp atDick Robinson, a few miles beyond the Kentucky River, south ofNicholasville; and Brigadier-General L. H. Rousseau had anothercamp at Jeffersonville, opposite Louisville. The State Legislaturewas in session at Frankfort, and was ready to take definite actionas soon as General Anderson was prepared, for the State wasthreatened with invasion from Tennessee, by two forces: one fromthe direction of Nashville, commanded by Generals Albert SidneyJohnston and Buckner; and the other from the direction ofCumberland Gap, commanded by Generals Crittenden and Zollicoffer. General Anderson saw that he had not force enough to resist thesetwo columns, and concluded to send me in person for help toIndianapolis and Springfield, to confer with the Governors ofIndiana, and Illinois, and to General Fremont, who commanded in St. Louis. 

McClellan and Fremont were the two men toward whom the countrylooked as the great Union leaders, and toward them were streamingthe newly-raised regiments of infantry and cavalry, and batteriesof artillery; nobody seeming to think of the intervening linkcovered by Kentucky. While I was to make this tour, GeneralsAnderson and Thomas were to go to Louisville and initiate thedepartment. None of us had a staff, or any of the machinery fororganizing an army, and, indeed, we had no army to organize. Anderson was empowered to raise regiments in Kentucky, and tocommission a few brigadier-generals. 

At Indianapolis I found Governor Morton and all the State officialsbusy in equipping and providing for the new regiments, and myobject was to divert some of them toward Kentucky; but they werecalled for as fast as they were mustered in, either for the army ofMcClellan or Fremont. At Springfield also I found the same generalactivity and zeal, Governor Yates busy in providing for his men;but these men also had been promised to Fremont. I then went on toSt. Louis, where all was seeming activity, bustle, and preparation. Meeting R. M. Renick at the Planters' House (where I stopped), Iinquired where I could find General Fremont. Renick said, "What doyou want with General Fremont?" I said I had come to see him onbusiness; and he added, "You don't suppose that he will see such asyou?" and went on to retail all the scandal of the day: that Fremontwas a great potentate, surrounded by sentries and guards; that hehad a more showy court than any real king; that he kept senators, governors, and the first citizens, dancing attendance for days andweeks before granting an audience, etc. ; that if I expected to seehim on business, I would have to make my application in writing, and submit to a close scrutiny by his chief of staff and by hiscivil surroundings. Of course I laughed at all this, and renewedmy simple inquiry as to where was his office, and was informed thathe resided and had his office at Major Brant's new house onChouteau Avenue. It was then late in the afternoon, and Iconcluded to wait till the next morning; but that night I receiveda dispatch from General Anderson in Louisville to hurry back, asevents were pressing, and he needed me. 

Accordingly, I rose early next morning before daybreak, gotbreakfast with the early railroad-passengers, and about sunrise wasat the gate of General Fremont's headquarters. A sentinel withdrawn sabre paraded up and down in front of the house. I had on myundress uniform indicating my rank, and inquired of the sentinel, "Is General Fremont up?" He answered, "I don't know. " Seeing thathe was a soldier by his bearing, I spoke in a sharp, emphaticvoice, "Then find out. " He called for the corporal of the guard, and soon a fine-looking German sergeant came, to whom I addressedthe same inquiry. He in turn did not know, and I bade him findout, as I had immediate and important business with the general. The sergeant entered the house by the front-basement door, andafter ten or fifteen minutes the main front-door above was slowlyopened from the inside, and who should appear but my old SanFrancisco acquaintance Isaiah C. Woods, whom I had not seen orheard of since his flight to Australia, at the time of the failureof Adams & Co. In 1851! He ushered me in hastily, closed the door, and conducted me into the office on the right of the hall. We wereglad to meet, after so long and eventful an interval, and mutuallyinquired after our respective families and special acquaintances. I found that he was a commissioned officer, a major on duty withFremont, and Major Eaton, now of the paymaster's Department, was inthe same office with him. I explained to them that I had come fromGeneral Anderson, and wanted to confer with General Fremont inperson. Woods left me, but soon returned, said the general wouldsee me in a very few minutes, and within ten minutes I was shownacross the hall into the large parlor, where General Fremontreceived me very politely. We had met before, as early as 1847, inCalifornia, and I had also seen him several times when he wassenator. I then in a rapid manner ran over all the points ofinterest in General Anderson's new sphere of action, hoped he wouldspare us from the new levies what troops he could, and generallyact in concert with us. He told me that his first business wouldbe to drive the rebel General Price and his army out of Missouri, when he would turn his attention down the Mississippi. He asked myopinion about the various kinds of field-artillery whichmanufacturers were thrusting on him, especially the thennewly-invented James gun, and afterward our conversation took a wideturn about the character of the principal citizens of St. Louis, with whom I was well acquainted. 

Telling General Fremont that I had been summoned to Louisville andthat I should leave in the first train, viz. , at 3 p. M. , I took myleave of him. Returning to Wood's office, I found there two moreCalifornians, viz. , Messrs. Palmer and Haskell, so I felt that, while Fremont might be suspicious of others, he allowed freeingress to his old California acquaintances. 

Returning to the Planters' House, I heard of Beard, anotherCalifornian, a Mormon, who had the contract for the line ofredoubts which Fremont had ordered to be constructed around thecity, before he would take his departure for the interior of theState; and while I stood near the office-counter, I saw old BaronSteinberger, a prince among our early California adventurers, comein and look over the register. I avoided him on purpose, but hispresence in St. Louis recalled the maxim, "Where the vultures are, there is a carcass close by;" and I suspected that the profitablecontracts of the quartermaster, McKinstry, had drawn to St. Louissome of the most enterprising men of California. I suspect theycan account for the fact that, in a very short time, Fremont fellfrom his high estate in Missouri, by reason of frauds, or supposedfrauds, in the administration of the affairs of his command. 

I left St. Louis that afternoon and reached Louisville the nextmorning. I found General Anderson quartered at the LouisvilleHotel, and he had taken a dwelling homes on ______ Street as anoffice. Captain O. D. Greens was his adjutant-general, LieutenantThrockmorton his aide, and Captain Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was on duty with him. General George H. Thomas had been dispatchedto camp Dick Robinson, to relieve Nelson. 

The city was full of all sorts of rumors. The Legislature, movedby considerations purely of a political nature, had taken the step, whatever it was, that amounted to an adherence to the Union, instead of joining the already-seceded States. This wasuniversally known to be the signal for action. For it we wereutterly unprepared, whereas the rebels were fully prepared. General Sidney Johnston immediately crossed into Kentucky, andadvanced as far as Bowling Green, which he began to fortify, andthence dispatched General Buckner with a division forward towardLouisville; General Zollicoffer, in like manner, entered the Stateand advanced as far as Somerset. On the day I reached Louisvillethe excitement ran high. It was known that Columbus, Kentucky, hadbeen occupied, September 7th, by a strong rebel force, underGenerals Pillow and Polk, and that General Grant had moved fromCairo and occupied Paducah in force on the 6th. Many of the rebelfamilies expected Buckner to reach Louisville at any moment. Thatnight, General Anderson sent for me, and I found with him Mr. Guthrie, president of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, who hadin his hands a dispatch to the effect that the bridge across theRolling Fork of Salt Creek, less than thirty miles out, had beenburned, and that Buckner's force, en route for Louisville, had beendetained beyond Green River by a train thrown from the track. Welearned afterward that a man named Bird had displaced a rail onpurpose to throw the train off the track, and thereby give us time. 

Mr. Guthrie explained that in the ravine just beyond Salt Creekwere several high and important trestles which, if destroyed, wouldtake months to replace, and General Anderson thought it well. Worth the effort to save them. Also, on Muldraugh's Hill beyond, was a strong position, which had in former years been used as thesite for the State "Camp of Instruction, " and we all supposed thatGeneral Buckner, who was familiar with the ground, was aiming for aposition there, from which to operate on Louisville. 

All the troops we had to counteract Buckner were Rousseau's Legion, and a few Home Guards in Louisville. The former were stillencamped across the river at Jeffersonville; so General Andersonordered me to go over, and with them, and such Home Guards as wecould collect, make the effort to secure possession of Muldraugh'sHill before Buckner could reach it. I took Captain Prime with me;and crossed over to Rousseau's camp. The long-roll was beaten, andwithin an hour the men, to the number of about one thousand, weremarching for the ferry-boat and for the Nashville depot. MeantimeGeneral Anderson had sent to collect some Home Guards, and Mr. Guthrie to get the trains ready. It was after midnight before webegan to move. The trains proceeded slowly, and it was daybreakwhen we reached Lebanon Junction, twenty-six miles out, where wedisembarked, and marched to the bridge over Salt River, which wefound had been burnt; whether to prevent Buckner coming intoLouisville, or us from going out, was not clear. Rousseau's Legionforded the stream and marched up to the State Camp of Instruction, finding the high trestles all secure. The railroad hands went towork at once to rebuild the bridge. I remained a couple of days atLebanon Junction, during which General Anderson forwarded tworegiments of volunteers that had come to him. Before the bridgewas done we advanced the whole camp to the summit of Muldraugh'sHill, just back of Elizabethtown. There I learned definitely thatGeneral Buckner had not crossed Green River at all, that GeneralSidney Johnston was fortifying Bowling Green, and preparing for asystematic advance into Kentucky, of which he was a native, andwith whose people and geography he must have been familiar. Asfast as fresh troops reached Louisville, they were sent out to meat Muldraugh's Hill, where I was endeavoring to put them into shapefor service, and by the 1st of October I had the equivalent of adivision of two brigades preparing to move forward toward GreenRiver. The daily correspondence between General Anderson andmyself satisfied me that the worry and harassment at Louisvillewere exhausting his strength and health, and that he would soonleave. On a telegraphic summons from him, about the 5th ofOctober, I went down to Louisville, when General Anderson said hecould not stand the mental torture of his command any longer, andthat he must go away, or it would kill him. On the 8th of Octoberhe actually published an order relinquishing the command, and, byreason of my seniority, I had no alternative but to assume command, though much against the grain, and in direct violation of Mr. Lincoln's promise to me. I am certain that, in my earliestcommunication to the War Department, I renewed the expression of mywish to remain in a subordinate position, and that I received theassurance that Brigadier-General Buell would soon arrive fromCalifornia, and would be sent to relieve me. By that time I hadbecome pretty familiar with the geography and the general resourcesof Kentucky. We had parties all over the State raising regimentsand companies; but it was manifest that the young men weregenerally inclined to the cause of the South, while the older menof property wanted to be let alone--i. E. , to remain neutral. As toa forward movement that fall, it was simply impracticable; for wewere forced to use divergent lines, leading our columns farther andfarther apart; and all I could attempt was to go on and collectforce and material at the two points already chosen, viz. , DickRobinson and Elizabethtown. General George H. Thomas stillcontinued to command the former, and on the 12th of October Idispatched Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook to command the latter, which had been moved forward to Nolin Creek, fifty-two miles out ofLouisville, toward Bowling Green. Staff-officers began to arriveto relieve us of the constant drudgery which, up to that time, hadbeen forced on General Anderson and myself; and these were all goodmen. Colonel Thomas Swords, quartermaster, arrived on the 13th;Paymaster Larned on the 14th; and Lieutenant Smyzer, FifthArtillery, acting ordnance-officer, on the 20th; Captain Symondswas already on duty as the commissary of subsistence; Captain O. D. Greene was the adjutant-general, and completed a good workingstaff. 

The everlasting worry of citizens complaining of every pettydelinquency of a soldier, and forcing themselves forward to discusspolitics, made the position of a commanding general no sinecure. Icontinued to strengthen the two corps forward and their routes ofsupply; all the time expecting that Sidney Johnston, who was a realgeneral, and who had as correct information of our situation as Ihad, would unite his force with Zollicoffer, and fall on Thomas atDick Robinson, or McCook at Nolin: Had he done so in October, 1861, he could have walked into Louisville, and the vital part of thepopulation would have hailed him as a deliverer. Why he did not, was to me a mystery then and is now; for I know that he saw themove; and had his wagons loaded up at one time for a start towardFrankfort, passing between our two camps. Conscious of ourweakness, I was unnecessarily unhappy, and doubtless exhibited ittoo much to those near me; but it did seem to me that theGovernment at Washington, intent on the larger preparations ofFremont in Missouri and McClellan in Washington, actually ignoredus in Kentucky. 

About this time, say the middle of October, I received notice, bytelegraph, that the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron (then in St. Louis), would visit me at Louisville, on his way back toWashington. I was delighted to have an opportunity to properlyrepresent the actual state of affairs, and got Mr. Guthrie to gowith me across to Jeffersonville, to meet the Secretary of War andescort him to Louisville. The train was behind time, but Mr. Guthrie and I waited till it actually arrived. Mr. Cameron wasattended by Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas, and six or sevengentlemen who turned out to be newspaper reporters. Mr. Cameron'sfirst inquiry was, when he could start for Cincinnati, saying that, as he had been detained at St. Louis so long, it was important heshould hurry on to Washington. I explained that the regularmail-boat would leave very soon--viz. , at 12 M. --but I begged himto come over to Louisville; that I wanted to see him on business asimportant as any in Washington, and hoped he would come and spendat least a day with us. He asked if every thing was not well withus, and I told him far from it; that things were actually bad, asbad as bad could be. This seemed to surprise him, and Mr. Guthrieadded his persuasion to mine; when Mr. Cameron, learning that hecould leave Louisville by rail via Frankfort next morning early, and make the same connections at Cincinnati, consented to go withus to Louisville, with the distinct understanding that he mustleave early the next morning for Washington. 

We accordingly all took hacks, crossed the river by the ferry, anddrove to the Galt House, where I was then staying. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood had come down from Indianapolis by the sametrain, and was one of the party. We all proceeded to my room onthe first floor of the Galt House, where our excellent landlord, Silas Miller, Esq. , sent us a good lunch and something to drink. Mr. Cameron was not well, and lay on my bed, but joined in thegeneral conversation. He and his party seemed to be full of theparticulars of the developments in St. Louis of some of Fremont'sextravagant contracts and expenses, which were the occasion ofCameron's trip to St. Louis, and which finally resulted inFremont's being relieved, first by General Hunter, and after byGeneral H. W. Halleck. 

After some general conversation, Mr. Cameron called to me, "Now, General Sherman, tell us of your troubles. " I said I preferred notto discuss business with so many strangers present. He said, "They are all friends, all members of my family, and you may speakyour mind freely and without restraint. " I am sure I stepped tothe door, locked it to prevent intrusion, and then fully and fairlyrepresented the state of affairs in Kentucky, especially thesituation and numbers of my troops. I complained that the newlevies of Ohio and Indiana were diverted East and West, and we gotscarcely any thing; that our forces at Nolin and Dick Robinson werepowerless for invasion, and only tempting to a general such as webelieved Sidney Johnston to be; that, if Johnston chose, he couldmarch to Louisville any day. Cameron exclaimed: "You astonish me!Our informants, the Kentucky Senators and members of Congress, claim that they have in Kentucky plenty of men, and all they wantare arms and money. " I then said it was not true; for the youngmen were arming and going out openly in broad daylight to the rebelcamps, provided with good horses and guns by their fathers, whowere at best "neutral;" and as to arms, he had, in Washington, promised General Anderson forty thousand of the best Springfieldmuskets, instead of which we had received only about twelvethousand Belgian muskets, which the Governor of Pennsylvania hadrefused, as had also the Governor of Ohio, but which had beenadjudged good enough for Kentucky. I asserted that volunteercolonels raising regiments in various parts of the State had cometo Louisville for arms, and when they saw what I had to offer hadscorned to receive them--to confirm the truth of which I appealedto Mr. Guthrie, who said that every word I had spoken was true, andhe repeated what I had often heard him say, that no man who owned aslave or a mule in Kentucky could be trusted. 

Mr. Cameron appeared alarmed at what was said, and turned toAdjutant-General L. Thomas, to inquire if he knew of any troopsavailable, that had not been already assigned. He mentionedNegley's Pennsylvania Brigade, at Pittsburg, and a couple of otherregiments that were then en route for St. Louis. Mr. Cameronordered him to divert these to Louisville, and Thomas made thetelegraphic orders on the spot. He further promised, on reachingWashington, to give us more of his time and assistance. 

In the general conversation which followed, I remember taking alarge map of the United States, and assuming the people of thewhole South to be in rebellion, that our task was to subdue them, showed that McClellan was on the left, having a frontage of lessthan a hundred miles, and Fremont the right, about the same;whereas I, the centre, had from the Big Sandy to Paducah, overthree hundred miles of frontier; that McClellan had a hundredthousand men, Fremont sixty thousand, whereas to me had only beenallotted about eighteen thousand. I argued that, for the purposeof defense we should have sixty thousand men at once, and foroffense, would need two hundred thousand, before we were done. Mr. Cameron, who still lay on the bed, threw up his hands andexclaimed, "Great God! where are they to come from?" I assertedthat there were plenty of men at the North, ready and willing tocome, if he would only accept their services; for it was notoriousthat regiments had been formed in all the Northwestern States, whose services had been refused by the War Department, on theground that they would not be needed. We discussed all thesematters fully, in the most friendly spirit, and I thought I hadaroused Mr. Cameron to a realization of the great war that wasbefore us, and was in fact upon us. I heard him tell GeneralThomas to make a note of our conversation, that he might attend tomy requests on reaching Washington. We all spent the eveningtogether agreeably in conversation, many Union citizens calling topay their respects, and the next morning early we took the trainfor Frankfort; Mr. Cameron and party going on to Cincinnati andWashington, and I to Camp Dick Robinson to see General Thomas andthe troops there. 

I found General Thomas in a tavern, with most of his regimentscamped about him. He had sent a small force some miles in advancetoward Cumberland Gap, under Brigadier-General Schoepf. Remainingthere a couple of days, I returned to Louisville; on the 22d ofOctober, General Negley's brigade arrived in boats from Pittsburg, was sent out to Camp Nolin; and the Thirty-seventh Indiana. , Colonel Hazzard, and Second Minnesota, Colonel Van Cleve, alsoreached Louisville by rail, and were posted at Elizabethtown andLebanon Junction. These were the same troops which had beenordered by Mr. Cameron when at Louisville, and they were all that Ireceived thereafter, prior to my leaving Kentucky. On reachingWashington, Mr. Cameron called on General Thomas, as he himselfafterward told me, to submit his memorandum of events during hisabsence, and in that memorandum was mentioned my insane request fortwo hundred thousand men. By some newspaper man this was seen andpublished, and, before I had the least conception of it, I wasuniversally published throughout the country as "insane, crazy, "etc. Without any knowledge, however, of this fact, I hadpreviously addressed to the Adjutant-General of the army atWashington this letter:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OP THE CUMBERLAND, LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, October 22, 1881. 

To General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C. 

Sir: On my arrival at Camp Dick Robinson, I found GeneralThomas had stationed a Kentucky regiment at Rock Castle Hill, beyond a river of the same name, and had sent an Ohio and anIndiana regiment forward in support. He was embarrassed fortransportation, and I authorized him to hire teams, and to move hiswhole force nearer to his advance-guard, so as to support it, as hehad information of the approach of Zollicoffer toward London. Ihave just heard from him, that he had sent forward General Schoepfwith Colonel Wolford's cavalry, Colonel Steadman's Ohio regiment, and a battery of artillery, followed on a succeeding day by aTennessee brigade. He had still two Kentucky regiments, theThirty-eighth Ohio and another battery of artillery, with which hewas to follow yesterday. This force, if concentrated, should bestrong enough for the purpose; at all events, it is all he had or Icould give him. 

I explained to you fully, when here, the supposed position of ouradversaries, among which was a force in the valley of Big Sandy, supposed to be advancing on Paris, Kentucky. General Nelson atMaysville was instructed to collect all the men he could, andColonel Gill's regiment of Ohio Volunteers. Colonel Harris wasalready in position at Olympian Springs, and a regiment lay atLexington, which I ordered to his support. This leaves the line ofThomas's operations exposed, but I cannot help it. I explained sofully to yourself and the Secretary of War the condition of things, that I can add nothing new until further developments, You know myviews that this great centre of our field is too weak, far tooweak, and I have begged and implored till I dare not say more. 

Buckner still is beyond Green River. He sent a detachment of hismen, variously estimated at from two to four thousand towardGreensburg. General Ward, with about one thousand men, retreatedto Campbellsburg, where he called to his assistance somepartially-formed regiments to the number of about two thousand. The enemy did not advance, and General Ward was at last dates atCampbellsburg. The officers charged with raising regiments must ofnecessity be near their homes to collect men, and for this reasonare out of position; but at or near Greensburg and Lebanon, Idesire to assemble as large a force of the Kentucky Volunteers aspossible. This organization is necessarily irregular, but thenecessity is so great that I must have them, and therefore haveissued to them arms and clothing during the process of formation. This has facilitated their enlistment; but inasmuch as theLegislature has provided money for organizing the KentuckyVolunteers, and intrusted its disbursement to a board of loyalgentlemen, I have endeavored to cooperate with them to hasten theformation of these corps. 

The great difficulty is, and has been, that as volunteers offer, wehave not arms and clothing to give them. The arms sent us are, asyou already know, European muskets of uncouth pattern, which thevolunteers will not touch. 

General McCook has now three brigades--Johnson's, Wood's, andRousseau's. Negley's brigade arrived to-day, and will be sent outat once. The Minnesota regiment has also arrived, and will be sentforward. Hazzard's regiment of Indiana troops I have ordered tothe month of Salt Creek, an important point on the turnpike-roadleading to Elizabethtown. 

I again repeat that our force here is out of all proportion to theimportance of the position. Our defeat would be disastrous to thenation; and to expect of new men, who never bore arms, to domiracles, is not right. 

I am, with much respect, yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding. 

About this time my attention was drawn to the publication in allthe Eastern papers, which of course was copied at the West, of thereport that I was "crazy, insane, and mad, " that "I had demandedtwo hundred thousand men for the defense of Kentucky;" and theauthority given for this report was stated to be the Secretary ofWar himself, Mr. Cameron, who never, to my knowledge, took pains toaffirm or deny it. My position was therefore simply unbearable, and it is probable I resented the cruel insult with language ofintense feeling. Still I received no orders, no reenforcements, not a word of encouragement or relief. About November 1st, GeneralMcClellan was appointed commander-in-chief of all the armies in thefield, and by telegraph called for a report from me. It isherewith given:

HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Louisville, Kentucky, November 4, 1861

General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C. 

Sir: In compliance with the telegraphic orders of GeneralMcClellan, received late last night, I submit this report of theforces in Kentucky, and of their condition. 

The tabular statement shows the position of the several regiments. The camp at Nolin is at the present extremity of the NashvilleRailroad. This force was thrown forward to meet the advance ofBuckner's army, which then fell back to Green River, twenty-threemiles beyond. These regiments were substantially without means oftransportation, other than the railroad, which is guarded at alldangerous points, yet is liable to interruption at any moment, bythe tearing up of a rail by the disaffected inhabitants or a hiredenemy. These regiments are composed of good materials, but devoidof company officers of experience, and have been put under thoroughdrill since being in camp. They are generally well clad, andprovided for. Beyond Green River, the enemy has masked his forces, and it is very difficult to ascertain even the approximate numbers. No pains have been spared to ascertain them, but without success, and it is well known that they far outnumber us. Depending, however, on the railroads to their rear for transportation, theyhave not thus far advanced this side of Green River, except inmarauding parties. This is the proper line of advance, but willrequire a very large force, certainly fifty thousand men, as theirrailroad facilities south enable them to concentrate atMunfordsville the entire strength of the South. General McCook'scommand is divided into four brigades, under Generals Wood, R. W. Johnson, Rousseau, and Negley. 

General Thomas's line of operations is from Lexington, towardCumberland Gap and Ford, which are occupied by a force of rebelTennesseeans, under the command of Zollicoffer. Thomas occupiesthe position at London, in front of two roads which lead to thefertile part of Kentucky, the one by Richmond, and the other byCrab Orchard, with his reserve at Camp Dick Robinson, eight milessouth of the Kentucky River. His provisions and stores go byrailroad from Cincinnati to Nicholasville, and thence in wagons tohis several regiments. He is forced to hire transportation. 

Brigadier-General Nelson is operating by the line from OlympianSprings, east of Paris, on the Covington & Lexington Railroad, toward Prestonburg, in the valley of the Big Sandy where isassembled a force of from twenty-five to thirty-five hundred rebelKentuckians waiting reenforcements from Virginia. My last reportfrom him was to October 28th, at which time he had Colonel Harris'sOhio Second, nine hundred strong; Colonel Norton's Twenty-firstOhio, one thousand; and Colonel Sill's Thirty-third Ohio, sevenhundred and fifty strong; with two irregular Kentucky regiments, Colonels Marshall and Metcalf. These troops were on the road nearHazel Green and West Liberty, advancing toward Prestonburg. 

Upon an inspection of the map, you will observe these are alldivergent lines, but rendered necessary, from the fact that ourenemies choose them as places of refuge from pursuit, where theycan receive assistance from neighboring States. Our lines are alltoo weak, probably with the exception of that to Prestonburg. Tostrengthen these, I am thrown on the raw levies of Ohio andIndiana, who arrive in detachments, perfectly fresh from thecountry, and loaded down with baggage, also upon the Kentuckians, who are slowly forming regiments all over the State, at pointsremote from danger, and whom it will be almost impossible toassemble together. The organization of this latter force is, bythe laws of Kentucky, under the control of a military board ofcitizens, at the capital, Frankfort, and they think they will beenabled to have fifteen regiments toward the middle of this month, but I doubt it, and deem it unsafe to rely on them: There are fourregiments forming in the neighborhood of Owensboro, near the mouthof Green River, who are doing good service, also in theneighborhood of Campbellsville, but it is unsafe to rely on troopsso suddenly armed and equipped. They are not yet clothed oruniformed. I know well you will think our force too widelydistributed, but we are forced to it by the attitude of ourenemies, whose force and numbers the country never has and probablynever will comprehend. 

I am told that my estimate of troops needed for this line, viz. , two hundred thousand, has been construed to my prejudice, andtherefore leave it for the future. This is the great centre onwhich our enemies can concentrate whatever force is not employedelsewhere. Detailed statement of present force inclosed with this. 

With great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL McCOOK'S CAMP, AT NOLIN, FIFTY-TWO MILES FROMLOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, NOVEMBER 4, 1861. 

First Brigade (General ROUSSEAU). -Third Kentucky, Colonel Bulkley;Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Whittaker; First Cavalry, Colonel Board;Stone's battery; two companies Nineteenth United States Infantry, and two companies Fifteenth United States Infantry, Captain Gilman. 

Second Brigade (General T. J. WOOD). -Thirty-eighth Indiana, ColonelScribner; Thirty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Harrison; ThirtiethIndiana, Colonel Bass; Twenty-ninth Indiana, Colonel Miller. 

Third Brigade (General JOHNSON). -Forty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Gibson;Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel Dickey; Thirty-fourth Illinois, ColonelKing; Thirty-second Indiana, Colonel Willach. 

Fourth Brigade (General NEGLEY). -Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Colonel Hambright; Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, Colonel Sinnell;Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, Colonel Stambaugh; Battery, CaptainMueller. 

Camp Dick Robinson (General G. H. THOMAS). ---Kentucky, ColonelBramlette;--Kentucky, Colonel Fry;--Kentucky Cavalry, ColonelWoolford; Fourteenth Ohio, Colonel Steadman; First Artillery, Colonel Barnett; Third Ohio, Colonel Carter;--East Tennessee, Colonel Byrd. 

Bardstown, Kentucky. -Tenth Indiana, Colonel Manson. 

Crab Orchard. -Thirty-third Indiana, Colonel Coburn. 

Jeffersonville, Indiana. -Thirty-fourth Indiana, Colonel Steele;Thirty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Gross; First Wisconsin, ColonelStarkweather. 

Mouth of Salt River. -Ninth Michigan, Colonel Duffield;Thirty-seventh Indiana, Colonel Hazzard. 

Lebanon Junction.. -Second Minnesota, Colonel Van Cleve. 

Olympian Springs. -Second Ohio, Colonel Harris. 

Cynthiana, Kentucky. -Thirty-fifth Ohio, Colonel Vandever. 

Nicholasville, Kentucky. -Twenty-first Ohio, Colonel Norton;Thirty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Bradley. 

Big Hill. -Seventeenth Ohio, Colonel Connell. 

Colesburg. -Twenty-fourth Illinois, Colonel Hecker. 

Elizabethtown, Kentucky. -Nineteenth Illinois, Colonel Turchin. 

Owensboro' or Henderson. -Thirty-first Indiana, Colonel Cruft;Colonel Edwards, forming Rock Castle; Colonel Boyle, Harrodsburg;Colonel Barney, Irvine; Colonel Hazzard, Burksville; ColonelHaskins, Somerset. 

And, in order to conclude this subject, I also add copies of twotelegraphic dispatches, sent for General McClellan's use about thesame time, which are all the official letters received at hisheadquarters, as certified by the Adjutant-General, L. Thomas, in aletter of February 1, 1862; in answer to an application of mybrother, Senator John Sherman, and on which I was adjudged insane:

Louisville, November 3, 10 p. M. 

To General McLELLAN, Washington, D. C. :

Dispatch just received. We are forced to operate on three lines, all dependent on railroads of doubtful safety, requiring strongguards. From Paris to Prestonbnrg, three Ohio regiments and somemilitia--enemy variously reported from thirty-five hundred to seventhousand. From Lexington toward Cumberland Gap, Brigadier-GeneralThomas, one Indiana and five Ohio regiments, two Kentucky and twoTennessee; hired wagons and badly clad. Zollicoffer, at CumberlandFord, about seven thousand. Lee reported on the way with Virginiareenforcements. In front of Louisville, fifty-two miles, McCook, with four brigades of about thirteen thousand, with four regimentsto guard the railroad, at all times in danger. Enemy along therailroad from Green River to Bowling Green, Nashville, andClarksville. Buckner, Hardee, Sidney Johnston, Folk, and Pillow, the two former in immediate command, the force as large as theywant or can subsist, from twenty-five to thirty thousand. BowlingGreen strongly fortified. Our forces too small to do good, and toolarge to sacrifice. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General. 

HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, Louisville, Kentucky, November 6, 1861

General L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General. 

Sir: General McClellan telegraphs me to report to him daily thesituation of affairs here. The country is so large that it isimpossible to give clear and definite views. Our enemies have aterrible advantage in the fact that in our midst, in our camps, andalong our avenues of travel, they have active partisans, farmersand business-men, who seemingly pursue their usual calling, but arein fact spies. They report all our movements and strength, whilewe can procure information only by circuitous and unreliable means. I inclose you the copy of an intercepted letter, which is but thetype of others. Many men from every part of the State are nowenrolled under Buckner--have gone to him--while ours have to beraised in neighborhoods, and cannot be called together except atlong notice. These volunteers are being organized under the lawsof the State, and the 10th of November is fixed for the time ofconsolidating them into companies and regiments. Many of them arearmed by the United States as home guards, and many by GeneralAnderson and myself, because of the necessity of being armed toguard their camps against internal enemies. Should we beoverwhelmed, they would scatter, and their arms and clothing willgo to the enemy, furnishing the very material they so much need. We should have here a very large force, sufficient to giveconfidence to the Union men of the ability to do what should bedone--possess ourselves of all the State. But all see and feel weare brought to a stand-still, and this produces doubt and alarm. With our present force it would be simple madness to cross GreenRiver, and yet hesitation may be as fatal. In like manner theother columns are in peril, not so much in front as rear, therailroads over which our stores must pass being much exposed. Ihave the Nashville Railroad guarded by three regiments, yet it isfar from being safe; and, the moment actual hostilities commence, these roads will be interrupted, and we will be in a dilemma. Tomeet this in part I have put a cargo of provisions at the mouth ofSalt River, guarded by two regiments. All these detachments weakenthe main force, and endanger the whole. Do not conclude, asbefore, that I exaggerate the facts. They are as stated, and thefuture looks as dark as possible. It would be better if some manof sanguine mind were here, for I am forced to order according tomy convictions. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding. 

After the war was over, General Thomas J. Wood, then in command ofthe district of Vicksburg, prepared a statement addressed to thepublic, describing the interview with the Secretary of War, whichhe calls a "Council of War. " I did not then deem it necessary torenew a matter which had been swept into oblivion by the waritself; but, as it is evidence by an eyewitness, it is worthy ofinsertion here. 

STATEMENT. 

On the 11th of October, 1861, the writer, who had been personallyon mustering duty in Indiana, was appointed a brigadier-general ofvolunteers, and ordered to report to General Sherman, then incommand of the Department of the Cumberland, with his headquartersat Louisville, having succeeded General Robert Anderson. When thewriter was about leaving Indianapolis to proceed to Louisville, Mr. Cameron, returning from his famous visit of inspection to GeneralFremont's department, at St. Louis, Missouri, arrived atIndianapolis, and announced his intention to visit General Sherman. 

The writer was invited to accompany the party to Louisville. Taking the early morning train from Indianapolis to Louisville onthe 16th of October, 1861, the party arrived in Jeffersonvilleshortly after mid-day. General Sherman met the party inJeffersonville, and accompanied it to the Galt House, inLouisville, the hotel at which he was stopping. 

During the afternoon General Sherman informed the writer that acouncil of war was to be held immediately in his private room inthe hotel, and desired him to be present at the council. GeneralSherman and the writer proceeded directly to the room. The writerentered the room first, and observed in it Mr. Cameron, Adjutant-General L. Thomas, and some other persons, all of whose names hedid not know, but whom he recognized as being of Mr. Cameron'sparty. The name of one of the party the writer had learned, whichhe remembers as Wilkinson, or Wilkerson, and who he understood wasa writer for the New York Tribune newspaper. The Hon. JamesGuthrie was also in the room, having been invited, on account ofhis eminent position as a citizen of Kentucky, his high civicreputation, and his well-known devotion to the Union, to meet theSecretary of War in the council. When General Sherman entered theroom he closed the door, and turned the key in the lock. 

Before entering on the business of the meeting, General Shermanremarked substantially: "Mr. Cameron, we have met here to discussmatters and interchange views which should be known only by personshigh in the confidence of the Government. There are personspresent whom I do not know, and I desire to know, before openingthe business of the council, whether they are persons who may beproperly allowed to hear the views which I have to submit to you. "Mr. Cameron replied, with some little testiness of manner, that thepersons referred to belonged to his party, and there was noobjection to their knowing whatever might be communicated to him. 

Certainly the legitimate and natural conclusion from this remark ofMr. Cameron's was that whatever views might be submitted by GeneralSherman would be considered under the protection of the seal ofsecrecy, and would not be divulged to the public till allapprehension of injurious consequences from such disclosure hadpassed. And it may be remarked, further, that justice to GeneralSherman required that if, at any future time, his conclusions as tothe amount of force necessary to conduct the operations committedto his charge should be made public, the grounds on which hisconclusions were based should be made public at the same time. 

Mr. Cameron then asked General Sherman what his plans were. Tothis General Sherman replied that he had no plans; that nosufficient force had been placed at his disposition with which todevise any plan of operations; that, before a commanding generalcould project a plan of campaign, he must know what amount of forcehe would have to operate with. 

The general added that he had views which he would be happy tosubmit for the consideration of the Secretary. Mr. Cameron desiredto hear General Sherman's views. 

General Sherman began by giving his opinion of the people ofKentucky, and the then condition of the State. He remarked that hebelieved a very large majority of the people of Kentucky werethoroughly devoted to the Union, and loyal to the Government, andthat the Unionists embraced almost all the older and moresubstantial men in the State; but, unfortunately, there was noorganization nor arms among the Union men; that the rebel minority, thoroughly vindictive in its sentiments, was organized and armed(this having been done in advance by their leaders), and, beyondthe reach of the Federal forces, overawed and prevented the Unionmen from organizing; that, in his opinion, if Federal protectionwere extended throughout the State to the Union men, a large forcecould be raised for the service of the Government. 

General Sherman next presented a resume of the information in hispossession as to the number of the rebel troops in Kentucky. Commencing with the force at Columbus, Kentucky, the reportsvaried, giving the strength from ten to twenty thousand. It wascommanded by Lieutenant-General Polk. General Sherman fixed it atthe lowest estimate; say, ten thousand. The force at BowlingGreen, commanded by General. A. S. Johnston, supported by Hardee, Buckner, and others, was variously estimated at from eighteen tothirty thousand. General Sherman estimated this force at thelowest figures given to it by his information--eighteen thousand. 

He explained that, for purposes of defense, these two forces ought, owing to the facility with which troops might be transported fromone to the other, by the net-work of railroads in Middle and WestTennessee, to be considered almost as one. General Shermanremarked, also, on the facility with which reinforcements could betransported by railroad to Bowling Green, from the other rebellionsStates. 

The third organized body of rebel troops was in Eastern Kentucky, under General Zollicoffer, estimated, according to the mostreliable information, at six thousand men. This force threatened adescent, if unrestrained, on the blue-grass region of Kentucky, including the cities of Lexington, and Frankfort, the capital ofthe State; and if successful in its primary movements, as it wouldgather head as it advanced, might endanger the safety ofCincinnati. 

General Sherman said that the information in his possessionindicated an intention, on the part of the rebels, of a general andgrand advance toward the Ohio River. He further expressed theopinion that, if such advance should be made, and not checked, therebel force would be swollen by at least twenty thousand recruitsfrom the disloyalists in Kentucky. His low computation of theorganized rebel soldiers then in Kentucky fixed the strength atabout thirty-five thousand. Add twenty thousand for reenforcementsgained in Kentucky, to say nothing of troops drawn from other rebelStates, and the effective rebel force in the State, at a lowestimate, would be fifty-five thousand men. 

General Sherman explained forcibly how largely the difficulties ofsuppressing the rebellion would be enhanced, if the rebels shouldbe allowed to plant themselves firmly, with strong fortifications, at commanding points on the Ohio River. It would be facile forthem to carry the war thence into the loyal States north of theriver. 

To resist an advance of the rebels, General Sherman stated that hedid not have at that time in Kentucky more than some twelve tofourteen thousand effective men. The bulk of this force was postedat camp Nolin, on the Louisville & Nashville Railway, fifty milessouth of Louisville. A part of it was in Eastern Kentucky, underGeneral George H. Thomas, and a very small force was in the lowervalley of Green River. 

This disposition of the force had been made for the double purposeof watching and checking the rebels, and protecting the raising andorganization of troops among the Union men of Kentucky. 

Having explained the situation from the defensive point of view, General Sherman proceeded to consider it from the offensivestand-point. The Government had undertaken to suppress therebellion; the onus faciendi, therefore, rested on the Government. The rebellion could never be put down, the authority of theparamount Government asserted, and the union of the States declaredperpetual, by force of arms, by maintaining the defensive; toaccomplish these grand desiderata, it was absolutely necessary theGovernment should adopt, and maintain until the rebellion wascrushed, the offensive. 

For the purpose of expelling the rebels from Kentucky, GeneralSherman said that at least sixty thousand soldiers were necessary. Considering that the means of accomplishment must always beproportioned to the end to be achieved, and bearing in mind thearray of rebel force then in Kentucky, every sensible man mustadmit that the estimate of the force given by General Sherman, fordriving the rebels out of the State, and reestablishing andmaintaining the authority of the Government, was a very low one. The truth is that, before the rebels were driven from Kentucky, many more than sixty thousand soldiers were sent into the State. 

Ascending from the consideration of the narrow question of thepolitical and military situation in Kentucky, and the extent offorce necessary to redeem the State from rebel thraldom, forecasting in his sagacious intellect the grand and daringoperations which, three years afterward, he realized in a campaign, taken in its entirety, without a parallel in modern times, GeneralSherman expressed the opinion that, to carry the war to the Gulf ofMexico, and destroy all armed opposition to the Goverment, in theentire Mississippi Valley, at least two hundred thousand troopswere absolutely requisite. 

So soon as General Sherman had concluded the expression of hisviews, Mr. Cameron asked, with much warmth and apparent irritation, "Where do you suppose, General Sherman, all this force is to comefrom. " General Sherman replied that he did not know; that it wasnot his duty to raise, organize, and put the necessary militaryforce into the field; that duty pertained to the War Department. His duty was to organize campaigns and command the troops afterthey had been put into the field. 

At this point of the proceedings, General Sherman suggested that itmight be agreeable to the Secretary to hear the views of Mr. Guthrie. Thus appealed to, Mr. Guthrie said he did not considerhimself, being a civilian, competent to give an opinion as to theextent of force necessary to parry the war to the Gulf of Mexico;but, being well informed of the condition of things in Kentucky, heindorsed fully General Sherman's opinion of the force required todrive the rebels out of the State. 

The foregoing is a circumstantial account of the deliberations ofthe council that were of any importance. 

A good deal of desultory conversation followed, on immaterialmatters; and some orders were issued by telegraph, by the Secretaryof War, for some small reenforcements to be sent to Kentuckyimmediately, from Pennsylvania and Indiana. 

A short time after the council was held--the exact time is not nowremembered by the writer--an imperfect narrative of it appeared inthe New York Tribune. This account announced to the public theconclusions uttered by General Sherman in the council, withoutgiving the reasons on which his conclusions were based. Theunfairness of this course to General Sherman needs no comment. Allmilitary men were shocked by the gross breach of faith which hadbeen committed

TH. J. WOOD, Major-General Volunteers

Vicksburg, Mississippi, August 24, 1886. 

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell arrived at Louisville about themiddle of November, with orders to relieve me, and I wastransferred for duty to the Department of the Missouri, and orderedto report in person to Major-General H. W. Halleck at St. Louis. Iaccompanied General Buell to the camp at Nolin, where he reviewedand inspected the camp and troops under the command of General A. McD. McCook, and on our way back General Buell inspected theregiment of Hazzard at Elizabethtown. I then turned over mycommand to him, and took my departure for St. Louis. 

At the time I was so relieved I thought, of course, it was done infulfillment of Mr. Lincoln's promise to me, and as a necessaryresult of my repeated demand for the fulfillment of that promise;but I saw and felt, and was of course deeply moved to observe, themanifest belief that there was more or less of truth in the rumorthat the cares, perplexities, and anxiety of the situation hadunbalanced my judgment and mind. It was, doubtless, an incidentcommon to all civil wars, to which I could only submit with thebest grace possible, trusting to the future for an opportunity toredeem my fortune and good name. Of course I could not deny thefact, and had to submit to all its painful consequences for months;and, moreover, I could not hide from myself that many of theofficers and soldiers subsequently placed under my command lookedat me askance and with suspicion. Indeed, it was not until thefollowing April that the battle of Shiloh gave me personally thechance to redeem my good name. 

On reaching St. Louis and reporting to General Halleck, I wasreceived kindly, and was shortly afterward (viz. , November 23d)sent up to Sedalia to inspect the camp there, and the troopslocated along the road back to Jefferson City, and I was ordered toassume command in a certain contingency. I found General Steels atSedalia with his regiments scattered about loosely; and GeneralPope at Otterville, twenty miles back, with no concert betweenthem. The rebel general, Sterling Price, had his forces down aboutOsceola and Warsaw. I advised General Halleck to collect the wholeof his men into one camp on the La Mine River, near Georgetown, toput them into brigades and divisions, so as to be ready to behandled, and I gave some preliminary orders looking to that end. But the newspapers kept harping on my insanity and paralyzed myefforts. In spite of myself, they tortured from me some words andacts of imprudence. General Halleck telegraphed me on November26th: "Unless telegraph-lines are interrupted, make no movementof troops without orders;" and on November 29th: "No forwardmovement of troops on Osceola will be made; only strongreconnoitring-parties will be sent out in the supposed direction ofthe enemy; the bulk of the troops being held in position till morereliable information is obtained. "

About the same time I received the following dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURINovember 28, 1881. Brigadier-General SHERMAN, Sedalia:

Mrs. Sherman is here. General Halleck is satisfied, from reportsof scouts received here, that no attack on Sedalia is intended. You will therefore return to this city, and report yourobservations on the condition of the troops you have examined. Please telegraph when you will leave. 

SCHUYLER HAMILTON, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp. 

I accordingly returned to St. Louis, where I found Mrs. Sherman, naturally and properly distressed at the continued and reiteratedreports of the newspapers of my insanity, and she had come fromLancaster to see me. This recall from Sedalia simply swelled thecry. It was alleged that I was recalled by reason of somethingfoolish I had done at Sedalia, though in fact I had done absolutelynothing, except to recommend what was done immediately thereafteron the advice of Colonel McPherson, on a subsequent inspection. Seeing and realizing that my efforts were useless, I concluded toask for a twenty days' leave of absence, to accompany Mrs. Shermanto our home in Lancaster, and to allow the storm to blow oversomewhat. It also happened to be mid-winter, when, nothing wasdoing; so Mrs. Sherman and I returned to Lancaster, where I wasborn, and where I supposed I was better known and appreciated. 

The newspapers kept up their game as though instigated by malice, and chief among them was the Cincinnati Commercial, whose editor, Halsted, was generally believed to be an honorable man. P. B. Ewing, Esq. , being in Cincinnati, saw him and asked him why he, whocertainly knew better, would reiterate such a damaging slander. Heanswered, quite cavalierly, that it was one of the news-items ofthe day, and he had to keep up with the time; but he would be mosthappy to publish any correction I might make, as though I coulddeny such a malicious piece of scandal affecting myself. On the12th of November I had occasion to write to General Halleck, and Ihave a copy of his letter in answer:

ST. Louis, December 18, 1881. Brigadier-General W. T. SHERMAN, Lancaster, Ohio. 

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 12th was received a day or two ago, but was mislaid for the moment among private papers, or I shouldhave answered it sooner. The newspaper attacks are certainlyshameless and scandalous, but I cannot agree with you, that theyhave us in their power "to destroy us as they please. " I certainlyget my share of abuse, but it will not disturb me. 

Your movement of the troops was not countermanded by me because Ithought it an unwise one in itself, but because I was not thenready for it. I had better information of Price's movements thanyou had, and I had no apprehension of an attack. I intended toconcentrate the forces on that line, but I wished the movementdelayed until I could determine on a better position. 

After receiving Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson's report, I madeprecisely the location you had ordered. I was desirous at the timenot to prevent the advance of Price by any movement on our part, hoping that he would move on Lexington; but finding that he haddetermined to remain at Osceola for some time at least, I made themovement you proposed. As you could not know my plans, you andothers may have misconstrued the reason of my countermanding yourorders.... 

I hope to see you well enough for duty soon. Our organization goeson slowly, but we will effect it in time. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK. 

And subsequently, in a letter to Hon. Thomas Ewing, in answer tosome inquiries involving the same general subject, General Halleckwrote as follows:

Hon. THOMAS EWING, Lancaster, Ohio. 

DEAR SIR: Your note of the 13th, and one of this date, from Mr. Sherman, in relation to Brigadier-General Sherman's having beingrelieved from command in Sedalia, in November last, are justreceived. General Sherman was not put in command at Sedalia; hewas authorized to assume it, and did so for a day or two. He didnot know my plans, and his movement of troops did not accord withthem. I therefore directed him to leave them as they were, andreport here the result of his inspection, for which purpose he hadbeen ordered there. 

No telegram or dispatch of any kind was sent by me, or by any onewith my knowledge or authority, in relation to it. After hisreturn here, I gave him a leave of absence of twenty days, for thebenefit of his health. As I was then pressing General McClellanfor more officers, I deemed it necessary to explain why I did so. I used these words: "I am satisfied that General Sherman's physicaland mental system is so completely broken by labor and care as torender him, for the present, unfit for duty; perhaps a few weeks'rest may restore him. " This was the only communication I made onthe subject. On no occasion have I ever expressed an opinion thathis mind was affected otherwise than by over-exertion; to have saidso would have done him the greatest injustice. 

After General Sherman returned from his short leave, I found thathis health was nearly restored, and I placed him temporarily incommand of the camp of instruction, numbering over fifteen thousandmen. I then wrote to General McClellan that he would soon be ableto again take the field. I gave General Sherman a copy of myletter. This is the total of my correspondence on the subject. Asevidence that I have every confidence in General Sherman, I haveplaced him in command of Western Kentucky--a command only second inimportance in this department. As soon as divisions and columnscan be organized, I propose to send him into the field where he canrender most efficient service. I have seen newspaper squibs, charging him with being "crazy, " etc. This is the grossestinjustice; I do not, however, consider such attacks worthy ofnotice. The best answer is General Sherman's present position, andthe valuable services he is rendering to the country. I have thefullest confidence in him. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

On returning to St. Louis, on the expiration of my leave ofabsence, I found that General Halleck was beginning to move histroops: one part, under General U. S. Grant, up the TennesseeRiver; and another part, under General S. R. Curtis, in thedirection of Springfield, Missouri. General Grant was then atPaducah, and General Curtis was under orders for Rolls. I wasordered to take Curtis's place in command of the camp ofinstruction, at Benton Barracks, on the ground back of North St. Louis, now used as the Fair Grounds, by the following order:

[Special Order No. 87]. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURISt. Louis, December 23, 1861

[EXTRACT. ]

Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, United States Volunteers, ishereby assigned to the command of the camp of instruction and postof Benton Barracks. He will have every armed regiment and companyin his command ready for service at a moment's warning, and willnotify all concerned that, when marching orders are received, it isexpected that they will be instantly obeyed; no excuses for delaywill be admitted. General Sherman will immediately report to theseheadquarters what regiments and companies, at Benton Barracks, areready for the field. 

By order of Major-General Halleck, J. C. KELTEN, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

I immediately assumed command, and found, in the buildingconstructed for the commanding officer, Brigadier-General Strong, and the family of a captain of Iowa cavalry, with whom we boarded. Major Curtis, son of General Curtis, was the adjutant-general, butwas soon relieved by Captain J. H. Hammond, who was appointedassistant adjutant-general, and assigned to duty with me. 

Brigadier-General Hurlbut was also there, and about a dozenregiments of infantry and cavalry. I at once gave all matterspertaining to the post my personal attention, got the regiments inas good order as possible, kept up communication with GeneralHalleck's headquarters by telegraph, and, when orders came for themovement of any regiment or detachment, it moved instantly. Thewinter was very wet, and the ground badly drained. The quartershad been erected by General Fremont, under contract; they were mereshells, but well arranged for a camp, embracing the Fair Grounds, and some forty acres of flat ground west of it. I instituteddrills, and was specially ordered by General Halleck to watchGenerals Hurlbut and Strong, and report as to their fitness fortheir commissions as brigadier-generals. I had known Hurlbut as ayoung lawyer, in Charleston, South Carolina, before the MexicanWar, at which time he took a special interest in military matters, and I found him far above the average in the knowledge ofregimental and brigade drill, and so reported. General Strong hadbeen a merchant, and he told me that he never professed to be asoldier, but had been urged on the Secretary of War for thecommission of a brigadier-general, with the expectation of becoming quartermaster or commissary-general. He was a good, kind-hearted gentleman, boiling over with patriotism and zeal. Iadvised him what to read and study, was considerably amused at hisreceiving instruction from a young lieutenant who knew the companyand battalion drill, and could hear him practise in his room thewords of command, and tone of voice, "Break from the right, tomarch to the left!" "Battalion, halt!" "Forward into line!" etc. Of course I made a favorable report in his case. Among theinfantry and cavalry colonels were some who afterward rose todistinction--David Stuart, Gordon Granger, Bussey, etc. , etc. 

Though it was mid-winter, General Halleck was pushing hispreparations most vigorously, and surely he brought order out ofchaos in St. Louis with commendable energy. I remember, one night, sitting in his room, on the second floor of the Planters' House, with him and General Cullum, his chief of staff, talkingof things generally, and the subject then was of the much-talked-of"advance, " as soon as the season would permit. Most people urgedthe movement down the Mississippi River; but Generals Polk andPillow had a large rebel force, with heavy guns in a very strongposition, at Columbus, Kentucky, about eighteen miles below Cairo. Commodore Foote had his gunboat fleet at Cairo; and General U. S. Grant, who commanded the district, was collecting a large force atPaducah, Cairo, and Bird's Point. General Halleck had a map on histable, with a large pencil in his hand, and asked, "where is therebel line?" Cullum drew the pencil through Bowling Green, FortsDonelson and Henry, and Columbus, Kentucky. "That is their line, "said Halleck. "Now, where is the proper place to break it?" Andeither Cullum or I said, "Naturally the centre. " Halleck drew aline perpendicular to the other, near its middle, and it coincidednearly with the general course of the Tennessee River; and he said, "That's the true line of operations. " This occurred more than amonth before General Grant began the movement, and, as he wassubject to General Halleck's orders, I have always given Halleckthe full credit for that movement, which was skillful, successful, and extremely rich in military results; indeed, it was the firstreal success on our side in the civil war. The movement up theTennessee began about the 1st of February, and Fort Henry wascaptured by the joint action of the navy under Commodore Foote, andthe land forces under General Grant, on the 6th of February, 1862. About the same time, General S. R. Curtis had moved forward fromRolls, and, on the 8th of March, defeated the rebels underMcCulloch, Van Dom, and Price, at Pea Ridge. 

As soon as Fort Henry fell, General Grant marched straight acrossto Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, invested the place, and, as soon as the gunboats had come round from the Tennessee, and hadbombarded the water-front, he assaulted; whereupon Bucknersurrendered the garrison of twelve thousand men; Pillow andex-Secretary of War General Floyd having personally escaped acrossthe river at night, occasioning a good deal of fun and criticism attheir expense. 

Before the fall of Donelson, but after that of Henry, I received, at Benton Barracks, the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURISt. Louis, February, 13, 1862

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, Benton Barracks:

You will immediately repair to Paducah, Kentucky, and assumecommand of that post. Brigadier-General Hurlbut will accompanyyou. The command of Benton Barracks will be turned over to GeneralStrong. 

H. W. HALECK, Major-General. 

I started for Paducah the same day, and think that General Cullumwent with me to Cairo; General Halleck's purpose being to pushforward the operations up the Tennessee River with unusual vigor. On reaching Paducah, I found this dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS THE DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURISt. Louis, February 15, 1862

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, Paducah, Kentucky:

Send General Grant every thing you can spare from Paducah and Smithand also General Hurlbut. 

Bowling Green has been evacuated entirely. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

The next day brought us news of the surrender of Buckner, andprobably at no time during the war did we all feel so heavy aweight raised from our breasts, or so thankful for a most fruitfulseries of victories. They at once gave Generals Halleck, Grant, and C. F. Smith, great fame. Of course, the rebels let go theirwhole line, and fell back on Nashville and Island No. Ten, and tothe Memphis & Charleston Railroad. Everybody was anxious to help. Boats passed up and down constantly, and very soon arrived therebel prisoners from Donelson. I saw General Buckner on the boat, he seemed self-sufficient, and thought their loss was not really soserious to their cause as we did. 

About this time another force of twenty or twenty-five thousand menwas collected on the west bank of the Mississippi, above Cairo, under the command of Major-General John Pope, designed to becomethe "Army of the Mississippi, " and to operate, in conjunction withthe navy, down the river against the enemy's left flank, which hadheld the strong post of Columbus, Kentucky, but which, on the fallof Fort Donelson, had fallen back to New Madrid and Island No. 10. 

CHAPTER X. 

BATTLE of SHILOH. 

MARCH AND APRIL, 1862. 

By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded allthe armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his headquartersin St: Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio, Major-GeneralBuell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Grant, at Forts Henry and Donelson; the Army of the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R. Curtis, in SouthwestMissouri. He posted his chief of staff, General Cullum, at Cairo, and me at Paducah, chiefly to expedite and facilitate the importantoperations then in progress up the Tennessee, and CumberlandRivers. 

Fort Donelson had surrendered to General Grant on the 16th ofFebruary, and there must have been a good deal of confusionresulting from the necessary care of the wounded, and dispositionof prisoners, common to all such occasions, and there was a realdifficulty in communicating between St. Louis and Fort Donelson. 

General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which hadretreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville, acity of so much importance to the South, that it was at one timeproposed as its capital. Both Generals Grant and Buell looked toits capture as an event of great importance. On the 21st GeneralGrant sent General Smith with his division to Clarksville, fiftymiles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on the 27th wenthimself to Nashville to meet and confer with General Buell, butreturned to Donelson the next day. 

Meantime, General Halleck at St. Louis must have felt that hisarmies were getting away from him, and began to send dispatches tome at Paducah, to be forwarded by boat, or by a ricketytelegraph-line up to Fort Henry, which lay entirely in a hostilecountry, and was consequently always out of repair. On the 1st ofMarch I received the following dispatch, and forwarded it toGeneral Grant, both by the telegraph and boat:

To General GRANT, Fort Henry

Transports will be sent you as soon as possible, to move yourcolumn up the Tennessee River. The main object of this expeditionwill be to destroy the railroad-bridge over Bear Creek, nearEastport, Mississippi; and also the railroad connections atCorinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that theseobjects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments ofcavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapidmovements reach these points from the river, without any seriousopposition. 

Avoid any general engagements with strong forces. It will bebetter to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should bestrongly impressed on the officers sent with expeditions from theriver. General C. F. Smith or some very discreet officer should beselected for such commands. Having accomplished these objects, orsuch of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville, and move on Paris. 

Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humbolt can reach Paris byland as easily as to return to the transports. This must depend onthe character of the roads and the position of the enemy. Alltelegraphic lines which can be reached must be cut. The gunboatswill accompany the transports for their protection. Any loyalTennesseeans who desire it, may be enlisted and supplied with arms. Competent officers should be left to command Forts Henry andDonelson in your absence. I have indicated in general terms theobject of this. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

Again on the 2d:

Cairo, March 1, 1862

To General GRANT:

General Halleck, February 25th, telegraphs me: "General Grant willsend no more forces to Clarksville. General Smith's division willcome to Fort Henry, or a point higher up on the Tennessee River;transports will also be collected at Paducah. Two gunboats inTennessee River with Grant. General Grant will immediately havesmall garrisons detailed for Forts Henry and Donelson, and allother forces made ready for the field"

From your letter of the 28th, I learn you were at Fort Donelson, and General Smith at Nashville, from which I infer you could nothave received orders. Halleck's telegram of last night says: "Whosent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered it across to theTennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. Send all spare transports up Tennessee to General Grant. "Evidently the general supposes you to be on the Tennessee. I amsending all the transports I can find for you, reporting to GeneralSherman for orders to go up the Cumberland for you, or, if youmarch across to Fort Henry, then to send them up the Tennessee. 

G. W. CULLUM, Brigadier-General. 

On the 4th came this dispatch:

To Major-General U. S. GRANT

You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my ordersto report strength and positions of your command?

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

Halleck was evidently working himself into a passion, but he wastoo far from the seat of war to make due allowance for the actualstate of facts. General Grant had done so much, that GeneralHalleck should have been patient. Meantime, at Paducah, I was busysending boats in every direction--some under the orders of GeneralHalleck, others of General Cullum; others for General Grant, andstill others for General Buell at Nashville; and at the same time Iwas organizing out of the new troops that were arriving at Paducaha division for myself when allowed to take the field, which I hadbeen promised by General Halleck. His purpose was evidently tooperate up the Tennessee River, to break up Bear Creek Bridge andthe railroad communications between the Mississippi and TennesseeRivers, and no doubt he was provoked that Generals Grant and Smithhad turned aside to Nashville. In the mean time several of thegunboats, under Captain Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up theTennessee as far as Florence, and on their return had reported astrong Union feeling among the people along the river. On the 10thof March, having received the necessary orders from GeneralHalleck, I embarked my division at Paducah. It was composed offour brigades. The First, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, wascomposed of the Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, and Morton'sIndiana Battery, on the boats Sallie List, Golden Gate, J. B. Adams, and Lancaster. 

The Second Brigade, Colonel D. Stuart, was composed of theFifty-fifth Illinois, Seventy-first Ohio, and Fifty-fourth Ohio;embarked on the Hannibal, Universe, Hazel Dell, Cheeseman, andPrairie Rose. 

The Third Brigade, Colonel Hildebrand, was composed of theSeventy-seventh Ohio, Fifty-seventh Ohio, and Fifty-third Ohio;embarked on the Poland, Anglo-Saxon, Ohio No. Three, andContinental. 

The Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, was composed of theSeventy-second Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and Seventieth Ohio;embarked on the Empress, Baltic, Shenango, and Marrengo. 

We steamed up to Fort Henry, the river being high and in splendidorder. There I reported in person to General C. F. Smith, and byhim was ordered a few miles above, to the remains of the burnedrailroad bridge, to await the rendezvous of the rest of his army. I had my headquarters on the Continental. 

Among my colonels I had a strange character--Thomas Worthington, colonel of the Forty-sixth Ohio. He was a graduate of West Point, of the class of 1827; was, therefore, older than General Halleck, General Grant, or myself, and claimed to know more of war than allof us put together. In ascending the river he did not keep hisplace in the column, but pushed on and reached Savannah a daybefore the rest of my division. When I reached that place, I foundthat Worthington had landed his regiment, and was flying aboutgiving orders, as though he were commander-in-chief. I made himget back to his boat, and gave him to understand that he mustthereafter keep his place. General C. F. Smith arrived about the13th of March, with a large fleet of boats, containing Hurlbut'sdivision, Lew. Wallace's division, and that of himself, thencommanded by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace. 

General Smith sent for me to meet him on his boat, and ordered meto push on under escort of the two gunboats, Lexington and Tyler, commanded by Captains Gwin and Shirk, United States Navy. I was toland at some point below Eastport, and make a break of the Memphis& Charleston Railroad, between Tuscumbia and Corinth. GeneralSmith was quite unwell, and was suffering from his leg, which wasswollen and very sore, from a mere abrasion in steppinginto a small boat. This actually mortified, and resulted in hisdeath about a month after, viz. , April 25, 1862. He wasadjutant of the Military Academy during the early part of mycareer there, and afterward commandant of cadets. He was a veryhandsome and soldierly man, of great experience, and at Donelsonhad acted with so much personal bravery that to him many attributedthe success of the assault. 

I immediately steamed up the Tennessee River, following the twogunboats, and, in passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by CaptainGwin that, on his former trip up the river, he had found a rebelregiment of cavalry posted there, and that it was the usuallanding-place for the people about Corinth, distant thirty miles. I sent word back to General Smith that, if we were detained up theriver, he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing. We wenton up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw, both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small rebelforce of infantry. 

We then dropped back quietly to the mouth of Yellow River, a fewmiles below, whence led a road to Burnsville, a place on theMemphis & Charleston road, where were the company's repair-shops. We at once commenced disembarking the command: first the cavalry, which started at once for Burnsville, with orders to tear up therailroad-track, and burn the depots, shops, etc; and I followedwith the infantry and artillery as fast as they were disembarked. It was raining very hard at the time. Daylight found us about sixmiles out, where we met the cavalry returning. They had madenumerous attempts to cross the streams, which had become so swollenthat mere brooks covered the whole bottom; and my aide-de-camp, Sanger, whom I had dispatched with the cavalry, reported the loss, by drowning, of several of the men. The rain was pouring intorrents, and reports from the rear came that the river was risingvery fast, and that, unless we got back to our boats soon, thebottom would be simply impassable. There was no alternative but toregain our boats; and even this was so difficult, that we had tounharness the artillery-horses, and drag the guns under waterthrough the bayous, to reach the bank of the river. Once moreembarked, I concluded to drop down to Pittsburg Landing, and tomake the attempt from there. During the night of the 14th, wedropped down to Pittsburg Landing, where I found Hurlbut's divisionin boats. Leaving my command there, I steamed down to Savannah, and reported to General Smith in person, who saw in the floodedTennessee the full truth of my report; and he then instructed me todisembark my own division, and that of General Hurlbut, atPittsburg Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave roomfor his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up inperson, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the railroad, contemplated by General Halleck's orders. 

Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of General C. F. Smith's, or ratherGeneral Halleck's, staff, returned with me, and on the 16th ofMarch we disembarked and marched out about ten miles towardCorinth, to a place called Monterey or Pea Ridge, where the rebelshad a cavalry regiment, which of course decamped on our approach, but from the people we learned that trains were bringing largemasses of men from every direction into Corinth. McPherson and Ireconnoitred the ground well, and then returned to our boats. Onthe 18th, Hurlbut disembarked his division and took post about amile and a half out, near where the roads branched, one leading toCorinth and the other toward Hamburg. On the 19th I disembarked mydivision, and took post about three miles back, three of thebrigades covering the roads to Purdy and Corinth, and the otherbrigade (Stuart's) temporarily at a place on the Hamburg Road, nearLick Creek Ford, where the Bark Road came into the Hamburg Road. Within a few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on myleft, and afterward McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions, which formed a line to our rear. Lew Wallace's division remainedon the north side of Snake Creek, on a road leading from Savannahor Cramp's Landing to Purdy. 

General C. F. Smith remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and I was only responsible for my own division. I kept picketswell out on the roads, and made myself familiar with all the groundinside and outside my lines. My personal staff was composed ofCaptain J. H. Hammond, assistant adjutant-general; SurgeonsHartshorn and L'Hommedieu; Lieutenant Colonels Hascall andSanger, inspector-generals; Lieutenants McCoy and John Taylor, aides-de-camp. We were all conscious that the enemy was collectingat Corinth, but in what force we could not know, nor did we knowwhat was going on behind us. On the 17th of March, General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of all the troops up theTennessee River, by reason of General Smith's extreme illness, andbecause he had explained to General Halleck satisfactorily hisconduct after Donelson; and he too made his headquarters atSavannah, but frequently visited our camps. I always acted on thesupposition that we were an invading army; that our purpose was tomove forward in force, make a lodgment on the Memphis & Charlestonroad, and thus repeat the grand tactics of Fort Donelson, byseparating the rebels in the interior from those at Memphis and onthe Mississippi River. We did not fortify our camps against anattack, because we had no orders to do so, and because such acourse would have made our raw men timid. The position wasnaturally strong, with Snake Creek on our right, a deep, boldstream, with a confluent (Owl Creek) to our right front; and LickCreek, with a similar confluent, on our left, thus narrowing thespace over which we could be attacked to about a mile and a half ortwo miles. 

At a later period of the war, we could have rendered this positionimpregnable in one night, but at this time we did not do it, and itmay be it is well we did not. From about the 1st of April we wereconscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting bolderand more saucy; and on Friday, the 4th of April, it dashed down andcarried off one of our picket-guards, composed of an officer andseven men, posted a couple of miles out on the Corinth road. Colonel Buckland sent a company to its relief, then followedhimself with a regiment, and, fearing lest he might be worsted, Icalled out his whole brigade and followed some four or five miles, when the cavalry in advance encountered artillery. I then, afterdark, drew back to our lines, and reported the fact by letter toGeneral Grant, at Savannah; but thus far we had not positivelydetected the presence of infantry, for cavalry regiments generallyhad a couple of guns along, and I supposed the guns that opened onthe on the evening of Friday, April 4th, belonged to the cavalrythat was hovering along our whole front. 

Saturday passed in our camps without any unusual event, the weatherbeing wet and mild, and the roads back to the steamboat landingbeing heavy with mud; but on Sunday morning, the 6th, early, therewas a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast, rode outalong my lines, and, about four hundred yards to the front ofAppler's regiment, received from some bushes in a ravine to theleft front a volley which killed my orderly, Holliday. About thesame time I saw the rebel lines of battle in front coming down onus as far as the eye could reach. All my troops were in line ofbattle, ready, and the ground was favorable to us. I gave thenecessary orders to the battery (Waterhouse's) attached toHildebrand's brigade, and cautioned the men to reserve their firetill the rebels had crossed the ravine of Owl Creek, and had begunthe ascent; also, sent staff-officers to notify Generals McClernandand Prentiss of the coming blow. Indeed, McClernand had alreadysent three regiments to the support of my left flank, and they werein position when the onset came. 

In a few minutes the battle of "Shiloh" began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. Its history has been well given, and it hasbeen made the subject of a great deal of controversy. Hildebrand'sbrigade was soon knocked to pieces, but Buckland's and McDowell'skept their organization throughout. Stuart's was driven back tothe river, and did not join me in person till the second day of thebattle. I think my several reports of that battle are condensedand good, made on the spot, when all the names and facts were freshin my memory, and are herewith given entire:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISIONPITTSBURG LANDING, March 17, 1862

Captain Wm. McMICHAEL, Assistant Adjutant-General to General C. FSMITH, Savannah, Tennessee. 

SIR: Last night I dispatched a party of cavalry, at 6 p. M. , underthe command of Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, Fifth Ohio Cavalry, for astrong reconnoissance, if possible, to be converted into an attackupon the Memphis road. The command got off punctually, followed attwelve o'clock at night by the First Brigade of my division, commanded by Colonel McDowell, the other brigades to follow inorder. 

About one at night the cavalry returned, reporting the roadoccupied in force by the enemy, with whose advance-guard theyskirmished, driving them back--about a mile, taking two prisoners, and having their chief guide, Thomas Maxwell, Esq. , and three menof the Fourth Illinois wounded. 

Inclosed please find the report of Lieutenant-Colonel Heath; also acopy of his instructions, and the order of march. As soon as thecavalry returned, I saw that an attempt on the road was frustrated, and accordingly have placed McDowell's brigade to our right front, guarding the pass of Snake Creek; Stuart's brigade to the leftfront, to watch the pass of Lick Creek; and I shall this morningmove directly out on the Corinth road, about eight miles to ortoward Pea Ridge, which is a key-point to the southwest. 

General Hurlbut's division will be landed to-day, and the artilleryand infantry disposed so as to defend Pittsburg, leaving mydivision entire for any movement by land or water. 

As near as I can learn, there are five regiments of rebel infantryat Purdy; at Corinth, and distributed along the railroad to Inca, are probably thirty thousand men; but my information from prisonersis very indistinct. Every road and path is occupied by the enemy'scavalry, whose orders seem to be to fire a volley, retire, againfire and retire. The force on the Purdy road attacked and drivenby Major Bowman yesterday, was about sixty strong. Thatencountered last night on the Corinth road was about five companiesof Tennessee cavalry, sent from Purdy about 2 p. M. Yesterday. 

I hear there is a force of two regiments on Pea Ridge, at the pointwhere the Purdy and Corinth roads come together. 

I am satisfied we cannot reach the Memphis & Charleston roadwithout a considerable engagement, which is prohibited by GeneralHalleck's instructions, so that I will be governed by your ordersof yesterday, to occupy Pittsburg strongly, extend the pickets soas to include a semicircle of three miles, and push a strongreconnoissance as far out as Lick Creek and Pea Ridge. 

I will send down a good many boats to-day, to be employed as youmay direct; and would be obliged if you would send a couple ofthousand sacks of corn, as much hay as you can possibly spare, and, if possible, a barge of coal. 

I will send a steamboat under care of the gunboat, to collect cornfrom cribs on the river-bank. 

I have the honor to be your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General, commanding First Division. 

HEADQUARTERS, STEAMBOAT CONTINENTAL, Pittsburg, March 18, 1882. 

Captain RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-Generalto General GRANT. 

SIR: The division surgeon having placed some one hundred or moresick on board the Fanny Bullitt, I have permitted her to take themto Savannah. There is neither house nor building of any kind thatcan be used for a hospital here. 

I hope to receive an order to establish floating hospitals, but inthe mean time, by the advise of the surgeon, allow these sick mento leave. Let me hope that it will meet your approbation. 

The order for debarkation came while General Sherman was absentwith three brigades, and no men are left to move the effects ofthese brigades. 

The landing, too, is small, with scarcely any chance to increaseit; therefore there is a great accumulation of boats. ColonelMcArthur has arrived, and is now cutting a landing for himself. 

General Sherman will return this evening. I am obliged totransgress, and write myself in the mean time, Respectfully your obedient servant, J. H. HAMMOND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

P. S--4 p. M. --Just back; have been half-way to Corinth and toPurdy. All right. Have just read this letter, and approve all butfloating hospitals; regimental surgeons can take care of all sick, except chronic cases, which can always be sent down to Paducah. 

Magnificent plain for camping and drilling, and a military point ofgreat strength. The enemy has felt us twice, at great loss anddemoralization; will report at length this evening; am now muchworn out. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General. 

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISIONPittsburg Landing, March 19, 1862. 

Captain RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-Generalto General GRANT, Savannah, Tennessee. 

SIR: I have just returned from an extensive reconnoissance towardCorinth and Purdy, and am strongly impressed with the importance ofthis position, both for its land advantages and its strategicposition. The ground itself admits of easy defense by a smallcommand, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for a hundredthousand men. I will as soon as possible make or cause to be madea topographical sketch of the position. The only drawback is that, at this stage of water, the space for landing is contracted toomuch for the immense fleet now here discharging. 

I will push the loading and unloading of boats, but suggest thatyou send at once (Captain Dodd, if possible) the best quartermasteryou can, that he may control and organize this whole matter. Ihave a good commissary, and will keep as few provisions afloat aspossible. Yours, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS SHERMAN'S DIVISIONCamp Shiloh, near Pittsburg Landing, Tennessee, April 2, 1862

Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-Generalto General GRANT. 

SIR: In obedience to General Grant's instructions of March 31st, with one section of Captain Muench's Minnesota Battery, twotwelve-pound howitzers, a detachment of Fifth Ohio Cavalry of onehundred and fifty men, under Major Ricker, and two battalions ofinfantry from the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh Ohio, under thecommand of Colonels Hildebrand and Mungen, I marched to the river, and embarked on the steamers Empress and Tecumseh. The gunboatCairo did not arrive at Pittsburg, until after midnight, and at 6p. M. Captain Bryant, commanding the gunboat, notified me that hewas ready to proceed up the river. I followed, keeping thetransports within about three hundred yards of the gunboat. About1 p. M. , the Cairo commenced shelling the battery above the mouth ofIndian Creek, but elicited no reply. She proceeded up the riversteadily and cautiously, followed close by the Tyler and Lexington, all throwing shells at the points where, on former visits of thegunboats, enemy's batteries were found. In this order allfollowed, till it was demonstrated that all the enemy's batteries, including that at Chickasaw, were abandoned. 

I ordered the battalion of infantry under Colonel Hildebrand todisembark at Eastport, and with the other battalion proceeded toChickasaw and landed. The battery at this point had evidently beenabandoned some time, and consisted of the remains of an old Indianmound, partly washed away by the river, which had been fashionedinto a two-gun battery, with a small magazine. The ground to itsrear had evidently been overflowed during the late freshet, and ledto the removal of the guns to Eastport, where the batteries were onhigh, elevated ground, accessible at all seasons from the countryto the rear. 

Upon personal inspection, I attach little importance to Chickasawas a military position. The people, who had fled during theapproach of the gunboats, returned to the village, and said theplace had been occupied by one Tennessee regiment and a battery ofartillery from Pensacola. After remaining at Chickasaw somehours, all the boats dropped back to Eastport, not more than a milebelow, and landed there. Eastport Landing during the late freshetmust have been about twelve feet under water, but at the presentstage the landing is the best I have seen on the Tennessee River. 

The levee is clear of trees or snags, and a hundred boats couldland there without confusion. 

The soil is of sand and gravel, and very firm. The road back ishard, and at a distance of about four hundred yards from the waterbegin the gravel hills of the country. The infantry scouts sentout by Colonel Hildebrand found the enemy's cavalry mounted, andwatching the Inca road, about two miles back of Eastport. Thedistance to Inca is only eight miles, and Inca is the nearest pointand has the best road by which the Charleston & Memphis Railroadcan be reached. I could obtain no certain information as to thestrength of the enemy there, but am satisfied that it would havebeen folly to have attempted it with my command. Our object beingto dislodge the enemy from the batteries recently erected nearEastport, and this being attained, I have returned, and report theriver to be clear to and beyond Chickasaw. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding Division. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONCAMP SHILOH, April 5, 1862. 

Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General, District ofWestern Tennessee. 

SIR: I have the honor to report that yesterday, about 3 p. M. , thelieutenant commanding and seven men of the advance picketsimprudently advanced from their posts and were captured. I orderedMajor Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, to proceed rapidly to thepicket-station, ascertain the truth, and act according tocircumstances. He reached the station, found the pickets had beencaptured as reported, and that a company of infantry sent by thebrigade commander had gone forward in pursuit of some cavalry. Herapidly advanced some two miles, and found them engaged, chargedthe enemy, and drove them along the Ridge road, till hemet and received three discharges of artillery, when he veryproperly wheeled under cover, and returned till he met me. 

As soon as I heard artillery, I advanced with two regiments ofinfantry, and took position, and remained until the scatteredcompanies of infantry and cavalry had returned. This was afternight. 

I infer that the enemy is in some considerable force at Pea Ridge, that yesterday morning they crossed a brigade of two regimentsof infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one battery offield-artillery, to the ridge on which the Corinth road lies. Theyhalted the infantry and artillery at a point abort five miles in myfront, sent a detachment to the lane of General Meeks, on the northof Owl Creek, and the cavalry down toward our camp. This cavalrycaptured a part of our advance pickets, and afterward engaged thetwo companies of Colonel Buckland's regiment, as described by himin his report herewith inclosed. Our cavalry drove them back upontheir artillery and Infantry, killing many, and bringing off tenprisoners, all of the First Alabama Cavalry, whom I send to you. 

We lost of the pickets one first-lieutenant and seven men of theOhio Seventieth Infantry (list inclosed); one major, onelieutenant, and one private of the Seventy-second Ohio, takenprisoners; eight privates wounded (names in full, embraced inreport of Colonel Buckland, inclosed herewith). 

We took ten prisoners, and left two rebels wounded and many killedon the field. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General, commanding Division. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONCamp Shiloh, April 10, 1862. 

Captain J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-Generalto General GRANT. 

SIR: I had the honor to report that, on Friday the 4th inst. , theenemy's cavalry drove in our pickets, posted about a mile and ahalf in advance of my centre, on the main Corinth road, capturingone first-lieutenant and seven men; that I caused a pursuit by thecavalry of my division, driving them back about five miles, andkilling many. On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to our front; yet I did not believe they designedany thing but a strong demonstration. On Sunday morning early, the6th inst. , the enemy drove our advance-guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms all my division, and sent word to GeneralMcClernand, asking him to support my left; to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and toGeneral Hurlbut, asking him to support General Prentiss. At thattime--7 a. M. --my division was arranged as follows:

First Brigade, composed of the Sixth Iowa, Colonel J. A. McDowell;

Fortieth Illinois, Colonel Hicks; Forty-sixth Ohio, ColonelWorthington; and the Morton battery, Captain Behr, on the extremeright, guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek. 

Second Brigade, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Colonel D. Stuart; the Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; and theSeventy-first Ohio, Colonel Mason, on the extreme left, guardingthe ford over Lick Creek. 

Third Brigade, composed of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, ColonelHildebrand; the Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel Appler; and theFifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Mungen, on the left of the Corinthroad, its right resting on Shiloh meeting-house. 

Fourth Brigade, composed of the Seventy-second Ohio, ColonelBuckland; the Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Sullivan; and theSeventieth Ohio, Colonel Cookerill, on the right of the Corinthroad, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house. 

Two batteries of artillery--Taylor's and Waterhouse's--were posted, the former at Shiloh, and the latter on a ridge to the left, with afront-fire over open ground between Mungen's and Appler'sregiments. The cavalry, eight companies of the Fourth Illinois, under Colonel Dickey, were posted in a large open field to the leftand rear of Shiloh meeting-house, which I regarded as the centre ofmy position. 

Shortly after 7 a. M. , with my entire staff, I rode along a portionof our front, and when in the open field before Appler's regiment, the enemy's pickets opened a brisk fire upon my party, killing myorderly, Thomas D. Holliday, of Company H, Second Illinois Cavalry. The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that risesin the field in front of Appler's camp, and flows to the northalong my whole front. 

This valley afforded the enemy partial cover; but our men were soposted as to have a good fire at them as they crossed the valleyand ascended the rising ground on our side. 

About 8 a. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses ofinfantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small streamalluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemydesigned a determined attack on our whole camp. 

All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle attheir proper posts. I rode to Colonel Appler, and ordered him tohold his ground at all hazards, as he held the left flank of ourfirst line of battle, and I informed him that he had a good batteryon his right, and strong support to his rear. General McClernandhad promptly and energetically responded to my request, and hadsent me three regiments which were posted to protect Waterhouse'sbattery and the left flank of my line. 

The battle opened by the enemy's battery, in the woods to ourfront, throwing shells into our camp. Taylor's and Waterhouse'sbatteries promptly responded, and I then observed heavy battalionsof infantry passing obliquely to the left, across the open field inAppler's front; also, other columns advancing directly upon mydivision. Our infantry and artillery opened along the whole line, and the battle became general. Other heavy masses of the enemy'sforces kept passing across the field to our left, and directingtheir course on General Prentiss. I saw at once that the enemydesigned to pass my left flank, and fall upon Generals McClernandand Prentiss, whose line of camps was almost parallel with theTennessee River, and about two miles back from it. Very soon thesound of artillery and musketry announced that General Prentiss wasengaged; and about 9 A. M. I judged that he was falling back. About this time Appler's regiment broke in disorder, followed byMungen's regiment, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse'sbattery thereby exposed. 

The three Illinois regiments in immediate support of this batterystood for some time; but the enemy's advance was so vigorous, andthe fire so severe, that when Colonel Raith, of the Forty-thirdIllinois, received a severe wound and fell from his horse, hisregiment and the others manifested disorder, and the enemy gotpossession of three guns of this (Waterhouse's) battery. Althoughour left was thus turned, and the enemy was pressing our wholeline, I deemed Shiloh so important, that I remained by it andrenewed my orders to Colonels McDowell and Buckland to hold theirground; and we did hold these positions until about 10 a. M. , whenthe enemy had got his artillery to the rear of our left flank andsome change became absolutely necessary. Two regiments ofHildebrand's brigade--Appler's and Mungen's--had alreadydisappeared to the rear, and Hildebrand's own regiment was indisorder. I therefore gave orders for Taylor's battery--still atShiloh--to fall back as far as the Purdy and Hamburg road, and forMcDowell and Buckland to adopt that road as their new line. I rodeacross the angle and met Behr's battery at the cross-roads, andordered it immediately to come into battery, action right. CaptainBehr gave the order, but he was almost immediately shot from hishorse, when drivers and gunners fled in disorder, carrying off thecaissons, and abandoning five out of six guns, without firing ashot. The enemy pressed on, gaining this battery, and we wereagain forced to choose a new line of defense. Hildebrand's brigadehad substantially disappeared from the field, though he himselfbravely remained. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades maintainedtheir organizations, and were conducted by my aides, so as to joinon General McClernand's right, thus abandoning my original campsand line. This was about 10 1/2 a. M. , at which time the enemy hadmade a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. Hestraggled most determinedly, but, finding him pressed, I movedMcDowell's brigade directly against the left flank of the enemy, forced him back some distance, and then directed the men to availthemselves of every cover-trees, fallen timber, and a wooded valleyto our right. We held this position for four long hours, sometimesgaining and at others losing ground; General McClernand and myselfacting in perfect concert, and struggling to maintain this line. While we were so hard pressed, two Iowa regiments approached fromthe rear, but could not be brought up to the severe fire that wasraging in our front, and General Grant, who visited us on thatground, will remember our situation about 3 p. M. ; but about 4 p. M. It was evident that Hurlbut's line had been driven back to theriver; and knowing that General Lew Wallace was coming withreinforcements from Cramp's Landing, General McClernand and I, onconsultation, selected a new line of defense, with its rightcovering a bridge by which General Wallace had to approach. Wefell back as well as we could, gathering in addition to our ownsuch scattered forces as we could find, and formed the new line. 

During this change the enemy's cavalry charged us, but werehandsomely repulsed by the Twenty-ninth Illinois Regiment. TheFifth Ohio Battery, which had come up, rendered good service inholding the enemy in check for some time, and Major Taylor alsocame up with another battery and got into position, just in time toget a good flank-fire upon the enemy's column, as he pressed onGeneral McClernand's right, checking his advance; when GeneralMcClernand's division made a fine charge on the enemy and drove himback into the ravines to our front and right. I had a clear field, about two hundred yards wide, in my immediate front, and contentedmyself with keeping the enemy's infantry at that distance duringthe rest of the day. In this position we rested for the night. 

My command had become decidedly of a mixed character. Buckland'sbrigade was the only one that retained its organization. ColonelHildebrand was personally there, but his brigade was not. ColonelMcDowell had been severely injured by a fall off his horse, and hadgone to the river, and the three regiments of his brigade were notin line. The Thirteenth Missouri, Colonel Crafts J. Wright, hadreported to me on the field, and fought well, retaining itsregimental organization; and it formed a part of my line duringSunday night and all Monday. Other fragments of regiments andcompanies had also fallen into my division, and acted with itduring the remainder of the battle. General Grant and Buellvisited me in our bivouac that evening, and from them I learned thesituation of affairs on other parts of the field. General Wallacearrived from Crump's Landing shortly after dark, and formed hisline to my right rear. It rained hard during the night, but ourmen were in good spirits, lay on their arms, being satisfied withsuch bread and meat as could be gathered at the neighboring camps, and determined to redeem on Monday the losses of Sunday. 

At daylight of Monday I received General Grant's orders to advanceand recapture our original camps. I dispatched several members ofmy staff to bring up all the men they could find, especially thebrigade of Colonel Stuart, which had been separated from thedivision all the day before; and at the appointed time thedivision, or rather what remained of it, with the ThirteenthMissouri and other fragments, moved forward and reoccupied theground on the extreme right of General McClernand's camp, where weattracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell'sformer headquarters. Here I remained, patiently waiting for thesound of General Buell's advance upon the main Corinth road. About10 a. M. The heavy firing in that direction, and its steadyapproach, satisfied me; and General Wallace being on our rightflank with his well-conducted division, I led the head of my columnto General McClernand's right, formed line of battle, facing south, with Buckland's brigade directly across the ridge, and Stuart'sbrigade on its right in the woods; and thus advanced, steadily andslowly, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Taylor hadjust got to me from the rear, where he had gone for ammunition, andbrought up three guns, which I ordered into position, to advance byhand firing. These guns belonged to Company A, Chicago LightArtillery, commanded by Lieutenant P. P. Wood, and did mostexcellent service. Under cover of their fire, we advanced till wereached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line ofMcClernand's camp, and here I saw for the first time thewell-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentuckyforces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to ournewer and less disciplined men. Here I saw Willich's regimentadvance upon a point of water-oaks and thicket, behind which I knewthe enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry-fire I ever heard, and lasted sometwenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back. Thisgreen point of timber is about five hundred yards east of Shilohmeeting-home, and it was evident here was to be the struggle. Theenemy could also be seen forming his lines to the south. GeneralMcClernand sending to me for artillery, I detached to him the threeguns of Wood's battery, with which he speedily drove them back, and, seeing some others to the rear, I sent one of my staff tobring them forward, when, by almost providential decree, theyproved to be two twenty-four pound howitzers belonging toMcAlister's battery, and served as well as guns ever could be. 

This was about 2 p. M. The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh, and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canisterupon any column of troops that advanced upon the green point ofwater-oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a wholebrigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed, andentered this dreaded wood. I ordered my second brigade (thencommanded by Colonel T. Kilby Smith, Colonel Smart being wounded)to form on its right, and my fourth brigade, Colonel Buckland, onits right; all to advance abreast with this Kentucky brigade beforementioned, which I afterward found to be Rousseau's brigade ofMcCook's division. I gave personal direction to the twenty-fourpounder guns, whose well-directed fire first silenced the enemy'sguns to the left, and afterward at the Shiloh meeting-house. 

Rousseau's brigade moved in splendid order steadily to the front, sweeping every thing before it, and at 4 p. M. We stood upon theground of our original front line; and the enemy was in fullretreat. I directed my several brigades to resume at once theiroriginal camps. 

Several times during the battle, cartridges gave out; but GeneralGrant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear. When Iappealed to regiments to stand fast, although out of cartridges, Idid so because, to retire a regiment for any cause, has a badeffect on others. I commend the Fortieth Illinois and ThirteenthMissouri for thus holding their ground under heavy fire, althoughtheir cartridge-boxes were empty. 

I am ordered by General Grant to give personal credit where I thinkit is due, and censure where I think it merited. I concede thatGeneral McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back theenemy along the Corinth road, which was the great centre of thisfield of battle, where Beauregard commanded in person, supported byBragg's, Polk's, and Breckenridge's divisions. I think Johnstonwas killed by exposing himself in front of his troops, at the timeof their attack on Buckland's brigade on Sunday morning; althoughin this I may be mistaken. 

My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, nearly allhaving received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. Noneof them had ever been under fire or beheld heavy columns of anenemy bearing down on them as they did on last Sunday. 

To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops wouldbe wrong. They knew not the value of combination and organization. When individual fears seized them, the first impulse was to getaway. My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yetadvised where they were during Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I eversaw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men totheir places than he did. He kept his own regiment with individualexceptions in hand, an hour after Appler's and Mungen's regimentshad left their proper field of action. Colonel Buckland managedhis brigade well. I commend him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence andexperience, to make a good commander. His subordinates, ColonelsSullivan and Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry; the formerreceiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holdinghis regiment well in hand all day, and on Monday, until his rightarm was broken by a shot. Colonel Cookerill held a largerproportion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was withme from first to last. 

Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held hisground on Sunday, till I ordered him to fall back, which he did inline of battle; and when ordered, he conducted the attack on theenemy's left in good style. In falling back to the next position, he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was notin position on Monday morning. His subordinates, Colonels Hicksand Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicksled his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound, which it is feared may prove mortal. He is a brave and gallantgentleman, and deserves well of his country. Lieutenant-ColonelWalcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since. My second brigade, ColonelStuart, was detached nearly two miles from my headquarters. He hadto fight his own battle on Sunday, against superior numbers, as theenemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty onMonday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when thecommand devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in thethickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely. 

I have not yet received Colonel Stuart's report of the operationsof his brigade during the time he was detached, and must thereforeforbear to mention names. Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of theSeventy-first, was mortally wounded on Sunday, but the regimentitself I did not see, as only a small fragment of it was with thebrigade when it joined the division on Monday morning. Greatcredit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments whokept in the advance. I observed and noticed them, but until thebrigadiers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture toname individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in ourfront line, as well as those who preferred to keep back near thesteamboat-landing. I will also send a full list of the killed, wounded, and missing, by name, rank, company, and regiment. Atpresent I submit the result in figures:

[Summary of General Sherman's detailed table:]Killed ........................ 318Wounded ....................... 1275Missing ....................... 441Aggregate loss in the division: 2034

The enemy captured seven of our guns on Sunday, but on Monday werecovered seven; not the identical guns we had lost, but enough innumber to balance the account. At the time of recovering our campsour men were so fatigued that we could not follow the retreatingmasses of the enemy; but on the following day I followed up withBuckland's and Hildebrand's brigade for six miles, the result ofwhich I have already reported. 

Of my personal staff, I can only speak with praise and thanks. Ithink they smelled as much gunpowder and heard as many cannon-ballsand bullets as must satisfy their ambition. Captain Hammond, mychief of staff, though in feeble health, was very active inrallying broken troops, encouraging the steadfast and aiding toform the lines of defense and attack. I recommend him to yournotice. Major Sanger's intelligence, quick perception, and rapidexecution, were of very great value to me, especially in bringinginto line the batteries that cooperated so efficiently in ourmovements. Captains McCoy and Dayton, aides-de-camp, were with meall the time, carrying orders, and acting with coolness, spirit, and courage. To Surgeon Hartshorne and Dr. L'Hommedieu hundreds ofwounded men are indebted for the kind and excellent treatmentreceived on the field of battle and in the various temporaryhospitals created along the line of our operations. They workedday and night, and did not rest till all the wounded of our owntroops as well as of the enemy were in safe and comfortableshelter. To Major Taylor, chief of artillery, I feel under deepobligations, for his good sense and judgment in managing thebatteries, on which so much depended. I inclose his report andindorse his recommendations. The cavalry of my command kept to therear, and took little part in the action; but it would have beenmadness to have exposed horses to the musketry-fire under which wewere compelled to remain from Sunday at 8 a. M. Till Monday at4 p. M. Captain Kossack, of the engineers, was with me all the time, and was of great assistance. I inclose his sketch of thebattlefield, which is the best I have seen, and which will enableyou to see the various positions occupied by my division, as well asof the others that participated in the battle. I will also send in, during the day, the detailed reports of my brigadiers and colonels, and will indorse them with such remarks as I deem proper. 

I am, with much respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Brigadier-General commanding Fifth Division. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONTuesday, April 8, 1862

Sir: With the cavalry placed at my command and two brigades of myfatigued troops, I went this morning out on the Corinth road. Oneafter another of the abandoned camps of the enemy lined the roads, with hospital flags for their protection; at all we found more orless wounded and dead men. At the forks of the road I found thehead of General T. J. Wood's division of Buell's Army. I orderedcavalry to examine both roads leading toward Corinth, and found theenemy on both. Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, asking for reenforcements, I ordered General Wood to advance thehead of his column cautiously on the left-hand road, while Iconducted the head of the third brigade of my division up theright-hand road. About half a mile from the forks was a clearfield, through which the road passed, and, immediately beyond, aspace of some two hundred yards of fallen timber, and beyond thatan extensive rebel camp. The enemy's cavalry could be seen in thiscamp; after reconnoisance, I ordered the two advance companies ofthe Ohio Seventy-seventh, Colonel Hildebrand, to deploy forward asskirmishers, and the regiment itself forward into line, with aninterval of one hundred yards. In this order we advancedcautiously until the skirmishers were engaged. Taking it forgranted this disposition would clear the camp, I held ColonelDickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry ready for the charge. The enemy'scavalry came down boldly at a charge, led by General Forrest inperson, breaking through our line of skirmishers; when the regimentof infantry, without cause, broke, threw away their muskets, andfled. The ground was admirably adapted for a defense of infantryagainst cavalry, being miry and covered with fallen timber. 

As the regiment of infantry broke, Dickey's Cavalry began todischarge their carbines, and fell into disorder. I instantly sentorders to the rear for the brigade to form line of battle, whichwas promptly executed. The broken infantry and cavalry rallied onthis line, and, as the enemy's cavalry came to it, our cavalry inturn charged and drove them from the field. I advanced the entirebrigade over the same ground and sent Colonel Dickey's cavalry amile farther on the road. On examining the ground which had beenoccupied by the Seventy-seventh Ohio, we found fifteen of our mendead and about twenty-five wounded. I sent for wagons and had allthe wounded carried back to camp, and caused the dead to be buried, also the whole rebel camp to be destroyed. 

Here we found much ammunition for field-pieces, which wasdestroyed; also two caissons, and a general hospital, with abouttwo hundred and eighty Confederate wounded, and about fifty of ourown wounded men. Not having the means of bringing them off, Colonel Dickey, by my orders, took a surrender, signed by themedical director (Lyle) and by all the attending surgeons, and apledge to report themselves to you as prisoners of war; also apledge that our wounded should be carefully attended to, andsurrendered to us to-morrow as soon as ambulances could go out. Iinclose this written document, and request that you cause wagons orambulances for our wounded to be sent to-morrow, and that wagons'be sent to bring in the many tents belonging to us which arepitched along the road for four miles out. I did not destroy them, because I knew the enemy could not move them. The roads are verybad, and are strewed with abandoned wagons, ambulances, andlimber-boxes. The enemy has succeeded in carrying off the guns, but has crippled his batteries by abandoning the hind limber-boxesof at least twenty caissons. I am satisfied the enemy's infantryand artillery passed Lick Creek this morning, traveling all of lastnight, and that he left to his rear all his cavalry, which hasprotected his retreat; but signs of confusion and disorder mark thewhole road. The check sustained by us at the fallen timber delayedour advance, so that night came upon us before the wounded wereprovided for and the dead buried, and our troops being fagged outby three days' hard fighting, exposure, and privation, I orderedthem back to their camps, where they now are. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMANBrigadier-General commanding Division. 

General Grant did not make an official report of the battle ofShiloh, but all its incidents and events were covered by thereports of division commanders and Subordinates. Probably nosingle battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damagingreports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army wastaken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in ourtents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant wasdrunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of theTennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were in ameasure sustained by the published opinions of Generals Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the steamboat-landing from theeast, just before nightfall of the 6th, when there was a largecrowd of frightened, stampeded men, who clamored and declared thatour army was all destroyed and beaten. Personally I saw GeneralGrant, who with his staff visited me about 10 a. M. Of the 6th, when we were desperately engaged. But we had checked the headlongassault of our enemy, and then held our ground. This gave himgreat satisfaction, and he told me that things did not look as wellover on the left. He also told me that on his way up from Savannahthat morning he had stopped at Crump's Landing, and had ordered LewWallace's division to cross over Snake Creek, so as to come up onmy right, telling me to look out for him. He came again justbefore dark, and described the last assault made by the rebels atthe ravine, near the steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by aheavy battery collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and otherofficers, and he was convinced that the battle was over for thatday. He ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in themorning, saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at thecrisis of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoeverassumed the offensive was sure to win. General Grant alsoexplained to me that General Buell had reached the bank of theTennessee River opposite Pittsburg Landing, and was in the act offerrying his troops across at the time he was speaking to me. 

About half an hour afterward General Buell himself rode up to whereI was, accompanied by Colonels Fry, Michler, and others of hisstaff. I was dismounted at the time, and General Buell made of mea good many significant inquiries about matters and thingsgenerally. By the aid of a manuscript map made by myself, Ipointed out to him our positions as they had been in the morning, and our then positions; I also explained that my right then coveredthe bridge over Snake Creek by which we had all day been expectingLew Wallace; that McClernand was on my left, Hurlbut on his left, and so on. But Buell said he had come up from the landing, and hadnot seen our men, of whose existence in fact he seemed to doubt. Iinsisted that I had five thousand good men still left in line, andthought that McClernand had as many more, and that with what wasleft of Hurlbut's, W. H. L. Wallace's, and Prentiss's divisions, weought to have eighteen thousand men fit for battle. I reckonedthat ten thousand of our men were dead, wounded, or prisoners, andthat the enemy's loss could not be much less. Buell said thatNelson's, McCook's, and Crittendens divisions of his army, containing eighteen thousand men, had arrived and could cross overin the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I arguedthat with these reenforcements we could sweep the field. Buellseemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not like thelooks of things, especially about the boat-landing, --and I reallyfeared he would not cross over his army that night, lest he shouldbecome involved in our general disaster. He did not, of course, understand the shape of the ground, and asked me for the use of mymap, which I lent him on the promise that he would return it. Hehanded it to Major Michler to have it copied, and the originalreturned to me, which Michler did two or three days after thebattle. Buell did cross over that night, and the next day weassumed the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battledecisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as usualmaintained an imperturbable silence. 

After the battle, a constant stream of civilian surgeons, andsanitary commission agents, men and women, came up the Tennessee tobring relief to the thousands of maimed and wounded soldiers forwhom we had imperfect means of shelter and care. These peoplecaught up the camp-stories, which on their return home theyretailed through their local papers, usually elevating their ownneighbors into heroes, but decrying all others: Among them wasLieutenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio, who published in Belfontaine, Ohio, a most abusive article about General Grant and hissubordinate generals. As General Grant did not and would not takeup the cudgels, I did so. My letter in reply to Stanton, datedJune 10, 1862, was published in the Cincinnati Commercial soonafter its date. To this Lieutenant-Governor Stanton replied, and Ifurther rejoined in a letter dated July 12, 1862. These lettersare too personal to be revived. By this time the good people ofthe North had begun to have their eyes opened, and to give us inthe field more faith and support. Stanton was never again electedto any public office, and was commonly spoken of as "the late Mr. Stanton. " He is now dead, and I doubt not in life he oftenregretted his mistake in attempting to gain popular fame by abusingthe army-leaders, then as now an easy and favorite mode of gainingnotoriety, if not popularity. Of course, subsequent events gaveGeneral Grant and most of the other actors in that battle theirappropriate place in history, but the danger of sudden popularclamors is well illustrated by this case. 

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the mostfiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6, 1862, the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about thirty-two thousand men. Wehad no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon asBuell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the enemy. Therebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions, forty-five thousandstrong, had the momentum of attack, and beyond all question foughtskillfully from early morning till about 2 a. M. , when theircommander-in-chief was killed by a Mini-ball in the calf of hisleg, which penetrated the boot and severed the main artery. Therewas then a perceptible lull for a couple of hours, when the attackwas renewed, but with much less vehemence, and continued up todark. Early at night the division of Lew Wallace arrived from theother side of Snake Creek, not having fired a shot. A very smallpart of General Buell's army was on our side of the Tennessee Riverthat evening, and their loss was trivial. 

During that night, the three divisions of McCook, Nelson, andCrittenden, were ferried across the Tennessee, and fought with usthe next day (7th). During that night, also, the two woodengunboats, Tyler, commanded by Lieutenant Groin, and Lexington, Lieutenant Shirk, both of the regular navy, caused shells to bethrown toward that part of the field of battle known to be occupiedby the enemy. Beauregard afterward reported his entire loss as tenthousand six hundred and ninety-nine. Our aggregate loss, made upfrom official statements, shows seventeen hundred killed, seventhousand four hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousandand twenty-two prisoners; aggregate, twelve thousand two hundredand seventeen, of which twenty-one hundred and sixty-seven were inBuell's army, leaving for that of Grant ten thousand and fifty. This result is a fair measure of the amount of fighting done byeach army. 

CHAPTER XI. 

SHILOH TO MEMPHIS. 

APRIL TO JULY, 1862. 

While, the "Army of the Tennessee, " under Generals Grant and C. F. Smith, was operating up the Tennessee River, another force, styledthe "Army of the Mississippi, " commanded by Major-General JohnPope, was moving directly down the Mississippi River, against thatportion of the rebel line which, under Generals Polk and Pillow, had fallen back from Columbus, Kentucky, to Island Number Ten andNew Madrid. This army had the full cooperation of the gunboatfleet, commanded by Admiral Foote, and was assisted by the highflood of that season, which enabled General Pope, by great skilland industry, to open a canal from a point above Island Number Tento New Madrid below, by which he interposed between the rebel armyand its available line of supply and retreat. At the very timethat we were fighting the bloody battle on the Tennessee River, General Pope and Admiral Foote were bombarding the batteries onIsland Number Ten, and the Kentucky shore abreast of it; andGeneral Pope having crossed over by steamers a part of his army tothe east bank, captured a large part of this rebel army, at andnear Tiptonville. 

General Halleck still remained at St. Louis, whence he gave generaldirections to the armies of General Curtis, Generals Grant, Buell, and Pope; and instead of following up his most important andbrilliant successes directly down the Mississippi, he concluded tobring General Pope's army around to the Tennessee, and to come inperson to command there. The gunboat fleet pushed on down theMississippi, but was brought up again all standing by the heavybatteries at Fort Pillow, about fifty miles above Memphis. Aboutthis time Admiral Farragut, with another large sea-going fleet, andwith the cooperating army of General Butler, was entering theMississippi River by the Passes, and preparing to reduce FortsJackson and St, Philip in order to reach New Orleans; so that allminds were turned to the conquest of the Mississippi River, andsurely adequate means were provided for the undertaking. 

The battle of Shiloh had been fought, as described, on the 6th and7th of April; and when the movement of the 8th had revealed thatour enemy was gone, in full retreat, leaving killed, wounded, andmuch property by the way, we all experienced a feeling of relief. The struggle had been so long, so desperate and bloody, that thesurvivors seemed exhausted and nerveless; we appreciated the valueof the victory, but realized also its great cost of life. Theclose of the battle had left the Army of the Tennessee on theright, and the Army of the Ohio on the left; but I believe neitherGeneral Grant nor Buell exercised command, the one over the other;each of them having his hands full in repairing damages. All thedivision, brigade, and regimental commanders were busy incollecting stragglers, regaining lost property, in burying dead menand horses, and in providing for their wounded. Some few newregiments came forward, and some changes of organization becamenecessary. Then, or very soon after, I consolidated my fontbrigades into three, which were commanded: First, Brigadier-GeneralMorgan L: Smith; Second, Colonel John A. McDowell; Third, Brigadier-General J. W. Denver. About the same time I was promotedto major-general volunteers. 

The Seventy-first Ohio was detached to Clarksville, Tennessee, andthe Sixth and Eighth Missouri were transferred to my division. 

In a few days after the battle, General Halleck arrived bysteamboat from St. Louis, pitched his camp near the steamboat-landing, and assumed personal command of all the armies. He wasattended by his staff, composed of General G. W. Cullum, U. S. Engineers, as his chief of staff; Colonel George Thom, U. S. Engineers; and Colonels Kelton and Kemper, adjutants-general. Itsoon became manifest that his mind had been prejudiced by therumors which had gone forth to the detriment of General Grant; forin a few days he issued an order, reorganizing and rearranging thewhole army. General Buell's Army of the Ohio constituted thecentre; General Pope's army, then arriving at Hamburg Landing, wasthe left; the right was made up of mine and Hurlbut's divisions, belonging to the old Army of the Tennessee, and two new ones, madeup from the fragments of the divisions of Prentiss and C. F. Smith, and of troops transferred thereto, commanded by Generals T. W. Sherman and Davies. General George H. Thomas was taken from Buell, to command the right. McClernand's and Lew Wallace's divisionswere styled the reserve, to be commanded by McClernand. GeneralGrant was substantially left out, and was named "second incommand, " according to some French notion, with no clear, well-defined command or authority. He still retained his oldstaff, composed of Rawlins, adjutant-general; Riggin, Lagow, andHilyer, aides; and he had a small company of the Fourth IllinoisCavalry as an escort. For more than a month he thus remained, without any apparent authority, frequently visiting me and others, and rarely complaining; but I could see that he felt deeply theindignity, if not insult, heaped upon him. 

General Thomas at once assumed command of the right wing, and, until we reached Corinth, I served immediately under his command. We were classmates, intimately acquainted, had served togetherbefore in the old army, and in Kentucky, and it made to us littledifference who commanded the other, provided the good causeprevailed. 

Corinth was about thirty miles distant, and we all knew that weshould find there the same army with which we had so fiercelygrappled at Shiloh, reorganized, reenforced, and commanded in chiefby General Beauregard in place of Johnston, who had fallen atShiloh. But we were also reenforced by Buell's and Pope's armies;so that before the end of April our army extended from Snake Creekon the right to the Tennessee River, at Hamburg, on the left, andmust have numbered nearly one hundred thousand men. 

Ample supplies of all kinds reached us by the Tennessee River, which had a good stage of water; but our wagon transportation waslimited, and much confusion occurred in hauling supplies to theseveral camps. By the end of Aril, the several armies seemed to beready, and the general forward movement on Corinth began. Mydivision was on the extreme right of the right wing, and marchedout by the "White House, " leaving Monterey or Pea Ridge to thesouth. Crossing Lick Creek, we came into the main road about amile south of Monterey, where we turned square to the right, andcame into the Purdy road, near "Elams. " Thence we followed thePurdy road to Corinth, my skirmishers reaching at all times theMobile & Ohio Railroad. Of course our marches were governed by themain centre, which followed the direct road from Pittsburg Landingto Corinth; and this movement was provokingly slow. We fortifiedalmost every camp at night, though we had encountered no seriousopposition, except from cavalry, which gave ground easily as weadvanced. The opposition increased as we neared Corinth, and at aplace called Russell's we had a sharp affair of one brigade, underthe immediate direction of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, assisted by the brigade of General Denver. This affair occurred onthe 19th of May, and our line was then within about two miles ofthe northern intrenchments of Corinth. 

On the 27th I received orders from General Halleck "to send a forcethe next day to drive the rebels from the house in our front, onthe Corinth road, to drive in their pickets as far as possible, andto make a strong demonstration on Corinth itself;" authorizing meto call on any adjacent division for assistance. 

I reconnoitred the ground carefully, and found that the main roadled forward along the fence of a large cotton-field to our rightfront, and ascended a wooded hill, occupied in some force by theenemy, on which was the farm-house referred to in General Halleck'sorders. At the farther end of the field was a double log-house, whose chinking had been removed; so that it formed a good blockhouse from which the enemy could fire on any person approachingfrom our quarter. 

General Hurlbut's division was on my immediate left, and GeneralMcClernand's reserve on our right rear. I asked of each theassistance of a brigade. The former sent General Veatch's, and thelatter General John A. Logan's brigade. I asked the former tosupport our left flank, and the latter our right flank. The nextmorning early, Morgan L. Smith's brigade was deployed under coveron the left, and Denver's on the right, ready to move forwardrapidly at a signal. I had a battery of four twenty-pound Parrottguns, commanded by Captain Silversparre. Colonel Ezra Taylor, chief of artillery, had two of these guns moved up silently by handbehind a small knoll, from the crest of which the enemy'sblock-house and position could be distinctly seen; when all wereready, these guns were moved to the crest, and several quick roundswere fired at the house, followed after an interval by a singlegum. This was the signal agreed on, and the troops respondedbeautifully, crossed the field in line of battle, preceded by theirskirmishers who carried the position in good style, and pursued theenemy for half a mile beyond. 

The main line halted on the crest of the ridge, from which we couldlook over the parapets of the rebel works at Corinth, and heartheir drum and bugle calls. The rebel brigade had evidently beentaken by surprise in our attack; it soon rallied and came back onus with the usual yell, driving in our skirmishers, but was quicklychecked when it came within range of our guns and line of battle. Generals Grant and Thomas happened to be with me during thisaffair, and were well pleased at the handsome manner in which thetroops behaved. That night we began the usual entrenchments, andthe next day brought forward the artillery and the rest of thedivision, which then extended from the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, atBowie Hill Out, to the Corinth & Purdy road, there connecting withHurlbut's division. That night, viz. , May 29th, we heard unusualsounds in Corinth, the constant whistling of locomotives, and soonafter daylight occurred a series of explosions followed by a densesmoke rising high over the town. There was a telegraph lineconnecting my headquarters with those of General Halleck, aboutfour miles off, on the Hamburg road. I inquired if he knew thecause of the explosions and of the smoke, and he answered to"advance with my division and feel the enemy if still in my front"I immediately dispatched two regiments from each of my threebrigades to feel the immediate front, and in a very short timeadvanced with the whole division. Each brigade found the rebelparapets abandoned, and pushed straight for the town, which lies inthe northeast angle of intersection of the Mobile & Ohio andMemphis & Charleston Railroads. Many buildings had been burned bythe enemy on evacuation, which had begun the night before at 6p. M. , and continued through the night, the rear-guard burning theirmagazine at the time of withdrawing, about daybreak. Morgan L. Smith's brigade followed the retreating rear-guard some four milesto the Tuacumbia Bridge, which was found burned. I halted theother brigades at the college, about a mile to the southwest of thetown, where I was overtaken by General Thomas in person. 

The heads of all the columns had entered the rebel lines about thesame time, and there was some rather foolish clamor for the firsthonors, but in fact there was no honor in the event. Beauregardhad made a clean retreat to the south, and was only seriouslypursued by cavalry from General Pope's flank. But he reachedTupelo, where he halted for reorganization; and there is no doubtthat at the moment there was much disorganization in his ranks, forthe woods were full of deserters whom we did not even takeprisoners, but advised them to make their way home and stay there. We spent the day at and near the college, when General Thomas, whoapplied for orders at Halleck's headquarters, directed me toconduct my division back to the camp of the night before, where wehad left our trains The advance on Corinth had occupied all of themonth of May, the most beautiful and valuable month of the year forcampaigning in this latitude. There had been little fighting, saveon General Pope's left flank about Farmington; and on our right. Iesteemed it a magnificent drill, as it served for the instructionof our men in guard and picket duty, and in habituating them toout-door life; and by the time we had reached Corinth I believethat army was the best then on this continent, and could have gonewhere it pleased. The four subdivisions were well commanded, aswere the divisions and brigades of the whole army. General Halleckwas a man of great capacity, of large acquirements, and at the timepossessed the confidence of the country, and of most of the army. I held him in high estimation, and gave him credit for thecombinations which had resulted in placing this magnificent army ofa hundred thousand men, well equipped and provided, with a goodbase, at Corinth, from which he could move in any direction. 

Had he held his force as a unit, he could have gone to Mobile, orVicksburg, or anywhere in that region, which would by one move havesolved the whole Mississippi problem; and, from what he then toldme, I believe he intended such a campaign, but was overruled fromWashington. Be that as it may, the army had no sooner settled downat Corinth before it was scattered: General Pope was called to theEast, and his army distributed among the others; General Thomas wasrelieved from the command of the right wing, and reassigned to hisdivision in the Army of the Ohio; and that whole army under GeneralBuell was turned east along the Memphis & Charleston road, to marchfor Chattanooga. McClernand's "reserve" was turned west to Bolivarand Memphis. General Halleck took post himself at Corinth, assigned Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson to take charge of therailroads, with instructions to repair them as far as Columbus, Kentucky, and to collect cars and locomotives to operate them toCorinth and Grand Junction. I was soon dispatched with my own andHurlbut's divisions northwest fourteen miles to Chewalla, to savewhat could be of any value out of six trains of cars belonging tothe rebels which had been wrecked and partially burned at the timeof the evacuation of Corinth. 

A short time before leaving Corinth I rode from my camp to GeneralHalleck's headquarters, then in tents just outside of the town, where we sat and gossiped for some time, when he mentioned to mecasually that General Grant was going away the next morning. Iinquired the cause, and he said that he did not know, but thatGrant had applied for a thirty days' leave, which had been givenhim. Of course we all knew that he was chafing under the slightsof his anomalous position, and I determined to see him on my wayback. His camp was a short distance off the Monterey road, in thewoods, and consisted of four or five tents, with a sapling railingaround the front. As I rode up, Majors Rawlins, Lagow, and Hilyer, were in front of the camp, and piled up near them were the usualoffice and camp chests, all ready for a start in the morning. Iinquired for the general, and was shown to his tent, where I foundhim seated on a camp-stool, with papers on a rude camp-table; heseemed to be employed in assorting letters, and tying them up withred tape into convenient bundles. After passing the usualcompliments, I inquired if it were true that he was going away. Hesaid, "Yes. " I then inquired the reason, and he said "Sherman, youknow. You know that I am in the way here. I have stood it as longas I can, and can endure it no longer. " I inquired where he wasgoing to, and he said, "St. Louis. " I then asked if he had anybusiness there, and he said, "Not a bit. " I then begged him tostay, illustrating his case by my own. 

Before the battle of Shiloh, I had been cast down by a merenewspaper assertion of "crazy;" but that single battle had given menew life, and now I was in high feather; and I argued with himthat, if he went away, events would go right along, and he would beleft out; whereas, if he remained, some happy accident mightrestore him to favor and his true place. He certainly appreciatedmy friendly advice, and promised to wait awhile; at all events, notto go without seeing me again, or communicating with me. Very soonafter this, I was ordered to Chewalla, where, on the 6th of June, Ireceived a note from him, saying that he had reconsidered hisintention, and would remain. I cannot find the note, but my answerI have kept:

Chewalla, Jane 6, 1862. 

Major-General GRANT. 

My DEAR SIR: I have just received your note, and am rejoiced atyour conclusion to remain; for you could not be quiet at home for aweek when armies were moving, and rest could not relieve your mindof the gnawing sensation that injustice had been done you. 

My orders at Chewalla were to rescue the wrecked trains there, toreconnoitre westward and estimate the amount of damage to therailroad as far as Grand Junction, about fifty miles. We campedour troops on high, healthy ground to the south of Chewalla, andafter I had personally reconnoitred the country, details of menwere made and volunteer locomotive engineers obtained tosuperintend the repairs. I found six locomotives and about sixtycars, thrown from the track, parts of the machinery detached andhidden in the surrounding swamp, and all damaged as much by fire aspossible. It seems that these trains were inside of Corinth duringthe night of evacuation, loading up with all sorts of commissarystores, etc. , and about daylight were started west; but thecavalry-picket stationed at the Tuscumbia bridge had, by mistake orpanic, burned the bridge before the trains got to them. Thetrains, therefore, were caught, and the engineers and guardshastily scattered the stores into the swamp, and disabled thetrains as far as they could, before our cavalry had discoveredtheir critical situation. The weather was hot, and the swampfairly stunk with the putrid flour and fermenting sugar andmolasses; I was so much exposed there in the hot sun, pushingforward the work, that I got a touch of malarial fever, which hungon me for a month, and forced me to ride two days in an ambulance, the only time I ever did such a thing during the whole war. By the7th I reported to General Halleck that the amount of work necessaryto reestablish the railroad between Corinth and Grand Junction wasso great, that he concluded not to attempt its repair, but to relyon the road back to Jackson (Tennessee), and forward to GrandJunction; and I was ordered to move to Grand Junction, to take upthe repairs from there toward Memphis. 

The evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, and the movements ofGeneral McClernand's force toward Memphis, had necessitated theevacuation of Fort Pillow, which occurred about June 1st; soonfollowed by the further withdrawal of the Confederate army fromMemphis, by reason of the destruction of the rebel gunboats in thebold and dashing attack by our gun-boats under command of AdmiralDavis, who had succeeded Foote. This occurred June 7th. AdmiralFarragut had also captured New Orleans after the terrible passageof Forts Jackson and St. Philip on May 24th, and had ascended theriver as high as Vicksburg; so that it seemed as though, before theend of June, we should surely have full possession of the wholeriver. But it is now known that the progress of our Western armieshad aroused the rebel government to the exercise of the moststupendous energy. Every man capable of bearing arms at the Southwas declared to be a soldier, and forced to act as such. All theirarmies were greatly reenforced, and the most despotic power wasgranted to enforce discipline and supplies. Beauregard wasreplaced by Bragg, a man of more ability--of greater powers oforganization, of action, and discipline--but naturally exacting andsevere, and not possessing the qualities to attract the love of hisofficers and men. He had a hard task to bring into order anddiscipline that mass of men to whose command he succeeded atTupelo, with which he afterward fairly outmanoeuvred General Buell, and forced him back from Chattanooga to Louisville. It was a fatalmistake, however, that halted General Halleck at Corinth, and ledhim to disperse and scatter the best materials for a fighting armythat, up to that date, had been assembled in the West. 

During the latter part of June and first half of July, I had my ownand Hurlbut's divisions about Grand Junction, Lagrange, Moscow, andLafayette, building railroad-trestles and bridges, fighting offcavalry detachments coming from the south, and waging aneverlasting quarrel with planters about their negroes and fences--they trying, in the midst of moving armies, to raise a crop ofcorn. On the 17th of June I sent a detachment of two brigades, under General M. L. Smith, to Holly Springs, in the belief that Icould better protect the railroad from some point in front thanby scattering our men along it; and, on the 23d, I was atLafayette Station, when General Grant, with his staff and a veryinsignificant escort, arrived from Corinth en route for Memphis, totake command of that place and of the District of West Tennessee. He came very near falling into the hands of the enemy, who infestedthe whole country with small but bold detachments of cavalry. Upto that time I had received my orders direct from General Halleckat Corinth, but soon after I fell under the immediate command ofGeneral Grant and so continued to the end of the war; but, on the29th, General Halleck notified me that "a division of troops underGeneral C. S. Hamilton of 'Rosecrans's army corps, ' had passed theHatchie from Corinth, " and was destined for Holly Springs, orderingme to "cooperate as far as advisable, " but "not to neglect theprotection of the road. " I ordered General Hurlbut to leavedetachments at Grand Junction and Lagrange, and to march for HollySprings. I left detachments at Moscow and Lafayette, and, withabout four thousand men, marched for the same point. Hurlbut and Imet at Hudsonville, and thence marched to the Coldwater, withinfour miles of Holly Springs. We encountered only small detachmentsof rebel cavalry under Colonels Jackson and Pierson, and drove theminto and through Holly Springs; but they hung about, and I kept aninfantry brigade in Holly Springs to keep them out. I heardnothing from General Hamilton till the 5th of July, when I receiveda letter from him dated Rienzi, saying that he had been withinnineteen miles of Holly Springs and had turned back for Corinth;and on the next day, July 6th, I got a telegraph order from GeneralHalleck, of July 2d, sent me by courier from Moscow, "not toattempt to hold Holly Springs, but to fall back and protect therailroad. " We accordingly marched back twenty-five miles--Hurlbutto Lagrange, and I to Moscow. The enemy had no infantry nearerthan the Tallahatchee bridge, but their cavalry was saucy andactive, superior to ours, and I despaired of ever protecting arailroad, preventing a broad front of one hundred miles, from theirdashes. 

About this time, we were taunted by the Confederate soldiers andcitizens with the assertion that Lee had defeated McClellan atRichmond; that he would soon be in Washington; and that our turnwould come next. The extreme caution of General Halleck alsoindicated that something had gone wrong, and, on the 16th of July, at Moscow, I received a dispatch from him, announcing that he hadbeen summoned to Washington, which he seemed to regret, and whichat that moment I most deeply deplored. He announced that hiscommand would devolve on General Grant, who had been summonedaround from Memphis to Corinth by way of Columbus, Kentucky, andthat I was to go into Memphis to take command of the District ofWest Tennessee, vacated by General Grant. By this time, also, Iwas made aware that the great, army that had assembled at Corinthat the end of May had been scattered and dissipated, and thatterrible disasters had befallen our other armies in Virginia andthe East. 

I soon received orders to move to Memphis, taking Hurlbut'sdivision along. We reached Memphis on the 21st, and on the 22d Iposted my three brigades mostly in and near Fort Dickering, andHurlbut's division next below on the river-bank by reason of thescarcity of water, except in the Mississippi River itself. Theweather was intensely hot. The same order that took us to Memphisrequired me to send the division of General Lew Wallace (thencommanded by Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey) to Helena, Arkansas, toreport to General Curtis, which was easily accomplished bysteamboat. I made my own camp in a vacant lot, near Mr. Moon'shouse, and gave my chief attention to the construction of FortPickering, then in charge of Major Prime, United States Engineers;to perfecting the drill and discipline of the two divisions undermy command; and to the administration of civil affairs. 

At the time when General Halleck was summoned from Corinth toWashington, to succeed McClellan as commander-in-chief, I surelyexpected of him immediate and important results. The Army of theOhio was at the time marching toward Chattanooga, and was strungfrom Eastport by Huntsville to Bridgeport, under the command ofGeneral Buell. In like manner, the Army of the Tennessee wasstrung along the same general line, from Memphis to Tuscumbia, andwas commanded by General Grant, with no common commander for boththese forces: so that the great army which General Halleck had sowell assembled at Corinth, was put on the defensive, with afrontage of three hundred miles. Soon thereafter the rebelsdisplayed peculiar energy and military skill. General Bragg hadreorganized the army of Beauregard at Tupelo, carried it rapidlyand skillfully toward Chattanooga, whence he boldly assumed theoffensive, moving straight for Nashville and Louisville, andcompelling General Buell to fall back to the Ohio River atLouisville. 

The army of Van Dorn and Price had been brought from thetrans-Mississippi Department to the east of the river, and wascollected at and about Holly Springs, where, reenforced byArmstrong's and Forrests cavalry, it amounted to about fortythousand brave and hardy soldiers. These were General Grant'simmediate antagonists, and so many and large detachments had beendrawn from him, that for a time he was put on the defensive. Inperson he had his headquarters at Corinth, with the three divisionsof Hamilton, Davies, and McKean, under the immediate orders ofGeneral Rosecrans. General Ord had succeeded to the division ofMcClernand (who had also gone to Washington), and held Bolivar andGrand Junction. I had in Memphis my own and Hurlbut's divisions, and other smaller detachments were strung along the Memphis &Charleston road. But the enemy's detachments could strike thisroad at so many points, that no use could be made of it, andGeneral Grant had to employ the railroads, from Columbus, Kentucky, to Corinth and Grand Junction, by way of Jackson, Tennessee, apoint common to both roads, and held in some force. 

In the early part of September the enemy in our front manifestedgreat activity, feeling with cavalry at all points, and on the 13thGeneral Van Dorn threatened Corinth, while General Price seized thetown of Iuka, which was promptly abandoned by a small garrisonunder Colonel Murphy. Price's force was about eight thousand men, and the general impression was that he was en route for Eastport, with the purpose to cross the Tennessee River in the direction ofNashville, in aid of General Bragg, then in full career forKentucky. General Grant determined to attack him in force, prepared to regain Corinth before Van Dorn could reach it. He haddrawn Ord to Corinth, and moved him, by Burnsville, on Iuka, by themain road, twenty-six miles. General Grant accompanied this columnas far as Burnsville. At the same time he had dispatched Rosecransby roads to the south, via Jacinto, with orders to approach Iuka bythe two main roads, coming into Iuka from the south, viz. , theyJacinto and Fulton roads. 

On the 18th General Ord encountered the enemy about four miles outof Iuka. His orders contemplated that he should not make a seriousattack, until Rosecrans had gained his position on the south; but, as usual, Rosecrans had encountered difficulties in the confusionof roads, his head of column did not reach the vicinity of Iukatill 4 p. M. Of the 19th, and then his troops were long drawn outon the single Jacinto road, leaving the Fulton road clear forPrice's use. Price perceived his advantage, and attacked withvehemence the head of Rosecrans's column, Hamilton's division, beating it back, capturing a battery, and killing and disablingseven hundred and thirty-six men, so that when night closed inRosecrans was driven to the defensive, and Price, perceiving hisdanger, deliberately withdrew by the Fulton road, and the nextmorning was gone. Although General Ord must have been within fouror six miles of this battle, he did not hear a sound; and he orGeneral Grant did not know of it till advised the next morning by acourier who had made a wide circuit to reach them. General Grantwas much offended with General Rosecrans because of this affair, but in my experience these concerted movements generally fail, unless with the very best kind of troops, and then in a country onwhose roads some reliance can be placed, which is not the case inNorthern Mississippi. If Price was aiming for Tennessee; hefailed, and was therefore beaten. He made a wide circuit by thesouth, and again joined Van Dorn. 

On the 6th of September, at Memphis, I received an order fromGeneral Grant dated the 2d, to send Hurlbut's division toBrownsville, in the direction of Bolivar, thence to report byletter to him at Jackson. The division started the same day, and, as our men and officers had been together side by side from thefirst landing at Shiloh, we felt the parting like the breaking upof a family. But General Grant was forced to use every man, for heknew well that Van Dorn could attack him at pleasure, at any pointof his long line. To be the better prepared, on the 23d ofSeptember he took post himself at Jackson, Tennessee, with a smallreserve force, and gave Rosecrans command of Corinth, with histhree divisions and some detachments, aggregating about twentythousand men. He posted General Ord with his own and Hurlbut'adivisions at Bolivar, with outposts toward Grand Junction andLagrange. These amounted to nine or ten thousand men, and I heldMemphis with my own division, amounting to about six thousand men. The whole of General Grant's men at that time may have aggregatedfifty thousand, but he had to defend a frontage of a hundred andfifty miles, guard some two hundred miles of railway, and as muchriver. Van Dom had forty thousand men, united, at perfect libertyto move in any direction, and to choose his own point of attack, under cover of woods, and a superior body of cavalry, familiar withevery foot of the ground. Therefore General Grant had good reasonfor telegraphing to General Halleck, on the 1st of October, thathis position was precarious, "but I hope to get out of it allright. " In Memphis my business was to hold fast that importantflank, and by that date Fort Dickering had been made very strong, and capable of perfect defense by a single brigade. I thereforeendeavored by excursions to threaten Van Dorn's detachments to thesoutheast and east. I repeatedly sent out strong detachmentstoward Holly Springs, which was his main depot of supply; andGeneral Grierson, with his Sixth Illinois, the only cavalry I had, made some bold and successful dashes at the Coldwater, compellingVan Dorn to cover it by Armstrong's whole division of cavalry. Still, by the 1st of October, General Grant was satisfied that theenemy was meditating an attack in force on Bolivar or Corinth; andon the 2d Van Dorn made his appearance near Corinth, with hisentire army. On the 3d he moved down on that place from the northand northwest, General Roseerana went out some four miles to meethim, but was worsted and compelled to fall back within the line ofhis forts. These had been began under General Halleck, but weremuch strengthened by General Grant, and consisted of severaldetached redoubts, bearing on each other, and inclosing the townand the depots of stores at the intersection of the two railroads. Van Dorn closed down on the forts by the evening of the 3d, and onthe morning of the 4th assaulted with great vehemence. Our men, covered by good parapets, fought gallantly, and defended theirposts well, inflicting terrible losses on the enemy, so that bynoon the rebels were repulsed at all points, and drew off, leavingtheir dead and wounded in our hands. Their losses, were variouslyestimated, but the whole truth will probably never be known, for inthat army reports and returns were not the fashion. GeneralRosecrans admitted his own loss to be three hundred and fifteenkilled, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred andthirty-two missing or prisoners, and claimed on the part of therebels fourteen hundred and twenty-three dead, two thousand andtwenty-five prisoners and wounded. Of course, most of the woundedmust have gone off or been carried off, so that, beyond doubt, therebel army lost at Corinth fully six thousand men. 

Meantime, General Grant, at Jackson, had dispatched Brigadier-General McPherson, with a brigade, directly for Corinth, whichreached General Rosecrans after the battle; and, in anticipation ofhis victory, had ordered him to pursue instantly, notifying himthat he had ordered Ord's and Hurlbut's divisions rapidly across toPocahontas, so as to strike the rebels in flank. On the morning ofthe 5th, General Ord reached the Hatchie River, at Davies bridge, with four thousand men; crossed over and encountered the retreatingarmy, captured a battery and several hundred prisoners, dispersingthe rebel advance, and forcing the main column to make a widecircuit by the south in order to cross the Hatchie River. HadGeneral Rosecrans pursued promptly, and been on the heels of thismass of confused and routed men, Van Dorn's army would surely havebeen utterly ruined; as it was, Van Dom regained Holly Springssomewhat demoralized. 

General Rosecrans did not begin his pursuit till the next morning, the 5th, and it was then too late. General Grant was againdispleased with him, and never became fully reconciled. GeneralRosecrans was soon after relieved, and transferred to the Army ofthe Cumberland, in Tennessee, of which he afterward obtained thecommand, in place of General Buell, who was removed. 

The effect of the battle of Corinth was very great. It was, indeed, a decisive blow to the Confederate cause in our quarter, and changed the whole aspect of affairs in West Tennessee. Fromthe timid defensive we were at once enabled to assume the boldoffensive. In Memphis I could see its effects upon the citizens, and they openly admitted that their cause had sustained adeath-blow. But the rebel government was then at its maximumstrength; Van Dorn was reenforced, and very soon Lieutenant-GeneralJ. C. Pemberton arrived and assumed the command, adopting for hisline the Tallahatchie River, with an advance-guard along theColdwater, and smaller detachments forward at Grand Junction andHernando. General Grant, in like manner, was reenforced by newregiments. 

Out of those which were assigned to Memphis, I organized two newbrigades, and placed them under officers who had gained skill andexperience during the previous campaign. 

CHAPTER XII. 

MEMPHIS TO ARKANSAS POST. 

JULY, 1882 TO JANUARY, 1883

When we first entered Memphis, July 21, 1862, I found the placedead; no business doing, the stores closed, churches, schools, andevery thing shut up. The people were all more or less in sympathywith our enemies, and there was a strong prospect that the wholecivil population would become a dead weight on our hands. Inasmuchas the Mississippi River was then in our possession northward, andsteamboats were freely plying with passengers and freight, I causedall the stores to be opened, churches, schools, theatres, andplaces of amusement, to be reestablished, and very soon Memphisresumed its appearance of an active, busy, prosperous place. Ialso restored the mayor (whose name was Parks) and the citygovernment to the performance of their public functions, andrequired them to maintain a good civil police. 

Up to that date neither Congress nor the President had made anyclear, well-defined rules touching the negro slaves, and thedifferent generals had issued orders according to their ownpolitical sentiments. Both Generals Halleck and Grant regarded theslave as still a slave, only that the labor of the slave belongedto his owner, if faithful to the Union, or to the United States, ifthe master had taken up arms against the Government, or adhered tothe fortunes of the rebellion. Therefore, in Memphis, we receivedall fugitives, put them to work on the fortifications, suppliedthem with food and clothing, and reserved the question of paymentof wages for future decision. No force was allowed to be used torestore a fugitive slave to his master in any event; but if themaster proved his loyalty, he was usually permitted to see hisslave, and, if he could persuade him to return home, it waspermitted. Cotton, also, was a fruitful subject of controversy. The Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Chase, was extremely anxious atthat particular time to promote the purchase of cotton, becauseeach bale was worth, in gold, about three hundred dollars, andanswered the purpose of coin in our foreign exchanges. Hetherefore encouraged the trade, so that hundreds of greedyspeculators flocked down the Mississippi, and resorted to all sortsof measures to obtain cotton from the interior, often purchasing itfrom negroes who did not own it, but who knew where it wasconcealed. This whole business was taken from the jurisdiction ofthe military, and committed to Treasury agents appointed by Mr. Chase. 

Other questions absorbed the attention of military commanders; andby way of illustration I here insert a few letters from my"letter-book, " which contains hundreds on similar subjects:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONMemphis, Tennessee, August 11, 1862

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury. 

Sir: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussionof the cotton question. 

I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time tolisten to trifles. This is no trifle; when one nation is at warwith another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other:then the rules are plain and easy of understanding. Mostunfortunately, the war in which we are now engaged has beencomplicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the otherare not enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, thismistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to be misled byit. The Government of the United States may now safely proceed onthe proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in theNorth; and not only are they unfriendly, but all who can procurearms now bear them as organized regiments, or as guerrillas. Thereis not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sightof the flag-staff without being shot or captured. It so happenedthat these people had cotton, and, whenever they apprehended ourlarge armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the beliefthat, of course, we world seize it, and convert it to our use. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it. It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledgedgovernment, and was therefore lost to their people; and could havebeen, without injustice, taken by us, and sent away, either asabsolute prize of war, or for future compensation. But thecommercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten centswould buy a pound of cotton behind our army; that four cents wouldtake it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold. The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire, when here theydiscovered that salt, bacon, powder, fire-arms, percussion-caps, etc. , etc. , were worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, thistraffic was not only permitted, but encouraged. Before we in theinterior could know it, hundreds, yea thousands of barrels of saltand millions of dollars had been disbursed; and I have no doubtthat Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, receivedenough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have movedtheir armies in mass; and that from ten to twenty thousand fresharms, and a due supply of cartridges, have also been got, I amequally satisfied. As soon as I got to Memphis, having seen theeffect in the interior, I ordered (only as to my own command) thatgold, silver, and Treasury notes, were contraband of war, andshould not go into the interior, where all were hostile. It isidle to talk about Union men here: many want peace, and fear warand its results; but all prefer a Southern, independent government, and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that wasspent for cotton, was sent to the seaboard, to be exchanged forbank-notes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here, andare taken in ordinary transactions. I therefore required cotton tobe paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end ofthe war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee, viz. , the United States Quartermaster. Under these rules cotton isbeing obtained about as fast as by any other process, and yet theenemy receives no "aid or comfort. " Under the "gold" rule, thecountry people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, andwho openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to takeTennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that thetrade is to be encouraged, and gold paid out, I admit that cottonwill be sent in by our open enemies, who can make better use ofgold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton. 

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but myviews on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens warbecause we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can'temploy and feed her own people, to send them here, where theycannot only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence bymoderate labor. We are not bound to furnish her cotton. She hasmore reason to fight the South for burning that cotton, than us fornot shipping it. To aid the South on this ground would behypocrisy which the world would detect at once. Let her make herultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that willcounteract her in the balance. Of course her motive is to cripplea power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures, thatthreatens even to usurp her history. In twenty more years ofprosperity, it will require a close calculation to determinewhether England, her laws and history, claim for a home theContinent of America or the Isle of Britain. Therefore, finding usin a death-struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel todestroy both parts in detail. 

Southern people know this full well, and will only accept thealliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures inexchange for their cotton. The Southern Confederacy will accept noother mediation, because she knows full well that in Old Englandher slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than inNew England. 

France certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb herequilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respectconsideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feelassured the French will not encourage rebellion and secessionanywhere as a political doctrine. Certainly all the German statesmust be our ardent friends; and, in case of European intervention;they could not be kept down. 

With great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Memphis, July23, 1862

Dr. E. S. PLUMMER and others, Physician in Memphis, Signers to aPetition. 

GENTLEMEN: I have this moment received your communication, andassure you that it grieves my heart thus to be the instrument ofadding to the seeming cruelty and hardship of this unnatural war. 

On my arrival here, I found my predecessor (General Hovey) hadissued an order permitting the departure south of all personssubject to the conscript law of the Southern Confederacy. Manyapplications have been made to me to modify this order, but Iregarded it as a condition precedent by which I was bound in honor, and therefore I have made no changes or modifications; nor shall Idetermine what action I shall adopt in relation to personsunfriendly to our cause who remain after the time limited byGeneral Hovey's order had expired. It is now sunset, and all whohave not availed themselves of General Hovey's authority, and whoremain in Memphis, are supposed to be loyal and true men. 

I will only say that I cannot allow the personal convenience ofeven a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination tomake Memphis a safe place of operations for an army, and all peoplewho are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in suchdirection as I may hereafter indicate. 

Surgeons are not liable to be made prisoners of war, but theyshould not reside within the lines of an army which they regard ashostile. The situation would be too delicate. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS, MEMPHIS, July 24, 1862

SAMUEL SAWYER, Esq. , Editor Union Appeal, Memphis. 

DEAR SIR: It is well I should come to an understanding at oncewith the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am orderedto command; which means, to control for the interest, welfare; andglory of the whole Government of the United States. 

Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal. Thus, thoughyou meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you makemore than a dozen mistakes of fact, which I need not correct, as Idon't desire my biography to be written till I am dead. It isenough for the world to know that I live and am a soldier, bound toobey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and tovenerate its Constitution; and that, when discretion is given me, Ishall exercise it wisely and account to my superiors. 

I regard your article headed "City Council--General Sherman andColonel Slack, " as highly indiscreet. Of course, no person who canjeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much lessexercise public authority; but I must take time, and be satisfiedthat injustice be not done. 

If the parties named be the men you describe, the fact should notbe published, to put them on their guard and thus to encouragetheir escape. The evidence should be carefully collected, authenticated, and then placed in my hands. But your statement offacts is entirely qualified; in my mind, and loses its force byyour negligence of the very simple facts within your reach as tomyself: I had been in the army six years in 1846; am not related byblood to any member of Lucas, Turner & Co. ; was associated withthem in business six years (instead of two); am not colonel of theFifteenth Infantry, but of the Thirteenth. Your correction, thismorning, of the acknowledged error as to General Denver and others, is still erroneous. General Morgan L. Smith did not belong to mycommand at the battle of Shiloh at all, but he was transferred tomy division just before reaching Corinth. I mention these facts inkindness, to show you how wrong it is to speak of persons. 

I will attend to the judge, mayor, Boards of Aldermen, andpolicemen, all in good time. 

Use your influence to reestablish system, order, government. Youmay rest easy that no military commander is going to neglectinternal safety, or to guard against external danger; but to doright requires time, and more patience than I usually possess. IfI find the press of Memphis actuated by high principle and a soledevotion to their country, I will be their best friend; but, if Ifind them personal, abusive, dealing in innuendoes and hints at ablind venture, and looking to their own selfish aggrandizement andfame, then they had better look out; for I regard such persons asgreater enemies to their country and to mankind than the men who, from a mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets, andfight us about as hard as we care about. In haste, but inkindness, yours, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 27, 1882. 

JOHN PARK, Mayor of Memphis, present. 

Sir: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as allsimilar papers ever will, my careful and most respectfulconsideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civillaw, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power torestore them to their proper use, viz. , the protection of life, liberty, and property. 

Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, andnecessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior tothe civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it. Civilcourts and executive officers should still exist and performduties, without which civil or municipal bodies would soon passinto disrespect--an end to be avoided. I am glad to find inMemphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence, but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavorto restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration ofcontracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neithertime nor inclination to interfere with. Among these, first inimportance is the maintenance of order, peace, and quiet, withinthe jurisdiction of Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strongprovost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guardingpublic property held or claimed by the United States, and for thearrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who aredisorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guardought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. Thisshould be done by the city police. I understand that the citypolice is too weak in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and Itherefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps toincrease this force to a number which, in their judgment, day andnight can enforce your ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order; sothat any change in our military dispositions will not have atendency to leave your people unguarded. I am willing to instructthe provost guard to assist the police force when any combinationis made too strong for them to overcome; but the city police shouldbe strong enough for any probable contingency. The cost ofmaintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon allcitizens equitably. I am not willing, nor do I think it goodpolicy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging tothe State and County, as you recommend; for these would have to berefunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on allinterested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the propermunicipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of yourpolice force, and for raising the necessary means for their supportand maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection ofthe tax. Of course, I cannot suggest how this tax should be laid, but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, realestate, and personal property, including money, and merchandise. 

All who are protected should share the expenses in proportion tothe interests involved. I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, MEMPHIS, August 7, 1862. 

Captain FITCH, Assistant Quartermaster, Memphis, Tennessee. 

SIR: The duties devolving on the quartermaster of this post, inaddition to his legitimate functions, are very important andonerous, and I am fully aware that the task is more than shoulddevolve on one man. I will endeavor to get you help in the personof some commissioned officer, and, if possible, one under bond, ashe must handle large amounts of money in trust; but, for thepresent, we most execute the duties falling to our share as well aspossible. On the subject of vacant houses, General Grant's ordersare: "Take possession of all vacant stores and houses in the city, and have them rented at reasonable rates; rent to be paid monthlyin advance. These buildings, with their tenants, can be turnedover to proprietors on proof of loyalty; also take charge of suchas have been leased out by disloyal owners. "

I understand that General Grant takes the rents and profits of thisclass of real property under the rules and laws of war, and notunder the confiscation act of Congress; therefore the question oftitle is not involved simply the possession, and the rents andprofits of houses belonging to our enemies, which are not vacant, we hold in trust for them or the Government, according to thefuture decisions of the proper tribunals. 

Mr. McDonald, your chief agent in renting and managing thisbusiness, called on me last evening and left with me writtenquestions, which it would take a volume to answer and a Webster toelucidate; but as we can only attempt plain, substantial justice, Iwill answer these questions as well as I can, briefly and to thepoint. 

First. When ground is owned by parties who have gone south, andhave leased the ground to parties now in the city who own theimprovements on the ground?

Answer. The United States takes the rents due the owner of theland; does not disturb the owner of the improvements. 

Second. When parties owning houses have gone south, and the tenanthas given his notes for the rent in advance?

Answer. Notes are mere evidence of the debt due landlord. Thetenant pays the rent to the quartermaster, who gives a bond ofindemnity against the notes representing the debt for theparticular rent. 

Third. When the tenant has expended several months' rent inrepairs on the house?

Answer. Of course, allow all such credits on reasonable proof andshowing. 

Fourth. When the owner has gone south, and parties here hold lienson the property and are collecting the rents to satisfy theirliens?

Answer. The rent of a house can only be mortgaged to a person inpossession. If a loyal tenant be in possession and claim the rentfrom himself as due to himself on some other debt, allow it; but, if not in actual possession of the property, rents are not goodliens for a debt, but must be paid to the quartermaster. 

Fifth. Of parties claiming foreign protection?

Answer. Many claim foreign protection who are not entitled to it. If they are foreign subjects residing for business in this, country, they are entitled to consideration and protection solong as they obey the laws of the country. If they occupyhouses belonging to absent rebels, they must pay rent to thequarter-master. If they own property, they must occupy it bythemselves, tenants, or servants. 

Eighth. When houses are occupied and the owner has gone south, leaving an agent to collect rent for his benefit?

Answer. Rent must be paid to the quartermaster. No agent cancollect and remit money south without subjecting himself to arrestand trial for aiding and abetting the public enemy. 

Ninth.. When houses are owned by loyal citizens, but areunoccupied?

Answer. Such should not be disturbed, but it would be well toadvise them to have some servant at the house to occupy it. 

Tenth. When parties who occupy the house are creditors of theowner, who has gone south? Answer. You only look to collection ofrents. Any person who transmits money south is liable to arrestand trial for aiding and abetting the enemy; but I do not think itour business to collect debts other than rents. 

Eleventh. When the parties who own the property have left the cityunder General Hovey's Order No. 1, but are in the immediateneighborhood, on their plantations?

Answer. It makes no difference where they are, so they are absent. 

Twelfth. When movable property is found in stores that are closed?

Answer. The goods are security for the rent. If the owner of thegoods prefers to remove the goods to paying rent, he can do so. 

Thirteenth. When the owner lives in town, and refuses to take theoath of allegiance?

Answer. If the house be occupied, it does not fall under theorder. If the house be vacant, it does. The owner can recover hisproperty by taking the oath. 

All persons in Memphis residing within our military lines arepresumed to be loyal, good citizens, and may at any moment becalled to serve on juries, posses comitatua, or other civil servicerequired by the Constitution and laws of our country. Should theybe called upon to do such duty, which would require them toacknowledge their allegiance and subordination to the Constitutionof the United States, it would then be too late to refuse. So longas they remain quiet and conform to these laws, they are entitledto protection in their property and lives. 

We have nothing to do with confiscation. We only deal withpossession, and therefore the necessity of a strict accountability, because the United States assumes the place of trustee, and mustaccount to the rightful owner for his property, rents, and profits. In due season courts will be established to execute the laws, theconfiscation act included, when we will be relieved of this dutyand trust. Until that time, every opportunity should be given tothe wavering and disloyal to return to their allegiance to theConstitution of their birth or adoption. I am, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN. 

Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONMEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, August 26, 1862

Major-General GRANT, Corinth, Mississippi. 

Sir: In pursuance of your request that I should keep you advised ofmatters of interest here, in addition to the purely officialmatters, I now write. 

I dispatched promptly the thirteen companies of cavalry, nine ofFourth Illinois, and four of Eleventh Illinois, to their respectivedestinations, punctually on the 23d instant, although the order wasonly received on the 22d. I received at the same time, fromColonel Dickey, the notice that the bridge over Hatchie was burned, and therefore I prescribed their order of march via Bolivar. Theystarted at 12 m. Of the 23d, and I have no news of them since. None of the cavalry ordered to me is yet heard from. 

The guerrillas have destroyed several bridges over Wolf Creek; oneat Raleigh, on the road by which I had prescribed trade and travelto and from the city. I have a strong guard at the lower bridgeover Wolf River, by which we can reach the country to the north ofthat stream; but, as the Confederates have burned their ownbridges, I will hold them to my order, and allow no trade over anyother road than the one prescribed, using the lower or Randolphroad for our own convenience. I am still satisfied there is nolarge force of rebels anywhere in the neighborhood. All the navygunboats are below except the St. Louis, which lies off the city. When Commodore Davis passes down from Cairo, I will try to see him, and get him to exchange the St. Louis for a fleeter boat notiron-clad; one that can move up and down the river, to break upferry-boats and canoes, and to prevent all passing across theriver. Of course, in spite of all our efforts, smuggling iscarried on. We occasionally make hauls of clothing, gold-lace, buttons, etc. , but I am satisfied that salt and arms are got to theinterior somehow. I have addressed the Board of Trade a letter onthis point, which will enable us to control it better. 

You may have been troubled at hearing reports of drunkenness here. There was some after pay-day, but generally all is as quiet andorderly as possible. I traverse the city every day and night, andassert that Memphis is and has been as orderly a city as St. Louis, Cincinnati, or New York. 

Before the city authorities undertook to license saloons, there wasas much whiskey here as now, and it would take all my command ascustomhouse inspectors, to break open all the parcels and packagescontaining liquor. I can destroy all groggeries and shops wheresoldiers get liquor just as we would in St. Louis. 

The newspapers are accusing me of cruelty to the sick; as base acharge as was ever made. I would not let the Sanitary Committeecarry off a boat-load of sick, because I have no right to. We havegood hospitals here, and plenty of them. Our regimental hospitalsare in the camps of the men, and the sick do much better there thanin the general hospitals; so say my division surgeon and theregimental surgeons. The civilian doctors would, if permitted, take away our entire command. General Curtis sends his sick uphere, but usually no nurses; and it is not right that nurses shouldbe taken from my command for his sick. I think that, when we areendeavoring to raise soldiers and to instruct them, it is badpolicy to keep them at hospitals as attendants and nurses. 

I send you Dr. Derby's acknowledgment that he gave the leave ofabsence of which he was charged. I have placed him in arrest, inobedience to General Halleck's orders, but he remains in charge ofthe Overton Hospital, which is not full of patients. 

The State Hospital also is not full, and I cannot imagine what Dr. Derby wants with the Female Academy on Vance Street. I will seehim again, and now that he is the chief at Overton Hospital, Ithink he will not want the academy. Still, if he does, under yourorders I will cause it to be vacated by the children and Sisters ofMercy. They have just advertised for more scholars, and will besadly disappointed. If, however, this building or any other beneeded for a hospital, it must be taken; but really, in my heart, Ido not see what possible chance there is, under presentcircumstances, of filling with patients the two large hospitals nowin use, besides the one asked for. I may, however, be mistaken inthe particular building asked for by Dr. Derby, and will go myselfto see. 

The fort is progressing well, Captain Jenney having arrived. Sixteen heavy guns are received, with a large amount of shot andshell, but the platforms are not yet ready; still, if occasionshould arise for dispatch, I can put a larger force to work. Captain Prime, when here, advised that the work should proceedregularly under the proper engineer officers and laborers. I am, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONMEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 4, 1862

Colonel J. C, KELTON, Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters ofthe army, Washington, D. C. 

DEAR COLONEL: Please acknowledge to the major-general commandingthe receipt by me of his letter, and convey to him my assurancesthat I have promptly modified my first instructions about cotton, so as to conform to his orders. Trade in cotton is now free, butin all else I endeavor so to control it that the enemy shallreceive no contraband goods, or any aid or comfort; still I feelsure that the officers of steamboats are sadly tempted by highprices to land salt and other prohibited articles at waypointsalong the river. This, too, in time will be checked. All seemswell here and hereabout; no large body of the enemy within strikingdistance. A force of about two thousand, cavalry passed throughGrand Junction north last Friday, and fell on a detachment of theBolivar army at Middleburg, the result of which is doubtlessreported to you. As soon as I heard of the movement, I dispatcheda force to the southeast by way of diversion, and am satisfied thatthe enemy's infantry and artillery fell back in consequence behindthe Tallahatchie. The weather is very hot, country very dry, anddust as bad as possible. I hold my two divisions ready, with theiroriginal complement of transportation, for field service. Ofcourse all things most now depend on events in front of Washingtonand in Kentucky. The gunboat Eastport and four transports loadedwith prisoners of war destined for Vicksburg have been lying beforeMemphis for two days, but are now steaming up to resume theirvoyage. Our fort progresses well, but our guns are not yetmounted. The engineers are now shaping the banquette to receiveplatforms. I expect Captain Prime from Corinth in two or threedays. 

I am, with great respect, yours, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISIONMEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, September 21, 1862

Editor Bulletin. 

SIR: Your comments on the recent orders of Generals Halleck andMcClellan afford the occasion appropriate for me to make public thefact that there is a law of Congress, as old as our Governmentitself, but reenacted on the 10th of April, 1806, and in force eversince. That law reads:

"All officers and soldiers are to behave themselves orderly inquarters and on the march; and whoever shall commit any waste orspoil, either in walks of trees, parks, warrens, fish-ponds, housesand gardens, cornfields, inclosures or meadows, or shallmaliciously destroy any property whatever belonging to theinhabitants of the United States, unless by order of thecommander-in-chief of the armies of said United States, shall(besides such penalties as they are liable to by law) be punishedaccording to the nature and degree of the offense, by the judgmentof a general or regimental court-martial. "

Such is the law of Congress; and the orders of the commander-in-chief are, that officers or soldiers convicted of straggling andpillaging shall be punished with death. These orders have not cometo me officially, but I have seen them in newspapers, and amsatisfied that they express the determination of the commander-in-chief. Straggling and pillaging have ever been great militarycrimes; and every officer and soldier in my command knows whatstress I have laid upon them, and that, so far as in my power lies, I will punish them to the full extent of the law and orders. 

The law is one thing, the execution of the law another. Godhimself has commanded: "Thou shalt not kill, " "thou shalt notsteal, " "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods, " etc. Willany one say these things are not done now as well as before theselaws were announced at Sinai. I admit the law to be that "no officeror soldier of the United States shall commit waste or destructionof cornfields, orchards, potato-patches, or any kind of pillage onthe property of friend or foe near Memphis, " and that I standprepared to execute the law as far as possible. 

No officer or soldier should enter the house or premises of anypeaceable citizen, no matter what his politics, unless on business;and no such officer or soldier can force an entrance unless he havea written order from a commanding officer or provost-marshal, whichwritten authority must be exhibited if demanded. When propertysuch as forage, building or other materials are needed by theUnited States, a receipt will be given by the officer taking them, which receipt should be presented to the quartermaster, who willsubstitute therefor a regular voucher, to be paid-according to thecircumstances of the case. If the officer refuse to give suchreceipt, the citizen may fairly infer that the property iswrongfully taken, and he should, for his own protection, ascertainthe name, rank, and regiment of the officer, and report him inwriting. If any soldier commits waste or destruction, the personwhose property is thus wasted must find out the name, company, andregiment of the actual transgressor. In order to punish there mustbe a trial, and there must be testimony. It is not sufficient thata general accusation be made, that soldiers are doing this or that. I cannot punish my whole command, or a whole battalion, because oneor two bad soldiers do wrong. The punishment must reach theperpetrators, and no one can identify them as well as the party whois interested. The State of Tennessee does not hold itselfresponsible for acts of larceny committed by her citizens, nor doesthe United Staten or any other nation. These are individual actsof wrong, and punishment can only be inflicted on the wrong-doer. I know the difficulty of identifying particular soldiers, butdifficulties do not alter the importance of principles of justice. They should stimulate the parties to increase their efforts to findout the actual perpetrators of the crime. 

Colonels of regiments and commanders of corps are liable to severepunishment for permitting their men to leave their camps to commitwaste or destruction; but I know full well that many of the actsattributed to soldiers are committed by citizens and negroes, andare charged to soldiers because of a desire to find fault withthem; but this only reacts upon the community and increases themischief. While every officer would willingly follow up anaccusation against any one or more of his men whose names ordescription were given immediately after the discovery of the act, he would naturally resent any general charge against his good men, for the criminal conduct of a few bad ones. 

I have examined into many of the cases of complaint made in thisgeneral way, and have felt mortified that our soldiers should doacts which are nothing more or less than stealing, but I waspowerless without some clew whereby to reach the rightful party. Iknow that the great mass of our soldiers would scorn to steal orcommit crime, and I will not therefore entertain vague and generalcomplaints, but stand, prepared always to follow up any reasonablecomplaint when the charge is definite and the names of witnessesfurnished. 

I know, moreover, in some instances when our soldiers arecomplained of, that they have been insulted by sneering remarksabout "Yankees, " "Northern barbarians, " "Lincoln's hirelings, "etc. People who use such language must seek redress through someone else, for I will not tolerate insults to our country or cause. When people forget their obligations to a Government that made themrespected among the nations of the earth, and speak contemptuouslyof the flag which is the silent emblem of that country, I will notgo out of my way to protect them or their property. I will punishthe soldiers for trespass or waste if adjudged by a court-martial, because they disobey orders; but soldiers are men and citizens aswell as soldiers, and should promptly resent any insult to theircountry, come from what quarter it may. I mention this phasebecause it is too common. Insult to a soldier does not justifypillage, but it takes from the officer the disposition he wouldotherwise feel to follow up the inquiry and punish the wrong-doers. 

Again, armies in motion or stationary must commit some waste. Flankers must let down fences and cross fields; and, when an attackis contemplated or apprehended, a command will naturally clear theground of houses, fences, and trees. This is waste, but is thenatural consequence of war, chargeable on those who caused the war. So in fortifying a place, dwelling-houses must be taken, materialsused, even wasted, and great damage done, which in the end mayprove useless. This, too, is an expense not chargeable to us, butto those who made the war; and generally war is destruction andnothing else. 

We must bear this in mind, that however peaceful things look, weare really at war; and much that looks like waste or destruction isonly the removal of objects that obstruct our fire, or would affordcover to an enemy. 

This class of waste must be distinguished from the wanton wastecommitted by army-stragglers, which is wrong, and can be punishedby the death-penalty if proper testimony can be produced. 

Yours, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Satisfied that, in the progress of the war, Memphis would become animportant depot, I pushed forward the construction of FortPickering, kept most of the troops in camps back of the city, andmy own headquarters remained in tents on the edge of the city, nearMr. Moon's house, until, on the approach of winter, Mrs. Shermancame down with the children to visit me, when I took a house nearerthe fort. 

All this time battalion and brigade drills were enforced, so that, when the season approached for active operations farther south, Ihad my division in the best possible order, and about the 1st ofNovember it was composed as follows:

First Brigade, Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH--Eighth Missouri, Colonel G. A. Smith; Sixth Missouri, Colonel Peter E. Bland; OneHundred and Thirteenth Illinois, Colonel George B. Hoge;Fifty-fourth Ohio, Colonel T. Kilby Smith; One Hundred andTwentieth Illinois, Colonel G. W. McKeaig. 

Second Brigade, Colonel JOHN ADAIR McDOWELL. --Sixth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Corse; Fortieth Illinois, Colonel J. W. Booth; Forty-sixth Ohio, Colonel O. C. Walcutt; Thirteenth UnitedStates Infantry, First Battalion, Major D. Chase. 

Third Brigade, Brigadier-General J. W. DENVER. --Forty-eighth Ohio, Colonel P. J. Sullivan; Fifty-third Ohio, Colonel W. S. Jones;Seventieth Ohio, Colonel J. R. Cockerill. 

Fourth Brigade, Colonel DAVID STUART. --Fifty-fifth Illinois, Colonel O. Malmburg; Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel W. Mungen;Eighty-third Indiana, Colonel B. Spooner; One Hundred and SixteenthIllinois, Colonel Tupper; One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Eldridge. 

Fifth Brigade, Colonel R. P. BUCKLAND. --Seventy-second Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel D. W. C. Loudon; Thirty-second Wisconsin, Colonel J. W. Howe; Ninety-third Indiana, Colonel Thomas;Ninety-third Illinois, Major J. M. Fisher. 

Subsequently, Brigadier-General J. G. Lauman arrived at Memphis, and I made up a sixth brigade, and organized these six brigadesinto three divisions, under Brigadier-Generals M. L. Smith, J. W. Denver, and J. G. Lauman. 

About the 17th of November I received an order from General Grant, dated:

LAGRANGE, November 16, 1862. 

Meet me at Columbus, Kentucky, on Thursday next. If you have agood map of the country south of you, take it up with you. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

I started forthwith by boat, and met General Grant, who had reachedColumbus by the railroad from Jackson, Tennessee. He explained tome that he proposed to move against Pemberton, then intrenched on aline behind the Tallahatchie River below Holly Springs; that hewould move on Holly Springs and Abberville, from Grand Junction;that McPherson, with the troops at Corinth, would aim to makejunction with him at Holly Springs; and that he wanted me to leavein Memphis a proper garrison, and to aim for the Tallahatchie, soas to come up on his right by a certain date. He further said thathis ultimate object was to capture Vicksburg, to open thenavigation of the Mississippi River, and that General Halleck hadauthorized him to call on the troops in the Department of Arkansas, then commanded by General S. R. Curtis, for cooperation. Isuggested to him that if he would request General Curtis to send anexpedition from some point on the Mississippi, near Helena, thenheld in force, toward Grenada, to the rear of Pemberton, it wouldalarm him for the safety of his communications, and would assist usmaterially in the proposed attack on his front. He authorized meto send to the commanding officer at Helena a request to thateffect, and, as soon as I reached Memphis, I dispatched my aide, Major McCoy, to Helena, who returned, bringing me a letter fromGeneral Frederick Steele, who had just reached Helena withOsterhaus's division, and who was temporarily in command, GeneralCurtis having gone to St. Louis. This letter contained theassurance that he "would send from Friar's Point a large forceunder Brigadier-General A. P. Hovey in the direction of Grenada, aiming to reach the Tallahatchie at Charleston, on the next Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday (December 1st) at furthest. " My command wasappointed to start on Wednesday, November 24th, and meantimeMajor-General S. A. Hurlbut, having reported for duty, was assignedto the command of Memphis, with four regiments of infantry onebattery of artillery, two companies of Thielman's cavalry and thecertain prospect of soon receiving a number of new regiments, knownto be en route. 

I marched out of Memphis punctually with three small divisions, taking different roads till we approached the Tallahatchie, when weconverged on Wyatt to cross the river, there a bold, deep stream, with a newly-constructed fort behind. I had Grierson's SixthIllinois Cavalry with me, and with it opened communication withGeneral Grant when we were abreast of Holly Springs. We reachedWyatt on the 2d day of December without the least opposition, andthere learned that Pemberton's whole army had fallen back to theYalabusha near Grenada, in a great measure by reason of theexaggerated reports concerning the Helena force, which had reachedCharleston; and some of General Hovey's cavalry, under GeneralWashburn, having struck the railroad in the neighborhood ofCoffeeville, naturally alarmed General Pemberton for the safety ofhis communications, and made him let go his Tallahatchie line withall the forts which he had built at great cost in labor. We had tobuild a bridge at Wyatt, which consumed a couple of days, and onthe 5th of December my whole command was at College Hill, ten milesfrom Oxford, whence I reported to General Grant in Oxford. 

On the 8th I received the following letter:

OXFORD MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862--Morning

General SHERMAN, College Hill. 

DEAR GENERAL: The following is a copy of dispatch just receivedfrom Washington:

WASHINGTON, December 7, 1862--12M

General GRANT:

The capture of Grenada may change our plans in regard to Vicksburg. You will move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish thegreat object in view. You will retain, till further orders, alltroops of General Curtis now in your department. Telegraph toGeneral Allen in St. Louis for all steamboats you may require. AskPorter to cooperate. Telegraph what are your present plans. 

H. W. HALLECK, General-in. -Chief. 

I wish you would come over this evening and stay to-night, or comein the morning. I would like to talk with you about this matter. My notion is to send two divisions back to Memphis, and fix upon aday when they should effect a landing, and press from here withthis command at the proper time to cooperate. If I do not do thisI will move our present force to Grenada, including Steele's, repairing road as we proceed, and establish a depot of provisionsthere. When a good ready is had, to move immediately on Jackson, Mississippi, cutting loose from the road. Of the two plans I lookmost favorably on the former. 

Come over and we will talk this matter over. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

I repaired at once to Oxford, and found General Grant in a largehouse with all his staff, and we discussed every possible chance. He explained to me that large reenforcements had been promised, which would reach Memphis very soon, if not already there; that theentire gunboat fleet, then under the command of Admiral D. D. Porter, would cooperate; that we could count on a full divisionfrom the troops at Helena; and he believed that, by a promptmovement, I could make a lodgment up the Yazoo and captureVicksburg from the rear; that its garrison was small, and he, atOxford, would so handle his troops as to hold Pemberton away fromVicksburg. I also understood that, if Pemberton should retreatsouth, he would follow him up, and would expect to find me at theYazoo River, if not inside of Vicksburg. I confess, at that momentI did not dream that General McClernand, or anybody else, wasscheming for the mere honor of capturing Vicksburg. We knew at thetime that General Butler had been reenforced by General Banks atNew Orleans, and the latter was supposed to be working his wayup-stream from New Orleans, while we were working down. That dayGeneral Grant dispatched to General Halleck, in Washington, asfollows:

OXFORD, December 8, 1862. 

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Washington, D. C. :

General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand men; will land aboveVicksburg (up the Yazoo, if practicable), and out the MississippiCentral road and the road running east from Vicksburg, where theycross Black River. I will cooperate from here, my movementsdepending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force nowat my command, I will be able to have them show themselves atdifferent points on the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha; and, when anopportunity occurs, make a real attack. After cutting the tworoads, General Sherman's movements to secure the end desired willnecessarily be left to his judgment. 

I will occupy this road to Coffeeville. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

I was shown this dispatch before it was sent, and afterward thegeneral drew up for me the following letter of instructions in hisown handwriting, which I now possess:

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPSDEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, OXFORD, Mississippi, December 8, 1862. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Right Wing Army In theField, present. 

GENERAL: You will proceed with as little delay as practicable toMemphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your presentcommand. On your arrival at Memphis you will assume command of allthe troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces atpresent east of the Mississippi River, and organize them intobrigades and divisions in your own way. 

As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinityof Vicksburg, and, with the cooperation of the gunboat fleet undercommand of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of thatplace in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment maydictate. 

The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc. , necessaryto take, will be left entirely to yourself. 

The quartermaster in St. Louis will be instructed to send youtransportation for thirty thousand men. Should you still findyourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to makeup the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port ofMemphis. 

On arriving in Memphis put yourself in communication with AdmiralPorter, and arrange with him for his cooperation. 

Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you willembark, and such plans as may then be matured. I will hold theforces here in readiness to cooperate with you in such manner asthe movements of the enemy may make necessary. 

Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficientofficer and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, thesiege-guns, and what ever cavalry force may be there. 

One regiment of infantry and at least a section of artillery willalso be left at Friar's Point or Delta, to protect the stores ofthe cavalry post that will be left there. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

I also insert here another letter, dated the 14th instant, sentafterward to me at Memphis, which completes all instructionsreceived by me governing the first movement against Vicksburg:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEOXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 14, 1862

Major-General SHERMAN, commanding, etc. , Memphis, Tennessee. 

I have not had one word from Grierson since he left, and am gettinguneasy about him. I hope General Gorman will give you nodifficulty about retaining the troops on this side the river, andSteele to command them. The twenty-one thousand men you have, withthe twelve thousand from Helena, will make a good force. The enemyare as yet on the Yalabusha. I am pushing down on them slowly, butso as to keep up the impression of a continuous move. I feelparticularly anxious to have the Helena cavalry on this side of theriver; if not now, at least after you start. If Gorman will sendthem, instruct them where to go and how to communicate with me. Myheadquarters will probably be in Coffeeville one week hence.... Inthe mean time I will order transportation, etc.... It would be wellif you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigatingthe Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look to that base forsupplies before we get through.... 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

When we rode to Oxford from College Hill, there happened a littlecircumstance which seems worthy of record. While General Van Dornhad his headquarters in Holly Springs, viz. , in October, 1862, hewas very short of the comforts and luxuries of life, and resortedto every possible device to draw from the abundant supplies inMemphis. He had no difficulty whatever in getting spies into thetown for information, but he had trouble in getting bulky suppliesout through our guards, though sometimes I connived at his suppliesof cigars, liquors, boots, gloves, etc. , for his individual use;but medicines and large supplies of all kinds were confiscated, ifattempted to be passed out. As we rode that morning toward Oxford, I observed in a farmer's barn-yard a wagon that looked like a cityfurniture-wagon with springs. We were always short of wagons, so Icalled the attention of the quartermaster, Colonel J. Condit Smith, saying, "There is a good wagon; go for it. " He dropped out of theretinue with an orderly, and after we had ridden a mile or so heovertook us, and I asked him, "What luck?" He answered, "Allright; I have secured that wagon, and I also got another, " andexplained that he had gone to the farmer's house to inquire aboutthe furniture-wagon, when the farmer said it did not belong to him, but to some party in Memphis, adding that in his barn was anotherbelonging to the same party. They went to the barn, and therefound a handsome city hearse, with pall and plumes. The farmersaid they had had a big funeral out of Memphis, but when it reachedhis house, the coffin was found to contain a fine assortment ofmedicines for the use of Van Dorn's army. Thus under the pretenseof a first-class funeral, they had carried through our guards thevery things we had tried to prevent. It was a good trick, butdiminished our respect for such pageants afterward. 

As soon as I was in possession of General Grant's instructions ofDecember 8th, with a further request that I should dispatch ColonelGrierson, with his cavalry, across by land to Helena, to notifyGeneral Steele of the general plan, I returned to College Hill, selected the division of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith toreturn with me to Memphis; started Grierson on his errand toHelena, and ordered Generals Denver and Lauman to report to GeneralGrant for further orders. We started back by the most directroute, reached Memphis by noon of December 12th, and beganimmediately the preparations for the Vicksburg movement. There Ifound two irregular divisions which had arrived at Memphis in myabsence, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General A. J. Smithand Brigadier-General George W. Morgan. These were designated theFirst and Third Divisions, leaving the Second Division of Morgan Z. Smith to retain its original name and number. 

I also sent orders, in the name of General Grant, to GeneralGorman, who meantime had replaced General Steele in command ofHelena, in lieu of the troops which had been east of theMississippi and had returned, to make up a strong division toreport to me on my way down. This division was accordinglyorganized, and was commanded by Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, constituting my Fourth Division. 

Meantime a large fleet of steamboats was assembling from St. Louisand Cairo, and Admiral Porter dropped down to Memphis with hiswhole gunboat fleet, ready to cooperate in the movement. Thepreparations were necessarily hasty in the extreme, but this wasthe essence of the whole plan, viz. , to reach Vicksburg as it wereby surprise, while General Grant held in check Pemberton's armyabout Grenada, leaving me to contend only with the smaller garrisonof Vicksburg and its well-known strong batteries and defenses. Onthe 19th the Memphis troops were embarked, and steamed down toHelena, where on the 21st General Steele's division was alsoembarked; and on the 22d we were all rendezvoused at Friar's Point, in the following order, viz. :

Steamer Forest Queen, general headquarters, and battalionThirteenth United States Infantry. 

First Division, Brigadier-General A. J. SMITH. --Steamers Des Arc, division headquarters and escort; Metropolitan, Sixth Indiana; J. H. Dickey, Twenty-third Wisconsin; J. C. Snow, Sixteenth Indiana;Hiawatha, Ninety-sixth Ohio; J. S. Pringle, Sixty-seventh Indiana;J. W. Cheeseman, Ninth Kentucky; R. Campbell, Ninety-seventhIndiana; Duke of Argyle, Seventy-seventh Illinois; City of Alton, One Hundred and Eighth and Forty-eighth Ohio; City of Louisiana, Mercantile Battery; Ohio Belle, Seventeenth Ohio Battery; Citizen, Eighty-third Ohio; Champion, commissary-boat; General Anderson, Ordnance. 

Second Division, Brigadier-General M. L. SMITH. --SteamersChancellor, headquarters, and Thielman's cavalry; Planet, OneHundred and Sixteenth Illinois; City of Memphis, Batteries A and B(Missouri Artillery), Eighth Missouri, and section of Parrott guns;Omaha, Fifty-seventh Ohio; Sioux City, Eighty-third Indiana; SpreadEagle, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois; Ed. Walsh, OneHundred and Thirteenth Illinois; Westmoreland, Fifty-fifthIllinois, headquarters Fourth Brigade; Sunny South, Fifty-fourthOhio; Universe, Sixth Missouri; Robert Allen, commissary-boat. 

Third Division, Brigadier-General G. W. MORGAN. --Steamers Empress, division headquarters; Key West, One Hundred and EighteenthIllinois; Sam Gaty, Sixty-ninth Indiana; Northerner, One Hundredand Twentieth Ohio; Belle Peoria, headquarters Second Brigade, twocompanies Forty-ninth Ohio, and pontoons; Die Vernon, ThirdKentucky; War Eagle, Forty-ninth Indiana (eight companies), andFoster's battery; Henry von Phul, headquarters Third Brigade, andeight companies Sixteenth Ohio; Fanny Bullitt, One Hundred andFourteenth Ohio, and Lamphere's battery; Crescent City, Twenty-second Kentucky and Fifty-fourth Indiana; Des Moines, Forty-second Ohio; Pembina, Lamphere's and Stone's batteries; LadyJackson, commissary-boat. 

Fourth Division, Brigadier-General FREDERICK STEELE--SteamersContinental, headquarters, escort and battery; John J. Roe, Fourthand Ninth Iowa; Nebraska, Thirty-first Iowa; Key West, First IowaArtillery; John Warner, Thirteenth Illinois; Tecumseh, Twenty-sixthIowa; Decatur, Twenty-eighth Iowa; Quitman, Thirty-fourth Iowa;Kennett, Twenty ninth Missouri; Gladiator, Thirtieth Missouri;Isabella, Thirty-first Missouri; D. G. Taylor, quartermaster'sstores and horses; Sucker State, Thirty-second Missouri; Dakota, Third Missouri; Tutt, Twelfth Missouri Emma, Seventeenth Missouri;Adriatic, First Missouri; Meteor, Seventy-sixth Ohio; Polar Star, Fifty-eighth Ohio. 

At the same time were communicated the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY CorpsFOREST QUEEN, December 23, 1882. 

To Commanders of Divisions, Generals F. STEELE, GEORGE W. MORGAN, A. J. SMITH, and M. L. SMITH

With this I hand to each of you a copy of a map, compiled from thebest sources, and which in the main is correct. It is the sameused by Admiral Porter and myself. Complete military success canonly be accomplished by united action on some general plan, embracing usually a large district of country. In the presentinstance, our object is to secure the navigation of the MississippiRiver and its main branches, and to hold them as military channelsof communication and for commercial purposes. The river, aboveVicksburg, has been gained by conquering the country to its rear, rendering its possession by our enemy useless and unsafe to him, and of great value to us. But the enemy still holds the river fromVicksburg to Baton Rouge, navigating it with his boats, and thepossession of it enables him to connect his communications androutes of supply, east and west. To deprive him of this will be asevere blow, and, if done effectually, will be of great advantageto us, and probably, the most decisive act of the war. Toaccomplish this important result we are to act our part--animportant one of the great whole. General Banks, with a largeforce, has reinforced General Butler in Louisiana, and from thatquarter an expedition, by water and land, is coming northward. General Grant, with the Thirteenth Army Corps, of which we composethe right wing, is moving southward. The naval squadron (AdmiralPorter) is operating with his gunboat fleet by water, each inperfect harmony with the other. 

General Grant's left and centre were at last accounts approachingthe Yalabusha, near Grenada, and the railroad to his rear, by whichhe drew his supplies, was reported to be seriously damaged. Thismay disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our lineof operations. At the Yalabusha General Grant may encounter thearmy of General Pemberton, the same which refused him battle on theline of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified; but, as hewill not have time to fortify it, he will hardly stand there; and, in that event, General Grant will immediately advance down the highridge between the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet uson the Yazoo and receive from us the supplies which he needs, andwhich he knows we carry along. Parts of this general plan are tocooperate with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg; tosecure possession of the land lying between the Yazoo and BigBlack; and to act in concert with General Grant against Pemberton'sforces, supposed to have Jackson, Mississippi, as a point ofconcentration. Vicksburg is doubtless very strongly fortified, both against the river and land approaches. Already the gunboatshave secured the Yazoo up for twenty-three miles, to a fort on theYazoo at Haines's Bluff, giving us a choice for a landing-place atsome point up the Yazoo below this fort, or on the island whichlies between Vicksburg and the present mouth of the Yazoo. (Seemap [b, c, d], Johnson's plantation. )

 But, before any actual collision with the enemy, I purpose, after our whole land force is rendezvoused at Gaines's Landing, Arkansas, to proceed in order to Milliken's Bend (a), and theredispatch a brigade, without wagons or any incumbrances whatever, tothe Vicksburg & Shreveport Railroad (at h and k), to destroy thateffectually, and to cut off that fruitful avenue of supply; then toproceed to the mouth of the Yazoo, and, after possessing ourselvesof the latest and most authentic information from naval officersnow there, to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, andthen to reach the point where the Vicksburg & Jackson Railroadcrosses the Big Black (f); after which to attack Vicksburg by land, while the gun-boats assail it by water. It may be necessary(looking to Grant's approach), before attacking Vicksburg, toreduce the battery at Haine's Bluff first, so as to enable some ofthe lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Yazoo andcommunicate with General Grant. The detailed manner ofaccomplishing all these results will be communicated in due season, and these general points are only made known at this time, thatcommanders may study the maps, and also that in the event ofnon-receipt of orders all may act in perfect concert by followingthe general movement, unless specially detached. 

You all now have the same map, so that no mistakes or confusionneed result from different names of localities. All possiblepreparations as to wagons, provisions, axes, and intrenching-tools, should be made in advance, so that when we do land there will be nowant of them. When we begin to act on shore, we must do the workquickly and effectually. The gunboats under Admiral Porter will dotheir full share, and I feel every assurance that the army will notfall short in its work. 

Division commanders may read this to regimental commanders, andfurnish brigade commanders a copy. They should also cause as manycopies of the map to be made on the same scale as possible, beingvery careful in copying the names. 

The points marked e and g (Allan's and Mount Albans) are evidentlystrategical points that will figure in our future operations, andthese positions should be well studied. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

The Mississippi boats were admirably calculated for handlingtroops, horses, guns, stores, etc. , easy of embarkation anddisembarkation, and supplies of all kinds were abundant, exceptfuel. For this we had to rely on wood, but most of the wood-yards, so common on the river before the war, had been exhausted, so thatwe had to use fence-rails, old dead timber, the logs of houses, etc. Having abundance of men and plenty of axes, each boat coulddaily procure a supply. 

In proceeding down the river, one or more of Admiral Porter'sgunboats took the lead; others were distributed throughout thecolumn, and some brought up the rear. We manoeuvred by divisionsand brigades when in motion, and it was a magnificent sight as wethus steamed down the river. What few inhabitants remained at theplantations on the river-bank were unfriendly, except the slaves;some few guerrilla-parties infested the banks, but did not dare tomolest so, strong a force as I then commanded. 

We reached Milliken's Bend on Christmas-day, when I detached onebrigade (Burbridge's), of A. J. Smith's division, to the southwest, to break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg toward Shreveport, Louisiana. Leaving A. J. Smith's division there to await thereturn of Burbridge, the remaining three divisions proceeded, onthe 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo, and up that river toJohnson's plantation, thirteen miles, and there disembarkedSteele's division above the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou, Morgansdivision near the house of Johnson (which had been burned by thegunboats on a former occasion), and M. L. Smith's just below. A. J. Smith's division arrived the next night, and disembarked belowthat of M. L. Smith. The place of our disembarkation was in factan island, separated from the high bluff known as Walnut Hills, onwhich the town of Vicksburg stands, by a broad and shallowbayou-evidently an old channel of the Yazoo. On our right wasanother wide bayou, known as Old River; and on the left stillanother, much narrower, but too deep to be forded, known asChickasaw Bayou. All the island was densely wooded, exceptJohnson's plantation, immediately on the bank of the Yazoo, and aseries of old cotton-fields along Chickasaw Bayou. There was aroad from Johnson's plantation directly to Vicksburg, but itcrossed numerous bayous and deep swamps by bridges, which had beendestroyed; and this road debouched on level ground at the foot ofthe Vicksburg bluff, opposite strong forts, well prepared anddefended by heavy artillery. On this road I directed General A. J. Smith's division, not so much by way of a direct attack as adiversion and threat. 

Morgan was to move to his left, to reach Chickasaw Bayou, and tofollow it toward the bluff, about four miles above A. J. Smith. Steele was on Morgan's left, across Chickasaw Bayou, and M. L. Smith on Morgan's right. We met light resistance at all points, but skirmished, on the 27th, up to the main bayou, that separatedour position from the bluffs of Vicksburg, which were found to bestrong by nature and by art, and seemingly well defended. Onreconnoitring the front in person, during the 27th and 28th, Ibecame satisfied that General A. J. Smith could not cross theintervening obstacles under the heavy fire of the forts immediatelyin his front, and that the main bayou was impassable, except at twopoints--one near the head of Chickasaw Bayou, in front of Morgan, and the other about a mile lower down, in front of M. L. Smith'sdivision. 

During the general reconnoissance of the 28th General Morgan L. Smith received a severe and dangerous wound in his hip, whichcompletely disabled him and compelled him to go to his steamboat, leaving the command of his division to Brigadier General D. Stuart; but I drew a part of General A. J. Smith's division, andthat general himself, to the point selected for passing the bayou, and committed that special task to his management. 

General Steele reported that it was physically impossible to reachthe bluffs from his position, so I ordered him to leave but a showof force there, and to return to the west side of Chickasaw Bayouin support of General Morgan's left. He had to countermarch anduse the steamboats in the Yazoo to get on the firm ground on ourside of the Chickasaw. 

On the morning of December 29th all the troops were ready and inposition. The first step was to make a lodgment on the foot-hillsand bluffs abreast of our position, while diversions were made bythe navy toward Haines's Bluff, and by the first division directlytoward Vicksburg. I estimated the enemy's forces, then strung fromVicksburg to Haines's Bluff, at fifteen thousand men, commanded bythe rebel Generals Martin Luther Smith and Stephen D. Lee. Aimingto reach firm ground beyond this bayou, and to leave as little timefor our enemy to reenforce as possible, I determined to make a showof attack along the whole front, but to break across the bayou atthe two points named, and gave general orders accordingly. Ipointed out to General Morgan the place where he could pass thebayou, and he answered, "General, in ten minutes after you give thesignal I'll be on those hills. " He was to lead his division inperson, and was to be supported by Steele's division. The frontwas very narrow, and immediately opposite, at the base of the hillsabout three hundred yards from the bayou, was a rebel battery, supported by an infantry force posted on the spurs of the hillbehind. To draw attention from this, the real point of attack, Igave instructions to commence the attack at the flanks. 

I went in person about a mile to the right rear of Morgan'sposition, at a place convenient to receive reports from all otherparts of the line; and about noon of December 29th gave the ordersand signal for the main attack. A heavy artillery-fire openedalong our whole line, and was replied to by the rebel batteries, and soon the infantry-fire opened heavily, especially on A. J. Smith's front, and in front of General George W. Morgan. Onebrigade (DeCourcey's) of Morgan's troops crossed the bayou safely, but took to cover behind the bank, and could not be moved forward. Frank Blairs brigade, of Steele's division, in support, alsocrossed the bayou, passed over the space of level ground to thefoot of the hills; but, being unsupported by Morgan, and meeting avery severe cross-fire of artillery, was staggered and graduallyfell back, leaving about five hundred men behind, wounded andprisoners; among them Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward Governorof Missouri. Part of Thayer's brigade took a wrong direction, anddid not cross the bayou at all; nor did General Morgan cross inperson. This attack failed; and I have always felt that it was dueto the failure of General G. W. Morgan to obey his orders, or tofulfill his promise made in person. Had he used with skill andboldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of Blair's, hecould have made a lodgment on the bluff, which would have openedthe door for our whole force to follow. Meantime the SixthMissouri Infantry, at heavy loss, had also crossed the bayou at thenarrow passage lower down, but could not ascend the steep bank;right over their heads was a rebel battery, whose fire was in ameasure kept down by our sharp-shooters (Thirteenth United StatesInfantry) posted behind logs, stumps, and trees, on our side of thebayou. 

The men of the Sixth Missouri actually scooped out with their handscaves in the bank, which sheltered them against the fire of theenemy, who, right over their heads, held their muskets outside theparapet vertically, and fired down So critical was the position, that we could not recall the men till after dark, and then one at atime. Our loss had been pretty heavy, and we had accomplishednothing, and had inflicted little loss on our enemy. At first Iintended to renew the assault, but soon became satisfied that, theenemy's attention having been drawn to the only two practicablepoints, it would prove too costly, and accordingly resolved to lookelsewhere for a point below Haines's Bluff, or Blake's plantation. That night I conferred with Admiral Porter, who undertook to coverthe landing; and the next day (December 30th) the boats were allselected, but so alarmed were the captains and pilots, that we hadto place sentinels with loaded muskets to insure their remaining attheir posts. Under cover of night, Steele's division, and onebrigade of Stuart's, were drawn out of line, and quietly embarkedon steamboats in the Yazoo River. The night of December 30th wasappointed for this force, under the command of General Fred Steele, to proceed up the Yazoo just below Haines's Bluff, there todisembark about daylight, and make a dash for the hills. Meantimewe had strengthened our positions near Chickasaw Bayou, had all ourguns in good position with parapets, and had every thing ready torenew our attack as soon as we heard the sound of battle above. 

At midnight I left Admiral Porter on his gunboat; he had his fleetready and the night was propitious. I rode back to camp and gaveorders for all to be ready by daybreak; but when daylight came Ireceived a note from General Steele reporting that, before hisboats had got up steam, the fog had settled down on the river sothick and impenetrable, that it was simply impossible to move; sothe attempt had to be abandoned. The rain, too, began to fall, andthe trees bore water-marks ten feet above our heads, so that Ibecame convinced that the part of wisdom was to withdraw. Iordered the stores which had been landed to be reembarked on theboats, and preparations made for all the troops to regain theirproper boats during the night of the 1st of January, 1863. Fromour camps at Chickasaw we could hear, the whistles of the trainsarriving in Vicksburg, could see battalions of men marching uptoward Haines's Bluff, and taking post at all points in our front. I was more than convinced that heavy reenforcements were coming toVicksburg; whether from Pemberton at Grenada, Bragg in Tennessee, or from other sources, I could not tell; but at no point did theenemy assume the offensive; and when we drew off our rear-guard, onthe morning of the 2d, they simply followed up the movement, timidly. Up to that moment I had not heard a word from GeneralGrant since leaving Memphis; and most assuredly I had listened fordays for the sound of his guns in the direction of Yazoo City. Onthe morning of January 2d, all my command were again afloat intheir proper steamboats, when Admiral Porter told me that GeneralMcClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo in the steamboatTigress, and that it was rumored he had come down to supersede me. Leaving my whole force where it was, I ran down to the month of theYazoo in a small tug boat, and there found General McClernand, withorders from the War Department to command the expeditionary forceon the Mississippi River. I explained what had been done, and whatwas the actual state of facts; that the heavy reenforcementspouring into Vicksburg must be Pemberton's army, and that GeneralGrant must be near at hand. He informed me that General Grant wasnot coming at all; that his depot at Holly Springs had beencaptured by Van Dorn, and that he had drawn back from Coffeevilleand Oxford to Holly Springs and Lagrange; and, further, thatQuinby's division of Grant's army was actually at Memphis forstores when he passed down. This, then, fully explained howVicksburg was being reenforced. I saw that any attempt on theplace from the Yazoo was hopeless; and, with General McClernand'sfull approval, we all came out of the Yazoo, and on the 3d ofJanuary rendezvoused at Milliken's Bend, about ten miles above. On the 4th General McClernand issued his General Order No. 1, assuming command of the Army of the Mississippi, divided into twocorps; the first to be commanded by General Morgan, composed of hisown and A. J. Smith's divisions; and the second, composed ofSteele's and Stuart's divisions, to be commanded by me. Up to thattime the army had been styled the right wing of (General Grant's)Thirteenth Army Corps, and numbered about thirty thousand men. Theaggregate loss during the time of any command, mostly on the 29thof December, was one hundred and seventy-five killed, nine hundredand thirty wounded, and seven hundred and forty-three prisoners. According to Badeau, the rebels lost sixty-three killed, onehundred and thirty-four wounded, and ten prisoners. It afterwardtranspired that Van Dorn had captured Holly Springs on the 20th ofDecember, and that General Grant fell back very soon after. General Pemberton, who had telegraphic and railroad communicationwith Vicksburg, was therefore at perfect liberty to reenforce theplace with a garrison equal, if not superior, to my command. Therebels held high, commanding ground, and could see every movementof our men and boats, so that the only possible hope of successconsisted in celerity and surprise, and in General Grant's holdingall of Pemberton's army hard pressed meantime. General Grant wasperfectly aware of this, and had sent me word of the change, but itdid not reach me in time; indeed, I was not aware of it until aftermy assault of December 29th, and until the news was brought me byGeneral McClernand as related. General McClernand was appointed tothis command by President Lincoln in person, who had no knowledgeof what was then going on down the river. Still, my relief, on theheels of a failure, raised the usual cry, at the North, of"repulse, failure, and bungling. " There was no bungling on mypart, for I never worked harder or with more intensity of purposein my life; and General Grant, long after, in his report of theoperations of the siege of Vicksburg, gave us all full credit forthe skill of the movement, and described the almost impregnablenature of the ground; and, although in all official reports Iassumed the whole responsibility, I have ever felt that had GeneralMorgan promptly and skillfully sustained the lead of Frank Blair'sbrigade on that day, we should have broken the rebel line, andeffected a lodgment on the hills behind Vicksburg. General FrankBlair was outspoken and indignant against Generals Morgan and DeCourcey at the time, and always abused me for assuming the wholeblame. But, had we succeeded, we might have found ourselves in aworse trap, when General Pemberton was at full liberty to turn hiswhole force against us. While I was engaged at Chickasaw Bayou, Admiral Porter was equally busy in the Yazoo River, threatening theenemy's batteries at Haines's and Snyder's Bluffs above. In asharp engagement he lost one of his best officers, in the person ofCaptain Gwin, United States Navy, who, though on board an ironclad, insisted on keeping his post on deck, where he was struck in thebreast by a round shot, which carried away the muscle, andcontused the lung within, from which he died a few days after. Weof the army deplored his loss quite as much as his fellows of thenavy, for he had been intimately associated with us in our previousoperations on the Tennessee River, at Shiloh and above, and we hadcome to regard him as one of us. 

On the 4th of January, 1863, our fleet of transports was collectedat Milliken's Bend, about ten miles above the mouth of the Yazoo, Admiral Porter remaining with his gunboats at the Yazoo. GeneralJohn A. McClernand was in chief command, General George W. Morgancommanded the First Corps and I the Second Corps of the Army of theMississippi. 

I had learned that a small steamboat, the Blue Wing, with a mail, towing coal-barges and loaded with ammunition, had left Memphis forthe Yazoo, about the 20th of December, had been captured by a rebelboat which had come out of the Arkansas River, and had been carriedup that river to Fort Hind. 

We had reports from this fort, usually called the "Post ofArkansas, " about forty miles above the mouth, that it was held byabout five thousand rebels, was an inclosed work, commanding thepassage of the river, but supposed to be easy of capture from therear. At that time I don't think General McClernand had anydefinite views or plays of action. If so, he did not impart themto me. He spoke, in general terms of opening the navigation of theMississippi, "cutting his way to the sea, " etc. , etc. , but themodus operandi was not so clear. Knowing full well that we couldnot carry on operations against Vicksburg as long as the rebelsheld the Post of Arkansas, whence to attack our boats coming andgoing without convoy, I visited him on his boat, the Tigress, tookwith me a boy who had been on the Blue Wing, and had escaped, andasked leave to go up the Arkansas, to clear out the Post. He madevarious objections, but consented to go with me to see AdmiralPorter about it. We got up steam in the Forest Queen, during thenight of January 4th, stopped at the Tigress, took GeneralMcClernand on board, and proceeded down the river by night to theadmiral's boat, the Black Hawk, lying in the mouth of the Yazoo. It must have been near midnight, and Admiral Porter was indeshabille. We were seated in his cabin and I explained my viewsabout Arkansas Post, and asked his cooperation. He said that hewas short of coal, and could not use wood in his iron-clad boats. Of these I asked for two, to be commanded by Captain Shirk orPhelps, or some officer of my acquaintance. At that moment, poorGwin lay on his bed, in a state-room close by, dying from theeffect of the cannon shot received at Haines's Bluff, as beforedescribed. Porter's manner to McClernand was so curt that Iinvited him out into a forward-cabin where he had his charts, andasked him what he meant by it. He said that "he did not like him;"that in Washington, before coming West, he had been introduced tohim by President Lincoln, and he had taken a strong prejudiceagainst him. I begged him, for the sake of harmony, to waive that, which he promised to do. Returning to the cabin, the conversationwas resumed, and, on our offering to tow his gunboats up the riverto save coal, and on renewing the request for Shirk to command thedetachment, Porter said, "Suppose I go along myself?" I answered, if he would do so, it would insure the success of the enterprise. At that time I supposed General McClernand would send me on thisbusiness, but he concluded to go himself, and to take his wholeforce. Orders were at once issued for the troops not to disembarkat Milliken's Bend, but to remain as they were on board thetransports. My two divisions were commanded--the First, byBrigadier-General Frederick Steele, with three brigades, commandedby Brigadier-Generals F. P. Blair, C. E. Hooey, and J. M. Thayer;the Second, by Brigadier-General D. Stuart, with two brigades, commanded by Colonels G. A. Smith and T. Kilby Smith. 

The whole army, embarked on steamboats convoyed by the gunboats, ofwhich three were iron-clads, proceeded up the Mississippi River tothe mouth of White River, which we reached January 8th. On thenext day we continued up White River to the "Cut-off;" through thisto the Arkansas, and up the Arkansas to Notrib's farm, just belowFort Hindman. Early the next morning we disembarked. Stuart'sdivision, moving up the river along the bank, soon encountered aforce of the enemy intrenched behind a line of earthworks, extending from the river across to the swamp. I took Steele'sdivision, marching by the flank by a road through the swamp to thefirm ground behind, and was moving up to get to the rear of FortHindman, when General McClernand overtook me, with the report thatthe rebels had abandoned their first position, and had fallen backinto the fort. By his orders, we counter-marched, recrossed theswamp, and hurried forward to overtake Stuart, marching for FortHindman. The first line of the rebels was about four miles belowFort Hindman, and the intervening space was densely, wooded andobscure, with the exception of some old fields back of and close tothe fort. During the night, which was a bright moonlight one, wereconnoitred close up, and found a large number of huts which hadbeen abandoned, and the whole rebel force had fallen back into andabout the fort. Personally I crept up to a stump so close that Icould hear the enemy hard at work, pulling down houses, cuttingwith axes, and building intrenchments. I could almost hear theirwords, and I was thus listening when, about 4 A. M. The bugler inthe rebel camp sounded as pretty a reveille as I ever listened to. 

When daylight broke it revealed to us a new line of parapetstraight across the peninsula, connecting Fort Hindman, on theArkansas River bank, with the impassable swamp about a mile to itsleft or rear. This peninsula was divided into two nearly equalparts by a road. My command had the ground to the right of theroad, and Morgan's corps that to the left. McClernand had hisquarters still on the Tigress, back at Notrib's farm, but movedforward that morning (January 11th) to a place in the woods to ourrear, where he had a man up a tree, to observe and report themovements. 

There was a general understanding with Admiral Porter that he wasto attack the fort with his three ironclad gunboats directly by itswater-front, while we assaulted by land in the rear. About 10 a. M. I got a message from General McClernand, telling me where he couldbe found, and asking me what we were waiting for. I answered thatwe were then in close contact with the enemy, viz. , about five orsix hundred yards off; that the next movement must be a directassault; that this should be simultaneous along the whole line; andthat I was waiting to hear from the gunboats; asking him to notifyAdmiral Porter that we were all ready. In about half an hour Iheard the clear ring of the navy-guns; the fire graduallyincreasing in rapidity and advancing toward the fort. I haddistributed our field-guns, and, when I judged the time had come, Igave the orders to begin. The intervening ground between us andthe enemy was a dead level, with the exception of one or two smallgullies, and our men had no cover but the few standing trees andsome logs on the ground. The troops advanced well under a heavyfire, once or twice falling to the ground for a sort of rest orpause. Every tree had its group of men, and behind each log was acrowd of sharp-shooters, who kept up so hot a fire that the rebeltroops fired wild. The fire of the fort proper was kept busy bythe gunboats and Morgan's corps, so that all my corps had toencounter was the direct fire from the newly-built parapet acrossthe peninsula. This line had three sections of field-guns, thatkept things pretty lively, and several round-shot came so near methat I realized that they were aimed at my staff; so I dismounted, and made them scatter. 

As the gunboats got closer up I saw their flags actually over theparapet of Fort Hindman, and the rebel gunners scamper out of theembrasures and run down into the ditch behind. About the same timea man jumped up on the rebel parapet just where the road entered, waving a large white flag, and numerous smaller white rags appearedabove the parapet along the whole line. I immediately ordered, "Cease firing!" and sent the same word down the line to GeneralSteele, who had made similar progress on the right, following theborder of he swamp. I ordered my aide, Colonel Dayton, to jump onhis horse and ride straight up to the large white flag, and whenhis horse was on the parapet I followed with the rest of my staff. All firing had ceased, except an occasional shot away to the right, and one of the captains (Smith) of the Thirteenth Regulars waswounded after the display of the white flag. On entering the line, I saw that our muskets and guns had done good execution; for therewas a horse-battery, and every horse lay dead in the traces. Thefresh-made parapet had been knocked down in many places, and deadmen lay around very thick. I inquired who commanded at that point, and a Colonel Garland stepped up and said that he commanded thatbrigade. I ordered him to form his brigade, stack arms, hang thebelts on the muskets, and stand waiting for orders. Stuart'sdivision had been halted outside the parapet. I then sent MajorHammond down the rebel line to the right, with orders to stopSteele's division outside, and to have the other rebel brigadestack its arms in like manner, and to await further orders. Iinquired of Colonel Garland who commanded in chief, and he saidthat General Churchill did, and that he was inside the fort. Ithen rode into the fort, which was well built, with good parapets, drawbridge, and ditch, and was an inclosed work of four bastions. I found it full of soldiers and sailors, its parapets toward theriver well battered in, and Porter's gunboats in the river, closeagainst the fort, with their bows on shore. I soon found GeneralChurchill, in conversation with Admiral Porter and General A. J. Smith, and about this time my adjutant-general, Major J. H. Hammond, came and reported that General Deshler, who commanded therebel brigade facing and opposed to Steele, had refused to stackarms and surrender, on the ground that he had received no ordersfrom his commanding general; that nothing separated this brigadefrom Steele's men except the light parapet, and that there might betrouble there at any moment. I advised General Churchill to sendorders at once, because a single shot might bring the whole ofSteele's division on Deshler's brigade, and I would not beresponsible for the consequences; soon afterward, we both concludedto go in person. General Churchill had the horses of himself andstaff in the ditch; they were brought in, and we rode together towhere Garland was standing, and Churchill spoke to him in an angrytone, "Why did you display the white flag!" Garland replied, "Ireceived orders to do so from one of your staff. " Churchill deniedgiving such an order, and angry words passed between them. Istopped them, saying that it made little difference then, as theywere in our power. We continued to ride down the line to itsextreme point, where we found Deshler in person, and his troopswere still standing to the parapet with their muskets in hand. Steele'e men were on the outside. I asked Deshler: "What does thismean? You are a regular officer, and ought to know better. " Heanswered, snappishly, that "he had received no orders tosurrender;" when General Churchill said: "You see, sir, that we arein their power, and you may surrender. " Deshler turned to hisstaff-officers and ordered them to repeat the command to "stackarms, " etc. , to the colonels of his brigade. I was on my horse, and he was on foot. Wishing to soften the blow of defeat, I spoketo him kindly, saying that I knew a family of Deshlers in Columbus, Ohio, and inquired if they were relations of his. He disclaimedany relation with people living north of the Ohio, in an offensivetone, and I think I gave him a piece of my mind that he did notrelish. He was a West Point graduate, small but very handsome, andwas afterward killed in battle. I never met him again. 

Returning to the position where I had first entered the rebel line, I received orders from General McClernand, by one of his staff, toleave General A. J. Smith in charge of the fort and prisoners, andwith my troops to remain outside. The officer explained that thegeneral was then on the Tigress, which had moved up from below, toa point in the river just above the fort; and not understanding hisorders, I concluded to go and see him in person. My troops werethen in possession of two of the three brigades which composed thearmy opposed to us; and my troops were also in possession of allthe ground of the peninsula outside the "fort-proper" (Hindman). Ifound General McClernand on the Tigress, in high spirits. He saidrepeatedly: "Glorious! glorious! my star is ever in the ascendant!"He spoke complimentarily of the troops, but was extremely jealousof the navy. He said: "I'll make a splendid report;" "I had a manup a tree;" etc. I was very hungry and tired, and fear I did notappreciate the honors in reserve for us, and asked for something toeat and drink. He very kindly ordered something to be brought, andexplained to me that by his "orders" he did not wish to interferewith the actual state of facts; that General A. J. Smith wouldoccupy "Fort Hindman, " which his troops had first entered, and Icould hold the lines outside, and go on securing the prisoners andstores as I had begun. I returned to the position of Garland'sbrigade and gave the necessary orders for marching all theprisoners, disarmed, to a pocket formed by the river and two deepgullies just above the fort, by which time it had become quitedark. After dark another rebel regiment arrived from Pine Bluff, marched right in, and was also made prisoners. There seemed to bea good deal of feeling among the rebel officers against Garland, who asked leave to stay with me that night, to which I of courseconsented. Just outside the rebel parapet was a house which hadbeen used for a hospital. I had a room cleaned out, and occupiedit that night. A cavalry-soldier lent me his battered coffee-potwith some coffee and scraps of hard bread out of his nose-bag;Garland and I made some coffee, ate our bread together, and talkedpolitics by the fire till quite late at night, when we lay down onstraw that was saturated with the blood of dead or wounded men. The next day the prisoners were all collected on their boats, listswere made out, and orders given for their transportation to St. Louis, in charge of my aide, Major Sanger. We then proceeded todismantle and level the forts, destroy or remove the stores, and wefound in the magazine the very ammunition which had been sent forus in the Blue Wing, which was secured and afterward used in ourtwenty-pound Parrott guns. 

On the 13th we reembarked; the whole expedition returned out of theriver by the direct route down the Arkansas during a heavysnow-storm, and rendezvoused in the Mississippi, at Napoleon, atthe mouth of the Arkansas. Here General McClernand told me he hadreceived a letter from General Grant at Memphis, who disapproved ofour movement up the Arkansas; but that communication was madebefore he had learned of our complete success. When informed ofthis, and of the promptness with which it had been executed, hecould not but approve. We were then ordered back to Milliken'sBend, to await General Grant's arrival in person. We reachedMilliken's Bend January 21st. 

McClernand's report of the capture of Fort Hindman almost ignoredthe action of Porter's fleet altogether. This was unfair, for Iknow that the admiral led his fleet in person in the river-attack, and that his guns silenced those of Fort Hindman, and drove thegunners into the ditch. 

The aggregate loss in my corps at Arkansas Post was five hundredand nineteen, viz. , four officers and seventy-five men killed, thirty-four officers and four hundred and six men wounded. I neverknew the losses in the gunboat fleet, or in Morgan's corps; butthey must have been less than in mine, which was more exposed. Thenumber of rebel dead must have been nearly one hundred and fifty;of prisoners, by actual count, we secured four thousand sevenhundred and ninety-one, and sent them north to St. Louis. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

VICKSBURG. 

JANUARY TO JULY, 1888. 

The campaign of 1863, resulting, in the capture of Vicksburg, wasso important, that its history has been well studied and welldescribed in all the books treating of the civil war, moreespecially by Dr. Draper, in his "History of the Civil War inAmerica, " and in Badeau's "Military History of General Grant. " Inthe latter it is more fully and accurately given than in any other, and is well illustrated by maps and original documents. I now needonly attempt to further illustrate Badeau's account by someadditional details. When our expedition came out of the ArkansasRiver, January, 18, 1863, and rendezvoused at the river-bank, infront of the town of Napoleon, Arkansas, we were visited by GeneralGrant in person, who had come down from Memphis in a steamboat. Although at this time Major-General J. A. McClernand was in commandof the Army of the Mississippi, by virtue of a confidential orderof the War Department, dated October 21, 1862, which order bore theindorsement of President Lincoln, General Grant still exercised acommand over him, by reason of his general command of theDepartment of the Tennessee. By an order (No. 210) of December 18, 1862, from the War Department, received at Arkansas Post, theWestern armies had been grouped into five corps d'armee, viz. : theThirteenth, Major-General McClernand; the Fourteenth, Major-GeneralGeorge H. Thomas, in Middle Tennessee; the Fifteenth, Major-GeneralW. T. Sherman; the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, then at ornear Memphis; and the Seventeenth, Major-General McPherson, also atand back of Memphis. General Grant when at Napoleon, on the 18thof January, ordered McClernand with his own and my corps to returnto Vicksburg, to disembark on the west bank, and to resume work ona canal across the peninsula, which had been begun by GeneralThomas Williams the summer before, the object being to turn theMississippi River at that point, or at least to make a passage forour fleet of gunboats and transports across the peninsula, oppositeVicksburg. General Grant then returned to Memphis, ordered to LakeProvidence, about sixty miles above us, McPherson's corps, theSeventeenth, and then came down again to give his personalsupervision to the whole movement. 

The Mississippi River was very high and rising, and we began thatsystem of canals on which we expended so much hard workfruitlessly: first, the canal at Young's plantation, oppositeVicksburg; second, that at Lake Providence; and third, at the YazooPass, leading into the head-waters of the Yazoo River. Early inFebruary the gunboats Indianola and Queen of the West ran thebatteries of Vicksburg. The latter was afterward crippled in RedRiver, and was captured by the rebels; and the Indianola was buttedand sunk about forty miles below Vicksburg. We heard the boomingof the guns, but did not know of her loss till some days after. During the months of January and February, we were digging thecanal and fighting off the water of the Mississippi, whichcontinued to rise and threatened to drown us. We had no sure placeof refuge except the narrow levee, and such steamboats as remainedabreast of our camps. My two divisions furnished alternately adetail of five hundred men a day, to work on the canal. So highwas the water in the beginning of March, that McClernand's corpswas moved to higher ground, at Milliken's Bend, but I remained atYoung's plantation, laid off a due proportion of the levee for eachsubdivision of my command, and assigned other parts to suchsteamboats as lay at the levee. My own headquarters were in Mrs. Grove's house, which had the water all around it, and could only bereached by a plank-walk from the levee, built on posts. GeneralFrederick Steele commanded the first division, and General D. Smartthe second; this latter division had been reenforced by GeneralHugh Ewing's brigade, which had arrived from West Virginia. 

At the time of its date I received the following note from GeneralGrant:

MILLIKEN'S BEND, March 16, 1863

General SHERMAN. 

DEAR SIR: I have just returned from a reconnoissance up Steele'sBayou, with the admiral (Porter), and five of his gunboats. Withsome labor in cutting tree-tops out of the way, it will benavigable for any class of steamers. 

I want you to have your pioneer corps, or one regiment of good menfor such work, detailed, and at the landing as soon as possible. 

The party will want to take with them their rations, arms, andsufficient camp and garrison equipage for a few days. I will havea boat at any place you may designate, as early as the men can bethere. The Eighth Missouri (being many of them boatmen) would beexcellent men for this purpose. 

As soon as you give directions for these men to be in readiness, come up and see me, and I will explain fully. The tug that takesthis is instructed to wait for you. A full supply of axes will berequired. 

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

This letter was instantly (8 a. M. ) sent to Colonel Giles A. Smith, commanding the Eighth Missouri, with orders to prepare immediately. He returned it at 9. 15, with an answer that the regiment was allready. I went up to Milliken's Bend in the tug, and had aconference with the general, resulting in these orders:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEBEFORE VICKSBURG, March 16, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps. 

GENERAL: You will proceed as early as practicable up Steele'sBayou, and through Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with thegunboats now there by any route they may take to get into the YazooRiver, for the purpose of determining the feasibility of getting anarmy through that route to the east bank of that river, and at apoint from which they can act advantageously against Vicksburg. 

Make such details from your army corps as may be required to clearout the channel of the various bayous through which transportswould have to ran, and to hold such points as in your judgmentshould be occupied. 

I place at your disposal to-day the steamers Diligent and SilverWave, the only two suitable for the present navigation of thisroute. Others will be supplied you as fast as required, and theycan be got. 

I have given directions (and you may repeat them) that the partygoing on board the steamer Diligent push on until they reach BlackBayou, only stopping sufficiently long at any point before reachingthere to remove such obstructions as prevent their own progress. Captain Kossak, of the Engineers, will go with this party. Theother boat-load will commence their work in Steele's Bayou, andmake the navigation as free as possible all the way through. 

There is but little work to be done in Steele's Bayou, except forabout five miles abort midway of the bayou. In this portion manyoverhanging trees will have to be removed, and should be draggedout of the channel. 

Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

On returning to my camp at Young's Point, I started these two boatsup the Yazoo and Steele's Bayou, with the Eighth Missouri and somepioneers, with axes, saws, and all the tools necessary. I gaveorders for a part of Stuart's division to proceed in the largeboats up the Mississippi River to a point at Gwin's plantation, where a bend of Steele's Bayou neared the main river; and the nextday, with one or two stag-officers and orderlies, got a navy-tug, and hurried up to overtake Admiral Porter. About sixty miles upSteele's Bayou we came to the gunboat Price, Lieutenant Woodworth, United States Navy; commanding, and then turned into Black Bayou, anarrow, crooked channel, obstructed by overhanging oaks, and filledwith cypress and cotton-wood trees. The gunboats had forced theirway through, pushing aside trees a foot in diameter. In about fourmiles we overtook the gunboat fleet just as it was emerging intoDeer Creek. Along Deer Creek the alluvium was higher, and therewas a large cotton-plantation belonging to a Mr. Hill, who wasabsent, and the negroes were in charge of the place. Here Iovertook Admiral Porter, and accompanied him a couple of miles upDeer Creek, which was much wider and more free of trees, withplantations on both sides at intervals. Admiral Porter thought hehad passed the worst, and that he would be able to reach theRolling Fork and Sunflower. He requested me to return and use allpossible means to clear out Black Bayou. I returned to Hill'splantation, which was soon reached by Major Coleman, with a partof the Eighth Missouri; the bulk of the regiment and the pioneershad been distributed along the bayous, and set to work underthe general supervision of Captain Kosaak. The Diligent andSilver Wave then returned to twin's plantation and brought upBrigadier-General Giles A. Smith, with the Sixth Missouri, and partof the One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois. Admiral Porter was thenworking up Deer Creek with his iron-clads, but he had left me a tug, which enabled me to reconnoitre the country, which was all underwater except the narrow strip along Deer Creek. During the 19th Iheard the heavy navy-guns booming more frequently than seemedconsistent with mere guerrilla operations; and that night I got amessage from Porter, written on tissue-paper, brought me throughthe swamp by a negro, who had it concealed in a piece of tobacco. 

The admiral stated that he had met a force of infantry andartillery which gave him great trouble by killing the men who hadto expose themselves outside the iron armor to shove off the bowsof the boats, which had so little headway that they would notsteer. He begged me to come to his rescue as quickly as possible. Giles A. Smith had only about eight hundred men with him, but Iordered him to start up Deer Creek at once, crossing to the eastside by an old bridge at Hill's plantation, which we had repairedfor the purpose; to work his way up to the gunboat, fleet, and toreport to the admiral that I would come, up with every man I couldraise as soon as possible. I was almost alone at Hill's, but tooka canoe, paddled down Black Bayou to the gunboat Price, and there, luckily, found the Silver wave with a load of men just arrived fromtwin's plantation. Taking some of the parties who were at workalong the bayou into an empty coal-barge, we tugged it up by anavy-tug, followed by the Silver Wave, crashing through the trees, carrying away pilot-house, smoke-stacks, and every thingabove-deck; but the captain (McMillan, of Pittsburg) was a bravefellow, and realized the necessity. The night was absolutelyblack, and we could only make two and a half of the four miles. Wethen disembarked, and marched through the canebrake, carryinglighted candles in our hands, till we got into the opencotton-fields at Hill's plantation, where we lay down for a fewhours' rest. These men were a part of Giles A. Smith's brigade, and part belonged to the brigade of T. Bilby Smith, the seniorofficer present being Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, Fifty-fourth Ohio, an excellent young officer. We had no horses. 

On Sunday morning, March 21st, as soon as daylight appeared, westarted, following the same route which Giles A. Smith had takenthe day before; the battalion of the Thirteenth United StatesRegulars, Major Chase, in the lead. We could hear Porter's guns, and knew that moments were precious. Being on foot myself, no mancould complain, and we generally went at the double-quick, withoccasional rests. The road lay along Deer Creek, passing severalplantations; and occasionally, at the bends, it crossed the swamp, where the water came above my hips. The smaller drummer-boys hadto carry their drums on their heads, and most of the men slangtheir cartridge-boxes around their necks. The soldiers generallywere glad to have their general and field officers afoot, but wegave them a fair specimen of marching, accomplishing abouttwenty-one miles by noon. Of course, our speed was accelerated bythe sounds of the navy-guns, which became more and more distinct, though we could see nothing. At a plantation near some Indianmounds we met a detachment of the Eighth Missouri, that had been upto the fleet, and had been sent down as a picket to prevent anyobstructions below. This picket reported that Admiral Porter hadfound Deer Creek badly obstructed, had turned back; that there wasa rebel force beyond the fleet, with some six-pounders, and nothingbetween us and the fleet. So I sat down on the door-sill of acabin to rest, but had not been seated ten minutes when, in thewood just ahead, not three hundred yards off, I heard quick andrapid firing of musketry. Jumping up, I ran up the road, and foundLieutenant-Colonel Rice, who said the head of his column had strucka small force of rebels with a working gang of negroes, providedwith axes, who on the first fire had broken and run back into theswamp. I ordered Rice to deploy his brigade, his left on the road, and extending as far into the swamp as the ground would permit, andthen to sweep forward until he uncovered the gunboats. Themovement was rapid and well executed, and we soon came to somelarge cotton-fields and could see our gunboats in Deer Creek, occasionally firing a heavy eight-inch gun across the cotton fieldinto the swamp behind. About that time Major Kirby, of the EighthMissouri, galloped down the road on a horse he had picked up thenight before, and met me. He explained the situation of affairs, and offered me his horse. I got on bareback, and rode up thelevee, the sailors coming out of their iron-clads and cheering mostvociferously as I rode by, and as our men swept forward across thecotton-field in full view. I soon found Admiral Porter, who was onthe deck of one of his iron-clads, with a shield made of thesection of a smoke-stack, and I doubt if he was ever more glad tomeet a friend than he was to see me. He explained that he hadalmost reached the Rolling Fork, when the woods became full ofsharp-shooters, who, taking advantage of trees, stumps, and thelevee, would shoot down every man that poked his nose outside theprotection of their armor; so that he could not handle his clumsyboats in the narrow channel. The rebels had evidently dispatched aforce from Haines's Bluff up the Sunflower to the Rolling Fork, hadanticipated the movement of Admiral Porter's fleet, and hadcompletely obstructed the channel of the upper part of Deer Creekby felling trees into it, so that further progress in thatdirection was simply impossible. It also happened that, at theinstant of my arrival, a party of about four hundred rebels, armedand supplied with axes, had passed around the fleet and had gotbelow it, intending in like manner to block up the channel by thefelling of trees, so as to cut off retreat. This was the force wehad struck so opportunely at the time before described. I inquiredof Admiral Porter what he proposed to do, and he said he wanted toget out of that scrape as quickly as possible. He was actuallyworking back when I met him, and, as we then had a sufficient forceto cover his movement completely, he continued to back down DeerCreek. He informed me at one time things looked so critical thathe had made up his mind to blow up the gunboats, and to escape withhis men through the swamp to the Mississippi River. There being nolonger any sharp-shooters to bother the sailors, they made goodprogress; still, it took three full days for the fleet to back outof Deer Creek into Black Bayou, at Hill's plantation, whenceAdmiral Porter proceeded to his post at the month of the Yazoo, leaving Captain Owen in command of the fleet. I reported the factsto General Grant, who was sadly disappointed at the failure of thefleet to get through to the Yazoo above Haines's Bluff, and orderedus all to resume our camps at Young's Point. We accordinglysteamed down, and regained our camps on the 27th. As thisexpedition up Deer Creek was but one of many efforts to secure afooting from which to operate against Vicksburg, I add the reportof Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, who was the first to reach thefleet:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISIONFIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, YOUNGS POINT, LOUISIANA, March 28, 1863

Captain L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report the movements of the FirstBrigade in the expedition up Steele's Bayou, Black Bayou, and DeerCreek. The Sixth Missouri and One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinoisregiments embarked at the month of Muddy Bayou on the evening ofThursday, the 18th of March, and proceeded up Steele's Bayou to themonth of Black; thence up Black Bayou to Hill's plantation, at itsjunction with Deer Creek, where we arrived on Friday at fouro'clock p. M. , and joined the Eighth Missouri, Lieutenant-ColonelColeman commanding, which had arrived at that point two daysbefore. General Sherman had also established his headquartersthere, having preceded the Eighth Missouri in a tug, with no otherescort than two or three of his staff, reconnoitring all thedifferent bayous and branches, thereby greatly facilitating themovements of the troops, but at the same time exposing himselfbeyond precedent in a commanding general. At three o'clock ofSaturday morning, the 20th instant, General Sherman having receiveda communication from Admiral Porter at the mouth of Rolling Fork, asking for a speedy cooperation of the land forces with his fleet, I was ordered by General Sherman to be ready, with all theavailable force at that point, to accompany him to his relief; butbefore starting it was arranged that I should proceed with theforce at hand (eight hundred men), while he remained, againentirely unprotected, to hurry up the troops expected to arrivethat night, consisting of the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundredand Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers, completing my brigade, and theSecond Brigade, Colonel T. Kilby Smith commanding. 

This, as the sequel showed; proved a very wise measure, andresulted in the safety of the whole fleet. At daybreak we were inmotion, with a regular guide. We had proceeded but about sixmiles, when we found the enemy had been very busy felling trees toobstruct the creek. 

All the negroes along the route had been notified to be ready atnight fall to continue the work. To prevent this as much aspossible, I ordered all able-bodied negroes to be taken along, andwarned some of the principal inhabitants that they would be heldresponsible for any more obstructions being placed across thecreek. We reached the admiral about four o'clock p. M. , with noopposition save my advance-guard (Company A, Sixth Missouri) beingfired into from the opposite side of the creek, killing one man, and slightly wounding another; having no way of crossing, we had tocontent ourselves with driving them beyond musket-range. Proceeding with as little loss of time as possible, I found thefleet obstructed in front by fallen trees, in rear by a sunkencoal-barge, and surrounded, by a large force of rebels with anabundant supply of artillery, but wisely keeping their main forceout of range of the admiral's guns. Every tree and stump covered asharp-shooter, ready to pick off any luckless marine who showed hishead above-decks, and entirely preventing the working-parties fromremoving obstructions. 

In pursuance of orders from General Sherman, I reported to AdmiralPorter for orders, who turned over to me all the land-forces in hisfleet (about one hundred and fifty men), together with twohowitzers, and I was instructed by him to retain a sufficient forceto clear out the sharp-shooters, and to distribute the remainderalong the creek for six or seven miles below, to prevent any moreobstructions being placed in it during the night. This wasspeedily arranged, our skirmishers capturing three prisoners. Immediate steps were now taken to remove the coal-barge, which wasaccomplished about daylight on Sunday morning, when the fleet movedback toward Black Bayou. By three o'clock p. M. We had only madeabout six miles, owing to the large number of trees to be removed;at this point, where our progress was very slow, we discovered along line of the enemy filing along the edge of the woods, andtaking position on the creek below us, and about one mile ahead ofour advance. Shortly after, they opened fire on the gunboats frombatteries behind the cavalry and infantry. The boats not onlyreplied to the batteries, which they soon silenced, but poured adestructive fire into their lines. Heavy skirmishing was alsoheard in our front, supposed to be by three companies from theSixth and Eighth Missouri, whose position, taken the previous nightto guard the creek, was beyond the point reached by the enemy, andconsequently liable to be cut off or captured. Captain Owen, ofthe Louisville, the leading boat, made every effort to go throughthe obstructions and aid in the rescuing of the men. I orderedMajor Kirby, with four companies of the Sixth Missouri, forward, with two companies deployed. He soon met General Sherman, with theThirteenth Infantry and One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, driving the enemy before them, and opening communication along thecreek with the gunboats. Instead of our three companies referredto as engaging the enemy, General Sherman had arrived at a veryopportune moment with the two regiments mentioned above, and theSecond Brigade. The enemy, not expecting an attack from thatquarter, after some hot skirmishing, retreated. General Shermanimmediately ordered the Thirteenth Infantry and One Hundred andThirteenth Illinois to pursue; but, after following their trace forabout two miles, they were recalled. 

We continued our march for about two miles, when we bivouacked forthe night. Early on Monday morning (March 22d) we continued ourmarch, but owing to the slow progress of the gunboats did not reachHill's plantation until Tuesday, the 23d instant, where we remaineduntil the 25th; we then reembarked, and arrived at Young's Point onFriday, the 27th instant. 

Below you will find a list of casualties. Very respectfully, Giles A. SMITH, Colonel Eighth Missouri, commanding First Brigade. 

P. S. -I forgot to state above that the Thirteenth Infantry and OneHundred and Thirteenth Illinois being under the immediate commandof General Sherman, he can mention them as their conduct deserves. 

On the 3d of April, a division of troops, commanded byBrigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, was assigned to my corps, andwas designated the Third Division; and, on the 4th of April, Brigadier-General D. Stuart was relieved from the command of theSecond Division, to which Major-General Frank P. Blair was appointedby an order from General Grant's headquarters. Stuart had been withme from the time we were at Benton Barracks, in command of theFifty-fifth Illinois, then of a brigade, and finally of a division;but he had failed in seeking a confirmation by the Senate to hisnomination as brigadier-general, by reason of some old affair atChicago, and, having resigned his commission as colonel, he was outof service. I esteemed him very highly, and was actually mortifiedthat the service should thus be deprived of so excellent and gallantan officer. He afterward settled in New Orleans as a lawyer, anddied about 1867 or 1868. 

On the 6th of April, my command, the Fifteenth Corps, was composedof three divisions:

The First Division, commanded by Major-General Fred Steele; and histhree brigades by Colonel Manter, Colonel Charles R. Wood, andBrigadier-General John M. Thayer. 

The Second Division, commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair; andhis three brigades by Colonel Giles A. Smith, Colonel Thomas GilbySmith, and Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing. 

The Third Division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle;and his three brigades by Brigadier-General R. P. Buckland, ColonelJ. A. Mower, and Brigadier-General John E. Smith. 

My own staff then embraced: Dayton, McCoy, and Hill, aides; J. H. Hammond, assistant adjutant-general; Sanger, inspector-general;McFeeley, commissary; J. Condit Smith, quartermaster; CharlesMcMillan, medical director; Ezra Taylor, chief of artillery;Jno. C. Neely, ordnance-officer; Jenney and Pitzman, engineers. 

By this time it had become thoroughly demonstrated that we couldnot divert the main river Mississippi, or get practicable access tothe east bank of the Yazoo, in the rear of Vicksburg, by any of thepasses; and we were all in the habit of discussing the variouschances of the future. General Grant's headquarters were atMilliken's Bend, in tents, and his army was strung along the riverall the way from Young's Point up to Lake Providence, at leastsixty miles. I had always contended that the best way to takeVicksburg was to resume the movement which had been so well begunthe previous November, viz. , for the main army to march by landdown the country inland of the Mississippi River; while thegunboat-fleet and a minor land-force should threaten Vicksburg onits river-front. 

I reasoned that, with the large force then subject to GeneralGrant's orders-viz. , four army corps--he could easily resume themovement from Memphis, by way of Oxford and Grenada, to Jackson, Mississippi, or down the ridge between the Yazoo and Big Black; butGeneral Grant would not, for reasons other than military, take anycourse which looked like, a step backward; and he himself concludedon the river movement below Vicksburg, so as to appear likeconnecting with General Banks, who at the same time was besiegingPort Hudson from the direction of New Orleans. 

Preliminary orders had already been given, looking to the diggingof a canal, to connect the river at Duckport with Willow Bayou, back of Milliken's Bend, so as to form a channel for the conveyanceof supplies, by way of Richmond, to New Carthage; and several steamdredge-boats had come from the upper rivers to assist in the work. One day early in April, I was up at General Grant's headquarters, and we talked over all these things with absolute freedom. CharlesA. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, was there, and Wilson, Rawlins, Frank Blair, McPherson, etc. We all knew, what wasnotorious, that General McClernand was still intriguing againstGeneral Grant, in hopes to regain the command of the wholeexpedition, and that others were raising a clamor against GeneralGrant in the news papers at the North. Even Mr. Lincoln andGeneral Halleck seemed to be shaken; but at no instant of time didwe (his personal friends) slacken in our loyalty to him. Onenight, after such a discussion, and believing that GeneralMcClernand had no real plan of action shaped in his mind, I wrotemy letter of April 8, 1863, to Colonel Rawlins, which letter isembraced in full at page 616 of Badeau's book, and which I nowreproduce here:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, April 8, 1868. 

Colonel J. A. RAWLINS, Assistant Adjutant-General to General GRANT. 

SIR: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons which I willnot name) that General Grant call on his corps commanders for theiropinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of acampaign. Unless this be done, there are men who will, in anyresult falling below the popular standard, claim that their advicewas unheeded, and that fatal consequence resulted therefrom. Myown opinions are:

First. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance of theother grand armies of the United States. 

Second. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved fromSt. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas; suppliescollected there while the river is full, and land communicationwith Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White, and Madison on theSt. Francis River. 

Third. That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and TallahatchieRivers, as can be gained and fortified, be held, and the main armybe transported thither by land and water; that the road back toMemphis be secured and reopened, and, as soon as the waterssubside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp-road across to Helenabe patrolled by cavalry. 

Fourth. That the line of the Yalabusha be the base from which tooperate against the points where the Mississippi Central crossesBig Black, above Canton; and, lastly, where the Vicksburg & JacksonRailroad crosses the same river (Big Black). The capture ofVicksburg would result. 

Fifth. That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to exceedten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float andtransport them to any desired point; this force to be held alwaysnear enough to act with the gunboats when the main army is known tobe near Vicksburg--Haines's Bluff or Yazoo City. 

Sixth. I do doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I estimateto be fifty miles long and very tortuous) as a military channel, tosupply an army large enough to operate against Jackson, Mississippi, or the Black River Bridge; and such a channel will bevery vulnerable to a force coming from the west, which we mustexpect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to conveycoals and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the lower reachof the Mississippi between Vicksburg and the Red River. 

Seventh. The chief reason for operating solely by water was theseason of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and YalabushaRivers. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be noserious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of the forest, andwhatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable for us to allow the enemy to holdit and make crops this year. 

I make these suggestions, with the request that General Grant willread them and give them, as I know he will, a share of histhoughts. I would prefer that he should not answer this letter, but merely give it as much or as little weight as it deserves. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the samezealous cooperation and energetic support as though conceived bymyself. I do not believe General Banks will make any seriousattack on Port Hudson this spring. I am, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

This is the letter which some critics have styled a "protest. " Wenever had a council of war at any time during the Vicksburgcampaign. We often met casually, regardless of rank or power, andtalked and gossiped of things in general, as officers do andshould. But my letter speaks for itself--it shows my opinionsclearly at that stage of the game, and was meant partially toinduce General Grant to call on General McClernand for a similarexpression of opinion, but, so far as I know, he did not. He wenton quietly to work out his own designs; and he has told me, sincethe war, that had we possessed in December, 1862, the experience ofmarching and maintaining armies without a regular base, which weafterward acquired, he would have gone on from Oxford as firstcontemplated, and would not have turned back because of thedestruction of his depot at Holly Springs by Van Dorn. Thedistance from Oxford to the rear of Vicksburg is little greaterthan by the circuitous route we afterward followed, from Bruinsburgto Jackson and Vicksburg, during which we had neither depot nortrain of supplies. I have never criticised General Grant'sstrategy on this or any other occasion, but I thought then thathe had lost an opportunity, which cost him and us six months'extra-hard work, for we might have captured Vicksburg from thedirection of Oxford in January, quite as easily as was afterwarddone in July, 1863. 

General Grant's orders for the general movement past Vicksburg, byRichmond and Carthage, were dated April 20, 1863. McClernand wasto lead off with his corps, McPherson next, and my corps (theFifteenth) to bring up the rear. Preliminary thereto, on the nightof April 16th, seven iron-clads led by Admiral Porter in person, inthe Benton, with three transports, and ten barges in tow, ran theVicksburg batteries by night. Anticipating a scene, I had fouryawl-boats hauled across the swamp, to the reach of the river belowVicksburg, and manned them with soldiers, ready to pick up any ofthe disabled wrecks as they floated by. I was out in the streamwhen the fleet passed Vicksburg, and the scene was truly sublime. As soon as the rebel gunners detected the Benton, which was in thelead, they opened on her, and on the others in succession, withshot and shell; houses on the Vicksburg side and on the oppositeshore were set on fire, which lighted up the whole river; and theroar of cannon, the bursting of shells, and finally the burning ofthe Henry Clay, drifting with the current, made up a picture of theterrible not often seen. Each gunboat returned the fire as shepassed the town, while the transports hugged the opposite shore. When the Benton had got abreast of us, I pulled off to her, boarded, had a few words with Admiral Porter, and as she wasdrifting rapidly toward the lower batteries at Warrenton, I left, and pulled back toward the shore, meeting the gunboat Tuscumbiatowing the transport Forest Queen into the bank out of the range offire. The Forest Queen, Captain Conway, had been my flag-boat upthe Arkansas, and for some time after, and I was very friendly withher officers. This was the only transport whose captain would notreceive volunteers as a crew, but her own officers and crew stuckto their boat, and carried her safely below the Vicksburgbatteries, and afterward rendered splendid service in ferryingtroops across the river at Grand Gulf and Bruinsburg. In passingVicksburg, she was damaged in the hull and had a steam-pipe cutaway, but this was soon repaired. The Henry Clay was set on fireby bursting shells, and burned up; one of my yawls picked up herpilot floating on a piece of wreck, and the bulk of her crewescaped in their own yawl-boat to the shore above. The SilverWave, Captain McMillan, the same that was with us up Steele'sBayou, passed safely, and she also rendered good service afterward. 

Subsequently, on the night of April 26th, six other transports withnumerous barges loaded with hay, corn, freight, and provisions, were drifted past Vicksburg; of these the Tigress was hit, and sunkjust as she reached the river-bank below, on our side: I was therewith my yawls, and saw Colonel Lagow, of General Grant's staff, whohad passed the batteries in the Tigress, and I think he wassatisfied never to attempt such a thing again. Thus GeneralGrant's army had below Vicksburg an abundance of stores, and boatswith which to cross the river. The road by which the troopsmarched was very bad, and it was not until the 1st of May that itwas clear for my corps. While waiting my turn to march, I receiveda letter from General Grant, written at Carthage, saying that heproposed to cross over and attack Grand Gulf, about the end ofApril, and he thought I could put in my time usefully by making a"feint" on Haines's Bluff, but he did not like to order me to doit, because it might be reported at the North that I had again been"repulsed, etc. " Thus we had to fight a senseless clamor at theNorth, as well as a determined foe and the obstacles of Nature. Ofcourse, I answered him that I would make the "feint, " regardless ofpublic clamor at a distance, and I did make it most effectually;using all the old boats I could get about Milliken's Bend and themouth of the Yazoo, but taking only ten small regiments, selectedout of Blair's division, to make a show of force. We afterwardlearned that General Pemberton in Vicksburg had previouslydispatched a large force to the assistance of General Bowers, atGrand Gulf and Port Gibson, which force had proceeded as far asHankinson's Ferry, when he discovered our ostentatious movement upthe Yazoo, recalled his men, and sent them up to Haines's Bluff tomeet us. This detachment of rebel troops must have marched nearlysixty miles without rest, for afterward, on reaching Vicksburg, Iheard that the men were perfectly exhausted, and lay along the roadin groups, completely fagged out. This diversion, made with somuch pomp and display, therefore completely fulfilled its purpose, by leaving General Grant to contend with a minor force, on landingat Bruinsburg, and afterward at Port Gibson and Grand Gulf. 

In May the waters of the Mississippi had so far subsided that allour canals were useless, and the roads had become practicable. After McPherson's corps had passed Richmond, I took up the route ofmarch, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions. Blair's divisionremained at Milliken's Bend to protect our depots there, tillrelieved by troops from Memphis, and then he was ordered to followus. Our route lay by Richmond and Roundabout Bayou; then, following Bayou Vidal we struck the Mississippi at Perkins'splantation. Thence the route followed Lake St. Joseph to aplantation called Hard Times, about five miles above Grand Gulf. The road was more or less occupied by wagons and detachmentsbelonging to McPherson's corps; still we marched rapidly andreached Hard Times on the 6th of May. Along the Bayou or Lake St. Joseph were many very fine cotton plantations, and I recall that ofa Mr. Bowie, brother-in-law of the Hon. Reverdy Johnson, ofBaltimore. The house was very handsome, with a fine, extensivegrass-plot in front. We entered the yard, and, leaving our horseswith the headquarters escort, walked to the house. On thefront-porch I found a magnificent grand-piano, with severalsatin-covered arm-chairs, in one of which sat a Union soldier (oneof McPherson's men), with his feet on the keys of the piano, andhis musket and knapsack lying on the porch. I asked him what hewas doing there, and he answered that he was "taking a rest;" thiswas manifest and I started him in a hurry, to overtake his command. The house was tenantless, and had been completely ransacked;articles of dress and books were strewed about, and a handsomeboudoir with mirror front had been cast down, striking a Frenchbedstead, shivering the glass. The library was extensive, with afine collection of books; and hanging on the wall were twofull-length portraits of Reverdy Johnson and his wife, one of themost beautiful ladies of our country, with whom I had beenacquainted in Washington at the time of General Taylor'sadministration. Behind the mansion was the usual double row ofcabins called the "quarters. " There I found an old negro (a familyservant) with several women, whom I sent to the house to put thingsin order; telling the old man that other troops would follow, andhe must stand on the porch to tell any officers who came along thatthe property belonged to Mr. Bowie, who was the brother-in-law ofour friend Mr. Reverdy Johnson, of Baltimore, asking them to seethat no further harm was done. Soon after we left the house I sawsome negroes carrying away furniture which manifestly belonged tothe house, and compelled them to carry it back; and after reachingcamp that night, at Hard Times, I sent a wagon back to Bowie'splantation, to bring up to Dr. Hollingsworth's house the twoportraits for safe keeping; but before the wagon had reachedBowie's the house was burned, whether by some of our men or bynegroes I have never learned. 

At the river there was a good deal of scrambling to get across, because the means of ferriage were inadequate; but by the aid ofthe Forest Queen and several gunboats I got my command acrossduring the 7th of May, and marched out to Hankiuson's Ferry(eighteen miles), relieving General Crocker's division ofMcPherson's corps. McClernand's corps and McPherson's were stillahead, and had fought the battle of Port Gibson, on the 11th. Iovertook General Grant in person at Auburn, and he accompanied mycorps all the way into Jackson, which we reached May 14th. McClernand's corps had been left in observation toward Edwards'sFerry. McPherson had fought at Raymond, and taken the left-handroad toward Jackson, via Clinton, while my troops were ordered byGeneral Grant in person to take the right-hand road leading throughMississippi Springs. We reached Jackson at the same time;McPherson fighting on the Clinton road, and my troops fighting justoutside the town, on the Raymond road, where we captured threeentire field-batteries, and about two hundred prisoners of war. The rebels, under General Joe Johnston, had retreated through thetown northward on the Canton road. Generals Grant, McPherson, andI, met in the large hotel facing the State-House, where the formerexplained to us that he had intercepted dispatches from Pembertonto Johnston, which made it important for us to work smart toprevent a junction of their respective forces. McPherson wasordered to march back early the next day on the Clinton road tomake junction with McClernand, and I was ordered to remain one dayto break up railroads, to destroy the arsenal, a foundery, thecotton-factory of the Messrs. Green, etc. , etc. , and then tofollow McPherson. 

McPherson left Jackson early on the 15th, and General Grant duringthe same day. I kept my troops busy in tearing up railroad-tracks, etc. , but early on the morning of the 16th received notice fromGeneral Grant that a battle was imminent near Edwards's Depot; thathe wanted me to dispatch one of my divisions immediately, and tofollow with the other as soon as I had completed the work ofdestruction. Steele's division started immediately, and later inthe day I followed with the other division (Tuttle's). Just as Iwas leaving Jackson, a very fat man came to see me, to inquire ifhis hotel, a large, frame building near the depot, were doomed tobe burned. I told him we had no intention to burn it, or any otherhouse, except the machine-shops, and such buildings as could easilybe converted to hostile uses. He professed to be a law-abidingUnion man, and I remember to have said that this fact was manifestfrom the sign of his hotel, which was the "Confederate Hotel;" thesign "United States" being faintly painted out, and "Confederate"painted over it! I remembered that hotel, as it was thesupper-station for the New Orleans trains when I used to travel theroad before the war. I had not the least purpose, however, ofburning it, but, just as we were leaving the town, it burst out inflames and was burned to the ground. I never found out exactly whoset it on fire, but was told that in one of our batteries were someofficers and men who had been made prisoners at Shiloh, withPrentiss's division, and had been carried past Jackson in arailroad-train; they had been permitted by the guard to go to thisvery hotel for supper, and had nothing to pay but greenbacks, whichwere refused, with insult, by this same law-abiding landlord. These men, it was said, had quietly and stealthily applied the fireunderneath the hotel just as we were leaving the town. 

About dark we met General Grant's staff-officer near BoltonStation, who turned us to the right, with orders to push on toVicksburg by what was known as the upper Jackson Road, whichcrossed the Big Black at Bridgeport. During that day (May 16th)the battle of Champion Hills had been fought and won byMcClernand's and McPherson's corps, aided by one division of mine(Blairs), under the immediate command of General Grant; andMcPherson was then following the mass of Pemberton's army, disordered and retreating toward Vicksburg by the Edwards's Ferryroad. General Blair's division had come up from the rear, wastemporarily attached to McClernand's corps, taking part with it inthe battle of Champion Hills, but on the 17th it was ordered byGeneral Grant across to Bridgeport, to join me there. 

Just beyond Bolton there was a small hewn-log house, standing backin a yard, in which was a well; at this some of our soldiers weredrawing water. I rode in to get a drink, and, seeing a book on theground, asked some soldier to hand it to me. It was a volume ofthe Constitution of the United States, and on the title-page waswritten the name of Jefferson Davis. On inquiry of a negro, Ilearned that the place belonged to the then President of theSouthern Confederation. His brother Joe Davis's plantation was notfar off; one of my staff-officers went there, with a few soldiers, and took a pair of carriage-horses, without my knowledge at thetime. He found Joe Davis at home, an old man, attended by a youngand affectionate niece; but they were overwhelmed with grief to seetheir country overran and swarming with Federal troops. 

We pushed on, and reached the Big Black early, Blair'stroops having preceded us by an hour or so. I found GeneralBlair in person, and he reported that there was no bridge acrossthe Big Black; that it was swimming-deep; and that there wasa rebel force on the opposite side, intrenched. He had ordereda detachment of the Thirteenth United States Regulars, underCaptain Charles Ewing, to strip some artillery-horses, mount themen, and swim the river above the ferry, to attack and driveaway the party on the opposite bank. I did not approve of thisrisky attempt, but crept down close to the brink of theriver-bank, behind a corn-crib belonging to a plantation house nearby, and saw the parapet on the opposite bank. Ordering a section ofguns to be brought forward by hand behind this corn-crib, a fewwell-directed shells brought out of their holes the little partythat was covering the crossing, viz. , a lieutenant and ten men, whocame down to the river-bank and surrendered. Blair's pon-toon-trainwas brought up, consisting of India-rubber boats, one of which wasinflated, used as a boat, and brought over the prisoners. Apontoon-bridge was at once begun, finished by night, and the troopsbegan the passage. After dark, the whole scene was lit up withfires of pitch-pine. General Grant joined me there, and we sat on alog, looking at the passage of the troops by the light of thosefires; the bridge swayed to and fro under the passing feet, and madea fine war-picture. At daybreak we moved on, ascending the ridge, and by 10 a. M. The head of my column, long drawn out, reached theBenton road, and gave us command of the peninsula between the Yazooand Big Black. I dispatched Colonel Swan, of the Fourth IowaCavalry, to Haines's Bluff, to capture that battery from the rear, and he afterward reported that he found it abandoned, its garrisonhaving hastily retreated into Vicksburg, leaving their gunspartially disabled, a magazine full of ammunition, and a hospitalfull of wounded and sick men. Colonel Swan saw one of our gunboatslying about two miles below in the Yazoo, to which he signaled. Shesteamed up, and to its commander the cavalry turned over the batteryat Haines's Bluff, and rejoined me in front of Vicksburg. Allowinga couple of hours for rest and to close up the column, I resumed themarch straight on Vicksburg. About two miles before reaching theforts, the road forked; the left was the main Jackson road, and theright was the "graveyard" road, which entered Vicksburg near a largecemetery. General Grant in person directed me to take theright-hand road, but, as McPherson had not yet got up from thedirection of the railroad-bridge at Big Black, I sent the EighthMissouri on the main Jackson road, to push the rebel skirmishersinto town, and to remain until relieved by McPherson's advance, which happened late that evening, May 18th. The battalion of theThirteenth United States Regulars, commanded by Captain Washington, was at the head of the column on the right-hand road, and pushed therebels close behind their parapets; one of my staff, CaptainPitzman, receiving a dangerous wound in the hip, which apparentlydisabled him for life. By night Blair's whole division had closed upagainst the defenses of Vicksburg, which were found to be strong andwell manned; and, on General Steele's head of column arriving, Iturned it still more to the right, with orders to work its way downthe bluff, so as to make connection with our fleet in theMississippi River. There was a good deal of desultory fighting thatevening, and a man was killed by the aide of General Grant andmyself, as we sat by the road-side looking at Steele's divisionpassing to the right. General Steele's men reached the road whichled from Vicksburg up to Haines's Bluff, which road lay at the footof the hills, and intercepted some prisoners and wagons which werecoming down from Haines's Bluff. 

All that night McPherson's troops were arriving by the main Jacksonroad, and McClernand'a by another near the railroad, deployingforward as fast as they struck the rebel works. My corps (theFifteenth) had the right of the line of investment; McPherson's(the Seventeenth) the centre; and McClernand's (the Thirteenth) theleft, reaching from the river above to the railroad below. Ourlines connected, and invested about three-quarters of theland-front of the fortifications of Vicksburg. On the suppositionthat the garrison of Vicksburg was demoralized by the defeats atChampion Hills and at the railroad crossing of the Big Black, General Grant ordered an assault at our respective fronts on the19th. My troops reached the top of the parapet, but could notcross over. The rebel parapets were strongly manned, and the enemyfought hard and well. My loss was pretty heavy, falling chiefly onthe Thirteenth Regulars, whose commanding officer, CaptainWashington, was killed, and several other regiments were prettybadly cut up. We, however, held the ground up to the ditch tillnight, and then drew back only a short distance, and began tocounter-trench. On the graveyard road, our parapet was within lessthan fifty yards of the rebel ditch. 

On the 20th of May, General Grant called the three corps commanderstogether, viz. , McClernand, McPherson, and Sherman. We comparednotes, and agreed that the assault of the day before had failed, byreason of the natural strength of the position, and because we wereforced by the nature of the ground to limit our attacks to thestrongest parts of the enemy's line, viz. , where the threeprincipal roads entered the city. 

It was not a council of war, but a mere consultation, resulting inorders from General Grant for us to make all possible preparationsfor a renewed assault on the 22d, simultaneously, at 10 a. M. Ireconnoitred my front thoroughly in person, from right to left, andconcluded to make my real attack at the right flank of the bastion, where the graveyard road entered the enemy's intrenchments, and atanother point in the curtain about a hundred yards to its right(our left); also to make a strong demonstration by Steele'sdivision, about a mile to our right, toward the river. All ourfield batteries were put in position, and were covered by goodepaulements; the troops were brought forward, in easy support, concealed by the shape of the ground; and to the minute, viz. , 10 a. M. Of May 22d, the troops sprang to the assault. A smallparty, that might be called a forlorn hope, provided with plank tocross the ditch, advanced at a run, up to the very ditch; the linesof infantry sprang from cover, and advanced rapidly in line ofbattle. I took a position within two hundred yards of the rebelparapet, on the off slope of a spur of ground, where by advancingtwo or three steps I could see every thing. The rebel line, concealed by the parapet, showed no sign of unusual activity, butas our troops came in fair view, the enemy rose behind theirparapet and poured a furious fire upon our lines; and, for abouttwo hours, we had a severe and bloody battle, but at every point wewere repulsed. In the very midst of this, when shell and shot fellfurious and fast, occurred that little episode which has beencelebrated in song and story, of the boy Orion P. Howe, badlywounded, bearing me a message for cartridges, calibre 54, described in my letter to the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. This boy was afterward appointed a cadet to the United States NavalAcademy, at Annapolis, but he could not graduate, and I do not nowknow what has become of him. 

After our men had been fairly beaten back from off the parapet, andhad got cover behind the spurs of ground close up to the rebelworks, General Grant came to where I was, on foot, having left hishorse some distance to the rear. I pointed out to him the rebelworks, admitted that my assault had failed, and he said the resultwith McPherson and McClernand was about the same. While he waswith me, an orderly or staff-officer came and handed him a piece ofpaper, which he read and handed to me. I think the writing was inpencil, on a loose piece of paper, and was in General McClernand'shandwriting, to the effect that "his troops had captured the rebelparapet in his front, " that, "the flag of the Union waved over thestronghold of Vicksburg, " and asking him (General Grant) to giverenewed orders to McPherson and Sherman to press their attacks ontheir respective fronts, lest the enemy should concentrate on him(McClernand). General Grant said, "I don't believe a word of it;"but I reasoned with him, that this note was official, and must becredited, and I offered to renew the assault at once with newtroops. He said he would instantly ride down the line toMcClernand's front, and if I did not receive orders to thecontrary, by 3 o'clock p. M. , I might try it again. Mower's freshbrigade was brought up under cover, and some changes were made inGiles Smith's brigade; and, punctually at 3 p. M. , hearing heavyfiring down along the line to my left, I ordered the secondassault. It was a repetition of the first, equally unsuccessfuland bloody. It also transpired that the same thing had occurredwith General McPherson, who lost in this second assault some mostvaluable officers and men, without adequate result; and thatGeneral McClernand, instead of having taken any single point of therebel main parapet, had only taken one or two small outlyinglunettes open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of therebels behind their main parapet, and most of them were actuallythus captured. This affair caused great feeling with us, andsevere criticisms on General McClernand, which led finally to hisremoval from the command of the Thirteenth Corps, to whichGeneral Ord succeeded. The immediate cause, however, ofGeneral McClernand's removal was the publication of a sort ofcongratulatory order addressed to his troops, first published inSt. Louis, in which he claimed that he had actually succeeded inmaking a lodgment in Vicksburg, but had lost it, owing to the factthat McPherson and Sherman did not fulfill their parts of thegeneral plan of attack. This was simply untrue. The two severalassaults made May 22d, on the lines of Vicksburg, had failed, byreason of the great strength of the position and the determinedfighting of its garrison. I have since seen the position atSevastopol, and without hesitation I declare that at Vicksburg tohave been the more difficult of the two. 

Thereafter our proceedings were all in the nature of a siege. General Grant drew more troops from Memphis, to prolong our generalline to the left, so as completely to invest the place on itsland-side, while the navy held the river both above and below. General Mower's brigade of Tuttle's division was also sent acrossthe river to the peninsula, so that by May 31st Vicksburg wascompletely beleaguered. Good roads were constructed from our campsto the several landing-places on the Yazoo River, to which pointsour boats brought us ample supplies; so that we were in a splendidcondition for a siege, while our enemy was shut up in a close fort, with a large civil population of men, women, and children to feed, in addition to his combatant force. If we could prevent sallies, or relief from the outside, the fate of the garrison of Vicksburgwas merely a question of time. 

I had my headquarters camp close up to the works, near the centreof my corps, and General Grant had his bivouac behind a ravine tomy rear. We estimated Pemberton's whole force in Vicksburg atthirty thousand men, and it was well known that the rebel GeneralJoseph E. Johnston was engaged in collecting another strong forcenear the Big Black, with the intention to attack our rear, and thusto afford Pemberton an opportunity to escape with his men. Eventhen the ability of General Johnston was recognized, and GeneralGrant told me that he was about the only general on that side whomhe feared. Each corps kept strong pickets well to the rear; but, as the rumors of Johnston's accumulating force reached us, GeneralGrant concluded to take stronger measures. He had received fromthe North General J. G. Parker's corps (Ninth), which had beenposted at Haines's Bluff; then, detailing one division from each ofthe three corps d'armee investing Vicksburg, he ordered me to goout, take a general command of all, and to counteract any movementon the part of General Johnston to relieve Vicksburg. Ireconnoitred the whole country, from Haines's Bluff to the railroadbridge, and posted the troops thus:

Parke's two divisions from Haines's Bluff out to the Benton orridge road; Tuttle's division, of my corps, joining on andextending to a plantation called Young's, overlooking Bear Creekvalley, which empties into the Big Black above Messinger's Ferry;then McArthurs division, of McPherson's corps, took up the line, and reached to Osterhaus's division of McClernand's corps, whichheld a strong fortified position at the railroad-crossing of theBig Black River. I was of opinion that, if Johnston should crossthe Big Black, he could by the favorable nature of the country beheld in check till a concentration could be effected by us at thepoint threatened. From the best information we could gather, General Johnston had about thirty or forty thousand men. I tookpost near a plantation of one Trible, near Markham's, andfrequently reconnoitred the whole line, and could see the enemyengaged in like manner, on the east aide of Big Black; but he neverattempted actually to cross over, except with some cavalry, justabove Bear Creek, which was easily driven back. I was there fromJune 20th to the 4th of July. In a small log-house near Markham'swas the family of Mr. Klein, whose wife was the daughter of Mrs. Day, of New Orleans, who in turn was the sister of Judge T. W. Bartley, my brother-in-law. I used frequently to drop in and takea meal with them, and Mrs. Klein was generally known as thegeneral's cousin, which doubtless saved her and her family frommolestation, too common on the part of our men. 

One day, as I was riding the line near a farm known as ParsonFog's, I heard that the family of a Mr. Wilkinson, of New Orleans, was "refugeeing" at a house near by. I rode up, inquired, andfound two young girls of that name, who said they were the childrenof General Wilkinson, of Louisiana, and that their brother had beenat the Military School at Alexandria. Inquiring for their mother, I was told she was spending the day at Parson Fox's. As this housewas on my route, I rode there, went through a large gate into theyard, followed by my staff and escort, and found quite a number ofladies sitting on the porch. I rode up and inquired if that wereParson Fox's. The parson, a fine-looking, venerable old man, rose, and said that he was Parson Fox. I then inquired for Mrs. Wilkinson, when an elderly lady answered that she was the person. I asked her if she were from Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana, and shesaid she was. I then inquired if she had a son who had been acadet at Alexandria when General Sherman was superintendent, andshe answered yes. I then announced myself, inquired after the boy, and she said he was inside of Vicksburg, an artillery lieutenant. I then asked about her husband, whom I had known, when she burstinto tears, and cried out in agony, "You killed him at Bull Run, where he was fighting for his country!" I disclaimed killinganybody at Bull Run; but all the women present (nearly a dozen)burst into loud lamentations, which made it most uncomfortable forme, and I rode away. On the 3d of July, as I sat at my bivouac bythe road-side near Trible's, I saw a poor, miserable horse, carrying a lady, and led by a little negro boy, coming across acotton-field toward me; as they approached I recognized poor Mrs. Wilkinson, and helped her to dismount. I inquired what had broughther to me in that style, and she answered that she knew Vicksburg, was going to surrender, and she wanted to go right away to see herboy. I had a telegraph-wire to General Grant's headquarters, andhad heard that there were symptoms of surrender, but as yet nothingdefinite. I tried to console and dissuade her, but she wasresolved, and I could not help giving her a letter to GeneralGrant, explaining to him who she was, and asking him to give herthe earliest opportunity to see her son. The distance was fullytwenty miles, but off she started, and I afterward learned that myletter had enabled her to see her son, who had escaped unharmed. Later in the day I got by telegraph General Grant's notice of thenegotiations for surrender; and, by his directions, gave generalorders to my troops to be ready at a moment's notice to cross theBig Black, and go for Joe Johnston. 

The next day (July 4, 1863) Vicksburg surrendered, and orders weregiven for at once attacking General Johnston. The Thirteenth Corps(General Ord) was ordered to march rapidly, and cross the Big Blackat the railroad-bridge; the Fifteenth by Mesainger's, and the Ninth(General Parker) by Birdsong's Ferry-all to converge on Bolton. Mycorps crossed the Big Black during the 5th and 6th of July, andmarched for Bolton, where we came in with General Ord's troops; butthe Ninth Corps was delayed in crossing at Birdsong's. Johnstonhad received timely notice of Pemberton's surrender, and was infull retreat for Jackson. On the 8th all our troops reached theneighborhood of Clinton, the weather fearfully hot, and waterscarce. Johnston had marched rapidly, and in retreating had causedcattle, hogs, and sheep, to be driven into the ponds of water, andthere shot down; so that we had to haul their dead and stinkingcarcasses out to use the water. On the 10th of July we had driventhe rebel army into Jackson, where it turned at bay behind theintrenchments, which had been enlarged and strengthened since ourformer visit in May. We closed our lines about Jackson; my corps(Fifteenth) held the centre, extending from the Clinton to theRaymond road; Ord's (Thirteenth) on the right, reaching Pearl Riverbelow the town; and Parker's (Ninth) the left, above the town. 

On the 11th we pressed close in, and shelled the town from everydirection. One of Ords brigades (Lauman's) got too close, and wasvery roughly handled and driven back in disorder. General Ordaccused the commander (General Lauman) of having disregarded hisorders, and attributed to him personally the disaster and heavyloss of men. He requested his relief, which I granted, and GeneralLauman went to the rear, and never regained his division. He diedafter the war, in Iowa, much respected, as before that time he hadbeen universally esteemed a most gallant and excellent officer. The weather was fearfully hot, but we continued to press the siegeday and night, using our artillery pretty freely; and on themorning of July 17th the place was found evacuated. GeneralSteele's division was sent in pursuit as far as Brandon (fourteenmiles), but General Johnston had carried his army safely off, andpursuit in that hot weather would have been fatal to my command. 

Reporting the fact to General Grant, he ordered me to return, tosend General Parkes's corps to Haines's Bluff, General Ord's backto Vicksburg, and he consented that I should encamp my whole corpsnear the Big Black, pretty much on the same ground we had occupiedbefore the movement, and with the prospect of a period of rest forthe remainder of the summer. We reached our camps on the 27th ofJuly. 

Meantime, a division of troops, commanded by Brigadier-General W. Sooy Smith, had been added to my corps. General Smith applied forand received a sick-leave on the 20th of July; Brigadier-GeneralHugh Ewing was assigned to its command; and from that time itconstituted the Fourth Division of the Fifteenth Army Corps. 

Port Hudson had surrendered to General Banks on the 8th of July (anecessary consequence of the fall of Vicksburg), and thusterminated probably the most important enterprise of the civilwar--the recovery of the complete control of the Mississippi River, from its source to its mouth--or, in the language of Mr. Lincoln, the Mississippi went "unvexed to the sea. "

I put my four divisions into handsome, clean camps, looking tohealth and comfort alone, and had my headquarters in a beautifulgrove near the house of that same Parson Fox where I had found thecrowd of weeping rebel women waiting for the fate of their friendsin Vicksburg. 

The loss sustained by the Fifteenth Corps in the assault of May19th, at Vicksburg, was mostly confined to the battalion of theThirteenth Regulars, whose commanding officer, Captain Washington, was mortally wounded, and afterward died in the hands of the enemy, which battalion lost seventy-seven men out of the two hundred andfifty engaged; the Eighty-third Indiana (Colonel Spooner), and theOne Hundred and Twenty seventh Illinois (Lieutenant-ColonelEldridge), the aggregate being about two hundred. 

In the assaults of the 22d, the loss in the Fifteenth Corps wasabout six hundred. 

In the attack on Jackson, Mississippi, during the 11th-16th ofJuly, General Ord reported the loss in the Thirteenth Army Corpsseven hundred and sixty-two, of which five hundred and thirty-threewere confined to Lauman's division; General Parkes reported, in theNinth Corps, thirty-seven killed, two hundred and fifty-eightwounded, and thirty-three missing: total, three hundred andtwenty-eight. In the Fifteenth Corps the loss was less; so that, in the aggregate, the loss as reported by me at the time was lessthan a thousand men, while we took that number alone of prisoners. 

In General Grant's entire army before Vicksburg, composed of theNinth, part of the Sixteenth, and the whole of the Thirteenth;Fifteenth, and Seventeenth Corps, the aggregate loss, as stated byBadeau, was:

Killed: ....................... 1243Wounded:....................... 7095Missing: ...................... 535

Total: ........................ 8873

Whereas the Confederate loss, as stated by the same author, Surrendered at Vicksburg .............. 32000Captured at Champion Hills............. 3000Captured at Big Black Bridge .......... 2000Captured at Port Gibson................ 2000Captured with Loring .................. 4000Killed and wounded .................... 10000Stragglers............................. 3000

Total.................................. 56000

Besides which, "a large amount of public property, consisting ofrailroads, locomotives, cars, steamers, cotton, guns, muskets, ammunition, etc. , etc. , was captured in Vicksburg. "

The value of the capture of Vicksburg, however, was not measured bythe list of prisoners, guns, and small-arms, but by the fact thatits possession secured the navigation of the great central river ofthe continent, bisected fatally the Southern Confederacy, and setthe armies which had been used in its conquest free for otherpurposes; and it so happened that the event coincided as to timewith another great victory which crowned our arms far away, atGettysburg, Pennsylvania. That was a defensive battle, whereasours was offensive in the highest acceptation of the term, and thetwo, occurring at the same moment of time, should have ended thewar; but the rebel leaders were mad, and seemed determined thattheir people should drink of the very lowest dregs of the cup ofwar, which they themselves had prepared. 

The campaign of Vicksburg, in its conception and execution, belonged exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain many of hisletters and notes, all in his own handwriting, prescribing theroutes of march for divisions and detachments, specifying even theamount of food and tools to be carried along. Many persons gavehis adjutant general, Rawlins, the credit for these things, butthey were in error; for no commanding general of an army ever gavemore of his personal attention to details, or wrote so many of hisown orders, reports, and letters, as General Grant. His success atVicksburg justly gave him great fame at home and abroad. ThePresident conferred on him the rank of major-general in the regulararmy, the highest grade then existing by law; and General McPhersonand I shared in his success by receiving similar commissions asbrigadier-generals in the regular army. 

But our success at Vicksburg produced other results not sofavorable to our cause--a general relaxation of effort, and desireto escape the hard drudgery of camp: officers sought leaves ofabsence to visit their homes, and soldiers obtained furloughs anddischarges on the most slender pretexts; even the GeneralGovernment seemed to relax in its efforts to replenish our rankswith new men, or to enforce the draft, and the politicians werepressing their schemes to reorganize or patch up some form of civilgovernment, as fast as the armies gained partial possession of theStates. 

In order to illustrate this peculiar phase of our civil war, I giveat this place copies of certain letters which have not heretoforebeen published:

[Private. ]

WASHINGTON, August 29, 1868. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Vicksburg, Mississippi

My DEAR GENERAL: The question of reconstruction in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, will soon come up for decision of theGovernment, and not only the length of the war, but our ultimateand complete success, will depend upon its decision. It is adifficult matter, but I believe it can be successfully solved, ifthe President will consult opinions of cool and discreet men, whoare capable of looking at it in all its bearings and effects. Ithink he is disposed to receive the advice of our generals who havebeen in these States, and know much more of their condition thangassy politicians in Congress. General Banks has written prettyfully, on the subject. I wrote to General Grant, immediately, after the fall of Vicksburg, for his views in regard toMississippi, but he has not yet answered. 

I wish you would consult with Grant, McPherson, and others of cool, good judgment, and write me your views fully, as I may wish to usethem with the President. You had better write me unofficially, andthen your letter will not be put on file, and cannot hereafter beused against you. You have been in Washington enough to know howevery thing a man writes or says is picked up by his enemies andmisconstrued. With kind wishes for your further success, I am yours truly, H. W. HALLECK

[Private and Confidential. ]

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, CAMP ON BIG BLACK, MISSISSIPPI, September 17 1863H. W. HALLECK, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. 

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your letter of August 29th, and withpleasure confide to you fully my thoughts on the important mattersyou suggest, with absolute confidence that you will use what isvaluable, and reject the useless or superfluous. 

That part of the continent of North America known as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, is in my judgment the key to the wholeinterior. The valley of the Mississippi is America, and, althoughrailroads have changed the economy of intercommunication, yet thewater-channels still mark the lines of fertile land, and affordcheap carriage to the heavy products of it. 

The inhabitants of the country on the Monongahela, the Illinois, the Minnesota, the Yellowstone, and Osage, are as directlyconcerned in the security of the Lower Mississippi as are those whodwell on its very banks in Louisiana; and now that the nation hasrecovered its possession, this generation of men will make afearful mistake if they again commit its charge to a people liableto misuse their position, and assert, as was recently done, that, because they dwelt on the banks of this mighty stream, they had aright to control its navigation. 

I would deem it very unwise at this time, or for years to come, torevive the State governments of Louisiana, etc. , or to institute inthis quarter any civil government in which the local people havemuch to say. They had a government so mild and paternal that theygradually forgot they had any at all, save what they themselvescontrolled; they asserted an absolute right to seize public moneys, forts, arms, and even to shut up the natural avenues of travel andcommerce. They chose war--they ignored and denied all theobligations of the solemn contract of government and appealed toforce. 

We accepted the issue, and now they begin to realize that war is atwo-edged sword, and it may be that many of the inhabitants cry forpeace. I know them well, and the very impulses of their nature;and to deal with the inhabitants of that part of the South whichborders on the great river, we must recognize the classes intowhich they have divided themselves:

First. The large planters, owning lands, slaves, and all kinds ofpersonal property. These are, on the whole, the ruling class. They are educated, wealthy, and easily approached. In somedistricts they are bitter as gall, and have given up slaves, plantations, and all, serving in the armies of the Confederacy;whereas, in others, they are conservative. None dare admit afriendship for us, though they say freely that they were at theoutset opposed to war and disunion. I know we can manage thisclass, but only by action. Argument is exhausted, and words havelost their usual meaning. Nothing but the logic of events touchestheir understanding; but, of late, this has worked a wonderfulchange. If our country were like Europe, crowded with people, Iwould say it would be easier to replace this class than toreconstruct it, subordinate to the policy of the nation; but, asthis is not the case, it is better to allow the planters, withindividual exceptions, gradually to recover their plantations, tohire any species of labor, and to adapt themselves to the new orderof things. Still, their friendship and assistance to reconstructorder out of the present ruin cannot be depended on. They watchthe operations of our armies, and hope still for a SouthernConfederacy that will restore to them the slaves and privilegeswhich they feel are otherwise lost forever. In my judgment, wehave two more battles to win before we should even bother our mindswith the idea of restoring civil order--viz. , one near Meridian, inNovember, and one near Shreveport, in February and March next, whenRed River is navigable by our gunboats. When these are done, then, and not until then, will the planters of Louisiana, Arkansas, andMississippi, submit. Slavery is already gone, and, to cultivatethe land, negro or other labor must be hired. This, of itself, isa vast revolution, and time must be afforded to allow men to adjusttheir minds and habits to this new order of things. A civilgovernment of the representative type would suit this class farless than a pure military role, readily adapting itself to actualoccurrences, and able to enforce its laws and orders promptly andemphatically. 

Second. The smaller farmers, mechanics, merchants, and laborers. This class will probably number three-quarters of the whole; have, in fact, no real interest in the establishment of a SouthernConfederacy, and have been led or driven into war on the falsetheory that they were to be benefited somehow--they knew not how. They are essentially tired of the war, and would slink back home ifthey could. These are the real tiers etat of the South, and arehardly worthy a thought; for they swerve to and fro according toevents which they do not comprehend or attempt to shape. When thetime for reconstruction comes, they will want the old politicalsystem of caucuses, Legislatures, etc. , to amuse them and make thembelieve they are real sovereigns; but in all things they willfollow blindly the lead of the planters. The Southern politicians, who understand this class, use them as the French do their masses--seemingly consult their prejudices, while they make their ordersand enforce them. We should do the same. 

Third. The Union men of the South. I must confess I have littlerespect for this class. They allowed a clamorous set of demagoguesto muzzle and drive them as a pack of curs. Afraid of shadows, they submit tamely to squads of dragoons, and permit them, withouta murmur, to burn their cotton, take their horses, corn, and everything; and, when we reach them, they are full of complaints if ourmen take a few fence-rails for fire, or corn to feed our horses. They give us no assistance or information, and are loudest in theircomplaints at the smallest excesses of our soldiers. Their sons, horses, arms, and every thing useful, are in the army against us, and they stay at home, claiming all the exemptions of peacefulcitizens. I account them as nothing in this great game of war. 

Fourth. The young bloods of the South: sons of planters, lawyersabout towns, good billiard-players and sportsmen, men who never didwork and never will. War suits them, and the rascals are brave, fine riders, bold to rashness, and dangerous subjects in everysense. They care not a sou for niggers, land, or any thing. Theyhate Yankees per se, and don't bother their brains about the past, present, or future. As long as they have good horses, plenty offorage, and an open country, they are happy. This is a largerclass than most men suppose, and they are the most dangerous set ofmen that this war has turned loose upon the world. They aresplendid riders, first-rate shots, and utterly reckless. Stewart, John Morgan, Forrest, and Jackson, are the types and leaders ofthis class. These men must all be killed or employed by us beforewe can hope for peace. They have no property or future, andtherefore cannot be influenced by any thing, except personalconsiderations. I have two brigades of these fellows in my front, commanded by Cosby, of the old army, and Whitfield, of Texas. Stephen D. Lee is in command of the whole. I have frequentinterviews with their officers, a good understanding with them, andam inclined to think, when the resources of their country areexhausted, we must employ them. They are the best cavalry in theworld, but it will tax Mr. Chase's genius for finance to supplythem with horses. At present horses cost them nothing; for theytake where they find, and don't bother their brains as to who is topay for them; the same may be said of the cornfields, which have, as they believe, been cultivated by a good-natured people for theirspecial benefit. We propose to share with them the free use ofthese cornfields, planted by willing hands, that will never gatherthe crops. 

Now that I have sketched the people who inhabit the district ofcountry under consideration, I will proceed to discuss the future. 

A civil government now, for any part of it, would be simplyridiculous. The people would not regard it, and even the militarycommanders of the antagonistic parties would treat it lightly. Governors would be simply petitioners for military assistance, toprotect supposed friendly interests, and military commanders wouldrefuse to disperse and weaken their armies for military reasons. Jealousies would arise between the two conflicting powers, and, instead of contributing to the end of the war, would actually deferit. Therefore, I contend that the interests of the United States, and of the real parties concerned, demand the continuance of thesimple military role, till after all the organized armies of theSouth are dispersed, conquered, and subjugated. 

The people of all this region are represented in the Army ofVirginia, at Charleston, Mobile, and Chattanooga. They have sonsand relations in each of the rebel armies, and naturally areinterested in their fate. Though we hold military possession ofthe key-points of their country, still they contend, and naturally, that should Lee succeed in Virginia, or Bragg at Chattanooga, achange will occur here also. We cannot for this reason attempt toreconstruct parts of the South as we conquer it, till all idea ofthe establishment of a Southern Confederacy is abandoned. Weshould avail ourselves of the present lull to secure thestrategical points that will give us an advantage in the futuremilitary movements, and we should treat the idea of civilgovernment as one in which we as a nation have a minor orsubordinate interest. The opportunity is good to impress on thepopulation the truth that they are more interested in civilgovernment than we are; and that, to enjoy the protection of laws, they most not be passive observers of events, but must aid andsustain the constituted authorities in enforcing the laws; theymust not only submit themselves, but should pay their share oftaxes, and render personal services when called on. 

It seems to me, in contemplating the history of the past two years, that all the people of our country, North, South, East, and West, have been undergoing a salutary political schooling, learninglessons which might have been acquired from the experience of otherpeople; but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that wewould only learn by actual experience of our own. The people evenof small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, hadreasoned themselves into the belief that their opinions weresuperior to the aggregated interest of the whole nation. Half ourterritorial nation rebelled, on a doctrine of secession that theythemselves now scout; and a real numerical majority actuallybelieved that a little State was endowed with such sovereignty thatit could defeat the policy of the great whole. I think the presentwar has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, theexperience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense. 

Another great and important natural truth is still in contest, andcan only be solved by war. Numerical majorities by vote have beenour great arbiter. Heretofore all men have cheerfully submitted toit in questions left open, but numerical majorities are notnecessarily physical majorities. The South, though numericallyinferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority ofnumbers, and therefore by natural law they contend that they arenot bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in myjudgment all else should be deferred to it. War alone can decideit, and it is the only question now left for us as a people todecide. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majorityhas both the natural and constitutional right to govern them. Ifwe cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to selecttheir own government, and they have the argument. Our armies mustprevail over theirs; our officers, marshals, and courts, mustpenetrate into the innermost recesses of their land, before we havethe natural right to demand their submission. 

I would banish all minor questions, assert the broad doctrine thatas a nation the United States has the right, and also the physicalpower, to penetrate to every part of our national domain, and thatwe will do it--that we will do it in our own time and in our ownway; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two, or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle, if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle ofproperty, every thing that to us seems proper; that we will notcease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us areenemies, and that we will not account to them for our acts. If thepeople of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if theystand by, mere lookers-on in this domestic tragedy, they have noright to immunity, protection, or share in the final results. 

I even believe and contend further that, in the North, every memberof the nation is bound by both natural and constitutional law to"maintain and defend the Government against all its enemies andopposers whomsoever. " If they fail to do it they are derelict, andcan be punished, or deprived of all advantages arising from thelabors of those who do. If any man, North or South, withholds hisshare of taxes, or his physical assistance in this, the crisis ofour history, he should be deprived of all voice in the futureelections of this country, and might be banished, or reduced to thecondition of a mere denizen of the land. 

War is upon us, none can deny it. It is not the choice of theGovernment of the United States, but of a faction; the Governmentwas forced to accept the issue, or to submit to a degradation fataland disgraceful to all the inhabitants. In accepting war, itshould be "pure and simple" as applied to the belligerents. Iwould keep it so, till all traces of the war are effaced; tillthose who appealed to it are sick and tired of it, and come to theemblem of our nation, and sue for peace. I would not coax them, oreven meet them half-way, but make them so sick of war thatgenerations would pass away before they would again appeal to it. 

I know what I say when I repeat that the insurgents of the Southsneer at all overtures looking to their interests. They scorn thealliance with the Copperheads; they tell me to my face that theyrespect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fightmanfully and well for a principle, but despise the Copperheads andsneaks at the North, who profess friendship for the South andopposition to the war, as mere covers for their knavery andpoltroonery. 

God knows that I deplore this fratricidal war as much as any manliving, but it is upon us, a physical fact; and there is only onehonorable issue from it. We must fight it out, army against army, and man against man; and I know, and you know, and civilians beginto realize the fact, that reconciliation and reconstruction will beeasier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organizedarmies than through any species of conventions that can be framed. The issues are made, and all discussion is out of place andridiculous. The section of thirty-pounder Parrott rifles nowdrilling before my tent is a more convincing argument than thelargest Democratic meeting the State of New York can possiblyassemble at Albany; and a simple order of the War Department todraft enough men to fill our skeleton regiments would be moreconvincing as to our national perpetuity than an humble pardon toJeff. Davis and all his misled host. 

The only government needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, now exists in Grant's army. This needs, simply, enough privates to fill its ranks; all else will follow indue season. This army has its well-defined code of laws andpractice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of acity, the country, the rivers, the sea, indeed to all parts of thisland. It better subserves the interest and policy of the GeneralGovernment, and the people here prefer it to any weak or servilecombination that would at once, from force of habit, revive sadperpetuate local prejudices and passions. The people of thiscountry have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of thenation. They know it and feel it, and in after-years they will bethe better citizens from the dear bought experience of the presentcrisis. Let them learn now, and learn it well, that good citizensmust obey as well as command. Obedience to law, absolute--yea, even abject--is the lesson that this war, under Providence, willteach the free and enlightened American citizen. As a nation, weshall be the better for it. 

I never have apprehended foreign interference in our familyquarrel. Of coarse, governments founded on a different and it maybe an antagonistic principle with ours naturally feel a pleasure atour complications, and, it may be, wish our downfall; but in theend England and France will join with us in jubilation at thetriumph of constitutional government over faction. Even now theEnglish manifest this. I do not profess to understand Napoleon'sdesign in Mexico, and I do not, see that his taking militarypossession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory now aswe want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was aquestion as to what nation she should fall a prey. That is nowsolved, and I don't see that we are damaged. We have the finestpart of the North American Continent, all we can people and cantake care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land, and compose the strife generated by it, we shall have enoughpeople, resources, and wealth, if well combined, to defyinterference from any and every quarter. 

I therefore hope the Government of the United States will continue, as heretofore, to collect, in well-organized armies, the physicalstrength of the nation; applying it, as heretofore, in assertingthe national authority; and in persevering, without relaxation, tothe end. This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say; but, fortunately, we have no choice. We must succeed--no other choiceis left us except degradation. The South must be ruled by us, orshe will rule us. We must conquer them, or ourselves be conquered. There is no middle course. They ask, and will have, nothing else, and talk of compromise is bosh; for we know they would even scornthe offer. 

I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty years, till thesuperabundant population of the North could flow in and replace thelosses sustained by war; but this could not be, and we are forcedto take things as they are. 

All therefore I can now venture to advise is to raise the draft toits maximum, fill the present regiments to as large a standard aspossible, and push the war, pure and simple. Great attentionshould be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them may befounded the future stability of the Government. 

The cost of the war is, of course, to be considered, but financeswill adjust themselves to the actual state of affairs; and, even ifwe would, we could not change the cost. Indeed, the larger thecost now, the less will it be in the end; for the end must beattained somehow, regardless of loss of life and treasure, and ismerely a question of time. 

Excuse so long a letter. With great respect, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

General Halleck, on receipt of this letter, telegraphed me that Mr. Lincoln had read it carefully, and had instructed him to obtain myconsent to have it published. At the time, I preferred not to bedrawn into any newspaper controversy, and so wrote to GeneralHalleck; and the above letter has never been, to my knowledge, published; though Mr. Lincoln more than once referred to it withmarks of approval. 

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPSCAMP ON BIG BLACK, September 17, 1863

Brigadier-General J. A. RAWLINS, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Vicksburg. 

DEAR GENERAL: I inclose for your perusal, and for you to read toGeneral Grant such parts as you deem interesting, letters receivedby me from Prof. Mahan and General Halleck, with my answers. Afteryou have read my answer to General Halleck, I beg you to inclose itto its address, and return me the others. 

I think Prof. Mahan's very marked encomium upon the campaign ofVicksburg is so flattering to General Grant, that you may offer tolet him keep the letter, if he values such a testimonial. I havenever written a word to General Halleck since my report of lastDecember, after the affair at Chickasaw, except a short letter afew days ago, thanking him for the kind manner of his transmittingto me the appointment of brigadier-general. I know that inWashington I am incomprehensible, because at the outset of the warI would not go it blind and rush headlong into a war unprepared andwith an utter ignorance of its extent and purpose. I was thenconstrued unsound; and now that I insist on war pure and simple, with no admixture of civil compromises, I am supposed vindictive. You remember what Polonius said to his son Laertes: "Beware ofentrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear it, that the opposed maybeware of thee. " What is true of the single man, is equally trueof a nation. Our leaders seemed at first to thirst for thequarrel, willing, even anxious, to array against us all possibleelements of opposition; and now, being in, they would hasten toquit long before the "opposed" has received that lesson which heneeds. I would make this war as severe as possible, and show nosymptoms of tiring till the South begs for mercy; indeed, I know, and you know, that the end would be reached quicker by such acourse than by any seeming yielding on our part. I don't want ourGovernment to be bothered by patching up local governments, or bytrying to reconcile any class of men. The South has done herworst, and now is the time for us to pile on our blows thick andfast. 

Instead of postponing the draft till after the elections, we oughtnow to have our ranks full of drafted men; and, at best, if theycome at all, they will reach us when we should be in motion. 

I think General Halleck would like to have the honest, candidopinions of all of us, viz. , Grant, McPherson, and Sherman. I havegiven mine, and would prefer, of course, that it should coincidewith the others. Still, no matter what my opinion may be, I caneasily adapt my conduct to the plane of others, and am only toohappy when I find theirs better, than mine. 

If no trouble, please show Halleck's letter to McPherson, and askhim to write also. I know his regiments are like mine (meresquads), and need filling up. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

CHATTANOOGA AND KNOXVILLE. 

JULY TO DECEMBER, 1863. 

After the fall of Vicksburg, and its corollary, Port Hudson, theMississippi River was wholly in the possession of the Union forces, and formed a perfect line of separation in the territories of ouropponents. Thenceforth, they could not cross it save by stealth, and the military affairs on its west bank became unimportant. Grant's army had seemingly completed its share of the work of war, and lay, as it were, idle for a time. In person General Grant wentto New Orleans to confer with General Banks, and his victoriousarmy was somewhat dispersed. Parke's corps (Ninth) returned toKentucky, and afterward formed part of the Army of the Ohio, underGeneral Burnside; Ord's corps (Thirteenth) was sent down toNatchez, and gradually drifted to New Orleans and Texas; McPhersons(Seventeenth) remained in and near Vicksburg; Hurlbut's (Sixteenth)was at Memphis; and mine (Fifteenth) was encamped along the BigBlack, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg. This corps wascomposed of four divisions: Steele's (the First) was posted at andnear the railroad-bridge; Blair's (the Second), next in order, nearParson Fox's; the Third Division (Tuttle's) was on the ridge aboutthe head of Bear Creek; and the Fourth (Ewing's) was at Messinger'sFord. My own headquarters were in tents in a fine grove of oldoaks near Parson Fox's house, and the battalion of the ThirteenthRegulars was the headquarters guard. 

All the camps were arranged for health, comfort, rest, and drill. It being midsummer, we did not expect any change till the autumnmonths, and accordingly made ourselves as comfortable as possible. There was a short railroad in operation from Vicksburg to thebridge across the Big Black, whence supplies in abundance werehauled to our respective camps. With a knowledge of this fact Mrs. Sherman came down from Ohio with Minnie, Lizzie, Willie, and Tom, to pay us a visit in our camp at Parson Fog's. Willie was thennine years old, was well advanced for his years, and took the mostintense interest in the affairs of the army. He was a greatfavorite with the soldiers, and used to ride with me on horsebackin the numerous drills and reviews of the time. He then had thepromise of as long a life as any of my children, and displayed moreinterest in the war than any of them. He was called a "sergeant"in the regular battalion, learned the manual of arms, and regularlyattended the parade and guard-mounting of the Thirteenth, back ofmy camp. We made frequent visits to Vicksburg, and always stoppedwith General McPherson, who had a large house, and boarded with afamily (Mrs. Edwards's) in which were several interesting youngladies. General Grant occupied another house (Mrs. Lum's) inVicksburg during that summer, and also had his family with him. The time passed very agreeably, diversified only by little eventsof not much significance, among which I will recount only one. 

While, we occupied the west bank of the Big Black, the east bankwas watched by a rebel cavalry-division, commanded by GeneralArmstrong. He had four brigades, commanded by Generals Whitfield, Stark, Cosby, and Wirt Adams. Quite frequently they communicatedwith us by flags of truce on trivial matters, and we reciprocated;merely to observe them. One day a flag of truce, borne by aCaptain B.... , of Louisville, Kentucky, escorted by abouttwenty-five men, was reported at Messinger's Ferry, and I sentorders to let them come right into my tent. This brought themthrough the camps of the Fourth Division, and part of the Second;and as they drew up in front of my tent, I invited Captain B.... And another officer with him (a major from Mobile) to dismount, toenter my tent, and to make themselves at home. Their escort wassent to join mine, with orders to furnish them forage and everything they wanted. B.... Had brought a sealed letter for GeneralGrant at Vicksburg, which was dispatched to him. In the evening wehad a good supper, with wine and cigars, and, as we sat talking, B.... Spoke of his father and mother, in Louisville, got leave towrite them a long letter without its being read by any one, andthen we talked about the war. He said: "What is the use of yourpersevering? It is simply impossible to subdue eight millions ofpeople;" asserting that "the feeling in the South had become soembittered that a reconciliation was impossible. " I answered that, "sitting as we then were, we appeared very comfortable, and surelythere was no trouble in our becoming friends. " "Yes, " said he, "that is very true of us, but we are gentlemen of education, andcan easily adapt ourselves to any condition of things; but thiswould not apply equally well to the common people, or to the commonsoldiers. " I took him out to the camp-fires behind the tent, andthere were the men of his escort and mine mingled together, drinking their coffee, and happy as soldiers always seem. I askedB.... What he thought of that, and he admitted that I had the bestof the argument. Before I dismissed this flag of truce, hiscompanion consulted me confidentially as to what disposition heought to make of his family, then in Mobile, and I frankly gave himthe best advice I could. 

While we were thus lying idle in camp on the big Black, the Army ofthe Cumberland, under General Rosecrans, was moving against Braggat Chattanooga; and the Army of the Ohio, General Burnside, wasmarching toward East Tennessee. General Rosecrans was so confidentof success that he somewhat scattered his command, seemingly tosurround and capture Bragg in Chattanooga; but the latter, reenforced from Virginia, drew out of Chattanooga, concentrated hisarmy at Lafayette, and at Chickamauga fell on Rosecrans, defeatedhim, and drove him into Chattanooga. The whole country seemedparalyzed by this unhappy event; and the authorities in Washingtonwere thoroughly stampeded. From the East the Eleventh Corps(Slocum), and the Twelfth Corps (Howard), were sent by rail toNashville, and forward under command of General Hooker; orders werealso sent to General Grant, by Halleck, to send what reenforcementshe could spare immediately toward Chattanooga. 

Bragg had completely driven Rosecrans's army into Chattanooga; thelatter was in actual danger of starvation, and the railroad to hisrear seemed inadequate to his supply. The first intimation which Igot of this disaster was on the 22d of September, by an order fromGeneral Grant to dispatch one of my divisions immediately intoVicksburg, to go toward Chattanooga, and I designated the First, General Osterhaus--Steele meantime having been appointed to thecommand of the Department of Arkansas, and had gone to Little Rock. General Osterhaus marched the same day, and on the 23d I wassummoned to Vicksburg in person, where General Grant showed me thealarming dispatches from General Halleck, which had been sent fromMemphis by General Hurlbut, and said, on further thought, that hewould send me and my whole corps. But, inasmuch as one division ofMcPherson's corps (John E. Smith's) had already started, heinstructed me to leave one of my divisions on the Big Black, and toget the other two ready to follow at once. I designated theSecond, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, and theFourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Corse. 

On the 25th I returned to my camp on Big Black, gave all thenecessary orders for these divisions to move, and for the Third(Tittle's) to remain, and went into Vicksburg with my family. Thelast of my corps designed for this expedition started from camp onthe 27th, reached Vicksburg the 28th, and were embarked on boatsprovided for them. General Halleck's dispatches dwelt upon thefact that General Rosecrans's routes of supply were overtaxed, andthat we should move from Memphis eastward, repairing railroads aswe progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, whence I was to report toGeneral Rosecrans, at Chattanooga, by letter. 

I took passage for myself and family in the steamer Atlantic, Captain Henry McDougall. When the boat was ready to start, Williewas missing. Mrs. Sherman supposed him to have been with me, whereas I supposed he was with her. An officer of the Thirteenthwent up to General McPherson's house for him, and soon returned, with Captain Clift leading him, carrying in his hands a smalldouble-barreled shot gun; and I joked him about carrying awaycaptured property. In a short time we got off. As we all stood onthe guards to look at our old camps at Young's Point, I remarkedthat Willie was not well, and he admitted that he was sick. Hismother put him to bed, and consulted Dr. Roler, of the Fifty-fifthIllinois, who found symptoms of typhoid fever. The river was low;we made slow progress till above Helena; and, as we approachedMemphis, Dr. Roler told me that Willie's life was in danger, and hewas extremely anxious to reach Memphis for certain medicines andfor consultation. We arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October, carried Willie up to the Gayoso Hotel, and got the most experiencedphysician there, who acted with Dr. Roler, but he sank rapidly, anddied the evening of the 3d of October. The blow was a terrible oneto us all, so sudden and so unexpected, that I could not helpreproaching myself for having consented to his visit in that sicklyregion in the summer-time. Of all my children, he seemed the mostprecious. Born in San Francisco, I had watched with intenseinterest his development, and he seemed more than any of thechildren to take an interest in my special profession. Mrs. Sherman, Minnie, Lizzie, and Tom, were with him at the time, and weall, helpless and overwhelmed, saw him die. Being in the verymidst of an important military enterprise, I had hardly time topause and think of my personal loss. We procured a metalliccasket, and had a military funeral, the battalion of the ThirteenthUnited States Regulars acting as escort from the Gayoso Hotel tothe steamboat Grey Eagle, which conveyed him and my family up toCairo, whence they proceeded to our home at Lancaster, Ohio, wherehe was buried. I here give my letter to Captain C. C. Smith, whocommanded the battalion at the time, as exhibiting our intensefeelings:

GAYOSO HOUSE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEEOctober 4, 1863, Midnight

Captain C. C. SMITH, commanding Battalion Thirteenth United StatesRegulars. 

MY DEAR FRIEND: I cannot sleep to-night till I record an expressionof the deep feelings of my heart to you, and to the officers andsoldiers of the battalion, for their kind behavior to my poorchild. I realize that you all feel for my family the attachment ofkindred, and I assure you of full reciprocity. Consistent with asense of duty to my profession and office, I could not leave mypost, and sent for the family to come to me in that fatal climate, and in that sickly period of the year, and behold the result! Thechild that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with moreconfidence than I did in my own plan of life, now floats a merecorpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother, brother, and sisters, clustered about him. For myself, I ask nosympathy. On, on I must go, to meet a soldier's fate, or live tosee our country rise superior to all factions, till its flag isadored and respected by ourselves and by all the powers of theearth. 

But Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant in the Thirteenth. Ihave seen his eye brighten, his heart beat, as he beheld thebattalion under arms, and asked me if they were not real soldiers. Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth, honor, and love of country, which should animate all soldiers. 

God only knows why he should die thus young. He is dead, but willnot be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed himto that same mysterious end. 

Please convey to the battalion my heart-felt thanks, and assureeach and all that if in after-years they call on me or mine, andmention that they were of the Thirteenth Regulars when Willie was asergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family thatwill open all it has; that we will share with them our lastblanket, our last crust! Your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general. 

Long afterward, in the spring of 1867, we had his body disinterredand brought to St. Louis, where he is now buried in a beautifulspot, in Calvary Cemetery, by the side of another child, "Charles, "who was born at Lancaster, in the summer of 1864, died early, andwas buried at Notre Dame, Indiana. His body was transferred at thesame time to the same spot. Over Willie's grave is erected abeautiful marble monument, designed and executed by the officersand soldiers, of that battalion which claimed him as a sergeant andcomrade. 

During the summer and fall of 1863 Major-General S. A. Hurlbut wasin command at Memphis. He supplied me copies of all dispatchesfrom Washington, and all the information he possessed of the eventsabout Chattanooga. Two of these dispatches cover all essentialpoints:

WASHINGTON CITY, September 15, 1863--5 p. M. 

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis:

All the troops that can possibly be spared in West Tennessee and onthe Mississippi River should be sent without delay to assistGeneral Rosecrans on the Tennessee River. 

Urge Sherman to act with all possible promptness. 

If you have boats, send them down to bring up his troops. 

Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army hasbeen sent to reenforce Bragg. 

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 

Washington, September 19, 1868--4 p. M. 

Major-General S. A. HURLBUT, Memphis, Tennessee:

Give me definite information of the number of troops sent towardDecatur, and where they are. Also, what other troops are tofollow, and when. 

Has any thing been heard from the troops ordered from Vicksburg?

No efforts must be spared to support Rosecrans's right, and toguard the crossings of the Tennessee River. 

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 

My special orders were to repair the Memphis & Charleston Railroadeastward as I progressed, as far as Athens, Alabama, to drawsupplies by that route, so that, on reaching Athens, we should notbe dependent on the roads back to Nashville, already overtaxed bythe demand of Rosecrans's army. 

On reaching Memphis, October 2d, I found that Osterhaus's divisionhad already gone by rail as far as Corinth, and than John E. Smith's division was in the act of starting by cars. The SecondDivision, then commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, reached Memphis at the same time with me; and the Fourth Division, commanded by Brigadier-General John M. Corse, arrived a day or twoafter. The railroad was in fair condition as far as Corinth, ninety-six miles, but the road was badly stocked with locomotivesand cars, so that it took until the 9th to get off the SecondDivision, when I gave orders for the Fourth Division andwagon-trains to march by the common road. 

On Sunday morning, October 11th, with a special train loaded withour orderlies and clerks, the horses of our staff, the battalion ofthe Thirteenth United States Regulars, and a few officers goingforward to join their commands, among them Brigadier-General HughEwing, I started for Corinth. 

At Germantown, eight miles, we passed Corse's division (Fourth) onthe march, and about noon the train ran by the depot atColliersville, twenty-six miles out. I was in the rear car with mystaff, dozing, but observed the train slacking speed and stoppingabout half a mile beyond the depot. I noticed some soldiersrunning to and fro, got out at the end of the car, and soon ColonelAnthony (Silty-sixth Indiana), who commanded the post, rode up andsaid that his pickets had just been driven in, and there was anappearance of an attack by a large force of cavalry coming from thesoutheast. I ordered the men to get off the train, to form on theknoll near the railroad-cut, and soon observed a rebel officerriding toward us with a white flag. Colonel Anthony and ColonelDayton (one of my aides) were sent to meet him, and to keep him inconversation as long as possible. They soon returned, saying itwas the adjutant of the rebel general Chalmers, who demanded thesurrender of the place. I instructed them to return and give anegative answer, but to delay him as much as possible, so as togive us time for preparation. I saw Anthony, Dayton, and the rebelbearer of the flag, in conversation, and the latter turn his horseto ride back, when I ordered Colonel McCoy to run to the station, and get a message over the wires as quick as possible to Memphisand Germantown, to hurry forward Corse's division. I then orderedthe train to back to the depot, and drew back the battalion ofregulars to the small earth redoubt near it. The depot-buildingwas of brick, and had been punctured with loop-holes. To its east, about two hundred yards, was a small square earthwork or fort, intowhich were put a part of the regulars along with the company of theSixty-sixth Indiana already there. The rest of the men weredistributed into the railroad-cut, and in some shallowrifle-trenches near the depot. We had hardly made thesepreparations when the enemy was seen forming in a long line on theridge to the south, about four hundred yards off, and soon after twoparties of cavalry passed the railroad on both sides of us, cuttingthe wires and tearing up some rails. Soon they opened on us withartillery (of which we had none), and their men were dismounting andpreparing to assault. To the south of us was an extensivecornfield, with the corn still standing, and on the other side wasthe town of Colliersville. All the houses near, that could giveshelter to the enemy, were ordered to be set on fire, and the menwere instructed to keep well under cover and to reserve their firefor the assault, which seemed inevitable. A long line of rebelskirmishers came down through the cornfield, and two other partiesapproached us along the railroad on both sides. In the fort was asmall magazine containing some cartridges. Lieutenant James, afine, gallant fellow, who was ordnance-officer on my staff, askedleave to arm the orderlies and clerks with some muskets which he hadfound in the depot, to which I consented; he marched them into themagazine, issued cartridges, and marched back to the depot to assistin its defense. Afterward he came to me, said a party of the enemyhad got into the woods near the depot, and was annoying him, and hewanted to charge and drive it away. I advised him to be extremelycautious, as our enemy vastly outnumbered us, and had everyadvantage in position and artillery; but instructed him, if they gottoo near, he might make a sally. Soon after, I heard a rapid firein that quarter, and Lieutenant. James was brought in on astretcher, with a ball through his breast, which I supposed to befatal. 

[After the fight we sent him back to Memphis, where his mother andfather came from their home on the North River to nurse him. YoungJames was recovering from his wound, but was afterward killed by afall from his horse, near his home, when riding with the daughtersof Mr. Hamilton Fish, now Secretary of State. ]

The enemy closed down on us several times, and got possession ofthe rear of our train, from which they succeeded in getting five ofour horses, among them my favorite mare Dolly; but our men werecool and practised shots (with great experience acquired atVicksburg), and drove them back. With their artillery they knockedto pieces our locomotive and several of the cars, and set fire tothe train; but we managed to get possession again, and extinguishedthe fire. Colonel Audenreid, aide-de-camp, was provoked to findthat his valise of nice shirts had been used to kindle the fire. The fighting continued all round us for three or four hours, whenwe observed signs of drawing off, which I attributed to therightful cause, the rapid approach of Corse's division, whicharrived about dark, having marched the whole distance from Memphis, twenty-six miles, on the double-quick. The next day we repaireddamages to the railroad and locomotive, and went on to Corinth. 

At Corinth, on the 16th, I received the following importantdispatches:

MEMPHIS, October 14, 1863--11 a. M. 

Arrived this morning. Will be off in a few hours. My orders areonly to go to Cairo, and report from there by telegraph. McPhersonwill be in Canton to-day. He will remain there until Sunday orMonday next, and reconnoitre as far eastward as possible withcavalry, in the mean time. 

U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1863--1 p. M. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Corinth

Yours of the 10th is received. The important matter to be attendedto is that of supplies. When Eastport can be reached by boats, theuse of the railroad can be dispensed with; but until that time itmust be guarded as far as need. The Kentucky Railroad can barelysupply General Rosecrans. All these matters must be left to yourjudgment as circumstances may arise. Should the enemy be so strongas to prevent your going to Athena, or connecting with GeneralRosecrans, you will nevertheless have assisted him greatly bydrawing away a part of the enemy's forces. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. 

On the 18th, with my staff and a small escort, I rode forward toBurnsville, and on the 19th to Iuka, where, on the next day, I wasmost agreeably surprised to hear of the arrival at Eastport (onlyten miles off) of two gunboats, under the command of CaptainPhelps, which had been sent up the Tennessee River by AdmiralPorter, to help us. 

Satisfied that, to reach Athens and to communicate with GeneralRosecrans, we should have to take the route north of the TennesseeRiver, on the 24th I ordered the Fourth Division to cross atEastport with the aid of the gunboats, and to move to Florence. About the same time, I received the general orders assigningGeneral Grant to command the Military Division of the Mississippi, authorizing him, on reaching Chattanooga, to supersede GeneralRosecrans by General George H. Thomas, with other and completeauthority, as set, forth in the following letters of GeneralHalleck, which were sent to me by General Grant; and the sameorders devolved on me the command of the Department and Army of theTennessee. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, D. C. , October 16, 1863

Major-General U. S. GRANT, Louisville. 

GENERAL: You will receive herewith the orders of the President ofthe United States, placing you in command of the Departments of theOhio, Cumberland, and Tennessee. The organization of thesedepartments will be changed as you may deem most practicable. Youwill immediately proceed to Chattanooga, and relieve GeneralRosecrans. You can communicate with Generals Burnside and Shermanby telegraph. A summary of the orders sent to these officers willbe sent to you immediately. It is left optional with you tosupersede General Rosecrans by General G. H. Thomas or not. Anyother changes will be made on your request by telegram. 

One of the first objects requiring your attention is the supply ofyour armies. Another is the security of the passes in the Georgiamountains, to shut out the enemy from Tennessee and Kentucky. Youwill consult with General Meigs and Colonel Scott in regard totransportation and supplies. 

Should circumstances permit, I will visit you personally in a fewdays for consultation. 

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, D. C. , October 20, 1868. 

Major-General GRANT, Louisville. 

GENERAL: In compliance with my promise, I now proceed to give youa brief statement of the objects aimed at by General Rosecrans andGeneral Burnside's movement into East Tennessee, and of themeasures directed to be taken to attain these objects. 

It has been the constant desire of the government, from thebeginning of the war, to rescue the loyal inhabitants of EastTennessee from the hands of the rebels, who fully appreciated theimportance of continuing their hold upon that country. In additionto the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the uppervalley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and othermaterials from the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possession of EastTennessee would cut off one of their most important railroadcommunications, and threaten their manufactories at Rome, Atlanta, etc. 

When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of1882, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected; but Bragg reachedthere before Buell, and, by threatening his communications, forcedhim to retreat on Nashville and Louisville. Again, after thebattle of Perryville, General Buell was urged to pursue Bragg'sdefeated army, and drive it from East Tennessee. The same wasurged upon his successor, but the lateness of the season or othercauses prevented further operations after the battle of StoneRiver. 

Last spring, when your movements on the Mississippi River had drawnout of Tennessee a large force of the enemy, I again urged GeneralRosecrans to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out hisprojected plan of campaign, General Burnside being ready tocooperate, with a diminished but still efficient force. But hecould not be persuaded to act in time, preferring to lie still tillyour campaign should be terminated. I represented to him, butwithout avail, that by this delay Johnston might be able toreenforce Bragg with the troops then operating against you. 

When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he wasallowed to select his own lines and plans for carrying out theobjects of the expedition. He was directed, however, to report hismovements daily, till he crossed the Tennessee, and to connect hisleft, so far as possible, with General Burnside's right. GeneralBurnside was directed to move simultaneously, connecting his right, as far as possible, with General Rosecrans's left so that, if theenemy concentrated upon either army, the other could move to itsassistance. When General Burnside reached Kingston and Knoxville, and found no considerable number of the enemy in East Tennessee, hewas instructed to move down the river and cooperate with GeneralRosecrans. 

These instructions were repeated some fifteen times, but were notcarried out, General Burnside alleging as an excuse that hebelieved that Bragg was in retreat, and that General Rosecransneeded no reenforcements. When the latter had gained possession ofChattanooga he was directed not to move on Rome as he proposed, butsimply to hold the mountain-passes, so as to prevent the ingress ofthe rebels into East Tennessee. That object accomplished, Iconsidered the campaign as ended, at least for the present. Futureoperations would depend upon the ascertained strength and;movements of the enemy. In other words, the main objects of thecampaign were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, andby holding the two extremities of the valley to secure it fromrebel invasion. 

The moment I received reliable information of the departure ofLongstreet's corps from the Army of the Potomac, I ordered forwardto General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of theOhio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance. I also telegraphed to Generals Hurlbut, Sherman, and yourself, tosend forward all available troops in your department. If theseforces had been sent to General Rosecrans by Nashville, they couldnot have been supplied; I therefore directed them to move byCorinth and the Tennessee River. The necessity of this has beenproved by the fact that the reinforcements sent to him from theArmy of the Potomac have not been able, for the want of railroadtransportation, to reach General Rosecrans's army in the field. 

In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it isbelieved that General Rosecrans when he first moved against Bragghad double, if not treble, his force. General Burnside, also, hadmore than double the force of Buckner; and, even when Bragg andBuckner united, Rosecrans's army was very greatly superior innumber. Even the eighteen thousand men sent from Virginia, underLongstreet, would not have given the enemy the superiority. It isnow ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners parolled byyou at Vicksburg, and General Banks at Port Hudson, were illegallyand improperly declared exchanged, and forced into the ranks toswell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga. This outrageous act, inviolation of the laws of war, of the cartel entered into by therebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a usefullesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we arecontending. He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare, noreven his most solemn engagements. You may, therefore, expect tomeet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners released by you andothers on parole, not to serve again till duly exchanged. 

Although the enemy by this disgraceful means has been able toconcentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than weanticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him. Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means ofsupplying them at this season of the year. A single-track railroadcan supply an army of sixty or seventy thousand men, with the usualnumber of cavalry and artillery; but beyond that number, or with alarge mounted force, the difficulty of supply is very great. 

I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville toDecatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that trianglewill be of great assistance to you. I hope, also, that the recentrise of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enableyou to employ water transportation to Nashville, Eastport, orFlorence. 

If you reoccupy the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should neverhave been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and riverfrom Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vitalimportance, and should receive your early attention. 

I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fullyunderstanding the objects of the campaign, and the means ofattaining these objects. Probably the Secretary of War, in hisinterviews with you at Louisville, has gone over the same ground. Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existingcircumstances, you will receive all possible assistance from theauthorities at Washington. You have never, heretofore, complainedthat such assistance has not been afforded you in your operations, and I think you will have no cause of complaint in your presentcampaign. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief

General Frank P. Blair, who was then ahead with the two divisionsof Osterhaus and John E. Smith, was temporarily assigned to thecommand of the Fifteenth Corps. General Hurlbut remained atMemphis in command of the Sixteenth Corps, and General McPherson atVicksburg with the Seventeenth. These three corps made up the Armyof the Tennessee. I was still busy in pushing forward the repairsto the railroad bridge at Bear Creek, and in patching up the manybreaks between it and Tuscumbia, when on the 27th of October, as Isat on the porch of a house, I was approached by a dirty, black-haired individual with mixed dress and strange demeanor, whoinquired for me, and, on being assured that I was in fact the man, he handed me a letter from General Blair at Tuscumbia, and anothershort one, which was a telegraph-message from General Grant atChattanooga, addressed to me through General George Crook, commanding at Huntsville, Alabama, to this effect:

Drop all work on Memphis & Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennesseeand hurry eastward with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport, till you meet further orders from me. 

U. S. GRANT. 

The bearer of this message was Corporal Pike, who described to me, in his peculiar way, that General Crook had sent him in a canoe;that he had paddled down the Tennessee River, over Muscle Shoals, was fired at all the way by guerrillas, but on reaching Tuscumbiahe had providentially found it in possession of our troops. He hadreported to General Blair, who sent him on to me at Iuka. ThisPike proved to be a singular character; his manner attracted mynotice at once, and I got him a horse, and had him travel with useastward to about Elkton, whence I sent him back to General Crookat Huntsville; but told him, if I could ever do him a personalservice, he might apply to me. The next spring when I was inChattanooga, preparing for the Atlanta campaign, Corporal Pike madehis appearance and asked a fulfillment of my promise. I inquiredwhat he wanted, and he said he wanted to do something bold, something that would make him a hero. I explained to him, that wewere getting ready to go for Joe Johnston at Dalton, that Iexpected to be in the neighborhood of Atlanta about the 4th ofJuly, and wanted the bridge across the Savannah River at Augusta, Georgia, to be burnt about that time, to produce alarm andconfusion behind the rebel army. I explained to Pike that thechances were three to one that he would be caught and hanged; butthe greater the danger the greater seemed to be his desire toattempt it. I told him to select a companion, to disguise himselfas an East Tennessee refugee, work his way over the mountains intoNorth Carolina, and at the time appointed to float down theSavannah River and burn that bridge. In a few days he had made hispreparations and took his departure. The bridge was not burnt, andI supposed that Pike had been caught and hanged. 

When we reached Columbia, South Carolina, in February, 1865, justas we were leaving the town, in passing near the asylum, I heard myname called, and saw a very dirty fellow followed by a file of menrunning toward me, and as they got near I recognized Pike. Hecalled to me to identify him as one of my men; he was then aprisoner under guard, and I instructed the guard to bring him thatnight to my camp some fifteen miles up the road, which was done. Pike gave me a graphic narrative of his adventures, which wouldhave filled a volume; told me how he had made two attempts to burnthe bridge, and failed; and said that at the time of our enteringColumbia he was a prisoner in the hands of the rebels, under trialfor his life, but in the confusion of their retreat he made hisescape and got into our lines, where he was again made a prisonerby our troops because of his looks. Pike got some clothes, cleanedup, and I used him afterward to communicate with Wilmington, NorthCarolina. Some time after the war, he was appointed a lieutenantof the Regular, Cavalry, and was killed in Oregon, by theaccidental discharge of a pistol. Just before his death he wroteme, saying that he was tired of the monotony of garrison-life, andwanted to turn Indian, join the Cheyennes on the Plains, who werethen giving us great trouble, and, after he had gained theirconfidence, he would betray them into our hands. Of course I wrotehim that he must try and settle down and become a gentleman as wellas an officer, apply himself to his duties, and forget the wilddesires of his nature, which were well enough in time of war, butnot suited to his new condition as an officer; but, poor fellow Ihe was killed by an accident, which probably saved him from aslower but harder fate. 

At Iuka I issued all the orders to McPherson and Hurlbut necessaryfor the Department of the Tennessee during my absence, and, further, ordered the collection of a force out of the SixteenthCorps, of about eight thousand men, to be commanded by General G. M. Dodge, with orders to follow as far east as Athens, Tennessee, there to await instructions. We instantly discontinued allattempts to repair the Charleston Railroad; and the remaining threedivisions of the Fifteenth Corps marched to Eastport, crossed theTennessee River by the aid of the gunboats, a ferry-boat, and acouple of transports which had come up, and hurried eastward. 

In person I crossed on the 1st of November, and rode forward toFlorence, where I overtook Ewing's division. The other divisionsfollowed rapidly. On the road to Florence I was accompanied by mystaff, some clerks, and mounted orderlies. Major Ezra Taylorwas chief of artillery, and one of his sons was a clerk athead-quarters. The latter seems to have dropped out of the column, and gone to a farm house near the road. There was no organizedforce of the rebel army north of the Tennessee River, but thecountry was full of guerrillas. A party of these pounced down onthe farm, caught young Taylor and another of the clerks, and afterreaching Florence, Major Taylor heard of the capture of his son, andlearned that when last seen he was stripped of his hat and coat, wastied to the tail-board of a wagon, and driven rapidly to the northof the road we had traveled. The major appealed to me to dosomething for his rescue. I had no cavalry to send in pursuit, butknowing that there was always an understanding between theseguerrillas and their friends who staid at home, I sent for three orfour of the principal men of Florence (among them a Mr. Foster, whohad once been a Senator in Congress), explained to them the captureof young Taylor and his comrade, and demanded their immediaterestoration. They, of course, remonstrated, denied all knowledge ofthe acts of these guerrillas, and claimed to be peaceful citizens ofAlabama, residing at home. I insisted that these guerrillas weretheir own sons and neighbors; that they knew their haunts, and couldreach them if they wanted, and they could effect the restoration tous of these men; and I said, moreover, they must do it withintwenty-four hours, or I would take them, strip them of their hatsand coats, and tie them to the tail-boards of our wagons till theywere produced. They sent off messengers at once, and young Taylorand his comrade were brought back the next day. 

Resuming our march eastward by the large road, we soon reached ElkRiver, which was wide and deep, and could only be crossed by aferry, a process entirely too slow for the occasion; so I changedthe route more by the north, to Elkton, Winchester, and Deckerd. At this point we came in communication with the Army of theCumberland, and by telegraph with General Grant, who was atChattanooga. He reiterated his orders for me and my command tohurry forward with all possible dispatch, and in person I reachedBridgeport during the night of November 13th, my troops followingbehind by several roads. At Bridgeport I found a garrison guardingthe railroad-bridge and pontoon bridge there, and staid with thequartermaster, Colonel William G. Le Due (who was my school-mate atHow's School in 1836). There I received a dispatch from GeneralGrant, at Chattanooga, to come up in person, leaving my troops tofollow as fast as possible. At that time there were two or threesmall steamboats on the river, engaged in carrying stores up as faras Kelly's Ferry. In one of these I took passage, and on reachingKelly's Ferry found orderlies, with one of General Grant's privatehorses, waiting for me, on which I rode into Chattanooga, November14th. Of course, I was heartily welcomed by Generals Grant, Thomas, and all, who realized the extraordinary efforts we had madeto come to their relief. The next morning we walked out to FortWood, a prominent salient of the defenses of the place, and fromits parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama. LookoutMountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, andan occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchee or Moccasin Point gavelife to the scene. These shots could barely reach Chattanooga, andI was told that one or more shot had struck a hospital inside thelines. All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebelbeleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward theChickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels, in acontinuous chain, were walking their posts in plain view, not athousand yards off. "Why, " said I, "General Grant, you arebesieged;" and he said, "It is too true. " Up to that moment I hadno idea that things were so bad. The rebel lines actually extendedfrom the river, below the town, to the river above, and the Army ofthe Cumberland was closely held to the town and its immediatedefenses. General Grant pointed out to me a house on MissionaryRidge, where General Bragg's headquarters were known to be. Healso explained the situation of affairs generally; that the mulesand horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could nothaul his guns; that forage, corn, and provisions, were so scarcethat the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were givento favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's army had been sodemoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they couldnot be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive; thatBragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up intoEast Tennessee, to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside wasin danger, etc. ; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious toattack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least to force himto recall Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had so long beenin the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up, to take theoffensive first; after which, he had no doubt the Cumberland armywould fight well. Meantime the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, underGeneral Hooker, had been advanced from Bridgeport along therailroad to Wauhatchee, but could not as yet pass Lookout Mountain. A pontoon-bridge had been thrown across the Tennessee River atBrown's Ferry, by which supplies were hauled into Chattanooga fromKelly's and Wauhatchee.. 

Another bridge was in course of construction at Chattanooga, underthe immediate direction of Quartermaster-General Meigs, but at thetime all wagons, etc. , had to be ferried across by a flying-bridge. Men were busy and hard at work everywhere inside our lines, andboats for another pontoon-bridge were being rapidly constructedunder Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, familiarly known as "BaldySmith, " and this bridge was destined to be used by my troops, at apoint of the river about four miles above Chattanooga, just belowthe mouth of the Chickamauga River. General Grant explained to methat he had reconnoitred the rebel line from Lookout Mountain up toChickamauga, and he believed that the northern portion ofMissionary Ridge was not fortified at all; and he wanted me, assoon as my troops got up, to lay the new pontoon-bridge by night, cross over, and attack Bragg's right flank on that part of theridge abutting on Chickamauga Creek, near the tunnel; and heproposed that we should go at once to look at the ground. Incompany with Generals Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, wecrossed by the flying-bridge, rode back of the hills some fourmiles, left our horses, and got on a hill overlooking the wholeground about the mouth of the Chickamauga River, and across to theMissionary Hills near the tunnel. Smith and I crept down behind afringe of trees that lined the river-bank, to the very pointselected for the new bridge, where we sat for some time, seeing therebel pickets on the opposite bank, and almost hearing their words. 

Having seen enough, we returned to Chattanooga; and in order tohurry up my command, on which so much depended, I started back toKelly's in hopes to catch the steamboat that same evening; but onmy arrival the boat had gone. I applied to the commanding officer, got a rough boat manned by four soldiers, and started down theriver by night. I occasionally took a turn at the oars to relievesome tired man, and about midnight we reached Shell Mound, whereGeneral Whittaker, of Kentucky, furnished us a new and good crew, with which we reached Bridgeport by daylight. I started Ewingsdivision in advance, with orders to turn aside toward Trenton, tomake the enemy believe we were going to turn Braggs left by prettymuch the same road Rosecrans had followed; but with the other threedivisions I followed the main road, via the Big Trestle atWhitesides, and reached General Hooker's headquarters, just aboveWauhatchee, on the 20th; my troops strung all the way back toBridgeport. It was on this occasion that the Fifteenth Corpsgained its peculiar badge: as the men were trudging along thedeeply-cut, muddy road, of a cold, drizzly day, one of our Westernsoldiers left his ranks and joined a party of the Twelfth Corps attheir camp-fire. They got into conversation, the Twelfth-Corps menasking what troops we were, etc. , etc. In turn, our fellow (whohad never seen a corps-badge, and noticed that every thing wasmarked with a star) asked if they were all brigadier-generals. Ofcourse they were not, but the star was their corps-badge, and everywagon, tent, hat, etc. , had its star. Then the Twelfth-Corps meninquired what corps he belonged to, and he answered, "The FifteenthCorps. " "What is your badge?" "Why, " said he (and he was anIrishman), suiting the action to the word, "forty rounds in thecartridge-box, and twenty in the pocket. " At that time Blaircommanded the corps; but Logan succeeded soon after, and, hearingthe story, adopted the cartridge-box and forty rounds as thecorps-badge. 

The condition of the roads was such, and the bridge at Brown's sofrail, that it was not until the 23d that we got three of mydivisions behind the hills near the point indicated aboveChattanooga for crossing the river. It was determined to begin thebattle with these three divisions, aided by a division of Thomas'sarmy, commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, that was already nearthat point. All the details of the battle of Chattanooga, so faras I was a witness, are so fully given in my official reportherewith, that I need add nothing to it. It was a magnificentbattle in its conception, in its execution, and in its gloriousresults; hastened somewhat by the supposed danger of Burnside, atKnoxville, yet so completely successful, that nothing is left forcavil or fault-finding. The first day was lowering and overcast, favoring us greatly, because we wanted to be concealed from Bragg, whose position on the mountain-tops completely overlooked us andour movements. The second day was beautifully clear, and many atime, in the midst of its carnage and noise, I could not helpstopping to look across that vast field of battle, to admire itssublimity. 

The object of General Hooker's and my attacks on the extreme flanksof Bragg's position was, to disturb him to such an extent, thathe would naturally detach from his centre as against us, so thatThomas's army could break through his centre. The whole plansucceeded admirably; but it was not until after dark that I learnedthe complete success at the centre, and received General Grant'sorders to pursue on the north side of Chickamauga Creek:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Nov. 25, 1863

Major-General SHERMAN. 

GENERAL: No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in whichThomas's troops carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and canfeel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under yourcommand in taking first so much of the same range of hills, andthen in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to makeThomas's part certain of success. The neat thing now will be torelieve Burnside. I have heard from him to the evening of the 23d. At that time he had from ten to twelve days' supplies, and spokehopefully of being able to hold out that length of time. 

My plan is to move your forces out gradually until they reach therailroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up thesouth side of the Tennessee with a column of twenty thousand men, taking no wagons, or but few, with him. His men will carry fourdays' rations, and the steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations, will accompany the expedition. 

I take it for granted that Bragg's entire force has left. If not, of course, the first thing is to dispose of him. If he has gone, the only thing necessary to do to-morrow will be to send out areconnoissance to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy. Yourstruly, U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

P. S. -On reflection, I think we will push Bragg with all ourstrength to-morrow, and try if we cannot out off a good portion ofhis rear troops and trains. His men have manifested a strongdisposition to desert for some time past, and we will now give thema chance. I will instruct Thomas accordingly. Move the advanceforce early, on the most easterly road taken by the enemy. U. S. G. 

This compelled me to reverse our column, so as to use the bridgeacross the Chickamauga at its mouth. The next day we struck therebel rear at Chickamauga Station, and again near Graysville. There we came in contact with Hooker's and Palmer's troops, who hadreached Ringgold. There I detached Howard to cross Taylor's Ridge, and strike the railroad which comes from the north by Cleveland toDalton. Hooker's troops were roughly handled at Ringgold, and thepursuit was checked. Receiving a note from General Hooker, askinghelp, I rode forward to Ringgold to explain the movement of Howard;where I met General Grant, and learned that the rebels had againretreated toward Dalton. He gave orders to discontinue thepursuit, as he meant to turn his attention to General Burnside, supposed to be in great danger at Knoxville, about one hundred andthirty miles northeast. General Grant returned and spent part ofthe night with me, at Graysville. We talked over mattersgenerally, and he explained that he had ordered General GordonGranger, with the Fourth Corps, to move forward rapidly toBurnsides help, and that he must return to Chattanooga to push him. By reason of the scarcity of food, especially of forage, heconsented that, instead of going back, I might keep out in thecountry; for in motion I could pick up some forage and food, especially on the Hiawassee River, whereas none remained inChattanooga. 

Accordingly, on the 29th of November, my several columns marched toCleveland, and the next day we reached the Hiawassee at Charleston, where the Chattanooga & Knoxville Railroad crosses it. Therailroad-bridge was partially damaged by the enemy in retreating, but we found some abandoned stores. There and thereabouts Iexpected some rest for my weary troops and horses; but, as I rodeinto town, I met Colonel J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana (AssistantSecretary of War), who had ridden out from Chattanooga to find me, with the following letter from General Grant, and copies of severaldispatches from General Burnside, the last which had been receivedfrom him by way of Cumberland Gap:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, Nov. 29, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN

News are received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. Atthat time the place was still invested, but the attack on it wasnot vigorous. Longstreet evidently determined to starve thegarrison out. Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but Ihave lost all faith in his energy or capacity to manage anexpedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can tothe Hiawassee, and determine for yourself what force to take withyou from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from whichyou will select in conjunction with the force now with you. Inplain words, you will assume command of all the forces now movingup the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from thatforce, organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. Thebalance send back to Chattanooga. Granger has a boat loaded withprovisions, which you can issue, and return the boat. I will haveanother loaded, to follow you. Use, of course, as sparingly aspossible from the rations taken with you, and subsist off thecountry all you can. 

It is expected that Foster is moving, by this time, from CumberlandGap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he will have with him, but presume it will range from three thousand five hundred to fivethousand I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will dobetter acting upon your discretion than you could trammeled withinstructions. I will only add, that the last advices from Burnsidehimself indicated his ability to hold out with rations only toabout the 3d of December. Very respectfully, U. S. GRANT, Major-General commanding, This showed that, on the 27th of November, General Burnside was inKnoxville, closely besieged by the rebel General Longstreet; thathis provisions were short, and that, unless relieved by December3d, he might have to surrender. General Grant further wrote thatGeneral Granger, instead of moving with great rapidity as ordered, seemed to move "slowly, and with reluctance;" and, although he(General Grant) hated to call on me and on my tired troops, therewas no alternative. He wanted me to take command of every thingwithin reach, and to hurry forward to Knoxville. 

All the details of our march to Knoxville are also given in myofficial report. By extraordinary efforts Long's small brigade ofcavalry reached Knoxville during the night of the 3d, purposely tolet Burnside know that I was rapidly approaching with an adequateforce to raise the siege. 

With the head of my infantry column I reached Marysville, aboutfifteen miles short of Knoxville, on the 5th of December; when Ireceived official notice from Burnside that Longstreet had raisedthe siege, and had started in retreat up the valley towardVirginia. Halting all the army, except Granger's two divisions, onthe morning of the 6th, with General Granger and some of my staff Irode into Knoxville. Approaching from the south and west, wecrossed the Holston on a pontoon bridge, and in a large pen on theKnoxville side I saw a fine lot of cattle, which did not look muchlike starvation. I found General Burnside and staff domiciled in alarge, fine mansion, looking very comfortable, and in, a few wordshe described to me the leading events, of the previous few days, and said he had already given orders looking to the pursuit ofLongstreet. I offered to join in the pursuit, though in fact mymen were worn out, and suffering in that cold season and climate. 

Indeed, on our way up I personally was almost frozen, and had tobeg leave to sleep in the house of a family at Athens. 

Burnside explained to me that, reenforced by Granger's twodivisions of ten thousand men, he would be able to push Longstreetout of East Tennessee, and he hoped to capture much of hisartillery and trains. Granger was present at our conversation, andmost unreasonably, I thought, remonstrated against being left;complaining bitterly of what he thought was hard treatment to hismen and himself. I know that his language and manner at that timeproduced on my mind a bad impression, and it was one of the causeswhich led me to relieve him as a corps commander in the campaign ofthe next spring. I asked General Burnside to reduce his wishes towriting, which he did in the letter of December 7th, embodied in myofficial report. General Burnside and I then walked along hislines and examined the salient, known as Fort Sanders, where, somedays before, Longstreet had made his assault, and had sustained abloody repulse. 

Returning to Burnside's quarters, we all sat down to a good dinner, embracing roast-turkey. There was a regular dining table, withclean tablecloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc. , etc. I hadseen nothing of this kind in my field experience, and could nothelp exclaiming that I thought "they were starving, " etc. ; butBurnside explained that Longstreet had at no time completelyinvested the place, and that he had kept open communication withthe country on the south side of the river Holston, more especiallywith the French Broad settlements, from whose Union inhabitants hehad received a good supply of beef, bacon, and corn meal. Had Iknown of this, I should not have hurried my men so fast; but untilI reached Knoxville I thought his troops there were actually indanger of starvation. Having supplied General Burnside all thehelp he wanted, we began our leisurely return to Chattanooga, whichwe reached on the 16th; when General Grant in person ordered me torestore to General Thomas the divisions of Howard and Davis, whichbelonged to his army, and to conduct my own corps (the Fifteenth)to North Alabama for winter-quarters. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF TENNESSEE, BRIDGEPORT, ALABAMA December 19, 1863

Brigadier-General John A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff to General GRANT, Chattanooga. 

GENERAL: For the first time, I am now at leisure to make anofficial record of events with which the troops under my commandhave been connected daring the eventful campaign which has justclosed. Dating the month of September last, the Fifteenth ArmyCorps, which I had the honor to command, lay in camps along the BigBlack, about twenty miles east of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Itconsisted of four divisions:

The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus, wascomposed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-General C. R. Woods andColonel J. A. Williamson (of the Fourth Iowa). 

The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, wascomposed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smithand J. A. J. Lightburn. 

The Third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, wascomposed of three brigades, led by Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mowerand R. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood (of the Twelfth Iowa). 

The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, was composedof three brigades, led by Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, ColonelLoomis (Twenty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. R. Cockerill (of theSeventieth Ohio). 

On the 22d day of September I received a telegraphic dispatch fromGeneral Grant, then at Vicksburg, commanding the Department of theTennessee, requiring me to detach one of my divisions to march toVicksburg, there to embark for Memphis, where it was to form a partof an army to be sent to Chattanooga, to reenforce GeneralRosecrans. I designated the First Division, and at 4 a. M. Thesame day it marched for Vicksburg, and embarked the neat day. 

On the 23d of September I was summoned to Vicksburg by the generalcommanding, who showed me several dispatches from the general-in-chief, which led him to suppose he would have to send me and mywhole corps to Memphis and eastward, and I was instructed toprepare for such orders. It was explained to me that, inconsequence of the low stage of water in the Mississippi, boats hadarrived irregularly, and had brought dispatches that seemed toconflict in their meaning, and that General John E. Smith'sdivision (of General McPherson's corps) had been ordered up toMemphis, and that I should take that division and leave one of myown in its stead, to hold the line of the Big Black. I detailedmy third division (General Tuttle) to remain and report toMajor-General McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth Corps, atVicksburg; and that of General John E. Smith, already started forMemphis, was styled the Third Division, Fifteenth Corps, though itstill belongs to the Seventeenth Army Corps. This division is alsocomposed of three brigades, commanded by General Matthias, ColonelJ. B. Raum (of the Fifty-sixth Illinois), and Colonel J. I. Alexander (of the Fifty-ninth Indiana). 

The Second and Fourth Divisions were started for Vicksburg themoment I was notified that boats were in readiness, and on the27th of September I embarked in person in the steamer Atlantic, for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats conveying thesetwo divisions. Our progress was slow, on account of theunprecedentedly low water in the Mississippi, and the scarcity ofcoal and wood. We were compelled at places to gather fence-rails, and to land wagons and haul wood from the interior to the boats;but I reached Memphis during the night of the 2d of October, andthe other boats came in on the 3d and 4th. 

On arrival at Memphis I saw General Hurlbut, and read all thedispatches and letters of instruction of General Halleck, andtherein derived my instructions, which I construed to be asfollows:

To conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, and all other troops whichcould be spared from the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, to Athens, Alabama, and thence report by letter for orders toGeneral Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, atChattanooga; to follow substantially the railroad eastward, repairing it as I moved; to look to my own line for supplies; andin no event to depend on General Rosecrans for supplies, as theroads to his rear were already overtaxed to supply his presentarmy. 

I learned from General Hurlbut that General Osterhaus's divisionwas already out in front of Corinth, and that General John E. Smithwas still at Memphis, moving his troops and material by railroad asfast as its limited stock would carry them. General J. D. Websterwas superintendent of the railroad, and was enjoined to work nightand day, and to expedite the movement as rapidly as possible; butthe capacity of the road was so small, that I soon saw that I couldmove horses, mules, and wagons faster by land, and therefore Idispatched the artillery and wagons by the road under escort, andfinally moved the entire Fourth Division by land. 

The enemy seems to have had early notice of this movement, and heendeavored to thwart us from the start. A considerable forceassembled in a threatening attitude at Salem, south of SalisburyStation; and General Carr, who commanded at Corinth, felt compelledto turn back and use a part of my troops, that had already reachedCorinth, to resist the threatened attack. 

On Sunday, October 11th, having put in motion my whole force, Istarted myself for Corinth, in a special train, with the battalionof the Thirteenth United States Regulars as escort. We reachedCollierville Station about noon, just in time to take part in thedefense made of that station by Colonel D. C. Anthony, of theSixty-sixth Indiana, against an attack made by General Chalmerswith a force of about three thousand cavalry, with eight pieces ofartillery. He was beaten off, the damage to the road repaired, andwe resumed our journey the next day, reaching Corinth at night. 

I immediately ordered General Blair forward to Iuka, with the FirstDivision, and, as fast as I got troops up, pushed them forward ofBear Creek, the bridge of which was completely destroyed, and anengineer regiment, under command of Colonel Flag, was engaged inits repairs. 

Quite a considerable force of the enemy was assembled in our front, near Tuscumbia, to resist our advance. It was commanded by GeneralStephen D. Lee, and composed of Roddy's and Ferguson's brigades, with irregular cavalry, amounting in the aggregate to about fivethousand. 

In person I moved from Corinth to Burnsville on the 18th, and toIuka on the 19th of October. 

Osterhaus's division was in the advance, constantly skirmishingwith the enemy; he was supported by General Morgan L. Smith's, bothdivisions under the general command of Major-General Blair. General John E. Smith's division covered the working-party engagedin rebuilding the railroad. 

Foreseeing difficulty in crossing the Tennessee River, I hadwritten to Admiral Porter, at Cairo, asking him to watch theTennessee and send up some gunboats the moment the stage of wateradmitted; and had also requested General Allen, quartermaster atSt. Louis, to dispatch to Eastport a steam ferry-boat. 

The admiral, ever prompt and ready to assist us, had two finegunboats at Eastport, under Captain Phelps, the very day after myarrival at Iuka; and Captain Phelps had a coal-barge decked over, with which to cross our horses and wagons before the arrival of theferry-boat. 

Still following literally the instructions of General Halleck, Ipushed forward the repairs of the railroad, and ordered GeneralBlair, with the two leading divisions, to drive the enemy beyondTuscumbia. This he did successfully, after a pretty severe fightat Cane Creek, occupying Tuscumbia on the 27th of October. 

In the meantime many important changes in command had occurred, which I must note here, to a proper understanding of the case. 

General Grant had been called from Vicksburg, and sent toChattanooga to command the military division of the Mississippi, composed of the three Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, andTennessee; and the Department of the Tennessee had been devolved onme, with instructions, however, to retain command of the army inthe field. At Iuka I made what appeared to me the best dispositionof matters relating to the department, giving General McPhersonfull powers in Mississippi and General Hurlbut in West Tennessee, and assigned General Blair to the command of the Fifteenth ArmyCorps; and summoned General Hurlbut from Memphis, and General Dodgefrom Corinth, and selected out of the Sixteenth Corps a force ofabout eight thousand men, which I directed General Dodge toorganize with all expedition, and with it to follow me eastward. 

On the 27th of October, when General Blair, with two divisions, wasat Tuscumbia, I ordered General Ewing, with the Fourth Division, tocross the Tennessee (by means of the gunboats and scow) as rapidlyas possible at Eastport, and push forward to Florence, which hedid; and the same day a messenger from General Grant floated downthe Tennessee over Muscle Shoals, landed at Tuscumbia, and was sentto me at Iuka. He bore a short message from the general to thiseffect: "Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek; pushyour command toward Bridgeport till you meet orders;" etc. Instantly the order was executed; the order of march was reversed, and all the columns were directed to Eastport, the only place wherewe could cross the Tennessee. At first we only had the gunboatsand coal-barge; but the ferry-boat and two transports arrived onthe 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with allthe vigor possible. In person I crossed, and passed to the head ofthe column at Florence on the 1st of November, leaving the reardivisions to be conducted by General Blair, and marched toRogersville and Elk River. This was found impassable. To ferrywould have consumed to much time, and to build a bridge still more;so there was no alternative but to turn up Elk River by way ofGilbertsboro, Elkton, etc. , to the stone bridge at Fayetteville, where we crossed the Elk, and proceeded to Winchester and Deckerd. 

At Fayetteville I received orders from General Grant to come toBridgeport with the Fifteenth Army Corps, and to leave GeneralDodge's command at Pulaski, and along the railroad from Columbia toDecatur. I instructed General Blair to follow with the Second andFirst Divisions by way of New Market, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte, while I conducted the other two divisions by way of Deckerd; theFourth Division crossing the mountain to Stevenson, and the Thirdby University Place and Sweden's Cove. 

In person I proceeded by Sweden's Cove and Battle Creek, reachingBridgeport on the night of November 13th. I immediatelytelegraphed to the commanding general my arrival, and the positionsof my several divisions, and was summoned to Chattanooga. I tookthe first steamboat daring the night of the 14th for Belly's Ferry, and rode into Chattanooga on the 16th. I then learned the partassigned me in the coming drama, was supplied with the necessarymaps and information, and rode, during the 18th, in company withGenerals Grant, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan, and others, to thepositions occupied on the west bank of the Tennessee, from whichcould be seen the camps of the enemy, compassing Chattanooga andthe line of Missionary Hills, with its terminus on ChickamaugaCreek, the point that I was expected to take, hold, and fortify. Pontoons, with a full supply of balks and chesses, had beenprepared for the bridge over the Tennessee, and all things had beenprearranged with a foresight that elicited my admiration. From thehills we looked down on the amphitheatre of Chattanooga as on amap, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in thedesired position. The plan contemplated that, in addition tocrossing the Tennessee River and making a lodgment on the terminusof Missionary Ridge, I should demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton, with a part of my command. 

All in Chattanooga were impatient for action, rendered almost acuteby the natural apprehensions felt for the safety of GeneralBurnside in East Tennessee. 

My command had marched from Memphis, three hundred and thirtymiles, and I had pushed them as fast as the roads and distancewould admit, but I saw enough of the condition of men and animalsin Chattanooga to inspire me with renewed energy. I immediatelyordered my leading division (General Ewing's) to march viaShellmound to Trenton, demonstrating against Lookout Ridge, but tobe prepared to turn quickly and follow me to Chattanooga and inperson I returned to Bridgeport, rowing a boat down the Tennesseefrom Belly's Ferry, and immediately on arrival put in motion mydivisions in the order in which they had arrived. The bridge ofboats at Bridgeport was frail, and, though used day and night, ourpassage was slow; and the road thence to Chattanooga was dreadfullycut up and encumbered with the wagons of the other troops stationedalong the road. I reached General Hooker's headquarters during arain, in the afternoon of the 20th, and met General Grant's ordersfor the general attack on the next day. It was simply impossiblefor me to fulfill my part in time; only one division (General JohnE. Smith's) was in position. General Ewing was still at Trenton, and the other two were toiling along the terrible road fromShellmound to Chattanooga. No troops ever were or could be inbetter condition than mine, or who labored harder to fulfill theirpart. On a proper representation, General Grant postponed theattack. On the 21st I got the Second Division over Brown's-FerryBridge, and General Ewing got up; but the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred which no human sagacity could prevent. Alllabored night and day, and General Ewing got over on the 23d; butmy rear division was cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry, and could not join me. I offered to go into action with my threedivisions, supported by General Jeff. C. Davis, leaving one of mybest divisions (Osterhaus's) to act with General Hooker againstLookout Mountain. That division has not joined me yet, but I knowand feel that it has served the country well, and that it hasreflected honor on the Fifteenth Army Corps and the Army of theTennessee. I leave the record of its history to General Hooker, orwhomsoever has had its services during the late memorable events, confident that all will do it merited honor. 

At last, on the 28d of November, my three divisions lay behind thehills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga. I dispatched thebrigade of the Second Division, commanded by General Giles A. Smith, under cover of the hills, to North Chickamauga Creek, to manthe boats designed for the pontoon-bridge, with orders (atmidnight) to drop down silently to a point above the mouth of theSouth Chickamauga, there land two regiments, who were to move alongthe river-bank quietly, and capture the enemy's river-pickets. 

General Giles A. Smith then was to drop rapidly below the month ofthe Chickamauga, disembark the rest of his brigade, and dispatchthe boats across for fresh loads. These orders were skillfullyexecuted, and every rebel picket but one was captured. The balanceof General Morgan L. Smith's division was then rapidly ferriedacross; that of General John E. Smith followed, and by daylight ofNovember 24th two divisions of about eight thousand men were on theeast bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a very respectablerifle-trench as a tete du pont. As soon as the day dawned, some ofthe boats were taken from the use of ferrying, and a pontoon-bridgewas begun, under the immediate direction of Captain Dresser, thewhole planned and supervised by General William F. Smith in person. A pontoon-bridge was also built at the same time over ChickamangaCreek, near its mouth, giving communication with the two regimentswhich had been left on the north side, and fulfilling a mostimportant purpose at a later stage of the drama. I will here bearmy willing testimony to the completeness of this whole business. All the officers charged with the work were present, and manifesteda skill which I cannot praise too highly. I have never beheld anywork done so quietly, so well; and I doubt if the history of warcan show a bridge of that extent (viz. , thirteen hundred and fiftyfeet) laid so noiselessly and well, in so short a time. Iattribute it to the genius and intelligence of General William F. Smith. The steamer Dunbar arrived up in the course of the morning, and relieved Ewing's division of the labor of rowing across; but bynoon the pontoon-bridge was done, and my three divisions wereacross, with men, horses, artillery, and every thing. 

General Jeff. C. Davis's division was ready to take the bridge, andI ordered the columns to form in order to carry the MissionaryHills. The movement had been carefully explained to all divisioncommanders, and at 1 p. M. We marched from the river in threecolumns in echelon: the left, General Morgan L. Smith, the columnof direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; thecentre, General, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre, at one brigade interval to the right and rear; the right, GeneralEwing, in column at the same distance to the right rear, preparedto deploy to the right, on the supposition that we would meet anenemy in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a goodline of skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rainprevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking our movement from theenemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon gainedthe foothills; our skirmishers crept up the face of the hills, followed by their supports, and at 3. 30 p. M. We had gained, with noloss, the desired point. A brigade of each division was pushedrapidly to the top of the hill, and the enemy for the first timeseemed to realize the movement, but too late, for we were inpossession. He opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon gotsome of Captain Richardson's guns up that steep hill and gave backartillery, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectualdashes at General Lightburn, who had swept round and got a fartherhill, which was the real continuation of the ridge. From studyingall the maps, I had inferred that Missionary Ridge was a continuoushill; but we found ourselves on two high points, with a deepdepression between us and the one immediately over the tunnel, which was my chief objective point. The ground we had gained, however, was so important, that I could leave nothing to chance, and ordered it to be fortified during the night. One brigade ofeach division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing'sright was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge ina general line, facing southeast. 

The enemy felt our left flank about 4 p. M. , and a pretty smartengagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off; butit cost us dear, for General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and had to go to the rear; and the command of the brigade devolvedon Colonel Topper (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois), who managedit with skill during the rest of the operations. At the moment ofmy crossing the bridge, General Howard appeared, having come withthree regiments from Chattanooga, along the east bank of theTennessee, connecting my new position with that of the main army inChattanooga. He left the three regiments attached temporarily toGen. Ewing's right, and returned to his own corps at Chattanooga. As night closed in, I ordered General Jeff. C. Davis to keep one ofhis brigades at the bridge, one close up to my position, and oneintermediate. Thus we passed the night, heavy details being keptbusy at work on the intrenchments on the hill. During the nightthe sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and ourcamp-fires revealed to the enemy and to our friends in Chattanoogaour position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight I received, atthe hands of Major Rowley (of General Grant's staff), orders toattack the enemy at "dawn of day, " with notice that General Thomaswould attack in force early in the day. Accordingly, before day Iwas in the saddle, attended by all my staff; rode to the extremeleft of our position near Chickamauga Creek; thence up the hill, held by General Lightburn; and round to the extreme right ofGeneral Ewing. 

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as possible by the dimlight of morning, I saw that our line of attack was in thedirection of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on eitherflank. Quite a valley lay between us and the next hill of theseries, and this hill presented steep sides, the one to the westpartially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest. The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The farther point ofthis hill was held-by the enemy with a breastwork of logs and freshearth, filled with men and two guns. The enemy was also seen ingreat force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, from which hehad a fine plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorgebetween, through which several roads and the railroad-tunnel pass, could not be seen from our position, but formed the natural placed'armes, where the enemy covered his masses to resist ourcontemplated movement of turning his right flank and endangeringhis communications with his depot at Chickamauga Station. 

As soon as possible, the following dispositions were made: Thebrigades of Colonels Cockrell and Alexander, and General Lightburn, were to hold our hill as the key-point. General Corse, with asmuch of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was toattack from our right centre. General Lightburn was to dispatch agood regiment from his position to cooperate with General Corse;and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base ofMissionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse; and ColonelLoomis, in like manner, to move along the west bank, supported bythe two reserve brigades of General John E. Smith. 

The sun had hardly risen before General Corse had completed hispreparations and his bugle sounded the "forward!" The FortiethIllinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on our right centre, with the Thirtieth Ohio (Colonel Jones), moved down the face of ourhill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to withinabout eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corsefound a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this pointhe called his reserves, and asked for reenforcements, which weresent; but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd themen, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approachto his position, giving him great advantage. As soon as GeneralCorse had made his preparations, he assaulted, and a close, severecontest ensued, which lasted more than an hour, gaining and losingground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemyin vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith keptgaining ground on the left spurs of Missionary Ridge, and ColonelLoomis got abreast of the tunnel and railroad embankment on hisaide, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving theassaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Callender had four ofhis guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Woods his Napoleonbattery on General Lightburn's; also, two guns of Dillon's batterywere with Colonel Alexander's brigade. All directed their fire ascarefully as possible, to clear the hill to our front, withoutendangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about 10 a. M. , when General Corse received a severe wound, was brought off thefield, and the command of the brigade and of the assault at thatkey-point devolved on that fine young, gallant officer, ColonelWalcutt, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who fulfilled his part manfully. He continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. ColonelLoomis had made good progress to the right, and about 2 p. M. , General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be most severe on thehill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered upColonel Raum's and General Matthias's brigades across the field tothe summit that was being fought for. They moved up under a heavyfire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Walcutt; but thecrest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face ofthe hill. The enemy, at the time being massed in great strength inthe tunnel-gorge, moved a large force under cover of the ground andthe thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right rear of thiscommand. The suddenness of the attack disconcerted the men, exposed as they were in the open field; they fell back in somedisorder to the lower edge of the field, and reformed. These twobrigades were in the nature of supports, and did not constitute apart of the real attack. 

The movement, seen from Chattanooga (five miles off ) withspy-glasses, gave rise to the report, which even General Meiga hasrepeated, that we were repulsed on the left. It was not so. Thereal attacking columns of General Corse, Colonel Loomis, andGeneral Smith, were not repulsed. They engaged in a close struggleall day persistently, stubbornly, and well. When the two reservebrigades of General John E. Smith fell back as described, the enemymade a show of pursuit, but were in their turn caught in flank bythe well-directed fire of our brigade on the wooded crest, andhastily sought cover behind the hill. Thus matters stood about 3p. M. The day was bright and clear, and the amphitheatre ofChattanooga sat in beauty at our feet. I had watched for theattack of General Thomas "early in the day. " Column after columnof the enemy was streaming toward me; gun after gun poured itsconcentric shot on us, from every hill and spur that gave a view ofany part of the ground held by us. An occasional shot from FortWood and Orchard Knob, and some musketry-fire and artillery overabout Lookout Mountain, was all that I could detect on our side;but about 3 p. M. I noticed the white line of musketry-fire infront of Orchard Knoll extending farther and farther right and leftand on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough wasseen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on thecentre. I knew that our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemyto our flank, and felt sure of the result. Some guns which hadbeen firing on us all day were silent, or were turned in adifferent direction. 

The advancing line of musketry-fire from Orchard Knoll disappearedto us behind a spar of the hill, and could no longer be seen; andit was not until night closed in that I knew that the troops inChattanooga had swept across Missionary Ridge and broken theenemy's centre. Of course, the victory was won, and pursuit wasthe next step. 

I ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel to the tunnel, and it wasfound vacant, save by the dead and wounded of our own and the enemycommingled. The reserve of General Jeff. C. Davis was ordered tomarch at once by the pontoon-bridge across Chickamauga Creek, atits mouth, and push forward for the depot. 

General Howard had reported to me in the early part of the day, with the remainder of his army corps (the Eleventh), and had beenposted to connect my left with Chickamauga Creek. He was orderedto repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow General Davis at 4 a. M. , and the Fifteenth Army Corpswas ordered to follow at daylight. But General Howard found thatto repair the bridge was more of a task than was at first supposed, and we were all compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the newpontoon-bridge at its mouth. By about 11 a. M. General Jeff. C. Davis's division reached the depot, just in time to see it inflames. He found the enemy occupying two hills, partiallyintrenched, just beyond the depot. These he soon drove away. The depot presented a scene of desolation that war alone exhibits--corn-meal and corn in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandonedcaissons, two thirty-two-pounder rifled-guns with carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks and chesses, etc. , destined doubtless forthe famous invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, burningand broken. Still, the enemy kindly left us a good supply of foragefor our horses, and meal, beans, etc. , for our men. 

Pausing but a short while, we passed on, the road filled withbroken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the headof the column emerged from a dark, miry swamp, we encountered therear-guard of the retreating enemy. The fight was sharp, but thenight closed in so dark that we could not move. General Grant cameup to us there. At daylight we resumed the march, and atGraysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, we foundthe corps of General Palmer on the south bank, who informed us thatGeneral Hooker was on a road still farther south, and we could hearhis guns near Ringgold. 

As the roads were filled with all the troops they could possiblyaccommodate, I turned to the east, to fulfill another part of thegeneral plan, viz. , to break up all communication between Bragg andLongstreet. 

We had all sorts of rumors as to the latter, but it was manifestthat we should interpose a proper force between these two armies. I therefore directed General Howard to move to Parker's Gap, andthence send rapidly a competent force to Red Clay, or theCouncil-Ground, there to destroy a large section of the railroadwhich connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was mostsuccessfully and fully accomplished that day. The division ofGeneral Jeff. C. Davis was moved close up to Ringgold, to assistGeneral Hooker if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps was held atGrayeville, for any thing that might turn up. About noon I had amessage from General Hooker, saying he had had a pretty hard fightat the mountain-pass just beyond Ringgold, and he wanted me to comeforward to turn the position. He was not aware at the time thatHoward, by moving through Parker's Gap toward Red Clay, had alreadyturned it. So I rode forward to Ringgold in person, and found theenemy had already fallen back to Tunnel Hill. He was already outof the valley of the Chickamauga, and on ground whence the watersflow to the Coosa. He was out of Tennessee. 

I found General Grant at Ringgold, and, after some explanations asto breaking up the railroad from Ringgold back to the State line, as soon as some cars loaded with wounded men could be pushed backto Chickamauga depot, I was ordered to move slowly and leisurelyback to Chattanooga. 

On the following day the Fifteenth Corps destroyed absolutely andeffectually the railroad from a point half-way between Ringgold andGraysville, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming toGraysville, consented that, instead of returning direct toChattanooga, I might send back all my artillery-wagons andimpediments, and make a circuit by the north as far as theHiawasaee River. 

Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard movedfrom Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel'sGap, and General Blair with two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps byway of Julien's Gap, all meeting at Cleveland that night. Hereanother good break was made in the Dalton & Cleveland road. On the30th the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching sorapidly that the enemy evacuated with haste, leaving the bridge butpartially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions onthe north bank of the Hiawassee. 

This was to have been the limit of our operations. Officers andmen had brought no baggage or provisions, and the weather wasbitter cold. I had already reached the town of Charleston, whenGeneral Wilson arrived with a letter from General Grant, atChattanooga, informing me that the latest authentic accounts fromKnoxville were to the 27th, at which time General Burnside wascompletely invested, and had provisions only to include the 3d ofDecember; that General Granger had left Chattanooga for Knoxville, by the river-road, with a steamboat following him in the river; buthe feared that General Granger could not reach Knoxville in time, and ordered me to take command of all troops moving for the reliefof Knoxville, and hasten to General Burnside. Seven days before, we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with twodays' rations, without a change of clothing--stripped for thefight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself tothe private included. 

Of course, we then had no provisions save what we gathered by theroad, and were ill supplied for such a march. But we learned thattwelve thousand of our fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in themountain town of Knoxville, eighty-four miles distant; that theyneeded relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough--and it had to be done. General Howard that night repaired andplanked the railroad-bridge, and at daylight the army passed overthe Hiawassee and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. I had supposedrightly that General Granger was about the mouth of the Hiawassee, and had sent him notice of my orders; that General Grant had sentme a copy of his written instructions, which were full andcomplete, and that he must push for Kingston, near which we wouldmake a junction. But by the time I reached Athens I had betterstudied the geography, and sent him orders, which found him atDecatur, that Kingston was out of our way; that he should send hisboat to Kingston, but with his command strike across toPhiladelphia, and report to me there. I had but a small force ofcavalry, which was, at the time of my receipt of General Grant'sorders, scouting over about Benton and Columbus. I left my aide, Major McCoy, at Charleston, to communicate with this cavalry andhurry it forward. It overtook me in the night at Athens. 

On the 2d of December the army moved rapidly north toward Loudon, twenty-six miles distant. About 11 a. M. , the cavalry passed to thehead of the column, was ordered to push to London, and, ifpossible, to save a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, held by abrigade of the enemy commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalrymoved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but thebrigade of Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks, and displayed a force too respectable to be carried by a cavalrydash, so that darkness closed in before General Howard's infantrygot up. The enemy abandoned the place in the night, destroying thepontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into theTennessee River, and abandoned much provision, four guns, and othermaterial, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridgewas gone, and we were forced to turn east and trust to GeneralBurnside's bridge at Knoxville. It was all-important that GeneralBurnside should have notice of our coming, and but one day of thetime remained. 

Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of the 2d ofDecember, I sent my aide (Major Audenried) forward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry at London, to explain to him howall-important it was that notice of our approach should reachGeneral Burnside within twenty-four hours, ordering him to selectthe best materials of his command, to start at once, ford theLittle Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of lifeand horse-flesh. Major Audenried was ordered to go along. Thedistance to be traveled was about forty miles, and the roadsvillainous. Before day they were off, and at daylight theFifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia for the LittleTennessee at Morgantown, where my maps represented the river asbeing very shallow; but it was found too deep for fording, and thewater was freezing cold--width two hundred and forty yards, depthfrom two to five feet; horses could ford, but artillery and mencould not. A bridge was indispensable. General Wilson (whoaccompanied me) undertook to superintend the bridge, and I am undermany obligations to him, as I was without an engineer, having sentCaptain Jenny back from Graysville to survey our field of battle. We had our pioneers, but only such tools as axes, picks, andspades. General Wilson, working partly with cut wood and partlywith square trestles (made of the houses of the late town ofMorgantown), progressed apace, and by dark of December 4th troopsand animals passed over the bridge, and by daybreak of the 5th theFifteenth Corps (General Blair's) was over, and Generals-Granger'sand Davis's divisions were ready to pass; but the diagonal bracingwas imperfect for, want of spikes, and the bridge broke, causingdelay. I had ordered General Blair to move out on the Marysvilleroad five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was ona parallel road abreast of him, and in person I was at a housewhere the roads parted, when a messenger rode up, bringing me a fewwords from General Burnside, to the effect that Colonel Long hadarrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and that all was well withhim there; Longstreet still lay before the place, but there weresymptoms of his speedy departure. 

I felt that I had accomplished the first great step in the problemfor the relief of General Burnside's army, but still urged on thework. As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops movedforward. General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found apretty good ford for his horses and wagons at Davis's, seven milesbelow Morgantown, and had made an ingenious bridge of the wagonsleft by General Vaughn at London, on which to pass his men. Hemarched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th all theheads of columns communicated at Marysville, where I met Major VanBuren (of General Burnside's staff), who announced that Longstreethad the night before retreated on the Rutledge, Rogersville, andBristol road, leading to Virginia; that General Burnside's cavalrywas on his heels; and that the general desired to see me in personas soon as I could come to Knoxville. I ordered all the troops tohalt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, whichwere ordered to move forward to Little River, and General Grangerto report in person to General Burnside for orders. His was theforce originally designed to reenforce General Burnside, and it waseminently proper that it should join in the stern-chase afterLongstreet. 

On the morning of December 6th I rode from Marysville intoKnoxville, and met General Burnside. General Granger arrived laterin the day. We examined his lines of fortifications, which were awonderful production for the short time allowed in their selectionof ground and construction of work. It seemed to me that they werenearly impregnable. We examined the redoubt named "Sanders, "where, on the Sunday previous, three brigades of the enemy hadassaulted and met a bloody repulse. Now, all was peaceful andquiet; but a few hours before, the deadly bullet sought its victimall round about that hilly barrier. 

The general explained to me fully and frankly what he had done, andwhat he proposed to do. He asked of me nothing but GeneralGranger's command; and suggested, in view of the large force I hadbrought from Chattanooga, that I should return with due expeditionto the line of the Hiawasaee, lest Bragg, reenforced, might takeadvantage of our absence to resume the offensive. I asked him toreduce this to writing, which he did, and I here introduce it aspart of my report:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE OHIOKNOXVILLE, December 7, 1863

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding, etc. 

GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command my most heartythanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our reliefduring the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied your approachserved to raise the siege. The emergency having passed, I do notdeem, for the present, any other portion of your command but thecorps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section;and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediatelywith him in order to relieve us (thereby rendering the position ofGeneral Thomas less secure), I deem it advisable that all thetroops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, shouldreturn at once to within supporting distance of the forces in frontof Bragg's army. In behalf of my command, I desire again to thankyou and your command for the kindness you have done us. 

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General commanding. 

Accordingly, having seen General Burnside's forces move out ofKnoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in, I put in motion my own command to return. General Howard wasordered to move, via Davis's Ford and Sweetwater, to Athena, with aguard forward at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge whichthe enemy had retaken after our passage up. General Jeff. C. Davis moved to Columbus, on the Hiawaesee, via Madisonville, andthe two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Tellico Plains, to cover movement of cavalry across the mountains into Georgia, toovertake a wagon-train which had dodged us on our way up, and hadescaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report from GeneralHoward that the enemy held Charleston, I diverted General Ewing'sdivision to Athena, and went in person to Tellico with GeneralMorgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th all our troops were inposition, and we held the rich country between the Little Tennesseeand the Hiawasaee. The cavalry, under Colonel Long, passed themountain at Tellico, and proceeded about seventeen miles beyondMurphy, when Colonel Long, deeming his farther pursuit of thewagon-train useless, returned on the 12th to Tellico. I thenordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move toCharleston, to which point I had previously ordered the corps ofGeneral Howard. 

On the 14th of December all of my command in the field lay alongthe Hiawassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actualstate of affairs, I received orders to leave, on the line of theHiawassee, all the cavalry, and come to Chattanooga with the restof my command. I left the brigade of cavalry commanded by ColonelLong, reenforced by the Fifth Ohio Cavalry (Lieutenant-ColonelHeath)--the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth ArmyCorps--at Charleston, and with the remainder moved by easy marches, by Cleveland and Tyner's Depot, into Chattanooga, where I receivedin person from General Grant orders to transfer back to theirappropriate commands the corps of General Howard and the divisioncommanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, and to conduct the FifteenthArmy Corps to its new field of operations. 

It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion sinceour departure from the Big Black, in Mississippi, until the presentmoment. I have been unable to receive from subordinate commandersthe usual full, detailed reports of events, and have therefore beencompelled to make up this report from my own personal memory; but, as soon as possible, subordinate reports will be received and dulyforwarded. 

In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to the men of my commandfor the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and menhave displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp. For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur. Without a moment's rest after a march of overfour hundred miles, without sleep for three successive nights, wecrossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle ofChattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turnedmore than a hundred and twenty miles north and compelled Longstreetto raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to thewhole country. It is hard to realize the importance of theseevents without recalling the memory of the general feeling whichpervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannotspeak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity; but asI am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better bodyof soldiers in America than it. I wish all to feel a just pride inits real honors. 

To General Howard and his command, to General Jeff. C. Davis andhis, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence ofcommanders and fidelity of commands. The brigade of ColonelBushbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first tocome out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill, inconnection with General Ewing's division, and displayed a couragealmost amounting to rashness. Following the enemy almost to thetunnel-gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among themLieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier. 

In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christiangentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalric traits of thesoldier. General Davis handled his division with artistic skill, more especially at the moment we encountered the enemy'srear-guard, near Graysville, at nightfall. I must award to thisdivision the credit of the best order during our movement throughEast Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging tothe right and left gave some reason for disordered ranks:

Inasmuch as exception may be taken to my explanation of thetemporary confusion, during the battle of Chattanooga, of the twobrigades of General Matthias and Colonel Raum, I will here statethat I saw the whole; and attach no blame to any one. Accidentswill happen in battle, as elsewhere; and at the point where they somanfully went to relieve the pressure on other parts of ourassaulting line, they exposed themselves unconsciously to an enemyvastly superior in force, and favored by the shape of the ground. Had that enemy come out on equal terms, those brigades would haveshown their mettle, which has been tried more than once before andstood the test of fire. They reformed their ranks, and were readyto support General Ewing's division in a very few minutes; and thecircumstance would have hardly called for notice on my part, hadnot others reported what was seen from Chattanooga, a distance ofnearly five miles, from where could only be seen the troops in theopen field in which this affair occurred. 

I now subjoin the best report of casualties I am able to compilefrom the records thus far received:

Killed; Wounded; and Missing............... 1949

No report from General Davis's division, but loss is small. 

Among the killed were some of our most valuable officers: ColonelsPutnam, Ninety-third Illinois; O'Meara, Ninetieth Illinois; andTorrence, Thirtieth Iowa; Lieutenant-Colonel-Taft, of the EleventhCorps; and Major Bushnell, Thirteenth Illinois. 

Among the wounded are Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, Corse, andMatthias; Colonel Raum; Colonel Waugelin, Twelfth Missouri;Lieutenant-Colonel Partridge, Thirteenth Illinois; Major P. I. Welsh, Fifty-sixth Illinois; and Major Nathan McAlla, Tenth Iowa. 

Among the missing is Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa. 

My report is already so long, that I must forbear mentioning actsof individual merit. These will be recorded in the reports ofdivision commanders, which I will cheerfully indorse; but I mustsay that it is but justice that colonels of regiments, who have solong and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with somuch usefulness and credit to the public service, viz. : Colonel J. R. Cockerell, Seventieth, Ohio; Colonel J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixthIllinois; Colonel C. C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel J. A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa; Colonel G. B. Raum, Fifty-sixth Illinois;Colonel J. I. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana. 

My personal staff, as usual, have served their country withfidelity, and credit to themselves, throughout these events, andhave received my personal thanks. 

Inclosed you will please find a map of that part of thebattle-field of Chattanooga fought over by the troops under mycommand, surveyed and drawn by Captain Jenney, engineer on mystaff. I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

[General Order No. 68. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICEWASHINGTON, February 21, 1884

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Major-GeneralW. T. Sherman and others. 

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of theUnited States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks ofCongress and of the people of the United States are due, and thatthe same are hereby tendered, to Major-General W. T. Sherman, commander of the Department and Army of the Tennessee, and theofficers and soldiers who served under him, for their gallant andarduous services in marching to the relief of the Army of theCumberland, and for their gallantry and heroism in the battle ofChattanooga, which contributed in a great degree to the success ofour arms in that glorious victory. 

Approved February 19, 1864. By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

On the 19th of December I was at Bridgeport, and gave all theorders necessary for the distribution of the four divisions of theFifteenth Corps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, andthe part of the Sixteenth Corps; commanded by General Dodge, alongthe railroad from Decatur to Nashville, to make the needed repairs, and to be in readiness for the campaign of the succeeding year; andon the 21st I went up to Nashville, to confer with General Grantand conclude the arrangements for the winter. At that time GeneralGrant was under the impression that the next campaign would be upthe valley of East Tennessee, in the direction of Virginia; and asit was likely to be the last and most important campaign of thewar, it became necessary to set free as many of the old troopsserving along the Mississippi River as possible. This was the realobject and purpose of the Meridian campaign, and of Banks'sexpedition up Red River to Shreveport during that winter. 

CHAPTER XV. 

MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 

JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1864. 

The winter of 1863-'64 opened very cold and severe; and it wasmanifest after the battle of Chattanooga, November 25, 1863, andthe raising of the siege of Knoxville, December 5th, that militaryoperations in that quarter must in a measure cease, or be limitedto Burnside's force beyond Knoxville. On the 21st of DecemberGeneral Grant had removed his headquarters to Nashville, Tennessee, leaving General George H. Thomas at Chattanooga, in command of theDepartment of the Cumberland, and of the army round about thatplace; and I was at Bridgeport, with orders to distribute my troopsalong the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, Alabama, and fromDecatur up toward Nashville. 

General G. M. Dodge, who was in command of the detachment of theSixteenth Corps, numbering about eight thousand men, had notparticipated with us in the battle of Chattanooga, but had remainedat and near Pulaski, Tennessee, engaged in repairing that railroad, as auxiliary to the main line which led from Nashville toStevenson, and Chattanooga. General John A. Logan had succeeded tothe command of the Fifteenth Corps, by regular appointment of thePresident of the United States, and had relieved General Frank P. Blair, who had been temporarily in command of that corps during theChattanooga and Knoxville movement. 

At that time I was in command of the Department of the Tennessee, which embraced substantially the territory on the east bank of theMississippi River, from Natchez up to the Ohio River, and thencealong the Tennessee River as high as Decatur and Bellefonte, Alabama. General McPherson was at Vicksburg and General Hurlbut atMemphis, and from them I had the regular reports of affairs in thatquarter of my command. The rebels still maintained a considerableforce of infantry and cavalry in the State of Mississippi, threatening the river, whose navigation had become to us sodelicate and important a matter. Satisfied that I could check thisby one or two quick moves inland, and thereby set free aconsiderable body of men held as local garrisons, I went up toNashville and represented the case to General Grant, who consentedthat I might go down the Mississippi River, where the bulk of mycommand lay, and strike a blow on the east of the river, whileGeneral Banks from New Orleans should in like manner strike anotherto the west; thus preventing any further molestation of the boatsnavigating the main river, and thereby widening the gap in theSouthern Confederacy. 

After having given all the necessary orders for the distribution, during the winter months, of that part of my command which was inSouthern and Middle Tennessee, I went to Cincinnati and Lancaster, Ohio, to spend Christmas with my family; and on my return I tookMinnie with me down to a convent at Reading, near Cincinnati, whereI left her, and took the cars for Cairo, Illinois, which I reachedJanuary 3d, a very cold and bitter day. The ice was forming fast, and there was great danger that the Mississippi River, would becomeclosed to navigation. Admiral Porter, who was at Cairo, gave me asmall gunboat (the Juliet), with which I went up to Paducah, toinspect that place, garrisoned by a small force; commanded byColonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois, who had been with me andwas severely wounded at Shiloh. Returning to Cairo, we starteddown the Mississippi River, which was full of floating ice. Withthe utmost difficulty we made our way through it, for hoursfloating in the midst of immense cakes, that chafed and ground ourboat so that at times we were in danger of sinking. But about the10th of January we reached Memphis, where I found General Hurlbut, and explained to him my purpose to collect from his garrisons andthose of McPherson about twenty thousand men, with which inFebruary to march out from Vicksburg as far as Meridian, break upthe Mobile & Ohio Railroad, and also the one leading from Vicksburgto Selma, Alabama. I instructed him to select two good divisions, and to be ready with them to go along. At Memphis I foundBrigadier-General W. Sooy Smith, with a force of about twenty-fivehundred cavalry, which he had by General Grant's orders broughtacross from Middle Tennessee, to assist in our general purpose, aswell as to punish the rebel General Forrest, who had been mostactive in harassing our garrisons in West Tennessee andMississippi. After staying a couple of days at Memphis, wecontinued on in the gunboat Silver Cloud to Vicksburg, where Ifound General McPherson, and, giving him similar orders, instructedhim to send out spies to ascertain and bring back timelyinformation of the strength and location of the enemy. The wintercontinued so severe that the river at Vicksburg was full offloating ice, but in the Silver Cloud we breasted it manfully, andgot back to Memphis by the 20th. A chief part of the enterprisewas to destroy the rebel cavalry commanded by General Forrest, whowere a constant threat to our railway communications in MiddleTennessee, and I committed this task to Brigadier-General W. SooySmith. General Hurlbut had in his command about seven thousandfive hundred cavalry, scattered from Columbus, Kentucky, toCorinth, Mississippi, and we proposed to make up an aggregatecavalry force of about seven thousand "effective, " out of these andthe twenty-five hundred which General Smith had brought with himfrom Middle Tennessee. With this force General Smith was orderedto move from Memphis straight for Meridian, Mississippi, and tostart by February 1st. I explained to him personally the nature ofForrest as a man, and of his peculiar force; told him that in hisroute he was sure to encounter Forrest, who always attacked with avehemence for which he must be prepared, and that, after he hadrepelled the first attack, he must in turn assume the mostdetermined offensive, overwhelm him and utterly destroy his wholeforce. I knew that Forrest could not have more than four thousandcavalry, and my own movement would give employment to every otherman of the rebel army not immediately present with him, so that he(General Smith) might safely act on the hypothesis I have stated. 

Having completed all these preparations in Memphis, being satisfiedthat the cavalry force would be ready to start by the 1st ofFebruary, and having seen General Hurlbut with his two divisionsembark in steamers for Vicksburg, I also reembarked for the samedestination on the 27th of January. 

On the 1st of February we rendezvoused in Vicksburg, where I founda spy who had been sent out two weeks before, had been to Meridian, and brought back correct information of the state of facts in theinterior of Mississippi. Lieutenant-General (Bishop) Polk was inchief command, with headquarters at Meridian, and had two divisionsof infantry, one of which (General Loring's) was posted at Canton, Mississippi, the other (General French's) at Brandon. He had alsotwo divisions of cavalry--Armstrong's, composed of the threebrigades of Ross, Stark, and Wirt Adams, which were scattered fromthe neighborhood of Yazoo City to Jackson and below; and Forrest's, which was united, toward Memphis, with headquarters at Como. General Polk seemed to have no suspicion of our intentions todisturb his serenity. 

Accordingly, on the morning of February 3d, we started in twocolumns, each of two divisions, preceded by a light force ofcavalry, commanded by Colonel E. F. Winslow. General McPhersoncommanded the right column, and General Hurlbut the left. Theformer crossed the Big Black at the railroad-bridge, and the latterseven miles above, at Messinger's. We were lightly equipped as towagons, and marched without deployment straight for Meridian, distant one hundred and fifty miles. We struck the rebel cavalrybeyond the Big Black, and pushed them pell-mell into and beyondJackson during the 6th. The next day we reached Brandon, and onthe 9th Morton, where we perceived signs of an infantryconcentration, but the enemy did not give us battle, and retreatedbefore us. The rebel cavalry were all around us, so we kept ourcolumns compact and offered few or no chances for their dashes. Asfar as Morton we had occupied two roads, but there we were forcedinto one. Toward evening of the 12th, Hurlbut's column passedthrough Decatur, with orders to go into camp four miles beyond at acreek. McPherson's head of column was some four miles behind, andI personally detached one of Hurlbut's regiments to guard thecross-roads at Decatur till the head of McPherson's column shouldcome in sight. Intending to spend the night in Decatur, I went toa double log-house, and arranged with the lady for some supper. Weunsaddled our horses, tied them to the fence inside the yard, and, being tired, I lay down on a bed and fell asleep. Presently Iheard shouts and hallooing, and then heard pistol-shots close tothe house. My aide, Major Audenried, called me and said we wereattacked by rebel cavalry, who were all around us. I jumped up andinquired where was the regiment of infantry I had myself posted atthe cross-roads. He said a few moments before it had marched pastthe house, following the road by which General Hurlbut had gone, and I told him to run, overtake it, and bring it back. Meantime, Iwent out into the back-yard, saw wagons passing at a run down theroad, and horsemen dashing about in a cloud of dust, firing theirpistols, their shots reaching the house in which we were. Gathering the few orderlies and clerks that were about, I waspreparing to get into a corn-crib at the back side of the lot, wherein to defend ourselves, when I saw Audenried coming back withthe regiment, on a run, deploying forward as they came. Thisregiment soon cleared the place and drove the rebel cavalry backtoward the south, whence they had come. 

It transpired that the colonel of this infantry regiment, whosename I do not recall, had seen some officers of McPherson's staff(among them Inspector-General Strong) coming up the road at agallop, raising a cloud of duet; supposing them to be the head ofMcPherson's column, and being anxious to get into camp before dark, he had called in his pickets and started down the road, leaving meperfectly exposed. Some straggling wagons, escorted by a NewJersey regiment, were passing at the time, and composed the rear ofHurlbut's train. The rebel cavalry, seeing the road clear oftroops, and these wagons passing, struck them in flank, shot downthe mules of three or four wagons, broke the column, and began ageneral skirmish. The escort defended their wagons as well as theycould, and thus diverted their attention; otherwise I would surelyhave been captured. In a short time the head of McPherson's columncame up, went into camp, and we spent the night in Decatur. 

The next day we pushed on, and on the 14th entered Meridian, theenemy retreating before us toward Demopolis, Alabama. We at onceset to work to destroy an arsenal, immense storehouses, and therailroad in every direction. We staid in Meridian five days, expecting every hour to hear of General Sooy Smith, but could getno tidings of him whatever. A large force of infantry was kept atwork all the time in breaking up the Mobile & Ohio Railroad southand north; also the Jackson & Selma Railroad, east and west. I wasdetermined to damage these roads so that they could not be usedagain for hostile purposes during the rest of the war. I never hadthe remotest idea of going to Mobile, but had purposely given outthat idea to the people of the country, so as to deceive the enemyand to divert their attention. Many persons still insist that, because we did not go to Mobile on this occasion, I had failed; butin the following letter to General Banks, of January 31st, writtenfrom Vicksburg before starting for Meridian, it will be seenclearly that I indicated my intention to keep up the delusion of anattack on Mobile by land, whereas I promised him to be back toVicksburg by the 1st of March, so as to cooperate with him in hiscontemplated attack on Shreveport:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEVICKSBURG, January 31, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, NewOrleans. 

GENERAL: I received yesterday, at the hands of Captain Durham, aide-de-camp, your letter of the 25th inst. , and hasten to reply. Captain Durham has gone to the mouth of White River, en route forLittle Rock, and the other officers who accompanied him have goneup to Cairo, as I understand, to charter twenty-five steamboats forthe Red River trip. The Mississippi River, though low for theseason, is free of ice and in good boating order; but I understandthat Red River is still low. I had a man in from Alexandriayesterday, who reported the falls or rapids at that placeimpassable save by the smallest boats. My inland expedition is nowmoving, and I will be off for Jackson and Meridian to-morrow. Theonly fear I have is in the weather. All the other combinations aregood. I want to keep up the delusion of an attack on Mobile andthe Alabama River, and therefore would be obliged if you would keepup an irritating foraging or other expedition in that direction. 

My orders from General Grant will not, as yet, justify me inembarking for Red River, though I am very anxious to move in thatdirection. The moment I learned that you were preparing for it, Isent a communication to Admiral Porter, and dispatched to GeneralGrant at Chattanooga, asking if he wanted me and Steele tocooperate with you against Shreveport; and I will have his answerin time, for you cannot do any thing till Red River has twelve feetof water on the rapids at Alexandria. That will be from March toJune. I have lived on Red River, and know somewhat of the phasesof that stream. The expedition on Shreveport should be maderapidly, with simultaneous movements from Little Rock onShreveport, from Opelousas on Alexandria, and a combined force ofgunboats and transports directly up Red River. Admiral Porter willbe able to have a splendid fleet by March 1st. I think Steelecould move with ten thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. Icould take about ten thousand, and you could, I suppose, have thesame. Your movement from Opelousas, simultaneous with mine up theriver, would compel Dick Taylor to leave Fort De Russy (nearMarksville), and the whole combined force could appear atShreveport about a day appointed beforehand. 

I doubt if the enemy will risk a siege at Shreveport, although I aminformed they are fortifying the place, and placing many heavy gunsin position. It would be better for us that they should standthere, as we might make large and important captures. But I do notbelieve the enemy will fight a force of thirty thousand men, actingin concert with gunboats. 

I will be most happy to take part in the proposed expedition, andhope, before you have made your final dispositions, that I willhave the necessary permission. Half the Army of the Tennessee isnear the Tennessee River, beyond Huntsville, Alabama, awaiting thecompletion of the railroad, and, by present orders, I will becompelled to hasten there to command it in person, unless meantimeGeneral Grant modifies the plan. I have now in this departmentonly the force left to hold the river and the posts, and I amseriously embarrassed by the promises made the veteran volunteersfor furlough. I think, by March 1st, I can put afloat forShreveport ten thousand men, provided I succeed in my presentmovement in cleaning out the State of Mississippi, and in breakingup the railroads about Meridian. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, commanding. 

The object of the Meridian expedition was to strike the roadsinland, so to paralyze the rebel forces that we could take from thedefense of the Mississippi River the equivalent of a corps oftwenty thousand men, to be used in the next Georgia campaign; andthis was actually done. At the same time, I wanted to destroyGeneral Forrest, who, with an irregular force of cavalry, wasconstantly threatening Memphis and the river above, as well as ourroutes of supply in Middle Tennessee. In this we failed utterly, because General W. Sooy Smith did not fulfill his orders, whichwere clear and specific, as contained in my letter of instructionsto him of January 27th, at Memphis, and my personal explanations tohim at the same time. Instead of starting at the date ordered, February 1st, he did not leave Memphis till the 11th, waiting forWarings brigade that was ice-bound near Columbus, Kentucky; andthen, when he did start, he allowed General Forrest to head him offand to defeat him with an inferior force, near West Point, belowOkalona, on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. 

We waited at Meridian till the 20th to hear from General Smith, buthearing nothing whatever, and having utterly destroyed therailroads in and around that junction, I ordered General McPhersonto move back slowly toward Canton. With Winslow's cavalry, andHurlbut's infantry, I turned north to Marion, and thence to a placecalled "Union, " whence I dispatched the cavalry farther north toPhiladelphia and Louisville, to feel as it were for General Smith, and then turned all the infantry columns toward Canton, Mississippi. On the 26th we all reached Canton, but we had notheard a word of General Smith, nor was it until some time after (atVicksburg) that I learned the whole truth of General Smith'smovement and of his failure. Of course I did not and could notapprove of his conduct, and I know that he yet chafes under thecensure. I had set so much store on his part of the project that Iwas disappointed, and so reported officially to General Grant. General Smith never regained my confidence as a soldier, though Istill regard him as a most accomplished gentleman and a skillfulengineer. Since the close of the war he has appealed to me torelieve him of that censure, but I could not do it, because itwould falsify history. 

Having assembled all my troops in and about Canton, on the 27th ofFebruary I left them under the command of the senior major-general, Hurlbut, with orders to remain till about the 3d of March, and thento come into Vicksburg leisurely; and, escorted by Winslow'scavalry, I rode into Vicksburg on the last day of February. ThereI found letters from General Grant, at Nashville, and GeneralBanks, at New Orleans, concerning his (General Banks's) projectedmovement up Red River. I was authorized by the former tocontribute aid to General Banks for a limited time; but GeneralGrant insisted on my returning in person to my own command aboutHuntsville, Alabama, as soon as possible, to prepare for the springcampaign. 

About this time we were much embarrassed by a general order of theWar Department, promising a thirty-days furlough to all soldierswho would "veteranize"--viz. , reenlist for the rest of the war. This was a judicious and wise measure, because it doubtless securedthe services of a very large portion of the men who had almostcompleted a three-years enlistment, and were therefore veteransoldiers in feeling and in habit. But to furlough so many of ourmen at that instant of time was like disbanding an army in the verymidst of battle. 

In order to come to a perfect understanding with General Banks, Itook the steamer Diana and ran down to New Orleans to see him. Among the many letters which I found in Vicksburg on my return fromMeridian was one from Captain D. F. Boyd, of Louisiana, writtenfrom the jail in Natchez, telling me that he was a prisoner of warin our hands; had been captured in Louisiana by some of our scouts;and he bespoke my friendly assistance. Boyd was Professor ofAncient Languages at the Louisiana Seminary of Learning during myadministration, in 1859-'60; was an accomplished scholar, ofmoderate views in politics, but, being a Virginian, was drawn, likeall others of his kind, into the vortex of the rebellion by theevents of 1861, which broke up colleges and every thing at theSouth. Natchez, at this time, was in my command, and was held by astrong division, commanded by Brigadier-General J. W. Davidson. Inthe Diana we stopped at Natchez, and I made a hasty inspection ofthe place. I sent for Boyd, who was in good health, but quitedirty, and begged me to take him out of prison, and to effect hisexchange. I receipted for him; took him along with me to NewOrleans; offered him money, which he declined; allowed him to gofree in the city; and obtained from General Banks a promise toeffect his exchange, which was afterward done. Boyd is now mylegitimate successor in Louisiana, viz. , President of the LouisianaUniversity, which is the present title of what had been theSeminary of Learning. After the war was over, Boyd went back toAlexandria, reorganized the old institution, which I visited in1866 but the building was burnt down by an accident or by anincendiary about 1868, and the institution was then removed toBaton Rouge, where it now is, under its new title of the Universityof Louisiana. 

We reached New Orleans on the 2d of March. I found General Banks, with his wife and daughter, living in a good house, and heexplained to me fully the position and strength of his troops, andhis plans of action for the approaching campaign. I dined withhim, and, rough as I was--just out of the woods--attended, thatnight, a very pleasant party at the house of a lady, whose name Icannot recall, but who is now the wife of Captain Arnold, FifthUnited States Artillery. At this party were also Mr. And Mrs. Frank Howe. I found New Orleans much changed since I had beenfamiliar with it in 1853 and in 1860-'61. It was full of officersand soldiers. Among the former were General T. W. Sherman, who hadlost a leg at Port Hudson, and General Charles P: Stone, whom Iknew so well in California, and who is now in the Egyptian serviceas chief of staff. The bulk of General Banks's army was aboutOpelousas, under command of General Franklin, ready to move onAlexandria. General Banks seemed to be all ready, but intended todelay his departure a few days to assist in the inauguration of acivil government for Louisiana, under Governor Hahn. In LafayetteSquare I saw the arrangements of scaffolding for the fireworks andbenches for the audience. General Banks urged me to remain overthe 4th of March, to participate in the ceremonies, which heexplained would include the performance of the "Anvil Chorus" byall the bands of his army, and during the performance thechurch-bells were to be rung, and cannons were to be fired byelectricity. I regarded all such ceremonies as out of place at atime when it seemed to me every hour and every minute were due tothe war. General Banks's movement, however, contemplated mysending a force of ten thousand men in boats up Red River fromVicksburg, and that a junction should occur at Alexandria by March17th. I therefore had no time to wait for the grand pageant of the4th of March, but took my departure from New Orleans in the Dianathe evening of March 3d. 

On the next day, March 4th, I wrote to General Banks a letter, which was extremely minute in conveying to him how far I feltauthorized to go under my orders from General Grant. At that timeGeneral Grant commanded the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing my own Department of the Tennessee and that of GeneralSteele in Arkansas, but not that of General Banks in Louisiana. General Banks was acting on his own powers, or under theinstructions of General Halleck in Washington, and our assistanceto him was designed as a loan of ten thousand men for a period ofthirty days. The instructions of March 6th to General A. J. Smith, who commanded this detachment, were full and explicit on thispoint. The Diana reached Vicksburg on the 6th, where I found thatthe expeditionary army had come in from Canton. One division offive thousand men was made up out of Hurlbut's command, and placedunder Brigadier-General T. Kilby Smith; and a similar division wasmade out of McPherson's and Hurlbut's troops, and placed underBrigadier-General Joseph A. Mower; the whole commanded byBrigadier-General A. J. Smith. General Hurlbut, with the rest ofhis command, returned to Memphis, and General McPherson remained atVicksburg. General A. J. Smith's command was in due seasonembarked, and proceeded to Red River, which it ascended, convoyedby Admiral Porter's fleet. General Mower's division was landednear the outlet of the Atchafalaya, marched up by land and capturedthe fort below Alexandria known as Fort De Russy, and the wholefleet then proceeded up to Alexandria, reaching it on the dayappointed, viz. , March 17th, where it waited for the arrival ofGeneral Banks, who, however, did not come till some days after. These two divisions participated in the whole of General Banks'sunfortunate Red River expedition, and were delayed so long up RedRiver, and subsequently on the Mississippi, that they did not sharewith their comrades the successes and glories of the Atlantacampaign, for which I had designed them; and, indeed, they, did notjoin our army till just in time to assist General George H. Thomasto defeat General Hood before Nashville, on the 15th and 16th ofDecember, 1864. 

General Grant's letter of instructions, which was brought me byGeneral Butterfield, who had followed me to New Orleans, enjoinedon me, after concluding with General Banks the details for his RedRiver expedition, to make all necessary arrangements forfurloughing the men entitled to that privilege, and to hurry backto the army at Huntsville, Alabama. I accordingly gave thenecessary orders to General McPherson, at Vicksburg, and continuedup the river toward Memphis. On our way we met Captain Badeau, ofGeneral Grant's staff, bearing the following letter, of March 4th, which I answered on the 10th, and sent the answer by GeneralButterfield, who had accompanied me up from New Orleans. Copies ofboth were also sent to General McPherson, at Vicksburg:

[Private. ]

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, March 4, 1864

DEAR SHERMAN: The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general inthe army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senatefor the place. 

I now receive orders to report at Washington immediately, inperson, which indicates either a confirmation or a likelihood ofconfirmation. I start in the morning to comply with the order, butI shall say very distinctly on my arrival there that I shall acceptno appointment which will require me to make that city myheadquarters. This, however, is not what I started out to writeabout. 

While I have been eminently successful in this war, in at leastgaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I howmuch of this success is due to the energy, skill, and theharmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom ithas been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positionsunder me. 

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to agreater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers;but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, asthe men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever Ihave had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have beenof assistance, you know. How far your execution of whatever hasbeen given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, youcannot know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letterwould express, giving it the most flattering construction. 

The word you I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but, starting in themorning, I do not know that I will find time just now. Yourfriend, U. S. GRANT, Major-General. 

[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL]

NEAR MEMPHIS, March 10, 1864

General GRANT. 

DEAR GENERAL: I have your more than kind and characteristic letterof the 4th, and will send a copy of it to General McPherson atonce. 

You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to usso large a share of the merits which have led to your highadvancement. I know you approve the friendship I have everprofessed to you, and will permit me to continue as heretofore tomanifest it on all proper occasions. 

You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy aposition of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue asheretofore to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, youwill enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and thehomage of millions of human beings who will award to you a largeshare for securing to them and their descendants a government oflaw and stability. 

I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. AtBelmont you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; atDonelson also you illustrated your whole character. I was notnear, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity toinfluence you. 

Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by theterrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves atevery point; but that victory admitted the ray of light which Ihave followed ever since. 

I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the greatprototype Washington; as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest, as aman should be; but the chief characteristic in your nature is thesimple faith in success you have always manifested, which I canliken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in hisSaviour. 

This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, whenyou have completed your best preparations, you go into battlewithout hesitation, as at Chattanooga--no doubts, no reserve; and Itell you that it was this that made us act with confidence. I knewwherever I was that you thought of me, and if I got in a tightplace you would come--if alive. 

My only points of doubt were as to your knowledge of grandstrategy, and of books of science and history; but I confess yourcommon-sense seems to have supplied all this. 

Now as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. Halleck isbetter qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue andpolicy. Come out West; take to yourself the whole MississippiValley; let us make it dead-sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slopeand Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs ofa tree live or die with the main trunk! We have done much; stillmuch remains to be done. Time and time's influences are all withus; we could almost afford to sit still and let these influenceswork. Even in the seceded States your word now would go furtherthan a President's proclamation, or an act of Congress. 

For God's sake and for your country's sake, come out of Washington!I foretold to General Halleck, before he left Corinth, theinevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, whenour task is done, we will make short work of Charleston andRichmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic. Your sincerefriend, W. T. SHERMAN

We reached Memphis on the 13th, where I remained some days, but onthe 14th of March received from General Grant a dispatch to hurryto Nashville in person by the 17th, if possible. Disposing of allmatters then pending, I took a steamboat to Cairo, the cars thenceto Louisville and Nashville, reaching that place on the 17th ofMarch, 1864. 

I found General Grant there. He had been to Washington and back, and was ordered to return East to command all the armies of theUnited States, and personally the Army of the Potomac. I was tosucceed him in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, Tennessee, andArkansas. General Grant was of course very busy in winding up allmatters of business, in transferring his command to me, and inpreparing for what was manifest would be the great and closingcampaign of our civil war. Mrs. Grant and some of their childrenwere with him, and occupied a large house in Nashville, which wasused as an office, dwelling, and every thing combined. 

On the 18th of March I had issued orders assuming command of theMilitary Division of the Mississippi, and was seated in the office, when the general came in and said they were about to present him asword, inviting me to come and see the ceremony. I went back intowhat was the dining-room of the house; on the table lay a rose-woodbox, containing a sword, sash, spurs, etc. , and round about thetable were grouped Mrs. Grant, Nelly, and one or two of the boys. I was introduced to a large, corpulent gentleman, as the mayor, andanother citizen, who had come down from Galena to make thispresentation of a sword to their fellow-townsman. I think thatRawlins, Bowers, Badeau, and one or more of General Grant'spersonal staff, were present. The mayor rose and in the mostdignified way read a finished speech to General Grant, who stood, as usual, very awkwardly; and the mayor closed his speech byhanding him the resolutions of the City Council engrossed onparchment, with a broad ribbon and large seal attached. After themayor had fulfilled his office so well, General Grant said: "Mr. Mayor, as I knew that this ceremony was to occur, and as I am notused to speaking, I have written something in reply. " He thenbegan to fumble in his pockets, first his breast-coat pocket, thenhis pants, vest; etc. , and after considerable delay he pulled out acrumpled piece of common yellow cartridge-paper, which he handed tothe mayor. His whole manner was awkward in the extreme, yetperfectly characteristic, and in strong contrast with the elegantparchment and speech of the mayor. When read, however, thesubstance of his answer was most excellent, short, concise, and, ifit had been delivered by word of mouth, would have been all thatthe occasion required. 

I could not help laughing at a scene so characteristic of the manwho then stood prominent before the country; and to whom all hadturned as the only one qualified to guide the nation in a war thathad become painfully critical. With copies of the few lettersreferred to, and which seem necessary to illustrate thesubject-matter, I close this chapter:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEESTEAMER DIANA (UNDER WEIGH), March 4, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, NewOrleans. 

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 2d instantyesterday at New Orleans, but was unable to answer, exceptverbally, and I now reduce it to writing. 

I will arrive at Vicksburg the 6th instant, and I expect to meetthere my command from Canton, out of which I will select twodivisions of about ten thousand men, embark them under a goodcommander, and order him:

1st. To rendezvous at the mouth of Red River, and, in concert withAdmiral Porter (if he agree), to strike Harrisonburg a hard blow. 

2d. To return to Red River and ascend it, aiming to reachAlexandria on the 17th of March, to report to you. 

3d. That, as this command is designed to operate by water, it willnot be encumbered with much land transportation, say two wagons toa regiment, but with an ample supply of stores, including mortarsand heavy rifled guns, to be used against fortified places. 

4th. That I have calculated, and so reported to General Grant, that this detachment of his forces in no event is to go beyondShreveport, and that you will spare them the moment you can, tryingto get them back to the Mississippi River in thirty days from thetime they actually enter Red River. 

The year is wearing away fast, and I would like to carry to GeneralGrant at Huntsville, Alabama, every man of his military division, as early in April as possible, for I am sure we ought to move fromthe base of the Tennessee River to the south before the season istoo far advanced, say as early as April 15th next. 

I feel certain of your complete success, provided you make theconcentration in time, to assure which I will see in person to theembarkation and dispatch of my quota, and I will write to GeneralSteele, conveying to him my personal and professional opinion thatthe present opportunity is the most perfect one that will everoffer itself to him to clean out his enemies in Arkansas. 

Wishing you all honor and success, I am, with respect, your friendand servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEVICKSBURG, March 6, 1864

Brigadier-General A. J. SMITH, commanding Expedition up Red River, Vicksburg, Mississippi. 

GENERAL: By an order this day issued, you are to command a strong, well-appointed detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, sent toreinforce a movement up Red River, but more especially against thefortified position at Shreveport. 

You will embark your command as soon as possible, little encumberedwith wagons or wheeled vehicles, but well supplied with fuel, provisions, and ammunition. Take with you the twelve mortars, with their ammunition, and all the thirty-pound Parrotts theordnance-officer will supply. Proceed to the mouth of Red Riverand confer with Admiral Porter. Consult with him, and in all theexpedition rely on him implicitly, as he is the approved friend ofthe Army of the Tennessee, and has been associated with us from thebeginning. I have undertaken with General Banks that you will be atAlexandria, Louisiana, on or before the 17th day of March; and youwill, if time allows, cooperate with the navy in destroyingHarrisonburg, up Black River; but as I passed Red River yesterday Isaw Admiral Porter, and he told me he had already sent an expeditionto Harrisonburg, so that I suppose that part of the plan will beaccomplished before you reach Red River; but, in any event, becareful to reach Alexandria about the 17th of March. 

General Banks will start by land from Franklin, in the Techecountry, either the 6th or 7th, and will march via Opelousas toAlexandria. You will meet him there, report to him, and act underhis orders. My understanding with him is that his forces will moveby land, via Natchitoches, to Shreveport, while the gunboat-fleetis to ascend the river with your transports in company. Red Riveris very low for the season, and I doubt if any of the boats canpass the falls or rapids at Alexandria. What General Banksproposes to do in that event I do not know; but my own judgment isthat Shreveport ought not to be attacked until the gunboats canreach it. Not that a force marching by land cannot do it alone, but it would be bad economy in war to invest the place with an armyso far from heavy guns, mortars, ammunition, and provisions, whichcan alone reach Shreveport by water. Still, I do not know aboutGeneral Banks's plans in that event; and whatever they may be, yourduty will be to conform, in the most hearty manner. 

My understanding with General Banks is that he will not need thecooperation of your force beyond thirty days from the date youreach Red River. As soon as he has taken Shreveport, or as soon ashe can spare you, return to Vicksburg with all dispatch, gather upyour detachments, wagons, tents, transportation, and all propertypertaining to so much of the command as belongs to the SixteenthArmy Corps, and conduct it to Memphis, where orders will await you. My present belief is your division, entire, will be needed with theArmy of the Tennessee, about Huntsville or Bridgeport. Still, Iwill leave orders with General, Hurlbut, at Memphis, for you onyour return. 

I believe if water will enable the gunboats to cross the rapids atAlexandria, you will be able to make a quick, strong, and effectiveblow at our enemy in the West, thus widening the belt of ourterritory, and making the breach between the Confederate Governmentand its outlying trans-Mississippi Department more perfect. 

It is understood that General Steele makes a simultaneous move fromLittle Rock, on Shreveport or Natchitoches, with a force of aboutten thousand men. Banks will have seventeen thousand, and you tenthousand. If these can act concentrically and simultaneously, youwill make short work of it, and then General Banks will have enoughforce to hold as much of the Red River country as he deems wise, leaving you to bring to General Grant's main army the seventhousand five hundred men of the Sixteenth Corps now with you. Having faith in your sound judgment and experience, I confide thisimportant and delicate command to you, with certainty that you willharmonize perfectly with Admiral Porter and General Banks, withwhom you are to act, and thereby insure success. 

I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEMEMPHIS, March 14, 1864

Major General McPHERSON, commanding, etc, Vicksburg, Mississippi

DEAR GENERAL: I wrote you at length on the 11th, by a specialbearer of dispatches, and now make special orders to cover themovements therein indicated. It was my purpose to await youranswer, but I am summoned by General Grant to be in Nashville onthe 17th, and it will keep me moving night and day to get there bythat date. I must rely on you, for you understand that we mustreenforce the great army at the centre (Chattanooga) as much aspossible, at the same time not risking the safety of any point onthe Mississippi which is fortified and armed with heavy guns. Iwant you to push matters as rapidly as possible, and to do all youcan to put two handsome divisions of your own corps at Cairo, readyto embark up the Tennessee River by the 20th or 30th of April atthe very furthest. I wish it could be done quicker; but thepromise of those thirty-days furloughs in the States of enlistment, though politic, is very unmilitary. It deprives us of our abilityto calculate as to time; but do the best you can. Hurlbut can donothing till A. J. Smith returns from Red River. I will then orderhim to occupy Grenada temporarily, and to try and get thoselocomotives that we need here. I may also order him with cavalryand infantry to march toward Tuscaloosa, at the same time that wemove from the Tennessee River about Chattanooga. 

I don't know as yet the grand strategy of the next campaign, but onarrival at Nashville I will soon catch the main points, and willadvise you of them.. 

Steal a furlough and run to Baltimore incog. ; but get back in timeto take part in the next grand move. 

Write me fully and frequently of your progress. I have ordered thequartermaster to send down as many boats as he can get, tofacilitate your movements. Mules, wagons, etc. , can come upafterward by transient boats. I am truly your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

[Special Field Order No. 28. ]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEMEMPHIS, March 14, 1864

1. Major-General McPherson will organize two good divisions of hiscorps (Seventeenth) of about five thousand men, each embracing inpart the reenlisted veterans of his corps whose furloughs willexpire in April, which he will command in person, and willrendezvous at Cairo, Illinois, and report by telegraph and letterto the general commanding at department headquarters, wherever theymay be. These divisions will be provided with new arms andaccoutrements, and land transportation (wagons and mules) out ofthe supplies now at Vicksburg, which will be conveyed to Cairo byor before April 15th. 

4. During the absence of General McPherson from the district ofVicksburg, Major-General Hurlbut will exercise command over all thetroops in the Department of the Tennessee from Cairo to Natchez, inclusive, and will receive special instructions from departmentheadquarters. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman:

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

APPENDIX TO VOLUME I. 

CHICKASAW BAYOU. 

Report of Brigadier-General G. W. Morgan. 

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, RIGHT WING, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, STEAMER EMPRESS, January 8, 1868. 

Major J. H. HAMMOND, Chief of Staff:

SIR: On the 1st instant, while pressed by many arduous duties, Iwas requested to report to the commanding general the operations ofmy division during the affair of the 27th, the action of the 28th, and the battle of the 29th ult. 

I had not received the report of subordinate commanders, nor had Itime to review the report I have the honor to submit. 

Herewith I have the honor to forward these reports, connected withwhich I will submit a few remarks. 

Brigadier-General Blair speaks of having discovered, while on hisretreat from the enemy's works, a broad and easy road running fromthe left of my position to the enemy's lines. The road is neitherbroad nor easy, and was advanced over by De Courcey when leadinghis brigade to the charge. The road General Blair speaks of is theone running from Lake's Landing and intersecting with the Vicksburgroad on the Chickasaw Bluffs. Its existence was known to me on the28th ult. , but it was left open intentionally by the enemy, and wascommanded by a direct and cross fire from batteries and rifle-pits. The withdrawal of his brigade from the assault by Colonel DeCourcey was justified by the failure of the corps of A. J. Smith, and the command of Colonel Lindsey, to advance simultaneously tothe assault. Both had the same difficulties to encounter--impassable bayous. The enemy's line of battle was concave, andDe Courcey advanced against his centre--hence he sustained aconcentric fire, and the withdrawal of Steele from the front of theenemy's right on the 28th ult. Enabled the enemy on the followingday to concentrate his right upon his centre. 

I regret to find, from the report of Brigadier-General Thayer, someone regiment skulked; this I did not observe, nor is it mentionedby General Blair, though his were the troops which occupied thatportion of the field. As far as my observation extended, thetroops bore themselves nobly; but the Sixteenth Ohio Infantry waspeerless on the field, as it had ever been in camp or on the march. Lieutenant-Colonel Kershner, commanding, was wounded and takenprisoner. He is an officer of rare merit, and deserves to commanda brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel Dieter, commanding the Fifty-eighthOhio, was killed within the enemy's works; and Lieutenant-ColonelMonroe, Twenty-second Kentucky, was struck down at the head of hisregiment. 

I again express my profound acknowledgments to Brigadier-GeneralsBlair and Thayer, and Colonels De Conrcey, Lindsey, and Sheldon, brigade commanders. Also to Major M. C. Garber, assistantquartermaster; Captain S. S. Lyon, acting topographical engineer;Lieutenant Burdick, acting ordnance officer; Lieutenant Hutchins, acting chief of staff; Lieutenants H. G. Fisher and Smith, ofSignal Corps; Lieutenant E. D. Saunders, my acting assistantadjutant-general; and Lieutenants English and Montgomery, actingaides-de-camp, for the efficient services rendered me. 

Nor can I close this report without speaking in terms of highpraise of the meritorious and gallant services of Captains Fosterand Lamphier. Their batteries silenced several of the enemy'sworks, and throughout the operations rendered good service. Mysincere acknowledgments are also due to Captain Griffith, commanding First Iowa Battery, and Captain Hoffman, commandingFourth Ohio Battery. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEORGE W. MORGAN, Brigadier-General Volunteers. 

CINCINNATI, February 8, 1876. 

MY DEAR GENERAL: Regarding the attack at Chickasaw Bayou, my recordshows the position of Steele on the left; Morgan to his right;Morgan L. Smith to his right, and A. J. Smith on the extreme right;the latter not expected to accomplish much more than a diversion, the result to come from the three other divisions, Morgan havingthe best opportunity. Saturday night they were in position; youwere at Lake's plantation, right and rear of Morgan. 

The attack for lodgment on the hills was ordered for Sundaymorning, December 28th. I was sent to A. J. Smith before daylight, and returned to you soon after. You were with Morgan. You hadfully explained to him the importance of his success, and that heshould be present with the attacking column, which was to be a partof his division, supported by the remainder, and by Blair's brigadeof Steele's division cooperating. The attack was to besimultaneous, by the four divisions, on a signal. 

Morgan's answer to you was that, when the signal was given, hewould lead his attack, and with his life he would be on the bluffsin fifteen minutes. He seemed of positive knowledge, and as sure ofsuccess. You then retired to a central point, to be in easycommunication with Steele and Morgan L. Smith. The attack wasmade, and developed, in the case of Steele, M. L. Smith, and A. J. Smith, that to cross the bayou was impossible, if opposed by anyforce, and in each they were by a strong one. Morgan's attackingforce succeeded in getting across the causeway and marsh, but hedid not go with it, nor support it with more men, and a largenumber were captured from Blair's brigade after gaining the enemy'slast line of works covering the bayou. At the time everybodyblamed and criticised Morgan with the failure. You felt from theadvance of his attack it must be successful, and, as it pushedforward, you sent me to urge on M. L. Smith, as Morgan was over, and he, Smith, must aid by persistent attack, and give Morgan asgood a chance as could be to make his lodgment.... 

I am, etc. , L. M. DAYTONLate Colonel of the Staff, now of Cincinnati, OhioGeneral W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri

[COPY. ]

" . . . . The expedition was wonderfully well provided withprovisions, transportation, and munitions, and even axes, picks, and shovels, so much in use later in the war, evidenced theforethought that governed this force. The boats, from their openlower deck construction, proved admirable for transports, but theirtinder-box construction made fire-traps of them, requiringunremitting vigilance. These points were well understood, and thereadiness with which the troops adapted themselves to circumstanceswas a constant source of wonder and congratulations. 

"The fleet collected at Friar's Point for final orders, and therethe order of sailing was laid down with great minuteness, andprivate instructions issued to commanders of divisions, all of whomhad personal interviews with the commanding general, and receivedpersonal explanations on pretty much every point involved. Ourheadquarters boat, the Forest Queen, was not very comfortable, norwell provided, but General Sherman submitted cheerfully, on thegrounds of duty, and thought Conway a fine fellow. I was only ableto concede that he was a good steamboat captain.... 

"Our camp appointments were Spartan in the extreme, and in theirsimplicity would have met the demands of any demagogue in the land. The nights were cold and damp, and General Sherman uncomfortablyactive in his preparations, so that the assistant adjutant-generalhad no very luxurious post just then. We were surrounded withsloughs. The ground was wet, and the water, although in winter, was very unwholesome. Many of our men, to this day, have remindersof the Yazoo in ague, fevers, and diseases of the bowels. Cavalrywas useless. One battalion of Illinois cavalry was stronglysuspected of camping in the timber, until time passed enough tojustify the suspicion of having been somewhere. Really thestrength of Vicksburg was in being out of reach of attack.... 

"My orders were to learn and report what was going on on the right, particularly to try and form an idea of the enemy's force in frontof M. L. Smith's division, and at the sand-bar. Leaving my horseclose in the rear of the Sixth Missouri, when the fire became tooheavy for riding, I succeeded, by taking frequent cover, inreaching unhurt the verge of the bayou among the drift-logs. There, by concert of action with Lieutenant-Colonel Blood, of theSixth Missouri, his regiment, and the Thirteenth Regular Infantry, kept up a heavy fire on everything that showed along the levee andearthworks in front. The enemy were behind the embankment, notover one hundred and fifty yards across the bayou. Severalofficers, including Colonel Blood, Colonel Kilby Smith, and myself, managed, by getting on the piles of drift, to see over the leveethrough the cleared fields beyond, even to the foot of the bluff. The chips and twigs flew around lively enough, but we staid up longenough to make sure that the enemy had as many men behind the leveeas could get cover. We saw, also, a line of rifle-pits in therear, commanding the rear of the levee, and still beyond, windingalong the foot of the bluff, a road worn by long use deep into theside-hill, and with the side next us strengthened with a goodearthwork, affording a covered line of communication in the rear. The fire of our men was so well maintained that we were able to seeall these things, say a minute or more. Some of those who venturedwere wounded, but those mentioned and myself escaped unhurt. Iadvised that men enough to hold the position, once across--saythree hundred--should make a rush (protected as our lookout hadbeen by a heavy fire) across the sand-bar, and get a footing underthe other bank of the bayou, as the nucleus of an attacking force, if General Sherman decided to attack there, or to make a strongdiversion if the attack was made at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, infront of Morgan. General A. J. Smith, commanding First and SecondDivisions, approved of this. While returning to General Sherman, Ipassed along the Second and part of the Third Division. On theleft of the Second I found a new Illinois regiment, high up innumbers, working its way into position. The colonel, a brave butinexperienced officer, was trying to lead his men according to thepopular pictorial idea, viz. , riding in advance waving his sword. I was leading my horse, and taking advantage of such cover as Icould find on my course, but this man acted so bravely that I triedto save him. He did not accept my expostulations with very goodgrace, but was not rough about it. While I was begging him todismount, he waved his sword and advanced. In a second he wasshot, through the chest, and dropped from his horse, plucky to thelast. He died, I was told, within the hour. Many of the regimentswere new and inexperienced, but as a rule behaved well. The firealong the bayou was severe, but not very fatal, on account of thecover. I was constantly asked what news from Grant, for from themoment of our arrival in the Yazoo we were in expectation of eitherhearing his guns in the rear, or of having communication with him. This encouraged the men greatly, but the long waiting wasdisappointing, as the enemy was evidently in large force in theplenty of works, and a very strong position. Careful estimates andavailable information placed their force at fifteen to twentythousand men. I returned to headquarters about the middle of theafternoon, and made my report to the general. We were busy tillafter midnight, and again early in the morning of the 29th, inpreparing orders for the attack. These were unusually minute indetail. It seemed as though no contingency was left unprovidedfor. Urgent orders and cautions as to rations and ammunition weregiven. Drawings of the line of attack, orders for supports, alland everything was foreseen and given in writing, with personalexplanations to commanders of divisions, brigades, and evencommanders of regiments. Indeed, the commanding general, alwayscareful as to detail, left nothing to chance, and with experiencedand ordinate officers we would have succeeded, for the troops weregood. The general plan involved a feint on our left towardHaines's Bluff, by the navy, under Admiral Porter, with whom wewere in constant communication, while between him and GeneralSherman perfect harmony existed. On the right a demonstration byA. J. Smith was to be made. The Second Division (Stuart's) was tocross the sand-bar, and the Third (General Morgan's) was to crosson a small bridge over the dough at the head of Chickasaw Bayou, and, supported by Steele, was to push straight for the Bluff at thenearest spur where there was a battery in position, and to effecta lodgment there and in the earthworks. General Sherman gave hisorders in person to Morgan and Steele. I understood Morgan topromise that he would lead his division in person, and he seemed toexpect an easy victory, and expressed himself freely to thateffect. The aides were sent out, until I was left alone with thegeneral and a couple of orderlies. He located himself in aposition easy of access, and the most convenient afforded to thepoint of attack. He directed me to see what I could, and report ifI met anything that he should know. I galloped as fast as possibleto the right, and found part of the Sixth Missouri pushing over thesand-bar covered by the Thirteenth Regulars with a heavy fire. Wesupposed, if once across, they could get up the bank and turn thelevee against the enemy, and left with that impression. Being inheavy timber, I was not quite sure of my way back to the general, his location being new, and therefore pushed full gallop forMorgan's front, catching a good many stray shots from thesharpshooters behind the levee, as I was compelled to keep in sightof the bayou to hold direction. Something over half-way alongMorgan's division front, the commander of a Kentucky regimenthailed me and said he must have support, as he was threatened by amasked battery, and the enemy was in force in his front, and mightcross any moment. I answered, rather shortly, 'How the devil doyou know there is a masked battery? If you can't get over, how canthe rebels get at you?' He insisted on the battery, and danger. Ifinally told him the bayou was utterly impassable there, but, if heinsisted the enemy could cross, I would insist on an advance on ourside at that point. Hurrying on to make up lost time, I soonreached Morgan. He was making encouraging speeches in a generalway, but stopped to ask me questions as to Steele's rank, date ofcommission, etc. I was very much disturbed at this, fearing wantof harmony, and rode on to Steele, whom I found cursing Morgan sofiercely that I could not exactly make out the source of thetrouble, or reason why; but saw want of concert clearly enough. Ihastened back to General Sherman, and endeavored to impress myideas on him and my fears; but, while he admitted the facts, hecould not be made to believe that any jealousy or personal quarrelcould lead to a failure to support each other, and a neglect ofduty. The signal for attack had already been given, and theartillery had opened, when I left him again for Morgan's front. Ifound Morgan where I left him, and the troops advancing. I hadunderstood that he was to lead his division, and asked about it, but, getting no satisfaction, pushed for the front, crossing theslough at the little bridge at the head of the bayou. I found thewillows cut off eighteen inches or two feet long, with sharp pointsabove the mud, making it slow and difficult to pass, save at thebridge. I overtook the rear of the advance about two or threehundred feet up the gentle slope, and was astonished to find howsmall a force was making the attack. I was also surprised to findthat they were Steele's men instead of Morgan's. I also sawseveral regiments across the bayou, but not advancing; they werenear the levee. A heavy artillery and infantry fire was going onall this time. While making my way along the column, from whichthere were very few falling back, a shell burst near me, and theconcussion confused me at the time and left me with a headache forseveral months. When I got my wits about me again I found a goodmany coming back, but the main part of the force was compact andkeeping up the fight. I did not get closer to the woods than aboutfive hundred feet, and found that a large number had penetratedinto the enemy's works. When our men fell back, very few ran, butcame slowly and sullenly, far more angry than frightened. I foundGeneral Frank Blair on foot, and with him Colonel Sea, of SouthwestMissouri, and learned that Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterwardGovernor of Missouri, was captured with many of his men. They bothinsisted there on the spot, with those around us, that if all themen ordered up had gone up, or even all that crossed the bayou hadmoved forward, we could have readily established ourselves in theenemy's works. I was firmly of the same opinion at the time on theground; and, an entrance effected, we could have brought the wholeforce on dry ground, and had a base of operations againstVicksburg--though probably, in view of later events, we would havehad to stand a siege from Pemberton's army. After explanationswith Blair, I rode to where the men were, who had crossed thebayou, but had not advanced with the others. I found them to be DeCourcey's brigade; of Morgan's division, which General Shermansupposed to be in advance. In fact, it was the intended supportthat made the attack. A correspondence and controversy followedbetween General Blair and Colonel De Courcey, most of which I have, but nothing came of it. On reaching the bayou, I found thatThayer's brigade, of Steele's division, had in some way lost itsdirection and filed off to the right. Remembering the maskedbattery, I suspected that had something to do with the matter, and, on following it up, I learned that the Kentucky colonel beforementioned had appealed for aid against the masked battery andinvisible force of rebels, and that a regiment had been ordered tohim. This regiment, filing off into the timber, had been followedby Thayer's brigade, supposing it to be advancing to the front, andthus left a single brigade to attack a superior force of the enemyin an intrenched and naturally strong position. By the time themistake could be rectified, it was too late. Our loss was from onehundred and fifty to two hundred killed, and about eleven hundredprisoners and wounded. During the afternoon I went with a flag oftruce, with reference to burying the dead. I saw between eightyand one hundred of our men dead, all stripped. There were otherscloser into the enemy's works than I was allowed to go. On goinglater to where the Sixth Missouri crossed, I found that they wereunder the bank, and had dug in with their hands and bayonets, oranything in reach, to protect themselves from a vertical fire fromthe enemy overhead, who had a heavy force there. With greatdifficulty they were withdrawn at night. Next day arrangementswere made to attempt a lodgment below Haines's Bluff: This was tobe done by Steele's command, while the rest of the force attackedagain where we had already tried. During the day locomotiveswhistled, and a great noise and fuss went on in our front, and wesupposed that Grant was driving in Pemberton, and expected firingany moment up the Yazoo or in the rear of Vicksburg. Not hearingthis, we concluded that Pemberton was throwing his forces intoVicksburg. A heavy fog prevented Steele from making his movement. Rain began to fall, and our location was not good to be in after aheavy rain, or with the river rising. During the night (I think)of January, 1, 1863, our troops were embarked, material andprovisions having been loaded during the day. A short time beforedaylight of the 2d, I went by order of the general commanding, toour picket lines and carefully examined the enemy's lines, wherevera camp-fire indicated their presence. They were not very vigilant, and I once got close enough to hear them talk, but could understandnothing. Early in the morning I came in with the rear-guard, theenemy advancing his pickets and main guards only, and making noeffort at all to press us. Once I couldn't resist the temptationto fire into a squad that came bolder than the rest, and the twoshots were good ones. We received a volley in return that did comevery close among us, but hurt none of my party. Very soon afterour rear-guard was aboard, General Sherman learned from AdmiralPorter that McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo. Hewent, taking me and one other staff-officer, to see McClernand, andfound that, under an order from the President, he had taken commandof the Army of the Mississippi. He and his staff, of whom I onlyremember two-Colonels Scates and Braham, assistant adjutant-generaland aide-de-camp--seemed to think they had a big thing, and, so faras I could judge, they had just that. All hands thought thecountry expected them to cut their way to the Gulf; and to us, whohad just come out of the swamp, the cutting didn't seem such aneasy job as to the new-comers. Making due allowance for theelevation they seemed to feel in view of their job, everythingpassed off pleasantly, and we learned that General Grant'scommunications had been cut at Holly Springs by the capture ofMurphy and his force (at Holly Springs), and that he was either inMemphis by that time or would soon be. So that, everythingconsidered, it was about as well that we did not get our forces onthe bluff's of Walnut Hill. "

The above statement was sent to General Sherman in a letter dated"Chicago, February 5, 1876, " and signed "John H. Hammond. " Hammondwas General Sherman's assistant adjutant-general at the ChickasawBayou. 

J. E. TOURTELOTTE, Colonel and Aide-de-Camp. 

On 29th December, 1862, at Chickasaw Bayou, I was in command of theThirty-first Missouri Volunteer Infantry, First Brigade, FirstDivision, Fifteenth Army Corps (Blair's brigade). Colonel Wyman, of the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, having been killed, I was the senior colonel of the brigade. General Blair rode up towhere my regiment lay, and said to me:

"We are to make a charge here; we will charge in two lines; yourregiment will be in the first line, and the Twenty-ninth(Cavender's) will support you. Form here in the timber, and moveout across the bayou on a double-quick, and go right on to the topof the heights in your front. " He then told me to await a signal. I then attempted to make a reconnaissance of the ground over whichwe would have to charge, and rode out to the open ground in myfront, and saw that there was water and soft mud in the bayou, andwas fired upon by the sharp-shooters of the enemy, and turned andwent back into the woods where my command lay. Soon after thatGeneral Blair came near me, and I told him there was water and mudin the bayou, and I doubted if we could get across. He answered methat General Morgan told him there was no water nor mud to hinderus. I remarked that I had seen it myself, and General Morgan, orany one else, could see it if he would risk being shot at prettylively. I then told General Blair that it was certain destructionto us if we passed over the abatis upon the open ground where therehad once been a corn-field; that we could never reach the base ofthe hill. He turned to me and said, "Can't you take your regimentup there?" I told him, "Yes, I can take my regiment anywhere, because the men do not know any better than to go, " but remarkedthat old soldiers could not be got to go up there. General Blairthen said, "Tom, if we succeed, this will be a grand thing; youwill have the glory of leading the assault. " He then went on tosay that General Morgan's division would support us, and they wereheroes of many battles, and pointed to the Fifty-eighth Ohio, thenforming in the rear of the Thirteenth Illinois on my right, andsaid: "See these men? They are a part of Morgan's division, and areheroes of many battles. " I laughingly said that they might beheroes, but the regiment did not number as many as one of mycompanies. He again assured me we would be supported by Morgan'sdivision, and all I had to do was to keep right on and "keep goingtill you get into Vicksburg. " I took my position in advance of myregiment and awaited the signal. When we heard it, we raised ashout, and started at a double-quick, the Thirteenth Illinois on myright. I saw no troops on my left. When we emerged from thewoods, the enemy opened upon us; crossing the bayou under fire, andmany of the men sinking in the mud and water, our line was verymuch disordered, but we pretty well restored it before reaching theabatis. Here we were greatly disordered, but somewhat restored theline on reaching the plateau or corn-field. The Twenty-ninthMissouri came on, gallantly supporting us. The Thirteenth Illinoiscame out upon the corn-field, and the Fifty-eighth Ohio followedclose upon it. There was firing to my left, and as I afterwardlearned was from the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's brigade (and I believeof Steele's division). I was struck and fell, and my regiment wentback in great disorder. The fire was terrific. I saw beyond theThirteenth Illinois, to my right, a disordered line, and learnedafterward it was the Sixteenth Ohio. When I was taken from thefield by the enemy and taken into Vicksburg, I found among thewounded and prisoners men and officers of the Sixteenth andFifty-eighth Ohio, and of the Twenty-ninth and Thirty-firstMissouri, and Thirteenth Illinois. After I was exchanged andjoined my command, General Blair laughingly remarked to me that Ihad literally obeyed his order and gone "straight on to Vicksburg. "He lamented the cutting to pieces of our force on that day. Wetalked the whole matter over at his headquarters during the siegeof Vicksburg. He said that if the charge had been made along ourwhole line with the same vigor of attack made by his brigade, andif we had been supported as Morgan promised to do, we might havesucceeded. I dissented from the opinion that we could even thenhave succeeded. I asked him what excuse Morgan gave for failing tosupport us, and he said that Colonel or General De Courcey was insome manner to blame for that, but he said Morgan was mistaken asto the nature of the ground and generally as to the feasibility ofthe whole thing, and was responsible for the failure to afford usthe support he had promised; that he and General Sherman and all ofthem were misled by the statements and opinions of Morgan as to thesituation in our front, and Morgan was, on his part, deceived bythe reports of his scouts about other matters as well as the matterof the water in the bayou. 

THOMAS C. FLETCHER

ARKANSAS POST. 

Extracts from Admiral Porter's Journal. 

Sherman and I had made arrangements to capture Arkansas Post. 

On the 31st of December, while preparing to go out of the Yazoo, anarmy officer called to see me, and said that he belonged to GeneralMcClernand's staff, and that the general was at the mouth of theYazoo River, and desired to see me at once. I sent word to thegeneral that if he wished to see me he could have an opportunity bycalling on board my flag-ship. 

A few moments after I had heard the news of McClernand'a arrival, Isaw Sherman pulling about in a boat, and hailed him, informing himthat McClernand was at the mouth of the Yazoo. Sherman then cameon board, and, in consequence of this unexpected news, determinedto postpone the movement out of the Yazoo River, and let McClernandtake that upon himself. 

General McClernand took my hint and came on board the flag-ship, but I soon discovered that any admiral, Grant, Sherman, or all thegenerals in the army, were nobody in his estimation. Sherman hadbeen at McClernand's headquarters to see him and state thecondition of affairs, and he then suggested to the latter the planof going to Arkansas Post. 

I had a number of fine maps hanging up in my cabin, and whenMcClernand came on board he examined them all with the eye of aconnoisseur. He then stated to me as a new thing the plan heproposed!!! of going to Arkansas Post and stirring up our troops, which had been "demoralized by the late defeat" (Sherman waspresent, looking daggers at him). I answered, "Yes, GeneralSherman and myself have already arranged for going to ArkansasPost. " Sherman then made some remark about the disposition of thetroops in the coming expedition, when McClernand gave him rather acurt answer. McClernand then remarked, "If you will let me havethree gunboats, I will go and take the place. " Now GeneralMcClernand had about as much idea of what a gunboat was, or coulddo, as the man in the moon. He did not know, the differencebetween an ironclad and a "tin-clad. " He had heard that gunboatshad taken Fort Henry, and that was all he knew about them. I saidto him: "I'll tell you what I will do, General McClernand. IfGeneral Sherman goes in command of the troops, I will go myself incommand of a proper force, and will insure the capture of thepost. " McClernand winced under this, and Sherman quietly walkedoff into the after-cabin. He beckoned me to come there, whileMcClernand was apparently deeply engaged in studying out a chart, making believe he was interested, in order to conceal his temper. Sherman said to me: "Admiral, how could you make such a remark toMcClernand? He hates me already, and you have made him an enemyfor life. "

"I don't care, " said I; "he shall not treat you rudely in my cabin, and I was glad of the opportunity of letting him know mysentiments. " By this time, General McClernand having bottled uphis wrath, or cooled down, I went in to him and we discussed thematter. He consented that Sherman should go in command of thetroops, and the interview ended pleasantly enough. 

The above extracts from Admiral Porter's journal were sent by theadmiral to General Sherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Washington, May 29, 1875, " and signed "David D. Porter. "

J. E. TOURTELOTTE. 

After leaving the Yazoo, the Army of the Mississippi rendezvous wasat Milliken's Bend. During the night of January 4th or 5th, General McClernand came on board the Forest Queen, and with GeneralSherman went to the Black Hawk flag-boat. There an interview tookplace, during which the expedition to Arkansas Post took shape. General Sherman having asked leave to take the post, and AdmiralPorter having decided to go along, McClernand thought best to gowith his entire army, although the enemy were supposed to have onlyabout four or five thousand men, and the fort was little more thana large earthwork commanding the river. 

General Sherman's command was then entitled the Second Corps, Armyof the Mississippi, and was comprised of the First Division, Blair's, Hovey's, and Thayer's brigades, commanded by Steele; andthe Second Division, commanded by David Stuart, with Colonels GilesA. And Kilby Smith commanding brigades. 

Our fleet was convoyed by three ironclads and several othergunboats. The weather was bitterly cold for that latitude; we werefour days getting into the Arkansas River, which we entered by theWhite River cut-off; and my recollection is, that our passing themouth of the main river deceived the enemy as to our destination. The entrance through the cut-off was feasible by reason of highwater, and I think made our appearance a surprise to the force atthe post. We disembarked on the morning of the 10th of January. Stuart's division first encountered the enemy behind an earthworkabout four miles from the fort, running across the solid groundfrom the river to a swamp. General Sherman in person took Steele'sdivision, and followed a road leading to the rear of the earthworkjust mentioned. We had got fairly under way when the rebels fellback to the fort, and McClernand, coming up, ordered us to fallback, and march up the river. It seemed to me then, and afterward, that it would have been better to have marched straight to the rearof the fort, as we started to do. We soon overtook Stuart andclosed in, General Sherman on the right, Morgan's force on theleft, reaching to the river, where the gunboats were, while Shermanreached from the road which connected the post with the backcountry, toward where the earthworks reached the river above thefort, and threatened their communications with Little Rock. Thenight was cold and cloudy, with some snow. There were a good manyabandoned huts to our rear, but our forces in position lay on thefrozen ground, sheltered as best they could, among the bushes andtimber. We were so close that they could have reached us any timeduring the night with light artillery. The gun-boats threw heavyshells into the fort and behind the earthworks all night, keepingthe enemy awake and anxious. The heavy boom of the artillery wasfollowed by the squeak, squeak of Admiral Porter's little tug, ashe moved around making his arrangements for the morrow. The soundswere ridiculous by comparison. General Sherman and staff lay onthe roots of an old oak-tree, that kept them partly clear of mud. The cold was sharp, my right boot being frozen solid in a puddle inthe morning. About half-past two or three o'clock, GeneralSherman, with another and myself, crept in as close as possible andreconnoitred the position. The general managed to creep in muchcloser than the rest of us--in fact, so close as to cause usanxiety. The enemy worked hard all night on their abatis andintrenchments, and in the morning we found a ditch and parapetrunning clear across the point on which the post was situated. This point was cut by a road from the back country, across whichwas a heavy earthwork and a battery. This road was at theextremity of our left. General McClernand kept his head-quarterson his boat, the Tigress. He came up in the morning to a place inthe woods in our rear. One of his staff, a cavalry-officer, climbed a tree to report movements; but from that point there wasvery little to be seen. Between ten and eleven o'clock the fireopened from the fleet, and we opened along the whole line frominfantry and field-guns. Our men soon worked in close enough tokeep down the fire of the enemy to a very marked degree. 

After reporting to General Sherman, and while explaining theposition of the fleet, the smoke-stacks and flags appeared abovethe fort. What firing was going on in our immediate front ceased. A good many rebels were in plain sight, running away from the fortand scattering. While we were still surprised, the cry was raisedthat a white flag was hung out. I did not see it, but in a fewminutes saw others along the line, and just as the general startedfor the fort I saw the flag not far from the white house, near theparapet. Orders were given to cease firing. Captain Dayton wassent to the fort where the first flag was raised. Some shots werefired and some men hurt after this. The first rebel officer weencountered was Colonel or General Garland, commanding brigade, whowas ordered to put his men in line and stack arms, which was done. I was directed to pass along the line to the right, and cause theprisoners to stack arms and form our men in line, just outside thework. This I did till I reached Deshler's brigade, on our extremeright, or nearly so, and who was opposed to the right of Steele'sforce. Steele's men had rushed up to the very foot of the parapet, and some were on it, though they did not fire. The commander ofthe enemy (Deshler) refused to obey my orders to stack arms, andasked a good many questions as to "how it happened;" said he wasnot whipped, but held us in check, etc. I told him there wereeight or nine thousand men right there, that a shot from me, or acall, would bring down on him, and that we had entire possession ofthe place. After sending two officers from the nearest troops toexplain the condition to Steele, and to warn every officer they metto pass the word for everybody to be on the sharp lookout, Iarranged with Deshler to keep quiet until I could bring his owncommander, or orders from him. Returning to General Sherman, Ifound a party of young rebel officers, including Robert Johnston'sson (rebel Senate) and Captain Wolf, quartermaster, of New Orleans, who declined to surrender except to gentlemen. Some GermanMissouri soldiers didn't relish the distinction, and were aboutclubbing them over the head, when I interfered and received theirsurrender. Hurrying back to the general, I reported the dangerouscondition of things. He and General Churchill, commanding officerof the enemy, started for Deshler's brigade; meeting Garland, aquarrel and some recrimination followed between him and Churchill, as to where the fault of the surrender belonged, which was ratherpromptly silenced by General Sherman, who hurried to the scene oftrouble. There, after some ill-natured talk, Deshler ordered hismen to lay down their arms. I rode into the fort, and found theparapet badly torn up by the fire from the fleet. On going to theembrasure where I had seen the gun while on the river-bank talkingto Captain Shirk, the piece was found split back about eighteeninches, and the lower half of the muzzle dropped out. A batteredbut unexploded shell lying with the piece explained that it musthave struck the gun in the muzzle, almost squarely. On passingalong the inside I saw from the torn condition of the earthworkshow tremendous our fire was, and how the fire of the enemy was keptdown. The fire of the navy had partly torn down the side of thefort next the river. A good many sailors were in the fort. General A. J. Smith, Admiral Porter, and General Burbridge werethere--all in high spirits, but in some contention as to who got infirst. Toward dark, or nearly so, an Arkansas regiment came in asreenforcements, but surrendered without any trouble. About thesame time General Sherman received orders to put General A. J. Smith in charge of the fort, and stay outside with his men. As histroops were nearly all inside, and had four-fifths of the prisonersin charge, these orders were not very clear, and the general leftfor headquarters to find out what was meant. I went on collectingarms, and as our men were scattering a good deal and were greatlyexcited, I took the precaution to pass along the line and march theprisoners far enough from the stacked arms to be out of temptation. I was especially urged to this by hearing several rebel officersspeak of their guns being still loaded. It was dark before all theprisoners were collected and under guard, including the regimentthat arrived after the fight. I am confident that all theprisoners were under guard by General Sherman's troops. 

Everything being secure, the staff-officers, all of whom had beenbusily engaged, scattered to compare notes and enjoy the victory. I found my way onboard the Tigress, where every one was greatlyexcited, and in high feather regarding our victory, the biggestthing since Donelson. I also obtained some food and small comfortsfor a few rebel officers, including young Johnston, Wolfe, and theColonel Deshler already mentioned. Then hunted up General Sherman, whom I found sitting on a cracker-boa in the white house alreadymentioned, near where the white flag first appeared. Garland waswith him, and slept with him that night, while the rest of us laidaround wherever we could. It was a gloomy, bloody house, andsuggestive of war. Garland was blamed by the other Confederateofficers for the white flag, and remained with us for safety. Nextday was very cold. We worked hard at the lists of prisoners--nearly five thousand in number--all of whom were sent to St. Louis, in charge of our inspector-general, Major Sanger. Ourloss was less than one hundred. The enemy, although behindintrenchments, lost more than double what we did. Their woundedwere much worse hurt than ours, who were mostly hit around the headand arms. 

The losses were nearly all in General Sherman's wing of the army. The loss in the fleet amounted to little, but their service wasvery valuable, and deserved great credit, though they receivedlittle. There was a good deal of sympathy between our part of theforces and the fleet people, and I then thought, and still think, if we had been on the left next the river, that in connection withthe tremendous fire from the navy, we could have carried the workin an hour after we opened on it. Their missiles traversed thewhole fortification, clear through to the hospitals at the upperend, and I stood five minutes in rifle-range of the fort next theriver--not hit, and but seldom shot at, and no one hit near me. 

On the 18th we embarked, in a snow-storm; collected at Napoleon, which seemed to be washing away; and steamed to Milliken's Bend, were we arrived on January 21st, and soon after went to Young'splantation, near Vicksburg. 

The above statement from General Hammond was received by GeneralSherman, inclosed in a letter dated "Chicago, February 5, 1876" andsigned "John H. Hammond, " who was adjutant-general to GeneralSherman during the winter of 1862-'83. 

J. E. TOURTELLOTTE

CINCINNATI, February 3, 1876

MY DEAR GENERAL: At Arkansas Post the troops debarked from steamerJanuary 9th, from one o'clock to dark, in the vicinity of Notrib'sfarm, and on the 10th moved out to get position; Steele to theright, crossing the low ground to the north, to get a higherground, avoid crowding the moving columns, and gain the left (ourright) and rear of the "post, " and the river-bank above the post. Stuart took the river-road the movement commencing at 11 o'clocka. M.. After crossing the low ground covered with water, you werecalled back with Steele, as Stuart had driven out the enemy'srifle-trench pickets, this giving more and feasible room formoving. Stuart was pushed forward, and by dark he and Steele werewell up to their expected positions. Before daylight on the 11thyou directed me to accompany you for a personal inspection of theground to your front, which we made on foot, going so far forwardthat we could easily hear the enemy at work and moving about. Discovering the open fields, you at once directed Steele to move tothe right and front, and pushed Stuart out so as to fully commandthem and the field-work of the enemy extending from the fort, toprevent farther strengthening, as it was evident these works werethe product of a recent thought. Stuart and Steele were prompt intaking position, but Morgan's command (not under your control) didnot seem to work up, or keep in junction with you. At ten o'clockyou sent me to McClernand to ascertain why the delay of attack. Heattributed it to Admiral Porter, which was really unjust. Theattack began at 1 p. M. , by Admiral Porter, and the sound of hisfirst gun had not died till your men were engaged--Wood's, Barrett's, and the Parrott batteries and infantry. It waslively for a time, and Stuart pushed clear up to the enemy'srifle-trenches, and forced them to keep sheltered. Hammond wasmostly with Steele; Sanger sent to McClernand, and McCoy, myself, and John Taylor were with you and Stuart. At about half-past threeI got your permission to go to Giles Smith's skirmish-line, and, thinking I saw evidence of the enemy weakening, I hurried back toyou and reported my observations. I was so confident that a demandfor it would bring a surrender, that I asked permission to make it, and, as you granted me, but refused to let another member of yourstaff, at his request, go with me, I rode directly down the roadwith only an orderly. Colonel Garland, commanding a brigade, wasthe first officer I saw, to whom, for you, I made the demand. Allfiring ceased at once, or in a few moments. I sent the orderly backto you, and you rode forward. It was then four o'clock. 

During the attack, nobody seemed to think McClernand had any clearidea of what or how it was to be done. During the day he gave youno directions, nor came where you were; he was well to the rear, with his "man up a tree, " who in the capacity of a lookout gaveMcClernand information, from which he based such instructions as hemade to his subordinates. He was free to express himself as beinga man of "destiny, " and his "star" was in the ascendance. I am, etc. , L. M. DAYTON, late Colonel of the Staff, now of Cincinnati, Ohio. 

General W. T. SHERMAN. 

MERIDIAN CAMPAIGN. 

[Special Field Orders, No. 11. ]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEMEMPHIS, January 27, 1864

V. The expedition is one of celerity, and all things must tend tothat. Corps commanders and staff-officers will see that ourmovements are not encumbered by wheeled vehicles improperly loaded. Not a tent, from the commander-in-chief down, will be carried. Thesick will be left behind, and the surgeons can find houses andsheds for all hospital purposes. 

VI. All the cavalry in this department is placed under the ordersand command of Brigadier-General W. S. Smith, who will receivespecial instructions. 

By order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN

L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

NOTE. -That same evening I started in a steamboat for Vicksburg. W. T. S. St. Louis, 1885. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEEMEMPHIS, January 27, 1864

Brigadier-General W. S. SMITH, commanding Cavalry, etc. , present. 

DEAR GENERAL: By an order issued this day I have placed all thecavalry of this department subject to your command. I estimate youcan make a force of full seven thousand men, which I believe to besuperior and better in all respects than the combined cavalry whichthe enemy has in all the State of Mississippi. I will in personstart for Vicksburg to-day, and with four divisions of infantry, artillery, and cavalry move out for Jackson, Brandon, and Meridian, aiming to reach the latter place by February 10th. General Bankswill feign on Pascagoula and General Logan on Rome. I want youwith your cavalry to move from Colliersville on Pontotoc andOkolona; thence sweeping down near the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, disable that road as much as possible, consume or destroy theresources of the enemy along that road, break up the connectionwith Columbus, Mississippi, and finally reach me at or nearMeridian as near the date I have mentioned as possible. This willcall for great energy of action on your part, but I believe you areequal to it, and you have the best and most experienced troops inthe service, and they will do anything that is possible. GeneralGrierson is with you, and is familiar with the whole country. Iwill send up from Haines's Bluff an expedition of gunboats andtransports combined, to feel up the Yazoo as far as the presentwater will permit. This will disconcert the enemy. My movement onJackson will also divide the enemy, so that by no combination canhe reach you with but a part of his force. I wish you to attackany force of cavalry you meet and follow them southward, but in noevent be drawn into the forks of the streams that make up the Yazoonor over into Alabama. Do not let the enemy draw you into minoraffairs, but look solely to the greater object to destroy hiscommunication from Okolona to Meridian, and thence eastward toSelma. From Okolona south you will find abundance of foragecollected along the railroad, and the farmers have corn standing inthe fields. Take liberally of all these, as well as horses, mules, cattle, etc. As a rule, respect dwellings and families assomething too sacred to be disturbed by soldiers, but mills, barns, sheds, stables, and such like things use for the benefit orconvenience of your command. If convenient, send into Columbus, Mississippi, and destroy all machinery there, and the bridge acrossthe Tombigbee, which enables the enemy to draw the resources of theeast side of the valley, but this is not of sufficient importanceto delay your movement. Try and communicate with me by scouts andspies from the time you reach Pontotoc. Avoid any large force ofinfantry, leaving them to me. We have talked over this matter somuch that the above covers all points not provided for in mypublished orders of to-day. I am, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Mayor-General, commanding. 

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, January 27, 1864. 

Brigadier-General J. P. HATCH, in charge of Cavalry Bureau, St. Louis, Missouri. 

SIR: Your favor of the 21st inst. Is just received. Up to thepresent time eight hundred and eighteen horses have arrived heresince Captain Hudson's visit to St. Louis. I wrote you upon hisreturn several days ago that it would not be necessary to divertshipments to this point which could not reach us before February1st. We shall certainly get off on our contemplated expeditionbefore that time. The number of horses estimated for in thisdepartment by its chief quartermaster was two thousand, and thisnumber, including those already sent, will, I think, completelymount all the dismounted cavalry of this department. Recruits forcavalry regiments are arriving freely, and this will swell ourrequisitions for a couple of months to come. I will as far aspossible procure horses from the regions of country traversed byour cavalry. 

Yours truly, W. SOOY SMITH, Brigadier-General, Chief of Cavalry, Military Division of the Mississippi. 

MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, January 28, 1864

Brigadier-General GEORGE CROOK, commanding Second Cavalry Division, Huntsville, Alabama. 

I start in about three days with seven, thousand men to Meridianvia Pontotoc. Demonstrate on Decatur, to hold Roddy. 

W. SOOY SMITH, Brigadier-General, Chief of Cavalry, Military Division of the Mississippi. 

MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, July 9, 1875General W. T. SHERMAN, Commander-in-Chief, United States Army. 

SIR: Your letter of July 7th is just received. 

Your entire statement in the "Memoirs" concerning my part in theMeridian campaign is incorrect. 

You overstate my strength, placing it at seven thousand effective, when it was but six. The nominal strength of my command was seventhousand. 

You understate the strength of my enemy, putting Forrest's force atfour thousand. On our return to Nashville, you stated it, inGeneral Grant's presence, to have been but twenty-five hundred. Before and during my movement I positively knew Forrest's strengthto be full six thousand, and he has since told me so himself. 

Instead of delaying from the 1st to the 11th of February for "someregiment that was ice-bound near Columbus, Kentucky, " it was anentire brigade, Colonel Waring's, without which your orders to mewere peremptory not to move. I asked you if I should wait itsarrival, and you answered: "Certainly; if you go without it, youwill be, too weak, and I want you strong enough to go where youplease. "

The time set for our arrival at Meridian, the 10th of February, hadarrived before it was possible for me, under your orders, to movefrom Memphis, and I would have been entirely justifiable if I hadnot started at all. But I was at that time, and at all timesduring the war, as earnest and anxious to carry out my orders, anddo my full duty as you or any other officer could be, and I set outto make a march of two hundred and fifty miles into theConfederacy, having to drive back a rebel force equal to my own. After the time had arrived for the full completion of my movement, I drove this force before me, and penetrated one hundred and sixtymiles into the Confederacy--did more hard fighting, and killed, wounded, and captured more of the enemy than you did during thecampaign--did my work most thoroughly, as far as I could go withoutencountering the rebel cavalry set loose by your return fromMeridian, and brought off my command, with all the capturedproperty and rescued negroes, with very small loss, consideringthat inflicted on the enemy, and the long-continued and very severefighting. If I had disobeyed your orders, and started withoutWaring's brigade, I would have been "too weak, " would probably havebeen defeated, and would have been subjected to just censure. Having awaited its arrival, as I was positively and distinctlyordered to do, it only remained for me to start upon its arrival, and accomplish all that I could of the work allotted to me. Tohave attempted to penetrate farther into the enemy's country, withthe cavalry of Polk's army coming up to reenforce Forrest, wouldhave insured the destruction of my entire command, situated as itwas. I cannot now go into all the particulars, though I assure youthat they make the proof of the correctness of my conduct asconclusive as I could desire it to be. I was not headed off anddefeated by an inferior force near West Point. We had the fightingall our own way near West Point, and at all other points except atOkalona, on our return, when we had the worst of it for a littlewhile, but finally checked the enemy handsomely, and continued ourreturn march, fighting at the rear and on both flanks, repulsingall attacks and moving in perfect order. And so my movement wasnot a failure, except that I did not reach Meridian as intended, for the reason stated, and for many more which it is not necessaryfor me to detail here. On the other hand, it was a very decidedsuccess, inflicting a terrible destruction of supplies of everykind, and a heavy loss of men upon the enemy. You should have soreported it in the beginning. You should so amend your report, and"Memoirs" now. This, and no less than this, is due from onesoldier to another. It is due to the exalted position which youoccupy, and, above all, it is due to that truthfulness in historywhich you claim to revere. If you desire it, I will endeavor tovisit you, and in a friendly manner "fight our battles o'er again, "and endeavor to convince you that you have always been mistaken asto the manner in which my part in the "Meridian campaign" wasperformed. But I will never rest until the wrong statementsregarding it are fully and fairly corrected. Yours truly, WILLIAM SOOY SMITH

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATESSt. Louis, Missouri, July 11, 1875. 

General J. D. WEBSTER, Chicago, Illinois

DEAR GENERAL: General W. Sooy Smith feels aggrieved and wronged bymy account of his part in the Meridian campaign, in my "Memoirs, "pages 394, 395, and properly appeals to me for correction. I haveoffered to modify any words or form of expression that he may pointout, but he asks me to completely change the whole that concernshim. This, of course, I will not do, as his part was material tothe whole, and cannot be omitted or materially altered withoutchanging the remainder, for his failure to reach Meridian byFebruary 10th was the reason for other movements distant from him. I now offer him, what seems to me fair and liberal, that we submitthe points at issue to you as arbitrator. You are familiar withthe ground, the coincident history, and most, if not all, theparties. 

I propose to supply you with

1. Copy of my orders placing all the cavalry under General Smith'sorders (with returns). 

2. My letter of instructions to him of January 27th. 

3. My official report of the campaign, dated Vicksburg, March 7, 1864. 

4. General W. Sooy Smith's report of his operations, datedNashville, Tennessee, March 4, 1864. 

After reading these, I further propose that you address usquestions which we will answer in writing, when you are to make usa concise, written decision, which I will have published in closeconnection with the subject in controversy. If General Smith willshow you my letter to him of this date, and also deliver this withhis written assent, I will promptly furnish you the abovedocuments, and also procure from the official files a return of thecavalry force available at and near Memphis on the date of myorders, viz. , January 27, 1864. 

With great respect, your friend and servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

NOTE:--General Smith never submitted his case to the arbitrationoffered. The whole will be made clear by the publication of theofficial records, which are already in print, though not yetissued. His orders were in writing, and I have no recollection ofthe "peremptory" verbal orders to which he refers, and quotes asfrom me. 

ST. Louis, Missouri, 1895. W. T. S. 

MAYWOOD, ILLINOIS, July 14, 1875. 

General W. T. SHERMAN, Commander-in-Chief, etc. 

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 11th of July reaches me just as Iam starting to spend the first vacation I have ever allowed myself--in the Territories, with my wife and son. 

It indicates a spirit of fairness from which we have better thingsthan an arbitration to hope for. Though, if we should reach such anecessity, there is no one living to whom our differences mightmore properly be referred than to General Webster. I make noobjection to your writing your "Memoirs, " and, as long as theyrefer to your own conduct, you are at liberty to write them as youlike; but, when they refer to mine, and deal unjustly with myreputation, I, of right, object. 

Neither do I wish to write my "Memoirs, " unless compelled to do soto vindicate my good name. There were certain commands which wereto make up mine. These, Waring's brigade included, were spoken ofby us in the long conversation to which you refer. This brigade weknew was having a hard time of it in its movement from Columbus toMemphis. I asked you if I should move without it if it did notarrive, and you answered me as stated in my last letter to you. Those who immediately surrounded me during the painful delay thatoccurred will inform you how sorely I chafed under the restraint ofthat peremptory order. 

In the conversation that occurred between us at Nashville, whileall the orders, written and verbal, were still fresh in yourmemory, you did not censure me for waiting for Waring, but forallowing myself to be encumbered with fugitive negroes to such anextent that my command was measurably unfit for active movement oreasy handling, and for turning back from West Point, instead ofpressing on toward Meridian. Invitations had been industriouslycirculated, by printed circulars and otherwise, to the negroes tocome into our lines, and to seek our protection wherever they couldfind it, and I considered ourselves pledged to receive and protectthem. Your censure for so doing, and your remarks on that subjectto me in Nashville, are still fresh in my memory, and of acharacter which you would now doubtless gladly disavow. 

But we must meet and talk the whole matter over, and I will be atany trouble to see you when I return. 

Meantime I will not let go the hope that I will convince youabsolutely of your error, for the facts are entirely on my side. Yours truly, WILLIAM SOOY SMITH

MEMOIRS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

By William T. Sherman

VOLUME II

CHAPTER XVI. 

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN-NASHVILLE AND CHATTANOOGA TO BENEBAW. 

MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY, 1864. 

On the 18th day of March, 1864, at Nashville, Tennessee, I relievedLieutenant-General Grant in command of the Military Division of theMississippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, Cumberland, Tennessee, and Arkansas, commanded respectively by Major-GeneralsSchofield, Thomas, McPherson, and Steele. General Grant was in theact of starting East to assume command of all the armies of theUnited States, but more particularly to give direction in person tothe Armies of the Potomac and James, operating against Richmond;and I accompanied him as far as Cincinnati on his way, to availmyself of the opportunity to discuss privately many little detailsincident to the contemplated changes, and of preparation for thegreat events then impending. Among these was the intendedassignment to duty of many officers of note and influence, who had, by the force of events, drifted into inactivity and discontent. Among these stood prominent Generals McClellan, Burnside, andFremont, in, the East; and Generals Buell, McCook, Negley, andCrittenden, at the West. My understanding was that General Grantthought it wise and prudent to give all these officers appropriatecommands, that would enable them to regain the influence they hadlost; and, as a general reorganization of all the armies was thennecessary, he directed me to keep in mind especially the claims ofGenerals Buell, McCook, and Crittenden, and endeavor to give themcommands that would be as near their rank and dates of commissionas possible; but I was to do nothing until I heard further fromhim on the subject, as he explained that he would have to consultthe Secretary of War before making final orders. General Buell andhis officers had been subjected to a long ordeal by a court ofinquiry, touching their conduct of the campaign in Tennessee andKentucky, that resulted in the battle of Perryville, or Chaplin'sHills, October 8, 1862, and they had been substantially acquitted;and, as it was manifest that we were to have some hard fighting, wewere anxious to bring into harmony every man and every officer ofskill in the profession of arms. Of these, Generals Buell andMcClellan were prominent in rank, and also by reason of their fameacquired in Mexico, as well as in the earlier part of the civilwar. 

After my return to Nashville I addressed myself to the task oforganization and preparation, which involved the general securityof the vast region of the South which had been already conquered, more especially the several routes of supply and communication withthe active armies at the front, and to organize a large army tomove into Georgia, coincident with the advance of the Easternarmies against Richmond. I soon received from Colonel J. B. Fry--now of the Adjutant-General's Department, but then at Washington incharge of the Provost-Marshal-General's office--a letter asking me todo something for General Buell. I answered him frankly, telling himof my understanding with General Grant, and that I was still awaitingthe expected order of the War Department, assigning General Buell tomy command. Colonel Fry, as General Buell's special friend, repliedthat he was very anxious that I should make specific application forthe services of General Buell by name, and inquired what I proposedto offer him. To this I answered that, after the agreement withGeneral Grant that he would notify me from Washington, I could notwith propriety press the matter, but if General Buell should beassigned to me specifically I was prepared to assign him to commandall the troops on the Mississippi River from Cairo to Natchez, comprising about three divisions, or the equivalent of a corpsd'armee. General Grant never afterward communicated to me on thesubject at all; and I inferred that Mr. Stanton, who was notoriouslyvindictive in his prejudices, would not consent to the employment ofthese high officers. General Buell, toward the close of the war, published a bitter political letter, aimed at General Grant, reflecting on his general management of the war, and stated that bothGenerals Canby and Sherman had offered him a subordinate command, which he had declined because he had once outranked us. This was nottrue as to me, or Canby either, I think, for both General Canby and Iranked him at West Point and in the old army, and he (General Buell)was only superior to us in the date of his commission asmajor-general, for a short period in 1862. This newspapercommunication, though aimed at General Grant, reacted on himself, forit closed his military career. General Crittenden afterward obtainedauthority for service, and I offered him a division, but he declinedit for the reason, as I understood it, that he had at one timecommanded a corps. He is now in the United States service, commanding the Seventeenth Infantry. General McCook obtained acommand under General Canby, in the Department of the Gulf, where herendered good service, and he is also in the regular service, lieutenant-colonel Tenth Infantry. 

I returned to Nashville from Cincinnati about the 25th of March, and started at once, in a special car attached to the regulartrain, to inspect my command at the front, going to Pulaski, Tennessee, where I found General G. M. Dodge; thence to Huntsville, Alabama, where I had left a part of my personal staff and therecords of the department during the time we had been absent atMeridian; and there I found General McPherson, who had arrived fromVicksburg, and had assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee. General McPherson accompanied me, and we proceeded by the cars toStevenson, Bridgeport, etc. , to Chattanooga, where we spent a dayor two with General George H. Thomas, and then continued on toKnoxville, where was General Schofield. He returned with us toChattanooga, stopping by the way a few hours at Loudon, where werethe headquarters of the Fourth Corps (Major-General GordonGranger). General Granger, as usual, was full of complaints at thetreatment of his corps since I had left him with General Burnside, at Knoxville, the preceding November; and he stated to mepersonally that he had a leave of absence in his pocket, of whichhe intended to take advantage very soon. About the end of March, therefore, the three army commanders and myself were together atChattanooga. We had nothing like a council of war, but conversedfreely and frankly on all matters of interest then in progress orimpending. We all knew that, as soon as the spring was fairlyopen, we should have to move directly against our antagonist, General Jos. E. Johnston, then securely intrenched at Dalton, thirty miles distant; and the purpose of our conference at the timewas to ascertain our own resources, and to distribute to each partof the army its appropriate share of work. We discussed everypossible contingency likely to arise, and I simply instructed eacharmy commander to make immediate preparations for a hard campaign, regulating the distribution of supplies that were coming up by railfrom Nashville as equitably as possible. We also agreed on somesubordinate changes in the organization of the three separatearmies which were destined to take the field; among which was theconsolidation of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps (Howard and Slocum)into a single corps, to be commanded by General Jos. Hooker. General Howard was to be transferred to the Fourth Corps, viceGordon Granger to avail himself of his leave of absence; andGeneral Slocum was to be ordered down the Mississippi River, tocommand the District of Vicksburg. These changes required theconsent of the President, and were all in due time approved. 

The great question of the campaign was one of supplies. Nashville, our chief depot, was itself partially in a hostile country, andeven the routes of supply from Louisville to Nashville by rail, andby way of the Cumberland River, had to be guarded. Chattanooga(our starting-point) was one hundred and thirty-six miles in frontof Nashville, and every foot of the way, especially the manybridges, trestles, and culverts, had to be strongly guarded againstthe acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy's cavalry. Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia, it was manifest thatwe should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard itlikewise: General Thomas's army was much the largest of the three, was best provided, and contained the best corps of engineers, railroad managers, and repair parties, as well as the best body ofspies and provost-marshals. On him we were therefore compelled in agreat measure to rely for these most useful branches of service. Hehad so long exercised absolute command and control over the railroadsin his department, that the other armies were jealous, and thesethought the Army of the Cumberland got the lion's share of thesupplies and other advantages of the railroads. I found a good dealof feeling in the Army of the Tennessee on this score, and thereforetook supreme control of the roads myself, placed all the armycommanders on an equal footing, and gave to each the same control, sofar as orders of transportation for men and stores were concerned. Thomas's spies brought him frequent and accurate reports of Jos. E. Johnston's army at Dalton, giving its strength anywhere between fortyand fifty thousand men, and these were being reenforced by troopsfrom Mississippi, and by the Georgia militia, under General G. W. Smith. General Johnston seemed to be acting purely on the defensive, so that we had time and leisure to take all our measures deliberatelyand fully. I fixed the date of May 1st, when all things should be inreadiness for the grand forward movement, and then returned toNashville; General Schofield going back to Knoxville, and McPhersonto Huntsville, Thomas remaining at Chattanooga. 

On the 2d of April, at Nashville, I wrote to General Grant, then atWashington, reporting to him the results of my visit to the severalarmies, and asked his consent to the several changes proposed, which was promptly given by telegraph. I then addressed myselfspecially to the troublesome question of transportation andsupplies. I found the capacity of the railroads from Nashvilleforward to Decatur, and to Chattanooga, so small, especially in thenumber of locomotives and care, that it was clear that they werebarely able to supply the daily wants of the armies then dependenton them, with no power of accumulating a surplus in advance. Thecars were daily loaded down with men returning from furlough, withcattle, horses, etc. ; and, by reason of the previous desolation ofthe country between Chattanooga and Knoxville, General Thomas hadauthorized the issue of provisions to the suffering inhabitants. 

We could not attempt an advance into Georgia without food, ammunition, etc. ; and ordinary prudence dictated that we shouldhave an accumulation at the front, in case of interruption to therailway by the act of the enemy, or by common accident. Accordingly, on the 6th of April, I issued a general order, limiting the use of the railroad-cars to transporting only theessential articles of food, ammunition, and supplies for the armyproper, forbidding any further issues to citizens, and cutting offall civil traffic; requiring the commanders of posts within thirtymiles of Nashville to haul out their own stores in wagons;requiring all troops destined for the front to march, and allbeef-cattle to be driven on their own legs. This was a great help, but of course it naturally raised a howl. Some of the poor Unionpeople of East Tennessee appealed to President Lincoln, whose kindheart responded promptly to their request. He telegraphed me to knowif I could not modify or repeal my orders; but I answered him that agreat campaign was impending, on which the fate of the nation hung;that our railroads had but a limited capacity, and could not providefor the necessities of the army and of the people too; that one orthe other must quit, and we could not until the army of Jos. Johnstonwas conquered, etc. , etc. Mr. Lincoln seemed to acquiesce, and Iadvised the people to obtain and drive out cattle from Kentucky, andto haul out their supplies by the wagon-road from the same quarter, by way of Cumberland Gap. By these changes we nearly or quitedoubled our daily accumulation of stores at the front, and yet eventhis was not found enough. 

I accordingly called together in Nashville the master oftransportation, Colonel Anderson, the chief quartermaster, GeneralJ. L. Donaldson, and the chief commissary, General Amos Beckwith, for conference. I assumed the strength of the army to move fromChattanooga into Georgia at one hundred thousand men, and thenumber of animals to be fed, both for cavalry and draught, atthirty-five thousand; then, allowing for occasional wrecks oftrains, which were very common, and for the interruption of theroad itself by guerrillas and regular raids, we estimated it wouldrequire one hundred and thirty cars, of ten tons each, to reachChattanooga daily, to be reasonably certain of an adequate supply. Even with this calculation, we could not afford to bring forwardhay for the horses and mules, nor more than five pounds of oats orcorn per day for each animal. I was willing to risk the questionof forage in part, because I expected to find wheat and cornfields, and a good deal of grass, as we advanced into Georgia atthat season of the year. The problem then was to deliver atChattanooga and beyond one hundred and thirty car-loads daily, leaving the beef-cattle to be driven on the hoof, and all thetroops in excess of the usual train-guards to march by the ordinaryroads. Colonel Anderson promptly explained that he did not possesscars or locomotives enough to do this work. I then instructed andauthorized him to hold on to all trains that arrived at Nashvillefrom Louisville, and to allow none to go back until he had securedenough to fill the requirements of our problem. At the time heonly had about sixty serviceable locomotives, and about six hundredcars of all kinds, and he represented that to provide for allcontingencies he must have at least one hundred locomotives and onethousand cars. As soon as Mr. Guthrie, the President of theLouisville & Nashville Railroad, detected that we were holding onto all his locomotives and cars, he wrote me, earnestlyremonstrating against it, saying that he would not be able withdiminished stock to bring forward the necessary stores fromLouisville to Nashville. I wrote to him, frankly telling himexactly how we were placed, appealed to his patriotism to stand byus, and advised him in like manner to hold on to all trains cominginto Jeffersonville, Indiana. He and General Robert Allen, thenquartermaster-general at Louisville, arranged a ferry-boat so as totransfer the trains over the Ohio River from Jeffersonville, and ina short time we had cars and locomotives from almost every road atthe North; months afterward I was amused to see, away down inGeorgia, cars marked "Pittsburg & Fort Wayne, " "Delaware &Lackawanna, " "Baltimore & Ohio, " and indeed with the names ofalmost every railroad north of the Ohio River. How these railroadcompanies ever recovered their property, or settled theirtransportation accounts, I have never heard, but to this fact, asmuch as to any other single fact, I attribute the perfect successwhich afterward attended our campaigns; and I have always feltgrateful to Mr. Guthrie, of Louisville, who had sense enough andpatriotism enough to subordinate the interests of his railroadcompany to the cause of his country. 

About this time, viz. , the early part of April, I was muchdisturbed by a bold raid made by the rebel General Forrest upbetween the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers. He reached the OhioRiver at Paducah, but was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Hicks. Hethen swung down toward Memphis, assaulted and carried Fort Pillow, massacring a part of its garrison, composed wholly of negro troops. At first I discredited the story of the massacre, because, inpreparing for the Meridian campaign, I had ordered Fort Pillow tobe evacuated, but it transpired afterward that General Hurlbut hadretained a small garrison at Fort Pillow to encourage theenlistment of the blacks as soldiers, which was a favoritepolitical policy at that day. The massacre at Fort Pillow occurredApril 12, 1864, and has been the subject of congressional inquiry. No doubt Forrest's men acted like a set of barbarians, shootingdown the helpless negro garrison after the fort was in theirpossession; but I am told that Forrest personally disclaims anyactive participation in the assault, and that he stopped the firingas soon as he could. I also take it for granted that Forrest didnot lead the assault in person, and consequently that he was to therear, out of sight if not of hearing at the time, and I was told byhundreds of our men, who were at various times prisoners inForrest's possession, that he was usually very kind to them. Hehad a desperate set of fellows under him, and at that very timethere is no doubt the feeling of the Southern people was fearfullysavage on this very point of our making soldiers out of their lateslaves, and Forrest may have shared the feeling. 

I also had another serious cause of disturbance about that time. Iwanted badly the two divisions of troops which had been loaned toGeneral Banks in the month of March previously, with the expressunderstanding that their absence was to endure only one month, andthat during April they were to come out of Red River, and be againwithin the sphere of my command. I accordingly instructed one ofmy inspector-generals, John M. Corse, to take a fleet steamboat atNashville, proceed via Cairo, Memphis, and Vicksburg, to GeneralBanks up the Red River, and to deliver the following letter ofApril 3d, as also others, of like tenor, to Generals A. J. Smithand Fred Steele, who were supposed to be with him:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPINASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 3, 1864

Major-General N. P. BANKS, commanding Department of the Gulf, RedRiver. 

GENERAL: The thirty days for which I loaned you the command ofGeneral A. J. Smith will expire on the 10th instant. I send withthis Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, to carry orders to General A. J. Smith, and to give directions for a new movement, which ispreliminary to the general campaign. General Corse may see you andexplain in full, but, lest he should not find you in person, I willsimply state that Forrest, availing himself of the absence of ourfurloughed men and of the detachment with you, has pushed upbetween the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, even to the Ohio. Heattacked Paducah, but got the worst of it, and he still lingersabout the place. I hope that he will remain thereabouts tillGeneral A. J. Smith can reach his destined point, but this I canhardly expect; yet I want him to reach by the Yazoo a position nearGrenada, thence to operate against Forrest, after which to marchacross to Decatur, Alabama. You will see that he has a big job, and therefore should start at once. From all that I can learn, mytroops reached Alexandria, Louisiana, at the time agreed on, viz. , March 17th, and I hear of them at Natchitoches, but cannot hear ofyour troops being above Opelousas. 

Steele is also moving. I leave Steele's entire force to cooperatewith you and the navy, but, as I before stated, I must have A. T. Smith's troops now as soon as possible. 

I beg you will expedite their return to Vicksburg, if they have notalready started, and I want them if possible to remain in the sameboats they have used up Red River, as it will save the timeotherwise consumed in transfer to other boats. 

All is well in this quarter, and I hope by the time you turnagainst Mobile our forces will again act toward the same end, though from distant points. General Grant, now having lawfulcontrol, will doubtless see that all minor objects are disregarded, and that all the armies act on a common plan. 

Hoping, when this reaches you, that you will be in possession ofShreveport, I am, with great respect, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Rumors were reaching us thick and fast of defeat and disaster inthat quarter; and I feared then, what afterward actually happened, that neither General Banks nor Admiral Porter could or would sparethose two divisions. On the 23d of April, General Corse returned, bringing full answers to my letters, and I saw that we must go onwithout them. This was a serious loss to the Army of theTennessee, which was also short by two other divisions that were ontheir veteran furlough, and were under orders to rendezvous atCairo, before embarking for Clifton, on the Tennessee River. 

On the 10th of April, 1864, the headquarters of the three Armies ofthe Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, were at Chattanooga. , Huntsville, and Knoxville, and the tables on page 16, et seq. , givetheir exact condition and strength. 

The Department of the Arkansas was then subject to my command, butGeneral Fred Steele, its commander, was at Little Rock, remote fromme, acting in cooperation with General Banks, and had fullemployment for every soldier of his command; so that I neverdepended on him for any men, or for any participation in theGeorgia campaign. Soon after, viz. , May 8th, that department wastransferred to the Military Division of "the Gulf, " or "Southwest, "Major-General E. R. S. Canby commanding, and General Steele servedwith him in the subsequent movement against Mobile. 

In Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, I had three generalsof education and experience, admirably qualified for the workbefore us. Each has made a history of his own, and I need not heredwell on their respective merits as men, or as commanders ofarmies, except that each possessed special qualities of mind and ofcharacter which fitted them in the highest degree for the work thenin contemplation. 

By the returns of April 10, 1864, it will be seen that theArmy of the Cumberland had on its muster-rolls--

 Men. Present and absent................... 171, 450Present for duty..................... 88, 883

The Army of the Tennessee--Present and absent.................... 134, 763Present for duty...................... 64, 957

The Army of the Ohio--Present and absent ................... 46, 052Present for duty ..................... 26, 242

The department and army commanders had to maintain strong garrisonsin their respective departments, and also to guard their respectivelines of supply. I therefore, in my mind, aimed to prepare out ofthese three armies, by the 1st of May, 1864, a compact army foractive operations in Georgia, of about the following numbers:

Army of the Cumberland................ 50, 000Army of the Tennessee................. 35, 000Army of the Ohio ..................... 15, 000

Total ............................... 100, 000

and, to make these troops as mobile as possible, I made thestrictest possible orders in relation to wagons and all species ofincumbrances and impedimenta whatever. Each officer and soldierwas required to carry on his horse or person food and clothingenough for five days. To each regiment was allowed but one wagonand one ambulance, and to the officers of each company one packhorse or mule. 

Each division and brigade was provided a fair proportion of wagonsfor a supply train, and these were limited in their loads to carryfood, ammunition, and clothing. Tents were forbidden to all savethe sick and wounded, and one tent only was allowed to eachheadquarters for use as an office. These orders were notabsolutely enforced, though in person I set the example, and didnot have a tent, nor did any officer about me have one; but we hadwall tent-flies, without poles, and no tent-furniture of any kind. We usually spread our flies over saplings, or on fence-rails orposts improvised on the spot. Most of the general officers, exceptThomas, followed my example strictly; but he had a regularheadquarters-camp. I frequently called his attention to the orderson this subject, rather jestingly than seriously. He would breakout against his officers for having such luxuries, but, needing atent himself, and being good-natured and slow to act, he neverenforced my orders perfectly. In addition to his regularwagon-train, he had a big wagon which could be converted into anoffice, and this we used to call "Thomas's circus. " Several timesduring the campaign I found quartermasters hid away in somecomfortable nook to the rear, with tents and mess-fixtures whichwere the envy of the passing soldiers; and I frequently broke themup, and distributed the tents to the surgeons of brigades. Yet myorders actually reduced the transportation, so that I doubt if anyarmy ever went forth to battle with fewer impedimenta, and wherethe regular and necessary supplies of food, ammunition, andclothing, were issued, as called for, so regularly and so well. 

My personal staff was then composed of Captain J. C. McCoy, aide-de-camp; Captain L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp; Captain J. C. Audenried, aide-de-camp; Brigadier-General J. D. Webster, chief ofstaff; Major R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general; CaptainMontgomery Rochester, assistant adjutant-general. These last threewere left at Nashville in charge of the office, and were empoweredto give orders in my name, communication being generally kept up bytelegraph. 

Subsequently were added to my staff, and accompanied me in thefield, Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, chief of artillery; ColonelO. M. Poe, chief of engineers; Colonel L. C. Easton, chiefquartermaster; Colonel Amos Beckwith, chief commissary; CaptainThos. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance; Surgeon E. D. Kittoe, medicaldirector; Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, inspector-general;Lieutenant-Colonel C. Ewing, inspector-general; and Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, inspector-general. 

These officers constituted my staff proper at the beginning of thecampaign, which remained substantially the same till the close ofthe war, with very few exceptions; viz. : Surgeon John Moore, UnitedStates Army, relieved Surgeon Kittoe of the volunteers (aboutAtlanta) as medical director; Major Henry Hitchcock joined asjudge-advocate, and Captain G. Ward Nichols reported as an extraaide-de-camp (after the fall of Atlanta) at Gaylesville, justbefore we started for Savannah. 

During the whole month of April the preparations for active warwere going on with extreme vigor, and my letter-book shows anactive correspondence with Generals Grant, Halleck, Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield on thousands of matters of detail andarrangement, most of which are embraced in my testimony before theCommittee on the Conduct of the War, vol. I. , Appendix. 

When the time for action approached, viz. , May 1, 1864, the actualarmies prepared to move into Georgia resulted as follows, presentfor battle: Men. Army of the Cumberland, Major-General THOMAS. Infantry ....................... 54, 568Artillery ...................... 2, 377Cavalry......................... 3, 828 Aggregate............... 60, 773Number of field-guns, 130. 

Army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPHERSON. 

Infantry ....................... 22, 437Artillery ...................... 1, 404Cavalry ........................ 624 Aggregate ............. 24, 465Guns, 96

Army of the Ohio, Major-General SCHOFIELD. 

Infantry ....................... 11, 183Artillery....................... 679Cavalry......................... 1, 697 Aggregate .............. 13, 559Guns, 28. 

Grand aggregate, 98, 797 men and 254 guns

These figures do not embrace the cavalry divisions which were stillincomplete, viz. , of General Stoneman, at Lexington, Kentucky, andof General Garrard, at Columbia, Tennessee, who were then rapidlycollecting horses, and joined us in the early stage of thecampaign. General Stoneman, having a division of about fourthousand men and horses, was attached to Schofield's Army of theOhio. General Garrard's division, of about four thousand fivehundred men and horses, was attached to General Thomas's command;and he had another irregular division of cavalry, commanded byBrigadier-General E. McCook. There was also a small brigade ofcavalry, belonging to the Army of the Cumberland, attachedtemporarily to the Army of the Tennessee, which was commanded byBrigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick. These cavalry commandschanged constantly in strength and numbers, and were generally usedon the extreme flanks, or for some special detached service, aswill be herein-after related. The Army of the Tennessee was stillshort by the two divisions detached with General Banks, up RedRiver, and two other divisions on furlough in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, but which were rendezvousing at Cairo, under GeneralsLeggett and Crocker, to form a part of the Seventeenth Corps, whichcorps was to be commanded by Major-General Frank P. Blair, then amember of Congress, in Washington. On the 2d of April I notifiedhim by letter that I wanted him to join and to command these twodivisions, which ought to be ready by the 1st of May. GeneralBlair, with these two divisions, constituting the Seventeenth ArmyCorps, did not actually overtake us until we reached Acworth andBig Shanty, in Georgia, about the 9th of June, 1864. 

In my letter of April 4th to General John A. Rawains, chief ofstaff to General Grant at Washington, I described at length all thepreparations that were in progress for the active campaign thuscontemplated, and therein estimated Schofield at twelve thousand, Thomas at forty-five thousand, and McPherson at thirty thousand. At first I intended to open the campaign about May 1st, by movingSchofield on Dalton from Cleveland, Thomas on the same objectivefrom Chattanooga, and McPherson on Rome and Kingston from Gunter'sLanding. My intention was merely to threaten Dalton in front, andto direct McPherson to act vigorously against the railroad belowResaca, far to the rear of the enemy. But by reason of his beingshort of his estimated strength by the four divisions beforereferred to, and thus being reduced to about twenty-four thousandmen, I did not feel justified in placing him so far away from thesupport of the main body of the army, and therefore subsequentlychanged the plan of campaign, so far as to bring that army up toChattanooga, and to direct it thence through Ship's Gap against therailroad to Johnston's rear, at or near Resaca, distant from Daltononly eighteen miles, and in full communication with the otherarmies by roads behind Rocky face Ridge, of about the same length. 

On the 10th of April I received General Grant's letter of April 4thfrom Washington, which formed the basis of all the campaigns of theyear 1864, and subsequently received another of April 19th, writtenfrom Culpepper, Virginia, both of which are now in my possession, in his own handwriting, and are here given entire. These lettersembrace substantially all the orders he ever made on thisparticular subject, and these, it will be seen, devolved on me thedetails both as to the plan and execution of the campaign by thearmies under my immediate command. These armies were to bedirected against the rebel army commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, then lying on the defensive, strongly intrenched atDalton, Georgia; and I was required to follow it up closely andpersistently, so that in no event could any part be detached toassist General Lee in Virginia; General Grant undertaking in likemanner to keep Lee so busy that he could not respond to any callsof help by Johnston. Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah, was the objective, but the "army of Jos. Johnston, " go where itmight. 

[PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL. ]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWASHINGTON D. C. , April 4, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me totake the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts ofthe army together, and somewhat toward a common centre. For yourinformation I now write you my programme, as at present determinedupon. 

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up hispresent expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turnover the defense of Red River to General Steels and the navy, andto return your troops to you, and his own to New Orleans; toabandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that withnot to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops onthe Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and tocollect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. To this I will add five thousand from Missouri. With this force heis to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can. Itwill be impossible for him to commence too early. 

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operateagainst Richmond from the south aide of James River. This willgive Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smithcommanding the right wing of his forces, and Gillmore the leftwing. I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased byBurnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effectivemen, and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may befound. 

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, underOrd and Averill, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston, on the Kanawha, to moveagainst the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad. 

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in aboutSaltville, and move east from there to join Ord. His force will beall cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men ofall arms. 

You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, andto get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. 

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simplyto lay down the work it is desirable to have done, and leave youfree to execute it in your own way. Submit to me, however, asearly as you can, your plan of operations. 

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as hecan. Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18thinst. , or as soon thereafter as practicable. Sigel isconcentrating now. None will move from their places of rendezvousuntil I direct, except Banks. I want to be ready to move by the25th inst. , if possible; but all I can now direct is that you getready as soon as possible. I know you will have difficulties toencounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies areabundant, but I believe you will accomplish it. 

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do notcalculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can taketroops from there. With the long line of railroad Sigel has toprotect, he can spare no troops, except to move directly to hisfront. In this way he must get through to inflict great damage onthe enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a largeforce to prevent it. In other words, if Sigel can't skin himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins. 

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPINASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 10, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, Washington, D. 

DEAR GENERAL: Your two letters of April 4th are now before me, andafford me infinite satisfaction. That we are now all to act on acommon plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightenedwar. 

Like yourself, you take the biggest load, and from me you shallhave thorough and hearty cooperation. I will not let side issuesdraw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos. Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy aspossible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and toColonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the method in which Ipropose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and divisioncommanders, and have signified only to the former, viz. , Schofield, Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from thepurport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati. 

First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch, and am completing the army organization according to the ordersfrom Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory. 

It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, tobring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions andcattle on the line of the Tennessee. Each of the armies willguard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications. 

At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a selectgarrison at Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men willdrop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right bythe old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing thecavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofieldon his left front--it may be, pushing a select body of about twothousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athens, Georgia. 

Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, andmove straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting himcautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage. He will havetwo divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering. 

McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, ifA. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirtythousand of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennesseeat Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas. If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push forRome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believehe will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas. 

McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas'sdivisions, viz. , Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now atColombia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design thisdivision to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, accordingas the enemy appears. But the moment I detect Johnston fallingbehind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective partof this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight forOpelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the roadbetween Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work well, he can return to the Union army; but should a superior forceinterpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks, or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east ofMobile, till such time as he can reach me. 

Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to theright, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its easterncommunications, according to developed facts. 

This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed, to look, but I willever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busythat he cannot in any event send any part of his command againstyou or Banks. 

If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the AlabamaRiver, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of myproblem, viz. , "provisions. " But in that I must venture. Georgiahas a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should notstarve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will beabsolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, andwill feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever wecan find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with thefeeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary tolife, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on thatvery ground. As ever, your friend and servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCULPEPPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, April 19, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reasonto change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemyremain still and allow us to take the initiative. Rain hascontinued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it willbe impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no moreshould fall in the meantime. I think Saturday, the 30th, willprobably be the day for our general move. 

Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, andfill up many little gaps of information not given in any of myletters. 

What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two mainattacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of theirline of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other, believing a single defeat without any victory to sustain thembetter than a defeat all along their line, and hoping too, at thesame time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will restperfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to agiven point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force firstupon one and then on the other. 

With the majority of military commanders they might do this. 

But you have had too much experience in traveling light, andsubsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hopemy experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, wouldbe, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, followhim up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent theconcentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of thisarmy to do it. 

The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge, officers and men feel well. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPINASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 24, 1864

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, Culpepper, Virginia

GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of yourstaff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assumethe offensive as possible. I only ask as much time as you thinkproper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions fromCairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some ofthem should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march toDecatur, to join General Dodge. 

McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's, and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) atDecatur at the earliest possible moment. From these two points hewill direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette, where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton;or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, andfall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah. I see that there is somerisk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will havestrength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and, should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latterwill have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga viaWilla's Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and ifJohnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough topush on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him. Myown opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to hisrailroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimatedat from forty-five to sixty thousand men. 

At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnstonstands at Dalton we must attack him in position. Thomas feelscertain that he has no material increase of force, and that he hasnot sent away Hardee, or any part of his army. Supplies are thegreat question. I have materially increased the number of carsdaily. When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eightyper day. Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three;to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that onehundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day's supply anda day's accumulation. 

McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day's rations, andto rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread. Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and thecommissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importanceof the whole matter. 

Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I willbe forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on thefact that the enemy has no force available with which to threatenour communications from that direction. 

Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannotcommit to paper. I am, with great respect, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

On the 28th of April I removed my headquarters to Chattanooga, andprepared for taking the field in person. General Grant had firstindicated the 30th of April as the day for the simultaneousadvance, but subsequently changed the day to May 5th. McPhersonstroops were brought forward rapidly to Chattanooga, partly by railand partly by marching. Thomas's troops were already in position(his advance being out as far as Ringgold-eighteen miles), andSchofield was marching down by Cleveland to Red Clay and CatoosaSprings. On the 4th of May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, hisleft at Catoosa, and his right at Leet's Tan-yard. Schofield wasat Red Clay, closing upon Thomas's left; and McPherson was movingrapidly into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon's Mill. 

On the 5th I rode out to Ringgold, and on the very day appointed byGeneral Grant from his headquarters in Virginia the great campaignwas begun. To give all the minute details will involve more thanis contemplated, and I will endeavor only to trace the principalevents, or rather to record such as weighed heaviest on my own mindat the time, and which now remain best fixed in my memory. 

My general headquarters and official records remained back atNashville, and I had near me only my personal staff andinspectors-general, with about half a dozen wagons, and a singlecompany of Ohio sharp-shooters (commanded by Lieutenant McCrory) asheadquarters or camp guard. I also had a small company ofirregular Alabama cavalry (commanded by Lieutenant Snelling), usedmostly as orderlies and couriers. No wall-tents were allowed, onlythe flies. Our mess establishment was less in bulk than that ofany of the brigade commanders; nor was this from an indifference tothe ordinary comforts of life, but because I wanted to set theexample, and gradually to convert all parts of that army into amobile machine, willing and able to start at a minute's notice, andto subsist on the scantiest food. To reap absolute success mightinvolve the necessity even of dropping all wagons, and to subsiston the chance food which the country was known to contain. I hadobtained not only the United States census-tables of 1860, but acompilation made by the Controller of the State of Georgia for thepurpose of taxation, containing in considerable detail the"population and statistics" of every county in Georgia. One of myaides (Captain Dayton) acted as assistant adjutant general, with anorder-book, letter-book, and writing-paper, that filled a smallchest not much larger than an ordinary candle-boa. The onlyreports and returns called for were the ordinary tri-monthlyreturns of "effective strength. " As these accumulated they weresent back to Nashville, and afterward were embraced in the archivesof the Military Division of the Mississippi, changed in 1865 to theMilitary Division of the Missouri, and I suppose they were burnedin the Chicago fire of 1870. Still, duplicates remain of allessential papers in the archives of the War Department. 

The 6th of May was given to Schofield and McPherson to get intoposition, and on the 7th General Thomas moved in force againstTunnel Hill, driving off a mere picket-guard of the enemy, and Iwas agreeably surprised to find that no damage had been done to thetunnel or the railroad. From Tunnel Hill I could look into thegorge by which the railroad passed through a straight andwell-defined range of mountains, presenting sharp palisade faces, and known as "Rocky Face. " The gorge itself was called the"Buzzard Roost. " We could plainly see the enemy in this gorge andbehind it, and Mill Creek which formed the gorge, flowing towardDalton, had been dammed up, making a sort of irregular lake, filling the road, thereby obstructing it, and the enemy's batteriescrowned the cliffs on either side. The position was very strong, and I knew that such a general as was my antagonist (Jos. Johnston), who had been there six months, had fortified it to themaximum. Therefore I had no intention to attack the positionseriously in front, but depended on McPherson to capture and holdthe railroad to its rear, which would force Johnston to detachlargely against him, or rather, as I expected, to evacuate hisposition at Dalton altogether. My orders to Generals Thomas andSchofield were merely to press strongly at all points in front, ready to rush in on the first appearance of "let go, " and, ifpossible, to catch our enemy in the confusion of retreat. 

All the movements of the 7th and 8th were made exactly as ordered, and the enemy seemed quiescent, acting purely on the defensive. 

I had constant communication with all parts of the army, and on the9th McPherson's head of column entered and passed through SnakeCreek, perfectly undefended, and accomplished a complete surpriseto the enemy. At its farther debouche he met a cavalry brigade, easily driven, which retreated hastily north toward Dalton, anddoubtless carried to Johnston the first serious intimation that aheavy force of infantry and artillery was to his rear and within afew miles of his railroad. I got a short note from McPherson thatday (written at 2 p. M. , when he was within a mile and a half of therailroad, above and near Resaca), and we all felt jubilant. Irenewed orders to Thomas and Schofield to be ready for the instantpursuit of what I expected to be a broken and disordered army, forced to retreat by roads to the east of Resaca, which were knownto be very rough and impracticable. 

That night I received further notice from McPherson that he hadfound Resaca too strong for a surprise; that in consequence he hadfallen back three miles to the month of Snake Creek Gap, and wasthere fortified. I wrote him the next day the following letters, copies of which are in my letter-book; but his to me were merenotes in pencil, not retained. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee, Sugar Valley, Georgia. 

GENERAL: I received by courier (in the night) yours of 5 and 8. 30P. M. Of yesterday. 

You now have your twenty-three thousand men, and General Hooker isin close support, so that you can hold all of Jos. Johnston's armyin check should he abandon Dalton. He cannot afford to abandonDalton, for he has fixed it up on purpose to receive us, and heobserves that we are close at hand, waiting for him to quit. Hecannot afford a detachment strong enough to fight you, as his armywill not admit of it. 

Strengthen your position; fight any thing that comes; and threatenthe safety of the railroad all the time. But, to tell the truth, Iwould rather the enemy would stay in Dalton two more days, when hemay find in his rear a larger party than he expects in an openfield. At all events, we can then choose our own ground, and hewill be forced to move out of his works. I do not intend to put acolumn into Buzzard-Roost Gap at present. 

See that you are in easy communication with me and with allhead-quarters. After to-day the supplies will be at Ringgold. 

Yours, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, TUNNEL HILL, GEORGIA, May 11, 1864-Evening

Major-General McPHERSON, commanding army of the Tennessee, Sugar Valley, Georgia

GENERAL: The indications are that Johnston is evacuating Dalton. In that event, Howard's corps and the cavalry will pursue; all therest will follow your route. I will be down early in the morning. 

Try to strike him if possible about the forks of the road. 

Hooker must be with you now, and you may send General Garrard bySummerville to threaten Rome and that flank. I will cause all thelines to be felt at once. 

W. T. SHERMAN, major-general commanding. 

McPherson had startled Johnston in his fancied security, but hadnot done the full measure of his work. He had in hand twenty-threethousand of the best men of the army, and could have walked intoResaca (then held only by a small brigade), or he could have placedhis whole force astride the railroad above Resaca, and there haveeasily withstood the attack of all of Johnston's army, with theknowledge that Thomas and Schofield were on his heels. Had he doneso, I am certain that Johnston would not have ventured to attackhim in position, but would have retreated eastward by Spring Place, and we should have captured half his army and all his artillery andwagons at the very beginning of the campaign. 

Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life, but atthe critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious. Still, he was perfectly justified by his orders, and fell back andassumed an unassailable defensive position in Sugar Valley, on theResaca side of Snake-Creek Gap. As soon as informed of this, Idetermined to pass the whole army through Snake-Creek Gap, and tomove on Resaca with the main army. 

But during the 10th, the enemy showed no signs of evacuatingDalton, and I was waiting for the arrival of Garrard's andStoneman's cavalry, known to be near at hand, so as to secure thefull advantages of victory, of which I felt certain. Hooker'sTwentieth Corps was at once moved down to within easy supportingdistance of McPherson; and on the 11th, perceiving signs ofevacuation of Dalton, I gave all the orders for the generalmovement, leaving the Fourth Corps (Howard) and Stoneman's cavalryin observation in front of Buzzard-Roost Gap, and directing all therest of the army to march through Snake-Creek Gap, straight onResaca. The roads were only such as the country afforded, mererough wagon-ways, and these converged to the single narrow trackthrough Snake-Creek Gap; but during the 12th and 13th the bulk ofThomas's and Schofield's armies were got through, and deployedagainst Resaca, McPherson on the right, Thomas in the centre, andSchofield on the left. Johnston, as I anticipated, had abandonedall his well-prepared defenses at Dalton, and was found inside ofResaca with the bulk of his army, holding his divisions well inhand, acting purely on the defensive, and fighting well at allpoints of conflict. A complete line of intrenchments was foundcovering the place, and this was strongly manned at all points. Onthe 14th we closed in, enveloping the town on its north and west, and during the 15th we had a day of continual battle and skirmish. At the same time I caused two pontoon-bridges to be laid across theOostenaula River at Lay's Ferry, about three miles below the town, by which we could threaten Calhoun, a station on the railroad sevenmiles below Resaca. At the same time, May 14th, I dispatchedGeneral Garrard, with his cavalry division, down the Oostenaula bythe Rome road, with orders to cross over, if possible, and toattack or threaten the railroad at any point below Calhoun andabove Kingston. 

During the 15th, without attempting to assault the fortified works, we pressed at all points, and the sound of cannon and musketry roseall day to the dignity of a battle. Toward evening McPherson movedhis whole line of battle forward, till he had gained a ridgeoverlooking the town, from which his field-artillery could reachthe railroad-bridge across the Oostenaula. The enemy made severalattempts to drive him away, repeating the sallies several times, and extending them into the night; but in every instance he wasrepulsed with bloody loss. 

Hooker's corps had also some heavy and handsome fighting thatafternoon and night on the left, where the Dalton roan entered theintrenchments, capturing a four-gun intrenched battery, with itsmen and guns; and generally all our men showed the finest fightingqualities. 

Howard's corps had followed Johnston down from Dalton, and was inline; Stoneman's division of cavalry had also got up, and was onthe extreme left, beyond the Oostenaula. 

On the night of May 15th Johnston got his army across the bridges, set them on fire, and we entered Resaca at daylight. Our loss upto that time was about six hundred dead and thirty-three hundredand seventy-five wounded--mostly light wounds that did notnecessitate sending the men to the rear for treatment. ThatJohnston had deliberately designed in advance to give up suchstrong positions as Dalton and Resaca, for the purpose of drawingus farther south, is simply absurd. Had he remained in Daltonanother hour, it would have been his total defeat, and he onlyevacuated Resaca because his safety demanded it. The movement byus through Snake-Creek Gap was a total surprise to him. My armyabout doubled his in size, but he had all the advantages of naturalpositions, of artificial forts and roads, and of concentratedaction. We were compelled to grope our way through forests, acrossmountains, with a large army, necessarily more or less dispersed. Of course, I was disappointed not to have crippled his, army moreat that particular stage of the game; but, as it resulted, theserapid successes gave us the initiative, and the usual impulse of aconquering army. 

Johnston having retreated in the night of May 15th, immediatepursuit was begun. A division of infantry (Jeff. C. Davis's) wasat once dispatched down the valley toward Rome, to supportGarrard's cavalry, and the whole army was ordered to pursue, McPherson by Lay's Ferry, on the right, Thomas directly by therailroad, and Schofield by the left, by the old road that crossedthe Oostenaula above Echota or Newtown. 

We hastily repaired the railroad bridge at Resaca, which had beenpartially burned, and built a temporary floating bridge out oftimber and materials found on the spot; so that Thomas got hisadvance corps over during the 16th, and marched as far as Calhoun, where he came into communication with McPherson's troops, which hadcrossed the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry by our pontoon-bridges, previously laid. Inasmuch as the bridge at Resaca was overtaxed, Hooker's Twentieth Corps was also diverted to cross by the fordsand ferries above Resaca, in the neighborhood of Echota. 

On the 17th, toward evening, the head of Thomas's column, Newton'sdivision, encountered the rear-guard of Johnston's army nearAdairsville. I was near the head of column at the time, trying toget a view of the position of the enemy from an elevation in anopen field. My party attracted the fire of a battery; a shellpassed through the group of staff-officers and burst just beyond, which scattered us promptly. The next morning the enemy haddisappeared, and our pursuit was continued to Kingston, which wereached during Sunday forenoon, the 19th. 

From Resaca the railroad runs nearly due south, but at Kingston itmakes junction with another railroad from Rome, and changesdirection due east. At that time McPherson's head of column wasabout four miles to the west of Kingston, at a country place called"Woodlawn;" Schofield and Hooker were on the direct roads leadingfrom Newtown to Casaville, diagonal to the route followed byThomas. Thomas's head of column, which had followed the countryroads alongside of the railroad, was about four miles east ofKingston, toward Cassville, when about noon I got a message fromhim that he had found the enemy, drawn up in line of battle, onsome extensive, open ground, about half-way between Kingston andCassville, and that appearances indicated a willingness andpreparation for battle. 

Hurriedly sending orders to McPherson to resume the march, tohasten forward by roads leading to the south of Kingston, so as toleave for Thomas's troops and trains the use of the main road, andto come up on his right, I rode forward rapidly, over some roughgravel hills, and about six miles from Kingston found GeneralThomas, with his troops deployed; but he reported that the enemyhad fallen back in echelon of divisions, steadily and in superborder, into Cassville. I knew that the roads by which GeneralsHooker and Schofield were approaching would lead them to a seminarynear Cassville, and that it was all-important to secure the pointof junction of these roads with the main road along which we weremarching. Therefore I ordered General Thomas to push forward hisdeployed lines as rapidly as possible; and, as night wasapproaching, I ordered two field-batteries to close up at a gallopon some woods which lay between us and the town of Cassville. Wecould not see the town by reason of these woods, but a high rangeof hills just back of the town was visible over the tree-tops. Onthese hills could be seen fresh-made parapets, and the movements ofmen, against whom I directed the artillery to fire at long range. The stout resistance made by the enemy along our whole front of acouple of miles indicated a purpose to fight at Cassville; and, asthe night was closing in, General Thomas and I were together, alongwith our skirmish-lines near the seminary, on the edge of the town, where musket-bullets from the enemy were cutting the leaves of thetrees pretty thickly about us. Either Thomas or I remarked thatthat was not the place for the two senior officers of a great army, and we personally went back to the battery, where we passed thenight on the ground. During the night I had reports fromMcPherson, Hooker, and Schofield. The former was about five milesto my right rear, near the "nitre-caves;" Schofield was about sixmiles north, and Hooker between us, within two miles. All wereordered to close down on Cassville at daylight, and to attack theenemy wherever found. Skirmishing was kept up all night, but whenday broke the next morning, May 20th, the enemy was gone, and ourcavalry was sent in pursuit. These reported him beyond the EtowahRiver. We were then well in advance of our railroad-trains, onwhich we depended for supplies; so I determined to pause a few daysto repair the railroad, which had been damaged but little, exceptat the bridge at Resaca, and then to go on. 

Nearly all the people of the country seemed to have fled withJohnston's army; yet some few families remained, and from one ofthem I procured the copy of an order which Johnston had made atAdairsville, in which he recited that he had retreated as far asstrategy required, and that his army must be prepared for battle atCassville. The newspapers of the South, many of which we found, were also loud in denunciation of Johnston's falling back before uswithout a serious battle, simply resisting by his skirmish-linesand by his rear-guard. But his friends proclaimed that it was allstrategic; that he was deliberately drawing us farther and fartherinto the meshes, farther and farther away from our base ofsupplies, and that in due season he would not only halt for battle, but assume the bold offensive. Of course it was to my interest tobring him to battle as soon as possible, when our numericalsuperiority was at the greatest; for he was picking up hisdetachments as he fell back, whereas I was compelled to makesimilar and stronger detachments to repair the railroads as weadvanced, and to guard them. I found at Cassville many evidencesof preparation for a grand battle, among them a long line of freshintrenchments on the hill beyond the town, extending nearly threemiles to the south, embracing the railroad-crossing. I was alsoconvinced that the whole of Polk's corps had joined Johnston fromMississippi, and that he had in hand three full corps, viz. , Hood's, Polk's, and Hardee's, numbering about sixty thousand men, and could not then imagine why he had declined battle, and did notlearn the real reason till after the war was over, and then fromGeneral Johnston himself. 

In the autumn of 1865, when in command of the Military Division ofthe Missouri, I went from St. Louis to Little Rock, Arkansas, andafterward to Memphis. Taking a steamer for Cairo, I found asfellow-passengers Generals Johnston and Frank Blair. We were, ofcourse, on the most friendly terms, and on our way up we talkedover our battles again, played cards, and questioned each other asto particular parts of our mutual conduct in the game of war. Itold Johnston that I had seen his order of preparation, in thenature of an address to his army, announcing his purpose to retreatno more, but to accept battle at Cassville. He answered that suchwas his purpose; that he had left Hardee's corps in the open fieldsto check Thomas, and gain time for his formation on the ridge, justbehind Cassville; and it was this corps which General Thomas hadseen deployed, and whose handsome movement in retreat he hadreported in such complimentary terms. Johnston described how hehad placed Hood's corps on the right, Polk's in the centre, andHardee's on the left. He said he had ridden over the ground, givento each corps commander his position, and orders to throw upparapets during the night; that he was with Hardee on his extremeleft as the night closed in, and as Hardee's troops fell back tothe position assigned them for the intended battle of the next day;and that, after giving Hardee some general instructions, he and hisstaff rode back to Cassville. As he entered the town, or village, he met Generals Hood and Polk. Hood inquired of him if he had hadany thing to eat, and he said no, that he was both hungry andtired, when Hood invited him to go and share a supper which hadbeen prepared for him at a house close by. At the supper theydiscussed the chances of the impending battle, when Hood spoke ofthe ground assigned him as being enfiladed by our (Union)artillery, which Johnston disputed, when General Polk chimed inwith the remark that General Hood was right; that the cannon-shotsfired by us at nightfall had enfiladed their general line ofbattle, and that for this reason he feared they could not holdtheir men. General Johnston was surprised at this, for heunderstood General Hood to be one of those who professed tocriticise his strategy, contending that, instead of retreating, heshould have risked a battle. General Johnston said he wasprovoked, accused them of having been in conference, with beingbeaten before battle, and added that he was unwilling to engage ina critical battle with an army so superior to his own in numbers, with two of his three corps commanders dissatisfied with the groundand positions assigned them. He then and there made up his mind toretreat still farther south, to put the Etowah River and theAllatoona range between us; and he at once gave orders to resumethe retrograde movement. 

This was my recollection of the substance of the conversation, ofwhich I made no note at the time; but, at a meeting of the Societyof the Army of the Cumberland some years after, at Cleveland, Ohio, about 1868, in a short after-dinner speech, I related thisconversation, and it got into print. Subsequently, in the springof 1870, when I was at New Orleans, on route for Texas, GeneralHood called to see me at the St. Charles Hotel, explained that hehad seen my speech reprinted in the newspapers and gave me hisversion of the same event, describing the halt at Cassville, thegeneral orders for battle on that ground, and the meeting at supperwith Generals Johnston and Polk, when the chances of the battle tobe fought the next day were freely and fully discussed; and hestated that he had argued against fighting the battle purely on thedefensive, but had asked General Johnston to permit him with hisown corps and part of Polk's to quit their lines, and to marchrapidly to attack and overwhelm Schofield, who was known to beseparated from Thomas by an interval of nearly five miles, claimingthat he could have defeated Schofield, and got back to his positionin time to meet General Thomas's attack in front. He also statedthat he had then contended with Johnston for the "offensive-defensive" game, instead of the "pure defensive, " as proposed byGeneral Johnston; and he said that it was at this time that GeneralJohnston had taken offense, and that it was for this reason he hadordered the retreat that night. As subsequent events estrangedthese two officers, it is very natural they should now differ onthis point; but it was sufficient for us that the rebel army didretreat that night, leaving us masters of all the country above theEtowah River. 

For the purposes of rest, to give time for the repair of therailroads, and to replenish supplies, we lay by some few days inthat quarter--Schofield with Stoneman's cavalry holding the groundat Cassville Depot, Cartersville, and the Etowah Bridge; Thomasholding his ground near Cassville, and McPherson that nearKingston. The officer intrusted with the repair of the railroadswas Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who, with about twothousand men, was so industrious and skillful that the bridge atResaca was rebuilt in three days, and cars loaded with stores cameforward to Kingston on the 24th. The telegraph also brought us thenews of the bloody and desperate battles of the Wilderness, inVirginia, and that General Grant was pushing his operations againstLee with terrific energy. I was therefore resolved to give myenemy no rest. 

In early days (1844), when a lieutenant of the Third Artillery, Ihad been sent from Charleston, South Carolina, to Marietta, Georgia, to assist Inspector-General Churchill to take testimonyconcerning certain losses of horses and accoutrements by theGeorgia Volunteers during the Florida War; and after completing thework at Marietta we transferred our party over to Bellefonte, Alabama. I had ridden the distance on horseback, and had notedwell the topography of the country, especially that about Kenesaw, Allatoona, and the Etowah River. On that occasion I had stoppedsome days with a Colonel Tumlin, to see some remarkable Indianmounds on the Etowah River, usually called the "Hightower:" Itherefore knew that the Allatoona Pass was very strong, would behard to force, and resolved not even to attempt it, but to turn theposition, by moving from Kingston to Marietta via. Dallas;accordingly I made orders on the 20th to get ready for the march tobegin on the 23d. The Army of the Cumberland was ordered to marchfor Dallas, by Euharlee and Stilesboro; Davis's division, then inRome, by Van Wert; the Army of the Ohio to keep on the left ofThomas, by a place called Burnt Hickory; and the Army of theTennessee to march for a position a little to the south, so as tobe on the right of the general army, when grouped about Dallas. 

The movement contemplated leaving our railroad, and to depend fortwenty days on the contents of our wagons; and as the country wasvery obscure, mostly in a state of nature, densely wooded, and withfew roads, our movements were necessarily slow. We crossed theEtowah by several bridges and fords, and took as many roads aspossible, keeping up communication by cross-roads, or by couriersthrough the woods. I personally joined General Thomas, who had thecentre, and was consequently the main column, or "column ofdirection. " The several columns followed generally the valley ofthe Euharlee, a tributary coming into the Etowah from the south, and gradually crossed over a ridge of mountains, parts of which hadonce been worked over for gold, and were consequently full of pathsand unused wagon-roads or tracks. A cavalry picket of the enemy atBurnt Hickory was captured, and had on his person an order fromGeneral Johnston, dated at Allatoona, which showed that he haddetected my purpose of turning his position, and it accordinglybecame necessary to use great caution, lest some of the minorcolumns should fall into ambush, but, luckily the enemy was notmuch more familiar with that part of the country than we were. Onthe other side of the Allatoona range, the Pumpkin-Vine Creek, alsoa tributary of the Etowah, flowed north and west; Dallas, the pointaimed at, was a small town on the other or east side of this creek, and was the point of concentration of a great many roads that ledin every direction. Its possession would be a threat to Mariettaand Atlanta, but I could not then venture to attempt either, till Ihad regained the use of the railroad, at least as far down as itsdebouche from the Allatoona range of mountains. Therefore, themovement was chiefly designed to compel Johnston to give upAllatoona. 

On the 25th all the columns were moving steadily on Dallas--McPherson and Davis away off to the right, near Van Wert; Thomas onthe main road in the centre, with Hooker's Twentieth Corps ahead, toward Dallas; and Schofield to the left rear. For the convenienceof march, Hooker had his three divisions on separate roads, allleading toward Dallas, when, in the afternoon, as he approached abridge across Pumpkin-Vine Creek, he found it held by a cavalryforce, which was driven off, but the bridge was on fire. This firewas extinguished, and Hooker's leading division (Geary's) followedthe retreating cavalry on a road leading due east toward Marietta, instead of Dallas. This leading division, about four miles out fromthe bridge, struck a heavy infantry force, which was moving down fromAllatoona toward Dallas, and a sharp battle ensued. I came up inperson soon after, and as my map showed that we were near animportant cross-road called "New Hope, " from a Methodistmeeting-house there of that name, I ordered General Hooker to secureit if possible that night. He asked for a short delay, till he couldbring up his other two divisions, viz. , of Butterfield and Williams, but before these divisions had got up and were deployed, the enemyhad also gained corresponding strength. The woods were so dense, andthe resistance so spirited, that Hooker could not carry the position, though the battle was noisy, and prolonged far into the night. Thispoint, "New Hope, " was the accidental intersection of the roadleading from Allatoona to Dallas with that from Van Wert to Marietta, was four miles northeast of Dallas, and from the bloody fightingthere for the next week was called by the soldiers "Hell-Hole. "

The night was pitch-dark, it rained hard, and the convergence ofour columns toward Dallas produced much confusion. I am suresimilar confusion existed in the army opposed to us, for we wereall mixed up. I slept on the ground, without cover, alongside of alog, got little sleep, resolved at daylight to renew the battle, and to make a lodgment on the Dallas and Allatoona road ifpossible, but the morning revealed a strong line of intrenchmentsfacing us, with a heavy force of infantry and guns. The battle wasrenewed, and without success. McPherson reached Dallas thatmorning, viz. , the 26th, and deployed his troops to the southeastand east of the town, placing Davis's division of the FourteenthCorps, which had joined him on the road from Rome, on his left; butthis still left a gap of at least three miles between Davis andHooker. Meantime, also, General Schofield was closing up onThomas's left. 

Satisfied that Johnston in person was at New Hope with all hisarmy, and that it was so much nearer my "objective;" the railroad, than Dallas, I concluded to draw McPherson from Dallas to Hooker'sright, and gave orders accordingly; but McPherson also wasconfronted with a heavy force, and, as he began to withdrawaccording to his orders, on the morning of the 28th he was fiercelyassailed on his right; a bloody battle ensued, in which he repulsedthe attack, inflicting heavy loss on his assailants, and it was notuntil the 1st of June that he was enabled to withdraw from Dallas, and to effect a close junction with Hooker in front of New Hope. Meantime Thomas and Schofield were completing their deployments, gradually overlapping Johnston on his right, and thus extending ourleft nearer and nearer to the railroad, the nearest point of whichwas Acworth, about eight miles distant. All this time a continualbattle was in progress by strong skirmish-lines, taking advantageof every species of cover, and both parties fortifying each nightby rifle-trenches, with head-logs, many of which grew to be asformidable as first-class works of defense. Occasionally one partyor the other would make a dash in the nature of a sally, butusually it sustained a repulse with great loss of life. I visitedpersonally all parts of our lines nearly every day, was constantlywithin musket-range, and though the fire of musketry and cannonresounded day and night along the whole line, varying from six toten miles, I rarely saw a dozen of the enemy at any one time; andthese were always skirmishers dodging from tree to tree, or behindlogs on the ground, or who occasionally showed their heads abovethe hastily-constructed but remarkably strong rifle-trenches. Onthe occasion of my visit to McPherson on the 30th of May, whilestanding with a group of officers, among whom were GeneralsMcPherson, Logan, Barry, and Colonel Taylor, my former chief ofartillery, a Minie-ball passed through Logan's coat-sleeve, scratching the skin, and struck Colonel Taylor square in thebreast; luckily he had in his pocket a famous memorandum-book, inwhich he kept a sort of diary, about which we used to joke him agood deal; its thickness and size saved his life, breaking theforce of the ball, so that after traversing the book it onlypenetrated the breast to the ribs, but it knocked him down anddisabled him for the rest of the campaign. He was a most competentand worthy officer, and now lives in poverty in Chicago, sustainedin part by his own labor, and in part by a pitiful pension recentlygranted. 

On the 1st of June General McPherson closed in upon the right, and, without attempting further to carry the enemy's strong position atNew Hope Church, I held our general right in close contact with it, gradually, carefully, and steadily working by the left, until ourstrong infantry-lines had reached and secured possession of all thewagon-roads between New Hope, Allatoona, and Acworth, when Idispatched Generals Garrard's and Stoneman's divisions of cavalryinto Allatoona, the first around by the west end of the pass, andthe latter by the direct road. Both reached their destinationwithout opposition, and orders were at once given to repair therailroad forward from Kingston to Allatoona, embracing the bridgeacross the Etowah River. Thus the real object of my move on Dallaswas accomplished, and on the 4th of June I was preparing to drawoff from New Hope Church, and to take position on the railroad infront of Allatoona, when, General Johnston himself having evacuatedhis position, we effected the change without further battle, andmoved to the railroad, occupying it from Allatoona and Acworthforward to Big Shanty, in sight of the famous Kenesaw Mountain. 

Thus, substantially in the month of May, we had steadily driven ourantagonist from the strong positions of Dalton, Resaea, Cassville, Allatoona, and Dallas; had advanced our lines in strong, compactorder from Chattanooga to Big Shanty, nearly a hundred miles of asdifficult country as was ever fought over by civilized armies; andthus stood prepared to go on, anxious to fight, and confident ofsuccess as soon as the railroad communications were complete tobring forward the necessary supplies. It is now impossible tostate accurately our loss of life and men in any one separatebattle; for the fighting was continuous, almost daily, among treesand bushes, on ground where one could rarely see a hundred yardsahead. 

The aggregate loss in the several corps for the month of May isreported-as follows in the usual monthly returns sent to theAdjutant-General's office, which are, therefore, official:

Casualties during the Month of May, 1864(Major-General SHERMAN commanding). 

 Killed and Missing. Wounded. Total. 1, 863 7, 436 9, 299

General Joseph E. Johnston, in his "Narrative of his MilitaryOperations, " just published (March 27, 1874), gives the effectivestrength of his army at and about Dalton on the 1st of May, 1864(page 302), as follows:

Infantry..................... 37, 652Artillery.................... 2, 812Cavalry...................... 2, 392

 Total ................... 42, 856

During May, and prior to reaching Cassville, he was furtherreenforced (page 352)

Polk's corps of three divisions....... 12, 000Martin's division of cavalry.......... 3, 500Jackson's division of cavalry......... 3, 900

And at New Hope Church, May 26th

Brigade of Quarles.................... 2, 200

 Grand-total.................. 64, 456

His losses during the month of May are stated by him, as taken fromthe report of Surgeon Foard (page 325)

 Killed Wounded Total 721 4, 672 5, 393

These figures include only the killed and wounded, whereas mystatement of losses embraces the "missing, " which are usually"prisoners, " and of these we captured, during the whole campaign offour and a half months, exactly 12, 983, whose names, rank, andregiments, were officially reported to the Commissary-General ofPrisoners; and assuming a due proportion for the month of May, viz. , one-fourth, makes 3, 245 to be added to the killed and woundedgiven above, making an aggregate loss in Johnston's army, fromDalton to New Hope, inclusive, of 8, 638, against ours of 9, 299. 

Therefore General Johnston is greatly in error, in his estimates onpage 357, in stating our loss, as compared with his, at six or tento one. 

I always estimated my force at about double his, and could affordto lose two to one without disturbing our relative proportion; butI also reckoned that, in the natural strength of the country, inthe abundance of mountains, streams, and forests, he had a fairoffset to our numerical superiority, and therefore endeavored toact with reasonable caution while moving on the vigorous"offensive. "

With the drawn battle of New Hope Church, and our occupation of thenatural fortress of Allatoona, terminated the month of May, and thefirst stage of the campaign. 

CHAPTER XVII. 

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT KENESAW MOUNTAIN. 

JUNE, 1864. 

On the 1st of June our three armies were well in hand, in thebroken and densely-wooded country fronting the enemy intrenched atNew Hope Church, about five miles north of Dallas. GeneralStoneman's division of cavalry had occupied Allatoona, on therailroad, and General Garrard's division was at the western end ofthe pass, about Stilesboro. Colonel W. W. Wright, of theEngineers, was busily employed in repairing the railroad andrebuilding the bridge across the Etowah (or High tower) River, which had been destroyed by the enemy on his retreat; and thearmies were engaged in a general and constant skirmish along afront of about six miles--McPherson the right, Thomas the centre, and Schofield on the left. By gradually covering our front withparapet, and extending to the left, we approached the railroadtoward Acworth and overlapped the enemy's right. By the 4th ofJune we had made such progress that Johnston evacuated his lines inthe night, leaving us masters of the situation, when I deliberatelyshifted McPherson's army to the extreme left, at and in front ofAcworth, with Thomas's about two miles on his right, andSchofield's on his right all facing east. Heavy rains set in aboutthe 1st of June, making the roads infamous; but our marches wereshort, as we needed time for the repair of the railroad, so as tobring supplies forward to Allatoona Station. On the 6th I rodeback to Allatoona, seven miles, found it all that was expected, andgave orders for its fortification and preparation as a "secondarybase. "

General Blair arrived at Acworth on the 8th with his two divisionsof the Seventeenth Corps--the same which had been on veteranfurlough--had come up from Cairo by way of Clifton, on theTennessee River, and had followed our general route to Allatoona, where he had left a garrison of about fifteen hundred men. Hiseffective strength, as reported, was nine thousand. These, withnew regiments and furloughed men who had joined early in the monthof May, equaled our losses from battle, sickness, and bydetachments; so that the three armies still aggregated about onehundred thousand effective men. 

On the 10th of June the whole combined army moved forward sixmiles, to "Big Shanty, " a station on the railroad, whence we had agood view of the enemy's position, which embraced three prominenthills known as Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. On eachof these hills the enemy had signal-stations and fresh lines ofparapets. Heavy masses of infantry could be distinctly seen withthe naked eye, and it was manifest that Johnston had chosen hisground well, and with deliberation had prepared for battle; but hisline was at least ten miles in extent--too long, in my judgment, tobe held successfully by his force, then estimated at sixtythousand. As his position, however, gave him a perfect view overour field, we had to proceed with due caution. McPherson had theleft, following the railroad, which curved around the north base ofKenesaw; Thomas the centre, obliqued to the right, deploying belowKenesaw and facing Pine Hill; and Schofield, somewhat refused, wason the general right, looking south, toward Lost Mountain. 

On the 11th the Etowah bridge was done; the railroad was repairedup to our very skirmish line, close to the base of Kenesaw, and aloaded train of cars came to Big Shanty. The locomotive, detached, was run forward to a water-tank within the range of the enemy'sguns on Kenesaw, whence the enemy opened fire on the locomotive;but the engineer was not afraid, went on to the tank, got water, and returned safely to his train, answering the guns with thescreams of his engine, heightened by the cheers and shouts of ourmen. 

The rains continued to pour, and made our developments slow anddilatory, for there were no roads, and these had to be improvisedby each division for its own supply train from the depot in BigShanty to the camps. Meantime each army was deploying carefullybefore the enemy, intrenching every camp, ready as against a sally. The enemy's cavalry was also busy in our rear, compelling us todetach cavalry all the way back as far as Resaca, and tostrengthen all the infantry posts as far as Nashville. Besides, there was great danger, always in my mind, that Forrest wouldcollect a heavy cavalry command in Mississippi, cross the TennesseeRiver, and break up our railroad below Nashville. In anticipationof this very danger, I had sent General Sturgis to Memphis to takecommand of all the cavalry in that quarter, to go out towardPontotoc, engage Forrest and defeat him; but on the 14th of June Ilearned that General Sturgis had himself been defeated on the 10thof June, and had been driven by Forrest back into Memphis inconsiderable confusion. I expected that this would soon befollowed by a general raid on all our roads in Tennessee. GeneralG. J. Smith, with the two divisions of the Sixteenth andSeventeenth Corps which had been with General Banks up Red River, had returned from that ill-fated expedition, and had been orderedto General Canby at New Orleans, who was making a diversion aboutMobile; but, on hearing of General Sturgis's defeat, I orderedGeneral Smith to go out from Memphis and renew the offensive, so asto keep Forrest off our roads. This he did finally, defeatingForrest at Tupelo, on the 13th, 14th, and 15th days of July; andhe so stirred up matters in North Mississippi that Forrest couldnot leave for Tennessee. This, for a time, left me only the taskof covering the roads against such minor detachments of cavalry asJohnston could spare from his immediate army, and I proposed tokeep these too busy in their own defense to spare detachments. Bythe 14th the rain slackened, and we occupied a continuous line often miles, intrenched, conforming to the irregular position of theenemy, when I reconnoitred, with a view to make a break in theirline between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain. When abreast of PineMountain I noticed a rebel battery on its crest, with a continuousline of fresh rifle-trench about half-way down the hill. Ourskirmishers were at the time engaged in the woods about the base ofthis hill between the lines, and I estimated the distance to thebattery on the crest at about eight hundred yards. Near it, inplain view, stood a group of the enemy, evidently observing us withglasses. General Howard, commanding the Fourth Corps, was near by, and I called his attention to this group, and ordered him to compelit to keep behind its cover. He replied that his orders fromGeneral Thomas were to spare artillery-ammunition. This was right, according to the general policy, but I explained to him that wemust keep up the morale of a bold offensive, that he must use hisartillery, force the enemy to remain on the timid defensive, andordered him to cause a battery close by to fire three volleys. Icontinued to ride down our line, and soon heard, in quicksuccession, the three volleys. The next division in order wasGeary's, and I gave him similar orders. General Polk, in myopinion, was killed by the second volley fired from the firstbattery referred to. 

In a conversation with General Johnston, after the war, heexplained that on that day he had ridden in person from Marietta toPine Mountain, held by Bates's division, and was accompanied byGenerals Hardee and Polk. When on Pine Mountain, reconnoitring, quite a group of soldiers, belonging to the battery close by, clustered about him. He noticed the preparations of our battery tofire, and cautioned these men to scatter. They did so, and helikewise hurried behind the parapet, from which he had an equallygood view of our position but General Polk, who was dignified andcorpulent, walked back slowly, not wishing to appear too hurried orcautious in the presence of the men, and was struck across thebreast by an unexploded shell, which killed him instantly. This ismy memory of the conversation, and it is confirmed by Johnstonhimself in his "Narrative, " page 337, except that he calculated thedistance of our battery at six hundred yards, and says that Polkwas killed by the third shot; I know that our guns fired by volley, and believe that he was hit by a shot of the second volley. It hasbeen asserted that I fired the gun which killed General Polk, andthat I knew it was directed against that general. The fact is, atthat distance we could not even tell that the group were officersat all; I was on horseback, a couple of hundred yards off, beforemy orders to fire were executed, had no idea that our shot hadtaken effect, and continued my ride down along the line toSchofield's extreme flank, returning late in the evening to myhead-quarters at Big Shanty, where I occupied an abandoned house. In a cotton-field back of that house was our signal-station, on theroof of an old gin-house. The signal-officer reported that bystudying the enemy's signals he had learned the key, and that hecould read their signals. He explained to me that he hadtranslated a signal about noon, from Pine Mountain to Marietta, "Send an ambulance for General Polk's body;" and later in the dayanother, "Why don't you send an ambulance for General Polk?" Fromthis we inferred that General Polk had been killed, but how orwhere we knew not; and this inference was confirmed later in thesame day by the report of some prisoners who had been captured. 

On the 15th we advanced our general lines, intending to attack atany weak point discovered between Kenesaw and Pine Mountain; butPine Mountain was found to be abandoned, and Johnston hadcontracted his front somewhat, on a direct line, connecting Kenesawwith Lost Mountain. Thomas and Schofield thereby gained about twomiles of most difficult, country, and McPherson's left lapped wellaround the north end of Kenesaw. We captured a good manyprisoners, among them a whole infantry regiment, the FourteenthAlabama, three hundred and twenty strong. 

On the 16th the general movement was continued, when Lost Mountainwas abandoned by the enemy. Our right naturally swung round, so asto threaten the railroad below Marietta, but Johnston had stillfurther contracted and strengthened his lines, covering Mariettaand all the roads below. 

On the 17th and 18th the rain again fell in torrents, making armymovements impossible, but we devoted the time to strengthening ourpositions, more especially the left and centre, with a viewgradually to draw from the left to add to the right; and we had tohold our lines on the left extremely strong, to guard against asally from Kenesaw against our depot at Big Shanty. Garrard'sdivision of cavalry was kept busy on our left, McPherson hadgradually extended to his right, enabling Thomas to do the samestill farther; but the enemy's position was so very strong, andeverywhere it was covered by intrenchments, that we found it asdangerous to assault as a permanent fort. We in like mannercovered our lines of battle by similar works, and even ourskirmishers learned to cover their bodies by the simplest and bestforms of defensive works, such as rails or logs, piled in the formof a simple lunette, covered on the outside with earth thrown up atnight. 

The enemy and ourselves used the same form of rifle-trench, variedaccording to the nature of the ground, viz. : the trees and busheswere cut away for a hundred yards or more in front, serving as anabatis or entanglement; the parapets varied from four to six feethigh, the dirt taken from a ditch outside and from a covered wayinside, and this parapet was surmounted by a "head-log, " composedof the trunk of a tree from twelve to twenty inches at the butt, lying along the interior crest of the parapet and resting innotches cut in other trunks which extended back, forming aninclined plane, in case the head-log should be knocked inward by acannon-shot. The men of both armies became extremely skillful inthe construction of these works, because each man realized theirvalue and importance to himself, so that it required no orders fortheir construction. As soon as a regiment or brigade gained aposition within easy distance for a sally, it would set to workwith a will, and would construct such a parapet in a single night;but I endeavored to spare the soldiers this hard labor byauthorizing each division commander to organize out of the freedmenwho escaped to us a pioneer corps of two hundred men, who were fedout of the regular army supplies, and I promised them ten dollars amonth, under an existing act of Congress. These pioneerdetachments became very useful to us during the rest of the war, for they could work at night while our men slept; they in turn werenot expected to fight, and could therefore sleep by day. Ourenemies used their slaves for a similar purpose, but usually keptthem out of the range of fire by employing them to fortify andstrengthen the position to their rear next to be occupied in theirgeneral retrograde. During this campaign hundreds if not thousandsof miles of similar intrenchments were built by both armies, and, as a rule, whichever party attacked got the worst of it. 

On the 19th of June the rebel army again fell back on its flanks, to such an extent that for a time I supposed it had retreated tothe Chattahoochee River, fifteen miles distant; but as we pressedforward we were soon undeceived, for we found it still moreconcentrated, covering Marietta and the railroad. These successivecontractions of the enemy's line encouraged us and discouraged him, but were doubtless justified by sound reasons. On the 20thJohnston's position was unusually strong. Kenesaw Mountain was hissalient; his two flanks were refused and covered by parapets and byNoonday and Nose's Creeks. His left flank was his weak point, solong as he acted on the "defensive, " whereas, had he designed tocontract the extent of his line for the purpose of getting inreserve a force with which to strike "offensively" from his right, he would have done a wise act, and I was compelled to presume thatsuch was his object: We were also so far from Nashville andChattanooga that we were naturally sensitive for the safety of ourrailroad and depots, so that the left (McPherson) was held verystrong. 

About this time came reports that a large cavalry force of theenemy had passed around our left flank, evidently to strike thisvery railroad somewhere below Chattanooga. I therefore reenforcedthe cavalry stationed from Resaca to Casaville, and ordered forwardfrom Huntsville, Alabama, the infantry division of General John E. Smith, to hold Kingston securely. 

While we were thus engaged about Kenesaw, General Grant had hishands full with Lee, in Virginia. General Halleck was the chief ofstaff at Washington, and to him I communicated almost daily. Ifind from my letter-book that on the 21st of June I reported to himtersely and truly the condition of facts on that day: "This is thenineteenth day of rain, and the prospect of fair weather is as faroff as ever. The roads are impassable; the fields and woods becomequagmire's after a few wagons have crossed over. Yet we are atwork all the time. The left flank is across Noonday Creek, and theright is across Nose's Creek. The enemy still holds Kenesaw, aconical mountain, with Marietta behind it, and has his flanksretired, to cover that town and the railroad behind. I am allready to attack the moment the weather and roads will permit troopsand artillery to move with any thing like life. "

The weather has a wonderful effect on troops: in action and on themarch, rain is favorable; but in the woods, where all is blind anduncertain, it seems almost impossible for an army covering tenmiles of front to act in concert during wet and stormy weather. Still I pressed operations with the utmost earnestness, aimingalways to keep our fortified lines in absolute contact with theenemy, while with the surplus force we felt forward, from one flankor the other, for his line of communication and retreat. On the22d of June I rode the whole line, and ordered General Thomas inperson to advance his extreme right corps (Hooker's); andinstructed General Schofield, by letter, to keep his entire army, viz. , the Twenty-third Corps, as a strong right flank in closesupport of Hooker's deployed line. During this day the sun cameout, with some promise of clear weather, and I had got back to mybivouac about dark, when a signal message was received, dated--

KULP HOUSE, 5. 30 P. M. 

General SHERMAN:We have repulsed two heavy attacks, and feel confident, our onlyapprehension being from our extreme right flank. Three entirecorps are in front of us. 

Major-General HOOKER. 

Hooker's corps (the Twentieth) belonged to Thomas's army; Thomas'sheadquarters were two miles nearer to Hooker than mine; and Hooker, being an old army officer, knew that he should have reported thisfact to Thomas and not to me; I was, moreover, specially disturbedby the assertion in his report that he was uneasy about his rightflank, when Schofield had been specially ordered to protect that. I first inquired of my adjutant, Dayton, if he were certain thatGeneral Schofield had received his orders, and he answered that theenvelope in which he had sent them was receipted by GeneralSchofield himself. I knew, therefore, that General Schofield mustbe near by, in close support of Hooker's right flank. GeneralThomas had before this occasion complained to me of GeneralHooker's disposition to "switch off, " leaving wide gaps in hisline, so as to be independent, and to make glory on his ownaccount. I therefore resolved not to overlook this breach ofdiscipline and propriety. The rebel army was only composed ofthree corps; I had that very day ridden six miles of their lines, found them everywhere strongly occupied, and therefore Hooker couldnot have encountered "three entire corps. " Both McPherson andSchofield had also complained to me of this same tendency of Hookerto widen the gap between his own corps and his proper army(Thomas's), so as to come into closer contact with one or other ofthe wings, asserting that he was the senior by commission to bothMcPherson and Schofield, and that in the event of battle he shouldassume command over them, by virtue of his older commission. 

They appealed to me to protect them. I had heard during that daysome cannonading and heavy firing down toward the "Kulp House, "which was about five miles southeast of where I was, but this wasnothing unusual, for at the same moment there was firing along ourlines full ten miles in extent. Early the next day (23d) I rodedown to the "Kulp House, " which was on a road leading from PowderSprings to Marietta, about three miles distant from the latter. Onthe way I passed through General Butterfield's division of Hooker'scorps, which I learned had not been engaged at all in the battle ofthe day before; then I rode along Geary's and Williams's divisions, which occupied the field of battle, and the men were engaged inburying the dead. I found General Schofield's corps on the PowderSprings road, its head of column abreast of Hooker's right, therefore constituting "a strong right flank, " and I met GeneraleSchofield and Hooker together. As rain was falling at the moment, we passed into a little church standing by the road-side, and Ithere showed General Schofield Hooker's signal-message of the daybefore. He was very angry, and pretty sharp words passed betweenthem, Schofield saying that his head of column (Hascall's division)had been, at the time of the battle, actually in advance ofHooker's line; that the attack or sally of the enemy struck histroops before it did Hooker's; that General Hooker knew of it atthe time; and he offered to go out and show me that the dead men ofhis advance division (Hascall's) were lying farther out than any ofHooker's. General Hooker pretended not to have known this fact. Ithen asked him why he had called on me for help, until he had usedall of his own troops; asserting that I had just seen Butterfield'sdivision, and had learned from him that he had not been engaged theday before at all; and I asserted that the enemy's sally must havebeen made by one corps (Hood's), in place of three, and that it hadfallen on Geary's and Williams's divisions, which had repulsed theattack handsomely. As we rode away from that church General Hookerwas by my side, and I told him that such a thing must not occuragain; in other words, I reproved him more gently than the occasiondemanded, and from that time he began to sulk. General Hooker hadcome from the East with great fame as a "fighter, " and atChattanooga he was glorified by his "battle above the clouds, "which I fear turned his head. He seemed jealous of all the armycommanders, because in years, former rank, and experience, hethought he was our superior. 

On the 23d of June I telegraphed to General Halleck this summary, which I cannot again better state:

We continue to press forward on the principle of an advance againstfortified positions. The whole country is one vast fort, andJohnston must have at least fifty miles of connected trenches, withabatis and finished batteries. We gain ground daily, fighting allthe time. On the 21st General Stanley gained a position near thesouth end of Kenesaw, from which the enemy attempted in vain todrive him; and the same day General T. J. Wood's division took ahill, which the enemy assaulted three times at night withoutsuccess, leaving more than a hundred dead on the ground. Yesterdaythe extreme right (Hooker and Schofield) advanced on the PowderSprings road to within three miles of Marietta. The enemy made astrong effort to drive them away, but failed signally, leaving morethan two hundred dead on the field. Our lines are now in closecontact, and the fighting is incessant, with a good deal ofartillery-fire. As fast as we gain one position the enemy hasanother all ready, but I think he will soon have to let go Kenesaw, which is the key to the whole country. The weather is now better, and the roads are drying up fast. Our losses are light, and, not-withstanding the repeated breaks of the road to our rear, supplies are ample. 

During the 24th and 25th of June General Schofield extended hisright as far as prudent, so as to compel the enemy to thin out hislines correspondingly, with the intention to make two strongassaults at points where success would give us the greatestadvantage. I had consulted Generals Thomas, McPherson, andSchofield, and we all agreed that we could not with prudencestretch out any more, and therefore there was no alternative but toattack "fortified lines, " a thing carefully avoided up to thattime. I reasoned, if we could make a breach anywhere near therebel centre, and thrust in a strong head of column, that with theone moiety of our army we could hold in check the correspondingwing of the enemy, and with the other sweep in flank and overwhelmthe other half. The 27th of June was fixed as the day for theattempt, and in order to oversee the whole, and to be in closecommunication with all parts of the army, I had a place cleared onthe top of a hill to the rear of Thomas's centre, and had thetelegraph-wires laid to it. The points of attack were chosen, andthe troops were all prepared with as little demonstration aspossible. About 9 A. M. Of the day appointed, the troops moved tothe assault, and all along our lines for ten miles a furious fireof artillery and musketry was kept up. At all points the enemy metus with determined courage and in great force. McPherson'sattacking column fought up the face of the lesser Kenesaw, butcould not reach the summit. About a mile to the right (just belowthe Dallas road) Thomas's assaulting column reached the parapet, where Brigadier-General Barker was shot down mortally wounded, andBrigadier-General Daniel McCook (my old law-partner) wasdesperately wounded, from the effects of which he afterward died. By 11. 30 the assault was in fact over, and had failed. We had notbroken the rebel line at either point, but our assaulting columnsheld their ground within a few yards of the rebel trenches, andthere covered themselves with parapet. McPherson lost about fivehundred men and several valuable officers, and Thomas lost nearlytwo thousand men. This was the hardest fight of the campaign up tothat date, and it is well described by Johnston in his "Narrative"(pages 342, 343), where he admits his loss in killed and woundedas

 Total ............. 808

This, no doubt, is a true and fair statement; but, as usual, Johnston overestimates our loss, putting it at six thousand, whereas our entire loss was about twenty-five hundred, killed andwounded. 

While the battle was in progress at the centre, Schofield crossedOlley's Creek on the right, and gained a position threateningJohnston's line of retreat; and, to increase the effect, I orderedStoneman's cavalry to proceed rapidly still farther to the right, to Sweetwater. Satisfied of the bloody cost of attackingintrenched lines, I at once thought of moving the whole army to therailroad at a point (Fulton) about ten miles below Marietta, or tothe Chattahoochee River itself, a movement similar to the oneafterward so successfully practised at Atlanta. All the orderswere issued to bring forward supplies enough to fill our wagons, intending to strip the railroad back to Allatoona, and leave thatplace as our depot, to be covered as well as possible by Garrard'scavalry. General Thomas, as usual, shook his head, deeming itrisky to leave the railroad; but something had to be done, and Ihad resolved on this move, as reported in my dispatch to GeneralHalleck on July 1st:

General Schofield is now south of Olley's Creek, and on the head ofNickajack. I have been hurrying down provisions and forage, andtomorrow night propose to move McPherson from the left to theextreme right, back of General Thomas. This will bring my rightwithin three miles of the Chattahoochee River, and about five milesfrom the railroad. By this movement I think I can force Johnstonto move his whole army down from Kenesaw to defend his railroad andthe Chattahoochee, when I will (by the left flank) reach therailroad below Marietta; but in this I must cut loose from therailroad with ten days' supplies in wagons. Johnston may come outof his intrenchments to attack Thomas, which is exactly what Iwant, for General Thomas is well intrenched on a line parallel withthe enemy south of Kenesaw. I think that Allatoona and the line ofthe Etowah are strong enough for me to venture on this move. Themovement is substantially down the Sandtown road straight forAtlanta. 

McPherson drew out of his lines during the night of July 2d, leaving Garrard's cavalry, dismounted, occupying his trenches, andmoved to the rear of the Army of the Cumberland, stretching downthe Nickajack; but Johnston detected the movement, and promptlyabandoned Marietta and Kenesaw. I expected as much, for, by theearliest dawn of the 3d of July, I was up at a large spy-glassmounted on a tripod, which Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, had at his bivouac close by our camp. I directed the glass onKenesaw, and saw some of our pickets crawling up the hillcautiously; soon they stood upon the very top, and I could plainlysee their movements as they ran along the crest just abandoned bythe enemy. In a minute I roused my staff, and started them offwith orders in every direction for a pursuit by every possibleroad, hoping to catch Johnston in the confusion of retreat, especially at the crossing of the Chattahoochee River. 

I must close this chapter here, so as to give the actual lossesduring June, which are compiled from the official returns bymonths. These losses, from June 1st to July 3d, were allsubstantially sustained about Kenesaw and Marietta, and it wasreally a continuous battle, lasting from the 10th day of June tillthe 3d of July, when the rebel army fell back from Marietta towardthe Chattahoochee River. Our losses were:

 Killed and Missing Wounded TotalLoss in June Aggregate 1, 790 5, 740 7, 530

Johnston makes his statement of losses from the report of hissurgeon Foard, for pretty much the same period, viz. , from June 4thto July 4th (page 576): Killed Wounded Total Total............ 468 3, 480 3, 948

In the tabular statement the "missing" embraces the prisoners; and, giving two thousand as a fair proportion of prisoners captured byus for the month of June (twelve thousand nine hundred andeighty-three in all the campaign), makes an aggregate loss in therebel army of fifty-nine hundred and forty-eight, to ours ofseventy-five hundred and thirty--a less proportion than in therelative strength of our two armies, viz. , as six to ten, thusmaintaining our relative superiority, which the desperate gameof war justified. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN--BATTLES ABOUT ATLANTA

JULY, 1864. 

As before explained, on the 3d of July, by moving McPherson'sentire army from the extreme left, at the base of Kenesaw to theright, below Olley's Creek, and stretching it down the Nickajacktoward Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee, we forced Johnston tochoose between a direct assault on Thomas's intrenched position, orto permit us to make a lodgment on his railroad below Marietta, oreven to cross the Chattahoochee. Of course, he chose to let goKenesaw and Marietta, and fall back on an intrenched camp preparedby his orders in advance on the north and west bank of theChattahoochee, covering the railroad-crossing and his severalpontoon-bridges. I confess I had not learned beforehand of theexistence of this strong place, in the nature of a tete-du-pont, and had counted on striking him an effectual blow in the expectedconfusion of his crossing the Chattahoochee, a broad and deep riverthen to his rear. Ordering every part of the army to pursuevigorously on the morning of the 3d of July, I rode into Marietta, just quitted by the rebel rear-guard, and was terribly angry at thecautious pursuit by Garrard's cavalry, and even by the head of ourinfantry columns. But Johnston had in advance cleared andmultiplied his roads, whereas ours had to cross at right anglesfrom the direction of Powder Springs toward Marrietta, producingdelay and confusion. By night Thomas's head of column ran upagainst a strong rear-guard intrenched at Smyrna camp-ground, sixmiles below Marietta, and there on the next day we celebrated ourFourth of July, by a noisy but not a desperate battle, designedchiefly to hold the enemy there till Generals McPherson andSchofield could get well into position below him, near theChattahoochee crossings. 

It was here that General Noyes, late Governor of Ohio, lost hisleg. I came very near being shot myself while reconnoitring in thesecond story of a house on our picket-line, which was struckseveral times by cannon-shot, and perfectly riddled withmusket-balls. 

During the night Johnston drew back all his army and trains insidethe tete-du-pont at the Chattahoochee, which proved one of thestrongest pieces of field-fortification I ever saw. We closed upagainst it, and were promptly met by a heavy and severe fire. Thomas was on the main road in immediate pursuit; next on his rightwas Schofield; and McPherson on the extreme right, reaching theChattahoochee River below Turner's Ferry. Stoneman's cavalry wasstill farther to the right, along down the Chattahoochee River asfar as opposite Sandtown; and on that day I ordered Garrard'sdivision of cavalry up the river eighteen miles, to securepossession of the factories at Roswell, as well as to hold animportant bridge and ford at that place. 

About three miles out from the Chattahoochee the main road forked, the right branch following substantially the railroad, and the leftone leading straight for Atlanta, via Paice's Ferry and Buckhead. We found the latter unoccupied and unguarded, and the Fourth Corps(Howard's) reached the river at Paice's Ferry. The right-hand roadwas perfectly covered by the tete-du-pont before described, wherethe resistance was very severe, and for some time deceived me, forI was pushing Thomas with orders to fiercely assault his enemy, supposing that he was merely opposing us to gain time to get histrains and troops across the Chattahoochee; but, on personallyreconnoitring, I saw the abatis and the strong redoubts, whichsatisfied me of the preparations that had been made by Johnston inanticipation of this very event. While I was with General Jeff. C. Davis, a poor negro came out of the abatis, blanched with fright, said he had been hidden under a log all day, with a perfect stormof shot, shells, and musket-balls, passing over him, till a shortlull had enabled him to creep out and make himself known to ourskirmishers, who in turn had sent him back to where we were. Thisnegro explained that he with about a thousand slaves had been atwork a month or more on these very lines, which, as he explained, extended from the river about a mile above the railroad-bridge toTurner's Ferry below, --being in extent from five to six miles. 

Therefore, on the 5th of July we had driven our enemy to cover inthe valley of the Chattahoochee, and we held possession of theriver above for eighteen miles, as far as Roswell, and below tenmiles to the mouth of the Sweetwater. Moreover, we held the highground and could overlook his movements, instead of his lookingdown on us, as was the case at Kenesaw. 

From a hill just back of Mining's Station I could see the houses inAtlanta, nine miles distant, and the whole intervening valley ofthe Chattahoochee; could observe the preparations for our receptionon the other side, the camps of men and large trains of coveredwagons; and supposed, as a matter of course, that Johnston hadpassed the river with the bulk of his army, and that he had onlyleft on our side a corps to cover his bridges; but in fact he hadonly sent across his cavalry and trains. Between Howard's corps atPaice's Ferry and the rest of Thomas's army pressing up againstthis tete-du-pont, was a space concealed by dense woods, incrossing which I came near riding into a detachment of the enemy'scavalry; and later in the same day Colonel Frank Sherman, ofChicago, then on General Howard's staff, did actually ride straightinto the enemy's camp, supposing that our lines were continuous. He was carried to Atlanta, and for some time the enemy supposedthey were in possession of the commander-in-chief of the opposingarmy. 

I knew that Johnston would not remain long on the west bank of theChattahoochee, for I could easily practise on that ground to betteradvantage our former tactics of intrenching a moiety in his front, and with the rest of our army cross the river and threaten eitherhis rear or the city of Atlanta itself, which city was of vitalimportance to the existence not only of his own army, but of theConfederacy itself. In my dispatch of July 6th to General Halleck, at Washington, I state that:

Johnston (in his retreat from Kenesaw) has left two breaks in therailroad--one above Marietta and one near Mining's Station. Theformer is already repaired, and Johnston's army has heard the soundof our locomotives. The telegraph is finished to Mining's Station, and the field-wire has just reached my bivouac, and will be readyto convey this message as soon as it is written and translated intocipher. 

I propose to study the crossings of the Chattahoochee, and, whenall is ready, to move quickly. As a beginning, I will keep thetroops and wagons well back from the river, and only display to theenemy our picket-line, with a few field-batteries along at random. I have already shifted Schofield to a point in our left rear, whence he can in a single move reach the Chattahoochee at a pointabove the railroad-bridge, where there is a ford. At present thewaters are turbid and swollen from recent rains; but if the presenthot weather lasts, the water will run down very fast. We havepontoons enough for four bridges, but, as our crossing will beresisted, we must manoeuvre some. All the regular crossing-placesare covered by forts, apparently of long construction; but we shallcross in due time, and, instead of attacking Atlanta direct, or anyof its forts, I propose to make a circuit, destroying all itsrailroads. This is a delicate movement, and must be done withcaution. Our army is in good condition and full of confidence; butthe weather is intensely hot, and a good many men have fallen withsunstroke. The country is high and healthy, and the sanitarycondition of the army is good. 

At this time Stoneman was very active on our extreme right, pretending to be searching the river below Turner's Ferry for acrossing, and was watched closely by the enemy's cavalry on theother side, McPherson, on the right, was equally demonstrative atand near Turner's Ferry. Thomas faced substantially the intrenchedtete-du-pont, and had his left on the Chattahoochee River, atPaice's Ferry. Garrard's cavalry was up at Roswell, and McCook'ssmall division of cavalry was intermediate, above Soap's Creek. Meantime, also, the railroad-construction party was hard at work, repairing the railroad up to our camp at Vining's Station. 

Of course, I expected every possible resistance in crossing theChattahoochee River, and had made up my mind to feign on the right, but actually to cross over by the left. We had already secured acrossing place at Roswell, but one nearer was advisable; GeneralSchofield had examined the river well, found a place just below themouth of Soap's Creek which he deemed advantageous, and wasinstructed to effect an early crossing there, and to intrench agood position on the other side, viz. , the east bank. But, preliminary thereto, I had ordered General Rousseau, at Nashville, to collect, out of the scattered detachments of cavalry inTennessee, a force of a couple of thousand men, to rendezvous atDecatur, Alabama, thence to make a rapid march for Opelika, tobreak up the railroad links between Georgia and Alabama, and thento make junction with me about Atlanta; or, if forced, to go on toPensacola, or even to swing across to some of our posts inMississippi. General Rousseau asked leave to command thisexpedition himself, to which I consented, and on the 6th of July hereported that he was all ready at Decatur, and I gave him orders tostart. He moved promptly on the 9th, crossed the Coosa below the"Ten Islands" and the Tallapoosa below "Horseshoe Bend, " havingpassed through Talladega. He struck the railroad west of Opelika, tore it up for twenty miles, then turned north and came to Mariettaon the 22d of July, whence he reported to me. This expedition wasin the nature of a raid, and must have disturbed the enemysomewhat; but, as usual, the cavalry did not work hard, and theirdestruction of the railroad was soon repaired. Rousseau, when hereported to me in person before Atlanta, on the 28d of July, statedhis entire loss to have been only twelve killed and thirty wounded. He brought in four hundred captured mules and three hundred horses, and also told me a good story. He said he was far down in Alabama, below Talladega, one hot, dusty day, when the blue clothing of hismen was gray with dust; he had halted his column along a road, andhe in person, with his staff, had gone to the house of a planter, who met him kindly on the front-porch. He asked for water, whichwas brought, and as the party sat on the porch in conversation hesaw, in a stable-yard across the road, quite a number of goodmules. He remarked to the planter, "My good sir, I fear I must takesome of your mules. " The planter remonstrated, saying he hadalready contributed liberally to the good cause; that it was onlylast week he had given to General Roddy ten mules. Rousseaureplied, "Well, in this war you should be at least neutral--thatis, you should be as liberal to us as to Roddy" (a rebel cavalrygeneral). "Well, ain't you on our side?" "No, " said Rousseau; "Iam General Rousseau, and all these men you see are Yanks. " "GreatGod! is it possible! Are these Yanks! Who ever supposed theywould come away down here in Alabama?" Of course, Rousseau tookhis ten mules. 

Schofield effected his crossing at Soap's Creek very handsomely onthe 9th, capturing the small guard that was watching the crossing. By night he was on the high ground beyond, strongly intrenched, with two good pontoon-bridges finished, and was prepared, ifnecessary, for an assault by the whole Confederate army. The sameday Garrard's cavalry also crossed over at Roswell, drove away thecavalry-pickets, and held its ground till relieved by Newton'sdivision of Howard's corps, which was sent up temporarily, till itin turn was relieved by Dodge's corps (Sixteenth) of the Army ofthe Tennessee, which was the advance of the whole of that army. 

That night Johnston evacuated his trenches, crossed over theChattahoochee, burned the railroad bridge and his pontoon andtrestle bridges, and left us in full possession of the north orwest bank-besides which, we had already secured possession of thetwo good crossings at Roswell and Soap's Creek. I have alwaysthought Johnston neglected his opportunity there, for he had laincomparatively idle while we got control of both banks of the riverabove him. 

On the 13th I ordered McPherson, with the Fifteenth Corps, to moveup to Roswell, to cross over, prepare good bridges, and to make astrong tete-du-pont on the farther side. Stoneman had been sentdown to Campbellton, with orders to cross over and to threaten therailroad below Atlanta, if he could do so without too much risk;and General Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was to remain atTurner's Ferry, demonstrating as much as possible, thus keeping upthe feint below while we were actually crossing above. Thomas wasalso ordered to prepare his bridges at Powers's and Paice'sFerries. By crossing the Chattahoochee above the railroad bridge, we were better placed to cover our railroad and depots than below, though a movement across the river below the railroad, to the southof Atlanta, might have been more decisive. But we were already sofar from home, and would be compelled to accept battle wheneveroffered, with the Chattahoochee to our rear, that it becameimperative for me to take all prudential measures the case admittedof, and I therefore determined to pass the river above therailroad-bridge-McPherson on the left, Schofield in the centre, and Thomas on the right. On the 13th I reported to General Halleckas follows:

All is well. I have now accumulated stores at Allatoona andMarietta, both fortified and garrisoned points. Have also threeplaces at which to cross the Chattahoochee in our possession, andonly await General Stoneman's return from a trip down the river, tocross the army in force and move on Atlanta. 

Stoneman is now out two days, and had orders to be back on thefourth or fifth day at furthest. 

From the 10th to the 15th we were all busy in strengthening theseveral points for the proposed passage of the Chattahoochee, inincreasing the number and capacity of the bridges, rearranging thegarrisons to our rear, and in bringing forward supplies. On the15th General Stoneman got back to Powder Springs, and was orderedto replace General Blair at Turner's Ferry, and Blair, with theSeventeenth Corps, was ordered up to Roswell to join McPherson. Onthe 17th we began the general movement against Atlanta, Thomascrossing the Chattahoochee at Powers's and Paice's, by pontoon-bridges; Schofield moving out toward Cross Keys, and McPhersontoward Stone Mountain. We encountered but little opposition exceptby cavalry. On the 18th all the armies moved on a general rightwheel, Thomas to Buckhead, forming line of battle facingPeach-Tree Creek; Schofield was on his left, and McPherson wellover toward the railroad between Stone Mountain and Decatur, whichhe reached at 2 p. M. Of that day, about four miles from StoneMountain, and seven miles east of Decatur, and there he turnedtoward Atlanta, breaking up the railroad as he progressed, hisadvance-guard reaching Ecatur about night, where he came intocommunication with Schofield's troops, which had also reachedDecatur. About 10 A. M. Of that day (July 18th), when the armieswere all in motion, one of General Thomas's staff-officers broughtme a citizen, one of our spies, who had just come out of Atlanta, and had brought a newspaper of the same day, or of the day before, containing Johnston's order relinquishing the command of theConfederate forces in Atlanta, and Hood's order assuming thecommand. I immediately inquired of General Schofield, who was hisclassmate at West Point, about Hood, as to his general character, etc. , and learned that he was bold even to rashness, and courageousin the extreme; I inferred that the change of commanders meant"fight. " Notice of this important change was at once sent to allparts of the army, and every division commander was cautioned to bealways prepared for battle in any shape. This was just what wewanted, viz. , to fight in open ground, on any thing like equalterms, instead of being forced to run up against preparedintrenchments; but, at the same time, the enemy having Atlantabehind him, could choose the time and place of attack, and could atpleasure mass a superior force on our weakest points. Therefore, we had to be constantly ready for sallies. 

On the 19th the three armies were converging toward Atlanta, meeting such feeble resistance that I really thought the enemyintended to evacuate the place. McPherson was moving astride ofthe railroad, near Decatur; Schofield along a road leading towardAtlanta, by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery; and Thomaswas crossing "Peach-Tree" in line of battle, building bridges fornearly every division as deployed. There was quite a gap betweenThomas and Schofield, which I endeavored to close by drawing two ofHoward's divisions nearer Schofield. On the 20th I was withGeneral Schofield near the centre, and soon after noon heard heavyfiring in front of Thomas's right, which lasted an hour or so, andthen ceased. 

I soon learned that the enemy had made a furious sally, the blowfalling on Hooker's corps (the Twentieth), and partially onJohnson's division of the Fourteenth, and Newton's of the Fourth. The troops had crossed Peach-Tree Creek, were deployed, but at thetime were resting for noon, when, without notice, the enemy camepouring out of their trenches down upon them, they becamecommingled, and fought in many places hand to hand. General Thomashappened to be near the rear of Newton's division, and got somefield-batteries in a good position, on the north side of Peach-TreeCreek, from which he directed a furious fire on a mass of theenemy, which was passing around Newton's left and exposed flank. After a couple of hours of hard and close conflict, the enemyretired slowly within his trenches, leaving his dead and manywounded on the field. Johnson's and Newton's losses were light, forthey had partially covered their fronts with light parapet; butHooker's whole corps fought in open ground, and lost about fifteenhundred men. He reported four hundred rebel dead left on theground, and that the rebel wounded would number four thousand; butthis was conjectural, for most of them got back within their ownlines. We had, however, met successfully a bold sally, hadrepelled it handsomely, and were also put on our guard; and theevent illustrated the future tactics of our enemy. This sally camefrom the Peach-Tree line, which General Johnston had carefullyprepared in advance, from which to fight us outside of Atlanta. Wethen advanced our lines in compact order, close up to thesefinished intrenchments, overlapping them on our left. From variousparts of our lines the houses inside of Atlanta were plainlyvisible, though between us were the strong parapets, with ditch, fraise, chevaux-de-frise, and abatis, prepared long in advance byColonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, formerly of the United States Engineers. McPherson had the Fifteenth Corps astride the Augusta Railroad, andthe Seventeenth deployed on its left. Schofield was next on hisright, then came Howard's, Hooker's, and Palmer's corps, on theextreme right. Each corps was deployed with strong reserves, andtheir trains were parked to their rear. McPherson's trains were inDecatur, guarded by a brigade commanded by Colonel Sprague of theSixty-third Ohio. The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's) was crowded out ofposition on the right of McPherson's line, by the contraction ofthe circle of investment; and, during the previous afternoon, theSeventeenth Corps (Blair's) had pushed its operations on thefarther side of the Augusta Railroad, so as to secure possession ofa hill, known as Leggett's Hill, which Leggett's and Force'sdivisions had carried by assault. Giles A. Smith's division was onLeggett's left, deployed with a weak left flank "in air, " inmilitary phraseology. The evening before General Gresham, a greatfavorite, was badly wounded; and there also Colonel Tom Reynolds, now of Madison, Wisconsin, was shot through the leg. When thesurgeons were debating the propriety of amputating it in hishearing, he begged them to spare the leg, as it was very valuable, being an "imported leg. " He was of Irish birth, and thiswell-timed piece of wit saved his leg, for the surgeons thought, ifhe could perpetrate a joke at such a time, they would trust to hisvitality to save his limb. 

During the night, I had full reports from all parts of our line, most of which was partially intrenched as against a sally, andfinding that McPherson was stretching out too much on his leftflank, I wrote him a note early in the morning not to extend somuch by his left; for we had not troops enough to completely investthe place, and I intended to destroy utterly all parts of theAugusta Railroad to the east of Atlanta, then to withdraw from theleft flank and add to the right. In that letter I orderedMcPherson not to extend any farther to the left, but to employGeneral Dodge's corps (Sixteenth), then forced out of position, todestroy every rail and tie of the railroad, from Decatur up to hisskirmish-line, and I wanted him (McPherson) to be ready, as soon asGeneral Garrard returned from Covington (whither I had sent him), to move to the extreme right of Thomas, so as to reach if possiblethe railroad below Atlanta, viz. , the Macon road. In the morningwe found the strong line of parapet, "Peach-Tree line, " to thefront of Schofield and Thomas, abandoned, and our lines wereadvanced rapidly close up to Atlanta. For some moments I supposedthe enemy intended to evacuate, and in person was on horseback atthe head of Schofield's troops, who had advanced in front of theHoward House to some open ground, from which we could plainly seethe whole rebel line of parapets, and I saw their men dragging upfrom the intervening valley, by the distillery, trees and saplingsfor abatis. Our skirmishers found the enemy down in this valley, and we could see the rebel main line strongly manned, with guns inposition at intervals. Schofield was dressing forward his lines, and I could hear Thomas farther to the right engaged, when GeneralMcPherson and his staff rode up. We went back to the Howard House, a double frame-building with a porch, and sat on the steps, discussing the chances of battle, and of Hood's general character. McPherson had also been of the same class at West Point with Hood, Schofield, and Sheridan. We agreed that we ought to be unusuallycautious and prepared at all times for sallies and for hardfighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or ofgreat mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, andrash man; and the change of commanders at that particular crisisargued the displeasure of the Confederate Government with thecautious but prudent conduct of General Jos. Johnston. 

McPherson was in excellent spirits, well pleased at the progress ofevents so far, and had come over purposely to see me about theorder I had given him to use Dodge's corps to break up therailroad, saying that the night before he had gained a position onLeggett's Hill from which he could look over the rebel parapet, andsee the high smoke-stack of a large foundery in Atlanta; thatbefore receiving my order he had diverted Dodge's two divisions(then in motion) from the main road, along a diagonal one that ledto his extreme left flank, then held by Giles A. Smith's division(Seventeenth Corps), for the purpose of strengthening that flank;and that he had sent some intrenching-tools there, to erect somebatteries from which he intended to knock down that foundery, andotherwise to damage the buildings inside of Atlanta. He said hecould put all his pioneers to work, and do with them in the timeindicated all I had proposed to do with General Dodge's twodivisions. Of course I assented at once, and we walked down theroad a short distance, sat down by the foot of a tree where I hadmy map, and on it pointed out to him Thomas's position and his own. I then explained minutely that, after we had sufficiently broken upthe Augusta road, I wanted to shift his whole army around by therear to Thomas's extreme right, and hoped thus to reach the otherrailroad at East Point. While we sat there we could hear livelyskirmishing going on near us (down about the distillery), andoccasionally round-shot from twelve or twenty-four pound guns camethrough the trees in reply to those of Schofield, and we could hearsimilar sounds all along down the lines of Thomas to our right, andhis own to the left; but presently the firing appeared a littlemore brisk (especially over about Giles G. Smith's division), andthen we heard an occasional gun back toward Decatur. I asked himwhat it meant. We took my pocket-compass (which I always carried), and by noting the direction of the sound, we became satisfied thatthe firing was too far to our left rear to be explained by knownfacts, and he hastily called for his horse, his staff, and hisorderlies. 

McPherson was then in his prime (about thirty-four years old), oversix feet high, and a very handsome man in every way, wasuniversally liked, and had many noble qualities. He had on hisboots outside his pantaloons, gauntlets on his hands, had on hismajor-general's uniform, and wore a sword-belt, but no sword. Hehastily gathered his papers (save one, which I now possess) into apocket-book, put it in his breast-pocket, and jumped on his horse, saying he would hurry down his line and send me back word whatthese sounds meant. His adjutant-general, Clark, Inspector-GeneralStrong, and his aides, Captains Steele and Gile, were with him. Although the sound of musketry on our left grew in volume, I wasnot so much disturbed by it as by the sound of artillery backtoward Decatur. I ordered Schofield at once to send a brigade backto Decatur (some five miles) and was walking up and down the porchof the Howard House, listening, when one of McPherson's staff, withhis horse covered with sweat, dashed up to the porch, and reportedthat General McPherson was either "killed or a prisoner. " Heexplained that when they had left me a few minutes before, they hadridden rapidly across to the railroad, the sounds of battleincreasing as they neared the position occupied by General Giles A. Smith's division, and that McPherson had sent first one, thenanother of his staff to bring some of the reserve brigades of theFifteenth Corps over to the exposed left flank; that he had reachedthe head of Dodge's corps (marching by the flank on the diagonalroad as described), and had ordered it to hurry forward to the samepoint; that then, almost if not entirely alone, he had followedthis road leading across the wooded valley behind the SeventeenthCorps, and had disappeared in these woods, doubtless with a senseof absolute security. The sound of musketry was there heard, andMcPherson's horse came back, bleeding, wounded, and riderless. Iordered the staff-officer who brought this message to return atonce, to find General Logan (the senior officer present with theArmy of the Tennessee), to report the same facts to him, and toinstruct him to drive back this supposed small force, which hadevidently got around the Seventeenth Corps through the blind woodsin rear of our left flank. I soon dispatched one of my own staff(McCoy, I think) to General Logan with similar orders, telling himto refuse his left flank, and to fight the battle (holding fast toLeggett's Hill) with the Army of the Tennessee; that I wouldpersonally look to Decatur and to the safety of his rear, and wouldreenforce him if he needed it. I dispatched orders to GeneralThomas on our right, telling him of this strong sally, and myinference that the lines in his front had evidently been weakenedby reason thereof, and that he ought to take advantage of theopportunity to make a lodgment in Atlanta, if possible. 

Meantime the sounds of the battle rose on our extreme left more andmore furious, extending to the place where I stood, at the HowardHouse. Within an hour an ambulance came in (attended by ColonelsClark and Strong, and Captains Steele and Gile), bearingMcPherson's body. I had it carried inside of the Howard House, andlaid on a door wrenched from its hinges. Dr. Hewitt, of the army, was there, and I asked him to examine the wound. He opened thecoat and shirt, saw where the ball had entered and where it cameout, or rather lodged under the skin, and he reported thatMcPherson must have died in a few seconds after being hit; that theball had ranged upward across his body, and passed near the heart. He was dressed just as he left me, with gauntlets and boots on, buthis pocket-book was gone. On further inquiry I learned that hisbody must have been in possession of the enemy some minutes, duringwhich time it was rifled of the pocket-book, and I was muchconcerned lest the letter I had written him that morning shouldhave fallen into the hands of some one who could read andunderstand its meaning. Fortunately the spot in the woods whereMcPherson was shot was regained by our troops in a few minutes, andthe pocket-book found in the haversack of a prisoner of warcaptured at the time, and it and its contents were secured by oneof McPherson's staff. 

While we were examining the body inside the house, the battle wasprogressing outside, and many shots struck the building, which Ifeared would take fire; so I ordered Captains Steele and Gile tocarry the body to Marietta. They reached that place the samenight, and, on application, I ordered his personal staff to go onand escort the body to his home, in Clyde, Ohio, where it wasreceived with great honor, and it is now buried in a smallcemetery, close by his mother's house, which cemetery is composedin part of the family orchard, in which he used to play when a boy. The foundation is ready laid for the equestrian monument now inprogress, under the auspices of the Society of the Army of theTennessee. 

The reports that came to me from all parts of the field revealedclearly what was the game of my antagonist, and the ground somewhatfavored him. The railroad and wagon-road from Decatur to Atlantalie along the summit, from which the waters flow, by short, steepvalleys, into the "Peach-Tree" and Chattahoochee, to the west, andby other valleys, of gentler declivity, toward the east (Ocmulgee). The ridges and level ground were mostly cleared, and had beencultivated as corn or cotton fields; but where the valleys werebroken, they were left in a state of nature--wooded, and full ofundergrowth. McPherson's line of battle was across this railroad, along a general ridge, with a gentle but cleared valley to hisfront, between him and the defenses of Atlanta; and another valley, behind him, was clear of timber in part, but to his left rear thecountry was heavily wooded. Hood, during the night of July 21st, had withdrawn from his Peach-Tree line, had occupied the fortifiedline of Atlanta, facing north and east, with Stewart's--formerlyPolk's--corps and part of Hardee's, and with G. W. Smith's divisionof militia. His own corps, and part of Hardee's, had marched outto the road leading from McDonough to Decatur, and had turned so asto strike the left and, rear of McPherson's line "in air. " At thesame time he had sent Wheeler's division of cavalry against thetrains parked in Decatur. Unluckily for us, I had sent away thewhole of Garrard's division of cavalry during the night of the20th, with orders to proceed to Covington, thirty miles east, toburn two important bridges across the Ulcofauhatchee and YellowRivers, to tear up the railroad, to damage it as much as possiblefrom Stone Mountain eastward, and to be gone four days; so thatMcPherson had no cavalry in hand to guard that flank. 

The enemy was therefore enabled, under cover or the forest, toapproach quite near before he was discovered; indeed, hisskirmish-line had worked through the timber and got into the field tothe rear of Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corpsunseen, had captured Murray's battery of regular artillery, movingthrough these woods entirely unguarded, and had got possession ofseveral of the hospital camps. The right of this rebel line struckDodge's troops in motion; but, fortunately, this corps (Sixteenth)had only to halt, face to the left, and was in line of battle; andthis corps not only held in check the enemy, but drove him backthrough the woods. About the same time this same force had struckGeneral Giles A. Smith's left flank, doubled it back, captured fourguns in position and the party engaged in building the very batterywhich was the special object of McPherson's visit to me, and almostenveloped the entire left flank. The men, however, were skillful andbrave, and fought for a time with their backs to Atlanta. Theygradually fell back, compressing their own line, and gaining strengthby making junction with Leggett's division of the Seventeenth Corps, well and strongly posted on the hill. One or two brigades of theFifteenth Corps, ordered by McPherson, came rapidly across the openfield to the rear, from the direction of the railroad, filled up thegap from Blair's new left to the head of Dodge's column--now facingto the general left--thus forming a strong left flank, at rightangles to the original line of battle. The enemy attacked, boldly andrepeatedly, the whole of this flank, but met an equally fierceresistance; and on that ground a bloody battle raged from littleafter noon till into the night. A part of Hood's plan of action wasto sally from Atlanta at the same moment; but this sally was not, forsome reason, simultaneous, for the first attack on our extreme leftflank had been checked and repulsed before the sally came from thedirection of Atlanta. Meantime, Colonel Sprague, in Decatur, had gothis teams harnessed up, and safely conducted his train to the rear ofSchofield's position, holding in check Wheeler's cavalry till he hadgot off all his trains, with the exception of three or four wagons. I remained near the Howard House, receiving reports and sendingorders, urging Generals Thomas and Schofield to take advantage of theabsence from their front of so considerable a body as was evidentlyengaged on our left, and, if possible, to make a lodgment in Atlantaitself; but they reported that the lines to their front, at allaccessible points, were strong, by nature and by art, and were fullymanned. About 4 p. M. The expected, sally came from Atlanta, directedmainly against Leggett's Hill and along the Decatur road. AtLeggett's Hill they were met and bloodily repulsed. Along therailroad they were more successful. Sweeping over a small force withtwo guns, they reached our main line, broke through it, and gotpossession of De Gress's battery of four twenty-pound Parrotts, killing every horse, and turning the guns against us. GeneralCharles R. Wood's division of the Fifteenth Corps was on the extremeright of the Army of the Tennessee, between the railroad and theHoward House, where he connected with Schofield's troops. Hereported to me in person that the line on his left had been sweptback, and that his connection with General Logan, on Leggett's Hill, was broken. I ordered him to wheel his brigades to the left, toadvance in echelon, and to catch the enemy in flank. GeneralSchofield brought forward all his available batteries, to the numberof twenty guns, to a position to the left front of the Howard House, whence we could overlook the field of action, and directed a heavyfire over the heads of General Wood's men against the enemy; and wesaw Wood's troops advance and encounter the enemy, who had securedpossession of the old line of parapet which had been held by our men. His right crossed this parapet, which he swept back, taking it inflank; and, at the same time, the division which had been driven backalong the railroad was rallied by General Logan in person, and foughtfor their former ground. These combined forces drove the enemy intoAtlanta, recovering the twenty pound Parrott guns but one of them wasfound "bursted" while in the possession of the enemy. The twosix-pounders farther in advance were, however, lost, and had beenhauled back by the enemy into Atlanta. Poor Captain de Gress came tome in tears, lamenting the loss of his favorite guns; when they wereregained he had only a few men left, and not a single horse. He askedan order for a reequipment, but I told him he must beg and borrow ofothers till he could restore his battery, now reduced to three guns. How he did so I do not know, but in a short time he did get horses, men, and finally another gun, of the same special pattern, and servedthem with splendid effect till the very close of the war. Thisbattery had also been with me from Shiloh till that time. 

The battle of July 22d is usually called the battle of Atlanta. Itextended from the Howard House to General Giles A. Smith'sposition, about a mile beyond the Augusta Railroad, and then backtoward Decatur, the whole extent of ground being fully seven miles. In part the ground was clear and in part densely wooded. I rodeover the whole of it the next day, and it bore the marks of abloody conflict. The enemy had retired during the night inside ofAtlanta, and we remained masters of the situation outside. Ipurposely allowed the Army of the Tennessee to fight this battlealmost unaided, save by demonstrations on the part of GeneralSchofield and Thomas against the fortified lines to their immediatefronts, and by detaching, as described, one of Schofield's brigadesto Decatur, because I knew that the attacking force could only be apart of Hood's army, and that, if any assistance were rendered byeither of the other armies, the Army of the Tennessee would bejealous. Nobly did they do their work that day, and terrible wasthe slaughter done to our enemy, though at sad cost to ourselves, as shown by the following reports:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, July 23, 1864. 

General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

Yesterday morning the enemy fell back to the intrenchments properof the city of Atlanta, which are in a general circle, with aradius of one and a half miles, and we closed in. While we wereforming our lines, and selecting positions for our batteries, theenemy appeared suddenly out of the dense woods in heavy masses onour extreme left, and struck the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair)in flank, and was forcing it back, when the Sixteenth Corps(General Dodge) came up and checked the movement, but the enemy'scavalry got well to our rear, and into Decatur, and for some hoursour left flank was completely enveloped. The fight that resultedwas continuous until night, with heavy loss on both sides. Theenemy took one of our batteries (Murray's, of the Regular Army)that was marching in its place in column in the road, unconsciousof danger. About 4 p. M. The enemy sallied against the division ofGeneral Morgan L. Smith, of the Fifteenth Corps, which occupied anabandoned line of rifle-trench near the railroad east of the city, and forced it back some four hundred yards, leaving in his handsfor the time two batteries, but the ground and batteries wereimmediately after recovered by the same troops reenforced. Icannot well approximate our loss, which fell heavily on theFifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, but count it as three thousand; Iknow that, being on the defensive, we have inflicted equally heavyloss on the enemy. 

General McPherson, when arranging his troops about 11. 00 A. M. , andpassing from one column to another, incautiously rode upon anambuscade without apprehension, at some distance ahead of his staffand orderlies, and was shot dead. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD NEAR ATLANTA, July 26, 1864. 

Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I find it difficult to make prompt report of results, coupled with some data or information, without occasionally makingmistakes. McPherson's sudden death, and Logan succeeding to thecommand as it were in the midst of battle, made some confusion onour extreme left; but it soon recovered and made sad havoc with theenemy, who had practised one of his favorite games of attacking ourleft when in motion, and before it had time to cover its weakflank. After riding over the ground and hearing the varyingstatements of the actors, I directed General Logan to make anofficial report of the actual result, and I herewith inclose it. 

Though the number of dead rebels seems excessive, I am disposed togive full credit to the report that our loss, though onlythirty-five hundred and twenty-one killed, wounded, and missing, theenemy's dead alone on the field nearly equaled that number, viz. , thirty-two hundred and twenty. Happening at that point of the linewhen a flag of truce was sent in to ask permission for each party tobury its dead, I gave General Logan authority to permit a temporarytruce on that flank alone, while our labors and fighting proceeded atall others. 

I also send you a copy of General Garrard's report of the breakingof the railroad toward Augusta. I am now grouping my command toattack the Macon road, and with that view will intrench a strongline of circumvallation with flanks, so as to have as large aninfantry column as possible, with all the cavalry to swing round tothe south and east, to strike that road at or below East Point. 

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEEBEFORE ATLANTA GEORGIA, July 24, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following general summaryof the result of the attack of the enemy on this army on the 22dinst. 

Total loss, killed, wounded, and missing, thirty-five hundred andtwenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery. 

We have buried and delivered to the enemy, under a flag of trucesent in by them, in front of the Third Division, Seventeenth Corps, one thousand of their killed. 

The number of their dead in front of the Fourth Division of thesame corps, including those on the ground not now occupied by ourtroops, General Blair reports, will swell the number of their deadon his front to two thousand. 

The number of their dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps, upto this hour, is three hundred and sixty, and the commandingofficer reports that at least as many more are yet unburied;burying-parties being still at work. 

The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps is fourhundred and twenty-two. We have over one thousand of their woundedin our hands, the larger number of the wounded being carried offduring the night, after the engagement, by them. 

We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now. We alsocaptured five thousand stands of arms. 

The attack was made on our lines seven times, and was seven timesrepulsed. Hood's and Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry engagedus. 

We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, includingthirty-three commissioned officers of high rank. 

We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits. Adetailed and full report will be furnished as soon as completed. 

Recapitulation. 

Our total loss............................ 3, 521Enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried, and delivered to them..................... 3, 220Total prisoners sent North................ 1, 017Total prisoners, wounded, in our hands.... 1, 000Estimated loss of the enemy, at least.... 10, 000

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Joan A. Logan, Major-General. 

On the 22d of July General Rousseau reached Marietta, havingreturned from his raid on the Alabama road at Opelika, and on thenext day General Garrard also returned from Covington, both havingbeen measurably successful. The former was about twenty-fivehundred strong, the latter about four thousand, and both reportedthat their horses were jaded and tired, needing shoes and rest. But, about this time, I was advised by General Grant (theninvesting Richmond) that the rebel Government had become aroused tothe critical condition of things about Atlanta, and that I mustlook out for Hood being greatly reenforced. I therefore wasresolved to push matters, and at once set about the originalpurpose of transferring the whole of the Army of the Tennessee toour right flank, leaving Schofield to stretch out so as to rest hisleft on the Augusta road, then torn up for thirty miles eastward;and, as auxiliary thereto, I ordered all the cavalry to be ready topass around Atlanta on both flanks, to break up the Macon road atsome point below, so as to cut off all supplies to the rebel armyinside, and thus to force it to evacuate, or come out and fight uson equal terms. 

But it first became necessary to settle the important question ofwho should succeed General McPherson? General Logan had takencommand of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue of his seniority, and had done well; but I did not consider him equal to the commandof three corps. Between him and General Blair there existed anatural rivalry. Both were men of great courage and talent, butwere politicians by nature and experience, and it may be that forthis reason they were mistrusted by regular officers like GeneralsSchofield, Thomas, and myself. It was all-important that thereshould exist a perfect understanding among the army commanders, andat a conference with General George H. Thomas at the headquartersof General Thomas J. Woods, commanding a division in the FourthCorps, he (Thomas) remonstrated warmly against my recommending thatGeneral Logan should be regularly assigned to the command of theArmy of the Tennessee by reason of his accidental seniority. Wediscussed fully the merits and qualities of every officer of highrank in the army, and finally settled on Major-General O. O. Howardas the best officer who was present and available for the purpose;on the 24th of July I telegraphed to General Halleck thispreference, and it was promptly ratified by the President. GeneralHoward's place in command of the Fourth Corps was filled by GeneralStanley, one of his division commanders, on the recommendation ofGeneral Thomas. All these promotions happened to fall uponWest-Pointers, and doubtless Logan and Blair had some reason tobelieve that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the warfor the regular officers. I remember well my own thoughts andfeelings at the time, and feel sure that I was not intentionallypartial to any class, I wanted to succeed in taking Atlanta, andneeded commanders who were purely and technically soldiers, men whowould obey orders and execute them promptly and on time; for I knewthat we would have to execute some most delicate manoeuvres, requiring the utmost skill, nicety, and precision. I believed thatGeneral Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I thinkthe result has justified my choice. I regarded both Generals Loganand Blair as "volunteers, " that looked to personal fame and gloryas auxiliary and secondary to their political ambition, and not asprofessional soldiers. 

As soon as it was known that General Howard had been chosen tocommand the Army of the Tennessee; General Hooker applied toGeneral Thomas to be relieved of the command of the TwentiethCorps, and General Thomas forwarded his application to me approvedand heartily recommended. I at once telegraphed to GeneralHalleck, recommending General Slocum (then at Vicksburg) to be hissuccessor, because Slocum had been displaced from the command ofhis corps at the time when the Eleventh and Twelfth were united andmade the Twentieth. 

General Hooker was offended because he was not chosen to succeedMcPherson; but his chances were not even considered; indeed, I hadnever been satisfied with him since his affair at the Gulp House, and had been more than once disposed to relieve him of his corps, because of his repeated attempts to interfere with GeneralsMcPherson and Schofield. I had known Hooker since 1836, and wasintimately associated with him in California, where we servedtogether on the staff of General Persifer F. Smith. He had come tous from the East with a high reputation as a "fighter, " which hehad fully justified at Chattanooga and Peach-Tree Creek; at whichlatter battle I complimented him on the field for specialgallantry, and afterward in official reports. Still, I did feel asense of relief when he left us. We were then two hundred andfifty miles in advance of our base, dependent on a single line ofrailroad for our daily food. We had a bold, determined foe in ourimmediate front, strongly intrenched, with communication open tohis rear for supplies and reenforcements, and every soldierrealized that we had plenty of hard fighting ahead, and that allhonors had to be fairly earned. 

Until General Slocum joined (in the latter part of August), theTwentieth Corps was commanded by General A. S. Williams, the seniordivision commander present. On the 25th of July the army, therefore, stood thus: the Army of the Tennessee (General O. O. Howard commanding) was on the left, pretty much on the same groundit had occupied during the battle of the 22d, all ready to moverapidly by the rear to the extreme right beyond Proctor's Creek;the Army of the Ohio (General Schofield) was next in order, withits left flank reaching the Augusta Railroad; next in order, conforming closely with the rebel intrenchments of Atlanta, wasGeneral Thomas's Army of the Cumberland, in the order of--theFourth Corps (Stanley's), the Twentieth Corps (Williams's), and theFourteenth Corps (Palmer's). Palmer's right division (Jefferson C. Davis's) was strongly refused along Proctor's Creek. This line wasabout five miles long, and was intrenched as against a sally aboutas strong as was our enemy. The cavalry was assembled in twostrong divisions; that of McCook (including the brigade of Harrisonwhich had been brought in from Opelika by General Rousseau)numbered about thirty-five hundred effective cavalry, and wasposted to our right rear, at Turner's Ferry, where we had a goodpontoon-bridge; and to our left rear, at and about Decatur, werethe two cavalry divisions of Stoneman, twenty-five hundred, andGarrard, four thousand, united for the time and occasion under thecommand of Major-General George Stoneman, a cavalry-officer of highrepute. My plan of action was to move the Army of the Tennessee tothe right rapidly and boldly against the railroad below Atlanta, and at the same time to send all the cavalry around by the rightand left to make a lodgment on the Macon road about Jonesboro. 

All the orders were given, and the morning of the 27th was fixedfor commencing the movement. On the 26th I received from GeneralStoneman a note asking permission (after having accomplished hisorders to break up the railroad at Jonesboro) to go on to Macon torescue our prisoners of war known to be held there, and then topush on to Andersonville, where was the great depot of Unionprisoners, in which were penned at one time as many as twenty-threethousand of our men, badly fed and harshly treated. I wrote him ananswer consenting substantially to his proposition, only modifyingit by requiring him to send back General Garrard's division to itsposition on our left flank after he had broken up the railroad atJonesboro. Promptly, and on time, all got off, and General Dodge'scorps (the Sixteenth, of the Army of the Tennessee) reached itsposition across Proctor's Creek the same evening, and early thenext morning (the 28th) Blair's corps (the Seventeenth) deployed onhis right, both corps covering their front with the usual parapet;the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan's) came up that morning on theright of Blair, strongly refused, and began to prepare the usualcover. As General Jeff. C. Davis's division was, as it were, leftout of line, I ordered it on the evening before to march downtoward Turner's Ferry, and then to take a road laid down on ourmaps which led from there toward East Point, ready to engage anyenemy that might attack our general right flank, after the samemanner as had been done to the left flank on the 22d. 

Personally on the morning of the 28th I followed the movement, androde to the extreme right, where we could hear some skirmishing andan occasional cannon-shot. As we approached the ground held by theFifteenth Corps, a cannon-ball passed over my shoulder and killedthe horse of an orderly behind; and seeing that this gun enfiladedthe road by which we were riding, we turned out of it and rode downinto a valley, where we left our horses and walked up to the hillheld by Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps. Near ahouse I met Generals Howard and Logan, who explained that there wasan intrenched battery to their front, with the appearance of astrong infantry support. I then walked up to the ridge, where Ifound General Morgan L. Smith. His men were deployed and engagedin rolling logs and fence-rails, preparing a hasty cover. Fromthis ridge we could overlook the open fields near a meeting-houseknown as "Ezra Church, " close by the Poor-House. We could see thefresh earth of a parapet covering some guns (that fired anoccasional shot), and there was also an appearance of activitybeyond. General Smith was in the act of sending forward a regimentfrom, his right flank to feel the position of the enemy, when Iexplained to him and to Generals Logan and Howard that they mustlook out for General Jeff. C. Davis's division, which was comingup from the direction of Turner's Ferry. 

As the skirmish-fire warmed up along the front of Blair's corps, aswell as along the Fifteenth Corps (Logan's), I became convincedthat Hood designed to attack this right flank, to prevent, ifpossible, the extension of our line in that direction. I regainedmy horse, and rode rapidly back to see that Davis's division hadbeen dispatched as ordered. I found General Davis in person, whowas unwell, and had sent his division that morning early, under thecommand of his senior brigadier, Morgan; but, as I attached greatimportance to the movement, he mounted his horse, and rode away toovertake and to hurry forward the movement, so as to come up on theleft rear of the enemy, during the expected battle. 

By this time the sound of cannon and musketry denoted a severebattle as in progress, which began seriously at 11. 30 a. M. , andended substantially by 4 p. M. It was a fierce attack by the enemyon our extreme right flank, well posted and partially covered. Themost authentic account of the battle is given by General Logan, whocommanded the Fifteenth Corps, in his official report to theAdjutant-General of the Army of the Tennessee, thus:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPSBEFORE ATLANTA, GEORGIA, July 29, 1864

Lieutenant-Colonel WILLIAM T. CLARK, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Tennessee, present. 

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, Imoved my command into position on the right of the SeventeenthCorps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, duringthe night of the 27th and morning of the 28th; and, while advancingin line of battle to a more favorable position, we were met by therebel infantry of Hardee's and Lee's corps, who made a determinedand desperate attack on us at 11 A. M. Of the 28th (yesterday). 

My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown upin front of them. 

The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commencedand lasted until about three o'clock in the evening. During thattime six successive charges were made, which were six timesgallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy. 

Later in the evening my lines were several times assaultedvigorously, but each time with like result. The worst of thefighting occurred on General Harrow's and Morgan L. Smith's fronts, which formed the centre and right of the corps. The troops couldnot have displayed greater courage, nor greater determination notto give ground; had they shown less, they would have been drivenfrom their position. 

Brigadier-Generals C. R. Woods, Harrow, and Morgan L. Smith, division commanders, are entitled to equal credit for gallantconduct and skill in repelling the assault. My thanks are due toMajor-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reenforeements at atime when they were much needed. My losses were fifty killed, fourhundred and forty-nine wounded, and seventy-three missing:aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two. 

The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags. Therewere about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets left on theground. One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive ofseventy-three wounded, who were sent to our hospital, and are beingcared for by our surgeons. Five hundred and sixty-five rebels haveup to this time been buried, and about two hundred are supposed tobe yet unburied. A large number of their wounded were undoubtedlycarried away in the night, as the enemy did not withdraw till neardaylight. The enemy's loss could not have been less than six orseven thousand men. A more detailed report will hereafter be made. 

I am, very respectfully, Your obedient servant, JOHN A. LOGAN, Major-General, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps. 

General Howard, in transmitting this report, added:

I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of thetroops engaged. I never saw better conduct in battle. GeneralLogan, though ill and much worn out, was indefatigable, and thesuccess of the day is as much attributable to him as to any oneman. 

This was, of coarse, the first fight in which General Howard hadcommanded the Army of the Tennessee, and he evidently aimed toreconcile General Logan in his disappointment, and to gain theheart of his army, to which he was a stranger. He very properlyleft General Logan to fight his own corps, but exposed himselffreely; and, after the firing had ceased, in the afternoon hewalked the lines; the men, as reported to me, gathered about him inthe most affectionate way, and he at once gained their respect andconfidence. To this fact I at the time attached much importance, for it put me at ease as to the future conduct of that mostimportant army. 

At no instant of time did I feel the least uneasiness about theresult on the 28th, but wanted to reap fuller results, hoping thatDavis's division would come up at the instant of defeat, and catchthe enemy in flank; but the woods were dense, the roads obscure, and as usual this division got on the wrong road, and did not comeinto position until about dark. In like manner, I thought thatHood had greatly weakened his main lines inside of Atlanta, andaccordingly sent repeated orders to Schofield and Thomas to make anattempt to break in; but both reported that they found the parapetsvery strong and full manned. 

Our men were unusually encouraged by this day's work, for theyrealized that we could compel Hood to come out from behind hisfortified lines to attack us at a disadvantage. In conversationwith me, the soldiers of the Fifteenth Corps, with whom I was onthe most familiar terms, spoke of the affair of the 28th as theeasiest thing in the world; that, in fact, it was a commonslaughter of the enemy; they pointed out where the rebel lines hadbeen, and how they themselves had fired deliberately, had shot downtheir antagonists, whose bodies still lay unburied, and markedplainly their lines of battle, which must have halted within easymusket-range of our men, who were partially protected by theirimprovised line of logs and fence-rails. All bore willingtestimony to the courage and spirit of the foe, who, thoughrepeatedly repulsed, came back with increased determination somesix or more times. 

The next morning the Fifteenth Corps wheeled forward to the leftover the battle-field of the day before, and Davis's division stillfarther prolonged the line, which reached nearly to theever-to-be-remembered "Sandtown road. "

Then, by further thinning out Thomas's line, which was wellentrenched, I drew another division of Palmer's corps (Baird's)around to the right, to further strengthen that flank. I wasimpatient to hear from the cavalry raid, then four days out, andwas watching for its effect, ready to make a bold push for thepossession of East Point. General Garrard's division returned toDecatur on the 31st, and reported that General Stoneman had postedhim at Flat Rock, while he (Stoneman) went on. The month of Julytherefore closed with our infantry line strongly entrenched, butdrawn out from the Augusta road on the left to the Sandtown road onthe right, a distance of full ten measured miles. 

The enemy, though evidently somewhat intimidated by the results oftheir defeats on the 22d and 28th, still presented a bold front atall points, with fortified lines that defied a direct assault. Ourrailroad was done to the rear of our camps, Colonel W. P. Wrighthaving reconstructed the bridge across the Chattahoochee in sixdays; and our garrisons and detachments to the rear had soeffectually guarded the railroad that the trains from Nashvillearrived daily, and our substantial wants were well supplied. 

The month, though hot in the extreme, had been one of constantconflict, without intermission, and on four several occasions--viz. , July 4th, 20th, 22d, and 28th--these affairs had amounted toreal battles, with casualty lists by the thousands. Assuming thecorrectness of the rebel surgeon Foard's report, on page 577 ofJohnston's "Narrative, " commencing with July 4th and terminatingwith July 31st, we have:

 Aggregate loss of the enemy......... 10, 841

Our losses, as compiled from the official returns for July, 1864, are: Killed and Missing. Wounded. Total. 

Aggregate loss of July....... 3, 804 5, 915 9, 719

In this table the column of "killed and missing" embraces theprisoners that fell into the hands of the enemy, mostly lost in theSeventeenth Corps, on the 22d of July, and does not embrace thelosses in the cavalry divisions of Garrard and McCook, which, however, were small for July. In all other respects the statementis absolutely correct. I am satisfied, however, that Surgeon Foardcould not have been in possession of data sufficiently accurate toenable him to report the losses in actual battle of men who neversaw the hospital. During the whole campaign I had rendered to metri-monthly statements of "effective strength, " from which Icarefully eliminated the figures not essential for my conduct, sothat at all times I knew the exact fighting-strength of each corps, division, and brigade, of the whole army, and also endeavored tobear in mind our losses both on the several fields of battle and bysickness, and well remember that I always estimated that during themonth of July we had inflicted heavier loss on the enemy than wehad sustained ourselves, and the above figures prove itconclusively. Before closing this chapter, I must record one ortwo minor events that occurred about this time, that may prove ofinterest. 

On the 24th of July I received a dispatch from Inspector-GeneralJames A. Hardie, then on duty at the War Department in Washington, to the effect that Generals Osterhaus and Alvan P. Hovey had beenappointed major-generals. Both of these had begun the campaignwith us in command of divisions, but had gone to the rear--theformer by reason of sickness, and the latter dissatisfied withGeneral Schofield and myself about the composition of his divisionof the Twenty-third Corps. Both were esteemed as first-classofficers, who had gained special distinction in the Vicksburgcampaign. But up to that time, when the newspapers announced dailypromotions elsewhere, no prominent officers serving with me hadbeen advanced a peg, and I felt hurt. I answered Hardie on the25th, in a dispatch which has been made public, closing with thislanguage: "If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better allchange front on Washington. " To my amazement, in a few days Ireceived from President Lincoln himself an answer, in which hecaught me fairly. I have not preserved a copy of that dispatch, and suppose it was burned up in the Chicago fire; but it wascharacteristic of Mr. Lincoln, and was dated the 26th or 27th dayof July, contained unequivocal expressions of respect for those whowere fighting hard and unselfishly, offering us a full share of thehonors and rewards of the war, and saying that, in the cases ofHovey and Osterhaus, he was influenced mainly by therecommendations of Generals Grant and Sherman. On the 27th Ireplied direct, apologizing somewhat for my message to GeneralHardie, saying that I did not suppose such messages ever reachedhim personally, explaining that General Grant's and Sherman'srecommendations for Hovey and Osterhaus had been made when theevents of the Vicksburg campaign were fresh with us, and that mydispatch of the 25th to General Hardie had reflected chiefly thefeelings of the officers then present with me before Atlanta. Theresult of all this, however, was good, for another dispatch fromGeneral Hardie, of the 28th, called on me to nominate eightcolonels for promotion as brigadier-generals. I at once sent acircular note to the army-commanders to nominate two colonels fromthe Army of the Ohio and three from each of the others; and theresult was, that on the 29th of July I telegraphed the names of--

Colonel William Gross, Thirty-sixth Indiana; Colonel Charles C. Walcutt, Forty-sixth Ohio; Colonel James W. Riley, One Hundred andFourth Ohio; Colonel L. P. Bradley, Fifty-first Illinois; ColonelJ. W. Sprague, Sixty-third Ohio; Colonel Joseph A. Cooper, SixthEast Tennessee; Colonel John T. Croxton, Fourth Kentucky; ColonelWilliam W. Belknap, Fifteenth Iowa. These were promptly appointedbrigadier-generals, were already in command of brigades ordivisions; and I doubt if eight promotions were ever made fairer, or were more honestly earned, during the whole war. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

CAPTURE OF ATLANTA. 

AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 1864

The month of August opened hot and sultry, but our position beforeAtlanta was healthy, with ample supply of wood, water, andprovisions. The troops had become habituated to the slow andsteady progress of the siege; the skirmish-lines were held close upto the enemy, were covered by rifle-trenches or logs, and kept up acontinuous clatter of musketry. The mainlines were held fartherback, adapted to the shape of the ground, with muskets loaded andstacked for instant use. The field-batteries were in selectpositions, covered by handsome parapets, and occasional shots fromthem gave life and animation to the scene. The men loitered aboutthe trenches carelessly, or busied themselves in constructingingenious huts out of the abundant timber, and seemed as snug, comfortable, and happy, as though they were at home. GeneralSchofield was still on the extreme left, Thomas in the centre, andHoward on the right. Two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps(Baird's and Jeff. C. Davis's) were detached to the right rear, and held in reserve. 

I thus awaited the effect of the cavalry movement against therailroad about Jonesboro, and had heard from General Garrard thatStoneman had gone on to Mason; during that day (August 1st) ColonelBrownlow, of a Tennessee cavalry regiment, came in to Marietta fromGeneral McCook, and reported that McCook's whole division had beenoverwhelmed, defeated, and captured at Newnan. Of course, I wasdisturbed by this wild report, though I discredited it, but madeall possible preparations to strengthen our guards along therailroad to the rear, on the theory that the force of cavalry whichhad defeated McCook would at once be on the railroad aboutMarietta. At the same time Garrard was ordered to occupy thetrenches on our left, while Schofield's whole army moved to theextreme right, and extended the line toward East Point. Thomas wasalso ordered still further to thin out his lines, so as to set freethe other division (Johnson's) of the Fourteenth Corps (Palmer's), which was moved to the extreme right rear, and held in reserveready to make a bold push from that flank to secure a footing onthe Mason Railroad at or below East Point. 

These changes were effected during the 2d and 3d days of August, when General McCook came in and reported the actual results of hiscavalry expedition. He had crossed the Chattahoochee River belowCampbellton, by his pontoon-bridge; had then marched rapidly acrossto the Mason Railroad at Lovejoy's Station, where he had reason toexpect General Stoneman; but, not hearing of him, he set to work, tore up two miles of track, burned two trains of cars, and cut awayfive miles of telegraph-wire. He also found the wagon-trainbelonging to the rebel army in Atlanta, burned five hundred wagons, killed eight hundred mules; and captured seventy-two officers andthree hundred and fifty men. Finding his progress eastward, towardMcDonough, barred by a superior force, he turned back to Newnan, where he found himself completely surrounded by infantry andcavalry. He had to drop his prisoners and fight his way out, losing about six hundred men in killed and captured, and thenreturned with the remainder to his position at Turner's Ferry. This was bad enough, but not so bad as had been reported by ColonelBrownlow. Meantime, rumors came that General Stoneman was downabout Mason, on the east bank of the Ocmulgee. On the 4th ofAugust Colonel Adams got to Marietta with his small brigade of ninehundred men belonging to Stoneman's cavalry, reporting, as usual, all the rest lost, and this was partially confirmed by a reportwhich came to me all the way round by General Grant's headquartersbefore Richmond. A few days afterward Colonel Capron also got in, with another small brigade perfectly demoralized, and confirmed thereport that General Stoneman had covered the escape of these twosmall brigades, himself standing with a reserve of seven hundredmen, with which he surrendered to a Colonel Iverson. Thus anotherof my cavalry divisions was badly damaged, and out of the fragmentswe hastily reorganized three small divisions underBrigadier-Generals Garrard, McCook, and Kilpatrick. 

Stoneman had not obeyed his orders to attack the railroad firstbefore going to Macon and Andersonville, but had crossed theOcmulgee River high up near Covington, and had gone down that riveron the east bank. He reached Clinton, and sent out detachmentswhich struck the railroad leading from Macon to Savannah atGriswold Station, where they found and destroyed seventeenlocomotives and over a hundred cars; then went on and burned thebridge across the Oconee, and reunited the division before Macon. Stoneman shelled the town across the river, but could not crossover by the bridge, and returned to Clinton, where he found hisretreat obstructed, as he supposed, by a superior force. There hebecame bewildered, and sacrificed himself for the safety of hiscommand. He occupied the attention of his enemy by a small forceof seven hundred men, giving Colonels Adams and Capron leave, withtheir brigades, to cut their way back to me at Atlanta. The formerreached us entire, but the latter was struck and scattered at someplace farther north, and came in by detachments. Stonemansurrendered, and remained a prisoner until he was exchanged sometime after, late in September, at Rough and Ready. 

I now became satisfied that cavalry could not, or would not, make asufficient lodgment on the railroad below Atlanta, and that nothingwould suffice but for us to reach it with the main army. Thereforethe most urgent efforts to that end were made, and to Schofield, onthe right, was committed the charge of this special object. He hadhis own corps (the Twenty-third), composed of eleven thousand andseventy-five infantry and eight hundred and eighty-five artillery, with McCook's broken division of cavalry, seventeen hundred andfifty-four men and horses. For this purpose I also placed theFourteenth Corps (Palmer) under his orders. This corps numbered atthe time seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty-eight infantryand eight hundred and twenty-six artillery; but General Palmerclaimed to rank General Schofield in the date of his commission asmajor-general, and denied the latter's right to exercise commandover him. General Palmer was a man of ability, but was notenterprising. His three divisions were compact and strong, wellcommanded, admirable on the defensive, but slow to move or to acton the offensive. His corps (the Fourteenth) had sustained, up tothat time, fewer hard knocks than any other corps in the wholearmy, and I was anxious to give it a chance. I always expected tohave a desperate fight to get possession of the Macon road, whichwas then the vital objective of the campaign. Its possession by uswould, in my judgment, result in the capture of Atlanta, and giveus the fruits of victory, although the destruction of Hood's armywas the real object to be desired. Yet Atlanta was known as the"Gate-City of the South, " was full of founderies, arsenals, andmachine-shops, and I knew that its capture would be the death-knellof the Southern Confederacy. 

On the 4th of August I ordered General Schofield to make a boldattack on the railroad, anywhere about East Point, and orderedGeneral Palmer to report to him for duty. He at once deniedGeneral Schofield's right to command him; but, after examining thedates of their respective commissions, and hearing their arguments, I wrote to General Palmer. 

August 4th. -10. 45 p. M. 

From the statements made by yourself and General Schofield to-day, my decision is, that he ranks you as a major-general, being of thesame date of present commission, by reason of his previous superiorrank as brigadier-general. The movements of to-morrow are soimportant that the orders of the superior on that flank must beregarded as military orders, and not in the nature of cooperation. I did hope that there would be no necessity for my making thisdecision; but it is better for all parties interested that noquestion of rank should occur in actual battle. The Sandtown road, and the railroad, if possible, must be gained to-morrow, if itcosts half your command. I regard the loss of time this afternoonas equal to the loss of two thousand men. 

I also communicated the substance of this to General Thomas, towhose army Palmer's corps belonged, who replied on the 5th:

I regret to hear that Palmer has taken the course he has, and Iknow that he intends to offer his resignation as soon as he canproperly do so. I recommend that his application be granted. 

And on the 5th I again wrote to General Palmer, arguing the pointwith him, advising him, as a friend, not to resign at that crisislest his motives might be misconstrued, and because it might damagehis future career in civil life; but, at the same time, I felt itmy duty to say to him that the operations on that flank, during the4th and 5th, had not been satisfactory--not imputing to him, however, any want of energy or skill, but insisting that "theevents did not keep pace with my desires. " General Schofield hadreported to me that night:

I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to makeany aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps. I have orderedGeneral Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's thisevening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops(Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has beenlost by two days' delay. The force may likely be too small. 

I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmers divisions--Davis's and Baird's--to follow en echelon in support of Schofield, and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person: He came on the6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his resignation beingaccepted, for which formal act I referred him to General Thomas. He then rode to General Thomas's camp, where he made a writtenresignation of his office as commander of the Fourteenth Corps, andwas granted the usual leave of absence to go to his home inIllinois, there to await further orders. General Thomasrecommended that the resignation be accepted; that Johnson, thesenior division commander of the corps, should be ordered back toNashville as chief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General JeffersonC. Davis, the next in order, should be promoted major general, andassigned to command the corps. These changes had to be referred tothe President, in Washington, and were, in due time, approved andexecuted; and thenceforward I had no reason to complain of theslowness or inactivity of that splendid corps. It had beenoriginally formed by General George H. Thomas, had been commandedby him in person, and had imbibed some what his personal character, viz. , steadiness, good order, and deliberation nothing hasty orrash, but always safe, "slow, and sure. " On August 7th Itelegraphed to General Halleck:

Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and ofGeneral Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering awayall the time, and there is no peace, inside or outside of Atlanta. To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaultedyesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it and gained theground where the assault had been made, and got possession of allour dead and wounded. He continued to press on that flank, andbrought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. He drove the enemybehind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlantato East Point, and captured a good many of the skirmishers, who areof his best troops--for the militia hug the breastworks close. Ido not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but willpush forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta toohot to be endured. I have sent back to Chattanooga for twothirty-pound Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house intown. I am too impatient for a siege, and don't know but this is asgood a place to fight it out on, as farther inland. One thing iscertain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be aused-up community when we are done with it. 

In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigade hadstruck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as usual, gotentangled in the trees and bushes which had been felled, and lostabout five hundred men, in killed and wounded; but, as abovereported, this outwork was found abandoned the next day, and wecould see from it that the rebels were extending their lines, parallel with the railroad, about as fast as we could add to ourline of investment. On the 10th of August the Parrottthirty-pounders were received and placed in Position; for a coupleof days we kept up a sharp fire from all our batteries convergingon Atlanta, and at every available point we advanced ourinfantry-lines, thereby shortening and strengthening theinvestment; but I was not willing to order a direct assault, unlesssome accident or positive neglect on the part of our antagonistshould reveal an opening. However, it was manifest that no suchopening was intended by Hood, who felt secure behind his strongdefenses. He had repelled our cavalry attacks on his railroad, andhad damaged us seriously thereby, so I expected that he wouldattempt the same game against our rear. Therefore I madeextraordinary exertions to recompose our cavalry divisions, whichwere so essential, both for defense and offense. Kilpatrick wasgiven that on our right rear, in support of Schofield's exposedflank; Garrard retained that on our general left; and McCook'sdivision was held somewhat in reserve, about Marietta and therailroad. On the 10th, having occasion to telegraph to GeneralGrant, then in Washington, I used this language:

Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside hisparapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually hiscommunications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad-bridge, well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle ofdesolation around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the works, which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches. I havelost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by the expirationof service; and this is the only reason why I want reenforcements. We have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than wehave lost by his acts. 

On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut inentering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuableauxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had beencommissioned a major-general in the regular army, which wasunexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture ofAtlanta. These did not change the fact that we were held in checkby the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was forcedon my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though every housein the town should be battered down by our artillery. It wasevident that we most decoy him out to fight us on something likeequal terms, or else, with the whole army, raise the siege andattack his communications. Accordingly, on the 13th of August, Igave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to therailroad-bridge at the Chattahoochee, to protect our trains, hospitals, spare artillery, and the railroad-depot, while the restof the army should move bodily to some point on the Macon Railroadbelow East Point. 

Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, underGeneral Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank, andhad actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca, captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and was strongenough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its commander, Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place. General John E. Smith, who was at Kingston, collected together a couple of thousand men, and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton when Wheelerretreated northward toward Cleveland. On the 16th anotherdetachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force about Allatoonaand the Etowah bridge, when I became fully convinced that Hood hadsent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads. For some daysour communication with Nashville was interrupted by the destructionof the telegraph-lines, as well as railroad. I at once orderedstrong reconnoissances forward from our flanks on the left byGarrard, and on the right by Kilpatrick. The former moved with somuch caution that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on thecontrary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was attractedto him at once. He reached Fairburn Station, on the West Pointroad, and tore it up, returning safely to his position on our rightflank. I summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spiritand confidence, that I concluded to suspend the general movement ofthe main army, and to send him with his small division of cavalryto break up the Macon road about Jonesboro, in the hopes that itwould force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should thereby notonly secure possession of the city itself, but probably could catchHood in the confusion of retreat; and, further to increase thechances of success. 

I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard'sdivision of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as areserve in support of General Kilpatrick. Meantime, also, theutmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the infantryand artillery. Kilpatrick got off during the night of the 18th, and returned to us on the 22d, having made the complete circuit ofAtlanta. He reported that he had destroyed three miles of therailroad about Jonesboro, which he reckoned would take ten days torepair; that he had encountered a division of infantry and abrigade of cavalry (Ross's); that he had captured a battery anddestroyed three of its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and healso brought in three battle-flags and seventy prisoners. On the23d, however, we saw trains coming into Atlanta from the south, when I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not orwould not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, andtherefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of myoriginal plan. Meantime, the damage done to our own railroad andtelegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired, and Wheeler himself was too far away to be of any service to hisown army, and where he could not do us much harm, viz. , up aboutthe Hiawaesee. On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahoocheebridge, to see in person that it could be properly defended by thesingle corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and foundthat the rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resistus, could be easily utilized against themselves; and on returningto my camp, at that same evening, I telegraphed to GeneralHalleck as follows:

Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will beall ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by thesouth, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little ofus. I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoocheebridge, by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth Corps will hold therailroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army, provisioned for twenty days. 

Meantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps) had beenwounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his twodivisions were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps. The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night. The TwentiethCorps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and theFourth Corps (Stanley) moved to his right rear, closing up with theFourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same timeGarrard's cavalry, leaving their horses out of sight, occupied thevacant trenches, so that the enemy did not detect the change atall. The next night (26th) the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, composing the Army of the Tennessee (Howard), drew out of theirtrenches, made a wide circuit, and came up on the extreme right ofthe Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland(Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south. The enemy seemed tosuspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely;but I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether. Anartillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and woundedanother, and the next morning some of his infantry came out ofAtlanta and found our camps abandoned. It was afterward relatedthat there was great rejoicing in Atlanta "that the Yankees weregone;" the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and severaltrains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in thecelebration of their grand victory. 

On the 28th (making a general left-wheel, pivoting on Schofield)both Thomas and Howard reached the West Point Railroad, extendingfrom East Point to Red-Oak Station and Fairburn, where we spent thenext day (29th) in breaking it up thoroughly. The track was heavedup in sections the length of a regiment, then separated rail byrail; bonfires were made of the ties and of fence-rails on whichthe rails were heated, carried to trees or telegraph-poles, wrappedaround and left to cool. Such rails could not be used again; and, to be still more certain, we filled up many deep cuts with trees, brush, and earth, and commingled with them loaded shells, soarranged that they would explode on an attempt to haul out thebushes. The explosion of one such shell would have demoralized agang of negroes, and thus would have prevented even the attempt toclear the road. 

Meantime Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, presented a boldfront toward East Point, daring and inviting the enemy to sally outto attack him in position. His first movement was on the 30th, toMount Gilead Church, then to Morrow's Mills, facing Rough andReady. Thomas was on his right, within easy support, moving bycross-roads from Red Oak to the Fayetteville road, extending fromCouch's to Renfrew's; and Howard was aiming for Jonesboro. 

I was with General Thomas that day, which was hot but otherwisevery pleasant. We stopped for a short noon-rest near a littlechurch (marked on our maps as Shoal-Creek Church), which stood backabout a hundred yards from the road, in a grove of native oaks. The infantry column had halted in the road, stacked their arms, andthe men were scattered about--some lying in the shade of the trees, and others were bringing corn-stalks from a large corn-field acrossthe road to feed our horses, while still others had arms full ofthe roasting-ears, then in their prime. Hundreds of fires weresoon started with the fence-rails, and the men were busy roastingthe ears. Thomas and I were walking up and down the road which ledto the church, discussing the chances of the movement, which hethought were extra-hazardous, and our path carried us by a fire atwhich a soldier was roasting his corn. The fire was builtartistically; the man was stripping the ears of their husks, standing them in front of his fire, watching them carefully, andturning each ear little by little, so as to roast it nicely. Hewas down on his knees intent on his business, paying little heed tothe stately and serious deliberations of his leaders. Thomas'smind was running on the fact that we had cut loose from our base ofsupplies, and that seventy thousand men were then dependent fortheir food on the chance supplies of the country (alreadyimpoverished by the requisitions of the enemy), and on the contentsof our wagons. Between Thomas and his men there existed a mostkindly relation, and he frequently talked with them in the mostfamiliar way. Pausing awhile, and watching the operations of thisman roasting his corn, he said, "What are you doing?" The manlooked up smilingly "Why, general, I am laying in a supply ofprovisions. " "That is right, my man, but don't waste yourprovisions. " As we resumed our walk, the man remarked, in a sortof musing way, but loud enough for me to hear: "There he goes, there goes the old man, economizing as usual. " "Economizing" withcorn, which cost only the labor of gathering and roasting!

As we walked, we could hear General Howard's guns at intervals, away off to our right front, but an ominous silence continuedtoward our left, where I was expecting at each moment to hear thesound of battle. That night we reached Renfrew's, and had reportsfrom left to right (from General Schofield, about Morrow's Mills, to General Howard, within a couple of miles of Jonesboro). Thenext morning (August 31st) all moved straight for the railroad. Schofield reached it near Rough and Ready, and Thomas at two pointsbetween there and Jonesboro. Howard found an intrenched foe(Hardee's corps) covering Jonesboro, and his men began at once todig their accustomed rifle-pits. Orders were sent to GeneralsThomas and Schofield to turn straight for Jonesboro, tearing up therailroad-track as they advanced. About 3. 00 p. M. The enemysallied from Jonesboro against the Fifteenth corps, but was easilyrepulsed, and driven back within his lines. All hands were keptbusy tearing up the railroad, and it was not until toward eveningof the 1st day of September that the Fourteenth Corps (Davis)closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on hisright with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along whichGeneral Stanley was moving, followed by Schofield. General Davisformed his divisions in line about 4 p. M. , swept forward over someold cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapethandsomely, capturing the whole of Govan's brigade, with twofield-batteries of ten guns. Being on the spot, I checked Davis'smovement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions ofthe Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get belowJonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat inthat direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurryforward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hopingthus to capture the whole of Hardee's corps. I sent first CaptainAudenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, andlastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during thecampaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into agallop). Night was approaching, and the country on the fartherside of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanley had comeup on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could nothave been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he movedstraight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, hewould have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee's corps, and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on, andHardee did escape. 

Meantime General Slocum had reached his corps (the Twentieth), stationed at the Chattahoochee bridge, had relieved General A. S. Williams in command, and orders had been sent back to him to feelforward occasionally toward Atlanta, to observe the effect when wehad reached the railroad. That night I was so restless andimpatient that I could not sleep, and about midnight there arosetoward Atlanta sounds of shells exploding, and other sound likethat of musketry. I walked to the house of a farmer close by mybivouac, called him out to listen to the reverberations which camefrom the direction of Atlanta (twenty miles to the north of us), and inquired of him if he had resided there long. He said he had, and that these sounds were just like those of a battle. Aninterval of quiet then ensued, when again, about 4 a. M. , aroseother similar explosions, but I still remained in doubt whether theenemy was engaged in blowing up his own magazines, or whetherGeneral Slocum had not felt forward, and become engaged in a realbattle. 

The next morning General Hardee was gone, and we all pushed forwardalong the railroad south, in close pursuit, till we ran up againsthis lines at a point just above Lovejoy's Station. While bringingforward troops and feeling the new position of our adversary, rumors came from the rear that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, andthat General Slocum was in the city. Later in the day I received anote in Slocum's own handwriting, stating that he had heard duringthe night the very sounds that I have referred to; that he hadmoved rapidly up from the bridge about daylight, and had enteredAtlanta unopposed. His letter was dated inside the city, so therewas no doubt of the fact. General Thomas's bivouac was but a shortdistance from mine, and, before giving notice to the army ingeneral orders, I sent one of my staff-officers to show him thenote. In a few minutes the officer returned, soon followed byThomas himself, who again examined the note, so as to be perfectlycertain that it was genuine. The news seemed to him too good to betrue. He snapped his fingers, whistled, and almost danced, and, asthe news spread to the army, the shouts that arose from our men, the wild hallooing and glorious laughter, were to us a fullrecompense for the labor and toils and hardships through which wehad passed in the previous three months. 

A courier-line was at once organized, messages were sent back andforth from our camp at Lovejoy's to Atlanta, and to ourtelegraph-station at the Chattahoochee bridge. Of course, the gladtidings flew on the wings of electricity to all parts of the North, where the people had patiently awaited news of their husbands, sons, and brothers, away down in "Dixie Land;" and congratulations camepouring back full of good-will and patriotism. This victory was mostopportune; Mr. Lincoln himself told me afterward that even he hadpreviously felt in doubt, for the summer was fast passing away; thatGeneral Grant seemed to be checkmated about Richmond and Petersburg, and my army seemed to have run up against an impassable barrier, when, suddenly and unexpectedly, came the news that "Atlanta wasours, and fairly won. " On this text many a fine speech was made, butnone more eloquent than that by Edward Everett, in Boston. Apresidential election then agitated the North. Mr. Lincolnrepresented the national cause, and General McClellan had acceptedthe nomination of the Democratic party, whose platform was that thewar was a failure, and that it was better to allow the South to gofree to establish a separate government, whose corner-stone should beslavery. Success to our arms at that instant was therefore apolitical necessity; and it was all-important that somethingstartling in our interest should occur before the election inNovember. The brilliant success at Atlanta filled that requirement, and made the election of Mr. Lincoln certain. Among the many lettersof congratulation received, those of Mr. Lincoln and General Grantseem most important:

EXECUTIVE MANSIONWASHINGTON, D. C. September 3, 1864. 

The national thanks are rendered by the President to Major-GeneralW. T. Sherman and the gallant officers and soldiers of his commandbefore Atlanta, for the distinguished ability and perseverancedisplayed in the campaign in Georgia, which, under Divine favor, has resulted in the capture of Atlanta. The marches, battles, sieges, and other military operations, that have signalized thecampaign, must render it famous in the annals of war, and haveentitled those who have participated therein to the applause andthanks of the nation. 

ABRAHAM LINCOLNPresident of the United States

CITY POINT VIRGINIA, September 4, 1864-9 P. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN:I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture ofAtlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have ordered a saluteto be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon theenemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amid greatrejoicing. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

These dispatches were communicated to the army in general orders, and we all felt duly encouraged and elated by the praise of thosecompetent to bestow it. 

The army still remained where the news of success had first foundus, viz. , Lovejoy's; but, after due refection, I resolved not toattempt at that time a further pursuit of Hood's army, but slowlyand deliberately to move back, occupy Atlanta, enjoy a short periodof rest, and to think well over the next step required in theprogress of events. Orders for this movement were made on the 5thSeptember, and three days were given for each army to reach theplace assigned it, viz. : the Army of the Cumberland in and aboutAtlanta; the Army of the Tennessee at East Point; and the Army ofthe Ohio at Decatur. 

Personally I rode back to Jonesboro on the 6th, and there inspectedthe rebel hospital, full of wounded officers and men left by Hardeein his retreat. The next night we stopped at Rough and Ready, andon the 8th of September we rode into Atlanta, then occupied by theTwentieth Corps (General Slocum). In the Court-House Square wasencamped a brigade, embracing the Massachusetts Second andThirty-third Regiments, which had two of the finest bands of thearmy, and their music was to us all a source of infinite pleasureduring our sojourn in that city. I took up my headquarters in thehouse of Judge Lyons, which stood opposite one corner of theCourt-House Square, and at once set about a measure already ordered, of which I had thought much and long, viz. , to remove the entirecivil population, and to deny to all civilians from the rear theexpected profits of civil trade. Hundreds of sutlers and traderswere waiting at Nashville and Chattanooga, greedy to reach Atlantawith their wares and goods, with, which to drive a profitable tradewith the inhabitants. I gave positive orders that none of thesetraders, except three (one for each separate army), should bepermitted to come nearer than Chattanooga; and, moreover, Iperemptorily required that all the citizens and families resident inAtlanta should go away, giving to each the option to go south ornorth, as their interests or feelings dictated. I was resolved tomake Atlanta a pure military garrison or depot, with no civilpopulation to influence military measures. I had seen Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, and New Orleans, all captured from the enemy, andeach at once was garrisoned by a full division of troops, if notmore; so that success was actually crippling our armies in the fieldby detachments to guard and protect the interests of a hostilepopulation. 

I gave notice of this purpose, as early as the 4th of September, toGeneral Halleck, in a letter concluding with these words:

If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I willanswer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they wantpeace, they and their relatives most stop the war. 

I knew, of course, that such a measure would be stronglycriticised, but made up my mind to do it with the absolutecertainty of its justness, and that time would sanction its wisdom. I knew that the people of the South would read in this measure twoimportant conclusions: one, that we were in earnest; and the other, if they were sincere in their common and popular clamor "to die inthe last ditch, " that the opportunity would soon come. 

Soon after our reaching Atlanta, General Hood had sent in by a flagof truce a proposition, offering a general exchange of prisoners, saying that he was authorized to make such an exchange by theRichmond authorities, out of the vast number of our men then heldcaptive at Andersonville, the same whom General Stoneman had hopedto rescue at the time of his raid. Some of these prisoners hadalready escaped and got in, had described the pitiable condition ofthe remainder, and, although I felt a sympathy for their hardshipsand sufferings as deeply as any man could, yet as nearly all theprisoners who had been captured by us during the campaign had beensent, as fast as taken, to the usual depots North, they were thenbeyond my control. There were still about two thousand, mostlycaptured at Jonesboro, who had been sent back by cars, but had notpassed Chattanooga. These I ordered back, and offered General Hoodto exchange them for Stoneman, Buell, and such of my own army aswould make up the equivalent; but I would not exchange for hisprisoners generally, because I knew these would have to be sent totheir own regiments, away from my army, whereas all we could givehim could at once be put to duty in his immediate army. Quite anangry correspondence grew up between us, which was published at thetime in the newspapers, but it is not to be found in any book ofwhich I have present knowledge, and therefore is given here, asillustrative of the events referred to, and of the feelings of theactors in the game of war at that particular crisis, together withcertain other original letters of Generals Grant and Halleck, neverhitherto published. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi

GENERAL: I send Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, of my staff, withthis. Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition ofaffairs here, better than I can do in the limits of a letter. Although I feel myself strong enough now for offensive operations, I am holding on quietly, to get advantage of recruits andconvalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. My lines arenecessarily very long, extending from Deep Bottom, north of theJames, across the peninsula formed by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Appomattox to the Weldon road. This line is verystrongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men;but, from its great length, necessarily takes many in theaggregate. I propose, when I do move, to extend my left so as tocontrol what is known as the Southside, or Lynchburg & Petersburgroad; then, if possible, to keep the Danville road out. At thesame time this move is made, I want to send a force of from six toten thousand men against Wilmington. The way I propose to do thisis to land the men north of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. Atthe same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and theiron-clads will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This willgive us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we nowhave of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do with the forcesat your command, I do not exactly see. The difficulties ofsupplying your army, except when they are constantly moving beyondwhere you are, I plainly see. If it had not been for Price'smovement, Canby could have sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From your command on the Mississippi, an equal number could havebeen taken. With these forces, my idea would have been to dividethem, sending one-half to Mobile, and the other half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threatenMacon and Augusta equally. Whichever one should be abandoned bythe enemy, you could take and open up a new base of supplies. Myobject now in sending a staff-officer to you is not so much tosuggest operations for you as to get your views, and to have plansmatured by the time every thing can be got ready. It wouldprobably be the 5th of October before any of the plans hereindicated will be executed. If you have any promotions torecommend, send the names forward, and I will approve them. 

In conclusion, it is hardly necessary for me to say that I feel youhave accomplished the most gigantic undertaking given to anygeneral in this war, and with a skill and ability that will beacknowledged in history as unsurpassed, if not unequaled. It givesme as much pleasure to record this in your favor as it world infavor of any living man, myself included. Truly yours, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virgina. 

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge, at the hands ofLieutenant Colonel Porter, of your staff, your letter of September12th, and accept with thanks the honorable and kindly mentionof the services of this army in the great cause in which we are allengaged. 

I send by Colonel Porter all official reports which are completed, and will in a few days submit a list of names which are deemedworthy of promotion. 

I think we owe it to the President to save him the invidious taskof selection among the vast number of worthy applicants, and haveordered my army commanders to prepare their lists with great care, and to express their preferences, based upon claims of actualcapacity and services rendered. 

These I will consolidate, and submit in such a form that, ifmistakes are made, they will at least be sanctioned by the bestcontemporaneous evidence of merit, for I know that vacancies do notexist equal in number to that of the officers who really deservepromotion. 

As to the future, I am pleased to know that your army is beingsteadily reinforced by a good class of men, and I hope it will goon until you have a force that is numerically double that of yourantagonist, so that with one part you can watch him, and with theother push out boldly from your left flank, occupy the SouthsideRailroad, compel him to attack you in position, or accept battle onyour own terms. 

We ought to ask our country for the largest possible armies thatcan be raised, as so important a thing as the self-existence of agreat nation should not be left to the fickle chances of war. 

Now that Mobile is shut out to the commerce of our enemy, it callsfor no further effort on our part, unless the capture of the citycan be followed by the occupation of the Alabama River and therailroad to Columbus, Georgia, when that place would be amagnificent auxiliary to my further progress into Georgia; but, until General Canby is much reinforced, and until he can morethoroughly subdue the scattered armies west of the Mississippi, Isuppose that much cannot be attempted by him against the AlabamaRiver and Columbus, Georgia. 

The utter destruction of Wilmington, North Carolina, is ofimportance only in connection with the necessity of cutting off allforeign trade to our enemy, and if Admiral Farragut can get acrossthe bar, and move quickly, I suppose he will succeed. From myknowledge of the mouth of Cape Fear River, I anticipate moredifficulty in getting the heavy ships across the bar than inreaching the town of Wilmington; but, of course, the soundings ofthe channel are well known at Washington, as well as the draught ofhis iron-clads, so that it must be demonstrated to be feasible, orelse it would not be attempted. If successful, I suppose that FortCaswell will be occupied, and the fleet at once sent to theSavannah River. Then the reduction of that city is the nextquestion. It once in our possession, and the river open to us, Iwould not hesitate to cross the State of Georgia with sixtythousand men, hauling some stores, and depending on the country forthe balance. Where a million of people find subsistence, my armywon't starve; but, as you know, in a country like Georgia, with fewroads and innumerable streams, an inferior force can so delay anarmy and harass it, that it would not be a formidable object; butif the enemy knew that we had our boats in the Savannah River Icould rapidly move to Milledgeville, where there is abundance ofcorn and meat, and could so threaten Macon and Augusta that theenemy world doubtless give up Macon for Augusta; then I would moveso as to interpose between Augusta and Savannah, and force him togive us Augusta, with the only powder-mills and factories remainingin the South, or let us have the use of the Savannah River. Eitherhorn of the dilemma will be worth a battle. I would prefer hisholding Augusta (as the probabilities are); for then, with theSavannah River in our possession, the taking of Augusta would be amere matter of time. This campaign can be made in the winter. 

But the more I study the game, the more am I convinced that itwould be wrong for us to penetrate farther into Georgia without anobjective beyond. It would not be productive of much good. I canstart east and make a circuit south and back, doing vast damage tothe State, but resulting in no permanent good; and by merethreatening to do so, I hold a rod over the Georgians, who are notover-loyal to the South. I will therefore give it as my opinionthat your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum;that, after you get Wilmington, you should strike for Savannah andits river; that General Canby should hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to take Columbus, Georgia, either by way of theAlabama or Appalachicola River; that I should keep Hood employedand put my army in fine order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, andCharleston; and start as soon as Wilmington is sealed to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession. 

I think it will be found that the movements of Price and Shelby, west of the Mississippi, are mere diversions. They cannot hope toenter Missouri except as raiders; and the truth is, that GeneralRosecrans should be ashamed to take my troops for such a purpose. If you will secure Wilmington and the city of Savannah from yourcentre, and let General Canby leave command over the MississippiRiver and country west of it, I will send a force to the Alabamaand Appalachicola, provided you give me one hundred thousand of thedrafted men to fill up my old regiments; and if you will fix a dayto be in Savannah, I will insure our possession of Macon and apoint on the river below Augusta. The possession of the SavannahRiver is more than fatal to the possibility of Southernindependence. They may stand the fall of Richmond, but not of allGeorgia. 

I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him everything that may occur to me of interest to you. 

In the mean time, know that I admire your dogged perseverance andpluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to theAtlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave ofabsence to see the young folks. 

Yours as ever, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, September 16, 1864. 

General W. T. SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia. 

My DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is justreceived. Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure. I havenot written before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta, the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the reason thatI have been suffering from my annual attack of "coryza, " orhay-cold. It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see towrite. As you suppose, I have watched your movements mostattentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that yourcampaign has been the most brilliant of the war. Its results areless striking and less complete than those of General Grant atVicksburg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter, a longer line of communications to keep up, and a longer and morecontinuous strain upon yourself and upon your army. 

You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negrorecruiting-agents. Your letter was a capital one, and did muchgood. The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the WarDepartment, but passed through the influence of Easternmanufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way. Theywere making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well affordto purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employees at home. 

I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringentdraft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us, andI fear it will not amount to much. Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn, again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the rebellion wouldbe crushed in a few months, and saying that there would be nodraft, as we now had enough soldiers to end the war, etc. , has donemuch harm, in a military point of view. I have seen enough ofpolitics here to last me for life. You are right in avoiding them. McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose therespect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliationwith such traitors and Copperheads as B---, V---, W---, S---, & Co. He would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but he hadnot the manliness to oppose it. A major-general in the UnitedStates Army, and yet not one word to utter against rebels or therebellion! I had much respect for McClellan before he became apolitician, but very little after reading his letter accepting thenomination. 

Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture ofAtlanta. I understand that, when here, he said that you wouldfail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc. , etc. He ismost unmeasured in his abuse of me. I inclose you a specimen ofwhat he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes. They aredictated by himself and written by W. B. And such worthies. Thefunny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever to dowith his being relieved on either occasion. Moreover, I have neversaid any thing to the President or Secretary of War to injure himin the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well. Hisanimosity arises from another source. He is aware that I know somethings about his character and conduct in California, and, fearingthat I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward offits effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy, amjealous of him, etc. I know of no other reason for his hostilityto me. He is welcome to abuse me as much as he pleases; I don'tthink it will do him much good, or me much harm. I know verylittle of General Howard, but believe him to be a true, honorableman. Thomas is also a noble old war-horse. It is true, as yousay, that he is slow, but he is always sure. 

I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do notknow what instructions he has sent you. I fear that Canby has notthe means to do much by way of Mobile. The military effects ofBanks's disaster are now showing themselves by the threatenedoperations of Price & Co. Toward Missouri, thus keeping in checkour armies west of the Mississippi. 

With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your futuresuccess, yours truly, H. W. HALLECK. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864. 

Major General HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington D. C. 

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of acorrespondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, theMayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of theinhabitants of Atlanta. 

In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, Iwill only call your attention to the fact that, after I hadannounced my determination, General Hood took upon himself toquestion my motives. I could not tamely submit to suchimpertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of allofficial usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such partsof the correspondence as suited his purpose. This could have hadno other object than to create a feeling on the part of the people;but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I think I can meethim there too. 

It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of theinhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it hasbeen attended with no force, and that no women or children havesuffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectorsand friends. 

My real reasons for this step were:

We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage andoccupation. 

We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish thegarrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vitalparts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs. This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels andredoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used byfamilies as residences. 

Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairlycaptured. As captors, we have a right to it. 

The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner orlater, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes. 

The residence here of the families of our enemies would be atemptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous andhurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards, and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlastingcomplaints and special grievances that are not military. 

These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of theUnited States, it makes no difference whether it pleases GeneralHood and his people or not. I am, with respect, your obedientservant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864. 

General HOOD, commanding Confederate Army. 

GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States thatthe citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those whoprefer it to go south, and the rest north. For the latter I canprovide food and transportation to points of their election inTennessee, Kentucky, or farther north. For the former I canprovide transportation by cars as far as Rough and Ready, and alsowagons; but, that their removal may be made with as littlediscomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help thefamilies from Rough and Ready to the care at Lovejoy's. If youconsent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta whoprefer to go south to Rough and Ready, with all their movableeffects, viz. , clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding, etc. , with their servants, white and black, with the proviso thatno force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other. Ifthey want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so;otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they maybe employed by our quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for familiesor non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if youwill assist in conveying them south. If this proposition meetsyour views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Roughand Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, or personssent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner beharmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that any care, wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point, shall not be interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of, say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to, say, two days after a certain time appointed. 

I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to youthis letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward inexplanation, and shall await your reply. I have the honor to beyour obedient servant. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces inGeorgia

GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Balland James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received. You saytherein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States thatthe citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, " etc. I do notconsider that I have any alternative in this matter. I thereforeaccept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or suchtime as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, andshall render all assistance in my power to expedite thetransportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that astaff-officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal fromthe city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a like officer tocontrol their removal farther south; that a guard of one hundredmen be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain order atthat place, and that the removal begin on Monday next. 

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure youpropose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts everbefore brought to my attention in the dark history of war. 

In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you willfind that you are expelling from their homes and firesides thewives and children of a brave people. I am, general, veryrespectfully, your obedient servant, J. B. HOOD, General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864. 

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army. 

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letterof this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting tothe arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south ofthe people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. Iinclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly. 

You style the measures proposed "unprecedented, " and appeal to thedark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied andingenious cruelty. " It is not unprecedented; for General Johnstonhimself very wisely and properly removed the families all the wayfrom Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should beexcepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history ofwar, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourselfburned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-dayfifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because theystood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on aline so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shotsfrom our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went intothe habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the sameat Jonesboro, and General Johnston did the same, last summer, atJackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, andcould go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge anyfair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for thefamilies of a "brave people. "

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to removethem now, at once, from scenes that women and children should notbe exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit theirwives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its darkhistory. 

In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just Godin such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace andprosperity, have plunged a nation into war--dark and cruel war--whodared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized ourarsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody ofpeaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" thevery garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes andIndians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you)hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri intorebellion, spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana;turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelledUnion families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared, by an act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts dueNorthern men for goods had and received! Talk thus to the marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this daymake as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as thebest-born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us bemen, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in archhypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in duetime, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight witha town full of women and the families of a brave people at our backor to remove them in time to places of safety among their ownfriends and people. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEESeptember 12, 1864

Major-General W. T, SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letterof the 9th inst. , with its inclosure in reference to the women, children, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel fromtheir homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let thematter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to closethis correspondence, and, without your expressing it in words, would have been willing to believe that, while "the interests ofthe United States, " in your opinion, compelled you to an act ofbarbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would havedropped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statementswhich I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify mydissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed asacquiescence. 

I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify thelanguage of condemnation with which I characterized your order. Itbut strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "preeminent in thedark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty. " Youroriginal order was stripped of all pretenses; you announced theedict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of theUnited States. " This alone you offered to us and the civilizedworld as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of Godand man. You say that "General Johnston himself very wisely andproperly removed the families all the way from Dalton down. " It isdue to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of hisdistinguished career gives the least color to your unfoundedaspersions upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, nortowns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile. He offered andextended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens whodesired to flee from your fraternal embraces. You are equallyunfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act ofcruelty, either in the defense of Jonesboro, by General Hardee, orof Atlanta, by myself. General Hardee defended his position infront of Jonesboro at the expense of injury to the houses; anordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlantaat the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case, it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case ofAtlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in waramong civilized nations. No inhabitant was expelled from his homeand fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, andtherefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct ofeither of us. I feel no other emotion other than pain in readingthat portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shellingAtlanta without notice under pretense that I defended Atlanta upona line so close to town that every cannon-shot and manymusket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. I made no complaintof your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper. I makenone now, but there are a hundred thousand witnesses that you firedinto the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing farabove and miles beyond my line of defense. I have too good anopinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skillof your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they for severalweeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, andslaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill. 

The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a widefield for the discussion of questions which I do not feel arecommitted to me. I am only a general of one of the armies of theConfederate States, charged with military operations in the field, under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not calledupon to discuss with you the causes of the present war, or thepolitical questions which led to or resulted from it. These graveand important questions have been committed to far abler hands thanmine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjustconclusion which might be drawn from my silence. You charge mycountry with "daring and badgering you to battle. " The truth is, we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peacefulseparation, before the first gun was fired on either aide. You saywe insulted your flag. The truth is, we fired upon it, and thosewho fought under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission ofsubjugation. You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, andmade prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroesand Indians. The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove outinsolent intruders and took possession of our own forts andarsenals, to resist your claims to dominion over masters, slaves, and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a unanimityunexampled in the history of the world, warring against yourattempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to forceMissouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. Thetruth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle tothis hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, toleave it to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, todetermine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny withyour Government or ours; and your Government has resisted thisfundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, andlabors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyrannyupon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say we falsifiedthe vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only separatedherself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of herpeople, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field fromGettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion toher decision which challenges the admiration and respect of everyman capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration forheroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder yourunarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of thenavy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of ourcountry, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy, around thewhole circumference of the globe. You say we have expelled Unionfamilies by thousands. The truth is, not a single family has beenexpelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of; but, onthe contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors hasbeen a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies andwell-meaning friends of our cause. You say my Government, by actsof Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goodssold and delivered. " The truth is, our Congress gave due and ampletime to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores withtheir ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the propertyof our enemies in retaliation for their acts--declaring ustraitors, and confiscating our property wherever their powerextended, either in their country or our own. Such are youraccusations, and such are the facts known of all men to be true. 

You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men, women and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet, under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, andon the claim that it is "an act of kindness to these families ofAtlanta. " Butler only banished from New Orleans the registeredenemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as apunishment. You issue a sweeping edict, covering all theinhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon thedefenseless by assuming that you have done them a kindness. Thisyou follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrificefor the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner. "And, because I characterize what you call as kindness as being realcruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God; andyou decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to saveour women and children from what you call kindness, is a"sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal. "

You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the purposeof subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not onlyintend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, anddesire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised frombarbarism to its present position, which is the highest everattained by that race, in any country, in all time. I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to yourkindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness tosacrifice every thing for the peace and honor of the South, andrefuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters betweenmyself, my country, and my God. 

You say, "Let us fight it out like men. " To this my reply is--formyself, and I believe for all the free men, ay, and women andchildren, in my country--we will fight you to the death! Betterdie a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or yourGovernment and your negro allies!

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9thof September, I close this correspondence with you; and, notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause ofhumanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his almighty aid indefense of justice and right. Respectfully, your obedient servant, J. B. HOOD, General. 

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11, 1864Major-General W. T. SHERMAN. 

Sir: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the cityof Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the peopleof the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave mostearnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the orderrequiring them to leave Atlanta. 

At first view, it struck us that the measure world involveextraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen thepractical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and theindividual condition of the people, and heard their statements asto the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we aresatisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregateconsequences appalling and heart-rending. 

Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others nowhaving young children, and whose husbands for the greater part areeither in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have such aone sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?"Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go to, and nomeans to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, orfriends, to go to. " Another says: "I will try and take this orthat article of property, but such and such things I must leavebehind, though I need them much. " We reply to them: "GeneralSherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and GeneralHood will take it thence on. " And they will reply to that: "But Iwant to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot getconveyance from there on. "

We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how thismeasure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the peoplenorth of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a largeportion of the people had retired south, so that the country southof this is already crowded, and without houses enough toaccommodate the people, and we are informed that many are nowstaying in churches and other out-buildings. 

This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostlywomen and children) to find any shelter? And how can they livethrough the winter in the woods--no shelter or subsistence, in themidst of strangers who know them not, and without the power toassist them much, if they were willing to do so?

This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering, cannot bedescribed by words; imagination can only conceive of it, and we askyou to take these things into consideration. 

We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the dutiesof your command, which almost deters us from asking your attentionto this matter, but thought it might be that you had not consideredthis subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on morereflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception toall mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred--surely never in the United States--and what has this helplesspeople done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wanderstrangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those whoare here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed toremain at home, could subsist for several months withoutassistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, andwho might not need assistance at any time. 

In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you toreconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunatepeople to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have. Respectfully submittedJAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor. E. E. RAWSON, Councilman. S. C. Warns, Councilman. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 12, 1864. 

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON and S. C. Wares, representingCity Council of Atlanta. 

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of apetition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants fromAtlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to yourstatements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet shallnot revoke my orders, because they were not designed to meet thehumanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles inwhich millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deepinterest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in allAmerica. To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolatesour once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must defeatthe rebel armies which are arrayed against the laws andConstitution that all must respect and obey. To defeat thosearmies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us toaccomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of ourenemy, that we may have many years of military operations from thisquarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare intime. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent withits character as a home for families. There will be nomanufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the maintenance offamilies, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants togo. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed forthe transfer, --instead of waiting till the plunging shot ofcontending armies will renew the scenes of the past months. Ofcourse, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but youdo not suppose this army will be here until the war is over. Icannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannotimpart to you what we propose to do, but I assert that our militaryplans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I canonly renew my offer of services to make their exodus in anydirection as easy and comfortable as possible. 

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War iscruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war intoour country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people canpour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know Iwill make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If theUnited States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but willgo on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. TheUnited States does and must assert its authority, wherever it oncehad power; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, andI believe that such is the national feeling. This feeling assumesvarious shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admitthe Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the nationalGovernment, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets androads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once yourprotectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it comefrom what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannotresist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South intorebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those whodesire a government, and those who insist on war and itsdesolation. 

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against theseterrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only waythe people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quietat home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admittingthat it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. 

We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or yourlands, or any thing you have, but we do want and will have a justobedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannothelp it. 

You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, thatlive by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek fortruth in other quarters, the better. I repeat then that, by theoriginal compact of Government, the United States had certainrights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and neverwill be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc. , etc. , long before Mr. Lincoln wasinstalled, and before the South had one jot or tittle ofprovocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and childrenfleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleedingfeet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousandsupon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you;you feel very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did notfeel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, andmoulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, to desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people whoonly asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under theGovernment of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through union andwar, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and earlysuccess. 

But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch withyou to shield your homes and families against danger from everyquarter. 

Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed andnurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, properhabitations to shield them against the weather until the madpassions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once moreto settle over your old homes at Atlanta. Yours in haste, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864. 

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of the Tennessee, ConfederateArmy. 

GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has beencarefully perused. I agree with you that this discussion by twosoldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit thatyou began the controversy by characterizing an official act of minein unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my former answer, and tothe only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no"negro allies" in this army; not a single negro soldier leftChattanooga with this army, or is with it now. There are a fewguarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman sent at one time todrive Wheeler out of Dalton. 

I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shellingof Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals, founderies, and public stores;" you were bound to take notice. Seethe books. 

This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did notbegin, and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, yourobedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, September 28, 1864, Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia. 

GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removalof families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and alsothe official report of your campaign, are just received. I havenot had time as yet to examine your report. The course which youhave pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta, and in theexchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department. Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war inremoving these people, but I think it was your duty to your ownarmy to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature ofyour position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy(and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory whichwe have heretofore conquered and occupied), will justify you ingathering up all the forage and provisions which your army mayrequire, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in yourmarch farther into the enemy's country. Let the disloyal familiesof the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, andnatural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three yearsof conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on thecontrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas inour rear and within our lines. The safety of our armies, and aproper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we applyto our inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We certainly arenot required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels betterthan they themselves treat each other. Even herein Virginia, within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families ofprovisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, orto starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people longenough. Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebelranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends andnatural protectors. I would destroy every mill and factory withinreach which I did not want for my own use. This the rebels havedone, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginiaand other rebel States, when compelled to fall back before ourarmies. In many sections of the country they have not left a millto grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might usethem to supply our armies. We most do the same. 

I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders forthe last two years. You are almost the only one who has properlyapplied them. I do not approve of General Hunter's course inburning private homes or uselessly destroying private property. That is barbarous. But I approve of taking or destroying whatevermay serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff

In order to effect the exchange of prisoners, to facilitate theexodus of the people of Atlanta, and to keep open communicationwith the South, we established a neutral camp, at and about therailroad-station next south of Atlanta, known as "Rough and Ready, "to which point I dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Willard Warner, ofmy staff, with a guard of one hundred men, and General Hood sentColonel Clare, of his staff, with a similar guard; these officersand men harmonized perfectly, and parted good friends when theirwork was done. In the mean time I also had reconnoitred the entirerebel lines about Atlanta, which were well built, but were entirelytoo extensive to be held by a single corps or division of troops, so I instructed Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, on my staff, to lay off an inner and shorter line, susceptible of defense by asmaller garrison. 

By the middle of September all these matters were in progress, thereports of the past campaign were written up and dispatched toWashington, and our thoughts began to turn toward the future. Admiral Farragut had boldly and successfully run the forts at theentrance to Mobile Bay, which resulted in the capture of FortMorgan, so that General Canby was enabled to begin his regularoperations against Mobile City, with a view to open the AlabamaRiver to navigation. My first thoughts were to concert operationswith him, either by way of Montgomery, Alabama, or by theAppalachicula; but so long a line, to be used as a base for furtheroperations eastward, was not advisable, and I concluded to awaitthe initiative of the enemy, supposing that he would be forced toresort to some desperate campaign by the clamor raised at the Southon account of the great loss to them of the city of Atlanta. 

General Thomas occupied a house on Marietta Streets which had averanda with high pillars. We were sitting there one evening, talking about things generally, when General Thomas asked leave tosend his trains back to Chattanooga, for the convenience andeconomy of forage. I inquired of him if he supposed we would beallowed much rest at Atlanta, and he said he thought we would, orthat at all events it would not be prudent for us to go muchfarther into Georgia because of our already long line ofcommunication, viz. , three hundred miles from Nashville. This wastrue; but there we were, and we could not afford to remain on thedefensive, simply holding Atlanta and fighting for the safety ofits railroad. I insisted on his retaining all trains, and onkeeping all his divisions ready to move at a moment's warning. Allthe army, officers and men, seemed to relax more or less, and sinkinto a condition of idleness. General Schofield was permitted togo to Knoxville, to look after matters in his Department of theOhio; and Generals Blair and Logan went home to look afterpolitics. Many of the regiments were entitled to, and claimed, their discharge, by reason of the expiration of their term ofservice; so that with victory and success came also many causes ofdisintegration. 

The rebel General Wheeler was still in Middle Tennessee, threatening our railroads, and rumors came that Forrest was on hisway from Mississippi to the same theatre, for the avowed purpose ofbreaking up our railroads and compelling us to fall back from ourconquest. To prepare for this, or any other emergency, I orderedNewton's division of the Fourth Corps back to Chattanooga, andCorse's division of the Seventeenth Corps to Rome, and instructedGeneral Rousseau at Nashville, Granger at Decatur, and Steadman atChattanooga, to adopt the most active measures to protect andinsure the safety of our roads. 

Hood still remained about Lovejoy's Station, and, up to the 15th ofSeptember, had given no signs of his future plans; so that withthis date I close the campaign of Atlanta, with the followingreview of our relative losses during the months of August andSeptember, with a summary of those for the whole campaign, beginning May 6 and ending September 15, 1864. The losses forAugust and September are added together, so as to include thoseabout Jonesboro:

 Killed and Missing Wounded Total Grand Aggregate..... 1, 408 3, 731 5, 139

Hood's losses, as reported for the same period, page 577, Johnston's "Narrative:"

 Killed Wounded Total 482 3, 223 3, 705

To which should be added:

 Prisoners captured by us:............ 3, 738

 Giving his total loss ............... 7, 440

On recapitulating the entire losses of each army during the entirecampaign, from May to September, inclusive, we have, in the Unionarmy, as per table appended:

Killed ........................ 4, 423Wounded ....................... 22, 822Missing........................ 4, 442 Aggregate Loss ......... 31, 627

In the Southern army, according to the reports of Surgeon Foard(pp. 576, 577, Johnston's "Narrative ")

 Total killed ................ 3, 044 Total killed and wounded..... 21, 996 Prisoners captured by us .... 12, 983

 Aggregate loss to the Southern Army .......... 34, 979

The foregoing figures are official, and are very nearly correct. Isee no room for error save in the cavalry, which was very muchscattered, and whose reports are much less reliable than of theinfantry and artillery; but as Surgeon Foard's tables do notembrace Wheeler's, Jackson's, and Martin's divisions of cavalry, Iinfer that the comparison, as to cavalry losses, is a "stand-off. "

I have no doubt that the Southern officers flattered themselvesthat they had filled and crippled of us two and even six to one, asstated by Johnston; but they were simply mistaken, and I herewithsubmit official tabular statements made up from the archives of theWar Department, in proof thereof. 

I have also had a careful tabular statement compiled from officialrecords in the adjutant-general's office, giving the "effectivestrength" of the army under my command for each of the months ofMay, June, July, August, and September, 1864, which enumerate everyman (infantry, artillery, and cavalry) for duty. Therecapitulation clearly exhibits the actual truth. We opened thecampaign with 98, 797 (ninety-eight thousand seven hundred andninety-seven) men. Blair's two divisions joined us early in June, giving 112, 819 (one hundred and twelve thousand eight hundred andnineteen), which number gradually became reduced to 106, 070 (onehundred and six thousand and seventy men), 91, 675 (ninety-onethousand six hundred and seventy-five), and 81, 758 (eighty-onethousand seven hundred and fifty-eight) at the end of the campaign. This gradual reduction was not altogether owing to death andwounds, but to the expiration of service, or by detachments sent topoints at the rear. 

CHAPTER XX

ATLANTA AND AFTER--PURSUIT OF HOOD. 

SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1864. 

By the middle of September, matters and things had settled down inAtlanta, so that we felt perfectly at home. The telegraph andrailroads were repaired, and we had uninterrupted communication tothe rear. The trains arrived with regularity and dispatch, andbrought us ample supplies. General Wheeler had been driven out ofMiddle Tennessee, escaping south across the Tennessee River atBainbridge; and things looked as though we were to have a period ofrepose. 

One day, two citizens, Messrs. Hill and Foster, came into our linesat Decatur, and were sent to my headquarters. They representedthemselves as former members of Congress, and particular friends ofmy brother John Sherman; that Mr. Hill had a son killed in therebel army as it fell back before us somewhere near Cassville, andthey wanted to obtain the body, having learned from a comrade whereit was buried. I gave them permission to go by rail to the rear, with a note to the commanding officer, General John E. Smith, atCartersville, requiring him to furnish them an escort and anambulance for the purpose. I invited them to take dinner with ourmess, and we naturally ran into a general conversation aboutpolitics and the devastation and ruin caused by the war. They hadseen a part of the country over which the army had passed, andcould easily apply its measure of desolation to the remainder ofthe State, if necessity should compel us to go ahead. 

Mr. Hill resided at Madison, on the main road to Augusta, andseemed to realize fully the danger; said that further resistance onthe part of the South was madness, that he hoped Governor Brown, ofGeorgia, would so proclaim it, and withdraw his people from therebellion, in pursuance of what was known as the policy of"separate State action. " I told him, if he saw Governor Brown, todescribe to him fully what he had seen, and to say that if heremained inert, I would be compelled to go ahead, devastating theState in its whole length and breadth; that there was no adequateforce to stop us, etc. ; but if he would issue his proclamationwithdrawing his State troops from the armies of the Confederacy, Iwould spare the State, and in our passage across it confine thetroops to the main roads, and would, moreover, pay for all the cornand food we needed. I also told Mr. Hill that he might, in myname, invite Governor Brown to visit Atlanta; that I would give hima safeguard, and that if he wanted to make a speech, I wouldguarantee him as full and respectable an audience as any he hadever spoken to. I believe that Mr. Hill, after reaching his homeat Madison, went to Milledgeville, the capital of the State, anddelivered the message to Governor Brown. I had also sent similarmessages by Judge Wright of Rome, Georgia, and by Mr. King, ofMarietta. On the 15th of September I telegraphed to GeneralHalleck as follows:

My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get in a fewmore of the subordinate reports. I am awaiting a courier fromGeneral Grant. All well; the troops are in good, healthy camps, and supplies are coming forward finely. Governor Brown hasdisbanded his militia, to gather the corn and sorghum of the State. I have reason to believe that he and Stephens want to visit me, andhave sent them hearty invitation. I will exchange two thousandprisoners with Hood, but no more. 

Governor Brown's action at that time is fully explained by thefollowing letter, since made public, which was then only known tous in part by hearsay:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTMILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864

General J. B. HOOD, commanding army of Tennessee. 

GENERAL: As the militia of the State were called out for thedefense of Atlanta during the campaign against it, which hasterminated by the fall of the city into the hands of the enemy, andas many of these left their homes without preparation (expecting tobe gone but a few weeks), who have remained in service over threemonths (most of the time in the trenches), justice requires thatthey be permitted, while the enemy are preparing for the wintercampaign, to return to their homes, and look for a time afterimportant interests, and prepare themselves for such service as maybe required when another campaign commences against other importantpoints in the State. I therefore hereby withdraw said organizationfrom your command . . . . 

JOSEPH C. BROWN

This militia had composed a division under command of Major-GeneralGustavus W. Smith, and were thus dispersed to their homes, togather the corn and sorghum, then ripe and ready for theharvesters. 

On the 17th I received by telegraph from President Lincoln thisdispatch:

WASHINGTON, D. C. , September 17, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN:

I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch, mentioningcorn and sorghum, and the contemplated visit to you. 

A. LINCOLN, President of the United States. 

I replied at once:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 17, 1864. 

President LINCOLN, Washington. , D. C. :

I will keep the department fully advised of all developmentsconnected with the subject in which you feel interested. 

Mr. Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, and Mr. King, of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself. I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engagedin rebellion, began in error and perpetuated in pride, but thatGeorgia can now save herself from the devastations of war preparingfor her, only by withdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army, and aiding me to expel Hood from the borders of the State; in whichevent, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keepour men to the high-roads and commons, and pay for the corn andmeat we need and take. 

I am fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, butit would be a magnificent stroke of policy if we could, withoutsurrendering principle or a foot of ground, arouse the latentenmity of Georgia against Davis. 

The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stephens was and is aUnion man at heart; and they say that Davis will not trust him orlet him have a share in his Government. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

I have not the least doubt that Governor Brown, at that time, seriously entertained the proposition; but he hardly felt ready toact, and simply gave a furlough to the militia, and called aspecial session of the Legislature, to meet at Milledgeville, totake into consideration the critical condition of affairs in theState. 

On the 20th of September Colonel Horace Porter arrived from GeneralGrant, at City Point, bringing me the letter of September 12th, asking my general views as to what should next be done. He staidseveral days at Atlanta, and on his return carried back toWashington my full reports of the past campaign, and my letter ofSeptember 20th to General Grant in answer to his of the 12th. 

About this time we detected signs of activity on the part of theenemy. On the 21st Hood shifted his army across from the Masonroad, at Lovejoy's, to the West Point road, at Palmetto Station, and his cavalry appeared on the west side of the Chattahoochee, toward Powder Springs; thus, as it were, stepping aside, andopening wide the door for us to enter Central Georgia. I inferred, however, that his real purpose was to assume the offensive againstour railroads, and on the 24th a heavy force of cavalry fromMississippi, under General Forrest, made its appearance at Athena, Alabama, and captured its garrison. 

General Newton's division (of the Fourth Corps), and Corse's (ofthe Seventeenth), were sent back by rail, the former toChattanooga, and the latter to Rome. On the 25th I telegraphed toGeneral Halleck:

Hood seems to be moving, as it were, to the Alabama line, leavingopen the road to Mason, as also to Augusta; but his cavalry is busyon all our roads. A force, number estimated as high as eightthousand, are reported to have captured Athena, Alabama; and aregiment of three hundred and fifty men sent to its relief. I havesent Newton's division up to Chattanooga in cars, and will sendanother division to Rome. If I were sure that Savannah would soonbe in our possession, I should be tempted to march forMilledgeville and Augusta; but I must first secure what I have. Jeff. Davis is at Macon. 

On the next day I telegraphed further that Jeff. Davis was withHood at Palmetto Station. One of our spies was there at the time, who came in the next night, and reported to me the substance of hisspeech to the soldiers. It was a repetition of those he had madeat Colombia, South Carolina, and Mason, Georgia, on his way out, which I had seen in the newspapers. Davis seemed to be perfectlyupset by the fall of Atlanta, and to have lost all sense andreason. He denounced General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown aslittle better than traitors; attributed to them personally the manymisfortunes which had befallen their cause, and informed thesoldiers that now the tables were to be turned; that GeneralForrest was already on our roads in Middle Tennessee; and thatHood's army would soon be there. He asserted that the Yankee armywould have to retreat or starve, and that the retreat would provemore disastrous than was that of Napoleon from Moscow. He promisedhis Tennessee and Kentucky soldiers that their feet should soontread their "native soil, " etc. , etc. He made no concealment ofthese vainglorious boasts, and thus gave us the full key to hisfuture designs. To be forewarned was to be forearmed, and I thinkwe took full advantage of the occasion. 

On the 26th I received this dispatch. 

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, September 26, 1864-10 a. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN, AtlantaIt will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as afirst step, and do any thing else you may feel your forcesufficient for. When a movement is made on any part of thesea-coast, I will advise you. If Hood goes to the Alabama line, will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army?U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

Answer:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1864. 

GENERAL: I have your dispatch of to-day. I have already sent onedivision (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse's) to Rome. 

Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I willnot be able to threaten Georgia much. There are men enough to therear to whip Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defendthe roads. 

Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that arein Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts. 

Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south ofthis, and draws his supplies by that road. Jefferson Davis isthere to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road. 

Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy'scavalry. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

General Grant first thought I was in error in supposing that Jeff. Davis was at Macon and Palmetto, but on the 27th I received aprinted copy of his speech made at Macon on the 22d, which was sosignificant that I ordered it to be telegraphed entire as far asLouisville, to be sent thence by mail to Washington, and on thesame day received this dispatch:

WASHINGTON, D. C. , September 27, 1864-9 a. M. Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta:You say Jeff Davis is on a visit to General Hood. I judge thatBrown and Stephens are the objects of his visit. A. LINCOLN, President of the United States. 

To which I replied:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 28, 1864. 

President LINCOLN, Washington, D. C. :

I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon, onthe 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday. It wasbitter against General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown. Themilitia are on furlough. Brown is at Milledgeville, trying to geta Legislature to meet next month, but he is afraid to act unless inconcert with other Governors, Judge Wright, of Rome, has been here, and Messrs. Hill and Nelson, former members of Congress, are herenow, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, and then go back toMadison and Milledgeville. 

Great efforts are being made to reenforce Hood's army, and to breakup my railroads, and I should have at once a good reserve force atNashville. It would have a bad effect, if I were forced to sendback any considerable part of my army to guard roads, so as toweaken me to an extent that I could not act offensively if theoccasion calls for it. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

All this time Hood and I were carrying on the foregoingcorrespondence relating to the exchange of prisoners, the removalof the people from Atlanta, and the relief of our prisoners of warat Andersonville. Notwithstanding the severity of theirimprisonment, some of these men escaped from Andersonville, and gotto me at Atlanta. They described their sad condition: more thantwenty-five thousand prisoners confined in a stockade designed foronly ten thousand; debarred the privilege of gathering wood out ofwhich to make huts; deprived of sufficient healthy food, and thelittle stream that ran through their prison pen poisoned andpolluted by the offal from their cooking and butchering housesabove. On the 22d of September I wrote to General Hood, describingthe condition of our men at Andersonville, purposely refrainingfrom casting odium on him or his associates for the treatment ofthese men, but asking his consent for me to procure from ourgenerous friends at the North the articles of clothing and comfortwhich they wanted, viz. , under-clothing, soap, combs, scissors, etc. --all needed to keep them in health--and to send these storeswith a train, and an officer to issue them. General Hood, on the24th, promptly consented, and I telegraphed to my friend Mr. JamesE. Yeatman, Vice-President of the Sanitary Commission at St. Louis, to send us all the under-clothing and soap he could spare, specifying twelve hundred fine-tooth combs, and four hundred pairsof shears to cut hair. These articles indicate the plague thatmost afflicted our prisoners at Andersonville. 

Mr. Yeatman promptly responded to my request, expressed thearticles, but they did not reach Andersonville in time, for theprisoners were soon after removed; these supplies did, however, finally overtake them at Jacksonville, Florida, just before the warclosed. 

On the 28th I received from General Grant two dispatches

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA; September 27, 1864-8. 30 a. M. Major-General SHERMAN:It is evident, from the tone of the Richmond press and from othersources of information, that the enemy intend making a desperateeffort to drive you from where you are. I have directed all newtroops from the West, and from the East too, if necessary, in casenone are ready in the West, to be sent to you. If GeneralBurbridge is not too far on his way to Abingdon, I think he hadbetter be recalled and his surplus troops sent into Tennessee. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA; September 27, 1864-10. 30 a. M. Major-General SHERMAN:I have directed all recruits and new troops from all the WesternStates to be sent to Nashville, to receive their further ordersfrom you. I was mistaken about Jeff. Davis being in Richmond onThursday last. He was then on his way to Macon. U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

Forrest having already made his appearance in Middle Tennessee, andHood evidently edging off in that direction, satisfied me that thegeneral movement against our roads had begun. I thereforedetermined to send General Thomas back to Chattanooga, with anotherdivision (Morgan's, of the Fourteenth Corps), to meet the danger inTennessee. General Thomas went up on the 29th, and Morgan'sdivision followed the same day, also by rail. And I telegraphed toGeneral Halleck

I take it for granted that Forrest will cut our road, but think wecan prevent him from making a serious lodgment. His cavalry willtravel a hundred miles where ours will ten. I have sent twodivisions up to Chattanooga and one to Rome, and General Thomasstarted to-day to drive Forrest out of Tennessee. Our roads shouldbe watched from the rear, and I am glad that General Grant hasordered reserves to Nashville. I prefer for the future to make themovement on Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. Hood now reststwenty-four miles south, on the Chattahoochee, with his right onthe West Point road. He is removing the iron of the Macon road. Ican whip his infantry, but his cavalry is to be feared. 

There was great difficulty in obtaining correct information aboutHood's movements from Palmetto Station. I could not get spies topenetrate his camps, but on the 1st of October I was satisfied thatthe bulk of his infantry was at and across the Chattahoochee River, near Campbellton, and that his cavalry was on the west side, atPowder Springs. On that day I telegraphed to General Grant:

Hood is evidently across the Chattahoochee, below Sweetwater. Ifhe tries to get on our road, this side of the Etowah, I shallattack him; but if he goes to the Selma & Talladega road, why willit not do to leave Tennessee to the forces which Thomas has, andthe reserves soon to come to Nashville, and for me to destroyAtlanta and march across Georgia to Savannah or Charleston, breaking roads and doing irreparable damage? We cannot remain onthe defensive. 

The Selma & Talladega road herein referred to was an unfinishedrailroad from Selma, Alabama, through Talladega, to Blue Mountain, a terminus sixty-five miles southwest of Rome and about fifteenmiles southeast of Gadsden, where the rebel army could be suppliedfrom the direction of Montgomery and Mobile, and from which pointHood could easily threaten Middle Tennessee. My first impressionwas, that Hood would make for that point; but by the 3d of Octoberthe indications were that he would strike our railroad nearer us, viz. , about Kingston or Marietta. 

Orders were at once made for the Twentieth Corps (Slocum's) to holdAtlanta and the bridges of the Chattahoochee, and the other corpswere put in motion for Marietta. 

The army had undergone many changes since the capture of Atlanta. General Schofield had gone to the rear, leaving General J. D. Cogin command of the Army of the Ohio (Twenty-third Corps). GeneralThomas, also, had been dispatched to Chattanooga, with Newton'sdivision of the Fourth Corps and Morgan's of the Fourteenth Corps, leaving General D. S. Stanley, the senior major-general of the twocorps of his Army of the Cumberland, remaining and available forthis movement, viz. , the Fourth and Fourteenth, commanded byhimself and Major-General Jeff. C. Davis; and after General Dodgewas wounded, his corps (the Sixteenth) had been broken up, and itstwo divisions were added to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, constituting the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-GeneralO. O. Howard. Generals Logan and Blair had gone home to assist inthe political canvass, leaving their corps, viz. , the Fifteenth andSeventeenth, under the command of Major-Generals Osterhaus and T. E. G. Ransom. 

These five corps were very much reduced in strength, by detachmentsand by discharges, so that for the purpose of fighting Hood I hadonly about sixty thousand infantry and artillery, with two smalldivisions of cavalry (Kilpatrick's and Garrard's). General Elliottwas the chief of cavalry to the Army of the Cumberland, and was thesenior officer of that arm of service present for duty with me. 

We had strong railroad guards at Marietta and Kenesaw, Allatoona, Etowah Bridge, Kingston, Rome, Resaca, Dalton, Ringgold, andChattanooga. All the important bridges were likewise protected bygood block-houses, admirably constructed, and capable of a strongdefense against cavalry or infantry; and at nearly all the regularrailroad-stations we had smaller detachments intrenched. I hadlittle fear of the enemy's cavalry damaging our roads seriously, for they rarely made a break which could not be repaired in a fewdays; but it was absolutely necessary to keep General Hood'sinfantry off our main route of communication and supply. Forresthad with him in Middle Tennessee about eight thousand cavalry, andHood's army was estimated at from thirty-five to forty thousandmen, infantry and artillery, including Wheeler's cavalry, thenabout three thousand strong. 

We crossed the Chattahoochee River during the 3d and 4th ofOctober, rendezvoused at the old battle-field of Smyrna Camp, andthe next day reached Marietta and Kenesaw. The telegraph-wires hadbeen cut above Marietta, and learning that heavy masses ofinfantry, artillery, and cavalry, had been seen from Kenesaw(marching north), I inferred that Allatoona was their objectivepoint; and on the 4th of October I signaled from Mining's Stationto Kenesaw, and from Kenesaw to Allatoona, over the heads of theenemy, a message for General Corse, at Rome, to hurry back to theassistance of the garrison at Allatoona. Allatoona was held by, asmall brigade, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, mypresent aide-de-camp. He had two small redoubts on either side ofthe railroad, overlooking the village of Allatoona, and thewarehouses, in which were stored over a million rations of bread. 

Reaching Kenesaw Mountain about 8 a. M. Of October 5th (a beautifulday), I had a superb view of the vast panorama to the north andwest. To the southwest, about Dallas, could be seen the smoke ofcamp-fires, indicating the presence of a large force of the enemy, and the whole line of railroad from Big Shanty up to Allatoona(full fifteen miles) was marked by the fires of the burningrailroad. We could plainly see the smoke of battle about, Allatoona, and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon. 

From Kenesaw I ordered the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox) tomarch due west on the Burnt Hickory road, and to burn houses orpiles of brush as it progressed, to indicate the head of column, hoping to interpose this corps between Hood's main army at Dallasand the detachment then assailing Allatoona. The rest of the armywas directed straight for Allatoona, northwest, distant eighteenmiles. The signal-officer on Kenesaw reported that since daylighthe had failed to obtain any answer to his call for Allatoona; but, while I was with him, he caught a faint glimpse of the tell-taleflag through an embrasure, and after much time he made out theseletters-" C. , " "R. , " "S. , " "E. , " "H. , " "E. , " "R. , " and translatedthe message--"Corse is here. " It was a source of great relief, forit gave me the first assurance that General Corse had received hisorders, and that the place was adequately garrisoned. 

I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battleraging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress ofthe relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes whichwere made according to orders, but about 2 p. M. I noticed withsatisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less andless, and ceased altogether about 4 p. M. For a time I attributedthis result to the effect of General Cog's march, but later in theafternoon the signal-flag announced the welcome tidings that theattack had been fairly repulsed, but that General Corse waswounded. The next day my aide, Colonel Dayton, received thischaracteristic dispatch:

ALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 6, 1884-2 P. M. Captain L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp:I am short a cheek-bone and an ear, but am able to whip all h--lyet! My losses are very heavy. A force moving from Stilesboro' toKingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is. JOHN M. CORSE, Brigadier-General. 

Inasmuch as the enemy had retreated southwest, and would probablynext appear at Rome, I answered General Corse with orders to getback to Rome with his troops as quickly as possible. 

General Corse's report of this fight at Allatoona is very full andgraphic. It is dated Rome, October 27, 1864; recites the fact thathe received his orders by signal to go to the assistance ofAllatoona on the 4th, when he telegraphed to Kingston for cars, anda train of thirty empty cars was started for him, but about ten ofthem got off the track and caused delay. By 7 p. M. He had at Romea train of twenty cars, which he loaded up with Colonel Rowett'sbrigade, and part of the Twelfth Illinois Infantry; started at 8p. M. , reached Allatoona (distant thirty-five miles) at 1 a. M. Ofthe 5th, and sent the train back for more men; but the road was inbad order, and no more men came in time. He found ColonelTourtellotte's garrison composed of eight hundred and ninety men;his reenforcement was one thousand and fifty-four: total for thedefense, nineteen hundred and forty-four. The outposts werealready engaged, and as soon as daylight came he drew back the menfrom the village to the ridge on which the redoubts were built. 

The enemy was composed of French's division of three brigades, variously reported from four to five thousand strong. This forcegradually surrounded the place by 8 a. M. , when General French sentin by flag of truce this note:

AROUND ALLATOONA, October 5, 1884. 

Commanding Officer, United States Forces, Allatoona:

I have placed the forces under my command in such positions thatyou are surrounded, and to avoid a needless effusion of blood Icall on you to surrender your forces at once, and unconditionally. 

Five minutes will be allowed you to decide. Should you accede tothis, you will be treated in the most honorable manner as prisonersof war. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours, S. G. FRENCH, Major-General commanding forces Confederate States. 

General Corse answered immediately:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPSALLATOONA, GEORGIA, October 5, 1864. 

Major-General S. G. FRENCH, Confederate States, etc:

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledgereceipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the"needless effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you. 

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, JOHN M. CORSE, Brigadier-General commanding forces United States. 

Of course the attack began at once, coming from front, flank, andrear. There were two small redoubts, with slight parapets andditches, one on each side of the deep railroad-cut. These redoubtshad been located by Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, at thetime of our advance on Kenesaw, the previous June. Each redoubtoverlooked the storehouses close by the railroad, and each couldaid the other defensively by catching in flank the attacking forceof the other. Our troops at first endeavored to hold some groundoutside the redoubts, but were soon driven inside, when the enemymade repeated assaults, but were always driven back. About 11 a. M. , Colonel Redfield, of the Thirty-ninth Iowa, was killed, and ColonelRowett was wounded, but never ceased to fight and encourage hismen. Colonel Tourtellotte was shot through the hips, but continuedto command. General Corse was, at 1 p. M. , shot across the face, the ball cutting his ear, which stunned him, but he continued toencourage his men and to give orders. The enemy (about 1. 30 p. M. )made a last and desperate effort to carry one of the redoubts, butwas badly cut to pieces by the artillery and infantry fire from theother, when he began to draw off, leaving his dead and wounded onthe ground. 

Before finally withdrawing, General French converged a heavy fireof his cannon on the block-house at Allatoona Creek, about twomiles from the depot, set it on fire, and captured its garrison, consisting of four officers and eighty-five men. By 4 p. M. He wasin full retreat south, on the Dallas road, and got by before thehead of General Cox's column had reached it; still severalambulances and stragglers were picked up by this command on thatroad. General Corse reported two hundred and thirty-one rebeldead, four hundred and eleven prisoners, three regimental colors, and eight hundred muskets captured. 

Among the prisoners was a Brigadier-General Young, who thought thatFrench's aggregate loss would reach two thousand. ColonelTourtellotte says that, for days after General Corse had returnedto Rome, his men found and buried at least a hundred more deadrebels, who had doubtless been wounded, and died in the woods nearAllatoona. I know that when I reached Allatoona, on the 9th, I sawa good many dead men, which had been collected for burial. 

Corse's entire loss, officially reported, was:

 Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total. 142 353 212 707

I esteemed this defense of Allatoona so handsome and important, that I made it the subject of a general order, viz. , No. 86, ofOctober 7, 1864:

The general commanding avails himself of the opportunity, in thehandsome defense made of Allatoona, to illustrate the mostimportant principle in war, that fortified posts should be defendedto the last, regardless of the relative numbers of the partyattacking and attacked . . . . The thanks of this army are dueand are hereby accorded to General Corse, Colonel Tourtellotte, Colonel Rowett, officers, and men, for their determined and gallantdefense of Allatoona, and it is made an example to illustrate theimportance of preparing in time, and meeting the danger, whenpresent, boldly, manfully, and well. 

Commanders and garrisons of the posts along our railroad are herebyinstructed that they must hold their posts to the last minute, surethat the time gained is valuable and necessary to their comrades atthe front. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-A-Camp. 

The rebels had struck our railroad a heavy blow, burning every tie, bending the rails for eight miles, from Big Shanty to aboveAcworth, so that the estimate for repairs called for thirty-fivethousand new ties, and six miles of iron. Ten thousand men weredistributed along the break to replace the ties, and to prepare theroad-bed, while the regular repair-party, under Colonel W. W. Wright, came down from Chattanooga with iron, spikes, etc. , and inabout seven days the road was all right again. It was by such actsof extraordinary energy that we discouraged our adversaries, forthe rebel soldiers felt that it was a waste of labor for them tomarch hurriedly, on wide circuits, day and night, to burn a bridgeand tear up a mile or so of track, when they knew that we could layit back so quickly. They supposed that we had men and moneywithout limit, and that we always kept on hand, distributed alongthe road, duplicates of every bridge and culvert of any importance. 

A good story is told of one who was on Kenesaw Mountain during ouradvance in the previous June or July. A group of rebels lay in theshade of a tree, one hot day, overlooking our camps about BigShanty. One soldier remarked to his fellows:

"Well, the Yanks will have to git up and git now, for I heardGeneral Johnston himself say that General Wheeler had blown up thetunnel near Dalton, and that the Yanks would have to retreat, because they could get no more rations. "

"Oh, hell!" said a listener, "don't you know that old Shermancarries a duplicate tunnel along?"

After the war was over, General Johnston inquired of me who was ourchief railroad-engineer. When I told him that it was Colonel W. W. Wright, a civilian, he was much surprised, said that our feats ofbridge-building and repairs of roads had excited his admiration;and he instanced the occasion at Kenesaw in June, when an officerfrom Wheeler's cavalry had reported to him in person that he hadcome from General Wheeler, who had made a bad break in our roadabout Triton Station, which he said would take at least a fortnightto repair; and, while they were talking, a train was seen comingdown the road which had passed that very break, and had reached meat Big Shanty as soon as the fleet horseman had reached him(General Johnston) at Marietta

I doubt whether the history of war can furnish more examples ofskill and bravery than attended the defense of the railroad fromNashville to Atlanta during the year 1864. 

In person I reached Allatoona on the 9th of October, still in doubtas to Hood's immediate intentions. Our cavalry could do littleagainst his infantry in the rough and wooded country about Dallas, which masked the enemy's movements; but General Corse, at Rome, with Spencer's First Alabama Cavalry and a mounted regiment ofIllinois Infantry, could feel the country south of Rome aboutCedartown and Villa Rica; and reported the enemy to be in force atboth places. On the 9th I telegraphed to General Thomas, atNashville, as follows:

I came up here to relieve our road. The Twentieth Corps remains atAtlanta. Hood reached the road and broke it up between Big Shantyand Acworth. He attacked Allatoona, but was repulsed. We haveplenty of bread and meat, but forage is scarce. I want to destroyall the road below Chattanooga, including Atlanta, and to make forthe sea-coast. We cannot defend this long line of road. 

And on the same day I telegraphed to General Grant, at City Point:

It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now thatHood, Forrest, Wheeler, and the whole batch of devils, are turnedloose without home or habitation. I think Hood's movementsindicate a diversion to the end of the Selma & Talladega road, atBlue Mountain, about sixty miles southwest of Rome, from which hewill threaten Kingston, Bridgeport, and Decatur, Alabama. Ipropose that we break up the railroad from Ohattanooga forward, andthat we strike out with our wagons for Milledgeville, Millen, andSavannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia, it is useless for us tooccupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, andpeople, will cripple their military resources. By attempting tohold the roads, we will lose a thousand men each month, and willgain no result. I can make this march, and make Georgia howl! Wehave on hand over eight thousand head of cattle and three millionrations of bread, but no corn. We can find plenty of forage in theinterior of the State. 

Meantime the rebel General Forrest had made a bold circuit inMiddle Tennessee, avoiding all fortified points, and breaking upthe railroad at several places; but, as usual, he did his work sohastily and carelessly that our engineers soon repaired thedamage--then, retreating before General Rousseau, he left the Stateof Tennessee, crossing the river near Florence, Alabama, and gotoff unharmed. 

On the 10th of October the enemy appeared south of the Etowah Riverat Rome, when I ordered all the armies to march to Kingston, rodemyself to Cartersville with the Twenty-third Corps (General Cox), and telegraphed from there to General Thomas at Nashville:

It looks to me as though Hood was bound for Tuscumbia. He is nowcrossing the Coosa River below Rome, looking west. Let me know ifyou can hold him with your forces now in Tennessee and the expectedreenforeements, as, in that event, you know what I propose to do. 

I will be at Kingston to-morrow. I think Rome is strong enough toresist any attack, and the rivers are all high. If he turns up bySummerville, I will get in behind him. 

And on the same day to General Grant, at City Point:

Hood is now crossing the Coosa, twelve miles below Rome, boundwest. If he passes over to the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, had I notbetter execute the plan of my letter sent you by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, todefend the State? He will have an ample force when thereenforcements ordered reach Nashville. 

I found General John E. Smith at Cartersville, and on the 11throde on to Kingston, where I had telegraphic communications in alldirections. 

From General Corse, at Rome, I learned that Hood's army haddisappeared, but in what direction he was still in doubt; and I wasso strongly convinced of the wisdom of my proposition to change thewhole tactics of the campaign, to leave Hood to General Thomas, andto march across Georgia for Savannah or Charleston, that I againtelegraphed to General Grant:

We cannot now remain on the defensive. With twenty-five thousandinfantry and the bold cavalry he has, Hood can constantly break myroad. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road and ofthe country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city;send back all my wounded and unserviceable men, and with myeffective army move through Georgia, smashing things to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will beforced to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive, I will beon the offensive. Instead of my guessing at what he means to do, he will have to guess at my plans. The difference in war would befully twenty-five per pent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, orthe month of the Chattahoochee (Appalachicola). Answer quick, as Iknow we will not have the telegraph long. 

I received no answer to this at the time, and the next day went onto Rome, where the news came that Hood had made his appearance atResaca, and had demanded the surrender of the place, which wascommanded by Colonel Weaver, reenforced by Brevet Brigadier-GeneralRaum. General Hood had evidently marched with rapidity up theChattooga Valley, by Summerville, Lafayette, Ship's Gap, andSnake-Creek Gap, and had with him his whole army, except a smallforce left behind to watch Rome. I ordered Resaca to be furtherreenforced by rail from Kingston, and ordered General Cox to make abold reconnoissance down the Coosa Valley, which captured andbrought into Rome some cavalrymen and a couple of field-guns, withtheir horses and men. At first I thought of interposing my wholearmy in the Chattooga Valley, so as to prevent Hood's escape south;but I saw at a glance that he did not mean to fight, and in thatevent, after damaging the road all he could, he would be likely toretreat eastward by Spring Place, which I did not want him to do;and, hearing from General Raum that he still held Resaca safe, andthat General Edward McCook had also got there with some cavalryreenforcements, I turned all the heads of columns for Resaca, viz. , General Cox's, from Rome; General Stanley's, from McGuire's; andGeneral Howard's, from Kingston. We all reached Resaca during thatnight, and the next morning (13th) learned that Hood's whole armyhad passed up the valley toward Dalton, burning the railroad anddoing all the damage possible. 

On the 12th he had demanded the surrender of Resaca in thefollowing letter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEEIN THE FIELD, October 12, 1861. 

To the officer commanding the United Stales Forces at Resaca, Georgia. 

SIR: I demand the immediate and unconditional surrender of the postand garrison under your command, and, should this be acceded to, all white officers and soldiers will be parolled in a few days. Ifthe place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be taken. Mostrespectfully, your obedient servant, J. B. HOOD, General. 

To this Colonel Weaver, then in command, replied:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, THIRD DIVISION, FIFTEENTH CORPSRESACA, GEORGIA, October 12, 1884. 

To General J. B. HOOD

Your communication of this date just received. In reply, I have tostate that I am somewhat surprised at the concluding paragraph, tothe effect that, if the place is carried by assault, no prisonerswill be taken. In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it, come and take it. 

I am, general, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, CLARK R. WEAVER, Commanding Officer. 

This brigade was very small, and as Hood's investment extendedonly from the Oostenaula, below the town, to the Connesauga above, he left open the approach from the south, which enabled GeneralRaum and the cavalry of Generals McCook and Watkins to reenforcefrom Kingston. In fact, Hood, admonished by his losses atAllatoona, did not attempt an assault at all, but limited hisattack to the above threat, and to some skirmishing, giving hisattention chiefly to the destruction of the railroad, which heaccomplished all the way up to Tunnel Hill, nearly twenty miles, capturing en route the regiment of black troops at Dalton(Johnson's Forty-fourth United States colored). On the 14th, Iturned General Howard through Snake-Creek Gap, and sent GeneralStanley around by Tilton, with orders to cross the mountain to thewest, so as to capture, if possible, the force left by the enemy inSnake-Creek Gap. We found this gap very badly obstructed by fallentimber, but got through that night, and the next day the main armywas at Villanow. On the morning of the 16th, the leading divisionof General Howard's column, commanded by General Charles R. Woods, carried Ship's Gap, taking prisoners part of the Twenty-fourthSouth Carolina Regiment, which had been left there to hold us incheck. 

The best information there obtained located Hood's army atLafayette, near which place I hoped to catch him and force him tobattle; but, by the time we had got enough troops across themountain at Ship's Gap, Hood had escaped down the valley of theChattooga, and all we could do was to follow him as closely aspossible. From Ship's Gap I dispatched couriers to Chattanooga, and received word back that General Schofield was there, endeavoring to cooperate with me, but Hood had broken up thetelegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication. GeneralSchofield did not reach me till the army had got down toGaylesville, about the 21st of October. 

It was at Ship's Gap that a courier brought me the cipher messagefrom General Halleck which intimated that the authorities inWashington were willing I should undertake the march across Georgiato the sea. The translated dispatch named "Horse-i-bar Sound" asthe point where the fleet would await my arrival. After much timeI construed it to mean, "Ossabaw Sound, " below Savannah, which wascorrect. 

On the 16th I telegraphed to General Thomas, at Nashville:

Send me Morgan's and Newton's old divisions. Reestablish the road, and I will follow Hood wherever he may go. I think he will move toBlue Mountain. We can maintain our men and animals on the country. 

General Thomas's reply was:

NASHVILLE, October 17, 1864--10. 30 a. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch from Ship's Gap, 5 p. M. Of the 16th, just received. Schofield, whom I placed in command of the two divisions (Wagner'sand Morgan's), was to move up Lookout Valley this A. M. , tointercept Hood, should he be marching for Bridgeport. I will orderhim to join you with the two divisions, and will reconstruct theroad as soon as possible. Will also reorganize the guards forposts and block-houses .... Mower and Wilson have arrived, and areon their way to join you. I hope you will adopt Grant's idea ofturning Wilson loose, rather than undertake the plan of a marchwith the whole force through Georgia to the sea, inasmuch asGeneral Grant cannot cooperate with you as at first arranged. 

GEORGE H. THOMAS, Major-General. 

So it is clear that at that date neither General Grant nor GeneralThomas heartily favored my proposed plan of campaign. On the sameday, I wrote to General Schofield at Chattanooga:

Hood is not at Dear Head Cove. We occupy Ship's Gap and Lafayette. Hood is moving south via Summerville, Alpine, and Gadsden. If heenters Tennessee, it will be to the west of Huntsville, but I thinkhe has given up all such idea. I want the road repaired toAtlanta; the sick and wounded men sent north of the Tennessee; myarmy recomposed; and I will then make the interior of Georgia feelthe weight of war. It is folly for us to be moving our armies onthe reports of scouts and citizens. We must maintain theoffensive. Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right--the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify GeneralThomas of these my views. We must follow Hood till he is beyondthe reach of mischief, and then resume the offensive. 

The correspondence between me and the authorities at Washington, aswell as with the several army commanders, given at length in thereport of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, is full on allthese points. 

After striking our road at Dalton, Hood was compelled to go on toChattanooga and Bridgeport, or to pass around by Decatur andabandon altogether his attempt to make us let go our hold ofAtlanta by attacking our communications. It was clear to me thathe had no intention to meet us in open battle, and the lightnessand celerity of his army convinced me that I could not possiblycatch him on a stern-chase. We therefore quietly followed him downthe Chattooga Valley to the neighborhood of Gadsden, but halted themain armies near the Coosa River, at the mouth of the Chattooga, drawing our supplies of corn and meat from the farms of thatcomparatively rich valley and of the neighborhood. 

General Slocum, in Atlanta, had likewise sent out, under strongescort, large trains of wagons to the east, and brought back corn, bacon, and all kinds of provisions, so that Hood's efforts to cutoff our supplies only reacted on his own people. So long as therailroads were in good order, our supplies came full and regularfrom the North; but when the enemy broke our railroads we wereperfectly justified in stripping the inhabitants of all they had. I remember well the appeal of a very respectable farmer against ourmen driving away his fine flock of sheep. I explained to him thatGeneral Hood had broken our railroad; that we were a strong, hungrycrowd, and needed plenty of food; that Uncle Sam was deeplyinterested in our continued health and would soon repair theseroads, but meantime we must eat; we preferred Illinois beef, butmutton would have to answer. Poor fellow! I don't believe he wasconvinced of the wisdom or wit of my explanation. Very soon afterreaching Lafayette we organized a line of supply from Chattanoogato Ringgold by rail, and thence by wagons to our camps aboutGaylesville. Meantime, also, Hood had reached the neighborhood ofGadsden, and drew his supplies from the railroad at Blue Mountain. 

On the 19th of October I telegraphed to General Halleck, atWashington:

Hood has retreated rapidly by all the roads leading south. Ouradvance columns are now at Alpine and Melville Post-Office. Ishall pursue him as far as Gaylesville. The enemy will not venturetoward Tennessee except around by Decatur. I propose to send theFourth Corps back to General Thomas, and leave him, with thatcorps, the garrisons, and new troops, to defend the line of theTennessee River; and with the rest I will push into the heart ofGeorgia and come out at Savannah, destroying all the railroads ofthe State. The break in our railroad at Big Shanty is almostrepaired, and that about Dalton should be done in ten days. Wefind abundance of forage in the country. 

On the same day I telegraphed to General L. C. Easton, chief-quartermaster, who had been absent on a visit to Missouri, but had got back to Chattanooga:

Go in person to superintend the repairs of the railroad, and makeall orders in my name that will expedite its completion. I want itfinished, to bring back from Atlanta to Chattanooga the sick andwounded men and surplus stores. On the 1st of November I wantnothing in front of Chattanooga except what we can use as food andclothing and haul in our wagons. There is plenty of corn in thecountry, and we only want forage for the posts. I allow ten daysfor all this to be done, by which time I expect to be at or nearAtlanta. 

I telegraphed also to General Amos Beckwith, chief-commissary inAtlanta, who was acting as chief-quartermaster during the absenceof General Easton:

Hood will escape me. I want to prepare for my big raid. On the1st of November I want nothing in Atlanta but what is necessary forwar. Send all trash to the rear at once, and have on hand thirtydays' food and but little forage. I propose to abandon Atlanta, and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to sally forth to ruinGeorgia and bring up on the seashore. Make all dispositionsaccordingly. I will go down the Coosa until I am sure that Hoodhas gone to Blue Mountain. 

On the 21st of October I reached Gaylesville, had my bivouac in anopen field back of the village, and remained there till the 28th. During that time General Schofield arrived, with the two divisionsof Generals Wagner (formerly Newton's) and Morgan, which werereturned to their respective corps (the Fourth and Fourteenth), andGeneral Schofield resumed his own command of the Army of the Ohio, then on the Coosa River, near Cedar Bluff. General Joseph A. Moweralso arrived, and was assigned to command a division in theSeventeenth Corps; and General J. H. Wilson came, having been sentfrom Virginia by General Grant, for the purpose of commanding allmy cavalry. I first intended to organize this cavalry into a corpsof three small divisions, to be commanded by General Wilson; butthe horses were well run down, and, at Wilson's instance, Iconcluded to retain only one division of four thousand five hundredmen, with selected horses, under General Kilpatrick, and to sendGeneral Wilson back with all the rest to Nashville, to bereorganized and to act under General Thomas in the defense ofTennessee. Orders to this effect were made on the 24th of October. 

General Grant, in designating General Wilson to command my cavalry, predicted that he would, by his personal activity, increase theeffect of that arm "fifty per cent. , " and he advised that he shouldbe sent south, to accomplish all that I had proposed to do with themain army; but I had not so much faith in cavalry as he had, andpreferred to adhere to my original intention of going myself with acompetent force. 

About this time I learned that General Beauregard had reachedHood's army at Gadsden; that, without assuming direct command ofthat army, he had authority from the Confederate Government todirect all its movements, and to call to his assistance the wholestrength of the South. His orders, on assuming command, were fullof alarm and desperation, dated:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE WESTOctober 17, 1864

In assuming command, at this critical juncture, of the MilitaryDivision of the West, I appeal to my countrymen, of all classes andsections, for their generous support. In assigning me to thisresponsible position, the President of the Confederate States hasextended to me the assurance of his earnest support. TheExecutives of your States meet me with similar expressions of theirdevotion to our cause. The noble army in the field, composed ofbrave men and gallant officers, are strangers to me, but I knowthey will do all that patriots can achieve..... 

The army of Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta. He can and mustbe driven from it. It is only for the good people of Georgia andsurrounding states to speak the word, and the work is done, we haveabundant provisions. There are men enough in the country, liableto and able for service, to accomplish the result..... 

My countrymen, respond to this call as you have done in days thatare past, and, with the blessing of a kind and overrulingProvidence, the enemy shall be driven from your soil. The securityof your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of abrutal foe shall be established soon, and be followed by apermanent and honorable peace. The claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor andpatriotism, summon us to the field. We cannot, dare not, will notfail to respond. Full of hope and confidence, I come to join youin your struggles, sharing your privations, and, with your braveand true men, to strike the blow that shall bring success to ourarms, triumph to our cause, and peace to our country! . . . 

G. T. BEAUREGARD, General. 

Notwithstanding this somewhat boastful order or appeal, GeneralBeauregard did not actually accompany General Hood on hisdisastrous march to Nashville, but took post at Corinth, Mississippi, to control the movement of his supplies and to watchme. 

At Gaylesville the pursuit of Hood by the army under my immediatecommand may be said to have ceased. During this pursuit, theFifteenth Corps was commanded by its senior major-general present, P. J. Osterhaus, in the absence of General John A. Logan; and theSeventeenth Corps was commanded by Brigadier-General T. E. G. Ransom, the senior officer present, in the absence of General FrankP. Blair. 

General Ransom was a young, most gallant, and promising officer, son of the Colonel Ransom who was killed at Chapultepec, in theMexican War. He had served with the Army of the Tennessee in 1862and 1863, at Vicksburg, where he was severely wounded. He was notwell at the time we started from Atlanta, but he insisted on goingalong with his command. His symptoms became more aggravated on themarch, and when we were encamped near Gaylesville, I visited him incompany with Surgeon John Moors, United States Army, who said thatthe case was one of typhoid fever, which would likely prove fatal. A few days after, viz. , the 28th, he was being carried on a littertoward Rome; and as I rode from Gaylesville to Rome, I passed himby the way, stopped, and spoke with him, but did not then supposehe was so near his end. The next day, however, his escort reachedRome, bearing his dead body. The officer in charge reported that, shortly after I had passed, his symptoms became so much worse thatthey stopped at a farmhouse by the road-side, where he died thatevening. His body was at once sent to Chicago for burial, and amonument has been ordered by the Society of the Army of theTennessee to be erected in his memory. 

On the 26th of October I learned that Hood's whole army had madeits appearance about Decatur, Alabama, and at once caused a strongreconnoissance to be made down the Coosa to near Gadsden, whichrevealed the truth that the enemy was gone except a small force ofcavalry, commanded by General Wheeler, which had been left to watchus. I then finally resolved on my future course, which was toleave Hood to be encountered by General Thomas, while I shouldcarry into full effect the long-contemplated project of marchingfor the sea-coast, and thence to operate toward Richmond. But itwas all-important to me and to our cause that General Thomas shouldhave an ample force, equal to any and every emergency. 

He then had at Nashville about eight or ten thousand new troops, and as many more civil employs of the Quartermaster's Department, which were not suited for the field, but would be most useful inmanning the excellent forts that already covered Nashville. AtChattanooga, he had General Steedman's division, about fivethousand men, besides garrisons for Chattanooga, Bridgeport, andStevenson; at Murfreesboro' he also had General Rousseau'sdivision, which was full five thousand strong, independent of thenecessary garrisons for the railroad. At Decatur and Huntsville, Alabama, was the infantry division of General R. S. Granger, estimated at four thousand; and near Florence, Alabama, watchingthe crossings of the Tennessee, were General Edward Hatch'sdivision of cavalry, four thousand; General Croxton's brigade, twenty-five hundred; and Colonel Capron's brigade, twelve hundred;besides which, General J. H. Wilson had collected in Nashvilleabout ten thousand dismounted cavalry, for which he was rapidlycollecting the necessary horses for a remount. All theseaggregated about forty-five thousand men. General A. J. Smith atthat time was in Missouri, with the two divisions of the SixteenthCorps which had been diverted to that quarter to assist GeneralRosecrans in driving the rebel General Price out of Missouri. Thisobject had been accomplished, and these troops, numbering fromeight to ten thousand, had been ordered to Nashville. To these Iproposed at first to add only the Fourth Corps (General Stanley), fifteen thousand; and that corps was ordered from Gaylesville tomarch to Chattanooga, and thence report for orders to GeneralThomas; but subsequently, on the 30th of October, at Rome, Georgia, learning from General Thomas that the new troops promised byGeneral Grant were coming forward very slowly, I concluded tofurther reenforce him by General Schofield's corps (Twenty-third), twelve thousand, which corps accordingly marched for Resaca, andthere took the cars for Chattanooga. I then knew that GeneralThomas would have an ample force with which to encounter GeneralHood anywhere in the open field, besides garrisons to secure therailroad to his rear and as far forward as Chattanooga. And, moreover, I was more than convinced that he would have ample timefor preparation; for, on that very day, General R. S. Granger hadtelegraphed me from Decatur, Alabama:

I omitted to mention another reason why Hood will go to Tusomnbiabefore crossing the Tennessee River. He was evidently out ofsupplies. His men were all grumbling; the first thing theprisoners asked for was something to eat. Hood could not get anything if he should cross this side of Rogersville. 

I knew that the country about Decatur and Tuscumbia, Alabama, wasbare of provisions, and inferred that General Hood would have todraw his supplies, not only of food, but of stores, clothing, andammunition, from Mobile, Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama, by therailroad around by Meridian and Corinth, Mississippi, which we hadmost effectually disabled the previous winter. 

General Hood did not make a serious attack on Decatur, but hungaround it from October 26th to the 30th, when he drew off andmarched for a point on the south side of the Tennessee River, opposite Florence, where he was compelled to remain nearly a month, to collect the necessary supplies for his contemplated invasion ofTennessee and Kentucky. 

The Fourth Corps (Stanley) had already reached Chattanooga, and hadbeen transported by rail to Pulaski, Tennessee; and General Thomasordered General Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, toColumbia, Tennessee, a place intermediate between Hood (then on theTennessee River, opposite Florence) and Forrest, oppositeJohnsonville. 

On the 31st of October General Croxton, of the cavalry, reportedthat the enemy had crossed the Tennessee River four miles aboveFlorence, and that he had endeavored to stop him, but withoutsuccess. Still, I was convinced that Hood's army was in nocondition to march for Nashville, and that a good deal of furtherdelay might reasonably be counted on. I also rested with muchconfidence on the fact that the Tennessee River below Muscle Shoalswas strongly patrolled by gunboats, and that the reach of the riverabove Muscle Shoals, from Decatur as high up as our railroad atBridgeport, was also guarded by gunboats, so that Hood, to crossover, would be compelled to select a point inaccessible to thesegunboats. He actually did choose such a place, at the oldrailroad-piers, four miles above Florence, Alabama, which is belowMuscle Shoals and above Colbert Shoals. 

On the 31st of October Forrest made his appearance on the TennesseeRiver opposite Johnsonville (whence a new railroad led toNashville), and with his cavalry and field pieces actually crippledand captured two gunboats with five of our transports, a feat ofarms which, I confess, excited my admiration. 

There is no doubt that the month of October closed to us lookingdecidedly squally; but, somehow, I was sustained in the belief thatin a very few days the tide would turn. 

On the 1st of November I telegraphed very fully to General Grant, at City Point, who must have been disturbed by the wild rumors thatfilled the country, and on the 2d of November received (at Rome)this dispatch:

CITY POINT, November 1, 1864--6 P. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN:

Do you not think it advisable, now that Hood has gone so far north, to entirely ruin him before starting on your proposed campaign?With Hood's army destroyed, you can go where you please withimpunity. I believed and still believe, if you had started southwhile Hood was in the neighborhood of you, he would have beenforced to go after you. Now that he is far away he might look uponthe chase as useless, and he will go in one direction while you arepushing in the other. If you can see a chance of destroying Hood'sarmy, attend to that first, and make your other move secondary. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

My answer is dated

ROME, GEORGIA, November 2, 1864. Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:

Your dispatch is received. If I could hope to overhaul Hood, Iwould turn against him with my whole force; then he would retreatto the south west, drawing me as a decoy away from Georgia, whichis his chief object. If he ventures north of the Tennessee River, Imay turn in that direction, and endeavor to get below him on hisline of retreat; but thus far he has not gone above the TennesseeRiver. General Thomas will have a force strong enough to preventhis reaching any country in which we have an interest; and he hasorders, if Hood turns to follow me, to push for Selma, Alabama. Nosingle army can catch Hood, and I am convinced the best resultswill follow from our defeating Jeff. Davis's cherished plea ofmaking me leave Georgia by manoeuvring. Thus far I have confinedmy efforts to thwart this plan, and have reduced baggage so that Ican pick up and start in any direction; but I regard the pursuit ofHood as useless. Still, if he attempts to invade Middle Tennessee, I will hold Decatur, and be prepared to move in that direction;but, unless I let go of Atlanta, my force will not be equal to his. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

By this date, under the intelligent and energetic action of ColonelW. W. Wright, and with the labor of fifteen hundred men, therailroad break of fifteen miles about Dalton was repaired so far asto admit of the passage of cars, and I transferred my headquartersto Kingston as more central; and from that place, on the same day(November 2d), again telegraphed to General Grant:

KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 2, 1884. Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia:If I turn back, the whole effect of my campaign will be lost. By mymovements I have thrown Beauregard (Hood) well to the west, andThomas will have ample time and sufficient troops to hold him untilthe reenforcements from Missouri reach him. We have now amplesupplies at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and can stand a month'sinterruption to our communications. I do not believe theConfederate army can reach our railroad-lines except bycavalry-raids, and Wilson will have cavalry enough to checkmatethem. I am clearly of opinion that the best results will follow mycontemplated movement through Georgia. W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

That same day I received, in answer to the Rome dispatch, thefollowing:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 2, 1864--11. 30 a. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of 9 A. M. Yesterday is just received. I dispatchedyou the same date, advising that Hood's army, now that it hadworked so far north, ought to be looked upon now as the "object. "With the force, however, that you have left with General Thomas, hemust be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. 

I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to followHood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General, This was the first time that General Grant ordered the "march tothe sea, " and, although many of his warm friends and admirersinsist that he was the author and projector of that march, and thatI simply executed his plans, General Grant has never, in myopinion, thought so or said so. The truth is fully given in anoriginal letter of President Lincoln, which I received at Savannah, Georgia, and have at this instant before me, every word of which isin his own familiar handwriting. It is dated--

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1864. 

When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I wasanxious, if not fearful; but, feeling that you were the betterjudge, and remembering "nothing risked, nothing gained, " I did notinterfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is allyours; for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce;and, taking the work of General Thomas into account, as it shouldbe taken, it is indeed a great success. Not only does it affordthe obvious and immediate military advantages, but, in showing tothe world that your army could be divided, putting the strongerpart to an important new service, and yet leaving enough tovanquish the old opposing force of the whole, Hood's army, itbrings those who sat in darkness to see a great light. But whatnext? I suppose it will be safer if I leave General Grant andyourself to decide. 

A. LINCOLN

Of course, this judgment; made after the event, was extremelyflattering and was all I ever expected, a recognition of the truthand of its importance. I have often been asked, by well-meaningfriends, when the thought of that march first entered my mind. Iknew that an army which had penetrated Georgia as far as Atlantacould not turn back. It must go ahead, but when, how, and where, depended on many considerations. As soon as Hood had shiftedacross from Lovejoy's to Palmetto, I saw the move in my "mind'seye;" and, after Jeff. Davis's speech at Palmetto, of September26th, I was more positive in my conviction, but was in doubt as tothe time and manner. When General Hood first struck our railroadabove Marietta, we were not ready, and I was forced to watch hismovements further, till he had "carromed" off to the west ofDecatur. Then I was perfectly convinced, and had no longer ashadow of doubt. The only possible question was as to Thomas'sstrength and ability to meet Hood in the open field. I did notsuppose that General Hood, though rash, would venture to attackfortified places like Allatoona, Resaca, Decatur, and Nashville;but he did so, and in so doing he played into our hands perfectly. 

On the 2d of November I was at Kingston, Georgia, and my fourcorps--the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth--withone division of cavalry, were strung from Rome to Atlanta. Ourrailroads and telegraph had been repaired, and I deliberatelyprepared for the march to Savannah, distant three hundred milesfrom Atlanta. All the sick and wounded men had been sent back byrail to Chattanooga; all our wagon-trains had been carefullyoverhauled and loaded, so as to be ready to start on an hour'snotice, and there was no serious enemy in our front. 

General Hood remained still at Florence, Alabama, occupying bothbanks of the Tennessee River, busy in collecting shoes and clothingfor his men, and the necessary ammunition and stores with which toinvade Tennessee, most of which had to come from Mobile, Selma, andMontgomery, Alabama, over railroads that were still broken. Beauregard was at Corinth, hastening forward these necessarypreparations. 

General Thomas was at Nashville, with Wilson's dismounted cavalryand a mass of new troops and quartermaster's employs amplysufficient to defend the place. The Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, under Generals Stanley and Schofield were posted at Pulaski, Tennessee, and the cavalry of Hatch, Croxton, and Capron, wereabout Florence, watching Hood. Smith's (A. J. ) two divisions ofthe Sixteenth Corps were still in Missouri, but were reported asready to embark at Lexington for the Cumberland River andNashville. Of course, General Thomas saw that on him would likelyfall the real blow, and was naturally anxious. He still keptGranger's division at Decatur, Rousseau's at Murfreesboro', andSteedman's at Chattanooga, with strong railroad guards at all theessential points intermediate, confident that by means of this veryrailroad he could make his concentration sooner than Hood couldpossibly march up from Florence. 

Meantime, General F. P. Blair had rejoined his corps (Seventeenth), and we were receiving at Kingston recruits and returnedfurlough-men, distributing them to their proper companies. Paymasters had come down to pay off our men before their departure toa new sphere of action, and commissioners were also on hand from theseveral States to take the vote of our men in the presidentialelection then agitating the country. 

On the 6th of November, at Kingston, I wrote and telegraphed toGeneral Grant, reviewing the whole situation, gave him my full planof action, stated that I was ready to march as soon as the electionwas over, and appointed November 10th as the day for starting. Onthe 8th I received this dispatch:

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, November 7, 1864-10. 30 P. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of this evening received. I see no present reasonfor changing your plan. Should any arise, you will see it, or if Ido I will inform you. I think everything here is favorable now. Great good fortune attend you! I believe you will be eminentlysuccessful, and, at worst, can only make a march less fruitful ofresults than hoped for. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

Meantime trains of cars were whirling by, carrying to the rear animmense amount of stores which had accumulated at Atlanta, and atthe other stations along the railroad; and General Steedman hadcome down to Kingston, to take charge of the final evacuation andwithdrawal of the several garrisons below Chattanooga. 

On the 10th of November the movement may be said to have fairlybegun. All the troops designed for the campaign were ordered tomarch for Atlanta, and General Corse, before evacuating his post atRome, was ordered to burn all the mills, factories, etc. , etc. , that could be useful to the enemy, should he undertake to pursueus, or resume military possession of the country. This was done onthe night of the 10th, and next day Corse reached Kingston. On the11th General Thomas and I interchanged full dispatches. He hadheard of the arrival of General A. J. Smith's two divisions atPaducah, which would surely reach Nashville much sooner thanGeneral Hood could possibly do from Florence, so that he wasperfectly satisfied with his share of the army. 

On the 12th, with a full staff, I started from Kingston forAtlanta; and about noon of that day we reached Cartersville, andsat on the edge of a porch to rest, when the telegraph operator, Mr. Van Valkenburg, or Eddy, got the wire down from the poles tohis lap, in which he held a small pocket instrument. Calling"Chattanooga, " he received this message from General Thomas, dated--

NASHVILLE, November 12, 1884--8. 80 A. M. 

Major-General SHERMAN:

Your dispatch of twelve o'clock last night is received. I have nofears that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and, if he attemptsto follow you, I will follow him as far as possible. If he doesnot follow you, I will then thoroughly organize my troops, andbelieve I shall have men enough to ruin him unless he gets out ofthe way very rapidly. 

The country of Middle Alabama, I learn, is teeming with suppliesthis year, which will be greatly to our advantage. I have noadditional news to report from the direction of Florence. I am now convinced that the greater part of Beauregard's army isnear Florence and Tuscumbia, and that you will have at least aclear road before you for several days, and that your success willfully equal your expectations. 

George H. THOMAS, Major-General. 

I answered simply: "Dispatch received--all right. " About thatinstant of time, some of our men burnt a bridge, which severed thetelegraph-wire, and all communication with the rear ceasedthenceforth. 

As we rode on toward Atlanta that night, I remember the railroad-trains going to the rear with a furious speed; the engineers andthe few men about the trains waving us an affectionate adieu. Itsurely was a strange event--two hostile armies marching in oppositedirections, each in the full belief that it was achieving a finaland conclusive result in a great war; and I was strongly inspiredwith the feeling that the movement on our part was a direct attackupon the rebel army and the rebel capital at Richmond, though afull thousand miles of hostile country intervened, and that, forbetter or worse, it would end the war. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

THE MARCH TO THE SEA FROM ATLANTA TO SAVANNAH. 

NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER, 1864. 

On the 12th of November the railroad and telegraph communicationswith the rear were broken, and the army stood detached from allfriends, dependent on its own resources and supplies. No time wasto be lost; all the detachments were ordered to march rapidly forAtlanta, breaking up the railroad en route, and generally to sodamage the country as to make it untenable to the enemy. By the14th all the troops had arrived at or near Atlanta, and were, according to orders, grouped into two wings, the right and left, commanded respectively by Major-Generals O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum, both comparatively young men, but educated and experiencedofficers, fully competent to their command. 

The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps, Major-GeneralP. J. Osterhaus commanding, and the Seventeenth Corps, Major-General Frank P. Blair commanding. 

The left wing was composed of the Fourteenth Corps, Major-GeneralJefferson C. Davis commanding, and the Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. Williams commanding. 

The Fifteenth Corps had four divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, W. B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. Gorse. 

The Seventeenth Corps had three divisions, commanded byMajor-General J. A. Mower, and Brigadier-Generals M. D. Leggettand Giles A. Smith. 

The Fourteenth Corps had three divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals W. P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and A. Baird. 

The Twentieth Corps had also three divisions, commanded byBrigadier-Generals N. J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and W. T. Ward. 

The cavalry division was held separate, subject to my own orders. It was commanded by Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, and wascomposed of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray, ofKentucky, and Smith D. Atkins, of Illinois. 

The strength of the army, as officially reported, is given in thefollowing tables, and shows an aggregate of fifty-five thousandthree hundred and twenty-nine infantry, five thousand andsixty-three cavalry, and eighteen hundred and twelve artillery inall, sixty-two thousand two hundred and four officers and men. 

The most extraordinary efforts had been made to purge this army ofnon-combatants and of sick men, for we knew well that there was tobe no place of safety save with the army itself; our wagons wereloaded with ammunition, provisions, and forage, and we could illafford to haul even sick men in the ambulances, so that all on thisexhibit may be assumed to have been able-bodied, experiencedsoldiers, well armed, well equipped and provided, as far as humanforesight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, andvigorous action. 

The two general orders made for this march appear to me, even atthis late day, so clear, emphatic, and well-digested, that noaccount of that historic event is perfect without them, and I givethem entire, even at the seeming appearance of repetition; and, though they called for great sacrifice and labor on the part of theofficers and men, I insist that these orders were obeyed as well asany similar orders ever were, by an army operating wholly in anenemy's country, and dispersed, as we necessarily were, during thesubsequent period of nearly six months. 

[Special Field Orders, No. 119. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 8, 1864

The general commanding deems it proper at this time to inform theofficers and men of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, andTwentieth Corps, that he has organized them into an army for aspecial purpose, well known to the War Department and to GeneralGrant. It is sufficient for you to know that it involves adeparture from our present base, and a long and difficult march toa new one. All the chances of war have been considered andprovided for, as far as human sagacity can. All he asks of you isto maintain that discipline, patience, and courage, which havecharacterized you in the past; and he hopes, through you, to strikea blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in producingwhat we all so much desire, his complete overthrow. Of all things, the most important is, that the men, during marches and in camp, keep their places and do not scatter about as stragglers orforagers, to be picked up by a hostile people in detail. It isalso of the utmost importance that our wagons should not be loadedwith any thing but provisions and ammunition. All surplusservants, noncombatants, and refugees, should now go to the rear, and none should be encouraged to encumber us on the march. At somefuture time we will be able to provide for the poor whites andblacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they are nowsuffering. With these few simple cautions, he hopes to lead you toachievements equal in importance to those of the past. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

[Special Field Orders, No. 120. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, KINGSTON, GEORGIA, November 9, 1864

1. For the purpose of military operations, this army is dividedinto two wings viz. :

The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, composed ofthe Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the left wing, Major-GeneralH. W. Slocum commanding, composed of the Fourteenth and TwentiethCorps. 

2. The habitual order of march will be, wherever practicable, byfour roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging atpoints hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive specialorders from the commander-in-chief. 

3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each corps willhave its ammunition-train and provision-train, distributedhabitually as follows: Behind each regiment should follow one wagonand one ambulance; behind each brigade should follow a dueproportion of ammunition-wagons, provision-wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each corps commander should change this order ofmarch, by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered bywheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 a. M. , andmake about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders. 

4. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good andsufficient foraging party, under the command of one or morediscreet officers, who will gather, near the route traveled, cornor forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, orwhatever is needed by the command, aiming at all times to keep inthe wagons at least ten days' provisions for his command, and threedays' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of theinhabitants, or commit any trespass; but, during a halt or camp, they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and othervegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. Toregular foraging-parties must be intrusted the gathering ofprovisions and forage, at any distance from the road traveled. 

6. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to destroymills, houses, cotton-gins, etc. ; and for them this generalprinciple is laid down:

In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, nodestruction of each property should be permitted; but shouldguerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should theinhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifestlocal hostility, then army commanders should order and enforce adevastation more or less relentless, according to the measure ofsuch hostility. 

6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc. , belonging to theinhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely andwithout limit; discriminating, however, between the rich, who areusually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually neutral orfriendly. Foraging-parties may also take mules or horses, toreplace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve aspack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, ofwhatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive orthreatening language, and may, where the officer in command thinksproper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts;and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonableportion for their maintenance, 7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to theseveral columns may be taken along; but each army commander willbear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms. 

8. The organization, at once, of a good pioneer battalion for eacharmy corps, composed if possible of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance-guard, repair roads anddouble them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayedafter reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should practisethe habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, marchingtheir troops on one side, and instruct their troops to assistwagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams. 

9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief-engineer, will assign to each wing ofthe army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized; and thecommanders thereof will see to their being properly protected atall times. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

The greatest possible attention had been given to the artillery andwagon trains. The number of guns had been reduced to sixty-five, or about one gun to each thousand men, and these were generally inbatteries of four guns each. 

Each gun, caisson, and forges was drawn by four teams of horses. We had in all about twenty-five hundred wagons, with teams of sixmules to each, and six hundred ambulances, with two horses to each. The loads were made comparatively light, about twenty-five hundredpounds net; each wagon carrying in addition the forage needed byits own team: Each soldier carried on his person forty rounds ofammunition, and in the wagons were enough cartridges to make upabout two hundred rounds per man, and in like manner two hundredrounds of assorted ammunition were carried for each gun. 

The wagon-trains were divided equally between the four corps, sothat each had about eight hundred wagons, and these usually on themarch occupied five miles or more of road. Each corps commandermanaged his own train; and habitually the artillery and wagons hadthe road, while the men, with the exception of the advance and rearguards, pursued paths improvised by the aide of the wagons, unlessthey were forced to use a bridge or causeway in common. 

I reached Atlanta during the afternoon of the 14th, and found thatall preparations had been made-Colonel Beckwith, chief commissary, reporting one million two hundred thousand rations in possession ofthe troops, which was about twenty days' supply, and he had on handa good supply of beef-cattle to be driven along on the hoof. Offorage, the supply was limited, being of oats and corn enough forfive days, but I knew that within that time we would reach acountry well stocked with corn, which had been gathered and storedin cribs, seemingly for our use, by Governor Brown's militia. 

Colonel Poe, United States Engineers, of my staff, had been busy inhis special task of destruction. He had a large force at work, hadleveled the great depot, round house, and the machine-shops of theGeorgia Railroad, and had applied fire to the wreck. One of thesemachine-shops had been used by the rebels as an arsenal, and in itwere stored piles of shot and shell, some of which proved to beloaded, and that night was made hideous by the bursting of shells, whose fragments came uncomfortably, near Judge Lyon's house, inwhich I was quartered. The fire also reached the block of storesnear the depot, and the heart of the city was in flames all night, but the fire did not reach the parts of Atlanta where thecourt-house was, or the great mass of dwelling houses. 

The march from Atlanta began on the morning of November 15th, theright wing and cavalry following the railroad southeast towardJonesboro', and General Slocum with the Twentieth Corps leading offto the east by Decatur and Stone Mountain, toward Madison. Thesewere divergent lines, designed to threaten both Mason and Augustaat the same time, so as to prevent a concentration at our intendeddestination, or "objective, " Milledgeville, the capital of Georgia, distant southeast about one hundred miles. The time allowed eachcolumn for reaching Milledgeville was seven days. I remained inAtlanta during the 15th with the Fourteenth Corps, and therear-guard of the right wing, to complete the loading of the trains, and the destruction of the buildings of Atlanta which could beconverted to hostile uses, and on the morning of the 16th startedwith my personal staff, a company of Alabama cavalry, commanded byLieutenant Snelling, and an infantry company, commanded by LieutenantMcCrory, which guarded our small train of wagons. 

My staff was then composed of Major L. M. Dayton, aide-de-camp andacting adjutant-general, Major J. C. McCoy, and Major J. C. Audenried, aides. Major Ward Nichols had joined some weeks beforeat Gaylesville, Alabama, and was attached as an actingaide-de-camp. Also Major Henry Hitchcock had joined at the sametime as judge-advocate. Colonel Charles Ewing wasinspector-general, and Surgeon John Moore medical director. Theseconstituted our mess. We had no tents, only the flies, with whichwe nightly made bivouacs with the assistance of the abundantpine-boughs, which made excellent shelter, as well as beds. 

Colonel L. C. Easton was chief-quartermaster; Colonel AmosBeckwith, chief-commissary; Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer; andColonel T. G. Baylor, chief of ordnance. These invariably rodewith us during the day, but they had a separate camp and mess atnight. 

General William F. Barry had been chief of artillery in theprevious campaign, but at Kingston his face was so swollen witherysipelas that he was reluctantly compelled to leave us for therear; and he could not, on recovering, rejoin us till we hadreached Savannah. 

About 7 a. M. Of November 16th we rode out of Atlanta by the Decaturroad, filled by the marching troops and wagons of the FourteenthCorps; and reaching the hill, just outside of the old rebel works, we naturally paused to look back upon the scenes of our pastbattles. We stood upon the very ground whereon was fought thebloody battle of July 22d, and could see the copse of wood whereMcPherson fell. Behind us lay Atlanta, smouldering and in ruins, the black smoke rising high in air, and hanging like a pall overthe ruined city. Away off in the distance, on the McDonough road, was the rear of Howard's column, the gun-barrels glistening in thesun, the white-topped wagons stretching away to the south; andright before us the Fourteenth Corps, marching steadily andrapidly, with a cheery look and swinging pace, that made light ofthe thousand miles that lay between us and Richmond. Some band, byaccident, struck up the anthem of "John Brown's soul goes marchingon;" the men caught up the strain, and never before or since have Iheard the chorus of "Glory, glory, hallelujah!" done with morespirit, or in better harmony of time and place. 

Then we turned our horses' heads to the east; Atlanta was soon lostbehind the screen of trees, and became a thing of the past. Aroundit clings many a thought of desperate battle, of hope and fear, that now seem like the memory of a dream; and I have never seen theplace since. The day was extremely beautiful, clear sunlight, withbracing air, and an unusual feeling of exhilaration seemed topervade all minds--a feeling of something to come, vague andundefined, still full of venture and intense interest. Even thecommon soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called outto me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant iswaiting for us at Richmond!" Indeed, the general sentiment wasthat we were marching for Richmond, and that there we should endthe war, but how and when they seemed to care not; nor did theymeasure the distance, or count the cost in life, or bother theirbrains about the great rivers to be crossed, and the food requiredfor man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way. There was a"devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men, that made mefeel the full load of responsibility, for success would be acceptedas a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this "march" wouldbe adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool. I had no purposeto march direct for Richmond by way of Augusta and Charlotte, butalways designed to reach the sea-coast first at Savannah or PortRoyal, South Carolina, and even kept in mind the alternative ofPensacola. 

The first night out we camped by the road-side near Lithonia. Stone Mountain, a mass of granite, was in plain view, cut out inclear outline against the blue sky; the whole horizon was luridwith the bonfires of rail-ties, and groups of men all night werecarrying the heated rails to the nearest trees, and bending themaround the trunks. Colonel Poe had provided tools for ripping upthe rails and twisting them when hot; but the best and easiest wayis the one I have described, of heating the middle of theiron-rails on bonfires made of the cross-ties, and then windingthem around a telegraph-pole or the trunk of some convenientsapling. I attached much importance to this destruction of therailroad, gave it my own personal attention, and made reiteratedorders to others on the subject. 

The next day we passed through the handsome town of Covington, thesoldiers closing up their ranks, the color-bearers unfurling theirflags, and the bands striking up patriotic airs. The white peoplecame out of their houses to behold the sight, spite of their deephatred of the invaders, and the negroes were simply frantic withjoy. Whenever they heard my name, they clustered about my horse, shouted and prayed in their peculiar style, which had a naturaleloquence that would have moved a stone. I have witnessedhundreds, if not thousands, of such scenes; and can now see a poorgirl, in the very ecstasy of the Methodist "shout, " hugging thebanner of one of the regiments, and jumping up to the "feet ofJesus. "

I remember, when riding around by a by-street in Covington, toavoid the crowd that followed the marching column, that some onebrought me an invitation to dine with a sister of Sam. Anderson, who was a cadet at West Point with me; but the messenger reached meafter we had passed the main part of the town. I asked to beexcused, and rode on to a place designated for camp, at thecrossing of the Ulcofauhachee River, about four miles to the eastof the town. Here we made our bivouac, and I walked up to aplantation-house close by, where were assembled many negroes, amongthem an old, gray-haired man, of as fine a head as I ever saw. Iasked him if he understood about the war and its progress. He saidhe did; that he had been looking for the "angel of the Lord" eversince he was knee-high, and, though we professed to be fighting forthe Union, he supposed that slavery was the cause, and that oursuccess was to be his freedom. I asked him if all the negro slavescomprehended this fact, and he said they surely did. I thenexplained to him that we wanted the slaves to remain where theywere, and not to load us down with useless mouths, which would eatup the food needed for our fighting men; that our success was theirassured freedom; that we could receive a few of their young, heartymen as pioneers; but that, if they followed us in swarms of old andyoung, feeble and helpless, it would simply load us down andcripple us in our great task. I think Major Henry Hitchcock waswith me on that occasion, and made a note of the conversation, andI believe that old man spread this message to the slaves, which wascarried from mouth to mouth, to the very end of our journey, andthat it in part saved us from the great danger we incurred ofswelling our numbers so that famine would have attended ourprogress. It was at this very plantation that a soldier passed mewith a ham on his musket, a jug of sorghum-molasses under his arm, and a big piece of honey in his hand, from which he was eating, and, catching my eye, he remarked sotto voce and carelessly to acomrade, "Forage liberally on the country, " quoting from my generalorders. On this occasion, as on many others that fell under mypersonal observation, I reproved the man, explained that foragingmust be limited to the regular parties properly detailed, and thatall provisions thus obtained must be delivered to the regularcommissaries, to be fairly distributed to the men who kept theirranks. 

From Covington the Fourteenth Corps (Davis's), with which I wastraveling, turned to the right for Milledgeville, via Shady Dale. General Slocum was ahead at Madison, with the Twentieth Corps, having torn up the railroad as far as that place, and thence hadsent Geary's division on to the Oconee, to burn the bridges acrossthat stream, when this corps turned south by Eatonton, forMilledgeville, the common "objective" for the first stage of the"march. " We found abundance of corn, molasses, meal, bacon, andsweet-potatoes. We also took a good many cows and oxen, and alarge number of mules. In all these the country was quite rich, never before having been visited by a hostile army; the recent crophad been excellent, had been just gathered and laid by for thewinter. As a rule, we destroyed none, but kept our wagons full, and fed our teams bountifully. 

The skill and success of the men in collecting forage was one ofthe features of this march. Each brigade commander had authorityto detail a company of foragers, usually about fifty men, with oneor two commissioned officers selected for their boldness andenterprise. This party would be dispatched before daylight with aknowledge of the intended day's march and camp; would proceed onfoot five or six miles from the route traveled by their brigade, and then visit every plantation and farm within range. They wouldusually procure a wagon or family carriage, load it with bacon, corn-meal, turkeys, chickens, ducks, and every thing that could beused as food or forage, and would then regain the main road, usually in advance of their train. When this came up, they woulddeliver to the brigade commissary the supplies thus gathered by theway. Often would I pass these foraging-parties at the roadside, waiting for their wagons to come up, and was amused at theirstrange collections--mules, horses, even cattle, packed with oldsaddles and loaded with hams, bacon, bags of cornmeal, and poultryof every character and description. Although this foraging wasattended with great danger and hard work, there seemed to be acharm about it that attracted the soldiers, and it was a privilegeto be detailed on such a party. Daily they returned mounted on allsorts of beasts, which were at once taken from them andappropriated to the general use; but the next day they would startout again on foot, only to repeat the experience of the day before. No doubt, many acts of pillage, robbery, and violence, werecommitted by these parties of foragers, usually called "bummers;"for I have since heard of jewelry taken from women, and the plunderof articles that never reached the commissary; but these acts wereexceptional and incidental. I never heard of any cases of murderor rape; and no army could have carried along sufficient food andforage for a march of three hundred miles; so that foraging in someshape was necessary. The country was sparsely settled, with nomagistrates or civil authorities who could respond to requisitions, as is done in all the wars of Europe; so that this system offoraging was simply indispensable to our success. By it our menwere well supplied with all the essentials of life and health, while the wagons retained enough in case of unexpected delay, andour animals were well fed. Indeed, when we reached Savannah, thetrains were pronounced by experts to be the finest in flesh andappearance ever seen with any army. 

Habitually each corps followed some main road, and the foragers, being kept out on the exposed flank, served all the military usesof flankers. The main columns gathered, by the roads traveled, much forage and food, chiefly meat, corn, and sweet-potatoes, andit was the duty of each division and brigade quartermaster to fillhis wagons as fast as the contents were issued to the troops. Thewagon-trains had the right to the road always, but each wagon wasrequired to keep closed up, so as to leave no gaps in the column. If for any purpose any wagon or group of wagons dropped out ofplace, they had to wait for the rear. And this was always dreaded, for each brigade commander wanted his train up at camp as soonafter reaching it with his men as possible. 

I have seen much skill and industry displayed by thesequarter-masters on the march, in trying to load their wagons withcorn and fodder by the way without losing their place in column. They would, while marching, shift the loads of wagons, so as to havesix or ten of them empty. Then, riding well ahead, they would securepossession of certain stacks of fodder near the road, or cribs ofcorn, leave some men in charge, then open fences and a road back fora couple of miles, return to their trains, divert the empty wagonsout of column, and conduct them rapidly to their forage, load up andregain their place in column without losing distance. On one occasionI remember to have seen ten or a dozen wagons thus loaded with cornfrom two or three full cribs, almost without halting. These cribswere built of logs, and roofed. The train-guard, by a lever, hadraised the whole side of the crib a foot or two; the wagons droveclose alongside, and the men in the cribs, lying on their backs, kicked out a wagon-load of corn in the time I have taken to describeit. 

In a well-ordered and well-disciplined army, these things might bedeemed irregular, but I am convinced that the ingenuity of theseyounger officers accomplished many things far better than I couldhave ordered, and the marches were thus made, and the distanceswere accomplished, in the most admirable way. Habitually westarted from camp at the earliest break of dawn, and usuallyreached camp soon after noon. The marches varied from ten tofifteen miles a day, though sometimes on extreme flanks it wasnecessary to make as much as twenty, but the rate of travel wasregulated by the wagons; and, considering the nature of the roads, fifteen miles per day was deemed the limit. 

The pontoon-trains were in like manner distributed in about equalproportions to the four corps, giving each a section of about ninehundred feet. The pontoons were of the skeleton pattern, withcotton-canvas covers, each boat, with its proportion of balks andcheeses, constituting a load for one wagon. By uniting two suchsections together, we could make a bridge of eighteen hundred feet, enough for any river we had to traverse; but habitually the leadingbrigade would, out of the abundant timber, improvise a bridgebefore the pontoon-train could come up, unless in the cases ofrivers of considerable magnitude, such as the Ocmulgee, Oconee, Ogeechee, Savannah, etc. 

On the 20th of November I was still with the Fourteenth Corps, nearEatonton Factory, waiting to hear of the Twentieth Corps; and onthe 21st we camped near the house of a man named Mann; the nextday, about 4 p. M. , General Davis had halted his head of column on awooded ridge, overlooking an extensive slope of cultivated country, about ten miles short of Milledgeville, and was deploying histroops for camp when I got up. There was a high, raw wind blowing, and I asked him why he had chosen so cold and bleak a position. Heexplained that he had accomplished his full distance for the day, and had there an abundance of wood and water. He explained furtherthat his advance-guard was a mile or so ahead; so I rode on, askinghim to let his rear division, as it came up, move some distanceahead into the depression or valley beyond. Riding on somedistance to the border of a plantation, I turned out of the mainroad into a cluster of wild-plum bushes, that broke the force ofthe cold November wind, dismounted, and instructed the staff topick out the place for our camp. 

The afternoon was unusually raw and cold. My orderly was at handwith his invariable saddle-bags, which contained a change ofunder-clothing, my maps, a flask of whiskey, and bunch of cigars. Taking a drink and lighting a cigar, I walked to a row ofnegro-huts close by, entered one and found a soldier or two warmingthemselves by a wood-fire. I took their place by the fire, intending to wait there till our wagons had got up, and a camp madefor the night. I was talking to the old negro woman, when some onecame and explained to me that, if I would come farther down theroad, I could find a better place. So I started on foot, and foundon the main road a good double-hewed-log house, in one room ofwhich Colonel Poe, Dr. Moore, and others, had started a fire. Isent back orders to the "plum-bushes" to bring our horses andsaddles up to this house, and an orderly to conduct our headquarterwagons to the same place. In looking around the room, I saw asmall box, like a candle-box, marked "Howell Cobb, " and, oninquiring of a negro, found that we were at the plantation ofGeneral Howell Cobb, of Georgia, one of the leading rebels of theSouth, then a general in the Southern army, and who had beenSecretary of the United States Treasury in Mr. Buchanan's time. Ofcourse, we confiscated his property, and found it rich in corn, beans, pea-nuts, and sorghum-molasses. Extensive fields were allround the house; I sent word back to General David to explain whoseplantation it was, and instructed him to spare nothing. That nighthuge bonfires consumed the fence-rails, kept our soldiers warm, andthe teamsters and men, as well as the slaves, carried off animmense quantity of corn and provisions of all sorts. 

In due season the headquarter wagons came up, and we got supper. After supper I sat on a chair astride, with my back to a good fire, musing, and became conscious that an old negro, with atallow-candle in his hand, was scanning my face closely. I inquired, "What do you want, old man!" He answered, "Dey say you is MassaSherman. " I answered that such was the case, and inquired what hewanted. He only wanted to look at me, and kept muttering, "Disnigger can't sleep dis night. " I asked him why he trembled so, andhe said that he wanted to be sure that we were in fact "Yankees, "for on a former occasion some rebel cavalry had put on light-blueovercoats, personating Yankee troops, and many of the negroes weredeceived thereby, himself among the number had shown them sympathy, and had in consequence been unmercifully beaten therefor. Thistime he wanted to be certain before committing himself; so I toldhim to go out on the porch, from which he could see the wholehorizon lit up with camp-fires, and he could then judge whether hehad ever seen any thing like it before. The old man becameconvinced that the "Yankees" had come at last, about whom he hadbeen dreaming all his life; and some of the staff officers gave hima strong drink of whiskey, which set his tongue going. LieutenantSpelling, who commanded my escort, was a Georgian, and recognizedin this old negro a favorite slave of his uncle, who resided aboutsix miles off; but the old slave did not at first recognize hisyoung master in our uniform. One of my staff-officers asked himwhat had become of his young master, George. He did not know, onlythat he had gone off to the war, and he supposed him killed, as amatter of course. His attention was then drawn to Spelling's face, when he fell on his knees and thanked God that he had found hisyoung master alive and along with the Yankees. Spelling inquiredall about his uncle and the family, asked my permission to go andpay his uncle a visit, which I granted, of course, and the nextmorning he described to me his visit. The uncle was not cordial, by any means, to find his nephew in the ranks of the host that wasdesolating the land, and Spelling came back, having exchanged histired horse for a fresher one out of his uncle's stables, explaining that surely some of the "bummers" would have got thehorse had he not. 

The next morning, November 23d, we rode into Milledgeville, thecapital of the State, whither the Twentieth Corps had preceded us;and during that day the left wing was all united, in and aroundMilledgeville. From the inhabitants we learned that some ofKilpatrick's cavalry had preceded us by a couple of days, and thatall of the right wing was at and near Gordon, twelve miles off, viz. , the place where the branch railroad came to Milledgevillefrom the Mason & Savannah road. The first stage of the journeywas, therefore, complete, and absolutely successful. 

General Howard soon reported by letter the operations of his rightwing, which, on leaving Atlanta, had substantially followed the tworoads toward Mason, by Jonesboro' and McDonough, and reached theOcmulgee at Planters' Factory, which they crossed, by the aid ofthe pontoon-train, during the 18th and 19th of November. Thence, with the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair's) he (General Howard)had marched via Monticello toward Gordon, having dispatchedKilpatrick's cavalry, supported by the Fifteenth Corps(Osterhaus's), to feign on Mason. Kilpatrick met the enemy'scavalry about four miles out of Mason, and drove them rapidly backinto the bridge-defenses held by infantry. Kilpatrick chargedthese, got inside the parapet, but could not hold it, and retiredto his infantry supports, near Griswold Station. The FifteenthCorps tore up the railroad-track eastward from Griswold, leavingCharles R. Wood's division behind as a rear-guard-one brigade ofwhich was intrenched across the road, with some of Kilpatrick'scavalry on the flanks. On the 22d of November General G. W. Smith, with a division of troops, came out of Mason, attacked this brigade(Walcutt's) in position, and was handsomely repulsed and drivenback into Mason. This brigade was in part armed with Spencerrepeating-rifles, and its fire was so rapid that General Smithinsists to this day that he encountered a whole division; but he ismistaken; he was beaten by one brigade (Walcutt's), and made nofurther effort to molest our operations from that direction. General Walcutt was wounded in the leg, and had to ride the rest ofthe distance to Savannah in a carriage. 

Therefore, by the 23d, I was in Milledgeville with the left wing, and was in full communication with the right wing at Gordon. Thepeople of Milledgeville remained at home, except the Governor(Brown), the State officers, and Legislature, who had ignominiouslyfled, in the utmost disorder and confusion; standing not on theorder of their going, but going at once--some by rail, some bycarriages, and many on foot. Some of the citizens who remainedbehind described this flight of the "brave and patriotic" GovernorBrown. He had occupied a public building known as the "Governor'sMansion, " and had hastily stripped it of carpets, curtains, andfurniture of all sorts, which were removed to a train offreight-cars, which carried away these things--even the cabbages andvegetables from his kitchen and cellar--leaving behind muskets, ammunition, and the public archives. On arrival at Milledgeville Ioccupied the same public mansion, and was soon overwhelmed withappeals for protection. General Slocum had previously arrived withthe Twentieth Corps, had taken up his quarters at the MilledgevilleHotel, established a good provost-guard, and excellent order wasmaintained. The most frantic appeals had been made by the Governorand Legislature for help from every quarter, and the people of theState had been called out en masse to resist and destroy the invadersof their homes and firesides. Even the prisoners and convicts of thepenitentiary were released on condition of serving as soldiers, andthe cadets were taken from their military college for the samepurpose. These constituted a small battalion, under General HarryWayne, a former officer of the United States Army, and son of thethen Justice Wayne of the Supreme Court. But these hastily retreatedeast across the Oconee River, leaving us a good bridge, which wepromptly secured. 

At Milledgeville we found newspapers from all the South, andlearned the consternation which had filled the Southern mind at ourtemerity; many charging that we were actually fleeing for our livesand seeking safety at the hands of our fleet on the sea-coast. Alldemanded that we should be assailed, "front, flank, and rear;" thatprovisions should be destroyed in advance, so that we would starve;that bridges should be burned, roads obstructed, and no mercy shownus. Judging from the tone of the Southern press of that day, theoutside world must have supposed us ruined and lost. I give a fewof these appeals as samples, which to-day must sound strange to theparties who made them:

Corinth, Mississippi, November 18, 1884. 

To the People of Georgia:

Arise for the defense of your native soil! Rally around yourpatriotic Governor and gallant soldiers! Obstruct and destroy allthe roads in Sherman's front, flank, and rear, and his army willsoon starve in your midst. Be confident. Be resolute. Trust in anoverruling Providence, and success will soon crown your efforts. Ihasten to join you in the defense of your homes and firesides. 

G. T. BEAUREGARD. 

RICHMOND, November 18, 1884. 

To the People of Georgia:

You have now the best opportunity ever yet presented to destroy theenemy. Put every thing at the disposal of our generals; remove allprovisions from the path of the invader, and put all obstructionsin his path. 

Every citizen with his gun, and every negro with his spade and axe, can do the work of a soldier. You can destroy the enemy byretarding his march. 

Georgians, be firm! Act promptly, and fear not!

B. H. Hill, Senator. 

I most cordially approve the above. James A. SEDDON, Secretary of War. 

Richmond, November 19, 1864. 

To the People of Georgia:

We have had a special conference with President Davis and theSecretary of War, and are able to assure you that they have doneand are still doing all that can be done to meet the emergency thatpresses upon you. Let every man fly to arms! Remove your negroes, horses, cattle, and provisions from Sherman's army, and burn whatyou cannot carry. Burn all bridges, and block up the roads in hisroute. Assail the invader in front, flank, and rear, by night andby day. Let him have no rest. 

JULIAN HARTRIDGEMARK BLANDFORD, J. H. ECHOLSGEO. N. LESTERJOHN T. SHUEMAKERJAS. M. SMITH, Members of Congress. 

Of course, we were rather amused than alarmed at these threats, andmade light of the feeble opposition offered to our progress. Someof the officers (in the spirit of mischief) gathered together inthe vacant hall of Representatives, elected a Speaker, andconstituted themselves the Legislature of the State of Georgia! Aproposition was made to repeal the ordinance of secession, whichwas well debated, and resulted in its repeal by a fair vote! I wasnot present at these frolics, but heard of them at the time, andenjoyed the joke. 

Meantime orders were made for the total destruction of the arsenaland its contents, and of such public buildings as could be easilyconverted to hostile uses. But little or no damage was done toprivate property, and General Slocum, with my approval, sparedseveral mills, and many thousands of bales of cotton, taking whathe knew to be worthless bonds, that the cotton should not be usedfor the Confederacy. Meantime the right wing continued itsmovement along the railroad toward Savannah, tearing up the trackand destroying its iron. At the Oconee was met a feeble resistancefrom Harry Wayne's troops, but soon the pontoon-bridge was laid, and that wing crossed over. Gilpatrick's cavalry was brought intoMilledgeville, and crossed the Oconee by the bridge near the town;and on the 23d I made the general orders for the next stage of themarch as far as Millen. These were, substantially, for the rightwing to follow the Savannah Railroad, by roads on its south; theleft wing was to move to Sandersville, by Davisboro' andLouisville, while the cavalry was ordered by a circuit to thenorth, and to march rapidly for Millen, to rescue our prisoners ofwar confined there. The distance was about a hundred miles. 

General Wheeler, with his division of rebel cavalry, had succeededin getting ahead of us between Milledgeville and Augusta, andGeneral P. J. Hardee had been dispatched by General Beauregard fromHood's army to oppose our progress directly in front. He had, however, brought with him no troops, but relied on his influencewith the Georgians (of whose State he was a native) to arouse thepeople, and with them to annihilate Sherman's army!

On the 24th we renewed the march, and I accompanied the TwentiethCorps, which took the direct road to Sandersville, which we reachedsimultaneously with the Fourteenth Corps, on the 26th. A brigadeof rebel cavalry was deployed before the town, and was driven inand through it by our skirmish-line. I myself saw the rebel cavalryapply fire to stacks of fodder standing in the fields atSandersville, and gave orders to burn some unoccupied dwellingsclose by. On entering the town, I told certain citizens (who wouldbe sure to spread the report) that, if the enemy attempted to carryout their threat to burn their food, corn, and fodder, in ourroute, I would most undoubtedly execute to the letter the generalorders of devastation made at the outset of the campaign. Withthis exception, and one or two minor cases near Savannah, thepeople did not destroy food, for they saw clearly that it would beruin to themselves. 

At Sandersville I halted the left wing until I heard that the rightwing was abreast of us on the railroad. During the evening a negrowas brought to me, who had that day been to the station (Tenille), about six miles south of the town. I inquired of him if there wereany Yankees there, and he answered, "Yes. " He described in his ownway what he had seen. 

"First, there come along some cavalry-men, and they burned thedepot; then come along some infantry-men, and they tore up thetrack, and burned it;" and just before he left they had "sot fireto the well. "

The next morning, viz. , the 27th, I rode down to the station, andfound General Corse's division (of the Fifteenth Corps) engaged indestroying the railroad, and saw the well which my negro informanthad seen "burnt. " It was a square pit about twenty-five feet deep, boarded up, with wooden steps leading to the bottom, wherein was afine copper pump, to lift the water to a tank above. The soldiershad broken up the pump, heaved in the steps and lining, and setfire to the mass of lumber in the bottom of the well, whichcorroborated the negro's description. 

From this point Blair's corps, the Seventeenth, took up the work ofdestroying the railroad, the Fifteenth Corps following another roadleading eastward, farther to the south of the railroad. While theleft wing was marching toward Louisville, north of the railroad, General Kilpatrick had, with his cavalry division, moved rapidlytoward Waynesboro', on the branch railroad leading from Millen toAugusta. He found Wheeler's division of rebel cavalry there, andhad considerable skirmishing with it; but, learning that ourprisoners had been removed two days before from Millen, he returnedto Louisville on the 29th, where he found the left wing. Here heremained a couple of days to rest his horses, and, receiving ordersfrom me to engage Wheeler and give him all the fighting he wanted, he procured from General Slocum the assistance of the infantrydivision of General Baird, and moved back for Waynesboro' on the 2dof December, the remainder of the left wing continuing its march ontoward Millers. Near Waynesboro' Wheeler was again encountered, and driven through the town and beyond Brier Creek, toward Augusta, thus keeping up the delusion that the main army was moving towardAugusta. General Kilpatrick's fighting and movements aboutWaynesboro' and Brier Creek were spirited, and produced a goodeffect by relieving the infantry column and the wagon-trains of allmolestation during their march on Millen. Having thus covered thatflank, he turned south and followed the movement of the FourteenthCorps to Buckhead Church, north of Millen and near it. 

On the 3d of December I entered Millen with the Seventeenth Corps(General Frank P. Blair), and there paused one day, to communicatewith all parts of the army. General Howard was south of theOgeechee River, with the Fifteenth Corps, opposite Scarboro'. General Slocum was at Buckhead Church, four miles north of Millen, with the Twentieth Corps. The Fourteenth (General Davis) was atLumpkin's Station, on the Augusta road, about ten miles north ofMillen, and the cavalry division was within easy support of thiswing. Thus the whole army was in good position and in goodcondition. We had largely subsisted on the country; our wagonswere full of forage and provisions; but, as we approached thesea-coast, the country became more sandy and barren, and foodbecame more scarce; still, with little or no loss, we had traveledtwo-thirds of our distance, and I concluded to push on forSavannah. At Millen I learned that General Bragg was in Augusta, and that General Wade Hampton had been ordered there from Richmond, to organize a large cavalry force with which to resist ourprogress. 

General Hardee was ahead, between us and Savannah, with McLaw'sdivision, and other irregular troops, that could not, I feltassured, exceed ten thousand men. I caused the fine depot atMillen to be destroyed, and other damage done, and then resumed themarch directly on Savannah, by the four main roads. The SeventeenthCorps (General Blair) followed substantially the railroad, and, along with it, on the 5th of December, I reached OgeecheeChurch, about fifty miles from Savannah, and found there freshearthworks, which had been thrown up by McLaw's division; but hemust have seen that both his flanks were being turned, andprudently retreated to Savannah without a fight. All the columnsthen pursued leisurely their march toward Savannah, corn and foragebecoming more and more scarce, but rice-fields beginning to occuralong the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, which proved a goodsubstitute, both as food and forage. The weather was fine, theroads good, and every thing seemed to favor us. Never do I recalla more agreeable sensation than the sight of our camps by night, lit up by the fires of fragrant pine-knots. The trains were all ingood order, and the men seemed to march their fifteen miles a dayas though it were nothing. No enemy opposed us, and we could onlyoccasionally hear the faint reverberation of a gun to our leftrear, where we knew that General Kilpatrick was skirmishing withWheeler's cavalry, which persistently followed him. But theinfantry columns had met with no opposition whatsoever. McLaw'sdivision was falling back before us, and we occasionally picked upa few of his men as prisoners, who insisted that we would meet withstrong opposition at Savannah. 

On the 8th, as I rode along, I found the column turned out of themain road, marching through the fields. Close by, in the corner ofa fence, was a group of men standing around a handsome youngofficer, whose foot had been blown to pieces by a torpedo plantedin the road. He was waiting for a surgeon to amputate his leg, andtold me that he was riding along with the rest of his brigade-staffof the Seventeenth Corps, when a torpedo trodden on by his horsehad exploded, killing the horse and literally blowing off all theflesh from one of his legs. I saw the terrible wound, and madefull inquiry into the facts. There had been no resistance at thatpoint, nothing to give warning of danger, and the rebels hadplanted eight-inch shells in the road, with friction-matches toexplode them by being trodden on. This was not war, but murder, and it made me very angry. I immediately ordered a lot of rebelprisoners to be brought from the provost-guard, armed with picksand spades, and made them march in close order along the road, soas to explode their own torpedoes, or to discover and dig them up. They begged hard, but I reiterated the order, and could hardly helplaughing at their stepping so gingerly along the road, where it wassupposed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step, but theyfound no other torpedoes till near Fort McAllister. That night wereached Pooler's Station, eight miles from Savannah, and during thenext two days, December 9th and 10th, the several corps reached thedefenses of Savannah--the Fourteenth Corps on the left, touchingthe river; the Twentieth Corps next; then the Seventeenth; and theFifteenth on the extreme right; thus completely investing the city. Wishing to reconnoitre the place in person, I rode forward by theLouisville road, into a dense wood of oak, pine, and cypress, leftthe horses, and walked down to the railroad-track, at a place wherethere was a side-track, and a cut about four feet deep. From thatpoint the railroad was straight, leading into Savannah, and abouteight hundred yards off were a rebel parapet and battery. I couldsee the cannoneers preparing to fire, and cautioned the officersnear me to scatter, as we would likely attract a shot. Very soon Isaw the white puff of smoke, and, watching close, caught sight ofthe ball as it rose in its flight, and, finding it coming prettystraight, I stepped a short distance to one side, but noticed anegro very near me in the act of crossing the track at rightangles. Some one called to him to look out; but, before the poorfellow understood his danger, the ball (a thirty-two-pound roundshot) struck the ground, and rose in its first ricochet, caught thenegro under the right jaw, and literally carried away his head, scattering blood and brains about. A soldier close by spread anovercoat over the body, and we all concluded to get out of thatrailroad-cut. Meantime, General Mower's division of the SeventeenthCorps had crossed the canal to the right of the Louisvilleroad, and had found the line of parapet continuous; so at Savannahwe had again run up against the old familiar parapet, with its deepditches, canals, and bayous, full of water; and it looked as thoughanother siege was inevitable. I accordingly made a camp or bivouacnear the Louisville road, about five miles from Savannah, andproceeded to invest the place closely, pushing forwardreconnoissances at every available point. 

As soon as it was demonstrated that Savannah was well fortified, with a good garrison, commanded by General William J. Hardee, acompetent soldier, I saw that the first step was to opencommunication with our fleet, supposed to be waiting for us withsupplies and clothing in Ossabaw Sound. 

General Howard had, some nights previously, sent one of his bestscouts, Captain Duncan, with two men, in a canoe, to drift pastFort McAllister, and to convey to the fleet a knowledge of ourapproach. General Kilpatrick's cavalry had also been transferredto the south bank of the Ogeechee, with orders to opencommunication with the fleet. Leaving orders with General Slocumto press the siege, I instructed General Howard to send a divisionwith all his engineers to Grog's Bridge, fourteen and a half milessouthwest from Savannah, to rebuild it. On the evening of the 12thI rode over myself, and spent the night at Mr. King's house, whereI found General Howard, with General Hazen's division of theFifteenth Corps. His engineers were hard at work on the bridge, which they finished that night, and at sunrise Hazen's divisionpassed over. I gave General Hazen, in person, his orders to marchrapidly down the right bank of the Ogeechee, and without hesitationto assault and carry Fort McAllister by storm. I knew it to bestrong in heavy artillery, as against an approach from the sea, butbelieved it open and weak to the rear. I explained to GeneralHazen, fully, that on his action depended the safety of the wholearmy, and the success of the campaign. Kilpatrick had already feltthe fort, and had gone farther down the coast to Kilkenny Bluff, orSt. Catharine's Sound, where, on the same day, he had communicationwith a vessel belonging to the blockading fleet; but, at the time, I was not aware of this fact, and trusted entirely to General Hazenand his division of infantry, the Second of the Fifteenth Corps, the same old division which I had commanded at Shiloh andVicksburg, in which I felt a special pride and confidence. 

Having seen General Hazen fairly off, accompanied by GeneralHoward, I rode with my staff down the left bank of the Ogeechee, ten miles to the rice-plantation of a Mr. Cheevea, where GeneralHoward had established a signal-station to overlook the lowerriver, and to watch for any vessel of the blockading squadron, which the negroes reported to be expecting us, because they nightlysent up rockets, and daily dispatched a steamboat up the Ogeecheeas near to Fort McAllister as it was safe. 

On reaching the rice-mill at Cheevea's, I found a guard and acouple of twenty-pound Parrott gone, of De Gres's battery, whichfired an occasional shot toward Fort McAllister, plainly seen overthe salt-marsh, about three miles distant. Fort McAllister had therebel flag flying, and occasionally sent a heavy shot back acrossthe marsh to where we were, but otherwise every thing about theplace looked as peaceable and quiet as on the Sabbath. 

The signal-officer had built a platform on the ridge-pole ofthe rice-mill. Leaving our horses behind the stacks of rice-straw, we all got on the roof of a shed attached to the mill, wherefrom Icould communicate with the signal-officer above, and at the sametime look out toward Ossabaw Sound, and across the Ogeechee Riverat Fort McAllister. About 2 p. M. We observed signs of commotionin the fort, and noticed one or two guns fired inland, and somemusket-skirmishing in the woods close by. 

This betokened the approach of Hazen's division, which had beenanxiously expected, and soon thereafter the signal-officerdiscovered about three miles above the fort a signal-flag, withwhich he conversed, and found it to belong to General Hazen, whowas preparing to assault the fort, and wanted to know if I werethere. On being assured of this fact, and that I expected the fortto be carried before night, I received by signal the assurance ofGeneral Hazen that he was making his preparations, and would soonattempt the assault. The sun was rapidly declining, and I wasdreadfully impatient. At that very moment some one discovered afaint cloud of smoke, and an object gliding, as it were, along thehorizon above the tops of the sedge toward the sea, which little bylittle grew till it was pronounced to be the smoke-stack of asteamer coming up the river. "It must be one of our squadron!"Soon the flag of the United States was plainly visible, and ourattention was divided between this approaching steamer and theexpected assault. When the sun was about an hour high, anothersignal-message came from General Hazen that he was all ready, and Ireplied to go ahead, as a friendly steamer was approaching frombelow. Soon we made out a group of officers on the deck of thisvessel, signaling with a flag, "Who are you!" The answer went backpromptly, "General Sherman. " Then followed the question, "Is FortMcAllister taken?" "Not yet, but it will be in a minute!" Almostat that instant of time, we saw Hazen's troops come out of the darkfringe of woods that encompassed the fort, the lines dressed as onparade, with colors flying, and moving forward with a quick, steadypace. Fort McAllister was then all alive, its big guns belchingforth dense clouds of smoke, which soon enveloped our assaultinglines. One color went down, but was up in a moment. On the linesadvanced, faintly seen in the white, sulphurous smoke; there was apause, a cessation of fire; the smoke cleared away, and theparapets were blue with our men, who fired their muskets in theair, and shouted so that we actually heard them, or felt that wedid. Fort McAllister was taken, and the good news was instantlysent by the signal-officer to our navy friends on the approachinggunboat, for a point of timber had shut out Fort McAllister fromtheir view, and they had not seen the action at all, but must haveheard the cannonading. 

During the progress of the assault, our little group on Cheeves'smill hardly breathed; but no sooner did we see our flags on theparapet than I exclaimed, in the language of the poor negro atCobb's plantation, "This nigger will have no sleep this night!"

I was resolved to communicate with our fleet that night, whichhappened to be a beautiful moonlight one. At the wharf belongingto Cheeves's mill was a small skiff, that had been used by our menin fishing or in gathering oysters. I was there in a minute, called for a volunteer crew, when several young officers, Nicholsand Merritt among the number; said they were good oarsmen, andvolunteered to pull the boat down to Fort McAllister. GeneralHoward asked to accompany me; so we took seats in the stern of theboat, and our crew of officers pulled out with a will. The tidewas setting in strong, and they had a hard pull, for, though thedistance was but three miles in an air-line, the river was socrooked that the actual distance was fully six miles. On the waydown we passed the wreck of a steamer which had been sunk someyears before, during a naval attack on Fort McAllister. 

Night had fairly set in when we discovered a soldier on the beach. I hailed him, and inquired if he knew where General Hazen was. Heanswered that the general was at the house of the overseer of theplantation (McAllister's), and that he could guide me to it. Weaccordingly landed, tied our boat to a driftlog, and followed ourguide through bushes to a frame-house, standing in a grove oflive-oaks, near a row of negro quarters. 

General Hazen was there with his staff, in the act of gettingsupper; he invited us to join them, which we accepted promptly, forwe were really very hungry. Of course, I congratulated Hazen mostheartily on his brilliant success, and praised its execution veryhighly, as it deserved, and he explained to me more in detail theexact results. The fort was an inclosed work, and its land-frontwas in the nature of a bastion and curtains, with good parapet, ditch, fraise, and chevaux-de-frise, made out of the large branchesof live-oaks. Luckily, the rebels had left the larger and unwieldytrunks on the ground, which served as a good cover for theskirmish-line, which crept behind these logs, and from them keptthe artillerists from loading and firing their guns accurately. 

The assault had been made by three parties in line, one from below, one from above the fort, and the third directly in rear, along thecapital. All were simultaneous, and had to pass a good abatis andline of torpedoes, which actually killed more of the assailantsthan the heavy guns of the fort, which generally overshot the mark. Hazen's entire loss was reported, killed and wounded, ninety-two. Each party reached the parapet about the same time, and thegarrison inside, of about two hundred and fifty men (about fifty ofthem killed or wounded), were in his power. The commandingofficer, Major Anderson, was at that moment a prisoner, andGeneral Hazen invited him in to take supper with us, which he did. 

Up to this time General Hazen did not know that a gunboat was inthe river below the fort; for it was shut off from sight by a pointof timber, and I was determined to board her that night, atwhatever risk or cost, as I wanted some news of what was going onin the outer world. Accordingly, after supper, we all walked downto the fort, nearly a mile from the house where we had been, entered Fort McAllister, held by a regiment of Hazen's troops, andthe sentinel cautioned us to be very careful, as the ground outsidethe fort was full of torpedoes. Indeed, while we were there, atorpedo exploded, tearing to pieces a poor fellow who was huntingfor a dead comrade. Inside the fort lay the dead as they hadfallen, and they could hardly be distinguished from their livingcomrades, sleeping soundly side by side in the pale moonlight. Inthe river, close by the fort, was a good yawl tied to a stake, butthe tide was high, and it required some time to get it in to thebank; the commanding officer, whose name I cannot recall, mannedthe boat with a good crew of his men, and, with General Howard, Ientered, and pulled down-stream, regardless of the warnings allabout the torpedoes. 

The night was unusually bright, and we expected to find the gunboatwithin a mile or so; but, after pulling down the river fully threemiles, and not seeing the gunboat, I began to think she had turnedand gone back to the sound; but we kept on, following the bends ofthe river, and about six miles below McAllister we saw her light, and soon were hailed by the vessel at anchor. Pulling alongside, we announced ourselves, and were received with great warmth andenthusiasm on deck by half a dozen naval officers, among themCaptain Williamson, United States Navy. She proved to be theDandelion, a tender of the regular gunboat Flag, posted at themouth of the Ogeechee. All sorts of questions were made andanswered, and we learned that Captain Duncan had safely reached thesquadron, had communicated the good news of our approach, and theyhad been expecting us for some days. They explained that AdmiralDahlgren commanded the South-Atlantic Squadron, which was thenengaged in blockading the coast from Charleston south, and was onhis flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, lying in Wassaw Sound; thatGeneral J. G. Foster was in command of the Department of the South, with his headquarters at Hilton Head; and that several ships loadedwith stores for the army were lying in Tybee Roads and in PortRoyal Sound. From these officers I also learned that General Grantwas still besieging Petersburg and Richmond, and that matters andthings generally remained pretty much the same as when we had leftAtlanta. All thoughts seemed to have been turned to us in Georgia, cut off from all communication with our friends; and the rebelpapers had reported us to be harassed, defeated, starving, andfleeing for safety to the coast. I then asked for pen and paper, and wrote several hasty notes to General Foster, Admiral Dahlgren, General Grant, and the Secretary of War, giving in general termsthe actual state of affairs, the fact of the capture of FortMcAllister, and of my desire that means should be taken toestablish a line of supply from the vessels in port up the Ogeecheeto the rear of the army. As a sample, I give one of these notes, addressed to the Secretary of War, intended for publication torelieve the anxiety of our friends at the North generally:

ON BOARD DANDELION, OSSABAW SOUND, December 13, 1864--11. 50 p. M. 

To Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. :

To-day, at 6 p. M. , General Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corpscarried Fort McAllister by assault, capturing its entire garrisonand stores. This opened to us Ossabaw Sound, and I pushed down tothis gunboat to communicate with the fleet. Before openingcommunication we had completely destroyed all the railroads leadinginto Savannah, and invested the city. The left of the army is onthe Savannah River three miles above the city, and the right on theOgeechee, at King's Bridge. The army is in splendid order, andequal to any thing. The weather has been fine, and supplies wereabundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at allmolested by guerrillas. 

We reached Savannah three days ago, but, owing to Fort McAllister, could not communicate; but, now that we have McAllister, we can goahead. 

We have already captured two boats on the Savannah river andprevented their gunboats from coming down. 

I estimate the population of Savannah at twenty-five thousand, andthe garrison at fifteen thousand. General Hardee commands. 

We have not lost a wagon on the trip; but have gathered a largesupply of negroes, mules, horses, etc. , and our teams are in farbetter condition than when we started. 

My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses. We have utterly destroyed over two hundred miles ofrails, and consumed stores and provisions that were essential toLee's and Hood's armies. 

The quick work made with McAllister, the opening of communicationwith our fleet, and our consequent independence as to supplies, dissipate all their boasted threats to head us off and starve thearmy. 

I regard Savannah as already gained. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

By this time the night was well advanced, and the tide was runningebb-strong; so I asked. Captain Williamson to tow us up as nearFort McAllister as he would venture for the torpedoes, of which thenavy-officers had a wholesome dread. The Dandelion steamed up somethree or four miles, till the lights of Fort McAllister could beseen, when she anchored, and we pulled to the fort in our own boat. General Howard and I then walked up to the McAllister House, wherewe found General Hazen and his officers asleep on the floor of oneof the rooms. Lying down on the floor, I was soon fast asleep, butshortly became conscious that some one in the room was inquiringfor me among the sleepers. Calling out, I was told that an officerof General Fosters staff had just arrived from a steamboat anchoredbelow McAllister; that the general was extremely anxious to see meon important business, but that he was lame from an old Mexican-Warwound, and could not possibly come to me. I was extremely wearyfrom the incessant labor of the day and night before, but got up, and again walked down the sandy road to McAllister, where I found aboat awaiting us, which carried us some three miles down the river, to the steamer W. W. Coit (I think), on board of which we foundGeneral Foster. He had just come from Port Royal, expecting tofind Admiral Dahlgren in Ossabaw Sound, and, hearing of the captureof Fort McAllister, he had come up to see me. He described fullythe condition of affairs with his own command in South Carolina. He had made several serious efforts to effect a lodgment on therailroad which connects Savannah with Charleston near Pocotaligo, but had not succeeded in reaching the railroad itself, though hehad a full division of troops, strongly intrenched, near BroadRiver, within cannon-range of the railroad. He explained, moreover, that there were at Port Royal abundant supplies of breadand provisions, as well as of clothing, designed for our use. Westill had in our wagons and in camp abundance of meat, but weneeded bread, sugar, and coffee, and it was all-important that aroute of supply should at once be opened, for which purpose theassistance of the navy were indispensable. We accordinglysteamed down the Ogeechee River to Ossabaw Sound, in hopes to meetAdmiral Dahlgren, but he was not there, and we continued on by theinland channel to Warsaw Sound, where we found the Harvest Moon, and Admiral Dahlgren. I was not personally acquainted with him atthe time, but he was so extremely kind and courteous that I was atonce attracted to him. There was nothing in his power, he said, which he would not do to assist us, to make our campaign absolutelysuccessful. He undertook at once to find vessels of light draughtto carry our supplies from Port Royal to Cheeves's Mill, or toGrog's Bridge above, whence they could be hauled by wagons to ourseveral camps; he offered to return with me to Fort McAllister, tosuperintend the removal of the torpedoes, and to relieve me of allthe details of this most difficult work. General Foster thenconcluded to go on to Port Royal, to send back to us six hundredthousand rations, and all the rifled guns of heavy calibre, andammunition on hand, with which I thought we could reach the city ofSavannah, from the positions already secured. Admiral Dahlgrenthen returned with me in the Harvest Moon to Fort McAllister. Thisconsumed all of the 14th of December; and by the 15th I had againreached Cheeves's Mill, where my horse awaited me, and rode on toGeneral Howard's headquarters at Anderson's plantation, on theplank-road, about eight miles back of Savannah. I reached thisplace about noon, and immediately sent orders to my ownhead-quarters, on the Louisville road, to have them brought over tothe plank-road, as a place more central and convenient; gave writtennotice to Generals Slocum and Howard of all the steps taken, andordered them to get ready to receive the siege-guns, to put them inposition to bombard Savannah, and to prepare for the general assault. The country back of Savannah is very low, and intersected withinnumerable saltwater creeks, swamps, and rice-fields. Fortunatelythe weather was good and the roads were passable, but, should thewinter rains set in, I knew that we would be much embarrassed. Therefore, heavy details of men were at once put to work to prepare awharf and depot at Grog's Bridge, and the roads leading thereto werecorduroyed in advance. The Ogeechee Canal was also cleared out foruse; and boats, such as were common on the river plantations, werecollected, in which to float stores from our proposed base on theOgeechee to the points most convenient to the several camps. 

Slocum's wing extended from the Savannah River to the canal, andHoward's wing from the canal to the extreme right, along down theLittle Ogeechee. The enemy occupied not only the city itself, withits long line of outer works, but the many forts which had beenbuilt to guard the approaches from the sea-such as at Beaulieu, Rosedew, White Bluff, Bonaventura, Thunderbolt, Cansten's Bluff, Forts Tatnall, Boggs, etc. , etc. I knew that General Hardee couldnot have a garrison strong enough for all these purposes, and I wastherefore anxious to break his lines before he could receivereenforcements from Virginia or Augusta. General Slocum hadalready captured a couple of steamboats trying to pass down theSavannah River from Augusta, and had established some of his men onArgyle and Hutchinson Islands above the city, and wanted totransfer a whole corps to the South Carolina bank; but, as theenemy had iron-clad gunboats in the river, I did not deem itprudent, because the same result could be better accomplished fromGeneral Fosters position at Broad River. 

Fort McAllister was captured as described, late in the evening ofDecember 13th, and by the 16th many steamboats had passed up ashigh as King's Bridge; among them one which General Grant haddispatched with the mails for the army, which had accumulated sinceour departure from Atlanta, under charge of Colonel A. H. Markland. These mails were most welcome to all the officers and soldiers ofthe army, which had been cut off from friends and the world for twomonths, and this prompt receipt of letters from home had anexcellent effect, making us feel that home was near. By thisvessel also came Lieutenant Dune, aide-de-camp, with the followingletter of December 3d, from General Grant, and on the next dayColonel Babcock, United States Engineers, arrived with the letterof December 6th, both of which are in General Grant's ownhandwriting, and are given entire:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 3, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies near Savannah, Georgia. 

GENERAL: The little information gleaned from the Southern pressindicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have directed yourmails (which had been previously collected in Baltimore by ColonelMarkland, special-agent of the Post-Office Department) to be sentas far as the blockading squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded toyou as soon as heard from on the coast. 

Not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, I abstain fromcongratulating you and those under your command, until bottom hasbeen struck. I have never had a fear, however, for the result. 

Since you left Atlanta no very great progress has been made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, and prevented fromdetaching against you. I think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. Bragghas gone from Wilmington. I am trying to take advantage of hisabsence to get possession of that place. Owing to somepreparations Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blowup Fort Fisher (which, while hoping for the best, I do not believea particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. Ihope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that Bragg willnot have started back by that time. 

In this letter I do not intend to give you any thing likedirections for future action, but will state a general idea I have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on thesea-coast. With your veteran army I hope to get control of the onlytwo through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy beforethe fall of Atlanta. The condition will be filled by holdingSavannah and Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east ofSavannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force from therecan cooperate with you. 

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with Hood closeupon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads, except the main one leading to Chattanooga. Part of this fallingback was undoubtedly necessary, and all of it may have been. Itdid not look so, however, to me. In my opinion, Thomas faroutnumbers Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage inmorale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badly crippled, if not destroyed. The general news you will learn from the papersbetter than I can give it. 

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that thereis likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, I will rundown the coast to see you. If you desire it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 6, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi

GENERAL: On reflection since sending my letter by the hands ofLieutenant Dunn, I have concluded that the most important operationtoward closing out the rebellion will be to close out Lee and hisarmy. 

You have now destroyed the roads of the South so that it willprobably take them three months without interruption to reestablisha through line from east to west. In that time I think the job herewill be effectually completed. 

My idea now is that you establish a base on the sea-coast, fortifyand leave in it all your artillery and cavalry, and enough infantryto protect them, and at the same time so threaten the interior thatthe militia of the South will have to be kept at home. With thebalance of your command come here by water with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to leave in command, but you I want inperson. Unless you see objections to this plan which I cannot see, use every vessel going to you for purposes of transportation. 

Hood has Thomas close in Nashville. I have said all I can to forcehim to attack, without giving the positive order until to-day. To-day, however, I could stand it no longer, and gave the orderwithout any reserve. I think the battle will take place to-morrow. The result will probably be known in New York before ColonelBabcock (the bearer of this) will leave it. Colonel Babcock willgive you full information of all operations now in progress. Very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

The contents of these letters gave me great uneasiness, for I hadset my heart on the capture of Savannah, which I believed to bepracticable, and to be near; for me to embark for Virginia by seawas so complete a change from what I had supposed would be thecourse of events that I was very much concerned. I supposed, as amatter of course, that a fleet of vessels would soon pour in, readyto convey the army to Virginia, and as General Grant's orderscontemplated my leaving the cavalry, trains, and artillery, behind, I judged Fort McAllister to be the best place for the purpose, andsent my chief-engineer, Colonel Poe, to that fort, to reconnoitrethe ground, and to prepare it so as to make a fortified camp largeenough to accommodate the vast herd of mules and horses that wouldthus be left behind. And as some time might be required to collectthe necessary shipping, which I estimated at little less than ahundred steamers and sailing-vessels, I determined to pushoperations, in hopes to secure the city of Savannah before thenecessary fleet could be available. All these ideas are given inmy answer to General Grant's letters (dated December 16, 1864)herewith, which is a little more full than the one printed in thereport of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, because in thatcopy I omitted the matter concerning General Thomas, which now needno longer be withheld:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 16, 1864. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I received, day before yesterday, at the hands ofLieutenant Dunn, your letter of December 8d, and last night, at thehands of Colonel Babcock, that of December 6th. I had previouslymade you a hasty scrawl from the tugboat Dandelion, in OgeecheeRiver, advising you that the army had reached the sea-coast, destroying all the railroads across the State of Georgia, investingclosely the city of Savannah, and had made connection with thefleet. 

Since writing that note, I have in person met and conferred withGeneral Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, and made all the arrangementswhich were deemed essential for reducing the city of Savannah toour possession. But, since the receipt of yours of the 6th, I haveinitiated measures looking principally to coming to you with fiftyor Sixty thousand infantry, and incidentally to capture Savannah, if time will allow. 

At the time we carried Fort McAllister by assault so handsomely, with its twenty-two guns and entire garrison, I was hardly awareof its importance; but, since passing down the river with GeneralFoster and up with Admiral Dahlgren, I realize how admirablyadapted are Ossabaw Sound and Ogeechee River to supply an armyoperating against Savannah. Seagoing vessels can easily come toKing's Bridge, a point on Ogeechee River, fourteen and a half milesdue west of Savannah, from which point we have roads leading to allour camps. The country is low and sandy, and cut up with marshes, which in wet weather will be very bad, but we have been so favoredwith weather that they are all now comparatively good, and heavydetails are constantly employed in double-corduroying the marshes, so that I have no fears even of bad weather. Fortunately, also, byliberal and judicious foraging, we reached the sea-coast abundantlysupplied with forage and provisions, needing nothing on arrivalexcept bread. Of this we started from Atlanta, with from eight totwenty days' supply per corps and some of the troops only had oneday's issue of bread during the trip of thirty days; yet they didnot want, for sweet-potatoes were very abundant, as well ascorn-meal, and our soldiers took to them naturally. We startedwith about five thousand head of cattle, and arrived with over tenthousand, of course consuming mostly turkeys, chickens, sheep, hogs, and the cattle of the country. As to our mules and horses, we left Atlanta with about twenty-five hundred wagons, many ofwhich were drawn by mules which had not recovered from theChattanooga starvation, all of which were replaced, the poor mulesshot, and our transportation is now in superb condition. I have nodoubt the State of Georgia has lost, by our operations, fifteenthousand first-rate mules. As to horses, Kilpatrick collected allhis remounts, and it looks to me, in riding along ourcolumns, as though every officer had three or four led horses, andeach regiment seems to be followed by at least fifty negroes andfoot-sore soldiers, riding on horses and mules. The custom was foreach brigade to send out daily a foraging-party of about fifty men, on foot, who invariably returned mounted, with several wagonsloaded with poultry, potatoes, etc. , and as the army is composed ofabout forty brigades, you can estimate approximately the number ofhorses collected. Great numbers of these were shot by my order, because of the disorganizing effect on our infantry of having toomany idlers mounted. General Euston is now engaged in collectingstatistics on this subject, but I know the Government will neverreceive full accounts of our captures, although the result aimed atwas fully attained, viz. , to deprive our enemy of them. All theseanimals I will have sent to Port Royal, or collected behind FortMcAllister, to be used by General Saxton in his farming operations, or by the Quartermaster's Department, after they are systematicallyaccounted for. While General Easton is collecting transportationfor my troops to James River, I will throw to Port Royal Island allour means of transportation I can, and collect the rest near FortMcAllister, covered by the Ogeeehee River and intrenchments to beerected, and for which Captain Poe, my chief-engineer, is nowreconnoitring the ground, but in the mean time will act as I havebegun, as though the city of Savannah were my objective: namely, the troops will continue to invest Savannah closely, making attacksand feints wherever we have fair ground to stand upon, and I willplace some thirty-pound Parrotts, which I have got from GeneralFoster, in position, near enough to reach the centre of the city, and then will demand its surrender. If General Hardee is alarmed, or fears starvation, he may surrender; otherwise I will bombard thecity, but not risk the lives of our men by assaults across thenarrow causeways, by which alone I can now reach it. 

If I had time, Savannah, with all its dependent fortifications, would surely fall into our possession, for we hold all its avenuesof supply. 

The enemy has made two desperate efforts to get boats from above tothe city, in both of which he has been foiled-General Slocum (whoseleft flank rests on the river) capturing and burning the firstboat, and in the second instance driving back two gunboats andcapturing the steamer Resolute, with seven naval officers and acrew of twenty-five seamen. General Slocum occupies Argyle Islandand the upper end of Hutchinson Inland, and has a brigade on theSouth Carolina shore opposite, and is very urgent to pass one ofhis corps over to that shore. But, in view of the change of planmade necessary by your order of the 6th, I will maintain things instatu quo till I have got all my transportation to the rear and outof the way, and until I have sea-transportation for the troops yourequire at James River, which I will accompany and command inperson. Of course, I will leave Kilpatrick, with his cavalry (sayfive thousand three hundred), and, it may be, a division of theFifteenth Corps; but, before determining on this, I must seeGeneral Foster, and may arrange to shift his force (now over abovethe Charleston Railroad, at the head of Broad River) to theOgeeohee, where, in cooperation with Kilpatrick's cavalry, he canbetter threaten the State of Georgia than from the direction ofPort Royal. Besides, I would much prefer not to detach from myregular corps any of its veteran divisions, and would even preferthat other less valuable troops should be sent to reenforce Fosterfrom some other quarter. My four corps, full of experience andfull of ardor, coming to you en masse, equal to sixty thousandfighting men, will be a reenforcement that Lee cannot disregard. Indeed, with my present command, I had expected, after reducingSavannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina; thence toRaleigh, and thence to report to you. But this would consume, itmay be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah; whereas, bysea, I can probably reach you with my men and arms before themiddle of January. 

I myself am somewhat astonished at the attitude of things inTennessee. I purposely delayed at Kingston until General Thomasassured me that he was all ready, and my last dispatch from him ofthe 12th of November was full of confidence, in which he promisedme that he would ruin Hood if he dared to advance from Florence, urging me to go ahead, and give myself no concern about Hood's armyin Tennessee. 

Why he did not turn on him at Franklin, after checking anddiscomfiting him, surpasses my understanding. Indeed, I do notapprove of his evacuating Decatur, but think he should have assumedthe offensive against Hood from Pulaski, in the direction ofWaynesburg. I know full well that General Thomas is slow in mind and in action;but he is judicious and brave and the troops feel great confidencein him. I still hope he will out-manoeuvre and destroy Hood. 

As to matters in the Southeast, I think Hardee, in Savannah, hasgood artillerists, some five or six thousand good infantry, and, it may be, a mongrel mass of eight to ten thousand militia. In allour marching through Georgia, he has not forced us to use any thingbut a skirmish-line, though at several points he had erectedfortifications and tried to alarm us by bombastic threats. InSavannah he has taken refuge in a line constructed behind swampsand overflowed rice-fields, extending from a point on the SavannahRiver about three miles above the city, around by a branch of theLittle Ogeechee, which stream is impassable from its salt-marshesand boggy swamps, crossed only by narrow causeways or commoncorduroy-roads. 

There must be twenty-five thousand citizens, men, women, andchildren, in Savannah, that must also be fed, and how he is to feedthem beyond a few days I cannot imagine. I know that hisrequisitions for corn on the interior counties were not filled, andwe are in possession of the rice-fields and mills, which couldalone be of service to him in this neighborhood. He can drawnothing from South Carolina, save from a small corner down in thesoutheast, and that by a disused wagon-road. I could easily getpossession of this, but hardly deem it worth the risk of making adetachment, which would be in danger by its isolation from the mainarmy. Our whole army is in fine condition as to health, and theweather is splendid. For that reason alone I feel a personaldislike to turning northward. I will keep Lieutenant Dunn hereuntil I know the result of my demand for the surrender of Savannah, but, whether successful or not, shall not delay my execution ofyour order of the 6th, which will depend alone upon the time itwill require to obtain transportation by sea. 

I am, with respect, etc. , your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army. 

Having concluded all needful preparations, I rode from myheadquarters, on the plank-road, over to General Slocum'sheadquarters, on the Macon road, and thence dispatched (by flag oftruce) into Savannah, by the hands of Colonel Ewing, inspector-general, a demand for the surrender of the place. Thefollowing letters give the result. General Hardee refused tosurrender, and I then resolved to make the attempt to break hisline of defense at several places, trusting that some one wouldsucceed. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 17, 1864. 

General WILLIAM J. HARDEE, commanding Confederate Forces inSavannah. 

GENERAL: You have doubtless observed, from your station at Rosedewthat sea-going vessels now come through Ossabaw Sound and up theOgeechee to the rear of my army, giving me abundant supplies of allkinds, and more especially heavy ordnance necessary for thereduction of Savannah. I have already received guns that can castheavy and destructive shot as far as the heart of your city; also, I have for some days held and controlled every avenue by which thepeople and garrison of Savannah can be supplied, and I am thereforejustified in demanding the surrender of the city of Savannah, andits dependent forts, and shall wait a reasonable time for youranswer, before opening with heavy ordnance. Should you entertainthe proposition, I am prepared to grant liberal terms to theinhabitants and garrison; but should I be forced to resort toassault, or the slower and surer process of starvation, I shallthen feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, andshall make little effort to restrain my army--burning to avenge thenational wrong which they attach to Savannah and other large citieswhich have been so prominent in dragging our country into civilwar. I inclose you a copy of General Hood's demand for thesurrender of the town of Resaoa, to be used by you for what it isworth. I have the honor to be your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDASAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 17, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Federal Forces nearSavannah, Georgia. 

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of a communication fromyou of this date, in which you demand "the surrender of Savannahand its dependent forts, " on the ground that you "have receivedguns that can cast heavy and destructive shot into the heart of thecity, " and for the further reason that you "have, for some days, held and controlled every avenue by which the people and garrisoncan be supplied. " You add that, should you be "forced to resort toassault, or to the slower and surer process of starvation, you willthen feel justified in resorting to the harshest measures, and willmake little effort to restrain your army, " etc. , etc. The positionof your forces (a half-mile beyond the outer line for theland-defense of Savannah) is, at the nearest point, at least fourmiles from the heart of the city. That and the interior line areboth intact. 

Your statement that you have, for some days, held and controlledevery avenue by which the people and garrison can be supplied, isincorrect. I am in free and constant communication with mydepartment. 

Your demand for the surrender of Savannah and its dependent fortsis refused. 

With respect to the threats conveyed in the closing paragraphs ofyour letter (of what may be expected in case your demand is notcomplied with), I have to say that I have hitherto conducted themilitary operations intrusted to my direction in strict accordancewith the rules of civilized warfare, and I should deeply regret theadoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate fromthem in future. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yourobedient servant, W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p. M. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16thinstant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made ademand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah, and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both lettersare herewith inclosed. You will notice that I claim that my linesare within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but GeneralHardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant. But Imyself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and GeorgiaCentral Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yardsbeyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no picketsoutside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a milewithin the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R. Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was aprisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from theExchange, which is but two squares back from the river. Byto-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts inposition, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not. From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, thespires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely woodedwith pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothingfrom any other portion of our lines. General Slocum feelsconfident that he can make a successful assault at one or twopoints in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. All ofGeneral Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the LittleOgeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face ofan enemy. Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get asufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperativedemonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I should like verymuch indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wroteto you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark forthe James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to PortRoyal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximatenumber of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force. I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, foralready the movement of our transports and the gunboats hasrequired more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs;there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, andthere are no pilots whatever. Admiral Dahlgren promised to havethe channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We findonly six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about tenfeet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister. Allthese points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridgeacross Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to FortMcAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutelynecessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc. , en route for Port Royal. In relation to Savannah, you will remarkthat General Hardee refers to his still being in communication withhis department. This language he thought would deceive me; but Iam confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (theUnion Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feedhis army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures methat he has his force on that very road, near the head of BroadRiver, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah. We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed itfrom the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles). In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing thedestruction of their railroads, and at this moment have twodivisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroadfrom the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not takeSavannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope thatevents will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have toassault with some loss. I am satisfied that, unless we take it, the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon thebatteries which guard every approach from the sea. I have a faintbelief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delayoperations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannahin our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punishSouth Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people inGeorgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the wholeUnited States, North and South, would rejoice to have this armyturned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in themanner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst andimmediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia. 

I have the honor to be your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army. 

As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had openedcommunication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what hadtranspired in Tennessee since our departure. We received ourletters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts ofall the events there up to about the 1st of December. As beforedescribed, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D. Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--withForrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate aboutforty-five thousand men. General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee, quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat brokenforces at his disposal. He had posted his only two regular corps, the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command ofMajor-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front ofFlorence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, andCapron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely forHood's initiative. 

This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was thereforeinferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, incase the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly towardNashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomasin person. Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of myadvance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marchedfrom Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield'sposition at Pulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to therear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. GeneralHood followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofieldat Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, andCheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whitherGeneral Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of hisdivisions, to cover the movement of his trains. During the nightof November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with histrains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide ofHarpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to GeneralCheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while inmotion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundredyards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. GeneralSchofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, andposted his army in front of the town, where somerifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance. He had thetwo corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), withWilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind theHarpeth. 

General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted hisposition with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and woundingGeneral Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool anddetermined, and fought magnificently. The rebel officers led theirmen in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing thebattle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten anddiscomfited. 

Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; amongthem Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders. Hood's losson that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospitalat Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and twoprisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundredand fifty-two. General Schofields lose, reported officially, wasone hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-threewounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six. The next dayGeneral Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fellback to the defenses of Nashville. 

Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of theQuartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by thechief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in thefortifications of Nashville, under the general direction ofMajor-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers. Hehad also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and hehad drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions ofSteedman and of R. S. Granger. These, with General Schofields armyand about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson, constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville, but of beating Hood in the open field. Yet Thomas remained insideof Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed uponhim and had entrenched his position. 

General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leadingfrom Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at itsprincipal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro' thedivision of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to abouteight thousand men. 

At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground wascovered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested onthe defensive. Those matters stood at Nashville, while we wereclosing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; andthe country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seemingpassive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one timeconsidered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going toNashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be atCity Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily forthe latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, andthus escaped so terrible a fate. 

On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road, eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letterdeclining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault. Theground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved sobloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surroundSavannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and, in case of success, to capture the whole of his army. We hadalready completely invested the place on the north, west, andsouth, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of theold dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew thatHardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river. On examiningmy maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging toGeneral Fosters command, might be moved from its then position atBroad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reachthis plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course, because Hardee could avail himself of his central position to fallon this detachment with his whole army. I did not want to make amistake like "Ball's Bluff" at that period of the war; so, takingone or two of my personal staff, I rode back to Grog's Bridge, leaving with Generals Howard and Slocum orders to make allpossible preparations, but not to attack, during my two or threedays' absence; and there I took a boat for Wassaw Sound, whenceAdmiral Dahlgren conveyed me in his own boat (the Harvest Moon) toHilton Head, where I represented the matter to General Foster, andhe promptly agreed to give his personal attention to it. Duringthe night of the 20th we started back, the wind blowing strong, Admiral Dahlgren ordered the pilot of the Harvest Moon to run intoTybee, and to work his way through to Wassaw Sound and the OgeecheeRiver by the Romney Marshes. We were caught by a low tide andstuck in the mud. After laboring some time, the admiral orderedout his barge; in it we pulled through this intricate and shallowchannel, and toward evening of December 21st we discovered, comingtoward us, a tug, called the Red Legs, belonging to theQuarter-master's Department, with a staff-officer on board, bearingletters from Colonel Dayton to myself and the admiral, reporting thatthe city of Savannah had been found evacuated on the morning ofDecember 21st, and was then in our possession. General Hardee hadcrossed the Savannah River by a pontoon-bridge, carrying off his menand light artillery, blowing up his iron-clads and navy-yard, butleaving for us all the heavy guns, stores, cotton, railway-cars, steamboats, and an immense amount of public and private property. Admiral Dahlgren concluded to go toward a vessel (the Sonoma) of hisblockading fleet, which lay at anchor near Beaulieu, and Itransferred to the Red Legs, and hastened up the Ogeechee River toGrog's Bridge, whence I rode to my camp that same night. I therelearned that, early on the morning of December 21st, the skirmishershad detected the absence of the enemy, and had occupied his linessimultaneously along their whole extent; but the left flank (Slocum), especially Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, claimed to havebeen the first to reach the heart of the city. 

Generals Slocum and Howard moved their headquarters at once intothe city, leaving the bulk of their troops in camps outside. Onthe morning of December 22d I followed with my own headquarters, and rode down Bull Street to the custom-house, from the roof ofwhich we had an extensive view over the city, the river, and thevast extent of marsh and rice-fields on the South Carolina side. The navy-yard, and the wreck of the iron-clad ram Savannah, werestill smouldering, but all else looked quiet enough. Turning back, we rode to the Pulaski Hotel, which I had known in years long gone, and found it kept by a Vermont man with a lame leg, who used to bea clerk in the St. Louis Hotel, New Orleans, and I inquired aboutthe capacity of his hotel for headquarters. He was very anxious tohave us for boarders, but I soon explained to him that we had afull mess equipment along, and that we were not in the habit ofpaying board; that one wing of the building would suffice for ouruse, while I would allow him to keep an hotel for the accommodationof officers and gentlemen in the remainder. I then dispatched anofficer to look around for a livery-stable that could accommodateour horses, and, while waiting there, an English gentleman, Mr. Charles Green, came and said that he had a fine house completelyfurnished, for which he had no use, and offered it as headquarters. He explained, moreover, that General Howard had informed him, theday before, that I would want his house for headquarters. At firstI felt strongly disinclined to make use of any private dwelling, lest complaints should arise of damage and lose of furniture, andso expressed myself to Mr. Green; but, after riding about the city, and finding his house so spacious, so convenient, with large yardand stabling, I accepted his offer, and occupied that house duringour stay in Savannah. He only reserved for himself the use of acouple of rooms above the dining-room, and we had all else, and amost excellent house it was in all respects. 

I was disappointed that Hardee had escaped with his army, but onthe whole we had reason to be content with the substantial fruitsof victory. The Savannah River was found to be badly obstructed bytorpedoes, and by log piers stretched across the channel below thecity, which piers were filled with the cobble stones that formerlypaved the streets. Admiral Dahlgren was extremely active, visitedme repeatedly in the city, while his fleet still watchedCharleston, and all the avenues, for the blockade-runners thatinfested the coast, which were notoriously owned and managed byEnglishmen, who used the island of New Providence (Nassau) as asort of entrepot. One of these small blockade-runners came intoSavannah after we were in full possession, and the master did notdiscover his mistake till he came ashore to visit the custom-house. Of coarse his vessel fell a prize to the navy. A heavy force wasat once set to work to remove the torpedoes and obstructions in themain channel of the river, and, from that time forth, Savannahbecame the great depot of supply for the troops operating in thatquarter. 

Meantime, on the 15th and 16th of December, were fought, in frontof Nashville, the great battles in which General Thomas so noblyfulfilled his promise to ruin Hood, the details of which are fullygiven in his own official reports, long-since published. Rumors ofthese great victories reached us at Savannah by piecemeal, but hisofficial report came on the 24th of December, with a letter fromGeneral Grant, giving in general terms the events up to the 18th, and I wrote at once through my chief of staff, General Webster, toGeneral Thomas, complimenting him in the highest terms. Hisbrilliant victory at Nashville was necessary to mine at Savannah tomake a complete whole, and this fact was perfectly comprehended byMr. Lincoln, who recognized it fully in his personal letter ofDecember 26th, hereinbefore quoted at length, and which is alsoclaimed at the time, in my Special Field Order No. 6, of January 8, 1865, here given:

(Special Field Order No. 6. )

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864. 

The general commanding announces to the troops composing theMilitary Division of the Mississippi that he has received from thePresident of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant, letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaignjust closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat ofHood's army in Tennessee. 

In order that all may understand the importance of events, it isproper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. Weheld Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to theenemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in theSouth, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regainthe place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measureswhich he thought would be effectual. That army, by a rapid march, gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton. We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtakeit, and General Hood led his army successfully far over towardMississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we were notthus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and controlevents ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding thedepartments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared todecoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to completethe original journey. We quietly and deliberately destroyedAtlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry onwar against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured hiscommercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from thesea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the moment ofour victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expectednews that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly andwell their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and thenturned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all hisartillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing thefragments down in Alabama. So complete success in militaryoperations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement thatentitles it to a place in the military history of the world. Thearmies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the localgarrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro', are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment mayinscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or"Nashville. " The general commanding embraces, in the same generalsuccess, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, andparalyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safetyof East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defensive, we haveat all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completelythwarted the designs of the enemies of our country. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

Here terminated the "March to the Sea, " and I only add a fewletters, selected out of many, to illustrate the general feeling ofrejoicing throughout the country at the time. I only regarded themarch from Atlanta to Savannah as a "shift of base, " as thetransfer of a strong army, which had no opponent, and had finishedits then work, from the interior to a point on the sea-coast, fromwhich it could achieve other important results. I considered thismarch as a means to an end, and not as an essential act of war. Still, then, as now, the march to the sea was generally regarded assomething extraordinary, something anomalous, something out of theusual order of events; whereas, in fact, I simply moved fromAtlanta to Savannah, as one step in the direction of Richmond, amovement that had to be met and defeated, or the war wasnecessarily at an end. 

Were I to express my measure of the relative importance of themarch to the sea, and of that from Savannah northward, I wouldplace the former at one, and the latter at ten, or the maximum. 

I now close this long chapter by giving a tabular statement of thelosses during the march, and the number of prisoners captured. Theproperty captured consisted of horses and mules by the thousand, and of quantities of subsistence stores that aggregate very large, but may be measured with sufficient accuracy by assuming thatsixty-five thousand men obtained abundant food for about fortydays, and thirty-five thousand animals were fed for a like period, so as to reach Savannah in splendid flesh and condition. I alsoadd a few of the more important letters that passed betweenGenerals Grant, Halleck, and myself, which illustrate our opinionsat that stage of the war:

STATEMENT OF CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS CAPTURED BY THE ARMY IN THEFIELD, CAMPAIGN OF GEORGIA. 

 Killed Wounded Missing CapturedOfficers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men Officers/Men 10 93 24 404 1 277 77 1, 261

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, December 16, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head). 

GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his lastdispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry toRichmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entireforce, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as maybe given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate fromsuch base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster willobey such instructions as may be given by you. 

Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that bytransferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may bemade a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville, or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if capturedand not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort wouldserve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their mostvaluable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be themost important point at which to strike in order to sever allconnection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad. 

General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter ofyour future actions should be entirely left to your discretion. 

We can send you from here a number of complete batteries offield-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, assoon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents, and furloughed men of your army. It is reported thatThomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have noparticulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication beinginterrupted by a heavy storm. 

Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing hisapproach to Savannah. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, December 18, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head). 

My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is justreceived. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shallvery soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--thecapture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as thegreat one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for anotherwide swath through the centre of the Confederacy. But I will notanticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and willprobably write you his own views. 

I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that youare in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head. Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, Ihad prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty offoraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending anyunless you actually need them. The hay-crop this year is short, and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty inprocuring a supply for our animals. 

General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hopedthat he will completely, crush his army. Breckenridge, at lastaccounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, asThomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or bedefeated. 

General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowingPrice with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millionsof property. 

Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments havingthree months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah. Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained byGeneral Thomas. 

Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident theplace may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown uponits site, it may prevent the growth of future crops ofnullification and secession. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, December 18, 1864. 

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell youwith how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck. Icongratulate you and the brave officers and men under your commandon the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. Inever had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for yoursafety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the armyyou had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but youwould strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feelthe same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expeditionto any other living commander. 

It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gavehim the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself, before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since hestarted. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-ninepieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerablesmall-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive ofthe enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen generalofficers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lostfive thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last threedays' operations. Breckenridge is said to be making forMurfreesboro'. 

I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wipedout John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol. I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part ofyour army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to betaking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may notaccomplish more toward that result where you are than if broughthere, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city, that it would take about two months to get you here with all theother calls there are for ocean transportation. 

I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what canbe done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainlywill compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly thewhole South. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out ofVirginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmondto be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may bewell to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands. 

Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results ofyour campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, Isubscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia. 

GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst. , brought byMajor Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand. As themajor starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simplyacknowledge its receipt. The capture of Savannah, with all itsimmense stores, must tell upon the people of the South. All wellhere. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPISAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feelvery much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you paymy army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and menthe substance of your note. 

I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for Ifeared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb theunity and morale of my army, now so perfect. 

The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported, completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part ofyour instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebelforts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavyordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where theycan be more easily guarded than if left in the city. 

The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and withslight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force;and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. Ifeel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought themover so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. Ileft Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be indoubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide hisforces. I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by anycurved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in ourcourse as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston andAugusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing therelong enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for theCharleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee andCape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleetunder Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favoran attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler willfail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a meredesolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take tostarve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically andpolitically, much importance is attached to the place, and it maybe that, apart from its military importance, both you and theAdministration may prefer I should give it more attention; and itwould be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point oflittle importance, after all its railroads leading into theinterior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But, on thehypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I wouldthen favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up withLee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; inwhich case I should reckon on your being on his heels. Now thatHood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter toan issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can breakup the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the timespring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whipLee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that Ican handle him in the open country. 

One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believeHardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty ofprovisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be madeimpregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siegeoperations. 

I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas canspare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc. , belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I donot want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations asall-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down intoAlabama, trusting to the country for supplies. 

I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue to review thewhole army. I do not like to boast, but believe this army has aconfidence in itself that makes it almost invincible. I wish youcould run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and show toboth armies that they are acting on a common plan. The weather isnow cool and pleasant, and the general health very good. Your truefriend, W. T. SHERMAN Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864. 

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, Chief-of-Staff; Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I had the pleasure of receiving your two letters of the16th and 18th instant to-day, and feel more than usually flatteredby the high encomiums you have passed on our recent campaign, whichis now complete by the occupation of Savannah. 

I am also very glad that General Grant has changed his mind aboutembarking my troops for James River, leaving me free to make thebroad swath you describe through South and North Carolina; andstill more gratified at the news from Thomas, in Tennessee, becauseit fulfills my plans, which contemplated his being able to disposeof Hood, in case he ventured north of the Tennessee River. So, Ithink, on the whole, I can chuckle over Jeff. Davis'sdisappointment in not turning my Atlanta campaign into a "Moscowdisaster. "

I have just finished a long letter to General Grant, and haveexplained to him that we are engaged in shifting our base from theOgeeohee to the Savannah River, dismantling all the forts made bythe enemy to bear upon the salt-water channels, transferring theheavy ordnance, etc. , to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, and inremodeling the enemy's interior lines to suit our future plans andpurposes. I have also laid down the programme for a campaign whichI can make this winter, and which will put me in the spring on theRoanoke, in direct communication with General Grant on James River. In general terms, my plan is to turn over to General Foster thecity of Savannah, to sally forth with my army resupplied, cross theSavannah, feign on Charleston and Augusta, but strike between, breaking en route the Charleston & Augusta Railroad, also a largepart of that from Branchville and Camden toward North Carolina, andthen rapidly to move for some point of the railroad from Charlestonto Wilmington, between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers; then, communicating with the fleet in the neighborhood of Georgetown, Iwould turn upon Wilmington or Charleston, according to theimportance of either. I rather prefer Wilmington, as a live place, over Charleston, which is dead and unimportant when its railroadcommunications are broken. I take it for granted that the presentmovement on Wilmington will fail. If I should determine to takeCharleston, I would turn across the country (which I have huntedover many a time) from Santee to Mount Pleasant, throwing one wingon the peninsula between the Ashley and Cooper. Afteraccomplishing one or other of these ends, I would make a bee-linefor Raleigh or Weldon, when Lee world be forced to come out ofRichmond, or acknowledge himself beaten. He would, I think, by theuse of the Danville Railroad, throw himself rapidly between me andGrant, leaving Richmond in the hands of the latter. This would notalarm me, for I have an army which I think can maneuver, and Iworld force him to attack me at a disadvantage, always under thesupposition that Grant would be on his heels; and, if the worstcome to the worst, I can fight my way down to Albermarle Sound, orNewbern. 

I think the time has come now when we should attempt the boldestmoves, and my experience is, that they are easier of execution thanmore timid ones, because the enemy is disconcerted by them--as, forinstance, my recent campaign. 

I also doubt the wisdom of concentration beyond a certain extent, for the roads of this country limit the amount of men that can bebrought to bear in any one battle, and I do not believe that anyone general can handle more than sixty thousand men in battle. 

I think our campaign of the last month, as well as every step Itake from this point northward, is as much a direct attack uponLee's army as though we were operating within the sound of hisartillery. 

I am very anxious that Thomas should follow up his success to thevery utmost point. My orders to him before I left Kingston were, after beating Hood, to follow him as far as Columbus, Mississippi, or Selma, Alabama, both of which lie in districts of country whichare rich in corn and meat. 

I attach more importance to these deep incisions into the enemy'scountry, because this war differs from European wars in thisparticular: we are not only fighting hostile armies, but a hostilepeople, and must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hardhand of war, as well as their organized armies. I know that thisrecent movement of mine through Georgia has had a wonderful effectin this respect. Thousands who had been deceived by their lyingnewspapers to believe that we were being whipped all the time nowrealize the truth, and have no appetite for a repetition of thesame experience. To be sure, Jeff. Davis has his people underpretty good discipline, but I think faith in him is much shaken inGeorgia, and before we have done with her South Carolina will notbe quite so tempestuous. 

I will bear in mind your hint as to Charleston, and do not think"salt" will be necessary. When I move, the Fifteenth Corps will beon the right of the right wing, and their position will naturallybring them into Charleston first; and, if you have watched thehistory of that corps, you will have remarked that they generallydo their work pretty well. The truth is, the whole army is burningwith an insatiable desire to wreak vengeance upon South Carolina. I almost tremble at her fate, but feel that she deserves all thatseems in store for her. 

Many and many a person in Georgia asked me why we did not go toSouth Carolina; and, when I answered that we were enroute for thatState, the invariable reply was, "Well, if you will make thosepeople feel the utmost severities of war, we will pardon you foryour desolation of Georgia. "

I look upon Colombia as quite as bad as Charleston, and I doubt ifwe shall spare the public buildings there as we did atMilledgeville. 

I have been so busy lately that I have not yet made my officialreport, and I think I had better wait until I get my subordinatereports before attempting it, as I am anxious to explain clearlynot only the reasons for every step, but the amount of executiondone, and this I cannot do until I get the subordinate reports; forwe marched the whole distance in four or more columns, and, ofcourse, I could only be present with one, and generally that oneengaged in destroying railroads. This work of destruction wasperformed better than usual, because I had an engineer-regiment, provided with claws to twist the bars after being heated. Suchbars can never be used again, and the only way in which a railroadline can be reconstructed across Georgia is, to make a new roadfrom Fairburn Station (twenty-four miles southwest of Atlanta) toMadison, a distance of one hundred miles; and, before that can bedone, I propose to be on the road from Augusta to Charleston, whichis a continuation of the same. I felt somewhat disappointed atHardee's escape, but really am not to blame. I moved as quickly aspossible to close up the "Union Causeway, " but interveningobstacles were such that, before I could get troops on the road, Hardee had slipped out. Still, I know that the men that were inSavannah will be lost in a measure to Jeff. Davis, for the Georgiatroops, under G. W. Smith, declared they would not fight in SouthCarolina, and they have gone north, en route for Augusta, and Ihave reason to believe the North Carolina troops have gone toWilmington; in other words, they are scattered. I have reason tobelieve that Beauregard was present in Savannah at the time of itsevacuation, and think that he and Hardee are now in Charleston, making preparations for what they suppose will be my next step. 

Please say to the President that I have received his kind message(through Colonel Markland), and feel thankful for his high favor. If I disappoint him in the future, it shall not be from want ofzeal or love to the cause. 

From you I expect a full and frank criticism of my plans for thefuture, which may enable me to correct errors before it is toolate. I do not wish to be rash, but want to give my rebel friendsno chance to accuse us of want of enterprise or courage. 

Assuring you of my high personal respect, I remain, as ever, yourfriend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

[General Order No. 3. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICEWASHINGTON, January 14, 1865. 

The following resolution of the Senate and House of Representativesis published to the army:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION--No. 4. ]

Joint resolution tendering the thanks of the people and of Congressto Major-General William T. Sherman, and the officers and soldiersof his command, for their gallant conduct in their late brilliantmovement through Georgia. 

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of theUnited States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks ofthe people and of the Congress of the United States are due and arehereby tendered to Major-General William T. Sherman, and throughhim to the officers and men under his command, for their gallantryand good conduct in their late campaign from Chattanooga toAtlanta, and the triumphal march thence through Georgia toSavannah, terminating in the capture and occupation of that city;and that the President cause a copy of this joint resolution to beengrossed and forwarded to Major-General Sherman. 

Approved, January 10, 1865. 

By order of the Secretary of War, W. A. NICHOLS, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

SAVANNAH AND POCOTALIGO. 

DECEMBER, 1884, AND JANUARY, 1885. 

The city of Savannah was an old place, and usually accounted ahandsome one. Its houses were of brick or frame, with large yards, ornamented with shrubbery and flowers; its streets perfectlyregular, crossing each other at right angles; and at many of theintersections were small inclosures in the nature of parks. Thesestreets and parks were lined with the handsomest shade-trees ofwhich I have knowledge, viz. , the Willow-leaf live-oak, evergreensof exquisite beauty; and these certainly entitled Savannah to itsreputation as a handsome town more than the houses, which, thoughcomfortable, would hardly make a display on Fifth Avenue or theBoulevard Haussmann of Paris. The city was built on a plateau ofsand about forty feet above the level of the sea, abutting againstthe river, leaving room along its margin for a street of stores andwarehouses. The customhouse, court-house, post-office, etc. , wereon the plateau above. In rear of Savannah was a large park, with afountain, and between it and the court-house was a handsomemonument, erected to the memory of Count Pulaski, who fell in 1779in the assault made on the city at the time it was held by theEnglish during the Revolutionary War. Outside of Savannah therewas very little to interest a stranger, except the cemetery ofBonaventura, and the ride along the Wilmington Channel by way ofThunderbolt, where might be seen some groves of the majesticlive-oak trees, covered with gray and funereal moss, which weretruly sublime in grandeur, but gloomy after a few days' campingunder them:

Within an hour of taking up my quarters in Mr. Green's house, Mr. A. G. Browne, of Salem, Massachusetts, United States Treasury agentfor the Department of the South, made his appearance to claimpossession, in the name of the Treasury Department, of all capturedcotton, rice, buildings, etc. Having use for these articlesourselves, and having fairly earned them, I did not feel inclinedto surrender possession, and explained to him that thequartermaster and commissary could manage them more to my likingthan he; but I agreed, after the proper inventories had beenprepared, if there remained any thing for which we had no specialuse, I would turn it over to him. It was then known that in thewarehouses were stored at least twenty-five thousand bales ofcotton, and in the forts one hundred and fifty large, heavysea-coast guns: although afterward, on a more careful count, thereproved to be more than two hundred and fifty sea-coast or siegeguns, and thirty-one thousand bales of cotton. At that interviewMr. Browne, who was a shrewd, clever Yankee, told me that a vesselwas on the point of starting for Old Point Comfort, and, if she hadgood weather off Cape Hatteras, would reach Fortress Monroe byChristmas-day, and he suggested that I might make it the occasionof sending a welcome Christmas gift to the President, Mr. Lincoln, who peculiarly enjoyed such pleasantry. I accordingly sat down andwrote on a slip of paper, to be left at the telegraph-office atFortress Monroe for transmission, the following:

SAVANNAH GEORGIA, December 22, 1884. To His Excellency President Lincoln, Washington, D. C. :

I beg to present you as a Christmas-gift the city of Savannah, withone hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, alsoabout twenty five thousand bales of cotton. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

This message actually reached him on Christmas-eve, was extensivelypublished in the newspapers, and made many a household unusuallyhappy on that festive day; and it was in the answer to thisdispatch that Mr. Lincoln wrote me the letter of December 28th, already given, beginning with the words, "many, many thanks, " etc. , which he sent at the hands of General John A. Logan, who happenedto be in Washington, and was coming to Savannah, to rejoin hiscommand. 

On the 23d of December were made the following general orders forthe disposition of the troops in and about Savannah:

[Special Field Order No. 139. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 23, 1864. 

Savannah, being now in our possession, the river partially clearedout, and measures having been taken to remove all obstructions, will at once be made a grand depot for future operations:

1. The chief-quartermaster, General Euston, will, after giving thenecessary orders touching the transports in Ogeechee River andOasabaw Sound, come in person to Savannah, and take possession ofall public buildings, vacant storerooms, warehouses, etc. , that maybe now or hereafter needed for any department of the army. Norents will be paid by the Government of the United States duringthe war, and all buildings must be distributed according to theaccustomed rates of the Quartermaster's Department, as though theywere public property. 

2. The chief commissary of subsistence, Colonel A. Beckwith, willtransfer the grand depot of the army to the city of Savannah, secure possession of the needful buildings and offices, and givethe necessary orders, to the end that the army may be suppliedabundantly and well. 

S. The chief-engineer, Captain Poe, will at once direct which ofthe enemy's forts are to be retained for our use, and whichdismantled and destroyed. The chief ordnance-officer, CaptainBaylor, will in like manner take possession of all propertypertaining to his department captured from the enemy, and cause thesame to be collected and conveyed to points of security; all theheavy coast-guns will be dismounted and carried to Fort Pulaski. 

4. The troops, for the present, will be grouped about the city ofSavannah, looking to convenience of camps; General Slocum takingfrom the Savannah River around to the seven-mile post on the Canal, and General Howard thence to the sea; General Kilpatrick will holdKing's Bridge until Fort McAllister is dismantled, and the troopswithdrawn from the south side of the Ogeechee, when he will takepost about Anderson's plantation, on the plank-road, and picket allthe roads leading from the north and west. 

5. General Howard will keep a small guard at Forts Rosedale, Beaulieu, Wimberley, Thunderbolt, and Bonaventura, and he willcause that shore and Skidaway Island to be examined very closely, with a view to finding many and convenient points for theembarkation of troops and wagons on seagoing vessels. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

[Special Field Order No. 143. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 26, 1864. 

The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as amilitary post, and adapted to future military uses, but, as itcontains a population of some twenty thousand people, who must beprovided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to laydown certain general principles, that all within its militaryjurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations. 

1. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and, where interests clash, the civil must give way; yet, where there isno conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposedand peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits. Familiesshould be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, andtradesmen allowed the free use of their shops, tools, etc. ;churches, schools, and all places of amusement and recreation, should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe topersons in their pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within theline of outer pickets, but if any person shall abuse theseprivileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act ofhostility to the Government of the United States, he or she will bepunished with the utmost rigor of the law. Commerce with the outerworld will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants ofthe citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of theTreasury Department. 

2. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may givesuitable employment to the people, white and black, or transportthem to such points as they may choose where employment can be had;and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacanthouses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can helpthemselves. They will select first the buildings for the necessaryuses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores, to be turnedover to the Treasury agent for trade-stores. All vacantstore-houses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absentrebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States, until such time as their titles can be settled by the courts of theUnited States. 

8. The Mayor and City Council of Savannah will continue toexercise their functions, and will, in concert with the commandingofficer of the post and the chief-quartermaster, see that thefire-companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned andlighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens andsoldiers. They will ascertain and report to the chief commissaryof subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthyfamilies that need assistance and support. The mayor will forthwith give public notice that the time has come when all must choosetheir course, viz. , remain within our lines, and conduct themselvesas good citizens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the namesof all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names andresidence to the chief-quartermaster, that measures may be taken totransport them beyond our lines. 

4. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah;their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictestaccountability, and will be punished severely, in person andproperty, for any libelous publication, mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whateverupon the acts of the constituted authorities; they will be heldaccountable for such articles, even though copied from otherpapers. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

It was estimated that there were about twenty thousand inhabitantsin Savannah, all of whom had participated more or less in the war, and had no special claims to our favor, but I regarded the war asrapidly drawing to a close, and it was becoming a politicalquestion as to what was to be done with the people of the South, both white and black, when the war was actually over. I concludedto give them the option to remain or to join their friends inCharleston or Augusta, and so announced in general orders. Themayor, Dr. Arnold, was completely "subjugated, " and, afterconsulting with him, I authorized him to assemble his City Councilto take charge generally of the interests of the people; but warnedall who remained that they must be strictly subordinate to themilitary law, and to the interests of the General Government. About two hundred persona, mostly the families of men in theConfederate army, prepared to follow the fortunes of their husbandsand fathers, and these were sent in a steamboat under a flag oftruce, in charge of my aide Captain Audenried, to Charlestonharbor, and there delivered to an officer of the Confederate army. But the great bulk of the inhabitants chose to remain in Savannah, generally behaved with propriety, and good social relations at oncearose between them and the army. Shortly after our occupation ofSavannah, a lady was announced at my headquarters by the orderly orsentinel at the front-door, who was ushered into the parlor, andproved to be the wife of General G. W. Smith, whom I had knownabout 1850, when Smith was on duty at West Point. She was a nativeof New London, Connecticut, and very handsome. She began herinterview by presenting me a letter from her husband, who thencommanded a division of the Georgia militia in the rebel army, which had just quitted Savannah, which letter began, "DEAR SHERMAN:The fortunes of war, etc-. , compel me to leave my wife in Savannah, and I beg for her your courteous protection, " etc. , etc. Iinquired where she lived, and if anybody was troubling her. Shesaid she was boarding with a lady whose husband had, in like mannerwith her own, gone off with Hardee's army; that a part of the househad been taken for the use of Major-General Ward, of Kentucky; thather landlady was approaching her confinement, and was nervous atthe noise which the younger staff-officers made at night; etc. Iexplained to her that I could give but little personal attention tosuch matters, and referred her to General Slocum, whose troopsoccupied the city. I afterward visited her house, and saw, personally, that she had no reason to complain. Shortly afterwardMr. Hardee, a merchant of Savannah, came to me and presented aletter from his brother, the general, to the same effect, allegingthat his brother was a civilian, had never taken up arms, and askedof me protection for his family, his cotton, etc. To him I gavethe general assurance that no harm was designed to any of thepeople of Savannah who would remain quiet and peaceable, but that Icould give him no guarantee as to his cotton, for over it I had noabsolute control; and yet still later I received a note from thewife of General A. P. Stewart (who commanded a corps in Hood'sarmy), asking me to come to see her. This I did, and found her tobe a native of Cincinnati, Ohio, wanting protection, and who wasnaturally anxious about the fate of her husband, known to be withGeneral Hood, in Tennessee, retreating before General Thomas. Iremember that I was able to assure her that he had not been killedor captured, up to that date, and think that I advised her, insteadof attempting to go in pursuit of her husband, to go to Cincinnati, to her uncle, Judge Storer, there await the issue of events. 

Before I had reached Savannah, and during our stay there, the rebelofficers and newspapers represented the conduct of the men of ourarmy as simply infamous; that we respected neither age nor sex;that we burned every thing we came across--barns, stables, cotton-gins, and even dwelling-houses; that we ravished the womenand killed the men, and perpetrated all manner of outrages on theinhabitants. Therefore it struck me as strange that GeneralsHardee and Smith should commit their, families to our custody, andeven bespeak our personal care and attention. These officers knewwell that these reports were exaggerated in the extreme, and yettacitly assented to these publications, to arouse the droopingenergies of the people of the South. 

As the division of Major-General John W. Geary, of the TwentiethCorps, was the first to enter Savannah, that officer was appointedto command the place, or to act as a sort of governor. He verysoon established a good police, maintained admirable order, and Idoubt if Savannah, either before or since, has had a bettergovernment than during our stay. The guard-mountings and parades, as well as the greater reviews, became the daily resorts of theladies, to hear the music of our excellent bands; schools wereopened, and the churches every Sunday were well filled with mostdevout and respectful congregations; stores were reopened, andmarkets for provisions, meat, wood, etc. , were established, so thateach family, regardless of race, color, or opinion, could procureall the necessaries and even luxuries of life, provided they hadmoney. Of course, many families were actually destitute of this, and to these were issued stores from our own stock of supplies. Iremember to have given to Dr. Arnold, the mayor, an order for thecontents of a large warehouse of rice, which he confided to acommittee of gentlemen, who went North (to Boston), and soonreturned with one or more cargoes of flour, hams, sugar, coffee, etc. , for gratuitous distribution, which relieved the most pressingwants until the revival of trade and business enabled the people toprovide for themselves. 

A lady, whom I had known in former years as Miss Josephine Goodwin, told me that, with a barrel of flour and some sugar which she hadreceived gratuitously from the commissary, she had baked cakes andpies, in the sale of which she realized a profit of fifty-sixdollars. 

Meantime Colonel Poe had reconnoitred and laid off new lines ofparapet, which would enable a comparatively small garrison to holdthe place, and a heavy detail of soldiers was put to work thereon;Generals Easton and Beckwith had organized a complete depot ofsupplies; and, though vessels arrived almost daily with mails andprovisions, we were hardly ready to initiate a new and hazardouscampaign. I had not yet received from General Grant or GeneralHalleck any modification of the orders of December 6, 1864, toembark my command for Virginia by sea; but on the 2d of January, 1865, General J. G. Barnard, United States Engineers, arriveddirect from General Grant's headquarters, bearing the followingletter, in the general's own handwriting, which, with my answer, ishere given:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 27, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Before writing you definite instructions for the nextcampaign, I wanted to receive your answer to my letter written fromWashington. Your confidence in being able to march up and jointhis army pleases me, and I believe it can be done. The effect ofsuch a campaign will be to disorganize the South, and prevent theorganization of new armies from their broken fragments. Hood isnow retreating, with his army broken and demoralized. His loss inmen has probably not been far from twenty thousand, besidesdeserters. If time is given, the fragments may be collectedtogether and many of the deserters reassembled. If we can, weshould act to prevent this. Your spare army, as it were, moving asproposed, will do it. 

In addition to holding Savannah, it looks to me that an intrenchedcamp ought to be held on the railroad between Savannah andCharleston. Your movement toward Branchville will probably enableFoster to reach this with his own force. This will give us aposition in the South from which we can threaten the interiorwithout marching over long, narrow causeways, easily defended, aswe have heretofore been compelled to do. Could not such a camp beestablished about Pocotaligo or Coosawhatchie?

I have thought that, Hood being so completely wiped out for presentharm, I might bring A. J. Smith here, with fourteen to fifteenthousand men. With this increase I could hold my lines, and moveout with a greater force than Lee has. It would compel Lee toretain all his present force in the defenses of Richmond or abandonthem entirely. This latter contingency is probably the only dangerto the easy success of your expedition. In the event you shouldmeet Lee's army, you would be compelled to beat it or find thesea-coast. Of course, I shall not let Lee's army escape if I canhelp it, and will not let it go without following to the best of myability. 

Without waiting further directions, than, you may make yourpreparations to start on your northern expedition without delay. Break up the railroads in South and North Carolina, and join thearmies operating against Richmond as soon as you can. I will leaveout all suggestions about the route you should take, knowing thatyour information, gained daily in the course of events, will bebetter than any that can be obtained now. 

It may not be possible for you to march to the rear of Petersburg;but, failing in this, you could strike either of the sea-coastports in North Carolina held by us. From there you could takeshipping. It would be decidedly preferable, however, if you couldmarch the whole distance. 

From the best information I have, you will find no difficulty insupplying your army until you cross the Roanoke. From there hereis but a few days' march, and supplies could be collected south ofthe river to bring you through. I shall establish communicationwith you there, by steamboat and gunboat. By this means your wantscan be partially supplied. I shall hope to hear from you soon, andto hear your plan, and about the time of starting. 

Please instruct Foster to hold on to all the property in Savannah, and especially the cotton. Do not turn it over to citizens orTreasury agents, without orders of the War Department. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 2, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point. 

GENERAL: I have received, by the hands of General Barnard, yournote of 26th and letter of 27th December. 

I herewith inclose to you a copy of a projet which I have thismorning, in strict confidence, discussed with my immediatecommanders. 

I shall need, however, larger supplies of stores, especially grain. I will inclose to you, with this, letters from General Easton, quartermaster, and Colonel Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, setting forth what will be required, and trust you will forwardthem to Washington with your sanction, so that the necessary stepsmay be taken at once to enable me to carry out this plan on time. 

I wrote you very fully on the 24th, and have nothing to add. Everything here is quiet, and if I can get the necessary supplies in ourwagons, shall be ready to start at the time indicated in my projet(January 15th). But, until those supplies are in hand, I can donothing; after they are, I shall be ready to move with greatrapidity. 

I have heard of the affair at Cape Fear. It has turned out as youwill remember I expected. 

I have furnished General Easton a copy of the dispatch from theSecretary of War. He will retain possession of all cotton here, and ship it as fast as vessels can be had to New York. 

I shall immediately send the Seventeenth Corps over to Port Royal, by boats, to be furnished by Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster(without interfering with General Easton's vessels), to make alodgment on the railroad at Pocotaligo. 

General Barnard will remain with me a few days, and I send this bya staff-officer, who can return on one of the vessels of thesupply-fleet. I suppose that, now that General Butler has gotthrough with them, you can spare them to us. 

My report of recent operations is nearly ready, and will be sentyou in a day or two, as soon as some farther subordinate reportscome in. 

I am, with great respect, very truly, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

[Entirely confidential]

PROJET FOR JANUARY. 

1. Right wing to move men and artillery by transports to head ofBroad River and Beaufort; reestablish Port Royal Ferry, and massthe wing at or in the neighborhood of Pocotaligo. 

Left wing and cavalry to work slowly across the causeway towardHardeeville, to open a road by which wagons can reach their corpsabout Broad River; also, by a rapid movement of the left, to secureSister's Ferry, and Augusta road out to Robertsville. 

In the mean time, all guns, shot, shell, cotton, etc. , to be movedto a safe place, easy to guard, and provisions and wagons got readyfor another swath, aiming to have our army in hand about the headof Broad River, say Pocotaligo, Robertsville, and Coosawhatchie, bythe 15th January. 

2. The whole army to move with loaded wagons by the roads leadingin the direction of Columbia, which afford the best chance offorage and provisions. Howard to be at Pocotaligo by the 15thJanuary, and Slocum to be at Robertsville, and Kilpatrick at ornear Coosawhatchie about the same date. General Fosters troops tooccupy Savannah, and gunboats to protect the rivers as soon asHoward gets Pocotaligo. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

Therefore, on the 2d of January, I was authorized to march with myentire army north by land, and concluded at once to secure afoothold or starting-point on the South Carolina side, selectingPocotaligo and Hardeeville as the points of rendezvous for the twowings; but I still remained in doubt as to the wishes of theAdministration, whether I should take Charleston en route, orconfine my whole attention to the incidental advantages of breakingup the railways of South and North Carolina, and the greater objectof uniting my army with that of General Grant before Richmond. 

General Barnard remained with me several days, and was regardedthen, as now, one of the first engineers of the age, perfectlycompetent to advise me on the strategy and objects of the newcampaign. He expressed himself delighted with the high spirit ofthe army, the steps already taken, by which we had capturedSavannah, and he personally inspected some of the forts, such asThunderbolt and Causten's Bluff, by which the enemy had so longheld at bay the whole of our navy, and had defeated the previousattempts made in April, 1862, by the army of General Gillmore, which had bombarded and captured Fort Pulaski, but had failed toreach the city of Savannah. I think General Barnard expected me toinvite him to accompany us northward in his official capacity; butColonel Poe, of my staff, had done so well, and was so perfectlycompetent, that I thought it unjust to supersede him by a senior inhis own corps. I therefore said nothing of this to GeneralBarnard, and soon after he returned to his post with General Grant, at City Point, bearing letters and full personal messages of oursituation and wants. 

We were very much in want of light-draught steamers for navigatingthe shallow waters of the coast, so that it took the SeventeenthCorps more than a week to transfer from Thunderbolt to Beaufort, South Carolina. Admiral Dahlgren had supplied the Harvest Moon andthe Pontiac, and General Foster gave us a couple of hired steamers;I was really amused at the effect this short sea-voyage had on ourmen, most of whom had never before looked upon the ocean. Ofcourse, they were fit subjects for sea-sickness, and afterward theybegged me never again to send them to sea, saying they would rathermarch a thousand miles on the worst roads of the South than tospend a single night on the ocean. By the 10th General Howard hadcollected the bulk of the Seventeenth Corps (General Blair) onBeaufort Island, and began his march for Pocotaligo, twenty-fivemiles inland. They crossed the channel between the island andmain-land during Saturday, the 14th of January, by a pontoon-bridge, and marched out to Garden's Corners, where there was somelight skirmishing; the next day, Sunday, they continued on toPocotaligo, finding the strong fort there abandoned, andaccordingly made a lodgment on the railroad, having lost only twoofficers and eight men. 

About the same time General Slocum crossed two divisions of theTwentieth Corps over the Savannah River, above the city, occupiedHardeeville by one division and Purysburg by another. Thus, by themiddle of January, we had effected a lodgment in South Carolina, and were ready to resume the march northward; but we had not yetaccumulated enough provisions and forage to fill the wagons, andother causes of delay occurred, of which I will make mention in dueorder. 

On the last day of December, 1864, Captain Breese, United StatesNavy, flag-officer to Admiral Porter, reached Savannah, bringingthe first news of General Butler's failure at Fort Fisher, and thatthe general had returned to James River with his land-forces, leaving Admiral Porter's fleet anchored off Cape Fear, in thattempestuous season. Captain Breese brought me a letter from theadmiral, dated December 29th, asking me to send him from Savannahone of my old divisions, with which he said he would make shortwork of Fort Fisher; that he had already bombarded and silenced itsguns, and that General Butler had failed because he was afraid toattack, or even give the order to attack, after (as Porterinsisted) the guns of Fort Fisher had been actually silenced by thenavy. 

I answered him promptly on the 31st of December, that I proposed tomarch north inland, and that I would prefer to leave the rebelgarrisons on the coast, instead of dislodging and piling them up inmy front as we progressed. From the chances, as I then understoodthem, I supposed that Fort Fisher was garrisoned by a comparativelysmall force, while the whole division of General Hoke remainedabout the city of Wilmington; and that, if Fort Fisher werecaptured, it would leave General Hoke free to join the larger forcethat would naturally be collected to oppose my progress northward. I accordingly answered Admiral Porter to this effect, declining toloan him the use of one of my divisions. It subsequentlytranspired, however, that, as soon as General Butler reached CityPoint, General Grant was unwilling to rest under a sense offailure, and accordingly dispatched back the same troops, reenforced and commanded by General A. H. Terry, who, on the 15thday of January, successfully assaulted and captured Fort Fisher, with its entire garrison. After the war was over, about the 20thof May, when I was giving my testimony before the CongressionalCommittee on the Conduct of the War, the chairman of the committee, Senator B. F. Wade, of Ohio, told me that General Butler had beensummoned before that committee during the previous January, and hadjust finished his demonstration to their entire satisfaction thatFort Fisher could not be carried by assault, when they heard thenewsboy in the hall crying out an "extra" Calling him in, theyinquired the news, and he answered, "Fort Fisher done took!" Ofcourse, they all laughed, and none more heartily than GeneralButler himself. 

On the 11th of January there arrived at Savannah a revenue-cutter, having on board Simeon Draper, Esq. , of New York City, the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Quartermaster-General Meigs, Adjutant-General Townsend, and a retinue of civilians, who had comedown from the North to regulate the civil affairs of Savannah.... 

I was instructed by Mr. Stanton to transfer to Mr. Draper thecustom house, post-office, and such other public buildings as thesecivilians needed in the execution of their office, and to cause tobe delivered into their custody the captured cotton. This wasaccomplished by--

[Special Field Orders, No. 10. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 12, 1865. 

1. Brevet Brigadier-General Euston, chief-quartermaster, will turnover to Simeon Draper, Esq. , agent of the United States TreasuryDepartment, all cotton now in the city of Savannah, prize of war, taking his receipt for the same in gross, and returning for it tothe quartermaster-general. He will also afford Mr. Draper all thefacilities in his power in the way of transportation, labor, etc. , to enable him to handle the cotton with expedition. 

2. General Euston will also turn over to Mr. Draper thecustom-house, and such other buildings in the city of Savannah ashe may need in the execution of his office. 

By order of General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp. 

Up to this time all the cotton had been carefully guarded, withorders to General Euston to ship it by the return-vessels to NewYork, for the adjudication of the nearest prize-court, accompaniedwith invoices and all evidence of title to ownership. Marks, numbers, and other figures, were carefully preserved on the bales, so that the court might know the history of each bale. But Mr. Stanton, who surely was an able lawyer, changed all this, andordered the obliteration of all the marks; so that no man, friendor foe, could trace his identical cotton. I thought it strange atthe time, and think it more so now; for I am assured that claims, real and fictitious, have been proved up against this identicalcotton of three times the quantity actually captured, and thatreclamations on the Treasury have been allowed for more than theactual quantity captured, viz. , thirty-one thousand bales. 

Mr. Stanton staid in Savannah several days, and seemed very curiousabout matters and things in general. I walked with him through thecity, especially the bivouacs of the several regiments thatoccupied the vacant squares, and he seemed particularly pleased atthe ingenuity of the men in constructing their temporary huts. Four of the "dog-tents, " or tentes d'abri, buttoned together, served for a roof, and the sides were made of clapboards, or roughboards brought from demolished houses or fences. I remember hismarked admiration for the hut of a soldier who had made his doorout of a handsome parlor mirror, the glass gone and its gilt frameserving for his door. 

He talked to me a great deal about the negroes, the former slaves, and I told him of many interesting incidents, illustrating theirsimple character and faith in our arms and progress. He inquiredparticularly about General Jeff. C. Davis, who, he said, was aDemocrat, and hostile to the negro. I assured him that GeneralDavis was an excellent soldier, and I did not believe he had anyhostility to the negro; that in our army we had no negro soldiers, and, as a rule, we preferred white soldiers, but that we employed alarge force of them as servants, teamsters, and pioneers, who hadrendered admirable service. He then showed me a newspaper accountof General Davis taking up his pontoon-bridge across EbenezerCreek, leaving sleeping negro men, women, and children, on theother side, to be slaughtered by Wheeler's cavalry. I had heardsuch a rumor, and advised Mr. Stanton, before becoming prejudiced, to allow me to send for General Davis, which he did, and GeneralDavis explained the matter to his entire satisfaction. The truthwas, that, as we approached the seaboard, the freedmen in droves, old and young, followed the several columns to reach a place ofsafety. It so happened that General Davis's route into Savannahfollowed what was known as the "River-road, " and he had to makeconstant use of his pontoon-train--the head of his column reachingsome deep, impassable creek before the rear was fairly overanother. He had occasionally to use the pontoons both day andnight. On the occasion referred to, the bridge was taken up fromEbenezer Creek while some of the camp-followers remained asleep onthe farther side, and these were picked up by Wheeler's cavalry. Some of them, in their fright, were drowned in trying to swim over, and others may have been cruelly killed by Wheeler's men, but thiswas a mere supposition. At all events, the same thing might haveresulted to General Howard, or to any other of the many most humanecommanders who filled the army. General Jeff. C. Davis wasstrictly a soldier, and doubtless hated to have his wagons andcolumns encumbered by these poor negroes, for whom we all feltsympathy, but a sympathy of a different sort from that of Mr. Stanton, which was not of pure humanity, but of politics. Thenegro question was beginning to loom up among the politicaleventualities of the day, and many foresaw that not only would theslaves secure their freedom, but that they would also have votes. I did not dream of such a result then, but knew that slavery, assuch, was dead forever, and did not suppose that the former slaveswould be suddenly, without preparation, manufactured into voters, equal to all others, politically and socially. Mr. Stanton seemeddesirous of coming into contact with the negroes to confer withthem, and he asked me to arrange an interview for him. Iaccordingly sent out and invited the most intelligent of thenegroes, mostly Baptist and Methodist preachers, to come to myrooms to meet the Secretary of War. Twenty responded, and werereceived in my room up-stairs in Mr. Green's house, where Mr. Stanton and Adjutant-General Townsend took down the conversation inthe form of questions and answers. Each of the twenty gave hisname and partial history, and then selected Garrison Frazier astheir spokesman:

First Question. State what your understanding is in regard to theacts of Congress and President Lincoln's proclamation touching thecolored people in the rebel States?

Answer. So far as I understand President Lincoln's proclamation tothe rebel States, it is, that if they will lay down their arms andsubmit to the laws of the United States, before the 1st of January, 1863, all should be well; but if they did not, then all the slavesin the Southern States should be free, henceforth and forever. That is what I understood. 

Second Question. State what you understand by slavery, and thefreedom that was to be given by the President's proclamation?

Answer. Slavery is receiving by irresistible power the work ofanother man, and not by his consent. The freedom, as I understandit, promised by the proclamation, is taking us from under the yokeof bondage and placing us where we can reap the fruit of our ownlabor, and take care of ourselves and assist the Government inmaintaining our freedom. 

Fourth Question. State in what manner you would rather live--whether scattered among the whites, or in colonies by yourselves?

Answer. I would prefer to live by ourselves, for there is aprejudice against us in the South that will take years to get over;but I do not know that I can answer for my brethren. 

(All but Mr. Lynch, a missionary from the North, agreed withFrazier, but he thought they ought to live together, along with thewhites. )

Eighth Question. If the rebel leaders were to arm the slaves, whatwould be its effect?

Answer. I think they would fight as long as they were before the"bayonet, " and just as soon as they could get away they woulddesert, in my opinion. 

Tenth Question. Do you understand the mode of enlistment ofcolored persons in the rebel States by State agents, under the actof Congress; if yea, what is your understanding?

Answer. My understanding is, that colored persons enlisted byState agents are enlisted as substitutes, and give credit to theState and do not swell the army, because every black man enlistedby a State agent leaves a white man at home; and also that largerbounties are given, or promised, by the State agents than are givenby the United States. The great object should be to push throughthis rebellion the shortest way; and there seems to be somethingwanting in the enlistment by State agents, for it don't strengthenthe army, but takes one away for every colored man enlisted. 

Eleventh Question. State what, in your opinion, is the best way toenlist colored men as soldiers?

Answer. I think, sir, that all compulsory operations should be puta stop to. The ministers would talk to them, and the young menwould enlist. It is my opinion that it world be far better for theState agents to stay at home and the enlistments be made for theUnited States under the direction of General Sherman. 

Up to this time I was present, and, on Mr. Stanton's intimatingthat he wanted to ask some questions affecting me, I withdrew, andthen he put the twelfth and last question. 

Twelfth Question. State what is the feeling of the colored peopletoward General Sherman, and how far do they regard his sentimentsand actions as friendly to their rights and interests, orotherwise. 

Answer. We looked upon General Sherman, prior to his arrival, as aman, in the providence of God, specially set apart to accomplishthis work, and we unanimously felt inexpressible gratitude to him, looking upon him as a man who should be honored for the faithfulperformance of his duty. Some of us called upon him immediatelyupon his arrival, and it is probable he did not meet the secretarywith more courtesy than he did us. His conduct and deportmenttoward us characterized him as a friend and gentleman. We haveconfidence in General Sherman, and think what concerns us could notbe in better hands. This is our opinion now, from the shortacquaintance and intercourse we have had. 

It certainly was a strange fact that the great War Secretary shouldhave catechized negroes concerning the character of a general whohad commanded a hundred thousand men in battle, had captured citiesconducted sixty-five thousand men successfully across four hundredmiles of hostile territory, and had just brought tens of thousandsof freedmen to a place of security; but because I had not loadeddown my army by other hundreds of thousands of poor negroes, I wasconstrued by others as hostile to the black race. I had receivedfrom General Halleck, at Washington, a letter warning me that therewere certain influential parties near the President who weretorturing him with suspicions of my fidelity to him and his negropolicy; but I shall always believe that Mr. Lincoln, though acivilian, knew better, and appreciated my motives and character. Though this letter of General Halleck has always been treated by meas confidential, I now insert it here at length:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, D. C. , December 30, 1864. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah. 

MY DEAR GENERAL: I take the liberty of calling your attention, inthis private and friendly way, to a matter which may possiblyhereafter be of more importance to you than either of us may nowanticipate. 

While almost every one is praising your great march throughGeorgia, and the capture of Savannah, there is a certain classhaving now great influence with the President, and very probablyanticipating still more on a change of cabinet, who are decidedlydisposed to make a point against you. I mean in regard to"inevitable Sambo. " They say that you have manifested an almostcriminal dislike to the negro, and that you are not willing tocarry out the wishes of the Government in regard to him, butrepulse him with contempt! They say you might have brought with youto Savannah more than fifty thousand, thus stripping Georgia ofthat number of laborers, and opening a road by which as many morecould have escaped from their masters; but that, instead of this, you drove them from your ranks, prevented their following you bycutting the bridges in your rear, and thus caused the massacre oflarge numbers by Wheeler's cavalry. 

To those who know you as I do, such accusation will pass as theidle winds, for we presume that you discouraged the negroes fromfollowing you because you had not the means of supporting them, andfeared they might seriously embarrass your march. But there areothers, and among them some in high authority, who think or pretendto think otherwise, and they are decidedly disposed to make a pointagainst you. 

I do not write this to induce you to conciliate this class of menby doing any thing which you do not deem right and proper, and forthe interest of the Government and the country; but simply to callyour attention to certain things which are viewed here somewhatdifferently than from your stand-point. I will explain as brieflyas possible:

Some here think that, in view of the scarcity of labor in theSouth, and the probability that a part, at least, of theable-bodied slaves will be called into the military service of therebels, it is of the greatest importance to open outlets by whichthese slaves can escape into our lines, and they say that the routeyou have passed over should be made the route of escape, andSavannah the great place of refuge. These, I know, are the viewsof some of the leading men in the Administration, and they nowexpress dissatisfaction that you did not carry them out in yourgreat raid. 

Now that you are in possession of Savannah, and there can be nofurther fears about supplies, would it not be possible for you toreopen these avenues of escape for the negroes, without interferingwith your military operations? Could not such escaped slaves findat least a partial supply of food in the rice-fields aboutSavannah, and cotton plantations on the coast?

I merely throw out these suggestions. I know that such a coursewould be approved by the Government, and I believe that amanifestation on your part of a desire to bring the slaves withinour lines will do much to silence your opponents. You willappreciate my motives in writing this private letter. Yours truly, H. W. HALLECK. 

There is no doubt that Mr. Stanton, when he reached Savannah, shared these thoughts, but luckily the negroes themselves convincedhim that he was in error, and that they understood their owninterests far better than did the men in Washington, who tried tomake political capital out of this negro question. The idea thatsuch men should have been permitted to hang around Mr. Lincoln, totorture his life by suspicions of the officers who were toilingwith the single purpose to bring the war to a successful end, andthereby to liberate all slaves, is a fair illustration of theinfluences that poison a political capital. 

My aim then was, to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, tofollow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dreadus. "Fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. " I did not wantthem to cast in our teeth what General Hood had once done inAtlanta, that we had to call on their slaves to help us to subduethem. But, as regards kindness to the race, encouraging them topatience and forbearance, procuring them food and clothing, andproviding them with land whereon to labor, I assert that no armyever did more for that race than the one I commanded in Savannah. When we reached Savannah, we were beset by ravenous State agentsfrom Hilton Head, who enticed and carried away our servants, andthe corps of pioneers which we had organized, and which had donesuch excellent service. On one occasion, my own aide-de-camp, Colonel Audenried, found at least a hundred poor negroes shut up ina house and pen, waiting for the night, to be conveyed stealthilyto Hilton Head. They appealed to him for protection, alleging thatthey had been told that they must be soldiers, that "Massa Lincoln"wanted them, etc. I never denied the slaves a full opportunity forvoluntary enlistment, but I did prohibit force to be used, for Iknew that the State agents were more influenced by the profit theyderived from the large bounties then being paid than by any love ofcountry or of the colored race. In the language of Mr. Frazier, the enlistment of every black man "did not strengthen the army, buttook away one white man from the ranks. "

During Mr. Stanton's stay in Savannah we discussed this negroquestion very fully; he asked me to draft an order on the subject, in accordance with my own views, that would meet the pressingnecessities of the case, and I did so. We went over this order, No. 15, of January 16, 1865, very carefully. The secretary madesome verbal modifications, when it was approved by him in all itsdetails, I published it, and it went into operation at once. Itprovided fully for the enlistment of colored troops, and gave thefreedmen certain possessory rights to land, which afterward becamematters of judicial inquiry and decision. Of course, the militaryauthorities at that day, when war prevailed, had a perfect right togrant the possession of any vacant land to which they could extendmilitary protection, but we did not undertake to give a fee-simpletitle; and all that was designed by these special field orders wasto make temporary provisions for the freedmen and their familiesduring the rest of the war, or until Congress should take action inthe premises. All that I now propose to assert is, that Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, saw these orders in the rough, andapproved every paragraph thereof, before they were made public:

[Special Field Orders, No. 15. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 16, 1865. 

1. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fieldsalong the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and thecountry bordering the St. John's River, Florida, are reserved andset apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by theacts of war and the proclamation of the President of the UnitedStates. 

2. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville, the blacks may remain in their chosen oraccustomed vocations; but on the islands, and in the settlementshereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unlessmilitary officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permittedto reside; and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will beleft to the freed people themselves, subject only to the UnitedStates military authority, and the acts of Congress. By the lawsof war, and orders of the President of the United States, the negrois free, and must be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected toconscription, or forced military service, save by the writtenorders of the highest military authority of the department, undersuch regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe. Domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics, will be free to select their own work and residence, but the youngand able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiery inthe service of the United States, to contribute their share towardmaintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights ascitizens of the United States. 

Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments, under the orders of the United States militaryauthorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed; according to law. The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of therecruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuringagricultural implements, seed, tools, boots, clothing, and otherarticles necessary for their livelihood. 

8. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families, shalldesire to settle on land, and shall have selected for that purposean island or a locality clearly defined within the limits abovedesignated, the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations willhimself, or, by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, givethem a license to settle such island or district, and afford themsuch assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceableagricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdividethe land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves, and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that eachfamily shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillableground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not morethan eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of whichland the military authorities will afford them protection untilsuch time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shallregulate their title. The quartermaster may, on the requisition ofthe Inspector of Settlements and Plantations, place at the disposalof the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to plybetween the settlements and one or more of the commercial pointsheretofore named, in order to afford the settlers the opportunityto supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of theirland and labor. 

4. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of theUnited States, he may locate his family in any one of thesettlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead, and all otherrights and privileges of a settler, as though present in person. In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage onboard the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of theinland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantagesderived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler asabove defined, or unless absent on Government service, will beentitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlementby virtue of these orders. 

5. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a generalofficer will be detailed as Inspector of Settlements andPlantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements, toregulate their police and general arrangement, and who will furnishpersonally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of thePresident of the United States, a possessory title in writing, giving as near as possible the description of boundaries; and whoshall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether aspossessory. The same general officer will also be charged with theenlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protectingtheir interests while absent from their settlements; and will begoverned by the rules and regulations prescribed by the WarDepartment for such purposes. 

6. Brigadier-General R. Saxton is hereby appointed Inspector ofSettlements and Plantations, and will at once enter on theperformance of his duties. No change is intended or desired in thesettlement now on Beaufort Island, nor will any rights to propertyheretofore acquired be affected thereby. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

I saw a good deal of the secretary socially, during the time of hisvisit to Savannah. He kept his quarters on the revenue-cutter withSimeon Draper, Esq. , which cutter lay at a wharf in the river, buthe came very often to my quarters at Mr. Green's house. Thoughappearing robust and strong, he complained a good deal of internalpains, which he said threatened his life, and would compel him soonto quit public office. He professed to have come from Washingtonpurposely for rest and recreation, and he spoke unreservedly of thebickerings and jealousies at the national capital; of theinterminable quarrels of the State Governors about their quotas, and more particularly of the financial troubles that threatened thevery existence of the Government itself. He said that the price ofevery thing had so risen in comparison with the depreciated money, that there was danger of national bankruptcy, and he appealed tome, as a soldier and patriot, to hurry up matters so as to bringthe war to a close. 

He left for Port Royal about the 15th of January, and promised togo North without delay, so as to hurry back to me the supplies Ihad called for, as indispensable for the prosecution of the nextstage of the campaign. I was quite impatient to get off myself, for a city-life had become dull and tame, and we were all anxiousto get into the pine-woods again, free from the importunities ofrebel women asking for protection, and of the civilians from theNorth who were coming to Savannah for cotton and all sorts ofprofit. 

On the 18th of January General Slocum was ordered to turn over thecity of Savannah to General J. G. Foster, commanding the Departmentof the South, who proposed to retain his own headquarters at HiltonHead, and to occupy Savannah by General Grovers division of theNineteenth Corps, just arrived from James River; and on the nextday, viz. , January 19th, I made the first general orders for themove. 

These were substantially to group the right wing of the army atPocotaligo, already held by the Seventeenth Corps, and the leftwing and cavalry at or near Robertsville, in South Carolina. Thearmy remained substantially the same as during the march fromAtlanta, with the exception of a few changes in the commanders ofbrigades and divisions, the addition of some men who had joinedfrom furlough, and the loss of others from the expiration of theirterm of service. My own personal staff remained the same, with theexception that General W. F. Barry had rejoined us at Savannah, perfectly recovered from his attack of erysipelas, and continuedwith us to the end of the war. Generals Easton and Beckwithremained at Savannah, in charge of their respective depots, withorders to follow and meet us by sea with supplies when we shouldreach the coast at Wilmington or Newbern, North Carolina. 

Of course, I gave out with some ostentation, especially among therebels, that we were going to Charleston or Augusta; but I had longbefore made up my mind to waste no time on either, further than toplay off on their fears, thus to retain for their protection aforce of the enemy which would otherwise concentrate in our front, and make the passage of some of the great rivers that crossed ourroute more difficult and bloody. 

Having accomplished all that seemed necessary, on the 21st ofJanuary, with my entire headquarters, officers, clerks, orderlies, etc. , with wagons and horses, I embarked in a steamer for Beaufort, South Carolina, touching at Hilton Head, to see General Foster. The weather was rainy and bad, but we reached Beaufort safely onthe 23d, and found some of General Blair's troops there. The pinkof his corps (Seventeenth) was, however, up on the railroad aboutPocotaligo, near the head of Broad River, to which their supplieswere carried from Hilton Head by steamboats. General Hatch'sdivision (of General Foster's command) was still at Coosawhatchieor Tullafinny, where the Charleston & Savannah Railroad crosses theriver of that name. All the country between Beaufort andPocotaligo was low alluvial land, cut up by an infinite number ofsalt-water sloughs and freshwater creeks, easily susceptible ofdefense by a small force; and why the enemy had allowed us to makea lodgment at Pocotaligo so easily I did not understand, unless itresulted from fear or ignorance. It seemed to me then that theterrible energy they had displayed in the earlier stages of the warwas beginning to yield to the slower but more certain industry anddiscipline of our Northern men. It was to me manifest that thesoldiers and people of the South entertained an undue fear of ourWestern men, and, like children, they had invented such ghostlikestories of our prowess in Georgia, that they were scared by theirown inventions. Still, this was a power, and I intended to utilizeit. Somehow, our men had got the idea that South Carolina was thecause of all our troubles; her people were the first to fire onFort Sumter, had been in a great hurry to precipitate the countryinto civil war; and therefore on them should fall the scourge ofwar in its worst form. Taunting messages had also come to us, whenin Georgia, to the effect that, when we should reach SouthCarolina, we would find a people less passive, who would fight usto the bitter end, daring us to come over, etc. ; so that I saw andfelt that we would not be able longer to restrain our men as we haddone in Georgia. 

Personally I had many friends in Charleston, to whom I would gladlyhave extended protection and mercy, but they were beyond mypersonal reach, and I would not restrain the army lest its vigorand energy should be impaired; and I had every reason to expectbold and strong resistance at the many broad and deep rivers thatlay across our path. 

General Foster's Department of the South had been enlarged toembrace the coast of North Carolina, so that the few troops servingthere, under the command of General Innis N. Palmer, at Newbern, became subject to my command. General A. H. Terry held FortFisher, and a rumor came that he had taken the city of Wilmington;but this was premature. He had about eight thousand men. GeneralSchofield was also known to be en route from Nashville for NorthCarolina, with the entire Twenty-third Corps, so that I had everyreason to be satisfied that I would receive additional strength aswe progressed northward, and before I should need it. 

General W. J. Hardee commanded the Confederate forces inCharleston, with the Salkiehatchie River as his line of defense. It was also known that General Beauregard had come from thedirection of Tennessee, and had assumed the general command of allthe troops designed to resist our progress. 

The heavy winter rains had begun early in January, rendered theroads execrable, and the Savannah River became so swollen that itfilled its many channels, overflowing the vast extent ofrice-fields that lay on the east bank. This flood delayed ourdeparture two weeks; for it swept away our pontoon-bridge atSavannah, and came near drowning John E. Smith's division of theFifteenth Corps, with several heavy trains of wagons that were enroute from Savannah to Pocotaligo by the old causeway. 

General Slocum had already ferried two of his divisions across theriver, when Sister's Ferry, about forty miles above Savannah, wasselected for the passage of the rest of his wing and ofKilpatrick's cavalry. The troops were in motion for that pointbefore I quitted Savannah, and Captain S. B. Luce, United StatesNavy, had reported to me with a gunboat (the Pontiac) and a coupleof transports, which I requested him to use in protecting Sister'sFerry during the passage of Slocum's wing, and to facilitate thepassage of the troops all he could. The utmost activity prevailedat all points, but it was manifest we could not get off much beforethe 1st day of February; so I determined to go in person toPocotaligo, and there act as though we were bound for Charleston. On the 24th of January I started from Beaufort with a part of mystaff, leaving the rest to follow at leisure, rode across theisland to a pontoon-bridge that spanned the channel between it andthe main-land, and thence rode by Garden's Corners to a plantationnot far from Pocotaligo, occupied by General Blair. There we founda house, with a majestic avenue of live-oaks, whose limbs had beencut away by the troops for firewood, and desolation marked one ofthose splendid South Carolina estates where the proprietorsformerly had dispensed a hospitality that distinguished the oldregime of that proud State. I slept on the floor of the house, butthe night was so bitter cold that I got up by the fire severaltimes, and when it burned low I rekindled it with an oldmantel-clock and the wreck of a bedstead which stood in a corner ofthe room--the only act of vandalism that I recall done by myselfpersonally during the war. 

The next morning I rode to Pocotaligo, and thence reconnoitred ourentire line down to Coosawhatchie. Pocotaligo Fort was on low, alluvial ground, and near it began the sandy pine-land whichconnected with the firm ground extending inland, constituting thechief reason for its capture at the very first stage of thecampaign. Hatch's division was ordered to that point fromCoosawhatchie, and the whole of Howard's right wing was broughtnear by, ready to start by the 1st of February. I alsoreconnoitred the point of the Salkiehatchie River, where theCharleston Railroad crossed it, found the bridge protected by arebel battery on the farther side, and could see a few men aboutit; but the stream itself was absolutely impassable, for the wholebottom was overflowed by its swollen waters to the breadth of afull mile. Nevertheless, Force's and Mower's divisions of theSeventeenth Corps were kept active, seemingly with the intention tocross over in the direction of Charleston, and thus to keep up thedelusion that that city was our immediate "objective. " Meantime, Ihad reports from General Slocum of the terrible difficulties he hadencountered about Sister's Ferry, where the Savannah River wasreported nearly three miles wide, and it seemed for a time almostimpossible for him to span it at all with his frail pontoons. About this time (January 25th), the weather cleared away bright andcold, and I inferred that the river would soon run down, and enableSlocum to pass the river before February 1st. One of the divisionsof the Fifteenth Corps (Corse's) had also been cut off by the lossof the pontoon-bridge at Savannah, so that General Slocum had withhim, not only his own two corps, but Corse's division andKilpatrick's cavalry, without which it was not prudent for me toinaugurate the campaign. We therefore rested quietly aboutPocotaligo, collecting stores and making final preparations, untilthe 1st of February, when I learned that the cavalry and twodivisions of the Twentieth Corps were fairly across the river, andthen gave the necessary orders for the march northward. 

Before closing this chapter, I will add a few original letters thatbear directly on the subject, and tend to illustrate it:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWASHINGTON, D. C. January 21, 1866. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Your letters brought by General Barnard were received atCity Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you onall points of recommendation. As I arrived here at 1 p. M. , andmust leave at 6 p. M. , having in the mean time spent over threehours with the secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into theheart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Maryland, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboardby the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroadtransportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps numbersover twenty-one thousand men. 

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force, surplus to go toSelma under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, toknow whether he could go, and, if so, by which of several routes hewould select. No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered toset offensively from the seacoast to the interior, towardMontgomery and Selma. Thomas's forces will move from the north atan early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Withoutfurther reenforcement Canby will have a moving column of twentythousand men. 

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a forcethere of eight thousand effective. At Newbern about half thenumber. It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also hasfallen. I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th weknew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, andthat on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington. 

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, hewill be sent to Newbern. In either event, all the surplus forcesat the two points will move to the interior, toward Goldsboro', incooperation with your movements. From either point, railroadcommunications can be run out, there being here abundance ofrolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. 

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's armysouth. Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, ifWilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisherhaving overtaken about two thousand. 

All other troops are subject to your orders as you come incommunication with them. They will be so instructed. From aboutRichmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches many men, orattempts to evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should yoube brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirtythousand effective men to your support, from the troops aboutRichmond. 

To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from theGulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will cooperate with youfrom Newbern or Wilmington, or both. You can call forreenforcements. 

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who willreturn with any message you may have for me. If there is any thingI can do for you in the way of having supplies on shipboard, at anypoint on the seacoast, ready for you, let me know it. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

DEAR GENERAL: Captain Hudson has this moment arrived with yourletter of January 21st, which I have read with interest. 

The capture of Fort Fisher has a most important bearing on mycampaign, and I rejoice in it for many reasons, because of itsintrinsic importance, and because it gives me another point ofsecurity on the seaboard. I hope General Terry will follow it upby the capture of Wilmington, although I do not look for it, fromAdmiral Porter's dispatch to me. I rejoice that Terry was not aWest-Pointer, that he belonged to your army, and that he had thesame troops with which Butler feared to make the attempt. 

Admiral Dahlgren, whose fleet is reenforced by some more ironclads, wants to make an assault a la Fisher on Fort Moultrie, but Iwithhold my consent, for the reason that the capture of allSullivan's Island is not conclusive as to Charleston; the captureof James Island would be, but all pronounce that impossible at thistime. Therefore, I am moving (as hitherto designed) for therailroad west of Branchville, then will swing across to Orangeburg, which will interpose my army between Charleston and the interior. Contemporaneous with this, Foster will demonstrate up the Edisto, and afterward make a lodgment at Bull's Bay, and occupy the commonroad which leads from Mount Pleasant toward Georgetown. When I getto Columbia, I think I shall move straight for Goldsboro', viaFayetteville. By this circuit I cut all roads, and devastate theland; and the forces along the coast, commanded by Foster, willfollow my movement, taking any thing the enemy lets go, or sooccupy his attention that he cannot detach all his forces againstme. I feel sure of getting Wilmington, and may be Charleston, andbeing at Goldsboro', with its railroads finished back to MoreheadCity and Wilmington, I can easily take Raleigh, when it seems thatLee must come out. If Schofield comes to Beaufort, he should bepushed out to Kinston, on the Neuse, and may be Goldsboro' (or, rather, a point on the Wilmington road, south of Goldsboro'). Itis not necessary to storm Goldsboro', because it is in a distantregion, of no importance in itself, and, if its garrison is forcedto draw supplies from its north, it, will be eating up the samestores on which Lee depends for his command. 

I have no doubt Hood will bring his army to Augusta. Canby andThomas should penetrate Alabama as far as possible, to keepemployed at least a part of Hood's army; or, what would accomplishthe same thing, Thomas might reoccupy the railroad from Chattanoogaforward to the Etowah, viz. , Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, therebythreatening Georgia. I know that the Georgia troops aredisaffected. At Savannah I met delegates from several counties ofthe southwest, who manifested a decidedly hostile spirit to theConfederate cause. I nursed the feeling as far as possible, andinstructed Grower to keep it up. 

My left wing must now be at Sister's Ferry, crossing the SavannahRiver to the east bank. Slocum has orders to be at Robertsvilleto-morrow, prepared to move on Barnwell. Howard is here, all readyto start for the Augusta Railroad at Midway. 

We find the enemy on the east aide of the Salkiehatchie, andcavalry in our front; but all give ground on our approach, and seemto be merely watching us. If we start on Tuesday, in one week weshall be near Orangeburg, having broken up the Augusta road fromthe Edisto westward twenty or twenty-five miles. I will be surethat every rail is twisted. Should we encounter too muchopposition near Orangeburg, then I will for a time neglect thatbranch, and rapidly move on Columbia, and fill up the triangleformed by the Congaree and Wateree (tributaries of the Santee), breaking up that great centre of the Carolina roads. Up to thatpoint I feel full confidence, but from there may have to manoeuvresome, and will be guided by the questions of weather and supplies. 

You remember we had fine weather last February for our Meridiantrip, and my memory of the weather at Charleston is, that Februaryis usually a fine month. Before the March storms come we should bewithin striking distance of the coast. The months of April and Maywill be the best for operations from Goldsboro' to Raleigh and theRoanoke. You may rest assured that I will keep my troops well inhand, and, if I get worsted, will aim to make the enemy pay sodearly that you will have less to do. I know that this trip isnecessary; it must be made sooner or later; I am on time, and inthe right position for it. My army is large enough for thepurpose, and I ask no reinforcement, but simply wish the utmostactivity to be kept up at all other points, so that concentrationagainst me may not be universal. 

I suspect that Jeff. Davis will move heaven and earth to catch me, for success to this column is fatal to his dream of empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and the heartof South Carolina. 

If Thomas will not move on Selma, order him to occupy Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona, and again threaten Georgia in thedirection of Athena. 

I think the "poor white trash" of the South are falling out oftheir ranks by sickness, desertion, and every available means; butthere is a large class of vindictive Southerners who will fight tothe last. The squabbles in Richmond, the howls in Charleston, andthe disintegration elsewhere, are all good omens for us; we mustnot relax one iota, but, on the contrary, pile up our efforts: Iworld, ere this, have been off, but we had terrific rains, whichcaught us in motion, and nearly drowned some of the troops in therice-fields of the Savannah, swept away our causeway (which hadbeen carefully corduroyed), and made the swamps hereabout merelakes of slimy mud. The weather is now good, and I have the armyon terra firma. Supplies, too, came for a long time by dailydriblets instead of in bulk; this is now all remedied, and I hopeto start on Tuesday. 

I will issue instructions to General Foster, based on thereenforcements of North Carolina; but if Schofield comes, you hadbetter relieve Foster, who cannot take the field, and needs anoperation on his leg. Let Schofield take command, with hisheadquarters at Beaufort, North Carolina, and with orders to secureGoldsboro' (with its railroad communication back to Beaufort andWilmington). If Lee lets us get that position, he is gone up. 

I will start with my Atlanta army (sixty thousand), supplied asbefore, depending on the country for all food in excess of thirtydays. I will have less cattle on the hoof, but I hear of hogs, cows, and calves, in Barnwell and the Colombia districts. Evenhere we have found some forage. Of course, the enemy will carryoff and destroy some forage, but I will burn the houses where thepeople burn their forage, and they will get tired of it. 

I must risk Hood, and trust to you to hold Lee or be on his heelsif he comes south. I observe that the enemy has some respect formy name, for they gave up Pocotaligo without a fight when theyheard that the attacking force belonged to my army. I will try andkeep up that feeling, which is a real power. With respect, yourfriend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-general commanding. 

P. S. --I leave my chief-quartermaster and commissary behind tofollow coastwise. W. T. S. 

[Dispatch No. 6. ]

FLAG-STEAMER PHILADELPHIASAVANNAH RIVER, January 4, 1865. 

HON. GIDEON WELLS, Secretary of the Navy. 

SIR: I have already apprised the Department that the army ofGeneral Sherman occupied the city of Savannah on the 21st ofDecember. 

The rebel army, hardly respectable in numbers or condition, escapedby crossing the river and taking the Union Causeway toward therailroad. 

I have walked about the city several times, and can affirm that itstranquillity is undisturbed. The Union soldiers who are stationedwithin its limits are as orderly as if they were in New York orBoston.... One effect of the march of General Sherman throughGeorgia has been to satisfy the people that their credulity hasbeen imposed upon by the lying assertions of the rebel Government, affirming the inability of the United States Government towithstand the armies of rebeldom. They have seen the old flag ofthe United States carried by its victorious legions through theirState, almost unopposed, and placed in their principal city withouta blow. 

Since the occupation of the city General Sherman has been occupiedin making arrangements for its security after he leaves it for themarch that he meditates. My attention has been directed to suchmeasures of cooperation as the number and quality of my forcepermit. 

On the 2d I arrived here from Charleston, whither, as I stated inmy dispatch of the 29th of December, I had gone in consequence ofinformation from the senior officer there that the rebelscontemplated issuing from the harbor, and his request for mypresence. Having placed a force there of seven monitors, sufficient to meet each an emergency, and not perceiving any signof the expected raid, I returned to Savannah, to keep incommunication with General Sherman and be ready to render anyassistance that might be desired. General Sherman has fullyinformed me of his plans, and, so far as my means permit, theyshall not lack assistance by water. 

On the 3d the transfer of the right wing to Beaufort was began, andthe only suitable vessel I had at hand (the Harvest Moon) was sentto Thunderbolt to receive the first embarkation. This took placeabout 3 p. M. , and was witnessed by General Sherman and GeneralBernard (United States Engineers) and myself. The Pontiac isordered around to assist, and the army transports also followed thefirst move by the Harvest Moon. 

I could not help remarking the unbroken silence that prevailed inthe large array of troops; not a voice was to be heard, as theygathered in masses on the bluff to look at the vessels. The notesof a solitary bugle alone came from their midst. 

General Barnard made a brief visit to one of the rebel works(Cansten's Bluff) that dominated this water-course--the bestapproach of the kind to Savannah. 

I am collecting data that will fully exhibit to the Department thepowerful character of the defenses of the city and its approaches. General Sherman will not retain the extended limits they embrace. But will contract the line very much. 

General Foster still holds the position near the Tullifinny. Withhis concurrence I have detached the fleet brigade, and the menbelonging to it have returned to their vessels. The excellentservice performed by this detachment has fully realized my wishes, and exemplified the efficiency of the organization--infantry andlight artillery handled as skirmishers. The howitzers were alwayslanded as quickly as the men, and were brought into action beforethe light pieces of the land-service could be got ashore. 

I regret very much that the reduced complements of the vesselsprevent me from maintaining the force in constant organization. With three hundred more marines and five hundred seamen I couldfrequently operate to great advantage, at the present time, whenthe attention of the rebels is so engrossed by General Sherman. 

It is said that they have a force at Hardeeville, the pickets ofwhich were retained on the Union Causeway until a few days since, when some of our troops crossed the river and pushed them back. Concurrently with this, I caused the Sonoma to anchor so as tosweep the ground in the direction of the causeway. 

The transfer of the right-wing (thirty thousand men) to Beaufortwill so imperil the rebel force at Hardeeville that it will be cutoff or dispersed, if not moved in season. 

Meanwhile I will send the Dai-Ching to St. Helena, to meet any wantthat may arise in that quarter, while the Mingo and Pontiac will beready to act from Broad River. 

The general route of the army will be northward; but the exactdirection must be decided more or less by circumstances which itmay not be possible to foresee.... 

My cooperation will be confined to assistance in attackingCharleston, or in establishing communication at Georgetown, in casethe army pushes on without attacking Charleston, and time alonewill show which of these will eventuate. 

The weather of the winter first, and the condition of the ground inspring, would permit little advantage to be derived from thepresence of the army at Richmond until the middle of May. So thatGeneral Sherman has no reason to move in haste, but can choose suchobjects as he prefers, and take as much time as their attainmentmay demand. The Department will learn the objects in view ofGeneral Sherman more precisely from a letter addressed by him toGeneral Halleck, which he read to me a few days since. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. A. DAHLGREN, Rear-Admiral, commanding South-Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 29, 1885. 

Major-General J. G. FOSTER, commanding Department of the South. 

GENERAL: I have just received dispatches from General Grant, stating that Schofield's corps (the Twenty-third), twenty-onethousand strong, is ordered east from Tennessee, and will be sentto Beaufort, North Carolina. That is well; I want that force tosecure a point on the railroad about Goldsboro', and then to buildthe railroad out to that point. If Goldsboro' be too strong tocarry by a rapid movement, then a point near the Neuse, south ofGoldsboro', will answer, but the bridge and position about Kinston, should be held and fortified strong. The movement should be maskedby the troops already at Newbern. Please notify General Palmerthat these troops are coming, and to be prepared to receive them. Major-General Schofield will command in person, and is admirablyadapted for the work. If it is possible, I want him to secureGoldsboro', with the railroad back to Morehead City and Wilmington. As soon as General Schofield reaches Fort Macon, have him to meetsome one of your staff, to explain in full the details of thesituation of affairs with me; and you can give him the chiefcommand of all troops at Cape Fear and in North Carolina. If hefinds the enemy has all turned south against me, he need notfollow, but turn his attention against Raleigh; if he can secureGoldsboro' and Wilmington, it will be as much as I expect before Ihave passed the Santee. Send him all detachments of men that havecome to join my army. They can be so organized and officered as tobe efficient, for they are nearly all old soldiers who have beendetached or on furlough. Until I pass the Santee, you can betteruse these detachments at Bull's Bay, Georgetown, etc. 

I will instruct General McCallum, of the Railroad Department, totake his men up to Beaufort, North Carolina, and employ them on theroad out. I do not know that he can use them on any road here. Idid instruct him, while awaiting information from North Carolina, to have them build a good trestle-bridge across Port Royal ferry;but I now suppose the pontoon-bridge will do. If you move thepontoons, be sure to make a good road out to Garden's Corners, andmark it with sign-boards--obstructing the old road, so that, shouldI send back any detachments, they would not be misled. 

I prefer that Hatch's force should not be materially weakened untilI am near Columbia, when you may be governed by the situation ofaffairs about Charleston. If you can break the railroad betweenthis and Charleston, then this force could be reduced. 

I am, with respect, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 18, 1865. 

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

SIR: When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the mapwhich General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route bywhich his division entered the city of Savannah, being the firsttroops to occupy that city. I now send it to you. 

I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of allmy official orders touching trade and intercourse with the peopleof Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negrosettlements. 

Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come in, and I amsatisfied that, by judicious handling and by a little respect shownto their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis'sdominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth thatslavery as an institution is defunct, and the only questions thatremain are what disposition shall be made of the negroesthemselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solutionfor these questions, and prefer to leave it to the sloweroperations of time. We have given the initiative, and can affordto await the working of the experiment. 

As to trade-matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep theSouthern people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce towhich they have hitherto been accustomed. General Grover is nowhere, and will, I think, be able to handle this matter judiciously, and may gradually relax, and invite cotton to come in in largequantities. But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety onthat score; for the rebels would at once make use of it as a poweragainst us. We should assume, a tone of perfect contempt forcotton and every thing else in comparison with the great object ofthe war--the restoration of the Union, with all its rights andpower. It the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simplyplay into our hands by taking away the only product of value theyhave to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions. Bysuch a course, also, they alienate the feelings of a large class ofsmall farmers who look to their little parcels of cotton toexchange for food and clothing for their families. I hope theGovernment will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton inlarge quantities, and especially that the President will notindorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities ofcotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousandbales, indorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not insuch a form as to amount to an order to compel me to facilitatetheir execution. 

As to Treasury agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated andabandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can onlysay that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbingelements to a military government, and it is almost impossible forus to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully theirpowers and duties. I rather think the Quartermaster's Departmentof the army could better fulfill all their duties and accomplishall that is aimed at by the law. Yet on this subject I will leaveGenerals Foster and Grover to do the best they can. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, POCOTALIGO, SOUTH CAROLINA, January 2, 1865. 

Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. 

SIR: I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy ofthat part of your telegram to him of December 26th relating tocotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to GeneralEaston, chief-quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it. 

I had already been approached by all the consuls and half thepeople of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariableanswer was that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale ofit with my consent; that, as cotton had been one of the chiefcauses of this war, it should help to pay its expenses; that allcotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act ofhostility was committed against the United States some time inDecember, 1860; and that no bill of sale subsequent to that datecould convey title. 

My orders were that an officer of the Quartermaster's Department, United States Army, might furnish the holder, agent, or attorney, amere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of thebales' marks, etc. , the cotton then to be turned over to the agentof the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale. But, since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered GeneralEaston to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at NewYork, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think theTreasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes orcaptures of war. 

Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York, representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul here, but absent a long time, called on me withreference to cotton claimed by English subjects. He seemed amazedwhen I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favorthan one of our own deluded citizens, and that for my part I wasunwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openlyengaged in smuggling arms and instruments of war to kill us; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conductmy army to Nassau, and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explainedto him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the GeneralGovernment of the United States, but that my opinion, so franklyexpressed, was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him toheed. It appeared, also, that he owned a plantation on the line ofinvestment of Savannah, which, of course, was pillaged, and forwhich he expected me to give some certificate entitling him toindemnification, which I declined emphatically. 

I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property--severe butjust--founded upon the laws of nations and the practice ofcivilized governments, and am clearly of opinion that we shouldclaim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that thepeople may realize the truth that war is no child's play. 

I embrace in this a copy of a letter, dated December 31, 1864, inanswer to one from Solomon Cohen (a rich lawyer) to General Blair, his personal friend, as follows:

Major-General F. P. BLAIR, commanding Seventeenth Army Corps. 

GENERAL: Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, isreceived, and I answer frankly through you his inquiries. 

1. No one can practise law as an attorney in the United Stateswithout acknowledging the supremacy of our Government. If I am notin error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as theclerk, and it would be a novel thing in a government to have acourt to administer law which denied the supremacy of thegovernment itself. 

2. No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant, or, rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of theGovernment without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy. 

3. If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal, will not be disturbed unless its temporary usebe necessary for the military authorities of the city. The titleto property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicatedby the courts of the United States. 

4. If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order No. 148, itis a public acknowledgment that he "adheres to the enemies of theUnited States, " and all his property becomes forfeited to theUnited States. But, as a matter of favor, he will be allowed tocarry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, hisfamily, and servants, and will be trans ported within the enemy'slines, but not by way of Port Royal. 

These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exceptionwill be made. 

I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

This letter was in answer to specific inquiries; it is clear, andcovers all the points, and, should I leave before my orders areexecuted, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, GeneralFoster, their wisdom and propriety. 

I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet yourapprobation, and that the President will not refund to partiesclaiming cotton or other property, without the strongest evidenceof loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unlesssome other positive end is to be gained. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 

FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1865. 

On the 1st day of February, as before explained, the army designedfor the active campaign from Savannah northward was composed of twowings, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Howard and Slocum, and was substantially the same that had marched from Atlanta toSavannah. The same general orders were in force, and this campaignmay properly be classed as a continuance of the former. 

The right wing, less Corse's division, Fifteenth Corps, was groupedat or near Pocotaligo, South Carolina, with its wagons filled withfood, ammunition, and forage, all ready to start, and only waitingfor the left wing, which was detained by the flood in the SavannahRiver. It was composed as follows:

Fifteenth Corps, Major-General JOHN A. LOGAN. 

First Division, Brigadier-General Charles R. Woods;Second Division, Major-General W. B. Hazen;Third Division, Brigadier-General John E. Smith;Fourth Division, Brigadier-General John M. Corse. Artillery brigade, eighteen guns, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Ross, First Michigan Artillery. 

Seventeenth. Corps, Major-General FRANK P. BLAIR, JR. 

First Division, Major-General Joseph A. Mower;Second Division, Brigadier-General M. F. Force;Fourth Division, Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith. Artillery brigade, fourteen guns, Major A. C. Waterhouse, FirstIllinois Artillery. 

The left wing, with Corse's division and Kilpatrick's cavalry, was at and near Sister's Ferry, forty miles above the city ofSavannah, engaged in crossing the river, then much swollen. It was composed as follows:

Fourteenth Corps, Major-General JEFF. C. DAVIS. 

First Division, Brigadier-General W. P. Carlin;Second Division, Brigadier-General John D. Morgan;Third Division, Brigadier-General A. Baird. Artillery brigade, sixteen guns, Major Charles Houghtaling, FirstIllinois Artillery. 

Twentieth Corps, Brigadier-General A. S. WILLIAMS. 

First Division, Brigadier-General N. I. Jackson;Second Division, Brigadier-General J. W. Geary;Third Division, Brigadier-General W. T. Ward. Artillery brigade, Sixteen gnus, Major J. A. Reynolds, First NewYork Artillery. 

Cavalry Division, Brigadier-General JUDSON KILPATRICK. 

First Brigade, Colonel T. J. Jordan, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry;Second Brigade, Colonel S. D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Vol. ;Third Brigade, Colonel George E. Spencer, First Alabama Cavalry. One battery of four guns. 

The actual strength of the army, as given in the following officialtabular statements, was at the time sixty thousand and seventy-ninemen, and sixty-eight guns. The trains were made up of abouttwenty-five hundred wagons, with six mules to each wagon, and aboutsix hundred ambulances, with two horses each. The contents of thewagons embraced an ample supply of ammunition for a great battle;forage for about seven days, and provisions for twenty days, mostlyof bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, depending largely for fresh meaton beeves driven on the hoof and such cattle, hogs, and poultry, aswe expected to gather along our line of march. 

RECAPITULATION-CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS. 

 February 1. March 1. April 1. April 10Pers: 60, 079 57, 676 81, 150 88, 948

The enemy occupied the cities of Charleston and Augusta, withgarrisons capable of making a respectable if not successfuldefense, but utterly unable to meet our veteran columns in the openfield. To resist or delay our progress north, General Wheeler hadhis division of cavalry (reduced to the size of a brigade by hishard and persistent fighting ever since the beginning of theAtlanta campaign), and General Wade Hampton had been dispatchedfrom the Army of Virginia to his native State of South Carolina, with a great flourish of trumpets, and extraordinary powers toraise men, money, and horses, with which "to stay the progress ofthe invader, " and "to punish us for our insolent attempt to invadethe glorious State of South Carolina!" He was supposed at the timeto have, at and near Columbia, two small divisions of cavalrycommanded by himself and General Butler. 

Of course, I had a species of contempt for these scattered andinconsiderable forces, knew that they could hardly delay us anhour; and the only serious question that occurred to me was, wouldGeneral Lee sit down in Richmond (besieged by General Grant), andpermit us, almost unopposed, to pass through the States of Southand North Carolina, cutting off and consuming the very supplies onwhich he depended to feed his army in Virginia, or would he make aneffort to escape from General Grant, and endeavor to catch usinland somewhere between Columbia and Raleigh? I knew full well atthe time that the broken fragments of Hood's army (which hadescaped from Tennessee) were being hurried rapidly across Georgia, by Augusta, to make junction in my front; estimating them at themaximum twenty-five thousand men, and Hardee's, Wheeler's, andHampton's forces at fifteen thousand, made forty thousand; which, if handled with spirit and energy, would constitute a formidableforce, and might make the passage of such rivers as the Santee andCape Fear a difficult undertaking. Therefore, I took all possibleprecautions, and arranged with Admiral Dahlgren and General Fosterto watch our progress inland by all the means possible, and toprovide for us points of security along the coast; as, at Bull'sBay, Georgetown, and the mouth of Cape Fear River. Still, it wasextremely desirable in one march to reach Goldsboro' in the Stateof North Carolina (distant four hundred and twenty-five miles), apoint of great convenience for ulterior operations, by reason ofthe two railroads which meet there, coming from the seacoast atWilmington and Newbern. Before leaving Savannah I had sent toNewbern Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Engineers, with orders to lookto these railroads, to collect rolling-stock, and to have the roadsrepaired out as far as possible in six weeks--the time estimated asnecessary for us to march that distance. 

The question of supplies remained still the one of vitalimportance, and I reasoned that we might safely rely on the countryfor a considerable quantity of forage and provisions, and that, ifthe worst came to the worst, we could live several months on themules and horses of our trains. Nevertheless, time was equallymaterial, and the moment I heard that General Slocum had finishedhis pontoon-bridge at Sister's Ferry, and that Kilpatrick's cavalrywas over the river, I gave the general orders to march, andinstructed all the columns to aim for the South Carolina Railroadto the west of Branchville, about Blackville and Midway. 

The right wing moved up the Salkiehatchie, the Seventeenth Corps onthe right, with orders on reaching Rivers's Bridge to cross over, and the Fifteenth Corps by Hickory Hill to Beaufort's Bridge. Kilpatrick was instructed to march by way of Barnwell; Corse'sdivision and the Twentieth Corps to take such roads as would bringthem into communication with the Fifteenth Corps about Beaufort'sBridge. All these columns started promptly on the 1st of February. We encountered Wheeler's cavalry, which had obstructed the road byfelling trees, but our men picked these up and threw them aside, sothat this obstruction hardly delayed us an hour. In person Iaccompanied the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan) by McPhersonvilleand Hickory Hill, and kept couriers going to and fro to GeneralSlocum with instructions to hurry as much as possible, so as tomake a junction of the whole army on the South Carolina Railroadabout Blackville. 

I spent the night of February 1st at Hickory Hill Post-Office, andthat of the 2d at Duck Branch Post-Office, thirty-one miles outfrom Pocotaligo. On the 3d the Seventeenth Corps was oppositeRivers's Bridge, and the Fifteenth approached Beaufort's Bridge. The Salkiehatchie was still over its banks, and presented a mostformidable obstacle. The enemy appeared in some force on theopposite bank, had cut away all the bridges which spanned the manydeep channels of the swollen river, and the only available passageseemed to be along the narrow causeways which constituted thecommon roads. At Rivers's Bridge Generals Mower and Giles A. Smith led, their heads of column through this swamp, the water upto their shoulders, crossed over to the pine-land, turned upon therebel brigade which defended the passage, and routed it in utterdisorder. It was in this attack that General Wager Swayne lost hisleg, and he had to be conveyed back to Pocotaligo. Still, the lossof life was very small, in proportion to the advantages gained, forthe enemy at once abandoned the whole line of the Salkiehatchie, and the Fifteenth Corps passed over at Beaufort's Bridge, withoutopposition. 

On the 5th of February I was at Beaufort's Bridge, by which timeGeneral A. S. Williams had got up with five brigades' of theTwentieth Corps; I also heard of General Kilpatrick's being abreastof us, at Barnwell, and then gave orders for the march straight forthe railroad at Midway. I still remained with the Fifteenth Corps, which, on the 6th of February, was five miles from Bamberg. As amatter of course, I expected severe resistance at this railroad, for its loss would sever all the communications of the enemy inCharleston with those in Augusta. 

Early on the 7th, in the midst of a rain-storm, we reached therailroad; almost unopposed, striking it at several points. GeneralHoward told me a good story concerning this, which will bearrepeating: He was with the Seventeenth Corps, marching straight forMidway, and when about five miles distant he began to deploy theleading division, so as to be ready for battle. Sitting on hishorse by the road-side, while the deployment was making, he saw aman coming down the road, riding as hard as he could, and as heapproached he recognized him as one of his own "foragers, " mountedon a white horse, with a rope bridle and a blanket for saddle. Ashe came near he called out, "Hurry up, general; we have got therailroad!" So, while we, the generals, were proceedingdeliberately to prepare for a serious battle, a parcel of ourforagers, in search of plunder, had got ahead and actually capturedthe South Carolina Railroad, a line of vital importance to therebel Government. 

As soon as we struck the railroad, details of men were set to workto tear up the rails, to burn the ties and twist the bars. Thiswas a most important railroad, and I proposed to destroy itcompletely for fifty miles, partly to prevent a possibility of itsrestoration and partly to utilize the time necessary for GeneralSlocum to get up. 

The country thereabouts was very poor, but the inhabitants mostlyremained at home. Indeed, they knew not where to go. The enemy'scavalry had retreated before us, but his infantry was reported insome strength at Branchville, on the farther side of the Edisto;yet on the appearance of a mere squad of our men they burned theirown bridges the very thing I wanted, for we had no use for them, and they had. 

We all remained strung along this railroad till the 9th ofFebruary--the Seventeenth Corps on the right, then the Fifteenth, Twentieth, and cavalry, at Blackville. General Slocum reachedBlackville that day, with Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, and reported the Fourteenth Corps (General Jeff. C. Davis's) to befollowing by way of Barnwell. On the 10th I rode up to Blackville, where I conferred with Generals Slocum and Kilpatrick, becamesatisfied that the whole army would be ready within a day, andaccordingly made orders for the next movement north to Columbia, the right wing to strike Orangeburg en route. Kilpatrick wasordered to demonstrate strongly toward Aiken, to keep up thedelusion that we might turn to Augusta; but he was notified thatColumbia was the next objective, and that he should cover the leftflank against Wheeler, who hung around it. I wanted to reachColumbia before any part of Hood's army could possibly get there. Some of them were reported as having reached Augusta, under thecommand of General Dick Taylor. 

Having sufficiently damaged the railroad, and effected the junctionof the entire army, the general march was resumed on the 11th, eachcorps crossing the South Edisto by separate bridges, with orders topause on the road leading from Orangeberg to Augusta, till it wascertain that the Seventeenth Corps had got possession ofOrangeburg. This place was simply important as its occupationwould sever the communications between Charleston and Columbia. All the heads of column reached this road, known as the Edgefieldroad, during the 12th, and the Seventeenth Corps turned to theright, against Orangeburg. When I reached the head of columnopposite Orangeburg, I found Giles A. Smith's division halted, witha battery unlimbered, exchanging shots with a party on the oppositeside of the Edisto. He reported that the bridge was gone, and thatthe river was deep and impassable. I then directed General Blairto send a strong division below the town, some four or five miles, to effect a crossing there. He laid his pontoon-bridge, but thebottom on the other side was overflowed, and the men had to wadethrough it, in places as deep as their waists. I was with thisdivision at the time, on foot, trying to pick my way across theoverflowed bottom; but, as soon as the head of column reached thesand-hills, I knew that the enemy would not long remain inOrangeburg, and accordingly returned to my horse, on the west bank, and rode rapidly up to where I had left Giles A. Smith. I foundhim in possession of the broken bridge, abreast of the town, whichhe was repairing, and I was among the first to cross over and enterthe town. By and before the time either Force's or Giles A. Smith's skirmishers entered the place, several stores were on fire, and I am sure that some of the towns-people told me that a Jewmerchant had set fire to his own cotton and store, and from thisthe fire had spread. This, however, was soon put out, and theSeventeenth Corps (General Blair) occupied the place during thatnight. I remember to have visited a large hospital, on the hillnear the railroad depot, which was occupied by the orphan childrenwho had been removed from the asylum in Charleston. We gave themprotection, and, I think, some provisions. The railroad and depotwere destroyed by order, and no doubt a good deal of cotton wasburned, for we all regarded cotton as hostile property, a thing tobe destroyed. General Blair was ordered to break up this railroad, forward to the point where it crossed the Santee, and then to turnfor Columbia. On the morning of the 13th I again joined theFifteenth Corps, which crossed the North Edisto by Snilling'sBridge, and moved straight for Columbia, around the head of Caw-CawSwamp. Orders were sent to all the columns to turn for Columbia, where it was supposed the enemy had concentrated all the men theycould from Charleston, Augusta, and even from Virginia. That nightI was with the Fifteenth Corps, twenty-one miles from Columbia, where my aide, Colonel Audenried, picked up a rebel officer on theroad, who, supposing him to be of the same service with himself, answered all his questions frankly, and revealed the truth thatthere was nothing in Columbia except Hampton's cavalry. The factwas, that General Hardee, in Charleston, took it for granted thatwe were after Charleston; the rebel troops in Augusta supposed theywere "our objective;" so they abandoned poor Columbia to the careof Hampton's cavalry, which was confused by the rumors that pouredin on it, so that both Beauregard and Wade Hampton, who were inColumbia, seem to have lost their heads. 

On the 14th the head of the Fifteenth Corps, Charles R. Woods'sdivision, approached the Little Congaree, a broad, deep stream, tributary to the Main Congaree; six or eight miles below Columbia. On the opposite side of this stream was a newly-constructed fort, and on our side--a wide extent of old cotton-fields, which, had beenoverflowed, and was covered with a deep slime. General Woods haddeployed his leading brigade, which was skirmishing forward, but hereported that the bridge was gone, and that a considerable force ofthe enemy was on the other side. I directed General Howard orLogan to send a brigade by a circuit to the left, to see if thisstream could not be crossed higher up, but at the same time knewthat General Slocum's route world bring him to Colombia behind thisstream, and that his approach would uncover it. Therefore, therewas no need of exposing much life. The brigade, however, foundmeans to cross the Little Congaree, and thus uncovered the passageby the main road, so that General Woods's skirmishers at oncepassed over, and a party was set to work to repair the bridge, which occupied less than an hour, when I passed over with my wholestaff. I found the new fort unfinished and unoccupied, but fromits parapet could see over some old fields bounded to the north andwest by hills skirted with timber. There was a plantation to ourleft, about half a mile, and on the edge of the timber was drawn upa force of rebel cavalry of about a regiment, which advanced, andcharged upon some, of our foragers, who were plundering theplantation; my aide, Colonel Audenried, who had ridden forward, came back somewhat hurt and bruised, for, observing this charge ofcavalry, he had turned for us, and his horse fell with him inattempting to leap a ditch. General Woods's skirmish-line met thischarge of cavalry, and drove it back into the woods and beyond. Weremained on that ground during the night of the 15th, and I campedon the nearest dry ground behind the Little Congaree, where on thenext morning were made the written' orders for the government ofthe troops while occupying Columbia. These are dated February 16, 1865, in these words:

General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad Rivers as near theirmouths as possible, occupy Columbia, destroy the public buildings, railroad property, manufacturing and machine shops; but will sparelibraries, asylums, and private dwellings. He will then move toWinnsboro', destroying en route utterly that section of therailroad. He will also cause all bridges, trestles, water-tanks, and depots on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches broken, and such other destruction as he can find time toaccomplish consistent with proper celerity. 

These instructions were embraced in General Order No. 26, whichprescribed the routes of march for the several columns as far asFayetteville, North Carolina, and is conclusive that I thenregarded Columbia as simply one point on our general route ofmarch, and not as an important conquest. 

During the 16th of February the Fifteenth Corps reached the pointopposite Columbia, and pushed on for the Saluda Factory three milesabove, crossed that stream, and the head of column reached BroadRiver just in time to find its bridge in flames, Butler's cavalryhaving just passed over into Columbia. The head of Slocum's columnalso reached the point opposite Columbia the same morning, but thebulk of his army was back at Lexington. I reached this place earlyin the morning of the 16th, met General Slocum there; and explainedto him the purport of General Order No. 26, which contemplated thepassage of his army across Broad River at Alston, fifteen milesabove Columbia. Riding down to the river-bank, I saw the wreck ofthe large bridge which had been burned by the enemy, with its manystone piers still standing, but the superstructure gone. Acrossthe Congaree River lay the city of Columbia, in plain, easy view. I could see the unfinished State-House, a handsome granitestructure, and the ruins of the railroad depot, which were stillsmouldering. Occasionally a few citizens or cavalry could be seenrunning across the streets, and quite a number of negroes wereseemingly busy in carrying off bags of grain or meal, which werepiled up near the burned depot. 

Captain De Gres had a section of his twenty-pound Parrott gunsunlimbered, firing into the town. I asked him what he was firingfor; he said he could see some rebel cavalry occasionally at theintersections of the streets, and he had an idea that there was alarge force of infantry concealed on the opposite bank, lying low, in case we should attempt to cross over directly into the town. Iinstructed him not to fire any more into the town, but consented tohis bursting a few shells near the depot, to scare away the negroeswho were appropriating the bags of corn and meal which we wanted, also to fire three shots at the unoccupied State-House. I stood byand saw these fired, and then all firing ceased. Although thismatter of firing into Columbia has been the subject of much abuseand investigation, I have yet to hear of any single person havingbeen killed in Columbia by our cannon. On the other hand, thenight before, when Woods's division was in camp in the open fieldsat Little Congaree, it was shelled all night by a rebel batteryfrom the other aide of the river. This provoked me much at thetime, for it was wanton mischief, as Generals Beauregard andHampton must have been convinced that they could not prevent ourentrance into Columbia. I have always contended that I would havebeen justified in retaliating for this unnecessary act of war, butdid not, though I always characterized it as it deserved. 

The night of the 16th I camped near an old prison bivouac oppositeColumbia, known to our prisoners of war as "Camp Sorghum, " whereremained the mud-hovels and holes in the ground which our prisonershad made to shelter themselves from the winter's cold and thesummer's heat. The Fifteenth Corps was then ahead, reaching toBroad River, about four miles above Columbia; the Seventeenth Corpswas behind, on the river-bank opposite Columbia; and the left wingand cavalry had turned north toward Alston. 

The next morning, viz. , February 17th, I rode to the head ofGeneral Howard's column, and found that during the night he hadferried Stone's brigade of Woods's division of the FifteenthCorps across by rafts made of the pontoons, and that brigade wasthen deployed on the opposite bank to cover the construction of apontoon-bridge nearly finished. 

I sat with General Howard on a log, watching the men lay thisbridge; and about 9 or 10 A. M. A messenger came from Colonel Stoneon the other aide, saying that the Mayor of Columbia had come outof the city to surrender the place, and asking for orders. Isimply remarked to General Howard that he had his orders, to letColonel Stone go on into the city, and that we would follow as soonas the bridge was ready. By this same messenger I received a notein pencil from the Lady Superioress of a convent or school inColumbia, in which she claimed to have been a teacher in a conventin Brown County, Ohio, at the time my daughter Minnie was a pupilthere, and therefore asking special protection. My recollectionis, that I gave the note to my brother-in-law, Colonel Ewing, theninspector-general on my staff, with instructions to see this lady, and assure her that we contemplated no destruction of any privateproperty in Columbia at all. 

As soon as the bridge was done, I led my horse over it, followed bymy whole staff. General Howard accompanied me with his, andGeneral Logan was next in order, followed by General C. R. Woods, and the whole of the Fifteenth Corps. Ascending the hill, we soonemerged into a broad road leading into Columbia, between old fieldsof corn and cotton, and, entering the city, we found seemingly allits population, white and black, in the streets. A high andboisterous wind was prevailing from the north, and flakes of cottonwere flying about in the air and lodging in the limbs of the trees, reminding us of a Northern snow-storm. Near the market-square wefound Stone's brigade halted, with arms stacked, and a large detailof his men, along with some citizens, engaged with an oldfire-engine, trying to put out the fire in a long pile of burningcotton-bales, which I was told had been fired by the rebel cavalryon withdrawing from the city that morning. I know that, to avoidthis row of burning cotton-bales, I had to ride my horse on thesidewalk. In the market-square had collected a large crowd ofwhites and blacks, among whom was the mayor of the city, Dr. Goodwin, quite a respectable old gentleman, who was extremelyanxious to protect the interests of the citizens. He was on foot, and I on horseback, and it is probable I told him then not to beuneasy, that we did not intend to stay long, and had no purpose toinjure the private citizens or private property. About this time Inoticed several men trying to get through the crowd to speak withme, and called to some black people to make room for them; whenthey reached me, they explained that they were officers of ourarmy, who had been prisoners, had escaped from the rebel prison andguard, and were of course overjoyed to find themselves safe withus. I told them that, as soon as things settled down, they shouldreport to General Howard, who would provide for their safety, andenable them to travel with us. One of them handed me a paper, asking me to read it at my leisure; I put it in my breast-pocketand rode on. General Howard was still with me, and, riding downthe street which led by the right to the Charleston depot, we foundit and a large storehouse burned to the ground, but there were, onthe platform and ground near by, piles of cotton bags filled withcorn and corn-meal, partially burned. 

A detachment of Stone's brigade was guarding this, and separatingthe good from the bad. We rode along the railroad-track, somethree or four hundred yards, to a large foundery, when some manrode up and said the rebel cavalry were close by, and he warned usthat we might get shot. We accordingly turned back to themarket-square, and en route noticed that, several of the men wereevidently in liquor, when I called General Howard's attention toit. He left me and rode toward General Woods's head of column, which was defiling through the town. On reaching themarket-square, I again met Dr. Goodwin, and inquired where heproposed to quarter me, and he said that he had selected the houseof Blanton Duncan, Esq. , a citizen of Louisville, Kentucky, then aresident there, who had the contract for manufacturing theConfederate money, and had fled with Hampton's cavalry. We allrode some six or eight squares back from the new State-House, andfound a very good modern house, completely furnished, with stablingand a large yard, took it as our headquarters, and occupied itduring our stay. I considered General Howard as in command of theplace, and referred the many applicants for guards and protectionto him. Before our headquarters-wagons had got up, I strolledthrough the streets of Columbia, found sentinels posted at theprincipal intersections, and generally good order prevailing, butdid not again return to the main street, because it was filled witha crowd of citizens watching the soldiers marching by. 

During the afternoon of that day, February 17th, the whole of theFifteenth Corps passed through the town and out on the Camden andWinnsboro' roads. The Seventeenth Corps did not enter the city atall, but crossed directly over to the Winnsboro' road from thepontoon bridge at Broad River, which was about four miles above thecity. 

After we had got, as it were, settled in Blanton Duncan's house, say about 2 p. M. , I overhauled my pocket according to custom, toread more carefully the various notes and memoranda received duringthe day, and found the paper which had been given me, as described, by one of our escaped prisoners. It proved to be the song of"Sherman's March to the Sea, " which had been composed by AdjutantS. H. M. Byers, of the Fifth Iowa Infantry, when a prisoner in theasylum at Columbia, which had been beautifully written off by afellow-prisoner, and handed to me in person. This appeared to meso good that I at once sent for Byers, attached him to my staff, provided him with horse and equipment, and took him as far asFayetteville, North Carolina, whence he was sent to Washington asbearer of dispatches. He is now United States consul at Zurich, Switzerland, where I have since been his guest. I insert the songhere for convenient reference and preservation. Byers said thatthere was an excellent glee-club among the prisoners in Columbia, who used to sing it well, with an audience often of rebel ladies:

SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA. 

Composed by Adjutant Byers, Fifth Iowa Infantry. Arranged and sungby the Prisoners in Columbia Prison. 

I

Our camp-fires shone bright on the mountainThat frowned on the river below, As we stood by our guns in the morning, And eagerly watched for the foe;When a rider came out of the darknessThat hung over mountain and tree, And shouted, "Boys, up and be ready!For Sherman will march to the sea!"

CHORUS:

Then sang we a song of our chieftain, That echoed over river and lea;And the stars of our banner shone brighterWhen Sherman marched down to the sea!

II

Then cheer upon cheer for bold ShermanWent up from each valley and glen, And the bugles reechoed the musicThat came from the lips of the men;For we knew that the stars in our bannerMore bright in their splendor would be, And that blessings from Northland world greet us, When Sherman marched down to the sea! Then sang we a song, etc. 

III

Then forward, boys! forward to battle!We marched on our wearisome way, We stormed the wild hills of ResacarGod bless those who fell on that day!Then Kenesaw frowned in its glory, Frowned down on the flag of the free;But the East and the West bore our standard, And Sherman marched on to the sea! Then sang we a song, etc. 

IV

Still onward we pressed, till our bannersSwept out from Atlanta's grim walls, And the blood of the patriot dampenedThe soil where the traitor-flag falls;But we paused not to weep for the fallen, Who slept by each river and tree, Yet we twined them a wreath of the laurel, As Sherman marched down to the sea! Then sang we a song, etc. 

V

Oh, proud was our army that morning, That stood where the pine darkly towers, When Sherman said, "Boys, you are weary, But to-day fair Savannah is ours!"Then sang we the song of our chieftain, That echoed over river and lea, And the stars in our banner shone brighterWhen Sherman camped down by the sea!

Toward evening of February 17th, the mayor, Dr. Goodwin, came to myquarters at Duncan's house, and remarked that there was a lady inColumbia who professed to be a special friend of mine. On hisgiving her name, I could not recall it, but inquired as to hermaiden or family name. He answered Poyas. It so happened that, when I was a lieutenant at Fort Moultrie, in 1842-'46, I used veryoften to visit a family of that name on the east branch of CooperRiver, about forty miles from Fort Moultrie, and to hunt with theson, Mr. James Poyas, an elegant young fellow and a fine sportsman. His father, mother, and several sisters, composed the family, andwere extremely hospitable. One of the ladies was very fond ofpainting in water-colors, which was one of my weaknesses, and onone occasion I had presented her with a volume treating ofwater-colors. Of course, I was glad to renew the acquaintance, andproposed to Dr. Goodwin that we should walk to her house and visitthis lady, which we did. The house stood beyond the Charlottedepot, in a large lot, was of frame, with a high porch, which wasreached by a set of steps outside. Entering this yard, I noticedducks and chickens, and a general air of peace and comfort that wasreally pleasant to behold at that time of universal desolation; thelady in question met us at the head of the steps and invited usinto a parlor which was perfectly neat and well furnished. Afterinquiring about her father, mother, sisters, and especially herbrother James, my special friend, I could not help saying that Iwas pleased to notice that our men had not handled her house andpremises as roughly as was their wont. "I owe it to you, general, "she answered. "Not at all. I did not know you were here till afew minutes ago. " She reiterated that she was indebted to me forthe perfect safety of her house and property, and added, "Youremember, when you were at our house on Cooper River in 1845, yougave me a book;" and she handed me the book in question, on the flyleaf of which was written: "To Miss Poyas, with the compliments ofW. T. Sherman, First-lieutenant Third Artillery. " She thenexplained that, as our army approached Columbia, there was a doubtin her mind whether the terrible Sherman who was devastating theland were W. T. Sherman or T. W. Sherman, both known to be generalsin the Northern army; but, on the supposition that he was her oldacquaintance, when Wade Hampton's cavalry drew out of the city, calling out that the Yankees were coming, she armed herself withthis book, and awaited the crisis. Soon the shouts about themarkethouse announced that the Yankees had come; very soon men wereseen running up and down the streets; a parcel of them poured overthe fence, began to chase the chickens and ducks, and to enter herhouse. She observed one large man, with full beard, who exercisedsome authority, and to him she appealed in the name of "hisgeneral. " "What do you know of Uncle Billy?" "Why, " she said, "when he was a young man he used to be our friend in Charleston, and here is a book he gave me. " The officer or soldier took thebook, looked at the inscription, and, turning to his fellows, said:"Boys, that's so; that's Uncle Billy's writing, for I have seen itoften before. " He at once commanded the party to stop pillaging, and left a man in charge of the house, to protect her until theregular provost-guard should be established. I then asked her ifthe regular guard or sentinel had been as good to her. She assuredme that he was a very nice young man; that he had been telling herall about his family in Iowa; and that at that very instant of timehe was in another room minding her baby. Now, this lady had goodsense and tact, and had thus turned aside a party who, in fiveminutes more, would have rifled her premises of all that was goodto eat or wear. I made her a long social visit, and, beforeleaving Columbia, gave her a half-tierce of rice and about onehundred pounds of ham from our own mess-stores. 

In like manner, that same evening I found in Mrs. Simons anotheracquaintance--the wife of the brother of Hon. James Simons, ofCharleston, who had been Miss Wragg. When Columbia was on firethat night, and her house in danger, I had her family and effectscarried to my own headquarters, gave them my own room and bed, and, on leaving Columbia the next day, supplied her with a half-barrelof hams and a half-tierce of rice. I mention these specific factsto show that, personally, I had no malice or desire to destroy thatcity or its inhabitants, as is generally believed at the South. 

Having walked over much of the suburbs of Columbia in theafternoon, and being tired, I lay down on a bed in Blanton Duncan'shouse to rest. Soon after dark I became conscious that a brightlight was shining on the walls; and, calling some one of my staff(Major Nichols, I think) to inquire the cause, he said there seemedto be a house on fire down about the market-house. The same highwind still prevailed, and, fearing the consequences, I bade him goin person to see if the provost-guard were doing its duty. He soonreturned, and reported that the block of buildings directlyopposite the burning cotton of that morning was on fire, and thatit was spreading; but he had found General Woods on the ground, with plenty of men trying to put the fire out, or, at least, toprevent its extension. The fire continued to increase, and thewhole heavens became lurid. I dispatched messenger after messengerto Generals Howard, Logan, and Woods, and received from themrepeated assurances that all was being done that could be done, butthat the high wind was spreading the flames beyond all control. These general officers were on the ground all night, and Hazen'sdivision had been brought into the city to assist Woods's division, already there. About eleven o'clock at night I went down-townmyself, Colonel Dayton with me; we walked to Mr. Simons's house, from which I could see the flames rising high in the air, and couldhear the roaring of the fire. I advised the ladies to move to myheadquarters, had our own headquarter-wagons hitched up, and theireffects carried there, as a place of greater safety. The whole airwas full of sparks and of flying masses of cotton, shingles, etc. , some of which were carried four or five blocks, and started newfires. The men seemed generally under good control, and certainlylabored hard to girdle the fire, to prevent its spreading; but, solong as the high wind prevailed, it was simply beyond humanpossibility. Fortunately, about 3 or 4 a. M. , the wind moderated, and gradually the fire was got under control; but it had burned outthe very heart of the city, embracing several churches, the oldState-House, and the school or asylum of that very Sister ofCharity who had appealed for my personal protection. Nickerson'sHotel, in which several of my staff were quartered, was burneddown, but the houses occupied by myself, Generals Howard and Logan, were not burned at all. Many of the people thought that this firewas deliberately planned and executed. This is not true. It wasaccidental, and in my judgment began with the cotton which GeneralHampton's men had set fire to on leaving the city (whether by hisorders or not is not material), which fire was partially subduedearly in the day by our men; but, when night came, the high windfanned it again into full blaze, carried it against theframe-houses, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond ourcontrol. 

This whole subject has since been thoroughly and judiciallyinvestigated, in some cotton cases, by the mixed commission onAmerican and British claims, under the Treaty of Washington, whichcommission failed to award a verdict in favor of the Englishclaimants, and thereby settled the fact that the destruction ofproperty in Columbia, during that night, did not result from theacts of the General Government of the United States--that is tosay, from my army. In my official report of this conflagration, Idistinctly charged it to General Wade Hampton, and confess I did sopointedly, to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was inmy opinion boastful, and professed to be the special champion ofSouth Carolina. 

The morning sun of February 18th rose bright and clear over aruined city. About half of it was in ashes and in smoulderingheaps. Many of the people were houseless, and gathered in groupsin the suburbs, or in the open parks and spaces, around theirscanty piles of furniture. General Howard, in concert with themayor, did all that was possible to provide other houses for them;and by my authority he turned over to the Sisters of Charity theMethodist College, and to the mayor five hundred beef-cattle; tohelp feed the people; I also gave the mayor (Dr. Goodwin) onehundred muskets, with which to arm a guard to maintain order afterwe should leave the neighborhood. During the 18th and 19th weremained in Columbia, General Howard's troops engaged in tearing upand destroying the railroad, back toward the Wateree, while astrong detail, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, United States Engineers, destroyed the State Arsenal, whichwas found to be well supplied with shot, shell, and ammunition. These were hauled in wagons to the Saluda River, under thesupervision of Colonel Baylor, chief of ordnance, and emptied intodeep water, causing a very serious accident by the bursting of apercussion-shell, as it struck another on the margin of the water. The flame followed back a train of powder which had sifted out, reached the wagons, still partially loaded, and exploded them, killing sixteen men and destroying several wagons and teams ofmules. We also destroyed several valuable founderies and thefactory of Confederate money. The dies had been carried away, butabout sixty handpresses remained. There was also found an immensequantity of money, in various stages of manufacture, which our menspent and gambled with in the most lavish manner. 

Having utterly ruined Columbia, the right wing began its marchnorthward, toward Winnsboro', on the 20th, which we reached on the21st, and found General Slocum, with the left wing, who had come bythe way of Alston. Thence the right wing was turned eastward, toward Cheraw, and Fayetteville, North Carolina, to cross theCatawba River at Peay's Ferry. The cavalry was ordered to followthe railroad north as far as Chester, and then to turn east toRocky Mount, the point indicated for the passage of the left wing. In person I reached Rocky Mount on the 22d, with the TwentiethCorps, which laid its pontoon-bridge and crossed over during the23d. Kilpatrick arrived the next day, in the midst of heavy rain, and was instructed to cross the Catawba at once, by night, and tomove up to Lancaster, to make believe we were bound for Charlotte, to which point I heard that Beauregard had directed all hisdetachments, including a corps of Hood's old army, which had beenmarching parallel with us, but had failed to make junction with, the forces immediately opposing us. Of course, I had no purpose ofgoing to Charlotte, for the right wing was already moving rapidlytoward Fayetteville, North Carolina. The rain was so heavy andpersistent that the Catawba, River rose fast, and soon after I hadcrossed the pontoon bridge at Rocky Mount it was carried away, leaving General Davis, with the Fourteenth Corps, on the west bank. The roads were infamous, so I halted the Twentieth Corps at HangingRock for some days, to allow time for the Fourteenth to get over. 

General Davis had infinite difficulty in reconstructing his bridge, and was compelled to use the fifth chains of his wagons foranchor-chains, so that we were delayed nearly a week in thatneighborhood. While in camp at Hanging Rock two prisoners werebrought to me--one a chaplain, the other a boy, son of Richard Bacot, of Charleston, whom I had known as a cadet at West Point. They werejust from Charleston, and had been sent away by General Hardee inadvance, because he was, they said, evacuating Charleston. Rumors tothe same effect had reached me through the negroes, and it was, moreover, reported that Wilmington, North Carolina, was in possessionof the Yankee troops; so that I had every reason to be satisfied thatour march was fully reaping all the fruits we could possibly ask for. Charleston was, in fact, evacuated by General Hardee on the 18th ofFebruary, and was taken possession of by a brigade of General Fosterstroops, commanded by General Schimmelpfennig, the same day. Hardeehad availed himself of his only remaining railroad, by Florence toCheraw; had sent there much of his ammunition and stores, and reachedit with the effective part of the garrison in time to escape acrossthe Pedee River before our arrival. Wilmington was captured byGeneral Terry on the 22d of February; but of this important event weonly knew by the vague rumors which reached us through rebel sources. 

General Jeff. C. Davis got across the Catawba during the 27th, andthe general march was resumed on Cheraw. Kilpatrick remained nearLancaster, skirmishing with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry, keeping up the delusion that we proposed to move on Charlotte andSalisbury, but with orders to watch the progress of the FourteenthCorps, and to act in concert with it, on its left rear. On the 1stof March I was at Finlay's Bridge across Lynch's Creek, the roadsso bad that we had to corduroy nearly every foot of the way; but Iwas in communication with all parts of the army, which had met noserious opposition from the enemy. On the 2d of March we enteredthe village of Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's cavalry, which gave ground rapidly. There I received a message from GeneralHoward, who, reported that he was already in Cheraw with theSeventeenth Corps, and that the Fifteenth was near at hand. 

General Hardee had retreated eastward across the Pedee, burning thebridge. I therefore directed the left wing to march forSneedsboro', about ten miles above Cheraw, to cross the Pedeethere, while I in person proposed to cross over and join the rightwing in Cheraw. Early in the morning of the 3d of March I rode outof Chesterfield along with the Twentieth Corps, which filled theroad, forded Thompson's Creek, and, at the top of the hill beyond, found a road branching off to the right, which corresponded withthe one, on my map leading to Cheraw. Seeing a negro standing bythe roadside, looking at the troops passing, I inquired of him whatroad that was. "Him lead to Cheraw, master!" "Is it a good road, and how far?" "A very good road, and eight or ten miles. " "Anyguerrillas?"

"Oh! no, master, dey is gone two days ago; you could have playedcards on der coat-tails, dey was in sich a hurry!" I was on myLexington horse, who was very handsome and restive, so I madesignal to my staff to follow, as I proposed to go without escort. I turned my horse down the road, and the rest of the stafffollowed. General Barry took up the questions about the road, andasked the same negro what he was doing there. He answered, "Deysay Massa Sherman will be along soon!" "Why, " said General Barry, "that was General Sherman you were talking to. " The poor negro, almost in the attitude of prayer, exclaimed: "De great God! justlook at his horse!" He ran up and trotted by my side for a mile orso, and gave me all the information he possessed, but he seemed toadmire the horse more than the rider. 

We reached Cheraw in a couple of hours in a drizzling rain, and, while waiting for our wagons to come up, I staid with General Blairin a large house, the property of a blockade-runner, whose familyremained. General Howard occupied another house farther down-town. He had already ordered his pontoon-bridge to be laid across thePedee, there a large, deep, navigable stream, and Mower's divisionwas already across, skirmishing with the enemy about two miles out. Cheraw was found to be full of stores which had been sent up fromCharleston prior to its evacuation, and which could not be removed. I was satisfied, from inquiries, that General Hardee had with himonly the Charleston garrison, that the enemy had not divined ourmovements, and that consequently they were still scattered fromCharlotte around to Florence, then behind us. Having thus securedthe passage of the Pedee, I felt no uneasiness about the future, because there remained no further great impediment between us andCape Fear River, which I felt assured was by that time inpossession of our friends. The day was so wet that we all keptin-doors; and about noon General Blair invited us to take lunchwith him. We passed down into the basement dining-room, where theregular family table was spread with an excellent meal; and duringits progress I was asked to take some wine, which stood upon thetable in venerable bottles. It was so very good that I inquiredwhere it came from. General Blair simply asked, "Do you like it?"but I insisted upon knowing where he had got it; he only replied byasking if I liked it, and wanted some. He afterward sent to mybivouac a case containing a dozen bottles of the finest madeira Iever tasted; and I learned that he had captured, in Cheraw, thewine of some of the old aristocratic families of Charleston, whohad sent it up to Cheraw for safety, and heard afterward that Blairhad found about eight wagon-loads of this wine, which hedistributed to the army generally, in very fair proportions. 

After finishing our lunch, as we passed out of the dining room, General Blair asked me, if I did not want some saddle-blankets, ora rug for my tent, and, leading me into the hall to a space underthe stairway, he pointed out a pile of carpets which had also beensent up from Charleston for safety. After our headquarter-wagonsgot up, and our bivouac was established in a field near by, I sentmy orderly (Walter) over to General Blair, and he came backstaggering under a load of carpets, out of which the officers andescort made excellent tent-rugs, saddle-cloths, and blankets. There was an immense amount of stores in Cheraw, which were used ordestroyed; among them twenty-four guns, two thousand muskets, andthirty-six hundred barrels of gunpowder. By the carelessness of asoldier, an immense pile of this powder was exploded, which shookthe town badly; and killed and maimed several of our men. 

We remained in or near Cheraw till the 6th of March, by which timethe army was mostly across the Pedee River, and was prepared toresume the march on Fayetteville. In a house where General Hardeehad been, I found a late New York Tribune, of fully a month laterdate than any I had seen. It contained a mass of news of greatinterest to us, and one short paragraph which I thought extremelymischievous. I think it was an editorial, to the effect that atlast the editor had the satisfaction to inform his readers thatGeneral Sherman would next be heard from about Goldsboro', becausehis supply-vessels from Savannah were known to be rendezvousing atMorehead City:--Now, I knew that General Hardee had read that samepaper, and that he would be perfectly able to draw his owninferences. Up to, that moment I had endeavored so to feign to ourleft that we had completely, misled our antagonists; but this wasno longer possible, and I concluded that we must be ready, for theconcentration in our front of all the force subject to General Jos. Johnston's orders, for I was there also informed that he had beenrestored to the full command of the Confederate forces in South andNorth Carolina. 

On the 6th of March I crossed the Pedee, and all the army marchedfor Fayetteville: the Seventeenth Corps kept well to the right, tomake room; the Fifteenth Corps marched by a direct road; theFourteenth Corps also followed a direct road from Sneedsboro', where it had crossed the Pedee; and the Twentieth Corps, which hadcome into Cheraw for the convenience of the pontoon-bridge, diverged to the left, so as to enter Fayetteville next after theFourteenth Corps, which was appointed to lead into Fayetteville. Kilpatrick held his cavalry still farther to the left rear on theroads from Lancaster, by way of Wadesboro' and New Gilead, so as tocover our trains from Hampton's and Wheeler's cavalry, who hadfirst retreated toward the north. I traveled with the FifteenthCorps, and on the 8th of March reached Laurel Hill, North Carolina. Satisfied that our troops must be at Wilmington, I determined tosend a message there; I called for my man, Corporal Pike, whom Ihad rescued as before described, at Columbia, who was thentraveling with our escort, and instructed him in disguise to workhis way to the Cape Fear River, secure a boat, and float down toWilmington to convey a letter, and to report our approach. I alsocalled on General Howard for another volunteer, and he brought me avery clever young sergeant, who is now a commissioned officer inthe regular army. Each of these got off during the night byseparate routes, bearing the following message, reduced to the samecipher we used in telegraphic messages:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, LAUREL HILL, Wednesday, March 8, 1865. 

Commanding Officer, Wilmington, North Carolina:

We are marching for Fayetteville, will be there Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, and will then march for Goldsboro'. 

If possible, send a boat up Cape Fear River, and have word conveyedto General Schofield that I expect to meet him about Goldsboro'. We are all well and have done finely. The rains make our roadsdifficult, and may delay us about Fayetteville, in which case Iwould like to have some bread, sugar, and coffee. We haveabundance of all else. I expect to reach Goldsboro' by the 20thinstant. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

On the 9th I was with the Fifteenth Corps, and toward eveningreached a little church called Bethel, in the woods, in which wetook refuge in a terrible storm of rain, which poured all night, making the roads awful. All the men were at work corduroying theroads, using fence-rails and split saplings, and every foot of theway had thus to be corduroyed to enable the artillery and wagons topass. On the 10th we made some little progress; on the 11th Ireached Fayetteville, and found that General Hardee, followed byWade Hampton's cavalry, had barely escaped across Cape Fear River, burning the bridge which I had hoped to save. On reachingFayetteville I found General Slocum already in possession with theFourteenth Corps, and all the rest of the army was near at hand. Aday or two before, General Kilpatrick, to our left rear, haddivided his force into two parts, occupying roads behind theTwentieth Corps, interposing between our infantry columns and WadeHampton's cavalry. The latter, doubtless to make junction withGeneral Hardee, in Fayetteville, broke across this line, capturedthe house in which General Kilpatrick and the brigade-commander, General Spencer, were, and for a time held possession of the campand artillery of the brigade. However, General Kilpatrick and mostof his men escaped into a swamp with their arms, reorganized andreturned, catching Hampton's men--in turn, scattered and drove themaway, recovering most of his camp and artillery; but Hampton gotoff with Kilpatrick's private horses and a couple hundredprisoners, of which he boasted much in passing throughFayetteville. 

It was also reported that, in the morning after Hardee's army wasall across the bridge at Cape Fear River, Hampton, with a smallbodyguard, had remained in town, ready to retreat and burn thebridge as soon as our forces made their appearance. He was gettingbreakfast at the hotel when the alarm was given, when he and hisescort took saddle, but soon realized that the alarm came from aset of our foragers, who, as usual, were extremely bold and rash. On these he turned, scattered them, killing some and making othersprisoners; among them General Howard's favorite scout, CaptainDuncan. Hampton then crossed the bridge and burned it. 

I took up my quarters at the old United States Arsenal, which wasin fine order, and had been much enlarged by the Confederateauthorities, who never dreamed that an invading army would reach itfrom the west; and I also found in Fayetteville the widow anddaughter of my first captain (General Childs), of the ThirdArtillery, learned that her son Fred had been the ordnance-officerin charge of the arsenal, and had of course fled with Hardee'sarmy. 

During the 11th. The whole army closed down upon Fayetteville, andimmediate preparations were made to lay two pontoon bridges, onenear the burned bridge, and another about four miles lower down. 

Sunday, March 12th, was a day of Sabbath stillness in Fayetteville. The people generally attended their churches, for they were a verypious people, descended in a large measure from the old ScotchCovenanters, and our men too were resting from the toils and laborsof six weeks of as hard marching as ever fell to the lot ofsoldiers. Shortly after noon was heard in the distance the shrillwhistle of a steamboat, which came nearer and nearer, and soon ashout, long and continuous, was raised down by the river, whichspread farther and farther, and we all felt that it meant amessenger from home. The effect was electric, and no one canrealize the feeling unless, like us, he has been for months cut offfrom all communication with friends, and compelled to listen to thecroakings and prognostications of open enemies. But in a very fewminutes came up through the town to the arsenal on the plateaubehind a group of officers, among whom was a large, floridseafaring man, named Ainsworth, bearing a small mail-bag fromGeneral Terry, at Wilmington, having left at 2 p. M. The daybefore. Our couriers had got through safe from Laurel Hill, andthis was the prompt reply. 

As in the case of our former march from Atlanta, intense anxietyhad been felt for our safety, and General Terry had been prompt toopen communication. After a few minutes' conference with CaptainAinsworth about the capacity of his boat, and the state of factsalong the river, I instructed him to be ready to start back at 6p. M. , and ordered Captain Byers to get ready to carry dispatches toWashington. I also authorized General Howard to send back by thisopportunity some of the fugitives who had traveled with his armyall the way from Columbia, among whom were Mrs. Feaster and her twobeautiful daughters. 

I immediately prepared letters for Secretary Stanton, GeneralsHalleck and Grant, and Generals Schofield, Foster, Easton, andBeckwith, all of which have been published, but I include here onlythose to the Secretary of War, and Generals Grant and Terry, assamples of the whole:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March. 12, 1885. 

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

DEAR SIR: I know you will be pleased to hear that my army hasreached this point, and has opened communication with Wilmington. A tug-boat came up this morning, and will start back at 6 P. M. 

I have written a letter to General Grant, the substance of which hewill doubtless communicate, and it must suffice for me to tell youwhat I know will give you pleasure--that I have done all that Iproposed, and the fruits seem to me ample for the time employed. Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington, are incidents, while theutter demolition of the railroad system of South Carolina, and theutter destruction of the enemy's arsenals of Columbia, Cheraw, andFayetteville, are the principals of the movement. These pointswere regarded as inaccessible to us, and now no place in theConfederacy is safe against the army of the West. Let Lee hold onto Richmond, and we will destroy his country; and then of what useis Richmond. He must come out and fight us on open ground, and forthat we must ever be ready. Let him stick behind his parapets, andhe will perish. 

I remember well what you asked me, and think I am on the rightroad, though a long one. My army is as united and cheerful asever, and as full of confidence in itself and its leaders. It isutterly impossible for me to enumerate what we have done, but Iinclose a slip just handed me, which is but partial. At Columbiaand Cheraw we destroyed nearly all the gunpowder and cartridgeswhich the Confederacy had in this part of the country. Thisarsenal is in fine order, and has been much enlarged. I cannotleave a detachment to hold it, therefore shall burn it, blow it upwith gunpowder, and then with rams knock down its walls. I take itfor granted the United States will never again trust North Carolinawith an arsenal to appropriate at her pleasure. 

Hoping that good fortune may still attend my army. I remain yourservant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March. 12, 1885. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding United States Army, City Point, Virginia. 

DEAR GENERAL: We reached this place yesterday at noon; Hardee, asusual, retreating across the Cape Fear, burning his bridges; butour pontoons will be up to-day, and, with as little delay aspossible, I will be after him toward Goldsboro'. 

A tug has just come up from Wilmington, and before I get off fromhere, I hope to get from Wilmington some shoes and stockings, sugar, coffee, and flour. We are abundantly supplied with allelse, having in a measure lived off the country. 

The army is in splendid health, condition, and spirits, though wehave had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel toalmost any other body of men I ever heard of. 

Our march, was substantially what I designed--straight on Columbia, feigning on Branchville and Augusta. We destroyed, in passing, therailroad from the Edisto nearly up to Aiken; again, from Orangeburgto the Congaree; again, from Colombia down to Kingsville on theWateree, and up toward Charlotte as far as the Chester line; thencewe turned east on Cheraw and Fayetteville. At Colombia wedestroyed immense arsenals and railroad establishments, among whichwore forty-three cannon. At Cheraw we found also machinery andmaterial of war sent from Charleston, among which were twenty-fiveguns and thirty-six hundred barrels of powder; and here we findabout twenty guns and a magnificent United States' arsenal. 

We cannot afford to leave detachments, and I shall thereforedestroy this valuable arsenal, so the enemy shall not have its use;and the United States should never again confide such valuableproperty to a people who have betrayed a trust. 

I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clear my columns of thevast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber us. Some I willsend down the river in boats, and the rest to Wilmington by land, under small escort, as soon as we are across Cape Fear River. 

I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits ofthis march will be appreciated. It had to be made not only todestroy the valuable depots by the way, but for its incidents inthe necessary fall of Charleston, Georgetown, and Wilmington. If Ican now add Goldsboro' without too much cost, I will be in aposition to aid you materially in the spring campaign. 

Jos. Johnston may try to interpose between me here and Schofieldabout Newbern; but I think he will not try that, but concentratehis scattered armies at Raleigh, and I will go straight at him assoon as I get our men reclothed and our wagons reloaded. 

Keep everybody busy, and let Stoneman push toward Greensboro' orCharlotte from Knoxville; even a feint in that quarter will be mostimportant. 

The railroad from Charlotte to Danville is all that is left to theenemy, and it will not do for me to go there, on account of thered-clay hills which are impassable to wheels in wet weather. 

I expect to make a junction with General Schofield in ten days. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, FAYETTVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA, Sunday, March. 12, 1885. 

Major-General TERRY, commanding United States Forces, Wilmington, North Carolina. 

GENERAL: I have just received your message by the tug which leftWilmington at 2 p. M. Yesterday, which arrived here withouttrouble. The scout who brought me your cipher-message started backlast night with my answers, which are superseded by the fact ofyour opening the river. 

General Howard just reports that he has secured one of the enemy'ssteamboats below the city, General Slocum will try to secure twoothers known to be above, and we will load them with refugees(white and black) who have clung to our skirts, impeded ourmovements, and consumed our food. 

We have swept the country well from Savannah to here, and the menand animals are in fine condition. Had it not been for the foulweather, I would have caught Hardee at Cheraw or here; but atColumbia, Cheraw, and here, we have captured immense stores, anddestroyed machinery, guns, ammunition, and property, of inestimablevalue to our enemy. At all points he has fled from us, "standingnot on the order of his going. "

The people of South Carolina, instead of feeding Lee's army, willnow call on Lee to feed them. 

I want you to send me all the shoes, stockings, drawers, sugar, coffee, and flour, you can spare; finish the loads with oats orcorn: Have the boats escorted, and let them run at night at anyrisk. We must not give time for Jos. Johnston to concentrate atGoldsboro'. We cannot prevent his concentrating at Raleigh, but heshall have no rest. I want General Schofield to go on with hisrailroad from Newbern as far as he can, and you should do the samefrom Wilmington. If we can get the roads to and secure Goldsboro'by April 10th, it will be soon enough; but every day now is worth amillion of dollars. I can whip Jos. Johnston provided he does notcatch one of my corps in flank, and I will see that the armymarches hence to Goldsboro' in compact form. 

I must rid our army of from twenty to thirty thousand uselessmouths; as many to go down Cape Fear as possible, and the rest togo in vehicles or on captured horses via Clinton to Wilmington. 

I thank you for the energetic action that has marked your course, and shall be most happy to meet you. I am, truly your friend, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

In quick succession I received other messages from General Terry, of older date, and therefore superseded by that brought by the tugDavidson, viz. , by two naval officers, who had come up partly bycanoes and partly by land; General Terry had also sent theThirteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry to search for us, under ColonelKerwin, who had dispatched Major Berks with fifty men, who reachedus at Fayetteville; so that, by March 12th, I was in fullcommunication with General Terry and the outside world. Still, Iwas anxious to reach Goldsboro', there to make junction withGeneral Schofield, so as to be ready for the next and last stage ofthe war. I then knew that my special antagonist, General Jos. E. Johnston, was back, with part of his old army; that he would not bemisled by feints and false reports, and would somehow compel me toexercise more caution than I had hitherto done. I thenover-estimated his force at thirty-seven thousand infantry, supposed to be made up of S. D. Lee's corps, four thousand;Cheatham's, five thousand; Hoke's, eight thousand; Hardee's, tenthousand; and other detachments, ten thousand; with Hampton's, Wheeler's, and Butler's cavalry, about eight thousand. Of these, only Hardee and the cavalry were immediately in our front, whilethe bulk of Johnston's army was supposed to be collecting at ornear Raleigh. I was determined, however, to give him as littletime for organization as possible, and accordingly crossed CapeFear River, with all the army, during the 13th and 14th, leavingone division as a rearguard, until the arsenal could be completelydestroyed. This was deliberately and completely leveled on the14th, when fire was applied to the wreck. Little other damage wasdone at Fayetteville. 

On the 14th the tug Davidson again arrived from Wilmington, withGeneral Dodge, quartermaster, on board, reporting that there was noclothing to be had at Wilmington; but he brought up some sugar andcoffee, which were most welcome, and some oats. He was followed bya couple of gunboats, under command of Captain Young, United StatesNavy, who reached Fayetteville after I had left, and undertook topatrol the river as long as the stage of water would permit; andGeneral Dodge also promised to use the captured steamboats for alike purpose. Meantime, also, I had sent orders to GeneralSchofield, at Newbern, and to General Terry, at Wilmington, to movewith their effective forces straight for Goldsboro', where Iexpected to meet them by the 20th of March. 

On the 15th of March the whole army was across Cape Fear River, andat once began its march for Goldsboro'; the Seventeenth Corps stillon the right, the Fifteenth next in order, then the Fourteenth andTwentieth on the extreme left; the cavalry, acting in close concertwith the left flank. With almost a certainty of being attacked onthis flank, I had instructed General Slocum to send hiscorps-trains under strong escort by an interior road, holding fourdivisions ready for immediate battle. General Howard was in likemanner ordered to keep his trains well to his right, and to havefour divisions unencumbered, about six miles ahead of GeneralSlocum, within easy support. 

In the mean time, I had dispatched by land to Wilmington a train ofrefugees who had followed the army all the way from Columbia, SouthCarolina, under an escort of two hundred men, commanded by MajorJohn A. Winson (One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois Infantry), sothat we were disencumbered, and prepared for instant battle on ourleft and exposed flank. 

In person I accompanied General Slocum, and during the night ofMarch 15th was thirteen miles out on the Raleigh road. This flankfollowed substantially a road along Cape Fear River north, encountered pretty stubborn resistance by Hardee's infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and the ground favored our enemy; for thedeep river, Cape Fear, was on his right, and North River on hisleft, forcing us to attack him square in front. I proposed todrive Hardee well beyond Averysboro', and then to turn to the rightby Bentonville for Goldsboro'. During the day it rained veryhard, and I had taken refuge in an old cooper-shop, where aprisoner of war was brought to me (sent back from the skirmish-lineby General Kilpatrick), who proved to be Colonel Albert Rhett, former commander of Fort Sumter. He was a tall, slender, andhandsome young man, dressed in the most approved rebel uniform, with high jackboots beautifully stitched, and was dreadfullymortified to find himself a prisoner in our hands. General FrankBlair happened to be with me at the moment, and we were much amusedat Rhett's outspoken disgust at having been captured without afight. He said he was a brigade commander, and that his brigadethat day was Hardee's rear-guard; that his command was composedmostly of the recent garrisons of the batteries of CharlestonHarbor, and had little experience in woodcraft; that he was givingground to us as fast as Hardee's army to his rear moved back, andduring this operation he was with a single aide in the woods, andwas captured by two men of Kilpatrick's skirmish-line that wasfollowing up his retrograde movement. These men called on him tosurrender, and ordered him, in language more forcible than polite, to turn and ride back. He first supposed these men to be ofHampton's cavalry, and threatened to report them to General Hamptonfor disrespectful language; but he was soon undeceived, and wasconducted to Kilpatrick, who sent him back to General Slocum'sguard. 

The rain was falling heavily, and, our wagons coming up, we wentinto camp there, and had Rhett and General Blair to take supperwith us, and our conversation was full and quite interesting. Indue time, however, Rhett was passed over by General Slocum to hisprovost-guard, with orders to be treated with due respect, --and wasfurnished with a horse to ride. 

The next day (the 16th) the opposition continued stubborn, and nearAverysboro' Hardee had taken up a strong position, before whichGeneral Slocum deployed Jackson's division (of the TwentiethCorps), with part of Ward's. Kilpatrick was on his right front. Coming up, I advised that a brigade should make a wide circuit bythe left, and, if possible, catch this line in flank. The movementwas completely successful, the first line of the enemy was sweptaway, and we captured the larger part of Rhett's brigade, twohundred and seventeen men, including Captain Macbeth's battery ofthree guns, and buried one hundred and eight dead. 

The deployed lines (Ward's and Jackson's) pressed on, and foundHardee again intrenched; but the next morning he was gone, in fullretreat toward Smithfield. In this action, called the battle ofAverysboro', we lost twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, andfour hundred and seventy-seven men wounded; a serious loss, becauseevery wounded man had to be carried in an ambulance. The rebelwounded (sixty-eight) were carried to a house near by, all surgicaloperations necessary were performed by our surgeons, and then thesewounded men were left in care of an officer and four men of therebel prisoners, with a scanty supply of food, which was the bestwe could do for them. In person I visited this house while thesurgeons were at work, with arms and legs lying around loose, inthe yard and on the porch; and in a room on a bed lay a pale, handsome young fellow, whose left arm had just been cut off nearthe shoulder. Some one used my name, when he asked, in a feeblevoice, if I were General Sherman. He then announced himself asCaptain Macbeth, whose battery had just been captured; and saidthat he remembered me when I used to visit his father's house, inCharleston. I inquired about his family, and enabled him to writea note to his mother, which was sent her afterward from Goldsboro'. I have seen that same young gentleman since in St. Louis, where hewas a clerk in an insurance-office. 

While the battle of Averysboro' was in progress, and I was sittingon my horse, I was approached by a man on foot, without shoes orcoat, and his head bandaged by a handkerchief. He announcedhimself as the Captain Duncan who had been captured by Wade Hamptonin Fayetteville, but had escaped; and, on my inquiring how hehappened to be in that plight, he explained that when he was aprisoner Wade Hampton's men had made him "get out of his coat, hat, and shoes, " which they appropriated to themselves. He said WadeHampton had seen them do it, and he had appealed to him personallyfor protection, as an officer, but Hampton answered him with acurse. I sent Duncan to General Kilpatrick, and heard afterwardthat Kilpatrick had applied to General Slocum for his prisoner, Colonel Rhett, whom he made march on foot the rest of the way toGoldsboro', in retaliation. There was a story afloat thatKilpatrick made him get out of those fine boots, but restored thembecause none of his own officers had feet delicate enough to wearthem. Of course, I know nothing of this personally, and have neverseen Rhett since that night by the cooper-shop; and suppose that heis the editor who recently fought a duel in New Orleans. 

From Averysboro' the left wing turned east, toward Goldsboro', theFourteenth Corps leading. I remained with this wing until thenight of the 18th, when we were within twenty-seven miles ofGoldsboro' and five from Bentonsville; and, supposing that alldanger was over, I crossed over to join Howard's column, to theright, so as to be nearer to Generals Schofield and Terry, known tobe approaching Goldsboro'. I overtook General Howard atFalling-Creek Church, and found his column well drawn out, by reasonof the bad roads. I had heard some cannonading over about Slocum'shead of column, and supposed it to indicate about the same measure ofopposition by Hardee's troops and Hampton's cavalry beforeexperienced; but during the day a messenger overtook me, and notifiedme that near Bentonsville General Slocum had run up againstJohnston's whole army. I sent back orders for him to fightdefensively to save time, and that I would come up withreenforcements from the direction of Cog's Bridge, by the road whichwe had reached near Falling-Creek Church. The country was veryobscure, and the maps extremely defective. 

By this movement I hoped General Slocum would hold Johnston's armyfacing west, while I would come on his rear from the east. TheFifteenth Corps, less one division (Hazen's), still well to therear, was turned at once toward Bentonsville; Hazen's division wasordered to Slocum's flank, and orders were also sent for GeneralBlair, with the Seventeenth Corps, to come to the same destination. Meantime the sound of cannon came from the direction ofBentonsville. 

The night of the 19th caught us near Falling-Creek Church; butearly the next morning the Fifteenth Corps, General C. R. Woods'sdivision leading, closed down on Bentonsville, near which it wasbrought up by encountering a line of fresh parapet, crossing theroad and extending north, toward Mill Creek. 

After deploying, I ordered General Howard to proceed with duecaution, using skirmishers alone, till he had made junction withGeneral Slocum, on his left. These deployments occupied all day, during which two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps also got up. At that time General Johnston's army occupied the form of a V, theangle reaching the road leading from Averysboro' to Goldsboro', andthe flanks resting on Mill Creek, his lines embracing the villageof Bentonsville. 

General Slocum's wing faced one of these lines and General Howard'sthe other; and, in the uncertainty of General Johnston's strength, I did not feel disposed to invite a general battle, for we had beenout from Savannah since the latter part of January, and ourwagon-trains contained but little food. I had also received messagesduring the day from General Schofield, at Kinston, and GeneralTerry, at Faison's Depot, approaching Goldsboro', both expecting toreach it by March 21st. During the 20th we simply held our groundand started our trains back to Kinston for provisions, which wouldbe needed in the event of being forced to fight a general battle atBentonsville. The next day (21st) it began to rain again, and weremained quiet till about noon, when General Mower, ever rash, broke through the rebel line on his extreme left flank, and waspushing straight for Bentonsville and the bridge across Mill Creek. I ordered him back to connect with his own corps; and, lest theenemy should concentrate on him, ordered the whole rebel line to beengaged with a strong skirmish-fire. 

I think I made a mistake there, and should rapidly have followedMower's lead with the whole of the right wing, which would havebrought on a general battle, and it could not have resultedotherwise than successfully to us, by reason of our vastly superiornumbers; but at the moment, for the reasons given, I preferred tomake junction with Generals Terry and Schofield, before engagingJohnston's army, the strength of which was utterly unknown. Thenext day he was gone, and had retreated on Smithfield; and, theroads all being clear, our army moved to Goldsboro'. The heaviestfighting at Bentonsville was on the first day, viz. , the 19th, whenJohnston's army struck the head of Slocum's columns, knocking backCarlin's division; but, as soon as General Slocum had brought upthe rest of the Fourteenth Corps into line, and afterward theTwentieth on its left, he received and repulsed all attacks, andheld his ground as ordered, to await the coming back of the rightwing. His loss, as reported, was nine officers and one hundred andforty-five men killed, eight hundred and sixteen wounded, and twohundred and twenty-six missing. He reported having buried of therebel dead one hundred and sixty-seven, and captured three hundredand thirty-eight prisoners. 

The loss of the right wing was two officers and thirty-five menkilled, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine menwounded, and seventy missing. General Howard reported that he hadburied one hundred of the rebel dead, and had captured twelvehundred and eighty-seven prisoners. 

Our total loss, therefore, at Bentonsville was: 1, 604

General Johnston, in his "Narrative" (p. 392), asserts that hisentire force at Bentonsville, omitting Wheeler's and Butler'scavalry, only amounted to fourteen thousand one hundred infantryand artillery; and (p. 393) states his losses as: 2, 343

Wide discrepancies exist in these figures: for instance, GeneralSlocum accounts for three hundred and thirty-eight prisonerscaptured, and General Howard for twelve hundred and eighty-seven, making sixteen hundred and twenty-five in all, to Johnston's sixhundred and fifty three--a difference of eight hundred andseventy-two. I have always accorded to General Johnston due creditfor boldness in his attack on our exposed flank at Bentonville, but I think he understates his strength, and doubt whether at thetime he had accurate returns from his miscellaneous army, collectedfrom Hoke, Bragg, Hardee, Lee, etc. After the first attack onCarlin's division, I doubt if the fighting was as desperate asdescribed by him, p. 385, et seq. I was close up with theFifteenth Corps, on the 20th and 21st, considered the fighting asmere skirmishing, and know that my orders were to avoid a generalbattle, till we could be sure of Goldsboro', and of opening up anew base of supply. With the knowledge now possessed of his smallforce, of course I committed an error in not overwhelmingJohnston's army on the 21st of March, 1865. But I was content thento let him go, and on the 22d of March rode to Cog's Bridge, whereI met General Terry, with his two divisions of the Tenth Corps; andthe next day we rode into Goldsboro', where I found GeneralSchofield with the Twenty-third Corps, thus effecting a perfectjunction of all the army at that point, as originally contemplated. During the 23d and 24th the whole army was assembled at Goldsboro';General Terry's two divisions encamped at Faison's Depot to thesouth, and General Kilpatrick's cavalry at Mount Olive Station, near him, and there we all rested, while I directed my specialattention to replenishing the army for the next and last stage ofthe campaign. Colonel W. W. Wright had been so indefatigable, thatthe Newbern Railroad was done, and a locomotive arrived inGoldsboro' on the 25th of March. 

Thus was concluded one of the longest and most important marchesever made by an organized army in a civilized country. Thedistance from Savannah to Goldsboro' is four hundred andtwenty-five miles, and the route traversed embraced five largenavigable rivers, viz. , the Edisto, Broad, Catawba, Pedee, and CapeFear, at either of which a comparatively small force, well-handled, should have made the passage most difficult, if not impossible. The country generally was in a state of nature, with innumerableswamps, with simply mud roads, nearly every mile of which had to becorduroyed. In our route we had captured Columbia, Cheraw, andFayetteville, important cities and depots of supplies, hadcompelled the evacuation of Charleston City and Harbor, had utterlybroken up all the railroads of South Carolina, and had consumed avast amount of food and forage, essential to the enemy for thesupport of his own armies. We had in mid-winter accomplished thewhole journey of four hundred and twenty-five miles in fifty days, averaging ten miles per day, allowing ten lay-days, and had reachedGoldsboro' with the army in superb order, and the trains almost asfresh as when we had started from Atlanta. 

It was manifest to me that we could resume our march, and comewithin the theatre of General Grant's field of operations in allApril, and that there was no force in existence that could delayour progress, unless General Lee should succeed in eluding GeneralGrant at Petersburg, make junction with General Johnston, and thusunited meet me alone; and now that we had effected a junction withGenerals Terry and Schofield, I had no fear even of that event. Onreaching Goldsboro, I learned from General Schofield all thedetails of his operations about Wilmington and Newbern; also of thefight of the Twenty-third Corps about Kinston, with General Bragg. I also found Lieutenant Dunn, of General Grant's staff, awaitingme, with the general's letter of February 7th, coveringinstructions to Generals Schofield and Thomas; and his letter ofMarch 16th, in answer to mine of the 12th, from Fayetteville. 

These are all given here to explain the full reasons for the eventsof the war then in progress, with two or three letters from myself, to fill out the picture. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 7, 1865

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to beof any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions toSchofield and Thomas. I had informed Schofield by telegraph of thedeparture of Mahone's division, south from the Petersburg front. These troops marched down the Weldon road, and, as they apparentlywent without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have notreturned. I was absent from here when they left. Just returnedyesterday morning from Cape Fear River. I went there to determinewhere Schofield's corps had better go to operate against Wilmingtonand Goldsboro'. The instructions with this will inform you of theconclusion arrived at. 

Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement againstWilmington fully determined before we started back; hence theabsence of more detailed instructions to him. He will land onedivision at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of theriver, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with hispontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if hecan. With the aid of the gunboats, there is no doubt but this movewill drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of thecity, either back to their line or away altogether. There will bea large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to followup and invest the garrison, if they should go inside. 

The railroads of North Carolina are four feet eight and one-halfinches gauge. I have sent large parties of railroad-men there tobuild them up, and have ordered stock to run them. We haveabundance of it idle from the non-use of the Virginia roads. Ihave taken every precaution to have supplies ready for you whereveryou may turn up. I did this before when you left Atlanta, andregret that they did not reach you promptly when you reachedsalt-water.... 

Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now atmy headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr. Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace. The peace feelingwithin the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly. This, however, should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate usto greater activity. 

I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you woulddecline, or are opposed to, promotion. No one world be morepleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed inmy position, and I put subordinate, it would not change ourpersonal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions tosupport you that you have ever done to support me, and would do allin my power to make our cause win. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865. 

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland. 

GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. Atthe time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of thedepletion of your command by my orders. It will, be impossible atpresent for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force ofinfantry indicated. General Slocum is advised before this of thechanges made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under GeneralStoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thusvisiting a portion of the State which will not be reached bySherman's forces. He might also be able to return to EastTennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing homeour prisoners of war in rebel hands. 

Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have tobe the judge, making up his mind from information obtained whileexecuting the first part of his instructions. Sherman's movementswill attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execution of this. 

Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. Thisprobably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, withouttaking any now under General Wilson. It would require, though, thereorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, whichStoneman had in his very successful raid into SouthwesternVirginia. 

It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to theforce now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, toenable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, andthe mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson. 

You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copyof this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparationswithout loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with youas to these preparations. 

As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but toavoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing likeequal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should goas light as possible. Stoneman's experience, in raiding will teachhim in this matter better than he can be directed. 

Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, andkeep me advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedientservant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865. 

Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding army of the Ohio. 

GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes, North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placedin command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders. Ofcourse, you will receive orders from me direct until such time asGeneral Sherman gets within communicating distance of you. Thisobviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informedyou would meet you at Fortress Monroe. If the order referred toshould not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, youwill read these instructions as your authority to assume command ofall the troops in North Carolina, dating all officialcommunications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio. " Your headquarterswill be in the field, and with the portion of the army where youfeel yourself most needed. In the first move you will go to CapeFear River. 

Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movementthrough the States of South and North Carolina. The first point tobe obtained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be yourobjective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting thatplace with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building theroad behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: thefirst is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in hismarch north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on theline of his march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine whichof the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use forthrowing supplies from to the interior, you will commence theaccumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousandmen and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many asyou can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you maybe able to occupy. 

I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructionsdirectly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing suppliesfor his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and begoverned in your requisitions accordingly. A supply ofordnance-stores will also be necessary. 

Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respectivedepartments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate withme by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at anytime, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point youcan communicate by telegraph. 

The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive ofthose required by your own command. 

The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it yourimperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for theinterior, to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your ownjudgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying outthese instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to theimportance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in theneighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th ofFebruary. This limits your time very materially. 

If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, itcan be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad-men hasalready been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to FortFisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you bytelegraph. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. Is justreceived. I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but Ihave felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing. Iknew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you, you would come out safely somewhere. 

To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington ofthe greatest importance. Butler came near losing that prize to us. But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I donot know but the first failure has been as valuable a success forthe country as the capture of Fort Fisher. Butler may not see itin that light. 

Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I havebeen attempting to get something done in the West, both tocooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weaknessthere--to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to beslow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so thathe might act from Mobile Bay on the interior. With all I havesaid, he has not moved at last advices. Canby was sending acavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg towardSelma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward thesame point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of Februaryas possible. He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date. He has not yet started, or had not at last advices. I ordered himto send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina, to be there about the time you would reach Columbia. He wouldeither have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would havesucceeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material, which you could not reach. At that time the Richmond papers werefull of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts ofmovements in West North Carolina. I supposed all the time it wasStoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned thatStoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops inNorth Carolina were Kirk's forces! In order that Stoneman mightget off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men wouldbe sufficient for him to take. In the mean time I had directedSheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in themountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on anddestroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal. Time advanced, until he set the 28th of February for starting. I informed Thomas, and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg, to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place aspossible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he(Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soonas possible. 

Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far asheard. I am looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since aboutthe 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibitedfrom publishing accounts of army movements. We are left to our ownresources, therefore, for information. You will see from thepapers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bearsthis will tell you all. 

Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn ofnone going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but Ithink no division or brigade. The determination seems to be tohold Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient toleave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), andmove out with plenty to whip his whole army. But the roads areentirely impassable. Until they improve, I shall content myselfwith watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attemptsto evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over--think I will--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are thelast avenues left to the enemy. 

Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has nowabout as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. I havestopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, exceptthose from Illinois. 

Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, andafterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I haveordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and tofortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can. Hehas accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville, and hasbeen ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of theVirginia Hue. I told him to get ready for a campaign towardLynchburg, if it became necessary. He never can make one there orelsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else totake his troops and come east or go toward Rome, whichever may benecessary. I do not believe either will. 

When I hear that you and Schofield are together, with your backupon the coast, I shall feel that you are entirely safe against anything the enemy can do. Lee may evacuate Richmond, but he cannotget there with force enough to touch you. His army is nowdemoralized and deserting very fast, both to us and to their homes. A retrograde movement would cost him thousands of men, even if wedid not follow. 

Five thousand men, belonging to the corps with you, are now ontheir way to join you. If more reenforcements are necessary, Iwill send them. My notion is, that you should get Raleigh as soonas possible, and hold the railroad from there back. This may takemore force than you now have. 

From that point all North Carolina roads can be made useless to theenemy, without keeping up communications with the rear. 

Hoping to hear soon of your junction with the forces fromWilmington and Newborn, I remain, very respectfully, your obedientservant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, NEUSE RIVER, NORTH CAROLINA, March 22, 1865

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I wrote you from Fayetteville, North Carolina, on Tuesday, the 14th instant, that I was all ready to start for Goldsboro', towhich point I had also ordered General Schofield, from Newborn, andGeneral Terry, from Wilmington. I knew that General Jos. Johnstonwas supreme in command against me, and that he would have time toconcentrate a respectable army to oppose the last stage of thismarch. Accordingly, General Slocum was ordered to send his mainsupply-train, under escort of two divisions, straight forBentonsville, while he, with his other four divisions, disencumbered of all unnecessary wagons, should march towardRaleigh, by way of threat, as far as Averysboro'. General Howard, in like manner, sent his trains with the Seventeenth Corps, well tothe right, and, with the four divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, took roads which would enable him to come promptly to the exposedleft flank. We started on the 16th, but again the rains set in, and the roads, already bad enough, became horrible. 

On Tuesday, the 16th, General Slocum found Hardee's army, fromCharleston, which had retreated before us from Cheraw, in positionacross the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and North Rivers, where the road branches off to Goldsboro'. There a pretty severefight occurred, in which General Slocum's troops carried handsomelythe advanced line, held by a South Carolina brigade, commanded by aColonel Butler. Its Commander, Colonel Rhett, of Fort Sumternotoriety, with one of his staff, had the night before beencaptured, by Kilpatrick's scouts, from his very skirmish-line. Thenext morning Hardee was found gone, and was pursued through andbeyond Averysboro'. General Slocum buried one hundred and eightdead rebels, and captured and destroyed three guns. Some eightywounded rebels were left in our hands, and, after dressing theirwounds, we left them in a house, attended by a Confederate officerand four privates, detailed out of our prisoners and paroled forthe purpose. 

We resumed the march toward Goldsboro'. I was with the left winguntil I supposed all danger had passed; but, when General Slocum'shead of column was within four miles of Bentonsville, afterskirmishing as usual with cavalry, he became aware that there wasinfantry in his front. He deployed a couple of brigades, which, onadvancing, sustained a partial repulse, but soon rallied, when heformed a line of the two leading divisions (Morgan's and Carlin's)of Jeff. C. Davis's corps. The enemy attacked these with violence, but was repulsed. This was in the forenoon of Sunday, the 19th. General Slocum brought forward the two divisions of the TwentiethCorps, hastily disposed of them for defense, and General Kilpatrickmassed his cavalry on the left. 

General Jos. Johnston had, the night before, marched his whole army(Bragg, Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Hardee, and all the troops he haddrawn from every quarter), determined, as he told his men, to crashone of our corps, and then defeat us in detail. He attackedGeneral Slocum in position from 3 P. M. On the 19th till dark; butwas everywhere repulsed, and lost heavily. At the time, I was withthe Fifteenth Corps, marching on a road more to the right; but, onhearing of General Slocum's danger, directed that corps towardCox's Bridge, in the night brought Blair's corps over, and on the20th marched rapidly on Johnston's flank and rear. We struck himabout noon, forced him to assume the defensive, and to fortify. Yesterday we pushed him hard, and came very near crushing him, theright division of the Seventeenth Corps (Mower's) having broken into within a hundred yards of where Johnston himself was, at thebridge across Mill Creek. Last night he retreated, leaving us inpossession of the field, dead, and wounded. We have over twothousand prisoners from this affair and the one at Averysboro', andI am satisfied that Johnston's army was so roughly handledyesterday that we could march right on to Raleigh; but we have nowbeen out six weeks, living precariously upon the collections of ourforagers, our men dirty, ragged, and saucy, and we must rest andfix up a little. Our entire losses thus far (killed, wounded, andprisoners) will be covered by twenty-five hundred, a great part ofwhich are, as usual, slight wounds. The enemy has lost more thandouble as many, and we have in prisoners alone full two thousand. 

I limited the pursuit, this morning, to Mill Creek, and willforthwith march the army to Goldsboro', there to rest, reclothe, and get some rations. 

Our combinations were such that General Schofield enteredGoldsboro' from Newborn; General Terry got Cox's Bridge, withpontoons laid, and a brigade across Neuse River intrenched; and wewhipped Jos. Johnston--all on the same day. 

After riding over the field of battle to-day, near Bentonsville, and making the necessary orders, I have ridden down to this place(Cox's Bridge) to see General Terry, and to-morrow shall ride intoGoldsboro. 

I propose to collect there my army proper; shall post General Terryabout Faison's Depot, and General Schofield about Kinston, partlyto protect the road, but more to collect such food and forage asthe country affords, until the railroads are repaired leading intoGoldsboro'. 

I fear these have not been pushed with the vigor I had expected;but I will soon have them both going. I shall proceed at once toorganize three armies of twenty-five thousand men each, and willtry and be all ready to march to Raleigh or Weldon, as we maydetermine, by or before April 10th. 

I inclose you a copy of my orders of to-day. I would like to bemore specific, but have not the data. We have lost no generalofficers nor any organization. General Slocum took three guns atAverysboro', and lost three others at the first dash on him atBentonsville. We have all our wagons and trains in good order. 

Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 23, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, commanding the Armies of the UnitedStates, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: On reaching Goldsboro' this morning, I found LieutenantDunn awaiting me with your letter of March 18th and dispatch of the17th. I wrote you fully from Cox's Bridge yesterday, and sincereaching Goldsboro' have learned that my letter was sent punctuallyto Newborn, whence it will be dispatched to you. 

I am very glad to hear that General Sheridan did such good servicebetween Richmond and Lynchburg, and hope he will keep the ballmoving, I know that these raids and dashes disconcert our enemy anddiscourage him much. 

General Slocum's two corps (Fourteenth and Twentieth) are nowcoming in. I will dispose of them north of Goldsboro', between theWeldon road and Little River. General Howard to-day is marchingsouth of the Nenae, and to-morrow will come in and occupy groundnorth of Goldsboro', extending from the Weldon Railroad to thatleading to Kinston. 

I have ordered all the provisional divisions, made up of troopsbelonging to the regular corps, to be broken up, and the men tojoin their proper regiments and organizations; and have orderedGeneral Schofield to guard the railroads back to Newborn andWilmington, and to make up a movable column equal to twenty-fivethousand men, with which to take the field. His army will be thecentre, as on the Atlanta campaign. I do not think I want any moretroops (other than absentees and recruits) to fill up the presentregiments, and I can make up an army of eighty thousand men byApril 10th. I will post General Kilpatrick at Mount Olive Stationon the Wilmington road, and then allow the army some rest. 

We have sent all our empty wagons, under escort, with the properstaff-officers, to bring up from Kinston clothing and provisions. As long as we move we can gather food and forage; but, the momentwe stop, trouble begins. 

I feel sadly disappointed that our railroads are not done. I donot like to say there has been any neglect until I make inquiries;but it does seem to me the repairs should have been made ere this, and the road properly stocked. I can only hear of one locomotive(besides the four old ones) on the Newbern road, and two damagedlocomotives (found by General Terry) on the Wilmington road. Ileft Generals Easton and Beckwith purposely to make arrangements inanticipation of my arrival, and have heard from neither, though Isuppose them both to be at Morehead City. 

At all events, we have now made a junction of all the armies, andif we can maintain them, will, in a short time, be in a position tomarch against Raleigh, Gaston, Weldon, or even Richmond, as you maydetermine. 

If I get the troops all well planed, and the supplies working well, I may run up to see you for a day or two before diving again intothe bowels of the country. 

I will make, in a very short time, accurate reports of ouroperations for the past two months. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, March 24, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia. 

GENERAL: I have kept Lieutenant Dunn over to-day that I mightreport farther. All the army is now in, save the cavalry (which Ihave posted at Mount Olive Station, south of the Nenae) and GeneralTerry's command (which--to-morrow will move from Cog's Ferry toFaison's Depot, also on the Wilmington road). I send you a copy ofmy orders of this morning, the operation of which will, I think, soon complete our roads. The telegraph is now done to MoreheadCity, and by it I learn that stores have been sent to Kinston inboats, and that our wagons are loading with rations and clothing. By using the Neuse as high up as Kinston, hauling from theretwenty-six miles, and by equipping the two roads to Morehead Cityand Wilmington, I feel certain we can not only feed and equip thearmy, but in a short time fill our wagons for another start. Ifeel certain, from the character of the fighting, that we have gotJohnston's army afraid of us. He himself acts with timidity andcaution. His cavalry alone manifests spirit, but limits itsoperations to our stragglers and foraging-parties. My marchingcolumns of infantry do not pay the cavalry any attention, but walkright through it. 

I think I see pretty clearly how, in one more move, we cancheckmate Lee, forcing him to unite Johnston with him in the defenseof Richmond, or to abandon the cause. I feel certain, if he leavesRichmond, Virginia leaves the Confederacy. I will study my maps alittle more before giving my positive views. I want all possibleinformation of the Roanoke as to navigability, how far up, and withwhat draught. 

We find the country sandy, dry, with good roads, and more corn andforage than I had expected. The families remain, but I willgradually push them all out to Raleigh or Wilmington. We will needevery house in the town. Lieutenant Dunn can tell you of manythings of which I need not write. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, COX'S BRIGADE, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865

Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding Department of theCumberland. 

DEAR GENERAL: I can hardly help smiling when I contemplate mycommand--it is decidedly mixed. I believe, but am not certain, that you are in my jurisdiction, but I certainly cannot help you inthe way of orders or men; nor do I think you need either. GeneralCruft has just arrived with his provisional division, which will atonce be broken up and the men sent to their proper regiments, asthat of Meagher was on my arrival here. 

You may have some feeling about my asking that General Slocumshould have command of the two corps that properly belong to you, viz. , the Fourteenth and Twentieth, but you can recall that he wasbut a corps commander, and could not legally make orders ofdischarge, transfer, etc. , which was imperatively necessary. Itherefore asked that General Slocum should be assigned to command"an army in the field, " called the Army of Georgia, composed of theFourteenth and Twentieth Corps. The order is not yet made by thePresident, though I have recognized it because both, General Grantand the President have sanctioned it, and promised to have theorder made. 

My army is now here, pretty well clad and provided, divided intothree parts, of two corps each--much as our old Atlanta army was. 

I expect to move on in a few days, and propose (if Lee remains inRichmond) to pass the Roanoke, and open communication with theChowan and Norfolk. This will bring me in direct communicationwith General Grant. 

This is an admirable point--country open, and the two railroads ingood order back to Wilmington and Beaufort. We have alreadybrought up stores enough to fill our wagons, and only await somefew articles, and the arrival of some men who are marching up fromthe coast, to be off. 

General Grant explained to me his orders to you, which, of course, are all right. You can make reports direct to Washington or toGeneral Grant, but keep me advised occasionally of the generalstate of affairs, that I may know what is happening. I must givemy undivided attention to matters here. You will hear from athousand sources pretty fair accounts of our next march. Yourstruly, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

[LETTER FROM ADMIRAL DAHLGREN]

SOUTH ATLANTIC SQUADRONFLAG-SHIP PHILADELPHIA, CHARLESTON, April 20, 1865

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Armies of the Tennessee, Georgia, and Mississippi. 

Mr DEAR GENERAL: I was much gratified by a sight of yourhandwriting, which has just reached me from Goldsboro'; it was verysuggestive of a past to me, when these regions were the scene ofyour operations. 

As you progressed through South Carolina, there was nomanifestation of weakness or of an intention to abandon Charleston, until within a few hours of the fact. On the 11th of February Iwas at Stono, and a spirited demonstration was made by GeneralSchimmel-pfennig and the vessels. He drove the rebels from theirrifle-pits in front of the lines, extending from Fort Pringle, andpushed them vigorously. The next day I was at Bull's Bay, with adozen steamers, among them the finest of the squadron. GeneralPotter had twelve to fifteen hundred men, the object being to carryout your views. We made as much fuss as possible, and with bettersuccess than I anticipated, for it seems that the rebs conceivedStono to be a feint, and the real object at Bull's Bay, supposing, from the number of steamers and boats, that we had several thousandmen. Now came an aide from General Gillmore, at Port Royal, withyour cipher-dispatch from Midway, so I steamed down to Port Royalto see him. Next day was spent in vain efforts to decipher-finallyit was accomplished. You thought that the state of the roads mightforce you to turn upon Charleston; so I went there on the 15th, butthere was no sign yet of flinching. Then I went to Bull's Bay nextday (16th), and found that the troops were not yet ashore, owing tothe difficulties of shoal water. One of the gunboats had contrivedto get up to within shelling range, and both soldiers and sailorswere working hard. On the evening of the 18th I steamed down toStono to see how matters were going there. Passing Charleston, Inoticed two large fires, well inside--probably preparing to leave. On the 17th, in Stono, rumors were flying about loose ofevacuation. In course of the morning, General Schimmelpfennigtelegraphed me, from Morris Island, that there were symptoms ofleaving; that he would again make a push at Stono, and asked formonitors. General Schimmelpfennig came down in the afternoon, andwe met in the Folly Branch, near Secessionville. He was sore thatthe rebs would be off that night, so he was to assault them infront, while a monitor and gunboats stung their flanks both sides. I also sent an aide to order my battery of five eleven-inch guns, at Cumming's Point, to fire steadily all night on Sullivan'sIsland, and two monitors to close up to the island for the sameobject. Next morning (18th) the rascals were found to be off, andwe broke in from all directions, by land and water. The mainbodies had left at eight or nine in the evening, leavingdetachments to keep up a fire from the batteries. I steamed roundquickly, and soon got into the city, threading the streets with alarge group of naval captains who had joined me. All was silent asthe grave. No one to be seen but a few firemen. 

No one can question the excellence of your judgment in taking thetrack you did, and I never had any misgivings, but it was naturalto desire to go into the place with a strong hand, for, if any onespot in the land was foremost in the trouble, it was Charleston. 

Your campaign was the final blow, grand in conception, complete inexecution; and now it is yours to secure the last army whichrebeldom possesses. I hear of your being in motion by the 9th, andhope that the result may be all that you wish. 

Tidings of the murder of the President have just come, and shockedevery mind. Can it be that such a resort finds root in any stratumof American opinion? Evidently it has not been the act of one man, nor of a madman. Who have prompted him?

I am grateful for your remembrance of my boy; the thought of him isever nearest to my heart. Generous, brave, and noble, as I everknew him to be, that he should close his young life so early, evenunder the accepted conditions of a soldier's life, as a son of theUnion, would have been grief sufficient for me to bear; but thathis precious remains should have been so treated by the brutes intowhose hands they fell, adds even to the bitterness of death. I amnow awaiting the hour when I can pay my last duties to his memory. 

With my best and sincere wishes, my dear general, for your successand happiness, I am, most truly, your friend, J. A. DAHLGREN. 

[General Order No. 50. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICEWASHINGTON, March 27, 1865

Ordered--1. That at the hour of noon, on the 14th day of April, 1885, Brevet Major-General Anderson will raise and plant upon theruins of Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, the same United Statesflag which floated over the battlements of that fort during therebel assault, and which was lowered and saluted by him and thesmall force of his command when the works were evacuated on the14th day of April, 1861. 

2. That the flag, when raised, be saluted by one hundred guns fromFort Sumter, and by a national salute from every fort and rebelbattery that fired upon Fort Sumter. 

3. That suitable ceremonies be had upon the occasion, under thedirection of Major-General William T. Sherman, whose militaryoperations compelled the rebels to evacuate Charleston, or, in hisabsence, under the charge of Major-General Q. A. Gilmore, commanding the department. Among the ceremonies will be thedelivery of a public address by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. 

4. That the naval forces at Charleston, and their commander onthat station, be invited to participate in the ceremonies of theoccasion. 

By order of the President of the United States, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

[General Order No. 41. ]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTHHILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA, April 10, 1865

Friday next, the 14th inst. , will be the fourth anniversary of thecapture of Fort Sumter by the rebels. A befitting celebration onthat day, in honor of its reoccupation by the national forces, hasbeen ordered by the President, in pursuance of which Brevet Major-General Robert Anderson, United States Army, will restore to itsoriginal place on the fort the identical flag which, after anhonorable and gallant defense, he was compelled to lower to theinsurgents in South Carolina, in April, 1861. 

The ceremonies for the occasion will commence with prayer, atthirty minutes past eleven o'clock a. M. 

At noon precisely, the flag will be raised and saluted with onehundred guns from Fort Sumter, and with a national salute from FortMoultrie and Battery Bee on Sullivan's Island, Fort Putnam onMorris Island, and Fort Johnson on James's Island; it beingeminently appropriate that the places which were so conspicuous inthe inauguration of the rebellion should take a part not lessprominent in this national rejoicing over the restoration of thenational authority. 

After the salutes, the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher will deliver anaddress. 

The ceremonies will close with prayer and a benediction. 

Colonel Stewart L. Woodford, chief of staff, under such verbalinstructions as he may receive, is hereby charged with the detailsof the celebration, comprising all the arrangements that it may benecessary to make for the accommodation of the orator of the day, and the comfort and safety of the invited guests from the army andnavy, and from civil life. 

By command of Major-General Q. A. Gillmore, W. L. M. BURGER, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Copy of Major ANDERSON's Dispatch, announcing the Surrender of FortSumter, April 14, 1861. 

STEAMSHIP BALTIC, OFF SANDY HOOKApril 10, 1861, 10. 30 a. M. Via New York

Honorable S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington

Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until thequarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge-walls seriously injured, the magazine surrounded byflames, and its door closed from the effect of heat, four barrelsand three cartridges of powder only being available, and noprovisions remaining but pork, I accepted terms of evacuationoffered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the11th inst. , prior to the commencement of hostilities, and marchedout of the fort, Sunday afternoon, the 14th inst. , with colorsflying and drums beating, bringing away company and privateproperty, and saluting my flag with fifty guns. 

ROBERT ANDERSON, Major First Artillery, commanding. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

END OF THE WAR--FROM GOLDSBORO' TO RALEIGH AND WASHINGTON. 

APRIL AND MAY, 1865. 

As before described, the armies commanded respectively by GeneralsJ. M. Schofield, A. H. Terry, and myself, effected a junction inand about Goldsboro', North Carolina, during the 22d and 23d ofMarch, 1865, but it required a few days for all the troops andtrains of wagons to reach their respective camps. In person Ireached Goldsboro' on the 23d, and met General Schofield, whodescribed fully his operations in North Carolina up to that date;and I also found Lieutenant Dunn, aide-de-camp to General Grant, with a letter from him of March 16th, giving a general descriptionof the state of facts about City Point. The next day I receivedanother letter, more full, dated the 22d, which I give herewith. 

Nevertheless, I deemed it of great importance that I should have apersonal interview with the general, and determined to go in personto City Point as soon as the repairs of the railroad, then inprogress under the personal direction of Colonel W. W. Wright, would permit:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESCITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 22, 1865

Major-General SHERMAN, Commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: Although the Richmond papers do not communicate the fact, yet I saw enough in them to satisfy me that you occupied Goldsboro'on the 19th inst. I congratulate you and the army on what may beregarded as the successful termination of the third campaign sinceleaving the Tennessee River, less than one year ago. 

Since Sheridan's very successful raid north of the James, the enemyare left dependent on the Southside and Danville roads for alltheir supplies. These I hope to cut next week. Sheridan is atWhite House, "shoeing up" and resting his cavalry. I expect him tofinish by Friday night and to start the following morning, raidLong Bridge, Newmarket, Bermuda Hundred, and the extreme left ofthe army around Petersburg. He will make no halt with the armiesoperating here, but will be joined by a division of cavalry, fivethousand five hundred strong, from the Army of the Potomac, andwill proceed directly to the Southside and Danville roads. Hisinstructions will be to strike the Southside road as nearPetersburg as he can, and destroy it so that it cannot be repairedfor three or four days, and push on to the Danville road, as nearto the Appomattox as he can get. Then I want him to destroy theroad toward Burkesville as far as he can; then push on to theSouthside road, west of Burkesville, and destroy it effectually. From that point I shall probably leave it to his discretion eitherto return to this army, crossing the Danville road south ofBurkesville, or go and join you, passing between Danville andGreensboro'. When this movement commences I shall move out by myleft, with all the force I can, holding present intrenched lines. I shall start with no distinct view, further than holding Lee'sforces from following Sheridan. But I shall be along myself, andwill take advantage of any thing that turns up. If Lee detaches, Iwill attack; or if he comes out of his lines I will endeavor torepulse him, and follow it up to the best advantage. 

It is most difficult to understand what the rebels intend to do; sofar but few troops have been detached from Lee's army. Muchmachinery has been removed, and material has been sent toLynchburg, showing a disposition to go there. Points, too, havebeen fortified on the Danville road. 

Lee's army is much demoralized, and great numbers are deserting. Probably, from returned prisoners, and such conscripts as can bepicked up, his numbers may be kept up. I estimate his force now atabout sixty-five thousand men. 

Wilson started on Monday, with twelve thousand cavalry, fromEastport. Stoneman started on the same day, from East Tennessee, toward Lynchburg. Thomas is moving the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the interiorof Alabama. 

I ordered Gilmore, as soon as the fall of Charleston was known, tohold all important posts on the sea-coast, and to send toWilmington all surplus forces. Thomas was also directed to forwardto Newbern all troops belonging to the corps with you. Iunderstand this will give you about five thousand men, besidesthose brought east by Meagher. 

I have been telegraphing General Meigs to hasten up locomotives andcars for you. General McCallum, he informs me, is attending to it. I fear they are not going forward as fast as I world like. 

Let me know if you want more troops, or any thing else. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

The railroad was repaired to Goldsboro' by the evening of March25th, when, leaving General Schofield in chief command, with acouple of staff-officers I started for City Point, Virginia, in alocomotive, in company with Colonel Wright, the constructingengineer. We reached Newbern that evening, which was passed in thecompany of General Palmer and his accomplished lady, and early thenext morning we continued on to Morehead City, where General Eastonhad provided for us the small captured steamer Russia, CaptainSmith. We put to sea at once and steamed up the coast, reachingFortress Monroe on the morning of the 27th, where I landed andtelegraphed to my brother, Senator Sherman, at Washington, invitinghim to come down and return with me to Goldsboro. We proceeded onup James River to City Point, which we reached the same afternoon. I found General Grant, with his family and staff, occupying apretty group of huts on the bank of James River, overlooking theharbor, which was full of vessels of all classes, both war andmerchant, with wharves and warehouses on an extensive scale. Thegeneral received me most heartily, and we talked over matters veryfully. After I had been with him an hour or so, he remarked thatthe President, Mr. Lincoln, was then on board the steamer RiverQueen, lying at the wharf, and he proposed that we should call andsee him. We walked down to the wharf, went on board, and found Mr. Lincoln alone, in the after-cabin. He remembered me perfectly, andat once engaged in a most interesting conversation. He was full ofcuriosity about the many incidents of our great march, which hadreached him officially and through the newspapers, and seemed toenjoy very much the more ludicrous parts-about the "bummers, " andtheir devices to collect food and forage when the outside worldsupposed us to be starving; but at the same time he expressed agood deal of anxiety lest some accident might happen to the army inNorth Carolina during my absence. I explained to him that thatarmy was snug and comfortable, in good camps, at Goldsboro'; thatit would require some days to collect forage and food for anothermarch; and that General Schofield was fully competent to command itin my absence. Having made a good, long, social visit, we took ourleave and returned to General Grant's quarters, where Mrs. Granthad provided tea. While at the table, Mrs. Grant inquired if wehad seen Mrs. Lincoln. "No, " said the general, "I did not ask forher;" and I added that I did not even know that she was on board. Mrs. Grant then exclaimed, "Well, you are a pretty pair!" and addedthat our neglect was unpardonable; when the general said we wouldcall again the next day, and make amends for the unintended slight. 

Early the next day, March 28th, all the principal officers of thearmy and navy called to see me, Generals Meade, Ord, Ingalls, etc. , and Admiral Porter. At this time the River Queen was at anchor outin the river, abreast of the wharf, and we again started to visitMr. And Mrs. Lincoln. Admiral Porter accompanied us. We took asmall, tug at the wharf, which conveyed us on board, where we wereagain received most courteously by the President, who conducted usto the after-cabin. After the general compliments, General Grantinquired after Mrs. Lincoln, when the President went to her state-room, returned, and begged us to excuse her, as she was not well. We then again entered upon a general conversation, during whichGeneral Grant explained to the President that at that very instantof time General Sheridan was crossing James River from the north, by a pontoon-bridge below City Point; that he had a large, well-appointed force of cavalry, with which he proposed to strikethe Southside and Danville Railroads, by which alone General Lee, in Richmond, supplied his army; and that, in his judgment, matterswere drawing to a crisis, his only apprehension being that GeneralLee would not wait long enough. I also explained that my army atGoldsboro' was strong enough to fight Lee's army and Johnston'scombined, provided that General Grant could come up within a day orso; that if Lee would only remain in Richmond another fortnight, Icould march up to Burkesville, when Lee would have to starve insideof his lines, or come out from his intrenchments and fight us onequal terms. 

Both General Grant and myself supposed that one or the other of uswould have to fight one more bloody battle, and that it would bethe last. Mr. Lincoln exclaimed, more than once, that there hadbeen blood enough shed, and asked us if another battle could not beavoided. I remember well to have said that we could not controlthat event; that this necessarily rested with our enemy; and Iinferred that both Jeff. Davis and General Lee would be forced tofight one more desperate and bloody battle. I rather supposed itwould fall on me, somewhere near Raleigh; and General Grant addedthat, if Lee would only wait a few more days, he would have hisarmy so disposed that if the enemy should abandon Richmond, andattempt to make junction with General Jos. Johnston in NorthCarolina, he (General Grant) would be on his heels. Mr. Lincolnmore than once expressed uneasiness that I was not with my army atGoldsboro', when I again assured him that General Schofield wasfully competent to command in my absence; that I was going to startback that very day, and that Admiral Porter had kindly provided forme the steamer Bat, which he said was much swifter than my ownvessel, the Russia. During this interview I inquired of thePresident if he was all ready for the end of the war. What was tobe done with the rebel armies when defeated? And what should bedone with the political leaders, such as Jeff. Davis, etc. ? Shouldwe allow them to escape, etc. ? He said he was all ready; all hewanted of us was to defeat the opposing armies, and to get the mencomposing the Confederate armies back to their homes, at work ontheir farms and in their shops. As to Jeff. Davis, he was hardlyat liberty to speak his mind fully, but intimated that he ought toclear out, "escape the country, " only it would not do for him tosay so openly. As usual, he illustrated his meaning by a story:

A man once had taken the total-abstinence pledge. When visiting afriend, he was invited to take a drink, but declined, on the scoreof his pledge; when his friend suggested lemonade, which wasaccepted. In preparing the lemonade, the friend pointed to thebrandy-bottle, and said the lemonade would be more palatable if hewere to pour in a little brandy; when his guest said, if he coulddo so "unbeknown" to him, he would "not object. " From whichillustration I inferred that Mr. Lincoln wanted Davis to escape, "unbeknown" to him. 

I made no notes of this conversation at the time, but AdmiralPorter, who was present, did, and in 1866 he furnished me anaccount thereof, which I insert below, but the admiral describesthe first visit, of the 27th, whereas my memory puts AdmiralPorter's presence on the following day. Still he may be right, andhe may have been with us the day before, as I write this chieflyfrom memory. There were two distinct interviews; the first waslate in the afternoon of March 27th, and the other about noon ofthe 28th, both in the after-cabin of the steamer River Queen; onboth occasions Mr. Lincoln was full and frank in his conversation, assuring me that in his mind he was all ready for the civilreorganization of affairs at the South as soon as the war was over;and he distinctly authorized me to assure Governor Vance and thepeople of North Carolina that, as soon as the rebel armies laiddown their arms, and resumed their civil pursuits, they would atonce be guaranteed all their rights as citizens of a commoncountry; and that to avoid anarchy the State governments then inexistence, with their civil functionaries, would be recognized byhim as the government de facto till Congress could provide others. 

I know, when I left him, that I was more than ever impressed by hiskindly nature, his deep and earnest sympathy with the afflictionsof the whole people, resulting from the war, and by the march ofhostile armies through the South; and that his earnest desireseemed to be to end the war speedily, without more bloodshed ordevastation, and to restore all the men of both sections to theirhomes. In the language of his second inaugural address, he seemedto have "charity for all, malice toward none, " and, above all, anabsolute faith in the courage, manliness, and integrity of thearmies in the field. When at rest or listening, his legs and armsseemed to hang almost lifeless, and his face was care-worn andhaggard; but, the moment he began to talk, his face lightened up, his tall form, as it were, unfolded, and he was the veryimpersonation of good-humor and fellowship. The last words Irecall as addressed to me were that he would feel better when I wasback at Goldsboro'. We parted at the gangway of the River Queen, about noon of March 28th, and I never saw him again. Of all themen I ever met, he seemed to possess more of the elements ofgreatness, combined with goodness, than any other. 

ADMIRAL PORTER'S ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW WITHMr. LINCOLN. 

The day of General Sherman's arrival at City Point (I think the27th of March, 1866), I accompanied him and General Grant on boardthe President's flagship, the Queen, where the President receivedus in the upper saloon, no one but ourselves being present. 

The President was in an exceedingly pleasant mood, and delighted tomeet General Sherman, whom he cordially greeted. 

It seems that this was the first time he had met Sherman, toremember him, since the beginning of the war, and did not rememberwhen he had seen him before, until the general reminded him of thecircumstances of their first meeting. 

This was rather singular on the part of Mr. Lincoln, who was, Ithink, remarkable for remembering people, having that kinglyquality in an eminent degree. Indeed, such was the power of hismemory, that he seemed never to forget the most minutecircumstance. 

The conversation soon turned on the events of Sherman's campaignthrough the South, with every movement of which the Presidentseemed familiar. 

He laughed over some of the stories Sherman told of his "bummers, "and told others in return, which illustrated in a striking mannerthe ideas he wanted to convey. For example, he would often expresshis wishes by telling an apt story, which was quite a habit withhim, and one that I think he adopted to prevent his committinghimself seriously. 

The interview between the two generals and the President lastedabout an hour and a half, and, as it was a remarkable one, I jotteddown what I remembered of the conversation, as I have made apractice of doing during the rebellion, when any thing interestingoccurred. 

I don't regret having done so, as circumstances afterward occurred(Stanton's ill conduct toward Sherman) which tended to cast odiumon General Sherman for allowing such liberal terms to Jos. Johnston. 

Could the conversation that occurred on board the Queen, betweenthe President and General Sherman, have been known, Sherman wouldnot, and could not, have been censored. Mr. Lincoln, had he lived, would have acquitted the general of any blame, for he was onlycarrying out the President's wishes. 

My opinion is, that Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with themost liberal views toward the rebels. He felt confident that wewould be successful, and was willing that the enemy shouldcapitulate on the most favorable terms. 

I don't know what the President would have done had he been left tohimself, and had our army been unsuccessful, but he was thanwrought up to a high state of excitement. He wanted peace onalmost any terms, and there is no knowing what proposals he mighthave been willing to listen to. His heart was tendernessthroughout, and, as long as the rebels laid down their arms, he didnot care how it was done. I do not know how far he was influencedby General Grant, but I presume, from their long conferences, thatthey must have understood each other perfectly, and that the termsgiven to Lee after his surrender were authorized by Mr. Lincoln. Iknow that the latter was delighted when he heard that they had beengiven, and exclaimed, a dozen times, "Good!" "All right!""Exactly the thing!" and other similar expressions. Indeed, thePresident more than once told me what he supposed the terms wouldbe: if Lee and Johnston surrendered, he considered the war ended, and that all the other rebel forces world lay down their arms atonce. 

In this he proved to be right. Grant and Sherman were both of thesame opinion, and so was everyone else who knew anything about thematter. 

What signified the terms to them, so long as we obtained the actualsurrender of people who only wanted a good opportunity to give upgracefully? The rebels had fought "to the last ditch, " and allthat they had left them was the hope of being handed down inhistory as having received honorable terms. 

After hearing General Sherman's account of his own position, andthat of Johnston, at that time, the President expressed fears thatthe rebel general would escape south again by the railroads, andthat General Sherman would have to chase him anew, over the sameground; but the general pronounced this to be impracticable. Heremarked: "I have him where he cannot move without breaking up hisarmy, which, once disbanded, can never again be got together; and Ihave destroyed the Southern railroads, so that they cannot be usedagain for a long time. " General Grant remarked, "What is toprevent their laying the rails again?" "Why, " said GeneralSherman, "my bummers don't do things by halves. Every rail, afterhaving been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked asa ram's-horn, and they never can be used again. "

This was the only remark made by General Grant during theinterview, as he sat smoking a short distance from the President, intent, no doubt, on his own plans, which were being brought to asuccessful termination. 

The conversation between the President and General Sherman, aboutthe terms of surrender to be allowed Jos. Johnston, continued. Sherman energetically insisted that he could command his own terms, and that Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but thePresident was very decided about the matter, and insisted that thesurrender of Johnston's army most be obtained on any terms. 

General Grant was evidently of the same way of thinking, for, although he did not join in the conversation to any extent, yet hemade no objections, and I presume had made up his mind to allow thebest terms himself. 

He was also anxious that Johnston should not be driven intoRichmond, to reenforce the rebels there, who, from behind theirstrong intrenchments, would have given us incalculable trouble. 

Sherman, as a subordinate officer, yielded his views to those ofthe President, and the terms of capitulation between himself andJohnston were exactly in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's wishes. Hecould not have done any thing which would have pleased thePresident better. 

Mr. Lincoln did, in fact, arrange the (so considered) liberal termsoffered General Jos. Johnston, and, whatever may have been GeneralSherman's private views, I feel sure that he yielded to the wishesof the President in every respect. It was Mr. Lincoln's policythat was carried out, and, had he lived long enough, he would havebeen but too glad to have acknowledged it. Had Mr. Lincoln lived, Secretary Stanton would have issued no false telegraphicdispatches, in the hope of killing off another general in theregular army, one who by his success had placed himself in the wayof his own succession. 

The disbanding of Jos. Johnston's army was so complete, that thepens and ink used in the discussion of the matter were all wasted. 

It was asserted, by the rabid ones, that General Sherman had givenup all that we had been fighting for, had conceded every thing toJos. Johnston, and had, as the boys say, "knocked the fat into thefire;" but sober reflection soon overruled these harsh expressions, and, with those who knew General Sherman, and appreciated him, hewas still the great soldier, patriot, and gentleman. In futuretimes this matter will be looked at more calmly anddispassionately. The bitter animosities that have been engenderedduring the rebellion will have died out for want of food on whichto live, and the very course Grant, Sherman, and others pursued, ingranting liberal terms to the defeated rebels, will be applauded. The fact is, they met an old beggar in the road, whose crutches hadbroken from under him: they let him have only the broken crutchesto get home with!

I sent General Sherman back to Newbern, North Carolina, in thesteamer Bat. 

While he was absent from his command he was losing no time, for hewas getting his army fully equipped with stores and clothing; and, when he returned, he had a rested and regenerated army, ready toswallow up Jos. Johnston and all his ragamuffins. 

Johnston was cornered, could not move without leaving every thingbehind him, and could not go to Richmond without bringing on afamine in that destitute city. 

I was with Mr. Lincoln all the time he was at City Point, and untilhe left for Washington. He was more than delighted with thesurrender of Lee, and with the terms Grant gave the rebel general;and would have given Jos. Johnston twice as much, had the latterasked for it, and could he have been certain that the rebel worldhave surrendered without a fight. I again repeat that, had Mr. Lincoln lived, he would have shouldered all the responsibility. 

One thing is certain: had Jos. Johnston escaped and got intoRichmond, and caused a larger list of killed and wounded than wehad, General Sherman would have been blamed. Then why not give himthe full credit of capturing on the best terms the enemy's lastimportant army and its best general, and putting an end to therebellion. 

It was a finale worthy of Sherman's great march through the swampsand deserts of the South, a march not excelled by any thing we readof in modern military history. 

D. D. PORTER, Vice-Admiral. 

(Written by the admiral in 1866, at the United States Naval Academyat Annapolis, Md. , and mailed to General Sherman at St. Louis, Mo. )

As soon as possible, I arranged with General Grant for certainchanges in the organization of my army; and the general alsoundertook to send to North Carolina some tug-boat and barges tocarry stores from Newbern up as far as Kinston, whence they couldbe hauled in wagons to our camps, thus relieving our railroads tothat extent. I undertook to be ready to march north by April 10th, and then embarked on the steamer Bat, Captain Barnes, for NorthCarolina. We steamed down James River, and at Old Point Comforttook on board my brother, Senator Sherman, and Mr. Edwin Stanton, son of the Secretary of War, and proceeded at once to ourdestination. On our way down the river, Captain Barnes expressedhimself extremely obliged to me for taking his vessel, as it hadrelieved him of a most painful dilemma. He explained that he hadbeen detailed by Admiral Porter to escort the President's unarmedboat, the River Queen, in which capacity it became his special dutyto look after Mrs. Lincoln. The day before my arrival at CityPoint, there had been a grand review of a part of the Army of theJames, then commanded by General Ord. The President rode out fromCity Point with General Grant on horseback, accompanied by anumerous staff, including Captain Barnes and Mrs. Ord; but Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant had followed in a carriage. 

The cavalcade reached the review-ground some five or six miles outfrom City Point, found the troops all ready, drawn up in line, andafter the usual presentation of arms, the President and party, followed by Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes on horseback, rode thelines, and returned to the reviewing stand, which meantime had beenreached by Mrs. Lincoln and Mrs. Grant in their carriage, which hadbeen delayed by the driver taking a wrong road. Mrs. Lincoln, seeing Mrs. Ord and Captain Barnes riding with the retinue, andsupposing that Mrs. Ord had personated her, turned on CaptainBarnes and gave him a fearful scolding; and even indulged in somepretty sharp upbraidings to Mrs. Ord. 

This made Barne's position very unpleasant, so that he felt muchrelieved when he was sent with me to North Carolina. The Bat wasvery fast, and on the morning of the 29th we were near CapeHatteras; Captain Barnes, noticing a propeller coming out ofHatteras Inlet, made her turn back and pilot us in. We enteredsafely, steamed up Pamlico Sound into Neuse River, and the nextmorning, --by reason of some derangement of machinery, we anchoredabout seven miles below Newbern, whence we went up in CaptainBarnes's barge. As soon as we arrived at Newbern, I telegraphed upto General Schofield at Goldsboro' the fact of my return, and thatI had arranged with General Grant for the changes made necessary inthe reorganization of the army, and for the boats necessary tocarry up the provisions and stores we needed, prior to the renewalof our march northward. 

These changes amounted to constituting the left wing a distinctarmy, under the title of "the Army of Georgia, " under command ofGeneral Slocum, with his two corps commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis and General Joseph A. Mower; the Tenth and Twenty-third Corpsalready constituted another army, "of the Ohio, " under the commandof Major-General Schofield, and his two corps were commanded byGenerals J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry. These changes were necessary, because army commanders only could order courts-martial, grantdischarges, and perform many other matters of discipline andadministration which were indispensable; but my chief purpose wasto prepare the whole army for what seemed among the probabilitiesof the time--to fight both Lee's and Johnston's armies combined, incase their junction could be formed before General Grant couldpossibly follow Lee to North Carolina. 

General George H. Thomas, who still remained at Nashville, was notpleased with these changes, for the two corps with General Slocum, viz. , the Fourteenth and Twentieth, up to that time, had remainedtechnically a part of his "Army of the Cumberland;" but he was sofar away, that I had to act to the best advantage with the troopsand general officers actually present. I had specially asked forGeneral Mower to command the Twentieth Corps, because I regardedhim as one of the boldest and best fighting generals in the wholearmy. His predecessor, General A. S. Williams, the senior divisioncommander present, had commanded the corps well from Atlanta toGoldsboro', and it may have seemed unjust to replace him at thatprecise moment; but I was resolved to be prepared for a mostdesperate and, as then expected, a final battle, should it fall onme. 

I returned to Goldsboro' from Newbern by rail the evening of March30th, and at once addressed myself to the task of reorganizationand replenishment of stores, so as to be ready to march by April10th, the day agreed on with General Grant. 

The army was divided into the usual three parts, right and leftwings, and centre. The tabular statements herewith will give theexact composition of these separate armies, which by the 10th ofApril gave the following effective strength:

 Infantry ................... 80, 968 Artillery .................. 2, 448 Cavalry .................... 5, 587

 Aggregate ............ 88, 948 Total number of guns, 91

The railroads to our rear had also been repaired, so that storeswere arriving very fast, both from Morehead City and Wilmington. The country was so level that a single locomotive could haultwenty-five and thirty cars to a train, instead of only ten, as wasthe case in Tennessee and Upper Georgia. 

By the 5th of April such progress had been made, that I issued thefollowing Special Field Orders, No. 48, prescribing the time andmanner of the next march

[Special Field Orders, No. 48. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865. 

Confidential to Army Commanders, Corps Commanders, and Chiefs ofStaff Departments:

The next grand objective is to place this army (with its fullequipment) north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base forsupplies at Norfolk, and at Winton or Murfreesboro' on the Chowan, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, aboutPetersburg; and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible enroute:

1. To accomplish this result the following general plan will befollowed, or modified only by written orders from theseheadquarters, should events require a change:

(1. ) On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed tobe complete, and the outlying detachments will be called in, orgiven directions to meet on the next march. All preparations willalso be complete to place the railroad-stock back of Kinston on theone road, and below the Northeast Branch on the other. 

(2. ) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their linesof march, say, about seven miles, and close up. 

(3. ) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be keptup at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according tothe amount of resistance. All the columns will dress to the left(which is the exposed flank), and commanders will study always tofind roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general leftwheel, the wagons to be escorted to some place of security on thedirect route of march. Foraging and other details may continue asheretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed; andforagers should not go in advance of the advance-guard, but lookmore to our right rear for corn, bacon, and meal. 

2. The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding) will aimstraight for the railroad-bridge near Smithfield; thence along upthe Neuse River to the railroad-bridge over Neuse River, northeastof Raleigh (Powell's); thence to Warrenton, the general point ofconcentration. 

The centre (Major-General Schofield commanding) will move toWhitley's Mill, ready to support the left until it is pastSmithfield, when it will follow up (substantially) Little River toabout Rolesville, ready at all times to move to the support of theleft; after passing Tar River, to move to Warrenton. 

The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), preceded by thecavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahunta, then swingacross to Bulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to make junction with theother armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of NeuseRiver, about Smithfield; thence, in case of no serious oppositionon the left, will work up toward Earpsboro', Andrews, B----, andWarrenton. 

The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding), leaving itsencumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight forWeldon, until the enemy is across Tar River, and that bridgeburned; then it will deflect toward Nashville and Warrenton, keeping up communication with general headquarters. 

3. As soon as the army starts, the chief-quartermaster andcommissary will prepare a resupply of stores at some point onPamlico or Albemarle Sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston orWinton and Murfreesboro', according to developments. As soon asthey have satisfactory information that the army is north of theRoanoke, they will forthwith establish a depot at Winton, with asub-depot at Murfreesboro'. Major-General Schofield will hold, asheretofore, Wilmington (with the bridge across Northern Branch asan outpost), Newborn (and Kinston as its outpost), and will beprepared to hold Winton and Murfreesboro' as soon as the timearrives for that move. The navy has instructions from AdmiralPorter to cooperate, and any commanding officer is authorized tocall on the navy for assistance and cooperation, always in writing, setting forth the reasons, of which necessarily the navalcommander must be the judge. 

4. The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, butmay in person shift to either flank where his presence may beneeded, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports. He requires, absolutely, a report of each army or grand detachment each night, whether any thing material has occurred or not, for often theabsence of an enemy is a very important fact in militaryprognostication. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

But the whole problem became suddenly changed by the news of thefall of Richmond and Petersburg, which reached as at Goldsboro', onthe 6th of April. The Confederate Government, with Lee's army, hadhastily abandoned Richmond, fled in great disorder toward Danville, and General Grant's whole army was in close pursuit. Of course, Iinferred that General Lee would succeed in making junction withGeneral Johnston, with at least a fraction of his army, somewhereto my front. I at once altered the foregoing orders, and preparedon the day appointed, viz. , April 10th, to move straight onRaleigh, against the army of General Johnston, known to be atSmithfield, and supposed to have about thirty-five thousand men. Wade Hampton's cavalry was on his left front and Wheeler's on hisright front, simply watching us and awaiting our initiative. Meantime the details of the great victories in Virginia came thickand fast, and on the 8th I received from General Grant thiscommunication, in the form of a cipher-dispatch:

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865

Major-General SHERMAN, Goldsboro', North Carolina:

All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danvillewith the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him lastnight, reports all that is left with him--horse, foot, anddragoons--at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reducethis number one-half. I will push on to Burkesville, and, if astand is made at Danville, will, in a very few days, go there. Ifyou can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us seeif we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro' ornearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when youreceive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points tostrike at. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I answered immediately that we would move on the 10th, prepared tofollow Johnston wherever he might go. Promptly on Monday morning, April 10th, the army moved straight on Smithfield; the right wingmaking a circuit by the right, and the left wing, supported by thecentre, moving on the two direct roads toward Raleigh, distantfifty miles. General Terry's and General Kilpatrick's troops movedfrom their positions on the south or west bank of the Neuse Riverin the same general direction, by Cox's Bridge. On the 11th wereached Smithfield, and found it abandoned by Johnston's army, which had retreated hastily on Raleigh, burning the bridges. Torestore these consumed the remainder of the day, and during thatnight I received a message from General Grant, at Appomattox, thatGeneral Lee had surrendered to him his whole army, which I at onceannounced to the troops in orders:

[Special Field Orders, No. 54]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, SMITHFIELD, NORTH CAROLINA, April 12, 1865. 

The general commanding announces to the army that he has officialnotice from General Grant that General Lee surrendered to him hisentire army, on the 9th inst. , at Appomattox Court-House, Virginia. 

Glory to God and our country, and all honor to our comrades inarms, toward whom we are marching!

A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great raceis won, and our Government stands regenerated, after four longyears of war. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Of course, this created a perfect furore, of rejoicing, and we allregarded the war as over, for I knew well that General Johnston hadno army with which to oppose mine. So that the only questions thatremained were, would he surrender at Raleigh? or would he allowhis army to disperse into guerrilla bands, to "die in the lastditch, " and entail on his country an indefinite and prolongedmilitary occupation, and of consequent desolation? I knew wellthat Johnston's army could not be caught; the country was too open;and, without wagons, the men could escape us, disperse, andassemble again at some place agreed on, and thus the war might beprolonged indefinitely. 

I then remembered Mr. Lincoln's repeated expression that he wantedthe rebel soldiers not only defeated, but "back at their homes, engaged in their civil pursuits. " On the evening of the 12th I waswith the head of Slocum's column, at Gulley's, and GeneralKilpatrick's cavalry was still ahead, fighting Wade Hampton'srear-guard, with orders to push it through Raleigh, while I wouldgive a more southerly course to the infantry columns, so as, ifpossible, to prevent a retreat southward. On the 13th, early, Ientered Raleigh, and ordered the several heads of column towardAshville in the direction of Salisbury or Charlotte. Beforereaching Raleigh, a locomotive came down the road to meet me, passing through both Wade Hampton's and Kilpatrick's cavalry, bringing four gentlemen, with a letter from Governor Vance to me, asking protection for the citizens of Raleigh. These gentlemenwere, of course, dreadfully excited at the dangers through whichthey had passed. Among them were ex-Senator Graham, Mr. Swain, president of Chapel Hill University, and a Surgeon Warren, of theConfederate army. They had come with a flag of truce, to whichthey were not entitled; still, in the interest of peace, Irespected it, and permitted them to return to Raleigh with theirlocomotive, to assure the Governor and the people that the war wassubstantially over, and that I wanted the civil authorities toremain in the execution of their office till the pleasure of thePresident could be ascertained. On reaching Raleigh I found thesesame gentlemen, with Messrs. Badger, Bragg, Holden, and others, butGovernor Vance had fled, and could not be prevailed on to return, because he feared an arrest and imprisonment. From the Raleighnewspapers of the 10th I learned that General Stoneman, with hisdivision of cavalry, had come across the mountains from EastTennessee, had destroyed the railroad at Salisbury, and was thensupposed to be approaching Greensboro'. I also learned thatGeneral Wilson's cavalry corps was "smashing things" down aboutSelma and Montgomery, Alabama, and was pushing for Columbus andMacon, Georgia; and I also had reason to expect that GeneralSheridan would come down from Appomattox to join us at Raleigh withhis superb cavalry corps. I needed more cavalry to checkJohnston's retreat, so that I could come up to him with myinfantry, and therefore had good reason to delay. I ordered therailroad to be finished up to Raleigh, so that I could operate fromit as a base, and then made:

[Special Field Orders, No. 55]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865. 

The next movement will be on Ashboro', to turn the position of theenemy at the "Company's Shops" in rear of Haw River Bridge, and atGreensboro', and to cut off his only available line of retreat bySalisbury and Charlotte:

1. General Kilpatrick will keep up a show of pursuit in thedirection of Hillsboro' and Graham, but be ready to cross Haw Riveron General Howard's bridge, near Pittsboro', and thence willoperate toward Greensboro', on the right front of the right wing. 

2. The right wing, Major-General Howard commanding, will move outon the Chapel Hill road, and send a light division up in thedirection of Chapel Hill University to act in connection with thecavalry; but the main columns and trains will move via Hackney'sCross-Roads, and Trader's Hill, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence, etc. , tobe followed by the cavalry and light division, as soon as thebridge is laid over Haw River. 

8. The centre, Major-General Schofield commanding, will move viaHolly Springs, New Hill, Haywood, and Moffitt's Mills. 

4. The left wing, Major-General Slocum commanding, will moverapidly by the Aven's Ferry road, Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox'sMills. 

5. All the troops will draw well out on the roads designatedduring today and to-morrow, and on the following day will move withall possible rapidity for Ashboro'. No further destruction ofrailroads, mills, cotton, and produce, will be made without thespecific orders of an army commander, and the inhabitants will bedealt with kindly, looking to an early reconciliation. The troopswill be permitted, however, to gather forage and provisions asheretofore; only more care should be taken not to strip the poorerclasses too closely. 

By order of General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Thus matters stood, when on the morning of the 14th GeneralKilpatrick reported from Durham's Station, twenty-six miles up therailroad toward Hillsboro', that a flag of truce had come in fromthe enemy with a package from General Johnston addressed to me. Taking it for granted that this was preliminary to a surrender, Iordered the message to be sent me at Raleigh, and on the 14threceived from General Johnston a letter dated April 13, 1865, inthese words:

The results of the recent campaign in Virginia have changed therelative military condition of the belligerents. I am, therefore, induced to address you in this form the inquiry whether, to stopthe further effusion of blood and devastation of property, you arewilling to make a temporary suspension of active operations, and tocommunicate to Lieutenant-General Grant, commanding the armies ofthe United States, the request that he will take like action inregard to other armies, the object being to permit the civilauthorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate theexisting war. 

To which I replied as follows:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 14, 1865. 

General J. E. JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army. 

GENERAL: I have this moment received your communication of thisdate. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for thesuspension of farther hostilities between the armies commanded byyou and those commanded by myself, and will be willing to conferwith you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column, to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the university, andexpect that you will also maintain the present position of yourforces until each has notice of a failure to agree. 

That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the sameterms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee atAppomattox Court-House, on the 9th instant, relative to our twoarmies; and, furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order tosuspend the movements of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoneman is under my command, and my order will suspend anydevastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that Ireally desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage theywould sustain by the march of this army through the central orwestern parts of the State. 

I am, with respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

I sent my aide-de-camp, Colonel McCoy, up to Durham's Station withthis letter, with instructions to receive the answer, to telegraphits contents back to me at Raleigh, and to arrange for aninterview. On the 16th I received a reply from General Johnston, agreeing to meet me the next day at a point midway between ouradvance at Durham and his rear at Hillsboro'. I ordered a car andlocomotive to be prepared to convey me up to Durham's at eighto'clock of the morning of April 17th. Just as we were entering thecar, the telegraph-operator, whose office was up-stairs in thedepot-building, ran down to me and said that he was at that instantof time receiving a most important dispatch in cipher from MoreheadCity, which I ought to see. I held the train for nearly half anhour, when he returned with the message translated and written out. It was from Mr. Stanton, announcing the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, the attempt on the life of Mr. Seward and son, and asuspicion that a like fate was designed for General Grant and allthe principal officers of the Government. Dreading the effect ofsuch a message at that critical instant of time, I asked theoperator if any one besides himself had seen it; he answered No!I then bade him not to reveal the contents by word or look till Icame back, which I proposed to do the same afternoon. The trainthen started, and, as we passed Morris's Station, General Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, came into my car, and I told him Iwanted to see him on my return, as I had something very importantto communicate. He knew I was going to meet General Johnston, andvolunteered to say that he hoped I would succeed in obtaining hissurrender, as the whole army dreaded the long march to Charlotte(one hundred and seventy-five miles), already begun, but which hadbeen interrupted by the receipt of General Johnston's letter of the13th. We reached Durham's, twenty-six miles, about 10 a. M. , whereGeneral Kilpatrick had a squadron of cavalry drawn up to receiveme. We passed into the house in which he had his headquarters, andsoon after mounted some led horses, which he had prepared formyself and staff. General Kilpatrick sent a man ahead with a whiteflag, followed by a small platoon, behind which we rode, and werefollowed by the rest of the escort. We rode up the Hillsboro' roadfor about five miles, when our flag bearer discovered anothercoming to meet him: They met, and word was passed back to us thatGeneral Johnston was near at hand, when we rode forward and metGeneral Johnston on horseback, riding side by side with GeneralWade Hampton. We shook hands, and introduced our respectiveattendants. I asked if there was a place convenient where we couldbe private, and General Johnston said he had passed a smallfarmhouse a short distance back, when we rode back to it togetherside by side, our staff-officers and escorts following. We hadnever met before, though we had been in the regular army togetherfor thirteen years; but it so happened that we had never beforecometogether. He was some twelve or more years my senior; but we knewenough of each other to be well acquainted at once. We soonreached the house of a Mr. Bennett, dismounted, and left our horseswith orderlies in the road. Our officers, on foot, passed into theyard, and General Johnston and I entered the small frame-house. Weasked the farmer if we could have the use of his house for a fewminutes, and he and his wife withdrew into a smaller log-house, which stood close by. 

As soon as we were alone together I showed him the dispatchannouncing Mr. Lincoln's assassination, and watched him closely. The perspiration came out in large drops on his forehead, and hedid not attempt to conceal his distress. He denounced the act as adisgrace to the age, and hoped I did not charge it to theConfederate Government. I told him I could not believe that he orGeneral Lee, or the officers of the Confederate army, couldpossibly be privy to acts of assassination; but I would not say asmuch for Jeff. Davis, George Sanders, and men of that stripe. Wetalked about the effect of this act on the country at large and onthe armies, and he realized that it made my situation extremelydelicate. I explained to him that I had not yet revealed the newsto my own personal staff or to the army, and that I dreaded theeffect when made known in Raleigh. Mr. Lincoln was peculiarlyendeared to the soldiers, and I feared that some foolish woman orman in Raleigh might say something or do something that wouldmadden our men, and that a fate worse than that of Columbia wouldbefall the place. 

I then told Johnston that he must be convinced that he could notoppose my army, and that, since Lee had surrendered, he could dothe same with honor and propriety. He plainly and repeatedlyadmitted this, and added that any further fighting would be"murder;" but he thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, we might arrange terms that would embrace all the Confederatearmies. I asked him if he could control other armies than his own;he said, not then, but intimated that he could procure authorityfrom Mr. Davis. I then told him that I had recently had aninterview with General Grant and President Lincoln, and that I waspossessed of their views; that with them and the people North thereseemed to be no vindictive feeling against the Confederate armies, but there was against Davis and his political adherents; and thatthe terms that General Grant had given to General Lee's army werecertainly most generous and liberal. All this he admitted, butalways recurred to the idea of a universal surrender, embracing hisown army, that of Dick Taylor in Louisiana and Texas, and of Maury, Forrest, and others, in Alabama and Georgia. General Johnston'saccount of our interview in his "Narrative" (page 402, et seq. ) isquite accurate and correct, only I do not recall his naming thecapitulation of Loeben, to which he refers. Our conversation wasvery general and extremely cordial, satisfying me that it couldhave but one result, and that which we all desired, viz. , to endthe war as quickly as possible; and, being anxious to return toRaleigh before the news of Mr. Lincoln's assassination could bedivulged, on General Johnston's saying that he thought that, duringthe night, he could procure authority to act in the name of all theConfederate armies in existence we agreed to meet again the nextday at noon at the same place, and parted, he for Hillsboro' and Ifor Raleigh. 

We rode back to Durham's Station in the order we had come, and thenI showed the dispatch announcing Mr. Lincoln's death. I cautionedthe officers to watch the soldiers closely, to prevent any violentretaliation by them, leaving that to the Government at Washington;and on our way back to Raleigh in the cars I showed the samedispatch to General Logan and to several of the officers of theFifteenth Corps that were posted at Morrisville and Jones'sStation, all of whom were deeply impressed by it; but all gavetheir opinion that this sad news should not change our generalcourse of action. 

As soon as I reached Raleigh I published the following orders tothe army, announcing the assassination of the President, and Idoubt if, in the whole land, there were more sincere mourners overhis sad fate than were then in and about Raleigh. I watched theeffect closely, and was gratified that there was no single act ofretaliation; though I saw and felt that one single word by me wouldhave laid the city in ashes, and turned its whole populationhouseless upon the country, if not worse:

[Special Field Orders, No. 56. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 17, 1865. 

The general commanding announces, with pain and sorrow, that on theevening of the 14th instant, at the theatre in Washington city, hisExcellency the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, wasassassinated by one who uttered the State motto of Virginia. Atthe same time, the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, while sufferingfrom a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his ownhouse, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposedfatally. It is believed, by persons capable of judging, that otherhigh officers were designed to share the same fate. Thus it seemsthat our enemy, despairing of meeting us in open, manly warfare, begins to resort to the assassin's tools. 

Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, forhe knows that the great mass of the Confederate army world scorn tosanction each acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequenceof rebellion against rightful authority. 

We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now beprepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins andguerrillas; but woe onto the people who seek to expend their wildpassions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result!

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

During the evening of the 17th and morning of the 18th I saw nearlyall the general officers of the army (Schofield, Slocum, Howard, Logan, Blair), and we talked over the matter of the conference atBennett's house of the day before, and, without exception, alladvised me to agree to some terms, for they all dreaded the longand harassing march in pursuit of a dissolving and fleeing army--a march that might carry us back again over the thousand miles thatwe had just accomplished. We all knew that if we could bringJohnston's army to bay, we could destroy it in an hour, but thatwas simply impossible in the country in which we found ourselves. We discussed all the probabilities, among which was, whether, ifJohnston made a point of it, I should assent to the escape from thecountry of Jeff. Davis and his fugitive cabinet; and some one of mygeneral officers, either Logan or Blair, insisted that, if askedfor, we should even provide a vessel to carry them to Nassau fromCharleston. 

The next morning I again started in the cars to Durham's Station, accompanied by most of my personal staff, and by Generals Blair, Barry, Howard, etc. , and, reaching General Kilpatrick'sheadquarters at Durham's, we again mounted, and rode, with the sameescort of the day, before, to Bennett's house, reaching therepunctually at noon. General Johnston had not yet arrived, but acourier shortly came, and reported him as on the way. It must havebeen nearly 2 p. M. When he arrived, as before, with General WadeHampton. He had halted his escort out of sight, and we againentered Bennett's house, and I closed the door. General Johnstonthen assured me that he had authority over all the Confederatearmies, so that they would obey his orders to surrender on the sameterms with his own, but he argued that, to obtain so cheaply thisdesirable result, I ought to give his men and officers someassurance of their political rights after their surrender. Iexplained to him that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of amnesty, ofDecember 8, 1863, still in force; enabled every Confederate soldierand officer, below the rank of colonel, to obtain an absolutepardon, by simply laying down his arms, and taking the common oathof allegiance, and that General Grant, in accepting the surrenderof General Lee's army, had extended the same principle to all theofficers, General Lee included; such a pardon, I understood, wouldrestore to them all their rights of citizenship. But he insistedthat the officers and men of the Confederate army wereunnecessarily alarmed about this matter, as a sort of bugbear. Hethen said that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and he thoughtthat it would be well for him to be present. I objected, on thescore that he was then in Davis's cabinet, and our negotiationsshould be confined strictly to belligerents. He then saidBreckenridge was a major-general in the Confederate army, and mightsink his character of Secretary of War. I consented, and he sentone of his staff-officers back, who soon returned withBreckenridge, and he entered the room. General Johnston and I thenagain went over the whole ground, and Breckenridge confirmed whathe had said as to the uneasiness of the Southern officers andsoldiers about their political rights in case of surrender. Whilewe were in consultation, a messenger came with a parcel of papers, which General Johnston said were from Mr. Reagan, Postmaster-General. He and Breckenridge looked over them, and, after some side conversation, he handed one of the papers to me. It was in Reagan's handwriting, and began with a long preamble andterms, so general and verbose, that I said they were inadmissible. Then recalling the conversation of Mr. Lincoln, at City Point, Isat down at the table, and wrote off the terms, which I thoughtconcisely expressed his views and wishes, and explained that I waswilling to submit these terms to the new President, Mr. Johnson, provided that both armies should remain in statu quo until thetruce therein declared should expire. I had full faith thatGeneral Johnston would religiously respect the truce, which he did;and that I would be the gainer, for in the few days it would taketo send the papers to Washington, and receive an answer, I couldfinish the railroad up to Raleigh, and be the better prepared for along chase. 

Neither Mr. Breckenridge nor General Johnston wrote one word ofthat paper. I wrote it myself, and announced it as the best Icould do, and they readily assented. 

While copies of this paper were being made for signature, theofficers of our staffs commingled in the yard at Bennett's house, and were all presented to Generals Johnston and Breckenridge. Allwithout exception were rejoiced that the war was over, and that ina very few days we could turn our faces toward home. I remembertelling Breckenridge that he had better get away, as the feeling ofour people was utterly hostile to the political element of theSouth, and to him especially, because he was the Vice-President ofthe United States, who had as such announced Mr. Lincoln, ofIllinois, duly and properly elected the President of the UnitedStates, and yet that he had afterward openly rebelled and taken uparms against the Government. He answered me that he surely wouldgive us no more trouble, and intimated that he would speedily leavethe country forever. I may have also advised him that Mr. Davistoo should get abroad as soon as possible. 

The papers were duly signed; we parted about dark, and my partyreturned to Raleigh. Early the next morning, April 19th, Idispatched by telegraph to Morehead City to prepare a fleet-steamerto carry a messenger to Washington, and sent Major Henry Hitchcockdown by rail, bearing the following letters, and agreement withGeneral Johnston, with instructions to be very careful to letnothing escape him to the greedy newspaper correspondents, but tosubmit his papers to General Halleck, General Grant, or theSecretary of War, and to bring me back with all expedition theirorders and instructions. 

On their face they recited that I had no authority to make finalterms involving civil or political questions, but that I submittedthem to the proper quarter in Washington for their action; and theletters fully explained that the military situation was such thatthe delay was an advantage to us. I cared little whether they wereapproved, modified, or disapproved in toto; only I wantedinstructions. Many of my general officers, among whom, I am almostpositive, were Generals Logan and Blair, urged me to accept the"terms, " without reference at all to Washington, but I preferredthe latter course:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1886. 

General H. W. HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I received your dispatch describing the man Clark, detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry, or hewill be too late. 

The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect onour troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses; but nowit has softened down, and can easily be guided. None evinced morefeeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act wascalculated to stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contendedthat the loss was most serious to the South, who had begun torealize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend they had. 

I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolicalplot, but think it the emanation of a set of young men of theSouth, who are very devils. I want to throw upon the South thecare of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to theirindustrial classes as to us. 

Had I pushed Johnston's army to an extremity, it would havedispersed, and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me thatGeneral Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now at Statesville. I have sent him orders to come to me. 

General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was atColumbia, Georgia, and he wanted me to arrest his progress. I leavethat to you. 

Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, ourinterest is to cease all destruction. 

Please give all orders necessary according to the views theExecutive may take, and influence him, if possible, not to vary theterms at all, for I have considered every thing, and believe that, the Confederate armies once dispersed, we can adjust all elsefairly and well. I am, yours, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 18, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, or Major-General HALLECK, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this daybetween General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approvedby the President of the United States, will produce peace from thePotomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckenridge was present at ourconference, in the capacity of major-general, and satisfied me ofthe ability of General Johnston to carry out to their full extentthe terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President tosimply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. 

You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy tothe lawful authority of the United States, and disperses his armiesabsolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in sucha manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands. Onthe other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of repressing guerrillas, which wecould not expect them to do if we stripped them of all arms. 

Both Generals Johnston and Breckenridge admitted that slavery wasdead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail. I know that allthe men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do notbelieve they will resort to war again during this century. I haveno doubt that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate tothe laws of the United States. The moment my action in this matteris approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders toleave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and to marchmyself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, andTwenty-third Corps via Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick orHagerstown, Maryland, there to be paid and mustered out. 

The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier andofficer not needed should be got home at work. I would like to beable to begin the march north by May 1st. 

I urge, on the part of the President, speedy action, as it isimportant to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well asour own. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

Memorandum, or Basis of agreement, made this 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, byand between General Joseph E. JOHNSTON, commanding the ConfederateArmy, and Major-General William T. SHERMAN, commanding the army ofthe United States in North Carolina, both present:

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the statuquo until notice is given by the commanding general of any one toits opponent, and reasonable time--say, forty-eight hours--allowed. 

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded andconducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit theirarms and public property in the State Arsenal; and each officer andman to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, andto abide the action of the State and Federal authority. The numberof arms and munitions of war to be reported to the Chief ofOrdnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of theCongress of the United States, and, in the mean time, to be neededsolely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the Statesrespectively. 

3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of theseveral State governments, on their officers and Legislaturestaking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the UnitedStates, and, where conflicting State governments have resulted fromthe war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the SupremeCourt of the United States. 

4. The reestablishment of all the Federal Courts in the severalStates, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the UnitedStates and of the States respectively. 

5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person sad property, as defined by theConstitution of the United States and of the States respectively. 

6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United Statesnot to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so longas they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armedhostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of theirresidence. 

7. In general terms--the war to cease; a general amnesty, so faras the Executive of the United States can command, on condition ofthe disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of thearms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers andmen hitherto composing said armies. 

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfillthese terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves topromptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the aboveprogramme. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina. 

Major Hitchcock got off on the morning of the 20th, and I reckonedthat it would take him four or five days to go to Washington andback. During that time the repairs on all the railroads andtelegraph-lines were pushed with energy, and we also got possessionof the railroad and telegraph from Raleigh to Weldon, in thedirection of Norfolk. Meantime the troops remained statu quo, ourcavalry occupying Durham's Station and Chapel Hill. GeneralSlocum's head of column was at Aven's Ferry on Cape Fear River, andGeneral Howard's was strung along the railroad toward Hillsboro';the rest of the army was in and about Raleigh. 

On the 20th I reviewed the Tenth Corps, and was much pleased at theappearance of General Paines's division of black troops, the firstI had ever seen as a part of an organized army; and on the 21st Ireviewed the Twenty-third Corps, which had been with me to Atlanta, but had returned to Nashville had formed an essential part of thearmy which fought at Franklin, and with which General Thomas haddefeated General Hood in Tennessee. It had then been transferredrapidly by rail to Baltimore and Washington by General Grant'sorders, and thence by sea to North Carolina. Nothing of interesthappened at Raleigh till the evening of April 23d, when MajorHitchcock reported by telegraph his return to Morehead City, andthat he would come up by rail during the night. He arrived at 6a. M. , April 24th, accompanied by General Grant and one or twoofficers of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of theirbeing on the train, for prudential reasons. Of course, I was bothsurprised and pleased to see the general, soon learned that myterms with Johnston had been disapproved, was instructed by him togive the forty-eight hours' notice required by the terms of thetruce, and afterward to proceed to attack or follow him. Iimmediately telegraphed to General Kilpatrick, at Durham's, to havea mounted courier ready to carry the following message, then on itsway up by rail, to the rebel lines:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 24, 1865 6 A. M. 

General JOHNSTON, commanding Confederate Army, Greensboro':

You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilitiesagreed to between us will cease in forty-eight hours after this isreceived at your lines, under the first of the articles ofagreement. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General. 

At the same time I wrote another short note to General Johnston, ofthe same date:

I have replies from Washington to my communications of April 18th. I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, and not to attempt civil negotiations. I therefore demand thesurrender of your army on the same terms as were given to GeneralLee at Appomattox, April 9th instant, purely and simply. 

Of course, both these papers were shown to General Grant at thetime, before they were sent, and he approved of them. 

At the same time orders were sent to all parts of the army to beready to resume the pursuit of the enemy on the expiration of theforty-eight hours' truce, and messages were sent to GeneralGillmore (at Hilton Head) to the same effect, with instructions toget a similar message through to General Wilson, at Macon, by somemeans. 

General Grant had brought with him, from Washington, writtenanswers from the Secretary of War, and of himself, to mycommunications of the 18th, which I still possess, and here givethe originals. They embrace the copy of a dispatch made by Mr. Stanton to General Grant, when he was pressing Lee at Appomattox, which dispatch, if sent me at the same time (as should have beendone), would have saved a world of trouble. I did not understandthat General Grant had come down to supersede me in command, nordid he intimate it, nor did I receive these communications as aserious reproof, but promptly acted on them, as is already shown;and in this connection I give my answer made to General Grant, atRaleigh, before I had received any answer from General Johnston tothe demand for the surrender of his own army, as well as my answerto Mr. Stanton's letter, of the same date, both written on thesupposition that I might have to start suddenly in pursuit ofJohnston, and have no other chance to explain. 

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, April 21, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General GRANT. 

GENERAL: The memorandum or basis agreed upon between GeneralSherman and General Johnston having been submitted to thePresident, they are disapproved. You will give notice of thedisapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resumehostilities at the earliest moment. 

The instructions given to you by the late President, AbrahamLincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegraph of that date, addressed to you, express substantially the views of PresidentAndrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman. A copy isherewith appended. 

The President desires that you proceed immediately to theheadquarters of Major-General Sherman, and direct operationsagainst the enemy. 

Yours truly, EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

The following telegram was received 2 p. M. , City Point, March 4, 1865 (from Washington, 12 M. , March 3, 1865)

[CIPHER]

OFFICE UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH, HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to haveno conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulationof Lee's army or on solely minor and purely military matters. 

He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, orconfer upon any political question; such questions the Presidentholds in his own hands, and will submit them to no militaryconferences or conventions. 

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATESWASHINGTON, D. C. April 21, 1865. 

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of theMississippi. 

GENERAL: The basis of agreement entered into between yourself andGeneral J. E. Johnston, for the disbandment of the Southern army, and the extension of the authority of the General Government overall the territory belonging to it, sent for the approval of thePresident, is received. 

I read it carefully myself before submitting it to the Presidentand Secretary of War, and felt satisfied that it could not possiblybe approved. My reason for these views I will give you at anothertime, in a more extended letter. 

Your agreement touches upon questions of such vital importancethat, as soon as read, I addressed a note to the Secretary of War, notifying him of their receipt, and the importance of immediateaction by the President; and suggested, in view of theirimportance, that the entire Cabinet be called together, that allmight give an expression of their opinions upon the matter. Theresult was a disapproval by the President of the basis laid down; adisapproval of the negotiations altogether except for the surrenderof the army commanded by General Johnston, and directions to me tonotify you of this decision. I cannot do no better than by sendingyou the inclosed copy of a dispatch (penned by the late President, though signed by the Secretary of War) in answer to me, on sendinga letter received from General Lee, proposing to meet me for thepurpose of submitting the question of peace to a convention ofofficers. 

Please notify General Johnston, immediately on receipt of this, ofthe termination of the truce, and resume hostilities against hisarmy at the earliest moment you can, acting in good faith. 

Very respectfully your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, present. 

GENERAL: I had the honor to receive your letter of April 21st, withinclosures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, asyou must have observed that I held the military control so as toadapt it to any phase the case might assume. 

It is but just I should record the fact that I made my terms withGeneral Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms youextended to the army of General Lee at Appomattox Court-House onthe 9th, and the seeming policy of our Government, as evinced bythe call of the Virginia Legislature and Governor back to Richmond, under yours and President Lincoln's very eyes. 

It now appears this last act was done without any consultation withyou or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to aprevious policy well considered. 

I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of ourGovernment, but would shun it as something not to my liking; butoccasions do arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced onmilitary commanders not in immediate communication with the properauthority. It is probable that the terms signed by GeneralJohnston and myself were not clear enough on the point, wellunderstood between us, that our negotiations did not apply to anyparties outside the officers and men of the Confederate armies, which could easily have been remedied. 

No surrender of any army not actually at the mercy of an antagonistwas ever made without "terms, " and these always define the militarystatus of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the officersand men of Lee's army should not be molested at their homes so longas they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence. 

I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognitionof the State governments in actual existence, but will merely statemy conclusions, to await the solution of the future. 

Such action on our part in no manner recognizes for a moment theso-called Confederate Government, or makes us liable for its debtsor acts. 

The laws and acts done by the several States during the period ofrebellion are void, because done without the oath prescribed by ourConstitution of the United States, which is a "conditionprecedent. "

We have a right to, use any sort of machinery to produce militaryresults; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders touse the civil governments in actual existence as a means to an end. I do believe we could and can use the present State governmentslawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means toproduce the object desired, viz. , entire and complete submission tothe lawful authority of the United States. 

As to punishment for past crimes, that is for the judiciary, andcan in no manner of way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as Ican, I will use my influence that rebels shall suffer all thepersonal punishment prescribed by law, as also the civilliabilities arising from their past acts. 

What we now want is the new form of law by which common men mayregain the positions of industry, so long disturbed by the war. 

I now apprehend that the rebel armies will disperse; and, insteadof dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal withnumberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Mosby, Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not fordanger and its consequences. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 25, 1865. 

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War, Washington. 

DEAR SIR: I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21stto General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on whichGeneral Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, oncondition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in embracing in amilitary convention any civil matters; but, unfortunately, such isthe nature of our situation that they seem inextricably united, andI understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of thecountry demanded military success, and would warrant a littlebending to policy. 

When I had my conference with General Johnston I had the publicexamples before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, andGeneral Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature toassemble at Richmond. 

I still believe the General Government of the United States hasmade a mistake; but that is none of my business--mine is adifferent task; and I had flattered myself that, by four years ofpatient, unremitting, and successful labor, I deserved no remindersuch as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter toGeneral Grant. You may assure the President that I heed hissuggestion. I am truly, etc. , W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

On the same day, but later, I received an answer from GeneralJohnston, agreeing to meet me again at Bennett's house the nextday, April 26th, at noon. He did not even know that General Grantwas in Raleigh. 

General Grant advised me to meet him, and to accept his surrenderon the same terms as his with General Lee; and on the 26th I againwent up to Durham's Station by rail, and rode out to Bennett'shouse, where we again met, and General Johnston, withouthesitation, agreed to, and we executed, the following final terms:

Terms of a Military Convention, entered into this 26th day ofApril, 1865, at Bennett's House, near Durham's Station. , NorthCarolina, between General JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON, commanding theConfederate Army, and Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding theUnited States Army in North Carolina:

1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under GeneralJohnston's command to cease from this date. 

2. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro', and delivered to an ordnance-officer of the United States Army. 

3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; onecopy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the otherto be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writingnot to take up arms against the Government of the United States, until properly released from this obligation. 

4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses andbaggage, to be retained by them. 

5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted toreturn to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United Statesauthorities, so long as they observe their obligation and the lawsin force where they may reside. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina. 

Approved:

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

I returned to Raleigh the same evening, and, at my request, GeneralGrant wrote on these terms his approval, and then I thought thematter was surely at an end. He took the original copy, on the27th returned to Newbern, and thence went back to Washington. 

I immediately made all the orders necessary to carry into effectthe terms of this convention, devolving on General Schofield thedetails of granting the parole and making the muster-rolls ofprisoners, inventories of property, etc. , of General Johnston'sarmy at and about Greensboro', North Carolina, and on GeneralWilson the same duties in Georgia; but, thus far, I had beencompelled to communicate with the latter through rebel sources, andGeneral Wilson was necessarily confused by the conflict of ordersand information. I deemed it of the utmost importance to establishfor him a more reliable base of information and supply, andaccordingly resolved to go in person to Savannah for that purpose. But, before starting, I received a New York Times, of April 24th, containing the following extraordinary communications:

[First Bulletin]

WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, April 22, 1885. 

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from GeneralSherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and amemorandum of what is called a basis for peace, had been enteredinto on the 18th inst. By General Sherman, with the rebel GeneralJohnston. Brigadier-General Breckenridge was present at theconference. 

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the evening, atwhich the action of General Sherman was disapproved by thePresident, by the Secretary of War, by General Grant, and by everymember of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resumehostilities immediately, and was directed that the instructionsgiven by the late President, in the following telegram, which waspenned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and werereiterated to govern the action of military commanders. 

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and hiscabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant wasbrought to the Secretary of War, informing him that General Lee hadrequested an interview or conference, to make an arrangement forterms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in aletter to Davis and to the rebel Congress. General Grant'stelegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a fewminutes, took up his pen and wrote with his own hand the followingreply, which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretaryof War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed, by the Secretaryof War, and telegraphed to General Grant:

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1865-12 P. M. 

Lieutenant-General GRANT:

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to haveno conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulationof General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, orconfer upon any political questions. Such questions the Presidentholds in his own hands, and will submit them to no militaryconferences or conventions. 

Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw fromSalisbury and join him will probably open the way for Davis toescape to Mexico or Europe with his plunder, which is reported tobe very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmondbanks, but previous accumulations. 

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says: "It isstated here, by respectable parties, that the amount of specietaken south by Jeff. Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previousaccumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with GeneralSherman, or some other commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico orEurope. Johnston's negotiations look to this end. "

After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started forNorth Carolina, to direct operations against Johnston's army. 

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

Here followed the terms, and Mr. Stanton's ten reasons forrejecting them. 

The publication of this bulletin by authority was an outrage on me, for Mr. Stanton had failed to communicate to me in advance, as washis duty, the purpose of the Administration to limit ournegotiations to purely military matters; but, on the contrary, atSavannah he had authorized me to control all matters, civil andmilitary. 

By this bulletin, he implied that I had previously been furnishedwith a copy of his dispatch of March 3d to General Grant, which wasnot so; and he gave warrant to the impression, which was sownbroadcast, that I might be bribed by banker's gold to permit Davisto escape. Under the influence of this, I wrote General Grant thefollowing letter of April 28th, which has been published in theProceedings of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. 

I regarded this bulletin of Mr. Stanton as a personal and officialinsult, which I afterward publicly resented. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPIIN THE FIELD, RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, April 28, 1865. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New YorkTimes of the 24th, containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the Secretary of War, Hon. E. M. Stanton, which is grouped in such a way as to give the public veryerroneous impressions. It embraces a copy of the basis ofagreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, withcomments, which it will be time enough to discuss two or threeyears hence, after the Government has experimented a little more inthe machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of thevast country known as the "South. "

In the mean time, however, I did think that my rank (if not pastservices) entitled me at least to trust that the Secretary of Warwould keep secret what was communicated for the use of none but thecabinet, until further inquiry could be made, instead of givingpublicity to it along with documents which I never saw, and drawingtherefrom inferences wide of the truth. I never saw or hadfurnished me a copy of President Lincoln's dispatch to you of the3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton or any human being ever convey tome its substance, or any thing like it. On the contrary, I hadseen General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature, madein Mr. Lincoln's very presence, and failed to discover any otherofficial hint of a plan of reconstruction, or any ideas calculatedto allay the fears of the people of the South, after thedestruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave themwithout any government whatever. 

We should not drive a people into anarchy, and it is simplyimpossible for our military power to reach all the masses of theirunhappy country. 

I confess I did not desire to drive General Johnston's army intobands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable onlyof infinite mischief. But you saw, on your arrival here, that Ihad my army so disposed that his escape was only possible in adisorganized shape; and as you did not choose to "direct militaryoperations in this quarter, " I inferred that you were satisfiedwith the military situation; at all events, the instant I learnedwhat was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I actedin such a manner as to compel the surrender of General Johnston'swhole army on the same terms which you had prescribed to GeneralLee's army, when you had it surrounded and in your absolute power. 

Mr. Stanton, in stating that my orders to General Stoneman werelikely to result in the escape of "Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe, "is in deep error. General Stoneman was not at "Salisbury, " but hadgone back to "Statesville. " Davis was between us, and thereforeStoneman was beyond him. By turning toward me he was approachingDavis, and, had he joined me as ordered, I would have had a mountedforce greatly needed for Davis's capture, and for other purposes. Even now I don't know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught, and asmy official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to theworld, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done inthat regard. 

As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairlydrawn from this singular document the conclusion that I aminsubordinate, I can only deny the intention. 

I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, thoughmany and many a time have I risked my life, health, and reputation, in obeying orders, or even hints to execute plans and purposes, notto my liking. It is not fair to withhold from me the plans andpolicy of Government (if any there be), and expect me to guess atthem; for facts and events appear quite different from differentstand-points. For four years I have been in camp dealing withsoldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which thecabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to thepoints involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they weresingularly unanimous in the other conclusion. They will learn withpain and amazement that I am deemed insubordinate, and wanting incommonsense; that I, who for four years have labored day and night, winter and summer, who have brought an army of seventy thousand menin magnificent condition across a country hitherto deemedimpassable, and placed it just where it was wanted, on the dayappointed, have brought discredit on our Government! I do not wishto boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesyof being consulted, before publishing to the world a propositionrightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and thenaccompanied by statements which invited the dogs of the press to belet loose upon me. It is true that non-combatants, men who sleepin comfort and security while we watch on the distant lines, arebetter able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see anewspaper, hardly hear from our families, or stop long enough todraw our pay. I envy not the task of "reconstruction, " and amdelighted that the Secretary of War has relieved me of it. 

As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs ofthis army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrivedat a different conclusion from that of the Secretary of War. Iwill therefore go on to execute your orders to the conclusion, and, when done, will with intense satisfaction leave to the civilauthorities the execution of the task of which they seem sojealous. But, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to goback to Nashville and follow my path, for they will see some thingsand hear some things that may disturb their philosophy. 

With sincere respect, W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding. 

P. S. --As Mr. Stanton's most singular paper has been published, Idemand that this also be made public, though I am in no mannerresponsible to the press, but to the law, and my proper superiors. W. T. S. , Major-General. 

On the 28th I summoned all the army and corps commanders togetherat my quarters in the Governor's mansion at Raleigh, where everything was explained to them, and all orders for the future werecompleted. Generals Schofield, Terry, and Kilpatrick, were toremain on duty in the Department of North Carolina, alreadycommanded by General Schofield, and the right and left wings wereordered to march under their respective commanding generals Northby easy stages to Richmond, Virginia, there to await my returnfrom the South. 

On the 29th of April, with a part of my personal staff, I proceededby rail to Wilmington, North Carolina, where I found GeneralsHawley and Potter, and the little steamer Russia, Captain Smith, awaiting me. After a short pause in Wilmington, we embarked, andproceeded down the coast to Port Royal and the Savannah River, which we reached on the 1st of May. There Captain Hoses, who hadjust come from General Wilson at Macon, met us, bearing letters forme and General Grant, in which General Wilson gave a brief summaryof his operations up to date. He had marched from Eastport, Mississippi, five hundred miles in thirty days, took six thousandthree hundred prisoners, twenty-three colors, and one hundred andfifty-six guns, defeating Forrest, scattering the militia, anddestroying every railroad, iron establishment, and factory, inNorth Alabama and Georgia. 

He spoke in the highest terms of his cavalry, as "cavalry, "claiming that it could not be excelled, and he regarded his corpsas a model for modern cavalry in organization, armament, anddiscipline. Its strength was given at thirteen thousand fivehundred men and horses on reaching Macon. Of course I wasextremely gratified at his just confidence, and saw that all hewanted for efficient action was a sure base of supply, so that heneed no longer depend for clothing, ammunition, food, and forage, on the country, which, now that war had ceased, it was our solemnduty to protect, instead of plunder. I accordingly ordered thecaptured steamer Jeff. Davis to be loaded with stores, to proceedat once up the Savannah River to Augusta, with a small detachmentof troops to occupy the arsenal, and to open communication withGeneral Wilson at Macon; and on the next day, May 2d, this steamerwas followed by another with a fall cargo of clothing, sugar, coffee, and bread, sent from Hilton Head by the departmentcommander, General Gillmore, with a stronger guard commanded byGeneral Molineux. Leaving to General Gillmore, who was present, and in whose department General Wilson was, to keep up the suppliesat Augusta, and to facilitate as far as possible General Wilson'soperations inland, I began my return on the 2d of May. We wentinto Charleston Harbor, passing the ruins of old Forts Moultrie andSumter without landing. We reached the city of Charleston, whichwas held by part of the division of General John P. Hatch, thesame that we had left at Pocotaligo. We walked the old familiarstreets--Broad, King, Meeting, etc. --but desolation and ruin wereeverywhere. The heart of the city had been burned during thebombardment, and the rebel garrison at the time of its finalevacuation had fired the railroad-depots, which fire had spread, and was only subdued by our troops after they had reached the city. 

I inquired for many of my old friends, but they were dead or gone, and of them all I only saw a part of the family of Mrs. Pettigru. I doubt whether any city was ever more terribly punished thanCharleston, but, as her people had for years been agitating for warand discord, and had finally inaugurated the civil war by an attackon the small and devoted garrison of Major Anderson, sent there bythe General Government to defend them, the judgment of the worldwill be, that Charleston deserved the fate that befell her. Resuming our voyage, we passed into Cape Fear River by its mouth atFort Caswell and Smithville, and out by the new channel at FortFisher, and reached Morehead City on the 4th of May. We foundthere the revenue-cutter Wayanda, on board of which were the Chief-Justice, Mr. Chase, and his daughter Nettie, now Mrs. Hoyt. TheChief-Justice at that moment was absent on a visit to Newbern, butcame back the next day. Meantime, by means of the telegraph, I wasagain in correspondence with General Schofield at Raleigh. He hadmade great progress in paroling the officers and men of Johnston'sarmy at Greensboro', but was embarrassed by the utter confusion andanarchy that had resulted from a want of understanding on manyminor points, and on the political questions that had to be met atthe instant. In order to facilitate the return to their homes ofthe Confederate officers and men, he had been forced to make withGeneral Johnston the following supplemental terms, which were ofcourse ratified and approved:

MILITARY CONVENTION OF APRIL 26, 1865. SUPPLEMENTAL TERMS. 

1. The field transportation to be loaned to the troops for theirmarch to their homes, and for subsequent use in their industrialpursuits. Artillery-horses may be used in field-transportation, ifnecessary. 

2. Each brigade or separate body to retain a number of arms equalto one-seventh of its effective strength, which, when the troopsreach the capitals of their states, will be disposed of as thegeneral commanding the department may direct. 

3. Private horses, and other private property of both officers andmen, to be retained by them. 

4. The commanding general of the Military Division of WestMississippi, Major-General Canby, will be requested to givetransportation by water, from Mobile or New Orleans, to the troopsfrom Arkansas and Texas. 

5. The obligations of officers and soldiers to be signed by theirimmediate commanders. 

6. Naval forces within the limits of General Johnston's command tobe included in the terms of this convention. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General, Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina. 

J. E. JOHNSTON, General, Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina. 

The total number of prisoners of war parolled byGeneral Schofield, at Greensboro', North Carolina, as afterward officially reported, amounted to ........ 38, 817

And the total number who surrendered in Georgiaand Florida, as reported by General J. H. Wilson, was .................................................. 52, 458

Aggregate surrendered under the capitulation ofGeneral J. E. Johnston ............................... 89, 270

On the morning of the 5th I also received from General Schofieldthis dispatch:

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1866. 

To Major-General W: T. SHERMAN, Morehead City:

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he saidthe lines (for trade and intercourse) had been extended to embracethis and other States south. The order, it seems, has beenmodified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think itwould be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. 

I hope the Government will make known its policy as to the organsof State government without delay. Affairs must necessarily be ina very unsettled state until that is done. The people are now in amood to accept almost anything which promises a definitesettlement. "What is to be done with the freedmen?" is thequestion of all, and it is the all important question. It requiresprompt and wise notion to prevent the negroes from becoming a hugeelephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it isimportant for me to know it at once. If another is to be senthere, it cannot be done too soon, for he probably will undo themost that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from youfully, when you have time to write. I will send your message toGeneral Wilson at once. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major-General. 

I was utterly without instructions from any source on the points ofGeneral Schofield's inquiry, and under the existing state of factscould not even advise him, for by this time I was in possession ofthe second bulletin of Mr. Stanton, published in all the Northernpapers, with comments that assumed that I was a common traitor anda public enemy; and high officials had even instructed my ownsubordinates to disobey my lawful orders. General Halleck, who hadso long been in Washington as the chief of staff, had been sent onthe 21st of April to Richmond, to command the armies of the Potomacand James, in place of General Grant, who had transferred hisheadquarters to the national capital, and he (General Halleck) wastherefore in supreme command in Virginia, while my command overNorth Carolina had never been revoked or modified. 

[Second Bulletin. ]

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, April 27 9. 30 a. M. 

To Major-General DIX:

The department has received the following dispatch from Major-General Halleck, commanding the Military Division of the James. Generals Canby and Thomas were instructed some days ago thatSherman's arrangements with Johnston were disapproved by thePresident, and they were ordered to disregard it and push the enemyin every direction. 

E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, April 26-9. 30 p. M. 

HON. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright, are acting under orders topay no regard to any truce or orders of General Sherman respectinghostilities, on the ground that Sherman's agreement could bind hiscommand only, and no other. 

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders from anyone except from General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat. 

Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new arrangement hasbeen made with Sherman, and that the advance of the Sixth Corps wasto be suspended until further orders. 

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, but to pushforward as rapidly as possible. 

The bankers here have information to-day that Jeff. Davis's specieis moving south from Goldsboro', in wagons, as fast as possible. 

I suggest that orders be telegraphed, through General Thomas, thatWilson obey no orders from Sherman, and notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mississippi, to take measures tointercept the rebel chiefs and their plunder. 

The specie taken with them is estimated here at from six tothirteen million dollars. 

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General commanding. 

Subsequently, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, inWashington, on the 22d of May, I testified fully on this wholematter, and will abide the judgment of the country on thepatriotism and wisdom of my public conduct in this connection. General Halleck's measures to capture General Johnston's army, actually surrendered to me at the time, at Greensboro', on the 26thof April, simply excited my contempt for a judgment such as he wassupposed to possess. The assertion that Jeff. Davis's specie-train, of six to thirteen million dollars, was reported to bemoving south from Goldsboro' in wagons as fast as possible, foundplenty of willing ears, though my army of eighty thousand men hadbeen at Goldsboro' from March 22d to the date of his dispatch, April 26th; and such a train would have been composed of fromfifteen to thirty-two six-mule teams to have hauled this specie, even if it all were in gold. I suppose the exact amount oftreasure which Davis had with him is now known to a cent; some ofit was paid to his escort, when it disbanded at and nearWashington, Georgia, and at the time of his capture he had a smallparcel of gold and silver coin, not to exceed ten thousand dollars, which is now retained in the United States Treasury-vault atWashington, and shown to the curious. 

The thirteen millions of treasure, with which Jeff. Davis was tocorrupt our armies and buy his escape, dwindled down to thecontents of a hand-valise!

To say that I was merely angry at the tone and substance of thesepublished bulletins of the War Department, would hardly express thestate of my feelings. I was outraged beyond measure, and wasresolved to resent the insult, cost what it might. I went to theWayanda and showed them to Mr. Chase, with whom I had a long andfrank conversation, during which he explained to me the confusioncaused in Washington by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, thesudden accession to power of Mr. Johnson, who was then supposed tobe bitter and vindictive in his feelings toward the South, and thewild pressure of every class of politicians to enforce on the newPresident their pet schemes. He showed me a letter of his own, which was in print, dated Baltimore, April 11th, and another ofApril 12th, addressed to the President, urging him to recognize thefreedmen as equal in all respects to the whites. He was the firstman, of any authority or station, who ever informed me that theGovernment of the United States would insist on extending to theformer slaves of the South the elective franchise, and he gave as areason the fact that the slaves, grateful for their freedom, forwhich they were indebted to the armies and Government of the North, would, by their votes, offset the disaffected and rebel element ofthe white population of the South. At that time quite a storm wasprevailing at sea, outside, and our two vessels lay snug at thewharf at Morehead City. I saw a good deal of Mr. Chase, andseveral notes passed between us, of which I have the originals yet. Always claiming that the South had herself freed all her slaves byrebellion, and that Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of freedom (ofSeptember 22, 1862) was binding on all officers of the GeneralGovernment, I doubted the wisdom of at once clothing them with theelective franchise, without some previous preparation andqualification; and then realized the national loss in the death atthat critical moment of Mr. Lincoln, who had long pondered over thedifficult questions involved, who, at all events, would have beenhonest and frank, and would not have withheld from his armycommanders at least a hint that would have been to them a guide. It was plain to me, therefore, that the manner of his assassinationhad stampeded the civil authorities in Washington, had unnervedthem, and that they were then undecided as to the measuresindispensably necessary to prevent anarchy at the South. 

On the 7th of May the storm subsided, and we put to sea, Mr. Chaseto the south, on his proposed tour as far as New Orleans, and I forJames River. I reached Fortress Monroe on the 8th, and thencetelegraphed my arrival to General Grant, asking for orders. Ifound at Fortress Monroe a dispatch from General Halleck, professing great friendship, and inviting me to accept hishospitality at Richmond. I answered by a cipher-dispatch that Ihad seen his dispatch to Mr. Stanton, of April 26th, embraced inthe second bulletin, which I regarded as insulting, declined hishospitality, and added that I preferred we should not meet as Ipassed through Richmond. I thence proceeded to City Point in theRussia, and on to Manchester, opposite Richmond, via Petersburg, byrail. I found that both wings of the army had arrived fromRaleigh, and were in camp in and around Manchester, whence I againtelegraphed General Grant, an the 9th of May, for orders, and alsoreported my arrival to General Halleck by letter. I found thatGeneral Halleck had ordered General Davis's corps (the Fourteenth)for review by himself. This I forbade. All the army knew of theinsult that had been made me by the Secretary of War and GeneralHalleck, and watched me closely to see if I would tamely submit. During the 9th I made a full and complete report of all theseevents, from the last report made at Goldsboro' up to date, and thenext day received orders to continue the march to Alexandria, nearWashington. 

On the morning of the 11th we crossed the pontoon-bridge atRichmond, marched through that city, and out on the HanoverCourt House road, General Slocum's left wing leading. The right wing(General Logan) followed the next day, viz. , the 12th. Meantime, General O. O. Howard had been summoned to Washington to take chargeof the new Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, and, from that time till the army was finally disbanded, General John A. Logan was in command of the right wing, and of the Army of theTennessee. The left wing marched through Hanover Court House, andthence took roads well to the left by Chilesburg; the FourteenthCorps by New Market and Culpepper, Manassas, etc. ; the TwentiethCorps by Spotsylvania Court-House and Chancellorsville. The rightwing followed the more direct road by Fredericksburg. On my waynorth I endeavored to see as much of the battle-fields of the Armyof the Potomac as I could, and therefore shifted from one column tothe other, visiting en route Hanover Court-House, Spotsylvania, Fredericksburg, Dumfries, etc. , reaching Alexandria during theafternoon of May 19th, and pitched my camp by the road side, abouthalf-way between Alexandria and the Long Bridge. During the sameand next day the whole army reached Alexandria, and camped roundabout it; General Meade's Army of the Potomac had possession of thecamps above, opposite Washington and Georgetown. The next day (byinvitation) I went over to Washington and met many friends--amongthem General Grant and President Johnson. The latter occupiedrooms in the house on the corner of Fifteenth and H Streets, belonging to Mr. Hooper. He was extremely cordial to me, andknowing that I was chafing under the censures of the WarDepartment, especially of the two war bulletins of Mr. Stanton, hevolunteered to say that he knew of neither of them till seen in thenewspapers, and that Mr. Stanton had shown neither to him nor toany of his associates in the cabinet till they were published. Nearly all the members of the cabinet made similar assurances to meafterward, and, as Mr. Stanton made no friendly advances, andoffered no word of explanation or apology, I declined GeneralGrant's friendly offices for a reconciliation, but, on thecontrary, resolved to resent what I considered an insult, aspublicly as it was made. My brother, Senator Sherman, who was Mr. Stanton's neighbor, always insisted that Mr. Stanton had beenfrightened by the intended assassination of himself, and had becomeembittered thereby. At all events, I found strong military guardsaround his house, as well as all the houses occupied by the cabinetand by the principal officers of Government; and a sense ofinsecurity pervaded Washington, for which no reason existed. 

On the 19th I received a copy of War Department Special Order No. 239, Adjutant-General's office, of May 18th, ordering a grandreview, by the President and cabinet, of all the armies then nearWashington; General Meade's to occur on Tuesday, May 23d, mine onWednesday, the 24th; and on the 20th I made the necessary ordersfor my part. Meantime I had also arranged (with General Grant'sapproval) to remove after the review, my armies from the south sideof the Potomac to the north; both for convenience and because ourmen had found that the grounds assigned them had been used so longfor camps that they were foul and unfit. 

By invitation I was on the reviewing-stand, and witnessed thereview of the Army of the Potomac (on the 23d), commanded byGeneral Meade in person. The day was beautiful, and the pageantwas superb. Washington was full of strangers, who filled thestreets in holiday-dress, and every house was decorated with flags. The army marched by divisions in close column around the Capitol, down Pennsylvania Avenue, past the President and cabinet, whooccupied a large stand prepared for the occasion, directly in frontof the White House. 

I had telegraphed to Lancaster for Mrs. Sherman, who arrived thatday, accompanied by her father, the Hon. Thomas Ewing, and my sonTom, then eight years old. 

During the afternoon and night of the 23d, the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps, crossed Long Bridge, bivouacked in thestreets about the Capitol, and the Fourteenth Corps closed up tothe bridge. The morning of the 24th was extremely beautiful, andthe ground was in splendid order for our review. The streets werefilled with people to see the pageant, armed with bouquets offlowers for their favorite regiments or heroes, and every thing waspropitious. Punctually at 9 A. M. The signal-gun was fired, when inperson, attended by General Howard and all my staff, I rode slowlydown Pennsylvania Avenue, the crowds of men, women, and children, densely lining the sidewalks, and almost obstructing the way. Wewere followed close by General Logan and the head of the FifteenthCorps. When I reached the Treasury-building, and looked back, thesight was simply magnificent. The column was compact, and theglittering muskets looked like a solid mass of steel, moving withthe regularity of a pendulum. We passed the Treasury building, infront of which and of the White House was an immense throng ofpeople, for whom extensive stands had been prepared on both sidesof the avenue. As I neared the brick-house opposite the lowercorner of Lafayette Square, some one asked me to notice Mr. Seward, who, still feeble and bandaged for his wounds, had been removedthere that he might behold the troops. I moved in that directionand took off my hat to Mr. Seward, who sat at an upper window. Herecognized the salute, returned it, and then we rode on steadilypast the President, saluting with our swords. All on his standarose and acknowledged the salute. Then, turning into the gate ofthe presidential grounds, we left our horses with orderlies, andwent upon the stand, where I found Mrs. Sherman, with her fatherand son. Passing them, I shook hands with the President, GeneralGrant, and each member of the cabinet. As I approached Mr. Stanton, he offered me his hand, but I declined it publicly, andthe fact was universally noticed. I then took my post on the leftof the President, and for six hours and a half stood, while thearmy passed in the order of the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Fourteenth Corps. It was, in my judgment, the most magnificentarmy in existence--sixty-five thousand men, in splendid physique, who had just completed a march of nearly two thousand miles in ahostile country, in good drill, and who realized that they werebeing closely scrutinized by thousands of their fellow-countrymenand by foreigners. Division after division passed, each commanderof an army corps or division coming on the stand during the passageof his command, to be presented to the President, cabinet, andspectators. The steadiness and firmness of the tread, the carefuldress on the guides, the uniform intervals between the companies, all eyes directly to the front, and the tattered and bullet-riddenflags, festooned with flowers, all attracted universal notice. Many good people, up to that time, had looked upon our Western armyas a sort of mob; but the world then saw, and recognized the fact, that it was an army in the proper sense, well organized, wellcommanded and disciplined; and there was no wonder that it hadswept through the South like a tornado. For six hours and a halfthat strong tread of the Army of the West resounded alongPennsylvania Avenue; not a soul of that vast crowd of spectatorsleft his place; and, when the rear of the column had passed by, thousands of the spectators still lingered to express their senseof confidence in the strength of a Government which could claimsuch an army. 

Some little scenes enlivened the day, and called for the laughterand cheers of the crowd. Each division was followed by sixambulances, as a representative of its baggage-train. Some of thedivision commanders had added, by way of variety, goats, milch-cows, and pack-mules, whose loads consisted of game-cocks, poultry, hams, etc. , and some of them had the families of freed slavesalong, with the women leading their children. Each division waspreceded by its corps of black pioneers, armed with picks andspades. These marched abreast in double ranks, keeping perfectdress and step, and added much to the interest of the occasion. Onthe whole, the grand review was a splendid success, and was afitting conclusion to the campaign and the war. 

I will now conclude by a copy of my general orders taking leave ofthe army, which ended my connection with the war, though Iafterward visited and took a more formal leave of the officers andmen on July 4, 1865, at Louisville, Kentucky:

[SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS NO. 76]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, WASHINGTON, D. C. May 30, 1865

The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee andGeorgia that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will go to yourhomes, and others will be retained in military service till furtherorders. 

And now that we are all about to separate, to mingle with the civilworld, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situationof national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we weregathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the futurewas wrapped in doubt and uncertainty. 

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separatehistories, yet bound by one common cause--the union of our country, and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. Thereis no need to recall to your memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky-FaceMountain and Buzzard-Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Daltonbehind. 

We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, butdashed through Snake-Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; then on to theEtowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on thebanks of the Chattahoochee, far from home, and dependent on asingle road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by anyobstacle, and crossed over and fought four hard battles for thepossession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of ourhistory. A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved theproblem, destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State ofGeorgia, severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, andChristmas found us at Savannah. 

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began amarch which, for peril, labor, and results, will compare with anyever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, theswamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the "high hills" and rocks ofthe Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in theface of an accumulating enemy; and, after the battles ofAverysboro' and Bentonsville, we once more came out of thewilderness, to meet our friends at Goldsboro'. Even then we pausedonly long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, againpushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we met our enemy suing forpeace, instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured lawsof his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, normountains nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold, had checkedus; but when he, who had fought us hard and persistently, offeredsubmission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all know, in hissurrender. 

How far the operations of this army contributed to the finaloverthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us; but that you have done allthat men could do has been admitted by those in authority, and wehave a right to join in the universal joy that fills our landbecause the war is over, and our Government stands vindicatedbefore the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies andnavy of the United States. 

To such as remain in the service, your general need only remind youthat success in the past was due to hard work and discipline, andthat the same work and discipline are equally important in thefuture. To such as go home, he will only say that our favoredcountry is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil, and productions, that every man may find a home and occupationsuited to his taste; none should yield to the natural impatiencesure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. Youwill be invited to seek new adventures abroad; do not yield to thetemptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment. 

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, asin war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make goodcitizens; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in ourcountry, "Sherman's army" will be the first to buckle on its oldarmor, and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of ourinheritance. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman, L. M. DAYTON, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

List of the Average Number of Miles marched by the Different ArmyCorps of the United States Forces under Command of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, United States Army, during his Campaigns: 1863-'64-'65. 

 4th 14th 15th 16th 17th 20th Corps. Corps. Corps. Corps Corps. Corps. 

Miles: 110 1, 586 2, 289 508 2, 076 1, 525

CHAPTER XXV. 

CONCLUSION--MILITARY LESSONS OF THE WAR. 

Having thus recorded a summary of events, mostly under my ownpersonal supervision, during the years from 1846 to 1865, it seemsproper that I should add an opinion of some of the useful militarylessons to be derived therefrom. 

That civil war, by reason of the existence of slavery, wasapprehended by most of the leading statesmen of the half-centurypreceding its outbreak, is a matter of notoriety. General Scotttold me on my arrival at New York, as early as 1850, that thecountry was on the eve of civil war; and the Southern politiciansopenly asserted that it was their purpose to accept as a casusbelli the election of General Fremont in 1856; but, fortunately orunfortunately, he was beaten by Mr. Buchanan, which simplypostponed its occurrence for four years. Mr. Seward had alsopublicly declared that no government could possibly exist halfslave and half free; yet the Government made no militarypreparation, and the Northern people generally paid no attention, took no warning of its coming, and would not realize its existencetill Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries of artillery, handled bydeclared enemies, from the surrounding islands and from the city ofCharleston. 

General Bragg, who certainly was a man of intelligence, and who, inearly life, ridiculed a thousand times, in my hearing, the threatsof the people of South Carolina to secede from the Federal Union, said to me in New Orleans, in February, 1861, that he was convincedthat the feeling between the slave and free States had become soembittered that it was better to part in peace; better to partanyhow; and, as a separation was inevitable, that the South shouldbegin at once, because the possibility of a successful effort wasyearly lessened by the rapid and increasing inequality between thetwo sections, from the fact that all the European immigrants werecoming to the Northern States and Territories, and none to theSouthern. 

The slave population m 1860 was near four millions, and the moneyvalue thereof not far from twenty-five hundred million dollars. Now, ignoring the moral side of the question, a cause thatendangered so vast a moneyed interest was an adequate cause ofanxiety and preparation, and the Northern leaders surely ought tohave foreseen the danger and prepared for it. After the electionof Mr. Lincoln in 1860, there was no concealment of the declarationand preparation for war in the South. In Louisiana, as I haverelated, men were openly enlisted, officers were appointed, and warwas actually begun, in January, 1861. The forts at the mouth ofthe Mississippi were seized, and occupied by garrisons that hauleddown the United States flag and hoisted that of the State. TheUnited States Arsenal at Baton Rouge was captured by New Orleansmilitia, its garrison ignominiously sent off, and the contents ofthe arsenal distributed. These were as much acts of war as was thesubsequent firing on Fort Sumter, yet no public notice was takenthereof; and when, months afterward, I came North, I found not onesingle sign of preparation. It was for this reason, somewhat, thatthe people of the South became convinced that those of the Northwere pusillanimous and cowardly, and the Southern leaders werethereby enabled to commit their people to the war, nominally indefense of their slave property. Up to the hour of the firing onFort Sumter, in April, 1861, it does seem to me that our publicmen, our politicians, were blamable for not sounding the note ofalarm. 

Then, when war was actually begun, it was by a call for seventy-five thousand "ninety-day" men, I suppose to fulfill Mr. Seward'sprophecy that the war would last but ninety days. 

The earlier steps by our political Government were extremelywavering and weak, for which an excuse can be found in the factthat many of the Southern representatives remained in Congress, sharing in the public councils, and influencing legislation. Butas soon as Mr. Lincoln was installed, there was no longer anyreason why Congress and the cabinet should have hesitated. Theyshould have measured the cause, provided the means, and left theExecutive to apply the remedy. 

At the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, viz. , March 4, 1861, theRegular Army, by law, consisted of two regiments of dragoons, tworegiments of cavalry, one regiment of mounted rifles, fourregiments of artillery, and ten regiments of infantry, admitting ofan aggregate strength of thirteen thousand and twenty-four officersand men. On the subsequent 4th of May the President, by his ownorders (afterward sanctioned by Congress), added a regiment ofcavalry, a regiment of artillery, and eight regiments of infantry, which, with the former army, admitted of a strength of thirty-ninethousand nine hundred and seventy-three; but at no time during thewar did the Regular Army attain a strength of twenty-five thousandmen. 

To the new regiments of infantry was given an organizationdiffering from any that had heretofore prevailed in this country--of three battalions of eight companies each; but at no time didmore than one of these regiments attain its full standard; nor inthe vast army of volunteers that was raised during the war were anyof the regiments of infantry formed on the three-battalion system, but these were universally single battalions of ten companies; sothat, on the reorganization of the Regular Army at the close of thewar, Congress adopted the form of twelve companies for theregiments of cavalry and artillery, and that of ten companies forthe infantry, which is the present standard. 

Inasmuch as the Regular Army will naturally form the standard oforganization for any increase or for new regiments of volunteers, it becomes important to study this subject in the light of pastexperience, and to select that form which is best for peace as wellas war. 

A cavalry regiment is now composed of twelve companies, usuallydivided into six squadrons, of two companies each, or bettersubdivided into three battalions of four companies each. This isan excellent form, easily admitting of subdivision as well as unioninto larger masses. 

A single battalion of four companies, with a field-officer, willcompose a good body for a garrison, for a separate expedition, orfor a detachment; and, in war, three regiments would compose a goodbrigade, three brigades a division, and three divisions a strongcavalry corps, such as was formed and fought by Generals Sheridanand Wilson during the war. 

In the artillery arm, the officers differ widely in their opinionof the true organization. A single company forms a battery, andhabitually each battery acts separately, though sometimes severalare united or "massed;" but these always act in concert withcavalry or infantry. 

Nevertheless, the regimental organization for artillery has alwaysbeen maintained in this country for classification and promotion. Twelve companies compose a regiment, and, though probably nocolonel ever commanded his full regiment in the form of twelvebatteries, yet in peace they occupy our heavy sea-coast forts oract as infantry; then the regimental organization is both necessaryand convenient. 

But the infantry composes the great mass of all armies, and thetrue form of the regiment or unit has been the subject of infinitediscussion; and, as I have stated, during the civil war theregiment was a single battalion of ten companies. In olden timesthe regiment was composed of eight battalion companies and twoflank companies. The first and tenth companies were armed withrifles, and were styled and used as "skirmishers;" but during 'thewar they were never used exclusively for that special purpose, andin fact no distinction existed between them and the other eightcompanies. 

The ten-company organization is awkward in practice, and I amsatisfied that the infantry regiment should have the same identicalorganization as exists for the cavalry and artillery, viz. , twelvecompanies, so as to be susceptible of division into threebattalions of four companies each. 

These companies should habitually be about a hundred one menstrong, giving twelve hundred to a regiment, which in practicewould settle down to about one thousand men. 

Three such regiments would compose a brigade, three brigades adivision, and three divisions a corps. Then, by allowing to aninfantry corps a brigade of cavalry and six batteries offield-artillery, we would have an efficient corps d'armee ofthirty thousand men, whose organization would be simple and mostefficient, and whose strength should never be allowed to fall belowtwenty-five thousand men. 

The corps is the true unit for grand campaigns and battle, shouldhave a full and perfect staff, and every thing requisite forseparate action, ready at all times to be detached and sent off forany nature of service. The general in command should have the rankof lieutenant-general, and should be, by experience and education, equal to any thing in war. Habitually with us he was a major-general, specially selected and assigned to the command by an orderof the President, constituting, in fact, a separate grade. 

The division is the unit of administration, and is the legitimatecommand of a major general. 

The brigade is the next subdivision, and is commanded by abrigadier-general. 

The regiment is the family. The colonel, as the father, shouldhave a personal acquaintance with every officer and man, and shouldinstill a feeling of pride and affection for himself, so that hisofficers and men would naturally look to him for personal adviceand instruction. In war the regiment should never be subdivided, but should always be maintained entire. In peace this isimpossible. 

The company is the true unit of discipline, and the captain is thecompany. A good captain makes a good company, and he should havethe power to reward as well as punish. The fact that soldiersworld naturally like to have a good fellow for their captain is thebest reason why he should be appointed by the colonel, or by somesuperior authority, instead of being elected by the men. 

In the United States the people are the "sovereign, " all poweroriginally proceeds from them, and therefore the election ofofficers by the men is the common rule. This is wrong, because anarmy is not a popular organization, but an animated machine, aninstrument in the hands of the Executive for enforcing the law, andmaintaining the honor and dignity of the nation; and the President, as the constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy, should exercise the power of appointment (subject to theconfirmation of the Senate) of the officers of "volunteers, " aswell as of "regulars. "

No army can be efficient unless it be a unit for action; and thepower must come from above, not from below: the President usuallydelegates his power to the commander-in-chief, and he to the next, and so on down to the lowest actual commander of troops, howeversmall the detachment. No matter how troops come together, whenonce united, the highest officer in rank is held responsible, andshould be consequently armed with the fullest power of theExecutive, subject only to law and existing orders. The moresimple the principle, the greater the likelihood of determinedaction; and the less a commanding officer is circumscribed bybounds or by precedent, the greater is the probability that he willmake the best use of his command and achieve the best results. 

The Regular Army and the Military Academy at West Point have in thepast provided, and doubtless will in the future provide an amplesupply of good officers for future wars; but, should their numbersbe insufficient, we can always safely rely on the great number ofyoung men of education and force of character throughout thecountry, to supplement them. At the close of our civil war, lasting four years, some of our best corps and division generals, as well as staff-officers, were from civil life; but I cannotrecall any of the most successful who did not express a regret thathe had not received in early life instruction in the elementaryprinciples of the art of war, instead of being forced to acquirethis knowledge in the dangerous and expensive school of actual war. 

But the vital difficulty was, and will be again, to obtain anadequate number of good soldiers. We tried almost every systemknown to modern nations, all with more or less success--voluntaryenlistments, the draft, and bought substitutes--and I think that allofficers of experience will confirm my assertion that the men whovoluntarily enlisted at the outbreak of the war were the best, better than the conscript, and far better than the boughtsubstitute. When a regiment is once organized in a State, andmustered into the service of the United States, the officers andmen become subject to the same laws of discipline and government asthe regular troops. They are in no sense "militia, " but composea part of the Army of the United States, only retain their Statetitle for convenience, and yet may be principally recruited fromthe neighborhood of their original organization: Once organized, the regiment should be kept full by recruits, and when it becomesdifficult to obtain more recruits the pay should be raised byCongress, instead of tempting new men by exaggerated bounties. Ibelieve it would have been more economical to have raised the payof the soldier to thirty or even fifty dollars a month than to haveheld out the promise of three hundred and even six hundred dollarsin the form of bounty. Toward the close of the war, I have oftenheard the soldiers complain that the "stay at-home" men got betterpay, bounties, and food, than they who were exposed to all thedangers and vicissitudes of the battles and marches at the front. The feeling of the soldier should be that, in every event, thesympathy and preference of his government is for him who fights, rather than for him who is on provost or guard duty to the rear, and, like most men, he measures this by the amount of pay. Ofcourse, the soldier must be trained to obedience, and should be"content with his wages;" but whoever has commanded an army in thefield knows the difference between a willing, contented mass ofmen, and one that feels a cause of grievance. There is a soul toan army as well as to the individual man, and no general canaccomplish the full work of his army unless he commands the soul ofhis men, as well as their bodies and legs. 

The greatest mistake made in our civil war was in the mode ofrecruitment and promotion. When a regiment became reduced by thenecessary wear and tear of service, instead of being filled up atthe bottom, and the vacancies among the officers filled from thebest noncommissioned officers and men, the habit was to raise newregiments, with new colonels, captains, and men, leaving the oldand experienced battalions to dwindle away into mere skeletonorganizations. I believe with the volunteers this matter was leftto the States exclusively, and I remember that Wisconsin kept herregiments filled with recruits, whereas other States generallyfilled their quotas by new regiments, and the result was that weestimated a Wisconsin regiment equal to an ordinary brigade. Ibelieve that five hundred new men added to an old and experiencedregiment were more valuable than a thousand men in the form of anew regiment, for the former by association with good, experiencedcaptains, lieutenants, and non-commissioned officers, soon becameveterans, whereas the latter were generally unavailable for a year. The German method of recruitment is simply perfect, and there is nogood reason why we should not follow it substantially. 

On a road, marching by the flank, it would be considered "goodorder" to have five thousand men to a mile, so that a full corps ofthirty thousand men would extend six miles, but with the averagetrains and batteries of artillery the probabilities are that itwould draw out to ten miles. On a long and regular march thedivisions and brigades should alternate in the lead, the leadingdivision should be on the road by the earliest dawn, and march atthe rate of about two miles, or, at most, two and a half miles anhour, so as to reach camp by noon. Even then the rear divisionsand trains will hardly reach camp much before night. Theoretically, a marching column should preserve such order that by simply haltingand facing to the right or left, it would be in line of battle; butthis is rarely the case, and generally deployments are made"forward, " by conducting each brigade by the flank obliquely to theright or left to its approximate position in line of battle, andthere deployed. In such a line of battle, a brigade of threethousand infantry would occupy a mile of "front;" but for a strongline of battle five-thousand men with two batteries should beallowed to each mile, or a division would habitually constitute adouble line with skirmishers and a reserve on a mile of "front. "

The "feeding" of an army is a matter of the most vital importance, and demands the earliest attention of the general intrusted with acampaign. To be strong, healthy, and capable of the largestmeasure of physical effort, the soldier needs about three poundsgross of food per day, and the horse or mule about twenty pounds. When a general first estimates the quantity of food and forageneeded for an army of fifty or one hundred thousand men, he is aptto be dismayed, and here a good staff is indispensable, though thegeneral cannot throw off on them the responsibility. He must givethe subject his personal attention, for the army reposes in himalone, and should never doubt the fact that their existenceoverrides in importance all other considerations. Once satisfiedof this, and that all has been done that can be, the soldiers arealways willing to bear the largest measure of privation. Probablyno army ever had a more varied experience in this regard than theone I commanded in 1864'65. 

Our base of supply was at Nashville, supplied by railways and theCumberland River, thence by rail to Chattanooga, a "secondarybase, " and thence forward a single-track railroad. The stores cameforward daily, but I endeavored to have on hand a full supply fortwenty days in advance. These stores were habitually in thewagon-trains, distributed to corps, divisions, and regiments, incharge of experienced quartermasters and commissaries, and becamesubject to the orders of the generals commanding these bodies. They were generally issued on provision returns, but these had tobe closely scrutinized, for too often the colonels would makerequisitions for provisions for more men than they reported forbattle. Of course, there are always a good many non-combatantswith an army, but, after careful study, I limited their amount totwenty-five per cent. Of the "effective strength, " and that wasfound to be liberal. An ordinary army-wagon drawn by six mules maybe counted on to carry three thousand pounds net, equal to the foodof a full regiment for one day, but, by driving along beef-cattle, a commissary may safely count the contents of one wagon assufficient for two days' food for a regiment of a thousand men; andas a corps should have food on hand for twenty days ready fordetachment, it should have three hundred such wagons, as aprovision-train; and for forage, ammunition, clothing, and othernecessary stores, it was found necessary to have three hundred morewagons, or six hundred wagons in all, for a corps d'armee. 

These should be absolutely under the immediate control of the corpscommander, who will, however, find it economical to distribute themin due proportion to his divisions, brigades, and even regiments. Each regiment ought usually to have at least one wagon forconvenience to distribute stores, and each company two pack-mules, so that the regiment may always be certain of a meal on reachingcamp without waiting for the larger trains. 

On long marches the artillery and wagon-trains should always havethe right of way, and the troops should improvise roads to oneside, unless forced to use a bridge in common, and all trainsshould have escorts to protect them, and to assist them in badplaces. To this end there is nothing like actual experience, only, unless the officers in command give the subject their personalattention, they will find their wagon-trains loaded down withtents, personal baggage, and even the arms and knapsacks of theescort. Each soldier should, if not actually "sick or wounded, "carry his musket and equipments containing from forty to sixtyrounds of ammunition, his shelter-tent, a blanket or overcoat, andan extra pair of pants, socks, and drawers, in the form of a scarf, worn from the left shoulder to the right side in lieu of knapsack, and in his haversack he should carry some bread, cooked meat, salt, and coffee. I do not believe a soldier should be loaded down toomuch, but, including his clothing, arms, and equipment, he cancarry about fifty pounds without impairing his health or activity. A simple calculation will show that by such a distribution a corpswill-thus carry the equivalent of five hundred wagon-loads--animmense relief to the trains. 

Where an army is near one of our many large navigable rivers, orhas the safe use of a railway, it can usually be supplied with thefull army ration, which is by far the best furnished to any army inAmerica or Europe; but when it is compelled to operate away fromsuch a base, and is dependent on its own train of wagons, thecommanding officer must exercise a wise discretion in the selectionof his stores. In my opinion, there is no better food for man thanbeef-cattle driven on the hoof, issued liberally, with salt, bacon, and bread. Coffee has also become almost indispensable, thoughmany substitutes were found for it, such as Indian-corn, roasted, ground, and boiled as coffee; the sweet-potato, and the seed of theokra plant prepared in the same way. All these were used by thepeople of the South, who for years could procure no coffee, but Inoticed that the women always begged of us some real coffee, whichseems to satisfy a natural yearning or craving more powerful thancan be accounted for on the theory of habit. Therefore I wouldalways advise that the coffee and sugar ration be carried along, even at the expense of bread, for which there are many substitutes. Of these, Indian-corn is the best and most abundant. Parched in afrying-pan, it is excellent food, or if ground, or pounded andboiled with meat of any sort, it makes a most nutritious meal. Thepotato, both Irish and sweet, forms an excellent substitute forbread, and at Savannah we found that rice (was) also suitable, both formen and animals. For the former it should be cleaned of its huskin a hominy block, easily prepared out of a log, and sifted with acoarse corn bag; but for horses it should be fed in the straw. During the Atlanta campaign we were supplied by our regularcommissaries with all sorts of patent compounds, such as desiccatedvegetables, and concentrated milk, meat-biscuit, and sausages, butsomehow the men preferred the simpler and more familiar forms offood, and usually styled these "desecrated vegetables andconsecrated milk. " We were also supplied liberally withlime-juice, sauerkraut, and pickles, as an antidote to scurvy, andI now recall the extreme anxiety of my medical director, Dr. Kittoe, about the scurvy, which he reported at one time as spreading andimperiling the army. This occurred at a crisis about Kenesaw, whenthe railroad was taxed to its utmost capacity to provide thenecessary ammunition, food, and forage, and could not possiblybring us an adequate supply of potatoes and cabbage, the usualanti-scorbutics, when providentially the black berries ripened andproved an admirable antidote, and I have known the skirmish-line, without orders, to fight a respectable battle for the possession ofsome old fields that were full of blackberries. Soon, thereafter, the green corn or roasting-ear came into season, and I heard nomore of the scurvy. Our country abounds with plants which can beutilized for a prevention to the scurvy; besides the above are thepersimmon, the sassafras root and bud, the wild-mustard, the"agave, " turnip tops, the dandelion cooked as greens, and adecoction of the ordinary pine-leaf. 

For the more delicate and costly articles of food for the sick werelied mostly on the agents of the Sanitary Commission. I do notwish to doubt the value of these organizations, which gained somuch applause during our civil war, for no one can question themotives of these charitable and generous people; but to be honest Imust record an opinion that the Sanitary Commission should limitits operations to the hospitals at the rear, and should neverappear at the front. They were generally local in feeling, aimedto furnish their personal friends and neighbors with a better classof food than the Government supplied, and the consequence was, thatone regiment of a brigade would receive potatoes and fruit whichwould be denied another regiment close by: Jealousy would be theinevitable result, and in an army all parts should be equal; thereshould be no "partiality, favor, or affection. " The Governmentshould supply all essential wants, and in the hospitals to the rearwill be found abundant opportunities for the exercise of allpossible charity and generosity. During the war I several timesgained the ill-will of the agents of the Sanitary Commissionbecause I forbade their coming to the front unless they wouldconsent to distribute their stores equally among all, regardless ofthe parties who had contributed them. 

The sick, wounded, and dead of an army are the subjects of thegreatest possible anxiety, and add an immense amount of labor tothe well men. Each regiment in an active campaign should have asurgeon and two assistants always close at hand, and each brigadeand division should have an experienced surgeon as a medicaldirector. The great majority of wounds and of sickness should betreated by the regimental surgeon, on the ground, under the eye ofthe colonel. As few should be sent to the brigade or divisionhospital as possible, for the men always receive better care withtheir own regiment than with strangers, and as a rule the cure ismore certain; but when men receive disabling wounds, or havesickness likely to become permanent, the sooner they go far to therear the better for all. The tent or the shelter of a tree is abetter hospital than a house, whose walls absorb fetid andpoisonous emanations, and then give them back to the atmosphere. To men accustomed to the open air, who live on the plainest food, wounds seem to give less pain, and are attended with less danger tolife than to ordinary soldiers in barracks. 

Wounds which, in 1861, would have sent a man to the hospital formonths, in 1865 were regarded as mere scratches, rather the subjectof a joke than of sorrow. To new soldiers the sight of blood anddeath always has a sickening effect, but soon men become accustomedto it, and I have heard them exclaim on seeing a dead comrade borneto the rear, "Well, Bill has turned up his toes to the daisies. "Of course, during a skirmish or battle, armed men should neverleave their ranks to attend a dead or wounded comrade--this shouldbe seen to in advance by the colonel, who should designate hismusicians or company cooks as hospital attendants, with a white ragon their arm to indicate their office. A wounded man should gohimself (if able) to the surgeon near at hand, or, if he need help, he should receive it from one of the attendants and not a comrade. It is wonderful how soon the men accustom themselves to thesesimple rules. In great battles these matters call for a moreenlarged attention, and then it becomes the duty of the divisiongeneral to see that proper stretchers and field hospitals are readyfor the wounded, and trenches are dug for the dead. There shouldbe no real neglect of the dead, because it has a bad effect on theliving; for each soldier values himself and comrade as highly asthough he were living in a good house at home. 

The regimental chaplain, if any, usually attends the burials fromthe hospital, should make notes and communicate details to thecaptain of the company, and to the family at home. Of course it isusually impossible to mark the grave with names, dates, etc. , andconsequently the names of the "unknown" in our national cemeteriesequal about one-half of all the dead. 

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought asdescribed in European text-books, viz. , in great masses, in perfectorder, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades. We weregenerally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployedaccording to tactics, the men generally fought in strongskirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and ofevery cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded andbroken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the groundto their immediate front; whereas we, their assailants, had togrope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a clearedfield or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under aclose and withering fire. Rarely did the opposing lines in compactorder come into actual contact, but when, as at Peach-Tree Creekand Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men foughtindividually in every possible style, more frequently with themusket clubbed than with the bayonet, and in some instances the menclinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together. Europeans frequently criticised our war, because we did not alwaystake full advantage of a victory; the true reason was, thathabitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did notrealize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was alreadymiles away and was again intrenched, having left a mereskirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to thenew position. 

Our war was fought with the muzzle-loading rifle. Toward the closeI had one brigade (Walcutt's) armed with breech-loading "Spencer's;"the cavalry generally had breach-loading carbines, "Spencer's" and"Sharp's, " both of which were good arms. 

The only change that breech-loading arms will probably make in theart and practice of war will be to increase the amount ofammunition to be expended, and necessarily to be carried along; tostill further "thin out" the lines of attack, and to reduce battlesto short, quick, decisive conflicts. It does not in the leastaffect the grand strategy, or the necessity for perfectorganization, drill, and discipline. The companies and battalionswill be more dispersed, and the men will be less under theimmediate eye of their officers, and therefore a higher order ofintelligence and courage on the part of the individual soldier willbe an element of strength. 

When a regiment is deployed as skirmishers, and crosses an openfield or woods, under heavy fire, if each man runs forward fromtree to tree, or stump to stump, and yet preserves a good generalalignment, it gives great confidence to the men themselves, forthey always keep their eyes well to the right and left, and watchtheir comrades; but when some few hold back, stick too close or toolong to a comfortable log, it often stops the line and defeats thewhole object. Therefore, the more we improve the fire-arm the morewill be the necessity for good organization, good discipline andintelligence on the part of the individual soldier and officer. There is, of course, such a thing as individual courage, which hasa value in war, but familiarity with danger, experience in war andits common attendants, and personal habit, are equally valuabletraits, and these are the qualities with which we usually have todeal in war. All men naturally shrink from pain and danger, andonly incur their risk from some higher motive, or from habit; sothat I would define true courage to be a perfect sensibility of themeasure of danger, and a mental willingness to incur it, ratherthan that insensibility to danger of which I have heard far morethan I have seen. The most courageous men are generallyunconscious of possessing the quality; therefore, when oneprofesses it too openly, by words or bearing, there is reason tomistrust it. I would further illustrate my meaning by describing aman of true courage to be one who possesses all his faculties andsenses perfectly when serious danger is actually present. 

Modern wars have not materially changed the relative values orproportions of the several arms of service: infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineers. If any thing, the infantry has beenincreased in value. The danger of cavalry attempting to chargeinfantry armed with breech-loading rifles was fully illustrated atSedan, and with us very frequently. So improbable has such a thingbecome that we have omitted the infantry-square from our recenttactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry, and as auxiliary toinfantry, will always be valuable, while all great wars will, asheretofore, depend chiefly on the infantry. Artillery is morevaluable with new and inexperienced troops than with veterans. Inthe early stages of the war the field-guns often bore theproportion of six to a thousand men; but toward the close of thewar one gun; or at most two, to a thousand men, was deemed enough. Sieges; such as characterized the wars of the last century, are tooslow for this period of the world, and the Prussians recentlyalmost ignored them altogether, penetrated France between theforts, and left a superior force "in observation, " to watch thegarrison and accept its surrender when the greater events of thewar ahead made further resistance useless; but earth-forts, andespecially field-works, will hereafter play an important part inwar, because they enable a minor force to hold a superior one incheck for a time, and time is a most valuable element in all wars. It was one of Prof. Mahan's maxims that the spade was as useful inwar as the musket, and to this I will add the axe. The habit ofintrenching certainly does have the effect of making new troopstimid. When a line of battle is once covered by a good parapet, made by the engineers or by the labor of the men themselves, itdoes require an effort to make them leave it in the face of danger;but when the enemy is intrenched, it becomes absolutely necessaryto permit each brigade and division of the troops immediatelyopposed to throw up a corresponding trench for their own protectionin case of a sudden sally. We invariably did this in all ourrecent campaigns, and it had no ill effect, though sometimes ourtroops were a little too slow in leaving their well-covered linesto assail the enemy in position or on retreat. Even ourskirmishers were in the habit of rolling logs together, or ofmaking a lunette of rails, with dirt in front, to cover theirbodies; and, though it revealed their position, I cannot say thatit worked a bad effect; so that, as a rule, it may safely be leftto the men themselves: On the "defensive, " there is no doubt of thepropriety of fortifying; but in the assailing army the general mustwatch closely to see that his men do not neglect an opportunity todrop his precautionary defenses, and act promptly on the"offensive" at every chance. 

I have many a time crept forward to the skirmish-line to availmyself of the cover of the pickets "little fort, " to observe moreclosely some expected result; and always talked familiarly with themen, and was astonished to see how well they comprehended thegeneral object, and how accurately they were informed of the sateof facts existing miles away from their particular corps. Soldiersare very quick to catch the general drift and purpose of acampaign, and are always sensible when they are well commanded orwell cared for. Once impressed with this fact, and that they aremaking progress, they bear cheerfully any amount of labor andprivation. 

In camp, and especially in the presence of an active enemy, it ismuch easier to maintain discipline than in barracks in time ofpeace. Crime and breaches of discipline are much less frequent, and the necessity for courts-martial far less. The captain canusually inflict all the punishment necessary, and the colonelshould always. The field-officers' court is the best form for war, viz. , one of the field-officers-the lieutenant-colonel or major--can examine the case and report his verdict, and the colonelshould execute it. Of course, there are statutory offenses whichdemand a general court-martial, and these must be ordered by thedivision or corps commander; but, the presence of one of ourregular civilian judge-advocates in an army in the field would be afirst-class nuisance, for technical courts always work mischief. Too many courts-martial in any command are evidence of poordiscipline and inefficient officers. 

For the rapid transmission of orders in an army covering a largespace of ground, the magnetic telegraph is by far the best, thoughhabitually the paper and pencil, with good mounted orderlies, answer every purpose. I have little faith in the signal-service byflags and torches, though we always used them; because, almostinvariably when they were most needed, the view was cut off byintervening trees, or by mists and fogs. There was one notableinstance in my experience, when the signal-flags carried a message. Of vital importance over the heads of Hood's army, which hadinterposed between me and Allatoona, and had broken thetelegraph-wires--as recorded in Chapter XIX. ; but the value of themagnetic telegraph in war cannot be exaggerated, as was illustratedby the perfect concert of action between the armies in Virginia andGeorgia during 1864. Hardly a day intervened when General Grantdid not know the exact state of facts with me, more than fifteenhundred miles away as the wires ran. So on the field a thininsulated wire may be run on improvised stakes or from tree to treefor six or more miles in a couple of hours, and I have seenoperators so skillful, that by cutting the wire they would receivea message with their tongues from a distant station. As a matterof course, the ordinary commercial wires along the railways formthe usual telegraph-lines for an army, and these are easilyrepaired and extended as the army advances, but each army and wingshould have a small party of skilled men to put up the field-wire, and take it down when done. This is far better than thesignal-flags and torches. Our commercial telegraph-lines willalways supply for war enough skillful operators. 

The value of railways is also fully recognized in war quite as muchas, if not more so than, in peace. The Atlanta campaign wouldsimply have been impossible without the use of the railroads fromLouisville to Nashville--one hundred and eighty-five miles--fromNashville to Chattanooga--one hundred and fifty-one miles--and fromChattanooga to Atlanta--one hundred and thirty-seven miles. Everymile of this "single track" was so delicate, that one man could ina minute have broken or moved a rail, but our trains usuallycarried along the tools and means to repair such a break. We had, however, to maintain strong guards and garrisons at each importantbridge or trestle--the destruction of which would have necessitatedtime for rebuilding. For the protection of a bridge, one or twolog block houses, two stories high, with a piece of ordnance and asmall infantry guard, usually sufficed. The block-house had asmall parapet and ditch about it, and the roof was made shot proofby earth piled on. These points could usually be reached only by adash of the enemy's cavalry, and many of these block housessuccessfully resisted serious attacks by both cavalry andartillery. The only block-house that was actually captured on themain was the one described near Allatoona. Our trains fromNashville forward were operated under military rules, and ran aboutten miles an hour in gangs of four trains of ten cars each. Foursuch groups of trains daily made one hundred and sixty cars, of tentons each, carrying sixteen hundred tons, which exceeded theabsolute necessity of the army, and allowed for the accidents thatwere common and inevitable. But, as I have recorded, that singlestem of railroad, four hundred and seventy-three miles long, supplied an army of one hundred thousand men and thirty-fivethousand animals for the period of one hundred and ninety-six days, viz. , from May 1 to November 12, 1864. To have delivered regularlythat amount of food and forage by ordinary wagons would haverequired thirty-six thousand eight hundred wagons of six muleseach, allowing each wagon to have hauled two tons twenty miles eachday, a simple impossibility in roads such as then existed in thatregion of country. Therefore, I reiterate that the Atlantacampaign was an impossibility without these railroads; and onlythen, because we had the men and means to maintain and defend them, in addition to what were necessary to overcome the enemy. Habitually, a passenger-car will carry fifty men with theirnecessary baggage. Box-cars, and even platform-cars, answer thepurpose well enough, but they, should always have roughboard-seats. For sick and wounded men, box-cars filled with strawor bushes were usually employed. Personally, I saw but little ofthe practical working of the railroads, for I only turned back onceas far as Resaca; but I had daily reports from the engineer incharge, and officers who came from the rear often explained to methe whole thing, with a description of the wrecked trains all theway from Nashville to Atlanta. I am convinced that the risk tolife to the engineers and men on that railroad fully equaled thaton the skirmish-line, called for as high an order of courage, andfully equaled it in importance. Still, I doubt if there be anynecessity in time of peace to organize a corps specially to workthe military railroads in time of war, because in peace these samemen gain all the necessary experience, possess all the daring andcourage of soldiers, and only need the occasional protection andassistance of the necessary train-guard, which may be composed ofthe furloughed men coming and going, or of details made from thelocal garrisons to the rear. 

For the transfer of large armies by rail, from one theatre ofaction to another by the rear--the cases of the transfer of theEleventh and Twelfth Corps--General Hooker, twenty-three thousandmen--from the East to Chattanooga, eleven hundred and ninety-twomiles in seven days, in the fall of 1863; and that of the Army ofthe Ohio--General Schofield, fifteen thousand men--from the valleyof the Tennessee to Washington, fourteen hundred miles in elevendays, en route to North Carolina in January, 1865, are the bestexamples of which I have any knowledge, and reference to these ismade in the report of the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, datedNovember 22, 1865. 

Engineer troops attached to an army are habitually employed insupervising the construction of forts or field works of a naturemore permanent than the lines need by the troops in motion, and inrepairing roads and making bridges. I had several regiments ofthis kind that were most useful, but as a rule we used theinfantry, or employed parties of freedmen, who worked on thetrenches at night while the soldiers slept, and these in turnrested by day. Habitually the repair of the railroad and itsbridges was committed to hired laborers, like the English navies, under the supervision of Colonel W. W. Wright, a railroad-engineer, who was in the military service at the time, and his successfullabors were frequently referred to in the official reports of thecampaign. 

For the passage of rivers, each army corps had a pontoon-train witha detachment of engineers, and, on reaching a river, the leadinginfantry division was charged with the labor of putting it down. Generally the single pontoon-train could provide for nine hundredfeet of bridge, which sufficed; but when the rivers were very widetwo such trains would be brought together, or the single train wassupplemented by a trestle-bridge, or bridges made on crib-work, outof timber found near the place. The pontoons in general use wereskeleton frames, made with a hinge, so as to fold back andconstitute a wagon-body. In this same wagon were carried thecotton canvas cover, the anchor and chains, and a due proportion ofthe balks, cheeses, and lashings. All the troops became veryfamiliar with their mechanism and use, and we were rarely delayedby reason of a river, however broad. I saw, recently, inAldershot, England, a very complete pontoon-train; the boats weresheathed with wood and felt, made very light; but I think thesewere more liable to chafing and damage in rough handling than wereour less expensive and rougher boats. On the whole, I would preferthe skeleton frame and canvas cover to any style of pontoon that Ihave ever seen. 

In relation to guards, pickets, and vedettes, I doubt if anydiscoveries or improvements were made during our war, or in any ofthe modern wars in Europe. These precautions vary with the natureof the country and the situation of each army. When advancing orretreating in line of battle, the usual skirmish-line constitutesthe picket-line, and may have "reserves, " but usually the main lineof battle constitutes the reserve; and in this connection I willstate that the recent innovation introduced into the new infantrytactics by General Upton is admirable, for by it each regiment, brigade, and division deployed, sends forward as "skirmishers" theone man of each set of fours, to cover its own front, and these canbe recalled or reenforced at pleasure by the bugle-signal. 

For flank-guards and rear-guards, one or more companies should bedetached under their own officers, instead of making up the guardby detailing men from the several companies. 

For regimental or camp guards, the details should be made accordingto existing army regulations; and all the guards should be postedearly in the evening, so as to afford each sentinel or vedette achance to study his ground before it becomes too dark. 

In like manner as to the staff. The more intimately it comes intocontact with the troops, the more useful and valuable it becomes. The almost entire separation of the staff from the line, as nowpractised by us, and hitherto by the French, has provedmischievous, and the great retinues of staff-officers with whichsome of our earlier generals began the war were simply ridiculous. I don't believe in a chief of staff at all, and any generalcommanding an army, corps, or division, that has a staff-officerwho professes to know more than his chief, is to be pitied. Eachregiment should have a competent adjutant, quartermaster, andcommissary, with two or three medical officers. Each brigadecommander should have the same staff, with the addition of a coupleof young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from the subalterns ofthe brigade, who should be good riders, and intelligent enough togive and explain the orders of their general. 

The same staff will answer for a division. The general in commandof a separate army, and of a corps d'armee, should have the sameprofessional assistance, with two or more good engineers, and hisadjutant-general should exercise all the functions usually ascribedto a chief of staff, viz. , he should possess the ability tocomprehend the scope of operations, and to make verbally and inwriting all the orders and details necessary to carry into effectthe views of his general, as well as to keep the returns andrecords of events for the information of the next higher authority, and for history. A bulky staff implies a division ofresponsibility, slowness of action, and indecision, whereas a smallstaff implies activity and concentration of purpose. The smallnessof General Grant's staff throughout the civil war forms the bestmodel for future imitation. So of tents, officers furniture, etc. , etc. In real war these should all be discarded, and an army isefficient for action and motion exactly in the inverse ratio of itsimpedimenta. Tents should be omitted altogether, save one to aregiment for an office, and a few for the division hospital. Officers should be content with a tent fly, improvising poles andshelter out of bushes. The tents d'abri, or shelter-tent, carriedby the soldier himself, is all-sufficient. Officers should neverseek for houses, but share the condition of their men. 

A recent message (July 18, 1874) made to the French Assembly byMarshal MacMahon, President of the French Republic, submits aprojet de loi, with a report prepared by a board of French generalson "army administration, " which is full of information, and is asapplicable to us as to the French. I quote from its verybeginning: "The misfortunes of the campaign of 1870 havedemonstrated the inferiority of our system.... Two separateorganizations existed with parallel functions--the 'general' moreoccupied in giving direction to his troops than in providing fortheir material wants, which he regarded as the special province ofthe staff, and the 'intendant' (staff) often working at random, taking on his shoulders a crushing burden of functions and duties, exhausting himself with useless efforts, and aiming to accomplishan insufficient service, to the disappointment of everybody. Thisseparation of the administration and command, this coexistence oftwo wills, each independent of the other, which paralyzed both andannulled the dualism, was condemned. It was decided by the boardthat this error should be "proscribed" in the new military system. The report then goes on at great length discussing the provisions. Of the "new law, " which is described to be a radical change fromthe old one on the same subject. While conceding to the Ministerof War in Paris the general control and supervision of the entiremilitary establishment primarily, especially of the annualestimates or budget, and the great depots of supply, it distributesto the commanders of the corps d'armee in time of peace, and to allarmy commanders generally in time of war, the absolute command ofthe money, provisions, and stores, with the necessary staff-officers to receive, issue, and account for them. I quote further:"The object of this law is to confer on the commander of troopswhatever liberty of action the case demands. He has the power evento go beyond the regulations, in circumstances of urgency andpressing necessity. The extraordinary measures he may take onthese occasions may require their execution without delay. Thestaff-officer has but one duty before obeying, and that is tosubmit his observations to the general, and to ask his orders inwriting. 

With this formality his responsibility ceases, and theresponsibility for the extraordinary act falls solely on thegeneral who gives the order. The officers and agents charged withsupplies are placed under the orders of the general in command ofthe troops, that is, they are obliged both in war and peace toobey, with the single qualification above named, of first makingtheir observations and securing the written order of the general. 

With us, to-day, the law and regulations are that, no matter whatmay be the emergency, the commanding general in Texas, New Mexico, and the remote frontiers, cannot draw from the arsenals a pistol-cartridge, or any sort of ordnance-stores, without first procuringan order of the Secretary of War in Washington. The commandinggeneral--though intrusted with the lives of his soldiers and withthe safety of a frontier in a condition of chronic war--cannottouch or be trusted with ordnance-stores or property, and that isdeclared to be the law! Every officer of the old army remembershow, in 1861, we were hampered with the old blue army regulations, which tied our hands, and that to do any thing positive andnecessary we had to tear it all to pieces--cut the red-tape, as itwas called, a dangerous thing for an army to do, for it wascalculated to bring the law and authority into contempt; but warwas upon us, and overwhelming necessity overrides all law. 

This French report is well worth the study of our army-officers, ofall grades and classes, and I will only refer again, casually, toanother part, wherein it discusses the subject of militarycorrespondence: whether the staff-officer should corresponddirectly with his chief in Paris, submitting to his general copies, or whether he should be required to carry on his correspondencethrough his general, so that the latter could promptly forward thecommunication, indorsed with his own remarks and opinions. Thelatter is declared by the board to be the only safe role, because"the general should never be ignorant of any thing that istranspiring that concerns his command. "

In this country, as in France, Congress controls the greatquestions of war and peace, makes all laws for the creation andgovernment of armies, and votes the necessary supplies, leaving tothe President to execute and apply these laws, especially theharder task of limiting the expenditure of public money to theamount of the annual appropriations. The executive power isfurther subdivided into the seven great departments, and to theSecretary of War is confided the general care of the militaryestablishment, and his powers are further subdivided into tendistinct and separate bureaus. 

The chiefs of these bureaus are under the immediate orders of theSecretary of War, who, through them, in fact commands the army from"his office, " but cannot do so "in the field"--an absurdity inmilitary if not civil law. 

The subordinates of these staff-corps and departments are selectedand chosen from the army itself, or fresh from West Point, and toocommonly construe themselves into the elite, as made of better claythan the common soldier. Thus they separate themselves more andmore from their comrades of the line, and in process of timerealize the condition of that old officer of artillery who thoughtthe army would be a delightful place for a gentleman if it were notfor the d-d soldier; or, better still, the conclusion of the younglord in "Henry IV. , " who told Harry Percy (Hotspur) that "but forthese vile guns he would himself have been a soldier. " This is allwrong; utterly at variance with our democratic form of governmentand of universal experience; and now that the French, from whom wehad copied the system, have utterly "proscribed" it, I hope thatour Congress will follow suit. I admit, in its fullest force, thestrength of the maxim that the civil law should be superior to themilitary in time of peace; that the army should be at all timessubject to the direct control of Congress; and I assert that, fromthe formation of our Government to the present day, the RegularArmy has set the highest example of obedience to law and authority;but, for the very reason that our army is comparatively so verysmall, I hold that it should be the best possible, organized andgoverned on true military principles, and that in time of peace weshould preserve the "habits and usages of war, " so that, when wardoes come, we may not again be compelled to suffer the disgrace, confusion, and disorder of 1861. 

The commanding officers of divisions, departments, and posts, should have the amplest powers, not only to command their troops, but all the stores designed for their use, and the officers of thestaff necessary to administer them, within the area of theircommand; and then with fairness they could be held to the mostperfect responsibility. The President and Secretary of War cancommand the army quite as well through these generals as throughthe subordinate staff-officers. Of course, the Secretary would, asnow, distribute the funds according to the appropriation bills, andreserve to himself the absolute control and supervision of thelarger arsenals and depots of supply. The error lies in the law, or in the judicial interpretation thereof, and no code of armyregulations can be made that meets the case, until Congress, likethe French Corps Legislatif, utterly annihilates and "proscribes"the old law and the system which has grown up under it. 

It is related of Napoleon that his last words were, "Tete d'armee!"Doubtless, as the shadow of death obscured his memory, the lastthought that remained for speech was of some event when he wasdirecting an important "head of column. " I believe that everygeneral who has handled armies in battle most recall from his ownexperience the intensity of thought on some similar occasion, whenby a single command he had given the finishing stroke to somecomplicated action; but to me recurs another thought that is worthyof record, and may encourage others who are to follow us in ourprofession. I never saw the rear of an army engaged in battle butI feared that some calamity had happened at the front the apparentconfusion, broken wagons, crippled horses, men lying about dead andmaimed, parties hastening to and fro in seeming disorder, and ageneral apprehension of something dreadful about to ensue; allthese signs, however, lessened as I neared the front, and there thecontrast was complete--perfect order, men and horses--full ofconfidence, and it was not unusual for general hilarity, laughing, and cheering. Although cannon might be firing, the musketryclattering, and the enemy's shot hitting close, there reigned ageneral feeling of strength and security that bore a markedcontrast to the bloody signs that had drifted rapidly to the rear;therefore, for comfort and safety, I surely would rather be at thefront than the rear line of battle. So also on the march, the headof a column moves on steadily, while the rear is alternatelyhalting and then rushing forward to close up the gap; and all sortsof rumors, especially the worst, float back to the rear. Oldtroops invariably deem it a special privilege to be in the front--to be at the "head of column"--because experience has taught themthat it is the easiest and most comfortable place, and danger onlyadds zest and stimulus to this fact. 

The hardest task in war is to lie in support of some position orbattery, under fire without the privilege of returning it; or toguard some train left in the rear, within hearing but out ofdanger; or to provide for the wounded and dead of some corps whichis too busy ahead to care for its own. 

To be at the head of a strong column of troops, in the execution ofsome task that requires brain, is the highest pleasure of war--agrim one and terrible, but which leaves on the mind and memory thestrongest mark; to detect the weak point of an enemy's line; tobreak through with vehemence and thus lead to victory; or todiscover some key-point and hold it with tenacity; or to do someother distinct act which is afterward recognized as the real causeof success. These all become matters that are never forgotten. Other great difficulties, experienced by every general, are tomeasure truly the thousand-and-one reports that come to him in themidst of conflict; to preserve a clear and well-defined purpose atevery instant of time, and to cause all efforts to converge to thatend. 

To do these things he must know perfectly the strength and qualityof each part of his own army, as well as that of his opponent, andmust be where he can personally see and observe with his own eyes, and judge with his own mind. No man can properly command an armyfrom the rear, he must be "at its front;" and when a detachment ismade, the commander thereof should be informed of the object to beaccomplished, and left as free as possible to execute it in his ownway; and when an army is divided up into several parts, thesuperior should always attend that one which he regards as mostimportant. Some men think that modern armies may be so regulatedthat a general can sit in an office and play on his several columnsas on the keys of a piano; this is a fearful mistake. Thedirecting mind must be at the very head of the army--must be seenthere, and the effect of his mind and personal energy must be feltby every officer and man present with it, to secure the bestresults. Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result inhumiliation and disaster. 

Lastly, mail facilities should be kept up with an army if possible, that officers and men may receive and send letters to theirfriends, thus maintaining the home influence of infinite assistanceto discipline. Newspaper correspondents with an army, as a rule, are mischievous. They are the world's gossips, pick up and retailthe camp scandal, and gradually drift to the headquarters of somegeneral, who finds it easier to make reputation at home than withhis own corps or division. They are also tempted to prophesyevents and state facts which, to an enemy, reveal a purpose in timeto guard against it. Moreover, they are always bound to see factscolored by the partisan or political character of their ownpatrons, and thus bring army officers into the politicalcontroversies of the day, which are always mischievous and wrong. Yet, so greedy are the people at large for war news, that it isdoubtful whether any army commander can exclude all reporters, without bringing down on himself a clamor that may imperil his ownsafety. Time and moderation must bring a just solution to thismodern difficulty. 

CHAPTER XXVI. 

AFTER THE WAR

In the foregoing pages I have endeavored to describe the publicevents in which I was an actor or spectator before and during thecivil war of 1861-'65, and it now only remains for me to treat ofsimilar matters of general interest subsequent to the civil war. Within a few days of the grand review of May 24, 1865, I took leaveof the army at Washington, and with my family went to Chicago toattend a fair held in the interest of the families of soldiersimpoverished by the war. I remained there about two weeks; on the22d of June was at South Bend, Indiana, where two of my childrenwere at school, and reached my native place, Lancaster, Ohio, onthe 24th. On the 4th of July I visited at Louisville, Kentucky, the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Army Corps, which had come from Washington, under the command of General JohnA. Logan, for "muster out, " or "further orders. " I then made ashort visit to General George H. Thomas at Nashville, and returnedto Lancaster, where I remained with the family till the receipt ofGeneral Orders No. 118 of June 27, 1865, which divided the wholeterritory of the United States into nineteen departments and fivemilitary divisions, the second of which was the military divisionof the "Mississippi, " afterward changed to "Missouri, " Major-General W. T. Sherman to command, with, headquarters at St. Louis, to embrace the Departments of the Ohio, Missouri, and Arkansas. 

This territorial command included the States north of the OhioRiver, and the States and Territories north of Texas, as far westas the Rocky Mountains, including Montana, Utah, and New Mexico, but the part east of the Mississippi was soon transferred toanother division. The department commanders were General E. O. C. Ord, at Detroit; General John Pope, at Fort Leavenworth; andGeneral J. J. Reynolds, at Little Rock, but these also were soonchanged. I at once assumed command, and ordered my staff andheadquarters from Washington to St. Louis, Missouri, going there inperson on the 16th of July. 

My thoughts and feelings at once reverted to the construction ofthe great Pacific Railway, which had been chartered by Congress inthe midst of war, and was then in progress. I put myself incommunication with the parties engaged in the work, visiting themin person, and assured them that I would afford them all possibleassistance and encouragement. Dr. Durant, the leading man of theUnion Pacific, seemed to me a person of ardent nature, of greatability and energy, enthusiastic in his undertaking, and determinedto build the road from Omaha to San Francisco. He had an ablecorps of assistants, collecting materials, letting out contractsfor ties, grading, etc. , and I attended the celebration of thefirst completed division of sixteen and a half miles, from Omaha toPapillon. When the orators spoke so confidently of thedetermination to build two thousand miles of railway across theplains, mountains, and desert, devoid of timber, with nopopulation, but on the contrary raided by the bold and bloody Siouxand Cheyennes, who had almost successfully defied our power forhalf a century, I was disposed to treat it jocularly, because Icould not help recall our California experience of 1855-'56, whenwe celebrated the completion of twenty-two and a half miles of thesame road eastward of Sacramento; on which occasion Edward Bakerhad electrified us by his unequalled oratory, painting the gloriousthings which would result from uniting the Western coast with theEast by bands of iron. Baker then, with a poet's imagination, sawthe vision of the mighty future, but not the gulf which meantimewas destined to swallow up half a million of the brightest and bestyouth of our land, and that he himself would be one of the firstvictims far away on the banks of the Potomac (he was killed inbattle at Balls Bluff, October 21, 1861). 

The Kansas Pacific was designed to unite with the main branch aboutthe 100 deg. Meridian, near Fort Kearney. Mr. Shoemaker was itsgeneral superintendent and building contractor, and this branch in1865 was finished about forty miles to a point near Lawrence, Kansas. I may not be able to refer to these roads again exceptincidentally, and will, therefore, record here that the location ofthis branch afterward was changed from the Republican to the SmokyHill Fork of the Kansas River, and is now the main line to Denver. The Union and Central Railroads from the beginning were pushed witha skill, vigor, and courage which always commanded my admiration, the two meeting at Promontory Point, Utah, July 15, 1869, and in myjudgment constitute one of the greatest and most beneficentachievements of man on earth. 

The construction of the Union Pacific Railroad was deemed soimportant that the President, at my suggestion, constituted on the5th of March, 1866, the new Department of the Platte, General P. St. George Cooke commanding, succeeded by General C. C. Augur, headquarters at Omaha, with orders to give ample protection to theworking-parties, and to afford every possible assistance in theconstruction of the road; and subsequently in like manner theDepartment of Dakota was constituted, General A. H. Terrycommanding, with headquarters at St. Paul, to give similarprotection and encouragement to the Northern Pacific Railroad. These departments, with changed commanders, have continued up tothe present day, and have fulfilled perfectly the uses for whichthey were designed. 

During the years 1865 and 1866 the great plains remained almost ina state of nature, being the pasture-fields of about ten millionbuffalo, deer, elk, and antelope, and were in full possession ofthe Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and Kiowas, a race of boldIndians, who saw plainly that the construction of two parallelrailroads right through their country would prove destructive tothe game on which they subsisted, and consequently fatal tothemselves. 

The troops were posted to the best advantage to protect the partiesengaged in building these roads, and in person I reconnoitred wellto the front, traversing the buffalo regions from south to north, and from east to west, often with a very small escort, minglingwith the Indians whenever safe, and thereby gained personalknowledge of matters which enabled me to use the troops to the bestadvantage. I am sure that without the courage and activity of thedepartment commanders with the small bodies of regular troops onthe plains during the years 1866-'69, the Pacific Railroads couldnot have been built; but once built and in full operation the fateof the buffalo and Indian was settled for all time to come. 

At the close of the civil war there were one million five hundredand sixteen names on the muster-rolls, of which seven hundred andninety-seven thousand eight hundred and seven were present, and twohundred and two thousand seven hundred and nine absent, of whichtwenty-two thousand nine hundred and twenty-nine were regulars, theothers were volunteers, colored troops, and veteran reserves. Theregulars consisted of six regiments of cavalry, five of artillery, and nineteen of infantry. By the act of July 28, 1866, the peaceestablishment was fixed at one general (Grant), one lieutenant-general (Sherman), five major-generals (Halleck, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas, and Hancock), ten brigadiers (McDowell, Cooke, Pope, Hooker, Schofield, Howard, Terry, Ord, Canby, and Rousseau), tenregiments of cavalry, five of artillery, and forty-five ofinfantry, admitting of an aggregate force of fifty-four thousandsix hundred and forty-one men. 

All others were mustered out, and thus were remanded to their homesnearly a million of strong, vigorous men who had imbibed thesomewhat erratic habits of the soldier; these were of everyprofession and trade in life, who, on regaining their homes, foundtheir places occupied by others, that their friends and neighborswere different, and that they themselves had changed. Theynaturally looked for new homes to the great West, to the newTerritories and States as far as the Pacific coast, and we realizeto-day that the vigorous men who control Kansas, Nebraska, Dakota, Montana, Colorado, etc. , etc. , were soldiers of the civil war. These men flocked to the plains, and were rather stimulated thanretarded by the danger of an Indian war. This was another potentagency in producing the result we enjoy to-day, in having in soshort a time replaced the wild buffaloes by more numerous herds oftame cattle, and by substituting for the useless Indians theintelligent owners of productive farms and cattle-ranches. 

While these great changes were being wrought at the West, in theEast politics had resumed full sway, and all the methods ofanti-war times had been renewed. President Johnson had differedwith his party as to the best method of reconstructing the Stategovernments of the South, which had been destroyed and impoverishedby the war, and the press began to agitate the question of the nextPresident. Of course, all Union men naturally turned to GeneralGrant, and the result was jealousy of him by the personal friendsof President Johnson and some of his cabinet. Mr. Johnson alwaysseemed very patriotic and friendly, and I believed him honest andsincere in his declared purpose to follow strictly the Constitutionof the United States in restoring the Southern States to theirnormal place in the Union; but the same cordial friendshipsubsisted between General Grant and myself, which was the outgrowthof personal relations dating back to 1839. So I resolved to keepout of this conflict. In September, 1866, I was in the mountainsof New Mexico, when a message reached me that I was wanted atWashington. I had with me a couple of officers and half a dozensoldiers as escort, and traveled down the Arkansas, through theKiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, all more or lessdisaffected, but reached St. Louis in safety, and proceeded toWashington, where I reported to General Grant. 

He explained to me that President Johnson wanted to see me. He didnot know the why or wherefore, but supposed it had some connectionwith an order he (General Grant) had received to escort the newlyappointed Minister, Hon. Lew Campbell, of Ohio, to the court ofJuarez, the President-elect of Mexico, which country was still inpossession of the Emperor Maximilian, supported by a corps ofFrench troops commanded by General Bazaine. General Grant deniedthe right of the President to order him on a diplomatic missionunattended by troops; said that he had thought the matter over, world disobey the order, and stand the consequences. He manifestedmuch feeling; and said it was a plot to get rid of him. I thenwent to President Johnson, who treated me with great cordiality, and said that he was very glad I had come; that General Grant wasabout to go to Mexico on business of importance, and he wanted meat Washington to command the army in General Grant's absence. Ithen informed him that General Grant would not go, and he seemedamazed; said that it was generally understood that General Grantconstrued the occupation of the territories of our neighbor, Mexico, by French troops, and the establishment of an empiretherein, with an Austrian prince at its head, as hostile torepublican America, and that the Administration had arranged withthe French Government for the withdrawal of Bazaine's troops, whichwould leave the country free for the President-elect Juarez toreoccupy the city of Mexico, etc. , etc. ; that Mr. Campbell had beenaccredited to Juarez, and the fact that he was accompanied by sodistinguished a soldier as General Grant would emphasize the act ofthe United States. I simply reiterated that General Grant wouldnot go, and that he, Mr. Johnson, could not afford to quarrel withhim at that time. I further argued that General Grant was at themoment engaged on the most delicate and difficult task ofreorganizing the army under the act of July 28, 1866; that if thereal object was to put Mr. Campbell in official communication withPresident Juarez, supposed to be at El Paso or Monterey, eitherGeneral Hancock, whose command embraced New Mexico, or GeneralSheridan, whose command included Texas, could fulfill the objectperfectly; or, in the event of neither of these alternates provingsatisfactory to the Secretary of State, that I could be easierspared than General Grant. "Certainly, " answered the President, "if you will go, that will answer perfectly. "

The instructions of the Secretary of State, W. H. Seward, to Hon. Lewis D. Campbell, Minister to Mexico, dated October 25, 1866; aletter from President Johnson to Secretary of War Stanton, datedOctober 26, 1866; and the letter of Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary ofWar, to General Grant, dated October 27th, had been alreadyprepared and printed, and the originals or copies were furnishedme; but on the 30th of October, 1866, the following letter passed

EXECUTIVE MANSION

WASHINGTON, D. C. , October 30, 1866. 

SIR: General Ulysses S. Grant having found it inconvenient toassume the duties specified in my letter to you of the 26th inst. , you will please relieve him, and assign them in all respects toWilliam T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General of the Army of the UnitedStates. By way of guiding General Sherman in the performance ofhis duties, you will furnish him with a copy of your special ordersto General Grant made in compliance with my letter of the 26thinst. , together with a copy of the instructions of the Secretary ofState to Lewis D. Campbell, Esq. , therein mentioned. 

The lieutenant-general will proceed to the execution of his dutieswithout delay. 

Very respectfully yours, ANDREW JOHNSONTo the Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War. 

At the Navy Department I learned that the United States shipSusquehanna, Captain Alden, was fitting out in New York for the useof this mission, and that there would be time for me to return toSt. Louis to make arrangements for a prolonged absence, as also tocommunicate with Mr. Campbell, who was still at his home inHamilton, Ohio. By correspondence we agreed to meet in New York, November 8th, he accompanied by Mr. Plumb, secretary of legation, and I by my aide, Colonel Audenried. 

We embarked November 10th, and went to sea next day, making forHavana and Vera Cruz, and, as soon as we were outside of SandyHook, I explained to Captain Alden that my mission was ended, because I believed by substituting myself for General Grant I hadprevented a serious quarrel between him and the Administration, which was unnecessary. We reached Havana on the 18th, with nothingto vary the monotony of an ordinary sea-voyage, except off Hatteraswe picked up one woman and twenty men from open boats, who had justabandoned a propeller bound from Baltimore to Charleston whichfoundered. The sea was very rough, but by the personal skill andsupervision of Captain Alden every soul reached our deck safely, and was carried to our consul at Havana. At Havana we were veryhandsomely entertained, especially by Senor Aldama, who took us byrail to his sugar-estates at Santa Ross, and back by Matanzas. 

We took our departure thence on the 25th, and anchored under IslaVerde, off Vera Cruz, on the 29th. 

Everything about Vera Cruz indicated the purpose of the French towithdraw, and also that the Emperor Maximilian would precede them, for the Austrian frigate Dandolo was in port, and an Austrian bark, on which were received, according to the report of our consul, Mr. Lane, as many as eleven hundred packages of private furniture to betransferred to Miramar, Maximilian's home; and Lieutenant Clarin, of the French navy, who visited the Susquehanna from the Frenchcommodore, Clouet, told me, without reserve, that, if we haddelayed eight days more, we would have found Maximilian gone. General Bazaine was reported to be in the city of Mexico with abouttwenty-eight thousand French troops; but instead of leaving Mexicoin three detachments, viz. , November, 1866, March, 1867, andNovember, 1867, as described in Mr. Seward's letter to Mr. Campbell, of October 25, 1866, it looked to me that, as a soldier, he would evacuate at some time before November, 1867, all at once, and not by detachments. Lieutenant Clarin telegraphed Bazaine atthe city of Mexico the fact of our arrival, and he sent me a mostcourteous and pressing invitation to come up to the city; but, aswe were accredited to the government of Juarez, it was consideredundiplomatic to establish friendly relations with the existingauthorities. Meantime we could not hear a word of Juarez, andconcluded to search for him along the coast northward. When I wasin Versailles, France, July, 1872, learning that General Bazainewas in arrest for the surrender of his army and post at Metz, in1870, I wanted to call on him to thank him for his courteousinvitation to me at Vera Cruz in 1866. I inquired of PresidentThiera if I could with propriety call on the marshal. He answeredthat it would be very acceptable, no doubt, but suggested forform's sake that I should consult the Minister of War, General deCissey, which I did, and he promptly assented. Accordingly, Icalled with my aide, Colonel Audenried, on Marshal Bazaine, whooccupied a small, two-story stone house at Versailles, in aninclosure with a high garden wall, at the front gate or door ofwhich was a lodge, in which was a military guard. We were shown toa good room on the second floor, where was seated the marshal inmilitary half-dress, with large head, full face, short neck, andevidently a man of strong physique. He did not speak English, butspoke Spanish perfectly. We managed to carry on a conversation inwhich I endeavored to convey my sense of his politeness in invitingme so cordially up to the city of Mexico, and my regret that thepeculiar duty on which I was engaged did not admit of a compliance, or even of an intelligent explanation, at the time. He spoke ofthe whole Mexican business as a "sad affair, " that the empirenecessarily fell with the result of our civil war, and that poorMaximilian was sacrificed to his own high sense of honor. 

While on board the Susquehanna, on the 1st day of December, 1866, we received the proclamation made by the Emperor Maximilian atOrizaba, in which, notwithstanding the near withdrawal of theFrench troops, he declared his purpose to remain and "shed the lastdrop of his blood in defense of his dear country. " Undoubtedlymany of the most substantial people of Mexico, having lost allfaith in the stability of the native government, had committedthemselves to what they considered the more stable government ofMaximilian, and Maximilian, a man of honor, concluded at the lastmoment he could not abandon them; the consequence was his death. 

Failing to hear of Juarez, we steamed up the coast to the Island ofLobos, and on to Tampico, off which we found the United Statessteamer Paul Jones, which, drawing less water than the Susquehanna, carried us over the bar to the city, then in possession of theLiberal party, which recognized Juarez as their constitutionalPresident, but of Juarez and his whereabout we could hear not aword; so we continued up the coast and anchored off BrazosSantiago, December 7th. Going ashore in small boats, we found arailroad, under the management of General J. R. West, now one ofthe commissioners of the city of Washington, who sent us up toBrownsville, Texas. We met on the way General Sheridan, returningfrom a tour of inspection of the Rio Grande frontier. On Sunday, December 9th, we were all at Matamoras, Mexico, where we metGeneral Escobedo, one of Juarez's trusty lieutenants, who developedto us the general plan agreed on for the overthrow of the empire, and the reestablishment of the republican government of Mexico. Heasked of us no assistance, except the loan of some arms, ammunition, clothing, and camp-equipage. It was agreed that Mr. Campbell should, as soon as he could get his baggage off theSusquehanna, return to Matamoras, and thence proceed to Monterey, to be received by Juarez in person as, the accredited Minister ofthe United States to the Republic of Mexico. Meantime the weatheroff the coast was stormy, and the Susquehanna parted a cable, sothat we were delayed some days at Brazos; but in due time Mr. Campbell got his baggage, and we regained the deck of theSusquehanna, which got up steam and started for New Orleans. Wereached New Orleans December 20th, whence I reported fullyeverything to General Grant, and on the 21st received the followingdispatch:

WASHINGTON, December 21, 1866. Lieutenant-General SHERMAN, New Orleans. 

Your telegram of yesterday has been submitted to the President. You are authorized to proceed to St. Louis at your convenience. Your proceedings in the special and delicate duties assigned youare cordially approved by the President and Cabinet and thisdepartment. EDWIN M. STANTON. 

And on the same day I received this dispatch

GALVESTON, December 21, 1866. To General SHERMAN, or General SHERIDAN. 

Will be in New Orleans to-morrow. Wish to see you both on arrival, on matters of importance. LEWIS D. CAMPBELL, Minister to Mexico. 

Mr. Campbell arrived on the 22d, but had nothing to tell of theleast importance, save that he was generally disgusted with thewhole thing, and had not found Juarez at all. I am sure this wholemovement was got up for the purpose of getting General Grant awayfrom Washington, on the pretext of his known antagonism to theFrench occupation of Mexico, because he was looming up as acandidate for President, and nobody understood the animus andpurpose better than did Mr. Stanton. He himself was not then ongood terms with President Johnson, and with several of hisassociates in the Cabinet. By Christmas I was back in St. Louis. 

By this time the conflict between President Johnson and Congresshad become open and unconcealed. Congress passed the bill known asthe "Tenure of Civil Office" on the 2d of March, 1867 (over thePresident's veto), the first clause of which, now section 1767 ofthe Revised Statutes, reads thus: "Every person who holds any civiloffice to which he has been or hereafter may be appointed, by andwith the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall havebecome duly qualified to act therein, shall be entitled to holdsuch office during the term for which he was appointed, unlesssooner removed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, orby the appointment with the like advice and consent of a successorin his place, except as herein otherwise provided. "

General E. D. Townsend, in his "Anecdotes of the Civil War, " statestersely and correctly the preliminary circumstances of which I musttreat. He says: "On Monday morning, August 5, 1867, PresidentJohnson invited Mr. Stanton to resign as Secretary of War. Underthe tenure-of-civil-office law, Mr. Stanton declined. The Presidenta week after suspended him, and appointed General Grant, General-in-Chief of the Army, to exercise the functions. This continueduntil January 13, 1868, when according to the law the Senate passeda resolution not sustaining the President's action. The nextmorning General Grant came to my office and handed me the key ofthe Secretary's room, saying: 'I am to be found over at my officeat army headquarters. I was served with a copy of the Senateresolution last evening. ' I then went up-stairs and delivered thekey of his room to Mr. Stanton. "

The mode and manner of Mr. Stanton's regaining his office, and ofGeneral Grant's surrendering it, were at the time subjects ofbitter controversy. Unhappily I was involved, and must beartestimony. In all January, 1868, I was a member of a board orderedto compile a code of articles of war and army regulations, of whichMajor-General Sheridan and Brigadier-General C. C. Augur wereassociate members. Our place of meeting was in the room of the oldWar Department, second floor, next to the corner room occupied bythe Secretary of War, with a door of communication. While we wereat work it was common for General Grant and, afterward, for Mr. Stanton to drop in and chat with us on the social gossip of thetime. 

On Saturday, January 11th, General Grant said that he had morecarefully read the law (tenure of civil office), and it wasdifferent from what he had supposed; that in case the Senate didnot consent to the removal of Secretary of War Stanton, and he(Grant) should hold on, he should incur a liability of ten thousanddollars and five years' imprisonment. We all expected theresolution of Senator Howard, of Michigan, virtually restoring Mr. Stanton to his office, would pass the Senate, and knowing that thePresident expected General Grant to hold on, I inquired if he hadgiven notice of his change of purpose; he answered that there wasno hurry, because he supposed Mr. Stanton would pursue toward him(Grant) the same course which he (Stanton) had required of him thepreceding August, viz. , would address him a letter claiming theoffice, and allow him a couple of days for the change. Still, hesaid he would go to the White House the same day and notify thePresident of his intended action. 

That afternoon I went over to the White House to present GeneralPope, who was on a visit to Washington, and we found the Presidentand General Grant together. We made our visit and withdrew, leaving them still together, and I always supposed the subject ofthis conference was the expected decision of the Senate, whichwould in effect restore Mr. Stanton to his civil office ofSecretary of War. That evening I dined with the Hon. ReverdyJohnson, Senator from Maryland, and suggested to him that the bestway to escape a conflict was for the President to nominate somegood man as Secretary of War whose confirmation by the Senate wouldfall within the provisions of the law, and named General J. D. Cox, then Governor of Ohio, whose term of office was drawing to a close, who would, I knew, be acceptable to General Grant and the armygenerally. Mr. Johnson was most favorably impressed with thissuggestion, and promised to call on the President the next day(Sunday), which he did, but President Johnson had made up his mindto meet the conflict boldly. I saw General Grant that afternoon athis house on I Street, and told him what I had done, and so anxiouswas he about it that he came to our room at the War Department thenext morning (Monday), the 13th, and asked me to go in person tothe White House to urge the President to send in the name ofGeneral Cox. I did so, saw the President, and inquired if he hadseen Mr. Reverdy Johnson the day before about General Cox. Heanswered that he had, and thought well of General Cox, but wouldsay no further. 

Tuesday, January 14, 1868, came, and with it Mr. Stanton. Heresumed possession of his former office; came into that whereGeneral Sheridan, General Augur, and I were at work, and greeted usvery cordially. He said he wanted to see me when at leisure, andat half-past 10 A. M. I went into his office and found him andGeneral Grant together. Supposing they had some special matters ofbusiness, I withdrew, with the remark that I was close at hand, andcould come in at any moment. In the afternoon I went again intoMr. Stanton's office, and we had a long and most friendlyconversation; but not one word was spoken about the"tenure-of-office" matter. I then crossed over Seventeenth Streetto the headquarters of the army, where I found General Grant, whoexpressed himself as by no means pleased with the manner in whichMr. Stanton had regained his office, saying that he had sent amessenger for him that morning as of old, with word that "he wantedto see him. " We then arranged to meet at his office the nextmorning at half-past nine, and go together to see the President. 

That morning the National Intelligencer published an articleaccusing General Grant of acting in bad faith to the President, andof having prevaricated in making his personal explanation to theCabinet, so that General Grant at first felt unwilling to go, butwe went. The President received us promptly and kindly. Beingseated, General Grant said, "Mr. President, whoever gave the factsfor the article of the Intelligencer of this morning has made someserious mistakes. " The President: "General Grant, let me interruptyou just there. I have not seen the Intelligencer of this morning, and have no knowledge of the contents of any article therein"General Grant then went on: "Well, the idea is given there that Ihave not kept faith with you. Now, Mr. President, I remember, whenyou spoke to me on this subject last summer, I did say that, likethe case of the Baltimore police commissioners, I did suppose Mr. Stanton could not regain his office except by a process through thecourts. " To this the President assented, saying he "remembered thereference to the case of the Baltimore commissioners, " when GeneralGrant resumed: "I said if I changed my opinion I would give younotice, and put things as they were before my appointment asSecretary of War ad interim. "

We then entered into a general friendly conversation, both partiesprofessing to be satisfied, the President claiming that he hadalways been most friendly to General Grant, and the latterinsisting that he had taken the office, not for honor or profit, but in the general interests of the army. 

As we withdrew, at the very door, General Grant said, "Mr. President, you should make some order that we of the army are notbound to obey the orders of Mr. Stanton as Secretary of War, " whichthe President intimated he would do. 

No such "orders" were ever made; many conferences were held, andthe following letters are selected out of a great mass to show thegeneral feeling at the time:

1321 K STREET, WASHINGTON, January 28, 1868, Saturday. 

To the President:

I neglected this morning to say that I had agreed to go down toAnnapolis to spend Sunday with Admiral Porter. General Grant alsohas to leave for Richmond on Monday morning at 6 A. M. 

At a conversation with the General after our interview, wherein Ioffered to go with him on Monday morning to Mr. Stanton, and to saythat it was our joint opinion be should resign, it was foundimpossible by reason of his (General Grant) going to Richmond andmy going to Annapolis. The General proposed this course: He willcall on you to-morrow, and offer to go to Mr. Stanton to say, forthe good of the Army and of the country, he ought to resign. Thison Sunday. On Monday I will again call on you, and, if you thinkit necessary, I will do the same, viz. , go to Mr. Stanton and tellhim he should resign. 

If he will not, then it will be time to contrive ulterior measures. In the mean time it so happens that no necessity exists forprecipitating matters. Yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

DEAR GENERAL: On the point of starting, I have written the above, and will send a fair copy of it to the President. Please retainthis, that in case of necessity I may have a copy. The Presidentclearly stated to me that he relied on us in this category. 

Think of the propriety of your putting in writing what you have tosay tomorrow, even if you have to put it in the form of a letter tohand him in person, retaining a copy. I'm afraid that acting as ago-between for three persons, I may share the usual fate ofmeddlers, at last get kinks from all. We ought not to be involvedin politics, but for the sake of the Army we are justified intrying at least to cut this Gordian knot, which they do not appearto have any practicable plan to do. In haste as usual, W. T. SHERMAN. 

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, January 29, 1888. 

DEAR SHERMAN: I called on the President and Mr. Stanton to-day, butwithout any effect. 

I soon found that to recommend resignation to Mr. Stanton wouldhave no effect, unless it was to incur further his displeasure;and, therefore, did not directly suggest it to him. I explained tohim, however, the course I supposed he would pursue, and what Iexpected to do in that case, namely, to notify the President of hisintentions, and thus leave him to violate the "Tenure-of-OfficeBill" if he chose, instead of having me do it. 

I would advise that you say nothing to Mr. Stanton on the subjectunless he asks your advice. It will do no good, and may embarrassyou. I did not mention your name to him, at least not inconnection with his position, or what you thought upon it. 

All that Mr. Johnson said was pacific and compromising. While Ithink he wanted the constitutionality of the "Tenure Bill" tested, I think now he would be glad either to get the vacancy of Secretaryof War, or have the office just where it was during suspension. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT. 

WASHINGTON D. C. , January 27, 1868. 

To the President. 

DEAR SIR: As I promised, I saw Mr. Ewing yesterday, and after along conversation asked him to put down his opinion in writing, which he has done and which I now inclose. 

I am now at work on these Army Regulations, and in the course ofpreparation have laid down the Constitution and laws now in force, clearer than I find them elsewhere; and beg leave herewith toinclose you three pages of printed matter for your perusal. Myopinion is, if you will adopt these rules and make them anexecutive order to General Grant, they will so clearly define theduties of all concerned that no conflict can arise. I hope to getthrough this task in the course of this week, and want very much togo to St. Louis. For eleven years I have been tossed about so muchthat I really do want to rest, study, and make the acquaintance ofmy family. I do not think, since 1857, I have averaged thirty daysout of three hundred and sixty-five at home. 

Next summer also, in fulfillment of our promise to the Sioux, Imust go to Fort Phil Kearney early in the spring, so that, unless Ican spend the next two months at home, I might as well break up myhouse at St. Louis, and give up all prospect of taking care of myfamily. 

For these reasons especially I shall soon ask leave to go to St. Louis, to resume my proper and legitimate command. With greatrespect, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

[Inclosure]

WASHINGTON, D. C. , January 25, 1868. 

MY DEAR GENERAL: I am quite clear in the opinion that it is notexpedient for the President to take any action now in the case ofStanton. So far as he and his interests are concerned, things arein the best possible condition. Stanton is in the Department, gothis secretary, but the secretary of the Senate, who have taken uponthemselves his sins, and who place him there under a large salaryto annoy and obstruct the operations of the Executive. This thepeople well enough understand, and he is a stench in the nostrilsof their own party. 

I thought the nomination of Cox at the proper juncture would havebeen wise as a peace-offering, but perhaps it would have let offthe Senate too easily from the effect of their arbitrary act. Nowthe dislodging of Stanton and filling the office even temporarilywithout the consent of the Senate would raise a question as to thelegality of the President's acts, and he would belong to theattacked instead of the attacking party. If the war betweenCongress and the President is to go on, as I suppose it is, Stantonshould be ignored by the President, left to perform his clericalduties which the law requires him to perform, and let the partybear the odium which is already upon them for placing him where heis. So much for the President. 

As to yourself, I wish you as far as possible to keep clear ofpolitical complications. I do not think the President will requireyou to do an act of doubtful legality. Certainly he will notwithout sanction of the opinion of his Attorney-General; and youshould have time, in a questionable case, to consult with me beforecalled upon to act. The office of Secretary of War is a civiloffice, as completely so as that of Secretary of State; and you asa military officer cannot, I think, be required to assume orexercise it. This may, if necessary, be a subject for furtherconsideration. Such, however, will not, I think, be the case. The appeal is to the people, and it is better for the President topersist in the course he has for some time pursued--let theaggressions all come from the other side; and I think there is nodoubt he will do so. Affectionately, T. EWING. 

To--Lieutenant-General SHERMAN. 

LIBRARY ROOM, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C. , January 31, 1868. 

To the President:

Since our interview of yesterday I have given the subject of ourconversation all my thoughts, and I beg you will pardon my reducingthe same to writing. 

My personal preferences, as expressed, were to be allowed to returnto St. Louis to resume my present command, because my command wasimportant, large, suited to my rank and inclination, and because myfamily was well provided for there in house, facilities, schools, living, and agreeable society; while, on the other hand, Washingtonwas for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable, especiallybecause it is the political capital of the country; and focus ofintrigue, gossip, and slander. Your personal preferences were, asexpressed, to make a new department East, adequate to my rank, withheadquarters at Washington, and assign me to its command, to removemy family here, and to avail myself of its schools, etc. ; to removeMr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me todischarge the duties. 

To effect this removal two modes were indicated: to simply causehim to quit the War-Office Building, and notify the TreasuryDepartment and the Army Staff Departments no longer to respect himas Secretary of War; or to remove him and submit my name to theSenate for confirmation. 

Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise bysaying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have noteven seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery, or General Grant, since I waswith you. 

It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organizationof the government, that the second officer of the army should be atthe second (in importance) command, and remote from generalheadquarters. To bring me to Washington world put three heads toan army, yourself, General Grant, and myself, and we would be morethan human if we were not to differ. In my judgment it world ruinthe army, and would be fatal to one or two of us. 

Generals Scott and Taylor proved themselves soldiers and patriotsin the field, but Washington was fatal to both. This city, and theinfluences that centre here, defeated every army that had itsheadquarters here from 1861 to 1864, and would have overwhelmedGeneral Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not beenfortified by a strong reputation, already hard-earned, and becauseno one then living coveted the place; whereas, in the West, we madeprogress from the start, because there was no political capitalnear enough to poison our minds, and kindle into life that craving, itching for fame which has killed more good men than bullets. Ihave been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughterwhen the howls of people reached him after Shiloh; when messengerswere speeding to and from his army to Washington, bearing slanders, to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga, when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules tosatisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the"forlorn hope" to command the Army of the Potomac, so oftendefeated--and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he hasbeen in Washington, and been compelled to read himself a "sneak anddeceiver, " based on reports of four of the Cabinet, and apparentlywith your knowledge. If this political atmosphere can disturb theequanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will bethe result with me, so careless, so outspoken as I am? Therefore, with my consent, Washington never. 

As to the Secretary of War, his office is twofold. As a Cabinetofficer he should not be there without your hearty, cheerfulassent, and I believe that is the judgment and opinion of everyfair-minded man. As the holder of a civil office, having thesupervision of moneys appropriated by Congress and of contracts forarmy supplies, I do think Congress, or the Senate by delegationfrom Congress, has a lawful right to be consulted. At all events, I would not risk a suit or contest on that phase of the question. The law of Congress, of March 2, 1867, prescribing the manner inwhich orders and instructions relating to "military movements"shall reach the army, gives you as constitutional Commander-in-Chief the very power you want to exercise, and enables you toprevent the Secretary from making any such orders and instructions;and consequently he cannot control the army, but is limited andrestricted to a duty that an Auditor of the Treasury could perform. You certainly can afford to await the result. The Executive poweris not weakened, but rather strengthened. Surely he is not such anobstruction as would warrant violence, or even s show of force, which would produce the very reaction and clamor that he hopes forto save him from the absurdity of holding an empty office "for thesafety of the country. "

This is so much as I ought to say, and more too, but if it producesthe result I will be more than satisfied, viz. , that I be simplyallowed to resume my proper post and duties in St. Louis. Withgreat respect, yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

On the 1st of February, the board of which I was the presidentsubmitted to the adjutant-general our draft of the "Articles of Warand Army Regulations, " condensed to a small compass, the result ofour war experience. But they did not suit the powers that were, and have ever since slept the sleep that knows no waking, to makeroom for the ponderous document now in vogue, which will not standthe strain of a week's campaign in real war. 

I hurried back to St. Louis to escape the political storm I sawbrewing. The President repeatedly said to me that he wanted me inWashington, and I as often answered that nothing could tempt me tolive in that center of intrigue and excitement; but soon came thefollowing:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, February 10, 1868. 

DEAR GENERAL: I have received at last the President's reply to mylast, letter. He attempts to substantiate his statements by hisCabinet. In this view it is important that I should have a letterfrom you, if you are willing to give it, of what I said to youabout the effect of the "Tenure-of-Office Bill, " and my object ingoing to see the President on Saturday before the installment ofMr. Stanton. What occurred after the meeting of the Cabinet on theTuesday following is not a subject under controversy now;therefore, if you choose to write down your recollection (and Iwould like to have it) on Wednesday, when you and I called on thePresident, and your conversation with him the last time you sawhim, make that a separate communication. 

Your order to come East was received several days ago, but thePresident withdrew it, I supposed to make some alteration, but ithas not been returned. Yours truly, U. S. GRANT. 

[TELEGRAM. ]

WASHINGTON, D. C. , February 18, 1868. 

Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis. 

The order is issued ordering you to Atlantic Division. 

U. S. GRANT, General. 

[TELEGRAM]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Louis, February 14, 1868. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

Your dispatch is received informing me that the order for theAtlantic Division has been issued, and that I am assigned to itscommand. I was in hopes I had escaped the danger, and now were Iprepared I should resign on the spot, as it requires no foresightto predict such must be the inevitable result in the end. I willmake one more desperate effort by mail, which please await. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

[TELEGRAM. ]

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1868. Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis. 

I think it due to you that your letter of January 31st to thePresident of the United States should be published, to correctmisapprehension in the public mind about your willingness to cometo Washington. It will not be published against your will. 

(Sent in cipher. )

[TELEGRAM. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

Dispatch of to-day received. Please await a letter I address thisday through you to the President, which will in due time reach thepublic, covering the very point you make. 

I don't want to come to Washington at all. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

[TELEGRAM. ]

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Loins, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868. 

Hon. John SHERMAN, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 

Oppose confirmation of myself as brevet general, on ground that itis unprecedented, and that it is better not to extend the system ofbrevets above major-general. If I can't avoid coming toWashington, I may have to resign. 

W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C. , February 12, 1868. 

The following orders are published for the information and guidanceof all concerned:

U. S. GRANT, General. 

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, D. C. , February 12, 1868. 

GENERAL: You will please issue an order creating a militarydivision to be styled the Military Division of the Atlantic, to becomposed of the Department of the Lakes, the Department of theEast, and the Department of Washington, to be commanded byLieutenant-General W. T. Sherman, with his headquarters atWashington. Until further orders from the President, you willassign no officer to the permanent command of the Military Divisionof the Missouri. 

Respectfully yours, ANDREW JOHNSON. 

GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commanding Armies of The United States, Washington, D. C. 

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, the senior officer in the MilitaryDivision of the Missouri, will temporarily perform the duties ofcommander of the Military Division of the Missouri in addition tohis duties of department commander. By command of General Grant:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

This order, if carried into effect, would have grouped inWashington:

1. The President, constitutional Commander-in-Chief. 

2. The Secretary of War, congressional Commander-in-Chief. 

3. The General of the Armies of the United States. 

4. The Lieutenant-General of the Army. 

5. The Commanding General of the Department of Washington. 

6. The commander of the post-of Washington. 

At that date the garrison of Washington was a brigade of infantryand a battery of artillery. I never doubted Mr. Johnson'ssincerity in wishing to befriend me, but this was the broadest kindof a farce, or meant mischief. I therefore appealed to him byletter to allow me to remain where I was, and where I could doservice, real service, and received his most satisfactory answer. 

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, St. Louis, MISSOURI, February 14, 1868. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

DEAR GENERAL: Last evening, just before leaving my office, Ireceived your note of the 10th, and had intended answering itaccording to your request; but, after I got home, I got yourdispatch of yesterday, announcing that the order I dreaded so muchwas issued. I never felt so troubled in my life. Were it an orderto go to Sitka, to the devil, to battle with rebels or Indians, Ithink you would not hear a whimper from me, but it comes in such aquestionable form that, like Hamlet's ghost, it curdles my bloodand mars my judgment. My first thoughts were of resignation, and Ihad almost made up my mind to ask Dodge for some place on thePacific road, or on one of the Iowa roads, and then again variouscolleges ran through my memory, but hard times and an expensivefamily have brought me back to staring the proposition square inthe face, and I have just written a letter to the President, whichI herewith transmit through you, on which I will hang a hope ofrespite till you telegraph me its effect. The uncertainties aheadare too great to warrant my incurring the expense of breaking up myhouse and family here, and therefore in no event will I do thistill I can be assured of some permanence elsewhere. If it were atall certain that you would accept the nomination of President inMay, I would try and kill the intervening time, and then judge ofthe chances, but I do not want you to reveal your plans to me tillyou choose to do so. 

I have telegraphed to John Sherman to oppose the nomination whichthe papers announce has been made of me for brevet general. 

I have this minute received your cipher dispatch of to-day, which Ihave just answered and sent down to the telegraph-office, and theclerk is just engaged in copying my letter to the President to gowith this. If the President or his friends pretend that I seek togo to Washington, it will be fully rebutted by letters I havewritten to the President, to you, to John Sherman, to Mr. Ewing, and to Mr. Stanbery. You remember that in our last talk yousuggested I should write again to the President. I thought of it, and concluded my letter of January 31st, already delivered, wasfull and emphatic. Still, I did write again to Mr. Stanbery, asking him as a friend to interpose in my behalf. There are plentyof people who know my wishes, and I would avoid, if possible, thepublication of a letter so confidential as that of January 31st, inwhich I notice I allude to the President's purpose of removing Mr. Stanton by force, a fact that ought not to be drawn out through meif it be possible to avoid it. In the letter herewith I confinemyself to purely private matters, and will not object if it reachesthe public in any proper way. My opinion is, the President thinksMrs. Sherman would like to come to Washington by reason of herfather and brothers being there. This is true, for Mrs. Shermanhas an idea that St. Louis is unhealthy for our children, andbecause most of the Catholics here are tainted with the old seceshfeeling. But I know better what is to our common interest, andprefer to judge of the proprieties myself. What I do object to isthe false position I would occupy as between you and the President. Were there an actual army at or near Washington, I could bewithdrawn from the most unpleasant attitude of a "go-between, " butthere is no army there, nor any military duties which you with ahost of subordinates can not perform. Therefore I would be therewith naked, informal, and sinecure duties, and utterly out ofplace. This you understand well enough, and the army too, but thePresident and the politicians, who flatter themselves they aresaving the country, cannot and will not understand. My opinion is, the country is doctored to death, and if President and Congresswould go to sleep like Rip Van Winkle, the country would go onunder natural influences, and recover far faster than under theirjoint and several treatment. This doctrine would be accounted byCongress, and by the President too, as high treason, and thereforeI don't care about saying so to either of them, but I know you canhear anything, and give it just what thought or action it merits. 

Excuse this long letter, and telegraph me the result of my letterto the President as early as you can. If he holds my letter solong as to make it improper for me to await his answer, alsotelegraph me. 

The order, when received, will, I suppose, direct me as to whom andhow I am to turn over this command, which should, in my judgment, not be broken up, as the three departments composing the divisionshould be under one head. 

I expect my staff-officers to be making for me within the hour tolearn their fate, so advise me all you can as quick as possible. 

With great respect, yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

To the President. 

DEAR SIR: It is hard for me to conceive you would purposely do mean unkindness unless under the pressure of a sense of public duty, or because you do not believe me sincere. I was in hopes, since myletter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded topass over that purpose of yours expressed more than once inconversation--to organize a new command for me in the East, withheadquarters in Washington; but a telegram from General Grant ofyesterday says that "the order was issued ordering you" (me) "toAtlantic Division"; and the newspapers of this morning contain thesame information, with the addition that I have been nominated asbrevet general. I have telegraphed my own brother in the Senate tooppose my confirmation, on the ground that the two higher grades inthe army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust youwill conceive my motives aright. If I could see my way clear tomaintain my family, I should not hesitate a moment to resign mypresent commission, and seek some business wherein I would be freefrom these unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me, spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them; but necessity ties myhands, and I must submit with the best grace I can till I makeother arrangements. 

In Washington are already the headquarters of a department, and ofthe army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can rendermilitary service there. Any staff-officer with the rank of majorcould surely fill any gap left between these two military officers;and, by being placed in Washington, I will be universally construedas a rival to the General-in-Chief, a position damaging to me inthe highest degree. Our relations have always been mostconfidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud ofdifferences should arise between us, my sense of personal dignityand duty would leave me no alternative but resignation. For this Iam not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it asrapidly as possible, so that when the time does come (as it surelywill if this plan is carried into effect) I may act promptly. 

Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a fullrevocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at NewYork, or any point you may name within the new military divisionother than Washington. This privilege is generally granted to allmilitary commanders, and I see no good reason why I too may not askfor it, and this simple concession, involving no public interest, will much soften the blow, which, right or wrong, I construe as oneof the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered withadversity. With great respects yours truly, W. T. SHERMAN, Lieutenant-General. 

WASHINGTON, D. C. , 2 p. M. , February 19, 1888. Lieutenant-General W. T. SHERMAN, St. Louis, Missouri:

I have just received, with General Grant's indorsement ofreference, your letter to me of the fourteenth (14th) inst. 

The order to which you refer was made in good faith, and with aview to the best interests of the country and the service; as, however, your assignment to a new military division seems soobjectionable, you will retain your present command. 

ANDREW JOHNSON. 

On that same 19th of February he appointed Adjutant, GeneralLorenzo Thomas to be Secretary of War ad interim, which finallyresulted in the articles of impeachment and trial of PresidentJohnson before the Senate. I was a witness on that trial, but ofcourse the lawyers would not allow me to express any opinion of thePresident's motives or intentions, and restricted me to the factsset forth in the articles of impeachment, of which I was glad toknow nothing. The final test vote revealed less than two thirds, and the President was consequently acquitted. Mr. Stantonresigned. General Schofield, previously nominated, was confirmedas Secretary of War, thus putting an end to what ought never tohave happened at all. 

INDIAN PEACE COMMISSION. 

On the 20th of July, 1867, President Johnson approved an act toestablish peace with certain hostile Indian tribes, the firstsection of which reads as follows: "Be it enacted, etc. , that thePresident of the United States be and is hereby authorized toappoint a commission to consist of three (3) officers of the armynot below the rank of brigadier-general, who, together with N. G. Taylor, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John B. Henderson, chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs of the Senate, S. F. Tappan, and John B. Sanborn, shall have power and authority tocall together the chiefs and head men of such bands or tribes ofIndians as are now waging war against the United States, orcommitting depredations on the people thereof, to ascertain thealleged reasons for their acts of hostility, and in theirdiscretion, under the direction of the President, to make andconclude with said bands or tribes such treaty stipulations, subject to the action of the Senate, as may remove all just causesof complaint on their part, and at the same time establish securityfor person and property along the lines of railroad now beingconstructed to the Pacific and other thoroughfares of travel to theWestern Territories, and such as will most likely insurecivilization for the Indians, and peace and safety for the whites. "

The President named as the military members Lieutenant-GeneralSherman, Brigadier-Generals A. H. Terry and W. S. Harney. Subsequently, to insure a full attendance, Brigadier-General C. C. Augur was added to the commission, and his name will be found onmost of the treaties. The commissioners met at St. Louis andelected N. G. Taylor, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, president; J. B. Sanborn, treasurer; and A. S. H. White, Esq. , ofWashington, D. C. , secretary. The year 1867 was too far advancedto complete the task assigned during that season, and it was agreedthat a steamboat (St. John's) should be chartered to convey thecommission up the Missouri River, and we adjourned to meet atOmaha. In the St. John's the commission proceeded up the MissouriRiver, holding informal "talks" with the Santees at their agencynear the Niobrara, the Yanktonnais at Fort Thompson, and theOgallallas, Minneconjous, Sans Arcs, etc. , at Fort Sully. Fromthis point runners were sent out to the Sioux occupying the countrywest of the Missouri River, to meet us in council at the Forks ofthe Platte that fall, and to Sitting Bull's band of outlaw Sioux, and the Crows on the upper Yellowstone, to meet us in May, 1868, atFort Laramie. We proceeded up the river to the mouth of theCheyenne and turned back to Omaha, having ample time on thissteamboat to discuss and deliberate on the problems submitted toour charge. 

We all agreed that the nomad Indians should be removed from thevicinity of the two great railroads then in rapid construction, andbe localized on one or other of the two great reservations south ofKansas and north of Nebraska; that agreements not treaties, shouldbe made for their liberal maintenance as to food, clothing, schools, and farming implements for ten years, during which time webelieved that these Indians should become self-supporting. To thenorth we proposed to remove the various bands of Sioux, with suchothers as could be induced to locate near them; and to the south, on the Indian Territory already established, we proposed to removethe Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, and such others as wecould prevail on to move thither. 

At that date the Union Pacific construction had reached the RockyMountains at Cheyenne, and the Kansas Pacific to about FortWallace. We held council with the Ogallallas at the Forks of thePlatte, and arranged to meet them all the next spring, 1868. Inthe spring of 1868 we met the Crows in council at Fort Laramie, theSioux at the North Platte, the Shoshones or Snakes at Fort Hall, the Navajos at Fort Sumner, on the Pecos, and the Cheyennes andArapahoes at Medicine Lodge. To accomplish these results thecommission divided up into committees, General Augur going to theShoshones, Mr. Tappan and I to the Navajos, and the remainder toMedicine Lodge. In that year we made treaties or arrangements withall the tribes which before had followed the buffalo in theirannual migrations, and which brought them into constant conflictwith the whites. 

Mr. Tappan and I found it impossible to prevail on the Navajos toremove to the Indian Territory, and had to consent to their returnto their former home, restricted to a limited reservation west ofSanta Fe, about old Fort Defiance, and there they continue untothis day, rich in the possession of herds of sheep and goats, withsome cattle and horses; and they have remained at peace ever since. 

A part of our general plan was to organize the two greatreservations into regular Territorial governments, with Governor, Council, courts, and civil officers. General Harney wastemporarily assigned to that of the Sioux at the north, and GeneralHazen to that of the Kiowas, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, etc. , etc. , at the south, but the patronage of the Indian Bureau was toostrong for us, and that part of our labor failed. Still, theIndian Peace Commission of 1867-'68 did prepare the way for thegreat Pacific Railroads, which, for better or worse, have settledthe fate of the buffalo and Indian forever. There have been warsand conflicts since with these Indians up to a recent period toonumerous and complicated in their detail for me to unravel andrecord, but they have been the dying struggles of a singular raceof brave men fighting against destiny, each less and less violent, till now the wild game is gone, the whites too numerous andpowerful; so that the Indian question has become one of sentimentand charity, but not of war. 

The peace, or "Quaker" policy, of which so much has been said, originated about thus: By the act of Congress, approved March3, 1869, the forty-five regiments of infantry were reduced totwenty-five, and provision was made for the "muster out" of many ofthe surplus officers, and for retaining others to be absorbed bythe usual promotions and casualties. On the 7th of May of thatyear, by authority of an act of Congress approved June 30, 1834, nine field-officers and fifty-nine captains and subalterns weredetached and ordered to report to the Commissioner of IndianAffairs, to serve as Indian superintendents and agents. Thus by anold law surplus army officers were made to displace the usual civilappointees, undoubtedly a change for the better, but mostdistasteful to members of Congress, who looked to theseappointments as part of their proper patronage. The consequencewas the law of July 15, 1870, which vacated the military commissionof any officer who accepted or exercised the functions of a civilofficer. I was then told that certain politicians called onPresident Grant, informing him that this law was chiefly designedto prevent his using army officers for Indian agents, "civiloffices, " which he believed to be both judicious and wise; armyofficers, as a rule, being better qualified to deal with Indiansthan the average political appointees. The President then quietlyreplied: "Gentlemen, you have defeated my plan of Indianmanagement; but you shall not succeed in your purpose, for I willdivide these appointments up among the religious churches, withwhich you dare not contend. " The army officers were consequentlyrelieved of their "civil offices, " and the Indian agencies wereapportioned to the several religious churches in about theproportion of their--supposed strength--some to the Quakers, someto the Methodists, to the Catholics, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, etc. , etc. --and thus it remains to the present time, thesereligious communities selecting the agents to be appointed by theSecretary of the Interior. The Quakers, being first named, gavename to the policy, and it is called the "Quaker" policy to-day. Meantime railroads and settlements by hardy, bold pioneers havemade the character of Indian agents of small concern, and itmatters little who are the beneficiaries. 

As was clearly foreseen, General U. S. Grant was duly nominated, and on the 7th of November, 1868, was elected President of theUnited States for the four years beginning with March 4, 1869. 

On the 15th and 16th of December, 1868, the four societies of theArmies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, Ohio, and Georgia, held ajoint reunion at Chicago, at which were present over two thousandof the surviving officers and soldiers of the war. The ceremoniesconsisted of the joint meeting in Crosby's magnificent opera-house, at which General George H. Thomas presided. General W. W. Belknapwas the orator for the Army of the Tennessee, General Charles Cruftfor the Army of the Cumberland, General J. D. Cox for the Army ofthe Ohio, and General William Cogswell for the Army of Georgia. The banquet was held in the vast Chamber of Commerce, at which Ipresided. General Grant, President-elect, General J. M. Schofield, Secretary of War, General H. W. Slocum, and nearly every generalofficer of note was present except General Sheridan, who at themoment was fighting the Cheyennes in Southern Kansas and the Indiancountry. 

At that time we discussed the army changes which would necessarilyoccur in the following March, and it was generally understood thatI was to succeed General Grant as general-in-chief, but as to mysuccessor, Meade, Thomas, and Sheridan were candidates. And here Iwill remark that General Grant, afterward famous as the "silentman, " used to be very gossipy, and no one was ever more fond thanhe of telling anecdotes of our West Point and early army life. Atthe Chicago reunion he told me that I would have to come toWashington, that he wanted me to effect a change as to the generalstaff, which he had long contemplated, and which was outlined inhis letter to Mr. Stanton of January 29, 1866, given hereafter, which had been repeatedly published, and was well known to themilitary world; that on being inaugurated President on the 4th ofMarch he would retain General Schofield as his Secretary of Waruntil the change had become habitual; that the modern custom of theSecretary of War giving military orders to the adjutant-general andother staff officers was positively wrong and should be stopped. Speaking of General Grant's personal characteristics at that periodof his life, I recall a conversation in his carriage, when, ridingdown Pennsylvania Avenue, he, inquired of me in a humorous way, "Sherman, what special hobby do you intend to adopt?" I inquiredwhat he meant, and he explained that all men had their specialweakness or vanity, and that it was wiser to choose one's own thanto leave the newspapers to affix one less acceptable, and that forhis part he had chosen the "horse, " so that when anyone tried topump him he would turn the conversation to his "horse. " I answeredthat I would stick to the "theatre and balls, " for I was alwaysfond of seeing young people happy, and did actually acquire areputation for "dancing, " though I had not attempted the waltz, oranything more than the ordinary cotillon, since the war. 

On the 24th of February, 1869, I was summoned to Washington, arriving on the 26th, taking along my aides, Lieutenant-ColonelsDayton and Audenried. 

On the 4th of March General Grant was duly inaugurated President ofthe United States, and I was nominated and confirmed as General ofthe Army. 

Major-General P. H. Sheridan was at the same time nominated andconfirmed as lieutenant-general, with orders to command theMilitary Division of the Missouri, which he did, moving theheadquarters from St. Louis to Chicago; and General Meade wasassigned to command the Military Division of the Atlantic, withheadquarters at Philadelphia. 

At that moment General Meade was in Atlanta, Georgia, commandingthe Third Military District under the "Reconstruction Act;" andGeneral Thomas, whose post was in Nashville, was in Washington on acourt of inquiry investigating certain allegations against GeneralA. B. Dyer, Chief of Ordnance. He occupied the room of the secondfloor in the building on the corner of H and Fifteenth Streets, since become Wormley's Hotel. I at the time was staying with mybrother, Senator Sherman, at his residence, 1321 K Street, and itwas my habit each morning to stop at Thomas's room on my way to theoffice in the War Department to tell him the military news, and totalk over matters of common interest. We had been intimatelyassociated as "man and boy" for thirty-odd years, and I profess tohave had better opportunities to know him than any man then living. His fame as the "Rock of Chickamauga" was perfect, and by the worldat large he was considered as the embodiment of strength, calmness, and imperturbability. Yet of all my acquaintances Thomas worriedand fretted over what he construed neglects or acts of favoritismmore than any other. 

At that time he was much worried by what he supposed was injusticein the promotion of General Sheridan, and still more that GeneralMeade should have an Eastern station, which compelled him to remainat Nashville or go to the Pacific. General Thomas claimed that allhis life he had been stationed in the South or remote West, and hadnot had a fair share of Eastern posts, whereas that General Meadehad always been there. I tried to get him to go with me to seePresident Grant and talk the matter over frankly, but he would not, and I had to act as a friendly mediator. General Grant assured meat the time that he not only admired and respected General Thomas, but actually loved him as a man, and he authorized me in making upcommands for the general officers to do anything and everything tofavor him, only he could not recede from his former action inrespect to Generals Sheridan and Meade. 

Prior to General Grant's inauguration the army register showed asmajor-generals Halleck, Meade, Sheridan, Thomas, and Hancock. Therefore, the promotion of General Sheridan to be lieutenant-general did not "overslaugh" Thomas, but it did Meade and Halleck. The latter did not expect promotion; General Meade did, but waspartially, not wholly, reconciled by being stationed atPhiladelphia, the home of his family; and President Grant assuredme that he knew of his own knowledge that General Sheridan had beennominated major-general before General Meade, but had waived datesout of respect for his age and longer service, and that he hadnominated him as lieutenant-general by reason of his specialfitness to command the Military Division of the Missouri, embracingall the wild Indians, at that very moment in a state of hostility. I gave General Thomas the choice of every other command in thearmy, and of his own choice he went to San Francisco, California, where he died, March 28, 1870. The truth is, Congress should haveprovided by law for three lieutenant-generals for these threepre-eminent soldiers, and should have dated their commissions with"Gettysburg, " "Winchester, " and "Nashville. " It would have been agraceful act, and might have prolonged the lives of two mostpopular officers, who died soon after, feeling that they hadexperienced ingratitude and neglect. 

Soon after General Grant's inauguration as President, and, as Isupposed, in fulfilment of his plan divulged in Chicago theprevious December, were made the following:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, March 8, 1869. 

General Orders No. 11:

The following orders of the President of the United States arepublished for the information and government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, March 5, 1869. 

By direction of the President, General William T. Sherman willassume command of the Army of the United States. 

The chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus will report toand act under the immediate orders of the general commanding thearmy. 

Any official business which by law or regulation requires theaction of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted bythe General of the Army to the Secretary of War, and in general allorders from the President or Secretary of War to any portion of thearmy, line or staff, will be transmitted through the General of theArmy. 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, Secretary of War. 

By command of the General of the Army. 

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

On the same day I issued my General Orders No. 12, assuming commandand naming all the heads of staff departments and bureaus asmembers of my staff, adding to my then three aides, Colonels McCoy, Dayton, and Audenried, the names of Colonels Comstock, HoracePorter, and Dent, agreeing with President Grant that the two lattercould remain with him till I should need their personal services orask their resignations. 

I was soon made aware that the heads of several of the staff corpswere restive under this new order of things, for by long usage theyhad grown to believe themselves not officers of the army in atechnical sense, but a part of the War Department, the civil branchof the Government which connects the army with the President andCongress. 

In a short time General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's formerchief of staff, was nominated and confirmed as Secretary of War;and soon appeared this order:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, March 27, 1869. 

General Orders No. 28:

The following orders received for the War Department are publishedfor the government of all concerned:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, March 26, 1869. 

By direction of the President, the order of the Secretary of War, dated War Department, March 5, 1869, and published in GeneralOrders No. 11, headquarters of the army, Adjutant-General's Office, dated March 8, 1869, except so much as directs General W. T. Sherman to assume command of the Army of the United States, ishereby rescinded. 

All official business which by law or regulations requires theaction of the President or Secretary of War will be submitted bythe chiefs of staff corps, departments, and bureaus to theSecretary of War. 

All orders and instructions relating to military operations issuedby the President or Secretary of War will be issued through theGeneral of the Army. 

JOHN A. RAWLINS, Secretary of War. 

By command of General SHERMAN:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. 

Thus we were thrown back on the old method in having a double--ifnot a treble-headed machine. Each head of a bureau in dailyconsultation with the Secretary of War, and the general to commandwithout an adjutant, quartermaster, commissary, or any staff excepthis own aides, often reading in the newspapers of military eventsand orders before he could be consulted or informed. This was thevery reverse of what General Grant, after four years' experience inWashington as general-in-chief, seemed to want, different from whathe had explained to me in Chicago, and totally different from thedemand he had made on Secretary of War Stanton in his completeletter of January 29, 1866. I went to him to know the cause: Hesaid he had been informed by members of Congress that his action, as defined by his order of March 5th, was regarded as a violationof laws making provision for the bureaus of the War Department;that he had repealed his own orders, but not mine, and that he hadno doubt that General Rawlins and I could draw the line ofseparation satisfactorily to us both. General Rawlins was veryconscientious, but a very sick man when appointed Secretary of War. Several times he made orders through the adjutant-general toindividuals of the army without notifying me, but always when hisattention was called to it he apologized, and repeatedly said to methat he understood from his experience on General Grant's staff howalmost insulting it was for orders to go to individuals of aregiment, brigade, division, or an army of any kind without thecommanding officer being consulted or even advised. This habit ismore common at Washington than any place on earth, unless it be inLondon, where nearly the same condition of facts exists. Membersof Congress daily appeal to the Secretary of War for the dischargeof some soldier on the application of a mother, or some youngofficer has to be dry-nursed, withdrawn from his company on theplains to be stationed near home. The Secretary of War, sometimesmoved by private reasons, or more likely to oblige the member ofCongress, grants the order, of which the commanding general knowsnothing till he reads it in the newspapers. Also, an Indian tribe, goaded by the pressure of white neighbors, breaks out in revolt. The general-in-chief must reenforce the local garrisons not onlywith men, but horses, wagons, ammunition, and food. All thenecessary information is in the staff bureaus in Washington, butthe general has no right to call for it, and generally finds itmore practicable to ask by telegraph of the distant division ordepartment commanders for the information before making the formalorders. The general in actual command of the army should have afull staff, subject to his own command. If not, he cannot be heldresponsible for results. 

General Rawlins sank away visibly, rapidly, and died in Washington, September 6, 1869, and I was appointed to perform the duties of hisoffice till a successor could be selected. I realized how mucheasier and better it was to have both offices conjoined. 

The army then had one constitutional commander-in-chief of botharmy and navy, and one actual commanding general, bringing allparts into real harmony. An army to be useful must be a unit, andout of this has grown the saying, attributed to Napoleon, butdoubtless spoken before the days of Alexander, that an army with aninefficient commander was better than one with two able heads. Ourpolitical system and methods, however, demanded a separateSecretary of War, and in October President Grant asked me to scanthe list of the volunteer generals of good record who had served inthe civil war, preferably from the "West. " I did so, and submittedto him in writing the names of W. W. Belknap, of Iowa; G. M. Dodge, the Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific Railroad; and LuciusFairchild, of Madison, Wisconsin. I also named General John W. Sprague, then employed by the Northern Pacific Railroad inWashington Territory. General Grant knew them all personally, andsaid if General Dodge were not connected with the Union PacificRailroad, with which the Secretary of War must necessarily havelarge transactions, he would choose him, but as the case stood, andremembering the very excellent speech made by General Belknap atthe Chicago reunion of December, 1868, he authorized me tocommunicate with him to ascertain if he were willing to come toWashington as Secretary of War. General Belknap was then thecollector of internal revenue at Keokuk, Iowa. I telegraphed himand received a prompt and favorable answer. His name was sent tothe Senate, promptly confirmed, and he entered on his dutiesOctober 25, 1869. General Belknap surely had at that date as fair afame as any officer of volunteers of my personal acquaintance. Hetook up the business where it was left off, and gradually fell intothe current which led to the command of the army itself as of thelegal and financial matters which properly pertain to the WarDepartment. Orders granting leaves of absence to officers, transfers, discharges of soldiers for favor, and all the oldabuses, which had embittered the life of General Scott in the daysof Secretaries of War Marcy and Davis, were renewed. I called hisattention to these facts, but without sensible effect. My officewas under his in the old War Department, and one day I sent myaide-de-camp, Colonel Audenried, up to him with some message, andwhen he returned red as a beet, very much agitated, he asked me asa personal favor never again to send him to General Belknap. Iinquired his reason, and he explained that he had been treated witha rudeness and discourtesy he had never seen displayed by anyofficer to a soldier. Colonel Audenried was one of the mostpolished gentlemen in the army, noted for his personal bearing anddeportment, and I had some trouble to impress on him the patiencenecessary for the occasion, but I promised on future occasions tosend some other or go myself. Things went on from bad to worse, till in 1870 I received from Mr. Hugh Campbell, of St. Louis, apersonal friend and an honorable gentleman, a telegraphic messagecomplaining that I had removed from his position Mr. Ward, posttrader at Fort Laramie, with only a month in which to dispose ofhis large stock of goods, to make room for his successor. 

It so happened that we of the Indian Peace Commission had been muchindebted to this same trader, Ward, for advances of flour, sugar, and coffee, to provide for the Crow Indians, who had come down fromtheir reservation on the Yellowstone to meet us in 1868, before ourown supplies had been received. For a time I could not-comprehendthe nature of Mr. Campbell's complaint, so I telegraphed to thedepartment commander, General C. C. Augur, at Omaha, to know if anysuch occurrence had happened, and the reasons therefor. I receiveda prompt answer that it was substantially true, and had beenordered by The Secretary of War. It so happened that duringGeneral Grant's command of the army Congress had given to thegeneral of the army the appointment of "post-traders. " He hadnaturally devolved it on the subordinate division and departmentcommanders, but the legal power remained with the general of thearmy. I went up to the Secretary of War, showed him thetelegraphic correspondence, and pointed out the existing law in theRevised Statutes. General Belknap was visibly taken aback, andexplained that he had supposed the right of appointment rested withhim, that Ward was an old rebel Democrat, etc. ; whereas Ward hadbeen in fact the sutler of Fort Laramie, a United States militarypost, throughout the civil war. I told him that I should revokehis orders, and leave the matter where it belonged, to the localcouncil of administration and commanding officers. Ward wasunanimously reelected and reinstated. He remained the trader ofthe post until Congress repealed the law, and gave back the powerof appointment to the Secretary of War, when of course he had togo. But meantime he was able to make the necessary businessarrangements which saved him and his partners the sacrifice whichwould have been necessary in the first instance. I never had anyknowledge whatever of General Belknap's transactions with thetraders at Fort Sill and Fort Lincoln which resulted in hisdownfall. I have never sought to ascertain his motives forbreaking with me, because he knew I had always befriended him whileunder my military command, and in securing him his office ofSecretary of War. I spoke frequently to President Grant of thegrowing tendency of his Secretary of War to usurp all the powers ofthe commanding general, which would surely result in driving meaway. He as frequently promised to bring us together to agree upona just line of separation of our respective offices, but never did. 

Determined to bring the matter to an issue, I wrote the followingletter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , August 17, 1870. 

General W. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. 

GENERAL: I must urgently and respectfully invite your attentionwhen at leisure to a matter of deep interest to future commandinggenerals of the army more than to myself, of the imperativenecessity of fixing and clearly defining the limits of the powersand duties of the general of the army or of whomsoever may succeedto the place of commander-in-chief. 

The case is well stated by General Grant in his letter of January29, 1866, to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, hereto appended, and though I find no official answer recorded, I remember thatGeneral Grant told me that the Secretary of War had promptlyassured him in conversation that he fully approved of his views asexpressed in this letter. 

At that time the subject was much discussed, and soon afterCongress enacted the bill reviving the grade of general, which billwas approved July 25, 1866, and provided that the general, whencommissioned, may be authorized under the direction and during thepleasure of the President to command the armies of the UnitedStates; and a few days after, viz. , July 28, 1866, was enacted thelaw which defined the military peace establishment. The enactingclause reads: "That the military peace establishment of the UnitedStates shall hereafter consist of five regiments of artillery, tenregiments of cavalry, forty-five regiments of infantry, theprofessors and Corps of Cadets of the United States MilitaryAcademy, and such other forces as shall be provided for by thisact, to be known as the army of the United States. "

The act then recites in great detail all the parts of the army, making no distinction between the line and staff, but clearly makeseach and every part an element of the whole. 

Section 37 provides for a board to revise the army regulations andreport; and declares that the regulations then in force, viz. , those of 1863, should remain until Congress "shall act on saidreport;" and section 38 and last enacts that all laws and parts oflaws inconsistent with the provisions of this act be and the sameare hereby repealed. 

Under the provisions of this law my predecessor, General Grant, didnot hesitate to command and make orders to all parts of the army, the Military Academy, and staff, and it was under his advice thatthe new regulations were compiled in 1868 that drew the line moreclearly between the high and responsible duties of the Secretary ofWar and the general of the army. He assured me many a time beforeI was called here to succeed him that he wanted me to perfect thedistinction, and it was by his express orders that on assuming thecommand of the army I specifically placed the heads of the staffcorps here in Washington in the exact relation to the army whichthey would bear to an army in the field. 

I am aware that subsequently, in his orders of March 26th, hemodified his former orders of March 5th, but only as to the headsof bureaus in Washington, who have, he told me, certain functionsof office imposed on them by special laws of Congress, which laws, of course, override all orders and regulations, but I did noteither understand from him in person, or from General Rawlins, atwhose instance this order was made, that it was designed in any wayto modify, alter, or change his purposes that division anddepartment commanders, as well as the general of the army, shouldexercise the same command of the staff as they did of the line ofthe army. 

I need not remind the Secretary that orders and reports are made toand from the Military Academy which the general does not even see, though the Military Academy is specifically named as a part of thatarmy which he is required to command. Leaves of absence aregranted, the stations of officers are changed, and other orders arenow made directly to the army, not through the general, but directthrough other officials and the adjutant-general. 

So long as this is the case I surely do not command the army of theUnited States, and am not responsible for it. 

I am aware that the confusion results from the fact that thethirty-seventh section of the act of July 28, 1866, clothes thearmy regulations of 1863 with the sanction of law, but the nextsection repeals all laws and parts of laws inconsistent with theprovisions of this act. The regulations of 1863 are but acompilation of orders made prior to the war, when such men as Davisand Floyd took pleasure in stripping General Scott of even thesemblance of power, and purposely reduced him to a cipher in thecommand of the army. 

Not one word can be found in those regulations speaking of theduties of the lieutenant-general commanding the army, or defining asingle act of authority rightfully devolving on him. Not a singlemention is made of the rights and duties of a commander-in-chief ofthe army. He is ignored, and purposely, too, as a part of theprogramme resulting in the rebellion, that the army without alegitimate head should pass into the anarchy which these men wereshaping for the whole country. 

I invite your attention to the army regulations of 1847, when ourbest soldiers lived, among whom was your own father, and seeparagraphs 48 and 49, page 8, and they are so important that Iquote them entire:

"48. The military establishment is placed under the orders of themajor-general commanding in chief in all that regards itsdiscipline and military control. Its fiscal arrangements properlybelong to the administrative departments of the staff and to theTreasury Department under the direction of the Secretary of War. 

"49. The general of the army will watch over the economy of theservice in all that relates to the expenditure of money, supply ofarms, ordnance and ordnance stores, clothing, equipments, camp-equipage, medical and hospital stores, barracks, quarters, transportation, Military Academy, pay, and subsistence: in short, everything which enters into the expenses of the militaryestablishment, whether personal or material. He will also see thatthe estimates for the military service are based on proper data, and made for the objects contemplated by law, and necessary to thedue support and useful employment of the army. In carrying intoeffect these important duties, he will call to his counsel andassistance the staff, and those officers proper, in his opinion, tobe employed in verifying and inspecting all the objects which mayrequire attention. The rules and regulations established for thegovernment of the army, and the laws relating to the militaryestablishment, are the guides to the commanding general in theperformance of his duties. "

Why was this, or why was all mention of any field of duty for thehead of the army left out of the army regulations? Simply becauseJefferson Davis had a purpose, and absorbed to himself, asSecretary of War, as General Grant well says, all the powers ofcommander-in-chief. Floyd succeeded him, and the last regulationsof 1863 were but a new compilation of their orders, hastilycollected and published to supply a vast army with a new edition. 

I contend that all parts of these regulations inconsistent with thelaw of July 28, 1866, are repealed. 

I surely do not ask for any power myself, but I hope and trust, nowwhen we have a military President and a military Secretary of War, that in the new regulations to be laid before Congress next sessionthe functions and duties of the commander-in-chief will be soclearly marked out and defined that they may be understood byhimself and the army at large. 

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

[Inclosure. ]

WASHINGTON, January 29, 1866. 

Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War:

From the period of the difficulties between Major-General (nowLieutenant-General) Scott with Secretary Marcy, during theadministration of President Polk, the command of the army virtuallypassed into the hands of the Secretary of War. 

From that day to the breaking out of the rebellion the general-in-chief never kept his headquarters in Washington, and could not, consequently, with propriety resume his proper functions. Toadminister the affairs of the army properly, headquarters and theadjutant-general's office must be in the same place. 

During the war, while in the field, my functions as commander ofall the armies was never impaired, but were facilitated in allessential matters by the Administration and by the War Department. Now, however, that the war is over, and I have brought my head-quarters to the city, I find my present position embarrassing and, I think, out of place. I have been intending, or did intend, tomake the beginning of the New Year the time to bring this matterbefore you, with the view of asking to have the old condition ofaffairs restored, but from diffidence about mentioning the matterhave delayed. In a few words I will state what I conceive to be myduties and my place, and ask respectfully to be restored to themand it. 

The entire adjutant-general's office should be under the entirecontrol of the general-in-chief of the army. No orders should goto the army, or the adjutant-general, except through the general-in-chief. Such as require the action of the President would belaid before the Secretary of War, whose actions would be regardedas those of the President. In short, in my opinion, the general-in-chief stands between the President and the army in all officialmatters, and the Secretary of War is between the army (through thegeneral-in-chief) and the President. 

I can very well conceive that a rule so long disregarded could not, or would not, be restored without the subject being presented, andI now do so respectfully for your consideration. 

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

General Belknap never answered that letter. 

In August, 1870, was held at Des Moines, Iowa, an encampment of oldsoldiers which I attended, en route to the Pacific, and at Omahareceived this letter:

LONG BRANCH, New Jersey, August 18, 1870. 

General W. T. SHERMAN. 

DEAR GENERAL: Your letter of the 7th inst. Did not reach LongBranch until after I had left for St. Louis, and consequently isjust before me for the first time. I do not know what changesrecent laws, particularly the last army bill passed, make in therelations between the general of the army and the Secretary of War. 

Not having this law or other statutes here, I cannot examine thesubject now, nor would I want to without consultation with theSecretary of War. On our return to Washington I have no doubt butthat the relations between the Secretary and yourself can be madepleasant, and the duties of each be so clearly defined as to leaveno doubt where the authority of one leaves off and the othercommences. 

My own views, when commanding the army, were that orders to thearmy should go through the general. No changes should be made, however, either of the location of troops or officers, without theknowledge of the Secretary of War. 

In peace, the general commanded them without reporting to theSecretary farther than he chose the specific orders he gave fromtime to time, but subjected himself to orders from the Secretary, the latter deriving his authority to give orders from thePresident. As Congress has the right, however, to make rules andregulations for the government of the army, rules made by themwhether they are as they should be or not, will have to govern. Asbefore stated, I have not examined the recent law. 

Yours truly, U. S. GRANT. 

To which I replied:

OMAHA, NEBRASKA, September 2, 1870. 

General U. S. GRANT, Washington, D. C. 

DEAR GENERAL: I have received your most acceptable letter of August18th, and assure you that I am perfectly willing to abide by anydecision you may make. We had a most enthusiastic meeting at DesMoines, and General Bellknap gave us a fine, finished address. Ihave concluded to go over to San Francisco to attend the annualcelebration of the Pioneers, to be held on the 9th instant; fromthere I will make a short tour, aiming to get back to St. Louis bythe 1st of October, and so on to Washington without unnecessarydelay. 

Conscious of the heavy burdens already on you, I should refrainfrom adding one ounce to your load of care, but it seems to me nowis the time to fix clearly and plainly the field of duty for theSecretary of War and the commanding general of the army, so that wemay escape the unpleasant controversy that gave so much scandal inGeneral Scott's time, and leave to our successors a clear field. 

No matter what the result, I promise to submit to whatever decisionyou may make. I also feel certain that General Belknap thinks heis simply executing the law as it now stands, but I am equallycertain that he does not interpret the law reviving the grade ofgeneral, and that fixing the "peace establishment" of 1868, as Iconstrue them. 

For instance, I am supposed to control the discipline of theMilitary Academy as a part of the army, whereas General Belknapordered a court of inquiry in the case of the colored cadet, madethe detail, reviewed the proceedings, and made his order, withoutmy knowing a word of it, except through the newspapers; and morerecently, when I went to Chicago to attend to some divisionbusiness, I found the inspector-general (Hardie) under orders fromthe Secretary of War to go to Montana on some claim business. 

All I ask is that such orders should go through me. If all thestaff-officers are subject to receive orders direct from theSecretary of War it will surely clash with the orders they may bein the act of executing from me, or from their immediatecommanders. 

I ask that General Belknap draw up some clear, well-defined rulesfor my action, that he show them to me before publication, that Imake on them my remarks, and then that you make a final decision. I promise faithfully to abide by it, or give up my commission. 

Please show this to General Belknap, and I will be back early inOctober. With great respect, your friend, W. T. SHERMAN

I did return about October 15th, saw President Grant, who saidnothing had been done in the premises, but that he would bringGeneral Belknap and me together and settle this matter. Matterswent along pretty much as usual till the month of August, 1871, when I dined at the Arlington with Admiral Alder and GeneralBelknap. The former said he had been promoted to rear-admiral andappointed to command the European squadron, then at Villa Franca, near Nice, and that he was going out in the frigate Wabash, inviting me to go along. I had never been to Europe, and theopportunity was too tempting to refuse. After some preliminaries Iagreed to go along, taking with me as aides-de-camp ColonelAudenried and Lieutenant Fred Grant. The Wabash was beingoverhauled at the Navy-Yard at Boston, and was not ready to sailtill November, when she came to New-York, where we all embarkedSaturday, November 11th. 

I have very full notes of the whole trip, and here need only statethat we went out to the Island of Madeira, and thence to Cadiz andGibraltar. Here my party landed, and the Wabash went on to VillaFranca. From Gibraltar we made the general tour of Spain toBordeaux, through the south of France to Marseilles, Toulon, etc. , to Nice, from which place we rejoined the Wabash and brought ashoreour baggage. 

From Nice we went to Genoa, Turin, the Mont Cenis Tunnel, Milan, Venice, etc. , to Rome. Thence to Naples, Messina, and Syracuse, where we took a steamer to Malta. From Malta to Egypt andConstantinople, to Sebastopol, Poti, and Tiflis. At Constantinopleand Sebastopol my party was increased by Governor Curtin, his son, and Mr. McGahan. 

It was my purpose to have reached the Caspian, and taken boats tothe Volga, and up that river as far as navigation would permit, butwe were dissuaded by the Grand-Duke Michael, Governor-General ofthe Caucasas, and took carriages six hundred miles to Taganrog, onthe Sea of Azof, to which point the railroad system of Russia wascompleted. From Taganrog we took cars to Moscow and St. Petersburg. Here Mr. Curtin and party remained, he being ourMinister at that court; also Fred Grant left us to visit his auntat Copenhagen. Colonel Audenried and I then completed the tour ofinterior Europe, taking in Warsaw, Berlin, Vienna, Switzerland, France, England, Scotland, and Ireland, embarking for home in thegood steamer Baltic, Saturday, September 7, 1872, reachingWashington, D. C. , September 22d. I refrain from dwelling on thistrip, because it would swell this chapter beyond my purpose. 

When I regained my office I found matters unchanged since mydeparture, the Secretary of War exercising all the functions ofcommander-in-chief, and I determined to allow things to run to theirnecessary conclusion. In 1873 my daughter Minnie also made a tripto Europe, and I resolved as soon as she returned that I wouldsimply move back to St. Louis to execute my office there as best Icould. But I was embarrassed by being the possessor of a largepiece of property in Washington on I Street, near the corner ofThird, which I could at the time neither sell nor give away. Itcame into my possession as a gift from friends in New York andBoston, who had purchased it of General Grant and transferred to meat the price of $65, 000. 

The house was very large, costly to light, heat, and maintain, andCongress had reduced my pay four or five thousand dollars a year, so that I was gradually being impoverished. Taxes, too, grewannually, from about four hundred dollars a year to fifteenhundred, besides all sorts of special taxes. 

Finding myself caught in a dilemma, I added a new hall, and madeout of it two houses, one of which I occupied, and the other Irented, and thus matters stood in 1873-'74. By the agency of Mr. Hall, a neighbor and broker, I effected a sale of the property tothe present owner, Mr. Emory, at a fair price, accepting about halfpayment in notes, and the other half in a piece of property on EStreet, which I afterward exchanged for a place in Cite Brilliante, a suburb of St. Louis, which I still own. Being thus foot-loose, and having repeatedly notified President Grant of my purpose, Iwrote the Secretary of War on the 8th day of May, 1874, asking theauthority of the President and the War Department to remove myheadquarters to St. Louis. 

On the 11th day of May General Belknap replied that I had theassent of the President and himself, inclosing the rough draft ofan order to accomplish this result, which I answered on the 15th, expressing my entire satisfaction, only requesting delay in thepublication of the orders till August or September, as I preferredto make the changes in the month of October. 

On the 3d of September these orders were made:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, September 8, 1874. 

General Orders No. 108. 

With the assent of the President, and at the request of theGeneral, the headquarters of the armies of the United States willbe established at St. Louis, Missouri, in the month of Octobernext. 

The regulations and orders now governing the functions of theGeneral of the Army, and those in relation to transactions ofbusiness with the War Department and its bureaus, will continue inforce. 

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General. 

Our daughter Minnie was married October 1, 1874, to Thomas W. Fitch, United States Navy, and we all forthwith packed up andregained our own house at St. Louis, taking an office on the cornerof Tenth and Locust Streets. The only staff I brought with me werethe aides allowed by law, and, though we went through the forms of"command, " I realized that it was a farce, and it did not need aprophet to foretell it would end in a tragedy. We made ourselvesvery comfortable, made many pleasant excursions into the interior, had a large correspondence, and escaped the mortification of beingslighted by men in Washington who were using their temporary powerfor selfish ends. 

Early in March, 1676, appeared in all the newspapers of the day thesensational report from Washington that Secretary of War Belknaphad been detected in selling sutlerships in the army; that he hadconfessed it to Representative Blackburn, of Kentucky; that he hadtendered his resignation, which had been accepted by the President;and that he was still subject to impeachment, --would be impeachedand tried by the Senate. I was surprised to learn that GeneralBelknap was dishonest in money matters, for I believed him a bravesoldier, and I sorely thought him honest; but the truth was soonrevealed from Washington, and very soon after I received from JudgeAlphonso Taft, of Cincinnati, a letter informing me that he hadbeen appointed Secretary of War, and should insist on my immediatereturn to Washington. I answered that I was ready to go toWashington, or anywhere, if assured of decent treatment. 

I proceeded to Washington, when, on the 6th of April, werepublished these orders:

General Orders No. 28. 

The following orders of the President of the United States arehereby promulgated for the information and guidance of allconcerned:

The headquarters of the army are hereby reestablished at WashingtonCity, and all orders and instructions relative to militaryoperations or affecting the military control and discipline of thearmy issued by the President through the Secretary of War, shall bepromulgated through the General of the Army, and the departments ofthe Adjutant-General and the Inspector-General shall report to him, and be under his control in all matters relating thereto. 

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. D. TOWNSEND, Adjutant-General. 

This was all I had ever asked; accordingly my personal staff werebrought back to Washington, where we resumed our old places; only Idid not, for some time, bring back the family, and then only to arented house on Fifteenth Street, which we occupied till we leftWashington for good. During the period from 1876 to 1884 we had asSecretaries of War in succession, the Hon's. Alphonso Taft, J. D. Cameron, George W. McCrary, Alexander Ramsey, and R. T. Lincoln, with each and all of whom I was on terms of the most intimate andfriendly relations. 

And here I will record of Washington that I saw it, under the magichand of Alexander R. Shepherd, grow from a straggling, ill-pavedcity, to one of the cleanest, most beautiful, and attractive citiesof the whole world. Its climate is salubrious, with as muchsunshine as any city of America. The country immediately about itis naturally beautiful and romantic, especially up the Potomac, inthe region of the Great Falls; and, though the soil be poor ascompared with that of my present home, it is susceptible of easyimprovement and embellishment. The social advantages cannot besurpassed even in London, Paris, or Vienna; and among the residentpopulation, the members of the Supreme Court, Senate, House ofRepresentatives, army, navy, and the several executive departments, may be found an intellectual class one cannot encounter in ourcommercial and manufacturing cities. The student may, without taxand without price, have access, in the libraries of Congress and ofthe several departments, to books of every nature and kind; and themuseums of natural history are rapidly approaching a standard ofcomparison with the best of the world. Yet it is the usual andproper center of political intrigue, from which the army especiallyshould keep aloof, because the army must be true and faithful tothe powers that be, and not be subjected to a temptation to favorone or other of the great parties into which our people havedivided, and will continue to divide, it may be, with advantage tothe whole. 

It would be a labor of love for me, in this connection, to pay atribute of respect, by name, to the many able and most patrioticofficers with whom I was so long associated as the commandinggenerals of military divisions and departments, as well asstaff-officers; but I must forego the temptation, because of themagnitude of the subject, certain that each and all of them willfind biographers better posted and more capable than myself; and Iwould also like to make recognition of the hundreds of acts of mostgraceful hospitality on the part of the officers and families atour remote military posts in the days, of the "adobe, " the "jacal, "and "dug-out, " when a board floor and a shingle roof were luxuriesexpected by none except the commanding officer. I can see, inmemory, a beautiful young city-bred lady, who had married a poorsecond-lieutenant, and followed him to his post on the plains, whose quarters were in a "dug-out" ten feet by about fifteen, sevenfeet high, with a dirt roof; four feet of the walls were thenatural earth, the other three of sod, with holes for windows andcorn-sacks for curtains. This little lady had her Saratoga trunk, which was the chief article of furniture; yet, by means of a rug onthe ground-floor, a few candle-boxes covered with red cotton calicofor seats, a table improvised out of a barrel-head, and a fireplaceand chimney excavated in the back wall or bank, she had transformedher "hole in the ground" into a most attractive home for her youngwarrior husband; and she entertained me with a supper consisting ofthe best of coffee, fried ham, cakes, and jellies from thecommissary, which made on my mind an impression more lasting thanhave any one of the hundreds of magnificent banquets I have sinceattended in the palaces and mansions of our own and foreign lands. 

Still more would I like to go over again the many magnificent tripsmade across the interior plains, mountains, and deserts before thedays of the completed Pacific Railroad, with regular "Doughertys"drawn by four smart mules, one soldier with carbine or loadedmusket in hand seated alongside the driver; two in the back seatwith loaded rifles swung in the loops made for them; the lightestkind of baggage, and generally a bag of oats to supplement thegrass, and to attach the mules to their camp. With an outfit oftwo, three, or four of such, I have made journeys of as much aseighteen hundred miles in a single season, usually from post topost, averaging in distance about two hundred miles a week, with asmuch regularity as is done today by the steam-car its five hundredmiles a day; but those days are gone, and, though I recognize thegreat national advantages of the more rapid locomotion, I cannothelp occasionally regretting the change. One instance in 1866rises in my memory, which I must record: Returning eastward fromFort Garland, we ascended the Rocky Mountains to the Sangre-de-Cristo Pass. The road descending the mountain was very rough andsidling. I got out with my rifle, and walked ahead about fourmiles, where I awaited my "Dougherty. " After an hour or so I saw, coming down the road, a wagon; and did not recognize it as my owntill quite near. It had been upset, the top all mashed in, and nomeans at hand for repairs. I consequently turned aside from themain road to a camp of cavalry near the Spanish Peaks, where wewere most hospitably received by Major A---- and his accomplishedwife. They occupied a large hospital-tent, which about a dozenbeautiful greyhounds were free to enter at will. The ambulance wasrepaired, and the next morning we renewed our journey, escorted bythe major and his wife on their fine saddle-horses. 

They accompanied us about ten miles of the way; and, though age hassince begun to tell on them, I shall ever remember them in theirpride and strength as they galloped alongside our wagons down thelong slopes of the Spanish Peaks in a driving snow-storm. 

And yet again would it be a pleasant task to recall the manybanquets and feasts of the various associations of officers andsoldiers, who had fought the good battles of the civil war, inwhich I shared as a guest or host, when we could indulge in areasonable amount of glorification at deeds done and recorded, withwit, humor, and song; these when memory was fresh, and when the oldsoldiers were made welcome to the best of cheer and applause inevery city and town of the land. But no! I must hurry to myconclusion, for this journey has already been sufficientlyprolonged. 

I had always intended to divide time with my natural successor, General P. H. Sheridan, and early, notified him that I should aboutthe year 1884 retire from the command of the army, leaving himabout an equal period of time for the highest office in the army. It so happened that Congress had meantime by successive "enactments"cut down the army to twenty-five thousand men, the usual strengthof a corps d'armee, the legitimate command of a lieutenant-general. Up to 1882 officers not disabled by wounds or sickness could onlyavail themselves of the privileges of retirement on application, after thirty years of service, at sixty-two years of age; but onthe 30th of June, 1882, a bill was passed which, by operation ofthe law itself, compulsorily retired all army officers, regardlessof rank, at the age of sixty-four years. At the time this law wasdebated in Congress, I was consulted by Senators and others in themost friendly manner, representing that, if I wanted it, anexception could justly and easily be made in favor of the generaland lieutenant-general, whose commissions expired with their lives;but I invariably replied that I did not ask or expect an exceptionin my case, because no one could know or realize when his ownmental and physical powers began to decline. I remembered well theexperience of Gil Blas with the Bishop of Granada, and favored thepassage of the law fixing a positive period for retirement, toobviate in the future special cases of injustice such as I had seenin the recent past. The law was passed, and every officer then knewthe very day on which he must retire, and could make hispreparations accordingly. In my own case the law was liberal inthe extreme, being "without reduction in his current pay andallowances. "

I would be sixty-four years old on the 8th of February, 1884, adate inconvenient to move, and not suited to other incidents; so Iresolved to retire on the 1st day of November, 1883, to resume myformer home at St. Louis, and give my successor ample time to meetthe incoming Congress, But, preliminary thereto, I concluded tomake one more tour of the continent, going out to the Pacific bythe Northern route, and returning by that of the thirty-fifthparallel. This we accomplished, beginning at Buffalo, June 21st, and ending at St. Louis, Missouri, September 30, 1883, a full andmost excellent account of which can be found in Colonel Tidball's"Diary, " which forms part of the report of the General of the Armyfor the year 1883. 

Before retiring also, as was my duty, I desired that my aides-de-camp who had been so faithful and true to me should not sufferby my act. All were to retain the rank of colonels of cavalry tillthe last day, February 8, 1884; but meantime each secured places, as follows:

Colonel O. M. Poe was lieutenant-colonel of the Engineer CorpsUnited States Army, and was by his own choice assigned to Detroitin charge of the engineering works on the Upper Lakes, which dutywas most congenial to him. 

Colonel J. C. Tidball was assigned to command the Artillery Schoolat Fort Monroe, by virtue of his commission as lieutenant-colonel, Third Artillery, a station for which he was specially qualified. 

Colonel John E. Tourtelotte was then entitled to promotion tomajor of the Seventh Cavalry, a rank in which he could be certainof an honorable command. 

The only remaining aide-de-camp was Colonel John M. Bacon, whoutterly ignored self in his personal attachment to me. He was thena captain of the Ninth Cavalry, but with almost a certainty ofpromotion to be major of the Seventh before the date of my officialretirement, which actually resulted. The last two accompanied meto St. Louis, and remained with me to the end. Having previouslyaccomplished the removal of my family to St. Louis, and havingcompleted my last journey to the Pacific, I wrote the followingletter:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C. , October 8, 1883. 

Hon. R. T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War. 

SIR: By the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1882, allarmy-officers are retired on reaching the age of sixty-four years. If living, I will attain that age on the 8th day of February, 1884;but as that period of the year is not suited for the changesnecessary on my retirement, I have contemplated anticipating theevent by several months, to enable the President to meet thesechanges at a more convenient season of the year, and also to enablemy successor to be in office before the assembling of the nextCongress. 

I therefore request authority to turn over the command of the armyto Lieutenant-General Sheridan on the 1st day of November, 1883, and that I be ordered to my home at St. Louis, Missouri, there toawait the date of my legal retirement; and inasmuch as for a longtime I must have much correspondence about war and officialmatters, I also ask the favor to have with me for a time my twopresent aides-de-camp, Colonels J. E. Tourtelotte and J. M. Bacon. 

The others of my personal staff, viz. , Colonels O. M. Poe and J. C. Tidball, have already been assigned to appropriate duties intheir own branches of the military service, the engineers andartillery. All should retain the rank and pay as aides-de-campuntil February 8, 1884. By or before the 1st day of November I cancomplete all official reports, and believe I can surrender the armyto my successor in good shape and condition, well provided in allrespects, and distributed for the best interests of the country. 

I am grateful that my physical and mental-strength remainunimpaired by years, and am thankful for the liberal provision madeby Congress for my remaining years, which will enable me to respondpromptly to any call the President may make for my military serviceor judgment as long as I live. I have the honor to be yourobedient servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

The answer was:

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON CITY, October 10, 1888. 

General W. T. SHERMAN, Washington, D. C. 

GENERAL: I have submitted to the President your letter of the 8thinstant, requesting that you be relieved of the command of the armyon the 1st of November next, as a more convenient time for makingthe changes in military commands which must follow your retirementfrom active service, than would be the date of your retirementunder the law. 

In signifying his approval of your request, the President directsme to express to you his earnest hope that there may be given youmany years of health and happiness in which to enjoy the gratitudeof your fellow-citizens, well earned by your most distinguishedpublic services. 

It will give me pleasure to comply with your wishes respecting youraides-de-camp, and the necessary orders will be duly issued. 

I have the honor to be, General, your obedient servant, ROBERT T. LINCOLN, Secretary of War. 

On the 27th day of October I submitted to the Secretary ofWar, the Hon. R. T. Lincoln, my last annual report, embracing amongother valuable matters the most interesting and condensed report ofColonel O. M. Poe, A. D. C. , of the "original conception, progress, and completion" of the four great transcontinental railways, whichhave in my judgment done more for the subjugation and civilizationof the Indians than all other causes combined, and have madepossible the utilization of the vast area of pasture lands andmineral regions which before were almost inaccessible, for myagency in which I feel as much pride as for my share in any of thebattles in which I took part. 

Promptly on the 1st of November were made the following generalorders, and the command of the Army of the United States passedfrom me to Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, with as littleceremony as would attend the succession of the lieutenant-colonelof a regiment to his colonel about to take a leave of absence:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, November 1, 1885. 

General Orders No. 77:

By and with the consent of the President, as contained in GeneralOrders No. 71, of October 13, 1883, the undersigned relinquishescommand of the Army of the United States. 

In thus severing relations which have hitherto existed between us, he thanks all officers and men for their fidelity to the high trustimposed on them during his official life, and will, in hisretirement, watch with parental solicitude their progress upward inthe noble profession to which they have devoted their lives. 

W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

Official: R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General. 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMYWASHINGTON, November 1, 1885. 

General Orders No. 78:

In obedience to orders of the President, promulgated in GeneralOrders No. 71, October 13, 1883, from these headquarters, theundersigned hereby assumes command of the Army of the UnitedStates.... 

P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieutenant-General. 

Official: R. C. DRUM, adjutant-General. 

After a few days in which to complete my social visits, and after ashort visit to my daughter, Mrs. A. M. Thackara, at Philadelphia, Iquietly departed for St. Louis; and, as I hope, for "good and all, "the family was again reunited in the same place from which we weredriven by a cruel, unnecessary civil war initiated in CharlestonHarbor in April, 1861. 

On the 8th day of February, 1884; I was sixty-four years of age, and therefore retired by the operation of the act of Congress, approved June 30, 1882; but the fact was gracefully noticed byPresident Arthur in the following general orders:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WASHINGTON, February 8, 1984. 

The following order of the President is published to the army:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 8, 1884. 

General William T. Sherman, General of the Army, having this dayreached the age of sixty-four years, is, in accordance with thelaw, placed upon the retired list of the army, without reduction inhis current pay and allowances. 

The announcement of the severance from the command of the army ofone who has been for so many years its distinguished chief, can butawaken in the minds, not only of the army, but of the people of theUnited States, mingled emotions of regret and gratitude--regret atthe withdrawal from active military service of an officer whoselofty sense of duty has been a model for all soldiers since hefirst entered the army in July, 1840; and gratitude, freshlyawakened, for the services of incalculable value rendered by him inthe war for the Union, which his great military genius and daringdid so much to end. 

The President deems this a fitting occasion to give expression, inthis manner, to the gratitude felt toward General Sherman by hisfellow-citizens, and to the hope that Providence may grant him manyyears of health and happiness in the relief from the active dutiesof his profession. 

By order of the Secretary of War:

CHESTER A. ARTHUR. 

R. C. DRUM, Adjutant-General. 

To which I replied:

St. Louis, February 9, 1884. 

His Excellency CHESTER A. ARTHUR, President of the United States. 

DEAR SIR: Permit me with a soldier's frankness to thank youpersonally for the handsome compliment bestowed in general ordersof yesterday, which are reported in the journals of the day. To meit was a surprise and a most agreeable one. I had supposed theactual date of my retirement would form a short paragraph in thecommon series of special orders of the War Department; but as thehonored Executive of our country has made it the occasion for hisown hand to pen a tribute of respect and affection to an officerpassing from the active stage of life to one of ease and rest, Ican only say I feel highly honored, and congratulate myself in thusrounding out my record of service in a manner most gratifying to myfamily and friends. Not only this, but I feel sure, when theorders of yesterday are read on parade to the regiments andgarrisons of the United States, many a young hero will tighten hisbelt, and resolve anew to be brave and true to the starry flag, which we of our day have carried safely through one epoch ofdanger, but which may yet be subjected to other trials, which maydemand similar sacrifices, equal fidelity and courage, and a largermeasure of intelligence. Again thanking you for so marked acompliment, and reciprocating the kind wishes for the future, I am, with profound respect, your friend and servant, W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

This I construe as the end of my military career. In looking backupon the past I can only say, with millions of others, that I havedone many things I should not have done, and have left undone stillmore which ought to have been done; that I can see where hundredsof opportunities have been neglected, but on the whole am content;and feel sure that I can travel this broad country of ours, and beeach night the welcome guest in palace or cabin; and, as

 "all the world's stage, And all the men and women merely players, "

I claim the privilege to ring down the curtain. 

W. T. SHERMAN, General. 

.............................................................. 

PERSONAL MEMOIRES OF P. H. SHERIDAN, VOLUME 1. 

By Philip Henry Sheridan

PREFACE

When, yielding to the solicitations of my friends, I finally decidedto write these Memoirs, the greatest difficulty which confronted mewas that of recounting my share in the many notable events of thelast three decades, in which I played a part, without entering toofully into the history of these years, and at the same time withoutgiving to my own acts an unmerited prominence. To what extent I haveovercome this difficulty I must leave the reader to judge. 

In offering this record, penned by my own hand, of the events of mylife, and of my participation in our great struggle for nationalexistence, human liberty, and political equality, I make nopretension to literary merit; the importance of the subject-matter ofmy narrative is my only claim on the reader's attention. 

Respectfully dedicating this work to my comrades in arms during theWar of the Rebellion, I leave it as a heritage to my children, and asa source of information for the future historian. 

P. H. SHERIDAN. 

Nonguitt, Mass. , August 2, 1888

PERSONAL MEMOIRS

P. H. SHERIDAN. 

VOLUME I. 

CHAPTER I. 

ANCESTRY--BIRTH--EARLY EDUCATION--A CLERK IN A GROCERYSTORE--APPOINTMENT--MONROE SHOES--JOURNEY TO WEST POINT--HAZING--A FISTICUFF BATTLE--SUSPENDED--RETURNS TO CLERKSHIP--GRADUATION. 

My parents, John and Mary Sheridan, came to America in 1830, havingbeen induced by the representations of my father's uncle, ThomasGainor, then living in Albany, N. Y. , to try their fortunes in theNew World: They were born and reared in the County Cavan, Ireland, where from early manhood my father had tilled a leasehold on theestate of Cherrymoult; and the sale of this leasehold provided himwith means to seek a new home across the sea. My parents wereblood relations--cousins in the second degree--my mother, whosemaiden name was Minor, having descended from a collateral branch ofmy father's family. Before leaving Ireland they had two children, and on the 6th of March, 1831, the year after their arrival in thiscountry, I was born, in Albany, N. Y. , the third child in a familywhich eventually increased to six--four boys and two girls. 

The prospects for gaining a livelihood in Albany did not meet theexpectations which my parents had been led to entertain, so in 1832they removed to the West, to establish themselves in the village ofSomerset, in Perry County, Ohio, which section, in the earliest daysof the State; had been colonized from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Atthis period the great public works of the Northwest--the canals andmacadamized roads, a result of clamor for internal improvements--werein course of construction, and my father turned his attention tothem, believing that they offered opportunities for a successfuloccupation. Encouraged by a civil engineer named Bassett, who hadtaken a fancy to him, he put in bids for a small contract on theCumberland Road, known as the "National Road, " which was then beingextended west from the Ohio River. A little success in this firstenterprise led him to take up contracting as a business, which hefollowed on various canals and macadamized roads then building indifferent parts of the State of Ohio, with some good fortune forawhile, but in 1853 what little means he had saved were swallowed up--in bankruptcy, caused by the failure of the Sciota and HockingValley Railroad Company, for which he was fulfilling a contract atthe time, and this disaster left him finally only a small farm, justoutside the village of Somerset, where he dwelt until his death in1875. 

My father's occupation kept him away from home much of the timeduring my boyhood, and as a consequence I grew up under the soleguidance and training of my mother, whose excellent common sense andclear discernment in every way fitted her for such maternal duties. When old enough I was sent to the village school, which was taught byan old-time Irish "master"--one of those itinerant dominies of theearly frontier--who, holding that to spare the rod was to spoil thechild, if unable to detect the real culprit when any offense had beencommitted, would consistently apply the switch to the whole schoolwithout discrimination. It must be conceded that by this means henever failed to catch the guilty mischief-maker. The school-year wasdivided into terms of three months, the teacher being paid in eachterm a certain sum--three dollars, I think, for each pupil-and havingan additional perquisite in the privilege of boarding around at hisoption in the different families to which his scholars belonged. This feature was more than acceptable to the parents at times, forhow else could they so thoroughly learn all the neighborhood gossip?But the pupils were in almost unanimous opposition, because Mr. McNanly's unheralded advent at any one's house resulted frequently inthe discovery that some favorite child had been playing "hookey, "which means (I will say to the uninitiated, if any such there be)absenting one's self from school without permission, to go on afishing or a swimming frolic. Such at least was my experience morethan once, for Mr. McNanly particularly favored my mother's house, because of a former acquaintanceship in Ireland, and many a time acomparison of notes proved that I had been in the woods with twoplayfellows, named Binckly and Greiner, when the master thought I washome, ill, and my mother, that I was at school, deeply immersed instudy. However, with these and other delinquencies not uncommonamong boys, I learned at McNanly's school, and a little later, undera pedagogue named Thorn, a smattering of geography and history, andexplored the mysteries of Pike's Arithmetic and Bullions' EnglishGrammar, about as far as I could be carried up to the age offourteen. This was all the education then bestowed upon me, andthis--with the exception of progressing in some of these branches byvoluntary study, and by practical application in others, supplementedby a few months of preparation after receiving my appointment as acadet--was the extent of my learning on entering the MilitaryAcademy. 

When about fourteen years old I began to do something for myself; Mr. John Talbot, who kept a country store in the village, employing me todeal out sugar, coffee, and calico to his customers at the munificentsalary of twenty-four dollars a year. After I had gained atwelve-months' experience with Mr. Talbot my services began to besought by, others, and a Mr. David Whitehead secured them by the offerof sixty dollars a year--Talbot refusing to increase my pay, but notobjecting to my advancement. A few months later, before my year wasup, another chance to increase my salary came about; Mr. Henry Dittoe, the enterprising man of the village, offering me one hundred andtwenty dollars a year to take a position in the dry-goods store ofFink & Dittoe. I laid the matter before Mr. Whitehead, and he franklyadvised me to accept, though he cautioned me that I might regret it, adding that he was afraid Henry (referring to Mr. Dittoe) "had toomany irons in the fire. " His warning in regard to the enterprisingmerchant proved a prophecy, for "too many irons in the fire" broughtabout Mr. Dittoe's bankruptcy, although this misfortune did not befallhim till long after I had left his service. I am glad to say, however, that his failure was an exceptionally honest one, and duemore to the fact that he was in advance of his surroundings than toany other cause. 

I remained with Fink & Dittoe until I entered the Military Academy, principally in charge of the book-keeping, which was no small workfor one of my years, considering that in those days the entirebusiness of country stores in the West was conducted on the creditsystem; the customers, being mostly farmers, never expecting to paytill the product of their farms could be brought to market; and eventhen usually squared the book-accounts by notes of hand, that wereoften slow of collection. 

From the time I ceased to attend school my employment hadnecessitated, to a certain degree, the application of what I hadlearned there, and this practical instruction I reinforced somewhatby doing considerable reading in a general way, until ultimately Ibecame quite a local authority in history, being frequently chosen asarbiter in discussions and disputes that arose in the store. TheMexican War, then going on, furnished, of course, a never-endingtheme for controversy, and although I was too young to enter themilitary service when volunteers were mustering in our section, yetthe stirring events of the times so much impressed and absorbed methat my sole wish was to become a soldier, and my highest aspirationto go to West Point as a Cadet from my Congressional district. Mychances for this seemed very remote, however, till one day anopportunity was thrown in my way by the boy who then held the placefailing to pass his examination. When I learned that by thisoccurrence a vacancy existed, I wrote to our representative inCongress, the Hon. Thomas Ritchey, and asked him for the appointment, reminding him that we had often met in Fink & Dittoe's store, andthat therefore he must know something of my qualifications. Heresponded promptly by enclosing my warrant for the class of 1848; so, notwithstanding the many romances that have been published about thematter, to Mr. Ritchey, and to him alone, is due all the credit--ifmy career justifies that term--of putting me in the United StatesArmy. 

At once I set about preparing for the examination which precedesadmission to the Military Academy, studying zealously under thedirection of Mr. William Clark; my old teachers, McNanly and Thorn, having disappeared from Somerset and sought new fields of usefulness. The intervening months passed rapidly away, and I fear that I did notmake much progress, yet I thought I should be able to pass thepreliminary examination. That which was to follow worried me moreand gave me many sleepless nights; but these would have been less innumber, I fully believe, had it not been for one specification of my, outfit which the circular that accompanied my appointment demanded. This requirement was a pair of "Monroe shoes. " Now, out in Ohio, what "Monroe shoes" were was a mystery--not a shoemaker in my sectionhaving so much as an inkling of the construction of the perplexingthings, until finally my eldest brother brought an idea of them fromBaltimore, when it was found that they were a familiar pattern underanother name. 

At length the time for my departure came, and I set out for WestPoint, going by way of Cleveland and across Lake Erie to Buffalo. Onthe steamer I fell in with another appointee en route to the academy, David S. Stanley, also from Ohio; and when our acquaintanceship hadripened somewhat, and we had begun to repose confidence in eachother, I found out that he had no "Monroe shoes, " so I deemed myselfjust that much ahead of my companion, although my shoes might notconform exactly to the regulations in Eastern style and finish. AtBuffalo, Stanley and I separated, he going by the Erie Canal and I bythe railroad, since I wanted to gain time on account of commands tostop in Albany to see my father's uncle. Here I spent a few days, till Stanley reached Albany, when we journeyed together down theriver to West Point. The examination began a few days after ourarrival, and I soon found myself admitted to the Corps of Cadets, todate from July 1, 1848, in a class composed of sixty-three members, many of whom--for example, Stanley, Slocum, Woods, Kautz, and Crook--became prominent generals in later years, and commanded divisions, corps, and armies in the war of the rebellion. 

Quickly following my admission I was broken in by a course of hazing, with many of the approved methods that the Cadets had handed downfrom year to year since the Academy was founded; still, I escapedexcessive persecution, although there were in my day many occurrencesso extreme as to call forth condemnation and an endeavor to suppressthe senseless custom, which an improved civilization has now abouteradicated, not only at West Point, but at other colleges. 

Although I had met the Academic board and come off with fair success, yet I knew so little of Algebra or any of the higher branches ofmathematics that during my first six months at the Academy I wasdiscouraged by many misgivings as to the future, for I speedilylearned that at the January examination the class would have to standa test much severer than that which had been applied to it onentering. I resolved to try hard, however, and, besides, goodfortune gave me for a room-mate a Cadet whose education was moreadvanced than mine, and whose studious habits and willingness to aidothers benefited me immensely. This room-mate was Henry W. Slocum, since so signally distinguished in both military and civil capacitiesas to win for his name a proud place in the annals of his country. After taps--that is, when by the regulations of the Academy all thelights were supposed to be extinguished, and everybody in bed--Slocumand I would hang a blanket over the one window of our room andcontinue our studies--he guiding me around scores of stumbling-blocksin Algebra and elucidating many knotty points in other branches ofthe course with which I was unfamiliar. On account of thisassociation I went up before the Board in January with lessuneasiness than otherwise would have been the case, and passed theexamination fairly well. When it was over, a self-confidence in mycapacity was established that had not existed hitherto, and at eachsucceeding examination I gained a little in order of merit till myfurlough summer came round--that is, when I was half through thefour-year course. 

My furlough in July and August, 1850, was spent at my home in Ohio, with the exception of a visit or two to other Cadets on furlough inthe State, and at the close of my leave I returned to the Academy inthe full expectation of graduating with my class in 1852. 

A quarrel of a belligerent character in September, ,1851, with CadetWilliam R. Terrill, put an end to this anticipation, however, andthrew me back into the class which graduated in 1853. Terrill was aCadet Sergeant, and, while my company was forming for parade, having, given me an order, in what I considered an improper tone, to "dress"in a certain direction, when I believed I was accurately dressed, Ifancied I had a grievance, and made toward him with a loweredbayonet, but my better judgment recalled me before actual contactcould take place. Of course Terrill reported me for this, and my irewas so inflamed by his action that when we next met I attacked him, and a fisticuff engagement in front of barracks followed, which wasstopped by an officer appearing on the scene. Each of us handed inan explanation, but mine was unsatisfactory to the authorities, for Ihad to admit that I was the assaulting party, and the result was thatI was suspended by the Secretary of War, Mr. Conrad, till August 28, 1852--the Superintendent of the Academy, Captain Brewerton, beinginduced to recommend this milder course, he said, by my previous goodconduct. At the time I thought, of course, my suspension a veryunfair punishment, that my conduct was justifiable and theauthorities of the Academy all wrong, but riper experience has led meto a different conclusion, and as I look back, though themortification I then endured was deep and trying, I am convinced thatit was hardly as much as I deserved for such an outrageous breach ofdiscipline. 

There was no question as to Terrill's irritating tone, but in givingme the order he was prompted by the duty of his position as a filecloser, and I was not the one to remedy the wrong which I conceivedhad been done me, and clearly not justifiable in assuming to correcthim with my own hands. In 1862, when General Buell's army wasassembling at Louisville, Terrill was with it as a brigadier-general(for, although a Virginian, he had remained loyal), and I then tookthe initiative toward a renewal of our acquaintance. Our renewedfriendship was not destined to be of long duration, I am sorry tosay, for a few days later, in the battle of Perryville, whilegallantly fighting for his country, poor Terrill was killed. 

My suspension necessitated my leaving the Academy, and I returnedhome in the fall of 1851, much crestfallen. Fortunately, my goodfriend Henry Dittoe again gave me employment in keeping the books ofhis establishment, and this occupation of my time made the ninemonths which were to elapse before I could go back to West Point passmuch more agreeably than they would have done had I been idle. InAugust, 1852, I joined the first class at the Academy in accordancewith the order of the War Department, taking my place at the foot ofthe class and graduating with it the succeeding June, numberthirty-four in a membership of fifty-two. At the head of this classgraduated James B. McPherson, who was killed in the Atlanta campaignwhile commanding the Army of the Tennessee. It also contained suchmen as John M. Schofield, who commanded the Army of the Ohio; JoshuaW. Sill, killed as a brigadier in the battle of Stone River; and manyothers who, in the war of the rebellion, on one side or the other, rose to prominence, General John B. Hood being the most distinguishedmember of the class among the Confederates. 

At the close of the final examination I made no formal applicationfor assignment to any particular arm of the service, for I knew thatmy standing would not entitle me to one of the existing vacancies, and that I should be obliged to take a place among the brevet secondlieutenants. When the appointments were made I therefore foundmyself attached to the First Infantry, well pleased that I hadsurmounted all the difficulties that confront the student at ournational school, and looking forward with pleasant anticipation tothe life before me. 

CHAPTER II. 

ORDERED TO FORT DUNCAN, TEXAS--"NORTHERS"--SCOUTINGDUTY--HUNTING--NEARLY CAUGHT BY THE INDIANS--A PRIMITIVE HABITATION--A BRAVE DRUMMERBOY'S DEATH--A MEXICAN BALL. 

On the 1st day of July, 1853, I was commissioned a brevet secondlieutenant in the First Regiment of United States Infantry, thenstationed in Texas. The company to which I was attached wasquartered at Fort Duncan, a military post on the Rio Grande oppositethe little town of Piedras Negras, on the boundary line between theUnited States and the Republic of Mexico. 

After the usual leave of three months following graduation from theMilitary Academy I was assigned to temporary duty at NewportBarracks, a recruiting station and rendezvous for the assignment ofyoung officers preparatory to joining their regiments. Here Iremained from September, 1853, to March, 1854, when I was ordered tojoin my company at Fort Duncan. To comply with this order Iproceeded by steamboat down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to NewOrleans, thence by steamer across the Gulf of Mexico to Indianola, Tex. , and after landing at that place, continued in a small schoonerthrough what is called the inside channel on the Gulf coast to CorpusChristi, the headquarters of Brigadier-General Persifer F. Smith, whowas commanding the Department of Texas. Here I met some of my oldfriends from the Military Academy, among them Lieutenant AlfredGibbs, who in the last year of the rebellion commanded under me abrigade of cavalry, and Lieutenant Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte, of theMounted Rifles, who resigned in 1854 to accept service in the FrenchImperial army, but to most of those about headquarters I was anentire stranger. Among the latter was Captain Stewart Van Vliet, ofthe Quartermaster's Department, now on the retired list. With him Isoon came in frequent contact, and, by reason of his connection withthe Quartermaster's Department, the kindly interest he took inforwarding my business inaugurated between us--a lasting friendship. 

A day or two after my arrival at Corpus Christi a train of Governmentwagons, loaded with subsistence stores and quartermaster's supplies, started for Laredo, a small town on the Rio Grande below Fort Duncan. There being no other means of reaching my station I put my smallpersonal possessions, consisting of a trunk, mattress, two blankets, and a pillow into one of the heavily loaded wagons and proceeded tojoin it, sitting on the boxes or bags of coffee and sugar, as I mightchoose. The movement of the train was very slow, as the soil wassoft on the newly made and sandy roads. We progressed but a fewmiles on our first day's journey, and in the evening parked our trainat a point where there was no wood, a scant supply of water--and thatof bad quality--but an abundance of grass. There being nocomfortable place to sleep in any of the wagons, filled as they wereto the bows with army supplies, I spread my blankets on the groundbetween the wheels of one of them, and awoke in the morning feelingas fresh and bright as would have been possible if all the comfortsof civilization had been at my command. 

It took our lumbering train many days to reach Laredo, a distance ofabout one hundred and sixty miles from Corpus Christi. Each marchwas but a repetition of the first day's journey, its monotonyoccasionally relieved, though, by the passage of immense flocks ofducks and geese, and the appearance at intervals of herds of deer, and sometimes droves of wild cattle, wild horses and mules. Thebands of wild horses I noticed were sometimes led by mules, butgenerally by stallions with long wavy manes, and flowing tails whichalmost touched the ground. 

We arrived at Laredo during one of those severe storms incident tothat section, which are termed "Northers" from the fact that thenorth winds culminate occasionally in cold windstorms, frequentlypreceded by heavy rains. Generally the blow lasts for three days, and the cold becomes intense and piercing. While the suddendepression of the temperature is most disagreeable, and often causesgreat suffering, it is claimed that these "Northers" make the climatemore healthy and endurable. They occur from October to May, and inaddition to the destruction which, through the sudden depression ofthe temperature, they bring on the herds in the interior, they areoften of sufficient violence to greatly injure the harbors on thecoast. 

The post near Laredo was called Fort McIntosh, and at this period thetroops stationed there consisted of eight companies of the FifthInfantry and two of the First, one of the First Artillery, and threeof the Mounted Rifles. Just before the "Norther" began these troopshad completed a redoubt for the defense of the post, with theexception of the ditches, but as the parapet was built of sand--theonly material about Laredo which could be obtained for itsconstruction--the severity of the winds was too much for such ashifting substance, and the work was entirely blown away early in thestorm. 

I was pleasantly and hospitably welcomed by the officers at the post, all of whom were living in tents, with no furniture except a cot andtrunk, and an improvised bed for a stranger, when one happened tocome along. After I had been kindly taken in by one of the youngerofficers, I reported to the commanding officer, and was informed byhim that he would direct the quartermaster to furnish me, as soon asconvenient, with transportation to Fort Duncan, the station of mycompany. 

In the course of a day or two, the quartermaster notified me that aGovernment six-mule wagon would be placed at my disposal to proceedto my destination. No better means offering, I concluded to set outin this conveyance, and, since it was also to carry a quantity ofquartermaster's property for Fort Duncan, I managed to obtain roomenough for my bed in the limited space between the bows and load, where I could rest tolerably well, and under cover at night, insteadof sleeping on the ground under the wagon, as I had done on the roadfrom Corpus Christi to Laredo. 

I reached Fort Duncan in March, 1854. , and was kindly received by thecommanding officer of the, regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel ThompsonMorris, and by the captain of my company ("D"), Eugene E. McLean, andhis charming wife the only daughter of General E. V. Sumner, who wasalready distinguished in our service, but much better known in afteryears in the operations of the Army of the Potomac, during its earlycampaigns in Virginia. Shortly after joining company "D" I was sentout on scouting duty with another company of the regiment to Camp LaPena, about sixty or seventy miles east of Fort Duncan, in a sectionof country that had for some time past been subjected to raids by theLipan and Comanche Indians. Our outpost at La Pena was intended as aprotection against the predatory incursions of these savages, soalmost constant scouting became a daily occupation. This enabled mesoon to become familiar with and make maps of the surroundingcountry, and, through constant association with our Mexican guide, topick up in a short time quite a smattering of the Spanish language, which was very useful to one serving on that frontier. 

At that early day western Texas was literally filled with game, andthe region in the immediate vicinity of La Pena contained its fullproportion of deer, antelope, and wild turkeys. The temptation tohunt was therefore constantly before me, and a desire to indulge inthis pastime, whenever free from the legitimate duty of the camp, soon took complete possession of me, so expeditions in pursuit ofgame were of frequent occurrence. In these expeditions I was alwaysaccompanied by a soldier named Frankman, belonging to "D" company, who was a fine sportsman, and a butcher by trade. In a short periodI learned from Frankman how to approach and secure the differentspecies of game, and also how to dress and care for it when killed. Almost every expedition we made was rewarded with a good supply ofdeer, antelope, and wild turkeys, and we furnished the command incamp with such abundance that it was relieved from the necessity ofdrawing its beef ration, much to the discomfiture of the disgruntledbeef contractor. 

The camp at La Pena was on sandy ground, unpleasant for men andanimals, and by my advice it was moved to La Pendencia, not far fromLake Espantosa. Before removal from our old location, however, earlyone bright morning Frankman and I started on one of our customaryexpeditions, going down La Pena Creek to a small creek, at the headof which we had established a hunting rendezvous. After proceedingalong the stream for three or four miles we saw a column of smoke onthe prairie, and supposing it arose from a camp of Mexican rancheroscatching wild horses or wild cattle, and even wild mules, which werevery numerous in that section of country along the Nueces River, wethought we would join the party and see how much success they werehaving, and observe the methods employed in this laborious andsometimes dangerous vocation. With this object in view, we continuedon until we found it necessary to cross to the other side of thecreek to reach the point indicated by the smoke. Just beforereaching the crossing I discovered moccasin tracks near the water'sedge, and realizing in an instant that the camp we were approachingmight possibly be one of hostile Indians--all Indians in that countryat that time were hostile--Frankman and I backed out silently, andmade eager strides for La Pena, where we had scarcely arrived whenCaptain M. E. Van Buren, of the Mounted Rifle regiment, came in witha small command, and reported that he was out in pursuit of a band ofComanche Indians, which had been committing depredations up aboutFort Clark, but that he had lost the trail. I immediately informedhim of what had occurred to me during the morning, and that I couldput him on the trail of the Indians he was desirous of punishing. 

We hurriedly supplied with rations his small command of thirteen, men, and I then conducted him to the point where I had seen thesmoke, and there we found signs indicating it to be the recentlyabandoned camp of the Indians he was pursuing, and we also noticedthat prairie rats had formed the principal article of diet at themeal they had just completed. As they had gone, I could do no morethan put him on the trail made in their departure, which was wellmarked; for Indians, when in small parties, and unless pressed, usually follow each other in single file. Captain Van Buren followedthe trail by Fort Ewell, and well down toward Corpus Christi, day andnight, until the Indians, exhausted and used up, halted, on an openplain, unsaddled their horses, mounted bareback, and offered battle. Their number was double that of Van Buren's detachment, but heattacked them fearlessly, and in the fight was mortally wounded by anarrow which entered his body in front, just above the sword belt, andcame through the belt behind. The principal chief of the Indians waskilled, and the rest fled. Captain Van Buren's men carried him toCorpus Christi, where in a few days he died. 

After our removal to La Pendencia a similar pursuit of savagesoccurred, but with more fortunate results. Colonel John H. King, nowon the retired list, then a captain in the First Infantry, came toour camp in pursuit of a marauding band of hostile Indians, and I wasenabled to put him also on the trail. He soon overtook them, andkilling two without loss to himself, the band dispersed like a flockof quail and left him nothing to follow. He returned to our campshortly after, and the few friendly Indian scouts he had with himheld a grand pow-wow and dance over the scalps of the fallen braves. 

Around La Pendencia, as at La Pena, the country abounded in deer, antelope, wild turkeys, and quail, and we killed enough to supplyabundantly the whole command with the meat portion of the ration. Some mornings Frankman and I would bring in as many as seven deer, and our hunting expeditions made me so familiar with the regionbetween our camp and Fort Duncan, the headquarters of the regiment, that I was soon enabled to suggest a more direct route ofcommunication than the circuitous one then traversed, and ina short time it was established. 

Up to this time I had been on detached duty, but soon my own companywas ordered into the field to occupy a position on Turkey Creek, about ten or twelve miles west of the Nueces River, on the road fromSan Antonio to Fort Duncan, and I was required to join the company. Here constant work and scouting were necessary, as our camp wasspecially located with reference to protecting from Indian raids theroad running from San Antonio to Fort Duncan, and on to the interiorof Mexico. In those days this road was the great line of travel, andMexican caravans were frequently passing over it, to and fro, in sucha disorganized condition as often to invite attack from maraudingComanches and Lipans. Our time, therefore, was incessantly occupiedin scouting, but our labors were much lightened because they weredirected with intelligence and justice by Captain McLean, whoseagreeable manners and upright methods are still so impressed on mymemory that to this day I look back upon my service with "D" Companyof the First Infantry as among those events which I remember withmost pleasure. 

In this manner my first summer of active field duty passed rapidlyaway, and in the fall my company returned to Fort Duncan to go intowinter quarters. These quarters, when constructed, consisted of "A"tents pitched under a shed improvised by the company. With onlythese accommodations I at first lived around as best I could untilthe command was quartered, and then, requesting a detail of wagonsfrom the quartermaster, I went out some thirty miles to get poles tobuild a more comfortable habitation for myself. In a few days enoughpoles for the construction of a modest residence were secured andbrought in, and then the building of my house began. First, thepoles were cut the proper length, planted in a trench around foursides of a square of very small proportions, and secured at the topby string-pieces stretched from one angle to another, in whichhalf-notches hack been made at proper intervals to receive theuprights. The poles were then made rigid by strips nailed onhalf-way to the ground, giving the sides of the structure firmness, but the interstices were large and frequent; still, with the aid ofsome old condemned paulins obtained from the quartermaster, the wallswere covered and the necessity for chinking obviated. This method ofcovering the holes in the side walls also possessed the advantage ofpermitting some little light to penetrate to the interior of thehouse, and avoided the necessity of constructing a window, for which, by the way, no glass could have been obtained. Next a good largefire-place and chimney were built in one corner by means of stonesand mud, and then the roof was put on--a thatched one of prairiegrass. The floor was dirt compactly tamped. 

My furniture was very primitive: a chair or two, with about the samenumber of camp stools, a cot, and a rickety old bureau that Iobtained in some way not now remembered. My washstand consisted of aboard about three feet long, resting on legs formed by driving sticksinto the ground until they held it at about the proper height fromthe floor. This washstand was the most expensive piece of furnitureI owned, the board having cost me three dollars, and even then Iobtained it as a favor, for lumber on the Rio Grande was so scarce inthose days that to possess even the smallest quantity was to indulgein great luxury. Indeed, about all that reached the post was whatcame in the shape of bacon boxes, and the boards from these werereserved for coffins in which to bury our dead. 

In this rude habitation I spent a happy winter, and was morecomfortably off than many of the officers, who had built none, butlived in tents and took the chances of "Northers. " During this periodour food was principally the soldier's ration: flour, pickled pork, nasty bacon--cured in the dust of ground charcoal--and fresh beef, ofwhich we had a plentiful supply, supplemented with game of variouskinds. The sugar, coffee, and smaller parts of the ration were good, but we had no vegetables, and the few jars of preserves and some fewvegetables kept by the sutler were too expensive to be indulged in. So during all the period I lived at Fort Duncan and its sub-camps, nearly sixteen months, fresh vegetables were practicallyunobtainable. To prevent scurvy we used the juice of the magueyplant, called pulque, and to obtain a supply of this anti-scorbutic Iwas often detailed to march the company out about forty miles, cutthe plant, load up two or three wagons with the stalks, and carrythem to camp. Here the juice was extracted by a rude press, and putin bottles until it fermented and became worse in odor thansulphureted hydrogen. At reveille roll-call every morning thisfermented liquor was dealt out to the company, and as it was my duty, in my capacity of subaltern, to attend these roll-calls and see thatthe men took their ration of pulque, I always began the duty bydrinking a cup of the repulsive stuff myself. Though hard toswallow, its well-known specific qualities in the prevention and cureof scurvy were familiar to all, so every man in the command gulpeddown his share notwithstanding its vile taste and odor. 

Considering our isolation, the winter passed very pleasantly to usall. The post was a large one, its officers congenial, and we hadmany enjoyable occasions. Dances, races, and horseback riding filledin much of the time, and occasional raids from Indians furnished moreserious occupation in the way of a scout now and then. The proximityof the Indians at times rendered the surrounding country somewhatdangerous for individuals or small parties at a distance from thefort; but few thought the savages would come near, so many risks weredoubtless run by various officers, who carried the familiarsix-shooter as their only weapon while out horseback riding, untilsuddenly we were awakened to the dangers we had been incurring. 

About mid-winter a party of hostile Lipans made a swoop around andskirting the garrison, killing a herder--a discharged drummer-boy--insight of the flag-staff. Of course great excitement followed. Captain J. G. Walker, of the Mounted Rifles, immediately started withhis company in pursuit of the Indians, and I was directed toaccompany the command. Not far away we found the body of the boyfilled with arrows, and near him the body of a fine looking youngIndian, whom the lad had undoubtedly killed before he was himselfoverpowered. We were not a great distance behind the Indians whenthe boy's body was discovered, and having good trailers we gained onthem rapidly, with the prospect of overhauling them, but as soon asthey found we were getting near they headed for the Rio Grande, madethe crossing to the opposite bank, and were in Mexico before we couldovertake them. When on the other side of the boundary they grew verybrave, daring us to come over to fight them, well aware all the timethat the international line prevented us from continuing the pursuit. So we had to return to the post without reward for our exertionexcept the consciousness of having made the best effort we could tocatch the murderers. That night, in company with Lieutenant ThomasG. Williams, I crossed over the river to the Mexican village ofPiedras Negras, and on going to a house where a large baille, ordance, was going on we found among those present two of the Indianswe had been chasing. As soon as they saw us they strung their bowsfor a fight, and we drew our six-shooters, but the Mexicans quicklyclosed in around the Indians and forced them out of the house--orrude jackal--where the "ball" was being held, and they escaped. Welearned later something about the nature of the fight the drummer hadmade, and that his death had cost them dear, for, in addition to theIndian killed and lying by his side, he had mortally wounded anotherand seriously wounded a third, with the three shots that he hadfired. 

At this period I took up the notion of making a study of ornithology, incited to it possibly by the great number of bright-colored birdsthat made their winter homes along the Rio Grande, and I spent many aleisure hour in catching specimens by means of stick traps, withwhich I found little difficulty in securing almost every variety ofthe feathered tribes. I made my traps by placing four sticks of alength suited to the size desired so as to form a square, andbuilding up on them in log-cabin fashion until the structure camealmost to a point by contraction of the corners. Then the stickswere made secure, the trap placed at some secluded spot, and from thecentre to the outside a trench was dug in the ground, and thinlycovered when a depth had been obtained that would leave an aperturesufficiently large to admit the class of birds desired. Along thistrench seeds and other food were scattered, which the birds soondiscovered, and of course began to eat, unsuspectingly following thetempting bait through the gallery till they emerged from its fartherend in the centre of the trap, where they contentedly fed till thefood was all gone. Then the fact of imprisonment first presenteditself, and they vainly endeavored to escape through the intersticesof the cage, never once guided by their instinct to return to libertythrough the route by which they had entered. 

Among the different kinds of birds captured in this way, mocking-birds, blue-birds, robins, meadow larks, quail, and ploverwere the most numerous. They seemed to have more voracious appetitesthan other varieties, or else they were more unwary, and consequentlymore easily caught. A change of station, however, put an end to myornithological plans, and activities of other kinds prevented me fromresuming them in after life. 

There were quite a number of young officers at the post during thewinter, and as our relations with the Mexican commandant at PiedrasNegras were most amicable, we were often invited to dances at hishouse. He and his hospitable wife and daughter drummed up the femaleportion of the elite of Piedras Negras and provided the house, whichwas the official as well as the personal residence of the commandant, while we--the young officers--furnished the music and suchsweetmeats, candies, &c. , for the baille as the country would afford. 

We generally danced in a long hall on a hard dirt floor. The girlssat on one side of the hall, chaperoned by their mothers or some oldduennas, and the men on the other. When the music struck up each manasked the lady whom his eyes had already selected to dance with him, and it was not etiquette for her to refuse--no engagements beingallowed before the music began. When the dance, which was generallya long waltz, was over, he seated his partner, and then went to alittle counter at the end of the room and bought his dulcinea a plateof the candies and sweetmeats provided. Sometimes she accepted them, but most generally pointed to her duenna or chaperon behind, who heldup her apron and caught the refreshments as they were slid into itfrom the plate. The greatest decorum was maintained at these dances, primitively as they were conducted; and in a region so completely cutoff from the world, their influence was undoubtedly beneficial to aconsiderable degree in softening the rough edges in a half-breedpopulation. 

The inhabitants of this frontier of Mexico were strongly marked withIndian characteristics, particularly with those of the Comanche type, and as the wild Indian blood predominated, few of the physical traitsof the Spaniard remained among them, and outlawry was common. TheSpanish conquerors had left on the northern border only theirgraceful manners and their humility before the cross. The sign ofChristianity was prominently placed at all important points on roadsor trails, and especially where any one had been killed; and as theComanche Indians, strong and warlike, had devastated northeasternMexico in past years, all along the border, on both sides of the RioGrande, the murderous effects of their raids were evidenced bynumberless crosses. For more than a century forays had been made onthe settlements and towns by these bloodthirsty savages, and, theMexican Government being too weak to afford protection, property wasdestroyed, the women and children carried off or ravished, and themen compelled to look on in an agony of helplessness till relieved bydeath. During all this time, however, the forms and ceremonials ofreligion, and the polite manners received from the Spaniards, wereretained, and reverence for the emblems of Christianity was alwaysuppermost in the mind of even the most ignorant. 

CHAPTER III. 

ORDERED TO FORT READING, CAL. --A DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING--A RESCUEDSOLDIER--DISCOVERING INDIANS--PRIMITIVE FISHING--A DESERTEDVILLAGE--CAMPING OPPOSITE FORT VANCOUVER. 

In November, 1854, I received my promotion to a second lieutenancy inthe Fourth Infantry, which was stationed in California and Oregon. Inorder to join my company at Fort Reading, California, I had to go toNew York as a starting point, and on arrival there, was placed onduty, in May, 1855, in command of a detachment of recruits atBedloe's Island, intended for assignment to the regiments on thePacific coast. I think there were on the island (now occupied by thestatue of Liberty Enlightening the World) about three hundredrecruits. For a time I was the only officer with them, but shortlybefore we started for California, Lieutenant Francis H. Bates, of theFourth Infantry, was placed in command. We embarked for the Pacificcoast in July, 1855, and made the journey without incident via theIsthmus of Panama, in due time landing our men at Benecia Barracks, above San Francisco. 

From this point I proceeded to join my company at Fort Reading, andon reaching that post, found orders directing me to relieveLieutenant John B. Hood--afterward well known as a distinguishedgeneral in the Confederate service. Lieutenant Hood was in commandof the personal mounted escort of Lieutenant R. S. Williamson, whowas charged with the duty of making such explorations and surveys aswould determine the practicability of connecting, by railroad, theSacramento Valley in California with the Columbia River in OregonTerritory, either through the Willamette Valley, or (if this routeshould prove to be impracticable) by the valley of the Des ChutesRiver near the foot-slopes of the Cascade chain. The survey wasbeing made in accordance with an act of Congress, which provided bothfor ascertaining the must practicable and economical route for arailroad between the Mississippi River and the Pacific Ocean, and formilitary and geographical surveys west of the Mississippi River. 

Fort Reading was the starting-point for this exploring expedition, and there I arrived some four or five days after the party underLieutenant Williamson had begun its march. His personal escortnumbered about sixty mounted men, made up of detachments fromcompanies of the First Dragoons, under command of Lieutenant Hood, together with about one hundred men belonging to the Fourth Infantryand Third Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Horatio Gates Gibson, the present colonel of the Third United States Artillery. LieutenantGeorge Crook--now major-general--was the quartermaster and commissaryof subsistence of the expedition. 

The commanding officer at Fort Reading seemed reluctant to let me goon to relieve Lieutenant Hood, as the country to be passed over wasinfested by the Pit River Indians, known to be hostile to whitepeople and especially to small parties. I was very anxious toproceed, however, and willing to take the chances; so, consent beingfinally obtained, I started with a corporal and two mounted men, through a wild and uninhabited region, to overtake if possibleLieutenant Williamson. Being on horseback, and unencumbered byluggage of any kind except blankets and a little hard bread, coffeeand smoking-tobacco, which were all carried on our riding animals, wewere sanguine of succeeding, for we traversed in one day fully thedistance made in three by Lieutenant Williamson's party on foot. 

The first day we reached the base of Lassan's Butte, where Idetermined to spend the night near an isolated cabin, or dugout, thathad been recently constructed by a hardy pioneer. The wind wasblowing a disagreeable gale, which had begun early in the day. Thismade it desirable to locate our camp under the best cover we couldfind, and I spent some little time in looking about for asatisfactory place, but nothing better offered than a large fallentree, which lay in such a direction that by encamping on its lee sidewe would be protected from the fury of the storm. This spot wastherefore fixed upon, and preparation made for spending the night ascomfortably as the circumstances would permit. 

After we had unsaddled I visited the cabin to inquire in regard tothe country ahead, and there found at first only a soldier ofWilliamson's party; later the proprietor of the ranch appeared. Thesoldier had been left behind by the surveying party on account ofillness, with instructions to make his way back to Fort Reading asbest he could when he recovered. His condition having greatlyimproved, however, since he had been left, he now begged me inbeseeching terms to take him along with my party, which I finallyconsented to do, provided that if he became unable to keep up withme, and I should be obliged to abandon him, the responsibility wouldbe his, not mine. This increased my number to five, and was quite areinforcement should we run across any hostile Indians; but it wasalso certain to prove an embarrassment should the man again fall ill. 

During the night, notwithstanding the continuance of the storm, I hada very sound and refreshing sleep behind the protecting log where wemade our camp, and at daylight next morning we resumed our journey, fortified by a breakfast of coffee and hard bread. I skirted aroundthe base of Lassan's Butte, thence down Hat Creek, all the timefollowing the trail made by Lieutenant Williamson's party. Aboutnoon the soldier I had picked up at my first camp gave out, and couldgo no farther. As stipulated when I consented to take him along, Ihad the right to abandon him, but when it came to the test I couldnot make up my mind to do it. Finding a good place not far off thetrail, one of my men volunteered to remain with him until he died;and we left them there, with a liberal supply of hard bread andcoffee, believing that we would never again see the invalid. Myreinforcement was already gone, and another man with it. 

With my diminished party I resumed the trail and followed it untilabout 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when we heard the sound of voices, and the corporal, thinking we were approaching LieutenantWilliamson's party, was so overjoyed in anticipation of the junction, that he wanted to fire his musket as an expression of his delight. This I prevented his doing, however, and we continued cautiously andslowly on to develop the source of the sounds in front. We had notgone far before I discovered that the noise came from a band of PitRiver Indians, who had struck the trail of the surveying expedition, and were following it up, doubtless with evil intent. Dismountingfrom my horse I counted the moccasin tracks to ascertain the numberof Indians, discovered it to be about thirty, and then followed onbehind them cautiously, but with little difficulty, as appearances ofspeed on their part indicated that they wished to overtake LieutenantWilliamson's party, which made them less on the lookout than usualfor any possible pursuers. After following the trail until nearlysundown, I considered it prudent to stop for the night, and drew offsome little distance, where, concealed in a dense growth of timber, we made our camp. 

As I had with me now only two men, I felt somewhat nervous, so Iallowed no fires to be built, and in consequence our supper consistedof hard bread only. I passed an anxious night, but beyond our ownsolicitude there was nothing to disturb us, the Indians being toomuch interested in overtaking the party in front to seek for victimsin the rear, After a hard-bread breakfast we started again on thetrail, and had proceeded but a short distance when, hearing thevoices of the Indians, we at once slackened our speed so as not toovertake them. 

Most of the trail on which we traveled during the morning ran over anexceedingly rough lava formation--a spur of the lava beds oftendescribed during the Modoc war of 1873 so hard and flinty thatWilliamson's large command made little impression on its surface, leaving in fact, only indistinct traces of its line of march. Bycare and frequent examinations we managed to follow his route throughwithout much delay, or discovery by the Indians, and about noon, owing to the termination of the lava formation, we descended into thevalley of Hat Greek, a little below where it emerges from the secondcanon and above its confluence with Pit River. As soon as we reachedthe fertile soil of the valley, we found Williamson's trail welldefined, deeply impressed in the soft loam, and coursing throughwild-flowers and luxuriant grass which carpeted the ground on everyhand. 

When we struck this delightful locality we traveled with considerablespeed, and after passing over hill and vale for some distance, thetrail becoming more and more distinct all the time, I suddenly saw infront of me the Pit River Indians. 

This caused a halt, and having hurriedly re-capped our guns andsix-shooters, thus preparing for the worst, I took a look at the bandthrough my field-glass. They were a half-mile or more in our frontand numbered about thirty individuals, armed with bows and arrowsonly. Observing us they made friendly demonstrations, but I had notimplicit faith in a Pit River Indian at that period of the settlementof our country, and especially in that wild locality, so after a"council of war" with the corporal and man, I concluded to advance toa point about two hundred yards distant from the party, when, relyingon the speed of our horses rather than on the peaceable intentions ofthe savages, I hoped to succeed in cutting around them and take thetrail beyond. Being on foot they could not readily catch us, andinasmuch as their arrows were good for a range of only about sixtyyards, I had no fear of any material damage on that score. 

On reaching the place selected for our flank movement we made a dashto the left of the trail, through the widest part of the valley, andran our horses swiftly by, but I noticed that the Indians did notseem to be disturbed by the manoeuvre and soon realized that thisindifference was occasioned by the knowledge that we could not crossHat Creek, a deep stream with vertical banks, too broad to be leapedby our horses. We were obliged, therefore, to halt, and the Indiansagain made demonstrations of friendship, some of them even gettinginto the stream to show that they were at the ford. Thus reassured, we regained our confidence and boldly crossed the river in the midstof them. After we had gained the bluff on the other side of thecreek, I looked down into the valley of Pit River, and could plainlysee the camp of the surveying party. Its proximity was the influencewhich had doubtless caused the peaceable conduct of the Indians. Probably the only thing that saved us was their ignorance of ourbeing in their rear, until we stumbled on them almost within sight ofthe large party under Williamson. 

The Pit River Indians were very hostile at that time, and for manysucceeding years their treachery and cruelty brought misfortune andmisery to the white settlers who ventured their lives in search ofhome and fortune in the wild and isolated section over which thesesavages roamed. Not long after Williamson's party passed throughtheir country, the Government was compelled to send into it aconsiderable force for the purpose of keeping them under control. The outcome of this was a severe fight--resulting in the loss of agood many lives--between the hostiles and a party of our troops underLieutenant George Crook. It finally ended in the establishment of amilitary post in the vicinity of the battle-ground, for the permanentoccupation of the country. 

A great load was lifted from my heart when I found myself so nearWilliamson's camp, which I joined August 4, 1855, receiving a warmwelcome from the officers. During the afternoon I relievedLieutenant Hood of the command of the personal escort, and he wasordered to return, with twelve of the mounted men, over the trail Ihad followed. I pointed out to him on the map the spot where hewould find the two men left on the roadside, and he was directed totake them into Fort Reading. They were found without difficulty, andcarried in to the post. The sick man--Duryea--whom I had expectednever to see again, afterward became the hospital steward at FortYamhill, Oregon, when I was stationed there. 

The Indians that I had passed at the ford came to the bluff above thecamp, and arranging themselves in a squatting posture, looked downupon Williamson's party with longing eyes, in expectation of a feast. They were a pitiable lot, almost naked, hungry and cadaverous. Indians are always hungry, but these poor creatures were particularlyso, as their usual supply of food had grown very scarce from onecause and another. 

In prosperity they mainly subsisted on fish, or game killed with thebow and arrow. When these sources failed they lived on grasshoppers, and at this season the grasshopper was their principal food. Informer years salmon were very abundant in the streams of theSacramento Valley, and every fall they took great quantities of thesefish and dried them for winter use, but alluvial mining had of lateyears defiled the water of the different streams and driven the fishout. On this account the usual supply of salmon was very limited. They got some trout high up on the rivers, above the sluices androckers of the miners, but this was a precarious source from which toderive food, as their means of taking the trout were very primitive. They had neither hooks nor lines, but depended entirely on acontrivance made from long, slender branches of willow, which grew onthe banks of most of the streams. One of these branches would becut, and after sharpening the butt-end to a point, split a certaindistance, and by a wedge the prongs divided sufficiently to admit afish between. The Indian fisherman would then slyly put the forkedend in the water over his intended victim, and with a quick dartfirmly wedge him between the prongs. When secured there, the work oflanding him took but a moment. When trout were plentiful thisprimitive mode of taking them was quite successful, and I have oftenknown hundreds of pounds to be caught in this way, but when they werescarce and suspicious the rude method was not rewarded with goodresults. 

The band looking down on us evidently had not had much fish or gameto eat for some time, so when they had made Williamson understandthat they were suffering for food he permitted them to come intocamp, and furnished them with a supply, which they greedily swallowedas fast as it was placed at their service, regardless of possibleindigestion. When they had eaten all they could hold, theirenjoyment was made complete by the soldiers, who gave them a quantityof strong plug tobacco. This they smoked incessantly, inhaling allthe smoke, so that none of the effect should be lost. When weabandoned this camp the next day, the miserable wretches remained init and collected the offal about the cooks' fires to feast stillmore, piecing out the meal, no doubt, with their staple article offood--grasshoppers. 

On the morning of August 5 Lieutenant Hood started back to FortReading, and Lieutenant Williamson resumed his march for the ColumbiaRiver. Our course was up Pit River, by the lower and upper canons, then across to the Klamath Lakes, then east, along their edge to theupper lake. At the middle Klamath Lake, just after crossing LostRiver and the Natural Bridge, we met a small party of citizens fromJacksonville, Oregon, looking for hostile Indians who had committedsome depredations in their neighborhood. From them we learned thatthe Rogue River Indians in southern Oregon were on the war-path, andthat as the "regular troops up there were of no account, the citizenshad taken matters in hand, and intended cleaning up the hostiles. "They swaggered about our camp, bragged a good deal, cursed theIndians loudly, and soundly abused the Government for not giving thembetter protection. It struck me, however, that they had not workedvery hard to find the hostiles; indeed, it could plainly be seen thattheir expedition was a town-meeting sort of affair, and that anxietyto get safe home was uppermost in their thoughts. The enthusiasmwith which they started had all oozed out, and that night theymarched back to Jacksonville. The next day, at the head of the lake, we came across an Indian village, and I have often wondered sincewhat would have been the course pursued by these valiant warriorsfrom Jacksonville had they gone far enough to get into its vicinity. 

When we reached the village the tepees--made of grass--were allstanding, the fires burning and pots boiling--the pots filled withcamas and tula roots--but not an Indian was to be seen. Williamsondirected that nothing in the village should be disturbed; so guardswere placed over it to carry out his instructions and we went intocamp just a little beyond. We had scarcely established ourselveswhen a very old Indian rose up from the high grass some distance off, and with peaceable signs approached our camp, evidently for thepurpose of learning whether or not our intentions were hostile. Williamson told him we were friendly; that we had passed through hisvillage without molesting it, that we had put a guard there to securethe property his people had abandoned in their fright, and that theymight come back in safety. The old man searchingly eyed everythingaround for some little time, and gaining confidence from thepeaceable appearance of the men, who were engaged in putting up thetents and preparing their evening meal, he concluded to accept ourprofessions of friendship, and bring his people in. Going out abouthalf a mile from the village he gave a peculiar yell, at whichbetween three and four hundred Indians arose simultaneously from theground, and in answer to his signal came out of the tall grass like aswarm of locusts and soon overran our camp in search of food, forlike all Indians they were hungry. They too, proved to be PitRivers, and were not less repulsive than those of their tribe we hadmet before. They were aware of the hostilities going on between theRogue Rivers and the whites, but claimed that they had not taken anypart in them. I question if they had, but had our party been small, I fear we should have been received at their village in a verydifferent manner. 

From the upper Klamath Lake we marched over the divide and down thevalley of the Des Chutes River to a point opposite the mountainscalled the Three Sisters. Here, on September 23, the party divided, Williamson and I crossing through the crater of the Three Sisters andalong the western slope of the Cascade Range, until we struck thetrail on McKenzie River, which led us into the Willamette Valley notfar from Eugene City. We then marched down the Willamette Valley toPortland, Oregon, where we arrived October 9, 1855

The infantry portion of the command, escorting Lieutenant Henry L. Abbot, followed farther down the Des Chutes River, to a pointopposite Mount Hood, from which it came into the Willamette Valleyand then marched to Portland. At Portland we all united, and movingacross the point between the Willamette and Columbia rivers, encampedopposite Fort Vancouver, on the south bank of the latter stream, onthe farm of an old settler named Switzler, who had located there manyyears before. 

CHAPTER IV. 

"OLD RED"--SKILLFUL SHOOTING--YAKIMA--WAR--A LUDICROUSMISTAKE--"CUT-MOUTH JOHN'S" ENCOUNTER--FATHER PANDOZA'SMISSION--A SNOW-STORM--FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION. 

Our camp on the Columbia, near Fort Vancouver, was beautifullysituated on a grassy sward close to the great river; and--as littleduty was required of us after so long a journey, amusement of onekind or another, and an interchange of visits with the officers atthe post, filled in the time acceptably. We had in camp an oldmountaineer guide who had accompanied us on the recent march, and whohad received the sobriquet of "Old Red, " on account of the shocky andtangled mass of red hair and beard, which covered his head and faceso completely that only his eyes could be seen. His eccentricitiesconstantly supplied us with a variety of amusements. Among thepastimes he indulged in was one which exhibited his skill with therifle, and at the same time protected the camp from the intrusionsand ravages of a drove of razor-backed hogs which belonged to Mr. Switzler. These hogs were frequent visitors, and very destructive toour grassy sward, rooting it up in front of our tents and all aboutus; in pursuit of bulbous roots and offal from the camp. Old Redconceived the idea that it would be well to disable the pigs byshooting off the tips of their snouts, and he proceeded to put hisconception into execution, and continued it daily whenever the hogsmade their appearance. Of course their owner made a row about it;but when Old Red daily settled for his fun by paying liberally withgold-dust from some small bottles of the precious metal in hispossession, Switzler readily became contented, and I think evenencouraged the exhibitions--of skill. 

It was at this period (October, 1855) that the Yakima Indian warbroke out, and I was detached from duty with the exploring party andrequired by Major Gabriel J. Rains, then commanding the district, tojoin an expedition against the Yakimas. They had some time beforekilled their agent, and in consequence a force under Major GranvilleO. Haller had been sent out from the Dalles of the Columbia tochastise them; but the expedition had not been successful; in fact, it had been driven back, losing a number of men and two mountainhowitzers. 

The object of the second expedition was to retrieve this disaster. The force was composed of a small body of regular troops, and aregiment of Oregon mounted volunteers under command of Colonel JamesW. Nesmith--subsequently for several years United States Senator fromOregon. The whole force was under the command of Major Rains, FourthInfantry, who, in order that he might rank Nesmith, by somehocus-pocus had been made a brigadier-general, under an appointmentfrom the Governor of Washington Territory. 

We started from the Dalles October 30, under conditions that were notconducive to success. The season was late for operations; and worsestill, the command was not in accord with the commanding officer, because of general belief in his incompetency, and on account of thefictitious rank he assumed. On the second day out I struck a smallbody of Indians with my detachment of dragoons, but was unable to dothem any particular injury beyond getting possession of a largequantity of their winter food, which their hurried departurecompelled them to abandon. This food consisted principally of driedsalmon-pulverized and packed in sacks made of grass-driedhuckleberries, and dried camas; the latter a bulbous root about thesize of a small onion, which, when roasted and ground, is made intobread by the Indians and has a taste somewhat like cooked chestnuts. 

Our objective point was Father Pandoza's Mission, in the YakimaValley, which could be reached by two different routes, and thoughcelerity of movement was essential, our commanding officer"strategically" adopted the longer route, and thus the Indians hadample opportunity to get away with their horses, cattle, women andchildren, and camp property. 

After the encounter which I just now referred to, the command, whichhad halted to learn the results of my chase, resumed its march to andthrough the Klikitat canon, and into the lower Yakima Valley, in thedirection of the Yakima River. I had charge at the head of thecolumn as it passed through the canon, and on entering the valleybeyond, saw in the distance five or six Indian scouts, whom I pressedvery closely, until after a run of several miles they escaped acrossthe Yakima River. 

The soil in the valley was light and dry, and the movement of animalsover it raised great clouds of dust, that rendered it very difficultto distinguish friend from foe; and as I was now separated from themain column a considerable distance, I deemed it prudent to call ahalt until we could discover the direction taken by the principalbody of the Indians. We soon learned that they had gone up thevalley, and looking that way, we discovered a column of alkali dustapproaching us, about a mile distant, interposing between my littledetachment and the point where I knew General Rains intended toencamp for the night. After hastily consulting with LieutenantEdward H. Day, of the Third United States Artillery, who was with me, we both concluded that the dust was caused by a body of the enemywhich had slipped in between us and our main force. There seemed noalternative left us but to get back to our friends by chargingthrough these Indians; and as their cloud of dust was much largerthan ours, this appeared a desperate chance. Preparations to chargewere begun, however, but, much to our surprise, before they werecompleted the approaching party halted for a moment and thencommenced to retreat. This calmed the throbbing of our hearts, andwith a wild cheer we started in a hot pursuit, that continued forabout two miles, when to our great relief we discovered that we weredriving into Rains's camp a squadron of Nesmith's battalion of Oregonvolunteers that we had mistaken for Indians, and who in turn believedus to be the enemy. When camp was reached, we all indulged in ahearty laugh over the affair, and at the fright each party had giventhe other. The explanations which ensued proved that the squadron ofvolunteers had separated from the column at the same time that I hadwhen we debouched from the canon, and had pursued an intermediatetrail through the hills, which brought it into the valley of theYakima at a point higher up the river than where I had struck it. 

Next day we resumed our march up the valley, parallel to the Yakima. About 1 o'clock we saw a large body of Indians on the opposite sideof the river, and the general commanding made up his mind to crossand attack them. The stream was cold, deep, and swift, still Isucceeded in passing my dragoons over safely, but had hardly got themwell on the opposite bank when the Indians swooped down upon us. Dismounting my men, we received the savages with a heavy fire, whichbrought them to a halt with some damage and more or less confusion. 

General Rains now became very much excited and alarmed about me, andendeavored to ford the swift river with his infantry and artillery, but soon had to abandon the attempt, as three or four of the poorfellows were swept off their feet and drowned. Meantime Nesmith cameup with his mounted force, crossed over, and joined me. 

The Indians now fell back to a high ridge, on the crest of which theymarched and countermarched, threatening to charge down its face. Most of them were naked, and as their persons were painted in gaudycolors and decorated with strips of red flannel, red blankets and gaywar-bonnets, their appearance presented a scene of picturesquebarbarism, fascinating but repulsive. As they numbered about sixhundred, the chances of whipping them did not seem overwhelmingly inour favor, yet Nesmith and I concluded we would give them a littlefight, provided we could engage them without going beyond the ridge. But all our efforts were in vain, for as we advanced they retreated, and as we drew back they reappeared and renewed their parade andnoisy demonstrations, all the time beating their drums and yellinglustily. They could not be tempted into a fight where we desired it, however, and as we felt unequal to any pursuit beyond the ridgewithout the assistance of the infantry and artillery, we re-crossedthe river and encamped with Rains. It soon became apparent that thenoisy demonstrations of the Indians were intended only as a blind tocover the escape of their women and children to a place of safety inthe mountains. 

Next morning we took up our march without crossing the river; and asour route would lead us by the point on the opposite bank where theIndians had made their picturesque display the day before, they at anearly hour came over to our side, and rapidly moved ahead of us tosome distant hills, leaving in our pathway some of the moreventuresome young braves, who attempted, to retard our advance byopening fire at long range from favorable places where they layconcealed. This fire did us little harm, but it had the effect ofmaking our progress so slow that the patience of every one butGeneral Rains was well-nigh exhausted. 

About 2 o'clock in the afternoon we arrived well up near the base ofthe range of hills, and though it was growing late we still had timeto accomplish something, but our commanding officer decided that itwas best to go into camp, and make a systematic attack next morning. I proposed that he let me charge with my dragoons through the narrowcanon where the river broke through the range, while the infantryshould charge up the hill and drive the enemy from the top down onthe other side. In this way I thought we might possibly catch someof the fugitives, but his extreme caution led him to refuse thesuggestion, so we pitched our tents out of range of their desultoryfire, but near enough to observe plainly their menacing andtantalizing exhibitions of contempt. 

In addition to firing occasionally, they called us all sorts of badnames, made indecent gestures, and aggravated us, so that between 3and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, by an inexplicable concert of action, and with a serious breach of discipline, a large number of the menand many of the officers broke en masse from the camp with loud yellsand charged the offending savages. As soon as this mob got withinmusket-shot they opened fire on the Indians, who ran down the otherface of the ridge without making the slightest resistance. The hillwas readily taken by this unmilitary proceeding, and no one was hurton either side, but as Rains would not permit it to be held, a largebonfire was lighted on the crest in celebration of the victory, andthen all hands marched back to camp, where they had no sooner arrivedand got settled down than the Indians returned to the summit of theridge, seemingly to enjoy the fire that had been so generously builtfor their benefit, and with renewed taunts and gestures continued toinsult us. 

Our camp that night was strongly picketed, and when we awoke in themorning the Indians still occupied their position on the hill. Atdaylight we advanced against them, two or three companies of infantrymoving forward to drive them from the summit, while our main columnpassed through the canon into the upper Yakima Valley led by mydragoons, who were not allowed to charge into the gorge, as thecelerity of such a movement might cause the tactical combination tofail. 

As we passed slowly and cautiously through the canon the Indians ranrapidly away, and when we reached the farther end they had entirelydisappeared from our front, except one old fellow, whose lame horseprevented him keeping up with the main body. This presented anopportunity for gaining results which all thought should not be lost, so our guide, an Indian named "Cut-mouth John, " seized upon it, andgiving hot chase, soon, overtook the poor creature, whom he speedilykilled without much danger to himself, for the fugitive was armedwith only an old Hudson's Bay flint-lock horse-pistol which could notbe discharged. 

"Cut-mouth John's" engagement began and ended all the fighting thattook place on this occasion, and much disappointment and discontentfollowed, Nesmith's mounted force and my dragoons being particularlydisgusted because they had not been "given a chance. " During theremainder of the day we cautiously followed the retreating foe, andlate in the evening went into camp a short distance from FatherPandoza's Mission; where we were to await a small column of troopsunder command of Captain Maurice Maloney, of the Fourth Infantry, that was to join us from Steilicom by way of the Natchez Pass, andfrom which no tidings had as yet been received. 

Next morning the first thing I saw when I put my head out from myblankets was "Cut-mouth John, " already mounted and parading himselfthrough the camp. The scalp of the Indian he had despatched the daybefore was tied to the cross-bar of his bridle bit, the hair danglingalmost to the ground, and John was decked out in the sacred vestmentsof Father Pandoza, having, long before any one was stirring in camp, ransacked the log-cabin at the Mission in which the good man hadlived. John was at all times a most repulsive looking individual, apart of his mouth having been shot away in a fight with Indians nearWalla Walla some years before, in which a Methodist missionary hadbeen killed; but his revolting personal appearance was now worse thanever, and the sacrilegious use of Father Pandoza's vestments, coupledwith the ghastly scalp that hung from his bridle, so turned opinionagainst him that he was soon captured, dismounted, and his paradebrought to an abrupt close, and I doubt whether he ever after quitereinstated himself in the good graces of the command. 

In the course of the day nearly all the men visited the Mission, butas it had been plundered by the Indians at the outbreak ofhostilities, when Father Pandoza was carried off, little of value wasleft about it except a considerable herd of pigs, which the fatherwith great difficulty had succeeded in accumulating from a very smallbeginning. The pigs had not been disturbed by the Indians, but thestraggling troops soon disposed of them, and then turned theirattention to the cabbages and potatoes in the garden, with theintention, no doubt, of dining that day on fresh pork and freshvegetables instead of on salt junk and hard bread, which formed theirregular diet on the march. In digging up the potatoes some onediscovered half a keg of powder, which had been buried in the gardenby the good father to prevent the hostile Indians from getting it touse against the whites. As soon as this was unearthed wildexcitement ensued, and a cry arose that Father Pandoza was the personwho furnished powder to the Indians; that here was the proof; that atlast the mysterious means by which the Indians obtained ammunitionwas explained--and a rush was made for the mission building. This wasa comfortable log-house of good size, built by the Indians for aschool and church, and attached to one end was the log-cabinresidence of the priest. Its destruction was a matter of but a fewmoments. A large heap of dry wood was quickly collected and piled inthe building, matches applied, and the whole Mission, including thepriest's house, was soon enveloped in flames, and burned to theground before the officers in camp became aware of the disgracefulplundering in which their men were engaged. 

The commanding officer having received no news from Captain Maloneyduring the day, Colonel Nesmith and I were ordered to go to hisrescue, as it was concluded that he had been surrounded by Indians inthe Natchez Pass. We started early the next morning, the snowfalling slightly as we set out, and soon arrived at the eastern mouthof the Natchez Pass. On the way we noticed an abandoned Indianvillage, which had evidently not been occupied for some time. As weproceeded the storm increased, and the snow-fall became deeper anddeeper, until finally our horses could not travel through it. Inconsequence we were compelled to give up further efforts to advance, and obliged to turn back to the abandoned village, where we encampedfor the night. Near night-fall the storm greatly increased, and ourbivouac became most uncomfortable; but spreading my blankets on thesnow and covering them with Indian matting, I turned in and sleptwith that soundness and refreshment accorded by nature to oneexhausted by fatigue. When I awoke in the morning I found myselfunder about two feet of snow, from which I arose with difficulty, yetgrateful that it had kept me warm during the night. 

After a cup of coffee and a little hard bread, it was decided weshould return to the main camp near the Mission, for we were nowconfident that Maloney was delayed by the snow, and safe enough onthe other side of the mountains. At all events he was beyond aidfrom us, for the impassable snowdrifts could not be overcome with themeans in our possession. It turned out that our suppositions as tothe cause of his delay were correct. He had met with the samedifficulties that confronted us, and had been compelled to go intocamp. 

Meanwhile valuable time had been lost, and the Indians, with theirfamilies and stock, were well on their way to the Okenagan country, aregion into which we could not penetrate in the winter season. Noother course was therefore left but to complete the dismal failure ofthe expedition by returning home, and our commander readily gave theorder to march back to the Dalles by the "short" route over theYakima Mountains. 

As the storm was still unabated, it was evident our march home wouldbe a most difficult one, and it was deemed advisable to start back atonce, lest we should be blocked up in the mountains by the snows fora period beyond which our provisions would not last. Relying on thefact that the short route to the Dalles would lead us over the rangeat its most depressed point, where it was hoped the depth of snow wasnot yet so great as to make the route impassable, we started withColonel Nesmith's battalion in advance to break the road, followed bymy dragoons. In the valley we made rapid progress, but when wereached the mountain every step we took up its side showed the snowto be growing deeper and deeper. At last Nesmith reached the summit, and there found a depth of about six feet of snow covering theplateau in every direction, concealing all signs of the trail sothoroughly that his guides became bewildered and took the wrongdivide. The moment I arrived at the top my guide--Donald Mc Kay--whoknew perfectly the whole Yakima range, discovered Nesmith's mistake. Word was sent to bring him back, but as he had already nearly crossedthe plateau, considerable delay occurred before he returned. When hearrived we began anew the work of breaking a road for the foot troopsbehind us, my detachment now in advance. The deep snow made our workextremely laborious, exhausting men and horses almost to the point ofrelinquishing the struggle, but our desperate situation required thatwe should get down into the valley beyond, or run the chance ofperishing on the mountain in a storm which seemed unending. Aboutmidnight the column reached the valley, very tired and hungry, butmuch elated over its escape. We had spent a day of the most intenseanxiety, especially those who had had the responsibility of keepingto the right trail, and been charged with the hard work of breakingthe road for the infantry and artillery through such a depth of snow. 

Our main difficulties were now over, and in due time we reached theDalles, where almost everyone connected with the expedition voted ita wretched failure; indeed, General Rains himself could not thinkotherwise, but he scattered far and wide blame for the failure of hiscombinations. This, of course, led to criminations andrecriminations, which eventuated in charges of incompetency preferredagainst him by Captain Edward O. C. Ord, of the Third Artillery. Rains met the charges with counter-charges against Ord, whom heaccused of purloining Father Pandoza's shoes, when the soldiers intheir fury about the ammunition destroyed the Mission. At the timeof its destruction a rumor of this nature was circulated throughcamp, started by some wag, no doubt in jest; for Ord, who wassomewhat eccentric in his habits, and had started on the expeditionrather indifferently shod in carpet-slippers, here came out in abrand-new pair of shoes. Of course there was no real foundation forsuch a report, but Rains was not above small things, as the bringingof this petty accusation attests. Neither party was ever tried, forGeneral John E. Wool the department commander, had not at command asufficient number of officers of appropriate rank to constitute acourt in the case of Rains, and the charges against Ord were veryproperly ignored on account of their trifling character. 

Shortly after the expedition returned to the Dalles, my detachmentwas sent down to Fort Vancouver, and I remained at that post duringthe winter of 1855-'56, till late in March. 

CHAPTER V. 

AN INDIAN CONFEDERATION--MASSACRE AT THE CASCADES OF THECOLUMBIA--PLAN TO RELIEVE THE BLOCKHOUSE--A HAZARDOUS FLANKMOVEMENT--A NEW METHOD OF ESTABLISHING GUILT--EXECUTION OFTHE INDIAN MURDERERS. 

The failure of the Haller expedition from lack of a sufficient force, and of the Rains expedition from the incompetency of its commander, was a great mortification to the officers and men connected withthem, and, taken together, had a marked effect upon the Indiansituation in Oregon and Washington Territories at that particularera. Besides, it led to further complications and troubles, for ithad begun to dawn upon the Indians that the whites wanted to come inand dispossess them of their lands and homes, and the failures ofHaller and Rains fostered the belief with the Indians that they couldsuccessfully resist the pressure of civilization. 

Acting under these influences, the Spokanes, Walla Wallas, Umatillas, and Nez Perces cast their lot with the hostiles, and all the savageinhabitants of the region east of the Cascade Range became involvedin a dispute as to whether the Indians or the Government shouldpossess certain sections of the country, which finally culminated inthe war of 1856. 

Partly to meet the situation that was approaching, the Ninth Infantryhad been sent out from the Atlantic coast to Washington Territory, and upon its arrival at Fort Vancouver encamped in front of theofficers' quarters, on the beautiful parade-ground of that post, andset about preparing for the coming campaign. The commander, ColonelGeorge Wright, who had been promoted to the colonelcy of the regimentupon its organization the previous year, had seen much active dutysince his graduation over thirty years before, serving with credit inthe Florida and Mexican wars. For the three years previous to hisassignment to the Ninth Infantry he had been stationed on the Pacificcoast, and the experience he had there acquired, added to hisexcellent soldierly qualities, was of much benefit in the activecampaigns in which, during the following years, he was toparticipate. Subsequently his career was brought to an untimelyclose when, nine years after this period, as he was returning to thescene of his successes, he, in common with many others was drowned bythe wreck of the ill-fated steamer Brother Jonathan. Colonel Wrighttook command of the district in place of Rains, and had been atVancouver but a short time before he realized that it would benecessary to fight the confederated tribes east of the Cascade Rangeof mountains, in order to disabuse them of the idea that they weresufficiently strong to cope with the power of the Government. Hetherefore at once set about the work of organizing and equipping histroops for a start in the early spring against the hostile Indians, intending to make the objective point of his expedition the heart ofthe Spokane country on the Upper Columbia River, as the head andfront of the confederation was represented in the person of oldCammiackan, chief of the Spokanes. 

The regiment moved from Fort Vancouver by boat, March 25, 1856, andlanded at the small town called the Dalles, below the mouth of theDes Chutes River at the eastern base of the Cascade Range, and justabove where the Columbia River enters those mountains. Thisrendezvous was to be the immediate point of departure, and all thetroops composing the expedition were concentrated there. 

On the morning of March 26 the movement began, but the column hadonly reached Five Mile Creek when the Yakimas, joined by many youngwarriors-free lances from other tribes, made a sudden and unexpectedattack at the Cascades of the Columbia, midway between Vancouver andthe Dalles, killed several citizens, women and children, and tookpossession of the Portage by besieging the settlers in their cabinsat the Upper Cascades, and those who sought shelter at the MiddleCascades in the old military block-house, which had been built someyears before as a place of refuge under just such circumstances. These points held out, and were not captured, but the landing at theLower Cascades fell completely into the hands of the savages. Straggling settlers from the Lower Cascades made their way down toFort Vancouver, distant about thirty-six miles, which they reachedthat night; and communicated the condition of affairs. As thenecessity for early relief to the settlers and the re-establishmentof communication with the Dalles were apparent, all the force thatcould be spared was ordered out, and in consequence I immediatelyreceived directions to go with my detachment of dragoons, numberingabout forty effective men, to the relief of the middle blockhouse, which really meant to retake the Cascades. I got ready at once, andbelieving that a piece of artillery would be of service to me, askedfor one, but as there proved to be no guns at the post, I should havebeen obliged to proceed without one had it not been that the regularsteamer from San Francisco to Portland was lying at the Vancouverdock unloading military supplies, and the commander, Captain Dall, supplied me with the steamer's small iron cannon, mounted on a woodenplatform, which he used in firing salutes at different ports on thearrival and departure of the vessel. Finding at the arsenal a supplyof solid shot that would fit the gun, I had it put upon the steamboatBelle, employed to carry my command to the scene of operations, andstarted up the Columbia River at 2 A. M. On the morning of the 27th. We reached the Lower Cascades early in the day, where, selecting afavorable place for the purpose, I disembarked my men and gun on thenorth bank of the river, so that I could send back the steamboat tobring up any volunteer assistance that in the mean time might havebeen collected at Vancouver. 

The Columbia River was very high at the time, and the water hadbacked up into the slough about the foot of the Lower Cascades tosuch a degree that it left me only a narrow neck of firm ground toadvance over toward the point occupied by the Indians. On this neckof land the hostiles had taken position, as I soon learned byfrequent shots, loud shouting, and much blustering; they, by the mostexasperating yells and indecent exhibitions, daring me to thecontest. 

After getting well in hand everything connected with my littlecommand, I advanced with five or six men to the edge of a growth ofunderbrush to make a reconnoissance. We stole along under cover ofthis underbrush until we reached the open ground leading over thecauseway or narrow neck before mentioned, when the enemy opened fireand killed a soldier near my side by a shot which, just grazing thebridge of my nose, struck him in the neck, opening an artery andbreaking the spinal cord. He died instantly. The Indians at oncemade a rush for the body, but my men in the rear, coming quickly tothe rescue, drove them back; and Captain Doll's gun being now broughtinto play, many solid shot were thrown into the jungle where they layconcealed, with the effect of considerably moderating theirimpetuosity. Further skirmishing at long range took place atintervals during the day, with little gain or loss, however, toeither side, for both parties held positions which could not beassailed in flank, and only the extreme of rashness in either couldprompt a front attack. My left was protected by the back waterdriven into the slough by the high stage of the river, and my rightrested secure on the main stream. Between us was only the narrowneck of land, to cross which would be certain death. The position ofthe Indians was almost the exact counterpart of ours. 

In the evening I sent a report of the situation back to Vancouver bythe steamboat, retaining a large Hudson's Bay bateau which I hadbrought up with me. Examining this I found it would carry abouttwenty men, and made up my mind that early next morning I would crossthe command to the opposite or south side of the Columbia River, andmake my way up along the mountain base until I arrived abreast themiddle blockhouse, which was still closely besieged, and then at somefavorable point recross to the north bank to its relief, endeavoringin this manner to pass around and to the rear of the Indians, whoseposition confronting me was too strong for a direct attack. Thisplan was hazardous, but I believed it could be successfully carriedout if the boat could be taken with me; but should I not be able todo this I felt that the object contemplated in sending me out wouldmiserably fail, and the small band cooped up at the block-house wouldsoon starve or fall a prey to the Indians, so I concluded to risk allthe chances the plan involved. 

On the morning of March 28 the savages were still in my front, andafter giving them some solid shot from Captain Dall's gun we slippeddown to the river-bank, and the detachment crossed by means of theHudson's Bay boat, making a landing on the opposite shore at a pointwhere the south channel of the river, after flowing around Bradford'sIsland, joins the main stream. It was then about 9 o'clock, andeverything had thus far proceeded favorably, but examination of thechannel showed that it would be impossible to get the boat up therapids along the mainland, and that success could only be assured bycrossing the south channel just below the rapids to the island, alongthe shore of which there was every probability we could pull the boatthrough the rocks and swift water until the head of the rapids wasreached, from which point to the block-house there was smooth water. Telling the men of the embarrassment in which I found myself, andthat if I could get enough of them to man the boat and pull it up thestream by a rope to the shore we would cross to the island and makethe attempt, all volunteered to go, but as ten men seemed sufficientI selected that number to accompany me. Before starting, however, Ideemed it prudent to find out if possible what was engaging theattention of the Indians, who had not yet discovered that we had lefttheir front. I therefore climbed up the side of the abrupt mountainwhich skirted the water's edge until I could see across the island. From this point I observed the Indians running horse-races andotherwise enjoying themselves behind the line they had held againstme the day before. The squaws decked out in gay colors, and the mengaudily dressed in war bonnets, made the scene most attractive, butas everything looked propitious for the dangerous enterprise in handI spent little time watching them. Quickly returning to the boat, Icrossed to the island with my ten men, threw ashore the rope attachedto the bow, and commenced the difficult task of pulling her up therapids. We got along slowly at first, but soon striking a camp ofold squaws who had been left on the island for safety, and had notgone over to the mainland to see the races, we utilized them to ouradvantage. With unmistakable threats and signs we made them not onlykeep quiet, but also give us much needed assistance in pullingvigorously on the towrope of our boat. 

I was laboring under a dreadful strain of mental anxiety during allthis time, for had the Indians discovered what we were about, theycould easily have come over to the island in their canoes, and, byforcing us to take up our arms to repel their attack, doubtless wouldhave obliged the abandonment of the boat, and that essential adjunctto the final success of my plan would have gone down the rapids. Indeed, under such circumstances, it would have been impossible forten men to hold out against the two or three hundred Indians; but theisland forming an excellent screen to our movements, we were notdiscovered, and when we reached the smooth water at the upper end ofthe rapids we quickly crossed over and joined the rest of the men, who in the meantime had worked their way along the south bank of theriver parallel with us. I felt very grateful to the old squaws forthe assistance they rendered. They worked well under compulsion, andmanifested no disposition to strike for higher wages. Indeed, I wasso much relieved when we had crossed over from the island and joinedthe rest of the party, that I mentally thanked the squaws one andall. I had much difficulty in keeping the men on the main shore fromcheering at our success, but hurriedly taking into the bateau all ofthem it could carry, I sent the balance along the southern bank, where the railroad is now built, until both detachments arrived at apoint opposite the block-house, when, crossing to the north bank, Ilanded below the blockhouse some little distance, and returned theboat for the balance of the men, who joined me in a few minutes. 

When the Indians attacked the people at the Cascades on the 26th, word was sent to Colonel Wright, who had already got out from theDalles a few miles on his expedition to the Spokane country. Heimmediately turned his column back, and soon after I had landed andcommunicated with the beleaguered block-house the advance of hiscommand arrived under Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. Steptoe. Ireported to Steptoe, and related what had occurred during the pastthirty-six hours, gave him a description of the festivities that weregoing on at the lower Cascades, and also communicated theintelligence that the Yakimas had been joined by the Cascade Indianswhen the place was first attacked. I also told him it was my beliefthat when he pushed down the main shore the latter tribe withoutdoubt would cross over to the island we had just left, while theformer would take to the mountains. Steptoe coincided with me inthis opinion, and informing me that Lieutenant Alexander Piper wouldjoin my detachment with a mountain' howitzer, directed me to conveythe command to the island and gobble up all who came over to it. 

Lieutenant Piper and I landed on the island with the first boatload, and after disembarking the howitzer we fired two or three shots tolet the Indians know we had artillery with us, then advanced down theisland with the whole of my command, which had arrived in the meantime; all of the men were deployed as skirmishers except a smalldetachment to operate the howitzer. Near the lower end of the islandwe met, as I had anticipated, the entire body of Cascade Indianmen, women, and children--whose homes were in the vicinity of theCascades. They were very much frightened and demoralized at the turnevents had taken, for the Yakimas at the approach of Steptoe hadabandoned them, as predicted, and fled to the mountians. The chiefand head-men said they had had nothing to do with the capture of theCascades, with the murder of men at the upper landing, nor with themassacre of men, women, and children near the block-house, and putall the blame on the Yakimas and their allies. I did not believethis, however, and to test the truth of their statement formed themall in line with their muskets in hand. Going up to the first man onthe right I accused him of having engaged in the massacre, but wasmet by a vigorous denial. Putting my forefinger into the muzzle ofhis gun, I found unmistakable signs of its having been recentlydischarged. My finger was black with the stains of burnt powder, andholding it up to the Indian, he had nothing more to say in the faceof such positive evidence of his guilt. A further examination provedthat all the guns were in the same condition. Their arms were atonce taken possession of, and leaving a small, force to look afterthe women and children and the very old men, so that there could beno possibility of escape, I arrested thirteen of the principalmiscreants, crossed the river to the lower landing, and placed themin charge of a strong guard. 

Late in the evening the steamboat, which I had sent back toVancouver, returned, bringing to my assistance from Vancouver, Captain Henry D. Wallen's company of the Fourth Infantry and acompany of volunteers hastily organized at Portland, but as theCascades had already been retaken, this reinforcement was too late toparticipate in the affair. The volunteers from Portland, however, were spoiling for a fight, and in the absence of other opportunitydesired to shoot the prisoners I held (who, they alleged, had killeda man named Seymour), and proceeded to make their arrangements to doso, only desisting on being informed that the Indians were myprisoners, subject to the orders of Colonel Wright, and would beprotected to the last by my detachment. Not long afterward Seymourturned up safe and sound, having fled at the beginning of the attackon the Cascades, and hid somewhere in the thick underbrush until thetrouble was over, and then made his way back to the settlement. Thenext day I turned my prisoners over to Colonel Wright, who had themmarched to the upper landing of the Cascades, where, after a trial bya military commission, nine of them were sentenced to death and dulyhanged. I did not see them executed, but was afterward informedthat, in the absence of the usual mechanical apparatus used on suchoccasions, a tree with a convenient limb under which two emptybarrels were placed, one on top of the other, furnished a rude butcertain substitute. In executing the sentence each Indian in turnwas made to stand on the top barrel, and after the noose was adjustedthe lower barrel was knocked away, and the necessary drop thusobtained. In this way the whole nine were punished. Just beforedeath they all acknowledged their guilt by confessing theirparticipation in the massacre at the block-house, and met their doomwith the usual stoicism of their race. 

CHAPTER VI. 

MISDIRECTED VENGEANCE--HONORABLE MENTION--CHANGE OF COMMAND--EDUCATEDOXEN--FEEDING THE INDIANS--PURCHASING A BURYING-GROUND--KNOWING RATS. 

While still encamped at the lower landing, some three or four daysafter the events last recounted, Mr. Joseph Meek, an old frontiersmanand guide for emigrant trains through the mountains, came down fromthe Dalles, on his way to Vancouver, and stopped at my camp toinquire if an Indian named Spencer and his family had passed down toVancouver since my arrival at the Cascades. Spencer, the head of thefamily, was a very influential, peaceable Chinook chief, whom ColonelWright had taken with him from Fort Vancouver as an interpreter andmediator with the Spokanes and other hostile tribes, against whichhis campaign was directed. He was a good, reliable Indian, and onleaving Vancouver to join Colonel Wright, took his family along, toremain with relatives and friends at Fort Dalles until the return ofthe expedition. When Wright was compelled to retrace his steps onaccount of the capture of the Cascades, this family for some reasonknown only to Spencer, was started by him down the river to theirhome at Vancouver. 

Meek, on seeing the family leave the Dalles, had some misgivings asto their safe arrival at their destination, because of the excitedcondition of the people about the Cascades; but Spencer seemed tothink that his own peaceable and friendly reputation, which waswidespread, would protect them; so he parted from his wife andchildren with little apprehension as to their safety. In reply toMeek's question, I stated that I had not seen Spencer's family, whenhe remarked, "Well, I fear that they are gone up, " a phrase used inthat country in early days to mean that they had been killed. Iquestioned him closely, to elicit further information, but no morecould be obtained; for Meek, either through ignorance or the usualtaciturnity of his class, did not explain more fully, and when thesteamer that had brought the reinforcement started down the river, hetook passage for Vancouver, to learn definitely if the Indian familyhad reached that point. I at once sent to the upper landing, distantabout six miles, to make inquiry in regard to the matter, and in a, little time my messenger returned with the information that thefamily had reached that place the day before, and finding that we haddriven the hostiles off, continued their journey on foot toward mycamp, from which point they expected to go by steamer down the riverto Vancouver. 

Their non-arrival aroused in me suspicions of foul play, so with allthe men I could spare, and accompanied by Lieutenant William T. Welcker, of the Ordnance Corps--a warm and intimate friend--I went insearch of the family, deploying the men as skirmishers across thevalley, and marching them through the heavy forest where the groundwas covered with fallen timber and dense underbrush, in order that nopoint might escape our attention. The search was continued betweenthe base of the mountain and the river without finding any sign ofSpencer's family, until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when wediscovered them between the upper and lower landing, in a small openspace about a mile from the road, all dead--strangled to death withbits of rope. The party consisted of the mother, two youths, threegirls, and a baby. They had all been killed by white men, who hadprobably met the innocent creatures somewhere near the blockhouse, driven them from the road into the timber, where the cruel murderswere committed without provocation, and for no other purpose than thegratification of the inordinate hatred of the Indian that has oftenexisted on the frontier, and which on more than one occasion hasfailed to distinguish friend from foe. The bodies lay in asemicircle, and the bits of rope with which the poor wretches hadbeen strangled to death were still around their necks. Each piece ofrope--the unwound strand of a heavier piece--was about two feet long, and encircled the neck of its victim with a single knot, that musthave been drawn tight by the murderers pulling at the ends. As therehad not been quite enough rope to answer for all, the babe wasstrangled by means of a red silk handkerchief, taken, doubtless, fromthe neck of its mother. It was a distressing sight. A most crueloutrage had been committed upon unarmed people--our friends andallies--in a spirit of aimless revenge. The perpetrators werecitizens living near the middle block-house, whose wives and childrenhad been killed a few days before by the hostiles, but who well knewthat these unoffending creatures had had nothing to do with thosemurders. 

In my experience I have been obliged to look upon many cruel scenesin connection with Indian warfare on the Plains since that day, butthe effect of this dastardly and revolting crime has never beeneffaced from my memory. Greater and more atrocious massacres havebeen committed often by Indians; their savage nature modifies one'sideas, however, as to the inhumanity of their acts, but when suchwholesale murder as this is done by whites, and the victims not onlyinnocent, but helpless, no defense can be made for those whoperpetrated the crime, if they claim to be civilized beings. It istrue the people at the Cascades had suffered much, and that theirwives and children had been murdered before their eyes, but to wreakvengeance on Spencer's unoffending family, who had walked into theirsettlement under the protection of a friendly alliance, was anunparalleled outrage which nothing can justify or extenuate. With aslittle delay as possible after the horrible discovery, I returned tocamp, had boxes made, and next day buried the bodies of these haplessvictims of misdirected vengeance. 

The summary punishment inflicted on the nine Indians, in their trialand execution, had a most salutary effect on the confederation, andwas the entering wedge to its disintegration; and though ColonelWright's campaign continued during the summer and into the earlywinter, the subjugation of the allied bands became a comparativelyeasy matter after the lesson taught the renegades who were capturedat the Cascades. My detachment did not accompany Colonel Wright, butremained for some time at the Cascades, and while still there GeneralWool came up from San Francisco to take a look into the condition ofthings. From his conversation with me in reference to the affair atthe Cascades, I gathered that he was greatly pleased at the service Ihad performed, and I afterward found that his report of my conducthad so favorably impressed General Scott that that distinguishedofficer complimented me from the headquarters of the army in generalorders. 

General Wool, while personally supervising matters on the ColumbiaRiver, directed a redistribution to some extent of the troops in thedistrict, and shortly before his return to San Francisco I wasordered with my detachment of dragoons to take station on the GrandeRonde Indian Reservation in Yamhill County, Oregon, about twenty-fivemiles southwest of Dayton, and to relieve from duty at that pointLieutenant William B. Hazen--late brigadier-general and chief signalofficer--who had established a camp there some time before. Istarted for my new station on April 21, and marching by way ofPortland and Oregon City, arrived at Hazen's camp April 25. The campwas located in the Coast range of mountains, on the northeast part ofthe reservation, to which last had been added a section of countrythat was afterward known as the Siletz reservation. The whole bodyof land set aside went under the general name of the "Coastreservation, " from its skirting the Pacific Ocean for some distancenorth of Yaquina Bay, and the intention was to establish within itsbounds permanent homes for such Indians as might be removed to it. In furtherance of this idea, and to relieve northern California andsouthwestern Oregon from the roaming, restless bands that kept thepeople of those sections in a state of constant turmoil, many of thedifferent tribes, still under control but liable to take part inwarfare, were removed to the reservation, so that they might be awayfrom the theatre of hostilities. 

When I arrived I found that the Rogue River Indians had just beenplaced upon the reservation, and subsequently the Coquille, Klamath, Modocs, and remnants of the Chinooks were collected there also, thehome of the latter being in the Willamette Valley. The number alltold amounted to some thousands, scattered over the entire Coastreservation, but about fifteen hundred were located at the GrandeRonde under charge of an agent, Mr. John F. Miller, a sensible, practical man, who left the entire police control to the military, and attended faithfully to the duty of settling the Indians in thework of cultivating the soil. 

As the place was to be occupied permanently, Lieutenant Hazen hadbegun, before my arrival, the erection of buildings for the shelterof his command, and I continued the work of constructing the post aslaid out by him. In those days the Government did not provide veryliberally for sheltering its soldiers; and officers and men werefrequently forced to eke out parsimonious appropriations by toilsomework or go without shelter in most inhospitable regions. Of coursethis post was no exception to the general rule, and as all hands wereoccupied in its construction, and I the only officer present, I waskept busily employed in supervising matters, both as commandant andquartermaster, until July, when Captain D. A. Russell, of the FourthInfantry, was ordered to take command, and I was relieved from thefirst part of my duties. 

About this time my little detachment parted from me, being ordered tojoin a company of the First Dragoons, commanded by Captain RobertWilliams, as it passed up the country from California by way ofYamhill. I regretted exceedingly to see them go, for their faithfulwork and gallant service had endeared every man to me by thestrongest ties. Since I relieved Lieutenant Hood on Pit River, nearly a twelvemonth before, they had been my constant companions, and the zeal with which they had responded to every call I made onthem had inspired in my heart a deep affection that years have notremoved. When I relieved Hood--a dragoon officer of their ownregiment--they did not like the change, and I understood that theysomewhat contemptuously expressed this in more ways than one, inorder to try the temper of the new "Leftenant, " but appreciative andunremitting care, together with firm and just discipline, soonquieted all symptoms of dissatisfaction and overcame all prejudice. The detachment had been made up of details from the differentcompanies of the regiment in order to give Williamson a mountedforce, and as it was usual, under such circumstances, for everycompany commander to shove into the detail he was called upon tofurnish the most troublesome and insubordinate individuals of hiscompany, I had some difficulty, when first taking command, incontrolling such a medley of recalcitrants; but by forethought forthem and their wants, and a strict watchfulness for their rights andcomfort, I was able in a short time to make them obedient and thedetachment cohesive. In the past year they had made long andtiresome marches, forded swift mountain streams, constructed rafts oflogs or bundles of dry reeds to ferry our baggage, swum deep rivers, marched on foot to save their worn-out and exhausted animals, climbedmountains, fought Indians, and in all and everything had done thebest they could for the service and their commander. The disaffectedfeeling they entertained when I first assumed command soon wore away, and in its place came a confidence and respect which it gives me thegreatest pleasure to remember, for small though it was, this was myfirst cavalry command. They little thought, when we were in themountains of California and Oregon--nor did I myself then dream--thatbut a few years were to elapse before it would be my lot again tocommand dragoons, this time in numbers so vast as of themselves tocompose almost an army. 

Shortly after the arrival of Captain Russell a portion of the Indiansat the Grande Ronde reservation were taken down the coast to theSiletz reservation, and I was transferred temporarily to FortHaskins, on the latter reserve, and assigned to the duty ofcompleting it and building a blockhouse for the police control of theIndians placed there. 

While directing this work, I undertook to make a road across thecoast mountains from King's Valley to the Siletz, to shorten the haulbetween the two points by a route I had explored. I knew there weremany obstacles in the way, but the gain would be great if we couldovercome them, so I set to work with the enthusiasm of a youngpath-finder. The point at which the road was to cross the range wasrough and precipitous, but the principal difficulty in making it wouldbe from heavy timber on the mountains that had been burned over yearsand years before, until nothing was left but limbless trunks of deadtrees--firs and pines--that had fallen from time to time until theground was matted with huge logs from five to eight feet in diameter. These could not be chopped with axes nor sawed by any ordinary means, therefore we had to burn them into suitable lengths, and drag thesections to either side of the roadway with from four to six yoke ofoxen. 

The work was both tedious and laborious, but in time perseverancesurmounted all obstacles and the road was finished, though its gradeswere very steep. As soon as it was completed, I wished todemonstrate its value practically, so I started a Government wagonover it loaded with about fifteen hundred pounds of freight drawn bysix yoke of oxen, and escorted by a small detachment of soldiers. When it had gone about seven miles the sergeant in charge came backto the post and reported his inability to get any further. Going outto the scene of difficulty I found the wagon at the base of a steephill, stalled. Taking up a whip myself, I directed the men to lay ontheir gads, for each man had supplied himself with a flexible hickorywithe in the early stages of the trip, to start the team, but thiscourse did not move the wagon nor have much effect on the demoralizedoxen; but following as a last resort an example I heard of on aformer occasion, that brought into use the rough language of thecountry, I induced the oxen to move with alacrity, and the wagon andcontents were speedily carried to the summit. The whole trouble wasat once revealed: the oxen had been broken and trained by a man who, when they were in a pinch, had encouraged them by his frontiervocabulary, and they could not realize what was expected of themunder extraordinary conditions until they heard familiar and possiblyprofanely urgent phrases. I took the wagon to its destination, butas it was not brought back, even in all the time I was stationed inthat country, I think comment on the success of my road isunnecessary. 

I spent many happy months at Fort Haskins, remaining there until thepost was nearly completed and its garrison increased by the arrivalof Captain F. T. Dent--a brother-in-law of Captain Ulysses S. Grant--with his company of the Fourth Infantry, in April, 1857. In thesummer of 1856, and while I was still on duty there, the CoquilleIndians on the Siletz, and down near the Yaquina Bay, became, onaccount of hunger and prospective starvation, very much excited andexasperated, getting beyond the control of their agent, and eventhreatening his life, so a detachment of troops was sent out to setthings to rights, and I took command of it. I took with me most ofthe company, and arrived at Yaquina Bay in time to succor the agent, who for some days had been besieged in a log hut by the Indians andhad almost abandoned hope of rescue. 

Having brought with me over the mountains a few head of beef cattlefor the hungry Indians, without thinking of running any greatpersonal risk I had six beeves killed some little distance from mycamp, guarding the meat with four Soldiers, whom I was obliged topost as sentinels around the small area on which the carcasses lay. The Indians soon formed a circle about the sentinels, and impelled bystarvation, attempted to take the beef before it could be equallydivided. This was of course resisted, when they drew their knives--their guns having been previously taken away from them--and some ofthe inferior chiefs gave the signal to attack. The principal chief, Tetootney John, and two other Indians joined me in the centre of thecircle, and protesting that they would die rather than that thefrenzied onslaught should succeed, harangued the Indians until therest of the company hastened up from camp and put an end to thedisturbance. I always felt grateful to Tetootney John for hisloyalty on this occasion, and many times afterward aided his familywith a little coffee and sugar, but necessarily surreptitiously, soas not to heighten the prejudices that his friendly act had arousedamong his Indian comrades. 

The situation at Yaquina Bay did not seem very safe, notwithstandingthe supply of beef we brought; and the possibility that the starvingIndians might break out was ever present, so to anticipate anyfurther revolt, I called for more troops. The request was compliedwith by sending to my assistance the greater part of my own company("K")from Fort Yamhill. The men, inspired by the urgency of oursituation, marched more than forty miles a day, accomplishing thewhole distance in so short a period, that I doubt if the record hasever been beaten. When this reinforcement arrived, the Indians sawthe futility of further demonstrations against their agent, who theyseemed to think was responsible for the insufficiency of food, andmanaged to exist with the slender rations we could spare and suchindifferent food as they could pick up, until the Indian Departmentsucceeded in getting up its regular supplies. In the past the poorthings had often been pinched by hunger and neglect, and at timestheir only food was rock oysters, clams and crabs. Great quantitiesof these shell-fish could be gathered in the bay near at hand, butthe mountain Indians, who had heretofore lived on the flesh ofmammal, did not take kindly to mollusks, and, indeed, ate theshell-fish only as a last resort. 

Crab catching at night on the Yaquina Bay by the coast Indians was avery picturesque scene. It was mostly done by the squaws andchildren, each equipped with a torch in one hand, and a sharp-pointedstick in the other to take and lift the fish into baskets slung onthe back to receive them. I have seen at times hundreds of squawsand children wading about in Yaquina Bay taking crabs in this manner, and the reflection by the water of the light from the many torches, with the movements of the Indians while at work, formed a weird anddiverting picture of which we were never tired. 

Not long after the arrival of the additional troops from Yamhill, itbecame apparent that the number of men at Yaquina Bay would have tobe reduced, so in view of this necessity, it was deemed advisable tobuild a block-house for the better protection of the agents and Ilooked about for suitable ground on which to erect it. Nearly allaround the bay the land rose up from the beach very abruptly, and theonly good site that could be found was some level ground used as theburial-place of the Yaquina Bay Indians--a small band of fish-eatingpeople who had lived near this point on the coast for ages. Theywere a robust lot, of tall and well-shaped figures, and were calledin the Chinook tongue "salt chuck, " which means fish-eaters, oreaters of food from the salt water. Many of the young men and womenwere handsome in feature below the forehead, having fine eyes, aquiline noses and good mouths, but, in conformity with along-standing custom, all had flat heads, which gave them a distortedand hideous appearance, particularly some of the women, who went tothe extreme of fashion and flattened the head to the rear in a sharphorizontal ridge by confining it between two boards, one running backfrom the forehead at an angle of about forty degrees, and the other upperpendicularly from the back of the neck. When a head had beenshaped artistically the dusky maiden owner was marked as a belle, andone could become reconciled to it after a time, but when carelessnessand neglect had governed in the adjustment of the boards, thereprobably was nothing in the form of a human being on the face of theearth that appeared so ugly. 

It was the mortuary ground of these Indians that occupied the onlylevel spot we could get for the block-house. Their dead were buriedin canoes, which rested in the crotches of forked sticks a few feetabove-ground. The graveyard was not large, containing probably fromforty to fifty canoes in a fair state of preservation. According tothe custom of all Indian tribes on the Pacific coast, when one oftheir number died all his worldly effects were buried with him, sothat the canoes were filled with old clothes, blankets, pieces ofcalico and the like, intended for the use of the departed in thehappy hunting grounds. 

I made known to the Indians that we would have to take this piece ofground for the blockhouse. They demurred at first, for there isnothing more painful to an Indian than disturbing his dead, but theyfinally consented to hold a council next day on the beach, and thuscome to some definite conclusion. Next morning they all assembled, and we talked in the Chinook language all day long, until at lastthey gave in, consenting, probably, as much because they could nothelp themselves, as for any other reason. It was agreed that on thefollowing day at 12 o'clock, when the tide was going out, I shouldtake my men and place the canoes in the bay, and let them float outon the tide across the ocean to the happy hunting-grounds:

At that day there existed in Oregon in vast numbers a species ofwood-rat, and our inspection of the graveyard showed that the canoeswere thickly infested with them. They were a light gray animal, larger than the common gray squirrel, with beautiful bushy tails, which made them strikingly resemble the squirrel, but in cunning anddeviltry they were much ahead of that quick-witted rodent. I haveknown them to empty in one night a keg of spikes in the storehouse inYamhill, distributing them along the stringers of the building, withapparently no other purpose than amusement. We anticipated great funwatching the efforts of these rats to escape the next day when thecanoes should be launched on the ocean, and I therefore forbade anyof the command to visit the graveyard in the interim, lest the ratsshould be alarmed. I well knew that they would not be disturbed bythe Indians, who held the sacred spot in awe. When the work oftaking down the canoes and carrying them to the water began, expectation was on tiptoe, but, strange as it may seem, not a rat wasto be seen. This unexpected development was mystifying. They hadall disappeared; there was not one in any of the canoes, asinvestigation proved, for disappointment instigated a most thoroughsearch. The Indians said the rats understood Chinook, and that asthey had no wish to accompany the dead across the ocean to the happyhunting-grounds, they took to the woods for safety. However that maybe, I have no doubt that the preceding visits to the burial-ground, and our long talk of the day before, with the unusual stir andbustle, had so alarmed the rats that, impelled, by their suspiciousinstincts, they fled a danger, the nature of which they could notanticipate, but which they felt to be none the less real andimpending. 

CHAPTER VII. 

LEARNING THE CHINOOK LANGUAGE--STRANGE INDIANCUSTOMS--THEIR DOCTORS--SAM PATCH--THE MURDER OF AWOMAN--IN A TIGHT PLACE--SURPRISING THE INDIANS--CONFLICTINGREPORTS OF THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN--SECESSION QUESTION INCALIFORNIA--APPOINTED A CAPTAIN--TRANSFERRED TO THE EAST. 

The troubles at the Siletz and Yaquina Bay were settled withoutfurther excitement by the arrival in due time of plenty of food, andas the buildings, at Fort Haskins were so near completion that myservices as quartermaster were no longer needed, I was ordered tojoin my own company at Fort Yamhill, where Captain Russell was stillin command. I returned to that place in May, 1857, and at a period alittle later, in consequence of the close of hostilities in southernOregon, the Klamaths and Modocs were sent back to their own country, to that section in which occurred, in 1873, the disastrous war withthe latter tribe. This reduced considerably the number of Indians atthe Grande Ronde, but as those remaining were still somewhat unruly, from the fact that many questions requiring adjustment wereconstantly arising between the different bands, the agent and theofficers at the post were kept pretty well occupied. Captain Russellassigned to me the special work of keeping up the police control, andas I had learned at an early day to speak Chinook (the "courtlanguage" among the coast tribes) almost as well as the Indiansthemselves, I was thereby enabled to steer my way successfully onmany critical occasions. 

For some time the most disturbing and most troublesome element we hadwas the Rogue River band. For three or four years they had foughtour troops obstinately, and surrendered at the bitter end in thebelief that they were merely overpowered, not conquered. They openlyboasted to the other Indians that they could whip the soldiers, andthat they did not wish to follow the white man's ways, continuingconsistently their wild habits, unmindful of all admonitions. Indeed, they often destroyed their household utensils, tepees andclothing, and killed their horses on the graves of the dead, in thefulfillment of a superstitious custom, which demanded that theyshould undergo, while mourning for their kindred, the deepestprivation in a property sense. Everything the loss of which wouldmake them poor was sacrificed on the graves of their relatives ordistinguished warriors, and as melancholy because of removal fromtheir old homes caused frequent deaths, there was no lack of occasionfor the sacrifices. The widows and orphans of the dead warriors wereof course the chief mourners, and exhibited their grief in manypeculiar ways. I remember one in particular which was universallypracticed by the near kinsfolk. They would crop their hair veryclose, and then cover the head with a sort of hood or plaster ofblack pitch, the composition being clay, pulverized charcoal, and theresinous gum which exudes from the pine-tree. The hood, nearly aninch in thickness, was worn during a period of mourning that lastedthrough the time it would take nature, by the growth of the hair, actually to lift from the head the heavy covering of pitch after ithad become solidified and hard as stone. It must be admitted thatthey underwent considerable discomfort in memory of their relatives. It took all the influence we could bring to bear to break up theseabsurdly superstitious practices, and it looked as if no permanentimprovement could be effected, for as soon as we got them to discardone, another would be invented. When not allowed to burn down theirtepees or houses, those poor souls who were in a dying conditionwould be carried out to the neighboring hillsides just beforedissolution, and there abandoned to their sufferings, with little orno attention, unless the placing under their heads of a small stickof wood--with possibly some laudable object, but doubtless greatdiscomfort to their victim--might be considered such. 

To uproot these senseless and monstrous practices was indeed mostdifficult. The most pernicious of all was one which was likely tobring about tragic results. They believed firmly in a class ofdoctors among their people who professed that they could procure theillness of an individual at will, and that by certain incantationsthey could kill or cure the sick person. Their faith in thissuperstition was so steadfast that there was no doubting itssincerity, many indulging at times in the most trying privations, that their relatives might be saved from death at the hands of thedoctors. I often talked with them on the subject, and tried toreason them out of the superstitious belief, defying the doctors tokill me, or even make me ill; but my talks were unavailing, and theyalways met my arguments with the remark that I was a white man, of arace wholly different from the red man, and that that was the reasonthe medicine of the doctors would not affect me. These villainousdoctors might be either men or women, and any one of them finding anIndian ill, at once averred that his influence was the cause, offering at the same time to cure the invalid for a fee, whichgenerally amounted to about all the ponies his family possessed. Ifthe proposition was accepted and the fee paid over, the family, incase the man died, was to have indemnity through the death of thedoctor, who freely promised that they might take his life in suchevent, relying on his chances of getting protection from the furiousrelatives by fleeing to the military post till time had so assuagedtheir grief that matters could be compromised or settled by arestoration of a part of the property, when the rascally leechescould again resume their practice. Of course the services of adoctor were always accepted when an Indian fell ill; otherwise theinvalid's death would surely ensue, brought about by the evilinfluence that was unpropitiated. Latterly it had become quite thething, when a patient died, for the doctor to flee to our camp--itwas so convenient and so much safer than elsewhere--and my cellar wasa favorite place of refuge from the infuriated friends of thedeceased. 

Among the most notable of these doctors was an Indian named SamPatch, who several times sought asylum in any cellar, and being amost profound diplomat, managed on each occasion and with littledelay to negotiate a peaceful settlement and go forth in safety toresume the practice of his nefarious profession. I often hoped hewould be caught before reaching the post, but he seemed to knowintuitively when the time had come to take leg-bail, for his adventat the garrison generally preceded by but a few hours the death ofsome poor dupe. 

Finally these peculiar customs brought about the punishment of anoted doctress of the Rogue River tribe, a woman who was constantlyworking in this professional way, and who had found a victim of suchprominence among the Rogue Rivers that his unlooked for death broughtdown on her the wrath of all. She had made him so ill, theybelieved, as to bring him to death's door notwithstanding the manyponies that had been given her to cease the incantations, and it wasthe conviction of all that she had finally caused the man's deathfrom some ulterior and indiscernible motive. His relatives andfriends then immediately set about requiting her with the justpenalties of a perfidious breach of contract. Their threats inducedher instant flight toward my house for the usual protection, but theenraged friends of the dead man gave hot chase, and overtook thewitch just inside the limits of the garrison, where, on theparade-ground, in sight of the officers' quarters, and before any onecould interfere, they killed her. There were sixteen men in pursuitof the doctress, and sixteen gun-shot wounds were found in her bodywhen examined by the surgeon of the post. The killing of the womanwas a flagrant and defiant outrage committed in the teeth of themilitary authority, yet done so quickly that we could not prevent it. This necessitated severe measures, both to allay the prevailingexcitement and to preclude the recurrence of such acts. The body wascared for, and delivered to the relatives the next day for burial, after which Captain Russell directed me to take such steps as wouldput a stop to the fanatical usages that had brought about thismurderous occurrence, for it was now seen that if timely measures werenot taken to repress them, similar tragedies would surely follow. 

Knowing all the men of the Rogue River tribe, and speaking fluentlythe Chinook tongue, which they all understood, I went down to theirvillage the following day, after having sent word to the tribe that Iwished to have a council with them. The Indians all met me incouncil, as I had desired, and I then told them that the men who hadtaken part in shooting the woman would have to be delivered up forpunishment. They were very stiff with me at the interview, and withall that talent for circumlocution and diplomacy with which theIndian is lifted, endeavored to evade my demands and delay anyconclusion. But I was very positive, would hear of no compromisewhatever, and demanded that my terms be at once complied with. Noone was with me but a sergeant of my company, named Miller, who heldmy horse, and as the chances of an agreement began to grow remote, Ibecame anxious for our safety. The conversation waxing hot and theIndians gathering close in around me, I unbuttoned the flap of mypistol holster, to be ready for any emergency. When the altercationbecame most bitter I put my hand to my hip to draw my pistol, butdiscovered it was gone--stolen by one of the rascals surrounding me. Finding myself unarmed, I modified my tone and manner to correspondwith my helpless condition, thus myself assuming the diplomatic sidein the parley, in order to gain time. As soon as an opportunityoffered, and I could, without too much loss of self-respect, andwithout damaging my reputation among the Indians, I moved out towhere the sergeant held my horse, mounted, and crossing the YamhillRiver close by, called back in Chinook from the farther bank that"the sixteen men who killed the woman must be delivered up, and mysix-shooter also. " This was responded to by contemptuous laughter, soI went back to the military post somewhat crestfallen, and made myreport of the turn affairs had taken, inwardly longing for anotherchance to bring the rascally Rogue Rivers to terms. 

When I had explained the situation to Captain Russell, he thoughtthat we could not, under any circumstances, overlook this defiantconduct of the Indians, since, unless summarily punished, it wouldlead to even more serious trouble in the future. I heartily secondedthis proposition, and gladly embracing the opportunity it offered, suggested that if he would give me another chance, and let me havethe effective force of the garrison, consisting of about fifty men, Iwould chastise the Rogue Rivers without fail, and that the next daywas all the time I required to complete arrangements. He gave me thenecessary authority, and I at once set to work to bring about abetter state of discipline on the reservation, and to put an end tothe practices of the medicine men (having also in view the recoveryof my six-shooter and self-respect), by marching to the village andtaking the rebellious Indians by force. 

In the tribe there was an excellent woman called Tighee Mary (Tigheein Chinook means chief), who by right of inheritance was a kind ofqueen of the Rogue Rivers. Fearing that the insubordinate conduct ofthe Indians would precipitate further trouble, she came early thefollowing morning to see me and tell me of the situation Maryinformed me that she had done all in her power to bring the Indiansto reason, but without avail, and that they were determined to fightrather than deliver up the sixteen men who had engaged in theshooting. She also apprised me of the fact that they had taken up aposition on the Yamhill River, on the direct road between the postand village, where, painted and armed for war, they were awaitingattack. 

On this information I concluded it would be best to march to thevillage by a circuitous route instead of directly, as at firstintended, so I had the ferry-boat belonging to the post floated abouta mile and a half down the Yamhill River and there anchored. At 11o'clock that night I marched my fifty men, out of the garrison, in adirection opposite to that of the point held by the Indians, and soonreached the river at the ferryboat. Here I ferried the party overwith little delay, and marched them along the side of the mountain, through underbrush and fallen timber, until, just before daylight, Ifound that we were immediately in rear of the village, and thence inrear, also, of the line occupied by the refractory Indians, who wereexpecting to meet me on the direct road from the post. Just at breakof day we made a sudden descent upon the village and took itsoccupants completely by surprise, even capturing the chief of thetribe, "Sam, " who was dressed in all his war toggery, fully armed andequipped, in anticipation of a fight on the road where his comradeswere in position. I at once put Sam under guard, giving orders tokill him instantly if the Indians fired a shot; then forming my lineon the road beyond the edge of the village, in rear of the forcelying in wait for a front attack, we moved forward. When the hostileparty realized that they were completely cut off from the village, they came out from their stronghold on the river and took up a linein my front, distant about sixty yards with the apparent intention ofresisting to the last. 

As is usual with Indians when expecting a fight, they were nearlynaked, fantastically painted with blue clay, and hideously arrayed inwar bonnets. They seemed very belligerent, brandishing their musketsin the air, dancing on one foot, calling us ugly names, and makingsuch other demonstrations of hostility, that it seemed at first thatnothing short of the total destruction of the party could bring aboutthe definite settlement that we were bent on. Still, as it was mydesire to bring them under subjection without loss of life, ifpossible, I determined to see what result would follow when theylearned that their chief was at our mercy. So, sending Sam underguard to the front, where he could be seen, informing them that hewould be immediately shot if they fired upon us, and aided by thecries and lamentations of the women of the village, who deprecatedany hostile action by either party, I soon procured a parley. 

The insubordinate Indians were under command of "Joe, " Sam's brother, who at last sent me word that he wanted to see me, and we met betweenour, respective lines. I talked kindly to him, but was firm in mydemand that the men who killed the woman must be given up and mysix-shooter returned. His reply was he did not think it could be done, but he would consult his people. After the consultation, he returnedand notified me that fifteen would surrender and the six-shooterwould be restored, and further, that we could kill the sixteenth man, since the tribe wished to get rid of him anyhow, adding that he was abad Indian, whose bullet no doubt had given the woman her deathwound. He said that if I assented to this arrangement, he wouldrequire all of his people except the objectionable man to run to theright of his line at a preconcerted signal. The bad Indian would beordered to stand fast on the extreme left, and we could open fire onhim as his comrades fell away to the right. I agreed to theproposition, and gave Joe fifteen minutes to execute his part of it. We then returned to our respective forces, and a few minutes laterthe fifteen ran to the right flank as agreed upon, and we opened fireon the one Indian left standing alone, bringing him down in histracks severely wounded by a shot through the shoulder. 

While all this was going on, the other bands of the reservation, several thousand strong, had occupied the surrounding hills for thepurpose of witnessing the fight, for as the Rogue Rivers had beenbragging for some time that they could whip the soldiers, these otherIndians had come out to see it done. The result, however, disappointed the spectators, and the Rogue Rivers naturally lostcaste. The fifteen men now came in and laid down their arms(including my six-shooter) in front of us as agreed, but I compelledthem to take the surrendered guns up again and carry them to thepost, where they were deposited in the block-house for futuresecurity. The prisoners were ironed with ball and chain, and made towork at the post until their rebellious spirit was broken; and thewounded man was correspondingly punished after he had fullyrecovered. An investigation as to why this man had been selected asthe offering by which Joe and his companions expected to gainimmunity, showed that the fellow was really a most worthlesscharacter, whose death even would have been a benefit to the tribe. Thus it seemed that they had two purposes in view--the one topropitiate me and get good terms, the other to rid themselves of avagabond member of the tribe. 

The punishment of these sixteen Indians by ball and chain ended alltrouble with the Rogue River tribe. The, disturbances arising fromthe incantations of the doctors and doctresses, and the practice ofkilling horses and burning all worldly property on the graves ofthose who died, were completely suppressed, and we made with littleeffort a great stride toward the civilization of these crude andsuperstitious people, for they now began to recognize the power ofthe Government. In their management afterward a course of justiceand mild force was adopted, and unvaryingly applied. They werecompelled to cultivate their land, to attend church, and to sendtheir children to school. When I saw them, fifteen years later, transformed into industrious and substantial farmers, with neathouses, fine cattle, wagons and horses, carrying their grain, eggs, and butter to market and bringing home flour, coffee, sugar, andcalico in return, I found abundant confirmation of my early opinionthat the most effectual measures for lifting them from a state ofbarbarism would be a practical supervision at the outset, coupledwith a firm control and mild discipline. 

In all that was done for these Indians Captain Russell's judgment andsound, practical ideas were the inspiration. His true manliness, honest and just methods, together with the warm-hearted interest hetook in all that pertained to matters of duty to his Government, could not have produced other than the best results, in what positionsoever he might have been placed. As all the lovable traits of hischaracter were constantly manifested, I became most deeply attachedto him, and until the day of his death in 1864, on the battle-fieldof Opequan, in front of Winchester, while gallantly leading hisdivision under my command, my esteem and affection were sustained andintensified by the same strong bonds that drew me to him in theseearly days in Oregon. 

After the events just narrated I continued on duty at the post ofYamhill, experiencing the usual routine of garrison life without anyincidents of much interest, down to the breaking out of the war ofthe rebellion in April, 1861. The news of the firing on Fort Sumterbrought us an excitement which overshadowed all else, and though wehad no officers at the post who sympathized with the rebellion, therewere several in our regiment--the Fourth Infantry--who did, and wewere considerably exercised as to the course they might pursue, butnaturally far more so concerning the disposition that would be madeof the regiment during the conflict. 

In due time orders came for the regiment to go East, and my companywent off, leaving me, however--a second lieutenant--in command of thepost until I should be relieved by Captain James J. Archer, of theNinth Infantry, whose company was to take the place of the oldgarrison. Captain Archer, with his company of the Ninth, arrivedshortly after, but I had been notified that he intended to go South, and his conduct was such after reaching the post that I would notturn over the command to him for fear he might commit some rebelliousact. Thus a more prolonged detention occurred than I had at firstanticipated. Finally the news came that he had tendered hisresignation and been granted a leave of absence for sixty days. OnJuly 17 he took his departure, but I continued in command tillSeptember 1, when Captain Philip A. Owen, of the Ninth Infantry, arrived and, taking charge, gave me my release. 

From the day we received the news of the firing on Sumter until Istarted East, about the first of September, 1861, I was deeplysolicitous as to the course of events, and though I felt confidentthat in the end the just cause of the Government must triumph, yetthe thoroughly crystallized organization which the SouthernConfederacy quickly exhibited disquieted me very much, for it alonewas evidence that the Southern leaders had long anticipated thestruggle and prepared for it. It was very difficult to obtain directintelligence of the progress of the war. Most of the time we were inthe depths of ignorance as to the true condition of affairs, and thistended to increase our anxiety. Then, too, the accounts of theconflicts that had taken place were greatly exaggerated by theEastern papers, and lost nothing in transition. The news came by thepony express across the Plains to San Francisco, where it was stillfurther magnified in republishing, and gained somewhat in Southernbias. I remember well that when the first reports reached us of, thebattle of Bull Run--that sanguinary engagement--it was stated thateach side had lost forty thousand men in killed and wounded, and nonewere reported missing nor as having run away. Week by week theselosses grew less, until they finally shrunk into the hundreds, butthe vivid descriptions of the gory conflict were not toned downduring the whole summer. 

We received our mail at Yamhill only once a week, and then had tobring it from Portland, Oregon, by express. On the day of the weekthat our courier, or messenger, was expected back from Portland, Iwould go out early in the morning to a commanding point above thepost, from which I could see a long distance down the road as it ranthrough the valley of the Yamhill, and there I would watch withanxiety for his coming, longing for good news; for, isolated as I hadbeen through years spent in the wilderness, my patriotism wasuntainted by politics, nor had it been disturbed by any discussion ofthe questions out of which the war grew, and I hoped for the successof the Government above all other considerations. I believe I wasalso uninfluenced by any thoughts of the promotion that might resultto me from the conflict, but, out of a sincere desire to contributeas much as I could to the preservation of the Union, I earnestlywished to be at the seat of war, and feared it might end before Icould get East. In no sense did I anticipate what was to happen tome afterward, nor that I was to gain any distinction from it. I wasready to do my duty to the best of my ability wherever I might becalled, and I was young, healthy, insensible to fatigue, and desiredopportunity, but high rank was so distant in our service that not adream of its attainment had flitted through my brain. 

During the period running from January to September, 1861, inconsequence of resignations and the addition of some new regiments tothe regular army, I had passed through the grade of first lieutenantand reached that of captain in the Thirteenth United States Infantry, of which General W. T. Sherman had recently been made the colonel. When relieved from further duty at Yamhill by Captain Owen, I leftfor the Atlantic coast to join my new regiment. A two days' ridebrought me down to Portland, whence I sailed to San Franciso, and atthat city took passage by steamer for New York via the Isthmus ofPanama, in company with a number of officers who were coming Eastunder circumstances like my own. 

At this time California was much agitated--on the question ofsecession, and the secession element was so strong that considerableapprehension was felt by the Union people lest the State might becarried into the Confederacy. As a consequence great distrustexisted in all quarters, and the loyal passengers on the steamer, notknowing what might occur during our voyage, prepared to meetemergencies by thoroughly organizing to frustrate any attempt thatmight possibly be made to carry us into some Southern port after weshould leave Aspinwall. However, our fears proved groundless; at allevents, no such attempt was made, and we reached New York in safetyin November, 1861. A day or two in New York sufficed to replenish amost meagre wardrobe, and I then started West to join my newregiment, stopping a day and a night at the home of my parents inOhio, where I had not been since I journeyed from Texas for thePacific coast. The headquarters of my regiment were at JeffersonBarracks, Missouri, to which point I proceeded with no further delayexcept a stay in the city of St. Louis long enough to pay my respectsto General H. W. Halleck. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

AUDITING ACCOUNTS--CHIEF QUARTERMASTER AND COMMISSARY OF THE ARMY OFSOUTHWEST MISSOURI--PREPARING FOR THE PEA RIDGE CAMPAIGN--ADIFFERENCE WITH GENERAL CURTIS--ORDERED TO THE FRONT--APPOINTED ACOLONEL. 

Some days after I had reached the headquarters of my regiment nearSt. Louis, General Halleck sent for me, and when I reported heinformed me that there existed a great deal of confusion regardingthe accounts of some of the disbursing officers in his department, whose management of its fiscal affairs under his predecessor, GeneralJohn C. Fremont, had been very loose; and as the chaotic condition ofthings could be relieved only by auditing these accounts, hetherefore had determined to create a board of officers for thepurpose, and intended to make me president of it. The varioustransactions in question covered a wide field, for the departmentembraced the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Illinois, Arkansas, and all of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. 

The duty was not distasteful, and I felt that I was qualified toundertake it, for the accounts to be audited belonged exclusively tothe Quartermaster and Subsistence departments, and by recentexperience I had become familiar with the class of papers thatpertained to those branches of the army. Indeed, it was myfamiliarity with such transactions, returns, etc. , that probablycaused my selection as president of the board. 

I entered upon the work forthwith, and continued at it until the 26thof December, 1861. At that date I was relieved from the auditingboard and assigned to duty as Chief Commissary of the Army ofSouthwest Missouri, commanded by General Samuel R. Curtis. This armywas then organizing at Rolla, Missouri, for the Pea Ridge campaign, its strength throughout the campaign being in the aggregate aboutfifteen thousand men. 

As soon as I received information of my selection for this position, I went to General Halleck and requested him to assign me as ChiefQuartermaster also. He was reluctant to do so, saying that I couldnot perform both duties, but I soon convinced him that I could doboth better than the one, for I reminded him that as ChiefQuartermaster I should control the transportation, and thus obviateall possible chances of discord between the two staff departments; acondition which I deemed essential to success, especially as it wasintended that Curtis's army should mainly subsist on the country. This argument impressed Halleck, and becoming convinced, he promptlyissued the order making me Chief Quartermaster and Chief Commissaryof Subsistence of the Army of Southwest Missouri, and I started forRolla to enter upon the work assigned me. 

Having reported to General Curtis, I quickly learned that his systemof supply was very defective, and the transportation without properorganization, some of the regiments having forty to fifty wagon each, and others only three or four. I labored day and night to remedythese and other defects, and with the help of Captain Michael P. Small, of the Subsistence Department, who was an invaluableassistant, soon brought things into shape, putting the transportationin good working order, giving each regiment its proper quota ofwagons, and turning the surplus into the general supply trains of thearmy. In accomplishing this I was several times on the verge ofpersonal conflict with irate regimental commanders, but Colonel G. M. Dodge so greatly sustained me with General Curtis by strong moralsupport, and by such efficient details from his regiment--the FourthIowa Volunteer Infantry--that I still bear him and it great affectionand lasting gratitude. 

On January 26, 1862, General Curtis's army began its march from Rollato Springfield, Missouri, by way of Lebanon. The roads were deepwith mud, and so badly cut up that the supply trains in movinglabored under the most serious difficulties, and were greatlyembarrassed by swollen streams. Under these circumstances manydelays occurred, and when we arrived at Lebanon nearly all thesupplies with which we had started had been consumed, and the work offeeding the troops off the country had to begin at that point. Toget flour, wheat had to be taken from the stacks, threshed, and sentto the mills to be ground. Wheat being scarce in this region, cornas a substitute had to be converted into meal by the same laboriousprocess. In addition, beef cattle had to be secured for the meatration. 

By hard work we soon accumulated a sufficient quantity of flour andcorn meal to justify the resumption of our march on Springfield; ator near which point the enemy was believed to be awaiting us, and theorder was given to move forward, the commanding general cautioningme, in the event of disaster, to let no salt fall into GeneralPrice's hands. General Curtis made a hobby of this matter of salt, believing the enemy was sadly in need of that article, and heimpressed me deeply with his conviction that our cause would beseriously injured by a loss which would inure so greatly andpeculiarly to the enemy's benefit; but we afterward discovered, whenPrice abandoned his position, that about all he left behind was salt. 

When we were within about eight miles of Springfield, General Curtisdecided to put his troops in line of battle for the advance on thetown, and directed me to stretch out my supply trains in a long lineof battle, so that in falling back, in case the troops were repulsed, he could rally the men on the wagons. I did not like the tactics, but of course obeyed the order. The line moved on Springfield, andtook the town without resistance, the enemy having fled southward, inthe direction of Pea Ridge, the preceding day. Of course our successrelieved my anxiety about the wagons; but fancy has often picturedsince, the stampede of six mule teams that, had we met with anyreverse, would have taken place over the prairies of southwestMissouri. 

The army set out in pursuit of Price, but I was left at Springfieldto gather supplies from the surrounding country, by the same meansthat had been used at Lebanon, and send them forward. To succeed inthis useful and necessary duty required much hard work. To procurethe grain and to run the mills in the country, replacing themachinery where parts had been carried away, or changing theprinciple and running the mills on some different plan whennecessary, and finally forward the product to the army, made a taskthat taxed the energy of all engaged in it. Yet, having at command avery skillful corps of millwrights, machinists, and millers, detailedprincipally from the Fourth Iowa and Thirty-sixth Illinois volunteerregiments, we soon got matters in shape, and were able to send suchlarge quantities of flour and meal to the front, that only the baconand small parts of the ration had to be brought forward from ourdepot at Rolla. When things were well systematized, I went forwardmyself to expedite the delivery of supplies, and joined the army atCross Hollows, just south of Pea Ridge. 

Finding everything working well at Cross Hollows, I returned toSpringfield in a few days to continue the labor of collectingsupplies. On my way back I put the mills at Cassville in good orderto grind the grain in that vicinity, and perfected there a plan forthe general supply from the neighboring district of both the men andanimals of the army, so that there should, be no chance of a failureof the campaign from bad roads or disaster to my trains. Springfieldthus became the centre of the entire supply section. 

Just after my return to Springfield the battle of Pea Ridge wasfought. The success of the Union troops in this battle wasconsiderable, and while not of sufficient magnitude to affect thegeneral cause materially, it was decisive as to that particularcampaign, and resulted in driving all organized Confederate forcesout of the State of Missouri. After Pea Ridge was won, certainefforts were made to deprive Curtis of the credit due him for thevictory; but, no matter what merit belonged to individual commanders, I was always convinced that Curtis was deserving of the highestcommendation, not only for the skill displayed on the field, but fora zeal and daring in campaign which was not often exhibited at thatearly period of the war. Especially should this credit be awardedhim, when we consider the difficulties under which he labored, how hewas hampered in having to depend on a sparsely settled country forthe subsistence of his troops. In the reports of the battle thatcame to Springfield, much glory was claimed for some other generalofficers, but as I had control of the telegraph line from Springfieldeast, I detained all despatches until General Curtis had sent in hisofficial report. He thus had the opportunity of communicating withhis superior in advance of some of his vain subordinates, who wouldhave laid claim to the credit of the battle had I not thwarted themby this summary means. 

Not long afterward came the culmination of a little difference thathad arisen between General Curtis and me, brought about, I have sincesometimes thought, by an assistant quartermaster from Iowa, whom Ihad on duty with me at Springfield. He coveted my place, and finallysucceeded in getting it. He had been an unsuccessful banker in Iowa, and early in the war obtained an appointment as assistantquartermaster of volunteers with the rank of captain. As chiefquartermaster of the army in Missouri, there would be opportunitiesfor the recuperation of his fortunes which would not offer to one ina subordinate place; so to gain this position he doubtless intriguedfor it while under my eye, and Curtis was induced to give it to himas soon as I was relieved. His career as my successor, as well as inother capacities in which he was permitted to act during the war, wasto say the least not savory. The war over he turned up in Chicago aspresident of a bank, which he wrecked; and he finally landed in thepenitentiary for stealing a large sum of money from the United StatesTreasury at Washington while employed there as a clerk. The chancesthat this man's rascality would be discovered were much less whenchief of the departments of transportation and supply of an army thanthey afterward proved to be in the Treasury. I had in my possessionat all times large sums of money for the needs of the army, and amongother purposes for which these funds were to be disbursed was thepurchase of horses and mules. Certain officers and men more devotedto gain than to the performance of duty (a few such are always to befound in armies) quickly learned this, and determined to profit byit. Consequently they began a regular system of stealing horses fromthe people of the country and proffering them to me for purchase. Ittook but a little time to discover this roguery, and when I becamesatisfied of their knavery I brought it to a sudden close by seizingthe horses as captured property, branding them U. S. , and refusing topay for them. General Curtis, misled by the misrepresentations thathad been made, and without fully knowing the circumstances, orrealizing to what a base and demoralizing state of things this coursewas inevitably tending, practically ordered me to make the Payments, and I refused. The immediate result of this disobedience was acourt-martial to try me; and knowing that my usefulness in that armywas gone, no matter what the outcome of the trial might be, I askedGeneral Halleck to relieve me from duty with General Curtis and orderme to St. Louis. This was promptly done, and as my connection withthe Army of Southwest Missouri was thus severed before the courtcould be convened, my case never came to trial. The man referred toas being the cause of this condition of affairs was appointed byGeneral Curtis to succeed me. I turned over to the former all thefunds and property for which I was responsible, also the brandedhorses and mules stolen from the people of the country, requiringreceipts for everything. I heard afterward that some of the bloodedstock of southwest Missouri made its way to Iowa in an unaccountablemanner, but whether the administration of my successor wasresponsible for it or not I am unable to say. 

On my arrival at St. Louis I felt somewhat forlorn and disheartenedat the turn affairs had taken. I did not know where I should beassigned, nor what I should be required to do, but theseuncertainties were dispelled in a few days by General Halleck, who, being much pressed by the Governors of some of the Western States todisburse money in their sections, sent me out into the Northwest witha sort of roving commission to purchase horses for the use of thearmy. I went to Madison and Racine, Wis. , at which places I boughttwo hundred horses, which were shipped to St. Louis. At Chicago Ibought two hundred more, and as the prices paid at the latter pointshowed that Illinois was the cheapest market--it at that timeproducing a surplus over home demands--I determined to make Chicagothe centre of my operations. 

While occupied in this way at Chicago the battle of Shiloh tookplace, and the desire for active service with troops became uppermostin my thoughts, so I returned to St. Louis to see if I could not getinto the field. General Halleck having gone down to the Shilohbattle-field, I reported to his Assistant Adjutant-General, ColonelJohn C. Kelton, and told him of my anxiety to take a hand in activefield-service, adding that I did not wish to join my regiment, whichwas still organizing and recruiting at Jefferson Barracks, for I feltconfident I could be more useful elsewhere. Kelton knew that thepurchasing duty was but temporary, and that on its completion, probably at no distant date, I should have to join my company at thebarracks; so, realizing the inactivity to which that situation ofaffairs would subject me, he decided to assume the responsibility ofsending me to report to General Halleck at Shiloh, and gave me anorder to that effect. 

This I consider the turning-point in my military career, and shallalways feel grateful to Colonel Kelton for his kindly act which sogreatly influenced my future. My desire to join the army at Shilohhad now taken possession of me, and I was bent on getting there bythe first means available. Learning that a hospital-boat undercharge of Dr. Hough was preparing to start for Pittsburg Landing, Iobtained the Doctor's consent to take passage on it, and on theevening of April 15, I left St. Louis for the scene of militaryoperations in northeastern Mississippi. 

At Pittsburg Landing I reported to General Halleck, who, after someslight delay, assigned me to duty as an assistant to Colonel GeorgeThom, of the topographical engineers. Colonel Thom put me at thework of getting the trains up from the landing, which involved therepair of roads for that purpose by corduroying the marshy places. This was rough, hard work, without much chance of reward, but it, wasnear the field of active operations, and I determined to do the bestI could at it till opportunity for something better might arise. 

General Halleck did not know much about taking care of himself in thefield. His camp arrangements were wholly inadequate, and inconsequence he and all the officers about him were subjected to muchunnecessary discomfort and annoyance. Someone suggested to him toappoint me quartermaster for his headquarters, with a view tosystematizing the establishment and remedying the defects complainedof, and I was consequently assigned to this duty. Shortly after thisassignment I had the satisfaction of knowing that General Halleck wasdelighted with the improvements made at headquarters, both in campoutfit and transportation, and in administration generally. Mypopularity grew as the improvements increased, but one triflingincident came near marring it. There was some hitch about gettingfresh beef for General Halleck's mess, and as by this time everybodyhad come to look to me for anything and everything in the way ofcomfort, Colonel Joe McKibben brought an order from the General forme to get fresh beef for the headquarters mess. I was not catererfor this mess, nor did I belong to it even, so I refused point-blank. McKibben, disliking to report my disobedience, undertook persuasion, and brought Colonel Thom to see me to aid in his negotiations, but Iwould not give in, so McKibben in the kindness of his heart rodeseveral miles in order to procure the beef himself, and thus save mefrom the dire results which he thought would follow should Halleckget wind of such downright insubordination. The next day I was madeCommissary of Subsistence for the headquarters in addition to myother duties, and as this brought me into the line of fresh beef, General Halleck had no cause thereafter to complain of a scarcity ofthat article in his mess. 

My stay at General Halleck's headquarters was exceedingly agreeable, and my personal intercourse with officers on duty there was not onlypleasant and instructive, but offered opportunities for improvementand advancement for which hardly any other post could have affordedlike chances. My special duties did not occupy all my time, andwhenever possible I used to go over to General Sherman's division, which held the extreme right of our line in the advance on Corinth, to witness the little engagements occurring there continuously duringthe slow progress which the army was then making, the enemy beingforced back but a short distance each day. I knew General Shermanvery well. We came from near the same section of country in Ohio, and his wife and her family had known me from childhood. I wasalways kindly received by the General, and one day he asked me if Iwould be willing to accept the colonelcy of a certain Ohio regimentif he secured the appointment. I gladly told him yes, if GeneralHalleck would let me go; but I was doomed to disappointment, for inabout a week or so afterward General Sherman informed me that theGovernor of Ohio would not consent, having already decided to appointsome one else. 

A little later Governor Blair, of Michigan, who was with the armytemporarily in the interest of the troops from his State, and whojust at this time was looking around for a colonel for the SecondMichigan Cavalry, and very anxious to get a regular officer, fixedupon me as the man. The regiment was then somewhat run down bylosses from sickness, and considerably split into factions growingout of jealousies engendered by local differences previous toorganization, and the Governor desired to bridge over all thesetroubles by giving the regiment a commander who knew nothing aboutthem. I presume that some one said to the Governor about this time, "Why don't you get Sheridan?" This, however, is only conjecture. Ireally do not know how my name was proposed to him, but I have oftenbeen told since that General Gordon Granger, whom I knew slightlythen, and who had been the former colonel of the regiment, firstsuggested the appointment. At all events, on the morning of May 27, 1862, Captain Russell A. Alger--recently Governor of Michigan--accompanied by the quartermaster of the regiment, Lieutenant FrankWalbridge, arrived at General Halleck's headquarters and delivered tome this telegram:

(By Telegraph. )"MILITARY DEPT OF MICHIGAN, "ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, "DETROIT, May 25, 1862. 

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 148. 

"Captain Philip H. Sheridan, U. S. Army, is hereby appointedColonel of the Second Regiment Michigan Cavalry, to rank fromthis date. 

"Captain Sheridan will immediately assume command of theregiment. 

"By order of the Commander-in-Chief, "JNO. ROBERTSON, "Adjutant-General. "

I took the order to General Halleck, and said that I would like toaccept, but he was not willing I should do so until the consent ofthe War Department could be obtained. I returned to my tent muchdisappointed, for in those days, for some unaccountable reason, theWar Department did not favor the appointment of regular officers tovolunteer regiments, and I feared a disapproval at Washington. Aftera further consultation with Captain Alger and Lieutenant Walbridge, Idetermined to go to the General again and further present the case. Enlarging on my desire for active service with troops, and urging theutter lack of such opportunity where I was, I pleaded my cause untilGeneral Halleck finally resolved to take the responsibility ofletting me go without consulting the War Department. When I hadthanked him for the kindness, he said that inasmuch as I was to leavehim, he would inform me that the regiment to which I had just beenappointed was ordered out as part of a column directed to make a raidto the south of the enemy, then occupying Corinth, and that if Icould turn over my property, it would probably be well for me to joinmy command immediately, so that I could go with the expedition. Ireturned to my tent, where Alger and Walbridge were still waiting, and told them of the success of my interview, at the same timenotifying them that I would join the regiment in season to accompanythe expedition of which Halleck had spoken. 

In the course of the afternoon I turned over all my property to mysuccessor, and about 8 o'clock that evening made my appearance at thecamp of the Second Michigan Cavalry, near Farmington, Mississippi. The regiment was in a hubbub of excitement making preparations forthe raid, and I had barely time to meet the officers of my command, and no opportunity at all to see the men, when the trumpet sounded tohorse. Dressed in a coat and trousers of a captain of infantry, butrecast as a colonel of cavalry by a pair of well-worn eagles thatGeneral Granger had kindly given me, I hurriedly placed on my saddlea haversack, containing some coffee, sugar, bacon, and hard bread, which had been prepared, and mounting my horse, I reported myregiment to the brigade commander as ready for duty. 

CHAPTER IX. 

EXPEDITION TO BOONEVILLE--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--CONFEDERATESTRAGGLERS--SUCCESS OF THE EXPEDITION--A RECONNOISSANCE--THEIMPORTANCE OF BODILY SUSTENANCE--THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE--RECOMMENDED FOR APPOINTMENT AS A BRIGADIER-GENERAL. 

The expedition referred to by General Halleck in his partingconversation was composed of the Second Michigan and Second Iowaregiments of cavalry, formed into a brigade under command of ColonelWashington L. Elliott, of the Second Iowa. It was to start on thenight of the 27th of May at 12 o'clock, and proceed by a circuitousroute through Iuka, Miss. , to Booneville, a station on the Mobile andOhio Railroad, about twenty-two miles below Corinth, and accomplishall it could in the way of destroying the enemy's supplies andcutting his railroad communications. 

The weather in that climate was already warm, guides unobtainable, and both men and horses suffered much discomfort from the heat, andfatigue from the many delays growing out of the fact that we were inalmost total ignorance of the roads leading to the point that wedesired to reach. In order that we might go light we carried onlysugar, coffee, and salt, depending on the country for meat and bread. Both these articles were scarce, but I think we got all there was, for our advent was so unexpected by the people of the region throughwhich we passed that, supposing us to be Confederate cavalry, theyoften gave us all they had, the women and servants contributing mostfreely from their, reserve stores. 

Before reaching Booneville I had the advance, but just as we arrivedon the outskirts of the town the brigade was formed with the SecondIowa on my right, and the whole force moved forward, right in front, preceded by skirmishers. Here we encountered the enemy, but forcedhim back with little resistance. When we had gained possession ofthe station, Colonel Elliott directed me to take the left wing of myregiment, pass to the south, and destroy a bridge or culvert supposedto be at a little distance below the town on the Mobile and OhioRailroad. The right wing, or other half of the regiment, was to beheld in reserve for my support if necessary. I moved rapidly in thedesignated direction till I reached the railroad, and then rode downit for a mile and a half, but found neither bridge nor culvert. Ithen learned that there was no bridge of any importance except theone at Baldwin, nine miles farther down, but as I was aware, frominformation recently received, that it was defended by threeregiments and a battery, I concluded that I could best accomplish thepurpose for which I had been detached--crippling the road--by tearingup the track, bending the rails, and burning the cross-ties. Thiswas begun with alacrity at four different points, officers and menvieing with one another in the laborious work of destruction. We hadbut few tools, and as the difficulties to overcome were serious, ourprogress was slow, until some genius conceived the idea that thetrack, rails and ties, might be lifted from its bed bodily, turnedover, and subjected to a high heat; a convenient supply of dryfence-rails would furnish ample fuel to render the rails useless. In this way a good deal of the track was effectively broken up, andcommunication by rail from Corinth to the south entirely cut off. While we were still busy in wrecking the road, a dash was made at myright and rear by a squadron of Confederate cavalry. This washandsomely met by the reserve under Captain Archibald P. Campbell, ofthe Second Michigan, who, dismounting a portion of his command, received the enemy with such a volley from his Colt's repeatingrifles that the squadron broke and fled in all directions. We werenot molested further, and resumed our work, intending to extend thebreak toward Baldwin, but receiving orders from Elliott to return toBooneville immediately, the men were recalled, and we started torejoin the main command. 

In returning to Booneville, I found the railroad track above where Ihad struck it blocked by trains that we had thus cut off, and thewoods and fields around the town covered with several thousandConfederate soldiers. These were mostly convalescents anddisheartened stragglers belonging to General Beauregard's army, andfrom them we learned that Corinth was being evacuated. I spent somelittle time in an endeavor to get these demoralized men into an openfield, with a view to some future disposition of them; but in themidst of the undertaking I received another order from ColonelElliott to join him at once. The news of the evacuation had alsoreached Elliott, and had disclosed a phase of the situation sodifferent from that under which he had viewed it when we arrived atBooneville, that he had grown anxious to withdraw, lest we should besuddenly pounced upon by an overwhelming force from some one of thecolumns in retreat. Under such circumstances my prisoners wouldprove a decided embarrassment, so I abandoned further attempts to getthem together--not even paroling them, which I thought might havebeen done with but little risk. 

In the meantime the captured cars had been fired, and as theircomplete destruction was assured by explosions from those containingammunition, they needed no further attention, so I withdrew my menand hastened to join Elliott, taking along some Confederate officerswhom I had retained from among four or five hundred prisonerscaptured when making the original dash below the town. 

The losses in my regiment, and, in fact, those of the entire command, were insignificant. The results of the expedition were important;the railroad being broken so thoroughly as to cut off all rollingstock north of Booneville, and to place at the service of GeneralHalleck's army the cars and locomotives of which the retreatingConfederates were now so much in need. In addition, we burnedtwenty-six cars containing ten thousand stand of small arms, threepieces of artillery, a great quantity of clothing, a heavy supply ofammunition, and the personal baggage of General Leonidas Polk. Alarge number of prisoners, mostly sick and convalescent, also fellinto our hands; but as we could not carry them with us--such a hurrieddeparture was an immediate necessity, by reason of our criticalsituation--the process of paroling them was not completed, and theydoubtless passed back to active service in the Confederacy, properlyenough unrecognized as prisoners of war by their superiors. 

In returning, the column marched back by another indirect route toits old camp near Farmington, where we learned that the whole armyhad moved into and beyond Corinth, in pursuit of Beauregard, on the13th of May, the very day we had captured Booneville. Although wehad marched about one hundred and eighty miles in four days, we wererequired to take part, of course, in the pursuit of the Confederatearmy. So, resting but one night in our old camp, we were early inthe saddle again on the morning of the 2d of June. Marching souththrough Corinth, we passed on the 4th of June the scene of our lateraid, viewing with much satisfaction, as we took the road towardBlackland, the still smoldering embers of the burned trains. 

On the 4th of June I was ordered to proceed with my regiment alongthe Blackland road to determine the strength of the enemy in thatdirection, as it was thought possible we might capture, by aconcerted movement which General John Pope had suggested to GeneralHalleck, a portion of Beauregard's rear guard. Pushing theConfederate scouts rapidly in with a running fire for a mile or more, while we were approaching a little stream, I hoped to gobble the mainbody of the enemy's pickets. I therefore directed the sabrebattalion of the regiment, followed by that portion of it armed withrevolving rifles, to dash forward in column, cut off these videttesbefore they could cross the stream, and then gather them in. Thepickets fled hastily, however, and a pell-mell pursuit carried usover the stream at their heels by a little bridge, with no thought ofhalting till we gained a hill on the other side, and suddenly foundourselves almost in the camp of a strong body of artillery andinfantry. Captain Campbell being in advance, hurriedly dismountedhis battalion for a further forward movement on foot, but it wasreadily seen that the enemy was present in such heavy force as almostto ensure our destruction, and I gave orders for a hasty withdrawal. We withdrew without loss under cover of thick woods, aided much, however, by the consternation of the Confederates, who had hardlyrecovered from their surprise at our sudden appearance in their campbefore we had again placed the stream between them and us byrecrossing the bridge. The reconnoissance was a success in one way--that is, in finding out that the enemy was at the point supposed by, General Pope; but it also had a tendency to accelerate Beauregard'sretreat, for in a day or two his whole line fell back as far south asGuntown, thus rendering abortive the plans for bagging a largeportion of his army. 

General Beauregard's evacuation of Corinth and retreat southward wereaccomplished in the face of a largely superior force of Union troops, and he reached the point where he intended to halt for reorganizationwithout other loss than that sustained in the destruction of the carsand supplies at Booneville, and the capture of some stragglers anddeserters that fell into our hands while we were pressing his rearfrom General Pope's flank. The number of these was quite large, andindicated that the enemy was considerably demoralized. Under suchcircumstances, an energetic and skillfully directed pursuit might nothave made certain the enemy's destruction, but it would largely haveaided in disintegrating his forces, and I never could quiteunderstand why it was not ordered. The desultory affairs betweenrear and advance guards seemed as a general, thing to have noparticular purpose in view beyond finding out where the enemy was, and when he was found, since no supporting colums were at hand and noone in supreme control was present to give directions, ourskirmishing was of little avail and brought but small reward. 

A short time subsequent to these occurrences, Colonel Elliott wasmade a brigadier-general, and as General Pope appointed him hisChief-of-Staff, I, on the 11th of June, 1862, fell in command of thebrigade by seniority. For the rest of the month but little of momentoccurred, and we settled down into camp at Booneville on the 26th ofJune, in a position which my brigade had been ordered to take up sometwenty miles, in advance of the main army for the purpose of coveringits front. Although but a few days had elapsed from the date of myappointment as colonel of the Second Michigan to that of mysucceeding to the command of the brigade, I believe I can say withpropriety that I had firmly established myself in the confidence ofthe officers and men of the regiment, and won their regard bythoughtful care. I had striven unceasingly to have them well fed andwell clothed, had personally looked after the selection of theircamps, and had maintained such a discipline as to allay formerirritation. 

Men who march, scout, and fight, and suffer all the hardships thatfall to the lot of soldiers in the field, in order to do vigorouswork must have the best bodily sustenance, and every comfort that canbe provided. I knew from practical experience on the frontier thatmy efforts in this direction would not only be appreciated, butrequited by personal affection and gratitude; and, further, that suchexertions would bring the best results to me. Whenever my authoritywould permit I saved my command from needless sacrifices andunnecessary toil; therefore, when hard or daring work was to be doneI expected the heartiest response, and always got it. Soldiers areaverse to seeing their comrades killed without compensating results, and none realize more quickly than they the blundering that oftentakes place on the field of battle. They want some tangibleindemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an offset the valueof which is manifest, it not only makes them content to shed theirblood, but also furnishes evidence of capacity in those who commandthem. My regiment had lost very few men since coming under mycommand, but it seemed, in the eyes of all who belonged to it, thatcasualties to the enemy and some slight successes for us had repaidevery sacrifice, and in consequence I had gained not only theirconfidence as soldiers, but also their esteem and love as men, and toa degree far beyond what I then realized. 

As soon as the camp of my brigade was pitched at Booneville, I beganto scout in every direction, to obtain a knowledge of the enemy'swhereabouts and learn the ground about me. My standing in drawing atthe Military Academy had never been so high as to warrant the beliefthat I could ever prove myself an expert, but a few practical lessonsin that line were impressed on me there, and I had retained enough toenable me to make rough maps that could be readily understood, andwhich would be suitable to replace the erroneous skeleton outlines ofnorthern Mississippi, with which at this time we were scantilyfurnished; so as soon as possible I compiled for the use of myselfand my regimental commanders an information map of the surroundingcountry. This map exhibited such details as country roads, streams, farmhouses, fields, woods, and swamps, and such other topographicalfeatures as would be useful. I must confess that my crude sketch didnot evidence much artistic merit, but it was an improvement on whatwe already possessed in the way of details to guide the command, andthis was what I most needed; for it was of the first importance thatin our exposed condition we should be equipped with a thoroughknowledge of the section in which we were operating, so as to beprepared to encounter an enemy already indicating recovery from thedisorganizing effects of his recent retreat. 

In the immediate vicinity of Booneville the country was covered withheavy forests, with here and there clearings or intervening fieldsthat had been devoted to the cultivation of cotton and corn. Theground was of a low character, typical of northeastern Mississippi, and abounded in small creeks that went almost totally dry even inshort periods of drought, but became flooded with muddy water underthe outpouring of rain peculiar to a semi-tropical climate. In sucha region there were many chances of our being surprised, especiallyby an enemy who knew the country well, and whose ranks were filledwith local guides; and great precautions as well as the fullestinformation were necessary to prevent disaster. I thereforeendeavored to familiarize all with our surroundings, but scarcely hadmatters begun to shape themselves as I desired when our annihilationwas attempted by a large force of Confederate cavalry. 

On the morning of July 1, 1862, a cavalry command of between five andsix thousand-men, under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers, advanced on two roads converging near Booneville. The head of theenemy's column on the Blackland and Booneville road came in contactwith my pickets three miles and a half west of Booneville. Thesepickets, under Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of the SecondMichigan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every tree orother cover to fire from till they arrived at the point where theconverging roads joined. At this junction there was a strongposition in the protecting timber, and here Scranton made a firmstand, being reinforced presently by the few men he had out aspickets on the road to his left, a second company I had sent him fromcamp, and subsequently by three companies more, all now commanded byCaptain Campbell. This force was dismounted and formed in line, andsoon developed that the enemy was present in large numbers. Up tothis time Chalmers had shown only the heads of his columns, and wehad doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance forced himto deploy two regiments on the right and left of the road, it becameapparent that he meant business, and that there was no time to losein preparing to repel his attack. 

Full information of the situation was immediately sent me, and Idirected Campbell to hold fast, if possible, till I could supporthim, but if compelled to retire he was authorized to do so slowly, taking advantage of every means that fell in his way to prolong thefighting. Before this I had stationed one battalion of the SecondIowa in Booneville, but Colonel Edward Hatch, commanding thatregiment, was now directed to leave one company for the protection ofour camp a little to the north of the station, and take the balanceof the Second Iowa, with the battalion in Booneville except two sabrecompanies, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell, to protecthis flanks and support him by a charge should the enemy break hisdismounted line. 

While these preparations were being made, the Confederates attemptedto drive Campbell from his position by a direct attack through anopen field. In this they failed, however, for our men, reservingtheir fire until the enemy came within about thirty yards, thenopened on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt's riflesthat it soon became too hot for him, and he was repulsed withconsiderable loss. Foiled in this move, Chalmers hesitated to attackagain in front, but began overlapping both flanks of Campbell's lineby force of numbers, compelling Campbell to retire toward a strongposition I had selected in his rear for a line on which to make ourmain resistance. As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he againcharged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as in the firstassault, although the encounter was for a short time so desperate asto have the character of a hand-to-hand conflict, several groups offriend and foe using on each other the butts of their guns. At thisjuncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowagave a breathing-spell to Campbell, and made the Confederates sochary of further direct attacks that he was enabled to retire; and atthe same time I found opportunity to make disposition of thereinforcement to the best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowaon the left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its rightwith all the men available. 

In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained confidence in hisability to overcome us, and in a little while again began hisflanking movements, his right passing around my left flank somedistance, and approaching our camp and transportation, which I hadforbidden to be moved out to the rear. Fearing that he would envelopus and capture the camp and transportation, I determined to take theoffensive. Remembering a circuitous wood road that I had becomefamiliar with while making the map heretofore mentioned, I concludedthat the most effective plan would be to pass a small column aroundthe enemy's left, by way of this road, and strike his rear by amounted charge simultaneously with an advance of our main line on hisfront. I knew that the attack in rear would be a most hazardousundertaking, but in the face of such odds as the enemy had thecondition of affairs was most critical, and could be relieved, onlyby a bold and radical change in our tactics; so I at once selectedfour sabre companies, two from the Second Michigan and two from theSecond Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, incommand of them, I informed him that I expected of them the quick anddesperate work that is usually imposed on a forlorn hope. 

To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed Captain Alger tofollow the wood road as it led around the left of the enemy'sadvancing forces, to a point where 'it joined the Blackland road, about three miles from Booneville, and directed him, upon reachingthe Blackland road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear ofthe enemy's line. Under no circumstances was he to deploy thebattalion, but charge in column right through whatever he came upon, and report to me in front of Booneville, if at all possible for himto get there. If he failed to break through the enemy's line, he wasto go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men were left, and he was able to retreat, he was to do so by the same route he hadtaken on his way out. To conduct him on this perilous service I sentalong a thin, sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom Ihad employed as a guide and scout a few days before, on account ofhis intimate knowledge of the roads, from the public thoroughfaresdown to the insignificant by-paths of the neighboring swamps. Withsuch guidance I felt sure that the column would get to the desiredpoint without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost ormisled by taking any of the many by-roads which traversed the denseforests through which it would be obliged to pass. I also informedAlger that I should take the reserve and join the main line in frontof Booneville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole force, and that as a signal he must have his men cheer loudly when he struckthe enemy's rear, in order that my attack might be simultaneous withhis. 

I gave him one hour to go around and come back through the enemy, andwhen he started I moved to the front with the balance of the reserve, to put everything I had into the fight. This meant an inestimableadvantage to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safetydemanded the hazard. All along our attenuated line the fighting wasnow sharp, and the enemy's firing indicated such numerical strengththat fear of disaster to Alger increased my anxiety terribly as thetime set for his cheering arrived and no sound of it was heard. 

Relying, however, on the fact that Beene's knowledge of the roadswould prevent his being led astray, and confident of Alger'sdetermination to accomplish the purpose for which he set out, as soonas the hour was up I ordered my whole line forward. Fortunately, just as this moment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain formy horses ran into Booneville from Corinth. I say fortunately, because it was well known throughout the command that in the morning, when I first discovered the large numbers of the enemy, I had calledfor assistance; and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements hadarrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry wasencamped, and inspirated by this belief, advanced with renewedconfidence and wild cheering. Meantime I had the engineer of thelocomotive blow his whistle loudly, so that the enemy might alsolearn that a train had come; and from the fact that in a few momentshe began to give way before our small force, I thought that thisstrategem had some effect. Soon his men broke, and ran in the utmostdisorder over the country in every direction. I found later, however, that his precipitous retreat was due to the pressure on hisleft from the Second Iowa, in concert with the front attack of theSecond Michigan, and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger, who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his expedition, though he had failed to come through, or so near that I could hearthe signal agreed upon before leaving Booneville. 

After Alger had reached and turned up the Blackland road, the firstthing he came across was the Confederate headquarters; the officersand orderlies about which he captured and sent back some distance toa farm-house. Continuing on a gallop, he soon struck the rear of theenemy's line, but was unable to get through; nor did he get nearenough for me to hear his cheering; but as he had made the distancehe was to travel in the time allotted, his attack and mine werealmost coincident, and the enemy, stampeded by the charges in frontand rear, fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to captureAlger's command, which might readily have been done. Alger'stroopers soon rejoined me at Booneville, minus many hats, havingreturned by their original route. They had sustained little lossexcept a few men wounded and a few temporarily missing. Among thesewas Alger himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb of atree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was unable to flank. The missing had been dismounted in one way or another, and run overby the enemy in his flight; but they all turned up later, none theworse except for a few scratches and bruises. 

My effective strength in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger'scommand comprised ninety officers and men. Chalmers's force wascomposed of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have beenunable to find any returns from which to verify his actual numbers, yet, from the statements of prisoners and from information obtainedfrom citizens along his line of march, it is safe to say that he hadin the action not less than five-thousand men. Our casualties werenot many--forty-one in all. His loss in killed and wounded wasconsiderable, his most severely wounded--forty men--falling into ourhands, having been left at farm-houses in the vicinity of thebattlefield. 

The victory in the face of such odds was most gratifying, and as itjustified my disinclination--in fact, refusal--to retire fromBooneville without fighting (for the purpose of saving mytransportation, as directed by superior authority when I applied inthe morning for reinforcements), it was to me particularly grateful. It was also very valuable in, view of the fact that it increased theconfidence between the officers and men of my brigade and me, andgave us for the balance of the month not only comparative rest, butentire immunity from the dangers of a renewed effort to gobble myisolated outpost. In addition to all this, commendation from myimmediate superiors was promptly tendered through oral and writtencongratulations; and their satisfaction at the result of the battletook definite form a few days later, in the following application formy promotion, when, by an expedition to Ripley, Miss. , most valuableinformation as to the enemy's location and plans was captured:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, "JULY 30, 1862. --3. 05 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, "Washington, D. C. 

"Brigadiers scarce; good ones scarce. Asboth goes on the month'sleave you gave him ten months since; Granger has temporary command. The undersigned respectfully beg that you will obtain the promotionof Sheridan. He is worth his weight in gold. His Ripley expeditionhas brought us captured letters of immense value, as well asprisoners, showing the rebel plans and dispositions, as you willlearn from District Commander. 

"W. S. ROSECRANS, Brigadier-General. "C. C. SULLIVAN, " ""G. GRANGER, " ""W. L. ELLIOTT, " ""A. ASBOTH, " " "

CHAPTER X. 

IN CAMP NEAR RIENZI--GENERAL GRANGER--A VALUABLE CAPTURE AT RIPLEY--RAIDING A CORNFIELD--REPULSING AN ATTACK--PRESENTED WITH THE BLACKHORSE "RIENZI"--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL. 

After the battle of Booneville, it was decided by General Rosecrans, on the advice of General Granger, that my position at Booneville wastoo much exposed, despite the fact that late on the evening of thefight my force had been increased by the addition of, a battery offour guns and two companies of infantry, and by the Third MichiganCavalry, commanded by Colonel John K. Mizner; so I was directed towithdraw from my post and go into camp near Rienzi, Mississippi, where I could equally well cover the roads in front of the army, andalso be near General Asboth's division of infantry, which occupied aline in rear of the town. This section of country, being higher andmore rolling than that in the neighborhood of Booneville, had manyadvantages in the way of better camping-grounds, better grazing andthe like, but I moved with reluctance, because I feared that myproximity to Asboth would diminish to a certain extent myindependence of command. 

General Asboth was a tall, spare, handsome man, with gray mustacheand a fierce look. He was an educated soldier, of unquestionedcourage, but the responsibilities of outpost duty bore rather heavilyon him, and he kept all hands in a state of constant worry inanticipation of imaginary attacks. His ideas of discipline were notvery rigid either, and as by this time there had been introduced intomy brigade some better methods than those obtaining when it firstfell to my command, I feared the effect should he, have any controlover it, or meddle with its internal affairs. However, there wasnothing to do but to move to the place designated, but GeneralGranger, who still commanded the cavalry division to which thebrigade belonged, so arranged matters with General Rosecrans, who hadsucceeded to the command of the Army of the Mississippi, that myindependence was to be undisturbed, except in case of a generalattack by the enemy. 

We went into camp near Rienzi, July 22, sending back to the generalfield-hospital at Tuscumbia Springs all our sick--a considerablenumber--stricken down by the malarial influences around Booneville. In a few days the fine grazing and abundance of grain for ourexhausted horses brought about their recuperation; and the many largeopen fields in the vicinity gave opportunity for drills and parades, which were much needed. I turned my attention to those disciplinarymeasures which, on account of active work in the field, had beennecessarily neglected since the brigade had arrived at PittsburgLanding, in April; and besides, we had been busy in collectinginformation by scouting parties and otherwise, in prosecution of thepurpose for which we were covering the main army. 

I kept up an almost daily correspondence with General Granger, concerning the information obtained by scouts and reconnoitringparties, and he came often to Rienzi to see me in relation to thisand other matters. Previously I had not had much personalassociation with Granger. While I was at Halleck's headquarters wemet on one or two occasions, and the day I joined the Second Michiganat Farmington I saw him for a few moments, but, with such slightexception, our intercourse had been almost exclusively official. Hehad suggested my name, I was told, to Governor Blair, when theGovernor was in search of an officer of the regular army to appointto the colonelcy of the Second Michigan Cavalry, but hisrecommendation must have been mainly based on the favorable opinionshe had heard expressed by General Halleck and by some of the officersof his staff, rather than from any personal knowledge of my capacity. Of course I was very grateful for this, but some of hischaracteristics did not impress me favorably, and I sometimes wishedthe distance between our camps greater. His most serious failing wasan uncontrollable propensity to interfere with and direct the minormatters relating to the command, the details for which those underhim were alone responsible. Ill-judged meddling in this respectoften led to differences between us, only temporary it is true, butmost harassing to the subordinate, since I was compelled by thecircumstances of the situation not only invariably to yield my ownjudgment, but many a time had to play peacemaker--smoothing downruffled feelings, that I knew had been excited by Granger's freakyand spasmodic efforts to correct personally some trifling fault thatought to have been left to a regimental or company commander toremedy. Yet with all these small blemishes Granger had many goodqualities, and his big heart was so full of generous impulses andgood motives as to far outbalance his short-comings; andnot-withstanding the friction and occasional acerbity of our officialintercourse, we maintained friendly relations till his death. 

In pursuance of the fatal mistake made by dispersing Halleck's forcesafter the fall of Corinth, General Don Carlos Buell's Army of theOhio had been started some time before on its march eastward towardChattanooga; and as this movement would be followed of course by amanoeuvre on the part of the enemy, now at Tupelo under GeneralBraxton Bragg, either to meet Buell or frustrate his designs by somecounter-operation, I was expected to furnish, by scouting and allother means available, information as to what was going on within theConfederate lines. To do the work required, necessitated an increaseof my command, and the Seventh Kansas Cavalry was therefore added toit, and my picket-line extended so as to cover from Jacintosouthwesterly to a point midway between Rienzi and Booneville, andthen northwesterly to the Hatchie River. Skirmishes between outpostson this line were of frequent occurrence, with small results toeither side, but they were somewhat annoying, particularly in thedirection of Ripley, where the enemy maintained a considerableoutpost. Deciding to cripple if not capture this outpost, on theevening of July 27, I sent out an expedition under Colonel Hatch, which drove the enemy from the town of Ripley and took a fewprisoners, but the most valuable prize was in the shape of a packageof thirty-two private letters, the partial reading of which disclosedto me the positive transfer from Mississippi of most of Bragg's army, for the purpose of counteracting Buell's operations in northernAlabama and East Tennessee. This decisive evidence was of the utmostimportance, and without taking time to read all the letters, Iforwarded them to General Granger July 28, in a despatch whichstated: "I deem it necessary to send them at once; the enemy ismoving in large force on Chattanooga. " Other than this the resultsof the expedition were few; and the enemy, having fled from Ripleywith but slight resistance, accompanied by almost all theinhabitants, re-occupied the place next day after our people hadquitted it, and resumed in due time his annoying attacks on ouroutposts, both sides trying to achieve something whenever occasionoffered. 

The prevalence of a severe drought had resulted in drying up many ofthe streams within the enemy's lines, and, in consequence, he wasobliged to shift his camps often, and send his beef-cattle and mulesnear his outposts for water. My scouts kept me well posted in regardto the movements of both camps and herds; and a favorable opportunitypresenting itself, I sent an expedition on August 14 to gather insome animals located on Twenty-Mile Creek, a stream always suppliedwith water from a source of never-failing, springs. Our side metwith complete success in this instance, and when the expeditionreturned, we were all made happy by an abundance of fresh beef, andby some two hundred captured mules, that we thus added to our trainsat a time when draft animals were much needed. 

Rations for the men were now supplied in fair quantities, and theonly thing required to make us wholly contented was plenty of grainfor our animals. Because of the large number of troops then in WestTennessee and about Corinth, the indifferent railroad leading downfrom Columbus, Ky. , was taxed to its utmost capacity to transportsupplies. The quantity of grain received at Corinth from the northwas therefore limited, and before reaching the different outposts, bypassing through intermediate depots of supply, it had dwindled toinsignificance. I had hopes, however, that this condition of thingsmight be ameliorated before long by gathering a good supply of cornthat was ripening in the neighborhood, and would soon, I thought, besufficiently hard to feed to my animals. Not far from myheadquarters there was a particularly fine field, which, with thisend in view, I had carefully protected through the milky stage, tothe evident disappointment of both Asboth's men and mine. They borethe prohibition well while it affected only themselves, but the trialwas too great when it came to denying their horses; and men whosediscipline kept faith with my guards during the roasting-ear periodnow fell from grace. Their horses were growing thin, and few couldwithstand the mute appeals of their suffering pets; so at night thecorn, because of individual foraging, kept stealthily and steadilyvanishing, until the field was soon fringed with only earless stalks. The disappearance was noticed, and the guard increased, but still thequantity of corn continued to grow less, the more honest troopersbemoaning the loss, and questioning the honor of those to whosesafekeeping it had been entrusted. Finally, doubtless under theapprehension that through their irregularities the corn would alldisappear and find its way to the horses in accordance with thestealthy enterprise of their owners, a general raid was made on thefield in broad daylight, and though the guard drove off themarauders, I must admit that its efforts to keep them back were sounsuccessful that my hopes for an equal distribution of the crop werequickly blasted. One look at the field told that it had been sweptclean of its grain. Of course a great row occurred as to who was toblame, and many arrests and trials took place, but there had beensuch an interchanging of cap numbers and other insignia that it wasnext to impossible to identify the guilty, and so much criminationand acrimony grew out of the affair that it was deemed best to dropthe whole matter. 

On August 27 about half of the command was absent reconnoitring, Ihaving sent it south toward Tupelo, in the hope of obtaining somedefinite information regarding a movement to Holly Springs of theremainder of the Confederate army, under General Price, when aboutmid-day I was suddenly aroused by excited cries and sounds of firing, and I saw in a moment that the enemy was in my camp. He had come inon my right flank from the direction of the Hatchie River, pell-mellwith our picket-post stationed about three miles out on the Ripleyroad. The whole force of the enemy comprised about eight hundred, but only his advance entered with my pickets, whom he had charged andbadly stampeded, without, on their part, the pretense of a fight inbehalf of those whom it was their duty to protect until properdispositions for defense could be made. The day was excessively hot, one of those sultry debilitating days that had caused the suspendingof all military exercises; and as most of the men were lounging orsleeping in their tents, we were literally caught napping. The alarmspread instantly through the camp, and in a moment the command turnedout for action, somewhat in deshabille it is true, but none the lesseffective, for every man had grabbed his rifle and cartridge-box atthe first alarm. Aided by a few shots from Captain Henry Hescock'sbattery, we soon drove the intruders from our camp in about the samedisorder in which they had broken in on us. By this time ColonelHatch and Colonel Albert L. Lee had mounted two battalions each, andI moved them out at a lively pace in pursuit, followed by a sectionof the battery. No halt was called till we came upon the enemy'smain body, under Colonel Faulkner, drawn up in line of battle nearNewland's store. Opening on him with the two pieces of artillery, Ihurriedly formed line confronting him, and quickly and with butlittle resistance drove him in confusion from the field. The suddenturning of the tables dismayed Faulkner's men, and panic seizingthem, they threw away every loose article of arms or clothing ofwhich they could dismember themselves, and ran in the wildestdisorder in a mad effort to escape. As the chase went on the panicincreased, the clouds of dust from the road causing an interminglingof friend and foe. In a little while the affair grew most ludicrous, Faulkner's hatless and coatless men taking to the woods in suchdispersed order and so demoralized that a good many prisoners weresecured, and those of the enemy who escaped were hunted until dark. When the recall was sounded, our men came in loaded down with plunderin the shape of hats, haversacks, blankets, pistols, and shotguns, ina quantity which amply repaid for the surprise of the morning, butdid not excuse the delinquent commander of our picket-guard, who afew days later was brought to a realizing sense of his duty by acourt-martial. 

Shortly after this affair Captain Archibald P. Campbell, of theSecond Michigan Cavalry, presented me with the black horse calledRienzi, since made historical from having been ridden by me in manybattles, conspicuously in the ride from Winchester to Cedar Creek, which has been celebrated in the poem by T. Buchanan Read. Thishorse was of Morgan stock, and then about three years old. He wasjet black, excepting three white feet, sixteen hands high, andstrongly built, with great powers of endurance. He was so activethat he could cover with ease five miles an hour at his naturalwalking gait. The gelding had been ridden very seldom; in fact, Campbell had been unaccustomed to riding till the war broke out, and, I think, felt some disinclination to mount the fiery colt. Campbellhad an affection for him, however, that never waned, and would oftencome to my headquarters to see his favorite, the colt being cared forthere by the regimental farrier, an old man named John Ashley, whohad taken him in charge when leaving Michigan, and had been his groomever since. Seeing that I liked the horse--I had ridden him onseveral occasions--Campbell presented him to me on one of thesevisits, and from that time till the close of the war I rode himalmost continuously, in every campaign and battle in which I tookpart, without once finding him overcome by fatigue, though on manyoccasions his strength was severely tested by long marches and shortrations. I never observed in him any vicious habit; a nervousnessand restlessness and switch of the tail, when everything about himwas in repose, being the only indication that he might beuntrustworthy. No one but a novice could be deceived by this, however, for the intelligence evinced in every feature, and histhoroughbred appearance, were so striking that any person accustomedto horses could not misunderstand such a noble animal. But Campbellthought otherwise, at least when the horse was to a certain degreeyet untrained, and could not be pursuaded to ride him; indeed, formore than a year after he was given to me, Campbell still retainedsuspicions of his viciousness, though, along with this mistrust, anundiminished affection. Although he was several times wounded, thishorse escaped death in action; and living to a ripe old age, died in1878, attended to the last with all the care and surrounded withevery comfort due the faithful service he had rendered. 

In moving from Corinth east toward Chattanooga, General Buell's armywas much delayed by the requirement that he should repair the Memphisand Charleston railroad as he progressed. The work of repair obligedhim to march very slowly, and was of but little use when done, forguerrillas and other bands of Confederates destroyed the road againas soon as he had passed on. But worst of all, the time thusconsumed gave General Bragg the opportunity to reorganize andincrease his army to such an extent that he was able to contest thepossession of Middle Tennessee and Kentucky. Consequently, themovement of this army through Tennessee and Kentucky toward the OhioRiver--its objective points being Louisville and Cincinnati--was nowwell defined, and had already rendered abortive General Buell'sdesigns on Chattanooga and East Tennessee. Therefore extraordinaryefforts on the part of the Government became necessary, and theconcentration of National troops at Louisville and Cincinnati to meetthe contingency of Bragg's reaching those points was an obviousrequirement. These troops were drawn from all sections in the Westwhere it was thought they could be spared, and among others I wasordered to conduct thither--to Louisville or Cincinnati, assubsequent developments might demand--my regiment, Hescock's battery, the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, and the Thirty-sixth andForty-fourth Illinois regiments of infantry, known as the "Pea RidgeBrigade. " With this column I marched back to Corinth on the 6th ofSeptember, 1862, for the purpose of getting railroad transportationto Columbus, Kentucky. 

At Corinth I met General Grant, who by this time had beenreestablished in favor and command somewhat, General Halleck havingdeparted for Washington to assume command of the army asGeneral-in-Chief. Before and during the activity which followed hisreinstatement, General Grant had become familiar with my servicesthrough the transmission to Washington of information I had furnishedconcerning the enemy's movements, and by reading reports of my fightsand skirmishes in front, and he was loth to let me go. Indeed, heexpressed surprise at seeing me in Corinth, and said he had notexpected me to go; he also plainly showed that he was much hurt atthe inconsiderate way in which his command was being depleted. SinceI was of the opinion that the chief field of usefulness andopportunity was opening up in Kentucky, I did not wish him to retainme, which he might have done, and I impressed him with my conviction, somewhat emphatically, I fear. Our conversation ended with my wishgratified. I afterward learned that General Granger, whom GeneralGrant did not fancy, had suggested that I should take to Cincinnatithe main portion of Granger's command--the Pea Ridge Brigade--as wellas the Second Michigan Cavalry, of which I was still colonel. We started that night, going by rail over the Mobile and Ohio road toColumbus, Ky. , where we embarked on steamboats awaiting us. Theseboats were five in number, and making one of them my flag-ship, expecting that we might come upon certain batteries reported to belocated upon the Kentucky shore of the Ohio, I directed the rest tofollow my lead. Just before reaching Caseyville, the captain of atin-clad gunboat that was patrolling the river brought me theinformation that the enemy was in strong force at Caseyville, andexpressed a fear that my fleet could not pass his batteries. Accepting the information as correct, I concluded to capture theplace before trying to pass up the river. Pushing in to the bank aswe neared the town, I got the troops ashore and moved on Caseyville, in the expectation of a bloody fight, but was agreeably surprisedupon reaching the outskirts of the village by an outpouring of itsinhabitants--men, women, and children--carrying the Stars andStripes, and making the most loyal professions. Similardemonstrations of loyalty had been made to the panic-stricken captainof the gunboat when he passed down the river, but he did not stay toascertain their character, neither by landing nor by inquiry, for heassumed that on the Kentucky bank of the river there could be noloyalty. The result mortified the captain intensely; and deeming hisconvoy of little further use, he steamed toward Cairo in quest ofother imaginary batteries, while I re-embarked at Caseyville, andcontinued up the Ohio undisturbed. About three miles belowCincinnati I received instructions to halt, and next day I wasordered by Major-General H. G. Wright to take my troops back toLouisville, and there assume command of the Pea Ridge Brigade, composed of the Second and Fifteenth Missouri, Thirty-sixth andForty-fourth Illinois infantry, and of such other regiments as mightbe sent me in advance of the arrival of General Buell's army. When I reached Louisville I reported to Major-General William Nelson, who was sick, and who received me as he lay in bed. He asked me whyI did not wear the shoulder-straps of my rank. I answered that I wasthe colonel of the Second Michigan cavalry, and had on my appropriateshoulder-straps. He replied that I was a brigadier-general for theBooneville fight, July 1, and that I should wear the shoulder-strapsof that grade. I returned to my command and put it in camp; andas I had no reluctance to wearing the shoulder-straps of abrigadier-general, I was not long in procuring a pair, particularlyas I was fortified next day by receiving from Washington officialinformation of my appointment as a brigadier-general, to date fromJuly 1, 1862, the day of the battle of Booneville. 

CHAPTER XI. 

GOOD ADVICE FROM GENERAL NELSON--HIS TRAGIC DEATH--PUTTING LOUISVILLEIN A STATE OF DEFENSE--ASSIGNED TO THE COMMAND OF THE ELEVENTHDIVISION--CAPTURE OF CHAPLIN HEIGHTS--BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE--REPORTEDAMONG THE KILLED--A THRILLING INCIDENT--GENERAL BUELL RELIEVED BYGENERAL ROSECRANS. 

I reported to Major-General Nelson at the Galt House in Louisville, September 14, 1862, who greeted me in the bluff and hearty fashion ofa sailor--for he had been in the navy till the breaking out of thewar. The new responsibilities that were now to fall upon me byvirtue of increased rank caused in my mind an uneasiness which, Ithink, Nelson observed at the interview, and he allayed it by givingme much good advice, and most valuable information in regard toaffairs in Kentucky, telling me also that he intended I should retainin my command the Pea Ridge Brigade and Hescock's battery. Thislatter assurance relieved me greatly, for I feared the loss of thesetroops in the general redistribution which I knew must soon takeplace; and being familiar with their valuable service in Missouri, and having brought them up from Mississippi, I hoped they wouldcontinue with me. He directed me to take position just below thecity with the Pea Ridge Brigade, Hescock's battery, and the SecondMichigan Cavalry, informing me, at the same time, that some of thenew regiments, then arriving under a recent call of the President forvolunteers, would also be assigned to my command. Shortly after theinterview eight new regiments and an additional battery joined me, thus making good his promise of more troops. 

A few days later came Nelson's tragic end, shocking the wholecountry. Those of us in camp outside of the city were startled onthe morning of September 29 by the news that General Jefferson C. Davis, of the Union Army, had shot General Nelson at the Galt House, and the wildest rumors in regard to the occurrence came thick andfast; one to the effect that Nelson was dead, another having it thathe was living and had killed Davis, and still others reflecting onthe loyalty of both, it being supposed by the general public at firstthat the difficulty between the two men had grown out of somepolitical rather than official or personal differences. When thenews came, I rode into the city to the Galt House to learn theparticulars, reaching there about 10 o'clock in the forenoon. Here Ilearned that Nelson had been shot by Davis about two hours before, atthe foot of the main stairway leading from the corridor just beyondthe office to the second floor, and that Nelson was already dead. Itwas almost as difficult to get reliable particulars of the matter atthe hotel as it had been in my camp, but I gathered that the two menhad met first at an early hour near the counter of the hotel office, and that an altercation which had begun several days before inrelation to something official was renewed by Davis, who, attemptingto speak to Nelson in regard to the subject-matter of their previousdispute, was met by an insulting refusal to listen. It now appearsthat when Nelson made this offensive remark, Davis threw a smallpaper ball that he was nervously rolling between his fingers intoNelson's face, and that this insult was returned by Nelson slappingDavis (Killed by a Brother Soldier. --Gen. J. B. Fry. ) in the face. But at the time, exactly what had taken place just before theshooting was shrouded in mystery by a hundred conflicting stories, the principal and most credited of which was that Davis had demandedfrom Nelson an apology for language used in the original altercation, and that Nelson's refusal was accompanied by a slap in the face, atthe same moment denouncing Davis as a coward. However this may be, Nelson, after slapping Davis, moved toward the corridor, from which astairway led to the second floor, and just as he was about to ascend, Davis fired with a pistol that he had obtained from some one near byafter the blow had been struck. The ball entered Nelson's breastjust above the heart, but his great strength enabled him to ascendthe stairway notwithstanding the mortal character of the wound, andhe did not fall till he reached the corridor on the second floor. Hedied about half an hour later. The tragedy cast a deep gloom overall who knew the men, for they both had many warm personal friends;and affairs at Louisville had hardly recovered as yet from theconfused and discouraging condition which preceded the arrival ofGeneral Buell's army. General Buell reported the killing of Nelsonto the authorities at Washington, and recommended the trial of Davisby court-martial, but no proceedings were ever instituted against himin either a civil or military court, so to this day it has not beendetermined judicially who was the aggressor. Some months later Daviswas assigned to the command of a division in Buell's army after thatofficer had been relieved from its command. 

Two Confederate armies, under General Kirby Smith and General BraxtonBragg, had penetrated into Kentucky, the one under Smith by the wayof Cumberland Gap, the other and main army under Bragg by way of theSequatche Valley, Glasgow, and Mumfordsville. Glasgow was capturedby the enemy on the 17th of September, and as the expectation wasthat Buell would reach the place in time to save the town, its losscreated considerable alarm in the North, for fears were nowentertained that Bragg would strike Louisville and capture the citybefore Buell could arrive on the ground. It became necessarytherefore to put Louisville in a state of defense, and after thecordon of principal works had been indicated, my troops threw up inone night a heavy line of rifle-pits south of the city, from theBardstown pike to the river. The apprehended attack by Bragg nevercame, however, for in the race that was then going on between him andBuell on parallel roads, the Army of the Ohio outmarched theConfederates, its advance arriving at Louisville September 25. 

General Buell immediately set about reorganizing the whole force, andon September 29 issued an order designating the troops under mycommand as the Eleventh Division, Army of the Ohio, and assigningBrigadier-General J. T. Boyle to command the division, and me tocommand one of its brigades. To this I could not object, of course, for I was a brigadier-general of very recent date, and could hardlyexpect more than a brigade. I had learned, however, that at leastone officer to whom a high command had been given--a corps--had notyet been appointed a general officer by the President, and Iconsidered it somewhat unfair that I should be relegated to abrigade, while men who held no commissions at all were being madechiefs of corps and divisions; so I sought an interview with GeneralBuell's chief-of-staff, Colonel Fry, and, while not questioningBuell's good intentions nor his pure motives, insisted that my rightsin the matter should be recognized. That same evening I was assignedto the command of the Eleventh Division, and began preparing it atonce for a forward movement, which I knew must soon take place in theresumption of offensive operations by the Army of the Ohio. 

During the interval from September 25 till October 1 there was amongthe officers much criticism of General Buell's management of therecent campaign, which had resulted in his retirement to Louisville;and he was particularly censured by many for not offering battle toGeneral Bragg while the two armies were marching parallel to eachother, and so near that an engagement could have been brought on atany one of several points--notably so at Glasgow, Kentucky, if therehad been a desire to join issue. It was asserted, and by manyconceded, that General Buell had a sufficient force to risk a fight. He was much blamed for the loss of Mumfordsville also. The captureof this point, with its garrison, gave Bragg an advantage in the racetoward the Ohio River, which odds would most likely have ensured thefall of Louisville had they been used with the same energy and skillthat the Confederate commander displayed from Chattanooga to Glasgow;but something always diverted General Bragg at the supreme moment, and he failed to utilize the chances falling to him at this time, for, deflecting his march to the north toward Bardstown, he left opento Buell the direct road to Louisville by way of Elizabethtown. 

At Bardstown Bragg's army was halted while he endeavored to establisha Confederate government in Kentucky by arranging for theinstallation of a provisional governor at Lexington. Bragg had beenassured that the presence of a Confederate army in Kentucky would soencourage the secession element that the whole State could be forcedinto the rebellion and his army thereby largely increased; but he hadbeen considerably misled, for he now found that though much latentsympathy existed for his cause, yet as far as giving active aid wasconcerned, the enthusiasm exhibited by the secessionists of Kentuckyin the first year of the war was now replaced by apathy, or at bestby lukewarmness. So the time thus spent in political machinationswas wholly lost to Bragg; and so little reinforcement was added tohis army that it may be said that the recruits gained were not enoughto supply the deficiencies resulting from the recent toilsome marchesof the campaign. 

In the meanwhile Buell had arrived at Louisville, system had beensubstituted for the chaos which had previously obtained there, andorders were issued for an advance upon the enemy with the purpose ofattacking and the hope of destroying him within the limits of the"blue grass" region, and, failing in that, to drive him fromKentucky. The army moved October 1, 1862, and my division, now apart of the Third Corps, commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, marcheddirectly on Bardstown, where it was thought the enemy would make astand, but Bragg's troops retreated toward Perryville, only resistingsufficiently to enable the forces of General Kirby Smith to be drawnin closer--they having begun a concentration at Frankfort--so theycould be used in a combined attack on Louisville as soon as theConfederate commander's political projects were perfected. 

Much time was consumed by Buell's army in its march on Perryville, but we finally neared it on the evening of October 7. During theday, Brigadier-General Robert B. Mitchell's division of Gilbert'scorps was in the advance on the Springfield pike, but as the enemydeveloped that he was in strong force on the opposite side of a smallstream called Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin River, mydivision was brought up and passed to the front. It was verydifficult to obtain water in this section of Kentucky, as a droughthad prevailed for many weeks, and the troops were suffering so forwater that it became absolutely necessary that we should gainpossession of Doctor's Creek in order to relieve their distress. Consequently General Gilbert, during the night, directed me to pushbeyond Doctor's Creek early the next morning. At daylight on the 8thI moved out Colonel Dan McCook's brigade and Barnett's battery forthe purpose, but after we had crossed the creek with some slightskirmishing, I found that we could not hold the ground unless wecarried and occupied a range of hills, called Chaplin Heights, infront of Chaplin River. As this would project my command in thedirection of Perryville considerably beyond the troops that were oneither flank, I brought up Laiboldt's brigade and Hescock's batteryto strengthen Colonel McCook. Putting both brigades into line wequickly carried the Heights, much to the surprise of the enemy, Ithink, for he did not hold on to the valuable ground as strongly ashe should have done. This success not only ensured us a good supplyof water, but also, later in the day, had an important bearing in thebattle of Perryville. After taking the Heights, I brought up therest of my division and intrenched, without much difficulty, bythrowing up a strong line of rifle-pits, although the enemy'ssharpshooters annoyed us enough to make me order Laiboldt's brigadeto drive them in on the main body. This was successfully done in afew minutes, but in pushing them back to Chaplin River, we discoveredthe Confederates forming a line of battle on the opposite bank, withthe apparent purpose of an attack in force, so I withdrew the brigadeto our intrenchments on the crest and there awaited the assault. 

While this skirmishing was going on, General Gilbert--the corpscommander--whose headquarters were located on a hill about a miledistant to the rear, kept sending me messages by signal not to bringon an engagement. I replied to each message that I was not bringingon an engagement, but that the enemy evidently intended to do so, andthat I believed I should shortly be attacked. Soon after returningto the crest and getting snugly fixed in the rifle-pits, my attentionwas called to our left, the high ground we occupied affording me inthat direction an unobstructed view. I then saw General A. McD. McCook's corps--the First-advancing toward Chaplin River by theMackville road, apparently unconscious that the Confederates werepresent in force behind the stream. I tried by the use of signalflags to get information of the situation to these troops, but myefforts failed, and the leading regiments seemed to approach theriver indifferently prepared to meet the sudden attack that speedilyfollowed, delivered as it was from the chosen position of the enemy. The fury of the Confederate assault soon halted this advance force, and in a short time threw it into confusion, pushed it back aconsiderable distance, and ultimately inflicted upon it such loss ofmen and guns as to seriously cripple McCook's corps, and prevent forthe whole day further offensive movement on his part, though hestoutly resisted the enemy's assaults until 4 o'clock in theafternoon. 

Seeing McCook so fiercely attacked, in order to aid him I advancedHescock's battery, supported by six regiments, to a very goodposition in front of a belt of timber on my extreme left, where anenfilading fire could be opened on that portion of the enemyattacking the right of the First Corps, and also on his batteriesacross Chaplin River. But at this juncture he placed two batterieson my right and began to mass troops behind them, and GeneralGilbert, fearing that my intrenched position on the heights might becarried, directed me to withdraw Hescock and his supports and returnthem to the pits. My recall was opportune, for I had no sooner gotback to my original line than the Confederates attacked me furiously, advancing almost to my intrenchments, notwithstanding that a largepart of the ground over which they had to move was swept by a heavyfire of canister from both my batteries. Before they had quitereached us, however, our telling fire made them recoil, and as theyfell back, I directed an advance of my whole division, bringing up myreserve regiments to occupy the crest of the hills; Colonel WilliamP. Carlin's brigade of Mitchell's division meanwhile moving forwardon my right to cover that flank. This advance pressed the enemy toPerryville, but he retired in such good order that we gained nothingbut some favorable ground that enabled me to establish my batteriesin positions where they could again turn their attention to theConfederates in front of McCook, whose critical condition was shortlyafter relieved, however, by a united pressure of Gilbert's corpsagainst the flank of McCook's assailants, compelling them to retirebehind Chaplin River. 

The battle virtually ended about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, thoughmore or less desultory firing continued until dark. Considering theseverity of the engagement on McCook's front, and the reverses thathad befallen him, I question if, from that part of the line, muchcould have been done toward retrieving the blunders of the day, butit did seem to me that, had the commander of the army been able to bepresent on the field, he could have taken advantage of Bragg's finalrepulse, and there would have remained in our hands more than thebarren field. But no attempt was made to do anything more till nextmorning, and then we secured little except the enemy's killed andmost severely wounded. 

The operations of my division during the engagement pleased. GeneralGilbert very much, and he informed me that he would relax a rigidlyenforced order which General Buell had issued some days before, sufficiently to permit my trains to come to the front and supply myalmost starving troops with rations. The order in question was oneof those issued, doubtless with a good intent, to secure generallythe safety of our trains, but General Gilbert was not elastic, and onthe march he had construed the order so illiberally that it was nextto impossible to supply the men with food, and they were particularlyshort in this respect on the eve of the battle. I had thenendeavored to persuade him to modify his iron-clad interpretation ofthe order, but without effect, and the only wagons we could bring upfrom the general parks in rear were ambulances and those containingammunition. So to gain access to our trains was a great boon, and atthat moment a more welcome result than would have been a completevictory minus this concession. 

When the battle ceased General Gilbert asked me to join him atBuell's headquarters, which were a considerable distance to the rear, so after making some dispositions for the evening I proceeded thereas requested. I arrived just as Buell was about to sit down to hissupper, and noticing that he was lame, then learned that he had beenseverely injured by a recent fall from his horse. He kindly invitedme to join him at the table, an invitation which I accepted withalacrity, enjoying the meal with a relish known only to a very-hungryman, for I had eaten nothing since morning. Of course the events ofthe day were the chief topic of discussion--as they were during mystay at headquarters--but the conversation indicated that what hadoccurred was not fully realized, and I returned to my troopsimpressed with the belief that General Buell and his staff-officerswere unconscious of the magnitude of the battle that had just beenfought. 

It had been expected by Buell that he would fight the enemy on the9th of October, but the Confederates disposed of that proposition byattacking us on the 8th, thus disarranging a tactical conceptionwhich, with our superior numbers, would doubtless have provedsuccessful had it not been anticipated by an enterprising foe. During the battle on the 8th the Second Corps, under General ThomasL. Crittenden, accompanied by General George H. Thomas, lay idle thewhole day for want of orders, although it was near enough to thefield to take an active part in the fight; and, moreover, a largepart of Gilbert's corps was unengaged during the pressure on McCook. Had these troops been put in on the enemy's left at any time after heassaulted McCook, success would have been beyond question; but therewas no one on the ground authorized to take advantage of thesituation, and the battle of Perryville remains in history an exampleof lost opportunities. This was due in some measure probably toGeneral Buell's accident, but is mainly attributable to the fact thathe did not clearly apprehend Bragg's aim, which was to gain time towithdraw behind Dick's River all the troops he had in Kentucky, forthe Confederate general had no idea of risking the fate of his armyon one general battle at a place or on a day to be chosen by theUnion commander. 

Considering the number of troops actually engaged, the losses toBuell were severe, amounting to something over five thousand inkilled, wounded, and missing. Among the killed were two brigadecommanders of much promise--General James S. Jackson and GeneralWilliam R. Terrill. McCook's corps lost twelve guns, some of whichwere recovered next day. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded wenever learned, but it must have equalled ours; and about fourthousand prisoners, consisting principally of sick and wounded, fellinto our hands. In the first report of the battle sent North to thenewspapers I was reported among the killed; but I was pleased tonotice, when the papers reached us a few days later, that the errorhad been corrected before my obituary could be written. 

The enemy retired from our front the night of the 8th, falling backon Harrodsburg to form a junction with Kirby Smith, and by takingthis line of retreat opened to us the road to Danville and the chancefor a direct march against his depot of supplies at Bryantsville. Wedid not take advantage of this opening, however, and late in the day--on the 9th--my division marched in pursuit, in the direction ofHarrodsburg, which was the apex of a triangle having for its base aline from Perryville to Danville. The pursuit was slow, very slow, consuming the evening of the 9th and all of the 10th and 11th. Bycutting across the triangle spoken of above, just south of the apex, I struck the Harrodsburg-Danville road, near Cave Springs, joiningthere Gilbert's left division, which had preceded me and marchedthrough Harrodsburg. Here we again rested until the intention of theenemy could be divined, and we could learn on which side of Dick'sRiver he would give us battle. A reconnoissance sent toward theDickville crossing developed to a certainty that we should not haveanother engagement, however; for it disclosed the fact that Bragg'sarmy had disappeared toward Camp Dick Robinson, leaving only a smallrear-guard at Danville, which in turn quickly fled in the directionof Lancaster, after exchanging a few shots with Hescock's battery. 

While this parting salute of deadly projectiles was going on, alittle, daughter of Colonel William J. Landram, whose home was inDanville, came running out from his house and planted a smallnational flag on one of Hescock's guns. The patriotic act was sobrave and touching that it thrilled all who witnessed the scene; anduntil the close of the war, when peace separated the survivingofficers and men of the battery, that little flag was protected andcherished as a memento of the Perryville campaign. 

Pursuit of the enemy was not continued in force beyond Crab Orchard, but some portions of the army kept at Bragg's heels until he crossedthe Cumberland River, a part of his troops retiring to Tennessee byway of Cumberland Gap, but the major portion through Somerset. Asthe retreat of Bragg transferred the theatre of operations back toTennessee, orders were now issued for a concentration of Buell's armyat Bowling Green, with a view to marching it to Nashville, and mydivision moved to that point without noteworthy incident. I reachedBowling Green with a force much reduced by the losses sustained inthe battle of Perryville and by sickness. I had started fromLouisville on October 1 with twelve regiments of infantry--four oldand eight new ones--and two batteries, but many poor fellows, overcome by fatigue, and diseases induced by the heat, dust, anddrought of the season, had to be left at roadside hospitals. Thiswas particularly the case with the new regiments, the men of which, much depressed by homesickness, and not yet inured to campaigning, fell easy victims to the hardships of war. 

At Bowling Green General Buell was relieved, General W. S. Rosecranssucceeding him. The army as a whole did not manifest much regret atthe change of commanders, for the campaign from Louisville on waslooked upon generally as a lamentable failure, yet there were manywho still had the utmost confidence in General Buell, and theyrepelled with some asperity the reflections cast upon him by hiscritics. These admirers held him blameless throughout for theblunders of the campaign, but the greater number laid every error athis door, and even went to the absurdity of challenging his loyaltyin a mild way, but they particularly charged incompetency atPerryville, where McCook's corps was so badly crippled while nearly30, 000 Union troops were idle on the field, or within strikingdistance. With these it was no use to argue that Buell's accidentstood in the way of his activity, nor that he did not know that theaction had assumed the proportions of a battle. The physicaldisability was denied or contested, but even granting this, hisdetractors claimed that it did not excuse his ignorance of the truecondition of the fight, and finally worsted his champions by pointingout that Bragg's retreat by way of Harrodsburg beyond Dick's River sojeopardized the Confederate army, that had a skillful and energeticadvance of the Union troops been made, instead of wasting precioustime in slow and unnecessary tactical manoeuvres, the enemy couldhave been destroyed before he could quit the State of Kentucky. 

CHAPTER XII. 

MOVING TO BOWLING GREEN--JAMES CARD, THE SCOUT AND GUIDE--GENERALSILL--COLONEL SCHAEFER--COLONEL G. W. ROBERTS--MOVEMENT ONMURFREESBORO'--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER. 

My division had moved from Crab Orchard to Bowling Green by easymarches, reaching this place November 1. General Rosecrans assumedcommand of the department October 30, at Louisville, and joined thearmy November 2. There had been much pressure brought to bear onGeneral Buell to induce him to take measures looking to the occupancyof East Tennessee, and the clamor to this end from Washington stillcontinued; but now that Bragg was south of the Cumberland River, in aposition threatening Nashville, which was garrisoned by but a smallforce, it was apparent to every one at all conversant with thesituation that a battle would have to be fought somewhere in MiddleTennessee. So, notwithstanding the pressure from Washington, thearmy was soon put in motion for Nashville, and when we arrived theremy division went into camp north of the river, on a plateau justoutside the little town of Edgefield, until the movements of theenemy should be further developed. 

While in this camp, on the plantation of Mr. Hobson, there came to myheadquarters one morning an East Tennessean named James Card, whooffered to the Union cause his services in any capacity in which theymight be made useful. This offer, and the relation of his personalhistory, were given with such sincerity of speech and manner that ina short time I became convinced of his honesty of purpose. He was asmall, active, busy man, with a determined way about him, and hiscountenance indicated great intelligence. He gave minute informationthat was of inestimable value to me regarding East and MiddleTennessee and northern Georgia, for, with a view to the army's futuremovements, I was then making a study of the topography of thisregion, and posting myself as to Middle Tennessee, for all knew thiswould be the scene of active operations whenever the campaign wasresumed. This man, like most of the East Tennesseans whom I had met, was intensely loyal and patriotic, and the interview led in a fewdays to his employment as a scout and guide, and subsequently to theengaging in the same capacity of two of his brothers, who were goodmen; but not quite as active nor so intelligent as he was. Card hadbeen a colporter, having pedled books, especially religious tracts, over all Middle and East Tennessee and Georgia, assisted by hisbrothers at times, and was therefore thoroughly familiar with theseregions, their roads and inhabitants. He also preached to countrycongregations occasionally, when ministers were scarce, and I have nodoubt often performed the functions of family physician in themountain district. Thus his opportunities were great; and the loyalpeople in every section of the country being well known to him andhis brothers, the three began, at this time, a system of scouting andinvestigation which bore its first-fruits in specifically locatingthe different divisions of Bragg's army, with statements of theirstrength and condition, and all with so much accuracy that Ithereafter felt reasonably sure that I could at all times procuresuch knowledge of the enemy's operations as would well equip me forany contingency that might arise. 

By the middle of November the enemy, having assembled his forces inMiddle Tennessee, showed considerable boldness, and it becamenecessary to rearrange the Union lines; so my troops were moved tothe south side of the river, out on the Murfreesboro' pike, to MillCreek, distant from Nashville about seven miles. While we were incamp on Mill Creek the army was reorganized, and General Joshua W. Sill, at his own request, was assigned to my division, and tookcommand of Colonel Nicholas Greusel's brigade. My division became atthe same time the Third Division, Right Wing, Fourteenth Army Corps, its three brigades of four regiments each being respectivelycommanded by General Sill, Colonel Frederick Schaefer and Colonel DanMcCook; but a few days later Colonel George W. Roberts's brigade, from the garrison at Nashville, was substituted for McCook's. 

General Sill was a classmate of mine at the Military Academy, havinggraduated in 1853. On graduating he was appointed to the OrdnanceCorps, and served in that department at various arsenals and ordnancedepots throughout the country till early in 1861, when he resigned toaccept a professorship of mathematics and civil engineering at theBrooklyn Collegiate and Polytechnic Institute. At the breaking outof the war he immediately tendered his services to the Government, and soon rose to the colonelcy of the Thirty-Third Ohio Volunteers, and afterward to the rank of brigadier-general. I knew him well, andwas glad that he came to my division, though I was very loth torelieve Colonel Greusel, of the Thirty-Sixth Illinois, who hadalready indicated much military skill and bravery, and at the battleof Perryville had handled his men with the experience of a veteran. Sill's modesty and courage were exceeded only by a capacity that hadalready been demonstrated in many practical ways, and his untimelydeath, almost within a month of his joining me, abruptly closed acareer which, had it been prolonged a little more, not only wouldhave shed additional lustre on his name, but would have been ofmarked benefit to his country. 

Colonel Schaefer, of the Second Missouri Infantry, had been absent onsick-leave during the Kentucky campaign, but about this date hereturned to duty, and by seniority fell in command of the secondbrigade. He was of German birth, having come from Baden, where, prior to 1848, he had been a non-commissioned officer in the serviceof his State. He took part as an insurgent in the so-calledrevolution which occurred at Baden in that year, and, compelled toemigrate on the suppression of the insurrection, made his way to thiscountry and settled in St. Louis. Here the breaking out of the warfound him, and through the personal interest which General Sigel tookin him he was commissioned a colonel of volunteers. He had had apretty fair education, a taste for the military profession, and wasof tall and slender build, all of which gave him a student-likeappearance. He was extremely excitable and nervous when anticipatinga crisis, but always calmed down to cool deliberation when thecritical moment came. With such a man I could not be less than wellsatisfied, although the officer whom he replaced--Colonel Laiboldt--had performed efficient service and shown much capacity in therecent campaign. 

Colonel G. W. Roberts, of the Forty-Second Illinois Infantry, alsocame to me in the reorganization. He was an ideal soldier both inmind and body. He was young, tall, handsome, brave, and dashing, andpossessed a balance-wheel of such good judgment that in his sphere ofaction no occasion could arise from which he would not reap the bestresults. But he too was destined to lay, down his life within a fewdays, and on the same fatal field. His brigade had been performinggarrison duty in Nashville during the siege of that city whileBuell's army was in Kentucky, but disliking the prospect ofinactivity pending the operations opening before us, Roberts hadrequested and obtained a transfer to the army in the field. Hisbrigade relieved Colonel Dan McCook's, the latter reluctantly joiningthe garrison at Nashville, every one in it disappointed and disgustedthat the circumstances existing at this time should necessitate theirrelegation to the harassing and tantalizing duty of protecting ourdepots and line of supply. 

I was fortunate in having such brigade commanders, and no lessfavored in the regimental and battery commanders. They all were notonly patriots, but soldiers, and knowing that discipline must be oneof the most potent factors in bringing to a successful termination, the mighty contest in which our nation was struggling for existence, they studied and practiced its methods ceaselessly, inspiring withthe same spirit that pervaded themselves the loyal hearts of theirsubordinate officers and men. All worked unremittingly in the campat Mill Creek in preparing for the storm, which now plainly indicatedits speedy coming. Drills, parades, scouts, foraging expeditions, picket and guard duty, made up the course in this school ofinstruction, supplemented by frequent changes in the locations of thedifferent brigades, so that the division could have opportunity tolearn to break camp quickly and to move out promptly on the march. Foraging expeditions were particularly beneficial in this respect, and when sent out, though absent sometimes for days, the men wentwithout tents or knapsacks, equipped with only one blanket and theirarms, ammunition, and rations, to teach them to shift for themselveswith slender means in the event of necessity. The number ofregimental and headquarters wagons was cut down to the lowestpossible figure, and everything made compact by turning into thesupply and ammunition trains of the division all surplustransportation, and restricting the personal baggage of officers tothe fewest effects possible. 

My own staff also was somewhat reorganized and increased at MillCreek, and though it had been perfectly satisfactory before, yet, onaccount of the changes of troops that had occurred in the command, Ifound it necessary to replace valuable officers in some instances, and secure additional ones in others. The gathering of informationabout the enemy was also industriously pursued, and Card and hisbrothers were used constantly on expeditions within the Confederatelines, frequently visiting Murfreesboro', Sparta, Tullahoma, Shelbyville, and other points. What they learned was reported toarmy headquarters, often orally through me or personally communicatedby Card himself, but much was forwarded in official letters, beginning with November 24, when I transmitted accurate informationof the concentration of Bragg's main force at Tullahoma. Indeed, Card kept me so well posted as to every movement of the enemy, notonly with reference to the troops in my immediate front, but alsothroughout his whole army, that General Rosecrans placed the mostunreserved reliance on all his statements, and many times used themto check and correct the reports brought in by his own scouts. 

Slight skirmishes took place frequently during this period, and nowand then heavy demonstrations were made in the neighborhood ofNolensville by reconnoitring parties from both armies, but none ofthese ever grew into a battle. These affairs sprung from the desireof each side to feel his antagonist, and had little result beyondemphasizing the fact that behind each line of pickets lay a massedand powerful army busily preparing for the inevitable conflict andeager for its opening. So it wore on till the evening of December25, 1862; then came the order to move forward. 

General Rosecrans, in the reorganization of the army, had assignedMajor-General A. McD. McCook to command the right wing, Major-GeneralGeorge H. Thomas the centre, and Major-General T. L. Crittenden theleft wing. McCook's wing was made up of three divisions, commanded in order of rank by Brigadier-General Jeff. C. Davis;Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, and Brigadier-General P. H. Sheridan. Although the corps nomenclature established by General Buell wasdropped, the grand divisions into which he had organized the army atLouisville were maintained, and, in fact, the conditions establishedthen remained practically unaltered, with the exception of theinterchange of some brigades, the transfer of a few general officersfrom one wing or division to another, and the substitution of GeneralThomas for Gilbert as a corps commander. The army was thus compactand cohesive, undisturbed by discord and unembarrassed by jealousiesof any moment; and it may be said that under a commander who, webelieved, had the energy and skill necessary to direct us to success, a national confidence in our invincibility made us all keen for atest of strength with the Confederates. We had not long to wait. 

Early on the morning of December 26, 1862, in a heavy rain, the armymarched, the movement being directed on Murfreesboro', where theenemy had made some preparation to go into winter-quarters, and tohold which town it was hoped he would accept battle. General Thomasmoved by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, General Crittenden by theMurfreesboro' pike, through Lavergne, and General McCook by theNolensville pike--Davis's division in advance. As McCook's commandneared Nolensville, I received a message from Davis informing me thatthe Confederates were in considerable force, posted on a range ofhills in his front, and requesting me to support him in an attack hewas about to make. When the head of my column arrived at NolensvilleI began massing my troops on the right of the road, and by the timethis formation was nearly completed Davis advanced, but not meetingwith sufficient resistance to demand active assistance from me, hewith his own command carried the hills, capturing one piece ofartillery. This position of the Confederates was a strong one, defending Knob's Gap, through which the Nolensville and Triune pikepassed. On the 27th Johnson's division, followed by mine, advancedto Triune, and engaged in a severe skirmish near that place, but mytroops were not called into action, the stand made by the enemy beingonly for the purpose of gaining time to draw in his outlying troops, which done, he retired toward Murfreesboro'. I remained inactive atTriune during the 28th, but early on the 29th moved out by the BoleJack road to the support of, Davis in his advance to Stewart's Creek, and encamped at Wilkinson's crossroads, from which point toMurfreesboro', distant about six miles, there was a good turnpike. The enemy had sullenly resisted the progress of Crittenden and McCookthroughout the preceding three days, and as it was thought probablethat he might offer battle at Stewart's Creek, Thomas, in pursuanceof his original instructions looking to just such a contingency, hadnow fallen into the centre by way of the Nolensville crossroads. 

On the morning of the 30th I had the advance of McCook's corps on theWilkinson pike, Roberts's brigade leading. At first only slightskirmishing took place, but when we came within about three miles ofMurfreesboro' the resistance of the enemy's pickets grew serious, anda little further on so strong that I had to put in two regiments topush them back. I succeeded in driving them about half a mile, whenI was directed by McCook to form line of battle and place myartillery in position so that I could act in concert with Davis'sdivision, which he wished to post on my right in the general line hedesired to take up. In obedience to these directions I deployed onthe right of, and oblique to the Wilkinson pike, with a front of fourregiments, a second line of four regiments within short supportingdistance, and a reserve of one brigade in column of regiments to therear of my centre. All this time the enemy kept up a heavy artilleryand musketry fire on my skirmishers, he occupying, with hissharpshooters, beyond some open fields, a heavy belt of timber to myfront and right, where it was intended the left of Davis shouldfinally rest. To gain this point Davis was ordered to swing hisdivision into it in conjunction with a wheeling movement of my rightbrigade, until our continuous line should face nearly due east. Thiswould give us possession of the timber referred to, and not only ridus of the annoying fire from the skirmishers screened by it, but alsoplace us close in to what was now developing as Bragg's line ofbattle. The movement was begun about half-past 2, and wassuccessfully executed, after a stubborn resistance. In thispreliminary affair the enemy had put in one battery of artillery, which was silenced in a little while, however, by Bush's andHescock's guns. By sundown I had taken up my prescribed position, facing almost east, my left (Roberts's brigade) resting on theWilkinson pike, the right (Sill's brigade) in the timber we had justgained, and the reserve brigade (Schaefer's) to the rear of mycentre, on some rising ground in the edge of a strip of woods behindHoughtaling's and Hescock's batteries. Davis's division was placedin position on my right, his troops thrown somewhat to the rear, sothat his line formed nearly a right angle with mine, while Johnson'sdivision formed in a very exposed position on the right of Davis, prolonging the general line just across the Franklin pike. 

The centre, under Thomas, had already formed to my left, the right ofNegley's division joining my left in a cedar thicket near theWilkinson pike, while Crittenden's corps was posted on the left ofThomas, his left resting on Stone River, at a point about two milesand a half from Murfreesboro'. 

The precision that had characterized every manoeuvre of the pastthree days, and the exactness with which each corps and division fellinto its allotted place on the evening of the 30th, indicated that atthe outset of the campaign a well-digested plan of operations hadbeen prepared for us; and although the scheme of the expected battlewas not known to subordinates of my grade, yet all the movements upto this time had been so successfully and accurately made as to givemuch promise for the morrow, and when night fell there was generalanticipation of the best results to the Union army. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

ASSAULT ON OUR RIGHT FLANK--OCCUPYING A NEW POSITION--THE ENEMYCHECKED--TERRIBLE LOSS OF OFFICERS--AMMUNITION GIVES OUT--RECONSTRUCTING THE LINE--COLLECTING THE WOUNDED AND BURYINGTHE DEAD--DEALING WITH COWARDS--RESULTS OF THE VICTORY. 

The enemy under Bragg lay between us and stone River in order ofbattle, his general line conforming to the course of that stream. Inmy immediate front he appeared to be established in strong force in adense cedar wood, just beyond an open valley, which varied from twohundred to four hundred yards in width, the cedars extending theentire length of the valley. From the events of the day and eveningof the 3oth, it was apparent that the two armies were in closeproximity, and orders received during the night revealed the factthat Rosecrans intended to attack by throwing his left on the enemy'sright, with the expectation of driving it in toward Murfreesboro', sothat the right of Crittenden's corps could attack Bragg's centre inreverse, while Thomas supported Crittenden by a simultaneous frontassault; and from the movements of the enemy at daylight nextmorning, it was plainly indicated that Bragg had planned to swing hisleft on our right by an exactly similar manoeuvre, get possession ofthe railroad and the Nashville pike, and if possible cut us off fromour base at Nashville. The conceptions in the minds of the twogenerals were almost identical; but Bragg took the initiative, beginning his movement about an hour earlier than the time set byRosecrans, which gained him an immense advantage in execution in theearlier stages of the action. 

During the evening, feeling keenly all the solicitude whichattends one in anticipation of a battle, I examined my position withgreat care, inspecting its whole length several times to remedy anydefects that might exist, and to let the men see that I was alive totheir interests and advantages. After dark, I went back to the rearof my reserve brigade, and establishing my headquarters behind thetrunk of a large fallen tree, which would shelter me somewhat fromthe cold December wind, lay down beside a small camp-fire to get somerest. 

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 31st General Sill came back to meto report that on his front a continuous movement of infantry andartillery had been going on all night within the Confederate lines, and that he was convinced that Bragg was massing on our right withthe purpose of making an attack from that direction early in themorning. After discussing for a few minutes the probabilities ofsuch a course on the part of the enemy, I thought McCook should bemade acquainted with what was going on, so Sill and I went back tosee him at his headquarters, not far from the Griscom House, where wefound him sleeping on some straw in the angle of a worm-fence. Iwaked him up and communicated the intelligence, and our consequentimpressions. He talked the matter over with us for some little time, but in view of the offensive-defensive part he was to play in thecoming battle, did not seem to think that there was a necessity forany further dispositions than had already been taken. He said thathe thought Johnson's division would be able to take care of theright, and seemed confident that the early assault which was to bemade from Rosecrans's left would anticipate and check the designswhich we presaged. We two then returned to my little camp-firebehind the log, and as we continued talking of what might be expectedfrom the indications on the right, and Sill becoming more anxious, Idirected two regiments from the reserve to report to him, that theymight be placed within very short supporting distance of his line. He then rejoined his brigade, better satisfied, but still adhering tothe belief he had expressed when first making his report. 

Long before dawn my division breakfasted, and was assembled underarms, the infantry in line, the cannoneers at their pieces, but whilewe were thus preparing, all the recent signs of activity in theenemy's camp were hushed, a death-like stillness prevailing in thecedars to our front. Shortly after daylight General Hardee openedthe engagement, just as Sill had predicted, by a fierce attack onJohnson's division, the extreme right of the Union line. Immediatesuccess attending this assault, Hardee extended the attack graduallyalong in front of Davis, hip movement taking the form of a wheel tothe right, the pivot being nearly opposite the left of my division. Johnson's division soon gave way, and two of Davis's brigades wereforced to fall back with it, though stubbornly resisting thedetermined and sweeping onset. 

In the meantime the enemy had also attacked me, advancing across anold cotton-field in Sill's front in heavy masses, which werefuriously opened upon by Bush's battery from Sill's line, and byHescock's and Houghtaling's batteries, which had an oblique fire onthe field from a commanding position in rear of my centre. Theeffect of this fire on the advancing column was terrible, but itcontinued on till it reached the edge of the timber where Sill'sright lay, when my infantry opened at a range of not over fiftyyards. For a short time the Confederates withstood the fire, butthen wavered, broke, and fell back toward their original line. Asthey retired, Sill's brigade followed in a spirited charge, drivingthem back across the open ground and behind their intrenchments. Inthis charge the gallant Sill was killed; a rifle ball passing throughhis upper lip and penetrating the brain. Although this was a heavyloss, yet the enemy's discomfiture was such as to give us an hour'stime, and as Colonel Greusel, Thirty-sixth Illinois, succeeded toSill's command, I directed him, as he took charge, to recall thebrigade to its original position, for the turning-column on myextreme right was now assuming the most menacing attitude, and it wasurgently necessary to prepare for it. 

When that portion of the enemy driven back by Sill recovered from itsrepulse it again advanced to the attack, this time directing itsefforts chiefly upon my extreme right, and the front of Woodruff'sbrigade of Davis's division, which brigade still held on in its firstposition. In front of my centre the Confederates were again drivenback, but as the assault on Woodruff was in conjunction with anadvance of the column that had forced Johnson to retire, Woodruff wascompelled unfortunately to give way, and two regiments on the rightof my line went with him, till they rallied on the two reserveregiments which, in anticipation of the enemy's initiatory attack Ihad sent to Sill's rear before daylight. 

Both Johnson's and Davis's divisions were now practically gone fromour line, having retired with a loss of all formation, and they werebeing closely pursued by the enemy, whose columns were following thearc of a circle that would ultimately carry him in on my rear. Inconsequence of the fact that this state of things would soon subjectme to a fire in reverse, I hastily withdrew Sill's brigade and thereserve regiments supporting it, and ordered Roberts's brigade, whichat the close of the enemy's second repulse had changed front towardthe south and formed in column of regiments, to cover the withdrawalby a charge on the Confederates as they came into the timber where myright had originally rested. Roberts made the charge at the propertime, and was successful in checking the enemy's advance, thus givingus a breathing-spell, during which I was able to take up a newposition with Schaefer's and Sill's brigades on the commanding groundto the rear, where Hescock's and Houghtaling's batteries had beenposted all the morning. 

The general course of this new position was at right angles with myoriginal line, and it took the shape of an obtuse angle, with mythree batteries at the apex. Davis, and Carlin of his division, endeavored to rally their men here on my right, but their effortswere practically unavailing, --though the calm and cool appearance ofCarlin, who at the time was smoking a stumpy pipe, had some effect, and was in strong contrast to the excited manner of Davis, who seemedoverpowered by the disaster that had befallen his command. But fewcould be rallied, however, as the men were badly demoralized, andmost of them fell back beyond the Wilkinson pike, where theyreorganized behind the troops of General Thomas. 

At this juncture the enemy's turning-column began advancing again inconcert with Cheatham's division, and as the extreme left of theConfederates was directed on Griscom's house, and their right on theBlanton house, my new position was in danger of envelopment. No hopeof stemming the tide at this point seemed probable, but to gain timeI retained my ground as long as possible, and until, under directionsfrom General McCook, I moved to the front from my left flank andattached myself to the right of Negley's division, which up to thishour had been left almost undisturbed by the enemy in the line it hadtaken up the night before. Under a heavy fire we succeeded in thismanoeuvre, Schaefer's brigade marching first, then the batteries, andRoberts's and Sill's brigades following. When my division arrived onthis new ground, I posted Roberts on Negley's right, with Hescock'sand Bush's guns, the brigade and guns occupying a low rocky ridge oflimestone, which faced them toward Murfreesboro', nearly south. Therest of my division was aligned facing west, along the edge of acedar thicket, the rear rank backed up on the right flank of Roberts, with Houghtaling's battery in the angle. This presented Sill's andSchaefer's brigades in an almost opposite direction to the line wehad so confidently taken up the night before, and covered Negley'srear. The enemy, in the meantime, had continued his wheelingmovement till he occupied the ground that my batteries and reservebrigade had held in the morning, and I had now so changed my positionthat the left brigade of my division approached his intrenchments infront of Stone River, while Sill's and Schaeffer's brigades, byfacing nearly west, confronted the successful troops that had smashedin our extreme right. 

I had hardly got straightened out in this last place when I wasattacked by Cheatham's'division, which, notwithstanding thestaggering blows it had previously received from Sill and Roberts, now again moved forward in conjunction with the wheeling movementunder the immediate command of Hardee. One of the most sanguinarycontests of the day now took place. In fulfillment of Bragg'soriginal design no doubt, Cheatham's division attacked on my left, while heavy masses under Hardee, covered by batteries posted on thehigh ground formerly occupied by my guns, assaulted my right, thewhole force advancing simultaneously. At the same time the enemyopened an artillery fire from his intrenchments in front ofMurfreesboro', and it seemed that he was present on every side. Myposition was strong, however, located in the edge of a dense cedarthicket and commanding a slight depression of open ground that lay inmy front. My men were in good spirits too, notwithstanding they hadbeen a good deal hustled around since daylight, with losses that hadtold considerably on their numbers. Only a short distance nowseparated the contending lines, and as the batteries on each sidewere not much more than two hundred yards apart when the enemy madehis assault, the artillery fire was fearful in its effect on theranks of both contestants, the enemy's heavy masses staggering underthe torrent of shell and canister from our batteries, while our lineswere thinned by his ricochetting projectiles, that rebounded againand again over the thinly covered limestone formation and sped on tothe rear of Negley. But all his efforts to dislodge or destroy uswere futile, and for the first time since daylight General Hardee wasseriously checked in the turning movement he had begun for thepurpose of getting possession of the Nashville pike, and thoughreinforced until two-fifths of Bragg's army was now at his command, yet he met with repulse after repulse, which created great gaps inhis lines and taught him that to overwhelm us was hopeless. 

As the enemy was recoiling from his first attack, I received amessage from Rosecrans telling me that he was making newdispositions, and directing me to hold on where I was until they werecompleted. From this I judged that the existing conditions of thebattle would probably require a sacrifice of my command, so Iinformed Roberts and Schaefer that we must be prepared to meet thedemand on us by withstanding the assault of the enemy, no matter whatthe outcome. Every energy was therefore bent to the simple holdingof our ground, and as ammunition was getting scarce, instructionswere given throughout the command to have it reserve its fire tillthe most effective moment. In a little while came a second and athird assault, and although they were as daring and furious as thefirst, yet in each case the Confederates were repulsed, driven backin confusion, but not without deadly loss to us, for the nobleRoberts was killed, and Colonel Harrington, of the Twenty-SeventhIllinois, who succeeded to his brigade, was mortally wounded a fewminutes later. I had now on the death-roll three brigade commanders, and the loss of subordinate officers and men was appalling, but theirsacrifice had accomplished the desired result; they had not fallen invain. Indeed, the bravery and tenacity of my division gave toRosecrans the time required to make new dispositions, and exactedfrom our foes the highest commendations. 

A lull followed the third fierce assault, and an investigation showedthat, with the exception of a few rounds in my brigade, ourammunition was entirely exhausted; and while it was apparent that theenemy was reluctant to renew the conflict in my front, yet I wassatisfied I could not hold on much longer without the danger ofultimate capture, so I prepared to withdraw as soon as the troops ofRousseau's division, which had been ordered to take up a line on myright, came into position. Schaefer's and Sill's brigades beingwithout a cartridge, I directed them to fix bayonets for a charge, and await any attempt of the enemy to embarrass my retreat, whileRoberts's brigade, offering such resistance as its small quantity ofammunition would permit, was pulled slowly in toward the Nashvillepike. Eighty of the horses of Houghtaling's battery having beenkilled, an attempt was made to bring his guns back by hand over therocky ground, but it could not be done, and we had to abandon them. Hescock also had lost most of his horses, but all his guns weresaved. Bush's battery lost two pieces, the tangled underbrush in thedense cedars proving an obstacle to getting them away which hisalmost superhuman exertions could not surmount. Thus far the bloodyduel had cost me heavily, one-third of my division being killed orwounded. I had already three brigade commanders killed; a littlelater I lost my fourth--Colonel Schaefer. 

The difficulties of withdrawing were very great, as the ground wasexceptionally rocky, and the growth of cedars almost impenetrable forwheeled carriages. Retiring sullenly under a heavy fire, while thegeneral line was reformed to my right and rear, my division was atlength drawn through the cedars and debouched into an open space nearthe Murfreesboro' pike, behind the right of Palmer's division. Tworegiments of Sill's brigade, however, on account of the conformationof the ground, were obliged to fall back from the point whereWoodruff's brigade of Davis's division had rallied after the disasterof the early morning. The division came out of the cedars withunbroken ranks, thinned by only its killed and wounded--but fewmissing. When we came into the open ground, McCook directedRoberts's brigade--now commanded by Colonel Luther P. Bradley--toproceed a short distance to the rear on the Nashville pike, to repelthe enemy's threatening attempt at our communications. Willingly andcheerfully the brigade again entered the fight under these newconditions, and although it was supplied with but three or fourcartridges to the man now, it charged gallantly and recaptured twopieces of artillery which the Union troops had had to abandon at thatpoint. 

Shortly after we debouched from the cedars I was directed byRosecrans to send some aid to the right of General Palmer's division;and two of Schaefer's regiments, having obtained ammunition, werepushed up on Palmer's right, accompanied by four of Hescock's guns;but the advance of the enemy here had already been checked by Palmer, and only a desultory contest ensued. Rosecrans, whom I now met inthe open ground west of the railroad, behind Palmer, directed that mycommand should relieve Wood's division, which was required to fallback and take up the new line that had been marked out while I washolding on in the cedars. His usually florid face had lost its ruddycolor, and his anxious eyes told that the disasters of the morningwere testing his powers to the very verge of endurance, but he seemedfully to comprehend what had befallen us. His firmly set lips and, the calmness with which his instructions were delivered inspiredconfidence in all around him; and expressing approbation of what mydivision had done, while deliberately directing it to a new point, herenewed in us all the hope of final victory, though it must beadmitted that at this phase of the battle the chances lay largelywith the enemy. 

Withdrawing the two regiments and Hescock's battery, that I hadposted on the right of Palmer, I moved as directed by Rosecrans intothe position to the east of the railroad, and formed immediately tothe right of Wood, who was now being attacked all along his front, but more particularly where his right rested near the railroad. Under a storm of shot and shell that came in torrents my troops tookup the new ground, advancing through a clump of open timber to Wood'sassistance. Forming in line in front of the timber we poured atelling fire into the enemy's ranks, which were then attacking acrosssome cleared fields; but when he discovered additional troopsconfronting him, he gave up the attempt to carry Wood's position. Itwas here that I lost Schaefer, who was killed instantly, making myfourth brigade commander dead that day. The enemy in front of Woodhaving been checked, our whole line east of the railroad executedundisturbed its retrograde movement to a position about three hundredyards to its rear. When I fell back to the edge of the clump oftimber, where when first coming on the ground I had formed to helpWood, I was ordered by Rosecrans to prepare to make a charge shouldthe enemy again assault us. In anticipation of this work I massed mytroops in close column. The expected attack never came, however, butthe shot and shell of a furious cannonade told with fatal effect uponmen and officers as they lay on their faces hugging the ground. Thetorments of this trying situation were almost unbearable, but it wasobvious to all that it was necessary to have at hand a compact bodyof troops to repel any assault the enemy might make pending thereconstruction of the extreme right of our line, and a silentdetermination to stay seemed to take hold of each individual soldier;nor was this grim silence interrupted throughout the cannonade, except in one instance, when one of the regiments broke out in alusty cheer as a startled rabbit in search of a new hiding-placesafely ran the whole length of the line on the backs of the men. 

While my troops were still lying here, General Rosecrans, with a partof his staff and a few orderlies, rode out on the rearranged line tosupervise its formation and encourage the men, and in prosecution ofthese objects moved around the front of my column of attack, withinrange of the batteries that were shelling us so viciously. As hepassed to the open ground on my left, I joined him. The enemy seeingthis mounted party, turned his guns upon it, and his accurate aim wassoon rewarded, for a solid shot carried away the head of ColonelGaresche, the chief-of-staff, and killed or wounded two or threeorderlies. Garesche's appalling death stunned us all, and amomentary expression of horror spread over Rosecrans's face; but atsuch a time the importance of self-control was vital, and he pursuedhis course with an appearance of indifference, which, however, thoseimmediately about him saw was assumed, for undoubtedly he felt mostdeeply the death of his friend and trusted staff-officer. 

No other attacks were made on us to the east of the railroad for therest of the afternoon, and just before dark I was directed towithdraw and take up a position along the west side of the Nashvillepike, on the extreme right of our new line, where Roberts's brigadeand the Seventy-third and Eighty-eighth Illinois had already beenplaced by McCook. The day had cost me much anxiety and sadness, andI was sorely disappointed at the general result, though I could notbe other than pleased at the part taken by my command. The loss ofmy brigade commanders--Sill, Roberts, Schaefer, and Harrington-and alarge number of regimental and battery officers, with so many oftheir men, struck deep into my heart: My thinned ranks told thewoeful tale of the fierce struggles, indescribable by words, throughwhich my division had passed since 7 o'clock in the morning; andthis, added to our hungry and exhausted condition, was naturallydisheartening. The men had been made veterans, however, by thefortunes and misfortunes of the day, and as they went into their newplaces still confident of final success, it was plain to see thatthey felt a self-confidence inspired by the part they had alreadyplayed. 

My headquarters were now established on the Nashville pike, aboutthree miles and a half from Murfreesboro'; my division being alignedto the west of the pike, bowed out and facing almost west, Cleburn'sdivision of the Confederates confronting it. Davis's division wasposted on my right, and Walker's brigade of Thomas's corps, which hadreported to me, took up a line that connected my left with Johnson'sdivision. 

Late in the evening General Rosecrans, accompanied by General McCook, and several other officers whose names I am now unable to recall, rode by my headquarters on their way to the rear to look for a newline of battle--on Overall's creek it was said--that would preserveour communications with Nashville and offer better facilities forresistance than the one we were now holding. Considerable time hadelapsed when they returned from this exploration and proceeded totheir respective commands, without intimating to me that anything hadbeen determined upon by the reconnoissance, but a little later it wasrumored through the different headquarters that while the party waslooking for a new position it discovered the enemy's troops movingtoward our right and rear, the head of his columns being conducted inthe darkness by the aid of torches, and that no alternative was leftus but to hold the lines we then occupied. The torches had been seenunquestionably, and possibly created some alarm at first in the mindsof the reconnoitring party, but it was soon ascertained that thelights came from a battalion of the Fourth regular cavalry that waspicketing our flank and happened to be starting its bivouac fires atthe moment. The fires and the supposed movements had no weight, therefore, in deciding the proposition to take up a line at Overall'screek, but General Rosecrans, fortunately for the army, decided toremain where he was. Doubtless reflections during his ride causedhim to realize that the enemy must be quite as much crippled ashimself. If it had been decided to fall back to Overall's creek, wecould have withdrawn without much difficulty very likely, but such aretrograde movement would have left to the enemy the entirebattle-field of Stone River and ultimately compelled our retreatto Nashville. 

In the night of December 3rd several slight demonstrations were madeon my front, but from the darkness neither party felt the effect ofthe other's fire, and when daylight came again the skirmishers andlines of battle were in about the same position they had taken up theevening before. Soon after daybreak it became evident that theconflict was to be renewed, and a little later the enemy resumed theoffensive by an attack along my left front, especially on Walker'sbrigade. His attempt was ineffectual, however, and so easilyrepulsed as to demonstrate that the desperate character of hisassaults the day before had nearly exhausted his strength. About 3o'clock in the afternoon he made another feeble charge on my front, but our fire from the barricades and rifle-pits soon demoralized hisadvancing lines, which fell back in some confusion, thus enabling usto pick up about a hundred prisoners. From this time till theevening of January 3 Bragg's left remained in our front, andcontinued to show itself at intervals by weak demonstrations, whichwe afterward ascertained were directly intended to cover thedesperate assault he made with Breckenridge on the left of Rosecrans, an assault that really had in view only a defensive purpose, forunless Bragg dislodged the troops which were now massing in front ofhis right he would be obliged to withdraw General Polk's corps behindStone River and finally abandon Murfreesboro'. The sequel provedthis to be the case; and the ill-judged assault led by Breckenridgeending in entire defeat, Bragg retired from Murfreesboro' the nightof January 3. 

General Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro' on the 4th and 5th, havinggained a costly victory, which was not decisive enough in itscharacter to greatly affect the general course of the war, though itsomewhat strengthened and increased our hold on Middle Tennessee. The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far--only behind DuckRiver to Shelbyville and Tullahoma--and but little endeavor was madeto follow him. Indeed, we were not in condition to pursue, even ifit had been the intention at the outset of the campaign. 

As soon as possible after the Confederate retreat I went over thebattle-field to collect such of my wounded as had not been carriedoff to the South and to bury my dead. In the cedars and on theground where I had been so fiercely assaulted when the battle opened, on the morning of the 31st, evidences of the bloody struggle appearedon every hand in the form of broken fire-arms, fragments ofaccoutrements, and splintered trees. The dead had nearly all beenleft unburied, but as there was likelihood of their mutilation byroving swine, the bodies had mostly been collected in piles atdifferent points and inclosed by rail fences. The sad duties ofinterment and of caring for the wounded were completed by the 5th, and on the 6th I moved my division three miles, south ofMurfreesboro' on the Shelbyville pike, going into camp on the banksof Stone River. Here the condition of my command was thoroughlylooked into, and an endeavor made to correct such defects as had beendisclosed by the recent battle. 

During the engagement there had been little straggling, and my listof missing was small and legitimate; still, it was known that a veryfew had shirked their duty, and an example was necessary. Among thissmall number were four officers who, it was charged, had abandonedtheir colors and regiments. When their guilt was clearlyestablished, and as soon as an opportunity occurred, I caused thewhole division to be formed in a hollow square, closed in mass, andhad the four officers marched to the centre, where, telling them thatI would not humiliate any officer or soldier by requiring him totouch their disgraced swords, I compelled them to deliver theirs upto my colored servant, who also cut from their coats every insigniaof rank. Then, after there had been read to the command an orderfrom army headquarters dismissing the four from the service, thescene was brought to a close by drumming the cowards out of camp. Itwas a mortifying spectacle, but from that day no officer in thatdivision ever abandoned his colors. 

My effective force in the battle of Stone River was 4, 154 officersand men. Of this number I lost 1, 633 killed, wounded, and missing, or nearly 40 per cent. In the remaining years of the war, thoughoften engaged in most severe contests, I never experienced in any ofmy commands so high a rate of casualties. The ratio of loss in thewhole of Rosecrans's army was also high, and Bragg's losses werealmost equally great. Rosecrans carried into the action about 42, 000officers and men. He lost 13, 230, or 31 per cent. Bragg's effectiveforce was 37, 800 officers and men; he lost 10, 306, or nearly 28 percent. 

Though our victory was dearly bought, yet the importance of gainingthe day at any price was very great, particularly when we considerwhat might have been the result had not the gallantry of the army andthe manoeuvring during the early disaster saved us from ultimatedefeat. We had started out from Nashville on an offensive campaign, probably with no intention of going beyond Murfreesboro', inmidwinter, but still with the expectation of delivering a crushingblow should the enemy accept our challenge to battle. He met us witha plan of attack almost the counterpart of our own. In the executionof his plan he had many advantages, not the least of which was hisintimate knowledge of the ground, and he came near destroying us. Had he done so, Nashville would probably have fallen; at all events, Kentucky would have been opened again to his incursions, and thetheatre of war very likely transferred once more to the Ohio River. As the case now stood, however, Nashville was firmly established as abase for future operations, Kentucky was safe from the possibility ofbeing again overrun, and Bragg, thrown on the defensive, wascompelled to give his thoughts to the protection of the interior ofthe Confederacy and the security of Chattanooga, rather than indulgein schemes of conquest north of the Cumberland River. While he stillheld on in Middle Tennessee his grasp was so much loosened that onlyslight effort would be necessary to push him back into Georgia, andthus give to the mountain region of East Tennessee an opportunity toprove its loyalty to the Union. 

The victory quieted the fears of the West and Northwest, destroyedthe hopes of the secession element in Kentucky, renewed the droopingspirits of the East Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists inMiddle Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concernedthe result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have planned thebattle with the idea that the enemy would continue passive, remainentirely on the defensive, and that it was necessary only to pushforward our left in order to force the evacuation of Murfreesboro';and notwithstanding the fact that on the afternoon of December 30McCook received information that the right of Johnson's division. Resting near the Franklin pike, extended only to about the centre ofthe Confederate army, it does not appear that attack from thatquarter was at all apprehended by the Union commanders. 

The natural line of retreat of the Confederates was not threatened bythe design of Rosecrans; and Bragg, without risk to hiscommunications, anticipated it by a counter-attack of like characterfrom his own left, and demolished his adversary's plan the moment wewere thrown on the defensive. Had Bragg followed up with the spiritwhich characterized its beginning the successful attack by Hardee onour right wing--and there seems no reason why he should not have doneso--the army of Rosecrans still might have got back to Nashville, butit would have been depleted and demoralized to such a degree as tounfit it for offensive operations for a long time afterward. Bragg'sintrenchments in front of Stone River were very strong, and thereseems no reason why he should not have used his plain advantage asexplained, but instead he allowed us to gain time, intrench, andrecover a confidence that at first was badly shaken. Finally, to capthe climax of his errors, he directed Breckenridge to make theassault from his right flank on January 2, with small chance foranything but disaster, when the real purpose in view could have beenaccomplished without the necessity of any offensive manoeuvrewhatever. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL--THE SECRET EXPEDITION UNDER CARD THESCOUT--HIS CAPTURE BY GUERRILLAS--ESCAPE--A REVENGE PARTY--WOMENSOLDIERS--A FIGHT WITH SABRES--TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN--A FOOLISHADVENTURE. 

On the 6th of January, 1863, my division settled quietly down in itscamp south of Murfreesboro'. Its exhausted condition after theterrible experiences of the preceding week required attention. Itneeded recuperation, reinforcement, and reorganization, and I setabout these matters without delay, in anticipation of activeoperations early in the spring. No forward movement was made fornearly six months, however, and throughout this period drills, parades, reconnoissances, and foraging expeditions filled in the timeprofitably. In addition to these exercises the construction ofpermanent fortifications for the security of Murfreesboro' wasundertaken by General Rosecrans, and large details from my troopswere furnished daily for the work. Much attention was also given tocreating a more perfect system of guard and picket duty-a matter thathad hitherto been somewhat neglected in the army, as its constantactivity had permitted scant opportunity for the development of sucha system. It was at this time that I received my appointment as amajor-general of Volunteers. My promotion had been recommended byGeneral Rosecrans immediately after the battle of Stone River, butfor some reason it was delayed until April, and though a long timeelapsed between the promise and the performance, my gratification wasextreme. 

My scout, Card, was exceedingly useful while encamped nearMurfreesboro, making several trips to East Tennessee within theenemy's lines to collect information as to the condition of the loyalpeople there, and to encourage them with the hope of earlyliberation. He also brought back from each trip very accuratestatements as to the strength and doings of the Confederate army, fixing almost with certainty its numbers and the locations of itsdifferent divisions, and enabling my engineer-officer--MajorMorhardt--to construct good maps of the country in our front. Onthese dangerous excursions Card was always accompanied by one of hisbrothers, the other remaining with me to be ready for duty if anyaccident occurred to those who had gone out, or in case I wanted tocommunicate with them. In this way we kept well posted, although theintelligence these men brought was almost always secured at the riskof their lives. 

Early in the spring, before the Tullahoma campaign began, I thoughtit would be practicable, by sending out a small secret expedition ofbut three or four men, to break the Nashville and Chattanoogarailroad between Chattanooga and the enemy's position at Tullahoma byburning the bridges in Crow Creek valley from its head to Stevenson, Alabama, and then the great bridge across the Tennessee River atBridgeport. Feeling confident that I could persuade Card toundertake the perilous duty, I broached the contemplated project tohim, and he at once jumped at the opportunity of thus distinguishinghimself, saying that with one of his brothers and three other loyalEast Tennesseeans, whose services he knew could be enlisted, he feltsure of carrying out the idea, so I gave him authority to choose hisown assistants. In a few days his men appeared at my headquarters, and when supplied with money in notes of the State Bank of Tennessee, current everywhere as gold in those days, the party, composed ofCard, the second brother, and the three East Tennesseeans, started ontheir precarious enterprise, their course being directed first towardthe Cumberland Mountains, intending to strike the Nashville andChattanooga railroad somewhere above Anderson's station. Theyexpected to get back in about fifteen days, but I looked for someknowledge of the progress of their adventure before the expiration ofthat period, hoping to hear through Confederate sources prisoners andthe like-of the destruction of the bridges. I waited in patience forsuch news, but none came, and as the time Card had allotted himselfpassed by, I watched anxiously for his return, for, as there wasscarcely a doubt that the expedition had proved a failure, the fateof the party became a matter of deep concern to Card's remainingbrother and to me. Finally this brother volunteered to go to hisfather's house in East Tennessee to get tidings of the party, and Iconsented, for the probabilities were that some of them had madetheir way to that point, or at least that some information hadreached there about them. As day after day went by, the time fixedfor this brother's return came round, yet he also remained out; butsome days after the lad was due Card himself turned up accompanied bythe brother he had taken with him, soon explained his delay ingetting back, and gave me the story of his adventures while absent. 

After leaving my camp, his party had followed various byways acrossthe Cumberland Mountains to Crow Creek Valley, as instructed; butwhen nearing the railroad above Anderson's Station, they werecaptured by some guerrillas prowling about that vicinity, and beingsuspected of disloyalty to the Confederacy, were carried toChattanooga and imprisoned as Yankee spies. Their prospects now weredecidedly discouraging, for death stared them in the face. Fortunately, however, some delays occurred relative to thedisposition that should be made of them, and they, meanwhile, effected their escape from their jailors by way of one of the prisonwindows, from which they managed to displace a bar, and by a skiff, in the darkness of night, crossed the Tennessee River a little belowChattanooga. From this point the party made their way back to mycamp, traveling only at night, hiding in the woods by day, and forfood depending on loyal citizens that Card had become acquainted withwhen preaching and peddling. 

Card's first inquiry after relating his story was for the youngestbrother, whom he had left with me. I told him what I had done, in myanxiety about himself, and that more than sufficient time had elapsedfor his brother's return. His reply was: "They have caught him. Thepoor fellow is dead. " His surmise proved correct; for news soon camethat the poor boy had been captured at his father's house, andhanged. The blow to Card was a severe one, and so hardened his heartagainst the guerrillas in the neighborhood of his father's home--forhe knew they were guilty of his brother's murder--that it was withdifficulty I could persuade him to continue in the employment of theGovernment, so determined was he to avenge his brother's death at thefirst opportunity. Finally, however, I succeeded in quieting thealmost uncontrollable rage that seemed to possess him, and heremained with me during the Tullahoma and Chickamauga campaigns; butwhen we reached Knoxville the next winter, he took his departure, informing me that he was going for the bushwhackers who had killedhis brother. A short time after he left me, I saw him at the head ofabout thirty well-armed East Tennesseeans--refugees. They weredetermined-looking men, seeking revenge for the wrongs and sufferingsthat had been put upon them in the last two years, and no doubtwreaked their vengeance right and left on all who had been in any wayinstrumental in persecuting them. 

The feeding of our army from the base at Louisville was attended witha great many difficulties, as the enemy's cavalry was constantlybreaking the railroad and intercepting our communications on theCumberland River at different points that were easily accessible tohis then superior force of troopers. The accumulation of reservestores was therefore not an easy task, and to get forage ahead a fewdays was well-nigh impossible, unless that brought from the North wassupplemented by what we could gather from the country. Corn wasabundant in the region to the south and southwest of Murfreesboro', so to make good our deficiences in this respect, I employed a brigadeabout once a week in the duty of collecting and bringing in forage, sending out sometimes as many as a hundred and fifty wagons to haulthe grain which my scouts had previously located. In nearly everyone of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and the wagonswere usually loaded while the skirmishers kept up a running fire, Often there would occur a respectable brush, with the loss on eachside of a number of killed and wounded. The officer in directcommand always reported to me personally whatever had happened duringthe time he was out--the result of his reconnoissance, so to speak, for that war the real nature of these excursions--and on one occasionthe colonel in command, Colonel Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri, informed me that he got through without much difficulty; in fact, that everything had gone all right and been eminently satisfactory, except that in returning he had been mortified greatly by the conductof the two females belonging to the detachment and division train atmy headquarters. These women, he said, had given much annoyance bygetting drunk, and to some extent demoralizing his men. To say thatI was astonished at his statement would be a mild way of putting it, and had I not known him to be a most upright man and of sound sense, I should have doubted not only his veracity, but his sanity. Inquiring who they were and for further details, I was informed thatthere certainly were in the command two females, that in somemysterious manner had attached themselves to the service as soldiers;that one, an East Tennessee woman, was a teamster in the divisionwagon-train and the other a private soldier in a cavalry companytemporarily attached to my headquarters for escort duty. While outon the foraging expedition these Amazons had secured a supply of"apple-jack" by some means, got very drunk, and on the return hadfallen into Stone River and been nearly drowned. After they had beenfished from, the water, in the process of resuscitation their sex wasdisclosed, though up to this time it appeared to be known only toeach other. The story was straight and the circumstance clear, so, convinced of Conrad's continued sanity, I directed theprovost-marshal to bring in arrest to my headquarters the twodisturbers of Conrad's peace of mind, After some little search theEast Tennessee woman was found in camp, somewhat the worse for theexperiences of the day before, but awaiting her fate content idlysmoking a cob-pipe. She was brought to me, and put in duress undercharge of the division surgeon until her companion could be secured. To the doctor she related that the year before she had "refugeed" fromEast Tennessee, and on arriving in Louisville assumed men's appareland sought and obtained employment as a teamster in thequartermaster's department. Her features were very large, and socoarse and masculine was her general appearance that she would readilyhave passed as a man, and in her case the deception was no doubteasily practiced. Next day the "she dragoon" was caught, and provedto be a rather prepossessing young woman, and though necessarilybronzed and hardened by exposure, I doubt if, even with these marks ofcampaigning, she could have deceived as readily as did her companion. How the two got acquainted, I never learned, and though they hadjoined the army independently of each other, yet an intimacy hadsprung up between them long before the mishaps of the foragingexpedition. They both were forwarded to army headquarters, and, whenprovided with clothing suited to their sex, sent back to Nashville, and thence beyond our lines to Louisville. 

On January 9, by an order from the War Department, the Army of theCumberland had been divided into three corps, designated theFourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first. This order did not alter thecomposition of the former grand divisions, nor change the commanders, but the new nomenclature was a decided improvement over the clumsydesignations Right Wing, Centre, and Left Wing, which were wellcalculated to lead to confusion sometimes. McCook's wing became theTwentieth Corps, and my division continued of the same organization, and held the same number as formerly-the Third Division, TwentiethCorps. My first brigade was now commanded by Brigadier-GeneralWilliam H. Lytle, the second by Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, and thethird by Colonel Luther P. Bradley. 

On the 4th of March I was directed to move in light marching ordertoward Franklin and join General Gordon Granger, to take part in someoperations which he was projecting against General Earl Van Dorn, then at Spring Hill. Knowing that my line of march would carry methrough a region where forage was plentiful, I took along a largetrain of empty wagons, which I determined to fill with corn and sendback to Murfreesboro', believing that I could successfully cover thetrain by Minty's brigade of cavalry, which had joined me for thepurpose of aiding in a reconnoissance toward Shelbyville. Inmarching the column I placed a regiment of infantry at its head, thenthe wagon-train, then a brigade of infantry--masking the cavalrybehind this brigade. The enemy, discovering that the train was withus, and thinking he could capture it, came boldly out with his, cavalry to attack. The head of his column came up to the crossroadsat Versailles, but holding him there, I passed the train and infantrybrigade beyond toward Eagleville, and when my cavalry had been thusunmasked, Minty, followed by the balance of my division, which wasstill behind, charged him with the sabre. Success was immediate andcomplete, and pursuit of the routed forces continued throughUnionville, until we fell upon and drove in the Confederate outpostsat Shelbyville. Here the enemy was taken by surprise evidently, which was most fortunate for us, otherwise the consequences mighthave been disastrous. Minty captured in the charge about fiftyprisoners and a few wagons and mules, and thus enabled me to load mytrain with corn, and send it back to Murfreesboro' unmolested. Inthis little fight the sabre was freely used by both sides, and I donot believe that during the whole war I again knew of so large apercentage of wounds by that arm in proportion to the numbersengaged. 

That night I encamped at Eagleville, and next day reported to Grangerat Franklin, arriving in the midst of much excitement prevailing onaccount of the loss of Coburn's brigade, which had been captured theday before a little distance south of that point, while marching toform a junction with a column that had been directed on Columbia fromMurfreesboro'. Shortly after Coburn's capture General Granger hadcome upon the scene, and the next day he advanced my division andMinty's troops directly on Spring Hill, with a view to making somereprisal; but Van Dorn had no intention of accommodating us, andretired from Spring Hill, offering but little resistance. Hecontinued to fall back, till finally he got behind Duck River, whereoperations against him ceased; for, in consequence of the incessantrains of the season, the streams had become almost impassable. Later, I returned by way of Franklin to my old camp at Murfreesboro', passing over on this march the ground on which the ConfederateGeneral Hood met with such disaster the following year in his attackon Stanley's corps. 

My command had all returned from the Franklin expedition toMurfreesboro' and gone into camp on the Salem pike by the latter partof March, from which time till June it took part in only the littleaffairs of outposts occurring every now and then on my own front. Inthe meanwhile General Rosecrans had been materially reinforced by thereturn of sick and wounded men; his army had become well disciplined, and was tolerably supplied; and he was repeatedly pressed by theauthorities at Washington to undertake offensive operations. 

During the spring and early summer Rosecrans resisted, with a greatdeal of spirit and on various grounds, these frequent urgings, andout of this grew up an acrimonious correspondence and strainedfeeling between him and General Halleck. Early in June, however, stores had been accumulated and other preparations made for a moveforward, Resecrans seeming to have decided that he could safely riskan advance, with the prospect of good results. Before finallydeciding, he called upon most of his corps and division commandersfor their opinions on certain propositions which he presented, andmost of them still opposed the projected movement, I among thenumber, reasoning that while General Grant was operating againstVicksburg, it was better to hold Bragg in Middle Tennessee than topush him so far back into Georgia that interior means ofcommunication would give the Confederate Government the opportunityof quickly joining a part of his force to that of General Johnson inMississippi. 

At this stage, and in fact prior to it, Rosecrans seemed to manifestspecial confidence in me, often discussing his plans with meindependent of the occasions on which he formally referred them formy views. I recollect that on two different occasions about thistime he unfolded his designs to me in this informal way, outlininggenerally how he expected ultimately to force Bragg south of theTennessee River, and going into the details of the contemplated moveon Tullahoma. His schemes, to my mind, were not only comprehensive, but exact, and showed conclusively, what no one doubted then, thatthey were original with him. I found in them very little tocriticise unfavorably, if we were to move at all, and Rosecranscertainly impressed me that he favored an advance at an early day, though many of his generals were against it until the operations onthe Mississippi River should culminate in something definite. Therewas much, fully apparent in the circumstances about his headquarters, leading to the conviction that Rosecrans originated the Tullahomacampaign, and the record of his prior performances collaterallysustains the visible evidence then existing. In my opinion, then, based on a clear recollection of various occurrences growing out ofour intimacy, he conceived the plan of the Tullahoma campaign and theone succeeding it; and is therefore entitled to every credit thatattended their execution, no matter what may be claimed for others. 

On the 23d of June Bragg was covering his position north of DuckRiver with a front extending from McMinnville, where his cavalryrested, through Wartrace and Shelbyville to Columbia, his depot beingat Tullahoma. Rosecrans, thinking that Bragg would offer strongresistance at Shelbyville--which was somewhat protected by a spurof low mountains or hills, offshoots of the Cumberland Mountains--decided to turn that place; consequently, he directed the massof the Union army on the enemy's right flank, about Manchester. 

On the 26th of June McCook's corps advanced toward Liberty Gap, mydivisions marching on the Shelbyville pike. I had proceeded but afew miles when I encountered the enemy's pickets, who fell back toChristiana, about nine miles from Murfreesboro'. Here I was assailedpretty wickedly by the enemy's sharpshooters and a section ofartillery, but as I was instructed to do nothing more than cover theroad from Eagleville, over which Brannan's division was to approachChristiana, I made little reply to this severe annoyance, wishing toconceal the strength of my force. As soon as the head of Brannan'scolumn arrived I marched across-country to the left, and encampedthat night at the little town of Millersburg, in the vicinity ofLiberty Gap. I was directed to move from Millersburg, on Hoover'sGap--a pass in the range of hills already referred to, through whichran the turnpike from Murfreesboro' to Manchester--but heavy rainshad made the country roads almost impassable, and the last of mydivision did not reach Hoover's Gap till the morning of June 27, after its abandonment by the enemy. Continuing on to Fairfield, thehead of my column met, south of that place, a small force ofConfederate infantry and cavalry, which after a slight skirmishLaiboldt's brigade drove back toward Wartrace. The next morning Iarrived at Manchester, where I remained quiet for the day. Early onthe 29th I marched by the Lynchburg road for Tullahoma, where theenemy was believed to be in force, and came into position about sixmiles from the town. 

By the 31st the whole army had been concentrated, in spite of manydifficulties, and though, on account of the heavy rains that hadfallen almost incessantly since we left Murfreesboro', its movementshad been slow and somewhat inaccurate, yet the precision with whichit took up a line of battle for an attack on Tullahoma showed thatforethought and study had been given to every detail. The enemy haddetermined to fall back from Tullahoma at the beginning of thecampaign, however, and as we advanced, his evacuation had so farprogressed that when, on July 1. We reached the earthworks thrown. Up early in the year for the defense of the place, he had almostwholly disappeared, carrying off all his stores and munitions of warexcept some little subsistence and eleven pieces of artillery. Astrong rearguard remained to cover the retreat, and on my front theusual encounters between advancing and retreating forces took place. Just before reaching the intrenchments on the Lynchburg road, I cameupon an open space that was covered by a network of fallen trees andunderbrush, which had been slashed all along in front of the enemy'searthworks. This made our progress very difficult, but I shortlybecame satisfied that there were only a few of the enemy within theworks, so moving a battalion of cavalry that had joined me the daybefore down the road as rapidly as the obstructions would permit, theConfederate pickets quickly departed, and we gained possession of thetown. Three siege guns, four caissons, a few stores, and a smallnumber of prisoners fell into my hands. 

That same evening orders were issued to the army to push on fromTullahoma in pursuit, for, as it was thought that we might not beable to cross Elk River on account of its swollen condition, we coulddo the enemy some damage by keeping close as possible at his heels. I marched on the Winchester road at 3 o'clock on the 2d of July andabout 8 o'clock reached Elk River ford. The stream was for the timetruly an impassable torrent, and all hope of crossing by theWinchester ford had to be abandoned. Deeming that further effortshould be made, however, under guidance of Card, I turned the head ofmy column in the direction of Alisona, marching up the river andnearly parallel with it till I came to Rock Creek. With a littledelay we got across Rock Creek, which was also much swollen, andfinding a short distance above its mouth a ford on Elk River thatCard said was practicable, I determined to attempt it: Some of theenemy's cavalry were guarding this ford, but after a sharp littleskirmish my battalion of cavalry crossed and took up a strongposition on the other bank. The stream was very high and the currentvery swift, the water, tumbling along over its rocky bed in animmense volume, but still it was fordable for infantry if means couldbe devised by which the men could keep their feet. A cable wasstretched across just below the ford as a lifeline for the weakerones, and then the men of the entire division having secured theirammunition by placing the cartridge-boxes on their shoulders, thecolumn pushed cheerfully into the rushing current. The men as theyentered the water joined each other in sets of four in a closeembrace, which enabled them to retain a foothold and successfullyresist the force of the flood. When they were across I turned thecolumn down the left bank of Elk River, and driving the enemy fromsome slight works near Estelle Springs, regained the Winchester road. 

By this time it was clear that Bragg intended to fall back behind theTennessee River, and our only chance of accomplishing anything ofimportance was to smash up his rear-guard before it crossed theCumberland Mountains, and in pursuance of this idea I was directed toattack such of his force as was holding on to Winchester. At 4o'clock on the morning of July 2 I moved on that town, and when wegot close to it directed my mounted troops to charge a small force ofConfederate cavalry that was picketing their front. The Confederatesresisted but little, and our men went with them in a disorderly chasethrough the village to Boiling Fork, a small stream about half a milebeyond. Here the fleeing pickets, rallying behind a stronger force, made a stand, and I was directed by McCook to delay till Iascertained if Davis's division, which was to support me, had madethe crossing of Elk River, and until I could open up communicationwith Brannan's division, which was to come in on my left at Decherd. As soon as I learned that Davis was across I pushed on, but the delayhad permitted the enemy to pull his rear-guard up on the mountain, and rendered nugatory all further efforts to hurt him materially, ouronly returns consisting in forcing him to relinquish a small amountof transportation and forage at the mouth of the pass just beyondCowan, a station on the line of the Nashville and Chattanoogarailroad. 

At Cowan, Colonel Watkins, of the Sixth Kentucky Cavalry, reported tome with twelve hundred mounted men. Having heard during the nightthat the enemy had halted on the mountain near the University--aneducational establishment on the summit--I directed Watkins to make areconnoissance and find out the value of the information. He learnedthat Wharton's brigade of cavalry was halted at the University tocover a moderately large force of the enemy's infantry which had notyet got down the mountain on the other side, so I pushed Watkins outagain on the 5th, supporting him by a brigade of infantry, which Iaccompanied myself. We were too late, however, for when we arrivedat the top of the mountain Wharton had disappeared, and thoughWatkins pursued to Bridgeport, he was able to do nothing more, and onhis return reported that the last of the enemy had crossed theTennessee River and burned the railroad bridge. 

Nothing further could now be done, so I instructed Watkins to rejointhe division at Cowan, and being greatly fatigued by the hardcampaigning of the previous ten days, I concluded to go back to mycamp in a more comfortable way than on the back of my tired horse. In his retreat the enemy had not disturbed the railway track at all, and as we had captured a hand-car at Cowan, I thought I would have itbrought up to the station near the University to carry me down themountain to my camp, and, desiring company, I persuasively invitedColonel Frank T. Sherman to ride with me. I sent for the car by acourier, and for a long time patiently awaited its arrival, in fact, until all the returning troops had passed us, but still it did notcome. Thinking it somewhat risky to remain at the station withoutprotection, Sherman and myself started our horses to Cowan by ourorderlies, and set out on foot to meet the car, trudging along downthe track in momentary expectation of falling in with our privateconveyance. We had not gone very far before night overtook us, andwe then began to realize the dangers surrounding us, for there wewere alone and helpless, tramping on in the darkness over an unknownrailroad track in the enemy's country, liable on the one hand to gotumbling through some bridge or trestle, and on the other, topossible capture or death at the hands of the guerrillas theninfesting these mountains. Just after dark we came to a little cabinnear the track, where we made bold to ask for water, notwithstandingthe fact that to disclose ourselves to the inmates might lead tofatal consequences. The water was kindly given, but the owner andhis family were very much exercised lest some misfortune might befallus near their house, so they encouraged us to move on with a franknessinspired by fear of future trouble to themselves. 

At every turn we eagerly hoped to meet the hand-car, but it nevercame, and we jolted on from tie to tie for eleven weary miles, reaching Cowan after midnight, exhausted and sore in every musclefrom frequent falls on the rough, unballasted road-bed. Inquiry. Developed that the car had been well manned, and started to us asordered, and nobody could account for its non-arrival. Furtherinvestigation next day showed, however, that when it reached the footof the mountain, where the railroad formed a junction, the improvisedcrew, in the belief no doubt that the University was on the main lineinstead of near the branch to Tracy City, followed the main stemuntil it carried them clear across the range down the Crow CreekValley, where the party was captured. 

I had reason to remember for many a day this foolish adventure, formy sore bones and bruised muscles, caused me physical suffering untilI left the Army of the Cumberland the next spring; but I had stillmore reason to feel for my captured men, and on this account I havenever ceased to regret that I so thoughtlessly undertook to rejoin mytroops by rail, instead of sticking to my faithful horse. 

CHAPTER XV. 

ORDERED TO OCCUPY BRIDGEPORT--A SPY--THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA--GENERAL THOMAS--TREATED TO COFFEE--RESULTS OF THE BATTLE. 

The Tullahoma campaign was practically closed by the disappearance ofthe enemy from the country north of the Tennessee River. MiddleTennessee was once more in the possession of the National troops, andRosecrans though strongly urged from Washington to continue on, resisted the pressure until he could repair the Nashville andChattanooga railroad, which was of vital importance in supplying hisarmy from its secondary base at Nashville. As he desired to holdthis road to where it crossed the Tennessee, it was necessary to pusha force beyond the mountains, and after a few days of rest at Cowanmy division was ordered to take station at Stevenson, Alabama, thejunction of the Memphis and Charleston road with the Nashville andChattanooga, with instructions to occupy Bridgeport also. 

The enemy had meanwhile concentrated most of his forces atChattanooga for the twofold purpose of holding this gateway of theCumberland Mountains, and to assume a defensive attitude which wouldenable him to take advantage of such circumstances as might arise inthe development of the offensive campaign he knew we must make. Thepeculiar topography of the country was much to his advantage, andwhile we had a broad river and numerous spurs and ridges of theCumberland Mountains to cross at a long distance from our base, hewas backed up on his depots of supply, and connected by interiorlines of railway with the different armies of the Confederacy, sothat he could be speedily reinforced. 

Bridgeport was to be ultimately a sub-depot for storing subsistencesupplies, and one of the points at which our army would cross theTennessee, so I occupied it on July 29 with two brigades, retainingone at Stevenson, however, to protect that railway junction fromraids by way of Caperton's ferry. By the 29th of August aconsiderable quantity of supplies had been accumulated, and thenbegan a general movement of our troops for crossing the river. Asthere were not with the army enough pontoons to complete the twobridges required, I was expected to build one of them of trestles;and a battalion of the First Michigan Engineers under Colonel Inniswas sent me to help construct the bridge. Early on the 31st I sentinto the neighboring woods about fifteen hundred men with axes andteams, and by nightfall they had delivered on the riverbank fifteenhundred logs suitable for a trestle bridge. Flooring had beenshipped to me in advance by rail, but the quantity was insufficient, and the lack had to be supplied by utilizing planking andweather-boarding taken from barns and houses in the surroundingcountry. The next day Innis's engineers, with the assistance of thedetail that had felled the timber, cut and half-notched the logs, andput the bridge across; spanning the main channel, which was swimmingdeep, with four or five pontoons that had been sent me for thispurpose. On the 2d and 3d of September my division crossed on thebridge in safety, though we were delayed somewhat because of itsgiving way once where the pontoons joined the trestles. We werefollowed by a few detachments from other commands, and by nearlyall the transportation of McCook's corps. 

After getting to the south side of the Tennessee River I was orderedto Valley Head, where McCook's corps was to concentrate. On the 4thof September I ascended Sand Mountain, but had got only half wayacross the plateau, on top, when night came, the march having been amost toilsome one. The next day we descended to the base, andencamped near Trenton. On the 10th I arrived at Valley Head, andclimbing Lookout Mountain, encamped on the plateau at Indian Falls. The following day I went down into Broomtown Valley to Alpine. The march of McCook's corps from Valley Head to Alpine was inpursuance of orders directing it to advance on Summerville, thepossession of which place would further threaten the enemy'scommunications, it being assumed that Bragg was in full retreatsouth, as he had abandoned Chattanooga on the 8th. This assumptionsoon proved erroneous, however, and as we, while in Broomtown Valley, could not communicate directly with Thomas's corps, the scatteredcondition of the army began to alarm us all, and McCook abandoned theadvance to Summerville, ordering back to the summit of LookoutMountain such of the corps trains as had got down into BroomtownValley. 

But before this I had grown uneasy in regard to the disjointedsituation of our army, and, to inform myself of what was going on, determined to send a spy into the enemy's lines. In passing ValleyHead on the 10th my scout Card, who had been on the lookout for someone capable to undertake the task, brought me a Union man with whomhe was acquainted, who lived on Sand Mountain, and had been muchpersecuted by guerrillas on account of his loyal sentiments. He knewthe country well, and as his loyalty was vouched for I asked him togo into the enemy's camp, which I believed to be near Lafayette, and, bring me such information as he could gather. He said such a journeywould be at the risk of his life, and that at best he could notexpect to remain in that section of country if he undertook it, butthat he would run all the chances if I would enable him to emigrateto the West at the end c f the "job, " which I could do by purchasingthe small "bunch" of stock he owned on the mountain. To this Ireadily assented, and he started on the delicate undertaking. Hepenetrated the enemy's lines with little difficulty, but whileprosecuting his search for information was suspected, and at oncearrested and placed under guard. From this critical situation heescaped; however, making his way through the enemy's picket-line inthe darkness by crawling on his belly and deceiving the sentinels byimitating the grunts of the half-wild, sand-colored hogs with whichthe country abounded. He succeeded in reaching Rosecrans'sheadquarters finally, and there gave the definite information thatBragg intended to fight, and that he expected to be reinforced byLongstreet. 

By this time it was clear that Bragg had abandoned Chattanooga withthe sole design of striking us in detail as we followed in pursuit;and to prevent his achieving this purpose orders came at 12 o'clock, midnight, for McCook to draw in toward Chattanooga. This could bedone only by recrossing Lookout Mountain, the enemy's army atLafayette now interposing between us and Thomas's corps. Theretrograde march began at once. I moved back over the mountain onthe 13th and 14th to Stevens's Mills, and on the 15th and 16threcrossed through Stevens's Gap, in the Lookout range, and encampedat its base in McLamore's cove. The march was made with all possiblecelerity, for the situation was critical and demanded every exertion. The ascent and descent of the mountains was extremely exhausting, thesteep grades often rendering it necessary to drag up and let down byhand both the transportation and artillery. But at last we were inconjunction with the main army, and my division breathed easier. 

On the 17th I remained in line of battle all day and night in frontof McLamore's cove, the enemy making slight demonstrations against mefrom the direction of Lafayette. The main body of the army havingbodily moved to the left meanwhile, I followed it on the 18th, encamping at Pond Spring. On the 19th I resumed the march to theleft and went into line of battle at Crawfish Springs to cover ourright and rear. Immediately after forming this line, I again becameisolated by the general movement to the left, and in consequence wasdirected to advance and hold the ford of Chickamauga Creek at Lee andGordon's Mills, thus coming into close communication with the balanceof our forces. I moved into this position rapidly, being compelled, though, first to drive back the enemy's cavalry skirmishers, who, having crossed to the west side of the creek, annoyed the right flankof my column a good deal while en route. 

Upon arrival at Lee and Gordon's Mills I found the ford overChickamauga Creek temporarily uncovered, through the hurried movementof Wood to the assistance of Davis's division. The enemy was alreadypresent in small force, with the evident intention of takingpermanent possession, but my troops at once actively engaged him andrecovered the ford with some slight losses. Scarcely had this beendone when I was directed to assist Crittenden. Leaving Lytle'sbrigade at the ford, I proceeded with Bradley's and Laiboldt's tohelp Crittenden, whose main line was formed to the east of theChattanooga and Lafayette road, its right trending toward a point onChickamauga Creek about a mile and a half north of Lee and Gordon'sMills. By the time I had joined Crittenden with my two brigades, Davis had been worsted in an attack Rosecrans had ordered him to makeon the left of that portion of the enemy's line which was locatedalong the west bank of the Chickamauga, the repulse being so severethat one of Davis's batteries had to be abandoned. Bradley's brigadearrived on the ground first and was hastily formed and thrown intothe fight, which up to this moment had been very doubtful, fortuneinclining first to one side, then to the other. Bradley's brigadewent in with steadiness, and charging across an open corn-field thatlay in front of the Lafayette road, recovered Davis's guns and forcedthe enemy to retire. Meanwhile Laiboldt's brigade had come on thescene, and forming it on Bradley's right, I found myself at the endof the contest holding the ground which was Davis's originalposition. It was an ugly fight and my loss was heavy, includingBradley wounded. The temporary success was cheering, and whenLytle's brigade joined me a little later I suggested to Crittendenthat we attack, but investigation showed that his troops, having beenengaged all day, were not in condition, so the suggestion could notbe carried out. 

The events of the day had indicated that Bragg's main object was toturn Rosecrans's left; it was therefore still deemed necessary thatthe army should continue its flank movement to the left, so orderscame to draw my troops in toward the widow Glenn's house. Bystrengthening the skirmish line and shifting my brigades insuccession from right to left until the point designated was reached, I was able to effect the withdrawal without much difficulty, callingin my skirmish line after the main force had retired. 

My command having settled down for the night in this new line I rodeto army headquarters, to learn if possible the expectations for themorrow and hear the result of the battle in General Thomas's front. Nearly all the superior officers of the army were at headquarters, and it struck me that much depression prevailed, notwithstanding thefact that the enemy's attempts during the day to turn our left flankand also envelop our right had been unsuccessful. It was nowpositively known, through prisoners and otherwise, that Bragg hadbeen reinforced to such an extent as to make him materially outnumberus, consequently there was much apprehension for the future. 

The necessity of protecting our left was most apparent, and the nextday the drifting in that direction was to be continued. Thismovement in the presence of the enemy, who at all points was activelyseeking an opportunity to penetrate our line and interpose a columnbetween its right and left, was most dangerous. But the necessityfor shifting the army to the left was obvious, hence only the methodby which it was undertaken is open to question. The move was made bythe flank in the face of an exultant foe superior in numbers, and wasa violation of a simple and fundamental military principle. Undersuch circumstances columns naturally stretch out into attenuatedlines, organizations become separated, and intervals occur, all ofwhich we experienced; and had the orders for the movement beenconstrued properly I doubt if it could have been executed withoutserious danger. Necessity knows no law, however, and when all thecircumstances of this battle are fully considered it is possible thatjustification may be found for the manoeuvres by which the army wasthus drifted to the left. We were in a bad strait unquestionably, and under such conditions possibly the exception had to be appliedrather than the rule. 

At daylight on the morning of the 20th a dense fog obscuredeverything; consequently both armies were passive so far as fightingwas concerned. Rosecrans took advantage of the inaction to rearrangehis right, and I was pulled back closer to the widow Glenn's house toa strong position, where I threw together some rails and logs asbarricades, but I was disconnected from the troops on my left by aconsiderable interval. Here I awaited the approach of the enemy, buthe did not disturb me, although about 9 o'clock in the forenoon hehad opened on our extreme left with musketry fire and a heavycannonade. Two hours later it was discovered by McCook that theinterval between the main army and me was widening, and he ordered meto send Laiboldt's brigade to occupy a portion of the front that hadbeen covered by Negley's division. Before getting this brigade intoplace, however, two small brigades of Davis's division occupied theground, and I directed Laiboldt to form in column of regiments on thecrest of a low ridge in rear of Carlin's brigade, so as to preventDavis's right flank from being turned. The enemy was now feelingDavis strongly, and I was about sending for Lytle's and Bradley'sbrigades when I received an order to move these rapidly to theextreme left of the army to the assistance of General Thomas. I rodehastily back toward their position, but in the meanwhile, they hadbeen notified by direct orders from McCook, and were moving out at adouble-quick toward the Lafayette road. By this time the enemy hadassaulted Davis furiously in front and flank, and driven him from hisline, and as the confused mass came back, McCook ordered Laiboldt tocharge by deploying to the front. This he did through Davis's brokenranks, but failed to check the enemy's heavy lines, and finallyLaiboldt's brigade broke also and fell to the rear. My remainingtroops, headed by Lytle, were now passing along the rear of theground where this disaster took place--in column on the road--enroute to Thomas, and as the hundreds of fugitives rushed back, McCookdirected me to throw in Lytle's and Bradley's brigades. This washastily done, they being formed to the front under a terrible fire. Scarcely were they aligned when the same horde of Confederates thathad overwhelmed Davis and Laiboldt poured in upon them a deadly fireand shivered the two brigades to pieces. We succeeded in rallyingthem, however, and by a counter attack regained the ridge thatLaiboldt had been driven from, where we captured the colors of theTwenty-fourth Alabama. We could not hold the ridge, though, and mytroops were driven back with heavy loss, including General Lytlekilled, past the widow Glenn's house, and till I managed to establishthem in line of battle on a range of low hills behind the Dry Valleyroad. 

During these occurrences General Rosecrans passed down the roadbehind my line, and sent word that he wished to see me, but affairswere too critical to admit of my going to him at once, and he rode onto Chattanooga. It is to be regretted that he did not wait till Icould join him, for the delay would have permitted him to see thatmatters were not in quite such bad shape as he supposed; still, thereis no disguising the fact that at this juncture his army was badlycrippled. 

Shortly after my division had rallied on the low hills alreadydescribed, I discovered that the enemy, instead of attacking me infront, was wedging in between my division and the balance of thearmy; in short, endeavoring to cut me off from Chattanooga. Thisnecessitated another retrograde movement, which brought me back tothe southern face of Missionary Ridge, where I was joined by Carlin'sbrigade of Davis's division. Still thinking I could join GeneralThomas, I rode some distance to the left of my line to look for a wayout, but found that the enemy had intervened so far as to isolate meeffectually. I then determined to march directly to Rossville, andfrom there effect a junction with Thomas by the Lafayette road. Ireached Rossville about o'clock in the afternoon, bringing with meeight guns, forty-six caissons, and a long ammunition train, thelatter having been found in a state of confusion behind the widowGlenn's when I was being driven back behind the Dry Valley road. 

The head of my column passed through Rossville, appearing uponThomas's left about 6 o'clock in the evening, penetrated without anyopposition the right of the enemy's line, and captured several of hisfield-hospitals. As soon as I got on the field I informed Thomas ofthe presence of my command, and asked for orders. He replied thathis lines were disorganized, and that it would be futile to attack;that all I could do was to hold on, and aid in covering hiswithdrawal to Rossville. 

I accompanied him back to Rossville, and when we reached the skirt ofthe little hamlet General Thomas halted and we dismounted. Goinginto one of the angles of a worm fence near by I took a rail from thetop and put it through the lower rails at a proper height from theground to make a seat, and General Thomas and I sat down while, mytroops were moving by. The General appeared very much exhausted, seemed to forget what he had stopped for, and said little or nothingof the incidents of the day. This was the second occasion on which Ihad met him in the midst of misfortune, for during the fight in thecedars at Stone River, when our prospects were most disheartening, weheld a brief conversation respecting the line he was then taking upfor the purpose of helping me. At other times, in periods ofinactivity, I saw but little of him. He impressed me, now as he didin the cedars, his quiet, unobtrusive: demeanor communicating agloomy rather than a hopeful view of the situation. This apparentdepression was due no doubt to the severe trial through which he hadgone in the last forty-eight hours, which, strain had exhausted himvery much both physically and mentally. His success in maintaininghis ground was undoubtedly largely influenced by the fact thattwo-thirds of the National forces had been sent to his succor, but hisfirm purpose to save the army was the mainstay on which all reliedafter Rosecrans left the field. As the command was getting prettywell past, I rose to go in order to put my troops into camp. Thisaroused the General, when, remarking that he had a little flask ofbrandy in his saddle-holster, he added that he had just stopped forthe purpose of offering me a drink, as he knew I must be very tired. He requested one of his staff-officers to get the flask, and aftertaking a sip himself, passed it to me. Refreshed by the brandy, Imounted and rode off to supervise the encamping of my division, by nomeans an easy task considering the darkness, and the confusion thatexisted among the troops that had preceded us into Rossville. 

This done, I lay down at the foot of a tree, with my saddle for apillow, and saddle-blanket for a cover. Some soldiers near me havingbuilt a fire, were making coffee, and I guess I must have beenlooking on wistfully, for in a little while they brought me atin-cupful of the coffee and a small piece of hard bread, which Irelished keenly, it being the first food that had passed my lipssince the night before. I was very tired, very hungry, and muchdiscouraged by what had taken place since morning. I had beenobliged to fight my command under the most disadvantageouscircumstances, disconnected, without supports, without evenopportunity to form in line of battle, and at one time contendingagainst four divisions of the enemy. In this battle of Chickamauga, out of an effective strength Of 4, 000 bayonets, I had lost 1, 517officers and men, including two brigade commanders. This was notsatisfactory indeed, it was most depressing--and then there was muchconfusion prevailing around Rossville; and, this condition of thingsdoubtless increasing my gloomy reflections, it did not seem to methat the outlook for the next day was at all auspicious, unless theenemy was slow to improve his present advantage. Exhaustion soonquieted all forebodings, though, and I fell into a sound sleep, fromwhich I was not aroused till daylight. 

On the morning of the 21st the enemy failed to advance, and hisinaction gave us the opportunity for getting the broken anddisorganized army into shape. It took a large part of the day toaccomplish this, and the chances of complete victory would have beengreatly in Bragg's favor if he could have attacked us vigorously atthis time. But he had been badly hurt in the two days' conflict, andhis inactivity on the 21st showed that he too had to go through theprocess of reorganization. Indeed, his crippled condition began toshow itself the preceding evening, and I have always thought that, had General Thomas held on and attacked the Confederate right andrear from where I made the junction with him on the Lafayette road, the field of Chickamauga would have been relinquished to us; but itwas fated to be otherwise. 

Rosecrans, McCook, and Crittenden passed out of the battle when theywent back to Chattanooga, and their absence was discouraging to allaware of it. Doubtless this had much to do with Thomas's finalwithdrawal, thus leaving the field to the enemy, though at an immensecost in killed and wounded. The night of the 21st the army movedback from Rossville, and my division, as the rearguard of theTwentieth Corps, got within our lines at Chattanooga about 8 o'clockthe morning of the 22d. Our unmolested retirement from Rossvillelent additional force to the belief that the enemy had been badlyinjured, and further impressed me with the conviction that we mighthave held on. Indeed, the battle of Chickamauga was somewhat likethat of Stone River, victory resting with the side that had the gritto defer longest its relinquishment of the field. 

The manoeuvres by which Rosecrans had carried his army over theCumberland Mountains, crossed the Tennessee River, and possessedhimself of Chattanooga, merit the highest commendation up to theabandonment of this town by Bragg on the 8th of September; but I havealways fancied that that evacuation made Rosecrans over-confident, and led him to think that he could force Bragg south as far as Rome. After the Union army passed the river and Chattanooga fell into ourhands; we still kept pressing the enemy's communications, and theconfiguration of the country necessitated more or less isolation ofthe different corps. McCook's corps of three divisions had crossedtwo difficult ridges--Sand and Lookout mountains--to Alpine inBroomtown Valley with intentions against Summerville. Thomas's corpshad marched by the way of Stevens's Gap toward Lafayette, which heexpected to occupy. Crittenden had passed through Chattanooga, atfirst directing his march an Ringgold. Thus the corps of the armywere not in conjunction, and between McCook and Thomas thereintervened a positive and aggressive obstacle in the shape of Bragg'sarmy concentrating and awaiting reinforcement at Lafayette. Underthese circumstances Bragg could have taken the different corps indetail, and it is strange that he did not, even before receiving hisreinforcements, turn on McCook in Broomtown Valley and destroy him. 

Intelligence that Bragg would give battle began to come to us fromvarious sources as early as the 10th of September, and on the 11thMcCook found that he could not communicate with Thomas by the directroad through Broomtown Valley; but we did not begin closing in towardChattanooga till the 13th, and even then the Twentieth Corps hadbefore it the certainty of many delays that must necessarily resultfrom the circuitous and difficult mountain roads which we would beobliged to follow. Had the different corps, beginning with McCook's, been drawn in toward Chattanooga between the 8th and 12th ofSeptember, the objective point of the campaign would have remained inour hands without the battle of Chickamauga, but, as has been seen, this was not done. McCook was almost constantly on the march day andnight between the 13th and the 19th, ascending and descendingmountains, his men worried and wearied, so that when they appeared onthe battle-field, their fatigued condition operated greatly againsttheir efficiency. This delay in concentration was also the originalcause of the continuous shifting toward our left to the support ofThomas, by which manoeuvre Rosecrans endeavored to protect hiscommunications with Chattanooga, and out of which grew the intervalsthat offered such tempting opportunities to Bragg. In addition toall this, much transpired on the field of battle tending to bringabout disaster. There did not seem to be any well-defined plan ofaction in the fighting; and this led to much independence of judgmentin construing orders among some of the subordinate generals. It alsogave rise to much license in issuing orders: too many people weregiving important directions, affecting the whole army, withoutauthority from its head. In view, therefore, of all the errors thatwere committed from the time Chattanooga fell into our hands afterour first crossing the Tennessee, it was fortunate that the Uniondefeat was not more complete, that it left in the enemy's possessionnot much more than the barren results arising from the simple holdingof the ground on which the engagement was fought. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

AT CHATTANOOGA--THE ENEMY FORTIFIES LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND MISSIONARYRIDGE--REORGANIZING THE ARMY--REMOVAL OF GENERAL ROSECRANS--PUNISHMENT OF DESERTERS--GRANT AT CHATTANOOGA--THE FIGHT ON LOOKOUTMOUNTAIN--A BRAVE COLOR-BEARER--BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE. 

By 9 o'clock on the morning of September 22 my command took up aposition within the heavy line of intrenchments at Chattanooga, thegreater part of which defenses had been thrown up since the armycommenced arriving there the day before. The enemy, having nowsomewhat recovered from the shock of the recent battle, followedcarefully, and soon invested us close into our lines with a parallelsystem of rifle-pits. He also began at once to erect permanent linesof earthworks on Missionary Ridge and to establish himself stronglyon Lookout Mountain. He then sent Wheeler's cavalry north of theTennessee, and, aided greatly by the configuration of the ground, held us in a state of partial siege, which serious rains mightconvert into a complete investment. The occupation of LookoutMountain broke our direct communication with Bridgeport--oursub-depot--and forced us to bring supplies by way of the SequatchieValley and Waldron's Ridge of the Cumberland Mountains, over a roadmost difficult even in the summer season, but now liable to berendered impassable by autumn rains. The distance to Bridgeport bythis circuitous route was sixty miles, and the numerous passes, coves, and small valleys through which the road ran offered temptingopportunities, for the destruction of trains, and the enemy was notslow to take advantage of them. Indeed, the situation was notpromising, and General Rosecrans himself, in communicating with thePresident the day succeeding the battle of Chickamauga, expresseddoubts of his ability to hold the gateway of the CumberlandMountains. 

The position taken up by my troops inside the lines of Chattanoogawas near the old iron-works, under the shadow of Lookout Mountain. Here we were exposed to a continual fire from the enemy's batteriesfor many days, but as the men were well covered by secure thoughsimple intrenchments, but little damage was done. My ownheadquarters were established on the grounds of Mr. WilliamCrutchfield, a resident of the place, whose devotion to the Unioncause knew no bounds, and who rendered me--and, in fact, at one timeor another, nearly every general officer in the Army of theCumberland--invaluable service in the way of information about theConfederate army. My headquarters camp frequently received shotsfrom the point of Lookout Mountain also, but fortunately nocasualties resulted from this plunging fire, though, I am free toconfess, at first our nerves were often upset by the whirring oftwenty-pounder shells dropped inconsiderately into our camp atuntimely hours of the night. 

In a few days rain began to fall, and the mountain roads by which oursupplies came were fast growing impracticable. Each succeeding trainof wagons took longer to make the trip from Bridgeport, and the draftmules were dying by the hundreds. The artillery horses would soon gotoo, and there was every prospect that later the troops would starveunless something could be done. Luckily for my division, a companyof the Second Kentucky Cavalry had attached itself to myheadquarters, and, though there without authority, had been leftundisturbed in view of a coming reorganization of the army incidentalto the removal of McCook and Crittenden from the command of theirrespective corps, a measure that had been determined upon immediatelyafter the battle of Chickamauga. Desiring to remain with me, CaptainLowell H. Thickstun, commanding this company, was ready for any dutyI might find, for him, so I ordered him into the Sequatchie Valleyfor the purpose of collecting supplies for my troops, and sent myscout, Card along to guide him to the best locations. The companyhid itself away in a deep cove in the upper end of the valley, and bykeeping very quiet and paying for everything it took from the people, in a few days was enabled to send me large quantities of corn for myanimals and food for the officers and men, which greatly supplementedthe scanty supplies we were getting from the sub-depot at Bridgeport. In this way I carried men and animals through our beleaguerment inpretty fair condition, and of the turkeys, chickens, ducks, and eggssent in for the messes of my officers we often had enough to divideliberally among those at different headquarters. Wheeler's cavalrynever discovered my detached company, yet the chances of its capturewere not small, sometimes giving much uneasiness; still, I concludedit was better to run all risks than to let the horses die ofstarvation in Chattanooga. Later, after the battle of MissionaryRidge, when I started to Knoxville, the company joined me inexcellent shape, bringing with it an abundance of food, including asmall herd of beef cattle. 

The whole time my line remained near the iron-mills the shelling fromLookout was kept up, the screeching shots inquisitively asking intheir well-known way, "Where are you? Where are you?" but it isstrange to see how readily, soldiers can become accustomed to thesound of dangerous missiles under circumstances of familiarity, andthis case was no exception to the rule. Few casualties occurred, andsoon contempt took the place of nervousness, and as we could notreply in kind on account of the elevation required for our guns, themen responded by jeers and imprecations whenever a shell fell intotheir camp. 

Meantime, orders having been issued for the organization of the army, additional troops were attached to my command, and it became theSecond Division of the Fourth Army Corps, to which Major-GeneralGordon Granger was assigned as commander. This necessitated a changeof position of the division, and I moved to ground behind our works, with my right resting on Fort Negley and my left extending well overtoward Fort Wood, my front being parallel to Missionary Ridge. Mydivision was now composed of twenty-five regiments, classified intobrigades and demi-brigades, the former commanded by Brigadier-GeneralG. D. Wagner, Colonel C. G. Harker, and Colonel F. T. Sherman; thelatter, by Colonels Laiboldt, Miller, Wood, Walworth, and Opdyke. The demi-brigade was an awkward invention of Granger's; but at thistime it was necessitated--perhaps by the depleted condition of ourregiments, which compelled the massing of a great number ofregimental organizations into a division to give it weight and force. 

On October 16, 1863, General Grant had been assigned to the commandof the "Military Division of the Mississippi, " a geographical areawhich embraced the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and theTennessee, thus effecting a consolidation of divided commands whichmight have been introduced most profitably at an earlier date. Thesame order that assigned General Grant relieved General Rosecrans, and placed General Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland. At the time of the reception of the order, Rosecrans was busy withpreparations for a movement to open the direct road to Bridgeport--having received in the interval, since we came back to Chattanooga, considerable reinforcement by the arrival in his department of theEleventh and Twelfth corps, under General Hooker, from the Army ofthe Potomac. With this force Rosecrans had already strengthenedcertain important points on the railroad between Nashville andStevenson, and given orders to Hooker to concentrate at Bridgeportsuch portions of his command as were available, and to hold them inreadiness to advance toward Chattanooga. 

On the 19th of October, after turning the command over to Thomas, General Rosecrans quietly slipped away from the army. He submitteduncomplainingly to his removal, and modestly left us without fuss ordemonstration; ever maintaining, though, that the battle ofChickamauga was in effect a victory, as it had ensured us, he said, the retention of Chattanooga. When his departure became knowndeep and almost universal regret was expressed, for he wasenthusiastically esteemed and loved by the Army of the Cumberland, from the day he assumed command of it until he left it, notwithstanding the censure poured upon him after the battle ofChickamauga. 

The new position to which my division had been moved, in consequenceof the reorganization, required little additional labor to strengthenit, and the routine of fatigue duty and drills was continued asbefore, its monotony occasionally broken by the excitement of anexpected attack, or by amusements of various kinds that werecalculated to keep the men in good spirits. Toward this result muchwas contributed by Mr. James E. Murdock, the actor, who came downfrom the North to recover the body of his son, killed at Chickamauga, and was quartered with me for the greater part of the time he wasobliged to await the successful conclusion of his sad mission. Hespent days, and even weeks, going about through the division givingrecitations before the camp-fires, and in improvised chapels, whichthe men had constructed from refuse lumber and canvas. Suiting hisselections to the occasion, he never failed to excite intenseinterest in the breasts of all present, and when circumstancesfinally separated him from us, all felt that a debt of gratitude wasdue him that could never be paid. The pleasure he gave, and theconfident feeling that was now arising from expected reinforcements, was darkened, however, by one sad incident. Three men of my divisionhad deserted their colors at the beginning of the siege and madetheir way north. They were soon arrested, and were brought back tostand trial for the worst offense that can be committed by a soldier, convicted of the crime, and ordered to be shot. To make the exampleeffective I paraded the whole division for the execution, and on the13th of November, in the presence of their former comrades, theculprits were sent, in accordance with the terms of their sentence, to render their account to the Almighty. It was the saddestspectacle I ever witnessed, but there could be no evasion, nomitigation of the full letter of the law; its timely enforcement wasbut justice to the brave spirits who had yet to fight the rebellionto the end. 

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on October 23, and began at onceto carry out the plans that had been formed for opening the shorteror river road to Bridgeport. This object was successfullyaccomplished by the moving of Hooker's command to Rankin's andBrown's ferries in concert with a force from the Army of theCumberland which was directed on the same points, so by the 27th ofOctober direct communication with our depots was established. Thefour weeks which followed this cheering result were busy with thework of refitting and preparing for offensive operations as soon asGeneral Sherman should reach us with his troops from West Tennessee. During this period of activity the enemy committed the serious faultof detaching Longstreet's corps--sending it to aid in the siege ofKnoxville in East Tennessee--an error which has no justificationwhatever, unless it be based on the presumption that it wasabsolutely necessary that Longstreet should ultimately rejoin Lee'sarmy in Virginia by way of Knoxville and Lynchburg, with a chance ofpicking up Burnside en route. Thus depleted, Bragg still heldMissionary Ridge in strong force, but that part of his line whichextended across the intervening valley to the northerly point of. Lookout Mountain was much attenuated. 

By the 18th of November General Grant had issued instructionscovering his intended operations. They contemplated that Sherman'scolumn, which was arriving by the north bank of the Tennessee, shouldcross the river on a pontoon bridge just below the mouth ofChickamauga Creek and carry the northern extremity of MissionaryRidge as far as the railroad tunnel; that the Army of the Cumberland--the centre--should co-operate with Sherman; and that Hooker with amixed command should continue to hold Lookout Valley and operate onour extreme right as circumstances might warrant. Sherman crossed onthe 24th to perform his alloted part of the programme, but in themeantime Grant becoming impressed with the idea that Bragg wasendeavoring to get away, ordered Thomas to make a strongdemonstration in his front, to determine the truth or falsity of theinformation that had been received. This task fell to the FourthCorps, and at 12 o'clock on the 23d I was notified that Wood'sdivision would make a reconnoissance to an elevated point in itsfront called Orchard Knob, and that I was to support it with mydivision and prevent Wood's right flank from being turned by anadvance of the enemy on Moore's road or from the direction ofRossville. For this duty I marched my division out of the worksabout 2 p. M. , and took up a position on Bushy Knob. Shortly after wereached this point Wood's division passed my left flank on itsreconnoissance, and my command, moving in support of it, drove in theenemy's picket-line. Wood's took possession of Orchard Knob easily, and mine was halted on a low ridge to the right of the Knob, where Iwas directed by General Thomas to cover my front by a strong line ofrifle-pits, and to put in position two batteries of the Fourthregular artillery that had joined me from the Eleventh Corps. Afterdark Wood began to feel uneasy about his right flank, for a gapexisted between it and my left, so I moved in closer to him, takingup a line where I remained inactive till the 25th, but suffering someinconvenience from the enemy's shells. 

On the 24th General Sherman made an attack for the purpose ofcarrying the north end of Missionary Ridge. His success was notcomplete, although at the time it was reported throughout the army tobe so. It had the effect of disconcerting Bragg, however, and causedhim to strengthen his right by withdrawing troops from his left, which circumstance led Hooker to advance on the northerly face ofLookout Mountain. At first, with good glasses, we could plainly seeHooker's troops driving the Confederates up the face of the mountain. All were soon lost to view in the dense timber, but emerged again onthe open ground, across which the Confederates retreated at a livelypace, followed by the pursuing line, which was led by a color-bearer, who, far in advance, was bravely waving on his comrades. Thegallantry of this man elicited much enthusiasm among us all, but ashe was a considerable distance ahead of his comrades I expected tosee his rashness punished at any moment by death or capture. Hefinally got quite near the retreating Confederates, when suddenlythey made a dash at him, but he was fully alive to such a move, andran back, apparently uninjured, to his friends. About this time asmall squad of men reached the top of Lookout and planted the Starsand Stripes on its very crest. Just then a cloud settled down on themountain, and a heavy bank of fog obscured its whole face. 

After the view was lost the sharp rattle of musketry continued sometime, but practically the fight had been already won by Hooker's men, the enemy only holding on with a rear-guard to assure his retreatacross Chattanooga Valley to Missionary Ridge. Later we heard veryheavy cannonading, and fearing that Hooker was in trouble I sent astaff-officer to find out whether he needed assistance, which Ithought could be given by a demonstration toward Rossville. Theofficer soon returned with the report that Hooker was all right, thatthe cannonading was only a part of a little rear-guard fight, twosections of artillery making all the noise, the reverberations frompoint to point in the adjacent mountains echoing and reechoing tillit seemed that at least fifty guns were engaged. 

On the morning of the 25th of November Bragg's entire army washolding only the line of Missionary Ridge, and our troops, being nowpractically connected from Sherman to Hooker, confronted it with theArmy of the Cumberland in the centre--bowed out along the front ofWood's division and mine. Early in the day Sherman, with greatdetermination and persistence, made an attempt to carry the highground near the tunnel, first gaining and then losing advantage, buthis attack was not crowned with the success anticipated. MeanwhileHooker and Palmer were swinging across Chattanooga Valley, using meas a pivot for the purpose of crossing Missionary Ridge in theneighborhood of Rossville. In the early part of the day I had drivenin the Confederate pickets in my front, so as to prolong my line ofbattle on that of Wood, the necessity of continuing to refuse myright having been obviated by the capture of Lookout Mountain and theadvance of Palmer. 

About 2 o'clock orders came to carry the line at the foot of theridge, attacking at a signal of six guns. I had few changes or newdispositions to make. Wagner's brigade, which was next to Wood'sdivision, was formed in double lines, and Harker's brigade took thesame formation on Wagner's right. Colonel F. T. Sherman's brigadecame on Harker's right, formed in a column of attack, with a front ofthree regiments, he having nine. My whole front was covered with aheavy line of skirmishers. These dispositions made, my right resteda little distance south of Moore's road, my left joined Wood overtoward Orchard Knob, while my centre was opposite Thurman's house--the headquarters of General Bragg--on Missionary Ridge. A smallstream of water ran parallel to my front, as far as which the groundwas covered by a thin patch of timber, and beyond the edge of thetimber was an open plain to the foot of Missionary Ridge, varying inwidth from four to nine hundred yards. At the foot of the ridge wasthe enemy's first line of rifle-pits; at a point midway up its face, another line, incomplete; and on the crest was a third line, in whichBragg had massed his artillery. 

The enemy saw we were making dispositions for an attack, and in plainview of my whole division he prepared himself for resistance, marching regiments from his left flank with flying colors; andfilling up the spaces not already occupied in his intrenchments. Seeing the enemy thus strengthening himself, it was plain that wewould have to act quickly if we expected to accomplish much, and Ialready began to doubt the feasibility of our remaining in the firstline of rifle-pits when we should have carried them. I discussed theorder with Wagner, Harker, and Sherman, and they were similarlyimpressed, so while anxiously awaiting the signal I sent CaptainRansom of my staff to Granger, who was at Fort Wood, to ascertain ifwe were to carry the first line or the ridge beyond. Shortly afterRansom started the signal guns were fired, and I told my brigadecommanders to go for the ridge. 

Placing myself in front of Harker's brigade, between the line ofbattle and the skirmishers, accompanied by only an orderly so as notto attract the enemy's fire, we moved out. Under a terrible storm ofshot and shell the line pressed forward steadily through the timber, and as it emerged on the plain took the double-quick and with fixedbayonets rushed at the enemy's first line. Not a shot was fired fromour line of battle, and as it gained on my skirmishers they meltedinto and became one with it, and all three of my brigades went overthe rifle-pits simultaneously. They then lay down on the face of theridge, for a breathing-spell and for protection' from the terriblefire, of canister and musketry pouring over us from the guns on thecrest. At the rifle-pits there had been little use for the bayonet, for most of the Confederate troops, disconcerted by the sudden rush, lay close in the ditch and surrendered, though some few fled up theslope to the next line. The prisoners were directed to move out toour rear, and as their intrenchments had now come under fire from thecrest, they went with alacrity, and without guard or escort, towardChattanooga. 

After a short pause to get breath the ascent of the ridge began, andI rode, into the ditch of the intrenchments to drive out a fewskulkers who were hiding there. Just at this time I was joined byCaptain Ransom, who, having returned from Granger, told me that wewere to carry only the line at the base, and that in coming back, when he struck the left of the division, knowing this interpretationof the order, he in his capacity as an aide-de-camp had directedWagner, who was up on the face of the ridge, to return, and that inconsequence Wagner was recalling his men to the base. I could notbear to order the recall of troops now so gallantly climbing the hillstep by step, and believing we could take it, I immediately rode toWagner's brigade and directed it to resume the attack. In themeantime Harker's and F. T. Sherman's troops were approaching thepartial line of works midway of the ridge, and as I returned to thecentre of their rear, they were being led by many stands ofregimental colors. There seemed to be a rivalry as to which colorshould be farthest to the front; first one would go forward a fewfeet, then another would come up to it, the color-bearers vying withone another as to who should be foremost, until finally everystandard was planted on the intermediate works. The enemy's firefrom the crest during the ascent was terrific in the noise made, butas it was plunging, it over-shot and had little effect on those abovethe second line of pits, but was very uncomfortable for those below, so I deemed it advisable to seek another place, and Wagner's brigadehaving reassembled and again pressed up the ridge, I rode up the faceto join my troops. 

As soon as the men saw me, they surged forward and went over theworks on the crest. The parapet of the intrenchment was too high formy horse to jump, so, riding a short distance to the left, I enteredthrough a low place in the line. A few Confederates were foundinside, but they turned the butts of their muskets toward me in tokenof surrender, for our men were now passing beyond them on both theirflanks. 

The right and right centre of my division gained the summit first, they being partially sheltered by a depression in the face of theridge, the Confederates in their immediate front fleeing down thesouthern face. When I crossed the rifle-pits on the top theConfederates were still holding fast at Bragg's headquarters, and abattery located there opened fire along the crest; making things mostuncomfortably hot. Seeing the danger to which I was exposed, for Iwas mounted, Colonel Joseph Conrad, of the Fifteenth Missouri, ran upand begged me to dismount. I accepted his excellent advice, and itprobably saved my life; but poor Conrad was punished for hissolicitude by being seriously wounded in the thigh at the moment hewas thus contributing to my safety. 

Wildly cheering, the men advanced along the ridge toward Bragg'sheadquarters, and soon drove the Confederates from this lastposition, capturing a number of prisoners, among them Breckenridge'sand Bates's adjutant-generals, and the battery that had made suchstout resistance on the crest-two guns which were named "LadyBreckenridge" and "Lady Buckner" General Bragg himself having barelytime to escape before his headquarters were taken. 

My whole division had now reached the summit, and Wagner and Harker--the latter slightly wounded--joined me as I was standing in thebattery just secured. The enemy was rapidly retiring, and thoughmany of his troops, with disorganized wagon-trains and several piecesof artillery, could be distinctly seen in much confusion about half amile distant in the valley below, yet he was covering them with apretty well organized line that continued to give us a desultoryfire. Seeing this, I at once directed Wagner and Harker to take upthe pursuit along Moore's road, which led to Chickamauga Station--Bragg's depot of supply--and as they progressed, I pushed Sherman'sbrigade along the road behind them. Wagner and Harker soon overtookthe rearguard, and a slight skirmish caused it to break, permittingnine guns and a large number of wagons which were endeavoring to getaway in the stampede to fall into our hands. 

About a mile and a half beyond Missionary Ridge, Moore's road passedover a second ridge or high range of hills, and here the enemy haddetermined to make a stand for that purpose, posting eight pieces ofartillery with such supporting force as he could rally. He wasimmediately attacked by Harker and Wagner, but the position wasstrong, the ridge being rugged and difficult of ascent, and after thefirst onset our men recoiled. A staff-officer from Colonel Wood'sdemi-brigade informing me at this juncture that that command was tooweak to carry the position in its front, I ordered the FifteenthIndiana and the Twenty-Sixth Ohio to advance to Wood's aid, and thenhastening to the front I found his men clinging to the face of theridge, contending stubbornly with the rear-guard of the enemy. Directing Harker to put Opdyke's demi-brigade in on the right, Iinformed Wagner that it was necessary to flank the enemy by carryingthe high bluff on our left where the ridge terminated, that I haddesignated the Twenty-Sixth Ohio and Fifteenth Indiana for the work, and that I wished him to join them. 

It was now dusk, but the two regiments engaged in the flankingmovement pushed on to gain the bluff. Just as they reached the crestof the ridge the moon rose from behind, enlarged by the refraction ofthe atmosphere, and as the attacking column passed along the summitit crossed the moon's disk and disclosed to us below a mostinteresting panorama, every figure nearly being thrown out in fullrelief. The enemy, now outflanked on left and right, abandoned hisground, leaving us two pieces of artillery and a number of wagons. After this ridge was captured I found that no other troops than minewere pursuing the enemy, so I called a halt lest I might become toomuch isolated. Having previously studied the topography of thecountry thoroughly, I knew that if I pressed on my line of marchwould carry me back to Chickamauga station, where we would be in rearof the Confederates that had been fighting General Sherman, and thatthere was a possibility of capturing them by such action; but I didnot feel warranted in marching there alone, so I rode back toMissionary Ridge to ask for more troops, and upon arriving there Ifound Granger in command, General Thomas having gone back toChattanooga. 

Granger was at Braggy's late headquarters in bed. I informed him ofmy situation and implored him to follow me up with the Army of theCumberland, but he declined, saying that he thought we had done wellenough. I still insisting, he told me finally to push on to thecrossing of Chickamauga Creek, and if I, encountered the enemy hewould order troops to my support. I returned to my division about12 o'clock at night, got it under way, and reached the crossing, about half a mile from the station, at 2 o'clock on the morning ofthe 26th, and there found the bridge destroyed, but that the creekwas fordable. I did not encounter the enemy in any force, but fearedto go farther without assistance. This I thought I might bring up bypracticing a little deception, so I caused two regiments to simulatean engagement by opening fire, hoping that this would alarm Grangerand oblige him to respond with troops, but my scheme failed. GeneralGranger afterward told me that he had heard the volleys, butsuspected their purpose, knowing that they were not occasioned by afight, since they were too regular in their delivery. 

I was much disappointed that my pursuit had not been supported, for Ifelt that great results were in store for us should the enemy bevigorously followed. Had the troops under Granger's command beenpushed out with mine when Missionary Ridge was gained, we could havereached Chickamauga Station by 12 o'clock the night of the 25th; orhad they been sent even later, when I called for them, we could havegot there by daylight and worked incalculable danger to theConfederates, for the force that had confronted Sherman did not passChickamauga Station in their retreat till after daylight on themorning of the 26th. 

My course in following so close was dictated by a thorough knowledgeof the topography of the country and a familiarity with its roads, bypaths, and farm-houses, gained with the assistance of Mr. Crutchfield; and sure my column was heading in the right direction, though night had fallen I thought that an active pursuit would almostcertainly complete the destruction of Bragg's army. When GeneralGrant came by my bivouac at the crossing of Chickamauga Creek on the26th, he realized what might have been accomplished had thesuccessful assault on Missionary Ridge been supplemented by vigorousefforts on the part of some high officers, who were more interestedin gleaning that portion of the battle-field over which my commandhad passed than in destroying a panic-stricken enemy. 

Although it cannot be said that the result of the two days'operations was reached by the methods which General Grant hadindicated in his instructions preceding the battle, yet the generaloutcome was unquestionably due to his genius, for the manoeuvring ofSherman's and Hooker's commands created the opportunity for Thomas'scorps of the Army of the Cumberland to carry the ridge at the centre. In directing Sherman to attack the north end of the ridge, Grantdisconcerted Bragg--who was thus made to fear the loss of his depotof supplies at Chickamauga Station--and compelled him to resiststoutly; and stout resistance to Sherman meant the withdrawal of theConfederates from Lookout Mountain. While this attack was in processof execution advantage was taken of it by Hooker in a well-plannedand well-fought battle, but to my mind an unnecessary one, for ourpossession of Lookout was the inevitable result that must follow fromSherman's threatening attitude. The assault on Missionary Ridge byGranger's and Palmer's corps was not premeditated by Grant, hedirecting only the line at its base to be carried, but when this fellinto our hands the situation demanded our getting the one at the topalso. 

I took into the action an effective force of 6, 000, and lost 123officers and 1, 181 men killed and wounded. These casualties speaklouder than words of the character of the fight, and plainly tellwhere the enemy struggled most stubbornly for these figures compriseone-third the casualties of the entire body of Union troops--Sherman's and all included. My division captured 1, 762 prisonersand, in all, seventeen pieces of artillery. Six of these guns Iturned over with caissons complete; eleven were hauled off the fieldand appropriated by an officer of high rank--General Hazen. I haveno disposition to renew the controversy which grew out of thismatter. At the time the occurrence took place I made the charge in aplain official report, which was accepted as correct by the corps andarmy commanders, from General Granger up to General Grant. GeneralHazen took no notice of this report then, though well aware of itsexistence. Nearly a quarter of a century later, however, heendeavored to justify his retention of the guns by trying to showthat his brigade was the first to reach the crest of MissionaryRidge, and that he was therefore entitled to them. This claim ofbeing the first to mount the ridge is made by other brigades thanHazen's, with equal if not greater force, so the absurdity of hisdeduction is apparent:

NOTE: In a book published by General Hazen in 1885, he endeavored toshow, by a number of letters from subordinate officers of hiscommand, written at his solicitation from fifteen to twenty yearsafter the occurrence, that his brigade was the first to mountMissionary Ridge, and that it was entitled to possess these guns. The doubtful character of testimony dimmed by the lapse of many yearshas long been conceded, and I am content to let the controversy standthe test of history, based on the conclusions of General Grant, as hedrew them from official reports made when the circumstances werefresh in the minds of all. 

General Grant says: "To Sheridan's prompt movement, the Army of theCumberland and the nation are indebted for the bulk of the capture ofprisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. Except for his promptpursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. "

General Thomas says: "We captured all their cannon and ammunitionbefore they could be removed or destroyed. After halting a fewmoments to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scatteredin the assault of the hill, General Sheridan pushed forward inpursuit, and drove those in his front who had escaped capture acrossChickamauga Creek. "

REPORT OF COLONEL FRANCIS T. SHERMAN, COMMANDING FIRST BRIGADE:"When within ten yards of the crest, our men seemed to be thrownforward as if by some powerful engine, and the old flag was plantedfirmly and surely on the last line of works of the enemy, followed bythe men, taking one battery of artillery. "

REPORT OF COLONEL MICHAEL GOODING, TWENTY-SECOND INDIANA:.... "I pushed men up to the second line of works as fast as possible;on and on, clear to the top, and over the ridge they went, to thehollow beyond, killing and wounding numbers of the enemy as weadvanced, and leaving the rebel battery in our rear. We capturedgreat numbers of prisoners, and sent them to the rear without guards, as we deemed the pursuit of the enemy of greater importance.... "I cannot give too much praise to Captain Powers, Company "H, "Lieutenant Smith, Company "K, " Lieutenant Gooding, Company "A, " andSecond Lieutenant Moser, Company "G, " for their assistance, and forthe gallant manner in which they encouraged their men up the side ofthe mountain, and charging the enemy's works right up to the muzzlesof their guns. "

REPORT OF COLONEL JASON MARSH, SEVENTY-FOURTH ILLINOIS:.... "The first on the enemy's works, and almost simultaneously, wereLieutenant Clement, Company "A, " Captain Stegner, Company "I, "Captain Bacon, Company "G, " and Captain Leffingwell, with some oftheir men. The enemy was still in considerable force behind theirworks; but, for some unaccountable reason, they either fled orsurrendered instantly upon the first few of our men reaching them--not even trying to defend their battery, which was immediatelycaptured by Captain Stegner. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL PORTER C. OLSON, THIRTY-SIXTH ILLINOIS:.... "In connection with other regiments of this brigade, we assistedin capturing several pieces of artillery, a number of caissons, and agreat quantity of small-arms. "

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHN Q. LANE:.... "At the house known as Bragg's headquarters, the enemy weredriven from three guns, which fell into our hands. "

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. D. WAGNER, SECOND BRIGADE:.... "I ordered the command to storm the ridge, bringing up theFifteenth Indiana and Ninety-seventh Ohio, which had not yet beenengaged, although suffering from the enemy's artillery. The resultis a matter of history, as we gained the ridge, capturing artillery, prisoners, and small-arms; to what amount, however, I do not know, aswe pushed on after the enemy as soon as I had re-formed the command..... Captain Tinney, with his usual gallantry, dashed up the line withthe first troops, and with the aid of an orderly (George Dusenbury, Fifteenth Indiana), turned the loaded gun of the enemy on hisretreating ranks. "

REPORT OF CAPTAIN BENJAMIN F. HEGLER, FIFTEENTH INDIANA:.... "Our captures amounted to prisoners not counted, representingmany different regiments; several pieces of artillery, and somewagons. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ELIAS NEFF, FORTIETH INDIANA:.... "As the regiment reached the top of the ridge and swept for. Ward, the right passed through, without stopping to take possession, the battery at General Bragg's headquarters that had fired sovenomously during the whole contest. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. MOORE, FIFTY-EIGHTH INDIANA:.... "In passing to the front from Missionary Ridge, we saw severalpieces of artillery which had been abandoned by the enemy, though Idid not leave any one in charge of them. "

REPORT OF MAJOR C, M. HAMMOND, ONE HUNDREDTH ILLINOIS:.... "I immediately organized my regiment, and while so doingdiscovered a number of pieces of artillery in a ravine on my left. Isent Lieutenant Stewart, of Company A, to see if these guns which theenemy had abandoned could not be turned upon them. He returned andreported them to be four ten-pound Parrotts and two brass Napoleons;also that it would require a number of men to place them in position. I ordered him to report the same to General Wagner, and askpermission, but before receiving a reply was ordered by you to moveforward my regiment on the left of the Fifty-Eighth IndianaVolunteers. "

REPORT OF COLONEL CHARLES G. HARKER, THIRD BRIGADE:.... "My right and Colonel Sherman's left interlocked, so to speak, aswe approached the summit, and it was near this point that I saw thefirst part of my line gain the crest. This was done by a few bravemen of my own and Colonel Sherman's command driving the enemy fromhis intrenchments. The gap thus opened, our men rushed rapidly in, and the enemy, loth to give up their position, still remained, firingat my command toward the left, and the battery in front of the houseknown as General Bragg's headquarters was still firing at the troops, and was captured by our men while the gunners were still at theirposts........ "We captured and sent to division and corps headquarters 503prisoners and a large number of small-arms. In regard to the numberof pieces of artillery, it will probably be difficult to reconcilethe reports of my regimental commanders with the reports of otherregiments and brigades who fought so nobly with my own command, andwho alike are entitled to share the honors and glories of the day. More anxious to follow the enemy than to appropriate trophies alreadysecured, we pushed to the front, while the place we occupied onascending the hill was soon occupied by other troops, who, I havelearned, claim the artillery as having fallen into their own hands. It must therefore remain with the division and corps commanders, whoknew the relative position of each brigade and division, to accord toeach the trophies to which they are due..... "From my personal observation I can claim a battery of six gunscaptured by a portion of my brigade. "

REPORT OF COLONEL EMERSON OPDYKE, FIRST DEMI-BRIGADE:.... "My command captured Bragg's headquarters, house, and the sixguns which were near there; one of these I ordered turned upon theenemy, which was done with effect. "

REPORT OF COLONEL H. C. DUNLAP, THIRD KENTUCKY:.... "The point at which the centre of my regiment reached the crestwas at the stable to the left of the house said to be Bragg'sheadquarters, and immediately in front of the road which leads downthe southern slope of the ridge. One piece of the abandoned battery, was to the left of this point, the remainder to the right, near by. "

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL W. A. BULLITT, SIXTY-FIFTH OHIO:.... "The position in which my regiment found itself was immediatelyin front of a battery, which belched forth a stream of canister uponus with terrible rapidity. In addition to this, the enemy, wheneverdriven from other points, rallied around this battery, and defendedit with desperation. It cost a struggle to take it; but we finallysucceeded, and the colors of the Sixty-fifth Ohio were the firstplanted upon the yet smoking guns. Captain Smith, of my regiment, was placed in charge of the captured battery, which consisted of 5guns, 3 caissons, and 17 horses. "

REPORT OF CAPTAIN E. P. BATES, ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIFTH OHIO:.... "Perceiving that the ridge across which my regiment extended wascommanded to the very crest by a battery in front, also by those toright and left, I directed the men to pass up the gorges on eitherside. About forty men, with Captain Parks and Lieutenant Stinger, passed to the left, the balance to the right, and boldly charged on, till, foremost with those of other regiments, they stood on thestrongest point of the enemy's works, masters alike of his guns andposition.... Captain Parks reports his skirmish-line to have chargedupon and captured one gun, that otherwise would have been hauledoff. "

REPORT OF COLONEL ALLEN BUCKNER, SEVENTY-NINTH ILLINOIS:.... "The right of the regiment rested on the left of the road, whereit crossed the rebel fortification, leading up the hill towardBragg's headquarters. We took a right oblique direction through apeach orchard until arriving at the woods and logs on the side of theridge, when I ordered the men to commence firing, which they did withgood effect, and continued it all the way up until the heights weregained. At this point the left of the regiment was near the right ofthe house, and I claim that my officers and men captured two largebrass pieces, literally punching the cannoniers from their guns. Privates John Fregan and Jasper Patterson, from Company "A, " rusheddown the hill, captured one caisson, with a cannonier and six horses, and brought them back. "

REPORT OF COLONEL J. R. MILES, TWENTY-SEVENTH ILLINOIS:.... "The regiment, without faltering, finally, at about 4. 30 P. M. , gained the enemy's works in conjunction with a party of theThirty-sixth Illinois, who were immediately on our right. Theregiment, or a portion of it, proceeded to the left, down the ridge, for nearly or quite a quarter of a mile capturing three or four piecesof cannon, driving the gunners from them. "

CHAPTER XVII. 

ORDERED TO RETURN TO CHATTANOOGA--MARCH TO KNOXVILLE--COLLECTINGSUBSISTENCE STORES--A CLEVER STRATAGEM--A BRIDGE OF WAGONS--LOOKINGOUT FOR THE PERSONAL COMFORT OF THE SOLDIERS-A LEAVE OF ABSENCE--ORDERED TO WASHINGTON--PARTING WITH SHERIDAN'S DIVISION. 

The day after the battle of Missionary Ridge I was ordered in theevening to return to Chattanooga, and from the limited supply ofstores to be had there outfit my command to march to the relief ofKnoxville, where General Burnside was still holding out against thebesieging forces of General Longstreet. When we left Murfreesboro'in the preceding June, the men's knapsacks and extra clothing, aswell as all our camp equipage, had been left behind, and thesearticles had not yet reached us, so we were poorly prepared for awinter campaign in the mountains of East Tennessee. There was butlittle clothing to be obtained in Chattanooga, and my commandreceived only a few overcoats and a small supply of India-rubberponchos. We could get no shoes, although we stood in great need ofthem, for the extra pair with which each man had started out fromMurfreesboro' was now much the worse for wear. The necessity forsuccoring Knoxville was urgent, however, so we speedily refitted asthoroughly as was possible with the limited means at hand. Mydivision teams were in very fair condition in consequence of theforage we had procured in the Sequatchie Valley, so I left the trainbehind to bring up clothing when any should arrive in Chattanooga. 

Under these circumstances, on the 29th of November the Fourth Corps(Granger's) took up the line of march for Knoxville, my men carryingin their haversacks four days' rations, depending for a furthersupply of food on a small steamboat loaded with subsistence stores, which was to proceed up the Tennessee River and keep abreast of thecolumn. 

Not far from Philadelphia, Tennessee, the columns of GeneralSherman's army, which had kept a greater distance from the river thanGranger's corps, so as to be able to subsist on the country, came intoward our right and the whole relieving force was directed onMarysville, about fifteen miles southwest of Knoxville. We got toMarysville December 5, and learned the same day that Longstreet hadshortly before attempted to take Knoxville by a desperate assault, but signally failing, had raised the siege and retired toward Bean'sStation on the Rutledge, Rogersville, and Bristol road, leading toVirginia. From Marysville General Sherman's troops returned toChattanooga, while Granger's corps continued on toward Knoxville, totake part in the pursuit of Longstreet. 

Burnside's army was deficient in subsistence, though not to theextent that we had supposed before leaving Chattanooga. It had eatenout the country in the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, however;therefore my division did not cross the Holstein River, but wasrequired, in order to maintain itself, to proceed to the region ofthe French Broad River. To this end I moved to Sevierville, andmaking this village my headquarters, the division was spread out overthe French Broad country, between Big Pigeon and Little Pigeonrivers, where we soon had all the mills in operation, grinding outplenty of flour and meal. The whole region was rich in provenderof all kinds, and as the people with rare exceptions wereenthusiastically loyal, we in a little while got more than enoughfood for ourselves, and by means of flatboats began sending thesurplus down the river to the troops at Knoxville. 

The intense loyalty of this part of Tennessee exceeded that of anyother section I was in during the war. The people could not do toomuch to aid the Union cause, and brought us an abundance ofeverything needful. The women were especially loyal, and as many oftheir sons and husbands, who had been compelled to "refugee" onaccount of their loyal sentiments, returned with us, numbers of thewomen went into ecstasies of joy when this part of the Union armyappeared among them. So long as we remained in the French Broadregion, we lived on the fat of the land, but unluckily our stay wasto be of short duration, for Longstreet's activity kept thedepartment commander in a state of constant alarm. 

Soon after getting the mills well running, and when the shipment oftheir surplus product down the river by flatboats had begun, I wasordered to move to Knoxville, on account of demonstrations byLongstreet from the direction of Blain's crossroads. On arriving atKnoxville, an inspection of my command, showed that the shoes of manyof the men were entirely worn out, the poor fellows having beenobliged to protect their feet with a sort of moccasin, made fromtheir blankets or from such other material as they could procure. About six hundred of the command were in this condition, plainly notsuitably shod to withstand the frequent storms of sleet and snow. These men I left in Knoxville to await the arrival of my train, whichI now learned was en route from Chattanooga with shoes, overcoats, and other clothing, and with the rest of the division proceeded toStrawberry Plains, which we reached the latter part of December. 

Mid-winter was now upon us, and the weather in this mountain regionof East Tennessee was very cold, snow often falling to the depth ofseveral inches. The thin and scanty clothing of the men affordedlittle protection, and while in bivouac their only shelter was theponchos with which they had been provided before leaving Chattanooga;there was not a tent in the command. Hence great suffering resulted, which I anxiously hoped would be relieved shortly by the arrival ofmy train with supplies. In the course of time the wagons reachedKnoxville, but my troops derived little comfort from this fact, forthe train was stopped by General Foster, who had succeeded Burnsidein command of the department, its contents distributed pro rata tothe different organizations of the entire army, and I received but asmall share. This was very disappointing, not to say exasperating, but I could not complain of unfairness, for every command in the armywas suffering to the same extent as mine, and yet it did seem that alittle forethought and exertion on the part of some of the othersuperior officers, whose transportation was in tolerable condition, might have ameliorated the situation considerably. I sent the trainback at once for more clothing, and on its return, just beforereaching Knoxville, the quartermaster in charge, Captain PhilipSmith, filled the open spaces in the wagons between the bows and loadwith fodder and hay, and by this clever stratagem passed it throughthe town safe and undisturbed as a forage train. On Smith's arrivalwe lost no time in issuing the clothing, and when it had passed intothe hands of the individual soldiers the danger of its appropriationfor general distribution, like the preceding invoice, was veryremote. 

General Foster had decided by this time to move his troops toDandridge for the twofold purpose of threatening the enemy's left andof getting into a locality where we could again gather subsistencefrom the French Broad region. Accordingly we began an advance on the15th of January, the cavalry having preceded us some time before. The Twenty-third Corps and Wood's division of the Fourth Corpscrossed the Holstein River by a bridge that had been constructed atStrawberry Plains. My division being higher up the stream, fordedit, the water very deep and bitter cold, being filled with slushyice. Marching by way of New Market, I reached Dandridge on the 17th, and here on my arrival met General Sturgis, then commanding ourcavalry. He was on the eve of setting out to, "whip the enemy'scavalry, " as he said, and wanted me to go along and see him do it. Ideclined, however, for being now the senior officer present, Foster, Parke, and Granger having remained at Knoxville and StrawberryPlains, their absence left me in command, and it was necessary that Ishould make disposition of the infantry when it arrived. As therewere indications of a considerable force of the enemy on theRussellville road I decided to place the troops in line of battle, soas to be prepared for any emergency that might arise in the absenceof the senior officers, and I deemed it prudent to supervisepersonally the encamping of the men. This disposition necessarilyrequired that some of the organizations should occupy verydisagreeable ground, but I soon got all satisfactorily posted withthe exception of General Willich, who expressed some discontent atbeing placed beyond the shelter of the timber, but accepted thesituation cheerfully when its obvious necessity was pointed out tohim. 

Feeling that all was secure, I returned to my headquarters in thevillage with the idea that we were safely established in ease ofattack, and that the men would now have a good rest if leftundisturbed; and plenty to eat, but hardly had I reached my own campwhen a staff-officer came post-haste from Sturgis with theinformation that he was being driven back to my lines, despite theconfident invitation to me (in the morning) to go out and witness thewhipping which was to be given to the enemy's cavalry. Riding to thefront, I readily perceived that the information was correct, and Ihad to send a brigade of infantry out to help Sturgis, thus relievinghim from a rather serious predicament. Indeed, the enemy was presentin pretty strong force, both cavalry and infantry, and from hisvicious attack on Sturgis it looked very much as though he intendedto bring on a general engagement. 

Under such circumstances I deemed it advisable that the responsiblecommanders of the army should be present, and so informed them. Mycommunication brought Parke and Granger to the front without delay, but Foster could not come, since the hardships of the winter hadreopened an old wound received during the Mexican War, and brought onmuch suffering. By the time Parke and Granger arrived, however, theenemy, who it turned out was only making a strong demonstration tolearn the object of our movement on Dandridge, seemed satisfied withthe results of his reconnoissance, and began falling back towardBull's Gap. Meanwhile Parke and Granger concluded that Dandridge wasan untenable point, and hence decided to withdraw a part of the armyto Strawberry Plains; and the question of supplies again coming up, it was determined to send the Fourth Corps to the south side of theFrench Broad to obtain subsistence, provided we could bridge theriver so that men could get across the deep and icy stream withoutsuffering. 

I agreed to undertake the construction of a bridge on condition thateach division should send to the ford twenty-five wagons with whichto make it. This being acceded to, Harker's brigade began the worknext morning at a favorable point a few miles down the river. As myquota of wagons arrived, they were drawn into the stream one afteranother by the wheel team, six men in each wagon, and as theysuccessively reached the other side of the channel the mules wereunhitched, the pole of each wagon run under the hind axle of the onejust in front, and the tailboards used so as to span the slight spacebetween them. The plan worked well as long as the material lasted, but no other wagons than my twenty-five coming on the ground, thework stopped when the bridge was only half constructed. Informed ofthe delay and its cause, in sheer desperation I finished the bridgeby taking from my own division all the wagons needed to make up thedeficiency. 

It was late in the afternoon when the work was finished, and I beganputting over one of my brigades; but in the midst of its crossingword came that Longstreet's army was moving to attack us, whichcaused an abandonment of the foraging project, and orders quicklyfollowed to retire to Strawberry Plains, the retrograde movement tobegin forthwith. I sent to headquarters information of the plight Iwas in--baggage and supplies on the bank and wagons in the stream--begged to know what was to become of them if we were to hurry off ata moment's notice, and suggested that the movement be delayed until Icould recover my transportation. Receiving in reply no assurancesthat I should be relieved from my dilemma--and, in fact, nothingsatisfactory--I determined to take upon myself the responsibility ofremaining on the ground long enough to get my wagons out of the river;so I sent out a heavy force to watch for the enemy, and with theremainder of the command went to work to break up the bridge. Beforedaylight next morning I had recovered everything without interferenceby Longstreet, who, it was afterward ascertained, was preparing tomove east toward Lynchburg instead of marching to attack us; the smalldemonstration against Dandridge, being made simply to deceive us as tohis ultimate object. I marched to Strawberry Plains unmolested, andby taking the route over Bay's Mountain, a shorter one than thatfollowed by the main body of our troops, reached the point ofrendezvous as soon as the most of the army, for the road it followedwas not only longer, but badly cut up by trains that had recentlypassed over it. 

Shortly after getting into camp, the beef contractor came in andreported that a detachment of the enemy's cavalry had captured myherd of beef cattle. This caused me much chagrin at first, but thecommissary of my division soon put in an appearance, and assured methat the loss would not be very disastrous to us nor of much benefitto the enemy, since the cattle were so poor and weak that they couldnot be driven off. A reconnoissance in force verified theCommissary's statement. From its inability to travel, the herd, after all efforts to carry it off had proved ineffectual, had beenabandoned by its captors. 

After the troops from Chattanooga arrived in the vicinity ofKnoxville and General Sherman had returned to Chattanooga, theoperations in East Tennessee constituted a series of blunders, lasting through the entire winter; a state of affairs doubtless due, in the main, to the fact that the command of the troops was sofrequently changed. Constant shifting of responsibility from one toanother ensued from the date that General Sherman, after assuringhimself that Knoxville was safe, devolved the command on Burnside. It had already been intimated to Burnside that he was to be relieved, and in consequence he was inactive and apathetic, confining hisoperations to an aimless expedition whose advance extended only asfar as Blain's crossroads, whence it was soon withdrawn. MeanwhileGeneral Foster had superseded Burnside, but physical disabilitiesrendered him incapable of remaining in the field, and then the chiefauthority devolved on Parke. By this time the transmission of powerseemed almost a disease; at any rate it was catching, so, while wewere en route to Dandridge, Parke transferred the command to Granger. The latter next unloaded it on me, and there is no telling what thefinal outcome would have been had I not entered a protest against afurther continuance of the practice, which remonstrance broughtGranger to the front at Dandridge. 

While the events just narrated were taking place, General Grant hadmade a visit to Knoxville--about the last of December--and arrangedto open the railroad between there and Chattanooga, with a view tosupplying the troops in East Tennessee by rail in the future, insteadof through Cumberland Gap by a tedious line of wagon-trains. Inpursuance of his plan the railroad had already been opened to Loudon, but here much delay occurred on account of the long time it took torebuild the bridge over the Tennessee. Therefore supplies were stillvery scarce, and as our animals were now dying in numbers fromstarvation, and the men were still on short allowance, it becamenecessary that some of the troops east of Knoxville should get nearerto their depot, and also be in a position to take part in the comingGeorgia campaign, or render assistance to General Thomas, shouldGeneral Johnston (who had succeeded in command of the Confederatearmy) make any demonstration against Chattanooga. Hence my divisionwas ordered to take station at Loudon, Tennessee, and I must confessthat we took the road for that point with few regrets, for a generaldisgust prevailed regarding our useless marches during the winter. 

At this time my faithful scout Card and his younger brother left me, with the determination, as I have heretofore related, to avenge theirbrother's death. No persuasion could induce Card to remain longer, for knowing that my division's next operation would be towardAtlanta, and being ignorant of the country below Dalton, herecognized and insisted that his services would then becomepractically valueless. 

At Loudon, where we arrived January 27, supplies were more plentiful, and as our tents and extra clothing reached us there in a few days, every one grew contented and happy. Here a number of my regiments, whose terms of service were about to expire, went through the processof "veteranizing, " and, notwithstanding the trials and hardships ofthe preceding nine months, they re-enlisted almost to a man. 

When everything was set in motion toward recuperating and refittingmy troops, I availed myself of the opportunity during a lull thatthen existed to take a short leave of absence--a privilege I had notindulged in since entering the service in 1853. This leave I spentin the North with much benefit to my physical condition, for I wasmuch run down by fatiguing service, and not a little troubled byintense pain which I at times still suffered from my experience inthe unfortunate hand-car incident on the Cumberland Mountains theprevious July. I returned from leave the latter part of March, rejoining my division with the expectation that the campaign in thatsection would begin as early as April. 

On the 12th of March, 1864, General Grant was assigned to the commandof the armies of the United States, as general-in-chief. He wasalready in Washington, whither he had gone to receive his commissionas lieutenant-general. Shortly after his arrival there, he commencedto rearrange the different commands in the army to suit the planswhich he intended to enter upon in the spring, and out of this grew achange in my career. Many jealousies and much ill-feeling, theoutgrowth of former campaigns, existed among officers of high gradein the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1864, and several generalofficers were to be sent elsewhere in consequence. Among these, General Alfred Pleasonton was to be relieved from the command of thecavalry, General Grant having expressed to the Presidentdissatisfaction that so little had hitherto been accomplished by thatarm of the service, and I was selected as chief of the cavalry corpsof the Army of the Potomac, receiving on the night of the 23d ofMarch from General Thomas at Chattanooga the following telegram:

"MARCH 23, 1864. "MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS, Chattanooga

"Lieutenant-General Grant directs that Major-General Sheridanimmediately repair to Washington and report to the Adjutant-Generalof the Army. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

I was not informed of the purpose for which I was to proceed toWashington, but I conjectured that it meant a severing of myrelations with the Second Division, Fourth Army Corps. I at once setabout obeying the order, and as but little preparation was necessary, I started for Chattanooga the next day, without taking any formalleave of the troops I had so long commanded. I could not do it; thebond existing between them and me had grown to such depth ofattachment that I feared to trust my emotions in any formal partingfrom a body of soldiers who, from our mutual devotion, had longbefore lost their official designation, and by general consent withinand without the command were called "Sheridan's Division. " When Itook the train at the station the whole command was collected on thehill-sides around to see me off. They had assembled spontaneously, officers and men, and as the cars moved out for Chattanooga theywaved me farewell with demonstrations of affection. 

A parting from such friends was indeed to be regretted. They hadnever given me any trouble, nor done anything that could bring aughtbut honor to themselves. I had confidence in them, and I believethey had in me. They were ever steady, whether in victory or inmisfortune, and as I tried always to be with them, to put them intothe hottest fire if good could be gained, or save them fromunnecessary loss, as occasion required, they amply repaid all my careand anxiety, courageously and readily meeting all demands in everyemergency that arose. 

In Kentucky, nearly two years before, my lot had been cast with abouthalf of the twenty-five regiments of infantry that I was justleaving, the rest joining me after Chickamauga. It was practically anew arm of the service to me, for although I was an infantry officer, yet the only large command which up to that time I had controlled wascomposed of cavalry, and most of my experience had been gained inthis arm of the service. I had to study hard to be able to masterall the needs of such a force, to feed and clothe it and guard allits interests. When undertaking these responsibilities I felt thatif I met them faithfully, recompense would surely come through thehearty response that soldiers always make to conscientious exertionon the part of their superiors, and not only that more could begained in that way than from the use of any species of influence, butthat the reward would be quicker. Therefore I always tried to lookafter their comfort personally; selected their camps, and providedabundantly for their subsistence, and the road they opened for meshows that my work was not in vain. I regretted deeply to have toleave such soldiers, and felt that they were sorry I was going, andeven now I could not, if I would, retain other than the warmestsentiments of esteem and the tenderest affection for the officers andmen of "Sheridan's Division, " Army of the Cumberland. 

On reaching Chattanooga I learned from General Thomas the purpose forwhich I had been ordered to Washington. I was to be assigned to thecommand of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac. Theinformation staggered me at first, for I knew well the greatresponsibilities of such a position; moreover, I was but slightlyacquainted with military operations in Virginia, and then, too, thehigher officers of the Army of the Potomac were little known to me, so at the moment I felt loth to undergo the trials of the newposition. Indeed, I knew not a soul in Washington except GeneralGrant and General Halleck, and them but slightly, and no one inGeneral Meade's army, from the commanding general down, except a fewofficers in the lower grades, hardly any of whom I had seen sincegraduating at the Military Academy. 

Thus it is not much to be wondered at that General Thomas'scommunication momentarily upset me. But there was no help for it, soafter reflecting on the matter a little I concluded to make the bestof the situation. As in Virginia I should be operating in a fieldwith which I was wholly unfamiliar, and among so many who werestrangers, it seemed to me that it would be advisable to have, as achief staff-officer, one who had had service in the East, if anavailable man could be found. In weighing all these considerationsin my mind, I fixed upon Captain James W. Forsyth, of the EighteenthInfantry, then in the regular brigade at Chattanooga--a dear friendof mine, who had served in the Army of the Potomac, in the Peninsulaand Antietam campaigns. He at once expressed a desire to accept aposition on my staff, and having obtained by the next day thenecessary authority, he and I started for Washington, accompanied byLieutenant T. W. C. Moore, one of my aides, leaving behind LieutenantM. V. Sheridan, my other aide, to forward our horses as soon as theyshould be sent down to Chattanooga from Loudon, after which he was tojoin me. 

CHAPTER XVIII. 

AT WASHINGTON--MEETING SECRETARY STANTON--INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENTLINCOLN--MADE COMMANDER OF THE CAVALRY CORPS OF THE ARMY OF THEPOTOMAC--ITS OFFICERS--GENERAL MEADE's METHOD OF USING CAVALRY--OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN--SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H. --A DIFFERENCE WITHGENERAL MEADE--PREPARING TO FIGHT STUART'S CAVALRY. 

Accompanied by Captain Forsyth and Lieutenant Moore, I arrived inWashington on the morning of April, 4, 1864, and stopped at Willard'sHotel, where, staying temporarily, were many officers of the Army ofthe Potomac en route to their commands from leave at the North. Among all these, however, I was an entire stranger, and I cannot nowrecall that I met a single individual whom I had ever before known. 

With very little delay after reaching my hotel I made my way toGeneral Halleck's headquarters and reported to that officer, havinglearned in the meantime that General Grant was absent from the city. General Halleck talked to me for a few minutes, outlining briefly thenature and duties of my new command, and the general militarysituation in Virginia. When he had finished all he had to say aboutthese matters, he took me to the office of the Secretary of War, topresent me to Mr. Stanton. During the ceremony of introduction, Icould feel that Mr. Stanton was eying me closely and searchingly, endeavoring to form some estimate of one about whom he knewabsolutely nothing, and whose career probably had never been calledto his attention until General Grant decided to order me East, aftermy name had been suggested by General Halleck in an interview the twogenerals had with Mr. Lincoln. I was rather young in appearance--looking even under than over thirty-three years--but five feet fiveinches in height, and thin almost to emaciation, weighing only onehundred and fifteen pounds. If I had ever possessed anyself-assertion in manner or speech, it certainly vanished in thepresence of the imperious Secretary, whose name at the time was thesynonym of all that was cold and formal. I never learned what Mr. Stanton's first impressions of me were, and his guarded and rathercalculating manner gave at this time no intimation that they wereeither favorable or unfavorable, but his frequent commendation inafter years indicated that I gained his goodwill before the close ofthe war, if not when I first came to his notice; and a more intimateassociation convinced me that the cold and cruel characteristicspopularly ascribed to him were more mythical than real. 

When the interview with the Secretary was over, I proceeded withGeneral Halleck to the White House to pay my respects to thePresident. Mr. Lincoln received me very cordially, offering both hishands, and saying that he hoped I would fulfill the expectations ofGeneral Grant in the new command I was about to undertake, addingthat thus far the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac had not done allit might have done, and wound up our short conversation by quotingthat stale interrogation so prevalent during the early years of thewar, "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" His manner did not impressme, however, that in asking the question he had meant anything beyonda jest, and I parted from the President convinced that he did notbelieve all that the query implied. 

After taking leave I separated from General Halleck, and on returningto my hotel found there an order from the War Department assigning meto the command of the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac. The nextmorning, April 5, as I took the cars for the headquarters of the Armyof the Potomac, General Grant, who had returned to Washington theprevious night from a visit to his family, came aboard the train onhis way to Culpeper Court House, and on the journey down I learnedamong other things that he had wisely determined to continuepersonally in the field, associating himself with General Meade'sarmy; where he could supervise its movements directly, and at thesame time escape the annoyances which, should he remain inWashington, would surely arise from solicitude for the safety of theCapital while the campaign was in progress. When we reached BrandyStation, I left the train and reported to General Meade, who told methat the headquarters of the Cavalry Corps were some distance backfrom the Station, and indicated the general locations of thedifferent divisions of the corps, also giving me, in the short time Iremained with him, much information regarding their composition. 

I reached the Cavalry Corps headquarters on the evening of April 5, 1864, and the next morning issued orders assuming command. GeneralPleasonton had but recently been relieved, and many of hisstaff-officers were still on duty at the headquarters awaiting thearrival of the permanent commander. I resolved to retain the most ofthese officers on my staff, and although they were all unknown to mewhen I decided on this course, yet I never had reason to regret it, nor to question the selections made by my predecessor. 

The corps consisted of three cavalry divisions and twelve batteriesof horse artillery. Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert was incommand of the First Division, which was composed of three brigades;Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg, of the Second, consisting of twobrigades; and Brigadier-General J. H. Wilson was afterward assignedto command the Third, also comprising two brigades: Captain Robinson, a veteran soldier of the Mexican war, was chief of artillery, and assuch had a general supervision of that arm, though the batteries, either as units or in sections, were assigned to the differentdivisions in campaign. 

Each one of my division commanders was a soldier by profession. Torbert graduated from the Military Academy in 1855, and wascommissioned in the infantry, in which arm he saw much service on thefrontier, in Florida, and on the Utah expedition. At the beginningof hostilities in April, 1861, he was made a colonel of New Jerseyvolunteers, and from that position was promoted in the fall of 1862to be a brigadier-general, thereafter commanding a brigade ofinfantry in the Army of the Potomac till, in the redistribution ofgenerals, after Grant came to the East, he was assigned to the FirstCavalry Division. 

Gregg graduated in 1855 also, and was appointed to the FirstDragoons, with which regiment, up to the breaking out of the war, hesaw frontier service extending from Fort Union, New Mexico, throughto the Pacific coast, and up into Oregon and Washington Territories, where I knew him slightly. In the fall of 1861 he became colonel ofthe Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and a year later was made abrigadier-general. He then succeeded to the command of a division ofcavalry, and continued in that position till the close of hisservice, at times temporarily commanding the Cavalry Corps. He wasthe only division commander I had whose experience had been almostexclusively derived from the cavalry arm. 

Wilson graduated in 1860 in the Topographical Engineers, and wasfirst assigned to duty in Oregon, where he remained till July, 1861. In the fall of that year his active service in the war began, and herose from one position to another, in the East and West, till, whileon General Grant's staff, he was made a brigadier-general in the fallof 1863 in reward for services performed during the Vicksburgcampaign and for engineer duty at Chattanooga preceding the battle ofMissionary Ridge. At my request he was selected to command the ThirdDivision. General Grant thought highly of him, and, expecting muchfrom his active mental and physical ability, readily assented toassign him in place of General Kilpatrick. The only other generalofficers in the corps were Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt, Brigadier-General George A. Custer, and Brigadier-General Henry E. Davies, each commanding a brigade. 

In a few days after my arrival at Brandy Station I reviewed my newcommand, which consisted of about twelve thousand officers and men, with the same number of horses in passable trim. Many of the generalofficers of the army were present at the review, among them GeneralsMeade, Hancock, and Sedgwick. Sedgwick being an old dragoon, came torenew his former associations with mounted troops, and to encourageme, as he jestingly said, because of the traditional prejudices thecavalrymen were supposed to hold against being commanded by aninfantry officer. The corps presented a fine appearance at thereview, and so far as the health and equipment of the men wereconcerned the showing was good and satisfactory; but the horses werethin and very much worn down by excessive and, it seemed to me, unnecessary picket duty, for the cavalry picket-line almostcompletely encircled the infantry and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, on a continuous line, of nearly sixty miles, with hardly a mounted Confederate confronting it at any point. Fromthe very beginning of the war the enemy had shown more wisdomrespecting his cavalry than we. Instead of wasting its strength by apolicy of disintegration he, at an early day, had organized hismounted force into compact masses, and plainly made it a favorite;and, as usual, he was now husbanding the strength of his horses bykeeping them to the rear, so that in the spring he could bring themout in good condition for the impending campaign. 

Before and at the review I took in this situation, and determined toremedy it if possible; so in due time I sought an interview withGeneral Meade and informed him that, as the effectiveness of mycommand rested mainly on the strength of its horses, I thought theduty it was then performing was both burdensome and wasteful. I alsogave him my idea as to what the cavalry should do, the main purportof which was that it ought to be kept concentrated to fight theenemy's cavalry. Heretofore, the commander of the Cavalry Corps hadbeen, virtually, but an adjunct at army headquarters--a sort of chiefof cavalry--and my proposition seemed to stagger General Meade not alittle. I knew that it would be difficult to overcome the recognizedcustom of using the cavalry for the protection of trains and theestablishment of cordons around the infantry corps, and so farsubordinating its operations to the movements of the main army thatin name only was it a corps at all, but still I thought it my duty totry. 

At first General Meade would hardly listen to my proposition, for hewas filled with the prejudices that, from the beginning of the war, had pervaded the army regarding the importance and usefulness ofcavalry, General Scott then predicting that the contest would besettled by artillery, and thereafter refusing the services ofregiment after regiment of mounted troops. General Meade deemedcavalry fit for little more than guard and picket duty, and wanted toknow what would protect the transportation trains and artilleryreserve, cover the front of moving infantry columns, and secure hisflanks from intrusion, if my policy were pursued. I told him that ifhe would let me use the cavalry as I contemplated, he need havelittle solicitude in these respects, for, with a mass of ten thousandmounted men, it was my belief that I could make it so lively for theenemy's cavalry that, so far as attacks from it were concerned, theflanks and rear of the Army of the Potomac would require little or nodefense, and claimed, further, that moving columns of infantry shouldtake care of their own fronts. I also told him that it was my objectto defeat the enemy's cavalry in a general combat, if possible, andby such a result establish a feeling of confidence in my own troopsthat would enable us after awhile to march where we pleased, for thepurpose of breaking General Lee's communications and destroying theresources from which his army was supplied. 

The idea as here outlined was contrary to Meade's convictions, forthough at different times since he commanded the Army of the Potomacconsiderable bodies of the cavalry had been massed for some specialoccasion, yet he had never agreed to the plan as a permanency, andcould not be bent to it now. He gave little encouragement, therefore, to what I proposed, yet the conversation was immediatelybeneficial in one way, for when I laid before him the true conditionof the cavalry, he promptly relieved it from much of the arduous andharassing picket service it was performing, thus giving me about twoweeks in which to nurse the horses before the campaign opened. 

The interview also disclosed the fact that the cavalry commandershould be, according to General Meade's views, at his headquarterspractically as one of his staff, through whom he would give detaileddirections as, in his judgment, occasion required. Meade's ideas andmine being so widely divergent, disagreements arose between us laterduring the battles of the Wilderness, which lack of concord ended insome concessions on his part after the movement toward SpottsylvaniaCourt House began, and although I doubt that his convictions wereever wholly changed, yet from that date on, in the organization ofthe Army of the Potomac, the cavalry corps became more of a compactbody, with the same privileges and responsibilities that attached tothe other corps--conditions that never actually existed before. 

On the 4th of May the Army of the Potomac moved against Lee, who wasoccupying a defensive position on the south bank of the Rapidan. After detailing the various detachments which I was obliged to supplyfor escorts and other mounted duty, I crossed the river with aneffective force of about 10, 000 troopers. In the interval succeedingmy assignment to the command of the cavalry, I had taken the pains tostudy carefully the topography of the country in eastern Virginia, and felt convinced that, under the policy Meade intended I shouldfollow, there would be little opportunity for mounted troops toacquit themselves well in a region so thickly wooded, and traversedby so many almost parallel streams; but conscious that he would becompelled sooner or later either to change his mind or partially giveway to the pressure of events, I entered on the campaign with theloyal determination to aid zealously in all its plans. 

General Lee's army was located in its winter quarters behindintrenchments that lay along the Rapidan for a distance of abouttwenty miles; extending from Barnett's to Morton's ford. The fordsbelow Morton's were watched by a few small detachments of Confederatecavalry, the main body of which, however, was encamped belowHamilton's crossing, where it could draw supplies from the richcountry along the Rappahannock. Only a few brigades of Lee'sinfantry guarded the works along the river, the bulk of it being sosituated that it could be thrown to either flank toward which theUnion troops approached. 

General Grant adopted the plan of moving by his left flank, with thepurpose of compelling Lee to come out from behind his intrenchmentsalong Mine Run and fight on equal terms. Grant knew well thecharacter of country through which he would have to pass, but he wasconfident that the difficulties of operation in the thickly woodedregion of the Wilderness would be counterbalanced by the facilitywith which his position would enable him to secure a new base; and bythe fact that as he would thus cover Washington, there would belittle or no necessity for the authorities there to detach from hisforce at some inopportune moment for the protection of that city. 

In the move forward two divisions of my cavalry took the advance, Gregg crossing the Rapidan at Ely's ford and Wilson at Germania ford. Torbert's division remained in the rear to cover the trains andreserve artillery, holding from Rapidan Station to Culpeper, andthence through Stevensburg to the Rappahannock River. Gregg crossedthe Rapidan before daylight, in advance of the Second Corps, and whenthe latter reached Ely's ford, he pushed on to Chancellorsville;Wilson preceded the Fifth Corps to Germania ford, and when it reachedthe river he made the crossing and moved rapidly by WildernessTavern, as far as Parker's Store, from which point he sent a heavyreconnoissance toward Mine Run, the rest of his division bivouackingin a strong position. I myself proceeded to Chancellorsville andfixed my headquarters at that place, whereon the 5th I was joined byTorbert's division. 

Meanwhile, General Meade had crossed the Rapidan and established hisheadquarters not far from Germania ford. From that point he was indirect communication with Wilson, whose original instructions from mecarried him only as far as Parker's Store, but it being found, duringthe night of the 4th, that the enemy was apparently unacquainted withthe occurrences of the day, Meade directed Wilson to advance in thedirection of Craig's Meeting House; leaving one regiment to holdParker's Store. Wilson with the second brigade encountered Rosser'sbrigade of cavalry just beyond the Meeting House, and drove it backrapidly a distance of about two miles, holding it there till noon, while his first brigade was halted on the north side of Robinson'sRun near the junction of the Catharpen and Parker's Store roads. 

Up to this time Wilson had heard nothing of the approach of the FifthCorps, and the situation becoming threatening, he withdrew the secondbrigade to the position occupied by the first, but scarcely had hedone so when he learned that at an early hour in the forenoon theenemy's infantry had appeared in his rear at Parker's Store and cutoff his communication with General Meade. Surprised at this, hedetermined to withdraw to Todd's Tavern, but before his resolutioncould be put into execution the Confederates attacked him with aheavy force, and at the same time began pushing troops down theCatharpen road. Wilson was now in a perplexing situation, sandwichedbetween the Confederates who had cut him off in the rear at Parker'sstore and those occupying the Catharpen road, but he extricated hiscommand by passing it around the latter force, and reached Todd'sTavern by crossing the Po River at Corbin's bridge. General Meadediscovering that the enemy had interposed at Parker's store betweenWilson and the Fifth Corps, sent me word to go to Wilson's relief, and this was the first intimation I received that Wilson had beenpushed out so far, but, surmising that he would retire in thedirection of Todd's Tavern I immediately despatched Gregg's divisionthere to his relief. Just beyond Todd's Tavern Gregg met Wilson, whowas now being followed by the enemy's cavalry. The pursuing forcewas soon checked, and then driven back to Shady Grove Church, whileWilson's troops fell in behind Gregg's line, somewhat the worse fortheir morning's adventure. 

When the Army of the Potomac commenced crossing the Rapidan on the4th, General J. E. B. Stuart, commanding the Confederate cavalry, began concentrating his command on the right of Lee's infantry, bringing it from Hamilton's crossing and other points where it hadbeen wintering. Stuart's force at this date was a little more thaneight thousand men, organized in two divisions, commanded by GeneralsWade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee. Hampton's division was composed ofthree brigades, commanded by Generals Cordon, Young, and Rosser;Fitzhugh Lee's division comprised three brigades also, Generals W. H. F. Lee, Lomax, and Wickham commanding them. 

Information of this concentration, and of the additional fact thatthe enemy's cavalry about Hamilton's crossing was all being drawn in, reached me on the 5th, which obviated all necessity for my moving onthat point as I intended at the onset of the campaign. Theresponsibility for the safety of our trains and of the left flank ofthe army still continued, however, so I made such dispositions of mytroops as to secure these objects by holding the line of the Brockroad beyond the Furnaces, and thence around to Todd's Tavern andPiney Branch Church. On the 6th, through some false information, General Meade became alarmed about his left flank, and sent me thefollowing note:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "May 6, 1864. --1 o'clock P. M. "MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Commanding Cavalry Corps

"Your despatch of 11. 45 a. M. , received. General Hancock has beenheavily pressed, and his left turned. The major-general commandingthinks that you had better draw in your cavalry, so as to secure theprotection of the trains. The order requiring an escort for thewagons to-night has been rescinded. 

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

On the morning of the 6th Custer's and Devin's brigades had beenseverely engaged at the Furnaces before I received the above note. They had been most successful in repulsing the enemy's attacks, however, and I felt that the line taken up could be held; but thedespatch from General Humphreys was alarming, so I drew all thecavalry close in toward Chancellorsville. It was found later thatHancock's left had not been turned, and the points thus abandoned hadto be regained at a heavy cost in killed and wounded, to both thecavalry and the infantry. 

On the 7th of May, under directions from headquarters, Army of thePotomac, the trains were put in motion to go into park at PineyBranch Church, in anticipation of the movement that was about to bemade for the possession of Spottsylvania Court House. I feltconfident that the order to move the trains there had been givenwithout a full understanding of the situation, for Piney BranchChurch was now held by the enemy, a condition which had resulted fromthe order withdrawing the cavalry on account of the supposed disasterto Hancock's left the day before; but I thought the best way toremedy matters was to hold the trains in the vicinity of Aldrich'still the ground on which it was intended to park them should beregained. 

This led to the battle of Todd's Tavern, a spirited fight for thepossession of the crossroads at that point, participated in by theenemy's cavalry and Gregg's division, and two brigades of Torbert'sdivision, the latter commanded by Merritt, as Torbert became very illon the 6th, and had to be sent to the rear. To gain the objectivepoint--the crossroads--I directed Gregg to assail the enemy on theCatharpen road with Irvin Gregg's brigade and drive him over Corbin'sbridge, while Merritt attacked him with the Reserve brigade on theSpottsylvania road in conjunction with Davies's brigade of Gregg'sdivision, which was to be put in on the Piney Branch Church road, andunite with Merritt's left. Davies's and Irvin Gregg's brigades on myright and left flanks met with some resistance, yet not enough todeter them from, executing their orders. In front of Merritt theenemy held on more stubbornly, however, and there ensued anexceedingly severe and, at times, fluctuating fight. Finally theConfederates gave way, and we pursued them almost to SpottsylvaniaCourt House; but deeming it prudent to recall the pursuers aboutdark, I encamped Gregg's and Merritt's divisions in the open fieldsto the east of Todd's Tavern. 

During the preceding three days the infantry corps of the army hadbeen engaged in the various conflicts known as the battles of theWilderness. The success of the Union troops in those battles had notbeen all that was desired, and General Grant now felt that it wasnecessary to throw himself on Lee's communications if possible, whilepreserving his own intact by prolonging the movement to the left. Therefore, on the evening of the 7th he determined to shift his wholearmy toward Spottsylvania Court House, and initiated the movement bya night march of the infantry to Todd's Tavern. In view of what wascontemplated, I gave orders to Gregg and Merritt to move at daylighton the morning of the 8th, for the purpose of gaining possession ofSnell's bridge over the Po River, the former by the crossing atCorbin's bridge and the latter by the Block House. I also directedWilson, who was at Alsop's house, to take possession of Spottsylvaniaas early as possible on the morning of the 8th, and then move intoposition at Snell's bridge conjointly with the other two divisions. Wilson's orders remained as I had issued them, so he movedaccordingly and got possession of Spottsylvania, driving the enemy'scavalry a mile beyond, as will be seen by the following despatch sentme at 9 A. M. Of the 8th:

"HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE, May 8, 1864 9 A. M. "LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FORSYTH, CHIEF-OF-STAFF, C. C. 

"Have run the enemy's cavalry a mile from Spottsylvania Court House;have charged them, and drove them through the village; am fightingnow with a considerable force, supposed to be Lee's division. Everything all right. 

"J. H. WILSON, "Brigadier-General Commanding. 

During the night of the 7th General Meade arrived at Todd's Tavernand modified the orders I had given Gregg and Merritt, directingGregg simply to hold Corbin's bridge, and Merritt to move out infront of the infantry column marching on the Spottsylvania road. Merritt proceeded to obey, but in advancing, our cavalry and infantrybecame intermingled in the darkness, and much confusion and delay wasthe consequence. I had not been duly advised of these changes inGregg's and Merritt's orders, and for a time I had fears for thesafety of Wilson, but, while he was preparing to move on to form hisjunction with Gregg and Merritt at Snell's bridge, the advance ofAnderson (who was now commanding Longstreet's corps) appeared on thescene and drove him from Spottsylvania. 

Had Gregg and Merritt been permitted to proceed as they wereoriginally instructed, it is doubtful whether the battles fought atSpottsylvania would have occurred, for these two divisions would haveencountered the enemy at the Pa River, and so delayed his march as toenable our infantry to reach Spottsylvania first, and thus force Leeto take up a line behind the Po. I had directed Wilson to move fromthe left by "the Gate" through Spottsylvania to Snell's bridge, whileGregg and Merritt were to advance to the same point by Shady Groveand the Block House. There was nothing to prevent at least a partialsuccess of these operations; that is to say, the concentration of thethree divisions in front of Snell's bridge, even if we could notactually have gained it. But both that important point and thebridge on the Block House road were utterly ignored, and Lee'sapproach to Spottsylvania left entirely unobstructed, while threedivisions of cavalry remained practically ineffective by reason ofdisjointed and irregular instructions. 

On the morning of the 8th, when I found that such orders had beengiven, I made some strong remonstrances against the course that hadbeen pursued, but it was then too late to carry out the combinationsI had projected the night before, so I proceeded to join Merritt onthe Spottsylvania road. On reaching Merritt I found General Warrenmaking complaint that the cavalry were obstructing his infantrycolumn, so I drew Merritt off the road, and the leading division ofthe Fifth Corps pushed up to the front. It got into line about 11o'clock, and advanced to take the village, but it did not go very farbefore it struck Anderson's corps, and was hurled back with heavyloss. This ended all endeavor to take Spottsylvania that day. 

A little before noon General Meade sent for me, and when I reachedhis headquarters I found that his peppery temper had got the betterof his good judgment, he showing a disposition to be unjust, layingblame here and there for the blunders that had been committed. Hewas particularly severe on the cavalry, saying, among other things, that it had impeded the march of the Fifth Corps by occupying theSpottsylvania road. I replied that if this were true, he himself hadordered it there without my knowledge. I also told him that he hadbroken up my combinations, exposed Wilson's division to disaster, andkept Gregg unnecessarily idle, and further, repelled his insinuationsby saying that such disjointed operations as he had been requiring ofthe cavalry for the last four days would render the corps inefficientand useless before long. Meade was very much irritated, and I wasnone the less so. One word brought on another, until, finally, Itold him that I could whip Stuart if he (Meade) would only let me, but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions withoutconsulting or even notifying me, he could henceforth command theCavalry Corps himself--that I would not give it another order. 

The acrimonious interview ended with this remark, and after I lefthim he went to General Grant's headquarters and repeated theconversation to him, mentioning that I had said that I could whipStuart. At this General Grant remarked: "Did he say so? Then let himgo out and do it. " This intimation was immediately acted upon byGeneral Meade, and a little later the following order came to me:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC"May 8th, 1864 1 P. M. 

"GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Commanding Cavalry Corps. 

"The major-general commanding directs you to immediately concentrateyour available mounted force, and with your ammunition trains andsuch supply trains as are filled (exclusive of ambulances) proceedagainst the enemy's cavalry, and when your supplies are exhausted, proceed via New Market and Green Bay to Haxall's Landing on the JamesRiver, there communicating with General Butler, procuring suppliesand return to this army. Your dismounted men will be left with thetrain here. 

"A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-staff. "

As soon as the above order was received I issued instructions for theconcentration of the three divisions of cavalry at Aldrich's toprepare for the contemplated expedition. Three days' rations for themen were distributed, and half rations of grain for one day weredoled out for the horses. I sent for Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson andcommunicated the order to them, saying at the same time, "We aregoing out to fight Stuart's cavalry in consequence of a suggestionfrom me; we will give him a fair, square fight; we are strong, and Iknow we can beat him, and in view of my recent representations toGeneral Meade I shall expect nothing but success. " I also indicatedto my division commanders the line of march I should take--moving inone column around the right flank of Lee's army to get in its rear--and stated at the same time that it was my intention to fight Stuartwherever he presented himself, and if possible go through to Haxall'sLanding; but that if Stuart should successfully interpose between usand that point we would swing back to the Army of the Potomac bypassing around the enemy's left flank by way of Gordonsville. Atfirst the proposition seemed to surprise the division commanderssomewhat, for hitherto even the boldest, mounted expeditions had beenconfined to a hurried ride through the enemy's country, withoutpurpose of fighting more than enough to escape in case ofmolestation, and here and there to destroy a bridge. Our move wouldbe a challenge to Stuart for a cavalry duel behind Lee's lines, inhis own country, but the advantages which it was reasonable toanticipate from the plan being quickly perceived, each divisioncommander entered into its support unhesitatingly, and at once setabout preparing for the march next day. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

THE EXPEDITION STARTS--DESTROYING SUPPLIES--OPENING OF THE FIGHT ATYELLOW TAVERN--GENERAL CUSTER'S BRILLIANT CHARGE--DEATH OF GENERALSTUART--REMOVING TORPEDOES--EXCITEMENT IN RICHMOND--A NIGHT MARCH--ENTERPRISING NEWSBOYS--THE EFFECTS OF STUART'S DEFEAT AND DEATH--END OF THE FIRST EXPEDITION--ITS GREAT SUCCESS AND BENEFICIALRESULTS. 

The expedition which resulted in the battle of Yellow Tavern and thedeath of General Stuart started from the vicinity of Aldrich's towardFredericksburg early on the morning of May 9, 1864, marching on theplank-road, Merritt's division leading. When the column reachedTabernacle Church it headed almost due east to the telegraph road, and thence down that highway to Thornburg, and from that pointthrough Childsburg to Anderson's crossing of the North Anna River, itbeing my desire to put my command south of that stream if possible, where it could procure forage before it should be compelled to fight. The corps moved at a walk, three divisions on the same road, making acolumn nearly thirteen miles in length, and marched around the rightflank of the enemy unsuspected until my rear guard had passedMassaponax Church. Although the column was very long, I preferred tomove it all on one road rather than to attempt combinations forcarrying the divisions to any given point by different routes. Unless the separate commands in an expedition of this nature are veryprompt in movement, and each fully equal to overcoming at once anyobstacle it may meet, combinations rarely work out as expected;besides, an engagement was at all times imminent, hence it wasspecially necessary to keep the whole force well together. 

As soon as the Ny, Po, and Ta rivers were crossed, each of whichstreams would have afforded an excellent defensive line to the enemy, all anxiety as to our passing around Lee's army was removed, and ourability to cross the North Anna placed beyond doubt. MeanwhileGeneral Stuart had discovered what we were about, and he set hiscavalry in motion, sending General Fitzhugh Lee to follow and attackmy rear on the Childsburg road, Stuart himself marching by way ofDavenport's bridge, on the North Anna, toward Beaver Dam Station, near which place his whole command was directed to unite the nextday. 

My column having passed the Ta River, Stuart attacked its rear withconsiderable vigor, in the hope that he could delay my whole forcelong enough to permit him to get at least a part of his command in myfront; but this scheme was frustrated by Davies's brigade, which Idirected to fight as a rear-guard, holding on at one position andthen at another along the line of march just enough to deter theenemy from a too rapid advance. Davies performed this responsibleand trying duty with tact and good judgment, following the maincolumn steadily as it progressed to the south, and never oncepermitting Fitzhugh Lee's advance to encroach far enough to compel ahalt of my main body. About dark Merritt's division crossed theNorth Anna at Anderson's ford, while Gregg and Wilson encamped on thenorth side, having engaged the enemy, who still hung on my rear up toa late hour at night. 

After Merritt's division passed the river, Custer's brigade proceededon to Beaver Dam Station to cut the Virginia Central railroad. Before reaching the station he met a small force of the enemy, butthis he speedily drove off, recapturing from it about four hundredUnion prisoners, who had been taken recently in the Wilderness andwere being conducted to Richmond. Custer also destroyed the station, two locomotives, three trains of cars, ninety wagons, from eight toten miles of railroad and telegraph lines, some two hundred thousandpounds of bacon and other supplies, amounting in all to about amillion and a half of rations, and nearly all they medical stores ofGeneral Lee's army, which had been moved from Orange Court Houseeither because Lee wished to have them directly in his rear orbecause he contemplated falling back to the North Anna. 

On the morning of the 10th Gregg and Wilson, while crossing the NorthAnna, were again attacked, but were covered by the division on thesouth side of the stream; the passage was effected without much loss, notwithstanding the approach of Stuart on the south bank from thedirection of Davenport's bridge. The possession of Beaver Dam gaveus an important point, as it opened a way toward Richmond by theNegro-foot road. It also enabled us to obtain forage for ourwell-nigh famished animals, and to prepare for fighting the enemy, who, I felt sure, would endeavor to interpose between my column andRichmond. 

Stuart had hardly united his troops near Beaver Dam when he realizedthat concentrating there was a mistake, so he began makingdispositions for remedying his error, and while we leisurely took theNegro-foot toad toward Richmond, he changed his tactics and hauledoff from my rear, urging his horses to the death in order to get inbetween Richmond and my column. This he effected about 10 o'clock onthe morning of the 11th, concentrating at Yellow Tavern, six milesfrom the city, on the Brook turnpike. His change of tactics left mymarch on the 10th practically unmolested, and we quietly encampedthat night on the south bank of the South Anna, near Ground SquirrelBridge. Here we procured an abundance of forage, and as the distancetraveled that day had been only fifteen to eighteen miles, men andhorses were able to obtain a good rest during the night. 

At 2 o'clock in the morning, May 11, Davies's brigade of Gregg'sdivision marched for Ashland to cut the Fredericksburg railroad. Arriving there before the head of the enemy's column, which had topass through this same place to reach Yellow Tavern, Davies drove outa small force occupying the town, burnt a train of cars and alocomotive, destroyed the railroad for some distance, and rejoinedthe main column at Allen's Station on the Fredericksburg and Richmondrailroad. From Allen's Station the whole command moved on YellowTavern, Merritt in the lead, Wilson following, and Gregg in the rear. 

The appearance of Davies's brigade at Ashland in the morning had hadthe effect of further mystifying the enemy as to my intentions; andwhile he held it incumbent to place himself between me and Richmond, yet he was still so uncertain of my movements that he committed thesame fault that he did the first day, when he divided his force andsent a part to follow me on the Childsburg road. He now divided hiscommand again, sending a portion to hang upon my rear, while heproceeded with the rest to Yellow Tavern. This separation not onlymaterially weakened the force which might have been thrown across myline of march, but it also enabled me to attack with almost my entirecorps, while occupying the pursuers with a small rearguard. 

By forced marches General Stuart succeeded in reaching Yellow Tavernahead of me on May 11; and the presence of, his troops, on theAshland and Richmond road becoming known to Merritt as he wasapproaching the Brook turnpike, this general pressed forward at onceto the attack. Pushing his division to the front, he soon gotpossession of the turnpike and drove the enemy back several hundredyards to the east of it. This success had the effect of throwing thehead of my column to the east of the pike, and I quickly brought upWilson and one of Gregg's brigades to take advantage of the situationby forming a line of battle on that side or the road. Meanwhile theenemy, desperate but still confident, poured in a heavy fire from hisline and from a battery which enfiladed the Brook road, and madeYellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place. Gibbs's and Devin'sbrigades, however, held fast there, while Custer, supported byChapman's brigade, attacked the enemy's left and battery in a mountedcharge. 

Custer's charge, with Chapman on his flank and the rest of Wilson'sdivision sustaining him, was brilliantly executed. Beginning at awalk, he increased his gait to a trot, and then at full speed rushedat the enemy. At the same moment the dismounted troops along mywhole front moved forward, and as Custer went through the battery, capturing two of the guns with their cannoneers and breaking up theenemy's left, Gibbs and Devin drove his centre and right from thefield. Gregg meanwhile, with equal success, charged the force in hisrear-Gordon's brigadeand the engagement ended by giving us completecontrol of the road to Richmond. We captured a number of prisoners, and the casualties on both sides were quite severe, General Stuarthimself falling mortally wounded, and General James B. Gordon, one ofhis brigade commanders, being killed. 

After Custer's charge, the Confederate cavalry was badly broken up, the main portion of it being driven in a rout toward Ashland and asmall part in the direction of Richmond, which latter force finallyrejoined Fitzhugh Lee near Mechanicsville. A reconnoitring partybeing now sent up the Brook turnpike toward the city, dashed acrossthe South Fork of the Chickahominy, drove a small force from theenemy's exterior intrenchments and went within them. I followed thisparty, and after a little exploration found between the two lines ofworks a country road that led across to the pike which runs fromMechanicsville to Richmond. I thought we could go around within theouter line of works by this country road across to the Mechanicsvillepike on the south side of the Chickahominy, and encamp the next nightat Fair Oaks; so I determined to make the movement after dark, beinginfluenced in this to some extent by reports received during theafternoon from colored people, to the effect that General B. F. Butler's army had reached a small stream on the south side of theJames, about four miles south of Richmond. If I could succeed ingetting through by this road, not only would I have a shorter line ofmarch to Haxall's landing, but there was also a possibility that Icould help Butler somewhat by joining him so near Richmond. Therefore, after making the wounded as comfortable as possible, wecommenced the march about 11 o'clock on the night of the 11th, andmassed the command on the plateau south of the Meadow bridge neardaylight on the 12th. 

The enemy, anticipating that I would march by this route, had plantedtorpedoes along it, and many of these exploded as the column passedover them, killing several horses and wounding a few men, but beyondthis we met with no molestation. The torpedoes were loaded shellsplanted on each side of the road, and so connected by wires attachedto friction-tubes in the shells, that when a horse's hoof struck awire the shell was exploded by the jerk on the improvised lanyard. After the loss of several horses and the wounding of some of the menby these torpedoes, I gave directions to have them removed, ifpracticable, so about twenty-five of the prisoners were brought upand made to get down on their knees, feel for the wires in thedarkness, follow them up and unearth the shells. The prisonersreported the owner of one of the neighboring houses to be theprincipal person who had engaged in planting these shells, and Itherefore directed that some of them be carried and placed in thecellar of his house, arranged to explode if the enemy's column camethat way, while he and his family were brought off as prisoners andheld till after daylight. 

Meanwhile the most intense excitement prevailed in Richmond. TheConfederates, supposing that their capital was my objective point, were straining every effort to put it in a state of defense, and hadcollected between four and five thousand irregular troops, underGeneral Bragg, besides bringing up three brigades of infantry fromthe force confronting General Butler south of the James River, thealarm being intensified by the retreat, after the defeat at YellowTavern, of Stuart's cavalry, now under General Fitzhugh Lee, by wayof Ashland to Mechanicsville, on the north side of the Chickahominy, for falling back in that direction, left me between them andRichmond. 

Our march during the night of the 11th was very tedious, on accountof the extreme darkness and frequent showers of rain; but at daylighton the 12th the head of my column, under Wilson, reached theMechanicsville pike. Here Wilson, encountering the enemy's works andbatteries manned by General Bragg's troops, endeavored to pass. Inthis he failed, and as soon as I was notified that it wasimpracticable to reach Fair Oaks by passing between the works and theChickahominy, Custer's brigade was directed to make the crossing tothe north side of the Chickahominy, at the Meadow bridge. Custermoved rapidly for the bridge, but found it destroyed, and that theenemy's cavalry was posted on the north side, in front ofMechanicsville. When this information came back, I ordered Merrittto take his whole division and repair the bridge, instructing himthat the crossing must be made at all hazards; for, in view of animpending attack by the enemy's infantry in Richmond, it wasnecessary that I should have the bridge as a means of egress in caseof serious disaster. 

All the time that Merritt was occupied in this important duty, theenemy gave great annoyance to the working party by sweeping thebridge with a section of artillery and a fire from the supportingtroops, so a small force was thrown across to drive them away. When Merritt had passed two regiments over, they attacked, butwere repulsed. The work on the bridge continued, however, not-withstanding this discomfiture; and when it was finished, Merrittcrossed nearly all his division, dismounted, and again attacked theenemy, this time carrying the line, of temporary breastworks, builtwith logs and rails, and pursuing his broken troops toward Gaines'sMills. 

While Merritt was engaged in this affair, the Confederates advancedfrom behind their works at Richmond, and attacked Wilson and Gregg. Wilson's troops were driven back in some confusion at first; butGregg, in anticipation of attack, had hidden a heavy line ofdismounted men in a bushy ravine on his front, and when the enemymarched upon it, with much display and under the eye of the Presidentof the Confederacy, this concealed line opened a destructive firewith repeating carbines; and at the same time the batteries ofhorse-artillery, under Captain Robinson, joining in the contest, belched forth shot and shell with fatal effect. The galling firecaused the enemy to falter, and while still wavering Wilson ralliedhis men, and turning some of them against the right flank of theConfederates, broke their line, and compelled them to withdraw forsecurity behind the heavy works thrown up for the defense of the cityin 1862. 

By destroying the Meadow bridge and impeding my column on theMechanicsville, pike, the enemy thought to corner us completely, forhe still maintained the force in Gregg's rear that had pressed it theday before; but the repulse of his infantry ended all his hopes ofdoing us any serious damage on the limited ground between thedefenses of Richmond and the Chickahominy. He felt certain that onaccount of the recent heavy rains we could not cross the Chickahominyexcept by the Meadow bridge, and it also seemed clear to him that wecould not pass between the river and his intrenchments; therefore hehoped to ruin us, or at least compel us to return by the same routewe had taken in coming, in which case we would run into Gordon'sbrigade, but the signal repulse of Bragg's infantry dispelled theseillusions. 

Even had it not been our good fortune to defeat him, we could havecrossed the Chickahominy if necessary at several points that werediscovered by scouting parties which, while the engagement was goingon, I had sent out to look up fords. This means of getting out fromthe circumscribed plateau I did not wish to use, however, unlessthere was no alternative, for I wished to demonstrate to the CavalryCorps the impossibility of the enemy's destroying or capturing solarge a body of mounted troops. 

The chances of seriously injuring, us were more favorable to theenemy this time than ever they were afterward, for with the troopsfrom Richmond, comprising three brigades of veterans and about fivethousand irregulars on my front and right flank, with Gordon'scavalry in the rear, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry on my left flank, holding the Chickahominy and Meadow bridge, I was apparently hemmedin on every side, but relying on the celerity with which mountedtroops could be moved, I felt perfectly confident that the seeminglyperilous situation could be relieved under circumstances even worsethan those then surrounding us. Therefore, instead of endeavoring toget away without a fight, I concluded that there would be littledifficulty in withdrawing, even should I be beaten, and none whateverif I defeated the enemy. 

In accordance with this view I accepted battle; and the completerepulse of the enemy's infantry, which assailed us from hisintrenchments, and of Gordon's cavalry, which pressed Gregg on theBrook road, ended the contest in our favor. The rest of the day weremained on the battle-field undisturbed, and our time was spent incollecting the wounded, burying the dead, grazing the horses, andreading the Richmond journals, two small newsboys with commendableenterprise having come within our lines from the Confederate capitalto sell their papers. They were sharp youngsters, and having comewell supplied, they did a thrifty business. When their stock intrade was all disposed of they wished to return, but they were sointelligent and observant that I thought their mission involved otherpurposes than the mere sale of newspapers, so they were held till wecrossed the Chickahominy and then turned loose. 

After Merritt had crossed the Chickahominy and reachedMechanicsville, I sent him orders to push on to Gaines's Mills. Nearthe latter place he fell in with the enemy's cavalry again, andsending me word, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon I crossed theChickahominy with Wilson and Gregg, but when we overtook Merritt hehad already brushed the Confederates away, and my whole command wentinto camp between Walnut Grove and Gaines's Mills. 

The main purposes of the expedition had now been executed. They were"to break up General Lee's railroad communications, destroy suchdepots of supplies as could be found in his rear, and to defeatGeneral Stuart's cavalry. " Many miles of the Virginia Central and ofthe Richmond and Fredericksburg railroads were broken up, andseveral of the bridges on each burnt. At Beaver Dam, Ashland, andother places, about two millions of rations had been captured anddestroyed. The most important of all, however, was the defeat ofStuart. Since the beginning of the war this general haddistinguished himself by his management of the Confederate mountedforce. Under him the cavalry of Lee's army had been nurtured, andhad acquired such prestige that it thought itself well-nighinvincible; indeed, in the early years of the war it had proved to beso. This was now dispelled by the successful march we had made inLee's rear; and the discomfiture of Stuart at Yellow Tavern hadinflicted a blow from which entire recovery was impossible. 

In its effect on the Confederate cause the defeat of Stuart was mostdisheartening, but his death was even a greater calamity, as isevidenced by the words of a Confederate writer (Cooke), who says:"Stuart could be ill spared at this critical moment, and General Leewas plunged into the deepest melancholy at the intelligence of hisdeath. When it reached him he retired from those around him, andremained for some time communing with his own heart and memory. Whenone of his staff entered and spoke of Stuart, General Lee said: 'Ican scarcely think of him without weeping. '"

From the camp near Gaines's Mills I resumed the march to Haxall'sLanding, the point on the James River contemplated in my instructionswhere I was to obtain supplies from General Butler. We got to theJames on the 14th with all our wounded and a large number ofprisoners, and camped between Haxall's and Shirley. The prisoners, as well as the captured guns, were turned over to General Butler'sprovost-marshal, and our wounded were quickly and kindly cared for byhis surgeons. Ample supplies, also, in the way of forage andrations, were furnished us by General Butler, and the work ofrefitting for our return to the Army of the Potomac was vigorouslypushed. By the 17th all was ready, and having learned by scoutingparties sent in the direction of Richmond and as far as Newmarketthat the enemy's cavalry was returning to Lee's army I started thatevening on my return march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones'sbridge, and bivouacking on the 19th near Baltimore crossroads. 

My uncertainty of what had happened to the Army of the Potomac in ourabsence, and as to where I should find it, made our getting back aproblem somewhat difficult of solution, particularly as I knew thatreinforcements for Lee had come up from the south to Richmond, andthat most likely some of these troops were being held at differentpoints on the route to intercept my column. Therefore I determinedto pass the Pamunkey River at the White House, and sent to FortMonroe for a pontoon-bridge on which to make the crossing. Whilewaiting for the pontoons I ordered Custer to proceed with his brigadeto Hanover Station, to destroy the railroad bridge over the SouthAnna, a little beyond that place; at the same time I sent Gregg andWilson to Cold Harbor, to demonstrate in the direction of Richmond asfar as Mechanicsville, so as to cover Custer's movements. Merritt, with the remaining brigades of his division, holding fast atBaltimore crossroads to await events. 

After Gregg and Custer had gone, it was discovered that the railroadbridge over the Pamunkey, near the White House, had been destroyedbut partially--the cross-ties and stringers being burned in placesonly--and that it was practicable to repair it sufficiently to carryus over. In view of this information General Merritt's two brigadeswere at once put on the duty of reconstructing the bridge. Bysending mounted parties through the surrounding country, each man ofwhich would bring in a board or a plank, Merritt soon accumulatedenough lumber for the flooring, and in one day the bridge was madepracticable. On the 22d Gregg, Wilson, and Custer returned. Thelatter had gone on his expedition as far as Hanover Station, destroyed some commissary stores there, and burned two trestlebridges over Hanover Creek. This done, he deemed it prudent toretire to Hanovertown. The next morning he again marched to HanoverStation, and there ascertained that a strong force of the enemy, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, was posted at theSouth Anna bridges. These troops had gone there from Richmond enroute to reinforce Lee. In the face of this impediment Custer'smission could not be executed fully, so he returned to Baltimorecrossroads. 

The whole command was drawn in by noon of the 22d, and that day itcrossed the Pamunkey by Merritt's reconstructed bridge, marching toAyletts, on the Mattapony River, the same night. Here I learned fromcitizens, and from prisoners taken during the day by scouting partiessent toward Hanover Court House, that Lee had been, forced from hisposition near Spottsylvania Court House and compelled to retire tothe line of the North Anna. I then determined to rejoin the Army ofthe Potomac at the earliest moment, which I did by making forChesterfield Station, where I reported to General Meade on the 24thof May. 

Our return to Chesterfield ended the first independent expedition theCavalry Corps had undertaken since coming under my command, and oursuccess was commended highly by Generals Grant and Meade, bothrealizing that our operations in the rear of Lee had disconcerted andalarmed that general so much as to aid materially in forcing hisretrograde march, and both acknowledged that, by drawing off theenemy's cavalry during the past fortnight, we had enabled them tomove the Army of the Potomac and its enormous trains withoutmolestation in the manoeuvres that had carried it to the North Anna. Then, too, great quantities of provisions and munitions of war hadbeen destroyed--stores that the enemy had accumulated at sub-depotsfrom strained resources and by difficult means; the railroads thatconnected Lee with Richmond broken, the most successful cavalryleader of the South killed, and in addition to all this there hadbeen inflicted on the Confederate mounted troops the most thoroughdefeat that had yet befallen them in Virginia. 

When the expedition set out the Confederate authorities in Richmondwere impressed, and indeed convinced, that my designs contemplatedthe capture of that city, and notwithstanding the loss they sustainedin the defeat and death of Stuart, and their repulse the succeedingday, they drew much comfort from the fact that I had not enteredtheir capital. Some Confederate writers have continued to hold thistheory and conviction since the war. In this view they were and arein error. When Stuart was defeated the main purpose of myinstructions had been carried out, and my thoughts then turned tojoining General Butler to get supplies. I believed that I could dothis by cutting across to the Mechanicsville pike and Fair Oaks onthe south side of the Chickahominy, but the failure of Wilson'scolumn to get possession of the outwork which commanded the pikenecessitated my crossing at Meadow bridge, and then moving byMechanicsville and Gaines's Mills instead of by the shorter route. Moreover, my information regarding General Butler's position wasincorrect, so that even had I been successful in getting to Fair Oaksby the direct road I should still have gained nothing thereby, for Ishould still have been obliged to continue down the James River toHaxall's. 

CHAPTER XX. 

GENERAL WILSON'S ADVANCE TOWARD HANOVER COURT HOUSE--CROSSING THEPAMUNKEY--ENGAGEMENT OF HAWE'S SHOP--FIGHT AT MATADEQUIN CREEK--CAPTURE OF COLD HARBOR--THE FIGHT TO RETAIN THE PLACE--MOVEMENTSOF GENERAL WILSON. 

When I rejoined the Army of the Potomac, near Chesterfield Station, the heavy battles around Spottsylvania had been fought, and thecomplicated manoeuvres by which the whole Union force was swungacross the North Anna were in process of execution. In conjunctionwith these manoeuvres Wilson's division was sent to the right flankof the army, where he made a reconnoissance south of the North Annaas far as Little River, crossing the former stream near JerichoMills. Wilson was to operate from day to day on that flank as itswung to the south, covering to New Castle ferry each advance of theinfantry and the fords left behind on the march. From the 26th tothe 30th these duties kept Wilson constantly occupied, and alsonecessitated a considerable dispersion of his force, but by the 31sthe was enabled to get all his division together again, and crossingto the south side of the Pamunkey at New Castle ferry, he advancedtoward Hanover Court House. Near Dr Pride's house he encountered adivision of the enemy's cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee, and droveit back across Mechamp's Creek, thus opening communication with theright of our infantry resting near Phillips's Mills. Just as thishad been done, a little before dark, Wilson received an order fromGeneral Meade directing him to push on toward Richmond until heencountered the Confederates in such strength that he could no longersuccessfully contend against them, and in compliance with this orderoccupied Hanover Court House that same day. Resuming his march atdaylight on June 1, he went ahead on the Ashland road while sendingChapman's brigade up the south bank of the South Anna to destroy thebridges on that stream. Chapman having succeeded in this work, Wilson re-united his whole command and endeavored to hold Ashland, but finding the Confederate cavalry and infantry there in strongforce, he was obliged to withdraw to Dr. Price's house. Here helearned that the army had gone to the left toward Cold Harbor, so onthe 2d of June he moved to Hawe's Shop. 

While Wilson was operating thus on the right, I had to cover withGregg's and Torbert's divisions the crossing of the army over thePamunkey River at and near Hanovertown. Torbert having recoveredfrom the illness which overtook him in the Wilderness, had nowreturned to duty. The march to turn the enemy's right began on the26th. Torbert and Gregg in advance, to secure the crossings of thePamunkey and demonstrate in such manner as to deceive the enemy asmuch as possible in the movement, the two cavalry divisions beingsupported by General D. A. Russell's division of the Sixth Corps. 

To attain this end in the presence of an ever-watchful foe who hadjust recently been reinforced in considerable numbers from Richmondand further south--almost enough to make up the losses he hadsustained in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania--required the mostvigorous and zealous work on the part of those to whom had beenallotted the task of carrying out the initial manoeuvres. Torbertstarted for Taylor's ford on the Pamunkey with directions todemonstrate heavily at that point till after dark, as if the crossingwas to be made there, and having thus impressed the enemy, he was toleave a small guard, withdraw quietly, and march to Hanovertown ford, where the real crossing was to be effected. Meanwhile Gregg marchedto Littlepage's crossing of the Pamunkey, with instructions to makefeints in the same manner as Torbert until after dark, when he was toretire discreetly, leaving a small force to keep up thedemonstration, and then march rapidly to Hanovertown crossing, takingwith him the pontoon-bridge. 

At the proper hour Russell took up the march and followed thecavalry. The troops were in motion all night, undergoing the usualdelays incident to night marches, and, early on the morning of the27th the crossing was made, Custer's brigade of Torbert's divisiondriving from the ford about one hundred of the enemy's cavalry, andcapturing between thirty and forty prisoners. The remainder ofTorbert's division followed this brigade and advanced to Hanovertown, where General Gordon's brigade of Confederate cavalry was met. Torbert attacked this force with Devin's brigade, while he sentCuster to Hawe's Shop, from which point a road leading to the rightwas taken that brought him in rear of the enemy's cavalry; when theConfederates discovered this manoeuvre, they retired in the directionof Hanover Court House. Pursuit continued as far as a little streamcalled Crump's Creek, and here Torbert was halted, Gregg moving up onhis line meanwhile, and Russell encamping near the crossing of theriver. This completed our task of gaining a foothold south of thePamunkey, and on the 28th the main army crossed unharassed and tookup a position behind my line, extending south from the river, withthe Sixth Corps on the right across the Hanover Court House road atCrump's Creek, the Second Corps on the left of the Sixth, and theFifth Corps about two miles in front of Hanovertown, its leftextending to the Tolopotomy. 

There was now much uncertainty in General Grant's mind as to theenemy's whereabouts, and there were received daily the mostconflicting statements as to the nature of Lee's movements. Itbecame necessary, therefore, to find out by an actual demonstrationwhat Lee was doing, and I was required to reconnoitre in thedirection of Mechanicsville. For this purpose I moved Gregg'sdivision out toward this town by way of Hawe's Shop, and when it hadgone about three-fourths of a mile beyond the Shop the enemy'scavalry was discovered dismounted and disposed behind a temporarybreastwork of rails and logs. 

This was the first occasion on which, since the battle of YellowTavern, the Confederate troopers had confronted us in large numbers, their mounted operations, like ours, having been dependent more orless on the conditions that grew out of the movements in which Lee'sinfantry had been engaged since the 14th of May. 

On that date General Lee had foreshadowed his intention of using hiscavalry in connection with the manoeuvres of his infantry by issuingan order himself, now that Stuart was dead, directing that the "threedivisions of cavalry serving with the army [Lee's] will constituteseparate commands, and will report directly to and receive ordersfrom the headquarters of the army. " The order indicates that sinceStuart's death the Confederate cavalry had been re-organized intothree divisions, that were commanded respectively by General WadeHampton, General Fitzhugh Lee, and General W. H. F. Lee, theadditional division organization undoubtedly growing out of the fact, that General M. C. Butler's brigade of about four thousand men hadjoined recently from South Carolina. 

When this force developed in Gregg's front, he attacked the momenthis troops could be dismounted; and the contest became one ofexceeding stubborness, for he found confronting him Hampton's andFitzhugh Lee's divisions, supported by what we then supposed to be abrigade of infantry, but which, it has since been ascertained, wasButler's brigade of mounted troops; part of them armed withlong-range rifles. The contest between the opposing forces was ofthe severest character and continued till late in the evening. Thevarying phases of the fight prompted me to reinforce Gregg as much aspossible, so I directed Custer's brigade to report to him, sending, meanwhile, for the other two brigades of Torbert, but these were notavailable at the time--on account of delays which occurred inrelieving them from the line at Crump's Creek--and did not get uptill the fight was over. As soon as Custer joined him, Greggvigorously assaulted the Confederate position along his whole front;and notwithstanding the long-range rifles of the South Carolinians, who were engaging in their first severe combat it appears, and foughtmost desperately, he penetrated their barricades at several points. 

The most determined and obstinate efforts for success were now madeon both sides, as the position at Hawe's Shop had become of verygreat importance on account of the designs of both Lee and Grant. Lee wished to hold this ground while he manoeuvred his army to theline of the Tolopotomy, where he could cover the roads to Richmond, while Grant, though first sending me out merely to discover by astrong reconnoissance the movements of the enemy, saw the value ofthe place to cover his new base at the White House, and also to giveus possession of a direct road to Cold Harbor. Hawe's Shop remainedin our possession finally, for late in the evening Custer's brigadewas dismounted and formed in close column in rear of Gregg, and whileit assaulted through an opening near the centre of his line, theother two brigades advanced and carried the temporary works. Theenemy's dead and many of his wounded fell into our hands; also aconsiderable number of prisoners, from whom we learned thatLongstreet's and Ewell's corps were but four miles to the rear. 

The battle was a decidedly severe one, the loss on each side beingheavy in proportion to the number of troops engaged. This fight tookplace almost immediately in front of our infantry, which, during thelatter part of the contest, was busily occupied in throwing upintrenchments. Late in the afternoon I reported to General Meade thepresence of the enemy's infantry, and likewise that Hampton's andFitzhugh Lee's divisions were in my front also, and asked, at thesame time; that some of our infantry, which was near at hand, be sentto my assistance. I could not convince Meade that anything but theenemy's horse was fighting us, however, and he declined to push outthe foot-troops, who were much wearied by night marches. It has beenascertained since that Meade's conclusions were correct in so far asthey related to the enemy's infantry; but the five cavalry brigadesfar outnumbered my three, and it is to be regretted that so much wasrisked in holding a point that commanded the roads to Cold Harbor andMeadow bridge, when there was at hand a preponderating number ofUnion troops which might have been put into action. However, Gregg'sdivision and Custer's brigade were equal to the situation, allunaided as they were till dark, when Torbert and Merritt came on theground. The contest not only gave us the crossroads, but alsoremoved our uncertainty regarding Lee's movements, clearlydemonstrating that his army was retiring by its right flank, so thatit might continue to interpose between Grant and the James River; aswell as cover the direct route to Richmond. 

General Lee reported this battle to his Government as a Confederatevictory, but his despatch was sent early in the day, long before thefight ended, and evidently he could not have known the final resultwhen he made the announcement, for the fight lasted until dark. After dark, our own and the Confederate dead having been buried, Iwithdrew, and moving to the rear of our infantry, marched all nightand till I reached the vicinity of Old Church, where I had beeninstructed to keep a vigilant watch on the enemy with Gregg's andTorbert's divisions. As soon as I had taken position at Old Churchmy pickets were pushed out in the direction of Cold Harbor, and thefact that the enemy was holding that point in some force was clearlyascertained. But our occupation of Cold Harbor was of the utmostimportance; indeed, it was absolutely necessary that we shouldpossess it, to secure our communications with the White House, aswell as to cover the extension of our line to the left toward theJames River. Roads from Bethesda Church, Old Church, and the WhiteHouse centred at Cold Harbor, and from there many roads diverged alsotoward different crossings of the Chickahominy, which wereindispensable to us. 

The enemy too realized the importance of the place, for as soon as hefound himself compelled to take up the line of the Tolopotomy hethrew a body of troops into Cold Harbor by forced marches, andfollowed it up by pushing a part of this force out on the Old Churchroad as far as Matadequin Creek, where he established a line ofbattle, arranging the front of it parallel to the road along thesouth bank of the Pamunkey; this for the purpose of endangering ourtrains as they moved back and forth between the army and the WhiteHouse. 

Meanwhile I had occupied Old Church and pushed pickets down towardCold Harbor. The outposts struck each other just north of MatadequinCreek, and a spirited fight immediately took place. At first ourpickets were sorely pressed, but Torbert, who was already preparingto make a reconnoissance, lost no time in reinforcing them on thenorth side of the creek with Devin's brigade. The fight then becamegeneral, both sides, dismounted, stubbornly contesting the ground. Of the Confederates, General Butler's South Carolinians bore thebrunt of the fight, and, strongly posted as they were on the southbank of the creek, held their ground with the same obstinacy they hadpreviously shown at Hawe's Shop. Finally, however, Torbert threwMerritt's and Custer's brigades into the action, and the enemyretired, we pursuing to within a mile and a half of Cold Harbor andcapturing a number of prisoners. Gregg's division took no part inthe actual fighting, but remained near Old Church observing the roadson Torberts flanks, one leading toward Bethesda Church on his right, the other to his left in the direction of the White House. Thislatter road Gregg was particularly instructed to keep open, so as tocommunicate with General W. F. Smith, who was then debarking hiscorps at the White House, and on the morning of the 31st thisgeneral's advance was covered by a brigade which Gregg had sent himfor the purpose. 

Torbert having pursued toward Cold Harbor the troops he fought atMatadequin Creek, had taken up a position about a mile and a halffrom that place, on the Old Church road. The morning of the 31st Ivisited him to arrange for his further advance, intending thus toanticipate an expected attack from Fitzhugh Lee, who was beingreinforced by infantry. I met Torbert at Custer's headquarters, andfound that the two had already been talking over a scheme to captureCold Harbor, and when their plan was laid before me it appeared soplainly feasible that I fully endorsed it, at once giving directionsfor its immediate execution, and ordering Gregg to come forward toTorbert's support with such troops as he could spare from the dutywith which he had been charged. 

Torbert moved out promptly, Merritt's brigade first, followed byCuster's, on the direct road to Cold Harbor, while Devin's brigadewas detached, and marched by a left-hand road that would bring him inon the right and rear of the enemy's line, which was posted in frontof the crossroads. Devin was unable to carry his part of theprogramme farther than to reach the front of the Confederate right, and as Merritt came into position to the right of the Old Church roadTorbert was obliged to place a part of Custer's brigade on Merritt'sleft so as to connect with Devin. The whole division was now inline, confronted by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by Clingman'sbrigade from Hoke's division of infantry; and from the Confederatebreastworks, hastily constructed out of logs, rails, and earth, aheavy fire was already being poured upon us that it seemed impossibleto withstand. None of Gregg's division had yet arrived, and sostubborn was the enemy's resistance that I began to doubt our abilityto carry the place before reinforcements came up, but just thenMerritt reported that he could turn the enemy's left, and beingdirected to execute his proposition, he carried it to a mostsuccessful issue with the First and Second regular cavalry. Just asthese two regiments passed around the enemy's left and attacked hisrear, the remainder of the division assailed him in front. Thismanoeuvre of Merritt's stampeded the Confederates, and the defensesfalling into our hands easily, we pushed ahead on the Bottom's bridgeroad three-fourths of a mile beyond Cold Harbor. 

Cold Harbor was now mine, but I was about nine miles away from ournearest infantry, and had been able to bring up only Davies's brigadeof cavalry, which arrived after the fight. My isolated positiontherefore made me a little uneasy. I felt convinced that the enemywould attempt to regain the place, for it was of as much importanceto him as to us, and the presence of his infantry disclosed that hefully appreciated this. My uneasiness increased as the day grewlate, for I had learned from prisoners that the balance of Hoke'sdivision was en route to Cold Harbor, and Kershaw near at hand, interposing between the Union left near Bethesda Church and myposition. In view of this state of affairs, I notified General Meadethat I had taken Cold Harbor, but could not with safety to my commandhold it, and forthwith gave directions to withdraw during the night. The last of my troops had scarcely pulled out, however, when Ireceived a despatch from Meade directing me to hold Cold Harbor atevery hazard. General Grant had expected that a severe battle wouldhave to be fought before we could obtain possession of the place; andits capture by our cavalry not being anticipated, no preparation hadbeen made for its permanent occupancy. No time was to be lost, therefore, if the advantages which possession of Cold Harbor gave uswere to be improved, so at the same hour that Meade ordered me tohold the place at all hazards the Sixth Corps was started on a forcedmarch, by Grant's directions, to aid in that object, and on arrivalto relieve my cavalry. 

The moment Meade's order was received, I directed a reoccupation ofCold Harbor, and although a large portion of Torbert's command wasalready well on its way back to the line we held on the morning ofthe 31st, this force speedily retraced its steps, and re-entered theplace before daylight; both our departure and return having beeneffected without the enemy being aware of our movements. We nowfound that the temporary breastworks of rails and logs which theConfederates had built were of incalculable benefit to us infurnishing material with which to establish a line of defense, theybeing made available by simply reversing them at some points, or atothers wholly reconstructing them to suit the circumstances of theground: The troops, without reserves, were then placed behind ourcover dismounted, boxes of ammunition distributed along the line, andthe order passed along that the place must be held. All this wasdone in the darkness, and while we were working away at our cover theenemy could be distinctly heard from our skirmish-line givingcommands and making preparations to attack. 

Just after daylight on the 1st of June the Confederate infantry underGeneral Kershaw endeavored to drive us out, advancing against myright from the Bethesda Church road. In his assault he was permittedto come close up to our works, and when within short range such afirewas opened on him from our horse-artillery and repeating carbinesthat he recoiled in confusion after the first onset; still, he seemeddetermined to get the place, and after reorganizing, again attacked;but the lesson of the first repulse was not without effect, and hisfeeble effort proved wholly fruitless. After his second failure wewere left undisturbed, and at 9 A. M. I sent the following despatch toarmy headquarters:

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, "ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. "Cold Harbor, Va. , June 1, 1864--9 A. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS, "Chief-of-Staff. 

"GENERAL: In obedience to your instructions I am holding Cold Harbor. I have captured this morning more prisoners; they belong to threedifferent infantry brigades. The enemy assaulted the right of mylines this morning, but were handsomely repulsed. I have been veryapprehensive, but General Wright is now coming up. I built slightworks for my men; the enemy came up to them, and were driven back. General Wright has just arrived. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. "

About 10 o'clock in the morning the Sixth Corps relieved Torbert andDavies, having marched all night, and these two generals moving outtoward the Chickahominy covered the left of the infantry line tillHancock's corps took their place in the afternoon. By this timeGregg had joined me with his two brigades, and both Torbert and Greggwere now marched to Prospect Church, from which point I moved them toa position on the north side of the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge. Here the enemy's cavalry confronted us, occupying the south bank ofthe stream, with artillery in position at the fords prepared todispute our passage; but it was not intended that we should cross; soGregg and Torbert lay quiet in camp at Bottom's bridge and at OldChurch without noteworthy event until the 6th of June. 

As before related, Wilson's division struck the enemy's infantry aswell as W. H. F. Lee's cavalry near Ashland on the 1st of June, andalthough Chapman destroyed the bridges over the South Anna, which washis part of the programme, Wilson found it necessary to return toPrice's Store. From this point he continued to cover the right ofthe Army of the Potomac, on the 2d of June driving the rear-guard ofthe enemy from Hawe's Shop, the scene of the battle of May 28. Thesame day he crossed Tolopotomy Creek, and passed around the enemy'sleft flank so far that Lee thought his left was turned by a strongforce, and under cover of darkness withdrew from a menacing positionwhich he was holding in front of the Ninth Corps. This successfulmanoeuvre completed, Wilson returned to Hawe's Shop, and on the 4thwent into camp at New Castle ferry, in anticipation of certainoperations of the Cavalry Corps, which were to take place while theArmy of the Potomac was crossing to the south side of the James. 

CHAPTER XXI. 

THE MOVEMENT TO THE JAMES--THE SECOND EXPEDITION--BATTLE OFTREVILLIAN STATION--DEFEAT OF GENERAL WADE HAMPTON--MALLORY'SCROSSROADS--SUFFERING OF THE WOUNDED--SECURING THE TRAINS--GENERALGREGG'S STUBBORN FIGHT. 

By the 6th of June General Grant again determined to continue themovement of the army by its left flank to the south bank of the JamesRiver, his unsuccessful attack on the enemy's works near Cold Harborhaving demonstrated that Lee's position north of the Chickahominycould not be carried by assault with results that would compensatefor the enormous loss of life which must follow; therefore a furtherattempt to fight a decisive battle north of Richmond was abandoned. In carrying the army to the James River the hazardous manoeuvreswould be hampered by many obstacles, such as the thick timber, underbrush, and troublesome swamps to be met in crossing theChickahominy. Besides, Lee held an interior line, from which all thedirect roads to Richmond could be covered with his infantry, leavinghis cavalry free to confront our advance on the south bank of theChickahominy as far down as Jones's bridge, and thence around toCharles City Court House. In view of these difficulties it becamenecessary to draw off the bulk of the enemy's cavalry while themovement to the James was in process of execution, and General Meadedetermined to do this by requiring me to proceed with two divisionsas far as Charlottesville to destroy the railroad bridge over theRivanna River near that town, the railroad itself from the Rivanna toGordonsville, and, if practicable, from Gordonsville back towardHanover Junction also. 

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "June 5, 1864. 3. 30 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Commanding Cavalry Corps. 

"I am directed by the major-general commanding to furnish thefollowing instructions for your guidance in the execution of the dutyreferred to in the order for movements and changes of positionto-night, a copy of which order accompanies this communication. 

"With two divisions of your corps you will move on the morning of the7th instant to Charlottesville and destroy the railroad bridge overthe Rivanna near that town; you will then thoroughly destroy therailroad from that point to Gordonsville, and from Gordonsvilletoward Hanover Junction, and to the latter point, if practicable. The chief engineer, Major Duane, will furnish you a canvaspontoon-train of eight boats. The chief quartermaster will supply youwith such tools, implements, and materials as you may require for thedestruction of the road. Upon the completion of this duty you willrejoin this army. 

"A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

After Meade's instructions reached me they were somewhat modified byGeneral Grant, who on the same evening had received information thatGeneral Hunter, commanding the troops in West Virginia, had reachedStaunton and engaged with advantage the Confederate commander, General Jones, near that place. General Grant informed me orallythat he had directed Hunter to advance as far as Charlottesville, that he expected me to unite with him there, and that the twocommands, after destroying the James River canal and the VirginiaCentral road, were to join the Army of the Potomac in the mannercontemplated in my instructions from General Meade; and that in viewof what was anticipated, it would be well to break up as much of therailroad as possible on my way westward. A copy of his letter toHunter comprised my written instructions. A junction with thisgeneral was not contemplated when the expedition was first conceived, but became an important though not the paramount object after thereception of the later information. The diversion of the enemy'scavalry from the south side of the Chickahominy was its main purpose, for in the presence of such a force as Lee's contracted lines wouldnow permit him to concentrate behind the Chickahominy, thedifficulties of crossing that stream would be largely increased if healso had at hand a strong body of horse, to gain the time necessaryfor him to oppose the movement at the different crossings with massesof his infantry. 

The order calling for two divisions for the expedition, I decided totake Gregg's and Torbert's, leaving Wilson's behind to continue withthe infantry in its march to the James and to receive instructionsdirectly from, the headquarters of the army. All my dismounted menhad been sent to the White House some days before, and they weredirected to report to Wilson as they could be provided with mounts. 

"COLD HARBOR, VA. , June 6, 1964. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER, Commanding Dept West Virginia. 

"General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning with instructions toproceed to Charlottesville, Va. , and to commence there thedestruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way asmuch as possible. The complete destruction of this road and of thecanal on James River is of great importance to us. According to theinstructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you willproceed to Lynchburg and commence there. It would be of great valueto us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day. But thatpoint is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting toget it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting into theroad or canal at all. I see, in looking over the letter to GeneralHalleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicatesthat your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville. If youhave so understood it, you will be doing just what I want. Thedirection I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in thevalley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east bythe most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch ofthe Virginia Central road. From there move eastward along the lineof the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you joinGeneral Sheridan. After the work laid out for General Sheridan andyourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomacby the route laid out in General Sheridan's instructions. If anyportion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back inyour department, you are authorized to send it back. If on receiptof this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable toreach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there. If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville andLynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroythe canal. Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

Owing to the hard service of the preceding month we had lost manyhorses, so the number of dismounted men was large; and my strengthhad also been much reduced by killed and wounded during the sameperiod of activity. The effective mounted force of my two divisionswas therefore much diminished, they mustering only about six thousandofficers and men when concentrated on June 6 at New Castle ferry. Here they were provided with three days' rations, intended to lastfive days, and with two days' grain for the horses. The rations andforty rounds of ammunition per man were to be carried on the personsof the troopers, the grain on the pommel of the saddle, and thereserve ammunition in wagons. One medical wagon and eight ambulanceswere also furnished, and one wagon was authorized for each divisionand brigade headquarters; enough canvas-covered boats for a smallpontoon-bridge were also provided. 

My instructions permitting latitude in the route I should take, Idecided to march along the north bank of the North Anna River, crossthat stream at Carpenter's ford, strike the Virginia Central railroadat Trevillian Station, destroy it toward Louisa Court House, marchpast Gordonsville, strike the railroad again at Cobham's Station, anddestroy it thence to Charlottesville as we proceeded west. Thesuccess of the last part of this programme would of course depend onthe location of General Hunter when I should arrive in the regionwhere it would be practicable for us to communicate with each other. 

From my camp at New Castle ferry we crossed the Pamunkey, marchedbetween Aylett's and Dunkirk on the Mattapony River, and on the 8thof June encamped at Polecat Station. The next day we resumed themarch along the North Anna--our advance guard skirmishing with a fewmounted men of the enemy, who proved to be irregulars--and bivouackedon Northeast Creek, near Young's Mills. This day I learned from someof these irregulars whom we made prisoners that Breckenridge'sdivision of infantry, en route to the Shenandoah Valley by way ofGordonsville, was passing slowly up the railroad parallel to me, andthat the enemy's cavalry had left its position on the south side ofthe Chickahominy, and was marching on the old Richmond andGordonsville road toward Gordonsville, under command of General WadeHampton, the information being confirmed by a scouting party sent outto cut the telegraph wires along the railroad in the night. Breckenridge had been ordered back to the valley by General Lee assoon as he heard of Hunter's victory near Staunton, but now that myexpedition had been discovered, the movement of Breckenridge's troopson the railroad was being timed to correspond with the marches of mycommand till Hampton could get more nearly parallel with me. 

On the 10th we resumed the march, passing by Twyman's store, crossingthe North Anna at Carpenter's ford and encamping on the road leadingalong the south fork of the North Anna to Trevillian Station. Duringthe evening and night of the 10th the boldness of the enemy'sscouting parties, with which we had been coming into collision moreor less every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating thepresence of a large force, and evidencing that his shorter line ofmarch had enabled him to bring to my front a strong body of cavalry, although it started from Lee's army nearly two days later than I didfrom Grant's. The arrival of this body also permitted Breckenridgeto pass on to Gordonsville, and from there to interpose betweenGeneral Hunter and me at either Charlottesville or Waynesboro' ascircumstances might determine. 

On the night of the Loth General Hampton's division camped aboutthree miles northwest of Trevillian, at a place called Green SpringValley and Fitzhugh Lee's division not far from Louisa Court House, some six miles east of Trevillian. Learning that I was atCarpenter's ford, Hampton marched his division by way of TrevillianStation toward Clayton's store, on the road from Trevillian toCarpenter's ford, intending to attack me at Clayton's. FitzhughLee's division was to join Hampton at Clayton's store from LouisaCourt House; but on the morning of the 11th the two generals wereseparated by several miles. 

At daylight of the 11th my march, to Trevillian Station was resumedon the direct road to that point, and engaging the enemy's picketsand advanced parties soon after setting out, we began to drive themin. Torbert had the lead with Merritt's and Devin's brigades, and ashe pressed back the pickets he came upon the enemy posted behind aline of barricades in dense timber about three miles from Trevillian. Meanwhile Custer's brigade had been sent from where we bivouacked, bya wood road found on our left, to destroy Trevillian Station. Infollowing this road Custer got to the rear of Hampton's division, having passed between its right flank and Fitzhugh Lee's division, which was at the time marching on the road leading from Louisa CourtHouse to Clayton's store to unite with Hampton. 

Custer, the moment he found himself in Hampton's rear, charged theled horses, wagons, and caissons found there, getting hold of a vastnumber of each, and also of the station itself. The stampede andhavoc wrought by Custer in Hampton's rear compelled him to turnRosser's brigade in that direction, and while it attacked Custer onone side, Fitzhugh Lee's division, which had followed Custer towardTrevillian, attacked him on the other. There then ensued a desperatestruggle for the possession of the captured property, resultingfinally in its being retaken by the enemy. Indeed, the great numberof horses and vehicles could not be kept on the limited space withinCuster's line, which now formed almost a complete circle; and whilehe was endeavoring to remove them to a secure place they, togetherwith Custer's headquarters wagon and four of his caissons, fell intothe hands of their original owners. 

As soon as the firing told that Custer had struck the enemy's rear, Idirected Torbert to press the line in front of Merritt and Devin, aided by one brigade of Gregg's division on their left, Gregg's otherbrigade in the meantime attacking Fitzhugh Lee on the Louisa CourtHouse road. The effect of this was to force Hampton back, and hisdivision was so hard pushed that a portion of it was driven pell-mellinto Custer's lines, leaving there about five hundred prisoners. Therest of Hampton's men did not rally till they got some distance westof Trevillian, while, in the meantime, Gregg had driven Fitzhugh Leetoward Louisa Court House so far that many miles now intervenedbetween the two Confederate divisions, precluding their union untilabout noon the next day, when Fitzhugh Lee effected the junctionafter a circuitous march in the night. The defeat of Hampton at thepoint where he had determined to resist my further advance, and hisretreat westward, gave me undisturbed possession of the station; andafter destroying the railroad to some extent toward Gordonsville, Iwent into camp. 

From prisoners taken during the day, I gathered that General Hunter, instead of coming toward Charlottesville, as I had reason to expect, both from the instructions given me and the directions sent him byGeneral Grant, was in the neighborhood of Lexington--apparentlymoving on Lynchburg--and that Breckenridge was at Gordonsville andCharlottesville. I also heard, from the same source, that Ewell'scorps was on its way to Lynchburg, but this intelligence provedafterward to be incorrect, for these troops, commanded by GeneralEarly, did not leave Richmond till two days later. 

There was no doubt as to the information about Hunter's generallocation, however. He was marching toward Lynchburg, away frominstead of toward me, thus making the junction of our commands beyondall reasonable probability. So in view of this, I made up my mind toabandon that part of the scheme, and to return by leisurely marches, which would keep Hampton's cavalry away from Lee while Grant wascrossing the James River. I was still further influenced to thiscourse by the burden which was thrown on me in the large number ofwounded--there being about five hundred cases of my own--and the fivehundred prisoners that I would probably be forced to abandon, shouldI proceed farther. Besides, the recent battle had reduced my supplyof ammunition to a very small amount--not more than enough for onemore respectable engagement; and as the chances were that I wouldhave to fight a great deal before I could reach Hunter, now that theenemy's cavalry and Breckenridge's infantry were between us, therisks of the undertaking seemed too great to warrant it. 

The morning of June 12 Gregg's division commenced destroying therailroad to Louisa Court House, and continued the work during theday, breaking it pretty effectually. While Gregg was thus occupied, I directed Torbert to make a reconnoissance up the Gordonsville road, to secure a by-road leading over Mallory's ford, on the North Anna, to the Catharpen road, as I purposed following that route toSpottsylvania Court House on my return, and thence via Bowling Greenand Dunkirk to the White House. About a mile beyond Trevillian theGordonsville road fork--the left fork leading to Charlottesville--andabout a mile beyond the fork Hampton had taken up and stronglyintrenched a line across both roads, being reinforced by FitzhughLee, who, as before related, had joined him about noon by aroundabout march. Torbert soon hotly engaged this line, and by theimpetuosity of his first attack, gained some advantage; but theappearance of Fitzhugh Lee's troops on the right, and Hampton'sstrong resistance in front, rendered futile all efforts to carry theposition; and, although I brought up one of Gregg's brigades toTorbert's assistance, yet the by-road I coveted was still held by theenemy when night closed in. 

This engagement, like that off the day before around Trevillian, wasmostly fought dismounted by both sides, as had also been the earlierfights of the cavalry during the summer in the Wilderness, at Todd'sTavern, Hawe's Shop, and Matadequin Creek. Indeed, they could hardlyhave been fought otherwise than on foot, as there was little chancefor mounted fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, thearmament of both parties, and the practice of barricading making itimpracticable to use the sabre with anything like a large force; andso with the exception of Yellow Tavern the dismounted methodprevailed in almost every engagement. 

The losses at Mallory's Crossroads were very heavy on both sides. The character of the fighting, together with the day's results, demonstrated that it was impossible to make the passage of the NorthAnna at Mallory's ford without venturing another battle the next day. This would consume the little ammunition left, and though we mightgain the road, yet the possibility of having no ammunition whateverto get back with was too great a hazard, so I gave orders to withdrawduring the night of the 12th. We retired along the same road bywhich we had come, taking with us the prisoners, and all of ourwounded who could be moved. Those who could not be transported, someninety in number, and all the Confederate wounded in my hands, wereleft at Trevillian in hospitals, under charge of one of our surgeons, with plenty of medical and other stores. 

We recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford the followingmorning, and halting there, unsaddled and turned the horses out tograze, for they were nearly famished, having had neither food norwater during the preceding forty-eight hours. Late in the afternoonwe saddled up and proceeded to Twyman's Store, while GeneralHampton's main body moved down the south bank of the North Anna, withthe purpose of intervening between me and the Army of the Potomac, inthe hope of preventing my return to it; but his movements took nodefinite shape beyond watching me, however, till several days later, near St. Mary's Church, when I was crossing the peninsula to theJames River. 

On the 14th the march was continued, and we reached the Catharpenroad, upon which it was originally intended to move if we had beenable to cross at Mallory's ford, and this conducted me to Shady GroveChurch. The next day we passed over the battle-field ofSpottsylvania Court House. The marks of the recent conflicts aboutthere were visible on every hand, and in the neighboring houses werefound many Union and Confederate wounded, who had been too severelyhurt to be removed from the field-hospitals at the time of thebattles. Such of our wounded as were able to travel were broughtaway. 

On the 16th I marched from Edge Hill on the Ta River through BowlingGreen to Dr. Butler's, on the north side of the Mattapony. When Iarrived here I was unable to ascertain the position of the Army ofthe Potomac, and was uncertain whether or not the base at the WhiteHouse had been discontinued. I had heard nothing from the army fornine days except rumors through Southern sources, and under thesecircumstances did not like to venture between the Mattapony andPamunkey rivers, embarrassed as I was with some four hundred wounded, five hundred prisoners, and about two thousand negroes that hadjoined my column in the hope of obtaining their freedom. I thereforedetermined to push down the north bank of the Mattapony far enough toenable me to send these impediments directly to West Point, where Ianticipated finding some of our gunboats and transports, that couldcarry all to the North. Following this plan, we proceeded throughWalkerton to King and Queen Court House, and bivouacked in itsvicinity the night of the 18th. Next day I learned that the depot atthe White House had not yet been broken up entirely, and thatsupplies were in store for me there; so after sending the wounded, prisoners, and negroes to West Point under an escort of tworegiments, I turned back to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony, and crossed tothe south side at a place where the stream was narrow enough tobridge with my pontoon-boats. 

In returning from Trevillian, as the most of our wounded were hauledin old buggies, carts, and such other vehicles as could be madeavailable in the absence of a sufficient number of ambulances, thesuffering was intense, the heat of the season and dusty roads addingmuch to the discomfort. Each day we halted many times to dress thewounds of the injured and to refresh them as much as possible, butour means for mitigating their distress were limited. The fortitudeand cheerfulness of the poor fellows under such conditions wereremarkable, for no word of complaint was heard. The Confederateprisoners and colored people being on foot, our marches werenecessarily made short, and with frequent halts also, but they toosuffered considerably from the heat and dust, though at times theprisoners were relieved by being mounted on the horses of some of ourregiments, the owners meantime marching on foot. Where all thecolored people came from and what started them was inexplicable, butthey began joining us just before we reached Trevillian--men, women, and children with bundles of all sorts containing their few worldlygoods, and the number increased from day to day until they arrived atWest Point. Probably not one of the poor things had the remotestidea, when he set out, as to where he would finally land, but to aman they followed the Yankees in full faith that they would lead tofreedom, no matter what road they took. 

On the morning of the 20th, at an early hour, we resumed our march, and as the column proceeded sounds of artillery were heard in thedirection of the White House, which fact caused us to quicken thepace. We had not gone far when despatches from General Abercrombie, commanding some fragmentary organizations at the White House, notified me that the place was about to be attacked. I hadpreviously sent an advance party with orders to move swiftly towardthe cannonading and report to me by couriers the actual condition ofaffairs. From this party I soon learned that there was no occasionto push our jaded animals, since the crisis, if there had been one, was over and the enemy repulsed, so the increased gait was reduced toa leisurely march that took us late in the afternoon to the northbank of the Pamunkey, opposite Abercrombie's camp. When I got to theriver the enemy was holding the bluffs surrounding the White Housefarm, having made no effort to penetrate General Abercrombie's lineor do him other hurt than to throw a few shells among the teamstersthere congregated. 

Next day Gregg's division crossed the Pamunkey dismounted, andTorbert's crossed mounted. As soon as the troops were over, Gregg, supported by Merritt's brigade, moved out on the road to Tunstall'sStation to attack Hampton, posted an the west side of Black Creek, Custer's brigade meanwhile moving, mounted, on the road toCumberland, and Devin's in like manner on the one to Baltimorecrossroads. This offer of battle was not accepted, however, andHampton withdrew from my front, retiring behind the Chickahominy, where his communications with Lee would be more secure. 

While at the White House I received orders to break up that depotwholly, and also instructions to move the trains which the Army ofthe Potomac had left there across the peninsula to the pontoon-bridgeat Deep Bottom on the James River. These trains amounted to hundredsof wagons and other vehicles, and knowing full well the dangers whichwould attend the difficult problem of getting them over toPetersburg, I decided to start them with as little delay ascircumstances would permit, and the morning of the 22d sent Torbert'sdivision ahead to secure Jones's bridge on the Chickahominy, so thatthe wagons could be crossed at that point. The trains followedTorbert, while Gregg's division marched by a road parallel to the oneon which the wagons were moving, and on their right flank, as theyneeded to be covered and protected in that direction only. 

The enemy made no effort to attack us while we were moving the trainsthat day, and the wagons were all safely parked for the night on thesouth side of the Chickahominy, guarded by General Getty, who hadrelieved Abercrombie from command of the infantry fragments before westarted off from the White House. 

To secure the crossing at Jones's bridge, Torbert had pushed Devin'sbrigade out on the Long Bridge road, on the side of the Chickahominywhere, on the morning of the 23d, he was attacked by Chambliss'sbrigade of W. H. F. Lee's division. Devin was driven in some littledistance, but being reinforced by Getty with six companies of coloredtroops, he quickly turned the tables on Chambliss and re-establishedhis picket-posts. From this affair I learned that Chambliss's brigadewas the advance of the Confederate cavalry corps, while Hamptondiscovered from it that we were already in possession of the Jones'sbridge crossing of the Chickahominy; and as he was too late tochallenge our passage of the stream at this point he contentedhimself with taking up a position that night so as to cover the roadsleading from Long Bridge to Westover, with the purpose of preventingthe trains from following the river road to the pontoon-bridge atDeep Bottom. 

My instructions required me to cross the trains over the James Riveron this pontoon-bridge if practicable, and to reach it I should beobliged to march through Charles City Court House, and then byHarrison's Landing and Malvern Hill, the latter point being held bythe enemy. In fact, he held all the ground between Long Bridge onthe Chickahominy and the pontoon-bridge except the Tete de pont atthe crossing. Notwithstanding this I concluded to make the attempt, for all the delays of ferrying the command and trains would beavoided if we got through to the bridge; and with this object in viewI moved Torbert's division out on the Charles City road to conductthe wagons. Just beyond Charles City Court House Torbert encounteredLomax's brigade, which he drove across Herring Creek on the road toWestover Church; and reporting the affair to me, I surmised, from thepresence of this force in my front, that Hampton would endeavor topenetrate to the long column of wagons, so I ordered them to go intopark near Wilcox's landing, and instructed Gregg, whose division hadbeen marching in the morning along the road leading from Jones'sbridge to St. Mary's Church for the purpose of covering the exposedflank of the train, to hold fast near the church without fail tillall the transportation had passed Charles City Court House. 

Meanwhile, General Hampton, who had conjectured that I would try toget the train across the James by the pontoon-bridge at Deep Bottom, began concentrating all his troops except Lomax's brigade, which wasto confront the head of my column on the river road, in the vicinityof Nance's Shop. This was discovered by Gregg at an early hour, anddivining this purpose he had prepared to meet it by constructinghasty cover for his men before receiving my instructions. About 4o'clock in the afternoon Hampton got his force in hand, and withFitzhugh Lee's division assailed the whole front of Gregg's line, andhis left flank with Chambliss's and Geary's brigades. For two hourshe continued to attack, but made little impression on Gregg--gain atone point being counterbalanced by failure at another. Because ofthe evident strength of Hampton, Gregg had placed all his troops inline of battle from the first, and on discovery of the enemy'ssuperior numbers sent message after message to me concerning thesituation, but the messengers never arrived, being either killed orcaptured, and I remained in total ignorance till dark of the straithis division was in. 

Toward night it became clear to Gregg that he could maintain theunequal contest no longer, and he then decided to retreat, but notuntil convinced that the time won had enabled all the trains to passCharles City Court House in safety. When he had got all his ledhorses fairly on the way, and such of the wounded as could betransported, he retired by his right flank-in some confusion, it istrue, but stubbornly resisting to Hopewell Church, where Hamptonceased to press him. 

Gregg's losses were heavy, and he was forced to abandon his dead andmost seriously wounded, but the creditable stand made ensured thesafety of the train, the last wagon of which was now parked atWilcox's Landing. His steady, unflinching determination to gain timefor the wagons to get beyond the point of danger was characteristicof the man, and this was the third occasion on which he had exhibiteda high order of capacity and sound judgment since coming under mycommand. The firmness and coolness with which he always met theresponsibilities of a dangerous place were particularly strong pointsin Gregg's make-up, and he possessed so much professional thoughunpretentious ability, that it is to be regretted he felt obliged afew months later to quit the service before the close of the war. 

Gregg's fight fully satisfied me that we could not get the trains upto the pontoon-bridge, for of course Hampton would now throw all hiscavalry in my front, on the river road, where it could be backed upby Lee's infantry. Meanwhile, General Meade had become assured ofthe same thing, and as he was now growing anxious about the fate ofWilson's division--which, during my absence, had been sent out tobreak the enemy's communications south of Petersburg, by destroyingthe Southside and Danville railroads--he sent ferryboats to cross meover the James. During the night of the 24th, and next morning, theimmense train--which ought never to have been left for the cavalry toescort, after a fatiguing expedition of three weeks--was moved backthrough Charles City Court House to Douthard's landing, and thereferried over the river, followed by my troops in like manner. WhenGeneral Hampton discovered this, he moved to Drury's Bluff, andthere, on the morning of the 27th, crossed the James by theConfederate pontoon-bridge. 

CHAPTER XXII. 

GENERAL WILSON'S RAID--DESTROYING RAILROADS--HIS DISCOMFITURE--RESULTS OF HIS RAID--REMOUNTS--MOVEMENT TO THE NORTH SIDE OF THEJAMES--DECEIVING LEE--MY ISOLATED POSITION--ESTIMATE OF HANCOCK--SUCCESS OF THE CAVALRY--THEIR CONSTANT DUTIES. 

While I was absent on the expedition to Trevillian, the movement ofthe Army of the Potomac across the James River was effected, andWilson, whom I had left behind for the purpose, was engaged in theduty of covering its front and rear. Late on the night of June 12he, with Chapman's brigade, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, in advance of the Fifth Corps, and by 7 o'clock next morning haddriven the enemy's pickets up to White Oak bridge, where he waitedfor our infantry. When that came up, he pushed on as far as Riddle'sShop, but late that evening the Confederate infantry forced him towithdraw to St. Mary's Church; for early in the morning General Leehad discovered the movement of our army, and promptly threw thiscolumn of infantry south of the Chickahominy to White Oak Swamp, withthe design of covering Richmond. From St. Mary's Church Wilsonguarded all the roads toward White Oak Swamp and Riddle's Shop, McIntosh's brigade joining him on the 14th, by way of Long Bridge, asthe rear of the Army of the Potomac passed the Chickahominy. In theperformance of this duty Wilson did not have to fight any engagementof magnitude, for the bulk of the enemy's cavalry had followed me toTrevillian. During the 15th and 16th Wilson drew his troops intoward the James River, and next day crossed it on the pontoon-bridgeand camped on the Blackwater, near Mt. Sinai Church. Here heremained till the 22d of June--the same day I reached the White Housewith Gregg and Torbert--when, under orders from General Meade, he setout to cut the enemy's communications to the south and southwest ofPetersburg. 

His instructions implied that the breaking up of the Petersburg andLynchburg, and Richmond and Danville railroads at Burkeville was themost important part of his mission, and that when the work ofdestruction began, it should be continued till he was driven off bythe enemy. Wilson's force consisted of about 5, 500 men, General A. V. Kautz, with the cavalry of the Army of the James, having joinedhim for the expedition. In moving out Wilson crossed the Weldon roadnear Ream's Station, first destroying it effectually at that point. About fourteen miles west of Petersburg he struck the Southsiderailroad, and broke it up clear to Burkeville, a distance of thirtymiles. Having destroyed everything at Burkeville Junction, he movedalong the Danville road to Staunton River, completely wrecking aboutthirty miles of that line also. At Staunton River he found therailroad bridge strongly guarded, and seeing that he could not burnit, he began his return march that night, and reached Nottoway River, some thirty miles south of Petersburg, at noon of the next day--the28th. 

In this expedition Wilson was closely followed from the start byBarringer's brigade of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, but the operationswere not interfered with materially, his success being signal till hereached the vicinity of Stony Creek depot on his return. At thispoint General Hampton, with his own and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, gotbetween Wilson and the Army of the Potomac, there being behind themat Ream's Station, at the same time, two brigades of infantry underGeneral Mahone. A severe battle ensued, resulting in Wilson'sdefeat, with the loss of twelve guns and all his wagons. Inconsequence of this discomfiture he was obliged to fall back acrossthe Nottoway River with his own division, and rejoined the army byway of Peter's bridge on that stream, while Kautz's division, unableto unite with Wilson after the two commands had become separated inthe fight, made a circuit of the enemy's left, and reached the linesof our army in the night of the 28th. 

Neither the presence of Hampton's cavalry at Stony Creek depot, northe possession of Ream's Station by the Confederate infantry, seemsto have been anticipated by Wilson, for in the report of theexpedition he states:

"Foreseeing the probability of having to return northward, I wrote toGeneral Meade the evening before starting that I anticipated noserious difficulty in executing his orders; but unless GeneralSheridan was required to keep Hampton's cavalry engaged, and ourinfantry to prevent Lee from making detachments, we should probablyexperience great difficulty in rejoining the army. In reply to thisnote, General Humphreys, chief-of-staff, informed me it was intendedthe Army of the Potomac should cover the Weldon road the next day, the Southside road the day after, and that Hampton having followedSheridan toward Gordonsville, I need not fear any trouble from him. "

I doubt that General Meade's letter of instructions and Wilson's noteof the same evening, warrant what General Wilson here says. It istrue that the Weldon railroad near Ream's Station was not covered byour infantry, as General Humphreys informed him it would be, butWilson is in error when he intimates that he was assured that I wouldlook after Hampton. I do not think General Meade's instructions aresusceptible of this interpretation. I received no orders requiringme to detain Hampton. On the contrary, when I arrived at the WhiteHouse my instructions required me to break up the depot there, andthen bring the train across the Peninsula as soon as practicable, norwere these instructions ever modified. I began the duty imposed onme on the morning of the 23d, totally in the dark as to what wasexpected of Wilson, though it seems, from some correspondence betweenGenerals Grant and Meade, which I never saw till after the war, thatGrant thought Wilson could rely on Hampton's absence from his fieldof operations throughout the expedition. 

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "June 21, 1864. 9:20 A. M. 

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILSON, "Commanding Third Division Cavalry Corps. 

"The major-general commanding directs that you move your command at2 A. M. To-morrow, the 22d instant, in execution of the duty assignedyou of destroying certain railroads. Despatches received from theWhite House state that Hampton's cavalry was before that placeyesterday evening, and that General Sheridan had also reached there, hence it is desirable that you should march at the earliest moment. In passing Petersburg you will endeavor to avoid the observation ofthe enemy, and then move by the shortest routes to the intersectionof the Petersburg and Lynchburg, and the Richmond and Danvillerailroads, and destroy both these roads to the greatest extentpossible, continuing their destruction until driven from it by suchattacks of the enemy as you can no longer resist. The destruction ofthose roads to such an extent that they cannot be used by the enemyin connection with Richmond during the remainder of the campaign isan important part of the plan of campaign. The latest informationfrom Major-General Hunter represents him to be a few miles west ofLynchburg. He may endeavor to form a junction with this army; youwill communicate with him if practicable, and have delivered to himverbally the contents of the following copy of a communication fromLieutenant-General Grant to the major-general commanding this army. Lieutenant Brooks, who will accompany your expedition part of theway, should be informed where General Hunter will probably be found. 

"The success of your expedition will depend upon the secrecy withwhich it is commenced, and the celerity with which its movements areconducted; your command will, therefore, have with it the lightestsupplies and smallest number of wheels consistent with the thoroughexecution of the duty, the supplies of the section of country youwill operate in being taken into account. Upon the completion of thework assigned you, you will rejoin this army. 

"The chief quartermaster was directed yesterday to supply you withthe implements and material for the destruction of railroads obtainedfor General Sheridan. 

"[Signed] "A. A. HUMPHREYS, "Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCES, Mount Sinai Church, June 21, 1864--6 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HUMPHREYS, ""Chief-of-Staff. "The instructions of the major-general commanding, of this date, arereceived. I shall march in obedience thereto at 2 A. M. To-morrow. Before starting I would like to know if our infantry forces cover theWeldon road. 

"I propose striking the Southside road first at Sutherland Station, or some point in that vicinity, tearing up the track sufficiently todelay railroad communication ten or twelve hours. At this place Ishall detach a force to strike the Richmond and Danville road, by arapid march, at the nearest point, tearing up the track at everypracticable point between there and Burkeville. 

"From Sutherlands I shall move the main body of my command by theGreat road (breaking the railroad at every convenient point) directlyto Burkeville, which, if we succeed in capturing, will afford us theopportunity of prosecuting our work with great advantage. As soon asI have made dispositions for communicating with Hunter and done allthe damage possible, I shall move with all possible rapidity forDanville and Grenboro'. 

"Circumstances must, however, is a great degree control our movementsafter leaving Burkeville. 

"If Sheridan will look after Hampton, I apprehend no difficulty, andhope to be able to do the enemy great damage. The ammunition issuedto my command is very defective. The implements for destroying roadshave not yet arrived, but I learn from General Ingalls that they willcertainly be here early to-morrow. 

"[Signed] J. H. WILSON, "Brigadier-General Commanding. "

The moment I received orders from General Meade to go to the reliefof Wilson, I hastened with Torbert and Gregg by way of Prince GeorgeCourt House and Lee's Mills to Ream's Station. Here I found theSixth Corps, which Meade had pushed out on his left flank immediatelyon hearing of Wilson's mishap, but I was too late to render anymaterial assistance, Wilson having already disappeared, followed bythe enemy. However, I at once sent out parties to gatherinformation, and soon learned that Wilson had got safe across theNottoway at Peter's bridge and was making for the army by way ofBlunt's bridge, on the Blackwater. 

The benefits derived from this expedition, in the destruction of theSouthside and Danville railroads, were considered by General Grant asequivalent for the losses sustained in Wilson's defeat, for thewrecking of the railroads and cars was most complete, occasioning atthis, time serious embarrassment to the Confederate Government; but Idoubt if all this compensated for the artillery and prisoners thatfell into the hands of the enemy in the swamps of Hatcher's Run andRowanty Creek. Wilson's retreat from the perilous situation atReam's station was a most creditable performance--in the face of twobrigades of infantry and three divisions of cavalry--and in theconduct of the whole expedition the only criticism that can holdagainst him is that he placed too much reliance on meeting ourinfantry at Ream's station, seeing that uncontrollable circumstancesmight, and did, prevent its being there. He ought to have marched onthe 28th by Jarrett's Station to Peter's bridge, on the Nottoway, andBlunts bridge on the Blackwater, to the rear of the Army of thePotomac. 

When the safety of Wilson's command was assured, I was ordered backto Light House Point, where I had gone into camp after crossing theJames River to rest and recruit my command, now very much reduced innumbers by reason of casualties to both horses and men. It had beenmarching and fighting for fifty consecutive days, and the fatiguingservice had told so fearfully on my animals that the number ofdismounted men in the corps was very large. With the exception ofabout four hundred horses that I received at the White House, noanimals were furnished to supply the deficiencies which had arisenfrom the wearing marches of the past two months until I got to thiscamp at Light House Point; here my needs were so obvious that theycould no longer be neglected. 

I remained at Light House Point from the 2d to the 26th of July, recuperating the cavalry, the intensely warm weather necessitatingalmost an entire suspension of hostilities on the part of the Army ofthe Potomac. Meanwhile fifteen hundred horses were sent me here, andthese, with the four hundred already mentioned, were all that mytroops received while I held the personal command of the CavalryCorps, from April 6 to August 1, 1864. This was not near enough tomount the whole command, so I disposed the men who could not besupplied in a dismounted camp. 

By the 26th of July our strength was pretty well restored, and asGeneral Grant was now contemplating offensive operations for thepurpose of keeping Lee's army occupied around Richmond, and also ofcarrying Petersburg by assault if possible, I was directed to move tothe north side of the James River in conjunction with GeneralHancock's corps, and, if opportunity offered, to make a secondexpedition against the Virginia Central railroad, and again destroythe bridges on the North Anna, the Little and the South Anna rivers. 

I started out on the afternoon of the 26th and crossed the Appomattoxat Broadway landing. At Deep Bottom I was joined by Kautz's smalldivision from the Army of the James, and here massed the wholecommand, to allow Hancock's corps to take the lead, it crossing tothe north bank of the James River by the bridge below the mouth ofBailey's Creek. I moved late in the afternoon, so as not to comewithin the enemy's view before dark, and after night-fall Hancock'scorps passed me and began crossing the pontoon-bridge about 2 o'clockin the morning. 

By daylight Hancock was across, the cavalry following. Soon aportion of his corps attacked the enemy's works on the east side ofBailey's Creek, and, aided by the cavalry moving on its right, captured four pieces of artillery. This opened the way for Hancockto push out his whole corps, and as he advanced by a wheel, with hisleft as a pivot, the cavalry joined in the movement, pressing forwardon the New Market and Central or Charles City roads. 

We did not go far before we found the enemy's infantry posted acrossthese two roads behind a strong line of intrenchments on the westbank of Bailey's Creek. His videttes in front of Ruffin's house onthe New Market road were soon driven in on their main line, and thehigh ground before the house was immediately occupied by Torbert andGregg, supported by Kautz's division. By the time the cavalry linewas formed the Confederate General Kershaw, with his own division ofinfantry and those of Wilcox and Heath, advanced to attack us. Directing the most of his troops against the cavalry, which was stillmounted, Kershaw drove it back some distance over the high ground. When it reached the eastern face of the ridge, however, it wasquickly dismounted, and the men directed to lie down in line ofbattle about fifteen yards from the crest, and here the onset of theenemy was awaited. When Kershaw's men reached the crest such asevere fire was opened on them, and at such close quarters, that theycould not withstand it, and gave way in disorder. They were followedacross the plain by the cavalry, and lost about two hundred and fiftyprisoners and two battle-flags. The counter attack against theinfantry by Torbert and Gregg re-established our line and gave us thevictory of Darbytown, but it also demonstrated the fact that GeneralLee had anticipated the movement around his left flank bytransferring to the north side of the James a large portion of hisinfantry and W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry. 

This development rendered useless any further effort on Hancock'spart or mine to carry out the plan of the expedition, for GeneralGrant did not intend Hancock to assault the enemy's works unlessthere should be found in them but a very thin line of infantry whichcould be surprised. In such event, Hancock was to operate so thatthe cavalry might turn the Confederates on the Central or CharlesCity road, but the continually increasing force of the enemy showedthis to be impracticable. The long front presented by Hancock'scorps and the cavalry deceived General Lee, and he undoubtedlythought that nearly all of Grant's army had been moved to the northside of the James River; and to meet the danger he transferred themost of his own strength to the same side to confront his adversary, thinning the lines around Petersburg to reinforce those opposing uson the Central and New Market roads. This was what Grant hoped Leewould do in case the operations of Hancock and myself becameimpracticable, for Grant had an alternative plan for carryingPetersburg by assault in conjunction with the explosion of a minethat had been driven under the enemy's works from the front ofBurnside's corps. 

Now that there was no longer a chance for the cavalry to turn theenemy's left, our attention was directed to keeping up the deceptionof Lee, and on the afternoon of the 28th Hancock's corps withdrew toa line nearer the head of the bridge, the cavalry drawing back to aposition on his right. From now on, all sorts of devices andstratagems were practiced--anything that would tend to make theConfederates believe we were being reinforced, while Hancock waspreparing for a rapid return to Petersburg at the proper time. Inorder to delude the enemy still more after night-fall of the 28th Isent one of my divisions to the south side of the James, firstcovering the bridgeway with refuse hay to keep the tramp of the horsesfrom being heard. After daylight the next morning, I marched thisdivision back again on foot, in full view of the enemy, to create theimpression of a continuous movement large bodies of infantry to thenorth side, while the same time Kautz was made to skirmish with theenemy on our extreme right. These various artifices had the effectintended, for by the evening of the 29th Lee had transferred all hisinfantry to the north bank of the James, except three divisions, andall his cavalry save one. 

The morning of the 30th had been fixed upon to explode the mine andassault the enemy's works, so after dark on the evening of the 29thHancock hastily but quietly withdrew his corps to the south side totake part in the engagement which was to succeed the explosion, and Iwas directed to follow Hancock. This left me on the north side ofthe river confronting two-thirds of Lee's army in a perilousposition, where I could easily be driven into Curl's Neck and mywhole command annihilated. The situation, therefore, was not apleasant one to contemplate, but it could not be avoided. Luckilythe enemy did not see fit to attack, and my anxiety was greatlyrelieved by getting the whole command safely across the bridgeshortly after daylight, having drawn in the different brigadessuccessively from my right. By 10 o'clock on the morning of the 30thmy leading division was well over toward the left of our army infront of Petersburg, marching with the purpose to get around theenemy's right flank during the operations that were to succeed themine explosion, but when I reached General Meade's headquarters Ifound that lamentable failure had attended the assault made when theenemy's works were blown up in the morning. Blunder after blunderhad rendered the assault abortive, and all the opportunities openedby our expedition to the north side were irretrievably lost, soGeneral Meade at once arrested the movement of the cavalry. 

In the expedition to Deep Bottom I was under the command ofMajor-General Hancock, who, by seniority, was to control my corps aswell as his own until the way was opened for me to get out on theVirginia Central railroad. If this opportunity was gained, I was tocut loose and damage Lee's communications with the Shenandoah Valleyin such manner as best suited the conditions, but my return was not tobe jeopardized nor long delayed. This necessitated that Hancock'sline should extend to Bottom's bridge on the Chickahominy. Theenemy's early discovery of the movement and his concentration oftroops on the north side prevented Hancock from accomplishing theprogramme laid out for him. Its impracticability was demonstratedearly on the 27th, and Hancock's soldierly instincts told him this themoment he unexpectedly discovered Kershaw blocking the New Market andCharles City roads. To Hancock the temptation to assault Kershaw'sposition was strong indeed, but if he carried it there would stillremain the dubious problem of holding the line necessary for my safereturn, so with rare judgment he desisted zealously turning to thealternative proposition--the assault on Petersburg--for moresignificant results. This was the only occasion during the war inwhich I was associated with Hancock in campaign. Up till then we hadseldom met, and that was the first opportunity I had to observe hisquick apprehension, his physical courage, and the soldierlypersonality which had long before established his high reputation. 

On the 1st of August, two days after the mine explosion, I was. Relieved from the personal command of the Cavalry Corps, and orderedto the Shenandoah Valley, where at a later date Torbert's andWilson's divisions joined me. Practically, after I went to thevalley, my command of the Cavalry Corps became supervisory merely. During the period of my immediate control of the corps, I tried tocarry into effect, as far as possible, the views I had advancedbefore and during the opening of the Wilderness campaign, i. E. , "thatour cavalry ought to fight the enemy's cavalry, and our infantry theenemy's infantry"; for there was great danger of breaking the spiritof the corps if it was to be pitted against the enemy's compactmasses of foot-troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless therewas some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be gained, such a use of it would not be justified. Immediately succeeding thebattles of the Wilderness, opportunity offered to put this plan intoexecution to some extent, and from that time forward--from the battleof Yellow Tavern--our success was almost continuous, resultingfinally, before the close of the war, in the nearly totalannihilation of the enemy's cavalry. 

The constant activity of the corps from May 5 till August 1 gavelittle opportunity for the various division and brigade commanders torecord its work in detail; so there exists but meagre accounts of thenumerous skirmishes and graver conflicts in which, in addition to thefights mentioned in this narrative, it engaged. A detailed historyof its performances is not within the province of a work of thisnature; but in review, it can be said, without trespassing on thereader's time, that the Cavalry Corps led the advance of the Army ofthe Potomac into the Wilderness in the memorable campaign of 1864;that on the expedition by way of Richmond to Haxall's it marked outthe army's line of march to the North Anna; that it again led theadvance to the Tolopotomy, and also to Cold Harbor, holding thatimportant strategic point at great hazard; and that by the Trevillianexpedition it drew away the enemy's cavalry from the south side ofthe Chickahominy, and thereby assisted General Grant materially insuccessfully marching to the James River and Petersburg. Subsequently, Wilson made his march to Staunton bridge, destroyingrailroads and supplies of inestimable value, and though this wasneutralized by his disaster near Ream's Station, the temporaryset-back there to one division was soon redeemed by victory overthe Confederate infantry at the battle of Darbytown. 

In the campaign we were almost always on the march, night and day, often unable to care properly for our wounded, and obliged to buryour dead where they fell; and innumerable combats attest the part thecavalry played in Grant's march from the Rapidan to Petersburg. Innearly all of these our casualties were heavy, particularly so when, as was often the case, we had to engage the Confederate infantry; butthe enemy returned such a full equivalent in dead and wounded inevery instance, that finally his mounted power, which from thebeginning of the war had been nurtured with a wise appreciation ofits value, was utterly broken. 

CHAPTER XXIII. 

GENERAL HUNTER'S SUCCESSFUL MARCH AND SUBSEQUENT RETREAT--GENERALJUBAL A. EARLY THREATENS WASHINGTON--CHAMBERSBURG, PA. , BURNED--SELECTED TO OPERATE AGAINST GENERAL EARLY--THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY--THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. 

When the attempt to take Petersburg in conjunction with the mineexplosion resulted in such a dismal failure, all the operationscontemplated in connection with that project came to a standstill, and there was every prospect that the intensely hot and sultryweather would prevent further activity in the Army of the Potomactill a more propitious season. Just now, however, the conditionsexisting in the Shenandoah Valley and along the upper Potomacdemanded the special attention of General Grant, for, notwithstandingthe successful march that Major-General David Hunter had made towardLynchburg early in the summer, what he had first gained wassubsequently lost by strategical mistakes, that culminated indisaster during the retreat he was obliged to make from the vicinityof Lynchburg to the Kanawha Valley. This route of march uncoveredthe lower portion of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and with theexception of a small force of Union troops under General Franz Sigelposted aft Martinsburg for the purpose of covering the Baltimore andOhio railroad, there was nothing at hand to defend the lower valley. 

The different bodies of Confederates which compelled Hunter's retreatwere under command of General Jubal A. Early, who had been sent toLynchburg with Ewell's corps after the defeat of the ConfederateGeneral W. C. Jones near Staunton on the 5th of June, to take commandof the Valley District. When Early had forced Hunter into theKanawha region far enough to feel assured that Lynchburg could notagain be threatened from that direction, he united to his own corpsGeneral John C. Breckenridge's infantry division and the cavalry ofGenerals J. H. Vaughn, John McCausland. B. T. Johnson, and J. D. Imboden, which heretofore had been operating in southwest and westernVirginia under General Robert Ransom, Jr. , and with the column thusformed, was ready to turn his attention to the lower ShenandoahValley. At Early's suggestion General Lee authorized him to movenorth at an opportune moment, cross the upper Potomac into Marylandand threaten Washington. Indeed, General Lee had foreshadowed such acourse when Early started toward Lynchburg for the purpose ofrelieving the pressure in front of Petersburg, but was in some doubtas to the practicability of the movement later, till persuaded to itby the representations of Early after that general had driven Hunterbeyond the mountains and found little or nothing opposing except thesmall force of Sigel, which he thought he could readily overcome bycelerity of movement. 

By rapid marching Early reached Winchester on the 2d of July, and onthe 4th occupied Martinsburg, driving General Sigel out of that placethe same day that Hunter's troops, after their fatiguing retreatthrough the mountains, reached Charlestown, West Virginia. Early wasthus enabled to cross the Potomac without difficulty, when, movingaround Harper's Ferry, through the gaps of the South Mountain, hefound his path unobstructed till he reached the Monocacy, whereRicketts's division of the Sixth Corps, and some raw troops that hadbeen collected by General Lew Wallace, met and held the Confederatestill the other reinforcements that had been ordered to the capitalfrom Petersburg could be brought up. Wallace contested the line ofthe Monocacy with obstinacy, but had to retire finally towardBaltimore. The road was then open to Washington, and Early marchedto the outskirts and began against the capital the demonstrationswhich were designed to divert the Army of the Potomac from its mainpurpose in front of Petersburg. 

Early's audacity in thus threatening Washington had caused someconcern to the officials in the city, but as the movement was lookedupon by General Grant as a mere foray which could have no decisiveissue, the Administration was not much disturbed till theConfederates came in close proximity. Then was repeated the alarmand consternation of two years before, fears for the safety of thecapital being magnified by the confusion and discord existing amongthe different generals in Washington and Baltimore; and the imaginarydangers vanished only with the appearance of General Wright, who, with the Sixth Corps and one division of the Nineteenth Corps, pushedout to attack Early as soon as he could get his arriving troops inhand, but under circumstances that precluded celerity of movement;and as a consequence the Confederates escaped with little injury, retiring across the Potomac to Leesburg, unharassed save by someUnion cavalry that had been sent out into Loudoun County by Hunter, who in the meantime had arrived at Harper's Ferry by the Baltimoreand Ohio railroad. From Leesburg Early retired through Winchestertoward Strasburg, but when the head of his column reached this placehe found that he was being followed by General Crook with thecombined troops of Hunter and Sigel only, Wright having returned toWashington under orders to rejoin Meade at Petersburg. Thisreduction of the pursuing force tempting Early to resume theoffensive, he attacked Crook at Kernstown, and succeeded inadministering such a check as to necessitate this general's retreatto Martinsburg, and finally to Harper's Ferry. Crook's withdrawalrestored to Early the line of the upper Potomac, so, recrossing thisstream, he advanced again into Maryland, and sending McCausland on toChambersburg, Pennsylvania, laid that town in ashes, leaving threethousand non-combatants without shelter or food. 

When Early fell back from the vicinity of Washington towardStrasburg, General Grant believed that he would rejoin Lee, but latermanoeuvres of the enemy indicated that Early had given up this idea, if he ever, entertained it, and intended to remain in the valley, since it would furnish Lee and himself with subsistence, and alsoafford renewed opportunities for threatening Washington. Indeed, thepossession of the Valley of the Shenandoah at this time was of vastimportance to Lee's army, and on every hand there were indicationsthat the Confederate Government wished to hold it at least untilafter the crops could be gathered in to their depots at Lynchburg andRichmond. Its retention, besides being of great advantage in thematter of supplies, would also be a menace to the North difficult forGeneral Grant to explain, and thereby add an element of considerablebenefit to the Confederate cause; so when Early's troops againappeared at Martinsburg it was necessary for General Grant toconfront them with a force strong enough to put an end to incursionsnorth of the Potomac, which hitherto had always led to Nationaldiscomfiture at some critical juncture, by turning our army ineastern Virginia from its chief purpose--the destruction of Lee andthe capture of the Confederate capital. 

This second irruption of Early, and his ruthless destruction ofChambersburg led to many recommendations on the part of General Grantlooking to a speedy elimination of the confusion then existing amongthe Union forces along the upper Potomac, but for a time theauthorities at Washington would approve none of his propositions. The President and Secretary Stanton seemed unwilling to adopt hissuggestions, and one measure which he deemed very important--theconsolidation into a single command of the four geographicaldistricts into which, to relieve political pressure no doubt, theterritory had been divided--met with serious opposition. DespiteGrant's representations, he could not prevail on the Administrationto approve this measure, but finally the manoeuvres of Early and theraid to Chambersburg compelled a partial compliance, though Grant hadsomewhat circumvented the difficulty already by deciding to appoint acommander for the forces in the field that were to operate againstEarly. 

On the 31st of July General Grant selected me as this commander, andin obedience to his telegraphic summons I repaired to hisheadquarters at City Point. In the interview that followed, hedetailed to me the situation of affairs on the upper Potomac, tellingme that I was to command in the field the troops that were to operateagainst Early, but that General Hunter, who was at the head of thegeographical department, would be continued in his position for thereason that the Administration was reluctant to reconstruct orconsolidate the different districts. After informing me that onedivision of the Cavalry Corps would be sent to my new command, hewent on to say that he wanted me to push the enemy as soon as thisdivision arrived, and if Early retired up the Shenandoah Valley I wasto pursue, but if he crossed the Potomac I was to put myself south ofhim and try to compass his destruction. The interview having ended, I returned to Hancock Station to prepare for my departure, and on theevening of August 1 I was relieved from immediate duty with the Armyof the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry as a corpsorganization. 

I arrived at Washington on the 4th of August, and the next dayreceived instructions from General Halleck to report to General Grantat Monocacy Junction, whither he had gone direct from City Point, inconsequence of a characteristic despatch from the Presidentindicating his disgust with the confusion, disorder, and helplessnessprevailing along the upper Potomac, and intimating that Grant'spresence there was necessary. 

In company with the Secretary of War I called on the President beforeleaving Washington, and during a short conversation Mr. Lincolncandidly told me that Mr. Stanton had objected to my assignment toGeneral Hunter's command, because he thought me too young, and thathe himself had concurred with the Secretary; but now, since GeneralGrant had "ploughed round" the difficulties of the situation bypicking me out to command the "boys in the field, " he felt satisfiedwith what had been done, and "hoped for the best. " Mr. Stantonremained silent during these remarks, never once indicating whetherhe, too, had become reconciled to my selection or not; and although, after we left the White House, he conversed with me freely in regardto the campaign I was expected to make, seeking to impress on me thenecessity for success from the political as well as from the militarypoint of view, yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken anypart in disapproving the recommendation of the general-in-chief. 

August 6, I reported to General Grant at the Monocacy, and he thereturned over to me the following instructions, which he had previouslyprepared for General Hunter in the expectation that general wouldcontinue to command the department:

"HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, "Monocacy Bridge, Md. , Aug. 5, 1864. 

"GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in thevicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards andgarrisons for public property as may be necessary. 

"Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so doing time can besaved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has movednorth of the Potomac in large force, push north, following andattacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of thePotomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained thatthe enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push souththe main force, detaching, under a competent commander, a sufficientforce to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. Indetaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en route fromWashington via Rockville may be taken into account. 

"There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of thebest of cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to joinyou by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probablystart to-morrow. 

"In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you will haveto go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left toinvite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stockwanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people should be informedthat so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of theseraids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at allhazards. 

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do thisyou want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course bythe course he takes. 

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regularvouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the countrythrough which you march. 

"Very respectfully, "U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. "

"Major-General D. HUNTER, "Commanding Department of West Virginia. "

When I had read the letter addressed to Hunter, General Grant said Iwould be expected to report directly to him, as Hunter had asked thatday to be wholly relieved, not from any chagrin at my assignment tothe control of the active forces of his command, but because hethought that his fitness for the position he was filling wasdistrusted by General Halleck, and he had no wish to causeembarrassment by remaining where he could but remove me one degreefrom the headquarters of the army. The next day Hunter's unselfishrequest was complied with, and an order was issued by the President, consolidating the Middle Department, the Department of Washington, the Department of the Susquehanna, and the Department of WestVirginia. 

Under this order these four geographical districts constituted theMiddle Military Division, and I was temporarily assigned to commandit. Hunter's men had been bivouacking for some days past in thevicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick, but before GeneralGrant's instructions were written out, Hunter had conformed to themby directing the concentration at Halltown, about four miles in frontof Harper's Ferry, of all his force available for field service. Therefore the different bodies of troops, with the exception ofAverell's cavalry, which had followed McCausland toward Moorefieldafter the burning of Chambersburg, were all in motion toward Halltownon August 6. 

Affairs at Monocacy kept me but an hour or two, and these disposedof, I continued on to Harper's Ferry by the special train which hadbrought me from Washington, that point being intended as myheadquarters while making preparations to advance. The enemy wasoccupying Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown at the time;sending occasional raiding parties into Maryland as far asHagerstown. The concentration of my troops at Halltown being anindication to Early that we intended to renew the offensive, however, he immediately began counter preparations by drawing in all hisdetached columns from the north side of the Potomac, abandoning acontemplated raid into Maryland, which his success against Crook atKernstown had prompted him to project, and otherwise disposinghimself for defense. 

At Harper's Ferry I made my headquarters in the second story of asmall and very dilapidated hotel, and as soon as settled sent forLieutenant John R. Meigs, the chief engineer officer of the command, to study with him the maps of my geographical division. It alwayscame rather easy to me to learn the geography of a new section, andits important topographical features as well; therefore I found that, with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession, the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in mymind. Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream, andwith all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge, and wasparticularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the ShenandoahValley, even down to the farmhouses. He imparted with greatreadiness what he knew of this, clearly pointing out itsconfiguration and indicating the strongest points for Confederatedefense, at the same time illustrating scientifically and forciblythe peculiar disadvantages under which the Union army had hithertolabored. 

The section that received my closest attention has its northern limitalong the Potomac between McCoy's ferry at the eastern base of theNorth Mountain, and Harper's Ferry at the western base of the BlueRidge. The southern limit is south of Staunton, on the divide whichseparates the waters flowing into the Potomac from those that run tothe James. The western boundary is the eastern slope of theAlleghany Mountains, the eastern, the Blue Ridge; these two distinctmountain ranges trending about southwest inclose a stretch of quiteopen, undulating country varying in width from the northern to thesouthern extremity, and dotted at frequent intervals with patches ofheavy woods: At Martinsburg the valley is about sixty miles broad, and on an east and west line drawn through Winchester aboutforty-five, while at Strasburg it narrows down to about twenty-five. Just southeast of Strasburg, which is nearly midway between theeastern and western walls of the valley, rises an abrupt range ofmountains called Massanutten, consisting of several ridges whichextend southward between the North and South Forks of the ShenandoahRiver until, losing their identity, they merge into lower but brokenground between New Market and Harrisonburg. The Massanutten ranges, with their spurs and hills, divide the Shenandoah Valley into twovalleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray, whilethat next the North Mountain retains the name of Shenandoah. 

A broad macadamized road, leading south from Williamsport, Maryland, to Lexington, Virginia, was built at an early day to connect theinterior of the latter State with the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, andalong this road are situated the principal towns and villages of theShenandoah Valley, with lateral lines of communication extending tothe mountain ranges on the east and west. The roads running towardthe Blue Ridge are nearly all macadamized, and the principal oneslead to the railroad system of eastern Virginia through Snicker's, Ashby's Manassas, Chester, Thornton's Swift Run, Brown's andRock-fish gaps, tending to an ultimate centre at Richmond. These gapsare low and easy, offering little obstruction to the march of an armycoming from eastern Virginia, and thus the Union troops operating westof the Blue Ridge were always subjected to the perils of a flankattack; for the Confederates could readily be brought by rail toGordonsville and Charlottesville, from which points they could movewith such celerity through the Blue Ridge that, on more than oneoccasion, the Shenandoah Valley had been the theatre of Confederatesuccess, due greatly to the advantage of possessing these interiorlines. 

Nature had been very kind to the valley, making it rich andproductive to an exceptional degree, and though for three yearscontending armies had been marching up and down it, the fertile soilstill yielded ample subsistence for Early's men, with a large surplusfor the army of Lee. The ground had long been well cleared oftimber, and the rolling surface presented so few obstacles to themovement of armies that they could march over the country in anydirection almost as well as on the roads, the creeks and rivers beingeverywhere fordable, with little or no difficulty beyond that ofleveling the approaches. 

I had opposing me an army largely composed of troops that hadoperated in this region hitherto under "Stonewall" Jackson withmarked success, inflicting defeat on the Union forces almost everytime the two armies had come in contact. These men were now commandedby a veteran officer of the Confederacy-General Jubal A. Early--whosepast services had so signalized his ability that General Leespecially selected him to take charge of the Valley District, and, notwithstanding the misfortunes that befell him later, clung to himtill the end, of the war. The Confederate army at this date wasabout twenty thousand strong, and consisted of Early's own corps, with Generals Rodes, Ramseur, and Gordon commanding its divisions;the infantry of Breckenridge from southwestern Virginia; threebattalions of artillery; and the cavalry brigades of Vaughn, Johnson, McCausland, and Imboden. This cavalry was a short time afterwardorganized into a division under the command of General Lomax. 

After discovering that my troops were massing in front of Harper'sFerry, Early lost not a moment in concentrating his in the vicinityof Martinsburg, in positions from which he could continue to obstructthe Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and yet be enabled to retire up thevalley under conditions of safety when I should begin an offensivecampaign. 

When I took command of the Army of the Shenandoah its infantry forcecomprised the Sixth Corps, one division of the Nineteenth Corps, andtwo divisions from West Virginia. The Sixth Corps was commandedby Major-General Horatio G. Wright; its three divisions byBrigadier-Generals David A. Russell, Geo. W. Getty, and James B. Ricketts. The single division of the Nineteenth Corps had for itsimmediate chief Brigadier-General William Dwight, the corps beingcommanded by Brigadier-General Wm. H. Emory. The troops from WestVirginia were under Brigadier-General George Crook, with ColonelsJoseph Thoburn and Isaac H. Duval as division commanders, and thoughin all not more than one fair-sized division, they had beendesignated, on account of the department they belonged to, the Army ofWest Virginia. General Torbert's division, then arriving from theCavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, represented the mounted armof the service, and in the expectation that Averell would soon join mewith his troopers, I assigned General Torbert as chief of cavalry, andGeneral Wesley Merritt succeeded to the command of Torbert's division. 

General Wright, the commander of the Sixth Corps, was an officer ofhigh standing in the Corps of Engineers, and had seen much activeservice during the preceding three years. He commanded theDepartment of the Ohio throughout the very trying period of thesummer and fall of 1862, and while in that position he, withother prominent officers, recommended my appointment as abrigadier-general. In 1863 he rendered valuable service at the battleof Gettysburg, following which he was assigned to the Sixth Corps, andcommanded it at the capture of the Confederate works at RappahannockStation and in the operations at Mine Run. He ranked me as amajor-general of volunteers by nearly a year in date of commission, but my assignment by the President to the command of the army in thevalley met with Wright's approbation, and, so far as I have everknown, he never questioned the propriety of the President's action. The Sixth Corps division commanders, Getty, Russell, and Ricketts, were all educated soldiers, whose records, beginning with the MexicanWar, had already been illustrated in the war of the rebellion bydistinguished service in the Army of the Potomac. 

General Emory was a veteran, having graduated at the Military Academyin 1831, the year I was born. In early life he had seen much servicein the Artillery, the Topographical Engineers, and the Cavalry, andin the war of the rebellion had exhibited the most soldierlycharacteristics at Port Hudson and on the Red River campaign. Atthis time he had but one division of the Nineteenth Corps present, which division was well commanded by General Dwight, a volunteerofficer who had risen to the grade of brigadier-general throughconstant hard work. Crook was a classmate of mine--at least, weentered the Military Academy the same year, though he graduated ayear ahead of me. We had known each other as boys before we enteredthe army, and later as men, and I placed implicit faith in hisexperience and qualifications as a general. 

The transfer of Torbert to the position of chief of cavalry leftMerritt, as I have already said, in command of the First CavalryDivision. He had been tried in the place before, and from the day hewas selected as one of a number of young men to be appointed generalofficers, with the object of giving life to the Cavalry Corps, hefilled the measure of expectation. Custer was one of these young mentoo, and though as yet commanding a brigade under Merritt, hisgallant fight at Trevillian Station, as well as a dozen others duringthe summer, indicated that he would be equal to the work that was tofall to him when in a few weeks he should succeed Wilson. But to goon down the scale of rank, describing the officers who commanded inthe Army of the Shenandoah, would carry me beyond all limit, so Irefrain from the digression with regret that I cannot pay to each hiswell-earned tribute. 

The force that I could take with me into the field at this timenumbered about 26, 000 men. Within the limits of the geographicaldivision there was a much greater number of troops than this. Baltimore, Washington, Harper's Ferry, Hagerstown, Frederick, Cumberland, and a score of other points; besides the strongdetachments that it took to keep the Baltimore and Ohio railroad openthrough the mountains of West Virginia, and escorts for my trains, absorbed so many men that the column which could be made availablefor field operations was small when compared with the showing onpaper. Indeed, it was much less than it ought to have been, but forme, in the face of the opposition made by different interestsinvolved, to detach troops from any of the points to which they hadbeen distributed before I took charge was next to impossible. 

In a few days after my arrival preparations were completed, and I wasready to make the first move for the possession of the ShenandoahValley. For the next five weeks the operations on my part consistedalmost wholly of offensive and defensive manoeuvring for certainadvantages, the enemy confining himself meanwhile to measuresintended to counteract my designs. Upon the advent of Torbert, Earlyimmediately grew suspicious, and fell back twelve miles south ofMartinsburg, to Bunker Hill and vicinity, where his right flank wouldbe less exposed, but from which position he could continue tomaintain the break in the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and pushreconnoitring parties through Smithfield to Charlestown. Thesereconnoitring parties exhibited considerable boldness at times, butsince they had no purpose in view save to discover whether or not wewere moving, I did not contest any ground with them except about ouroutposts. Indeed, I desired that Early might remain at some pointwell to the north till I was fully prepared to throw my army on hisright and rear and force a battle, and hence I abstained fromdisturbing him by premature activity, for I thought that if I couldbeat him at Winchester, or north of it, there would be far greaterchances of weighty results. I therefore determined to bring mytroops, if it were at all possible to do so, into such a positionnear that town as to oblige Early to fight. The sequel proved, however, that he was accurately informed of all my movements. Toanticipate them, therefore, he began his retreat up the valley theday that I moved out from Halltown, and consequently was able toplace himself south of Winchester before I could get there. 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

MOVING ON GENERAL EARLY--GENERAL GRANT'S LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS--DESTROYING THE RESOURCES OF THE VALLEY--REASON FOR THE DESTRUCTION--WITHDRAWAL TO HALLTOWN--ALARM IN THE NORTH OVER THE RETROGRADEMOVEMENT--RENEWING THE ADVANCE UP THE VALLEY--GENERAL ANDERSON'SATTEMPT TO RETURN TO PETERSBURG--STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES. 

For a clear understanding of the operations which preceded thevictories that resulted in almost annihilating General Early's armyin the Shenandoah Valley, it is necessary to describe in considerabledetail the events that took place prior to the 19th of September. Myarmy marched from Harper's Ferry on the 10th of August, 1864, GeneralTorbert with Merritt's division of cavalry moving in advance throughBerryville, going into position near White Post. The Sixth Corps, under General Wright, moved by way of Charlestown and Summit Point toClifton; General Emory, with Dwight's division of the NineteenthCorps, marched along the Berryville pike through Berryville to theleft of the position of the Sixth Corps at Clifton; General Crook'scommand, moving on the Kabletown road, passed through Kabletown tothe vicinity of Berryville, and went into position on the left ofDwight's division, while Colonel Lowell, with a detached force of twosmall regiments of cavalry, marched to Summit Point; so that on thenight of August 10 my infantry occupied a line stretching fromClifton to Berryville, with Merritt's cavalry at White Post andLowell's at Summit Point. The enemy, as stated before, moved at thesame time from Bunker Hill and vicinity, and stretched his line fromwhere the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequon Creek tothe point at which the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses thesame stream, thus occupying the west bank to cover Winchester. 

On the morning of the 11th the Sixth Corps was ordered to move acrossthe country toward the junction of the Berryville-Winchester pike andthe Opequon, and to take the crossing and hold it, Dwight's divisionbeing directed to move through Berryville on the White Post road fora mile, then file to the right by heads of regiments at deployingdistances, and carry the crossing of Opequon Creek at a ford aboutthree-fourths of a mile from the left of the Sixth Corps, while Crookwas instructed to move out on the White Post road, a mile and a halfbeyond Berryville, then head to the right and secure the ford about amile to the left of Dwight; Torbert's orders were to push Merritt'sdivision up the Millwood pike toward Winchester, attack any force hemight run against, and ascertain the movements of the Confederatearmy; and lastly, Lowell received instructions to close in fromSummit Point on the right of the Sixth Corps. 

My object in securing the fords was to further my march on Winchesterfrom the southeast, since, from all the information gathered duringthe 10th, I still thought Early could be brought to a stand at thatpoint; but in this I was mistaken, as Torbert's reconnoissanceproved, for on the morning of the 11th, when Merritt had driven theConfederate cavalry, then covering the Millwood pike west of theOpequon, off toward Kernstown, he found that their infantry andartillery were retreating south, up the Valley pike. 

As soon as this information was obtained Torbert moved quicklythrough the toll-gate on the Front Royal and Winchester road toNewtown, to strike the enemy's flank and harass him in his retreat, Lowell following up through Winchester, on the Valley pike; Crook wasturned to the left and ordered to Stony Point, while Emory andWright, marching to the left also, were directed to take post on thenight of the 11th between the Millwood and Front Royal roads, withinsupporting distance of Crook. Merritt meeting some of the enemy'scavalry at the tollgate, drove it in the direction of Newtown till itgot inside the line of Gordon's division of infantry, which had beenthrown out and posted behind barricades to cover the flank of themain force in its retreat. A portion of Merritt's cavalry attackedthis infantry and drove in its skirmish-line, and though not able todislodge Gordon, Merritt held the ground gained till night-fall, whenthe Confederate infantry moved off under cover of darkness to Hupp'sHill, between Strasburg and Cedar Creek. 

The next morning Crook marched from Stony Point to Cedar Creek, Emoryfollowed with Dwight, and the cavalry moved to the same point by wayof Newtown and the Valley pike, the Sixth Corps following thecavalry. That night Crook was in position at Cedar Creek, on theleft of the Valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the SixthCorps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the flanks. In theafternoon a heavy skirmish-line had been thrown forward to theheights on the south side of Cedar Creek, and a brisk affair with theenemy's pickets took place, the Confederates occupying with theirmain force the heights north of Strasburg. On the morning of the13th my cavalry went out to reconnoitre toward Strasburg, on themiddle road, about two and a half miles west of the Valley pike, anddiscovered that Early's infantry was at Fisher's Hill, where he hadthrown up behind Tumbling Run earthworks extending clear across thenarrow valley between the Massanutten and North mountains. On theleft of these works he had Vaughan's, McCausland's, and Johnson'sbrigades of cavalry under General Lomax, who at this time relievedGeneral Ramseur from the command of the Confederate mounted forces. 

Within the past day or two I had received information that a columnof the enemy was moving up from Culpeper Court House and approachingFront Royal through Chester Gap, and although the intelligence wasunconfirmed, it caused me much solicitude; for there was strongprobability that such a movement would be made, and any considerableforce advancing through Front Royal toward Winchester could fall uponmy rear and destroy my communication with Harper's Ferry, or, movingalong the base of Massanutten Mountain, could attack my flank inconjunction with the force at Fisher's Hill without a possibility ofmy preventing it. 

Neither Wilson's cavalry nor Grower's infantry had yet joined me, andthe necessities, already explained, which obliged me to hold withstring garrisons Winchester and other points heretofore mentioned. Had so depleted my line of battle strength that I knew the enemywould outnumber me when Anderson's corps should arrive in the valley. I deemed it advisable, therefore, to act with extreme caution, so, with the exception of a cavalry reconnoissance on the 13th, Iremained on the defensive, quietly awaiting developments. In theevening of that day the enemy's skirmishers withdrew to Tumbling Run, his main force remaining inactive behind the intrenchments atFisher's Hill waiting for the arrival of Anderson. 

The rumors in regard to the force advancing from Culpeper keptincreasing every hour, so on the morning of the 14th I concluded tosend a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal to ascertain definitely whatwas up. At the same time I crossed the Sixth Corps to the south sideof Cedar Creek, and occupied the heights near Strasburg. That day Ireceived from the hands of Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant-General'sDepartment, the following despatch, to deliver which he had ridden ingreat haste from Washington through Snicker's Gap, escorted by aregiment of cavalry:

"CITY POINT, August 12, 1864--9 A. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK

"Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain two (2) divisions ofinfantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty (20) piecesof artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night. He mustbe cautious, and act now on the defensive until movements here forcethem to detach to send this way. Early's force, with this increase, cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for GeneralSheridan to attack. Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade ofthe Nineteenth Corps. 

"I have ordered to Washington all the one-hundred-day men. Theirtime will soon be out, but for the present they will do to serve inthe defenses. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

The despatch explained the movement from Culpeper, and on the morningof the 15th Merritt's two remaining brigades were sent to Front Royalto oppose Anderson, and the Sixth Corps withdrawn to the north sideof Cedar Creek, where it would be in a position enabling me either toconfront Anderson or to act defensively, as desired by General Grant. 

To meet the requirements of his instructions I examined the map ofthe valley for a defensive line--a position where a smaller number oftroops could hold a larger number--for this information led me tosuppose that Early's force would greatly exceed mine when Anderson'stwo divisions of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry had joined him. I could see but one such position, and that was at Halltown, in frontof Harper's Ferry. Subsequent experience convinced me that there wasno other really defensive line in the Shenandoah Valley, for atalmost any other point the open country and its peculiar topographyinvites rather than forbids flanking operations. 

This retrograde movement would also enable me to strengthen mycommand by Grower's division of the Nineteenth Corps and Wilson'scavalry, both of which divisions were marching from Washington by wayof Snicker's Gap. 

After fully considering the matter, I determined to move back toHalltown, carrying out, as I retired, my instructions to destroy allthe forage and subsistence the country afforded. So Emory wasordered to retire to Winchester on the night of the 15th, and Wrightand Crook to follow through Winchester to Clifton the next night. 

For the cavalry, in this move to the rear, I gave the followinginstructions:

".... In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as it is expected you willhave to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be leftto invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, andstock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot beconsumed, destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should bedestroyed--they should, rather, be protected; but the people shouldbe informed that so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined tostop them at all hazards.... " [Grant's letter of instructions. ]

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, "Cedar Creek, Va. , August 16, 1864. 

"GENERAL: In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant-Generalcommanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give thenecessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of aline from Millwood to Winchester and Petticoat Gap. You will seizeall mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army. Loyalcitizens can bring in their claims against the Government for thisnecessary destruction. No houses will be burned, and officers incharge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the peoplethat the object is to make this valley untenable for the raidingparties of the rebel army. 

"Very respectfully, "P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. 

"BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. T. A. TORBERT, "Chief of Cavalry, Middle Military Division. "

During his visit to General Hunter at the Monocacy, General Grant hadnot only decided to retain in the Shenandoah Valley a large forcesufficient to defeat Early's army or drive it back to Lee, but he hadfurthermore determined to make that sections by the destruction ofits supplies, untenable for continued occupancy by the Confederates. This would cut off one of Lee's main-stays in the way of subsistence, and at the same time diminish the number of recruits and conscriptshe received; the valley district while under his control not onlysupplying Lee with an abundance of food, but also furnishing him manymen for his regular and irregular forces. Grant's instructions todestroy the valley began with the letter of August 5 to Hunter, whichwas turned over to me, and this was followed at intervals by morespecific directions, all showing the earnestness of his purpose. 

"CITY POINT, Va. , Aug. 16--3:30 P. M. , 1864. "MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Winchester, Va. :

"If you can possibly spare a division of cavalry, send them throughLoudoun County to destroy and carry off the crops, animals, negroes, and all men under fifty years of age capable of bearing arms. Inthis way you will get many of Mosby's men. All male citizens underfifty can fairly be held as prisoners of war, not as citizenprisoners. If not already soldiers, they will be made so the momentthe rebel army gets hold of them. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "CITY POINT, Aug. 21, 1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va. :

"In stripping Loudoun County of supplies, etc. , impress from allloyal persons so that they may receive pay for what is taken fromthem. I am informed by the Assistant Secretary of War that LoudounCounty has a large population of Quakers, who are all favorablydisposed to the Union. These people may be exempted from arrest. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES"CITY POINT, Va. , Aug. 26, 2:30 P. M. 1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Halltown, Va. :

"Telegraphed you that I had good reason for believing that Fitz Leehad been ordered back here. I now think it likely that all troopswill be ordered back from the valley except what they believe to bethe minimum number to detain you. My reason for supposing this isbased upon the fact that yielding up the Weldon road seems to be ablow to the enemy he cannot stand. I think I do not overstate theloss of the enemy in the last two weeks at 10, 000 killed and wounded. We have lost heavily, mostly in captured when the enemy gainedtemporary advantages. Watch closely, and if you find this theorycorrect, push with all vigor. Give the enemy no rest, and if it ispossible to follow to the Virginia Central road, follow that far. Doall the damage to railroads and crops you can. Carry off stock ofall descriptions and negroes, so as to prevent further planting. Ifthe war is to last another year we want the Shenandoah Valley toremain a barren waste. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. 

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "CITY POINT, Va. , Sept. 4, --10 A. M. --1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Charlestown, Va. :

"In cleaning out the arms-bearing community of Loudoun County and thesubsistence for armies, exercise your own judgment as to who shouldbe exempt from arrest, and as to who should receive pay for theirstock, grain, etc. It is our interest that that county should not becapable of subsisting a hostile army, and at the same time we want toinflict as little hardship upon Union men as possible. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

"CITY POINT, Va. , Nov. 9, 1864. "MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, Cedar Creek, Va. :

"Do you not think it advisable to notify all citizens living east ofthe Blue Ridge to move out north of the Potomac all their stock, grain, and provisions of every description? There is no doubt aboutthe necessity of clearing out that country so that it will notsupport Mosby's gang. And the question is whether it is not betterthat the people should save what they can. So long as the war laststhey must be prevented from raising another crop, both there and ashigh up the valley as we can control. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

He had rightly concluded that it was time to bring the war home to apeople engaged in raising crops from a prolific soil to feed thecountry's enemies, and devoting to the Confederacy its best youth. Iendorsed the programme in all its parts, for the stores of meat andgrain that the valley provided, and the men it furnished for Lee'sdepleted regiments, were the strongest auxiliaries he possessed inthe whole insurgent section. In war a territory like this is afactor of great importance, and whichever adversary controls itpermanently reaps all the advantages of its prosperity. Hence, as Ihave said, I endorsed Grant's programme, for I do not hold war tomean simply that lines of men shall engage each other in battle, andmaterial interests be ignored. This is but a duel, in which onecombatant seeks the other's life; war means much more, and is farworse than this. Those who rest at home in peace and plenty see butlittle of the horrors attending such a duel, and even growindifferent to them as the struggle goes on, contenting themselveswith encouraging all who are able-bodied to enlist in the cause, tofill up the shattered ranks as death thins them. It is anothermatter, however, when deprivation and suffering are brought to theirown doors. Then the case appears much graver, for the loss ofproperty weighs heavy with the most of mankind; heavier often, thanthe sacrifices made on the field of battle. Death is popularlyconsidered the maximum of punishment in war, but it is not; reductionto poverty brings prayers for peace more surely and more quickly thandoes the destruction of human life, as the selfishness of man hasdemonstrated in more than one great conflict. 

In the afternoon of the 16th I started back to Winchester, whence Icould better supervise our regressive march. As I was passingthrough Newtown, I heard cannonading from the direction of FrontRoyal, and on reaching Winchester, Merritt's couriers brought me wordthat he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah byKershaw's division of Anderson's corps and two brigades of FitzhughLee's cavalry, but that the attack had been handsomely repulsed, witha capture of two battle-flags and three hundred prisoners. This wasan absolute confirmation of the despatch from Grant; and I was nowmore than satisfied with the wisdom of my withdrawal. 

At daylight of the 17th Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville, and the same morning Crook and Wright reached Winchester, havingstarted from Cedar Creek the day before. From Winchester, Crook andWright resumed their march toward Clifton, Wright, who had the rearguard, getting that day as far as the Berryville crossing of theOpequon, where he was ordered to remain, while Crook went ahead tillhe reached the vicinity of Berryville. On the afternoon of the 17thLowell with his two regiments of troopers came into Winchester, wherehe was joined by Wilson's mounted division, which had come by a rapidmarch from Snicker's ferry. In the mean time Merritt, after hishandsome engagement with Kershaw near Front Royal, had been orderedback to the neighborhood of White Post, so that my cavalry outpostsnow extended from this last point around to the west of Winchester. 

During all these operations the enemy had a signal-station on ThreeTop Mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, from which every movementmade by our troops could be plainly seen; therefore, early on themorning of the 17th he became aware of the fact that we were retiringdown the valley, and at once made after us, and about sundown droveTorbert out of Winchester, he having been left there-with Wilson andLowell, and the Jersey brigade of the Sixth Corps, to develop thecharacter of the enemy's pursuit. After a severe skirmish Wilson andLowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined itscorps at the crossing of the Opequon. This affair demonstrated thatEarly's whole army had followed us from Fisher's Hill, in concertwith Anderson and Fitzhugh Lee from Front Royal, and the two columnsjoined near Winchester the morning of the 18th. 

That day I moved the Sixth Corps by way of Clifton to Flowing Spring, two and a half miles west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; andEmory, with Dwight's and Grower's divisions (Grower's having joinedthat morning from Washington), to a position about the same distancesouth of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike. Following thesemovements, Merritt fell back to Berryville, covering the Berryvillepike crossing of the Opequon, and Wilson was stationed at SummitPoint, whence he held a line along the Opequon as far north as thebridge at Smithfield. Crook continued to hold on near Clifton untilthe next day, and was then moved into place on the left of Emory. 

This line was practically maintained till the 21st, when the enemy, throwing a heavy force across the Opequon by the bridge atSmithfield, drove in my cavalry pickets to Summit Point, and followedup with a rapid advance against the position of the Sixth Corps nearFlowing Spring. A sharp and obstinate skirmish with a heavypicket-line of the Sixth Corps grew out of this manoeuvre, andresulted very much in our favor, but the quick withdrawal of theConfederates left no opportunity for a general engagement. It seemsthat General Early thought I had taken position near Summit Point, andthat by moving rapidly around through Smithfield he could fall upon myrear in concert with an attack in front by Anderson, but the warmreception given him disclosed his error, for he soon discovered thatmy line lay in front of Charlestown instead of where he supposed. 

In the manoeuvre Merritt had been attacked in front of Berryville andWilson at Summit Point, the former by cavalry and the latter byAnderson's infantry. The exposed positions of Merritt and Wilsonnecessitated their withdrawal if I was to continue to act on thedefensive; so, after the army had moved back to Halltown thepreceding night, without loss or inconvenience, I called them in andposted them on the right of the infantry. 

My retrograde move from Strasburg to Halltown caused considerablealarm in the North, as the public was ignorant of the reasons for it;and in the excited state of mind then prevailing, it was generallyexpected that the reinforced Confederate army would again cross thePotomac, ravage Maryland and Pennsylvania, and possibly captureWashington. Mutterings of dissatisfaction reached me from manysources, and loud calls were made for my removal, but I feltconfident that my course would be justified when the true situationwas understood, for I knew that I was complying with my instructions. Therefore I paid small heed to the adverse criticisms pouring downfrom the North almost every day, being fully convinced that the bestcourse was to bide my time, and wait till I could get the enemy intoa position from which he could not escape without such seriousmisfortune as to have some bearing on the general result of the war. Indeed, at this time I was hoping that my adversary would renew theboldness he had exhibited the early part of the month, and strike forthe north side of the Potomac, and wrote to General Grant on the 20thof August that I had purposely left everything in that direction opento the enemy. 

On the 22d the Confederates moved to Charlestown and pushed well upto my position at Halltown. Here for the next three days theyskirmished with my videttes and infantry pickets, Emory and Cookreceiving the main attention; but finding that they could make noimpression, and judging it to be an auspicious time to intensify thescare in the North, on the 25th of August Early despatched FitzhughLee's cavalry to Williamsport, and moved all the rest of his army butAnderson's infantry and McCausland's cavalry to Kerneysville. Thissame day there was sharp picket firing along the whole front of myinfantry line, arising, as afterward ascertained, from a heavydemonstration by Anderson. During this firing I sent Torbert, withMerritt's and Wilson's divisions, to Kerrteysville, whence he was toproceed toward Leetown and learn what had become of Fitz. Lee. 

About a mile from Leetown Torbert met a small force of Confederatecavalry, and soon after encountering it, stumbled on Breckenridge'scorps of infantry on the march, apparently heading for Shepherdstown. The surprise was mutual, for Torbert expected to meet only theenemy's cavalry, while the Confederate infantry column wasanticipating an unobstructed march to the Potomac. Torbert attackedwith such vigor as at first to double up the head of Breckenridge'scorps and throw it into confusion, but when the Confederates realizedthat they were confronted only by cavalry, Early brought up the wholeof the four infantry divisions engaged in his manoeuvre, and in asharp attack pushed Torbert rapidly back. 

All the advantages which Torbert had gained by surprising the enemywere nullified by this counter-attack, and he was obliged to withdrawWilson's division toward my right, to the neighborhood of Duffield'sStation, Merritt drawing back to the same point by way of theShepherdstown ford. Custer's brigade becoming isolated after thefight while assisting the rear guard, was also obliged to retire, which it did to Shepherdstown and there halted, picketing the riverto Antietam ford. 

When Torbert reported to me the nature of his encounter, and that apart of Early's infantry was marching to the north, while FitzhughLee's cavalry had gone toward Martinsburg, I thought that theConfederate general meditated crossing his cavalry into Maryland, soI sent Wilson by way of Harper's Ferry to watch his movements fromBoonesboro', and at the same time directed Averell, who had reportedfrom West Virginia some days before, to take post at Williamsport andhold the crossing there until he was driven away. I also thought itpossible that Early might cross the Potomac with his whole army, butthe doubts of a movement like this outweighed the probabilitiesfavoring it. Nevertheless, to meet such a contingency I arranged tothrow my army on his rear should the occasion arise, and deeming myposition at Halltown the most advantageous in which to awaitdevelopments, my infantry was retained there. 

If General Early had ever intended to cross the Potomac, Torbert'sdiscovery of his manoeuvre put an end to his scheme of invasion, forhe well knew that and success he might derive from such a coursewould depend on his moving with celerity, and keeping me in ignoranceof his march till it should be well under way; so he settled all thepresent uncertainties by retiring with all his troops aboutKerneysville to his old position at Bunker Hill behind the Opequon, and on the night of the 26th silently withdrew Anderson andMcCausland from my front at Halltown to Stephenson's depot. 

By the 27th all of Early's infantry was in position at Brucetown andBunker Hill, his cavalry holding the outposts of Leetown andSmithfield, and on that day Merritt's division attacked the enemy'shorse at Leetown, and pressed it back through Smithfield to the westside of the Opequon. This reconnoissance determined definitely thatEarly had abandoned the projected movement into Maryland, if he everseriously contemplated it; and I marched my infantry out fromHalltown to the front of Charlestown, with the intention of occupyinga line between Clifton and Berryville the moment matters should soshape themselves that I could do so with advantage. The night of the28th Wilson joined me near Charlestown from his points of observationin Maryland, and the next day Averell crossed the Potomac atWilliamsport and advanced to Martinsburg. 

Merritt's possession of Smithfield bridge made Early somewhat uneasy, since it afforded opportunity for interposing a column between hisright and left flanks, so he concluded to retake the crossing, and, to this end, on the 29th advanced two divisions of infantry. Asevere fight followed, and Merritt was forced to retire, being driventhrough the village toward Charlestown with considerable loss. AsMerritt was nearing my infantry line, I ordered. Ricketts's divisionof the Sixth Corps to his relief, and this in a few minutes turnedthe tide, the Smithfield crossing of the Opequon being regained, andafterward held by Lowell's brigade, supported by Ricketts. The nextmorning I moved Torbert, with Wilson and Merritt, to Berryville, andsucceeding their occupation of that point there occurred along mywhole line a lull, which lasted until the 3d of September, beingundisturbed except by a combat near Bunker Hill between Averell'scavalry and a part of McCausland's, supported by Rodes's division ofinfantry, in which affair the Confederates were defeated with theloss of about fifty prisoners and considerable property in the shapeof wagons and beef-cattle. 

Meanwhile Torbert's movement to Berryville had alarmed Early, and asa counter move on the 2d of September he marched with the bulk of hisarmy to Summit Point, but while reconnoitring in that region on the3d he learned of the havoc that Averell was creating in his rear, andthis compelled him to recross to the west side of the Opequon andmass his troops in the vicinity of Stephenson's depot, whence hecould extend down to Bunker Hill, continue to threaten the Baltimoreand Ohio railroad, and at the same time cover Winchester. 

The same day I was moving my infantry to take up the Clifton-Berryvilleline, and that afternoon Wright went into position at Clifton, Crookoccupied Berryville, and Emory's corps came in between them, formingalmost a continuous line. Torbert had moved to White Post meanwhile, with directions to reconnoitre as far south as the Front Royal Pike. 

My infantry had just got fairly into this position about an hourbefore sunset, when along Crook's front a combat took place that atthe time caused me to believe it was Early's purpose to throw acolumn between Crook and Torbert, with the intention of isolating thelatter; but the fight really arose from the attempt of GeneralAnderson to return to Petersburg with Kershaw's division in responseto loud calls from General Lee. Anderson started south on the 3d ofSeptember, and possibly this explains Early's reconnoissance that dayto Summit Point as a covering movement, but his rapid withdrawal lefthim in ignorance of my advance, and Anderson marched on heedlesslytoward Berryville, expecting to cross the Blue Ridge through Ashby'sGap. At Berryville however, he blundered into Crook's lines aboutsunset, and a bitter little fight ensued, in which the Confederatesgot so much the worst of it that they withdrew toward Winchester. When General Early received word of this encounter he hurried toAnderson's assistance with three divisions, but soon perceiving whatwas hitherto unknown to him, that my whole army was on a new line, hedecided, after some slight skirmishing, that Anderson must remain atWinchester until a favorable opportunity offered for him to rejoinLee by another route. 

Succeeding the discomfiture of Anderson, some minor operations tookplace on the part of, Averell on the right and McIntosh's brigade ofWilson's division on the left, but from that time until the 19th ofSeptember no engagement of much importance occurred. The line fromClifton to Berryville was occupied by the Sixth Corps and Grower'sand Dwight's divisions of the Nineteenth, Crook being transferred toSummit Point, whence I could use him to protect my right flank and mycommunication with Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened theenemy's right flank and line of retreat up the valley. 

The difference of strength between the two armies at this date wasconsiderably in my favor, but the conditions attending my situationin a hostile region necessitated so much detached service to protecttrains, and to secure Maryland and Pennsylvania from raids, that myexcess in numbers was almost canceled by these incidental demandsthat could not be avoided, and although I knew that I was strong, yet, in consequence of the injunctions of General Grant, I deemed itnecessary to be very cautious; and the fact that the Presidentialelection was impending made me doubly so, the authorities atWashington having impressed upon me that the defeat of my army mightbe followed by the overthrow of the party in power, which event, itwas believed, would at least retard the progress of the war, if, indeed, it did not lead to the complete abandonment of all coercivemeasures. Under circumstances such as these I could not afford torisk a disaster, to say nothing of the intense disinclination everysoldier has for such results; so, notwithstanding my superiorstrength, I determined to take all the time necessary to equip myselfwith the fullest information, and then seize an opportunity undersuch conditions that I could not well fail of success. 

PERSONAL MEMOIRES OF P. H. SHERIDAN, VOLUME 2. 

By Philip Henry Sheridan

CHAPTER I. 

ORGANIZING SCOUTS--MISS REBECCA WRIGHT--IMPORTANT INFORMATION--DECIDETO MOVE ON NEWTOWN--MEETING GENERAL GRANT--ORGANIZATION OF THE UNIONARMY--OPENING OF THE BATTLE OF THE OPEQUON--DEATH OF GENERAL RUSSELL--A TURNING MOVEMENT--A SUCCESSFUL CAVALRY CHARGE--VICTORY--THREELOYAL GIRLS--APPOINTED A BRIGADIER-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY--REMARKS ON THE BATTLE. 

While occupying the ground between Clifton and Berryville, referredto in the last chapter of the preceding volume, I felt the need of anefficient body of scouts to collect information regarding the enemy, for the defective intelligence-establishment with which I started outfrom Harper's Ferry early in August had not proved satisfactory. Itherefore began to organize my scouts on a system which I hoped wouldgive better results than bad the method hitherto pursued in thedepartment, which was to employ on this service doubtful citizens andConfederate deserters. If these should turn out untrustworthy, themischief they might do us gave me grave apprehension, and I finallyconcluded that those of our own soldiers who should volunteer for thedelicate and hazardous duty would be the most valuable material, anddecided that they should have a battalion organization and becommanded by an officer, Major H. K. Young, of the First Rhode IslandInfantry. These men were disguised in Confederate uniforms whenevernecessary, were paid from the Secret-Service Fund in proportion tothe value of the intelligence they furnished, which often stood us ingood stead in checking the forays of Gilmore, Mosby, and otherirregulars. Beneficial results came from the plan in many other waystoo, and particularly so when in a few days two of my scouts put mein the way of getting news conveyed from Winchester. They hadlearned that just outside of my lines, near Millwood, there wasliving an old colored man, who had a permit from the Confederatecommander to go into Winchester and return three times a week, forthe purpose of selling vegetables to the inhabitants. The scouts hadsounded this man, and, finding him both loyal and shrewd, suggestedthat he might be made useful to us within the enemy's lines; and theproposal struck me as feasible, provided there could be found inWinchester some reliable person who would be willing to co-operateand correspond with me. I asked General Crook, who was acquaintedwith many of the Union people of Winchester, if he knew of such aperson, and he recommended a Miss Rebecca Wright, a young lady whomhe had met there before the battle of Kernstown, who, he said, was amember of the Society of Friends and the teacher of a small privateschool. He knew she was faithful and loyal to the Government, andthought she might be willing to render us assistance, but he couldnot be certain of this, for on account of her well known loyalty shewas under constant surveillance. I hesitated at first, but finallydeciding to try it, despatched the two scouts to the old negro'scabin, and they brought him to my headquarters late that night. Iwas soon convinced of the negro's fidelity, and asking him if he wasacquainted with Miss Rebecca Wright, of Winchester, he replied thathe knew her well. There upon I told him what I wished to do, andafter a little persuasion he agreed to carry a letter to her on hisnext marketing trip. My message was prepared by writing it on tissuepaper, which was then compressed into a small pellet, and protectedby wrapping it in tin-foil so that it could be safely carried in theman's mouth. The probability, of his being searched when he came tothe Confederate picketline was not remote, and in such event he wasto swallow the pellet. The letter appealed to Miss Wright's loyaltyand patriotism, and requested her to furnish me with informationregarding the strength and condition of Early's army. The nightbefore the negro started one of the scouts placed the odd-lookingcommunication in his hands, with renewed injunctions as to secrecyand promptitude. Early the next morning it was delivered to MissWright, with an intimation that a letter of importance was enclosedin the tin-foil, the negro telling her at the same time that shemight expect him to call for a message in reply before his returnhome. At first Miss Wright began to open the pellet nervously, butwhen told to be careful, and to preserve the foil as a wrapping forher answer, she proceeded slowly and carefully, and when the noteappeared intact the messenger retired, remarking again that in theevening he would come for an answer. 

On reading my communication Miss Wright was much startled by theperils it involved, and hesitatingly consulted her mother, but herdevoted loyalty soon silenced every other consideration, and thebrave girl resolved to comply with my request, notwithstanding itmight jeopardize her life. The evening before a convalescentConfederate officer had visited her mother's house, and inconversation about the war had disclosed the fact that Kershaw'sdivision of infantry and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery had startedto rejoin General Lee. At the time Miss Wright heard this sheattached little if any importance to it, but now she perceived thevalue of the intelligence, and, as her first venture, determined tosend it to me at once, which she did with a promise that in thefuture she would with great pleasure continue to transmit informationby the negro messenger. 

"SEPTEMBER 15, 1864. 

"I learn from Major-General Crook that you are a loyal lady, andstill love the old flag. Can you inform me of the position ofEarly's forces, the number of divisions in his army, and the strengthof any or all of them, and his probable or reported intentions? Haveany more troops arrived from Richmond, or are any more coming, orreported to be coming?

"You can trust the bearer. "

"I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, "P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General Commanding. "

"SEPTEMBER 16, 1864. 

"I have no communication whatever with the rebels, but will tell youwhat I know. The division of General Kershaw, and Cutshaw'sartillery, twelve guns and men, General Anderson commanding, havebeen sent away, and no more are expected, as they cannot be sparedfrom Richmond. I do not know how the troops are situated, but theforce is much smaller than represented. I will take pleasurehereafter in learning all I can of their strength and position, andthe bearer may call again. 

"Very respectfully yours, "............ 

Miss Wright's answer proved of more value to me than she anticipated, for it not only quieted the conflicting reports concerning Anderson'scorps, but was most important in showing positively that Kershaw wasgone, and this circumstance led, three days later, to the battle ofthe Opequon, or Winchester as it has been unofficially called. Wordto the effect that some of Early's troops were under orders to returnto Petersburg, and would start back at the first favorableopportunity, had been communicated to me already from many sources, but we had not been able to ascertain the date for their departure. Now that they had actually started, I decided to wait before offeringbattle until Kershaw had gone so far as to preclude his return, feeling confident that my prudence would be justified by the improvedchances of victory; and then, besides, Mr. Stanton kept reminding methat positive success was necessary to counteract the politicaldissatisfaction existing in some of the Northern States. This coursewas advised and approved by General Grant, but even with his powerfulbacking it was difficult to resist the persistent pressure of thosewhose judgment, warped by their interests in the Baltimore and Ohiorailroad, was often confused and misled by stories of scouts (sentout from Washington), averring that Kershaw and Fitzhugh Lee hadreturned to Petersburg, Breckenridge to southwestern Virginia, and atone time even maintaining that Early's whole army was east of theBlue Ridge, and its commander himself at Gordonsville. 

During the inactivity prevailing in my army for the ten dayspreceding Miss Wright's communication the infantry was quiet, withthe exception of Getty's division, which made a reconnoissance to theOpequon, and developed a heavy force of the enemy at Edwards'sCorners. The cavalry, however, was employed a good deal in thisinterval skirmishing heavily at times to maintain a space about sixmiles in width between the hostile lines, for I wished to controlthis ground so that when I was released from the instructions ofAugust 12, I could move my men into position for attack without theknowledge of Early. The most noteworthy of these mounted encounterswas that of McIntosh's brigade, which captured the Eighth SouthCarolina at Abraham's Creek September 13. 

It was the evening of the 16th of September that I received from MissWright the positive information that Kershaw was in march towardFront Royal on his way by Chester Gap to Richmond. Concluding thatthis was my opportunity, I at once resolved to throw my whole forceinto Newtown the next day, but a despatch from General Grantdirecting me to meet him at Charlestown, whither he was coming toconsult with me, caused me to defer action until after I should seehim. In our resulting interview at Charlestown, I went over thesituation very thoroughly, and pointed out with so much confidencethe chances of a complete victory should I throw my army across theValley pike near Newtown that he fell in with the plan at once, authorized me to resume the offensive, and to attack Early as soon asI deemed it most propitious to do so; and although before leavingCity Point he had outlined certain operations for my army, yet heneither discussed nor disclosed his plans, my knowledge of thesituation striking him as being so much more accurate than his own. 

[Extract from "Grant's Memoirs, " page 328. ]

".... Before starting I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had brought with me; but seeing that he was so clear and sopositive in his views, and so confident of success, I said nothingabout this, and did not take it out of my pocket.... "

The interview over, I returned to my army to arrange for its movementtoward Newtown, but while busy with these preparations, a report cameto me from General Averell which showed that Early was moving withtwo divisions of infantry toward Martinsburg. This considerablyaltered the state of affairs, and I now decided to change my plan andattack at once the two divisions remaining about Winchester andStephenson's depot, and later, the two sent to Martinsburg; thedisjointed state of the enemy giving me an opportunity to take him indetail, unless the Martinsburg column should be returned by forcedmarches. 

While General Early was in the telegraph office at Martinsburg on themorning of the 18th, he learned of Grant's visit to me; andanticipating activity by reason of this circumstance, he promptlyproceeded to withdraw so as to get the two divisions withinsupporting distance of Ramseur's, which lay across the Berryvillepike about two miles east of Winchester, between Abraham's Creek andRed Bud Run, so by the night of the 18th Wharton's division, underBreckenridge, was at Stephenson's depot, Rodes near there, andGordon's at Bunker Hill. At daylight of the 19th these positions ofthe Confederate infantry still obtained, with the cavalry of Lomax, Jackson, and Johnson on the right of Ramseur, while to the left andrear of the enemy's general line was Fitzhugh Lee, covering fromStephenson's depot west across the Valley pike to Applepie Ridge. 

My army moved at 3 o'clock that morning. The plan was for Torbert toadvance with Merritt's division of cavalry from Summit Point, carrythe crossings of the Opequon at Stevens's and Lock's fords, and forma junction near Stephenson's depot, with Averell, who was to movesouth from Darksville by the Valley pike. Meanwhile, Wilson was tostrike up the Berryville pike, carry the Berryville crossing of theOpequon, charge through the gorge or canyon on the road west of thestream, and occupy the open ground at the head of this defile. Wilson's attack was to be supported by the Sixth and Nineteenthcorps, which were ordered to the Berryville crossing, and as thecavalry gained the open ground beyond the gorge, the two infantrycorps, under command of General Wright, were expected to press onafter and occupy Wilson's ground, who was then to shift to the southbank of Abraham's Creek and cover my left; Crook's two divisions, having to march from Summit Point, were to follow the Sixth andNineteenth corps to the Opcquon, and should they arrive before theaction began, they were to be held in reserve till the proper momentcame, and then, as a turning-column, be thrown over toward the Valleypike, south of Winchester. 

McIntosh's brigade of Wilson's division drove the enemy's picketsaway from the Berryville crossing at dawn, and Wilson followingrapidly through the gorge with the rest of the division, debouchedfrom its western extremity with such suddenness as to capture asmall earthwork in front of General Ramseur's main line; andnot-withstanding the Confederate infantry, on recovering from itsastonishment, tried hard to dislodge them, Wilson's troopersobstinately held the work till the Sixth Corps came up. I followedWilson to select the ground on which to form the infantry. The SixthCorps began to arrive about 8 o'clock, and taking up the line Wilsonhad been holding, just beyond the head of the narrow ravine, thecavalry was transferred to the south side of Abraham's Creek. 

The Confederate line lay along some elevated ground about two mileseast of Winchester, and extended from Abraham's Creek north acrossthe Berryville pike, the left being hidden in the heavy timber on RedBud Run. Between this line and mine, especially on my right, clumpsof woods and patches of underbrush occurred here and there, but theundulating ground consisted mainly of open fields, many of which werecovered with standing corn that had already ripened. 

Much time was lost in getting all of the Sixth and Nineteenth corpsthrough the narrow defile, Grover's division being greatly delayedthere by a train of ammunition wagons, and it was not until late inthe forenoon that the troops intended for the attack could be gotinto line ready to advance. General Early was not slow to availhimself of the advantages thus offered him, and my chances ofstriking him in detail were growing less every moment, for Gordon andRodes were hurrying their divisions from Stephenson's depot--across-country on a line that would place Gordon in the woods southof Red Bud Run, and bring Rodes into the interval between Gordon andRamseur. 

When the two corps had all got through the canyon they were formedwith Getty's division of the Sixth to the left of the Berryvillepike, Rickett's division to the right of the pike, and Russell'sdivision in reserve in rear of the other two. Grover's division ofthe Nineteenth Corps came next on the right of Rickett's, with Dwightto its rear in reserve, while Crook was to begin massing near theOpequon crossing about the time Wright and Emory were ready toattack. 

Just before noon the line of Getty, Ricketts, and Grover movedforward, and as we advanced, the Confederates, covered by some heavywoods on their right, slight underbrush and corn-fields along theirCentre, and a large body of timber on their left along the Red Bud, opened fire from their whole front. We gained considerable ground atfirst, especially on our left but the desperate resistance which theright met with demonstrated that the time we had unavoidably lost inthe morning had been of incalculable value to Early, for it wasevident that he had been enabled already to so far concentrate histroops as to have the different divisions of his army in a connectedline of battle, in good shape to resist. 

Getty and Ricketts made some progress toward Winchester in connectionwith Wilson's cavalry, which was beyond the Senseny road on Getty'sleft, and as they were pressing back Ramseur's infantry and Lomax'scavalry Grover attacked from the right with decided effect. Groverin a few minutes broke up Evans's brigade of Gordon's division, buthis pursuit of Evans destroyed the continuity of my general line, andincreased an interval that had already been made by the deflection ofRicketts to the left, in obedience to instructions that had beengiven him to guide his division on the Berryville pike. As the linepressed forward, Ricketts observed this widening interval andendeavored to fill it with the small brigade of Colonel Keifer, butat this juncture both Gordon and Rodes struck the weak spot where theright of the Sixth Corps and the left of the Nineteenth should havebeen in conjunction, and succeeded in checking my advance by drivingback a part of Ricketts's division, and the most of Grover's. Asthese troops were retiring I ordered Russell's reserve division to beput into action, and just as the flank of the enemy's troops inpursuit of Grover was presented, Upton's brigade, led in person byboth Russell and Upton, struck it in a charge so vigorous as to drivethe Confederates back in turn to their original ground. 

The success of Russell enabled me to re-establish the right of myline some little distance in advance of the position from which itstarted in the morning, and behind Russell's division (now commandedby Upton) the broken regiments of Ricketts's division were rallied. Dwight's division was then brought up on the right, and Grover's menformed behind it. 

The charge of Russell was most opportune, but it cost many men inkilled and wounded. Among the former was the courageous Russellhimself; killed by a piece of shell that passed through his heart, although he had previously been struck by a bullet in the leftbreast, which wound, from its nature, must have proved mortal, yet ofwhich he had not spoken. Russell's death oppressed us all withsadness, and me particularly. In the early days of my army life hewas my captain and friend, and I was deeply indebted to him, not onlyfor sound advice and good example, but for the inestimable service hehad just performed, and sealed with his life, so it may be inferredhow keenly I felt his loss. 

As my lines were being rearranged, it was suggested to me to putCrook into the battle, but so strongly had I set my heart on usinghim to take possession of the Valley pike and cut off the enemy, thatI resisted this advice, hoping that the necessity for putting him inwould be obviated by the attack near Stephenson's depot thatTorbert's cavalry was to make, and from which I was momentarilyexpecting to hear. No news of Torbert's progress came, however, so, yielding at last, I directed Crook to take post on the right of theNineteenth Corps and, when the action was renewed, to push hiscommand forward as a turning-column in conjunction with Emory. Aftersome delay in the annoying defile, Crook got his men up, and postingColonel Thoburn's division on the prolongation of the NineteenthCorps, he formed Colonel Duval's division to the right of Thoburn. Here I joined Crook, informing him that I had just got word thatTorbert was driving the enemy in confusion along the Martinsburg piketoward Winchester; at the same time I directed him to attack themoment all of Duval's men were in line. Wright was instructed toadvance in concert with Crook, by swinging Emory and the right of theSixth Corps to the left together in a half-wheel. Then leavingCrook, I rode along the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, the open groundover which they were passing affording a rare opportunity to witnessthe precision with which the attack was taken up from right to left. Crook's success began the moment he started to turn the enemy's left;and assured by the fact that Torbert had stampeded the Confederatecavalry and thrown Breckenridge's infantry into such disorder that itcould do little to prevent the envelopment of Gordon's left, Crookpressed forward without even a halt. 

Both Emory and Wright took up the fight as ordered, and as they didso I sent word to Wilson, in the hope that he could partly performthe work originally laid out for Crook, to push along the Sensenyroad and, if possible, gain the valley pike south of Winchester. Ithen returned toward my right flank, and as I reached the NineteenthCorps the enemy was contesting the ground in its front with greatobstinacy; but Emory's dogged persistence was at length rewarded withsuccess, just as Crook's command emerged from the morass of Red BudRun, and swept around Gordon, toward the right of Breckenridge, who, with two of Wharton's brigades, was holding a line at right angleswith the Valley pike for the protection of the Confederate rear. Early had ordered these two brigades back from Stephenson's depot inthe morning, purposing to protect with them his right flank and lineof retreat, but while they were en route to this end, he was obligedto recall them to his left to meet Crook's attack. 

To confront Torbert, Patton's brigade of infantry and some ofFitzhugh Lee's cavalry had been left back by Breckenridge, but, withAverell on the west side of the Valley pike and Merritt on the east, Torbert began to drive this opposing force toward Winchester themoment he struck it near Stephenson's depot, keeping it on the gotill it reached the position held by Breckenridge, where itendeavored to make a stand. 

The ground which Breckenridge was holding was open, and offered anopportunity such as seldom had been presented during the war for amounted attack, and Torbert was not slow to take advantage of it. The instant Merritt's division could be formed for the charge, itwent at Breckenridge's infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry with suchmomentum as to break the Confederate left, just as Averell waspassing around it. Merritt's brigades, led by Custer, Lowell, andDevin, met from the start with pronounced success, and with sabre orpistol in hand literally rode down a battery of five guns and tookabout 1, 200 prisoners. Almost simultaneously with this cavalrycharge, Crook struck Breckenridge's right and Gordon's left, forcingthese divisions to give way, and as they retired, Wright, in avigorous attack, quickly broke Rodes up and pressed Ramseur so hardthat the whole Confederate army fell back, contracting its lineswithin some breastworks which had been thrown up at a former periodof the war, immediately in front of Winchester. 

Here Early tried hard to stem the tide, but soon Torbert's cavalrybegan passing around his left flank, and as Crook, Emory, and Wrightattacked in front, panic took possession of the enemy, his troops, now fugitives and stragglers, seeking escape into and throughWinchester. 

When this second break occurred, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps weremoved over toward the Millwood pike to help Wilson on the left, butthe day was so far spent that they could render him no assistance, and Ramseur's division, which had maintained some organization, wasin such tolerable shape as to check him. Meanwhile Torbert passedaround to the west of Winchester to join Wilson, but was unable to doso till after dark. Crook's command pursued the enemy through thetown to Mill Greek, I going along. 

Just after entering the town, Crook and I met, in the main street, three young girls, who gave us the most hearty reception. One ofthese young women was a Miss Griffith, the other two Miss Jennie andMiss Susie Meredith. During the day they had been watching thebattle from the roof of the Meredith residence, with tears andlamentations, they said, in the morning when misfortune appeared tohave overtaken the Union troops, but with unbounded exultation when, later, the tide set in against the Confederates. Our presence was, to them, an assurance of victory, and their delight beingirrepressible, they indulged in the most unguarded manifestations andexpressions. When cautioned by Crook, who knew them well, andreminded that the valley had hitherto been a race-course--one day inthe possession of friends, and the next of enemies--and warned of thedangers they were incurring by such demonstrations, they assured himthat they had no further fears of that kind now, adding that Early'sarmy was so demoralized by the defeat it had just sustained that itwould never be in condition to enter Winchester again. As soon as wehad succeeded in calming the excited girls a little I expressed adesire to find some place where I could write a telegram to GeneralGrant informing him of the result of the battle, and General Crookconducted me to the home of Miss Wright, where I met for the firsttime the woman who had contributed so much to our success, and on adesk in her school-room wrote the despatch announcing that we hadsent Early's army whirling up the valley. 

My losses in the battle of the Opequon were heavy, amounting to about4, 500 killed, wounded, and missing. Among the killed was GeneralRussell, commanding a division, and the wounded included GeneralsUpton, McIntosh and Chapman, and Colonels Duval and Sharpe. TheConfederate loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners about equaledmine, General Rodes being of the killed, while Generals Fitzhugh Leeand York were severely wounded. 

We captured five pieces of artillery and nine battle-flags. Therestoration of the lower valley--from the Potomac to Strasburg--tothe control of the Union forces caused great rejoicing in the North, and relieved the Administration from further solicitude for thesafety of the Maryland and Pennsylvania borders. The President'sappreciation of the victory was expressed in a despatch so like Mr. Lincoln that I give a facsimile of it to the reader:

[In the handwriting of President Lincoln]"EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT"WASHINGTON, Sep. 20, 1864

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN"WINCHESTER, VA. 

"Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officersand men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you. 

"A. LINCOLN. "

This he supplemented by promoting me to the grade ofbrigadier-general in the regular army, and assigning me to thepermanent command of the Middle Military Department, and following thatcame warm congratulations from Mr. Stanton and from Generals Grant, Sherman, and Meade. 

The battle was not fought out on the plan in accordance with whichmarching orders were issued to my troops, for I then hoped to takeEarly in detail, and with Crook's force cut off his retreat. Iadhered to this purpose during the early part of the contest, but wasobliged to abandon the idea because of unavoidable delays by which Iwas prevented from getting the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through thenarrow defile and into position early enough to destroy Ramseur whilestill isolated. So much delay had not been anticipated, and thisloss of time was taken advantage of by the enemy to recall the troopsdiverted to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg on the 17th, thus enablinghim to bring them all to the support of Ramseur before I could strikewith effect. My idea was to attack Ramseur and Wharton, successively, at a very early hour and before they could get succor, but I was not in condition to do it till nearly noon, by which timeGordon and Rodes had been enabled to get upon the ground at a pointfrom which, as I advanced, they enfiladed my right flank, and gave itsuch a repulse that to re-form this part of my line I was obliged torecall the left from some of the ground it had gained. It was duringthis reorganization of my lines that I changed my plan as to Crook, and moved him from my left to my right. This I did with greatreluctance, for I hoped to destroy Early's army entirely if Crookcontinued on his original line of march toward the Valley pike, southof Winchester; and although the ultimate results did, in a measurevindicate the change, yet I have always thought that by adhering tothe original plan we might have captured the bulk of Early's army. 

CHAPTER 11. 

PURSUING EARLY--A SECRET MARCH--FISHER'S HILL--A GREAT SUCCESS--REMOVAL OF AVERELL--THE RETREAT--CAPTURING AN OLD COMRADE--THE MURDER OF LIEUTENANT MEIGS. 

The night of the 19th of September I gave orders for following Earlyup the valley next morning--the pursuit to begin at daybreak--and inobedience to these directions Torbert moved Averell out on the Backroad leading to Cedar Creek, and Merritt up the Valley pike towardStrasburg, while Wilson was directed on Front Royal by way ofStevensburg. Merritt's division was followed by the infantry, Emory's and Wright's columns marching abreast in the open country tothe right and left of the pike, and Crook's immediately behind them. The enemy having kept up his retreat at night, presented noopposition whatever until the cavalry discovered him posted atFisher's Hill, on the first defensive line where he could hope tomake any serious resistance. No effort was made to dislodge him, andlater in the day, after Wright and Emory came up, Torbert shiftedMerritt over toward the Back road till he rejoined Averell. AsMerritt moved to the right, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps crossedCedar Creek and took up the ground the cavalry was vacating, Wrightposting his own corps to the west of the Valley pike overlookingStrasburg, and Emory's on his left so as to extend almost to the roadleading from Strasburg to Front Royal. Crook, as he came up the sameevening, went into position in some heavy timber on the north bank ofCedar Creek. 

A reconnoissance made pending these movements convinced me that theenemy's position at Fisher's Hill was so strong that a direct assaultwould entail unnecessary destruction of life, and, besides, be ofdoubtful result. At the point where Early's troops were in position, between the Massanutten range and Little North Mountain, the valleyis only about three and a half miles wide. All along the precipitousbluff which overhangs Tumbling Run on the south side, a heavy line ofearthworks had been constructed when Early retreated to this point inAugust, and these were now being strengthened so as to make themalmost impregnable; in fact, so secure did Early consider himselfthat, for convenience, his ammunition chests were taken from thecaissons and placed behind the breastworks. Wharton, now in commandof Breckenridge's division--its late commander having gone tosouthwest Virginia--held the right of this line, with Gordon nexthim; Pegram, commanding Ramseur's old division, joined Gordon. Ramseur with Rodes's division, was on Pegram's left, while Lomax'scavalry, now serving as foot-troops, extended the line to the Backroad. Fitzhugh Lee being wounded, his cavalry, under GeneralWickham, was sent to Milford to prevent Fisher's Hill from beingturned through the Luray Valley. 

In consequence of the enemy's being so well protected from a directassault, I resolved on the night of the 20th to use again aturning-column against his left, as had been done on the 19th at theOpequon. To this end I resolved to move Crook, unperceived if possible, over to the eastern face of Little North Mountain, whence he couldstrike the left and rear of the Confederate line, and as he broke itup, I could support him by a left half-wheel of my whole line ofbattle. The execution of this plan would require perfect secrecy, however, for the enemy from his signal-station on Three Top couldplainly see every movement of our troops in daylight. Hence, to escapesuch observation, I marched Crook during the night of the 20th intosome heavy timber north of Cedar Creek, where he lay concealed all daythe 21st. This same day Wright and Emory were moved up closer to theConfederate works, and the Sixth Corps, after a severe fight, in whichRicketts's and Getty were engaged, took up some high ground on theright of the Manassas Gap railroad in plain view of the Confederateworks, and confronting a commanding point where much of Early'sartillery was massed. Soon after General Wright had established thisline I rode with him along it to the westward, and finding that theenemy was still holding an elevated position further to our right, onthe north side of Tumbling Run, I directed this also to be occupied. Wright soon carried the point, which gave us an unobstructed view ofthe enemy's works and offered good ground for our artillery. It alsoenabled me to move the whole of the Sixth Corps to the front till itsline was within about seven hundred yards of the enemy's works; theNineteenth Corps, on the morning of the 22d, covering the groundvacated by the Sixth by moving to the front and extending to the right, but still keeping its reserves on the railroad. 

In the darkness of the night of the gist, Crook was brought acrossCedar Creek and hidden in a clump of timber behind Hupp's Hill tilldaylight of the 22d, when, under cover of the intervening woods andravines, he was marched beyond the right of the Sixth Corps and againconcealed not far from the Back road. After Crook had got into thislast position, Ricketts's division was pushed out until it confrontedthe left of the enemy's infantry, the rest of the Sixth Corpsextending from Ricketts's left to the Manassas Gap railroad, whilethe Nineteenth Corps filled in the space between the left of theSixth and the North Fork of the Shenandoah. 

When Ricketts moved out on this new line, in conjunction withAverell's cavalry on his right, the enemy surmising, from informationsecured from his signal-station, no doubt, that my attack was to bemade from Ricketts's front, prepared for it there, but no suchintention ever existed. Ricketts was pushed forward only that hemight readily join Crook's turning-column as it swung into theenemy's rear. To ensure success, all that I needed now was enoughdaylight to complete my arrangements, the secrecy of movement imposedby the situation consuming many valuable hours. 

While Ricketts was occupying the enemy's attention, Crook, againmoving unobserved into the dense timber on the eastern face of LittleNorth Mountain, conducted his command south in two parallel columnsuntil he gained the rear of the enemy's works, when, marching hisdivisions by the left flank, he led them in an easterly directiondown the mountain-side. As he emerged from the timber near the baseof the mountain, the Confederates discovered him, of course, andopened with their batteries, but it was too late--they having fewtroops at hand to confront the turning-column. Loudly cheering, Crook's men quickly crossed the broken stretch in rear of the enemy'sleft, producing confusion and consternation at every step. 

About a mile from the mountain's base Crook's left was joined byRicketts, who in proper time had begun to swing his division into theaction, and the two commands moved along in rear of the works sorapidly that, with but slight resistance, the Confederates abandonedthe guns massed near the centre. The swinging movement of Rickettswas taken up successively from right to left throughout my line, andin a few minutes the enemy was thoroughly routed, the action, thoughbrief, being none the less decisive. Lomax's dismounted cavalry gaveway first, but was shortly followed by all the Confederate infantryin an indescribable panic, precipitated doubtless by fears of beingcaught and captured in the pocket formed by Tumbling Run and theNorth Fork of the Shenandoah River. The stampede was complete, theenemy leaving the field without semblance of organization, abandoningnearly all his artillery and such other property as was in the works, and the rout extending through the fields and over the roads towardWoodstock, Wright and Emory in hot pursuit. 

Midway between Fisher's Hill and Woodstock there is some high ground, where at night-fall a small squad endeavored to stay us with twopieces of artillery, but this attempt at resistance proved fruitless, and, notwithstanding the darkness, the guns were soon captured. Thechase was then taken up by Devin's brigade as soon as it could bepassed to the front, and continued till after daylight the nextmorning, but the delays incident to a night pursuit made itimpossible for Devin to do more than pick up stragglers. 

Our success was very great, yet I had anticipated results still morepregnant. Indeed, I had high hopes of capturing almost the whole ofEarly's army before it reached New Market, and with this object inview, during the manoeuvres of the 21st I had sent Torbert up theLuray Valley with Wilson's division and two of Merritt's brigades, inthe expectation that he would drive Wickham out of the Luray Pass byEarly's right, and by crossing the Massanutten Mountain near NewMarket, gain his rear. Torbert started in good season, and aftersome slight skirmishing at Gooney Run, got as far as Milford, butfailed to dislodge Wickham. In fact, he made little or no attempt toforce Wickham from his position, and with only a feeble effortwithdrew. I heard nothing at all from Torbert during the 22d, andsupposing that everything was progressing favorably, I was astonishedand chagrined on the morning of the 23d, at Woodstock, to receive theintelligence that he had fallen back to Front Royal and Buckton ford. My disappointment was extreme, but there was now no help for thesituation save to renew and emphasize Torbert's orders, and this wasdone at once, notwithstanding that I thought, the delay, had so muchdiminished the chances of his getting in the rear of Early as to makesuch a result a very remote possibility, unless, indeed, far greaterzeal was displayed than had been in the first attempt to penetratethe Luray Valley. 

The battle of Fisher's Hill was, in a measure, a part of the battleof the Opequon; that is to say, it was an incident of the pursuitresulting from that action. In many ways, however, it was much moresatisfactory, and particularly so because the plan arranged on theevening of the 20th was carried out to the very letter by GeneralsWright, Crook, and Emory, not only in all their preliminarymanoeuvres, but also during the fight itself. The only drawback waswith the cavalry, and to this day I have been unable to accountsatisfactorily for Torbert's failure. No doubt, Wickham's positionnear Milford was a strong one, but Torbert ought to have made afight. Had he been defeated in this, his withdrawal then to awaitthe result at Fisher's Hill would have been justified, but it doesnot appear that he made any serious effort of all to dislodge theConfederate cavalry: his impotent attempt not only chagrined me verymuch, but occasioned much unfavorable comment throughout the army. 

We reached Woodstock early on the morning of the 23d, and haltedthere some little time to let the troops recover their organization, which had been broken in the night march they had just made. Whenthe commands had closed up we pushed on toward Edinburg, in the hopeof making more captures at Narrow Passage Creek; but theConfederates, too fleet for us, got away; so General Wright haltedthe infantry not far from Edinburg, till rations could be brought themen. Meanwhile I, having remained at Woodstock, sent Dedin's brigadeto press the enemy under every favorable opportunity, and if possibleprevent him from halting long enough to reorganize. NotwithstandingDevin's efforts the Confederates managed to assemble a considerableforce to resist him, and being too weak for the rearguard, he awaitedthe arrival of Averell, who, I had informed him, would be hurried tothe front with all possible despatch, for I thought that Averell mustbe close at hand. It turned out, however, that he was not near by atall, and, moreover, that without good reason he had refrained fromtaking any part whatever in pursuing the enemy in the flight fromFisher's Hill; and in fact had gone into camp and left to theinfantry the work of pursuit. 

It was nearly noon when Averell came up, and a great deal of precioustime had been lost. We had some hot words, but hoping that he wouldretrieve the mistake of the night before, I directed him to proceedto the front at once, and in conjunction with Devin close with theenemy. He reached Devin's command about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, just as this officer was pushing the Confederates so energeticallythat they were abandoning Mount Jackson, yet Averell utterly failedto accomplish anything. Indeed, his indifferent attack was not atall worthy the excellent soldiers he commanded, and when I learnedthat it was his intention to withdraw from the enemy's front, andthis, too, on the indefinite report of a signal-officer that a"brigade or division" of Confederates was turning his right flank, and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the information, Isent him this order:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, "Woodstock, Va. , Sept. 23, 1864

"BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL AVERELL

"Your report and report of signal-officer received. I do not wantyou to let the enemy bluff you or your command, and I want you todistinctly understand this note. I do not advise rashness, but I dodesire resolution and actual fighting, with necessary casualties, before you retire. There must now be no backing or filling by youwithout a superior force of the enemy actually engaging you. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. "

Some little time after this note went to Averell, word was brought methat he had already carried out the programme indicated whenforwarding the report of the expected turning of his right, and thathe had actually withdrawn and gone into camp near Hawkinsburg. Ithen decided to relieve him from the command of his division, which Idid, ordering him to Wheeling, Colonel William H. Powell beingassigned to succeed him. 

The removal of Averell was but the culmination of a series of eventsextending back to the time I assumed command of the Middle MilitaryDivision. At the outset, General Grant, fearing discord on accountof Averell's ranking Torbert, authorized me to relieve the formerofficer, but I hoped that if any trouble of this sort arose, it couldbe allayed, or at least repressed, during the campaign against Early, since the different commands would often have to act separately. After that, the dispersion of my army by the return of the SixthCorps and Torbert's cavalry to the Army of the Potomac would takeplace, I thought, and this would restore matters to their normalcondition; but Averell's dissatisfaction began to show itselfimmediately after his arrival at Martinsburg, on the 14th of August, and, except when he was conducting some independent expedition, hadbeen manifested on all occasions since. I therefore thought that theinterest of the service would be subserved by removing one whosegrowing indifference might render the best-laid plans inoperative. 

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION. "HARRISONBURG, VA. , SEPT. 25, 1864 11:30 P. M. "LIEUT-GENERAL GRANT, Comd'g, City Point, Va. 

"I have relieved Averell from his command. Instead of following theenemy when he was broken at Fisher's Hill (so there was not a cavalryorganization left), he went into camp and let me pursue the enemy fora distance of fifteen miles, with infantry, during the night. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General. "

The failure of Averell to press the enemy the evening of the 23d gaveEarly time to collect his scattered forces and take up a position onthe east side of the North Fork of the Shenandoah, his left restingon the west side of that stream at Rude's Hill, a commanding pointabout two miles south of Mt. Jackson. Along this line he hadconstructed some slight works during the night, and at daylight onthe 24th, I moved the Sixth and Nineteenth corps through Mt. Jacksonto attack him, sending Powell's division to pass around his leftflank, toward Timberville, and Devin's brigade across the North Fork, to move along the base of Peaked Ridge and attack his right. Thecountry was entirely open, and none of these manoeuvres could beexecuted without being observed, so as soon as my advance began, theenemy rapidly retreated in line of battle up the valley through NewMarket, closely followed by Wright and Emory, their artillery on thepike and their columns on its right and left. Both sides moved withcelerity, the Confederates stimulated by the desire to escape, andour men animated by the prospect of wholly destroying Early's army. The stern-chase continued for about thirteen miles, our infantryoften coming within range, yet whenever we began to deploy, theConfederates increased the distance between us by resorting to adouble quick, evading battle with admirable tact. While all this wasgoing on, the open country permitted us a rare and brilliant sight, the bright sun gleaming from the arms and trappings of the thousandsof pursuers and pursued. 

Near New Market, as a last effort to hold the enemy, I pushed Devin'scavalry--comprising about five hundred men--with two guns right up onEarly's lines, in the hope that the tempting opportunity given him tocapture the guns would stay his retreat long enough to let myinfantry deploy within range, but he refused the bait, and aftermomentarily checking Devin he continued on with little loss and inpretty good order. 

All hope of Torbert's appearing in rear of the Confederates vanishedas they passed beyond New Market. Some six miles south of this placeEarly left the Valley Pike and took the road to Keezletown, a movedue in a measure to Powell's march by way of Timberville towardLacy's Springs, but mainly caused by the fact that the Keezletownroad ran immediately along the base of Peaked Mountain--a ruggedridge affording protection to Early's right flank--and led in adirection facilitating his junction with Kershaw, who had beenordered back to him from Culpeper the day after the battle of theOpequon. The chase was kept up on the Keezeltown road till darknessovertook us, when my weary troops were permitted to go into camp; andas soon as the enemy discovered by our fires that the pursuit hadstopped, he also bivouacked some five miles farther south toward PortRepublic. 

The next morning Early was joined by Lomax's cavalry fromHarrisonburg, Wickham's and Payne's brigades of cavalry also unitingwith him from the Luray Valley. His whole army then fell back to themouth of Brown's Gap to await Kershaw's division and Cutshaw'sartillery, now on their return. 

By the morning of the 25th the main body of the enemy had disappearedentirely from my front, and the capture of some small, squads ofConfederates in the neighboring hills furnished us the only incidentsof the day. Among the prisoners was a tall and fine looking officer, much worn with hunger and fatigue. The moment I saw him I recognizedhim as a former comrade, George W. Carr, with whom I had served inWashington Territory. He was in those days a lieutenant in the NinthInfantry, and was one of the officers who superintended the executionof the nine Indians at the Cascades of the Columbia in 1856. Carrwas very much emaciated, and greatly discouraged by the turn eventshad recently taken. For old acquaintance sake I gave him plenty toeat, and kept him in comfort at my headquarters until the next batchof prisoners was sent to the rear, when he went with them. He hadresigned from the regular army at the commencement of hostilities, and, full of high anticipation, cast his lot with the Confederacy, but when he fell into our hands, his bright dreams having beendispelled by the harsh realities of war, he appeared to think thatfor him there was no future. 

Picking up prisoners here and there, my troops resumed their marchdirectly south on the Valley pike, and when the Sixth and Nineteenthcorps reached Harrisonburg, they went into camp, Powell in themeanwhile pushing on to Mt. Crawford, and Crook taking up a positionin our rear at the junction of the Keezletown road and the Valleypike. Late in the afternoon Torbert's cavalry came in from NewMarket arriving at that place many hours later than it had beenexpected. 

The succeeding day I sent Merritt to Port Republic to occupy theenemy's attention, while Torbert, with Wilson's division and theregular brigade, was ordered to Staunton, whence he was to proceed toWaynesboro' and blow up the railroad bridge. Having done this, Torbert, as he returned, was to drive off whatever cattle he couldfind, destroy all forage and breadstuffs, and burn the mills. Hetook possession of Waynesboro' in due time, but had succeeded in onlypartially demolishing the railroad bridge when, attacked by Pegram'sdivision of infantry and Wickham's cavalry, he was compelled to fallback to Staunton. From the latter place he retired to Bridgewater, and Spring Hill, on the way, however, fully executing hisinstructions regarding the destruction of supplies. 

While Torbert was on this expedition, Merritt had occupied PortRepublic, but he happened to get there the very day that Kershaw'sdivision was marching from Swift Run Gap to join Early. By accidentKershaw ran into Merritt shortly after the latter had gained thevillage. Kershaw's four infantry brigades attacked at once, andMerrit, forced out of Port Republic, fell back toward Cross Keys; andin anticipation that the Confederates could be coaxed to that point, I ordered the infantry there, but Torbert's attack at Wavnesboro' hadalarmed Early, and in consequence he drew all his forces in towardRock-fish Gap. This enabled me to re-establish Merritt at PortRepublic, send the Sixth and Nineteenth corps to the neighborhood ofMt. Crawford to await the return of Torbert, and to post Crook atHarrisonburg; these dispositions practically obtained till the 6th ofOctober, I holding a line across the valley from Port Republic alongNorth River by Mt. Crawford to the Back road near the mouth of BrieryBranch Gap. 

It was during this period, about dusk on the evening of October 3, that between Harrisonburg and Dayton my engineer officer, LieutenantJohn R. Meigs, was murdered within my lines. He had gone out withtwo topographical assistants to plot the country, and late in theevening, while riding along the public road on his return to camp, heovertook three men dressed in our uniform. From their dress, andalso because the party was immediately behind our lines and within amile and a half of my headquarters, Meigs and his assistantsnaturally thought that they were joining friends, and whollyunsuspicious of anything to the contrary, rode on with the three mensome little distance; but their perfidy was abruptly discovered bytheir suddenly turning upon Meigs with a call for his surrender. Ithas been claimed that, refusing to submit, he fired on thetreacherous party, but the statement is not true, for one of thetopographers escaped--the other was captured--and reported a fewminutes later at my headquarters that Meigs was killed withoutresistance of any kind whatever, and without even the chance to givehimself up. This man was so cool, and related all the circumstancesof the occurrence with such exactness, as to prove the truthfulnessof his statement. The fact that the murder had been committed insideour lines was evidence that the perpetrators of the crime, havingtheir homes in the vicinity, had been clandestinely visiting them, and been secretly harbored by some of the neighboring residents. Determining to teach a lesson to these abettors of the foul deed--alesson they would never forget--I ordered all the houses within anarea of five miles to be burned. General Custer, who had succeededto the command of the Third Cavalry division (General Wilson havingbeen detailed as chief of cavalry to Sherman's army), was chargedwith this duty, and the next morning proceeded to put the order intoexecution. The prescribed area included the little village ofDayton, but when a few houses in the immediate neighborhood of thescene of the murder had been burned, Custer was directed to cease hisdesolating work, but to fetch away all the able-bodied males asprisoners. 

CHAPTER III. 

REASONS FOR NOT PURSUING EARLY THROUGH THE BLUE RIDGE--GENERALTORBERT DETAILED TO GIVE GENERAL ROSSER A "DRUBBING"--GENERAL ROSSERROUTED--TELEGRAPHED TO MEET STANTON--LONGSTREET'S MESSAGE--RETURN TOWINCHESTER--THE RIDE TO CEDAR CREEK--THE RETREATING ARMY--RALLYINGTHE TROOPS--REFORMING THE LINE--COMMENCING THE ATTACK--DEFEAT OF THECONFEDERATES--APPOINTED A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE REGULAR ARMY--RESULTSOF THE BATTLE. 

While we lay in camp at Harrisonburg it became necessary to decidewhether or not I would advance to Brown's Gap, and, after driving theenemy from there, follow him through the Blue Ridge into easternVirginia. Indeed, this question began to cause me solicitude as soonas I knew Early had escaped me at New Market, for I felt certain thatI should be urged to pursue the Confederates toward Charlottesvilleand Gordonsville, and be expected to operate on that line againstRichmond. For many reasons I was much opposed to such a plan, butmainly because its execution would involve the opening of the Orangeand Alexandria railroad. To protect this road against the raids ofthe numerous guerrilla bands that infested the region through whichit passed, and to keep it in operation, would require a large forceof infantry, and would also greatly reduce my cavalry; besides, Ishould be obliged to leave a force in the valley strong enough togive security to the line of the upper Potomac and the Baltimore andOhio railroad, and this alone would probably take the whole ofCrook's command, leaving me a wholly inadequate number of fightingmen to prosecute a campaign against the city of Richmond. Then, too, I was in doubt whether the besiegers could hold the entire army atPetersburg; and in case they could not, a number of troops sufficientto crush me might be detached by Lee, moved rapidly by rail, and, after overwhelming me, be quickly returned to confront General Meade. I was satisfied, moreover, that my transportation could not supply mefurther than Harrisonburg, and if in penetrating the Blue Ridge I metwith protracted resistance, a lack of supplies might compel me toabandon the attempt at a most inopportune time. 

I therefore advised that the Valley campaign be terminated north ofStaunton, and I be permitted to return, carrying out on the way myoriginal instructions for desolating the Shenandoah country so as tomake it untenable for permanent occupation by the Confederates. Iproposed to detach the bulk of my army when this work of destructionwas completed, and send it by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroadthrough Washington to the Petersburg line, believing that I couldmove it more rapidly by that route than by any other. I wasconfident that if a movement of this character could be made withcelerity it would culminate in the capture of Richmond and possiblyof General Lee's army, and I was in hopes that General Grant wouldtake the same view of the matter; but just at this time he was sopressed by the Government and by public-opinion at the North, that headvocated the wholly different conception of driving Early intoeastern Virginia, and adhered to this plan with some tenacity. Considerable correspondence regarding the subject took place betweenus, throughout which I stoutly maintained that we should not risk, bywhat I held to be a false move, all that my army had gained. I beingon the ground, General Grant left to me the final decision of thequestion, and I solved the first step by determining to withdraw downthe valley at least as far as Strasburg, which movement was begun onthe 6th of October. 

The cavalry as it retired was stretched across the country from theBlue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghanies, with orders todrive off all stock and destroy all supplies as it moved northward. The infantry preceded the cavalry, passing down the Valley pike, andas we marched along the many columns of smoke from burning stacks, and mills filled with grain, indicated that the adjacent country wasfast losing the features which hitherto had made it a great magazineof stores for the Confederate armies. 

During the 6th and 7th of October, the enemy's horse followed us up, though at a respectful distance. This cavalry was now under commandof General T. W. Rosser, who on October 5 had joined Early with anadditional brigade from Richmond. As we proceeded the Confederatesgained confidence, probably on account of the reputation with whichits new commander had been heralded, and on the third day's march hadthe temerity to annoy my rear guard considerably. Tired of theseannoyances, I concluded to open the enemy's eyes in earnest, so thatnight I told Torbert I expected him either to give Rosser a drubbingnext morning or get whipped himself, and that the infantry would behalted until the affair was over; I also informed him that I proposedto ride out to Round Top Mountain to see the fight. When I decidedto have Rosser chastised, Merritt was encamped at the foot of RoundTop, an elevation just north of Tom's Brook, and Custer some sixmiles farther north and west, near Tumbling Run. In the night Custerwas ordered to retrace his steps before daylight by the Back road, which is parallel to and about three miles from the Valley pike, andattack the enemy at Tom's Brook crossing, while Merritt'sinstructions were to assail him on the Valley pike in concert withCuster. About 7 in the morning, Custer's division encountered Rosserhimself with three brigades, and while the stirring sounds of theresulting artillery duel were reverberating through the valleyMerritt moved briskly to the front and fell upon Generals Lomax andJohnson on the Valley pike. Merritt, by extending his right, quicklyestablished connection with Custer, and the two divisions movedforward together under Torbert's direction, with a determination toinflict on the enemy the sharp and summary punishment his rashnesshad invited. 

The engagement soon became general across the valley, both sidesfighting mainly mounted. For about two hours the contending linesstruggled with each other along Tom's Brook, the charges and countercharges at many points being plainly visible from the summit of RoundTop, where I had my headquarters for the time. 

The open country permitting a sabre fight, both sides seemed bent onusing that arm. In the centre the Confederates maintained theirposition with much stubbornness, and for a time seemed to haverecovered their former spirit, but at last they began to give way onboth flanks, and as these receded, Merritt and Custer went at thewavering ranks in a charge along the whole front. The result was ageneral smash-up of the entire Confederate line, the retreat quicklydegenerating into a rout the like of which was never before seen. For twenty-six miles this wild stampede kept up, with our troopersclose at the enemy's heels; and the ludicrous incidents of the chasenever ceased to be amusing topics around the camp-fires of Merrittand Custer. In the fight and pursuit Torbert took eleven pieces ofartillery, with their caissons, all the wagons and ambulances theenemy had on the ground, and three hundred prisoners. Some ofRosser's troopers fled to the mountains by way of Columbia Furnace, and some up the Valley pike and into the Massamitten Range, apparently not discovering that the chase had been discontinued tillsouth of Mount Jackson they rallied on Early's infantry. 

After this catastrophe, Early reported to General Lee that hiscavalry was so badly demoralized that it should be dismounted; andthe citizens of the valley, intensely disgusted with the boasting andswaggering that had characterized the arrival of the "Laurel Brigade"in that section, baptized the action (known to us as Tom's Brook) the"Woodstock Races, " and never tired of poking fun at General Rosserabout his precipitate and inglorious flight. (When Rosser arrivedfrom Richmond with his brigade he was proclaimed as the savior of theValley, and his men came all bedecked with laurel branches. )

On the 10th my army, resuming its retrograde movement, crossed to thenorth side of Cedar Creek. The work of repairing the Manassas Gapbranch of the Orange and Alexandria railroad had been begun some daysbefore, out from Washington, and, anticipating that it would be inreadiness to transport troops by the time they could reach Piedmont, I directed the Sixth Corps to continue its march toward Front Royal, expecting to return to the Army of the Potomac by that line. By the12th, however, my views regarding the reconstruction of this railroadbegan to prevail, and the work on it was discontinued. The SixthCorps, therefore, abandoned that route, and moved toward Ashby's Gapwith the purpose of marching direct to Washington, but on the 13th Irecalled it to Cedar Creek, in consequence of the arrival of theenemy's infantry at Fisher's Hill, and the receipt, the night before, of the following despatch, which again opened the question of anadvance on Gordonsville and Charlottesville:

(Cipher. )"WASHINGTON, October 12, 1864, 12 M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south toserve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville andCharlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned. Some point in the vicinity of Manassas Gap would seem best suited forall purposes. Colonel Alexander, of the Engineers, will be sent toconsult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General. "

As it was well known in Washington that the views expressed in theabove despatch were counter to my convictions, I was the next dayrequired by the following telegram from Secretary Stanton to repairto that city:

"WASHINGTON, October 13, 1864. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN(through General Augur)

"If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremelydesirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to seeyou first. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, "Secretary of War. "

I got all ready to comply with the terms of Secretary Stanton'sdespatch, but in the meantime the enemy appeared in my front inforce, with infantry and cavalry, and attacked Colonel Thoburn, whohad been pushed out toward Strasburg from Crook's command, and alsoCuster's division of cavalry on the Back road. As afterwardappeared, this attack was made in the belief that all of my troopsbut Crook's had gone to Petersburg. From this demonstration thereensued near Hupp's Hill a bitter skirmish between Kershaw andThoburn, and the latter was finally compelled to withdraw to thenorth bank of Cedar Creek. Custer gained better results, however, onthe Back road, with his usual dash driving the enemy's cavalry awayfrom his front, Merritt's division then joining him and remaining onthe right. 

The day's events pointing to a probability that the enemy intended toresume the offensive, to anticipate such a contingency I ordered theSixth Corps to return from its march toward Ashby's Gap. It reachedme by noon of the 14th, and went into position to the right and rearof the Nineteenth Corps, which held a line along the north bank ofCedar Creek, west of the Valley pike. Crook was posted on the leftof the Nineteenth Corps and east of the Valley pike, with Thoburn'sdivision advanced to a round hill, which commanded the junction ofCedar Creek and the Shenandoah River, while Torbert retained bothMerritt and Custer on the right of the Sixth Corps, and at thesame time covered with Powell the roads toward Front Royal. Myhead-quarters were at the Belle Grove House, which was to the west ofthe pike and in rear of the Nineteenth Corps. It was my intention toattack the enemy as soon as the Sixth Corps reached me, but GeneralEarly having learned from his demonstration that I had not detached aslargely as his previous information had led him to believe, on thenight of the 13th withdrew to Fisher's Hill; so, concluding that hecould not do us serious hurt from there, I changed my mind as toattacking, deciding to defer such action till I could get toWashington, and come to some definite understanding about my futureoperations. 

To carry out this idea, on the evening of the 15th I ordered all ofthe cavalry under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal, again intending to push it thence through Chester Gap to the VirginiaCentral railroad at Charlottesville, to destroy the bridge over theRivanna River, while I passed through Manassas Gap to Rectortown, andthence by rail to Washington. On my arrival with the cavalry nearFront Royal on the 16th, I halted at the house of Mrs. Richards, onthe north bank of the river, and there received the followingdespatch and inclosure from General Wright, who had been left incommand at Cedar Creek:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY Division, "October 16, 1864. 

"GENERAL:

"I enclose you despatch which explains itself. If the enemy shouldbe strongly reenforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right, give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until theenemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on myright, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against andresisting. 

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "H. G. WRIGHT, Major-General Commanding. "MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN, "Commanding Middle Military Division. "

[INCLOSURE. ] "To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL EARLY:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crushSheridan. 

"LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General. "

The message from Longstreet had been taken down as it was beingflagged from the Confederate signal-station on Three Top Mountain, and afterward translated by our signal officers, who knew theConfederate signal code. I first thought it a ruse, and hardly worthattention, but on reflection deemed it best to be on the safe side, so I abandoned the cavalry raid toward Charlottesville, in order togive General Wright the entire strength of the army, for it did notseem wise to reduce his numbers while reinforcement for the enemymight be near, and especially when such pregnant messages werereaching Early from one of the ablest of the Confederate generals. Therefore I sent the following note to General Wright:

"HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, "Front Royal, October 16, 1864. 

"GENERAL: The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your positionstrong. If Longstreet's despatch is true, he is under the impressionthat we have largely detached. I will go over to Augur, and may getadditional news. Close in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point. If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him. Look well to your ground and be well prepared. Get up everythingthat can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will be up onTuesday, if not sooner. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT, "Commanding Sixth Army Corps. "

At 5 o'clock on the evening of the 16th I telegraphed General Halleckfrom Rectortown, giving him the information which had come to me fromWright, asking if anything corroborative of it had been received fromGeneral Grant, and also saying that I would like to see Halleck; thetelegram ending with the question: "Is it best for me to go to seeyou?" Next morning I sent back to Wright all the cavalry except oneregiment, which escorted me through Manassas Gap to the terminus ofthe railroad from Washington. I had with me Lieutenant-Colonel JamesW. Forsyth, chief-of-staff, and three of my aides, Major George A. Forsyth, Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and Captain Michael V. Sheridan. Irode my black horse, Rienzi, and the others their own respectivemounts. 

Before leaving Cedar Creek I had fixed the route of my return to beby rail from Washington to Martinsburg, and thence by horseback toWinchester and Cedar Creek, and had ordered three hundred cavalry toMartinsburg to escort me from that point to the front. At RectortownI met General Augur, who had brought a force out from Washington toreconstruct and protect the line of railroad, and through himreceived the following reply from General Halleck:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "WASHINGTON, D. C. , October 16 1864

"To MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN, "Rectortown, Va. 

General Grant says that Longstreet brought with him no troops fromRichmond, but I have very little confidence in the informationcollected at his headquarters. If you can leave your command withsafety, come to Washington, as I wish to give you the views of theauthorities here. 

"H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff. "

In consequence of the Longstreet despatch, I felt a concern about myabsence which I could hardly repress, but after duly considering whatHalleck said, and believing that Longstreet could not unite withEarly before I got back, and that even if he did Wright would be ableto cope with them both, I and my staff, with our horses, took thecars for Washington, where we arrived on the morning of the 17th atabout 8 o'clock. I proceeded at an early hour to the War Department, and as soon as I met Secretary Stanton, asked him for a special trainto be ready at 12 o'clock to take me to Martinsburg, saying that inview of existing conditions I must get back to my army as quickly aspossible. He at once gave the order for the train, and then theSecretary, Halleck, and I proceeded to hold a consultation in regardto my operating east of the Blue Ridge. The upshot was that my viewsagainst such a plan were practically agreed to, and two engineerofficers were designated to return with me for the purpose ofreporting on a defensive line in the valley that could be held whilethe bulk of my troops were being detached to Petersburg. ColonelAlexander and Colonel Thom both of the Engineer Corps, reported toaccompany me, and at 12 o'clock we took the train. 

We arrived about dark at Martinsburg, and there found the escort ofthree hundred men which I had ordered before leaving Cedar Creek. Wespent that night at Martinsburg, and early next morning mounted andstarted up the Valley pike for Winchester, leaving Captain Sheridanbehind to conduct to the army the Commissioners whom the State of NewYork had sent down to receive the vote of her troops in the comingPresidential election. Colonel Alexander was a man of enormousweight, and Colonel Thom correspondingly light, and as both wereunaccustomed to riding we had to go slowly, losing so much time, infact, that we did not reach Winchester till between 3 and 4 o'clockin the afternoon, though the distance is but twenty-eight miles. Assoon as we arrived at Colonel Edwards's headquarters in the town, where I intended stopping for the night, I sent a courier to thefront to bring me a report of the condition of affairs, and then tookColonel Alexander out on the heights about Winchester, in order thathe might overlook the country, and make up his mind as to the utilityof fortifying there. By the time we had completed our survey it wasdark, and just as we reached Colonel Edwards's house on our return acourier came in from Cedar Creek bringing word that everything wasall right, that the enemy was quiet at Fisher's Hill, and that abrigade of Grover's division was to make a reconnoissance in themorning, the 19th, so about 10 o'clock I went to bed greatlyrelieved, and expecting to rejoin my headquarters at my leisure nextday. 

Toward 6 o'clock the morning of the 19th, the officer on picket dutyat Winchester came to my room, I being yet in bed, and reportedartillery firing from the direction of Cedar Creek. I asked him ifthe firing was continuous or only desultory, to which he replied thatit was not a sustained fire, but rather irregular and fitful. Iremarked: "It's all right; Grover has gone out this morning to make areconnoissance, and he is merely feeling the enemy. " I tried to go tosleep again, but grew so restless that I could not, and soon got upand dressed myself. A little later the picket officer came back andreported that the firing, which could be distinctly heard from hisline on the heights outside of Winchester, was still going on. Iasked him if it sounded like a battle, and as he again said that itdid not, I still inferred that the cannonading was caused by Grover'sdivision banging away at the enemy simply to find out what he was upto. However, I went down-stairs and requested that breakfast behurried up, and at the same time ordered the horses to be saddled andin readiness, for I concluded to go to the front before any furtherexaminations were made in regard to the defensive line. 

We mounted our horses between half-past 8 and 9, and as we wereproceeding up the street which leads directly through Winchester, from the Logan residence, where Edwards was quartered, to the Valleypike, I noticed that there were many women at the windows and doorsof the houses, who kept shaking their skirts at us and who wereotherwise markedly insolent in their demeanor, but supposing thisconduct to be instigated by their well-known and perhaps naturalprejudices, I ascribed to it no unusual significance. On reachingthe edge of the town I halted a moment, and there heard quitedistinctly the sound of artillery firing in an unceasing roar. Concluding from this that a battle was in progress, I now feltconfident that the women along the street had received intelligencefrom the battle, field by the "grape-vine telegraph, " and were inraptures over some good news, while I as yet was utterly ignorant ofthe actual situation. Moving on, I put my head down toward thepommel of my saddle and listened intently, trying to locate andinterpret the sound, continuing in this position till we had crossedMill Creek, about half a mile from Winchester. The result of myefforts in the interval was the conviction that the travel of thesound was increasing too rapidly to be accounted for by my own rateof motion, and that therefore my army must be falling back. 

At Mill Creek my escort fell in behind, and we were going ahead at aregular pace, when, just as we made the crest of the rise beyond thestream, there burst upon our view the appalling spectacle of apanic-stricken army-hundreds of slightly wounded men, throngs of othersunhurt but utterly demoralized, and baggage-wagons by the score, allpressing to the rear in hopeless confusion, telling only too plainlythat a disaster had occurred at the front. On accosting some of thefugitives, they assured me that the army was broken up, in fullretreat, and that all was lost; all this with a manner true to thatpeculiar indifference that takes possession of panic-stricken men. Iwas greatly disturbed by the sight, but at once sent word to ColonelEdwards commanding the brigade in Winchester, to stretch his troopsacross the valley, near Mill Creek, and stop all fugitives, directingalso that the transportation be, passed through and parked on the northside of the town. 

As I continued at a walk a few hundred yards farther, thinking allthe time of Longstreet's telegram to Early, "Be ready when I joinyou, and we will crush Sheridan, " I was fixing in my mind what Ishould do. My first thought was too stop the army in the suburbs ofWinchester as it came back, form a new line, and fight there; but asthe situation was more maturely considered a better conceptionprevailed. I was sure the troops had confidence in me, forheretofore we had been successful; and as at other times they hadseen me present at the slightest sign of trouble or distress, I feltthat I ought to try now to restore their broken ranks, or, failing inthat, to share their fate because of what they had done hitherto. 

About this time Colonel Wood, my chief commissary, arrived from thefront and gave me fuller intelligence, reporting that everything wasgone, my headquarters captured, and the troops dispersed. When Iheard this I took two of my aides-de-camp, Major. George A. Forsythand Captain Joseph O'Keefe, and with twenty men from the escortstarted for the front, at the same time directing Colonel James W. Forsyth and Colonels Alexander and Thom to remain behind and do whatthey could to stop the runaways. 

For a short distance I traveled on the road, but soon found it soblocked with wagons and wounded men that my progress was impeded, andI was forced to take to the adjoining fields to make haste. Whenmost of the wagons and wounded were past I returned to the road, which was thickly lined with unhurt men, who, having got far enoughto the rear to be out of danger, had halted, without anyorganization, and begun cooking coffee, but when they saw me theyabandoned their coffee, threw up their hats, shouldered theirmuskets, and as I passed along turned to follow with enthusiasm andcheers. To acknowledge this exhibition of feeling I took off my hat, and with Forsyth and O'Keefe rode some distance in advance of myescort, while every mounted officer who saw me galloped out on eitherside of the pike to tell the men at a distance that I had come back. In this way the news was spread to the stragglers off the road, whenthey, too, turned their faces to the front and marched toward theenemy, changing in a moment from the depths of depression, to theextreme of enthusiasm. I already knew that even in the ordinarycondition of mind enthusiasm is a potent element with soldiers, butwhat I saw that day convinced me that if it can be excited from astate of despondency its power is almost irresistible. I saidnothing except to remark as I rode among those on the road: "If I hadbeen, with you this morning this disaster would not have happened. We must face the other way; we will go back and recover our camp. "

My first halt was made just north of Newtown, where I met a chaplaindigging his heels into the sides of his jaded horse, and making forthe rear with all possible speed. I drew up for an instant, andinquired of him how matters were going at the front. He replied, "Everything is lost; but all will be right when you get there"; yetnotwithstanding this expression of confidence in me, the parson atonce resumed his breathless pace to the rear. At Newtown I wasobliged to make a circuit to the left, to get round the village. Icould not pass through it, the streets were so crowded, but meetingon this detour Major McKinley, of Crook's staff, he spread the newsof my return through the motley throng there. 

When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown I saw aboutthree-fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, whichproved to be Ricketts's and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps, and then learned that the Nineteenth Corps had halted a little to theright and rear of these; but I did not stop, desiring to get to theextreme front. Continuing on parallel with the pike, about midwaybetween Newtown and Middletown I crossed to the west of it, and alittle later came up in rear of Getty's division of the Sixth Corps. When I arrived, this division and the cavalry were the only troops inthe presence of and resisting the enemy; they were apparently actingas a rear-guard at a point about three miles north of the line weheld at Cedar Creek when the battle began. General Torbert was thefirst officer to meet me, saying as he rode up, "My God! I am gladyou've come. " Getty's division, when I found it, was about a milenorth of Middletown, posted on the reverse slope of some slightlyrising ground, holding a barricade made with fence-rails, andskirmishing slightly with the enemy's pickets. Jumping my horse overthe line of rails, I rode to the crest of the elevation, and theretaking off my hat, the men rose up from behind their barricade withcheers of recognition. An officer of the Vermont brigade, Colonel A. S. Tracy, rode out to the front, and joining me, informed me thatGeneral Louis A. Grant was in command there, the regular divisioncommander, General Getty, having taken charge of the Sixth Corps inplace of Ricketts, wounded early in the action, while temporarilycommanding the corps. I then turned back to the rear of Getty'sdivision, and as I came behind it, a line of regimental flags rose upout of the ground, as it seemed, to welcome me. They were mostly thecolors of Crook's troops, who had been stampeded and scattered in thesurprise of the morning. The color-bearers, having withstood thepanic, had formed behind the troops of Getty. The line with thecolors was largely composed of officers, among whom I recognizedColonel R. B. Hayes, since president of the United States, one of thebrigade commanders. At the close of this incident I crossed thelittle narrow valley, or depression, in rear of Getty's line, anddismounting on the opposite crest, established that point as myheadquarters. In a few minutes some of my staff joined me, and thefirst directions I gave were to have the Nineteenth Corps and the twodivisions of Wright's corps brought to the front, so they could beformed on Getty's division, prolonged to the right; for I had alreadydecided to attack the enemy from that line as soon as I could getmatters in shape to take the offensive. Crook met me at this time, and strongly favored my idea of attacking, but said, however, thatmost of his troops were gone. General Wright came up a little later, when I saw that he was wounded, a ball having grazed the point of hischin so as to draw the blood plentifully. 

Wright gave me a hurried account of the day's events, and when toldthat we would fight the enemy on the line which Getty and the cavalrywere holding, and that he must go himself and send all his staff tobring up the troops, he zealously fell in with the scheme; and it wasthen that the Nineteenth Corps and two divisions of the Sixth wereordered to the front from where they had been halted to the right andrear of Getty. 

After this conversation I rode to the east of the Valley pike and tothe left of Getty's division, to a point from which I could obtain agood view of the front, in the mean time sending Major Forsyth tocommunicate with Colonel Lowell (who occupied a position close intoward the suburbs of Middletown and directly in front of Getty'sleft) to learn whether he could hold on there. Lowell replied thathe could. I then ordered Custer's division back to the right flank, and returning to the place where my headquarters had been establishedI met near them Ricketts's division under General Keifer and GeneralFrank Wheaton's division, both marching to the front. When the menof these divisions saw me they began cheering and took up the doublequick to the front, while I turned back toward Getty's line to pointout where these returning troops should be placed. Having done this, I ordered General Wright to resume command of the Sixth Corps, andGetty, who was temporarily in charge of it, to take command of hisown division. A little later the Nineteenth Corps came up and wasposted between the right of the Sixth Corps and Middle Marsh Brook. 

All this had consumed a great deal of time, and I concluded to visitagain the point to the east of the Valley pike, from where I hadfirst observed the enemy, to see what he was doing. Arrived there, Icould plainly see him getting ready for attack, and Major Forsyth nowsuggested that it would be well to ride along the line of battlebefore the enemy assailed us, for although the troops had learned ofmy return, but few of them had seen me. Following his suggestion Istarted in behind the men, but when a few paces had been taken Icrossed to the front and, hat in hand, passed along the entire lengthof the infantry line; and it is from this circumstance that many ofthe officers and men who then received me with such heartiness havesince supposed that that was my first appearance on the field. Butat least two hours had elapsed since I reached the ground, for it wasafter mid-day, when this incident of riding down the front tookplace, and I arrived not later, certainly, than half-past 10 o'clock. 

After re-arranging the line and preparing to attack I returned againto observe the Confederates, who shortly began to advance on us. Theattacking columns did not cover my entire front, and it appeared thattheir onset would be mainly directed against the Nineteenth Corps, so, fearing that they might be too strong for Emory on account of hisdepleted condition (many of his men not having had time to get upfrom the rear), and Getty's division being free from assault Itransferred a part of it from the extreme left to the support of theNineteenth Corps. The assault was quickly repulsed by Emory, however, and as the enemy fell back Getty's troops were returned totheir original place. This repulse of the Confederates made me feelpretty safe from further offensive operations on their part, and Inow decided to suspend the fighting till my thin ranks were furtherstrengthened by the men who were continually coming up from the rear, and particularly till Crook's troops could be assembled on theextreme left. 

In consequence of the despatch already mentioned, "Be ready when Ijoin you, and we will crush Sheridan, " since learned to have beenfictitious, I had been supposing all day that Longstreet's troopswere present, but as no definite intelligence on this point had beengathered, I concluded, in the lull that now occurred, to ascertainsomething positive regarding Longstreet; and Merritt having beentransferred to our left in the morning, I directed him to attack anexposed battery then at the edge of Middletown, and capture someprisoners. Merritt soon did this work effectually, concealing hisintention till his troops got close in to the enemy, and then by aquick dash gobbling up a number of Confederates. When the prisonerswere brought in, I learned from them that the only troops ofLongstreet's in the fight were of Kershaw's division, which hadrejoined Early at Brown's Gap in the latter part of September, andthat the rest of Longstreet's corps was not on the field. Thereceipt of this information entirely cleared the way for me to takethe offensive, but on the heels of it came information thatLongstreet was marching by the Front Royal pike to strike my rear atWinchester, driving Powell's cavalry in as he advanced. This renewedmy uneasiness, and caused me to delay the general attack till afterassurances came from Powell denying utterly the reports as toLongstreet, and confirming the statements of the prisoners. 

Between half-past and 4 o'clock, I was ready to assail, and decidedto do so by advancing my infantry line in a swinging movement, so asto gain the Valley pike with my right between Middletown and theBelle Grove House; and when the order was passed along, the menpushed steadily forward with enthusiasm and confidence. GeneralEarly's troops extended some little distance beyond our right, andwhen my flank neared the overlapping enemy, he turned on it, with theeffect of causing a momentary confusion, but General McMillan quicklyrealizing the danger, broke the Confederates at the reentering angleby a counter charge with his brigade, doing his work so well that theenemy's flanking troops were cut off from their main body and left toshift for themselves. Custer, who was just then moving in from thewest side of Middle Marsh Brook, followed McMillan's timely blow witha charge of cavalry, but before starting out on it, and while his menwere forming, riding at full speed himself, to throw his arms aroundmy neck. By the time he had disengaged himself from this embrace, the troops broken by McMillan had gained some little distance totheir rear, but Custer's troopers sweeping across the Middletownmeadows and down toward Cedar Creek, took many of them prisonersbefore they could reach the stream--so I forgave his delay. 

My whole line as far as the eye could see was now driving everythingbefore it, from behind trees, stone walls, and all such shelteringobstacles, so I rode toward the left to ascertain how matters weregetting on there. As I passed along behind the advancing troops, first General Grover, and then Colonel Mackenzie, rode up to welcomeme. Both were severely wounded, and I told them to leave the field, but they implored permission to remain till success was certain. When I reached the Valley pike Crook had reorganized his men, and asI desired that they should take part in the fight, for they were thevery same troops that had turned Early's flank at Winchester and atFisher's Hill, I ordered them to be pushed forward; and the alacrityand celerity with which they moved on Middletown demonstrated thattheir ill-fortune of the morning had not sprung from lack of valor. 

Meanwhile Lowell's brigade of cavalry, which, it will be remembered, had been holding on, dismounted, just north of Middletown ever sincethe time I arrived from Winchester, fell to the rear for the purposeof getting their led horses. A momentary panic was created in thenearest brigade of infantry by this withdrawal of Lowell, but as soonas his men were mounted they charged the enemy clear up to the stonewalls in the edge of Middletown; at sight of this the infantrybrigade renewed its attack, and the enemy's right gave way. Theaccomplished Lowell received his death-wound in this courageouscharge. 

All our troops were now moving on the retreating Confederates, and asI rode to the front Colonel Gibbs, who succeeded Lowell, made readyfor another mounted charge, but I checked him from pressing theenemy's right, in the hope that the swinging attack from my rightwould throw most of the Confederates to the east of the Valley pike, and hence off their line of retreat through Strasburg to Fisher'sHill. The eagerness of the men soon frustrated this anticipation, however, the left insisting on keeping pace with the centre andright, and all pushing ahead till we regained our old camps at CedarCreek. Beyond Cedar Creek, at Strasburg, the pike makes a sharp turnto the west toward Fisher's Hill, and here Merritt uniting withCuster, they together fell on the flank of the retreating columns, taking many prisoners, wagons, and guns, among the prisoners beingMajor-General Ramseur, who, mortally wounded, died the next day. 

When the news of the victory was received, General Grant directed asalute of one hundred shotted guns to be fired into Petersburg, andthe President at once thanked the army in an autograph letter. A fewweeks after, he promoted me, and I received notice of this in aspecial letter from the Secretary of War, saying:

"--that for the personal gallantry, military skill, and just confidencein the courage and patriotism of your troops, displayed by you on the19th day of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under the blessing ofProvidence, your routed army was reorganized, a great Nationaldisaster averted, and a brilliant victory achieved over the rebelsfor the third time in pitched battle within thirty days, Philip H. Sheridan is appointed a major-general in the United States Army. "

The direct result of the battle was the recapture of all theartillery, transportation, and camp equipage we had lost, and inaddition twenty-four pieces of the enemy's artillery, twelve hundredprisoners, and a number of battle-flags. But more still flowed fromthis victory, succeeding as it did the disaster of the morning, forthe reoccupation of our old camps at once re-established a moralewhich for some hours had been greatly endangered by ill-fortune. 

It was not till after the battle that I learned fully what had takenplace before my arrival, and then found that the enemy, havinggathered all the strength he could through the return ofconvalescents and other absentees, had moved quietly from Fisher'sHill, in the night of the 18th and early on the morning of the 19th, to surprise my army, which, it should be remembered, was posted onthe north bank of Cedar Creek, Crook holding on the left of theValley pike, with Thoburn's division advanced toward the creek onDuval's (under Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes) and Kitching'sprovisional divisions to the north and rear of Thoburn. TheNineteenth Corps was on the right of Crook, extending in asemi-circular line from the pike nearly to Meadow Brook, while theSixth Corps lay to the west of the brook in readiness to be used as amovable column. Merritt's division was to the right and rear of theSixth Corps, and about a mile and a half west of Merrit was Custercovering the fords of Cedar Creek as far west as the Middle road. 

General Early's plan was for one column under General Gordon, consisting of three divisions of infantry (Gordon's, Ramseur's, andPegram's), and Payne's brigade of cavalry to cross the ShenandoahRiver directly east of the Confederate works at Fisher's Hill, marcharound the northerly face of the Massanutten Mountain, and againcross the Shenandoah at Bowman's and McInturff's fords. Payne's taskwas to capture me at the Belle Grove House. General Early himself, with Kershaw's and Wharton's divisions, was to move throughStrasburg, Kershaw, accompanied by Early, to cross Cedar Creek atRoberts's ford and connect with Gordon, while Wharton was to continueon the Valley pike to Hupp's Hill and join the left of Kershaw, whenthe crossing of the Valley pike over Cedar Creek became free. 

Lomax's cavalry, then in the Luray Valley, was ordered to join theright of Gordon on the field of battle, while Rosser was to carry thecrossing of Cedar Creek on the Back road and attack Custer. Early'sconceptions were carried through in the darkness with little accidentor delay, Kershaw opening the fight by a furious attack on Thoburn'sdivision, while at dawn and in a dense fog Gordon struck Crook'sextreme left, surprising his pickets, and bursting into his camp withsuch suddenness as to stampede Crook's men. Gordon directing hismarch on my headquarters (the Belle Grove House), successfully turnedour position as he gained the Valley pike, and General Wright wasthus forced to order the withdrawal of the Nineteenth Corps from itspost at the Cedar Creek crossing, and this enabled Wharton to getover the stream there unmolested and join Kershaw early in theaction. 

After Crook's troops had been driven from their camps, General Wrightendeavored to form a line with the Sixth Corps to hold the Valleypike to the left of the Nineteenth, but failing in this he orderedthe withdrawal of the latter corps, Ricketts, temporarily commandingthe Sixth Corps, checking Gordon till Emory had retired. As alreadystated, Wharton was thus permitted to cross Cedar Creek on the pike, and now that Early had a continuous line, he pressed his advantage sovigorously that the whole Union army was soon driven from its campsin more or less disorder; and though much disjointed resistance wasdisplayed, it may be said that no systematic stand was made untilGetty's division, aided by Torbert's cavalry, which Wright hadordered to the left early in the action, took up the ground where, onarriving from Winchester, I found them. 

When I left my command on the 16th, little did I anticipate thatanything like this would happen. Indeed, I felt satisfied that Earlywas, of himself, too weak to take the offensive, and although Idoubted the Longstreet despatch, yet I was confident that, evenshould it prove true, I could get back before the junction could bemade, and at the worst I felt certain that my army was equal toconfronting the forces of Longstreet and Early combined. Still, thesurprise of the morning might have befallen me as well as the generalon whom it did descend, and though it is possible that this couldhave been precluded had Powell's cavalry been closed in, as suggestedin my despatch from Front Royal, yet the enemy's desperation mighthave prompted some other clever and ingenious scheme for relievinghis fallen fortunes in the Shenandoah Valley. 

CHAPTER IV. 

GENERAL EARLY REORGANIZES HIS FORCES--MOSBY THE GUERRILLA--GENERALMERRITT SENT TO OPERATE AGAINST MOSBY--ROSSER AGAIN ACTIVE--GENERALCUSTER SURPRISED--COLONEL YOUNG SENT TO CAPTURE GILMORE THEGUERRILLA--COLONEL YOUNG'S SUCCESS--CAPTURE OF GENERAL KELLY ANDGENERAL CROOK--SPIES--WAS WILKES BOOTH A SPY?--DRIVING THECONFEDERATES OUT OF THE VALLEY--THE BATTLE OF WAYNESBORO'--MARCHINGTO JOIN THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

Early's broken army practically made no halt in its retreat after thebattle of Cedar-Creek until it reached New Market, though at Fisher'sHill was left a small rear-guard of cavalry, which hastily decamped, however, when charged by Gibbs's brigade on the morning of the 20th. Between the date of his signal defeat and the 11th of November, theenemy's scattered forces had sufficiently reorganized to permit hisagain making a reconnoissance in the valley as far north as CedarCreek, my army having meanwhile withdrawn to Kernstown, where it hadbeen finally decided that a defensive line should be held to enableme to detach troops to General Grant, and where, by reconstructingthe Winchester and Potomac railroad from Stephenson's depot toHarper's Ferry, my command might be more readily, supplied. Early'sreconnoissance north of Cedar Creek ended in a rapid withdrawal ofhis infantry after feeling my front, and with the usual ill-fortuneto his cavalry; Merritt and Custer driving Rosser and Lomax with easeacross Cedar Creek on the Middle and Back roads, while Powell'scavalry struck McCausland near Stony Point, and after capturing twopieces of artillery and about three hundred officers and men chasedhim into the Luray Valley. 

Early got back to New Market on the 14th of November, and, from lackof subsistence, being unable to continue demonstrations to prevent myreinforcement of General Grant, began himself to detach to GeneralLee by returning Kershaw's division to Petersburg, as was definitelyascertained by Torbert in a reconnoissance to Mount Jackson. At thistime General Grant wished me to send him the Sixth Corps, and it wasgot ready for the purpose, but when I informed him that Torbert'sreconnoissance had developed the fact that Early still retained fourdivisions of infantry and one of cavalry, it was decided, on mysuggestion, to let the Sixth Corps remain till the season should be alittle further advanced, when the inclemency of the weather wouldpreclude infantry campaigning. These conditions came about early inDecember, and by the middle of the month the whole of the Sixth Corpswas at Petersburg; simultaneously with its transfer to that lineEarly sending his Second Corps to Lee. 

During the entire campaign I had been annoyed by guerrilla bandsunder such partisan chiefs as Mosby, White, Gilmore, McNeil, andothers, and this had considerably depleted my line-of-battlestrength, necessitating as it did large, escorts for mysupply-trains. The most redoubtable of these leaders was Mosby, whoseforce was made up from the country around Upperville, east of the BlueRidge, to which section he always fled for a hiding-place when hescented danger. I had not directed any special operations againstthese partisans while the campaign was active, but as Mosby's men hadlately killed, within my lines, my chief quartermaster, Colonel Tolles, and Medical Inspector Ohlenchlager, I concluded to devote particularattention to these "irregulars" during the lull that now occurred; soon the 28th of November, I directed General Merritt to march to theLoudoun Valley and operate against Mosby, taking care to clear thecountry of forage and subsistence, so as to prevent the guerrillas frombeing harbored there in the future their destruction or capture beingwell-nigh impossible, on account of their intimate knowledge of themountain region. Merritt carried out his instructions with his usualsagacity and thoroughness, sweeping widely over each side of hisgeneral line of march with flankers, who burned the grain and broughtin large herds of cattle, hogs and sheep, which were issued to thetroops. 

While Merritt was engaged in this service the Baltimore and Ohiorailroad once more received the attention of the enemy; Rosser, withtwo brigades of cavalry, crossing the Great North Mountain, capturingthe post of New Creek, with about five hundred prisoners and sevenguns, destroying all the supplies of the garrison, and breaking upthe railroad track. This slight success of the Confederates in WestVirginia, and the intelligence that they were contemplating furtherraids in that section, led me to send, Crook there with one division, his other troops going to City Point; and, I hoped that all thethreatened places would thus be sufficiently protected, butnegligence at Beverly resulted in the capture of that station byRosser on the 11th of January. 

In the meanwhile, Early established himself with Wharton's divisionat Staunton in winter quarters, posting his cavalry in thatneighborhood also, except a detachment at New Market, and anothersmall one at the signal-station on Three Top Mountain. The winter wasa most severe one, snow falling frequently to the depth of severalinches, and the mercury often sinking below zero. The rigor of theseason was very much against the success of any mounted operations, but General Grant being very desirous to have the railroads broken upabout Gordonsville and Charlottesville, on the 19th of December Istarted the cavalry out for that purpose, Torbert, with Merritt andPowell, marching through Chester Gap, while Custer moved towardStaunton to make a demonstration in Torbert's favor, hoping to holdthe enemy's troops in the valley. Unfortunately, Custer did notaccomplish all that was expected of him, and being surprised byRosser and Payne near Lacy's Springs before reveille, had to abandonhis bivouac and retreat down the valley, with the loss of a number ofprisoners, a few horses, and a good many horse equipments, for, because of the suddenness of Rosser's attack, many of the men had notime to saddle up. As soon as Custer's retreat was assured, Wharton's division of infantry was sent to Charlottesville to checkTorbert, but this had already been done by Lomax, with the assistanceof infantry sent up from Richmond. Indeed, from the very beginningof the movement the Confederates had been closely observing thecolumns of Torbert and Custer, and in consequence of the knowledgethus derived, Early had marched Lomax to Gordonsville in anticipationof an attack there, at the same time sending Rosser down the valleyto meet Custer. Torbert in the performance of his task captured twopieces of artillery from Johnson's and McCausland's brigades, atLiberty Mills on the Rapidan River, but in the main the purpose ofthe raid utterly failed, so by the 27th of December he returned, many, of his men badly frost-bitten from the extreme cold which hadprevailed. 

This expedition practically closed all operations for the season, andthe cavalry was put into winter cantonment near Winchester. Thedistribution of my infantry to Petersburg and West Virginia left withme in the beginning of the new year, as already stated, but the onesmall division of the Nineteenth Corps. On account of thisdiminution of force, it became necessary for me to keep thoroughlyposted in regard to the enemy, and I now realized more than I haddone hitherto how efficient my scouts had become since under thecontrol of Colonel Young; for not only did they bring me almost everyday intelligence from within Early's lines, but they also operatedefficiently against the guerrillas infesting West Virginia. 

Harry Gilmore, of Maryland, was the most noted of these since thedeath of McNeil, and as the scouts had reported him in Harrisonburgthe latter part of January, I directed two of the most trustworthy tobe sent to watch his movements and ascertain his purposes. In a fewdays these spies returned with the intelligence that Gilmore was onhis way to Moorefield, the centre of a very disloyal section in WestVirginia, about ninety miles southwest of Winchester, where, underthe guise of a camp-meeting, a gathering was to take place, at whichhe expected to enlist a number of men, be joined by a party of abouttwenty recruits coming from Maryland, and then begin depredationsalong the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Believing that Gilmore mightbe captured, I directed Young to undertake the task, and as apreliminary step he sent to Moorefield two of his men who early inthe war had "refugeed" from that section and enlisted in one of theUnion regiments from West Virginia. In about a week these men cameback and reported that Gilmore was living at a house between threeand four miles from Moorefield, and gave full particulars as to hiscoming and going, the number of men he had about there and where theyrendezvoused. 

With this knowledge at hand I directed Young to take twenty of hisbest men and leave that night for Moorefield, dressed in Confederateuniforms, telling him that I would have about three hundred cavalryfollow in his wake when he had got about fifteen miles start, andinstructing him to pass his party off as a body of recruits forGilmore coming from Maryland and pursued by the Yankee cavalry. Iknew this would allay suspicion and provide him help on the road;and, indeed, as Colonel Whittaker, who alone knew the secret, followed after the fleeing "Marylanders, " he found that their adventhad caused so little remark that the trail would have been lost hadhe not already known their destination. Young met with a hearty, welcome wherever he halted on the way, and as he passed through thetown of Moorefield learned with satisfaction that Gilmore still madehis headquarters at the house where the report of the two scouts hadlocated him a few days before. Reaching the designated place about12 o'clock on the night of the 5th of February, Young, under therepresentation that he had come directly from Maryland and was beingpursued by the Union cavalry, gained immediate access to Gilmore'sroom. He found the bold guerrilla snugly tucked in bed, with twopistols lying on a chair near by. He was sleeping so soundly that toarouse him Young had to give him a violent shake. As he awoke andasked who was disturbing his slumbers, Young, pointing at him acocked six-shooter, ordered him to dress without delay, and in answerto his inquiry, informed him that he was a prisoner to one ofSheridan's staff. Meanwhile Gilmore's men had learned of histrouble, but the early appearance of Colonel Whittaker caused them todisperse; thus the last link between Maryland and the Confederacy wascarried a prisoner to Winchester, whence he was sent to Fort Warren. 

The capture of Gilmore caused the disbandment of the party he hadorganized at the "camp-meeting, " most of the men he had recruitedreturning to their homes discouraged, though some few joined thebands of Woodson and young Jesse McNeil, which, led by the latter, dashed into Cumberland, Maryland, at 3 O'clock on the morning of the21st of February and made a reprisal by carrying off General Crookand General Kelly, and doing their work so silently and quickly thatthey escaped without being noticed, and were some distance on theirway before the colored watchman at the hotel where Crook wasquartered could compose himself enough to give the alarm. A troop ofcavalry gave hot chase from Cumberland, striving to intercept theparty at Moorefield and other points, but all efforts were fruitless, the prisoners soon being beyond reach. 

Although I had adopted the general rule of employing only soldiers asscouts, there was an occasional exception to it. I cannot say thatthese exceptions proved wholly that an ironclad observance of therule would have been best, but I am sure of it in one instance. Aman named Lomas, who claimed to be a Marylander, offered me hisservices as a spy, and coming highly recommended from Mr. Stanton, who had made use of him in that capacity, I employed him. He mademany pretensions, often appearing over anxious to impart informationseemingly intended to impress me with his importance, and yet wasmore than ordinarily intelligent, but in spite of that my confidencein him was by no means unlimited. I often found what he reported tome as taking place within the Confederate lines corroborated byYoung's men, but generally there were discrepancies in his tales, which led me to suspect that he was employed by the enemy as well asby me. I felt, however, that with good watching he could do melittle harm, and if my suspicions were incorrect he might be veryuseful, so I held on to him. 

Early in February Lomas was very solicitous for me to employ a manwho, he said, had been with Mosby, but on account of some quarrel inthe irregular camp had abandoned that leader. Thinking that with twoof them I might destroy the railroad bridges east of Lynchburg, Iconcluded, after the Mosby man had been brought to my headquarters byLomas about 12 o'clock one night, to give him employment, at the sametime informing Colonel Young that I suspected their fidelity, however, and that he must test it by shadowing their every movement. When Lomas's companion entered my room he was completely disguised, but on discarding the various contrivances by which his identity wasconcealed he proved to be a rather slender, dark-complexioned, handsome young man, of easy address and captivating manners. He gavehis name as Renfrew, answered all my questions satisfactorily, andwent into details about Mosby and his men which showed an intimacywith them at some time. I explained to the two men the work I hadlaid out for them, and stated the sum of money I would give to haveit done, but stipulated that in case of failure there would be nocompensation whatever beyond the few dollars necessary for theirexpenses. They readily assented, and it was arranged that theyshould start the following night. Meanwhile Young had selected hismen to shadow them, and in two days reported my spies as beingconcealed at Strasburg, where they remained, without making theslightest effort to continue on their mission, and were busy, nodoubt, communicating with the enemy, though I was not able to fastenthis on them. On the 16th of February they returned to Winchester, and reported their failure, telling so many lies about theirhazardous adventure as to remove all remaining doubt as to theirdouble-dealing. Unquestionably they were spies from the enemy, andhence liable to the usual penalties of such service; but it struck methat through them, I might deceive Early as to the time of openingthe spring campaign, I having already received from General Grant anintimation of what was expected of me. I therefore retained the menwithout even a suggestion of my knowledge of their true character, Young meanwhile keeping close watch over all their doings. 

Toward the last of February General Early had at Staunton twobrigades of infantry under Wharton. All the rest of the infantryexcept Echol's brigade, which was in southwestern Virginia, had beensent to Petersburg during the winter, and Fitz. Lee's two brigades ofcavalry also. Rosser's men were mostly at their homes, where, onaccount of a lack of subsistence and forage in the valley, they hadbeen permitted to go, subject to call. Lomax's cavalry was atMillboro, west of Staunton, where supplies were obtainable. It wasmy aim to get well on the road before Early could collect thesescattered forces, and as many of the officers had been in the habitof amusing themselves fox-hunting during the latter part of thewinter, I decided to use the hunt as an expedient for stealing amarch on the enemy, and had it given out officially that a grandfox-chase would take place on the 29th of February. Knowing thatLomas, and Renfrew would spread the announcement South, they werepermitted to see several red foxes that had been secured, as well as alarge pack of hounds which Colonel Young had collected for the sport, and were then started on a second expedition to burn the bridges. Ofcourse, they were shadowed as usual, and two days later, after they hadcommunicated with friends from their hiding-place, in Newtown, theywere arrested. On the way north to Fort Warren they escaped from theirguards when passing through Baltimore, and I never heard of them again, though I learned that, after the assassination of, Mr. Lincoln, Secretary Stanton strongly suspected his friend Lomas of beingassociated with the conspirators, and it then occurred to me that thegood-looking Renfrew may have been Wilkes Booth, for he certainly borea strong resemblance to Booth's pictures. 

On the 27th of February my cavalry entered upon the campaign whichcleared the Shenandoah Valley of every remnant of organizedConfederates. General Torbert being absent on leave at this time, Idid not recall him, but appointed General Merritt Chief of Cavalry. For Torbert had disappointed me on two important occasions--in theLuray Valley during the battle of Fisher's Hill, and on the recentGordonsville expedition--and I mistrusted his ability to conduct anyoperations requiring much self-reliance. The column was composed ofCuster's and Devin's divisions of cavalry, and two sections ofartillery, comprising in all about 10, 000 officers and men. Onwheels we had, to accompany this column, eight ambulances, sixteenammunition wagons, a pontoon train for eight canvas boats, and asmall supply-train, with fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar, andsalt, it being intended to depend on the country for the meat andbread ration, the men carrying in their haversacks nearly enough tosubsist them till out of the exhausted valley. 

Grant's orders were for me to destroy the Virginia Central railroadand the James River canal, capture Lynchburg if practicable, and thenjoin General Sherman in North Carolina wherever he might be found, orreturn to Winchester, but as to joining Sherman I was to be governedby the state of affairs after the projected capture of Lynchburg. The weather was cold, the valley and surrounding mountains beingstill covered with snow; but this was fast disappearing, however, under the heavy rain that was coming down as the column moved alongup the Valley pike at a steady gait that took us to Woodstock thefirst day. The second day we crossed the North Fork of theShenandoah on our pontoon-bridge, and by night-fall reached Lacy'sSprings, having seen nothing of the enemy as yet but a few partisanswho hung on our flanks in the afternoon. 

March 1 we encountered General Rosser at Mt. Crawford, he having beenable to call together only some five or six hundred of his troops, our unsuspected march becoming known to Early only the day before. Rosser attempted to delay us here, trying to burn the bridges overthe Middle Fork of the Shenandoah, but two regiments from ColonelCapehart's brigade swam the stream and drove Rosser to Kline's Mills, taking thirty prisoners and twenty ambulances and wagons. 

Meanwhile General Early was busy at Staunton, but not knowing myobjective point, he had ordered the return of Echol's brigade fromsouthwestern Virginia for the protection of Lynchburg, directedLomax's cavalry to concentrate at Pond Gap for the purpose ofharassing me if I moved toward Lynchburg, and at the same timemarched Wharton's two brigades of infantry, Nelson's artillery, andRosser's cavalry to Waynesboro', whither he went also to remain tillthe object of my movement was ascertained. 

I entered Staunton the morning of March 2, and finding that Early hadgone to Waynesboro' with his infantry and Rosser, the question atonce arose whether I should continue my march to Lynchburg direct, leaving my adversary in my rear, or turn east and open the waythrough Rockfish Gap to the Virginia Central railroad and James Rivercanal. I felt confident of the success of the latter plan, for Iknew that Early numbered there not more than two thousand men; so, influenced by this, and somewhat also by the fact that Early had leftword in Staunton that he would fight at Waynesboro', I directedMerritt to move toward that place with Custer, to be closely followedby Devin, who was to detach one brigade to destroy supplies atSwoope's depot. The by-roads were miry beyond description, rainhaving fallen almost incessantly since we left Winchester, butnotwithstanding the down-pour the column pushed on, men and horsesgrowing almost unrecognizable from the mud covering them from head tofoot. 

General Early was true to the promise made his friends in Staunton, for when Custer neared Waynesboro' he found, occupying a line ofbreastworks on a ridge west of the town, two brigades of infantry, with eleven pieces of artillery and Rosser's cavalry. Custer, whendeveloping the position of the Confederates, discovered that theirleft was somewhat exposed instead of resting on South River; hetherefore made his dispositions for attack, sending around that flankthe dismounted regiments from Pennington's brigade, while he himself, with two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, assaultedalong the whole line of breastworks. Pennington's flanking movementstampeded the enemy in short order, thus enabling Custer to carry thefront with little resistance, and as he did so the Eighth New Yorkand First Connecticut, in a charge in column, broke through theopening made by Custer, and continued on through the town ofWaynesboro', never stopping till they crossed South River. There, finding themselves immediately in the enemy's rear, they promptlyformed as foragers and held the east bank of the stream till all theConfederates surrendered except Rosser, who succeeded in making hisway back to the valley, and Generals Early, Wharton, Long, andLilley, who, with fifteen or twenty men, escaped across the BlueRidge. I followed up the victory immediately by despatching Capehartthrough Rock-fish Gap, with orders to encamp on the east side of theBlue Ridge. By reason of this move all the enemy's stores andtransportation fell into our hands, while we captured on the fieldseventeen battle flags, sixteen hundred officers and men, and elevenpieces of artillery. This decisive victory closed hostilities in theShenandoah Valley. The prisoners and artillery were sent back toWinchester next morning, under a guard of 1, 500 men, commanded byColonel J. H. Thompson, of the First New Hampshire. 

The night of March 2 Custer camped at Brookfield, Devin remaining atWaynesboro'. The former started for Charlottesville the next morningearly, followed by Devin with but two brigades, Gibbs having beenleft behind to blow up the iron railroad bridge across South River. Because of the incessant rains and spring thaws the roads were verysoft, and the columns cut them up terribly, the mud being thrown bythe sets of fours across the road in ridges as much as two feet high, making it most difficult to get our wagons along, and distressinglywearing on the animals toward the middle and rear of the columns. Consequently I concluded to rest at Charlottesville for a couple ofdays and recuperate a little, intending at the same time to destroy, with small parties, the railroad from that point toward Lynchburg. Custer reached Charlottesville the 3d, in the afternoon, and was metat the outskirts by a deputation of its citizens, headed by themayor, who surrendered the town with medieval ceremony, formallyhanding over the keys of the public buildings and of the Universityof Virginia. But this little scene did not delay Custer long enoughto prevent his capturing, just beyond the village, a small body ofcavalry and three pieces of artillery. Gibbs's brigade, which wasbringing up my mud-impeded train, did not arrive until the 5th ofMarch. In the mean time Young's scouts had brought word that thegarrison of Lynchburg was being increased and the fortificationsstrengthened, so that its capture would be improbable. I decided, however, to move toward the place as far as Amherst Court House, which is sixteen miles short of the town, so Devin, under Merritt'ssupervision, marched along the James River, destroying the canal, while Custer pushed ahead on the railroad and broke it up. The twocolumns were to join at New Market, whence I intended to cross theJames River at some point east of Lynchburg, if practicable, so as tomake my way to Appomattox Court House, and destroy the Southsiderailroad as far east as Farmville. Owing to its swollen conditionthe river was unfordable but knowing that there was a covered bridgeat Duguidsville, I hoped to secure it by a dash, and cross there, butthe enemy, anticipating this, had filled the bridge with inflammablematerial, and just as our troops got within striking distance itburst into flames. The bridge at Hardwicksville also having beenburned by the enemy, there was now no means of crossing except bypontoons. But, unfortunately, I had only eight of these, and theycould not be made to span the swollen river. 

Being thus unable to cross until the river should fall, and knowingthat it was impracticable to join General Sherman, and useless toadhere to my alternative instructions to return to Winchester, I nowdecided to destroy still more thoroughly the James River canal andthe Virginia Central railroad and then join General Grant in front ofPetersburg. I was master of the whole country north of the James asfar down as Goochland; hence the destruction of these arteries ofsupply could be easily compassed, and feeling that the war wasnearing its end, I desired my cavalry to be in at the death. 

On March 9 the main column started eastward down the James River, destroying locks, dams, and boats, having been preceded by ColonelFitzhugh's brigade of Devin's division in a forced march to Goochlandand Beaver Dam Creek, with orders to destroy everything belowColumbia. I made Columbia on the 10th, and from there sent acommunication to General Grant reporting what had occurred, informinghim of my condition and intention, asking him to send forage andrations to meet me at the White House, and also a pontoon-bridge tocarry me over the Pamunkey, for in view of the fact that hitherto ithad been impracticable to hold Lee in the trenches around Petersburg, I regarded as too hazardous a march down the south bank of thePamunkey, where the enemy, by sending troops out from Richmond, mightfall upon my flank and rear. It was of the utmost importance thatGeneral Grant should receive these despatches without chance offailure, in order that I might, depend absolutely on securingsupplies at the White House; therefore I sent the message induplicate, one copy overland direct to City Point by two scouts, Campbell and Rowan, and the other by Fannin and Moore, who were to godown the James River in a small boat to Richmond, join the troops inthe trenches in front of Petersburg, and, deserting to the Unionlines, deliver their tidings into General Grant's hands. Each set ofmessengers got through, but the copy confided to Campbell and Rowanwas first at Grant's headquarters. 

I halted for one day at Columbia to let my trains catch up, for itwas still raining and the mud greatly delayed the teams, fatiguingand wearying the mules so much that I believe we should have beenforced to abandon most of the wagons except for the invaluable helpgiven by some two thousand negroes who had attached themselves to thecolumn: they literally lifted the wagons out of the mud. FromColumbia Merritt, with Devin's division, marched to Louisa CourtHouse and destroyed the Virginia Central to Frederick's Hall. Meanwhile Custer was performing similar work from Frederick's Hall toBeaver Dam Station, and also pursued for a time General Early, who, it was learned from despatches captured in the telegraph office atFrederick's Hall, was in the neighborhood with a couple of hundredmen. Custer captured some of these men and two of Early'sstaff-officers, but the commander of the Valley District, accompaniedby a single orderly, escaped across the South Anna and next day madehis way to Richmond, the last man of the Confederate army that had solong contended with us in the Shenandoah Valley. 

At Frederick's Hall, Young's scouts brought me word from Richmondthat General Longstreet was assembling a force there to prevent myjunction with Grant, and that Pickett's division, which had been senttoward Lynchburg to oppose my march, and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, weremoving east on the Southside railroad, with the object ofcircumventing me. Reasoning that Longstreet could interposeeffectually only by getting to the White House ahead of me, I pushedone column under Custer across the South Anna, by way of GroundSquirrel bridge, to Ashland, where it united with Merritt, who hadmeanwhile marched through Hanover Junction. Our appearance atAshland drew the Confederates out in that direction, as was hoped, so, leaving Colonel Pennington's brigade there to amuse them, theunited command retraced its route to Mount Carmel church to cross theNorth Anna. After dark Pennington came away, and all the troopsreached the church by midnight of the 15th. 

Resuming the march at an early hour next morning, we took the road byway of King William Court House to the White House, where, arrivingon the 18th, we found, greatly to our relief, the supplies which Ihad requested to be sent there. In the meanwhile the enemy hadmarched to Hanover Court House, but being unable either to cross thePamunkey there or forestall me at the White House on the south sideof the river, he withdrew to Richmond without further effort toimpede my column. 

The hardships of this march far exceeded those of any previouscampaigns by the cavalry. Almost incessant rains had drenched us forsixteen days and nights, and the swollen streams and well-nighbottomless roads east of Staunton presented grave difficulties onevery hand, but surmounting them all, we destroyed the enemy's meansof subsistence, in quantities beyond computation, and permanentlycrippled the Virginia Central railroad, as well as the James Rivercanal, and as each day brought us nearer the Army of the Potomac, allwere filled with the comforting reflection that our work in theShenandoah Valley had been thoroughly done, and every one was buoyedup by the cheering thought that we should soon take part in the finalstruggle of the war. 

CHAPTER V. 

TRANSFERRED TO PETERSBURG--GENERAL RAWLINS CORDIAL WELCOME--GENERALGRANT's ORDERS AND PLANS--A TRIP WITH MR. LINCOLN AND GENERAL GRANT--MEETING GENERAL SHERMAN--OPPOSED TO JOINING THE ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE--OPENING OF THE APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGN--GENERAL GRANT AND GENERAL RAWLINS. 

The transfer of my command from the Shenandoah Valley to the field ofoperations in front of Petersburg was not anticipated by GeneralGrant; indeed, the despatch brought from Columbia by my scouts, asking that supplies be sent me at the White House, was the firstword that reached him concerning the move. In view of my message thegeneral-in-chief decided to wait my arrival before beginning springoperations with the investing troops south of the James River, for hefelt the importance of having my cavalry at hand in a campaign whichhe was convinced would wind up the war. We remained a few days atthe White House resting and refitting the cavalry, a large amount ofshoeing being necessary; but nothing like enough horses were at handto replace those that had died or been disabled on the mud march fromStaunton to the Pamunkey River, so a good many of the men were stillwithout mounts, and all such were sent by boat to the dismounted campnear City Point. When all was ready the column set out for HancockStation, a point on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, andarriving there on the 27th of March, was in orders reunited with itscomrades of the Second Division, who had been serving with the Armyof the Potomac since we parted from them the previous August. General Crook, who had been exchanged within a few days, was now incommand of this Second Division. The reunited corps was to enterupon the campaign as a separate army, I reporting directly to GeneralGrant; the intention being thus to reward me for foregoing, of my ownchoice, my position as a department commander by joining the armiesat Petersburg. 

Taking the road across the Peninsula, I started from the White Housewith Merritt's column on the 25th of March and encamped that night atHarrison's Landing. Very early next morning, in conformity with arequest from General Grant, I left by boat for City Point, Merrittmeanwhile conducting the column across the James River to the pointof rendezvous, The trip to City Point did not take long, and onarrival at army headquarters the first person I met was General JohnA. Rawlins, General Grant's chief-of-staff. Rawlins was a man ofstrong likes and dislikes, and positive always both in speech andaction, exhibiting marked feelings when greeting any one, and on thisoccasion met me with much warmth. His demonstrations of welcomeover, we held a few minutes' conversation about the coming campaign, he taking strong ground against a part of the plan of operationsadopted, namely, that which contemplated my joining General Sherman'sarmy. His language was unequivocal and vehement, and when he wasthrough talking, he conducted me to General Grant's quarters, but hehimself did not enter. 

General Grant was never impulsive, and always met his officers in anunceremonious way, with a quiet "How are you" soon putting one at hisease, since the pleasant tone in which he spoke gave assurance ofwelcome, although his manner was otherwise impassive. When theordinary greeting was over, he usually waited for his visitor to openthe conversation, so on this occasion I began by giving him thedetails of my march from Winchester, my reasons for not joiningSherman, as contemplated in my instructions, and the motives whichhad influenced me to march to the White House. The other provisionof my orders on setting out from Winchester--the alternative returnto that place--was not touched upon, for the wisdom of having ignoredthat was fully apparent. Commenting on this recital of my doings, the General referred only to the tortuous course of my march fromWaynesboro' down, our sore trials, and the valuable services of thescouts who had brought him tidings of me, closing with the remarkthat it was, rare a department commander voluntarily deprived himselfof independence, and added that I should not suffer for it. Thenturning to the business for which he had called me to City Point, heoutlined what he expected me to do; saying that I was to cut loosefrom the Army of the Potomac by passing its left flank to thesouthward along the line of the Danville railroad, and after crossingthe Roanoke River, join General Sherman. While speaking, he handedme a copy of a general letter of instructions that had been drawn upfor the army on the 24th. The letter contained these wordsconcerning the movements of my command:

"The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now underGeneral Davies, will move at the same time (29th inst. ) by the Weldonroad and the Jerusalem plank-road, turning west from the latterbefore crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column beforereaching Stony Creek. General Sheridan will then move independentlyunder other instructions which will be given him. All dismountedcavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismountedcavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guardingproperty belonging to their arm of the service, will report toBrigadier-General Benham to be added to the defenses of City Point. "

When I had gone over the entire letter I showed plainly that I wasdissatisfied with it, for, coupled with what the General had outlinedorally, which I supposed was the "other instructions, " I believed itforeshadowed my junction with General Sherman. Rawlins thought sotoo, as his vigorous language had left no room to doubt, so Iimmediately began to offer my objections to the programme. Thesewere, that it would be bad policy to send me down to the Carolinaswith a part of the Army of the Potomac, to come back to crush Leeafter the destruction of General Johnston's army; such a course wouldgive rise to the charge that his own forces around Petersburg werenot equal to the task, and would seriously affect public opinion inthe North; that in fact my cavalry belonged to the Army of thePotomac, which army was able unaided to destroy Lee, and I could notbut oppose any dispersion of its strength. 

All this was said in a somewhat emphatic manner, and when I hadfinished he quietly told me that the portion of my instructions fromwhich I so strongly dissented was intended as a "blind" to cover anycheck the army in its general move, to the left might meet with, andprevent that element in the North which held that the war could beended only through negotiation, from charging defeat. The fact thatmy cavalry was not to ultimately join Sherman was a great relief tome, and after expressing the utmost confidence in the plans unfoldedfor closing the war by directing every effort to the annihilation ofLee's army, I left him to go to General Ingalls's quarters. On theway I again met Rawlins, who, when I told him that General Grant hadintimated his intention to modify the written plan of operations sofar as regarded the cavalry, manifested the greatest satisfaction, and I judged from this that the new view of the matter had notpreviously been communicated to the chief-of-staff, though he musthave been acquainted of course with the programme made out on the24th of March. 

Toward noon General Grant sent for me to accompany him up the river. When I joined the General he informed me that the President was onboard the boat--the steamer Mary Martin. For some days Mr. Lincolnhad been at City Point, established on the steamer River Queen, having come down from Washington to be nearer his generals, no doubt, and also to be conveniently situated for the reception of tidingsfrom the front when operations began, for he could not endure thedelays in getting news to Washington. This trip up the James hadbeen projected by General Meade, but on account of demands at thefront he could not go, so the President, General Grant, and Icomposed the party. We steamed up to where my cavalry was crossingon the pontoon-bridge below the mouth of the Dutch Gap canal, and fora little while watched the column as it was passing over the river, the bright sunshine presaging good weather, but only to delude, aswas proved by the torrents of rain brought by the succeeding days ofMarch. On the trip the President was not very cheerful. In fact, hewas dejected, giving no indication of his usual means of diversion, by which (his quaint stories) I had often heard he could find relieffrom his cares. He spoke to me of the impending operations and askedmany questions, laying stress upon the one, "What would be the resultwhen the army moved out to the left, if the enemy should come downand capture City Point?" the question being prompted, doubtless, bythe bold assault on our lines and capture of Fort Steadman two daysbefore by General Gordon. I answered that I did not think it at allprobable that General Lee would undertake such a desperate measure torelieve the strait he was in; that General Hartranft's successfulcheck to Gordon had ended, I thought, attacks of such a character;and in any event General Grant would give Lee all he could attend toon the left. Mr. Lincoln said nothing about my proposed route ofmarch, and I doubt if he knew of my instructions, or was inpossession at most of more than a very general outline of the plan ofcampaign. It was late when the Mary Martin returned to City Point, and I spent the night there with General Ingalls. 

The morning of the 27th I went out to Hancock Station to look aftermy troops and prepare for moving two days later. In the afternoon Ireceived a telegram from General Grant, saying: "General Sherman willbe here this evening to spend a few hours. I should like to have youcome down. " Sherman's coming was a surprise--at least to me it was--this despatch being my first intimation of his expected arrival. Well knowing the zeal and emphasis with which General Sherman wouldpresent his views, there again came into my mind many misgivings withreference to the movement of the cavalry, and I made haste to startfor Grant's headquarters. I got off a little after 7 o'clock, takingthe rickety military railroad, the rails of which were laid on thenatural surface of the ground, with grading only here and there atpoints of absolute necessity, and had not gone far when thelocomotive jumped the track. This delayed my arrival at City Pointtill near midnight, but on repairing to the little cabin thatsheltered the general-in-chief, I found him and Sherman still uptalking over the problem whose solution was near at hand. As alreadystated, thoughts as to the tenor of my instructions became uppermostthe moment I received the telegram in the afternoon, and theycontinued to engross and disturb me all the way down the railroad, for I feared that the telegram foreshadowed, under the propositionsSherman would present, a more specific compliance with the writteninstructions than General Grant had orally assured me would beexacted. 

My entrance into the shanty suspended the conversation for a momentonly, and then General Sherman, without prelude, rehearsed his plansfor moving his army, pointing out with every detail how he would comeup through the Carolinas to join the troops besieging Petersburg andRichmond, and intimating that my cavalry, after striking theSouthside and Danville railroads, could join him with ease. I madeno comments on the projects for moving, his own troops, but as soonas opportunity offered, dissented emphatically from the propositionto have me join the Army of the Tennessee, repeating in substancewhat I had previously expressed to General Grant. 

My uneasiness made me somewhat too earnest, I fear, but General Grantsoon mollified me, and smoothed matters over by practically repeatingwhat he had told me in regard to this point at the close of ourinterview the day before, so I pursued the subject no further. In alittle while the conference ended, and I again sought lodging at thehospitable quarters of Ingalls. 

Very early the next morning, while I was still in bed, GeneralSherman came to me and renewed the subject of my joining him, butwhen he saw that I was unalterably opposed to it the conversationturned into other channels, and after we had chatted awhile hewithdrew, and later in the day went up the river with the President, General Grant, and Admiral Porter, I returning to my command atHancock Station, where my presence was needed to put my troops inmarch next day. 

During the entire winter General Grant's lines fronting Petersburghad extended south of the Appomattox River, practically from thatstream around to where the Vaughn road crosses Hatcher's Run, andthis was nearly the situation Wilien the cavalry concentrated atHancock Station, General Weitzel holding the line north of theAppomattox, fronting Richmond and Bermuda Hundred. 

The instructions of the 24th of March contemplated that the campaignshould begin with the movement of Warren's corps (the Fifth) at3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, and Humphreys's (the Second) at6; the rest of the infantry holding on in the trenches. The cavalrywas to move in conjunction with Warren and Humphreys, and make itsway out beyond our left as these corps opened the road. 

The night of the 28th I received the following additionalinstructions, the general tenor of which again disturbed me, foralthough I had been assured that I was not to join General Sherman, it will be seen that the supplemental directions distinctly presentthat alternative, and I therefore feared that during the trip up theJames River on the morning of the 28th General Grant had returned tohis original views:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "City Point, Va. , March 28, 1865. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN:

"The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 A. M. Tomorrow morning. The Second moves at about 9 A. M. , having but aboutthree miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take onthe right of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaches DinwiddieCourt House. 

"Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without beingconfined to any particular road or roads. You may go out by thenearest roads in rear of the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, andpassing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of theenemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack theenemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can beattacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and withthe full reliance that the army will engage or follow the enemy, ascircumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and willprobably be able to communicate with you; should I not do so, and youfind that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you maycut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicableI would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg andBurkeville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise muchdetention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I wouldlike you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible; make yourdestruction of that road as complete as possible; you can then passon to the Southside road, west of Burkeville, and destroy that inlike manner. 

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you mayreturn to this army, selecting your road farther south, or you may goon into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you selectthe latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, sothat I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. "

These instructions did not alter my line of march for the morrow, andI trusted matters would so come about as not to require compliancewith those portions relative to the railroads and to joining Sherman;so early on the 29th I moved my cavalry out toward Ream's Station onthe Weldon road, Devin commanding the First Division, with ColonelsGibbs, Stagg, and Fitzhugh in charge of the brigades; the ThirdDivision under Custer, Colonels Wells, Capehart and Pennington beingthe brigade commanders. These two divisions united were commanded byMerritt, as they had been since leaving Winchester. Crook headed theSecond Division, his brigades being under General Davies and ColonelsJohn I. Gregg and Smith. 

Our general direction was westward, over such routes as could befound, provided they did not embarrass the march of the infantry. The roads, from the winter's frosts and rains, were in a frightfulstate, and when it was sought to avoid a spot which the head of thecolumn had proved almost bottomless, the bogs and quicksands of theadjoining fields demonstrated that to make a detour was to go frombad to worse. In the face of these discouragements we floundered on, however, crossing on the way a series of small streams swollen totheir banks. Crook and Devin reached the county-seat of Dinwiddieabout 5 o'clock in the evening, having encountered only a smallpicket, that at once gave way to our advance. Merritt left Custer atMalon's crossing of Rowanty Creek to care for the trains containingour subsistence and the reserve ammunition, these being stuck in themire at, intervals all the way back to the Jerusalem plank-road; andto make any headway at all with the trains, Custer's men often had tounload the wagons and lift them out of the boggy places. 

Crook and Devin camped near Dinwiddie Court House in such manner asto cover the Vaughn, Flatfoot, Boydton, and Five Forks roads; for, asthese all intersected at Dinwiddie, they offered a chance for theenemy's approach toward the rear of the Fifth Corps, as Warrenextended to the left across the Boydton road. Any of these routesleading to the south or west might also be the one on which, inconformity with one part of my instructions, I was expected to getout toward the Danville and Southside railroads, and the Five Forksroad would lead directly to General Lee's right flank, in caseopportunity was found to comply with the other part. The place was, therefore, of great strategic value, and getting it without costrepaid us for floundering through the mud. 

Dinwiddie Court House, though a most important point in the campaign, was far from attractive in feature, being made up of a half-dozenunsightly houses, a ramshackle tavern propped up on two sides withpine poles, and the weatherbeaten building that gave official name tothe cross-roads. We had no tents--there were none in the command--soI took possession of the tavern for shelter for myself and staff, andjust as we had finished looking over its primitive interior a rainstorm set in. 

The wagon containing my mess equipment was back somewhere on theroad, hopelessly stuck in the mud, and hence we had nothing to eatexcept some coffee which two young women living at the tavern kindlymade for us; a small quantity of the berry being furnished from thehaversacks of my escort. By the time we got the coffee, rain wasfalling in sheets, and the evening bade fair to be a most dismal one;but songs and choruses set up by some of my staff--the two youngwomen playing accompaniments on a battered piano--relieved thesituation and enlivened us a little. However, the dreary nightbrought me one great comfort; for General Grant, who that day hadmoved out to Gravelly Run, sent me instructions to abandon all ideaof the contemplated raid, and directed me to act in concert with theinfantry under his immediate command, to turn, if possible, the rightflank of Lee's army. The despatch made my mind easy with respect tothe objectionable feature of my original instructions, and of courserelieved me also from the anxiety growing out of the letter receivedat Hancock Station the night of the 28th; so, notwithstanding thesuspicions excited by some of my staff concerning the Virginiafeather-bed that had been assigned me, I turned in at a late hour andslept most soundly. 

The night of the 29th the left of General Grant's infantry--Warren'scorps--rested on the Boydton road, not far from its intersection withthe Quaker road. Humphreys's corps was next to Warren; then cameOrd, next Wright, and then Parke, with his right resting on theAppomattox. The moving of Warren and Humphreys to the left duringthe day was early discovered by General Lee. He met it by extendingthe right of his infantry on the White Oak road, while drawing in thecavalry of W. H. F. Lee and Rosser along the south bank of StonyCreek to cover a crossroads called Five Forks, to anticipate methere; for assuming that my command was moving in conjunction withthe infantry, with the ultimate purpose of striking the Southsiderailroad, Lee made no effort to hold Dinwiddie, which he might havedone with his cavalry, and in this he made a fatal mistake. Thecavalry of Fitz. Lee was ordered at this same time from Sunderlanddepot to Five Forks, and its chief placed in command of all themounted troops of General Lee's army. 

At daylight on the 30th I proceeded to make dispositions under thenew conditions imposed by my modified instructions, and directedMerritt to push Devin out as far as the White Oak road to make areconnoissance to Five Forks, Crook being instructed to send Davies'sbrigade to support Devin. Crook was to hold, with Gregg's brigade, the Stony Creek crossing of the Boydton plank road, retaining Smith'snear Dinwiddie, for use in any direction required. On the 29th W. H. F. Lee conformed the march of his cavalry with that of ours, but myholding Stony Creek in this way forced him to make a detour west ofChamberlin's Run, in order to get in communication with his friendsat Five Forks. 

The rain that had been falling all night gave no sign of stopping, but kept pouring down all day long, and the swamps and quicksandsmired the horses, whether they marched in the roads or across theadjacent fields. Undismayed, nevertheless, each column set out forits appointed duty, but shortly after the troops began to move Ireceived from General Grant this despatch, which put a new phase onmatters:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "GRAVELLY RUN, March 30, 1865. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN:

"The heavy rain of to-day will make it impossible for us to do muchuntil it dries up a little, or we get roads around our rear repaired. You may, therefore, leave what cavalry you deem necessary to protectthe left, and hold such positions as you deem necessary for thatpurpose, and send the remainder back to Humphrey's Station where theycan get hay and grain. Fifty wagons loaded with forage will be sentto you in the morning. Send an officer back to direct the wagonsback to where you want them. Report to me the cavalry you will leaveback, and the position you will occupy. Could not your cavalry goback by the way of Stony Creek depot and destroy or capture the storeof supplies there?

"U. S. GRANT, Lieut. -General. "

When I had read and pondered this, I determined to ride over toGeneral Grant's headquarters on Gravelly Run, and get a clear idea ofwhat it was proposed to do, for it seemed to me that a suspension ofoperations would be a serious mistake. Mounting a powerful graypacing horse called Breckenridge (from its capture from one ofBreckenridge's staff-officers at Missionary Ridge), and that I knewwould carry me through the mud, I set out accompanied by my AssistantAdjutant-General, Colonel Frederick C. Newhall, and an escort ofabout ten or fifteen men. At first we rode north up the Boydtonplank-road, and coming upon our infantry pickets from a directionwhere the enemy was expected to appear, they began to fire upon us, but seeing from our actions that we were friends, they ceased, andpermitted us to pass the outposts. We then struggled on in anortheasterly direction across-country, till we struck the Vaughnroad. This carried us to army headquarters, which were establishedsouth of Gravelly Run in an old cornfield. I rode to within a fewyards of the front of General Grant's tent, my horse plunging atevery step almost to his knees in the mud, and dismounted near acamp-fire, apparently a general one, for all the staff-officers werestanding around it on boards and rails placed here and there to keepthem from sinking into the mire. 

Going directly to General Grant's tent, I found him and Rawlinstalking over the question of suspending operations till the weathershould improve. No orders about the matter had been issued yet, except the despatch to me, and Rawlins, being strongly opposed to theproposition, was frankly expostulating with General Grant, who, aftergreeting me, remarked, in his quiet way: "Well, Rawlins, I think youhad better take command. " Seeing that there was a difference upbetween Rawlins and his chief, I made the excuse of being wet andcold, and went outside to the fire. Here General Ingalls met me andtook me to his tent, where I was much more comfortable than whenstanding outside, and where a few minutes later we were joined byGeneral Grant. Ingalls then retired, and General Grant began talkingof our fearful plight, resulting from the rains and mud, and sayingthat because of this it seemed necessary to suspend operations. I atonce begged him not to do so, telling him that my cavalry was alreadyon the move in spite of the difficulties, and that although asuspension of operations would not be fatal, yet it would give riseto the very charge of disaster to which he had referred at CityPoint, and, moreover, that we would surely be ridiculed, just asGeneral Burnside's army was after the mud march of 1863. His betterjudgment was against suspending operations, but the proposition hadbeen suggested by all sorts of complaints as to the impossibility ofmoving the trains and the like, so it needed little argument toconvince him, and without further discussion he said, in that mannerwhich with him meant a firmness of purpose that could not be changedby further complainings, "We will go on. " I then told him that Ibelieved I could break in the enemy's right if he would let me havethe Sixth Corps; but saying that the condition of the roads wouldprevent the movement of infantry, he replied that I would have toseize Five Forks with the cavalry alone. 

On my way back to Dinwiddie I stopped at the headquarters of GeneralWarren, but the General being asleep, I went to the tent of one ofhis staff-officers. Colonel William T. Gentry, an old personalfriend with whom I had served in Oregon. In a few minutes Warrencame in and we had a short conversation, he speaking ratherdespondently of the outlook, being influenced no doubt by thedepressing weather. 

From Warren's headquarters I returned, by the Boydton road toDinwiddie Court House, fording Gravelly Run with ease. When I got asfar as the Dabney road I sent Colonel Newhall out on it toward FiveForks, with orders for Merritt to develop the enemy's position andstrength, and then rode on to Dinwiddie to endeavor to get all myother troops up. Merritt was halted at the intersection of the FiveForks and Gravelly Church roads when Newhall delivered the orders, and in compliance moving out Gibbs's brigade promptly, sharpskirmishing was brought on, Gibbs driving the Confederates to FiveForks, where he found them behind a line of breastworks running alongthe White Oak road. The reconnoissance demonstrating the intentionof the enemy to hold this point, Gibbs was withdrawn. 

That evening, at 7 o'clock, I reported the position of theConfederate cavalry, and stated that it had been reinforced byPickett's division of infantry. On receipt of this despatch, GeneralGrant offered me the Fifth Corps, but I declined to take it, andagain asked for the Sixth, saying that with it I believed I couldturn the enemy (Pickett's) left, or break through his lines. Themorning of the 31st General Grant replied the the Sixth Corps couldnot be taken from its position in the line, and offered me theSecond; but in the mean time circumstances had changed, and no corpswas ordered. 

CHAPTER VI. 

BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE--PICKETT REPULSED--REINFORCED BY THEFIFTH CORPS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--TURNING THE CONFEDERATE LEFT--ANUNQUALIFIED SUCCESS--RELIEVING GENERAL WARREN--THE WARREN COURT OFINQUIRY--GENERAL SHERMAN'S OPINION. 

The night of March 30 Merritt, with Devin's division and Davies'sbrigade, was camped on the Five Forks road about two miles in frontof Dinwiddie, near J. Boisseau's. Crook, with Smith and Gregg'sbrigades, continued to cover Stony Creek, and Custer was still backat Rowanty Creek, trying to get the trains up. This force had beencounted while crossing the creek on the 29th, the three divisionsnumbering 9, 000 enlisted men, Crook having 3, 300, and Custer andDevin 5, 700. 

During the 30th, the enemy had been concentrating his cavalry, and byevening General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser had joined FitzhughLee near Five Forks. To this force was added, about dark, fivebrigades of infantry--three from Pickett's division, and two fromJohnson's--all under command of Pickett. The infantry came by theWhite Oak road from the right of General Lee's intrenchments, andtheir arrival became positively known to me about dark, theconfirmatory intelligence being brought in then by some of Young'sscouts who had been inside the Confederate lines. 

On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at anearly hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissancespreparatory to securing Five Forks, and about 9 o'clock Merrittstarted for the crossroads, Davies's brigade supporting him. Hismarch was necessarily slow because of the mud, and the enemy'spickets resisted with obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fellto Merritt without much trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was justthen bent on other things. At the same hour that Merritt started, Crook moved Smith's brigade out northwest from Dinwiddie toFitzgerald's crossing of Chamberlain's Creek, to cover Merritt'sleft, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to his right and rear. Theoccupation of this ford was timely, for Pickett, now in command ofboth the cavalry and infantry, was already marching to get inMerritt's rear by crossing Chamberlain's Creek. 

To hold on to Fitzgerald's ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, butMumford's cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy's infantry succeeded ingetting over Chamberlain's Creek at a point higher up thanFitzgerald's ford, and assailing Davies, forced him back in anortheasterly direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road incompany with Devin. The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to passbetween Crook and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectuallyseparating them and cutting off both Davies and Devin from the roadto Dinwiddie, so that to get to that point they had to retreat acrossthe country to B. Boisseau's and then down the Boydton road. 

Gibbs's brigade had been in reserve near the intersection of the FiveForks and Dabney roads, and directing Merritt to hold on there, Iordered Gregg's brigade to be mounted and brought to Merritt's aid, for if Pickett continued in pursuit north of the Five Forks road hewould expose his right and rear, and I determined to attack him, insuch case, from Gibbs's position. Gregg arrived in good season, andas soon as his men were dismounted on Gibbs's left, Merritt assailedfiercely, compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thusinterrupting an advance that would finally have carried Pickett intothe rear of Warren's corps. 

It was now about 4 o'clock in the afternoon and we were in a criticalsituation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies toDinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurryCuster to the same point, for with its several diverging roads theCourt House was of vital importance, and I determined to stay thereat all hazards. At the same time orders were sent to Smith'sbrigade, which, by the advance of Pickett past its right flank andthe pressure of W. H. F. Lee on its front, had been compelled to giveup Fitzgerald's crossing, to fall back toward Dinwiddie but tocontest every inch of ground so as to gain time. 

When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting fromhis pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undividedattention to this unexpected force, and with his preponderatinginfantry pressed it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddle, though our men, fighting dismounted behind barricades at differentpoints, displayed such obstinacy as to make Pickett's progress slow, and thus give me time to look out a line for defending the CourtHouse. I selected a place about three-fourths of a mile northwest ofthe crossroads, and Custer coming up quickly with Capehart's brigade, took position on the left of the road to Five Forks in some openground along the crest of a gentle ridge. Custer got Capehart intoplace just in time to lend a hand to Smith, who, severely pressed, came back on us here from his retreat along Chamberlain's "bed"--thevernacular for a woody swamp such as that through which Smithretired. A little later the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs, falling tothe rear slowly and steadily, took up in the woods a line whichcovered the Boydton Road some distance to the right of Capehart, theintervening gap to be filled with Pennington's brigade. By this timeour horse-artillery, which for two days had been stuck in the mud, was all up, and every gun was posted in this line. 

It was now near sunset, and the enemy's cavalry thinking the day wastheirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the assailants appeared inthe open fields, Capehart's men opened so suddenly on their leftflank as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smithto connect his brigade with Custer unmolested. We were now in goodshape behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line, excepting only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that coveredDinwiddie and the Boydton Road. My left rested in the woods abouthalf a mile west of the Court House, and the barricades extended fromthis flank in a semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterlydirection, to a piece-of thick timber on the right, near the BoydtonRoad. 

A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formedfor the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington's brigade came upand filled the space to which it was assigned between Capehart andGibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in frontof Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we wereoutnumbered. 

Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rodealong the barricades to encourage the men. Our enthusiasticreception showed that they were determined to stay. The cavalcadedrew the enemy's fire, which emptied several of the saddles--amongothers Mr. Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald, being wounded. In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancingConfederates, but the men behind the barricades lay still tillPickett's troops were within short range. Then they opened, Custer'srepeating rifles pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing couldstand up against it. The repulse was very quick, and as the graylines retired to the woods from which but a few minutes before theyhad so confidently advanced, all danger of their taking Dinwiddie ormarching to the left and rear of our infantry line was over, at least for the night. The enemy being thus checked, I sent astaff-officer--Captain Sheridan--to General Grant to report what hadtaken place during the afternoon, and to say that I proposed to stay atDinwiddie, but if ultimately compelled to abandon the place, I would doso by retiring on the Vaughn road toward Hatcher's Run, for I thenthought the attack might be renewed next morning. Devin and Daviesjoined me about dark, and my troops being now well in hand, I sent asecond staff-officer--Colonel John Kellogg--to explain my situationmore fully, and to assure General Grant that I would hold on atDinwiddie till forced to let go. 

By following me to Dinwiddie the enemy's infantry had completelyisolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops arare opportunity. Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired, and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received thefirst report of my situation; General Meade appreciated it too fromthe information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to armyheadquarters with the first tidings, and sent this telegram toGeneral Grant:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "March 31, 1865. 9:45 p. M. 

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:

"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps andsmash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the lineto the Boydton plank-road, and the refusal along with it. Bartlett'sbrigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau's, running north, whereit crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road. Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threateningSheridan in rear at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy's rear with theother two. 

"G. G. MEADE, Major-General. "

An hour later General Grant replied in these words:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "DABNEY'S MILLS, March 311, 1865. 10:15 P. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, "Commanding Army of the Potomac. 

Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop foranything. Let Griffin (Griffin had been ordered by Warren to theBoydton road to protect his rear) go on as he was first directed. 

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General. "

These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the FifthCorps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me, and when Ireceived word of its coming and also that Genera Mackenzie's cavalryfrom the Army of the James was likewise to be added to my command, and that discretionary authority was given me to use all my forcesagainst Pickett, I resolved to destroy him, if it was within thebounds of possibility, before he could rejoin Lee. 

In a despatch, dated 10:05 p. M. , telling me of the coming of Warrenand Mackenzie, General Grant also said that the Fifth Corps shouldreach me by 12 o'clock that night, but at that hour not only had noneof the corps arrived, but no report from it, so believing that if itcame all the way down to Dinwiddie the next morning, our opportunitywould be gone, I concluded that it would be best to order Warren tomove in on the enemy's rear while the cavalry attacked in front, and, therefore, at 3 o'clock in the morning of April 1 sent this despatchto General Warren:

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE C. H. , "April 1, 1865--3. A. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN, "Commanding Fifth Army Corps. 

"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leadingto Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer'sdivision. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to coverthe road just this side of A. Adams's house, which leads acrossChamberlain's bed, or run. I understand you have a division at J. [G]Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line and almost onhis flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer atdaylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack atdaylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this sideof Adams's house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oakroad, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get anyforce that may escape you by a flank movement. Do not fear myleaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General. "

With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately, and Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward. As these divisionsadvanced the enemy's infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devinpressing him along the road, while Custer extended on the left overtoward Chamberlain's Run, Crook being held in watch along StonyCreek, meanwhile, to be utilized as circumstances might require whenWarren attacked. 

The order of General Meade to Warren the night of March 31--a copybeing sent me also--was positive in its directions, but as midnightcame without a sign of or word from the Fifth Corps, notwithstandingthat was the hour fixed for its arrival, I nevertheless assumed thatthere were good reasons for its non-appearance, but never oncedoubted that measures would be taken to comply with my despatch Of3 A. M. And therefore hoped that, as Pickett was falling back slowlytoward Five Forks, Griffin's and Crawford's divisions would come inon the Confederate left and rear by the Crump road near J. [G]Boisseau's house. 

But they did not reach there till after the enemy had got by. As amatter of fact, when Pickett was passing the all-important pointWarren's men were just breaking from the bivouac in which their chiefhad placed them the night before, and the head of Griffin's divisiondid not get to Boisseau's till after my cavalry, which meanwhile hadbeen joined by Ayres's division of the Fifth Corps by way of theBoydton and Dabney roads. By reason of the delay in moving Griffinand Crawford, the enemy having escaped, I massed the Fifth Corps atJ. [G] Boisseau's so that the men could be rested, and directed it toremain there; General Warren himself had not then come up. GeneralMackenzie, who had reported just after daybreak, was ordered at firstto stay at Dinwiddie Court House, but later was brought along theFive Forks road to Dr. Smith's, and Crook's division was directed tocontinue watching the crossings of Stony Creek and Chamberlain's Run. 

That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat wasto me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he wouldnot give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed himback there with Merritt's cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scottroad, while Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J. [G]Boisseau's to Five Forks. 

By 2 o'clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside hisintrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quartersof a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the WhiteOak road to a point about a mile west of the Forks. From the left ofthe return over toward Hatcher's Run was posted Mumford's cavalry, dismounted. In the return itself was Wallace's brigade, and next onits right came Ransom's, then Stewart's, then Terry's, then Corse's. On the right of Corse was W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry. Tenpieces of artillery also were in this line, three on the right of theworks, three near the centre at the crossroads, and four on the left, in the return. Rosser's cavalry was guarding the Confederate trainsnorth of Hatcher's Run beyond the crossing of the Ford road. 

I felt certain the enemy would fight at Five Forks--he had to--so, while we were getting up to his intrenchments, I decided on my planof battle. This was to attack his whole front with Merritt's twocavalry divisions, make a feint of turning his right flank, and withthe Fifth Corps assail his left. As the Fifth Corps moved intoaction, its right flank was to be covered by Mackenzie's cavalry, thus entirely cutting off Pickett's troops from communication withLee's right flank, which rested near the Butler house at the junctionof the Claiborne and White Oaks roads. In execution of this plan, Merritt worked his men close in toward the intrenchments, and whilehe was thus engaged, I ordered Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps, sending the order by my engineer officer, Captain Gillespie, who hadreconnoitred the ground in the neighborhood of Gravelly Run Church, where the infantry was to form for attack. 

Gillespie delivered the order about 1 o'clock, and when the corps wasput in motion, General Warren joined me at the front. Before hecame, I had received, through Colonel Babcock, authority from GeneralGrant to relieve him, but I did not wish to do it, particularly onthe eve of battle; so, saying nothing at all about the messagebrought me, I entered at once on the plan for defeating Pickett, telling Warren how the enemy was posted, explaining with considerabledetail, and concluding by stating that I wished his troops to beformed on the Gravelly Church road, near its junction with the WhiteOak road, with two divisions to the front, aligned obliquely to theWhite Oak road, and one in reserve, opposite the centre of these two. 

General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to joinhis command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructingMerritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn theenemy's right, and to assault the front of the works with hisdismounted cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged. Afterward Irode around to Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren'scolumn just appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making arough sketch of the ground. I was disappointed that more of thecorps was not already up, and as the precious minutes went by withoutany apparent effort to hurry the troops on to the field, thisdisappointment grew into disgust. At last I expressed to Warren myfears that the cavalry might expend all their ammunition before theattack could be made, that the sun would go down before the battlecould be begun, or that troops from Lee's right, which, be itremembered, was less than three miles away from my right, might, bystriking my rear, or even by threatening it, prevent the attack onPickett. 

Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his mannerexhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that"Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble. " With unconcernsuch as this, it is no wonder that fully three hours' time wasconsumed in marching his corps from J. [G] Boisseau's to Gravelly RunChurch, though the distance was but two miles. However, when mypatience was almost worn out, Warren reported his troops ready, Ayres's division being formed on the west side of the Gravelly Churchroad, Crawford's on the east side, and Griffin in reserve behind theright of Crawford, a little different from my instructions. Thecorps had no artillery present, its batteries, on account of the mud, being still north of Gravelly Run. Meanwhile Merritt had been busyworking his men close up to the intrenchments from the angle of thereturn west, along the White Oak road. 

About 4 o'clock Warren began the attack. He was to assault the leftflank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett'sintrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oakroad. I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher's Run this partof the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford's cavalrywere covering, but I did know where the refusal began. This return, then, was the point I wished to assail, believing that if the assaultwas made with spirit, the line could be turned. I therefore intendedthat Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely, and when these two divisions and Merritt's cavalry became hotlyengaged, Griffin's division was to pass around the left of theConfederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wishedhim to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flankwould be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over towardthe Ford road and Hatcher's Run. 

The front of the corps was oblique to the White Oak road; and ongetting there, it was to swing round to the left till perpendicularto the road, keeping closed to the left. Ayres did his part well, and to the letter, bringing his division square up to the front ofthe return near the angle; but Crawford did not wheel to the left, aswas intended. On the contrary, on receiving fire from Mumford'scavalry, Crawford swerved to the right and moved north from thereturn, thus isolating his division from Ayres; and Griffin, uncertain of the enemy's position, naturally followed Crawford. 

The deflection of this division on a line of march which finallybrought it out on the Ford road near C. Young's house, frustrated thepurpose I had in mind when ordering the attack, and caused a gapbetween Ayres and Crawford, of which the enemy quickly tookadvantage, and succeeded in throwing a part of Ayres's division intoconfusion. At this juncture I sent word to General Warren to haveCrawford recalled; for the direction he was following was not only amistaken one, but, in case the assault at the return failed, he rangreat risk of capture. Warren could not be found, so I then sent forGriffin--first by Colonel Newhall, and then by Colonel Sherman--tocome to the aid of Ayres, who was now contending alone with that partof the enemy's infantry at the return. By this time Griffin hadobserved and appreciated Crawford's mistake, however, and when thestaff-officers reached him, was already faced to the left; so, marching across Crawford's rear, he quickly joined Ayres, whomeanwhile had rallied his troops and carried the return. 

When Ayres's division went over the flank of the enemy's works, Devin's division of cavalry, which had been assaulting the front, went over in company with it; and hardly halting to reform, theintermingling infantry and dismounted cavalry swept down inside theintrenchments, pushing to and beyond Five Forks, capturing thousandsof prisoners. The only stand the enemy tried to make was when heattempted to form near the Ford road. Griffin pressed him so hardthere, however, that he had to give way in short order, and many ofhis men, with three pieces of artillery, fell into the hands ofCrawford while on his circuitous march. 

The right of Custer's division gained a foothold on the enemy's workssimultaneously with Devin's, but on the extreme left Custer had avery severe combat with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, as well as withCorse's and Terry's infantry. Attacking Terry and Corse withPennington's brigade dismounted, he assailed Lee's cavalry with hisother two brigades mounted, but Lee held on so obstinately thatCuster gained but little ground till our troops, advancing behind theworks, drove Corse and Terry out. Then Lee made no further standexcept at the west side of the Gillian field, where, assisted byCorse's brigade, he endeavored to cover the retreat, but just beforedark Custer, in concert with some Fifth Corps regiments under ColonelRichardson, drove ihe last of the enemy westward on the White Oakroad. 

Our success was unqualified; we had overthrown Pickett, taken sixguns, thirteen battle-flags, and nearly six thousand prisoners. Whenthe battle was practically over, I turned to consider my positionwith reference to the main Confederate army. My troops, thoughvictorious, were isolated from the Army of the Potomac, for on the31st of March the extreme left of that army had been thrown backnearly to the Boydton plank-road, and hence there was nothing toprevent the enemy's issuing from his trenches at the intersection ofthe White Oak and Claiborne roads and marching directly on my rear. I surmised that he might do this that night or early next morning. It was therefore necessary to protect myself in this criticalsituation, and General Warren having sorely disappointed me, both inthe moving of his corps and in its management during the battle, Ifelt that he was not the man to rely upon under such circumstances, and deeming that it was to the best interest of the service as wellas but just to myself, I relieved him, ordering him to report toGeneral Grant. 

I then put Griffin in command of the Fifth Corps, and directed him towithdraw from the pursuit as quickly as he could after following theenemy a short distance, and form in line of battle near Gravelly RunChurch, at right angles with the White Oak road, with Ayres andCrawford facing toward the enemy at the junction of the White Oak andClaiborne roads, leaving Bartlett, now commanding Griffin's division, near the Ford road. Mackenzie also was left on the Ford road at thecrossing of Hatcher's Run, Merritt going into camp on the WidowGillian's plantation. As I had been obliged to keep Crook's divisionalong Stony Creek throughout the day, it had taken no active part inthe battle. 

Years after the war, in 1879, a Court of Inquiry was given GeneralWarren in relation to his conduct on the day of the battle. Heassumed that the delay in not granting his request for an inquiry, which was first made at the close of the war, was due to oppositionon my part. In this he was in error; I never opposed the ordering ofthe Court, but when it was finally decided to convene it I naturallyasked to be represented by counsel, for the authorization of theInquiry was so peculiarly phrased that it made me practically arespondent. 

"NEW YORK CITY, May 3, 1880

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, U. S. A. "President Court of Inquiry, Governor's Island. 

"Sir: Since my arrival in this city, under a subpoena to appear andtestify before the Court of which you are president, I have beenindirectly and unofficially informed that the Court some time agoforwarded an invitation to me (which has not been received) to appearpersonally or by counsel, in order to aid it in obtaining a knowledgeas to the facts concerning the movements terminating in the battle of'Five Forks, ' with reference to the direct subjects of its inquiry. Any invitation of this character I should always and do consider itincumbent on me to accede to, and do everything in my power infurtherance of the specific purposes for which courts of inquiry areby law instituted. 

"The order convening the Court (a copy of which was not received byme at my division headquarters until two days after the timeappointed for the Court to assemble) contemplates an inquiry based onthe application of Lieutenant Colonel G. K. Warren, Corps ofEngineers, as to his conduct while major-general commanding the FifthArmy Corps, under my command, in reference to accusations orimputations assumed in the order to have been made against him, and Iunderstand through the daily press that my official report of thebattle of Five Forks has been submitted by him as a basis of inquiry. 

"If it is proposed to inquire, either directly or indirectly, as toany action of mine so far as the commanding general Fifth Army Corpswas concerned, or my motives for such action, I desire to bespecifically informed wherein such action or transaction is allegedto contain an accusation or imputation to become a subject ofinquiry, so that, knowing what issues are raised, I may intelligentlyaid the Court in arriving at the facts. 

"It is a long time since the battle of Five Forks was fought, andduring the time that has elapsed the official reports of that battlehave been received and acknowledged by the Government; but now, whenthe memory of events has in many instances grown dim, and three ofthe principal actors on that field are dead--Generals Griffin, Custer, and Devin, whose testimony would have been valuable--aninvestigation is ordered which might perhaps do injustice unless thefacts pertinent to the issues are fully developed. 

"My duties are such that it will not be convenient for me to bepresent continuously during the sessions of the Court. In order, however, that everything may be laid before it in my power pertinentto such specific issues as are legally raised, I beg leave tointroduce Major Asa Bird Gardner as my counsel. 

"Very respectfully, "P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieut. -General. "

Briefly stated, in my report of the battle of Five Forks there werefour imputations concerning General Warren. The first implied thatWarren failed to reach me on the 1st of April, when I had reason toexpect him; the second, that the tactical handling of his corps wasunskillful; the third, that he did not exert himself to get his corpsup to Gravelly Run Church; and the fourth, that when portions of hisline gave way he did not exert himself to restore confidence to histroops. The Court found against him on the first and second counts, and for him on the third and fourth. This finding was unsatisfactoryto General Warren, for he hoped to obtain such an unequivocalrecognition of his services as to cast discredit on my motives forrelieving him. These were prompted by the conditions alone--by theconduct of General Warren as described, and my consequent lack ofconfidence in him. 

It will be remembered that in my conversation with General Grant onthe 30th, relative to the suspension of operations because of themud, I asked him to let me have the Sixth Corps to help me inbreaking in on the enemy's right, but that it could not be sent me;it will be recalled also that the Fifth Corps was afterward tenderedand declined. From these facts it has been alleged that I wasprejudiced against General Warren, but this is not true. As we hadnever been thrown much together I knew but little of him. I had nopersonal objection to him, and certainly could have none to hiscorps. I was expected to do an extremely dangerous piece of work, and knowing the Sixth Corps well--my cavalry having campaigned withit so successfully in the Shenandoah Valley, I naturally preferredit, and declined the Fifth for no other reason. But the Sixth couldnot be given, and the turn of events finally brought me the Fifthafter my cavalry, under the most trying difficulties, had drawn theenemy from his works, and into such a position as to permit therealization of General Grant's hope to break up with my force Lee'sright flank. Pickett's isolation offered an opportunity which wecould not afford to neglect, and the destruction of his command wouldfill the measure of General Grant's expectations as well as meet myown desires. The occasion was not an ordinary one, and as I thoughtthat Warren had not risen to its demand in the battle, I deemed itinjudicious and unsafe under the critical conditions existing toretain him longer. That I was justified in this is plain to all whoare disposed to be fair-minded, so with the following extract fromGeneral Sherman's review of the proceedings of the Warren Court, andwith which I am convinced the judgment of history will accord, Ileave the subject:

".... It would be an unsafe and dangerous rule to hold the commanderof an army in battle to a technical adherence to any rule of conductfor managing his command. He is responsible for results, and holdsthe lives and reputations of every officer and soldier under hisorders as subordinate to the great end--victory. The most importantevents are usually compressed into an hour, a minute, and he cannotstop to analyze his reasons. He must act on the impulse, theconviction, of the instant, and should be sustained in hisconclusions, if not manifestly unjust. The power to command men, andgive vehement impulse to their joint action, is something whichcannot be defined by words, but it is plain and manifest in battles, and whoever commands an army in chief must choose his subordinates byreason of qualities which can alone be tested in actual conflict. 

"No one has questioned the patriotism, integrity, and greatintelligence of General Warren. These are attested by a long recordof most excellent service, but in the clash of arms at and near FiveForks, March 31 and April 1, 1865, his personal activity fell shortof the standard fixed by General Sheridan, on whom alone rested thegreat responsibility for that and succeeding days. 

"My conclusion is that General Sheridan was perfectly justified inhis action in this case, and he must be fully and entirely sustainedif the United States expects great victories by her arms in thefuture. "

CHAPTER VII. 

RESULT OF THE BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--RETREAT OF LEE--AN INTERCEPTEDDESPATCH--AT AMELIA COURT HOUSE--BATTLE OF SAILOR'S CREEK--THECONFEDERATES' STUBBORN RESISTANCE--A COMPLETE VICTORY--IMPORTANCE OFTHE BATTLE. 

When the news of the battle at Five Forks reached General Grant, herealized that the decisive character of our victory would necessitatethe immediate abandonment of Richmond and Petersburg by the enemy;and fearing that Lee would escape without further injury, he issuedorders, the propriety of which must be settled by history, to assaultnext morning the whole intrenched line. But Lee could not retreat atonce. He had not anticipated dissster at Five Forks, and hence wasunprepared to withdraw on the moment; and the necessity of gettingoff his trains and munitions of war, as well as being obliged tocover the flight of the Confederate Government, compelled him to holdon to Richmond and Petersburg till the afternoon of the 2d, thoughbefore that Parke, Ord, and Wright had carried his outerintrenchments at several points, thus materially shortening the lineof investment. 

The night of the 1st of April, General Humphreys's corps--the Second--had extended its left toward the White Oak road, and early nextmorning, under instructions from General Grant, Miles's division ofthat corps reported to me, and supporting him with Ayres's andCrawford's divisions of the Fifth Corps, I then directed him toadvance toward Petersburg and attack the enemy's works at theintersection of the Claiborne and White Oak roads. 

Such of the enemy as were still in the works Miles easily forcedacross Hatcher's Run, in the direction of Sutherland's depot, but theConfederates promptly took up a position north of the little stream, and Miles being anxious to attack, I gave him leave, but just at thistime General Humphreys came up with a request to me from GeneralMeade to return Miles. On this request I relinquished command of thedivision, when, supported by the Fifth Corps it could have broken inthe enemy's right at a vital point; and I have always since regrettedthat I did so, for the message Humphreys conveyed was withoutauthority from General Grant, by whom Miles had been sent to me, butthinking good feeling a desideratum just then, and wishing to avoidwrangles, I faced the Fifth Corps about and marched it down to FiveForks, and out the Ford road to the crossing of Hatcher's Run. Afterwe had gone, General Grant, intending this quarter of the field to beunder my control, ordered Humphreys with his other two divisions tomove to the right, in toward Petersburg. This left Miles entirelyunsupported, and his gallant attack made soon after was unsuccessfulat first, but about 3 o'clock in the afternoon he carried the pointwhich covered the retreat from Petersburg and Richmond. 

Merritt had been sent westward, meanwhile, in the direction of Ford'sStation, to break the enemy's horse which had been collecting to thenorth of Hatcher's Run. Meeting, with but little opposition, Merrittdrove this cavalry force in a northerly direction toward Scott'sCorners, while the Fifth Corps was pushed toward Sutherland's depot, in the hope of coming in on the rear of the force that wasconfronting Miles when I left him. Crawford and Merritt engaged theenemy lightly just before night, but his main column, retreatingalong the river road south of the Appomattox, had got across NamozineCreek, and the darkness prevented our doing more than to pick up somestragglers. The next morning the pursuit was resumed, the cavalryagain in advance, the Fifth Corps keeping up with it all the while, and as we pressed our adversaries hundreds and hundreds of prisoners, armed and unarmed, fell into our hands, together with many wagons andfive pieces of artillery. At Deep Creek the rearguard turned on us, and a severe skirmish took place. Merritt, finding the enemy verystrong, was directed to await the arrival of Crook and for the reardivision of the Fifth Corps; but by the time they reached the creek, darkness had again come to protect the Confederates, and we had to becontent with meagre results at that point. 

From the beginning it was apparent that Lee, in his retreat, wasmaking for Amelia Court House, where his columns north and south ofthe Appomattox River could join, and where, no doubt, he expected tomeet supplies, so Crook was ordered to march early on April 4 tostrike the Danville railroad, between Jettersville and Burkeville, and then move south along the railroad toward Jettersville, Merrittto move toward Amelia Court House, and the Fifth Corps toJettersville itself. 

The Fifth Corps got to Jettersville about 5 in the afternoon, and Iimmediately intrenched it across the Burkeville road with thedetermination to stay there till the main army could come up, for Ihoped we could force Lee to surrender at Amelia Court House, since afirm hold on Jettersville would cut him off from his line of retreattoward Burkeville. 

Accompanied only by my escort--the First United States Cavalry, abouttwo hundred strong--I reached Jettersville some little time beforethe Fifth Corps, and having nothing else at hand I at once deployedthis handful of men to cover the crossroads till the arrival of thecorps. Just as the troopers were deploying, a man on a mule, headingfor Burkeville, rode into my pickets. He was arrested, of course, and being searched there was found in his boots this telegram induplicate, signed by Lee's Commissary General. 

"The army is at Amelia Court House, short of provisions. Send300, 000 rations quickly to Burkeville Junction. " One copy wasaddressed to the supply department at Danville, and the other to thatat Lynchburg. I surmised that the telegraph lines north ofBurkeville had been broken by Crook after the despatches werewritten, which would account for their being transmitted bymessenger. There was thus revealed not only the important fact thatLee was concentrating at Amelia Court House, but also a trustworthybasis for estimating his troops, so I sent word to Crook to strike upthe railroad toward me, and to Merritt--who, as I have said, hadfollowed on the heels of the enemy--to leave Mackenzie there andhimself close in on Jettersville. Staff-officers were alsodespatched to hurry up Griffin with the Fifth Corps, and his tired menredoubled their strides. 

My troops too were hard up for rations, for in the pursuit we couldnot wait for our trains, so I concluded to secure if possible theseprovisions intended for Lee. To this end I directed Young to sendfour of his best scouts to Burkeville Junction. There they were toseparate, two taking the railroad toward Lynchburg and two towardDanville, and as soon as a telegraph station was reached the telegramwas to be transmitted as it had been written and the provisions thushurried forward. 

Although the Fifth Corps arrived at Jettersville the evening of April4, as did also Crook's and Merritt's cavalry, yet none of the army ofthe Potomac came up till about 3 o'clock the afternoon of the 5th, the Second Corps, followed by the Sixth, joining us then. GeneralMeade arrived at Jettersville an hour earlier, but being ill, requested me to put his troops in position. The Fifth Corps beingalready intrenched across the Amelia Court House road facing north, Iplaced the Sixth on its right and the Second on its left as theyreached the ground. 

As the enemy had been feeling us ever since morning--to learn what hewas up to I directed Crook to send Davies's brigade on areconnoissance to Paine's crossroads. Davies soon found out that Leewas trying to escape by that flank, for at the crossroads he foundthe Confederate trains and artillery moving rapidly westward. Havingdriven away the escort, Davies succeeded in burning nearly twohundred wagons, and brought off five pieces of artillery. Amongthese wagons were some belonging to General, Lee's and to GeneralFitzhugh Lee's headquarters. This work through, Davies withdrew andrejoined Crook, who, with Smith and Gregg, was established near FlatCreek. 

It being plain that Lee would attempt to escape as soon as his trainswere out of the way, I was most anxious to attack him when the SecondCorps began to arrive, for I felt certain that unless we did so hewould succeed in passing by our left flank, and would thus again makeour pursuit a stern-chase; but General Meade, whose plan of attackwas to advance his right flank on Amelia Court House, objected toassailing before all his troops were up. 

I then sent despatches to General Grant, explaining what Davies haddone, and telling him that the Second Corps was arriving, and that Iwished he himself was present. I assured him of my confidence in ourcapturing Lee if we properly exerted ourselves, and informed him, finally, that I would put all my cavalry, except Mackenzie, on myleft, and that, with such a disposition of my forces, I could see noescape for Lee. I also inclosed him this letter, which had just beencaptured:

"AMELIA C. H. , April 5, 1865. 

"DEAR MAMMA:

"Our army is ruined, I fear. We are all safe as yet. Shyron left ussick. John Taylor is well--saw him yesterday. We are in line ofbattle this morning. General Robert Lee is in the field near us. Mytrust is still in the justice of our cause, and that of God. GeneralHill is killed. I saw Murray a few minutes since. Bernard, Terrysaid, was taken prisoner, but may yet get out. I send this by anegro I see passing up the railroad to Mechlenburg. Love to all. 

"Your devoted son, "Wm. B. TAYLOR, Colonel. "

General Grant, who on the 5th was accompanying General Ord's columntoward Burkeville Junction, did not receive this intelligence tillnearly nightfall, when within about ten miles of the Junction. Heset out for Jettersville immediately, but did not reach us till nearmidnight, too late of course to do anything that night. Taking mewith him, we went over to see Meade, whom he then directed to advanceearly in the morning on Amelia Court House. In this interview Grantalso stated that the orders Meade had already issued would permitLee's escape, and therefore must be changed, for it was not the aimonly to follow the enemy, but to get ahead of him, remarking duringthe conversation that, "he had no doubt Lee was moving right then. "On this same occasion Meade expressed a desire to have in theproposed attack all the troops of the Army of the Potomac under hisown command, and asked for the return of the Fifth Corps. I made noobjections, and it was ordered to report, to him. 

When, on the morning of the 6th, Meade advanced toward Amelia CourtHouse, he found, as predicted, that Lee was gone. It turned out thatthe retreat began the evening of the 5th and continued all night. Satisfied that this would be the case, I did not permit the cavalryto participate in Meade's useless advance, but shifted it out towardthe left to the road running from Deatonsville to Rice's station, Crook leading and Merritt close up. Before long the enemy's trainswere discovered on this road, but Crook could make but littleimpression on them, they were so strongly guarded; so, leavingStagg's brigade and Miller's battery about three miles southwest ofDeatonsville--where the road forks, with a branch leading northtoward the Appomattox--to harass the retreating column and find avulnerable point, I again shifted the rest of the cavalry toward theleft, across-country, but still keeping parallel to the enemy's lineof march. 

Just after crossing Sailor's Greek, a favorable opportunity offering, both Merritt and Crook attacked vigorously, gained the Rice's Stationroad, destroyed several hundred wagons, made many prisoners, andcaptured sixteen pieces of artillery. This was important, but morevaluable still was the fact that we were astride the enemy's line ofretreat, and had cut off from joining Longstreet, waiting at Rice'sStation, a corps of Confederate infantry under General Ewell, composed of Anderson's, Kershaw's, and Custis Lee's divisions. Stagg's brigade and Miller's battery, which, as I have said, had beenleft at the forks of the Deatonsville road, had meanwhile broken inbetween the rear of Ewell's column and the head of Gordon's, forcingGordon to abandon his march for Rice's Station, and to take theright-hand road at the forks, on which he was pursued by GeneralHumphreys. 

The complete isolation of Ewell from Longstreet in his front andGordon in his rear led to the battle of Sailor's Creek, one of theseverest conflicts of the war, for the enemy fought with desperationto escape capture, and we, bent on his destruction, were no lesseager and determined. The capture of Ewell, with six of his generalsand most of his troops, crowned our success, but the fight was soovershadowed by the stirring events of the surrender three dayslater, that the battle has never been accorded the prominence itdeserves. 

The small creek from which the field takes its name flows in anorthwesterly direction across the road leading from Deatonsville toRice's Station. By shifting to the left, Merritt gained the Rice'sStation road west of the creek, making havoc of the wagon-trains, while Crook struck them further on and planted himself square acrossthe road. This blocked Ewell, who, advancing Anderson to some highground west of the creek, posted him behind barricades, with theintention of making a hard fight there, while the main body shouldescape through the woods in a westerly direction to roads that led toFarmville. This was prevented, however, by Crook forming hisdivision, two brigades dismounted and one mounted, and at onceassaulting all along Anderson's front and overlapping his right, while Merritt fiercely attacked to the right of Crook. The enemybeing thus held, enabled the Sixth Corps--which in the meantime I hadsent for--to come upon the ground, and Ewell, still contending withthe cavalry, found himself suddenly beset by this new danger from hisrear. To, meet it, he placed Kershaw to the right and Custis Lee tothe left of the Rice's Station road, facing them north toward andsome little distance from Sailor's Creek, supporting Kershaw withCommander Tucker's Marine brigade. Ewell's skirmishers held the lineof Sailor's Creek, which runs through a gentle valley, the northslope of which was cleared ground. 

By General Grant's directions the Sixth Corps had been following myroute of march since the discovery, about 9 o'clock in the morning, that Lee had decamped from Amelia Court House. Grant had promptlyinformed me of this in a note, saying, "The Sixth Corps will go inwith a vim any place you may dictate, " so when I sent word to Wrightof the enemy's isolation, and asked him to hurry on with all speed, his gallant corps came as fast as legs could carry them, he sendingto me successively Major McClellan and Colonel Franklin, of hisstaff, to report his approach. 

I was well advised as to the position of the enemy throughinformation brought me by an intelligent young soldier, William A. Richardson, Company "A, " Second Ohio, who, in one of the cavalrycharges on Anderson, had cleared the barricades and made his way backto my front through Ewell's line. Richardson had told me just howthe main body of the enemy was posted, so as Seymour's divisionarrived I directed General Wright to put it on the right of the road, while Wheaton's men, coming up all hot and out of breath, promptlyformed on Seymour's left. Both divisions thus aligned facedsouthwest toward Sailor's Creek, and the artillery of the corps beingmassed to the left and front of the Hibbon house, without waiting forGetty's division--for I feared that if we delayed longer the enemymight effect his escape toward Farmville--the general attack wasbegun. Seymour and Wheaton, moving forward together, assailed theenemy's front and left, and Stagg's brigade, too, which in the meantime had been placed between Wheaton's left and Devin's right, wentat him along with them, Merritt and Crook resuming the fight fromtheir positions in front of Anderson. The enemy, seeing littlechance of escape, fought like a tiger at bay, but both Seymour andWheaton pressed him vigorously, gaining ground at all points exceptjust to the right of the road, where Seymour's left was checked. Here the Confederates burst back on us in a counter-charge, surgingdown almost to the creek, but the artillery, supported by Getty, whoin the mean time had come on the ground, opened on them so terriblythat this audacious and furious onset was completely broken, thoughthe gallant fellows fell back to their original line doggedly, andnot until after they had almost gained the creek. Ewell was nowhemmed in on every side, and all those under his immediate commandwere captured. Merritt and Crook had also broken up Anderson by thistime, but he himself, and about two thousand disorganized men escapedby making their way through the woods toward the Appomattox Riverbefore they could be entirely enveloped. Night had fallen when thefight was entirely over, but Devin was pushed on in pursuit for abouttwo miles, part of the Sixth Corps following to clinch a victorywhich not only led to the annihilation of one corps of Lee'sretreating army, but obliged Longstreet to move up to Farmville, soas to take a road north of the Appomattox River toward Lynchburginstead of continuing toward Danville. 

At the close of the battle I sent one of my staff--Colonel RedwoodPrice--to General Grant to report what had been done; that we hadtaken six generals and from nine to ten thousand prisoners. On hisway Price stopped at the headquarters of General Meade, where helearned that not the slightest intelligence of the occurrence on myline had been received, for I not being under Meade's command, he hadpaid no attention to my movements. Price gave the story of thebattle, and General Meade, realizing its importance, sent directionsimmediately to General Wright to make his report of the engagement tothe headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, assuming that Wright wasoperating independently of me in the face of Grant's despatch Of2 o'clock, which said that Wright was following the cavalry and would"go in with a vim" wherever I dictated. Wright could not do elsethan comply with Meade's orders in the case, and I, being then inignorance of Meade's reasons for the assumption, could say nothing. But General Grant plainly intending, and even directing, that thecorps should be under my command, remedied this phase of the matter, when informed of what had taken place, by requiring Wright to send areport of the battle through me. What he then did, and what hisintentions and orders were, are further confirmed by a reference tothe episode in his "Memoirs, " where he gives his reasons for orderingthe Sixth Corps to abandon the move on Amelia Court House and pass tothe left of the army. On the same page he also says, referring tothe 6th of April: "The Sixth Corps now remained with the cavalryunder Sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. " Heunquestionably intended all of this, but his purpose was partlyfrustrated by General Meade's action next morning in assumingdirection of the movements of the corps; and before General Grantbecame aware of the actual conditions the surrender was at hand. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

LINCOLN'S LACONIC DESPATCH--CAPTURING LEE'S SUPPLIES--DELIGHTEDENGINEERS--THE CONFEDERATES' LAST EFFORT--A FLAG OF TRUCE--GENERALGEARY'S "LAST DITCH" ABSURDITY--MEETING OF GRANT AND LEE--THESURRENDER--ESTIMATE OF GENERAL GRANT. 

The first report of the battle of Sailor's Creek that General Grantreceived was, as already stated, an oral message carried by ColonelPrice, of my staff. Near midnight I sent a despatch giving the namesof the generals captured. These were Ewell, Kershaw, Barton, Corse, Dubose, and Custis Lee. In the same despatch I wrote: "If the thingis pressed, I think that Lee will surrender. " When Mr. Lincoln, atCity Point, received this word from General Grant, who wastransmitting every item of news to the President, he telegraphedGrant the laconic message: "Let the thing be pressed. " The morning ofthe 7th we moved out at a very early hour, Crook's division marchingtoward Farmville in direct pursuit, while Merritt and Mackenzie wereordered to Prince Edward's Court House to anticipate any effort Leemight make to escape through that place toward Danville since it hadbeen discovered that Longstreet had slipped away already from thefront of General Ord's troops at Rice's Station. Crook overtook themain body of the Confederates at Farmville, and promptly attackedtheir trains on the north side of the Appomattox with Gregg'sbrigade, which was fiercely turned upon and forced to re-cross theriver with the loss of a number of prisoner's, among them Gregghimself. When Crook sent word of this fight, it was clear that Leehad abandoned all effort to escape to the southwest by way ofDanville. Lynchburg was undoubtedly his objective point now; so, resolving to throw my cavalry again across his path, and hold himtill the infantry could overtake him, I directed everything onAppomattox depot, recalling Crook the night of the 7th to ProspectStation, while Merritt camped at Buffalo Creek, and Mackenzie made areconnoissance along the Lynchburg railroad. 

At break of day, April 8, Merritt and Mackenzie united with Crook atProspect Station, and the cavalry all moved then toward Appomattoxdepot. Hardly had it started when one of the scouts--Sergeant White--informed me that there were four trains of cars at the depot loadedwith supplies for Lee's army; these had been sent from Lynchburg, incompliance with the telegram of Lee's commissary-general, whichmessage, it will be remembered, was captured and transmitted toLynchburg by two of Young's scouts on the 4th. Sergeant White, whohad been on the lookout for the trains ever since sending thedespatch, found them several miles west of Appomattox depot feelingtheir way along, in ignorance of Lee's exact position. As he had theoriginal despatch with him, and took pains to dwell upon the pitiablecondition of Lee's army, he had little difficulty in persuading themen in charge of the trains to bring them east of Appomattox Station, but fearing that the true state of affairs would be learned beforelong, and the trains be returned to Lynchburg, he was painfullyanxious to have them cut off by breaking the track west of thestation. 

The intelligence as to the trains was immediately despatched toCrook, and I pushed on to join him with Merritt's command. Custerhaving the advance, moved rapidly, and on nearing the stationdetailed two regiments to make a detour southward to strike therailroad some distance beyond and break the track. These regimentsset off at a gallop, and in short order broke up the railroad enoughto prevent the escape of the trains, Custer meanwhile takingpossession of the station, but none too soon, for almost at themoment he did so the advance-guard of Lee's army appeared, bent onsecuring the trains. Without halting to look after the cars further, Custer attacked this advance-guard and had a spirited fight, in whichhe drove the Confederates away from the station, captured twenty-fivepieces of artillery, a hospital train, and a large park of wagons, which, in the hope that they would reach Lynchburg next day, werebeing pushed ahead of Lee's main body. 

Devin coming up a little before dusk, was put in on the right ofCuster, and one of Crook's brigades was sent to our left and theother two held in reserve. I then forced the enemy back on theAppomattox road to the vicinity of the Court House, and that theConfederates might have no rest, gave orders to continue theskirmishing throughout the night. Meanwhile the captured trains hadbeen taken charge of by locomotive engineers, soldiers of thecommand, who were delighted evidently to get back at their oldcalling. They amused themselves by running the trains to and fro, creating much confusion, and keeping up such an unearthly screechingwith the whistles that I was on the point of ordering the carsburned. They finally wearied of their fun, however, and ran thetrains off to the east toward General Ord's column. 

The night of the 8th I made my headquarters at a little frame housejust south of the station. I did not sleep at all, nor did anybodyelse, the entire command being up all night long; indeed, there hadbeen little rest in the cavalry for the past eight days. Thenecessity of getting Ord's column up was so obvious now thatstaff-officer after staff-officer was sent to him and to General Grantrequesting that the infantry be pushed on, for if it could get to thefront, all knew that the rebellion would be ended on the morrow. Merritt, Crook, Custer, and Devin were present at frequent intervalsduring the night, and everybody was overjoyed at the prospect thatour weary work was about to end so happily. Before sun-up GeneralOrd arrived, and informed me of the approach of his column, it havingbeen marching the whole night. As he ranked me, of course I couldgive him no orders, so after a hasty consultation as to where histroops should be placed we separated, I riding to the front tooverlook my line near Appomattox Court House, while he went back tourge along his weary troops. 

The night before General Lee had held a council with his principalgenerals, when it was arranged that in the morning General Gordonshould undertake to break through my cavalry, and when I neared mytroops this movement was beginning, a heavy line of infantry bearingdown on us from the direction of the village. In front of Crook andMackenzie firing had already begun, so riding to a slight elevationwhere a good view of the Confederates could be had, I there came tothe conclusion that it would be unwise to offer more resistance thanthat necessary to give Ord time to form, so I directed Merritt tofall back, and in retiring to shift Devin and Custer to the right soas to make room for Ord, now in the woods to my rear. Crook, whowith his own and Mackenzie's divisions was on my extreme leftcovering some by-roads, was ordered to hold his ground as long aspracticable without sacrificing his men, and, if forced to retire, tocontest with obstinacy the enemy's advance. 

As already stated, I could not direct General Ord's course, he beingmy senior, but hastily galloping back to where he was, at the edge ofthe timber, I explained to him what was taking place at the front. Merritt's withdrawal inspired the Confederates, who forthwith beganto press Crook, their line of battle advancing with confidence tillit reached the crest whence I had reconnoitred them. From thisground they could see Ord's men emerging from the woods, and thehopelessness of a further attack being plain, the gray linesinstinctively halted, and then began to retire toward a ridgeimmediately fronting Appomattox Court House, while Ord, joined on hisright by the Fifth Corps, advanced on them over the ground thatMerritt had abandoned. 

I now directed my steps toward Merritt, who, having mounted histroopers, had moved them off to the right, and by the time I reachedhis headquarters flag he was ready for work, so a move on the enemy'sleft was ordered, and every guidon was bent to the front. As thecavalry marched along parallel with the Confederate line, and intoward its left, a heavy fire of artillery opened on us, but thiscould not check us at such a time, and we soon reached some highground about half a mile from the Court House, and from here I couldsee in the low valley beyond the village the bivouac undoubtedly ofLee's army. The troops did not seem to be disposed in battle order, but on the other side of the bivouac was a line of battle--a heavyrear-guard--confronting, presumably, General Meade. 

I decided to attack at once, and formations were ordered at a trotfor a charge by Custer's and Devin's divisions down the slope leadingto the camps. Custer was soon ready, but Devin's division being inrear its formation took longer, since he had to shift further to theright; Devin's preparations were, therefore, but partially completedwhen an aide-decamp galloped up to with the word from Custer, "Leehas surrendered; do not charge; the white flag is up. " The enemyperceiving that Custer was forming for attack, had sent the flag outto his front and stopped the charge just in time. I at once sentword of the truce to General Ord, and hearing nothing more fromCuster himself, I supposed that he had gone down to the Court Houseto join a mounted group of Confederates that I could see near there, so I, too, went toward them, galloping down a narrow ridge, staff andorderlies following; but we had not got half way to the Court Housewhen, from a skirt of timber to our right, not more than threehundred yards distant, a musketry fire was opened on us. This haltedus, when, waving my hat, I called out to the firing party that wewere under a truce, and they were violating it. This did not stopthem, however, so we hastily took shelter in a ravine so situated asto throw a ridge between us and the danger. 

We traveled in safety down this depression to its mouth, and thenceby a gentle ascent approached the Court House. I was in advance, followed by a sergeant carrying my battleflag. When I got withinabout a hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's line, which wasimmediately in front of the Court House, some of the Confederatesleveled their pieces at us, and I again halted. Their officers kepttheir men from firing, however, but meanwhile a single-handed contesthad begun behind me, for on looking back I heard a Confederatesoldier demanding my battle-flag from the color-bearer, thinking, nodoubt, that we were coming in as prisoners. The sergeant had drawnhis sabre and was about to cut the man down, but at a word from me hedesisted and carried the flag back to my staff, his assailant quicklyrealizing that the boot was on the other leg. 

These incidents determined me to remain where I was till the returnof a staff-officer whom I had sent over to demand an explanation fromthe group of Confederates for which I had been heading. He came backin a few minutes with apologies for what had occurred, and informedme that General Gordon and General Wilcox were the superior officersin the group. As they wished me to join them I rode up with mystaff, but we had hardly met when in front of Merritt firing began. At the sound I turned to General Gordon, who seemed embarrassed bythe occurrence, and remarked: "General, your men fired on me as I wascoming over here, and undoubtedly they are treating Merritt andCuster the same way. We might as well let them fight it out. " Hereplied, "There must be some mistake. " I then asked, "Why not send astaff-officer and have your people cease firing; they are violatingthe flag. " He answered, "I have no staff-officer to send. " WhereuponI said that I would let him have one of mine, and calling forLieutenant Vanderbilt Allen, I directed him to carry General Gordon'sorders to General Geary, commanding a small brigade of South Carolinacavalry, to discontinue firing. Allen dashed off with the messageand soon delivered it, but was made a prisoner, Geary saying, "I donot care for white flags: South Carolinians never surrender.... " Bythis time Merritt's patience being exhausted, he ordered an attack, and this in short order put an end to General Geary's "last ditch"absurdity, and extricated Allen from his predicament. 

When quiet was restored Gordon remarked: "General Lee asks for asuspension of hostilities pending the negotiations which he is havingwith General Grant. " I rejoined: "I have been constantly informed ofthe progress of the negotiations, and think it singular that whilesuch discussions are going on, General Lee should have continued hismarch and attempted to break through my lines this morning. I willentertain no terms except that General Lee shall surrender to GeneralGrant on his arrival here. If these terms are not accepted we willrenew hostilities. " Gordon replied: "General Lee's army isexhausted. There is no doubt of his surrender to General Grant. "

It was then that General Ord joined us, and after shaking hands allaround, I related the situation to him, and Gordon went away agreeingto meet us again in half an hour. When the time was up he came backaccompanied by General Longstreet, who brought with him a despatch, the duplicate of one that had been sent General Grant through GeneralMeade's lines back on the road over which Lee had been retreating. 

General Longstreet renewed the assurances that already had been givenby Gordon, and I sent Colonel Newhall with the despatch to findGeneral Grant and bring him to the front. When Newhall started, everything on our side of the Appomattox Court House was quiet, forinevitable surrender was at hand, but Longstreet feared that Meade, in ignorance of the new conditions on my front might attack theConfederate rearguard. To prevent this I offered to send Colonel J. W. Forsyth through the enemy's lines to let Meade know of myagreement, for he too was suspicious that by a renewed correspondenceLee was endeavoring to gain time for escape. My offer beingaccepted, Forsyth set out accompanied by Colonel Fairfax, ofLongstreet's staff, and had no difficulty in accomplishing hismission. 

About five or six miles from Appomattox, on the road toward ProspectStation near its intersection with the Walker's Church road, myadjutant-general, Colonel Newhall, met General Grant, he havingstarted from north of the Appomattox River for my front the morningof April 9, in consequence of the following despatches which had beensent him the night before, after we had captured Appomattox Stationand established a line intercepting Lee:

"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, April 8, 1865--9:20 P. M. 

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "Commanding Armies of the U. S. 

"General: I marched early this morning from Buffalo Creek andProspect Station on Appomattox Station, where my scouts had reportedtrains of cars with supplies for Lee's army. A short time beforedark General Custer, who had the advance, made a dash at the station, capturing four trains of supplies with locomotives. One of thetrains was burned and the others were run back toward Farmville forsecurity. Custer then pushed on toward Appomattox Court House, driving the enemy--who kept up a heavy fire of artillery--chargingthem repeatedly and capturing, as far as reported, twenty-five piecesof artillery and a number of prisoners and wagons. The First CavalryDivision supported him on the right. A reconnoissance sent acrossthe Appomattox reports the enemy moving on the Cumberland road toAppomattox Station, where they expect to get supplies. Custer isstill pushing on. If General Gibbon and the Fifth Corps can get upto-night, we will perhaps finish the job in the morning. I do notthink Lee means to surrender until compelled to do so. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General. "

"HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY, April 8, 1865--9:40 p. M. 

"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT. "Commanding Armies U. S. 

"GENERAL: Since writing the accompanying despatch, General Custerreports that his command has captured in all thirty-five pieces ofartillery, one thousand prisoners--including one general officer--andfrom one hundred and fifty to two hundred wagons. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General. "

In attempting to conduct the lieutenant-general and staff back by ashort route, Newhall lost his bearings for a time, inclining intoward the enemy's lines too far, but regained the proper directionwithout serious loss of time. General Grant arrived about 1 o'clockin the afternoon, Ord and I, dismounted, meeting him at the edge ofthe town, or crossroads, for it was little more. He remainingmounted, spoke first to me, saying simply, "How are you, Sheridan?" I assured him with thanks that I was"first-rate, " when, pointing toward the village, he asked, "IsGeneral Lee up there?" and I replied: "There is his army down in thatvalley, and he himself is over in that house (designating McLean'shouse) waiting to surrender to you. " The General then said, "Come, let us go over, " this last remark being addressed to both Ord and me. We two then mounted and joined him, while our staff-officersfollowed, intermingling with those of the general-in-chief as thecavalcade took its way to McLean's house near by, and where GeneralLee had arrived some time before, in consequence of a message fromGeneral Grant consenting to the interview asked for by Lee throughMeade's front that morning--the consent having been carried byColonel Babcock. 

When I entered McLean's house General Lee was standing, as was alsohis military secretary, Colonel Marshall, his only staff-officerpresent. General Lee was dressed in a new uniform and wore ahandsome sword. His tall, commanding form thus set off contrastedstrongly with the short figure of General Grant, clothed as he was ina soiled suit, without sword or other insignia of his position excepta pair of dingy shoulder-straps. After being presented, Ord and I, and nearly all of General Grant's staff, withdrew to await theagreement as to terms, and in a little while Colonel Babcock came tothe door and said, "The surrender had been made; you can come inagain. "

When we re-entered General Grant was writing; and General Lee, havingin his hand two despatches, which I that morning requested might bereturned, as I had no copies of them, addressed me with the remark:"I am sorry. It is probable that my cavalry at that point of theline did not fully understand the agreement. " These despatches hadbeen sent in the forenoon, after the fighting had been stopped, notifying General Lee that some of his cavalry in front of Crook wasviolating the suspension of hostilities by withdrawing. About3 o'clock in the afternoon the terms of surrender were written outand accepted, and General Lee left the house, as he departedcordially shaking hands with General Grant. A moment later hemounted his chunky gray horse, and lifting his hat as he passed outof the yard, rode off toward his army, his arrival there beingannounced to us by cheering, which, as it progressed, varying inloudness, told he was riding through the bivouac of the Army ofNorthern Virginia. 

The surrender of General Lee practically ended the war of therebellion. For four years his army had been the main-stay of theConfederacy; and the marked ability with which he directed itsoperations is evidenced both by his frequent successes and the lengthof time he kept up the contest. Indeed, it may be said that tillGeneral Grant was matched against him, he never met an opponent hedid not vanquish, for while it is true that defeat was inflicted onthe Confederates at Antietam and Gettysburg, yet the fruits of thesevictories were not gathered, for after each of these battles Lee wasleft unmolested till he had a chance to recuperate. 

The assignment of General Grant to the command of the Union armies inthe winter of 1863-64 gave presage of success from the start, for hiseminent abilities had already been proved, and besides, he was atower of strength to the Government, because he had the confidence ofthe people. They knew that henceforth systematic direction would begiven to our armies in every section of the vast territory over whichactive operations were being prosecuted, and further, that thiscoherence, this harmony of plan, was the one thing needed to end thewar, for in the three preceding years there had been illustrated mostlamentable effects of the absence of system. From the moment he setour armies in motion simultaneously, in the spring of 1864, it couldbe seen that we should be victorious ultimately, for though ondifferent lines we were checked now and then, yet we were harassingthe Confederacy at so many vital points that plainly it must yield toour blows. Against Lee's army, the forefront of the Confederacy, Grant pitted himself; and it may be said that the Confederatecommander was now, for the first time, overmatched, for against allhis devices--the products of a mind fertile in defense--General Grantbrought to bear not only the wealth of expedient which had hithertodistinguished him, but also an imperturbable tenacity, particularlyin the Wilderness and on the march to the James, without which thealmost insurmountable obstacles of that campaign could not have beenovercome. During it and in the siege of Petersburg he met with manydisappointments--on several occasions the shortcomings of generals, when at the point of success, leading to wretched failures. But sofar as he was concerned, the only apparent effect of thesediscomfitures was to make him all the more determined to dischargesuccessfully the stupendous trust committed to his care, and to bringinto play the manifold resources of his well ordered military mind. He guided every subordinate then, and in the last days of therebellion, with a fund of common sense and superiority of intellect, which have left an impress so distinct as to exhibit his greatpersonality. When his military history is analyzed after the lapseof years, it will show, even more clearly than now, that during theseas well as in his previous campaigns he was the steadfast Centreabout and on which everything else turned. 

CHAPTER IX. 

ORDERED TO GREENSBORO', N. C. --MARCH TO THE DAN RIVER--ASSIGNED TOTHE COMMAND WEST OF THE MISSISSIPPI--LEAVING WASHINGTON--FLIGHT OFGENERAL EARLY--MAXIMILIAN--MAKING DEMONSTRATIONS ON THE UPPER RIOGRANDE--CONFEDERATES JOIN MAXIMILIAN--THE FRENCH INVASION OF MEXICOAND ITS RELATIONS TO THE REBELLION--ASSISTING THE LIBERALS--RESTORATION OF THE REPUBLIC. 

The surrender at Appomattox put a stop to all military operations onthe part of General Grant's forces, and the morning of April 10 mycavalry began its march to Petersburg, the men anticipating that theywould soon be mustered out and returned to their homes. At NottowayCourt House I heard of the assassination of the President. The firstnews came to us the night after the dastardly deed, the telegraphoperator having taken it from the wires while in transmission toGeneral Meade. The despatch ran that Mr. Lincoln had been, shot at10 o'clock that morning at Willard's Hotel, but as I could conceiveof nothing to take the President there I set the story down as acanard, and went to bed without giving it further thought. Nextmorning, however, an official telegram confirmed the fact of theassassination, though eliminating the distorted circumstances thathad been communicated the night before. 

When we reached Petersburg my column was halted, and instructionsgiven me to march the cavalry and the Sixth Corps to Greensboro', North Carolina, for the purpose of aiding General Sherman (thesurrender of General Johnston having not yet been effected), so Imade the necessary preparations and moved on the 24th of April, arriving at South Boston, on the Dan River, the 28th, the Sixth Corpshaving reached Danville meanwhile. At South Boston I received adespatch from General Halleck, who immediately after Lee's surrenderhad been assigned to command at Richmond, informing me that GeneralJohnston had been brought to terms. The necessity for going farthersouth being thus obviated we retraced our steps to Petersburg, fromwhich place I proceeded by steamer to Washington, leaving, thecavalry to be marched thither by easy stages. 

The day after my arrival in Washington an important order was sentme, accompanied by the following letter of instructions, transferringme to a new field of operations:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES. "Washington, D. C. , May 17, 1865. 

"GENERAL: Under the orders relieving you from the command of theMiddle Military Division and assigning you to command west of theMississippi, you will proceed without delay to the West to arrangeall preliminaries for your new field of duties. 

"Your duty is to restore Texas, and that part of Louisiana held bythe enemy, to the Union in the shortest practicable time, in a waymost effectual for securing permanent peace. 

"To do this, you will be given all the troops that can be sparedby Major-General Canby, probably twenty-five thousand men ofall arms; the troops with Major-General J. J. Reynolds, inArkansas, say twelve thousand, Reynolds to command; the FourthArmy Corps, now at Nashville, Tennessee, awaiting orders; andthe Twenty-Fifth Army Corps, now at City Point, Virginia, readyto embark. 

"I do not wish to trammel you with instructions; I will state, however, that if Smith holds out, without even an ostensiblegovernment to receive orders from or to report to, he and his men arenot entitled to the considerations due to an acknowledgedbelligerent. Theirs are the conditions of outlaws, making waragainst the only Government having an existence over the territorywhere war is now being waged. 

"You may notify the rebel commander west of the Mississippi--holdingintercourse with him in person, or through such officers of the rankof major-general as you may select--that he will be allowed tosurrender all his forces on the same terms as were accorded to Leeand Johnston. If he accedes, proceed to garrison the Red River ashigh up as Shreveport, the seaboard at Galveston, Malagorda Bay, Corpus Christi, and mouth of the Rio Grande. 

"Place a strong force on the Rio Grande, holding it at least to apoint opposite Camargo, and above that if supplies can be procured. 

"In case of an active campaign (a hostile one) I think a heavy forceshould be put on the Rio Grande as a first preliminary. Troops forthis might be started at once. The Twenty-Fifth Corps is nowavailable, and to it should be added a force of white troops, saythose now under Major-General Steele. 

"To be clear on this last point, I think the Rio Grande should bestrongly held, whether the forces in Texas surrender or not, and thatno time should be lost in getting troops there. If war is to bemade, they will be in the right place; if Kirby Smith surrenders, they will be on the line which is to be strongly garrisoned. 

"Should any force be necessary other than those designated, they canbe had by calling for them on Army Headquarters. 

"U. S. GRANT, "Lieutenant-General. 

"To MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN, "United States Army. "

On receipt of these instructions I called at once on General Grant, to see if they were to be considered so pressing as to preclude myremaining in Washington till after the Grand Review, which was fixedfor the 23d and 24th of May, for naturally I had a strong desire tohead my command on that great occasion. But the General told me thatit was absolutely necessary to go at once to force the surrender ofthe Confederates under Kirby Smith. He also told me that the Stateslately in rebellion would be embraced in two or three militarydepartments, the commanders of which would control civil affairsuntil Congress took action about restoring them to the Union, sincethat course would not only be economical and simple, but would givethe Southern people confidence, and encourage them to go to work, instead of distracting them with politics. 

At this same interview he informed me that there was an additionalmotive in sending me to the new command, a motive not explained bythe instructions themselves, and went on to say that, as a matter offact, he looked upon the invasion of Mexico by Maximilian as a partof the rebellion itself, because of the encouragement that invasionhad received from the Confederacy, and that our success in puttingdown secession would never be complete till the French and Austrianinvaders were compelled to quit the territory of our sister republic. With regard to this matter, though, he said it would be necessary forme to act with great circumspection, since the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, was much opposed to the use of our troops along theborder in any active way that would be likely to involve us in a warwith European powers. 

Under the circumstances, my disappointment at not being permitted toparticipate in the review had to be submitted to, and I leftWashington without an opportunity of seeing again in a body the menwho, while under my command, had gone through so many trials andunremittingly pursued and, assailed the enemy, from the beginning ofthe campaign of 1864 till the white flag came into their hands atAppomattox Court House. 

I went first to St. Louis, and there took the steamboat for NewOrleans, and when near the mouth of the Red River received word fromGeneral Canby that Kirby Smith had surrendered under terms similar tothose accorded Lee and Johnston. But the surrender was not carriedout in good faith, particularly by the Texas troops, though this Idid not learn till some little time afterward when I was informedthat they had marched off to the interior of the State in severalorganized bodies, carrying with them their camp equipage, arms, ammunition, and even some artillery, with the ultimate purpose ofgoing to Mexico. In consequence of this, and also because of thedesire of the Government to make a strong showing of force in Texas, I decided to traverse the State with two columns of cavalry, directing one to San Antonio under Merritt, the other to Houstonunder Custer. Both commands were to start from the Red River--Shreveport and Alexandria--being the respective initial points--andin organizing the columns, to the mounted force already on the RedRiver were added several regiments of cavalry from the east bank ofthe Mississippi, and in a singular way one of these fell upon thetrail of my old antagonist, General Early. While crossing the riversomewhere below Vicksburg some of the men noticed a suspiciouslooking party being ferried over in a rowboat, behind which twohorses were swimming in tow. Chase was given, and the horses, beingabandoned by the party, fell into the hands of our troopers, who, however, failed to capture or identify the people in the boat. Assubsequently ascertained, the men were companions of Early, who wasalready across the Mississippi, hidden in the woods, on his way withtwo or three of these followers to join the Confederates in Texas, not having heard of Kirby Smith's surrender. A week or two later Ireceived a letter from Early describing the affair, and the captureof the horses, for which he claimed pay, on the ground that they wereprivate property, because he had taken them in battle. The letteralso said that any further pursuit of Early would be useless, as he"expected to be on the deep blue sea" by the time his communicationreached me. The unfortunate man was fleeing from imaginary dangers, however, for striking his trail was purely accidental, and no effortwhatever was being made to arrest him personally. Had this beenespecially desired it might have been accomplished very readily justafter Lee's surrender, for it was an open secret that Early was thennot far away, pretty badly disabled with rheumatism. 

By the time the two columns were ready to set out for San Antonio andHouston, General Frank Herron, --with one division of the ThirteenthCorps, occupied Galveston, and another division under General FredSteele had gone to Brazos Santiago, to hold Brownsville and the lineof the Rio Grande, the object being to prevent, as far as possible, the escaping Confederates from joining Maximilian. With this purposein view, and not forgetting Grant's conviction that the Frenchinvasion of Mexico was linked with the rebellion, I asked for anincrease of force to send troops into Texas in fact, to concentrateat available points in the State an army strong enough to moveagainst the invaders of Mexico if occasion demanded. The Fourth andTwenty-fifth army corps being ordered to report to me, accordingly, Isent the Fourth Corps to Victoria and San Antonio, and the bulk ofthe Twenty-fifth to Brownsville. Then came the feeding and caringfor all these troops--a difficult matter--for those at Victoria andSan Antonio had to be provisioned overland from Indianola across the"hog-wallow prairie, " while the supplies for the forces atBrownsville and along the Rio Grande must come by way of BrazosSantiago, from which point I was obliged to construct, with the laborof the men, a railroad to Clarksville, a distance of about eighteenmiles. 

The latter part of June I repaired to Brownsville myself to impressthe Imperialists, as much as possible, with the idea that we intendedhostilities, and took along my chief of scouts--Major Young--and fourof his most trusty men, whom I had had sent from Washington. FromBrownsville I despatched all these men to important points innorthern Mexico, to glean information regarding the movements of theImperial forces, and also to gather intelligence about theex-Confederates who had crossed the Rio Grande. On informationfurnished by these scouts, I caused General Steele to makedemonstrations all along the lower Rio Grande, and at the same timedemanded the return of certain munitions of war that had been turnedover by ex-Confederates to the Imperial General (Mejia) commanding atMatamoras. These demands, backed up as they were by such aformidable show of force created much agitation and demoralizationamong the Imperial troops, and measures looking to the abandonment ofnorthern Mexico were forthwith adopted by those in authority--apolicy that would have resulted in the speedy evacuation of theentire country by Maximilian, had not our Government weakened;contenting itself with a few pieces of the contraband artilleryvarnished over with the Imperial apologies. A golden opportunity waslost, for we had ample excuse for crossing the boundary, but Mr. Seward being, as I have already stated, unalterably opposed to anyact likely to involve us in war, insisted on his course ofnegotiation with Napoleon. 

As the summer wore away, Maximilian, under Mr. Seward's policy, gained in strength till finally all the accessible sections of Mexicowere in his possession, and the Republic under President Juarezalmost succumbed. Growing impatient at this, in the latter part ofSeptember I decided to try again what virtue there might be in ahostile demonstration, and selected the upper Rio Grande for thescene of my attempt. Merritt's cavalry and the Fourth Corps stillbeing at San Antonio, I went to that place and reviewed these troops, and having prepared them with some ostentation for a campaign, ofcourse it was bruited about that we were going to invade Mexico. Then, escorted by a regiment of horse I proceeded hastily to FortDuncan, on the Rio Grande just opposite the Mexican town of PiedrasNegras. Here I opened communication with President Juarez, throughone of his staff, taking care not to do this in the dark, and thenews, spreading like wildfire, the greatest significance was ascribedto my action, it being reported most positively and with manyspecific details that I was only awaiting the arrival of the troops, then under marching orders at San Antonio, to cross the Rio Grande inbehalf of the Liberal cause. 

Ample corroboration of the reports then circulated was found in myinquiries regarding the quantity of forage we could depend upongetting in Mexico, our arrangements for its purchase, and my sendinga pontoon train to Brownsville, together with which was cited therenewed activity of the troops along the lower Rio Grande. Thesereports and demonstrations resulted in alarming the Imperialists somuch that they withdrew the French and Austrian soldiers fromMatamoras, and practically abandoned the whole of northern Mexico asfar down as Monterey, with the exception of Matamoras, where GeneralMejia continued to hang on with a garrison of renegade Mexicans. 

The abandonment of so much territory in northern Mexico encouragedGeneral Escobedo and other Liberal leaders to such a degree that theycollected a considerable army of their followers at Comargo, Mier, and other points. At the same time that unknown quantity, Cortinas, suspended his free-booting for the nonce, and stoutly harassingMatamoras, succeeded in keeping its Imperial garrison within thefortifications. Thus countenanced and stimulated, and largelysupplied with arms and ammunition, which we left at convenient placeson our side of the river to fall into their hands, the Liberals, under General Escobedo--a man of much force of character--wereenabled in northern Mexico to place the affairs of the Republic on asubstantial basis. 

But in the midst of what bade fair to cause a final withdrawal of theforeigners, we were again checked by our Government, as a result ofrepresentations of the French Minister at Washington. In October, hewrote to Mr. Seward that the United States troops on the Rio Grandewere acting "in exact opposition to the repeated assurances YourExcellency has given me concerning the desire of the Cabinet atWashington to preserve the most strict neutrality in the events nowtaking place in Mexico, " and followed this statement with an emphaticprotest against our course. Without any investigation whatever byour State Department, this letter of the French Minister wastransmitted to me, accompanied by directions to preserve a strictneutrality; so, of course, we were again debarred from anything likeactive sympathy. 

After this, it required the patience of Job to abide the slow andpoky methods of our State Department, and, in truth, it was oftenvery difficult to restrain officers and men from crossing the RioGrande with hostile purpose. Within the knowledge of my troops, there had gone on formerly the transfer of organized bodies ofex-Confederates to Mexico, in aid of the Imperialists, and at thisperiod it was known that there was in preparation an immigrationscheme having in view the colonizing, at Cordova and one or two otherplaces, of all the discontented elements of the defunct Confederacy--Generals Price, Magruder, Maury, and other high personages beingpromoters of the enterprise, which Maximilian took to readily. Hesaw in it the possibilities of a staunch support to his throne, andtherefore not only sanctioned the project, but encouraged it withlarge grants of land, inspirited the promoters with titles ofnobility, and, in addition, instituted a system of peonage, expectingthat the silver hook thus baited would be largely swallowed by theSouthern people. 

The announcement of the scheme was followed by the appointment ofcommissioners in each of the Southern States to send out emigrants;but before any were deluded into starting, I made to General Grant areport of what was going on, with the recommendation that measures betaken, through our State Department, looking to the suppression ofthe colony; but, as usual, nothing could be effected through thatchannel; so, as an alternative, I published, in April, 1866, byauthority of General Grant, an order prohibiting the embarkation fromports in Louisiana and Texas, for ports in Mexico, of any personwithout a permit from my headquarters. This dampened the ardor ofeverybody in the Gulf States who had planned to go to Mexico; andalthough the projectors of the Cordova Colonization Scheme--the nameby which it was known--secured a few innocents from other districts, yet this set-back led ultimately to failure. 

Among the Liberal leaders along the Rio Grande during this periodthere sprang up many factional differences from various causes, somepersonal, others political, and some, I regret to say, from downrightmoral obliquity--as, for example, those between Cortinas and Canales--who, though generally hostile to the Imperialists, were freebootersenough to take a shy at each other frequently, and now and then evento join forces against Escobedo, unless we prevented them by coaxingor threats. A general who could unite these several factions wastherefore greatly needed, and on my return to New Orleans I sotelegraphed General Grant, and he, thinking General Caravajal (thenin Washington seeking aid for the Republic) would answer the purpose, persuaded him to report to me in New Orleans. Caravajal promptlyappeared, but he did not impress me very favorably. He was old andcranky, yet, as he seemed anxious to do his best, I sent him over toBrownsville, with credentials, authorizing him to cross into Mexico, and followed him myself by the next boat. When I arrived inBrownsville, matters in Matamoras had already reached a crisis. General Mejia, feeling keenly the moral support we were giving theLiberals, and hard pressed by the harassing attacks of Cortinas andCanales, had abandoned the place, and Caravajal, because ofhis credentials from our side, was in command, much to thedissatisfaction of both those chiefs whose differences it wasintended he should reconcile. 

The day after I got to Brownsville I visited Matamoras, and had along interview with Caravajal. The outcome of this meeting was, onmy part, a stronger conviction than ever that he was unsuitable, andI feared that either Canales or Cortinas would get possession of thecity. Caravajal made too many professions of what he would do--inshort, bragged too much--but as there was no help for the situation, I made the best of it by trying to smooth down the ruffled feathersof Canales and Cortinas. In my interview with Caravajal Irecommended Major Young as a confidential man, whom he could relyupon as a "go-between" for communicating with our people atBrownsville, and whom he could trust to keep him informed of theaffairs of his own country as well. 

A day or two afterward I recrossed the Gulf to New Orleans, and then, being called from my headquarters to the interior of Texas, afortnight passed before I heard anything from Brownsville. In themeanwhile Major Young had come to New Orleans, and organized there aband of men to act as a body-guard for Caravajal, the old wretchhaving induced him to accept the proposition by representing that ithad my concurrence. I at once condemned the whole business, butYoung, having been furnished with seven thousand dollars to recruitthe men and buy their arms, had already secured both, and was sodeeply involved in the transaction, he said, that he could notwithdraw without dishonor, and with tears in his eyes he besought meto help him. He told me he had entered upon the adventure in thefirm belief that I would countenance it; that the men and theirequipment were on his hands; that he must make good his word at allhazards; and that while I need not approve, yet I must go far enoughto consent to the departure of the men, and to loan him the moneynecessary to provision his party and hire a schooner to carry them toBrazos. It was hard in deed to resist the appeals of this man, whohad served me so long and so well, and the result of his pleading wasthat I gave him permission to sail, and also loaned him the sum askedfor; but I have never ceased to regret my consent, for misfortunefell upon the enterprise almost from its inception. 

By the time the party got across the Gulf and over to Brownsville, Caravajal had been deposed by Canales, and the latter would notaccept their services. This left Young with about fifty men to whomhe was accountable, and as he had no money to procure themsubsistence, they were in a bad fix. The only thing left to do wasto tender their services to General Escobedo, and with this in viewthe party set out to reach the General's camp, marching up the RioGrande on the American side, intending to cross near Ringgold Barracks. In advance of them, however, had spread far and wide thetidings of who they were, what they proposed to do, and where theywere going, and before they could cross into Mexico they wereattacked by a party of ex-Confederates and renegade Mexicanrancheros. Being on American soil, Young forbade his men to returnthe fire, and bent all his efforts to getting them over the river;but in this attempt they were broken up, and became completelydemoralized. A number of the men were drowned while swimming theriver, Young himself was shot and killed, a few were captured, andthose who escaped--about twenty in all--finally joined Escobedo, butin such a plight as to be of little use. With this distressingaffair came to an end pretty much all open participation of Americansympathizers with the Liberal cause, but the moral support affordedby the presence of our forces continued, and this was frequentlysupplemented with material aid in the shape of munitions of war, which we liberally supplied, though constrained to do so by the mostsecret methods. 

The term of office of Juarez as President of the Mexican Republicexpired in December, 1865, but to meet existing exigencies he hadcontinued himself in office by proclamation, a course renderednecessary by the fact that no elections could be held on account ofthe Imperial occupation of most of the country. The official who, bythe Mexican Constitution, is designated for the succession in such anemergency, is the President of the Supreme Court, and the person theneligible under this provision was General Ortega, but in the interestof the Imperialists he had absented himself from Mexico, hence thepatriotic course of Juarez in continuing himself at the head ofaffairs was a necessity of the situation. This action of thePresident gave the Imperialists little concern at first, but with therevival of the Liberal cause they availed themselves of every meansto divide its supporters, and Ortega, who had been lying low in theUnited States, now came forward to claim the Presidency. Thoughridiculously late for such a step, his first act was to issue amanifesto protesting against the assumption of the executiveauthority by Juarez. The protest had little effect, however, and hisnext proceeding was to come to New Orleans, get into correspondencewith other disaffected Mexicans, and thus perfect his plans. When hethought his intrigue ripe enough for action, he sailed for Brazos, intending to cross the Rio Grande and assert his claims with arms. While he was scheming in New Orleans, however, I had learned what hewas up to, and in advance of his departure had sent instructions tohave him arrested on American soil. Colonel Sedgwick, commanding atBrownsville, was now temporary master of Matamoras also, by reason ofhaving stationed some American troops there for the protection ofneutral merchants, so when Ortega appeared at Brazos, Sedgwickquietly arrested him and held him till the city of Matamoras wasturned over to General Escobedo, the authorized representative ofJuarez; then Escobedo took charge, of Ortega, and with ease preventedhis further machinations. 

During the winter and spring of 1866 we continued covertly supplyingarms and ammunition to the Liberals--sending as many as 30, 000muskets from Baton Rouge Arsenal alone--and by mid-summer Juarez, having organized a pretty good sized army, was in possession of thewhole line of the Rio Grande, and, in fact, of nearly the whole ofMexico down to San Louis Potosi. Then thick and fast came rumorspointing to the tottering condition of Maximilian's Empire-first, that Orizaba and Vera Cruz were being fortified; then, that theFrench were to be withdrawn; and later came the intelligence that theEmpress Carlotta had gone home to beg assistance from Napoleon, theauthor of all of her husband's troubles. But the situation forcedNapoleon to turn a deaf ear to Carlotta's prayers. The brokenheartedwoman besought him on her knees, but his fear of losing an army madeall pleadings vain. In fact, as I ascertained by the followingcablegram which came into my hands, Napoleon's instructions for theFrench evacuation were in Mexico at the very time of this patheticscene between him and Carlotta. The despatch was in cipher when Ireceived it, but was translated by the telegraph operator at myheadquarters, who long before had mastered the key of the Frenchcipher:

"PARIS, January 10, 1867. FRENCH CONSUL, New Orleans, La. 

"To GENERAL CASTELNAU, at Mexico. 

"Received your despatch of the 9th December. Do not compel theEmperor to abdicate, but do not delay the departure of the troops;bring back all those who will not remain there. Most of the fleethas left. 

"NAPOLEON. "

This meant the immediate withdrawal of the French. The rest of thestory--which has necessarily been but in outline--is soon told. Maximilian, though deserted, determined to hold out to the last, andwith the aid of disloyal Mexicans stuck to his cause till the spring. When taken prisoner at Queretaro, he was tried and executed undercircumstances that are well known. From promptings of humanitySecretary Seward tried hard to save the Imperial prisoner, butwithout success. The Secretary's plea for mercy was sent through meat New Orleans, and to make speed I hired a steamer to proceed withit across the Gulf to Tampico. The document was carried by SergeantWhite, one of my scouts, who crossed the country from Tampico, anddelivered it to Escobedo at Queretaro; but Mr. Seward'srepresentations were without avail--refused probably because littlemercy had been shown certain Liberal leaders unfortunate enough tofall into Maximilian's hands during the prosperous days of hisEmpire. 

At the close of our war there was little hope for the Republic ofMexico. Indeed, till our troops were concentrated on the Rio Grandethere was none. Our appearance in such force along the borderpermitted the Liberal leaders, refugees from their homes, toestablish rendezvous whence they could promulgate their plans insafety, while the countenance thus given the cause, when hope waswell-nigh gone, incited the Mexican people to renewed resistance. Beginning again with very scant means, for they had lost about all, the Liberals saw their cause, under the influence of such significantand powerful backing, progress and steadily grow so strong thatwithin two years Imperialism had received its death-blow. I doubtvery much whether such, results could have been achieved without thepresence of an American army on the Rio Grande, which, be itremembered, was sent there because, in General Grant's words, theFrench invasion of Mexico was so closely related to the rebellion asto be essentially a part of it. 

CHAPTER X. 

A. J. HAMILTON APPOINTED PROVISIONAL GOVERNOR OF TEXAS--ASSEMBLES ACONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION--THE TEXANS DISSATISFIED--LAWLESSNESS--OPPRESSIVE LEGISLATION--EX-CONFEDERATES CONTROLLING LOUISIANA--ACONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION--THE MEETING SUPPRESSED--A BLOODY RIOT--MYREPORTS OF THE MASSACRE--PORTIONS SUPPRESSED BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON--SUSTAINED BY A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE--THE RECONSTRUCTION LAWS. 

Although in 1865-66 much of my attention was directed tointernational matters along the Rio Grande, the civil affairs ofTexas and Louisiana required a certain amount of military supervisionalso in the absence of regularly established civil authority. At thetime of Kirby Smith's surrender the National Government hadformulated no plan with regard to these or the other States lately inrebellion, though a provisional Government had been set up inLouisiana as early as 1864. In consequence of this lack of system, Governor Pendleton Murray, of Texas, who was elected underConfederate rule, continued to discharge the duties of Governor tillPresident Johnson, on June 17, in harmony with his amnestyproclamation of May 29, 1865, appointed A. J. Hamilton provisionalGovernor. Hamilton was empowered by the President to call aConstitutional convention, the delegates to which were to be elected, under certain prescribed qualifications, for the purpose oforganizing the political affairs of the State, the Governor to beguided by instructions similar to those given the provisionalGovernor of North Carolina (W. W. Holden), when appointed in May. 

The convening of this body gave rise to much dissatisfaction amongthe people of Texas. They had assumed that affairs were to go on asof old, and that the reintegration of the State was to take placeunder the administration of Governor Murray, who, meanwhile, hadtaken it upon himself, together with the Legislature, to authorizethe election of delegates to a State Convention, without restrictionas to who should be entitled to vote. Thus encouraged, the elementbut lately in armed rebellion was now fully bent on restoring theState to the Union without any intervention whatever of the FederalGovernment; but the advent of Hamilton put an end to such illusions, since his proclamation promptly disfranchised the element inquestion, whose consequent disappointment and chagrin were so greatas to render this factor of the community almost uncontrollable. Theprovisional Governor at once rescinded the edict of Governor Murray, prohibited the assembling of his convention, and shortly aftercalled, one himself, the delegates to which were to b chosen byvoters who could take the amnesty-oath. The proclamation conveningthis assemblage also announced the policy that would be pursued ingoverning the State until its affairs were satisfactorilyreorganized, defined in brief the course to be followed by theJudiciary, and provided for the appointment, by the Governor, ofcounty officials to succeed those known to be disloyal. As thisaction of Hamilton's disfranchised all who could not take the amnestyoath, and of course deprived them of the offices, it met at once withpronounced and serious opposition, and he quickly realized that hehad on his hands an arduous task to protect the colored people, particularly as in the transition state of society just after theclose of the war there prevailed much lawlessness, which venteditself chiefly on the freedmen. It was greatly feared that politicalrights were to be given those so recently in servitude, and as it wasgenerally believed that such enfranchisement would precipitate a racewar unless the freedmen were overawed and kept in a state ofsubjection, acts of intimidation were soon reported from all parts ofthe State. 

Hamilton, an able, determined, and fearless man, tried hard to curbthis terrorism, but public opinion being strong against him, he couldaccomplish little without military aid. As department commander, Iwas required, whenever called upon, to assist his government, and asthese requisitions for help became necessarily very frequent, theresult was that shortly after he assumed his duties, detachments oftroops were stationed in nearly every county of the State. By suchdisposition of my forces fairly good order was maintained under theadministration of Hamilton, and all went well till the inaugurationof J. W. Throckmorton, who, elected Governor in pursuance of anauthorization granted by the convention which Hamilton had calledtogether, assumed the duties of the office August 9, 1866. 

One of Governor Throckmorton's first acts was to ask the withdrawalor non-interference of the military. This was not all granted, butunder his ingenious persuasion President Johnson, on the 13th ofAugust, 1866, directed that the new State officials be entrusted withthe unhampered control of civil affairs, and this was more thanenough to revive the bulldozing methods that had characterized thebeginning of Hamilton's administration. Oppressive legislation inthe shape of certain apprentice and vagrant laws quickly followed, developing a policy of gross injustice toward the colored people onthe part of the courts, and a reign of lawlessness and disorderensued which, throughout the remote districts of the State at least, continued till Congress, by what are known as the ReconstructionActs, took into its own hands the rehabilitation of the secededStates. 

In the State of Louisiana a provisional government, chosen by theloyal element, had been put in operation, as already mentioned, asearly as 1864. This was effected under encouragement given byPresident Lincoln, through the medium of a Constitutional convention, which met at New Orleans in April, 1864, and adjourned in July. Theconstitution then agreed upon was submitted to the people, and inSeptember, 1864, was ratified by a vote of the few loyal residents ofthe State. 

The government provided under this constitution being looked upon asprovisional merely, was never recognized by Congress, and in 1865 thereturned Confederates, restored to citizenship by the President'samnesty proclamation, soon got control of almost all the State. TheLegislature was in their hands, as well as most of the State andmunicipal offices; so, when the President, on the 20th of August, 1866, by proclamation, extended his previous instructions regardingcivil affairs in Texas so as to have them apply to all the secededStates, there at once began in Louisiana a system of discriminativelegislation directed against the freedmen, that led to flagrantwrongs in the enforcement of labor contracts, and in the remoteparishes to numbers of outrages and murders. 

To remedy this deplorable condition of things, it was proposed, bythose who had established the government of 1864, to remodel theconstitution of the State; and they sought to do this by reassemblingthe convention, that body before its adjournment having provided forreconvening under certain conditions, in obedience to the call of itspresident. Therefore, early in the summer of 1866, many members ofthis convention met in conference at New Orleans, and decided that anecessity existed for reconvening the delegates, and a proclamationwas issued accordingly by B. K. Howell, President-pro-tempore. 

Mayor John T. Monroe and the other officials of New Orleans lookedupon this proposed action as revolutionary, and by the time theconvention assembled (July 30), such bitterness of feeling prevailedthat efforts were made by the mayor and city police to suppress themeeting. A bloody riot followed, resulting, in the killing andwounding of about a hundred and sixty persons. 

I happened to be absent from the city at the time, returning fromTexas, where I had been called by affairs on the Rio Grande. On myway up from the mouth of the Mississippi I was met on the night ofJuly 30 by one of my staff, who reported what had occurred, givingthe details of the massacre--no milder term is fitting--and informingme that, to prevent further slaughter, General Baird, the seniormilitary officer present, had assumed control of the municipalgovernment. On reaching the city I made an investigation, and thatnight sent the following report of the affair:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF, "NEW ORLEANS, LA. , Aug. 1, 1866. 

"GENERAL U. S. GRANT:

"You are doubtless aware of the serious riot which occurred in thiscity on the 30th. A political body, styling themselves theConvention of 1864, met on the 30th, for, as it is alleged, thepurpose of remodeling the present constitution of the State. Theleaders were political agitators and revolutionary men, and theaction of the convention was liable to produce breaches of the publicpeace. I had made up my mind to arrest the head men, if theproceedings of the convention were calculated to disturb thetranquility of the Department; but I had no cause for action untilthey committed the overt act. In the meantime official duty calledme to Texas, and the mayor of the city, during my absence suppressedthe convention by the use of the police force, and in so doingattacked the members of the convention, and a party of two hundrednegroes, with fire-arms, clubs, and knives, in a manner sounnecessary and atrocious as to compel me to say that it was murder. About forty whites and blacks were thus killed, and about one hundredand sixty wounded. Everything is now quiet, but I deem it best tomaintain a military supremacy in the city for a few days, until theaffair is fully investigated. I believe the sentiment of the generalcommunity is great regret at this unnecessary cruelty, and that thepolice could have made any arrest they saw fit without sacrificinglives. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. "

On receiving the telegram, General Grant immediately submitted itto the President. Much clamor being made at the North for thepublication of the despatch, Mr. Johnson pretended to give it to thenewspapers. It appeared in the issues of August 4, but with thisparagraph omitted, viz. :

"I had made up my mind to arrest the head men, if the proceedings ofthe convention were calculated to disturb the tranquility of theDepartment, but I had no cause for action until they committed theovert act. In the mean time official duty called me to Texas, andthe mayor of the city, during my absence, suppressed the conventionby the use of the police force, and in so doing attacked the membersof the convention, and a party of two hundred negroes, withfire-arms, clubs, and knives, in a manner so unnecessary and atrociousas to compel me to say it was murder. "

Against this garbling of my report--done by the President's own order--I strongly demurred; and this emphatic protest marks the beginning ofMr. Johnson's well-known personal hostility toward me. In the meantime I received (on August 3) the following despatch from General Grantapproving my course:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "WAR DEPT. , WASHINGTON, D. C. , "August 3, 1866--5 p. M. 

"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN, "Commanding Mil. Div. Of the Gulf, "New Orleans, La. 

"Continue to enforce martial law, so far as may be necessary topreserve the peace; and do not allow any of the civil authorities toact, if you deem such action dangerous to the public safety. Lose notime in investigating and reporting the causes that led to the riot, and the facts which occurred. 

"U. S. GRANT, "Lieutenant-General. "

In obedience to the President's directions, My report of August 1 wasfollowed by another, more in detail, which I give in full, since ittells the whole story of the riot:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF, "NEW ORLEANS, LA. , August 6, 1866. 

"His EXCELLENCY ANDREW JOHNSON, "President United States. 

"I have the honor to make the following reply to your despatch ofAugust 4. A very large number of colored people marched inprocession on Friday night, July twenty-seven (27), and wereaddressed from the steps of the City Hall by Dr. Dostie, ex-GovernorHahn, and others. The speech of Dostie was intemperate in languageand sentiment. The speeches of the others, so far as I can learn, were characterized by moderation. I have not given you the words ofDostie's speech, as the version published was denied; but from what Ihave learned of the man, I believe they were intemperate. 

"The convention assembled at twelve (12) M. On the thirtieth (30), the timid members absenting themselves because the tone of thegeneral public was ominous of trouble. I think there were abouttwenty-six (26) members present. In front of the MechanicsInstitute, where the meeting was held, there were assembled somecolored men, women, and children, perhaps eighteen (18) or twenty(20), and in the Institute a number of colored men, probably onehundred and fifty (150). Among those outside and inside there mighthave been a pistol in the possession of every tenth (10) man. 

"About one (1) p. M. A procession of say from sixty (60) to onehundred and thirty (130) colored men marched up Burgundy Street andacross Canal Street toward the convention, carrying an American flag. These men had about one pistol to every ten men, and canes and clubsin addition. While crossing Canal Street a row occurred. There weremany spectators on the street, and their manner and tone toward theprocession unfriendly. A shot was fired, by whom I am not able tostate, but believe it to have been by a policeman, or some coloredman in the procession. This led to other shots and a rush after theprocession. On arrival at the front of the Institute there was somethrowing of brickbats by both sides. The police, who had been heldwell in hand, were vigorously marched to the scene of disorder. Theprocession entered the Institute with the flag, about six (6) oreight (8) remaining outside. A row occurred between a policeman andone of these colored men, and a shot was again fired by one of theparties, which led to an indiscriminate fire on the building throughthe windows by the policemen. This had been going on for a shorttime, when a white flag was displayed from the windows of theInstitute, whereupon the firing ceased, and the police rushed intothe building. 

"From the testimony of wounded men, and others who were inside thebuilding, the policemen opened an indiscriminate fire upon theaudience until they had emptied their revolvers, when they retired, and those inside barricaded the doors. The door was broken in, andthe firing again commenced, when many of the colored and white peopleeither escaped throughout the door or were passed out by thepolicemen inside; but as they came out the policemen who formed thecircle nearest the building fired upon them, and they were againfired upon by the citizens that formed the outer circle. Many ofthose wounded and taken prisoners, and others who were prisoners andnot wounded, were fired upon by their captors and by citizens. Thewounded were stabbed while lying on the ground, and their headsbeaten with brickbats. In the yard of the building, whither some ofthe colored men had escaped and partially secreted themselves, theywere fired upon and killed or wounded by policemen. Some were killedand wounded several squares from the scene. Members of theconvention were wounded by the police while in their hands asprisoners, some of them mortally. 

"The immediate cause of this terrible affair was the assemblage ofthis Convention; the remote cause was the bitter and antagonisticfeeling which has been growing in this community since the advent ofthe present Mayor, who, in the organization of his police force, selected many desperate men, and some of them known murderers. People of clear views were overawed by want of confidence in theMayor, and fear of the thugs, many of which he had selected for hispolice force. I have frequently been spoken to by prominent citizenson this subject, and have heard them express fear, and want ofconfidence in Mayor Monroe. Ever since the intimation of this lastconvention movement I must condemn the course of several of the citypapers for supporting, by their articles, the bitter feeling of badmen. As to the merciless manner in which the convention was brokenup, I feel obliged to confess strong repugnance. 

"It is useless to disguise the hostility that exists on the part of agreat many here toward Northern men, and this unfortunate affair hasso precipitated matters that there is now a test of what shall be thestatus of Northern men--whether they can live here without being inconstant dread or not, whether they can be protected in life andproperty, and have justice in the courts. If this matter ispermitted to pass over without a thorough and determined prosecutionof those engaged in it, we may look out for frequent scenes of thesame kind, not only here, but in other places. No steps have as yetbeen taken by the civil authorities to arrest citizens who wereengaged in this massacre, or policemen who perpetrated suchcruelties. The members of the convention have been indicted by thegrand jury, and many of them arrested and held to bail. As towhether the civil authorities can mete out ample justice to theguilty parties on both sides, I must say it is my opinion, unequivocally, that they cannot. Judge Abell, whose course I haveclosely watched for nearly a year, I now consider one of the mostdangerous men that we have here to the peace and quiet of the city. The leading men of the convention--King, Cutler, Hahn, and others--have been political agitators, and are bad men. I regret to say thatthe course of Governor Wells has been vacillating, and that during thelate trouble he has shown very little of the man. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General Commanding. "

Subsequently a military commission investigated the subject of theriot, taking a great deal of testimony. The commission substantiallyconfirmed the conclusions given in my despatches, and still laterthere was an investigation by a select committee of the House ofRepresentatives, of which the Honorables Samuel Shellabarger, ofOhio, H. L. Elliot, of Massachusetts, and B. M. Boyer, ofPennsylvania, were the members. The majority report of the committeealso corroborated, in all essentials, my reports of the distressingoccurrence. The committee likewise called attention to a violentspeech made by Mr. Johnson at St. Louis in September, 1866, chargingthe origin of the riot to Congress, and went on to say of the speechthat "it was an unwarranted and unjust expression of hostile feeling, without pretext or foundation in fact. " A list of the killed andwounded was embraced in the committee's report, and among otherconclusions reached were the following: "That the meeting of July 30was a meeting of quiet citizens, who came together without arms andwith intent peaceably to discuss questions of public concern.... There has been no occasion during our National history when a riothas occurred so destitute of justifiable cause, resulting in amassacre so inhuman and fiend-like, as that which took place at NewOrleans on the 30th of July last. This riotous attack upon theconvention, with its terrible results of massacre and murder, was notan accident. It was the determined purpose of the mayor of the cityof New Orleans to break up this convention by armed force. "

The statement is also made, that, "He [the President] knew that'rebels' and 'thugs' and disloyal men had controlled the election ofMayor Monroe, and that such men composed chiefly his police force. "

The committee held that no legal government existed in Louisiana, andrecommended the temporary establishment of a provisional governmenttherein; the report concluding that "in the meantime the safety ofall Union men within the State demands that such government be formedfor their protection, for the well being of the nation and thepermanent peace of the Republic. "

The New Orleans riot agitated the whole country, and the official andother reports served to intensify and concentrate the opposition toPresident Johnson's policy of reconstruction, a policy restingexclusively on and inspired solely by the executive authority--for itwas made plain, by his language and his acts, that he was seeking torehabilitate the seceded States under conditions differing not a whitfrom those existing before the rebellion; that is to say, without theslightest constitutional provision regarding the status of theemancipated slaves, and with no assurances of protection for men whohad remained loyal in the war. 

In December, 1866, Congress took hold of the subject with such vigoras to promise relief from all these perplexing disorders, and, aftermuch investigation and a great deal of debate, there resulted theso-called "Reconstruction Laws, " which, for a clear understanding ofthe powers conferred on the military commanders, I deem best to appendin full:

AN ACT to provide for the more efficient government of the rebelStates. 

WHEREAS, no legal State governments or adequate protection for lifeor property now exist in the rebel States of Virginia, NorthCarolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas; and whereas, it is necessary that peaceand good order should be enforced in said States until loyal andrepublican State governments can be legally established; therefore, BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and House of Representatives of theUnited States of America in Congress assembled, That said rebelStates shall be divided into military districts and made subject tothe military authority of the United States as hereinafterprescribed; and for that purpose Virginia shall constitute the firstdistrict; North Carolina and South Carolina, the second district;Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, the third district; Mississippi andArkansas, the fourth district; and Louisiana and Texas, the fifthdistrict. 

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of thePresident to assign to the command of each of said districts anofficer of the army not below the rank of brigadier-general, and todetail a sufficient military force to enable such officer to performhis duties and enforce his authority within the district to which heis assigned. 

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of eachofficer assigned as aforesaid to protect all persons in their rightsof person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder, andviolence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers ofthe public peace and criminals, and to this end he may allow localcivil tribunals to take jurisdiction of and to try offenders, or, when in his judgment it may be necessary for the trial of offenders, he shall have power to organize military commissions or tribunals forthat purpose, and all interference, under cover of State authority, with the exercise of military authority under this act, shall be nulland void. 

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That all persons put undermilitary arrest by virtue of this act shall be tried withoutunnecessary delay, and no cruel or unjust punishment shall beinflicted; and no sentence of any military commission or tribunalhereby authorized affecting the life or liberty of any person, shallbe executed until it is approved by the officer in command of thedistrict; and the laws and regulations for the government of the armyshall not be affected by this act except in so far as they conflictwith its provisions: Provided, That no sentence of death, under theprovisions of this act, shall be carried into effect without theapproval of the President. 

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That when the people of any one ofsaid rebel States shall have formed a constitution of government inconformity with the Constitution of the United States in allrespects, framed by a convention of delegates elected by the malecitizens of said State twenty-one years old and upward, of whateverrace, color, or previous condition, who have been resident in saidState for one year previous to the day of such election, except suchas may be disfranchised for participation in the rebellion, or forfelony at common law; and when such constitution shall provide thatthe elective franchise shall be enjoyed by all such persons as havethe qualifications herein stated for electors of delegates; and whensuch constitution shall be ratified by a majority of the personsvoting on the question of ratification who are qualified as electorsfor delegates, and when such constitution shall have been submittedto Congress for examination and approval, and Congress shall haveapproved the same; and when said State, by a vote of its legislatureelected under said constitution, shall have adopted the amendment tothe Constitution of the United States proposed by the Thirty-ninthCongress, and known as article fourteen; and when said article shallhave become a part of the Constitution of the United States, saidState shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress, andsenators and representatives shall be admitted therefrom on theirtaking the oath prescribed by law; and then and thereafter thepreceding sections of this act shall be inoperative in said State:Provided, That no person excluded from the privilege of holdingoffice by said proposed amendment to the Constitution of the UnitedStates shall be eligible to election as a member of the convention toframe a constitution for any of said rebel States, nor shall any suchperson vote for members of such convention. 

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That until the people of saidrebel States shall be by law admitted to representation in theCongress of the United States, any civil government which may existtherein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects subjectto the paramount authority of the United States at any time toabolish, modify, control, or supersede the same; and in all electionsto any office under such provisional governments all persons shall beentitled to vote, and none others, who are entitled to vote under thefifth section of this act; and no person shall be eligible to anyoffice under any such provisional governments who would bedisqualified from holding office under the provisions of the thirdarticle of said constitutional amendment. 

SCHUYLER COLFAX, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

LAFAYETTE S. FOSTER, President of the Senate pro tempore. 

AN ACT supplementary to an act entitled "An act to provide for themore efficient government of the rebel States, " passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, and to facilitate restoration. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of theUnited States of America in Congress assembled, That before the firstday of September, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, the commandinggeneral in each district defined by an act entitled "An act toprovide for the more efficient government of the rebel States, "passed March second, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, shall cause aregistration to be made of the male citizens of the United States, twenty-one years of age and upwards, resident in each county orparish in the State or States included in his district, whichregistration shall include only those persons who are qualified tovote for delegates by the act aforesaid, and who shall have taken andsubscribed the following oath or affirmation: "I, ------, dosolemnly swear (or affirm), in the presence of the Almighty God, thatI am a citizen of the State of ---------; that I have resided in saidState for----- months next preceding this day, and now reside in thecounty of -------, or the parish of --------, in said State, (as thecase may be); that I am twenty-one years old; that I have not beendisfranchised for participation in any rebellion or civil war againstthe United States, nor for felony committed against the laws of anyState or of the United States; that I have never been a member of anyState Legislature, nor held any executive or judicial office in anyState, and afterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion againstthe United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof;that I have never taken an oath as a member of Congress of the UnitedStates, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of anyState Legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of anyState, to support the constitution of the United States, andafterwards engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the UnitedStates or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof; that I willfaithfully support the Constitution and obey the laws of the UnitedStates, and will, to the best of my ability, encourage others so todo: so help me God. "; which oath or affirmation may be administeredby any registering officer. 

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That after the completion of theregistration hereby provided for in any State, at such time andplaces therein as the commanding general shall appoint and direct, ofwhich at least thirty days' public notice shall be given, an electionshall be held of delegates to a convention for the purpose ofestablishing a constitution and civil government for such State loyalto the Union, said convention in each State, except Virginia, toconsist of the same number of members as the most numerous branch ofthe State Legislature of such State in the year eighteen hundred andsixty, to be apportioned among the several districts, counties, orparishes of such State by the commanding general, giving eachrepresentation in the ratio of voters registered as aforesaid asnearly as may be. The convention in Virginia shall consist of thesame number of members as represented the territory now constitutingVirginia in the most numerous branch of the Legislature of said Statein the year eighteen hundred and sixty, to be apportioned asaforesaid. 

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That at said election theregistered voters of each State shall vote for or against aconvention to form a constitution therefor under this act. Thosevoting in favor of such a convention shall have written or printed onthe ballots by which they vote for delegates, as aforesaid, the words"For a convention, " and those voting against such a convention shallhave written or printed on such ballot the words "Against aconvention. " The persons appointed to superintend said election, andto make return of the votes given thereat, as herein provided, shallcount and make return of the votes given for and against aconvention; and the commanding general to whom the same shall havebeen returned shall ascertain and declare the total vote in eachState for and against a convention. If a majority of the votes givenon that question shall be for a convention, then such conventionshall be held as hereinafter provided; but if a majority of saidvotes shall, be against a convention, then no such convention shallbe held under this act: Provided, That such convention shall not beheld unless a majority of all such registered voters shall have votedon the question of holding such convention. 

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That the commanding general ofeach district shall appoint as many boards of registration as may benecessary, consisting of three loyal officers or persons, to make andcomplete the registration, superintend the election, and make returnto him of the votes, list of voters, and of the persons elected asdelegates by a plurality of the votes cast at said election; and uponreceiving said returns he shall open the same, ascertain the personselected as delegates, according to the returns of the officers whoconducted said election, and make proclamation thereof; and if amajority of the votes given on that question shall be for aconvention, the commanding general, within sixty days from the dateof election, shall notify the delegates to assemble in convention, ata time and place to be mentioned in the notification, and saidconvention, when organized, shall proceed to frame a constitution andcivil government according to the provisions of this act, and the actto which it is supplementary; and when the same shall have been soframed, said constitution shall be submitted by the convention forratification to the persons registered under the provisions of thisact at an election to be conducted by the officers or personsappointed or to be appointed by the commanding general, ashereinbefore provided, and to be held after the expiration of thirtydays from the date of notice thereof, to be given by said convention;and the returns thereof shall be made to the commanding general ofthe district. 

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That if, according to saidreturns, the constitution shall be ratified by a majority of thevotes of the registered electors qualified as herein specified, castat said election, at least one-half of all the registered votersvoting upon the question of such ratification, the president of theconvention shall transmit a copy of the same, duly certified, to thePresident of the United States, who shall forthwith transmit the sameto Congress, if then in session, and if not in session, thenimmediately upon its next assembling; and if it shall moreover appearto Congress that the election was one at which all the registered andqualified electors in the State had an opportunity to vote freely, and without restraint, fear, or the influence of fraud, and if theCongress shall be satisfied that such constitution meets the approvalof a majority of all the qualified electors in the State, and if thesaid constitution shall be declared by Congress to be in conformitywith the provisions of the act to which this is supplementary, andthe other provisions of said act shall have been complied with, andthe said constitution shall be approved by Congress, the State shallbe declared entitled to representation, and senators andrepresentatives shall be admitted therefrom as therein provided. 

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That all elections in the Statesmentioned in the said "Act to provide for the more efficientgovernment of the rebel States" shall, during the operation of saidact, be by ballot; and all officers making the said registration ofvoters and conducting said elections, shall, before entering upon thedischarge of their duties, take and subscribe the oath prescribed bythe act approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, entitled "An act to prescribe an oath of office": Provided, That ifany person shall knowingly and falsely take and subscribe any oath inthis act prescribed, such person so offending and being thereof dulyconvicted, shall be subject to the pains, penalties, and disabilitieswhich by law are provided for the punishment of the crime of wilfuland corrupt perjury. 

SEC. 7. And be if further enacted, That all expenses incurred by theseveral commanding generals, or by virtue of any orders issued, orappointments made, by them, under or by virtue of this act, shall bepaid out of any moneys in the treasury not otherwise appropriated. 

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the convention for each Stateshall prescribe the fees, salary, and compensation to be paid to alldelegates and other officers and agents herein authorized ornecessary to carry into effect the purposes of this act not hereinotherwise provided for, and shall provide for the levy and collectionof such taxes on the property in such State as may be necessary topay the same. 

SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That the word "article, " in thesixth section of the act to which this is supplementary, shall beconstrued to mean, "section. "

SCHUYLER COLFAX, Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

B. F. WADE, President of the Senate pro tempore. 

CHAPTER XI. 

PASSAGE OF THE RECONSTRUCTION ACT OVER THE PRESIDENT'S VETO--PLACEDIN COMMAND OF THE FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT--REMOVING OFFICERS--MYREASONS FOR SUCH ACTION--AFFAIRS IN LOUISIANA AND TEXAS--REMOVAL OFGOVERNOR WELLS--REVISION OF THE JURY LISTS--RELIEVED FROM THE COMMANDOF THE FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT. 

The first of the Reconstruction laws was passed March 2, 1867, andthough vetoed by the President, such was the unanimity of loyalsentiment and the urgency demanding the measure, that the bill becamea law over the veto the day the President returned it to Congress. March the 11th this law was published in General Orders No. 10, fromthe Headquarters of the Army, the same order assigning certainofficers to take charge of the five military districts into which theStates lately in rebellion were subdivided, I being announced as thecommander of the Fifth Military District, which embraced Louisianaand Texas, a territory that had formed the main portion of my commandsince the close of the war. 

Between the date of the Act and that of my assignment, the LouisianaLegislature, then in special session, had rejected a proposed repealof an Act it had previously passed providing for an election ofcertain municipal officers in New Orleans. This election was set forMarch 11, but the mayor and the chief of police, together withGeneral Mower, commanding the troops in the city, having expressed tome personally their fears that the public peace would be disturbed bythe election, I, in this emergency, though not yet assigned to thedistrict, assuming the authority which the Act conferred on districtcommanders, declared that the election should not take place; that nopolls should be opened on the day fixed; and that the whole matterwould stand postponed till the district commander should beappointed, or special instructions be had. This, my first officialact under the Reconstruction laws, was rendered necessary by thecourse of a body of obstructionists, who had already begun to giveunequivocal indications of their intention to ignore the laws ofCongress. 

A copy of the order embodying the Reconstruction law, together withmy assignment, having reached me a few days after, I regularlyassumed control of the Fifth Military District on March 19, by anorder wherein I declared the State and municipal governments of thedistrict to be provisional only, and, under the provisions of thesixth section of the Act, subject to be controlled, modified, superseded, or abolished. I also announced that no removals fromoffice would be made unless the incumbents failed to carry out theprovisions of the law or impeded reorganization, or unless willfuldelays should necessitate a change, and added: "Pending thereorganization, it is, desirable and intended to create as littledisturbance in the machinery of the various branches of theprovisional governments as possible, consistent with the law ofCongress and its successful execution, but this condition isdependent upon the disposition shown by the people, and upon thelength of time required for reorganization. "

Under these limitations Louisiana and Texas retained their formerdesignations as military districts, the officers in commandexercising their military powers as heretofore. In addition, theseofficers were to carry out in their respective commands allprovisions of the law except those specially requiring the action ofthe district commander, and in cases of removals from and appointmentto office. 

In the course of legislation the first Reconstruction act, as I haveheretofore noted, had been vetoed. On the very day of the veto, however, despite the President's adverse action, it passed each Houseof Congress by such an overwhelming majority as not only to give itthe effect of law, but to prove clearly that the plan ofreconstruction presented was, beyond question, the policy endorsed bythe people of the country. It was, therefore, my determination tosee to the law's zealous execution in my district, though I feltcertain that the President would endeavor to embarrass me by everymeans in his power, not only on account of his pronounced personalhostility, but also because of his determination not to execute butto obstruct the measures enacted by Congress. 

Having come to this conclusion, I laid down, as a rule for myguidance, the principle of non-interference with the provisionalState governments, and though many appeals were made to have merescind rulings of the courts, or interpose to forestall somepresupposed action to be taken by them, my invariable reply was thatI would not take cognizance of such matters, except in cases ofabsolute necessity. The same policy was announced also in referenceto municipal affairs throughout the district, so long as the actionof the local officers did not conflict with the law. 

In a very short time, however, I was obliged to interfere inmunicipal matters in New Orleans, for it had become clearly apparentthat several of the officials were, both by acts of omission andcommission, ignoring the law, so on the 27th of March I removed fromoffice the Mayor, John T. Monroe; the Judge of the First DistrictCourt, E. Abell; and the Attorney-General of the State, Andrew S. Herron; at the same time appointing to the respective offices thusvacated Edward Heath, W. W. Howe, and B. L. Lynch. The officialsthus removed had taken upon themselves from the start to pronouncethe Reconstruction acts unconstitutional, and to advise such a courseof obstruction that I found it necessary at an early dav to replacethem by men in sympathy with the law, in order to make plain mydetermination to have its provisions enforced. The President at oncemade inquiry, through General Grant, for the cause of the removal, and I replied:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT, "New Orleans, La. , April 19, 1867. 

"GENERAL: On the 27th day of March last I removed from office JudgeE. Abell, of the Criminal Court of New Orleans; Andrew S. Herron, Attorney-General of the State of Louisiana; and John T. Monroe, Mayorof the City of New Orleans. These removals were made under thepowers granted me in what is usually termed the 'military bill, 'passed March 2, 1867, by the Congress of the United States. 

"I did not deem it necessary to give any reason for the removal ofthese men, especially after the investigations made by the militaryboard on the massacre Of July 30, 1866, and the report of thecongressional committee on the same massacre; but as some inquiry hasbeen made for the cause of removal, I would respectfully state asfollows:

"The court over which judge Abell presided is the only criminal courtin the city of New Orleans, and for a period of at least nine monthsprevious to the riot Of July 30 he had been educating a large portionof the community to the perpetration of this outrage, by almostpromising no prosecution in his court against the offenders, in casesuch an event occurred. The records of his court will show that hefulfilled his promise, as not one of the guilty has been prosecuted. 

"In reference to Andrew J. Herron, Attorney-General of the State ofLouisiana, I considered it his duty to indict these men before thiscriminal court. This he failed to do, but went so far as to attemptto impose on the good sense of the whole nation by indicting thevictims of the riot instead of the rioters; in other words, makingthe innocent guilty and the guilty innocent. He was therefore, in mybelief, an able coadjutor with judge Abell in bringing on themassacre of July 30. 

"Mayor Monroe controlled the element engaged in this riot, and whenbacked by an attorney-general who would not prosecute the guilty, anda judge who advised the grand jury to find the innocent guilty andlet the murderers go free, felt secure in engaging his police forcein the riot and massacre. 

"With these three men exercising a large influence over the worstelements of the population of this city, giving to those elements animmunity for riot and bloodshed, the general-in-chief will see howinsecurely I felt in letting them occupy their respective positionsin the troubles which might occur in registration and voting in thereorganization of this State. 

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General U. S. A. 

"GENERAL U. S. GRANT, "Commanding Armies of the United States, "Washington, D. C. "

To General Grant my reasons were satisfactory, but not so to thePresident, who took no steps, however, to rescind my action, for heknew that the removals were commended by well-nigh the entirecommunity in the city, for it will be understood that Mr. Johnsonwas, through his friends and adherents in Louisiana and Texas, keptconstantly advised of every step taken by me. Many of these personswere active and open opponents of mine, while others were spies, doing their work so secretly and quickly that sometimes Mr. Johnsonknew of my official acts before I could report them to General Grant. 

The supplemental Reconstruction act which defined the method ofreconstruction became a law despite the President's veto on March 23. This was a curative act, authorizing elections and prescribingmethods of registration. When it reached me officially I beganmeasures for carrying out its provisions, and on the 28th of Marchissued an order to the effect that no elections for the State, parish, or municipal officers would be held in Louisiana until theprovisions of the laws of Congress entitled "An act to provide forthe more efficient government of the rebel States, " and of the actsupplemental thereto, should have been complied with. I alsoannounced that until elections were held in accordance with theseacts, the law of the Legislature of the State providing for theholding over of those persons whose terms of office otherwise wouldhave expired, would govern in all cases excepting only those specialones in which I myself might take action. There was one parish, Livingston, which this order did no reach in time to prevent theelection previously ordered there, and which therefore took place, but by a supplemental order this election was declare null and void. 

In April. I began the work of administering the Supplemental Law, which, under certain condition of eligibility, required aregistration of the voter of the State, for the purpose of electingdelegate to a Constitutional convention. It therefore becamenecessary to appoint Boards of Registration throughout the electiondistricts, and on April 10 the boards for the Parish of Orleans weregiven out, those for the other parishes being appointed ten dayslater. Before announcing these boards, I had asked to be adviseddefinitely as to what persons were disfranchised by the law, and wasdirected by General Grant to act upon my own interpretation of it, pending an opinion expected shortly from the Attorney-General--Mr. Henry Stanbery--so, for the guidance of the boards, I gave thefollowing instructions:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT. "New Orleans, La. , April 10, 1867. 

"Special Orders, No. 15. 

".... In obedience to the directions contained in the first section ofthe Law of Congress entitled "An Act supplemental to an Act entitled'An Act to provide for the more efficient government of the rebelStates'" the registration of the legal voters, according to that lawin the Parish of Orleans, will be commenced on the 15th instant, andmust be completed by the 15th of May. 

"The four municipal districts of the City of New Orleans and theParish of Orleans, right bank (Algiers), will each constitute aRegistration district. Election precincts will remain as at presentconstituted. 

".... Each member of the Board of Registers, before commencing hisduties, will file in the office of the Assistant-Inspector-General atthese headquarters, the oath required in the sixth section of the Actreferred to, and be governed in the execution of his duty by theprovisions of the first section of that Act, faithfully administeringthe oath therein prescribed to each person registered. 

"Boards of Registers will immediately select suitable offices withintheir respective districts, having reference to convenience andfacility of registration, and will enter upon their duties on the daydesignated. Each Board will be entitled to two clerks. Office-hoursfor registration will be from 8 o'clock till 12 A. M. , and from 4till 7 P. M. 

"When elections are ordered, the Board of Registers for each districtwill designate the number of polls and the places where they shall beopened in the election precincts within its district, appoint thecommissioners and other officers necessary for properly conductingthe elections, and will superintend the same. 

"They will also receive from the commissioners of elections of thedifferent precincts the result of the vote, consolidate the same, andforward it to the commanding general. 

"Registers and all officers connected with elections will be held toa rigid accountability and will be subject to trial by militarycommission for fraud, or unlawful or improper conduct in theperformance of their duties. Their rate of compensation and mannerof payment will be in accordance with the provisions of sections sixand seven of the supplemental act. 

".... Every male citizen of the United States, twenty-one years oldand upward, of whatever race, color, or previous condition, who hasbeen resident in the State of Louisiana for one year and Parish ofOrleans for three months previous to the date at which he presentshimself for registration, and who has not been disfranchised by actof Congress or for felony at common law, shall, after having takenand subscribed the oath prescribed in the first section of the actherein referred to, be entitled to be, and shall be, registered as alegal voter in the Parish of Orleans and State of Louisiana. 

"Pending the decision of the Attorney-General of the United States onthe question as to who are disfranchised by law, registers will givethe most rigid interpretation to the law, and exclude fromregistration every person about whose right to vote there may be adoubt. Any person so excluded who may, under the decision of theAttorney-General, be entitled to vote, shall be permitted to registerafter that decision is received, due notice of which will be given. 

"By command of Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN, "GEO. L. HARTSUFF, "Assistant Adjutant-General. "

The parish Boards of Registration were composed of three memberseach. Ability to take what was known as the "ironclad oath" was thequalification exacted of the members, and they were prohibited frombecoming candidates for office. In the execution of their dutiesthey were to be governed by the provisions of the supplemental act. It was also made one of their functions to designate the number andlocation of the polling-places in the several districts, to appointcommissioners for receiving the votes and in general to attend tosuch other matters as were necessary, in order properly to conductthe voting, and afterward to receive from the commissioners theresult of the vote and forward it to my headquarters. Theseregisters, and all other officers having to do with elections, wereto be held to a rigid accountability, and be subject to trial bymilitary commission for fraud or unlawful or improper conduct in theperformance of their duties; and in order to be certain that theRegistration Boards performed their work faithfully andintelligently, officers of the army were appointed as supervisors. To this end the parishes were grouped together conveniently intemporary districts, each officer having from three to five parishesto supervise. The programme thus mapped out for carrying out the lawin Louisiana was likewise adhered to in Texas, and indeed wasfollowed as a model in some of the other military districts. 

Although Military Commissions were fully authorized by theReconstruction acts, yet I did not favor their use in governing thedistrict, and probably would never have convened one had these actsbeen observed in good faith. I much preferred that the civil courts, and the State and municipal authorities already in existence, shouldperform their functions without military control or interference, butoccasionally, because the civil authorities neglected their duty, Iwas obliged to resort to this means to ensure the punishment Ofoffenders. At this time the condition of the negroes in Texas andLouisiana was lamentable, though, in fact, not worse than that of thefew white loyalists who had been true to the Union during the war. These last were singled out as special objects of attack, and were, therefore, obliged at all times to be on the alert for the protectionof their lives and property. This was the natural outcome of Mr. Johnson's defiance of Congress, coupled with the sudden conversion tohis cause of persons in the North--who but a short time before hadbeen his bitterest enemies; for all this had aroused among thedisaffected element new hopes of power and place, hopes of being atonce put in political control again, with a resumption of theirfunctions in State and National matters without any preliminaryauthorization by Congress. In fact, it was not only hoped, butexpected, that things were presently to go on just as if there hadbeen no war. 

In the State of Texas there were in 1865 about 200, 000 of the coloredrace-roughly, a third of the entire population--while in Louisianathere were not less than 350, 000, or more than one-half of all thepeople in the State. Until the enactment of the Reconstruction lawsthese negroes were without rights, and though they had been liberatedby the war, Mr. Johnson's policy now proposed that they should haveno political status at all, and consequently be at the mercy of apeople who, recently their masters, now seemed to look upon them asthe authors of all the misfortunes that had come upon the land. Under these circumstances the blacks naturally turned for protectionto those who had been the means of their liberation, and it wouldhave been little less than inhuman to deny them sympathy. Theirfreedom had been given them, and it was the plain duty of those inauthority to make it secure, and screen them from the bitterpolitical resentment that beset them, and to see that they had a fairchance in the battle of life. Therefore, when outrages and murdersgrew frequent, and the aid of the military power was an absolutenecessity for the protection of life, I employed it unhesitatingly--the guilty parties being brought to trial before militarycommissions--and for a time, at least, there occurred a halt in themarch of terrorism inaugurated by the people whom Mr. Johnson haddeluded. 

The first, Military Commission was convened to try the case of JohnW. Walker, charged with shooting a negro in the parish of St. John. The proper civil authorities had made no effort to arrest Walker, andeven connived at his escape, so I had him taken into custody in NewOrleans, and ordered him tried, the commission finding him guilty, and sentencing him to confinement in the penitentiary for six months. This shooting was the third occurrence of the kind that had takenplace in St. John's parish, a negro being wounded in each case, andit was plain that the intention was to institute there a practice ofintimidation which should be effective to subject the freedmen to thewill of their late masters, whether in making labor contracts, or incase these newly enfranchised negroes should evince a disposition toavail themselves of the privilege to vote. 

The trial and conviction of Walker, and of one or two others forsimilar outrages, soon put a stop to every kind of "bull-dozing" inthe country parishes; but about this time I discovered that manymembers of the police force in New Orleans were covertly intimidatingthe freedmen there, and preventing their appearance at theregistration offices, using milder methods than had obtained in thecountry, it is true, but none the less effective. 

Early in 1866 the Legislature had passed an act which created for thepolice of New Orleans a residence qualification, the object of whichwas to discharge and exclude from the force ex-Union soldiers. Thisof course would make room for the appointment of ex-Confederates, andMayor Monroe had not been slow in enforcing the provisions of thelaw. It was, in fact, a result of this enactment that the police wasso reorganized as to become the willing and efficient tool which itproved to be in the riot of 1866; and having still the samepersonnel, it was now in shape to prevent registration by threats, unwarranted arrests, and by various other influences, all operatingto keep the timid blacks away from the registration places. 

That the police were taking a hand in this practice of repression, Ifirst discovered by the conduct of the assistant to the chief of thebody, and at once removed the offender, but finding this ineffectualI annulled that part of the State law fixing the five years'residence restriction, and restored the two years' qualification, thus enabling Mayor Heath, who by my appointment had succeededMonroe, to organize the force anew, and take about one-half of itsmembers from ex-Union soldiers who when discharged had settled in NewOrleans. This action put an end to intimidation in the parish ofOrleans; and now were put in operation in all sections the processesprovided by the supplemental Reconstruction law for the summoning ofa convention to form a Constitution preparatory to the readmission ofthe State, and I was full of hope that there would now be much lessdifficulty in administering the trust imposed by Congress. 

During the two years previous great damage had been done theagricultural interests of Louisiana by the overflow of theMississippi, the levees being so badly broken as to require extensiverepairs, and the Legislature of 1866 had appropriated for the purpose$4, 000, 000, to be raised by an issue of bonds. This money was to bedisbursed by a Board of Levee Commissioners then in existence, butthe term of service of these commissioners, and the law creating theboard, would expire in the spring of 1867. In order to overcome thisdifficulty the Legislature passed a bill continuing the commissionersin office but as the act was passed inside of ten days before theadjournment of the Legislature, Governor Wells pocketed the bill, andit failed to become a law. The Governor then appointed a board ofhis own, without any warrant of law whatever. The old commissionersrefused to recognize this new board, and of course a conflict ofauthority ensued, which, it was clear, would lead to vicious resultsif allowed to continue; so, as the people of the State had noconfidence in either of the boards, I decided to end the contentionsummarily by appointing an entirely new commission, which woulddisburse the money honestly, and further the real purpose for whichit had been appropriated. When I took this course the legislativeboard acquiesced, but Governor Wells immediately requested thePresident to revoke my order, which, however, was not done, butmeanwhile the Secretary of War directed me to suspend all proceedingsin the matter, and make a report of the facts. I complied in thefollowing telegram:

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT, "NEW ORLEANS, La. , June 3, 1867. 

"SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram ofthis date in reference to the Levee Commissioners in this State. 

"The following were my reasons for abolishing the two former boards, although I intended that my order should be sufficiently explanatory:

"Previous to the adjournment of the Legislature last winter it passedan act continuing the old Levee board in office, so that the fourmillions of dollars ($4, 000, 000) in bonds appropriated by theLegislature might be disbursed by a board of rebellious antecedents. 

"After its adjournment the Governor of the State appointed a board ofhis own, in violation of this act, and made the acknowledgment to mein person that his object was to disburse the money in the interestof his own party by securing for it the vote of the employees at thetime of election. 

"The board continued in office by the Legislature refused to turnover to the Governor's board, and each side appealed to me to sustainit, which I would not do. The question must then have gone to thecourts, which, according to the Governor's judgment when he wasappealing to me to be sustained, would require one year for decision. Meantime the State was overflowed, the Levee boards tied up bypolitical chicanery, and nothing done to relieve the poor people, nowfed by the charity of the Government and charitable associations ofthe North. 

"To obviate this trouble, and to secure to the overflowed districtsof the State the immediate relief which the honest disbursement ofthe four millions ($4, 000, 000) would give, my order dissolving bothboards was issued. 

"I say now, unequivocally, that Governor Wells is a politicaltrickster and a dishonest man. I have seen him myself, when I firstcame to this command, turn out all the Union men who had supportedthe Government, and put in their stead rebel soldiers who had not yetdoffed their gray uniform. I have seen him again, during the Julyriot of 1866, skulk away where I could not find him to give him aguard, instead of coming out as a manly representative of the Stateand joining those who were preserving the peace. I have watched himsince, and his conduct has been as sinuous as the mark left in thedust by the movement of a snake. 

"I say again that he is dishonest, and that dishonesty is more thanmust be expected of me. 

"P. H. SHERIDAN, "Major-General, U. S. A. 

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, "Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. "

The same day that I sent my report to the Secretary of War I removedfrom office Governor Wells himself, being determined to bear nolonger with the many obstructions he had placed in the way ofreorganizing the civil affairs of the State. I was also satisfiedthat he was unfit to retain the place, since he was availing himselfof every opportunity to work political ends beneficial to himself. In this instance Wells protested to me against his removal, and alsoappealed to the President for an opinion of the Attorney-General asto my power in the case; and doubtless he would have succeeded inretaining his office, but for the fact that the President had beeninformed by General James B. Steadman and others placed to watch methat Wells was wholly unworthy. 

"NEW ORLEANS, June 19, 1867. "ANDREW JOHNSON, President United States, "Washington City:

"Lewis D. Campbell leaves New Orleans for home this evening. Wantof respect for Governor Wells personally, alone represses theexpression of indignation felt by all honest and sensible men at theunwarranted usurpation of General Sheridan in removing the civilofficers of Louisiana. It is believed here that you will reinstateWells. He is a bad man, and has no influence. 

"I believe Sheridan made the removals to embarrass you, believing thefeeling at the North would sustain him. My conviction is that onaccount of the bad character of Wells and Monroe, you ought not toreinstate any who have been removed, because you cannot reinstate anywithout reinstating all, but you ought to prohibit the exercise ofthis power in the future. 

"Respectfully yours, "JAMES B. STEADMAN. "

I appointed Mr. Thomas J. Durant as Wells's successor, but hedeclining, I then appointed Mr. Benjamin F. Flanders, who, after Ihad sent a staff-officer to forcibly eject Wells in case ofnecessity, took possession of the Governor's office. Wells havingvacated, Governor Flanders began immediately the exercise of hisduties in sympathy with the views of Congress, and I then notifiedGeneral Grant that I thought he need have no further apprehensionabout the condition of affairs in Louisiana, as my appointee was aman of such integrity and ability that I already felt relieved ofhalf my labor. I also stated in the same despatch that nothing wouldanswer in Louisiana but a bold and firm course, and that in takingsuch a one I felt that I was strongly supported; a statement that wasthen correct, for up to this period the better classes were disposedto accept the Congressional plan of reconstruction. 

During the controversy over the Levee Commissioners, and thecorrespondence regarding the removal of Governor Wells, registrationhad gone on under the rules laid down for the boards. The date setfor closing the books was the 30th of June, but in the parish ofOrleans the time was extended till the 15th of July. This thePresident considered too short a period, and therefore directed theregistry lists not to be closed before the 1st of August, unlessthere was some good reason to the contrary. This was plainlydesigned to keep the books open in order that under theAttorney-General's interpretation of the Reconstruction laws, publishedJune 20, many persons who had been excluded by the registration boardscould yet be registered, so I decided to close the registration, unlessrequired by the President unconditionally, and in specific orders, toextend the time. My motives were manifold, but the main reasons werethat as two and a half months had been given already, the number ofpersons who, under the law, were qualified for registry was aboutexhausted; and because of the expense I did not feel warranted inkeeping up the boards longer, as I said, "to suit new issues coming inat the eleventh hour, " which would but open a "broad macadamized roadfor perjury and fraud. "

When I thus stated what I intended to do, the opinion of theAttorney-General had not yet been received. When it did reach me itwas merely in the form of a circular signed by Adjutant-GeneralTownsend, and had no force of law. It was not even sent as an order, nor was it accompanied by any instructions, or by anything except thestatement that it was transmitted to the 11 respective militarycommanders for their information, in order that there might beuniformity in the execution of the Reconstruction acts. To adoptMr. Stanbery's interpretation of the law and reopen registrationaccordingly, would defeat the purpose of Congress, as well as add tomy perplexities. Such a course would also require that the officersappointed by me for the performance of specified duties, under lawswhich I was empowered to interpret and enforce, should receive theirguidance and instructions from an unauthorized source, so oncommunicating with General Grant as to how I should act, he directedme to enforce my own construction of the military bill until orderedto do otherwise. 

Therefore the registration continued as I had originally directed, and nothing having been definitely settled at Washington in relationto my extending the time, on the 10th of July I ordered all theregistration boards to select, immediately, suitable persons to actas commissioners of election, and at the same time specified thenumber of each set of commissioners, designated the polling-places, gave notice that two days would be allowed for voting, and followedthis with an order discontinuing registration the 31st of July, andthen another appointing the 27th and 28th of September as the timefor the election of delegates to the State convention. 

In accomplishing the registration there had been little oppositionfrom the mass of the people, but the press of New Orleans, and theoffice-holders and office-seekers in the State generally, antagonizedthe work bitterly and violently, particularly after the promulgationof the opinion of the Attorney-General. These agitators condemnedeverybody and everything connected with the Congressional plan ofreconstruction; and the pernicious influence thus exerted wasmanifested in various ways, but most notably in the selection ofpersons to compose the jury lists in the country parishes it alsotempted certain municipal officers in New Orleans to perform illegalacts that would seriously have affected the credit of the city hadmatters not been promptly corrected by the summary removal fromoffice of the comptroller and the treasurer, who had already issued aquarter of a million dollars in illegal certificates. On learning ofthis unwarranted and unlawful proceeding, Mayor Heath demanded aninvestigation by the Common Council, but this body, taking its cuefrom the evident intention of the President to render abortive theReconstruction acts, refused the mayor's demand. Then he tried tohave the treasurer and comptroller restrained by injunction, but thecity attorney, under the same inspiration as the council, declined tosue out a writ, and the attorney being supported in this course bynearly all the other officials, the mayor was left helpless in hisendeavors to preserve the city's credit. Under such circumstances hetook the only step left him--recourse to the military commander; andafter looking into the matter carefully I decided, in the early partof August, to give the mayor officials who would not refuse to makean investigation of the illegal issue of certificates, and to thisend I removed the treasurer, surveyor, comptroller, city attorney, and twenty-two of the aldermen; these officials, and all of theirassistants, having reduced the financial credit of New Orleans to adisordered condition, and also having made efforts--and being thenengaged in such--to hamper the execution of the Reconstruction laws. 

This action settled matters in the city, but subsequently I had toremove some officials in the parishes--among them a justice of thepeace and a sheriff in the parish of Rapides; the justice forrefusing to permit negro witnesses to testify in a certain murdercase, and for allowing the murderer, who had foully killed a coloredman, to walk out of his court on bail in the insignificant sum offive hundred dollars; and the sheriff, for conniving at the escapefrom jail of another alleged murderer. Finding, however, even afterthese removals, that in the country districts murderers and othercriminals went unpunished, provided the offenses were against negroesmerely (since the jurors were selected exclusively from the whites, and often embraced those excluded from the exercise of the electionfranchise) I, having full authority under the Reconstruction laws, directed such a revision of the jury lists as would reject from themevery man not eligible for registration as a voter. This order wasissued August 24, and on its promulgation the President relieved mefrom duty and assigned General Hancock as my successor. 

"HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MILITARY DISTRICT, "NEW ORLEANS, LA. , August 24, 1867. 

"SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 125. 

"The registration of voters of the State of Louisiana, according tothe law of Congress, being complete, it is hereby ordered that noperson who is not registered in accordance with said law shall beconsidered as, a duly qualified voter of the State of Louisiana. Allpersons duly registered as above, and no others, are consequentlyeligible, under the laws of the State of Louisiana, to serve asjurors in any of the courts of the State. 

"The necessary revision of the jury lists will immediately be made bythe proper officers. 

"All the laws of the State respecting exemptions, etc. , from juryduty will remain in force. 

"By command of Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN. 

"GEO. L. HARTNUFF, Asst. Adj't-General. "

Pending the arrival of General Hancock, I turned over the command ofthe district September 1 to General Charles Griffin; but he dying ofyellow fever, General J. A. Mower succeeded him, and retained commandtill November 29, on which date General Hancock assumed control. Immediately after Hancock took charge, he revoked my order of August24 providing for a revision of the jury lists; and, in short, President Johnson's policy now became supreme, till Hancock himselfwas relieved in March, 1868. 

My official connection with the reconstruction of Louisiana and Texaspractically closed with this order concerning the jury lists. In myjudgment this had become a necessity, for the disaffected element, sustained as it was by the open sympathy of the President, had grownso determined in its opposition to the execution of theReconstruction acts that I resolved to remove from place and powerall obstacles; for the summer's experience had convinced me that inno other way could the law be faithfully administered. 

The President had long been dissatisfied with my course; indeed, hehad harbored personal enmity against me ever since he perceived thathe could not bend me to an acceptance of the false position in whichhe had tried to place me by garbling my report of the riot of 1866. When Mr. Johnson decided to remove me, General Grant protested inthese terms, but to no purpose:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "WASHINGTON, D. C. , August 17, 1867

"SIR: I am in receipt of your order of this date directing theassignment of General G. H. Thomas to the command of the FifthMilitary District, General Sheridan to the Department of theMissouri, and General Hancock to the Department of the Cumberland;also your note of this date (enclosing these instructions), saying:'Before you issue instructions to carry into effect the enclosedorder, I would be pleased to hear any suggestions you may deemnecessary respecting the assignments to which the order refers. '

"I am pleased to avail myself of this invitation to urge--earnestlyurge--urge in the name of a patriotic people, who have sacrificedhundreds of thousands of loyal lives and thousands of millions oftreasure to preserve the integrity and union of this country--thatthis order be not insisted on. It is unmistakably the expressed wishof the country that General Sheridan should not be removed from hispresent command. 

"This is a republic where the will of the people is the law of theland. I beg that their voice may be heard. 

"General Sheridan has performed his civil duties faithfully andintelligently. His removal will only be regarded as an effort todefeat the laws of Congress. It will be interpreted by theunreconstructed element in the South--those who did all they could tobreak up this Government by arms, and now wish to be the only elementconsulted as to the method of restoring order--as a triumph. It willembolden them to renewed opposition to the will of the loyal masses, believing that they have the Executive with them. 

"The services of General Thomas in battling for the Union entitle himto some consideration. He has repeatedly entered his protest againstbeing assigned to either of the five military districts, andespecially to being assigned to relieve General Sheridan. 

"There are military reasons, pecuniary reasons, and above all, patriotic reasons, why this should not be insisted upon. 

"I beg to refer to a letter marked 'private, ' which I wrote to thePresident when first consulted on the subject of the change in theWar Department. It bears upon the subject of this removal, and I hadhoped would have prevented it. 

"I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant, "U. S. GRANT, "General U. S. A. , Secretary of War ad interim. 

"His Excellency A. JOHNSON, "President of the United States. "

I was ordered to command the Department of the Missouri (GeneralHancock, as already noted, finally becoming my successor in the FifthMilitary District), and left New Orleans on the 5th of September. Iwas not loath to go. The kind of duty I had been performing inLouisiana and Texas was very trying under the most favorablecircumstances, but all the more so in my case, since I had to contendagainst the obstructions which the President placed in the way frompersistent opposition to the acts of Congress as well as fromantipathy to me--which obstructions he interposed with all theboldness and aggressiveness of his peculiar nature. 

On more than one occasion while I was exercising this command, impurity of motive was imputed to me, but it has never beentruthfully shown (nor can it ever be) that political or corruptinfluences of any kind controlled me in any instance. I simply triedto carry out, without fear or favor, the Reconstruction acts as theycame to me. They were intended to disfranchise certain persons, andto enfranchise certain others, and, till decided otherwise, were thelaws of the land; and it was my duty to execute them faithfully, without regard, on the one hand, for those upon whom it was thoughtthey bore so heavily, nor, on the other, for this or that politicalparty, and certainly without deference to those persons sent toLouisiana to influence my conduct of affairs. 

Some of these missionaries were high officials, both military andcivil, and I recall among others a visit made me in 1866 by adistinguished friend of the President, Mr. Thomas A. Hendricks. Thepurpose of his coming was to convey to me assurances of the very highesteem in which I was held by the President, and to explainpersonally Mr. Johnson's plan of reconstruction, its flawlessconstitutionality, and so on. But being on the ground, I had beforeme the exhibition of its practical working, saw the oppression andexcesses growing out of it, and in the face of these experiences evenMr. Hendricks's persuasive eloquence was powerless to convince me ofits beneficence. Later General Lovell H. Rousseau came down on alike mission, but was no more successful than Mr. Hendricks. 

During the whole period that I commanded in Louisiana and Texas myposition was a most unenviable one. The service was unusual, and thenature of it scarcely to be understood by those not entirely familiarwith the conditions existing immediately after the war. Inadministering the affairs of those States, I never acted except byauthority, and always from conscientious motives. I tried to guardthe rights of everybody in accordance with the law. In this I wassupported by General Grant and opposed by President Johnson. Theformer had at heart, above every other consideration, the good of hiscountry, and always sustained me with approval and kind suggestions. The course pursued by the President was exactly the opposite, andseems to prove that in the whole matter of reconstruction he wasgoverned less by patriotic motives than by personal ambitions. Addto this his natural obstinacy of character and personal enmity towardme, and no surprise should be occasioned when I say that I heartilywelcomed the order that lifted from me my unsought burden. 

CHAPTER XII. 

AT FORT LEAVENWORTH--THE TREATY OF MEDICINE LODGE--GOING TO FORTDODGE--DISCONTENTED INDIANS--INDIAN OUTRAGES--A DELEGATION OF CHIEFS--TERRIBLE INDIAN RAID--DEATH OF COMSTOCK--VAST HERDS OF BUFFALO--PREPARING FOR A WINTER CAMPAIGN--MEETING "BUFFALO BILL"--HE UNDERTAKES A DANGEROUS TASK--FORSYTH'S GALLANT FIGHT--RESCUED. 

The headquarters of the military department to which I was assignedwhen relieved from duty at New Orleans was at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and on the 5th of September I started for that post. In duetime I reached St. Louis, and stopped there a day to accept anovation tendered in approval of the course I had pursued in the FifthMilitary District--a public demonstration apparently of the mostsincere and hearty character. 

From St. Louis to Leavenworth took but one night, and the next day Itechnically complied with my orders far enough to permit GeneralHancock to leave the department, so that he might go immediately toNew Orleans if he so desired, but on account of the yellow feverepidemic then prevailing, he did not reach the city till late inNovember. 

My new command was one of the four military departments that composedthe geographical division then commanded by Lieutenant-GeneralSherman. This division had been formed in 1866, with a view tocontrolling the Indians west of the Missouri River, they havingbecome very restless and troublesome because of the building of thePacific railroads through their hunting-grounds, and theencroachments of pioneers, who began settling in middle and westernKansas and eastern Colorado immediately after the war. 

My department embraced the States of Missouri and Kansas, the IndianTerritory, and New Mexico. Part of this section of country--westernKansas particularly--had been frequently disturbed and harassedduring two or three years past, the savages every now and thenmassacring an isolated family, boldly attacking the surveying andconstruction parties of the Kansas-Pacific railroad, sweeping down onemigrant trains, plundering and burning stage-stations and the likealong the Smoky Hill route to Denver and the Arkansas route to NewMexico. 

However, when I relieved Hancock, the department was comparativelyquiet. Though some military operations had been conducted againstthe hostile tribes in the early part of the previous summer, allactive work was now suspended in the attempt to conclude a permanentpeace with the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches, incompliance with the act of Congress creating what was known as theIndian Peace Commission of 1867. 

Under these circumstances there was little necessity for my remainingat Leavenworth, and as I was much run down in health from theLouisiana climate, in which I had been obliged to live continuouslyfor three summers (one of which brought epidemic cholera, and anothera scourge of yellow fever), I took a leave of absence for a fewmonths, leaving Colonel A. J. Smith, of the Seventh Cavalry, temporarily in charge of my command. 

On this account I did not actually go on duty in the department ofthe Missouri till March, 1868. On getting back I learned that thenegotiations of the Peace Commissioners held at Medicine Lodge, aboutseventy miles south of Fort Larned had resulted in a treaty with theCheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, and Comanches, by which agreement itwas supposed all troubles had been settled. The compact, asconcluded, contained numerous provisions, the most important to usbeing one which practically relinquished the country between theArkansas and Platte rivers for white settlement; another permittedthe peaceable construction of the Pacific railroads through the sameregion; and a third requiring the tribes signing the treaty to retireto reservations allotted them in the Indian Territory. Although thechiefs and head-men were well-nigh unanimous in ratifying theseconcessions, it was discovered in the spring of 1868 that many of theyoung men were bitterly opposed to what had been done, and claimedthat most of the signatures had been obtained by misrepresentationand through proffers of certain annuities, and promises of arms andammunition to be issued in the spring of 1868. This grumbling wasvery general in extent, and during the winter found outlet inoccasional marauding, so, fearing a renewal of the pillaging andplundering at an early day, to prepare myself for the work evidentlyahead the first thing I did on assuming permanent command was to makea trip to Fort Larned and Fort Dodge, near which places the bulk ofthe Indians had congregated on Pawnee and Walnut creeks. I wanted toget near enough to the camps to find out for myself the actual stateof feeling among the savages, and also to familiarize myself with thecharacteristics of the Plains Indians, for my previous experience hadbeen mainly with mountain tribes on the Pacific coast. Fort Larned Ifound too near the camps for my purpose, its proximity too readilyinviting unnecessary "talks, " so I remained here but a day or two, and then went on to Dodge, which, though considerably farther awayfrom the camps, was yet close enough to enable us to obtain easilyinformation of all that was going on. 

It took but a few days at Dodge to discover that great discontentexisted about the Medicine Lodge concessions, to see that the youngmen were chafing and turbulent, and that it would require much tactand good management on the part of the Indian Bureau to persuade thefour tribes to go quietly to their reservations, under an agreementwhich, when entered into, many of them protested had not been fullyunderstood. 

A few hours after my arrival a delegation of prominent chiefs calledon me and proposed a council, where they might discuss theirgrievances, and thus bring to the notice of the Government thealleged wrongs done them; but this I refused, because Congress haddelegated to the Peace Commission the whole matter of treating withthem, and a council might lead only to additional complications. Myrefusal left them without hope of securing better terms, or of evendelaying matters longer; so henceforth they were more than everreckless and defiant. Denunciations of the treaty became outspoken, and as the young braves grew more and more insolent every day, itamounted to conviction that, unless by some means the irritation wasallayed, hostilities would surely be upon us when the buffaloreturned to their summer feeding-grounds between the Arkansas and thePlatte. 

The principal sufferers in this event would be the settlers in middleand western Kansas, who, entirely ignorant of the dangers hangingover them, were laboring to build up homes in a new country. Hencethe maintenance of peace was much to be desired, if it could besecured without too great concessions, and although I would not meetthe different tribes in a formal council, yet, to ward off fromsettlers as much as possible the horrors of savage warfare, I showed, by resorting to persuasive methods, my willingness to temporize agood deal. An abundant supply of rations is usually effective tokeep matters quiet in such cases, so I fed them pretty freely, andalso endeavored to control them through certain men who, I found, because of former associations, had their confidence. These men, employed as scouts, or interpreters, were Mr. William Comstock, Mr. Abner S. Grover, and Mr. Richard Parr. They had lived on the Plainsfor many years with different tribes of Indians, had trapped andhunted with them, and knew all the principal chiefs and headmen. Through such influences, I thought I saw good chances of preservingpeace, and of inducing the discontented to go quietly to theirreservations in the Indian Territory as soon as General Hazen, therepresentative of the Peace Commissioners, was ready to conduct themthere from Fort Larned. 

Before returning to Leavenworth I put my mediators (as I may callthem) under charge of an officer of the army, Lieutenant F. W. Beecher, a very intelligent man, and directed him to send them out tovisit among the different tribes, in order to explain what wasintended by the treaty of Medicine Lodge, and to make every effortpossible to avert hostilities. Under these instructions Comstock andGrover made it their business to go about among the Cheyennes--themost warlike tribe of all--then camping about the headwaters ofPawnee and Walnut creeks, and also to the north and west of FortWallace, while Parr spent his time principally with the Kiowas andComanches. 

From the different posts--Wallace, Dodge, and Larned LieutenantBeecher kept up communication with all three scouts, and through himI heard from them at least once a week. Every now and then sometrouble along the railroad or stage routes would be satisfactorilyadjusted and quiet restored, and matters seemed to be going on verywell, the warm weather bringing the grass and buffalo in plenty, andstill no outbreak, nor any act of downright hostility. So I began tohope that we should succeed in averting trouble till the favorite warseason of the Indians was over, but the early days of August rudelyended our fancied tranquility. 

In July the encampments about Fort Dodge began to break up, each bandor tribe moving off to some new location north of the Arkansas, instead of toward its proper reservation to the south of that river. Then I learned presently that a party of Cheyennes had made a raid onthe Kaws--a band of friendly Indians living near Council Grove--andstolen their horses, and also robbed the houses of several whitepeople near Council Grove. This raid was the beginning of the Indianwar of 1868. Immediately following it, the Comanches and Kiowas cameto Fort Larned to receive their annuities, expecting to get also thearms and ammunition promised them at Medicine Lodge, but the raid toCouncil Grove having been reported to the Indian Department, theissue of arms was suspended till reparation was made. This action ofthe Department greatly incensed the savages, and the agent's offer ofthe annuities without guns and pistols was insolently refused, theIndians sulking back to their camps, the young men giving themselvesup to war-dances, and to powwows with "medicine-men, " till all hopeof control was gone. 

Brevet Brigadier-General Alfred Sully, an officer of long experiencein Indian matters, who at this time was in command of the District ofthe Arkansas, which embraced Forts Larned and Dodge, having notifiedme of these occurrences at Larned, and expressed the opinion that theIndians were bent on mischief, I directed him there immediately toact against them. After he reached Larned, the chances for peaceappeared more favorable. The Indians came to see him, and protestedthat it was only a few bad young men who had been depredating, andthat all would be well and the young men held in check if the agentwould but issue the arms and ammunition. Believing their promises, Sully thought that the delivery of the arms would solve all thedifficulties, so on his advice the agent turned them over along withthe annuities, the Indians this time condescendingly accepting. 

This issue of arms and ammunition was a fatal mistake; Indiandiplomacy had overreached Sully's experience, and even while thedelivery was in progress a party of warriors had already begun a raidof murder and rapine, which for acts of devilish cruelty perhaps hasno parallel in savage warfare. The party consisted of about twohundred Cheyennes and a few Arapahoes, with twenty Sioux who had beenvisiting their friends, the Cheyennes. As near as could beascertained, they organized and left their camps along Pawnee Creekabout the 3d of August. Traveling northeast, they skirted aroundFort Harker, and made their first appearance among the settlers inthe Saline Valley, about thirty miles north of that post. Professingfriendship and asking food at the farm-houses, they saw theunsuspecting occupants comply by giving all they could spare fromtheir scanty stores. Knowing the Indian's inordinate fondness forcoffee, particularly when well sweetened, they even served him thisluxury freely. With this the demons began their devilish work. Pretending to be indignant because it was served them in tin cups, they threw the hot contents into the women's faces, and then, firstmaking prisoners of the men, they, one after another, ravished thewomen till the victims became insensible. For some inexplicablereason the two farmers were neither killed nor carried off, so afterthe red fiends had gone, the unfortunate women were brought in toFort Harker, their arrival being the first intimation to the militarythat hostilities had actually begun. 

Leaving the Saline, this war-party crossed over to the valley of theSolomon, a more thickly settled region, and where the people were inbetter circumstances, their farms having been started two or threeyears before. Unaware of the hostile character of the raiders, thepeople here received them in the friendliest way, providing food, andeven giving them ammunition, little dreaming of what was impending. These kindnesses were requited with murder and pillage, and worse, for all the women who fell into their hands were subjected to horrorsindescribable by words. Here also the first murders were committed, thirteen men and two women being killed. Then, after burning fivehouses and stealing all the horses they could find, they turned backtoward the Saline, carrying away as prisoners two little girls namedBell, who have never been heard of since. 

It was probably the intention to finish, as they marched back to thesouth, the devilish work begun on the Saline, but before they reachedthat valley on the return, the victims left there originally had fledto Fort Harker, as already explained, and Captain Benteen was nownearing the little settlement with a troop of cavalry, which he hadhurriedly marched from Fort Zarah. The savages were attacking thehouse of a Mr. Schermerhorn, where a few of the settlers hadcollected for defense, when Benteen approached. Hearing the firing, the troopers rode toward the sound at a gallop, but when theyappeared in view, coming over the hills, the Indians fled in alldirections, escaping punishment through their usual tactics ofscattering over the Plains, so as to leave no distinctive trail. 

When this frightful raid was taking place, Lieutenant Beecher, withhis three scouts--Comstock, Grover, and Parr--was on Walnut Creek. Indefinite rumors about troubles on the Saline and Solomon reachinghim, he immediately sent Comstock and Grover over to the headwatersof the Solomon, to the camp of a band of Cheyennes, whose chief wascalled "Turkey Leg, " to see if any of the raiders belonged there; tolearn the facts, and make explanations, if it was found that thewhite people had been at fault. For years this chief had been aspecial friend of Comstock and Grover. They had trapped, hunted, andlived with his band, and from this intimacy they felt confident ofbeing able to get "Turkey Leg" to quiet his people, if any of themwere engaged in the raid; and, at all events, they expected, throughhim and his band, to influence the rest of the Cheyennes. From themoment they arrived in the Indian village, however, the two scoutsmet with a very cold reception. Neither friendly pipe nor food wasoffered them, and before they could recover from their chillingreception, they were peremptorily ordered out of the village, withthe intimation that when the Cheyennes were on the war-path thepresence of whites was intolerable. The scouts were prompt to leave, of course, and for a few miles were accompanied by an escort of sevenyoung men, who said they were sent with them to protect the two fromharm. As the party rode along over the prairie, such a depthof attachment was professed for Comstock and Grover that, notwithstanding all the experience of their past lives, they werethoroughly deceived, and in the midst of a friendly conversation someof the young warriors fell suddenly to the rear and treacherouslyfired on them. 

At the volley Comstock fell from his horse instantly killed. Grover, badly wounded in the shoulder, also fell to the ground near ComstockSeeing his comrade was dead, Grover made use of his friend's body toprotect himself, lying close behind it. Then took place a remarkablecontest, Grover, alone and severely wounded, obstinately fighting theseven Indians, and holding them at bay for the rest of the day. Being an expert shot, and having a long-range repeating rifle, he"stood off" the savages till dark. Then cautiously crawling away onhis belly to a deep ravine, he lay close, suffering terribly from hiswound, till the following night, when, setting out for Fort Wallace, he arrived there the succeeding day, almost crazed from pain andexhaustion. 

Simultaneously with the fiendish atrocities committed on the Salineand Solomon rivers and the attack on Comstock and Grover, thepillaging and murdering began on the Smoky Hill stage-route, alongthe upper Arkansas River and on the headwaters of the Cimarron. Thatalong the Smoky Hill and north of it was the exclusive work of, theCheyennes, a part of the Arapahoes, and the few Sioux alliesheretofore mentioned, while the raiding on the Arkansas and Cimarronwas done principally by the Kiowas under their chief, Satanta, aidedby some of the Comanches. The young men of these tribes set out ontheir bloody work just after the annuities and guns were issued atLarned, and as soon as they were well on the road the rest of theComanches and Kiowas escaped from the post and fled south of theArkansas. They were at once pursued by General Sully with a smallforce, but by the time he reached the Cimarron the war-party hadfinished its raid on the upper Arkansas, and so many Indians combinedagainst Sully that he was compelled to withdraw to Fort Dodge, whichhe reached not without considerable difficulty, and after threesevere fights. 

These, and many minor raids which followed, made it plain that ageneral outbreak was upon us. The only remedy, therefore, was tosubjugate the savages immediately engaged in the forays by forcingthe several tribes to settle down on the reservations set apart bythe treaty of Medicine Lodge. The principal mischief-makers were theCheyennes. Next in deviltry were the Kiowas, and then the Arapahoesand Comanches. Some few of these last two tribes continued friendly, or at least took no active part in the raiding, but nearly all theyoung men of both were the constant allies of the Cheyennes andKiowas. All four tribes together could put on the war-path aformidable force of about 6, 000 warriors. The subjugation of thisnumber of savages would be no easy task, so to give the matter myundivided attention I transferred my headquarters from Leavenworth toFort Hays, a military post near which the prosperous town of HaysCity now stands. 

Fort Hays was just beyond the line of the most advanced settlements, and was then the terminus of the Kansas-Pacific railroad. For thisreason it could be made a depot of supplies, and was a good pointfrom which to supervise matters in the section of country to beoperated in, which district is a part of the Great American Plains, extending south from the Platte River in Nebraska to the Red River inthe Indian Territory, and westward from the line of frontiersettlements to the foothills of the Rocky Mountains, a vast regionembracing an area of about 150, 000 square miles. With the exceptionof a half-dozen military posts and a few stations on the two overlandemigrant routes--the Smoky Hill to Denver, and the Arkansas to NewMexico--this country was an unsettled waste known only to the Indiansand a few trappers. There were neither roads nor well-marked trails, and the only timber to be found--which generally grew only along thestreams--was so scraggy and worthless as hardly to deserve the name. Nor was water by any means plentiful, even though the section istraversed by important streams, the Republican, the Smoky Hill, theArkansas, the Cimarron, and the Canadian all flowing eastwardly, asdo also their tributaries in the main. These feeders are sometimeslong and crooked, but as a general thing the volume of water isinsignificant except after rain-falls. Then, because of unimpededdrainage, the little streams fill up rapidly with torrents of water, which quickly flows off or sinks into the sand, leaving only anoccasional pool without visible inlet or outlet. 

At the period of which I write, in 1868, the Plains were covered withvast herds of buffalo--the number has been estimated at 3, 000, 000head--and with such means of subsistence as this everywhere at hand, the 6, 000 hostiles were wholly unhampered by any problem offood-supply. The savages were rich too according to Indian standards, many a lodge owning from twenty to a hundred ponies; andconsciousness of wealth and power, aided by former temporizing, hadmade them not only confident but defiant. Realizing that theirthorough subjugation would be a difficult task, I made up my mind toconfine operations during the grazing and hunting season toprotecting the people of the new settlements and on the overlandroutes, and then, when winter came, to fall upon the savagesrelentlessly, for in that season their ponies would be thin, and weakfrom lack of food, and in the cold and snow, without strong ponies totransport their villages and plunder, their movements would be somuch impeded that the troops could overtake them. 

At the outbreak of hostilities I had in all, east of New Mexico, aforce of regulars numbering about 2, 600 men--1, 200 mounted and 1, 400foot troops. The cavalry was composed of the Seventh and Tenthregiments; the infantry, of the Third and Fifth regiments and fourcompanies of the Thirty-Eighth. With these few troops all the postsalong the Smoky Hill and Arkansas had to be garrisoned, emigranttrains escorted, and the settlements and routes of travel and theconstruction parties on the Kansas-Pacific railway protected. Then, too, this same force had to furnish for the field small movablecolumns, that were always on the go, so it will be rightly inferredthat every available man was kept busy from the middle of August tillNovember; especially as during this period the hostiles attacked overforty widely dispersed places, in nearly all cases stealing horses, burning houses, and killing settlers. It was of course impossible toforesee where these descents would be made, but as soon as an attackwas heard of assistance was always promptly rendered, and every nowand then we succeeded in killing a few savages. As a general thing, though, the raiders escaped before relief arrived, and when they hada few miles the start, all efforts to catch them were futile. Itherefore discouraged long pursuits, and, in fact, did not approve ofmaking any at all unless the chances of obtaining paying results werevery evident, otherwise the troops would be worn out by the time thehard work of the winter was demanded from them. 

To get ready for a winter campaign of six months gave us much to do. The thing most needed was more men, so I asked for additionalcavalry, and all that could be spareds--even troops of the FifthCavalry--was sent tome. Believing this reinforcement insufficient, to supplement it I applied for a regiment of Kansas volunteers, whichrequest being granted, the organization of the regiment wasimmediately begun at Topeka. It was necessary also to provide alarge amount of transportation and accumulate quantities of stores, since the campaign probably would not end till spring. Anotherimportant matter was to secure competent guides for the differentcolumns of troops, for, as I have said, the section of country to beoperated in was comparatively unknown. 

In those days the railroad town of Hays City was filled with socalled "Indian scouts, " whose common boast was of having slain scoresof redskins, but the real scout--that is, a 'guide and trailerknowing the habits of the Indians--was very scarce, and it was hardto find anybody familiar with the country south of the Arkansas, where the campaign was to be made. Still, about Hays City and thevarious military posts there was some good material to select from, and we managed to employ several men, who, from their experience onthe Plains in various capacities, or from natural instinct andaptitude, soon became excellent guides and courageous and valuablescouts, some of them, indeed, gaining much distinction. Mr. WilliamF. Cody ("Buffalo Bill"), whose renown has since become world-wide, was one of the men thus selected. He received his sobriquet from hismarked success in killing buffaloes for a contractor, to supply freshmeat to the construction parties, on the Kansas-Pacific railway. Hehad given up this business, however, and was now in the employ of thequartermaster's department of the army, and was first brought to mynotice by distinguishing himself in bringing me an important despatchfrom Fort Larned to Fort Hays, a distance of sixty-five miles, through a section infested with Indians. The despatch informed methat the Indians near Larned were preparing to decamp, and thisintelligence required that certain orders should be carried to FortDodge, ninety-five miles south of Hays. This too being aparticularly dangerous route--several couriers having been killed onit--it was impossible to get one of the various "Petes, " "Jacks, " or"Jims" hanging around Hays City to take my communication. Codylearning of the strait I was in, manfully came to the rescue, andproposed to make the trip to Dodge, though he had just finished hislong and perilous ride from Larned. I gratefully accepted his offer, and after four or five hours' rest he mounted a fresh horse andhastened on his journey, halting but once to rest on the way, andthen only for an hour, the stop being made at Coon Creek, where hegot another mount from a troop of cavalry. At Dodge he took sixhours' sleep, and then continued on to his own post--Fort Larned--with more despatches. After resting twelve hours at Larned, he wasagain in the saddle with tidings for me at Fort Hays, General Hazensending him, this time, with word that the villages had fled to thesouth of the Arkansas. Thus, in all, Cody rode about 350 miles in lessthan sixty hours, and such an exhibition of endurance and courage wasmore than enough to convince me that his services would be extremelyvaluable in the campaign, so I retained him at Fort Hays till thebattalion of the Fifth Cavalry arrived, and then made him chief ofscouts for that regiment. 

The information brought me by Cody on his second trip from Larnedindicated where the villages would be found in the winter, and Idecided to move on them about the 1st of November. Only the womenand children and the decrepit old men were with the villages, howeverenough, presumably, to look after the plunder most of the warriorsremaining north of the Arkansas to continue their marauding. Manysevere fights occurred between our troops and these marauders, and inthese affairs, before November 1 over a hundred Indians were killed, yet from the ease with which the escaping savages would disappearonly to fall upon remote settlements with pillage and murder, theresults were by no means satisfactory. One of the most noteworthy ofthese preliminary affairs was the gallant fight made on theRepublican River the 17th of September by my Aide, Colonel George A. Forsyth, and party, against about seven hundred Cheyennes and Sioux. Forsyth, with Lieutenant Beecher, and Doctor J. H. Mooers as surgeon, was in charge of a company of citizen scouts, mostly expertrifle-shots, but embracing also a few Indian fighters, among theseGrover and Parr. The company was organized the latter part of Augustfor immediate work in defense of the settlements, and also for futureuse in the Indian Territory when the campaign should open there. Aboutthe time the company had reached its complement--it was limited toforty-seven men and three officers--a small band of hostiles begandepredations near Sheridan City, one of the towns that grew upover-night on the Kansas-Pacific railway. Forsyth pursued this party, but failing to overtake it, made his way into Fort Wallace for rations, intending to return from there to Fort Hays. Before he started back, however, another band of Indians appeared near the post and stole somehorses from the stage company. This unexpected raid made Forsyth hotto go for the marauders, and he telegraphed me for permission, which Ias promptly gave him. He left the post on the 10th of September, thecommand consisting of himself, Lieutenant Beecher, Acting AssistantSurgeon Mooers, and the full strength, forty-seven men, with a few packmules carrying about ten days' rations. 

He headed north toward the Republican River. For the first two daysthe trail was indistinct and hard to follow. During the next threeit continued to grow much larger, indicating plainly that the numberof Indians ahead was rapidly increasing. Of course this sign meant afight as soon as a large enough force was mustered, but as this waswhat Forsyth was after, he pushed ahead with confidence and alacrity. The night of the 16th of September he encamped on the Arickareebranch of the Republican, not far from the forks of the river, withthe expectation of resuming the march as usual next day, for theindications were that the main body of the savages must be still along way off, though in the preceding twenty-four hours an occasionalIndian had been seen. 

But the enemy was much nearer than was thought, for at daybreak onthe morning of the 17th he made known his immediate presence by asudden dash at Forsyth's horses, a few of which were stampeded andcaptured before the scouts could reach them. This dash was made by asmall party only to get the horses, so those engaged in it were soondriven off, but a few minutes later hundreds of savages--it wasafterward learned that seven hundred warriors took part in the fight--hitherto invisible, showed themselves on the hills overlooking thecamp and so menacingly as to convince Forsyth that his defense mustbe one of desperation. The only place at hand that gave any hope ofsuccessful resistance was a small island in the Arickaree, thechannel on one side being about a foot deep while on the other it wascompletely dry; so to this position a hurried retreat was made. Allthe men and the remaining animals reached the island in safety, buton account of the heavy fire poured in from the neighboring hills thepacks containing the rations and medicines had to be abandoned. 

On seeing Forsyth's hasty move, the Indians, thinking they had him, prepared to overwhelm the scouts by swooping down on one side of theisland with about five hundred mounted warriors, while about twohundred, covered by the tall grass in the river-bottom attacked theother side, dismounted. But the brave little band sadly disappointedthem. When the charge came it was met with such a deadly fire that alarge number of the fiends were killed, some of them even aftergaining the bank of the island. This check had the effect of makingthe savages more wary, but they were still bold enough to make twomore assaults before mid-day. Each of these ending like the first, the Indians thereafter contented themselves with shootingall the horses, which had been tied up to some scraggy littlecottonwood-trees, and then proceeded to lay siege to the party. 

The first man struck was Forsyth himself. He was hit three times inall--twice in one leg, both serious wounds, and once on the head, aslight abrasion of the scalp. A moment later Beecher was killed andDoctor Mooers mortally wounded: and in addition to these misfortunesthe scouts kept getting hit, till several were killed, and the wholenumber of casualties had reached twenty-one in a company offorty-seven. Yet with all this, and despite the seeming hopelessnessof the situation, the survivors kept up their pluck undiminished, andduring a lull succeeding the third repulse dug into the loose soil tillthe entire party was pretty well protected by rifle-pits. Thus coveredthey stood off the Indians for the next three days, although of coursetheir condition became deplorable from lack of food, while those whowere hurt suffered indescribable agony, since no means were at hand fordressing their wounds. 

By the third day the Indians, seeming to despair of destroying thebeleaguered party before succor might arrive, began to draw off, andon the fourth wholly disappeared. The men were by this time nearlyfamished for food. Even now there was nothing to be had excepthorse-meat from the carcasses of the animals killed the first day, and this, though decidedly unpalatable, not to say disgusting, had tobe put up with, and so on such unwholesome stuff they managed to livefor four days longer, at the end of which time they were rescued by acolumn of troops under Colonel Bankhead, which had hastened from FortWallace in response to calls for help, carried there by two bravefellows--Stilwell and Truedell--who, volunteering to go for relief, had slipped through the Indians, and struck out for that post in thenight after the first day's fight. 

CHAPTER XIII, FITTING OUT THE WINTER EXPEDITION--ACCOMPANYING THE MAIN FORCE--THEOTHER COLUMNS--STRUCK BY A BLIZZARD--CUSTER'S FIGHT ON THE WASHITA--DEFEAT AND DEATH OF BLACK KETTLE--MASSACRE OF ELLIOTT'S PARTY--RELIEF OF COLONEL CRAWFORD. 

The end of October saw completed the most of my arrangements for thewinter campaign, though the difficulties and hardships to beencountered had led several experienced officers of the army, andsome frontiersmen like Mr. James Bridger, the famous scout and, guideof earlier days, to discourage the project. Bridger even went so faras to come out from St. Louis to dissuade me, but I reasoned that asthe soldier was much better fed and clothed than the Indian, I hadone great advantage, and that, in short, a successful campaign couldbe made if the operations of the different columns were energeticallyconducted. To see to this I decided to go in person with the maincolumn, which was to push down into the western part of the IndianTerritory, having for its initial objective the villages which, atthe beginning of hostilities, had fled toward the head-waters of theRed River, and those also that had gone to the same remote regionafter decamping from the neighborhood of Larned at the time thatGeneral Hazen sent Buffalo Bill to me with the news. 

The column which was expected to do the main work was to be composedof the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry, commanded by ColonelCrawford; eleven troops of the Seventh United States Cavalry, underGeneral Custer, and a battalion of five companies of infantry underBrevet Major John H. Page. To facilitate matters, General Sully, thedistrict commander, was ordered to rendezvous these troops andestablish a supply depot about a hundred miles south of Fort Dodge, as from such a point operations could be more readily conducted. Heselected for the depot a most suitable place at the confluence ofBeaver and Wolf creeks, and on his arrival there with Custer's andPage's commands, named the place Camp Supply. 

In conjunction with the main column, two others also were topenetrate the Indian Territory. One of these, which was to marcheast from New Mexico by way of Fort Bascom was to be composed of sixtroops of the Third Cavalry and two companies of infantry, the wholeunder Colonel A. W. Evans. The other, consisting of seven troops ofthe Fifth Cavalry, and commanded by Brevet Brigadier-General EugeneA. Carr, was to march southeast from Fort Lyon; the intention beingthat Evans and Carr should destroy or drive in toward old Fort Cobbany straggling bands that might be prowling through the country westof my own line of march; Carr, as he advanced, to be joined by BrevetBrigadier-General W. H. Penrose, with five troops of cavalry alreadyin the field southeast of Lyon. The Fort Bascom column, afterestablishing a depot of supplies at Monument Creek, was to work downthe main Canadian, and remain out as long as it could feed itselffrom New Mexico; Carr, having united with Penrose on the NorthCanadian, was to operate toward the Antelope Hills and headwaters ofthe Red River; while I, with the main column was to move southward tostrike the Indians along the Washita, or still farther south onbranches of the Red River. 

It was no small nor easy task to outfit all these troops by the timecold weather set in, and provide for them during the winter, but bythe 1st of November I had enough supplies accumulated at Forts Dodgeand Lyon for my own and Carr's columns, and in addition directedsubsistence and forage for three months to be sent to Fort Gibson forfinal delivery at Fort Arbuckle, as I expected to feed the commandfrom this place when we arrived in the neighborhood of old Fort Cobb, but through some mismanagement few of these stores got further thanGibson before winter came on. 

November 1, all being ready, Colonel Grawford was furnished withcompetent guides, and, after sending two troops to Fort Dodge to actas my escort, with the rest of his regiment he started from TopekaNovember 5, under orders to march straight for the rendezvous at thejunction of Beaver and Wolf creeks. He was expected to reach hisdestination about the 20th, and there unite with the Seventh Cavalryand the battalion of infantry, which in the mean time were on themarch from Dodge. A few days later Carr and Evans began their marchalso, and everything being now in motion, I decided to go to CampSupply to give the campaign my personal attention, determined toprove that operations could be successfully conducted in spite ofwinter, and bent on showing the Indians that they were not securefrom punishment because of inclement weather--an ally on which theyhad hitherto relied with much assurance. 

We started from Fort Hays on the 15th of November, and the firstnight out a blizzard struck us and carried away our tents; and as thegale was so violent that they could not be put up again, the rain andsnow drenched us to the skin. Shivering from wet and cold, I tookrefuge under a wagon, and there spent such a miserable night that, when at last morning came, the gloomy predictions of old man Bridgerand others rose up before me with greatly increased force. As wetook the road the sleet and snow were still falling, but we laboredon to Dodge that day in spite of the fact that many of the mulesplayed out on the way. We stayed only one night at Dodge, and thenon the 17th, escorted by a troop of cavalry and Forsyth's scouts, nowunder the command of Lieutenant Lewis Pepoon, crossed the Arkansasand camped the night of the 18th at Bluff Creek, where the two troopsof the Nineteenth Kansas, previously detailed as my escort, wereawaiting our coming. As we were approaching this camp somesuspicious looking objects were seen moving off at a long distance tothe east of us, but as the scouts confidently pronounced thembuffalo, we were unaware of their true character till next morning, when we became satisfied that what we had seen were Indians, forimmediately after crossing Beaver Creek we struck a trail, leading tothe northeast, of a war party that evidently came up from thehead-waters of the Washita River. 

The evening of November 21st arrived at the Camp Supply depot, havingtraveled all day in another snowstorm that did not end tilltwenty-four hours later. General Sully, with Custer's regiment and theinfantry battalion, had reached the place several days before, but theKansas regiment had not yet put in an appearance. All hands were hardat work trying to shelter the stores and troops, but from the trailseen that morning, believing that an opportunity offered to strike aneffective blow, I directed Custer to call in his working parties andprepare to move immediately, without waiting for Crawford's regiment, unaccountably absent. Custer was ready to start by the 23d, and he wasthen instructed to march north to where the trail had been seen nearBeaver Creek and follow it on the back track, for, being convinced thatthe war party had come from the Washita, I felt certain that this planwould lead directly to the villages. 

The difficulties attending a winter campaign were exhibited now withtheir full force, as the march had to be conducted through asnow-storm that hid surrounding objects, and so covered the country asto alter the appearance of the prominent features, making the task ofthe guides doubly troublesome; but in spite of these obstacles fifteenmiles had been traversed when Custer encamped for the night. The nextday the storm had ceased, and the weather was clear and cold. Theheavy fall of snow had of course obliterated the trail in the bottoms, and everywhere on the level; but, thanks to the wind, that had sweptcomparatively bare the rough places and high ground, the generaldirection could be traced without much trouble. The day's march, whichwas through a country abounding with buffalo, was unattended by anyspecial incident at first, but during the afternoon, after getting thecolumn across the Canadian River--an operation which, on account of thewagons, consumed considerable time--Custer's scouts (friendly Osages)brought back word that, some miles ahead, they had struck fresh signs, a trail coming into the old one from the north, which, in theiropinion, indicated that the war party was returning to the villages. 

On the receipt of this news, Custer, leaving a guard with the wagons, hastily assembled the rest of his men' and pushing on rapidly, overtook the scouts and a detailed party from his regiment which hadaccompanied them, all halted on the new trail awaiting his arrival. A personal examination satisfied Custer that the surmises of hisscouts were correct; and also that the fresh trail in the deep snowcould at night be followed with ease. After a short halt for supperand rest the pursuit was resumed, the Osage scouts in advance, andalthough the hostile Indians were presumed to be yet some distanceoff, every precaution was taken to prevent detection and to enableour troops to strike them unawares. The fresh trail, which it wasafterward ascertained had been made by raiders from Black Kettle'svillage of Cheyennes, and by some Arapahoes, led into the valley ofthe Washita, and growing fresher as the night wore on, finallybrought the Osages upon a campfire, still smoldering, which, it wasconcluded, had been built by the Indian boys acting as herders of theponies during the previous day. It was evident, then, that thevillage could be but a few miles off; hence the pursuit was continuedwith redoubled caution until, a few hours before dawn of the 27th, asthe leading scouts peered over a rise on the line of march, theydiscovered a large body of animals in the valley below. 

As soon as they reported this discovery, Custer determined toacquaint himself with the situation by making a reconnoissance inperson, accompanied by his principal officers. So, sending back wordto halt the cavalry, he directed the officers to ride forward withhim; then dismounting, the entire party crept cautiously to a highpoint which overlooked the valley, and from where, by the bright moonthen shining, they saw just how the village was situated. Itsposition was such as to admit of easy approach from all sides. So, to preclude an escape of the Indians, Custer decided to attack atdaybreak, and from four different directions. 

The plan having been fully explained to the officers, the remaininghours of the night were employed in making the necessarydispositions. Two of the detachments left promptly, since they hadto make a circuitous march of several miles to Teach the pointsdesignated for their attack; the third started a little later; andthen the fourth and last, under Custer himself, also moved intoposition. As the first light grew visible in the east, each columnmoved closer in to the village, and then, all dispositions havingbeen made according to the prearranged plan, from their appointedplaces the entire force to the opening notes of "Garry Owen, " playedby the regimental band as the signal for the attack--dashed at agallop into the village. The sleeping and unsuspecting savages werecompletely surprised by the onset; yet after the first confusion, during which the impulse to escape principally actuated them, theyseized their weapons, and from behind logs and trees, or plunginginto the stream and using its steep bank as a breastwork, they pouredupon their assailants a heavy fire, and kept on fighting with everyexhibition of desperation. In such a combat mounted men wereuseless, so Custer directed his troopers to fight on, foot, and theIndians were successively driven from one point of vantage toanother, until, finally, by 9 o'clock the entire camp was in hispossession and the victory complete. Black Kettle and over onehundred of his warriors were killed, and about fifty women andchildren captured; but most of the noncombatants, as well as a fewwarriors and boys, escaped in the confusion of the fight. Makingtheir way down the river, these fugitives alarmed the rest of theCheyennes and Arapahoes, and also the Kiowas and Comanches, whosevillages were in close proximity--the nearest not more than two milesoff. 

Then of course all the warriors of these tribes rallied to attackCuster, who meantime was engaged burning Black Kettle's camp andcollecting his herds of ponies. But these new foes were rather waryand circumspect, though they already had partial revenge in anunlooked for way by cutting off Major Elliott and fifteen men, whohad gone off in pursuit of a batch of young warriors when the fightwas going on at the village. In fact, the Indians had killedElliott's whole party, though neither the fate of the poor fellows, nor how they happened to be caught, was known till long afterward. It was then ascertained that the detachment pursued a course duesouth, nearly at right angles to the Washita River, and aftergalloping a couple of miles over the hills, crossing a small branchof the Washita on the way, they captured some of the fugitives. Inbringing the prisoners back, Elliott was in turn attacked on the openprairie by a large number of savages from farther down the Washita, who by this time were swarming to the aid of Black Kettle's village. The little band fought its way gallantly to within rifle-range of thesmall creek referred to, but could get no farther, for the Indianshad taken up a position in the bed of the stream, and from undercover of its banks Elliott and all his remaining men were quicklykilled. No relief was sent them, for Custer, not having seen Elliottset out, knew nothing of the direction taken, and, besides, was busyburning the villages and securing the ponies, and deeply concerned, too, with defending himself from the new dangers menacing him. Elliott and his brave little party were thus left to meet their fatealone. 

While Custer was burning the lodges and plunder and securing theponies, the Indians from the villages down the Washita were gatheringconstantly around him till by mid-day they had collected inthousands, and then came a new problem as to what should be done. Ifhe attacked the other villages, there was great danger of his beingoverwhelmed, and should he start back to Camp Supply by daylight, hewould run the risk of losing his prisoners and the ponies, so, thinking the matter over, he decided to shoot all the ponies, andkeep skirmishing with the savages till nightfall, and then, undercover of the darkness, return to Camp Supply; a programme that wascarried out successfully, but Custer's course received some severecriticism because no effort was made to discover what had become ofElliott. 

Custer had, in all, two officers and nineteen men killed, and twoofficers and eleven men wounded. The blow struck was a mosteffective one, and, fortunately, fell on one of the most villainous ofthe hostile bands that, without any provocation whatever, hadperpetrated the massacres on the Saline and Solomon, committingatrocities too repulsive for recital, and whose hands were still redfrom their bloody work on the recent raid. Black Kettle, the chief, was an old man, and did not himself go with the raiders to the Salineand Solomon, and on this account his fate was regretted by some. Butit was old age only that kept him back, for before the demons set outfrom Walnut Creek he had freely encouraged them by "making medicine, "and by other devilish incantations that are gone through with at warand scalp dances. 

When the horrible work was over he undertook to shield himself byprofessions of friendship, but being put to the test by my offeringto feed and care for all of his band who would come in to Fort Dodgeand remain there peaceably, he defiantly refused. The consequence ofthis refusal was a merited punishment, only too long delayed. 

I received the first news of Custer's fight on the Washita on themorning of November 29. It was brought to me by one of his whitescouts, "California Joe, " a noted character, who had beenexperiencing the ups and downs of pioneer life ever since crossingthe Plains in 1849. Joe was an invaluable guide and Indian fighterwhenever the clause of the statute prohibiting liquors in the Indiancountry happened to be in full force. At the time in question therestriction was by no means a dead letter, and Joe came through inthirty-six hours, though obliged to keep in hiding during daylight ofthe 28th. The tidings brought were joyfully received by everybody atCamp Supply, and they were particularly agreeable tome, for, besidesbeing greatly worried about the safety of the command in the extremecold and deep snows, I knew that the immediate effect a victory wouldbe to demoralize the rest of the hostiles, which of course wouldgreatly facilitate and expedite our ultimate success. Toward eveningthe day after Joe arrived the head of Custer's column made itsappearance on the distant hills, the friendly Osage scouts and theIndian prisoners in advance. As they drew near, the scouts began awild and picturesque performance in celebration of the victory, yelling, firing their guns, throwing themselves on the necks andsides of their horses to exhibit their skill in riding, and goingthrough all sorts of barbaric evolutions and gyrations, which werecontinued till night, when the rejoicings were ended with the hideousscalp dance. 

The disappearance of Major Elliott and his party was the only damperupon our pleasure, and the only drawback to the very successfulexpedition. There was no definite information as to the detachment, --and Custer was able to report nothing more than that he had notseen Elliott since just before the fight began. His theory was, however, that Elliott and his men had strayed off on account ofhaving no guide, and would ultimately come in all right to CampSupply or make their way back to Fort Dodge; a very unsatisfactoryview of the matter, but as no one knew the direction Elliott hadtaken, it was useless to speculate on other suppositions, andaltogether too late to make any search for him. I was now anxious tofollow up Custer's stroke by an immediate move to the south with theentire column, but the Kansas regiment had not yet arrived. At firstits nonappearance did not worry me much, for I attributed the delayto the bad weather, and supposed Colonel Crawford had wisely laid upduring the worst storms. Further, waiting, however, would give theIndians a chance to recover from the recent dispiriting defeat, so Isent out scouting parties to look Crawford up and hurry him along. After a great deal of searching, a small detachment of the regimentwas found about fifty miles below us on the North Canadian, seekingour camp. This detachment was in a pretty bad plight, and whenbrought in, the officer in charge reported that the regiment, by notfollowing the advice of the guide sent to conduct it to Camp Supply, had lost its way. Instead of relying on the guides, Crawford hadundertaken to strike through the canyons of the Cimarron by whatappeared to him a more direct route, and in the deep gorges, filledas they were with snow, he had been floundering about for dayswithout being able to extricate his command. Then, too, the men wereout of rations, though they had been able to obtain enough buffalomeat to keep from starving. As for the horses, since they could getno grass, about seven hundred of them had already perished fromstarvation and exposure. Provisions and guides were immediately sentout to the regiment, but before the relief could reach Crawford hisremaining horses were pretty much all gone, though the men werebrought in without loss of life. Thus, the regiment being dismountedby this misfortune at the threshold of the campaign, an importantfactor of my cavalry was lost to me, though as foot-troops the Kansasvolunteers continued to render very valuable services till musteredout the next spring. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

A WINTER EXPEDITION--HERDS OF BUFFALO--WOLVES--BLIZZARDS--A TERRIBLENIGHT--FINDING THE BODIES OF ELLIOTT'S PARTY--THE ABANDONED INDIANCAMPS--PUSHING DOWN THE WASHITA--THE CAPTURED CHIEFS--EVANS'SSUCCESSFUL FIGHT--ESTABLISHING FORT SILL--"CALIFORNIA JOE"--DUPLICITYOF THE CHEYENNES--ORDERED TO REPAIR TO WASHINGTON. 

A few days were necessarily lost setting up and refitting the Kansasregiment after its rude experience in the Cimarron canyons. Thisthrough with, the expedition, supplied with thirty days' rations, moved out to the south on the 7th of December, under my personalcommand. We headed for the Witchita Mountains, toward which roughregion all the villages along the Washita River had fled afterCuster's fight with Black Kettle. My line of march was by way ofCuster's battle-field, and thence down the Washita, and if theIndians could not sooner be brought to terms, I intended to followthem into the Witchita Mountains from near old Fort Cobb. The snowwas still deep everywhere, and when we started the thermometer wasbelow zero, but the sky being clear and the day very bright, thecommand was in excellent spirits. The column was made up of tencompanies of the Kansas regiment, dismounted; eleven companies of theSeventh Cavalry, Pepoon's scouts, and the Osage scouts. In additionto Pepoon's men and the Osages, there was also "California Joe, " andone or two other frontiersmen besides, to act as guides andinterpreters. Of all these the principal one, the one who best knewthe country, was Ben Clark, a young man who had lived with theCheyennes during much of his boyhood, and who not only had a prettygood knowledge of the country, but also spoke fluently the Cheyenneand Arapahoe dialects, and was an adept in the sign language. 

The first day we made only about ten miles, which carried us to thesouth bank of Wolf Creek. A considerable part of the day was devotedto straightening out matters in the command, and allowing time forequalizing the wagon loads, which as a general thing, on a firstday's march, are unfairly distributed. And then there was anabundance of fire-wood at Wolf Creek; indeed, here and on HackberryCreek--where I intended to make my next camp--was the only timbernorth of the Canadian River; and to select the halting places near aplentiful supply of wood was almost indispensable, for as the menwere provided with only shelter-tents, good fires were needed inorder to keep warm. 

The second day, after marching for hours through vast herds ofbuffalo, we made Hackberry Creek; but not, however, without severalstampedes in the wagon-train, the buffalo frightening the mules sothat it became necessary to throw out flankers to shoot the leadingbulls and thus turn off the herds. In the wake of every droveinvariably followed a band of wolves. This animal is a great cowardusually, but hunger had made these so ravenous that they would comeboldly up to the column, and as quick as a buffalo was killed, oreven disabled, they would fall upon the carcass and eagerly devourit. Antelope also were very numerous, and as they were quite tame--being seldom chased--and naturally very inquisitive, it was not anunfrequent thing to see one of the graceful little creatures run inamong the men and be made a prisoner. Such abundance of gamerelieved the monotony of the march to Hackberry Creek, but still, both men and animals were considerably exhausted by their long tramp, for we made over thirty miles that day. 

We camped in excellent shape on the creek and it was well we did, fora "Norther, " or "blizzard, " as storms on the Plains are now termedstruck us in the night. During the continuance of these blizzards, which is usually about three days, the cold wind sweeps over thePlains with great force, and, in the latitude of the IndianTerritory, is weighted with great quantities of sleet and snow, through which it is often impossible to travel; indeed, these"Northers" have many times proved fatal to the unprotectedfrontiersman. With our numbers the chance of any one's being lost, and perishing alone (one of the most common dangers in a blizzard), was avoided; but under any circumstances such a storm could butoccasion intense suffering to all exposed to it, hence it would havebeen well to remain in camp till the gale was over, but the timecould not be spared. We therefore resumed the march at an early hournext morning, with the expectation of making the south bank of themain Canathan and there passing the night, as Clark assured me thattimber was plentiful on that side of the river. The storm greatlyimpeded us, however, many of the mules growing discouraged, and somegiving out entirely, so we could not get to Clark's "good camp, " forwith ten hours of utmost effort only about half a day's distancecould be covered, when at last, finding the struggle useless, we wereforced to halt for the night in a bleak bottom on the north bank ofthe river. But no one could sleep, for the wind swept over us withunobstructed fury, and the only fuel to be had was a few greenbushes. As night fell a decided change of temperature added much toour misery, the mercury, which had risen when the "Norther" began, again falling to zero. It can be easily imagined that under suchcircumstances the condition of the men was one of extreme discomfort;in truth, they had to tramp up and down the camp all night long tokeep from freezing. Anything was a relief to this state of things, so at the first streak of day we quit the dreadful place and took upthe march. 

A seemingly good point for crossing the Canadian was found a coupleof miles down the stream, where we hoped to get our train over on theice, but an experiment proving that it was not strong enough, a fordhad to be made, which was done by marching some of the cavalrythrough the river, which was about half a mile wide, to break up thelarge floes when they had been cut loose with axes. After much hardwork a passage-way was thus opened, and by noon the command wascrossed to the south bank, and after thawing out and drying ourclothes before big fires, we headed for a point on the Washita, whereClark said there was plenty of wood, and good water too, to make uscomfortable till the blizzard had blown over. 

We reached the valley of the Washita a little before dark, and campedsome five or six miles above the scene of Custer's fight, where Iconcluded to remain at least a day, to rest the command and give it achance to refit. In the mean time I visited the battle-field incompany with Custer and several other officers, to see if there was apossibility of discovering any traces of Elliotts party. On arrivingat the site of the village, and learning from Custer whatdispositions had been made in approaching for the attack, thesquadron of the escort was deployed and pushed across the river atthe point where Elliott had crossed. Moving directly to the south, we had not gone far before we struck his trail, and soon the wholestory was made plain by our finding, on an open level space about twomiles from the destroyed village, the dead and frozen bodies of theentire party. The poor fellows were all lying within a circle notmore than fifteen or twenty paces in diameter, and the little pilesof empty cartridge shells near each body showed plainly that everyman had made a brave fight. None were scalped, but most of them wereotherwise horribly mutilated, which fiendish work is usually done bythe squaws. All had been stripped of their clothing, but theircomrades in the escort were able to identify the bodies, which beingdone, we gave them decent burial. Their fate was one that hasovertaken many of our gallant army in their efforts to protect thefrontiersmen's homes and families from savages who give no quarter, though they have often received it, and where the possibility ofdefeat in action carries with it the certainty of death and often ofpreceding torture. 

From the meadow where Elliott was found we rode to the Washita, andthen down the river through the sites of the abandoned villages, thathad been strung along almost continuously for about twelve miles inthe timber skirting the stream. On every hand appeared ampleevidence that the Indians had intended to spend the winter here, forthe ground was littered with jerked meat, bales of buffalo robes, cooking utensils, and all sorts of plunder usually accumulated in apermanent Indian camp. There were, also, lying dead near thevillages hundreds of ponies, that had been shot to keep them fromfalling into our hands, the scant grazing and extreme cold havingmade them too weak to be driven along in the flight. The wholesaleslaughter of these ponies was a most cheering indication that ourcampaign would be ultimately successful, and we all prayed for atleast a couple of months more of cold weather and plenty of snow. 

At the Kiowa village we found the body of a white woman--a Mrs. Blynn--and also that of her child. These captives had been taken bythe Kiowas near Fort Lyon the previous summer, and kept closeprisoners until the stampede began, the poor woman being reserved togratify the brutal lust of the chief, Satanta; then, however, Indianvengeance demanded the murder of the poor creatures, and afterbraining the little child against a tree, the mother was shot throughthe forehead, the weapon, which no doubt brought her welcome release, having been fired so close that the powder had horribly disfiguredher face. The two bodies were wrapped in blankets and taken to camp, and afterward carried along in our march, till finally they weredecently interred at Fort Arbuckle.. 

At an early hour on December 12 the command pulled out from its cosycamp and pushed down the valley of the Washita, following immediatelyon the Indian trail which led in the direction of Fort Cobb, butbefore going far it was found that the many deep ravines and canyonson this trail would delay our train very much, so we moved out of thevalley and took the level prairie on the divide. Here the travelingwas good, and a rapid gait was kept up till mid-day, when, anotherstorm of sleet and snow coming on, it became extremely difficult forthe guides to make out the proper course; and fearing that we mightget lost or caught on the open plain without wood or water--as we hadbeen on the Canadian--I turned the command back to the valley, resolved to try no more shortcuts involving the risk of a disaster tothe expedition. But to get back was no slight task, for a dense fogjust now enveloped us, obscuring all landmarks. However, we wereheaded right when the fog set in, and we had the good luck to reachthe valley before night-fall, though there was a great deal offloundering about, and also much disputing among the guides as towhere the river would be found Fortunately we struck the stream rightat a large grove of timber, and established ourselves, admirably. Bydark the ground was covered with twelve or fifteen inches of freshsnow, and as usual the temperature rose very sensibly while the stormwas on, but after night-fall the snow ceased and the skies clearedup. Daylight having brought zero weather again, our start on themorning of the 17th was painful work, many of the men freezing theirfingers while handling the horse equipments, harness, and tents. However, we got off in fairly good season, and kept to the trailalong the Washita notwithstanding the frequent digging and bridgingnecessary to get the wagons over ravines. 

Continuing on this line for three days, we at length came to a pointon the Washita where all signs indicated that we were nearing some ofthe villages. Wishing to strike them as soon as possible, we made avery early start next morning, the 17th. A march of four or fivemiles brought us to a difficult ravine, and while we were makingpreparations to get over, word was brought that several Indians hadappeared in our front bearing a white flag and making signs that theyhad a communication to deliver. We signaled back that they would bereceived, when one of the party came forward alone and delivered aletter, which proved to be from General Hazen, at Fort Cobb. Theletter showed that Hazen was carrying on negotiations with theIndians, and stated that all the tribes between Fort Cobb and mycolumn were friendly, but the intimation was given that theCheyennes and Arapahoes were still hostile, having moved offsouthward toward the Red River. It was added that Satanta and LoneWolf--the chiefs of the Kiowas--would give information of thewhereabouts of the hostiles; and such a communication coming directfrom the representative of the Indian Department, practically tookthe Kiowas--the village at hand was of that tribe--under itsprotection, and also the Comanches, who were nearer in to Cobb. Ofcourse, under such circumstances I was compelled to give up theintended attack, though I afterward regretted that I had paid anyheed to the message, because Satanta and Lone Wolf proved, bytrickery and double dealing, that they had deceived Hazen intowriting the letter. 

When I informed the Klowas that I would respect Hazen's letterprovided they all came into Fort Cobb and gave themselves up, the twochiefs promised submission, and, as an evidence of good faith, proposed to accompany the column to Fort Cobb with a large body ofwarriors, while their villages moved to the same point by easystages, along the opposite bank of the river--claiming this to benecessary from the poor condition of the ponies. I had somemisgivings as to the sincerity of Satanta and Lone Wolf, but as Iwanted to get the Kiowas where their surrender would be complete, sothat the Cheyennes and Arapahoes could then be pursued, I agreed tothe proposition, and the column moved on. All went well that day, but the next it was noticed that the warriors were diminishing, andan investigation showed that a number of them had gone off on variouspretexts--the main one being to help along the women and childrenwith the villages. With this I suspected that they were playing mefalse, and my suspicions grew into certainty when Satanta himselftried to make his escape by slipping beyond the flank of the columnand putting spurs to his pony. Fortunately, several officers sawhim, and quickly giving chase, overhauled him within a few hundredyards. I then arrested both him and Lone Wolf and held them ashostages--a measure that had the effect of bringing back many of thewarriors already beyond our reach. 

When we arrived at Fort Cobb we found some of the Comanches alreadythere, and soon after the rest of them, excepting one band, came into the post. The Kiowas, however, were not on hand, and there wereno signs to indicate their coming. At the end of two days it wasplain enough that they were acting in bad faith, and would continueto unless strong pressure was brought to bear. Indeed, they hadalready started for the Witchita Mountains, so I put on the screws atonce by issuing an order to hang Satanta and Lone Wolf, if theirpeople did not surrender at Fort Cobb within forty-eight hours. Thetwo chiefs promised prompt compliance, but begged for more time, seeking to explain the non-arrival of the women and children throughthe weak condition of the ponies; but I was tired of their duplicity, and insisted on my ultimatum. 

The order for the execution brought quick fruit. Runners were sentout with messages, by the two prisoners, appealing to their people tosave the lives of their chiefs, and the result was that the wholetribe came in to the post within the specified time. The twomanacled wretches thus saved their necks; but it is to be regrettedthat the execution did not come off; for some years afterward theirdevilish propensities led them into Texas, where both engaged in themost horrible butcheries. 

The Kiowas were now in our hands, and all the Comanches too, exceptone small band, which, after the Custer fight, had fled toward theheadwaters of the Red River. This party was made up of a lot of verybad Indians--outlaws from the main tribe--and we did not hope tosubdue them except by a fight, and of this they got their fill; forEvans, moving from Monument Creek toward the western base of theWitchita Mountains on Christmas Day, had the good fortune to striketheir village. In the snow and cold his approach was whollyunexpected, and he was thus enabled to deal the band a blow thatpractically annihilated it. Twenty-five warriors were killedoutright, most of the women and children captured, and all theproperty was destroyed. Only a few of the party escaped, and some ofthese made their way in to Fort Cobb, to join the rest of their tribein confinement; while others, later in the season, surrendered atFort Bascom. 

This sudden appearance of Evans in the Red River region also alarmedthe Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and their thoughts now began to turn tosubmission. Food was growing scarce with them, too, as there was butlittle game to be found either in the Witchita Mountains or on theedge of the Staked Plains, and the march of Carr's column fromAntelope Hills precluded their returning to where the buffalo ranged. Then, too, many of their ponies were dead or dying, most of theirtepees and robes had been abandoned, and the women and children, having been kept constantly on the move in the winter's storms, werecomplaining bitterly of their sufferings. 

In view of this state of things they intimated, through theirComanche-Apache friends at Fort Cobb, that they would like to maketerms. On receiving their messages I entered into negotiations withLittle Robe, chief of the Cheyennes, and Yellow Bear, chief of theArapahoes, and despatched envoys to have both tribes understandclearly that they must recognize their subjugation by surrendering atonce, and permanently settling on their reservations in the spring. Of course the usual delays of Indian diplomacy ensued, and it wassome weeks before I heard the result. 

Then one of my messengers returned with word that Little Robe andYellow Bear were on their way to see me. They arrived a few dayslater, and, promptly acceding to the terms, promised to bring theirpeople in, but as many of them would have to come on foot on accountof the condition of the ponies, more time was solicited. Convincedof the sincerity of their professions I gave them a reasonableextension, and eventually Yellow Bear made good his word, but LittleRobe, in spite of earnest and repeated efforts, was unable to deliverhis people till further operations were begun against them. 

While these negotiations were in progess I came to the conclusionthat a permanent military post ought to be established well down onthe Kiowa and Comanche reservation, in order to keep an eye on thesetribes in the future, Fort Cobb, being an unsuitable location, because too far to the north to protect the Texas frontier, and toofar away from where it was intended to permanently place the Indians. With this purpose in view I had the country thoroughly explored, andafterward a place was fixed upon not far from the base of theWitchita Mountains, and near the confluence of Medicine Bluff andCash creeks, where building stone and timber could be obtained inplenty, and to this point I decided to move. The place was namedCamp Sill-now Fort Sill--in honor of my classmate, General Sill, killed at Stone River; and to make sure of the surrendered Indians, Irequired them all, Kiowas, Comanches, and Comanche-Apaches, toaccompany us to the new post, so they could be kept under militarycontrol till they were settled. 

During the march to the new camp the weather was not so cold as thatexperienced in coming down from Camp Supply; still, rains werefrequent, and each was invariably followed by a depression oftemperature and high winds, very destructive to our animals, muchweakened by lack of food. The men fared pretty well, however, for onthe rough march along the Washita, and during our stay at Fort Cobb, they had learned to protect themselves materially from the cold. Forthis they had contrived many devices, the favorite means beingdugouts--that is, pits dug in the ground, and roofed over, withshelter-tents, and having at one end a fire-place and chimneyingeniously constructed with sod. In these they lived very snugly--four men in each--and would often amuse themselves by poking theirheads out and barking at the occupants of adjacent huts in imitationof the prairie-dog, whose comfortable nests had probably suggestedthe idea of dugouts. The men were much better off, in fact, thanmany of the officers, for the high winds frequently made havoc withour wall-tents. The horses and mules suffered most of all. Theycould not be sheltered, and having neither grain nor grass, the poorbeasts were in no condition to stand the chilling blasts. Still, bycutting down cottonwood-trees, and letting the animals browse on thesmall soft branches, we managed to keep them up till, finally eventhis wretched food beginning to grow scarce, I had all except a fewof the strongest sent to Fort Arbuckle, near which place we had beenable, fortunately, to purchase some fields of corn from thehalf-civilized Chickasaws and Choctaws. 

Through mismanagement, as previously noted, the greater part of thesupplies which I had ordered hauled to Arbuckle the preceding fallhad not got farther on the way than Fort Gibson, which post was aboutfour hundred miles off, and the road abominable, particularly east ofArbuckle, where it ran through a low region called "boggy bottom. "All along this route were abandoned wagons, left sticking in the mud, and hence the transportation was growing so short that I began tofear trouble in getting subsistence up for the men. Still, it wouldnot do to withdraw, so I made a trip to Arbuckle chiefly for thepurpose of reorganizing the transportation, but also with a view toopening a new route to that post, the road to lie on high ground, soas to avoid the creeks and mud that had been giving us so muchtrouble. If such a road could be made, I hoped to get up enoughrations and grain from the cornfields purchased to send out aformidable expedition against the Cheyennes, so I set out forArbuckle accompanied by my quartermaster, Colonel A. J. McGonigle. "California Joe" also went along to guide us through the scrub-oakscovering the ridge, but even the most thorough exploration failed todiscover any route more practicable than that already in use; indeed, the high ground was, if anything, worse than the bottom land, ourhorses in the springy places and quicksands often miring to theirknees. The ground was so soft and wet, in fact, that we had to makemost of the way on foot, so by the time we reached Arbuckle I wasglad to abandon the new road project. 

Finding near Arbuckle more fields of corn than those alreadypurchased, I had them bought also, and ordered more of the horsesback there to be fed. I next directed every available mule to be putto hauling rations, having discovered that the full capacity of thetransportation had not yet been brought into play in forwardingstores from Gibson, and with this regulation of the supply question Iwas ready to return immediately to Camp Sill. But my departure wasdelayed by California Joe, who, notwithstanding the prohibitory lawsof the Territory, in some unaccountable way had got gloriously tipsy, which caused a loss of time that disgusted me greatly; but as wecould not well do without Joe, I put off starting till the next day, by which time it was thought he would sober up. But I might just aswell have gone at first, for at the end of the twenty-four hours theincorrigible old rascal was still dead drunk. How he had managed toget the grog to keep up his spree was a mystery which we could notsolve, though we had had him closely watched, so I cut the mattershort by packing him into my ambulance and carrying him off to CampSill. 

By the time I got back to Sill, the Arapahoes were all in at thepost, or near at hand. The promised surrender of the Cheyennes wasstill uncertain of fulfillment, however, and although Little Robe andhis family had remained with us in evidence of good faith, themessages he sent to his followers brought no assurance of the tribe'scoming in--the runners invariably returning with requests for moretime, and bringing the same old excuse of inability to move becausethe ponies were so badly off. But more time was just what I wasdetermined not to grant, for I felt sure that if a surrender was notforced before the spring grass came, the ponies would regain theirstrength, and then it would be doubtful if the Cheyennes came in atall. 

To put an end to these delays, Custer proposed to go out and see theCheyennes himself, taking with him for escort only such number of menas could be fairly well mounted from the few horses not sent back toArbuckle. At first I was inclined to disapprove Custer'sproposition, but he urged it so strongly that I finally consented, though with some misgivings, for I feared that so small a party mighttempt the Cheyennes to forget their pacific professions and seek toavenge the destruction of Black Kettle's band. However, afterobtaining my approval, Custer, with characteristic energy, made hispreparations, and started with three or four officers and fortypicked men, taking along as negotiators Yellow Bear and Little Robe, who were also to conduct him to the head-waters of the Red River, where it was supposed the Cheyennes would be found. His progress wasreported by couriers every few days, and by the time he got to theWitchita foot-hills he had grown so sanguine that he sent CaliforniaJoe back to me with word that he was certain of success. Suchhopeful anticipation relieved me greatly, of course, but just aboutthe time I expected to hear that his mission had been achieved I wasastonished by the party's return. Inquiring as to the trouble, Ilearned that out toward the Staked Plains every sign of the Cheyenneshad disappeared. Surprised and disappointed at this, and discouragedby the loneliness of his situation--for in the whole region not atrace of animal life was visible, Custer gave up the search, and nonetoo soon, I am inclined to believe, to save his small party fromperishing. 

This failure put a stop to all expeditions till the latter part ofFebruary, by which time I had managed to lay in enough rations tofeed the command for about thirty days; and the horses back atArbuckle having picked up sufficiently for field service they wereordered to Sill, and this time I decided to send Custer out with hisown and the Kansas regiment, with directions to insist on theimmediate surrender of the Cheyennes, or give them a sound thrashing. He was ordered to get everything ready by March 1, and then move tothe mouth of Salt Creek, on the North Fork of the Red River, at whichplace I proposed to establish a new depot for feeding the command. Trains could reach this point from Camp Supply more readily than fromArbuckle, and wishing to arrange this part of the programme inperson, I decided to return at once to Supply, and afterward rejoinCuster at Salt Creek, on what, I felt sure, was to be the finalexpedition of the campaign. I made the three hundred and sixty milesfrom Sill to Supply in seven days, but much to my surprise therefound a despatch from General Grant directing me to repairimmediately to Washington. These orders precluded, of course, myrejoining the command; but at the appointed time it set out on themarch, and within three weeks brought the campaign to a successfulclose. 

In this last expedition, for the first few days Custer's route was bythe same trail he had taken in January--that is to say, along thesouthern base of the Witchita Mountains--but this time there was moreto encourage him than before, for, on getting a couple of marchesbeyond old Camp Radziminski, on all sides were fresh evidences ofIndians, and every effort was bent to strike them. 

From day to day the signs grew hotter, and toward the latter part ofMarch the game was found. The Indians being in a very forlorncondition, Custer might have destroyed most of the tribe, andcertainly all their villages, but in order to save two white womenwhom, it was discovered, they held as captives, he contented himselfwith the renewal of the Cheyennes' agreement to come in to CampSupply. In due time the entire tribe fulfilled its promise exceptone small band under "Tall Bull, " but this party received a gooddrubbing from General Carr on the Republican early in May. Afterthis fight all the Indians of the southern Plains settled down ontheir reservations, and I doubt whether the peace would ever againhave been broken had they not in after years been driven tohostilities by most unjust treatment. 

It was the 2d of March that I received at Camp Supply Grant'sdespatch directing me to report immediately in Washington. It hadbeen my intention, as I have said, to join Custer on the North Forkof the Red River, but this new order required me to recast my plans, so, after arranging to keep the expedition supplied till the end ofthe campaign, I started for Washington, accompanied by three of mystaff--Colonels McGonigle and Crosby, and Surgeon Asch, and Mr. Deb. Randolph Keim, a representative of the press, who went through thewhole campaign, and in 1870 published a graphic history of it. Theday we left Supply we, had another dose of sleet and snow, butnevertheless we made good time, and by night-fall reached BluffCreek. In twenty-four hours more we made Fort Dodge, and on the 6thof March arrived at Fort Hays. Just south of the Smoky Hill River, alittle before we got to the post, a courier heading for Fort Dodgepassed us at a rapid gait. Suspecting that he had despatches for me, I directed my outrider to overtake him and find out. The couriersoon turned back, and riding up to my ambulance handed me a telegramnotifying me that General Grant, on the day of his inauguration, March 4, 1869, had appointed me Lieutenant-General of the Army. WhenI reported in Washington, the President desired me to return to NewOrleans and resume command of the Fifth Military District, but thiswas not at all to my liking, so I begged off, and was assigned totake charge of the Division of the Missouri, succeeding GeneralSherman, who had just been ordered to assume command of the Army. 

CHAPTER XV. 

INSPECTING MILITARY POSTS IN UTAH AND MONTANA--DESIRE TO WITNESS THEFRANCO-GERMAN WAR--ON A SAND-BAR IN THE MISSOURI--A BEAR HUNT--ANINDIAN SCARE--MYRIADS OF MOSQUITOES--PERMISSION GIVEN TO VISITEUROPE--CALLING ON PRESIDENT GRANT--SAILING FOR LIVERPOOL--ARRIVAL INBERLIN. 

After I had for a year been commanding the Division of the Missouri, which embraced the entire Rocky Mountain region, I found it necessaryto make an inspection of the military posts in northern Utah andMontana, in order by personal observation to inform myself of theirlocation and needs, and at the same time become acquainted with thesalient geographical and topographical features of that section of mydivision. Therefore in May, 1870, I started west by theUnion-Pacific railroad, and on arriving at Corinne' Station, the nextbeyond Ogden, took passage by stage-coach for Helena, the capital ofMontana Territory. Helena is nearly five hundred miles north ofCorinne, and under ordinary conditions the journey was, in thosedays, a most tiresome one. As the stage kept jogging on day andnight, there was little chance for sleep, and there being with me asufficient number of staff-officers to justify the proceeding, wechartered the "outfit, " stipulating that we were to stop over onenight on the road to get some rest. This rendered the journey moretolerable, and we arrived at Helena without extraordinary fatigue. 

Before I left Chicago the newspapers were filled with rumors ofimpending war between Germany and France. I was anxious to observethe conflict, if it was to occur, but reports made one day concerningthe beginning of hostilities would be contradicted the next, and itwas not till I reached Helena that the despatches lost their doubtfulcharacter, and later became of so positive a nature as to make itcertain that the two nations would fight. I therefore decided to cutshort my tour of inspection, so that I could go abroad to witness thewar, if the President would approve. This resolution limited my stayin Helena to a couple of days, which were devoted to arranging for anexploration of what are now known as the Upper and the Lower GeyserBasins of the Yellowstone Park. While journeying between Corinne andHelena I had gained some vague knowledge of these geysers from an oldmountaineer named Atkinson, but his information was very indefinite, mostly second-hand; and there was such general uncertainty as to thecharacter of this wonderland that I authorized an escort of soldiersto go that season from Fort Ellis with a small party, to make suchsuperficial explorations as to justify my sending an engineer officerwith a well-equipped expedition there next summer to scientificallyexamine and report upon the strange country. When the arrangementsfor this preliminary expedition were completed I started for FortBenton, the head of navigation on the Missouri River, on the waypassing through Fort Shaw, on Sun River. I expected to take atBenton a steamboat to Fort Stevenson, a military post which had beenestablished about eighty miles south of Fort Buford, near asettlement of friendly Mandan and Arickaree Indians, to protect themfrom the hostile Sioux. From there I was to make my way overland, first to Fort Totten near Devil's lake in Dakota, and thence by wayof Fort Abercrombie to Saint Cloud, Minnesota, the terminus of therailroad. 

Luckily I met with no delay in getting a boat at Benton, and thoughthe water was extremely low, we steamed down the channel of theMissouri with but slight detention till we got within fifty miles ofFort Buford. Here we struck on a sandbar with such force of steamand current as to land us almost out of the water from stem tomidships. This bad luck was tantalizing, for to land on a bar whenyour boat is under full headway down-stream in the Missouri River isno trifling matter, especially if you want to make time, for therapid and turbid stream quickly depositing sand under the hull, makesit commonly a task of several days to get your boat off again. Asfrom our mishap the loss of much time was inevitable, I sent amessenger to Fort Buford for a small escort, and for horses to takemy party in to the post. Colonel Morrow, the commandant, camehimself to meet us, bringing a strong party of soldiers and somefriendly Indian scouts, because, he said, there were then in theregion around Buford so many treacherous band of Sioux as to makethings exceedingly unsafe. 

Desiring to reach the post without spending more than one night onthe way, we abandoned our steamer that evening, and set off at anearly hour the next morning. We made camp at the end of the day'smarch within ten miles of Buford, and arrived at the post withouthaving had any incident of moment, unless we may dignify as one abattle with three grizzly bears, discovered by our friendly Indiansthe morning of our second day's journey. While eating our breakfast--a rather slim one, by the way--spread on a piece of canvas, theIndians, whose bivouac was some distance off, began shoutingexcitedly, "Bear! bear!" and started us all up in time to see, out onthe plain some hundreds of yards away, an enormous grizzly and twoalmost full-grown cubs. Chances like this for a bear hunt seldomoffered, so there was hurried mounting--the horses being alreadysaddled--and a quick advance made on the game from many directions, Lieutenant Townsend, of the escort, and five or six of the Indiansgoing with me. Alarmed by the commotion, bruin and her cubs turnedabout, and with an awkward yet rapid gait headed for a deep ravine, in which there was brushwood shelter. 

My party rode directly across the prairie and struck the trail notfar behind the game. Then for a mile or more the chase was kept up, but with such poor shooting because of the "buck fever" which hadseized most of us, that we failed to bring down any of the grizzlies, though the cubs grew so tired that the mother was often obliged tohalt for their defense, meanwhile urging them on before her. Whenthe ravine was gained she hid the cubs away in the thick brushwood, and then coming out where we could plainly see her, stood on thedefense just within the edge of the thicket, beyond the range of ourrifles though, unless we went down into the canyon, which we wouldhave to do on foot, since the precipitous wall precluded going onhorseback. For an adventure like this I confess I had littleinclination, and on holding a council of war, I found that theIndians had still less, but Lieutenant Townsend, who was a fine shot, and had refrained from firing hitherto in the hope that I might bagthe game, relieved the embarrassing situation and saved the credit ofthe party by going down alone to attack the enemy. Meanwhile Imagnanimously held his horse, and the Sioux braves did a deal ofshouting, which they seemed to think of great assistance. 

Townsend, having descended to the bottom of the ravine, approachedwithin range, when the old bear struck out, dashing into and out ofthe bushes so rapidly, however, that he could not get fair aim ather, but the startled cubs running into full view, he killed one atthe first shot and at the second wounded the other. This terriblyenraged the mother, and she now came boldly out to fight, exposingherself in the open ground so much as to permit a shot, that broughther down too, with a broken shoulder. Then the Indians and I, growing very brave, scrambled down to--take part in the fight. Itwas left for me to despatch the wounded cub and mother, and havingrecovered possession of my nerves, I did the work effectively, and wecarried off with us the skins of the three animals as trophies of thehunt and evidence of our prowess. 

As good luck would have it, when we reached Buford we found asteamboat there unloading stores, and learned that it would be readyto start down the river the next day. Embarking on her, we got toStevenson in a few hours, and finding at the post camp equipage thathad been made ready for our use in crossing overland to Fort Totten, we set out the following forenoon, taking with us a small escort ofinfantry, transported in two light wagons, a couple of Mandans andthe post interpreter going along as mounted guides. 

To reach water we had to march the first day to a small lake fortymiles off, and the oppressive heat, together with the long distancetraveled, used up one of the teams so much that, when about to startout the second morning, we found the animals unable to go on with anyprospect of finishing the trip, so I ordered them to be restedforty-eight hours longer, and then taken back to Stevenson. Thisdiminished the escort by one-half, yet by keeping the Indians andinterpreter on the lookout, and seeing that our ambulance was keptclosed up on the wagon carrying the rest of the detachment, we could, I thought, stand off any ordinary party of hostile Indians. 

About noon I observed that the scouts in advance had left the trailand begun to reconnoitre a low ridge to their right, the sequel ofwhich was that in a few minutes they returned to the wagons on a deadrun and reported Sioux just ahead. Looking in the directionindicated, I could dimly see five or six horsemen riding in a circle, as Indians do when giving warning to their camp, but as our haltdisclosed that we were aware of their proximity, they darted backagain behind the crest of the ridge. Anticipating from this move animmediate attack, we hastily prepared for it by unhooking the mulesfrom the wagon and ambulance, so that we could use the vehicles as abarricade. This done, I told the interpreter to take the Mandanscouts and go over toward the ridge and reconnoitre again. As thescouts neared the crest two of them dismounted, and, crawling slowlyon their bellies to the summit, took a hasty look and returned atonce to their horses, coming back with word that in the valley beyondwas a camp of at least a hundred Sioux lodges, and that the Indianswere hurriedly getting ready to attack us. The news was anything butcheering, for with a village of that size the warriors would numbertwo or three hundred, and could assail us from every side. 

Still, nothing could be done, but stand and take what was to come, for there was no chance of escape--it being supreme folly toundertake in wagons a race with Indians to Fort Stevenson, sixtymiles away. To make the best of the situation, we unloaded thebaggage, distributing and adjusting the trunks, rolls of bedding, crackerboxes, and everything else that would stop a bullet, in suchmanner as to form a square barricade, two sides of which were thewagons, with the mules haltered to the wheels. Every man thensupplied himself with all the ammunition he could carry, and theMandan scouts setting up the depressing wail of the Indiandeath-song, we all awaited the attack with the courage of despair. 

But no attack came; and time slipping by, and we still unmolested, the interpreter and scouts were sent out to make anotherreconnoissance. Going through just such precautions as before inapproaching the ridge, their slow progress kept us in painfulsuspense; but when they got to the crest the strain on our nerves wasrelieved by seeing them first stand up boldly at full height, andthen descend beyond. Quickly returning, they brought welcome wordthat the whole thing was a mistake, and no Sioux were there at all. What had been taken for a hundred Indian lodges turned out to be thecamp of a Government train on its way to Fort Stevenson, and theofficer in charge seeing the scouts before they discovered him, andbelieving them to be Sioux, had sent out to bring his herds in. Itwould be hard to exaggerate the relief that this discovery gave us, and we all breathed much easier. The scare was a bad one, and I haveno hesitation in saying that, had we been mounted, it is more thanlikely that, instead of showing fight, we would have taken up alively pace for Fort Stevenson. 

After reciprocal explanations with the officer in charge of thetrain, the march was resumed, and at the close of that day we campednear a small lake about twenty miles from Fort Totten. From Tottenwe journeyed on to Fort Abercrombie. The country between the twoposts is low and flat, and I verily believe was then the favoriteabiding-place of the mosquito, no matter where he most loves to dwellnow; for myriads of the pests rose up out of the tall rank grass--more than I ever saw before or since--and viciously attacked bothmen and animals. We ourselves were somewhat protected by gloves andhead-nets, provided us before leaving Totten, but notwithstanding theseour sufferings were well-nigh intolerable; the annoyance that the poormules experienced must, therefore, have been extreme; indeed, they wereso terribly stung that the blood fairly trickled down their sides. Unluckily, we had to camp for one night in this region; but we partlyevaded the ravenous things by banking up our tent walls with earth, andthen, before turning in, sweeping and smoking out such as had gotinside. Yet with all this there seemed hundreds left to sing and stingthroughout the night. The mules being without protection, we triedhard to save them from the vicious insects by creating a dense smokefrom a circle of smothered fires, within which chain the gratefulbrutes gladly stood; but this relief was only partial, so the momentthere was light enough to enable us to hook up we pulled out forAbercrombie in hot haste. 

From Abercrombie we drove on to Saint Cloud, the terminus of therailroad, where, considerably the worse for our hurried trip andtruly wretched experience with the mosquitoes, we boarded the welcomecars. Two days later we arrived in Chicago, and having meanwhilereceived word from General Sherman that there would be no objectionto my going to Europe, I began making arrangements to leave, securingpassage by the steamship Scotia. 

President Grant invited me to come to see him at Long Branch before Ishould sail, and during my brief visit there he asked which army Iwished to accompany, the German or the French. I told him theGerman, for the reason that I thought more could be seen with thesuccessful side, and that the indications pointed to the defeat ofthe French. My choice evidently pleased him greatly, as he had theutmost contempt for Louis Napoleon, and had always denounced him as ausurper and a charlatan. Before we separated, the President gave methe following letter to the representatives of our Government abroad, and with it I not only had no trouble in obtaining permission to gowith the Germans, but was specially favored by being invited toaccompany the headquarters of the King of Prussia:

"LONG BRANCH, N. J. , July 25, 1870. 

"Lieutenant-General P. H. Sheridan, of the United State Army, isauthorized to visit Europe, to return at his own pleasure, unlessotherwise ordered. He is commended to the good offices of allrepresentatives of this Government whom he may meet abroad. 

"To citizens and representatives of other Governments I introduceGeneral Sheridan as one of the most skillful, brave and deservingsoldiers developed by the great struggle through which the UnitedStates Government has just passed. Attention paid him will be dulyappreciated by the country he has served so faithfully andefficiently. 

"U. S. GRANT. "

Word of my intended trip was cabled to Europe in the ordinary pressdespatches, and our Minister to France, Mr. Elihu B. Washburn, beingan intimate friend of mine, and thinking that I might wish to attachmyself to the French army, did me the favor to take preliminary stepsfor securing the necessary authority. He went so far as to broachthe subject to the French Minister of War, but in view of theinformality of the request, and an unmistakable unwillingness togrant it being manifested, Mr. Washburn pursued the matter nofurther. I did not learn of this kindly interest in my behalf tillafter the capitulation of Paris, when Mr. Washburn told me what hehad done of his own motion. Of course I thanked him gratefully, buteven had he succeeded in getting the permission he sought I shouldnot have accompanied the French army. 

I sailed from New York July 27, one of my aides-de-camp, GeneralJames W. Forsyth, going with me. We reached Liverpool August 6, andthe next day visited the American Legation in London, where we sawall the officials except our Minister, Mr. Motley, who, being absent, was represented by Mr. Moran, the Secretary of the Legation. We leftLondon August 9 for Brussels, where we were kindly cared for by theAmerican Minister, Mr. Russell Jones who the same evening saw us offfor Germany. Because of the war we secured transportation only asfar as Vera, and here we received information that the PrussianMinister of War had telegraphed to the Military Inspector ofRailroads to take charge of us on our arrival a Cologne, and send usdown to the headquarter of the Prussian army, but the Inspector, forsome unexplained reason, instead of doing this, sent us on to Berlin. Here our Minister, Mr. George Bancroft, met us with a telegram fromthe German Chancellor, Count Bismarck, saying we were expected tocome direct to the King's headquarters and we learned also that adespatch had been sent to the Prussian Minister at Brussels directinghim to forward us from Cologne to the army, instead of allowing us togo on to Berlin, but that we had reached and quit Brussels withoutthe Minister's knowledge. 

CHAPTER XVI. 

LEAVING FOR THE SEAT OF WAR--MEETING WITH PRINCE BISMARCK--HISINTEREST IN PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA--HIS INCLINATIONS IN EARLYLIFE--PRESENTED TO THE KING--THE BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE--THE GERMANPLAN--ITS FINAL SUCCESS--SENDING NEWS OF THE VICTORY--MISTAKEN FOR AFRENCHMAN. 

Shortly after we arrived in Berlin the Queen sent a messengeroffering us an opportunity to pay our respects, and fixed an hour forthe visit, which was to take place the next day; but as the tenor ofthe despatch Mr. Bancroft had received from Count Bismarck indicatedthat some important event which it was desired I should witness wasabout to happen at the theatre of war, our Minister got us excusedfrom our visit of ceremony, and we started for the headquarters ofthe German army that evening--our stay in the Prussian capital havingbeen somewhat less than a day. 

Our train was a very long one, of over eighty cars, and though drawnby three locomotives, its progress to Cologne was very slow and thejourney most tedious. From Cologne we continued on by rail up thevalley of the Rhine to Bingebruck, near Bingen, and thence acrossthrough Saarbrucken to Remilly, where we left the railway and rode ina hay-wagon to Pont-a-Mousson, arriving there August 17, late in theafternoon. This little city had been ceded to France at the Peace ofWestphalia, and although originally German, the people had become, inthe lapse of so many years, intensely French in sentiment. The townwas so full of officers and men belonging to the German army that itwas difficult to get lodgings, but after some delay we found quitecomfortable quarters at one of the small hotels, and presently, afterwe had succeeded in getting a slender meal, I sent my card to Countvon Bismarck, the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, whosoon responded by appointing an hour--about 9 o'clock the sameevening--for an interview. 

When the Count received me he was clothed in the undress uniform ofthe Cuirassier regiment, of which he was the colonel. During theinterview which ensued, he exhibited at times deep anxiety regardingthe conflict now imminent, for it was the night before the battle ofGravelotte, but his conversation was mostly devoted to the state ofpublic sentiment in America, about which he seemed much concerned, inquiring repeatedly as to which side--France or Prussia--was chargedwith bringing on the war. Expressing a desire to witness the battlewhich was expected to occur the next day, and remarking that I hadnot had sufficient time to provide the necessary transportation, hetold me to be ready at 4 o'clock in the morning, and he would take meout in his own carriage and present me to the King--adding that hewould ask one of his own staff-officers, who he knew had one or twoextra horses, to lend me one. As I did not know just what my statuswould be, and having explained to the President before leavingAmerica that I wished to accompany the German army unofficially, Ihardly knew whether to appear in uniform or not, so I spoke of thismatter too, and the Count, after some reflection, thought it best forme to wear my undress uniform, minus the sword, however, because Iwas a non combatant. 

At 4 o'clock the next morning, the 18th, I repaired to theChancellor's quarters. The carriage was at the door, also thesaddle-horse, but as no spare mount could be procured for GeneralForsyth, he had to seek other means to reach the battle-field. Thecarriage was an open one with two double seats, and in front a singleone for a messenger; it had also a hand-brake attached. 

Count Bismarck and I occupied the rear seat, and CountBismarck-Bohlen--the nephew and aide-decamp to the Chancellor--andDoctor Busch were seated facing us. The conveyance was strong, serviceable, and comfortable, but not specially prepossessing, andhitched to it were four stout horses--logy, ungainly animals, whoseclumsy harness indicated that the whole equipment was meant for heavywork. Two postilions in uniform, in high military saddles on the nighhorse of each span, completed the establishment. 

All being ready, we took one of the roads from Pont-a-Mousson toRezonville, which is on the direct road from Metz to Chalons, andnear the central point of the field where, on the 16th of August, thebattle of Mars-la-Tour had been fought. It was by this road that thePomeranians, numbering about 30, 000 men, had been ordered to march toGravelotte, and after proceeding a short distance we overtook thecolumn. As this contingent came from Count Bismarck's own section ofGermany, there greeted us as we passed along, first in the dim lightof the morning, and later in the glow of the rising sun, continuousand most enthusiastic cheering for the German Chancellor. 

On the way Count Bismarck again recurred to the state of publicopinion in America with reference to the war. He also talked muchabout our form of government, and said that in early life histendencies were all toward republicanism, but that family influencehad overcome his preferences, and intimated that, after adopting apolitical career, he found that Germany was not sufficiently advancedfor republicanism. He said, further, that he had been reluctant toenter upon this public career, that he had always longed to be asoldier, but that here again family opposition had turned him fromthe field of his choice into the sphere of diplomacy. 

Not far from Mars-la-Tour we alighted, and in a little while anaide-de-camp was introduced, who informed me that he was there toconduct and present me to his Majesty, the King of Prussia. As we werewalking along together, I inquired whether at the meeting I shouldremove my cap, and he said no; that in an out-of-door presentation itwas not etiquette to uncover if in uniform. We were soon in presenceof the King, where--under the shade of a clump of second-growthpoplar-trees, with which nearly all the farms in the north of Franceare here and there dotted--the presentation was made in the simplestand most agreeable manner. 

His Majesty, taking my hand in both of his, gave me a thoroughwelcome, expressing, like Count Bismarck, though through aninterpreter, much interest as to the sentiment in my own countryabout the war. At this time William the First of Prussia wasseventy-three years of age, and, dressed in the uniform of theGuards, he seemed to be the very ideal soldier, and graced with mostgentle and courteous manners. The conversation, which was brief, asneither of us spoke the other's native tongue, concluded by hisMajesty's requesting me in the most cordial way to accompany hisheadquarters during the campaign. Thanking him for his kindness, Irejoined Count Bismarck's party, and our horses having arrivedmeantime, we mounted and moved off to the position selected for theKing to witness the opening of the battle. 

This place was on some high ground overlooking the villages ofRezonville and Gravelotte, about the centre of the battlefield ofMars-la-Tour, and from it most of the country to the east toward Metzcould also be seen. The point chosen was an excellent one for thepurpose, though in one respect disagreeable, since the dead bodies ofmany of the poor fellows killed there two days before were yetunburied. In a little while the King's escort began to remove thesedead, however, bearing them away on stretchers improvised with theirrifles, and the spot thus cleared was much more acceptable. Then, when such unexploded shells as were lying around loose had beencautiously carried away, the King, his brother, Prince FrederickCharles Alexander, the chief-of-staff, General von Moltke, theMinister of War, General von Roon, and Count von Bismarck assembledon the highest point, and I being asked to join the group, was therepresented to General von Moltke. He spoke our language fluently, andBismarck having left the party for a time to go to a neighboringhouse to see his son, who had been wounded at Mars-la-Tour, and aboutwhom he was naturally very anxious, General von Moltke entertained meby explaining the positions of the different corps, the nature andobject of their movements then taking place, and so on. 

Before us, and covering Metz, lay the French army, posted on thecrest of a ridge extending north, and about its centre curvingslightly westward toward the German forces. The left of the Frenchposition was but a short distance from the Moselle, and this part ofthe line was separated from the Germans by a ravine, the slopes, fairly well wooded, rising quite sharply; farther north, near thecentre, this depression disappeared, merged in the general swell ofthe ground, and thence on toward the right the ground over which anapproach to the French line must be made was essentially a naturalopen glacis, that could be thoroughly swept by the fire of thedefenders. 

The line extended some seven or eight miles. To attack thisposition, formidable everywhere, except perhaps on the right flank, the Germans were bringing up the combined forces of the First andSecond armies, troops that within the past fortnight had alreadysuccessfully met the French in three pitched battles. On the rightwas the First Army, under command of General Von Steinmetz, thevictors, August 6, of Spicheren, near Saar, and, eight days later, ofColombey, to the east of Metz; while the centre and left werecomposed of the several corps of the Second Army, commanded by PrinceFrederick Charles of Prussia, a part of whose troops had just beenengaged in the sanguinary battle of Mars-la-Tour, by which Bazainewas cut off from the Verdun road, and forced back toward Metz. 

At first the German plan was simply to threaten with their right, while the corps of the Second Army advanced toward the north, toprevent the French, of whose intentions there was much doubt, fromescaping toward Chalons; then, as the purposes of the French mightbe, developed, these corps were to change direction toward the enemysuccessively, and seek to turn his right flank. But the location ofthis vital turning-point was very uncertain, and until it wasascertained and carried, late in the afternoon, the action raged withmore or less intensity along the entire line. 

But as it is not my purpose to describe in detail the battle ofGravelotte, nor any other, I will speak of some of its incidentsmerely. About noon, after many preliminary skirmishes, the actionwas begun according to the plan I have already outlined, the Germansadvancing their left while holding on strongly with their right, andit was this wing (the First Army) that came under my observation fromthe place where the King's headquarters were located. From here wecould see, as I have said, the village of Gravelotte. Before it laythe German troops, concealed to some extent, especially to the left, by clumps of timber here and there. Immediately in front of us, however, the ground was open, and the day being clear and sunny, witha fresh breeze blowing (else the smoke from a battle between fourhundred thousand men would have obstructed the view altogether), thespectacle presented Was of unsurpassed magnificence and sublimity. The German artillery opened the battle, and while the air was filledwith shot and shell from hundreds of guns along their entire line, the German centre and left, in rather open order, moved out to theattack, and as they went forward the reserves, in close column, tookup positions within supporting distances, yet far enough back to beout of range. 

The French artillery and mitrailleuses responded vigorously to theKrupps, and with deadly effect, but as far as we could see the Germanleft continued its advance, and staff-officers came up frequently toreport that all was going on well at points hidden from our viewThese reports were always made to the King first, and wheneveranybody arrived with tidings of the fight we clustered around to hearthe news, General Von Moltke unfolding a map meanwhile, andexplaining the situation. This done, the chief of the staff, whileawaiting the next report, would either return to a seat that had beenmade for him with some knapsacks, or would occupy the time walkingabout, kicking clods of dirt or small stones here and there, hishands clasped behind his back, his face pale and thoughtful. He wasthen nearly seventy years old, but because of his emaciated figure, the deep wrinkles in his face, and the crow's-feet about his eyes, helooked even older, his appearance being suggestive of the practice ofchurch asceticisms rather than of his well-known ardent devotion tothe military profession. 

By the middle of the afternoon the steady progress of the German leftand centre had driven the French from their more advanced positionsfrom behind stone walls and hedges, through valleys and hamlets, inthe direction of Metz, but as yet the German right had accomplishedlittle except to get possession of the village of Gravelotte, forcing the French across the deep ravine I have mentioned, whichruns north and south a little distance east of ihe town. 

But it was now time for the German right to move in earnest to carrythe Rozerieulles ridge, on which crest the French had evidentlydecided to make an obstinate fight to cover their withdrawal to Metz. As the Germans moved to the attack here, the French fire became heavyand destructive, so much so, indeed, as to cause General VonSteinmetz to order some cavalry belonging to the right wing to make acharge. Crossing the ravine before described, this body of horseswept up the slope beyond, the front ranks urged forward by themomentum from behind. The French were posted along a sunken road, behind stone walls and houses, and as the German cavalry neared theseobstructions it received a dreadful fire without the least chance ofreturning it, though still pushed on till the front ranks werecrowded into the deep cut of the road. Here the slaughter wasterrible, for the horsemen could make no further headway; and becauseof the blockade behind, of dead and wounded men and animals, anorderly retreat was impossible, and disaster inevitable. 

About the time the charge was ordered, the phase of the battle wassuch that the King concluded to move his headquarters into thevillage of Gravelotte; and just after getting there, we first learnedfully of the disastrous result of the charge which had been enteredupon with such spirit; and so much indignation was expressed againstSteinmetz, who, it was claimed, had made an unnecessary sacrifice ofhis cavalry, that I thought he would be relieved on the spot; thoughthis was not done. 

Followed by a large staff, General Steinmetz appeared in the villagepresently, and approached the King. When near, he bowed with greatrespect, and I then saw that he was a very old man though hissoldierly figure, bronzed face, and shortcropped hair gave someevidence of vigor still. When the King spoke to him I was not closeenough to learn what was said; but his Majesty's manner wasexpressive of kindly feeling, and the fact that in a few moments theveteran general returned to the command of his troops, indicatedthat, for the present at least, his fault had been overlooked. 

The King then moved out of the village, and just a little to the eastand north of it the headquarters were located on high, open ground, whence we could observe the right of the German infantry advancing upthe eastern face of the ravine. The advance, though slow andirregular, resulted in gradually gaining ground, the French resistingstoutly with a stubborn musketry fire all along the slopes. Theirartillery was silent, however; and from this fact the Germanartillery officers grew jubilant, confidently asserting that theirKrupp guns had dismounted the French batteries and knocked theirmitrailleuses to pieces. I did not indulge in this confidence, however; for, with the excellent field-glass I had, I coulddistinctly see long columns of French troops moving to their right, for the apparent purpose of making a vigorous fight on that flank;and I thought it more than likely that their artillery would be heardfrom before the Germans could gain the coveted ridge. 

The Germans labored up the glacis slowly at the most exposed places;now crawling on their bellies, now creeping on hands and knees, but, in the main, moving with erect and steady bearing. As theyapproached within short range, they suddenly found that the Frenchartillery and mitrallleuses had by no means been silenced--about twohundred pieces opening on them with fearful effect, while at the sametime the whole crest blazed with a deadly fire from the Chassepotrifles. Resistance like this was so unexpected by the Germans thatit dismayed them; and first wavering a moment, then becomingpanic-stricken, they broke and fled, infantry, cavalry, and artillerycoming down the slope without any pretence of formation, the Frenchhotly following and pouring in a heavy and constant fire as thefugitives fled back across the ravine toward Gravelotte. With thisthe battle on the right had now assumed a most serious aspect, andthe indications were that the French would attack the heights ofGravelotte; but the Pomeranian corps coming on the field at thiscrisis, was led into action by Von Moltke, himself, and shortly afterthe day was decided in favor of the Germans. 

When the French guns opened fire, it was discovered that the King'sposition was within easy range, many of the shells falling nearenough to make the place extremely uncomfortable; so it was suggestedthat he go to a less exposed point. At first he refused to listen tothis wise counsel, but yielded finally--leaving the ground withreluctance, however--and went back toward Rezonville. I waited forCount Bismarck, who did not go immediately with the King, butremained at Gravelotte, looking after some of the escort who had beenwounded. When he had arranged for their care, we set out to rejointhe King, and before going far, overtook his Majesty, who had stoppedon the Chalons road, and was surrounded by a throng of fugitives, whom he was berating in German so energetic as to remind me forciblyof the "Dutch" swearing that I used to hear in my boyhood in Ohio. The dressing down finished to his satisfaction, the King resumed hiscourse toward Re'zonville, halting, however, to rebuke in the sameemphatic style every group of runaways he overtook. 

Passing through Rezonville, we halted just beyond the village; therea fire was built, and the King, his brother, Prince FrederickCharles, and Von Roon were provided with rather uncomfortable seatsabout it, made by resting the ends of a short ladder on a couple ofboxes. With much anxiety and not a little depression of spirits newsfrom the battle-field was now awaited, but the suspense did not lastlong, for presently came the cheering intelligence that the Frenchwere retiring, being forced back by the Pomeranian corps, and some ofthe lately broken right wing organizations, that had been rallied onthe heights of Gravelotte. The lost ground being thus regained, andthe French having been beaten on their right, it was not long beforeword came that Bazaine's army was falling back to Metz, leaving theentire battle-field in possession of the Germans. 

During the excitement of the day I had not much felt the want ofeither food or water, but now that all was over I was nearlyexhausted, having had neither since early morning. Indeed, all ofthe party were in like straits; the immense armies had not only eatenup nearly everything in the country, but had drunk all the wells dry, too, and there seemed no relief for us till, luckily, a squad ofsoldiers came along the road with a small cask of wine in a cart. One of the staff-officers instantly appropriated the keg, andproceeded to share his prize most generously. Never had I tastedanything so refreshing and delicious, but as the wine was theordinary sour stuff drunk by the peasantry of northern France, myappreciation must be ascribed to my famished condition rather than toany virtues of the beverage itself. 

After I had thus quenched my thirst the King's, brother called measide, and drawing from his coat-tail pocket a piece of stale blackbread, divided it with me, and while munching on this the Princebegan talking of his son--General Prince Frederick Charles, popularlycalled the Red Prince--who was in command of the Second Army in thisbattle--the German left wing. In recounting his son's professionalcareer the old man's face was aglow with enthusiasm, and not withoutgood cause, for in the war between Prussia and Austria in 1866, aswell as in the present campaign, the Red Prince had displayed thehighest order of military genius. 

The headquarters now became the scene of much bustle, despatchesannouncing the victory being sent in all directions. The first onetransmitted was to the Queen, the King directing Count Bismarck toprepare it for his signature; then followed others of a more officialcharacter, and while these matters were being attended to I thought Iwould ride into the village to find, if possible, some water for myhorse. Just as I entered the chief street, however, I was suddenlyhalted by a squad of soldiers, who, taking me for a French officer(my coat and forage cap resembling those of the French), leveledtheir pieces at me. They were greatly excited, so much so, indeed, that I thought my hour had come, for they could not understandEnglish, and I could not speak German, and dare not utterexplanations in French. Fortunately a few disconnected German wordscame to me in the emergency. With these I managed to delay myexecution, and one of the party ventured to come up to examine the"suspect" more closely. The first thing he did was to take off mycap, and looking it over carefully, his eyes rested on the threestars above the visor, and, pointing to them, he emphaticallypronounced me French. Then of course they all became excited again, more so than before, even, for they thought I was trying to practicea ruse, and I question whether I should have lived to recount theadventure had not an officer belonging to the King's headquartersbeen passing by just then, when, hearing the threatenings andimprecations, he rode up to learn the cause of the hubbub, andimmediately recognized and released me. When he told my wrathycaptors who I was, they were much mortified of course, and made themost profuse apologies, promising that no such mistake should occuragain, and so on; but not feeling wholly reassured, for my uniformwas still liable to mislead, I was careful to return to headquartersin company with my deliverer. There I related what had occurred, andafter a good laugh all round, the King provided me with a pass whichhe said would preclude any such mishap in the future, and would alsopermit me to go wherever I pleased--a favor rarely bestowed. 

CHAPTER XVII

SEARCHING FOR QUARTERS--HUNTING UP PROVISIONS--A SLENDER BREAKFAST--GOING OVER THE BATTLEFIELD--THE GERMAN ARTILLERY--A GROUP OF WOUNDED--DINING WITH THE KING--ON THE MARCH--THE BAVARIANS--KIRSCHWASSER--URGING ON THE TROOPS. 

While I was absent, as related in the preceding chapter, it had beendecided that the King's quarters should be established for the nightin the village of Rezonville; and as it would be very difficult, atsuch a late hour, to billet the whole party regularly, Count Bismarckand I went off to look for shelter for ourselves. Remembering that Ihad seen, when seeking to water my horse, a partly burned barn withsome fresh-looking hay in it, I suggested that we lodge there. Hetoo thought it would answer our purpose, but on reaching it we foundthe unburned part of the barn filled with wounded, and thisnecessitating a further search we continued on through the village inquest of some house not yet converted into a hospital. Such, however, seemed impossible to come upon, so at last the Count fixedon one whose upper floor, we learned, was unoccupied, though thelower one was covered with wounded. 

Mounting a creaky ladder--there was no stairway--to the upper story, we found a good-sized room with three large beds, one of which theChancellor assigned to the Duke of Mecklenburg and aide, and anotherto Count Bismarck-Bohlen and me, reserving the remaining one forhimself. Each bed, as is common in Germany and northern France, wasprovided with a feather tick, but the night being warm, these spreadswere thrown off, and discovering that they would make a comfortableshakedown on the floor, I slept there leaving Bismarck-Bohlenunembarrassed by companionship--at least of a human kind. 

At daylight I awoke, and seeing that Count Bismarck was alreadydressed and about to go down the ladder, I felt obliged to follow hisexample, so I too turned out, and shortly descended to theground-floor, the only delays of the toilet being those incident todressing, for there were no conveniences for morning ablutions. Justoutside the door I met the Count, who, proudly exhibiting a couple ofeggs he had bought from the woman of the house, invited me tobreakfast with him, provided we could beg some coffee from the king'sescort. Putting the eggs under my charge, with many injunctions asto their safe-keeping, he went off to forage for the coffee, andpresently returned, having been moderately successful. One eggapiece was hardly enough, however, to appease the craving of twostrong men ravenous from long fasting. Indeed, it seemed only towhet the appetite, and we both set out on an eager expedition formore food. Before going far I had the good luck to meet a sutler'swagon, and though its stock was about all sold, there were still leftfour large bologna sausages, which I promptly purchased--paying around sum for them too--and hastening back found the Count alreadyreturned, though without bringing anything at all to eat; but he hadsecured a couple of bottles of brandy, and with a little of this--itwas excellent, too--and the sausages, the slim ration of eggs andcoffee was amply reinforced. 

Breakfast over, the Chancellor invited me to accompany him in a rideto the battle-field, and I gladly accepted, as I very much desired topass over the ground in front of Gravelotte, particularly so to seewhether the Krupp guns had really done the execution that was claimedfor them by the German artillery officers. Going directly throughthe village of Gravelotte, following the causeway over which theGerman cavalry had passed to make its courageous but futile charge, we soon reached the ground where the fighting had been the mostsevere. Here the field was literally covered with evidences of theterrible strife, the dead and wounded strewn thick on every side. 

In the sunken road the carnage had been awful; men and horses havingbeen slaughtered there by hundreds, helpless before the murderousfire delivered from behind a high stone wall impracticable to mountedtroops. The sight was sickening to an extreme, and we were not slowto direct our course elsewhere, going up the glacis toward the Frenchline, the open ground over which we crossed being covered withthousands of helmets, that had been thrown off by the Germans duringthe fight and were still dotting the field, though details ofsoldiers from the organizations which had been engaged here wereabout to begin to gather up their abandoned headgear. 

When we got inside the French works, I was astonished to observe howlittle harm had been done the defenses by the German artillery, foralthough I had not that serene faith in the effectiveness of theirguns held by German artillerists generally, yet I thought theirterrific cannonade must have left marked results. All I couldperceive, however, was a disabled gun, a broken mitrailleuse, and twobadly damaged caissons. 

Everything else, except a little ammunition in the trenches, had beencarried away, and it was plain to see, from the good shape in whichthe French left wing had retired to Metz, that its retreat had beenpredetermined by the disasters to the right wing. 

By this hour the German cavalry having been thrown out to the frontwell over toward Metz, we, following it to get a look at the city, rode to a neighboring summit, supposing it would be a safe point ofobservation; but we shortly realized the contrary, for scarcely hadwe reached the crest when some of the French pickets, lying concealedabout six hundred yards off, opened fire, making it so very hot forus that, hugging the necks of our horses, we incontinently fled. Observing what had taken place, a troop of German cavalry charged theFrench outpost and drove it far enough away to make safe our return, and we resumed possession of the point, but only to discover that thecountry to the east was so broken and hilly that no satisfactory viewof Metz could be had. 

Returning to Gravelotte, we next visited that part of the battlefieldto the northeast of the village, and before long Count Bismarckdiscovered in a remote place about twenty men dreadfully wounded. These poor fellows had had no attention whatever, having beenoverlooked by the hospital corps, and their condition was mostpitiful. Yet there was one very handsome man in the group--a captainof artillery--who, though shot through the right breast, wastalkative and cheerful, and felt sure of getting well. Pointing, however, to a comrade lying near, also shot in the breast, hesignificantly shook his head; it was easy to see on this man's facethe signs--of fast approaching death. 

An orderly was at once despatched for a surgeon, Bismarck and I doingwhat we could meanwhile to alleviate the intense sufferings of themaimed men, bringing them water and administering a little brandy, for the Count still had with him some of the morning's supply. Whenthe surgeons came, we transferred the wounded to their care, andmaking our way to Rezonville, there took the Count's carriage torejoin the King's headquarters, which in the mean time had been movedto Pont-a-Mousson. Our route led through the village of Gorze, andhere we found the streets so obstructed with wagons that I feared itwould take us the rest of the day to get through, for the teamsterswould not pay the slightest heed to the cries of our postilions. TheCount was equal to the emergency, however, for, taking a pistol frombehind his cushion, and bidding me keep my seat, he jumped out andquickly began to clear the street effectively, ordering wagons to theright and left. Marching in front of the carriage and making way forus till we were well through the blockade, he then resumed his seat, remarking, "This is not a very dignified business for the Chancellorof the German Confederation, but it's the only way to get through. "

At Pont-a-Mousson I was rejoined by my aide, General Forsyth, and forthe next two days our attention was almost wholly devoted to securingmeans of transportation. This was most difficult to obtain, but as Idid not wish to impose on the kindness of the Chancellor longer, wepersevered till, finally, with the help of Count Bismarck-Bohlen, wemanaged to get tolerably well equipped with a saddle-horse apiece, and a two-horse carriage. Here also, on the afternoon of August 21, I had the pleasure of dining with the King. The dinner was a simpleone, consisting of soup, a joint, and two or three vegetables; thewines vin ordinaire and Burgundy. There were a good many persons ofhigh rank present, none of whom spoke English, however, exceptBismarck, who sat next the King and acted as interpreter when hisMajesty conversed with me. Little was said of the events takingplace around us, but the King made many inquiries concerning the warof the rebellion, particularly with reference to Grant's campaign atVicksburg; suggested, perhaps, by the fact that there, and in therecent movements of the German army, had been applied many similarprinciples of military science. 

The French army under Marshal Bazaine having retired into thefortifications of Metz, that stronghold was speedily invested byPrince Frederick Charles. Meantime the Third Army, under the CrownPrince of Prussia--which, after having fought and won the battle ofWorth, had been observing the army of Marshal MacMahon during andafter the battle of Gravelotte--was moving toward Paris by way ofNancy, in conjunction with an army called the Fourth, which had beenorganized from the troops previously engaged around Metz, and on the22d was directed toward Bar-le-Duc under the command of the CrownPrince of Saxony. In consequence of these operations the Kingdecided to move to Commercy, which place we reached by carriage, traveling on a broad macadamized road lined on both sides withpoplar-trees, and our course leading through a most beautiful countrythickly dotted with prosperous-looking villages. 

On reaching Commercy, Forsyth and I found that quarters had beenalready selected for us, and our names written on the door with chalkthe quartermaster charged with the billeting of the officers atheadquarters having started out in advance to perform this duty andmake all needful preparations for the King before he arrived, whichcourse was usually pursued thereafter, whenever the royalheadquarters took up a new location. 

Forsyth and I were lodged with the notary of the village, who overand over again referred to his good fortune in not having toentertain any of the Germans. He treated us most hospitably, andnext morning, on departing, we offered compensation by tendering asum--about what our bill would have been at a good hotel--to be usedfor the "benefit of the wounded or the Church. " Under thisstipulation the notary accepted, and we followed that plan of payingfor food and lodging afterward, whenever quartered in private houses. 

The next day I set out in advance of the headquarters, and reachedBar-le-Duc about noon, passing on the way the Bavarian contingent ofthe Crown Prince's army. These Bavarians were trim-looking soldiers, dressed in neat uniforms of light blue; they looked healthy andstrong, but seemed of shorter stature than the North Germans I hadseen in the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and General vonSteinmetz. When, later in the day the King arrived, a guard for himwas detailed from this Bavarian contingent; a stroke of policy nodoubt, for the South Germans were so prejudiced against theirbrothers of the North that no opportunity to smooth them down waspermitted to go unimproved. 

Bar-le-Duc, which had then a population of about 15, 000, is one ofthe prettiest towns I saw in France, its quaint and ancient buildingsand beautiful boulevards charming the eye as well as exciting deepinterest. The King and his immediate suite were quartered on one ofthe best boulevards in a large building--the Bank of France--thebalcony of which offered a fine opportunity to observe a part of thearmy of the Crown Prince the next day on its march toward Vitry. This was the first time his Majesty had had a chance to see any ofthese troops--as hitherto he had accompanied either the army ofPrince Frederick Charles, or that of General Steinmetz--and thecheers with which he was greeted by the Bavarians left no room fordoubting their loyalty to the Confederation, notwithstanding ancientjealousies. 

While the troops were passing, Count Bismarck had the kindness topoint out to me the different organizations, giving scraps of theirhistory, and also speaking concerning the qualifications of thedifferent generals commanding them. When the review was over we wentto the Count's house, and there, for the first time in my life, Itasted kirschwasser, a very strong liquor distilled from cherries. Not knowing anything about the stuff, I had to depend on Bismarck'srecommendation, and he proclaiming it fine, I took quite a generousdrink, which nearly strangled me and brought on a violent fit ofcoughing. The Chancellor said, however, that this was in no way dueto the liquor, but to my own inexperience, and I was bound to believethe distinguished statesman, for he proved his words by swallowing agoodly dose with an undisturbed and even beaming countenance, demonstrating his assertion so forcibly that I forthwith set out withBismarck-Bohlen to lay in a supply for myself. 

I spent the night in a handsome house, the property of anexceptionally kind and polite gentleman bearing the indisputablyGerman name of Lager, but who was nevertheless French from head tofoot, if intense hatred of the Prussians be a sign of Gallicnationality. At daybreak on the 26th word came for us to be ready tomove by the Chalons road at 7 o'clock, but before we got off, theorder was suspended till 2 in the afternoon. In the interval Generalvon Moltke arrived and held a long conference with the King, and whenwe did pull out we traveled the remainder of the afternoon in companywith a part of the Crown Prince's army, which after this conferenceinaugurated the series of movements from Bar-le-Duc northward, thatfinally compelled the surrender at Sedan. This sudden change ofdirection I did not at first understand, but soon learned that it wasbecause of the movements of Marshal MacMahon, who, having united theFrench army beaten at Worth with three fresh corps at Chalons, wasmarching to relieve Metz in obedience to orders from the Minister ofWar at Paris. 

As we passed along the column, we noticed that the Crown Prince'stroops were doing their best, the officers urging the men to theirutmost exertions, persuading weary laggards and driving upstragglers. As a general thing, however, they marched in good shape, notwithstanding the rapid gait and the trying heat, for at the outsetof the campaign the Prince had divested them of all impedimentaexcept essentials, and they were therefore in excellent trim for aforced march. 

The King traveled further than usual that day--to Clermont--so we didnot get shelter till late, and even then not without some confusion, for the quartermaster having set out toward Chalons before the changeof programme was ordered, was not at hand to provide for us. I hadextreme good luck, though, in being quartered with a certainapothecary, who, having lived for a time in the United States, claimed it as a privilege even to lodge me, and certainly made me hisdebtor for the most generous hospitality. It was not so with some ofthe others, however; and Count Bismarck was particularly unfortunate, being billeted in a very small and uncomfortable house, where, visiting him to learn more fully what was going on, I found him, wrapped in a shabby old dressing-gown, hard at work. He wasestablished in a very small room, whose only furnishings consisted ofa table--at which he was writing--a couple of rough chairs, and theuniversal feather-bed, this time made on the floor in one corner ofthe room. On my remarking upon the limited character of hisquarters, the Count replied, with great good-humor, that they wereall right, and that he should get along well enough. Even the trampof his clerks in the attic, and the clanking of his orderlies' sabresbelow, did not disturb him much; he said, in fact, that he would haveno grievance at all were it not for a guard of Bavarian soldiersstationed about the house for his safety, he presumed the sentinelsfrom which insisted on protecting and saluting the Chancellor of theNorth German Confederation in and out of season, a proceeding thatled to embarrassment sometimes, as he was much troubled with a severedysentery. Notwithstanding his trials, however, and in the midst ofthe correspondence on which he was so intently engaged, he graciouslytook time to explain that the sudden movement northward fromBar-le-Duc was, as I have previously recounted, the result ofinformation that Marshal MacMahon was endeavoring to relieve Metz bymarching along the Belgian frontier; "a blundering manoeuvre, " remarkedthe Chancellor, "which cannot be accounted for, unless it has beenbrought about by the political situation of the French. "

CHAPTER XVIII. 

AFTER MacMAHON--THE BATTLE AT BEAUMONT--THE FRENCH SURPRISED--THEMARCHING OF THE GERMAN SOLDIERS--THE BATTLE OF SEDAN--GALLANT CAVALRYCHARGES--DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH--THE SURRENDER OF NAPOLEON--BISMARCKAND THE KING--DECORATING THE SOLDIERS. 

All night long the forced march of the army went on through Clermont, and when I turned out, just after daylight, the columns were stillpressing forward, the men looking tired and much bedraggled, asindeed they had reason to be, for from recent rains the roads werevery sloppy. Notwithstanding this, however, the troops were pushedahead with all possible vigor to intercept MacMahon and force abattle before he could withdraw from his faulty movement, for whichit has since been ascertained he was not at all responsible. Indeed, those at the royal headquarters seemed to think of nothing else thanto strike MacMahon, for, feeling pretty confident that Metz could notbe relieved, they manifested not the slightest anxiety on that score. 

By 8 o'clock, the skies having cleared, the headquarters set out forGrand Pre', which place we reached early in the afternoon, and thatevening I again had the pleasure of dining with the King. Theconversation at table was almost wholly devoted to the situation, ofcourse, everybody expressing surprise at the manoeuvre of the Frenchat this time, their march along the Belgian frontier being creditedentirely to Napoleon. Up to bed-time there was still muchuncertainty as to the exact positions of the French, but next morningintelligence being received which denoted the probability of abattle, we drove about ten miles, to Buzancy, and there mounting ourhorses, rode to the front. 

The French were posted not far from Buzancy in a strong position, their right resting near Stonne and the left extending over into thewoods beyond Beaumont. About 10 o'clock the Crown Prince of Saxonyadvanced against this line, and while a part of his army turned theFrench right, compelling it to fall back rapidly, the German centreand right attacked with great vigor and much skill, surprising one ofthe divisions of General De Failly's corps while the men were in theact of cooking their breakfast. 

The French fled precipitately, leaving behind their tents and othercamp equipage, and on inspecting the ground which they had abandonedso hastily, I noticed on all sides ample evidence that not even themost ordinary precautions had been taken to secure the division fromsurprise, The artillery horses had not been harnessed, and many ofthem had been shot down at the picket-rope where they had beenhaltered the night before, while numbers of men were lying dead withloaves of bread or other food instead of their muskets in theirhands. 

Some three thousand prisoners and nearly all the artillery andmitrailleuses of the division--were captured, while the fugitiveswere pursued till they found shelter behind--Douay's corps and therest of De Failly's beyond Beaumont. The same afternoon there wereseveral other severe combats along the Meuse, but I had no chance ofwitnessing any of them, and just before night-fall I started back toBuzancy, to which place the King's headquarters had been broughtduring the day. 

The morning of the 31st the King moved to Vendresse. First sendingour carriage back to Grand Pre' for our trunks, Forsyth and I mountedour horses and rode to the battle-field accompanied by an Englishnobleman, the Duke of Manchester. The part of the field we traversedwas still thickly strewn with the dead of both armies, though all thewounded had been collected in the hospitals. In the village ofBeaumont, we stopped to take a look at several thousand Frenchprisoners, whose worn clothing and evident dejection told that theyhad been doing a deal of severe marching under great discouragements. 

The King reached the village shortly after, and we all continued onto Chemery, just beyond where his Majesty alighted from his carriageto observe his son's troops file past as they came in from thedirection of Stonne. This delay caused us to be as late as 9 o'clockbefore we got shelter that night, but as it afforded me the bestopportunity I had yet had for seeing the German soldiers on themarch, I did not begrudge the time. They moved in a somewhat openand irregular column of fours, the intervals between files beingespecially intended to give room for a peculiar swinging gait, withwhich the men seemed to urge themselves over the ground with ease andrapidity. There was little or no straggling, and being strong, lustyyoung fellows, and lightly equipped--they carried only needle-guns, ammunition, a very small knapsack, a water-bottle, and a haversack--they strode by with an elastic step, covering at least three miles anhour. 

It having been definitely ascertained that the demoralized Frenchwere retiring to Sedan, on the evening of August 31 the German armybegan the work of hemming them in there, so disposing the differentcorps as to cover the ground from Donchery around by Raucourt toCarignan. The next morning this line was to be drawn in closer onSedan; and the Crown Prince of Saxony was therefore ordered to takeup a position to the north of Bazeilles, beyond the right bank of theMeuse, while the Crown Prince of Prussia was to cross his right wingover the Meuse at Remilly, to move on Bazeilles, his centre meantimemarching against a number of little hamlets still held by the Frenchbetween there and Donchery. At this last-mentioned place strongreserves were to be held, and from it the Eleventh Corps, followed bythe Fifth and a division of cavalry, was to march on St. Menges. 

Forsyth and I started early next morning, September 1, and in a thickfog-which, however, subsequently gave place to bright sunshine--wedrove to the village of Chevenges, where, mounting our horses, werode in a northeasterly direction to the heights of Frenois andWadelincourt, bordering the river Meuse on the left bank, where fromthe crest we had a good view of the town of Sedan with its circlingfortifications, which, though extensive, were not so formidable asthose around Metz. The King and his staff were already establishedon these heights, and at a point so well chosen that his Majestycould observe the movements of both armies immediately east and southof Sedan, and also to the northwest toward Floing and the Belgianfrontier. 

The battle was begun to the east and northeast of Sedan as early ashalf-past 4 o'clock by the German right wing--the fighting beingdesultory--and near the same hour the Bavarians attacked Bazeilles. This village, some two miles southeast of Sedan, being of importance, was defended with great obstinacy, the French contesting from streetto street and house to house the attack of the Bavarians till near10 o'clock, when, almost every building being knocked to pieces, theywere compelled to relinquish the place. The possession of thisvillage gave the Germans to the east of Sedan a continuous line, extending from the Meuse northward through La Moncelle and Daigny toGivonne, and almost to the Belgian frontier. 

While the German centre and right were thus engaged, the left hadmoved in accordance with the prescribed plan. Indeed, some of thesetroops had crossed the Meuse the night before, and now, at a littleafter 6 o'clock, their advance could be seen just north of thevillage of Floing. Thus far these columns, under the immediate eyeof the Crown Prince of Prussia, had met with no opposition to theirmarch, and as soon as they got to the high ground above the villagethey began extending to the east, to connect with the Army of theMeuse. This juncture was effected at Illy without difficulty, andthe French army was now completely encompassed. 

After a severe fight, the Crown Prince drove the French throughFloing, and as the ground between this village and Sedan is anundulating open plain, everywhere visible, there was then offered arare opportunity for seeing the final conflict preceding thesurrender. Presently up out of the little valley where Floing islocated came the Germans, deploying just on the rim of the plateau avery heavy skirmish-line, supported by a line of battle at closedistance. When these skirmishers appeared, the French infantry hadwithdrawn within its intrenched lines, but a strong body of theircavalry, already formed in a depression to the right of the Floingroad, now rode at the Germans in gallant style, going clear throughthe dispersed skirmishers to the main line of battle. Here theslaughter of the French was awful, for in addition to the deadlyvolleys from the solid battalions of their enemies, the skirmishers, who had rallied in knots at advantageous places, were now deliveringa severe and effective fire. The gallant horsemen, therefore, had toretire precipitately, but re-forming in the depression, they againundertook the hopeless task of breaking the German infantry, makingin all four successive charges. Their ardor and pluck were of noavail, however, for the Germans, growing stronger every minute by theaccession of troops from Floing, met the fourth attack in such largeforce that, even before coming in contact with their adversaries, theFrench broke and retreated to the protection of the intrenchments, where, from the beginning of the combat, had been lying plenty ofidle infantry, some of which at least, it seemed plain to me, oughtto have been thrown into the fight. This action was the last one ofconsequence around Sedan, for, though with the contraction of theGerman lines their batteries kept cannonading more or less, and therattle of musketry continued to be heard here and there, yet the hardfighting of the day practically ended on the plateau of Floing. 

By 3 o'clock, the French being in a desperate and hopeless situation, the King ordered the firing to be stopped, and at once despatched oneof his staff--Colonel von Bronsart--with a demand for a surrender. Just as this officer was starting off, I remarked to Bismarck thatNapoleon himself would likely be one of the prizes, but the Count, incredulous, replied, "Oh no; the old fox is too cunning to be caughtin such a trap; he has doubtless slipped off to Paris"--a beliefwhich I found to prevail pretty generally about headquarters. 

In the lull that succeeded, the King invited many of those about himto luncheon, a caterer having provided from some source or other asubstantial meal of good bread, chops and peas, with a bountifulsupply of red and sherry wines. Among those present were PrinceCarl, Bismarck, Von Moltke, Von Roon, the Duke of Weimar, the Duke ofCoburg, the Grand-Duke of Mecklenburg, Count Hatzfeldt, ColonelWalker, of the English army, General Forsyth, and I. The King wasagreeable and gracious at all times, but on this occasion he wasparticularly so, being naturally in a happy frame of mind becausethis day the war had reached a crisis which presaged for the nearfuture the complete vanquishment of the French. 

Between 4 and 5 o'clock Colonel von Bronsart returned from hismission to Sedan, bringing word to the King that the commandingofficer there General Wimpffen, wished to know, in order that thefurther effusion of blood might be spared, upon what terms he mightsurrender. The Colonel brought the intelligence also that the FrenchEmperor was in the town. Soon after Von Bronsart's arrival a Frenchofficer approached from Sedan, preceded by a white flag and twoGerman officers. Coming up the road till within a few hundred yardsof us, they halted; then one of the Germans rode forward to say thatthe French officer was Napoleon's adjutant, bearing an autographletter from the Emperor to the King of Prussia. At this the King, followed by Bismarck, Von Moltke, and Von Roon, walked out to thefront a little distance and halted, his Majesty still in advance, therest of us meanwhile forming in a line some twenty paces to the rearof the group. The envoy then approached, at first on horseback, butwhen within about a hundred yards he dismounted, and uncovering, camethe remaining distance on foot, bearing high up in his right hand thedespatch from Napoleon. The bearer proved to be General Reille, andas he handed the Emperor's letter to the King, his Majesty salutedhim with the utmost formality and precision. Napoleon's letter wasthe since famous one, running so characteristically, thus: "Nothaving been able to die in the midst of my troops, there is nothingleft me but to place my sword in your Majesty's hands. " The readingfinished, the King returned to his former post, and after aconference with Bismarck, Von Moltke, and Von Roon, dictated ananswer accepting Napoleon's surrender, and requesting him todesignate an officer with power to treat for the capitulation of thearmy, himself naming Von Moltke to represent the Germans. The Kingthen started for Vendresse, to pass the night. It was after7 o'clock now, and hence too late to arrange anything more where wewere, so further negotiations were deferred till later in theevening; and I, wishing to be conveniently near Bismarck, resolved totake up quarters in Donchery. On our way thither we were met by theCount's nephew, who assuring us that it would be impossible to findshelter there in the village, as all the houses were filled withwounded, Forsyth and I decided to continue on to Chevenge. On theother hand, Bismarck-Bohlen bore with him one great comfort--someexcellent brandy. Offering the flask to his uncle, he said: "You'vehad a hard day of it; won't you refresh yourself?" The Chancellor, without wasting time to answer, raised the bottle to his lips, exclaiming: "Here's to the unification of Germany!" which sentimentthe gurgling of an astonishingly long drink seemed to emphasize. TheCount then handed the bottle back to his nephew, who, shaking it, ejaculated, "Why, we can't pledge you in return--there is nothingleft!" to which came the waggish response, "I beg pardon; it was sodark I couldn't see"; nevertheless there was a little remaining, as Imyself can aver. 

Having left our carriage at Chevenge, Forsyth and I stopped there toget it, but a long search proving fruitless, we took lodging in thevillage at the house of the cure, resolved to continue the hunt inthe morning. But then we had no better success, so concluding thatour vehicle had been pressed into the hospital service, we at anearly hour on the 2d of September resumed the search, continuing ondown the road in the direction of Sedan. Near the gate of the citywe came on the German picket-line, and one of the Officers, recognizing our uniforms--he having served in the war of therebellion--stepped forward and addressed me in good English. Wenaturally fell into conversation, and in the midst of it there cameout through the gate an open carriage, or landau, containing two men, one of whom, in the uniform of a general and smoking a cigarette, werecognized, when the conveyance drew near, as the Emperor LouisNapoleon. The landau went on toward Donchery at a leisurely pace, and we, inferring that there was something more important at handjust then than the recovery of our trap, followed at a respectfuldistance. Not quite a mile from Donchery is a cluster of three orfour cottages, and at the first of these the landau stopped to await, as we afterward ascertained, Count Bismarck, with whom the diplomaticnegotiations were to be settled. Some minutes elapsed before hecame, Napoleon remaining seated in his carriage meantime, stillsmoking, and accepting with nonchalance the staring of a group ofGerman soldiers near by, who were gazing on their fallen foe withcurious and eager interest. 

Presently a clattering of hoofs was heard, and looking toward thesound, I perceived the Chancellor cantering down the road. Whenabreast of the carriage he dismounted, and walking up to it, salutedthe Emperor in a quick, brusque way that seemed to startle him. After a word or two, the party moved perhaps a hundred yards furtheron, where they stopped opposite the weaver's cottage so famous fromthat day. This little house is on the east side of the Doncheryroad, near its junction with that to Frenois, and stands about twentypaces back from the highway. In front is a stone wall covered withcreeping vines, and from a gate in this wall runs to the front door apath, at this time bordered on both sides with potato vines. 

The Emperor having alighted at the gate, he and Bismarck walkedtogether along the narrow path and entered the cottage. Reappearingin about a quarter of an hour, they came out and seated themselves inthe open air, the weaver having brought a couple of chairs. Herethey engaged in an animated conversation, if much gesticulation isany indication. The talk lasted fully an hour, Bismarck seeming todo most of it, but at last he arose, saluted the Emperor, and strodedown the path toward his horse. Seeing me standing near the gate, hejoined me for a moment, and asked if I had noticed how the Emperorstarted when they first met, and I telling him that I had, he added, "Well, it must have been due to my manners, not my words, for thesewe're, 'I salute your Majesty just as I would my King. '" Then theChancellor continued to chat a few minutes longer, assuring me thatnothing further was to be done there, and that we had better go tothe Chateau Bellevue, where, he said, the formal surrender was totake place. With this he rode off toward Vendresse to communicatewith his sovereign, and Forsyth and I made ready to go to the ChateauBellevue. 

Before we set out, however, a number of officers of the King's suitearrived at the weaver's cottage, and from them I gathered that therewere differences at the royal headquarters as to whether peace shouldbe made then at Sedan, or the war continued till the French capitalwas taken. I further heard that the military advisers of the Kingstrongly advocated an immediate move on Paris, while the Chancellorthought it best to make peace now, holding Alsace and Lorraine, andcompelling the payment of an enormous levy of money; and these rumorswere most likely correct, for I had often heard Bismarck say thatFrance being the richest country in Europe, nothing could keep herquiet but effectually to empty her pockets; and besides this, heimpressed me as holding that it would be better policy to preservethe Empire. 

On our way to the chateau we fell in with a number of artilleryofficers bringing up their guns hurriedly to post them closer in tothe beleaguered town on a specially advantageous ridge. Inquiringthe cause of this move, we learned that General Wimpffen had not yetagreed to the terms of surrender; that it was thought he would not, and that they wanted to be prepared for any such contingency. Andthey were preparing with a vengeance too, for I counted seventy-twoKrupp guns in one continuous line trained on the Chateau Bellevue andSedan. 

Napoleon went directly from the weaver's to the Chateau Bellevue, andabout 10 o'clock the King of Prussia arrived from Frenois, accompanied by a few of his own suite and the Crown Prince withseveral members of his staff; and Von Moltke and Wimpffen havingsettled their points of difference before the two monarchs met, within the next half-hour the articles of capitulation were formallysigned. 

On the completion of the surrender--the occasion being justlyconsidered a great one--the Crown Prince proceeded to distributeamong the officers congregated in the chateau grounds 'the order ofthe Iron Cross'--a generous supply of these decorations being carriedin a basket by one of his orderlies, following him about as he walkedalong. Meantime the King, leaving Napoleon in the chateau toruminate on the fickleness of fortune, drove off to see his ownvictorious soldiers, who greeted him with huzzas that rent the air, and must have added to the pangs of the captive Emperor. 

CHAPTER XIX. 

RIDING OVER THE BATTLEFIELD--DESTRUCTION OF BAZEILLES--MISTAKES OFTHE FRENCH--MARSHAL BAZAINE ON TO PARIS--A WEEK IN MEAUX--RHEIMS--ONTHE PICKETLINE-UNDER FIRE--A SURRENDER--AT VERSAILLES--GENERALBURNSIDE AND Mr. FORBES IN PARIS. 

The Crown Prince having got to the bottom of his medal basket-that isto say, having finished his liberal distribution of decorations tohis officers--Forsyth and I rode off by way of Wadelincourt toBazeilles to see what had taken place on that part of the field, andthe sight that met our eyes as we entered the village was trulydreadful to look upon. Most of the houses had been knocked down orburned the day before, but such as had been left standing were now inflames, the torch having been applied because, as it was claimed, Frenchmen concealed in them had fired on the wounded. The streetswere still encumbered with both German and French dead, and it wasevident that of those killed in the houses the bodies had not beenremoved, for the air was loaded with odors of burning flesh. FromBazeille we rode on toward the north about two miles, along where thefight had been largely an artillery duel, to learn what we could ofthe effectiveness of the Krupp gun. Counting all the French dead wecame across killed by artillery, they figured up about three hundred--a ridiculously small number; in fact, not much more than one deadman for each Krupp gun on that part of the line. Although the numberof dead was in utter disproportion to the terrific six-hourcannonade, yet small as it was the torn and mangled bodies made sucha horrible sight that we turned back toward Bazeilles without havinggone further than Givonne. 

At Bazeilles we met the King, accompanied by Bismarck and several ofthe staff. They too had been riding over the field, the King makingthis a practice, to see that the wounded were not neglected. As Idrew up by the party, Bismarck accosted me with, "Well, General, aren't you hungry? This is just the place to whet one's appetite--these burning Frenchmen--Ugh!" and shrugging his shoulders in evidentdisgust, he turned away to join his Majesty in further explorations, Forsyth and I continuing on to Chevenges. Here we got the firstinkling of what had become of our carriage since leaving it two daysbefore: it had been pressed into service to carry wounded officers fromthe field during the battle, but afterward released, and was now safeat the house in Vendresse where we had been quartered the night of the31st, so, on hearing this, we settled to go there again to lodge, butour good friend, the cure', insisting that we should stay with him, weremained in Chevenges till next morning. 

On September 3 the King removed from Vendresse to Rethel, where heremained two days; in the mean while the Germans, 240, 000 strong, beginning their direct march to Paris. The French had little withwhich to oppose this enormous force, not more, perhaps, than 50, 000regular troops; the rest of their splendid army had been lost orcaptured in battle, or was cooped up in the fortifications of Metz, Strasburg, and other places, in consequence of blunders withoutparallel in history, for which Napoleon and the Regency in Paris mustbe held accountable. The first of these gross faults was the fightat Worth, where MacMahon, before his army was mobilized, acceptedbattle with the Crown Prince, pitting 50, 000 men against 175, 000; thenext was Bazaine's fixing upon Metz as his base, and stupidly puttinghimself in position to be driven back to it, when there was nopossible obstacle to his joining forces with MacMahon at Chalons;while the third and greatest blunder of all was MacMahon's move torelieve Metz, trying to slip 140, 000 men along the Belgian frontier. Indeed, it is exasperating and sickening to think of all this; tothink that Bazaine carried into Metz--a place that should have beenheld, if at all, with not over 25, 000 men--an army of 180, 000, because it contained, the excuse was, "an accumulation of stores. "With all the resources of rich France to draw upon, I cannot conceivethat this excuse was sincere; on the contrary, I think that themovement of Bazaine must have been inspired by Napoleon with a viewto the maintenance of his dynasty rather than for the good of France. 

As previously stated, Bismarck did not approve of the German army'smoving on Paris after the battle of Sedan. Indeed, I think heforesaw and dreaded the establishment of a Republic, his idea beingthat if peace was made then, the Empire could be continued in theperson of the Prince Imperial who--, coming to the throne underGerman influences, would be pliable in his hands. These views foundfrequent expression in private, and in public too; I myselfparticularly remember the Chancellor's speaking thus most unguardedlyat a dinner in Rheims. But he could not prevent the march to Paris;it was impossible to stop the Germans, flushed with success. "On toParis" was written by the soldiers on every door, and everyfence-board along the route to the capital, and the thought of atriumphant march down the Champs Elysees was uppermost with everyGerman, from the highest to the lowest grade. 

The 5th of September we set out for Rheims. There it was said theGermans would meet with strong resistance, for the French intended todie to the last man before giving up that city. But this proved allfudge, as is usual with these "last ditch" promises, the garrisondecamping immediately at the approach of a few Uhlans. So far as Icould learn, but a single casualty happened; this occurred to anUhlan, wounded by a shot which it was reported was fired from a houseafter the town was taken; so, to punish this breach of faith, a levyof several hundred bottles of champagne was made, and the winedivided about headquarters, being the only seizure made in the city, I believe, for though Rheims, the centre of the champagne district, had its cellars well stocked, yet most of them being owned by Germanfirms, they received every protection. 

The land about Rheims is of a white, chalky character, and very poor, but having been terraced and enriched with fertilizers, it producesthe champagne grape in such abundance that the region, onceconsidered valueless, and named by the peasantry the "land of thelouse, " now supports a dense population. We remained in Rheims eightdays, and through the politeness of the American Consul--Mr. AdolphGill--had the pleasure of seeing all the famous wine cellars, andinspecting the processes followed in champagne making, from the stepof pressing the juice from the grape to that which shows the wineready for the market. Mr. Gill also took us to see everything elseof special interest about the city, and there being much to look at--fine old churches, ancient fortifications, a Roman gateway, etc. --the days slipped by very quickly, though the incessant rainssomewhat interfered with our enjoyment. 

For three or four days all sorts of rumors were rife as to what wasdoing in Paris, but nothing definite was learned till about the 9th;then Count Bismarck informed me that the Regency had been overthrownon the 4th, and that the Empress Eugenie had escaped to Belgium. TheKing of Prussia offered her an asylum with the Emperor atWilhelmshohe, "where she ought to go, " said the Chancellor, "for herproper place is with her husband, " but he feared she would not. Onthe same occasion he also told me that Jules Favre--the head of theProvisional Government--had sent him the suggestion that, the Empirebeing gone, peace should be made and the Germans withdrawn, but thathe (Bismarck) was now compelled to recognize the impossibility ofdoing this till Paris was taken, for although immediately after thesurrender of Sedan he desired peace, the past few days had made itplain that the troops would not be satisfied with anything short ofParis, no matter what form of Government the French should ultimatelyadopt. 

The German army having met with no resistance whatever in its marchon Paris, its advance approached the capital rapidly, and by the 14thof September the royal headquarters moved by a fine macadamized roadto the Chateau Thierry, and on the 5th reached Meaux, abouttwenty-eight miles from Paris, where we remained four days awaiting thereconstruction of some railroad and canal bridges. The town of Meauxhas a busy population of about 10, 000 souls, in peaceable timesprincipally occupied in manufacturing flour for the Paris market, having a fine waterpower for the many mills. These were kept going dayand night to supply the German army; and it was strange to see withwhat zeal Frenchmen toiled to fill the stomachs of their inveterateenemies, and with what alacrity the mayor and other officials filledrequisitions for wine, cheese, suits of livery, riding-whips, and evensquab pigeons. 

During our stay at Meaux the British Minister Lord Lyons, endeavoredto bring about a cessation of hostilities, to this end sending hissecretary out from Paris with a letter to Count Bismarck, offering toserve as mediator. The Chancellor would not agree to this, however, for he conjectured that the action of the British Minister had beeninspired by Jules Favre, who, he thought, was trying to draw theGermans into negotiations through the medium of a third party onlyfor purposes of delay. So the next morning Lord Lyons's secretary, Mr. Edward Malet, returned to Paris empty-handed, except that he borea communication positively declining mediation; which message, however, led no doubt to an interview between Bismarck and Favre acouple of days later. 

The forenoon of September 19 the King removed to the ChateauFerrieres--a castle belonging to the Rothschild family, whereNapoleon had spent many happy days in the time of his prosperity. His Majesty took up his quarters here at the suggestion of the owner, we were told, so that by the presence of the King the magnificentchateau and its treasures of art would be unquestionably protectedfrom all acts of vandalism. 

All of the people at headquarters except the King's immediate suitewere assigned quarters at Lagny; and while Forsyth and I, accompaniedby Sir Henry Havelock, of the British army, were driving thither, wepassed on the road the representative of the National DefenseGovernment, Jules Favre, in a carriage heading toward Meaux. Preceded by a flag of truce and accompanied by a single, companion, he was searching for Count Bismarck, in conformity, doubtless, withthe message the Chancellor had sent to Paris on the 17th by theBritish secretary. A half-mile further on we met Bismarck. He toowas traveling toward Meaux, not in the best of humor either, itappeared, for having missed finding the French envoy at therendezvous where they had agreed to meet, he stopped long enough tosay that the "air was full of lies, and that there were many personswith the army bent on business that did not concern them. "

The armies of the two Crown Princes were now at the outskirts ofParis. They had come from Sedan mainly by two routes--the CrownPrince of Saxony marching by the northern line, through Laon andSoissons, and the Crown Prince of Prussia by the southern line, keeping his right wing on the north bank of the Marne, while his leftand centre approached the French capital by roads between that riverand the Seine. 

The march of these armies had been unobstructed by any resistanceworth mentioning, and as the routes of both columns lay through aregion teeming with everything necessary for their support, and richeven in luxuries, it struck me that such campaigning was more a vastpicnic than like actual war. The country supplied at all pointsbread, meat, and wine in abundance, and the neat villages, never morethan a mile or two apart, always furnished shelter; hence theenormous trains required to feed and provide camp equipage for anarmy operating in a sparsely settled country were dispensed with; intruth, about the only impedimenta of the Germans was their wagonscarrying ammunition, pontoon-boats, and the field-telegraph. 

On the morning of the 20th I started out accompanied by Forsyth andSir Henry Havelock, and took the road through Boissy St. George, Boissy St. Martins and Noisy Le Grand to Brie. Almost every foot ofthe way was strewn with fragments of glass from wine bottles, emptiedand then broken by the troops. There was, indeed, so much of thisthat I refrain from making any estimate of the number of bottles, lest I be thought to exaggerate, but the road was literally pavedwith glass, and the amount of wine consumed (none was wasted) musthave been enormous, far more, even, than I had seen evidence of atany time before. There were two almost continuous lines of brokenbottles along the roadsides all the way down from Sedan; but thatexhibit was small compared with what we saw about Brie. 

At Brie we were taken charge of by the German commandant of theplace. He entertained us most hospitably for an hour or so, andthen, accompanied by a lieutenant, who was to be our guide, I set outahead of my companions to gain a point on the picket-line where Iexpected to get a good look at the French, for their rifle-pits werebut a few hundred yards off across the Marne, their main line beingjust behind the rifle-pits. As the lieutenant and I rode through thevillage, some soldiers warned us that the adventure would bedangerous, but that we could probably get to the desired place unhurtif we avoided the French fire by forcing our horses to a run incrossing some open streets where we would be exposed. On getting tothe first street my guide galloped ahead to show the way, and as theFrench were not on the lookout for anything of the kind at thesedangerous points, only a few stray shots were drawn by thelieutenant, but when I followed, they were fully up to what was goingon, and let fly a volley every time they saw me in the open. Fortunately, however, in their excitement they overshot, but when Idrew rein alongside of my guide under protection of the bluff wherethe German picket was posted, my hair was all on end, and I was aboutas badly scared as ever I had been in my life. As soon as I couldrecover myself I thought of Havelock and Forsyth, with the hope thatthey would not follow; nor did they, for having witnessed myexperience, they wisely concluded that, after all, they did not careso much to see the French rifle-pits. 

When I had climbed to the top of the bluff I was much disappointed, for I could see but little--only the advanced rifle-pits across theriver, and Fort Nogent beyond them, not enough, certainly, to repay anon-combatant for taking the risk of being killed. The next questionwas to return, and deciding to take no more such chances as those wehad run in coming out, I said we would wait till dark, but thisproved unnecessary, for to my utter astonishment my guide informed methat there was a perfectly safe route by which we might go back. Iasked why we had not taken it in coming, and he replied that he hadthought it "too long and circuitous. " To this I could say nothing, but I concluded that that was not quite the correct reason; the truthis that early that morning the young fellow had been helping to emptysome of the many wine bottles I saw around Brie, and consequently hada little more "Dutch courage"--was a little more rash--than wouldhave been the case under other conditions. 

I rode back to Brie by the "long and circuitous" route, and inquiringthere for my companions, found Havelock waiting to conduct me to thevillage of Villiers, whither, he said, Forsyth had been called tomake some explanation about his passport, which did not appear to bein satisfactory shape. Accordingly we started for Villiers, andHavelock, being well mounted on an English "hunter, " and wishing togive me an exhibition of the animal's training and power, led the wayacross ditches and fences, but my horse, never having followed "thehounds, " was unsafe to experiment with, so, after trying a low fenceor two, I decided to leave my friend alone in his diversion, and afew moments later, seeing both horse and rider go down before a ditchand high stone wall, I was convinced that my resolution was adiscreet one. After this mishap, which luckily resulted in no harm, I hoped Sir Henry would give up the amusement, but by failurebecoming only the more determined, in a second effort he cleared thewall handsomely and rode across-country to the villages. Followingthe road till it passed under a railway bridge, I there thought I sawa chance to gain Villiers by a short-cut, and changing my courseaccordingly, I struck into a large vineyard to the left, andproceeding a few hundred yards through the vines, came suddenly upona German picket-post. The guard immediately leveled their rifles atme, when, remembering my Rezonville experience of being taken for aFrench officer because of my uniform, I hastily flung myself from thesaddle in token of surrender. The action being rightly interpreted, the men held their fire, and as my next thought was the King's pass Ireached under my coat-skirt for the document, but this motion beingtaken as a grab for my pistol, the whole lot of them--some ten innumber--again aimed at me, and with such loud demands for surrenderthat I threw up my hands and ran into their ranks. The officer ofthe guard then coming up, examined my credentials, and seeing thatthey were signed by the King of Prussia, released me and directed therecovery of my horse, which was soon caught, and I was then conductedto the quarters of the commandant, where I found Forsyth with hispass properly vised, entirely ignorant of my troubles, andcontentedly regaling himself on cheese and beer. Havelock having gotto the village ahead of me, thanks to his cross-country ride, wasthere too, sipping beer with Forsyth; nor was I slow to follow theirexample, for the ride of the day, though rather barren in otherresults, at any rate had given me a ravenous appetite. 

Late that evening, the 20th, we resumed our old quarters at Lagny, and early next day I made a visit to the royal headquarters atFerrires, where I observed great rejoicing going on, the occasion forit being an important victory gained near Mendon, a French corps ofabout 30, 000 men under General Ducrot having been beaten by the FifthPrussian and Second Bavarian corps. Ducrot had been stubbornlyholding ground near Mendon for two or three days, much to theembarrassment of the Germans too, since he kept them from closing agap in their line to the southwest of Paris; but in the recent fighthe had been driven from the field with such heavy loss as to renderimpossible his maintaining the gap longer. The Crown Prince ofPrussia was thus enabled to extend his left, without danger, as faras Bougival, north of Versailles, and eventually met the right of theCrown Prince of Saxony, already at Denil, north of St. Denis. Theunbroken circle of investment around Paris being well-nigh assured, news of its complete accomplishment was momentarily expected;therefore everybody was jubilant on account of the breaking up ofDucrot, but more particularly because word had been received the samemorning that a correspondence had begun between Bazaine and PrinceFrederick Charles, looking to the capitulation of Metz, for thesurrender of that place would permit the Second Army to join in thesiege of Paris. 

Learning all this, and seeing that the investment was aboutcompleted, I decided to take up my quarters at Versailles, andstarted for that place on the 22d, halting at Noisy le Grand to takeluncheon with some artillery officers, whose acquaintance we had madethe day of the surrender at Sedan. During the meal I noticed twoAmerican flags flying on a couple of houses near by. Inquiring thesignificance of this, I was told that the flags had been put up toprotect the buildings--the owners, two American citizens, having in abad fright abandoned their property, and, instead of remainingoutside, gone into Paris, --"very foolishly, " said our hospitablefriends, "for here they could have obtained food in plenty, and beenperfectly secure from molestation. "

We arrived at Versailles about 7 o'clock that evening and settledourselves in the Hotel Reservoir, happy to find there two or threeAmerican families, with whom, of course, we quickly madeacquaintance. This American circle was enlarged a few days later bythe arrival of General Wm. B. Hazen, of our army, General Ambrose E. Burnside, and Mr. Paul Forbes. Burnside and Forbes were hot to see, from the French side, something of the war, and being almost besidethemselves to get into Paris, a permit was granted them by CountBismarck, and they set out by way of Sevres, Forsyth and Iaccompanying them as far as the Palace of St. Cloud, which we, proposed to see, though there were strict orders against its beingvisited generally. After much trouble we managed, through the "opensesame" of the King's pass, to gain access to the palace; but to ourgreat disappointment we found that all the pictures had been cut fromthe frames and carried off to Paris, except one portrait, that ofQueen Victoria, against whom the French were much incensed. Allother works of art had been removed, too--a most fortunatecircumstance, for the palace being directly on the German line, wasraked by the guns from the fortress of Mont Valerien, and in a fewdays burned to the ground. 

In less than a week Burnside and Forbes returned from Paris. Theytold us their experience had been interesting, but were very reticentas to particulars, and though we tried hard to find out what they hadseen or done, we could get nothing from them beyond the generalstatement that they had had a good time, and that General Trochu hadbeen considerate enough to postpone a sortie, in order to let themreturn; but this we did not quite swallow. After a day or two theywent into Paris again, and I then began to suspect that they wereessaying the role of mediators, and that Count Bismarck was feedingtheir vanity with permits, and receiving his equivalent by learningthe state of affairs within the beleaguered city. 

From about the 1st of October on, the Germans were engaged in makingtheir enveloping lines impenetrable, bringing up their reserves, siege guns, and the like, the French meanwhile continuing to drilland discipline the National Guard and relieving the monotonyoccasionally by a more or less spirited, but invariably abortive, sortie. The most notable of these was that made by General Vinoyagainst the heights of Clamart, the result being a disastrous repulseby the besiegers. After this, matters settled down to an almostuninterrupted quietude, only a skirmish here and there; and it beingplain that the Germans did not intend to assault the capital, butwould accomplish its capture by starvation, I concluded to find outfrom Count Bismarck about when the end was expected, with the purposeof spending the interim in a little tour through some portions ofEurope undisturbed by war, returning in season for the capitulation. Count Bismarck having kindly advised me as to the possible date. 

Forsyth and I, on the 14th of October, left Versailles, going firstdirect to the Chateau Ferrieres to pay our respects to the King, which we did, and again took luncheon with him. From the chateau wedrove to Meaux, and there spent the night; resuming our journey nextmorning, we passed through Epernay, Rheims, and Rethel to Sedan, where we tarried a day, and finally, on October 18, reached Brussels. 

CHAPTER XX. 

BRUSSELS--DECIDING TO VISIT EASTERN EUROPE--AUSTRIA--DOWN THE DANUBE--IN CONSTANTINOPLE--THE LADIES OF THE HAREM--THE SULTAN--TURKISHSOLDIERS--A BANQUET--A VISIT IN ATHENS--KING GEORGE OF GREECE--VICTOREMMANUEL--"BEDEVILED WITH CARES OF STATE"--DEER SHOOTING--A MILITARYDINNER--RETURN TO VERSAILLES--GERMANS ENTERING PARIS--CRITICISM ONTHE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR--CONCLUSION. 

On reaching Brussels, one of the first things to do was to pay myrespects to the King of Belgium, which I did, accompanied by ourMinister, Mr. Russell Jones. Later I dined with the King and Queen, meeting at the dinner many notable people, among them the Count andCountess of Flanders. A day or two in Brussels sufficed to matureour plans for spending the time up to the approximate date of ourreturn to Paris; and deciding to visit eastern Europe, we made Viennaour first objective, going there by way of Dresden. 

At Vienna our Minister, Mr. John Jay, took charge of us--Forsyth wasstill with me--and the few days' sojourn was full of interest. TheEmperor being absent from the capital, we missed seeing him; but thePrime Minister, Count von Beust, was very polite to us, and at hishouse we had the pleasure of meeting at dinner Count Andrassy, thePrime Minister of Hungary. 

From Vienna we went to Buda-Pesth, the Hungarian capital; and thence, in a I small, crowded, and uncomfortable steamboat, down the Danubeto Rustchuck, whence we visited Bucharest--all who travel in easternEurope do so--and then directing our course southward, we went firstto Varna, and from that city by steamer through the Black Sea toConstantinople. 

We reached the Turkish capital at the time of Ramadan, the period ofthe year (about a month) during which the Mohammedans are commandedby the Koran to keep a rigorous fast every day from sunrise tillsunset. All the followers of the Prophet were therefore busy withtheir devotions--holding a revival, as it were; hence there was nochance whatever to be presented to the Sultan, Abdul Aziz, it beingforbidden during the penitential season for him to receiveunbelievers, or in fact any one except the officials of hishousehold. However, the Grand Vizier brought me many messages ofwelcome, and arranged that I should be permitted to see and salutehis Serene Highness on the Esplanade as he rode by on horseback tothe mosque. 

So, the second day after arrival, the Grand Vizier drove me in abarouche to the Esplanade, where we took station about midway of itslength an hour or so before the Sultan was to appear. Shortly afterwe reached the Esplanade, carriages occupied by the women of theSultan's harem began to appear, coming out from the palace groundsand driving up and down the roadway. Only a few of the women wereclosely veiled, a majority of them wearing an apology for veiling, merely a strip of white lace covering the forehead down to theeyebrows. Some were yellow, and some white-types of the Mongolianand Caucasian races. Now and then a pretty face was seen, rarely abeautiful one. Many were plump, even to corpulence, and these werethe closest veiled, being considered the greatest beauties I presume, since with the Turk obesity is the chief element of comeliness. Asthe carriages passed along in review, every now and then an occupant, unable or unwilling to repress her natural promptings, would indulgein a mild flirtation, making overtures by casting demureside-glances, throwing us coquettish kisses, or waving strings of amberbeads with significant gestures, seeming to say: "Why don't youfollow?" But this we could not do if we would, for the Esplanadethroughout its entire length was lined with soldiers, put thereespecially to guard the harem first, and later, the Sultan on hispilgrimage to the mosque. 

But as it was now time for His Serene Highness to make his appearancethe carriages containing his wives drove off into the palace grounds, which were inclosed by a high wall, leaving the Esplanade whollyunencumbered except by the soldiers. Down between the two ranks, which were formed facing each other, came the Sultan on a whitesteed--a beautiful Arabian--and having at his side his son, a boyabout ten or twelve years old, who was riding a pony, a diminutivecopy of his father's mount, the two attended by a numerousbody-guard, dressed in gorgeous Oriental uniforms. As the processionpassed our carriage, I, as pre-arranged, stood up and took off myhat, His Serene Highness promptly acknowledging the salute by raisinghis hand to the forehead. This was all I saw of him, yet I receivedevery kindness at his hands, being permitted to see many of histroops, to inspect all the ordnance, equipment, and other militaryestablishments about Constantinople, and to meet numbers of the highfunctionaries of the Empire. 

Among other compliments tendered through his direction, and which Igladly accepted, was a review of all the troops then in Stamboul--about 6, 000--comprising infantry, cavalry, and artillery. 

They were as fine looking a body of soldiers as I ever saw--wellarmed and well clothed, the men all large and of sturdy appearance. 

After the review we attended a grand military dinner given by theGrand Vizier. At the hour set for this banquet we presentedourselves at the palace of the Grand Vizier, and being ushered into alarge drawing-room, found already assembled there the guests invitedto meet us. Some few spoke French, and with these we managed toexchange an occasional remark; but as the greater number stood aboutin silence, the affair, thus far, was undeniably a little stiff. Just before the dinner was announced, all the Turkish officers wentinto an adjoining room, and turning their faces to the east, prostrated themselves to the floor in prayer. Then we were allconducted to a large salon, where each being provided with a silverewer and basin, a little ball of highly perfumed soap and a napkin, set out on small tables, each guest washed his hands. Adjacent tothis salon was the dining-room, or, rather, the banqueting room, avery large and artistically frescoed hall, in the centre of whichstood a crescent-shaped table, lighted with beautiful silvercandelabra, and tastefully decorated with flowers and fruits. Theviands were all excellent; cooked, evidently, by a French chef, andfull justice was done the dishes, especially by the Turks, who, ofcourse, had been fasting all day. 

At the close of the banquet, which consisted of not less than fifteencourses, we withdrew to a smoking-room, where the coffee was servedand cigarettes and chibouks offered us--the latter a pipe having along flexible stem with an amber mouthpiece. I chose the chibouk, and as the stem of mine was studded with precious stones of enormousvalue, I thought I should enjoy it the more; but the tobacco beinghighly flavored with some sort of herbs, my smoke fell far short ofmy anticipations. The coffee was delicious, however, and I foundthis to be the case wherever I went in Constantinople, whether inmaking calls or at dinner, the custom of offering coffee and tobaccoon these occasions being universal. 

The temptations to linger at Constantinople were many indeed, not theleast being the delightful climate; and as time pressed, we set outwith much regret on the return journey, stopping a few days atAthens, whence we made several short excursions into the interior. King George and Queen Olga made our stay in Athens one of extremeinterest and exceeding pleasure. Throwing aside all ceremony, theybreakfasted and dined us informally, gave us a fine ball, and inaddition to these hospitalities showed us much personal attention, his Majesty even calling upon me, and the Queen sending her childrento see us at our hotel. 

Of course we visited all that remained of the city's ancientcivilization--the Acropolis, temples, baths, towers, and the like;nor did we omit to view the spot where St. Paul once instructed theAthenians in lessons of Christianity. We traveled some littlethrough the country districts outside of Athens, and I noticed thatthe peasantry, in point of picturesqueness of dress and color ofcomplexion, were not unlike the gypsies we see at times in America. They had also much of the same shrewdness, and, as far as I couldlearn, were generally wholly uneducated, ignorant, indeed, except asto one subject--politics--which I was told came to them intuitively, they taking to it, and a scramble for office, as naturally as a duckto water. In fact, this common faculty for politics seems aconnecting link between the ancient and modern Greek. 

Leaving Athens with the pleasantest recollections, we sailed forMessina, Sicily, and from there went to Naples, where we found manyold friends; among them Mr. Buchanan Reed, the artist and poet, andMiss Brewster, as well as a score or more of others of ourcountrymen, then or since distinguished, in art and letters at homeand abroad. We remained some days in Naples, and during the timewent to Pompeii to witness a special excavation among the ruins ofthe buried city, which search was instituted on account of our visit. A number of ancient household articles were dug up, and one, a terracotta lamp bearing upon its crown in bas-relief the legend of "Ledaand the Swan, " was presented to me as a souvenir of the occasion, though it is usual for the Government to place in its museumseverything of such value that is unearthed. 

From Naples to Rome by rail was our next journey. In the EternalCity we saw picture-galleries, churches, and ruins in plenty, but allthese have been so well described by hundreds of other travelers thatI shall not linger even to name them. While at Rome we alsowitnessed an overflow of the Tiber, that caused great suffering anddestroyed much property. The next stage of our tour took us toVenice, then to Florence--the capital of Italy--for although thetroops of the King of Italy had taken possession of Rome thepreceding September, the Government itself had not yet removedthither. 

At Florence, our Minister, Mr. Marsh, though suffering with a lamefoot, took me in charge, and in due course of time I was presented toKing Victor-Emmanuel. His Majesty received me informally at hispalace in a small, stuffy room--his office, no doubt--and an untidyone it was too. He wore a loose blouse and very baggy trousers; acomfortable suit, certainly, but not at all conducing to an idealkingliness of appearance. 

His Majesty's hobby was hunting, and no sooner had I made my bow thanhe began a conversation on that subject, thrusting his hands nearlyup to the elbows into the pockets of his trousers. He desired tolearn about the large game of America, particularly the buffalo, andwhen I spoke of the herds of thousands and thousands I had seen onthe plains of western Kansas, he interrupted me to bemoan the fatewhich kept him from visiting America to hunt, even going so far as tosay that "he didn't wish to be King of Italy, anyhow, but would muchprefer to pass his days hunting than be bedeviled with the cares ofstate. " On one of his estates, near Pisa, he had several large herdsof deer, many wild boars, and a great deal of other game. Of thispreserve he was very proud, and before we separated invited me to godown there to shoot deer, adding that he would be there himself if hecould, but feared that a trip which he had to take to Milan wouldinterfere, though he wished me to go in any event. 

I gladly accepted the invitation, and in two or three days wasnotified when I would be expected at the estate. At the designatedtime I was escorted to Pisa by an aide-de-camp, and from there wedrove the few miles to the King's chateau, where we fortifiedourselves for the work in hand by an elaborate and toothsomebreakfast of about ten courses. Then in a carriage we set out forthe King's stand in the hunting-grounds, accompanied by a crowd ofmounted game-keepers, who with great difficulty controlled the packof sixty or seventy hounds, the dogs and keepers together almostdriving me to distraction with their yelping and yelling. Onreaching the stand, I was posted within about twenty' yards of along, high picket-fence, facing the fence and covered by two treesvery close together. It was from behind these that the King usuallyshot, and as I was provided with a double-barreled shot-gun, Ithought I could do well, especially since close in rear of me stoodtwo game-keepers to load and hand me a second gun when the first wasemptied. 

Meantime the huntsmen and the hounds had made a circuit of the parkto drive up the game. The yelps of the hounds drawing near, Icautiously looked in the direction of the sound, and the next momentsaw a herd of deer close in to the fence, and coming down at fullspeed. Without a miss, I shot the four leading ones as they triedto run the gauntlet, for in passing between the stand and the fence, the innocent creatures were not more than ten to fifteen paces fromme. At the fourth I stopped, but the gamekeepers insisted on morebutchery, saying, "No one but the King ever did the like" (I guess noone else had ever had the chance), so, thus urged, I continued firingtill I had slaughtered eleven with eleven shots--an easy task with ashot-gun and buckshot cartridges. 

The "hunt" being ended--for with this I had had enough, and no oneelse was permitted to do any shooting--the aide-decamp directed thegame to be sent to me in Florence, and we started for the chateau. On the way back I saw a wild boar the first and only one I ever saw--my attention being drawn to him by cries from some of thegame-keepers. There was much commotion, the men pointing out the gameand shouting excitedly, "See the wild boar!" otherwise I should nothave known what was up, but now, looking in the indicated direction, Isaw scudding over the plain what appeared to me to be nothing but ahalfgrown black pig, or shoat. He was not in much of a hurry either, and gave no evidence of ferocity, yet it is said that thisinsignificant looking animal is dangerous when hunted with the spear--the customary way. After an early dinner at the chateau we returnedto Florence, and my venison next day arriving, it was distributed amongmy American friends in the city. 

Shortly after the hunt the King returned from Milan, and then honoredme with a military dinner, his Majesty and all the guests, numberingeighty, appearing in full uniform. The banqueting hall was lightedwith hundreds of wax candles, there was a profusion of beautifulflowers, and to me the scene altogether was one of unusualmagnificence. The table service was entirely of gold--the celebratedset of the house of Savoy--and behind the chair of each guest stood aservant in powdered wig and gorgeous livery of red plush. I sat atthe right of the King, who--his hands resting on his sword, the hiltof which glittered with jewels--sat through the hour and a half attable without once tasting food or drink, for it was his rule to eatbut two meals in twenty-four hours--breakfast at noon, and dinner atmidnight. The King remained silent most of the time, but when he didspeak, no matter on what subject, he inevitably drifted back tohunting. He never once referred to the Franco-Prussian war, nor tothe political situation in his own country, then passing through acrisis. In taking leave of his Majesty I thanked him with deepgratitude for honoring me so highly, and his response was that ifever he came to America to hunt buffalo, he should demand myassistance. 

From Florence I went to Milan and Geneva, then to Nice, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. Assembled at Bordeaux was a convention which had beencalled together by the government of the National Defense for thepurpose of confirming or rejecting the terms of an armistice oftwenty-one days, arranged between Jules Favre and Count Bismarck innegotiations begun at Versailles the latter part of January. Theconvention was a large body, chosen from all parts of France, and wasunquestionably the most noisy, unruly and unreasonable set of beingsthat I ever saw in a legislative assembly. The frequent efforts ofThiers, Jules Favre, and other leading men to restrain the moreimpetuous were of little avail. When at the sittings a delegatearose to speak on some question, he was often violently pulled to hisseat and then surrounded by a mob of his colleagues, who would throwoff their coats and gesticulate wildly, as though about to fight. 

But the bitter pill of defeat had to be swallowed in some way, so theconvention delegated M. Thiers to represent the executive power ofthe country, with authority to construct a ministry threecommissioners were appointed by the Executive, to enter into furthernegotiations with Count Bismarck at Versailles and arrange a peace, the terms of which, however, were to be submitted to the conventionfor final action. Though there had been so much discussion, it tookbut a few days to draw up and sign a treaty at Versailles, theprincipal negotiators being Thiers and Jules Favre for France, andBismarck on the part of the Germans. The terms agreed upon providedfor the occupation of Paris till ratification should be had by theconvention at Bordeaux; learning of which stipulation from ourMinister, Mr. Washburn, I hurried off to Paris to see the conquerorsmake their triumphal entry. 

In the city the excitement was at fever heat, of course; the entirepopulation protesting with one voice that they would never, neverlook upon the hated Germans marching through their beloved city. No!when the day arrived they would hide themselves in their houses, orshut their eyes to such a hateful sight. But by the 1st of March achange had come over the fickle Parisians, for at an early hour thesidewalks were jammed with people, and the windows and doors of thehouses filled with men, women, and children eager to get a look atthe conquerors. Only a few came in the morning, however--anadvance-guard of perhaps a thousand cavalry and infantry. The maincolumn marched from the Arc-de-Triomphe toward the middle of theafternoon. In its composition it represented United Germany--Saxons, Bavarians, and the Royal Guard of Prussia--and, to the strains ofmartial music, moving down the Champ Elysees to the Place de laConcorde, was distributed thence over certain sections of the cityagreed upon beforehand. Nothing that could be called a disturbancetook place during the march; and though there was a hiss now and thenand murmurings of discontent, yet the most noteworthy mutterings weredirected against the defunct Empire. Indeed, I found everywhere thatthe national misfortunes were laid at Napoleon's door--he, by thistime, having become a scapegoat for every blunder of the war. 

The Emperor William (he had been proclaimed German Emperor atVersailles the 18th of January) did not accompany his troops intoParis, though he reviewed them at Long Champs before they started. After the occupation of the city he still remained at Versailles, andas soon as circumstances would permit, I repaired to the Imperialheadquarters to pay my respects to his Majesty under his new titleand dignities, and to say good-bye. 

Besides the Emperor, the only persons I me at Versailles were Generalvon Moltke and Bismarck. His Majesty was in a very agreeable frameof mind, and as bluff and hearty as usual. His increased rank andpower had effected no noticeable change of any kind in him, and byhis genial and cordial ways he made me think that my presence withthe German army had contributed to his pleasure. Whether this wasreally so or not, I shall always believe it true, for his kind wordsand sincere manner could leave no other conclusion. 

General von Moltke was, as usual, quiet and reserved, betraying notthe slightest consciousness of his great ability, nor the leastindication of pride on account of his mighty work. I say thisadvisedly, for it is an undoubted fact that it was his marvelousmind that perfected the military system by which 800, 000 men weremobilized with unparalleled celerity and moved with such certainty ofcombination that, in a campaign of seven months, the military powerof France was destroyed and her vast resources sorely crippled. 

I said good-bye to Count Bismarck, also, for at that busy time thechances of seeing him again were very remote. The great Chancellormanifested more joy over the success of the Germans than did anyoneelse at the Imperial headquarters. Along with his towering strengthof mind and body, his character partook of much of the enthusiasm andimpulsiveness commonly restricted to younger men, and now in hisfrank, free way be plainly showed his light-heartedness andgratification at success. That which for years his genius had beenplanning and striving for--permanent unification of the GermanStates, had been accomplished by the war. It had welded themtogether in a compact Empire which no power in Europe could disrupt, and as such a union was the aim of Bismarck's life, he surely had aright to feel jubilant. 

Thanks to the courtesies extended me, I had been able to observe theprincipal battles, and study many of the minor details of a warbetween two of the greatest military nations of the world, and toexamine critically the methods followed abroad for subsisting, equipping, and manoeuvring vast bodies of men during a stupendous, campaign. Of course I found a great deal to interest and instructme, yet nowadays war is pretty much the same everywhere, and this oneoffered no marked exception to my previous experiences. The methodspursued on the march were the same as we would employ, with one mostimportant exception. Owing to the density of population throughoutFrance it was always practicable for the Germans to quarter theirtroops in villages, requiring the inhabitants to subsist bothofficers and men. Hence there was no necessity for camp and garrisonequipage, nor enormous provision trains, and the armies wereunencumbered by these impedimenta, indispensable when operating in apoor and sparsely settled country. As I have said before, the onlytrains were those for ammunition, pontoon-boats, and the fieldtelegraph, and all these were managed by special corps. Iftransportation was needed for other purposes, it was obtained byrequisition from the invaded country, just as food and forage weresecured. Great celerity of combination was therefore possible, thecolumns moving in compact order, and as all the roads were broad andmacadamized, there was little or nothing to delay or obstruct themarch of the Germans, except when their enemy offered resistance, buteven this was generally slight and not very frequent, for the Frenchwere discouraged by disaster from the very outset of the campaign. 

The earlier advantages gained by the Germans may be ascribed to thestrikingly prompt mobilization of their armies, one of the mostnoticeable features of their perfect military system, devised byalmost autocratic power; their later successes were greatly aided bythe blunders of the French, whose stupendous errors materiallyshortened the war, though even if prolonged it could, in my opinion, have had ultimately no other termination. 

As I have previously stated, the first of these blunders was theacceptance of battle by MacMahon at Worth; the second in attachingtoo much importance to the fortified position of Metz, resulting inthree battles Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, and Gravelotte--all of whichwere lost; and the third, the absurd movement of MacMahon along theBelgian frontier to relieve Metz, the responsibility for which, I amglad to say, does not belong to him. 

With the hemming in of Bazaine at Metz and the capture of MacMahon'sarmy at Sedan the crisis of the war was passed, and the Germanspractically the victors. The taking of Paris was but a sentiment--the money levy could have been made and the Rhine provinces heldwithout molesting that city, and only the political influencesconsequent upon the changes in the French Government caused peace tobe deferred. 

I did not have much opportunity to observe the German cavalry, eitheron the march or in battle. The only time I saw any of it engaged wasin the unfortunate charge at Gravelotte. That proved its mettle goodand discipline fair, but answered no other purpose. Such of it aswas not attached to the infantry was organized in divisions, andoperated in accordance with the old idea of covering the front andflanks of the army, a duty which it thoroughly performed. But thusdirected it was in no sense an independent corps, and hence cannotbe, said to have accomplished anything in the campaign, or have had aweight or influence at all proportionate to its strength. The methodof its employment seemed to me a mistake, for, being numericallysuperior to the French cavalry, had it been massed and manoeuvredindependently of the infantry, it could easily have broken up theFrench communications, and done much other work of weighty influencein the prosecution of the war. 

The infantry was as fine as I ever saw, the men young and hardy inappearance, and marching always with an elastic stride. The infantryregiment, however, I thought too large--too many men for a colonel tocommand unless he has the staff of a general--but this objection maybe counterbalanced by the advantages resulting from associatingtogether thus intimately the men from the same district, or county aswe would call it; the celerity of mobilization, and, in truth, thevery foundation of the German system, being based on this local orterritorial scheme of recruiting. 

There was no delay when the call sounded for the march; all turnedout promptly, and while on the road there was very little straggling, only the sick falling out. But on such fine, smooth roads, and withsuccess animating the men from the day they struck the first blow, itcould hardly be expected that the columns would not keep well closedup. Then, too, it must be borne in mind that, as already stated, 'campaigning' in France--that is, the marching, camping, andsubsisting of an army--is an easy matter, very unlike anything we, had during the war of the rebellion. To repeat: the country is rich, beautiful, and densely populated, subsistence abundant, and theroads--all macadamized highways; thus the conditions; are altogetherdifferent from those existing with us. I think that under the samecircumstances our troops would have done as well as the Germans, marched as admirably, made combinations as quickly and accurately, and fought with as much success. I can but leave to conjecture how. The Germans would have got along on bottomless roads--often none atall--through the swamps and quicksands of northern Virginia, from, the Wilderness to Petersburg, and from Chattanooga to Atlanta and thesea. 

Following the operations of the German armies from the battle ofGravelotte to the siege of Paris, I may, in conclusion, say that Isaw no new military principles developed, whether of strategy orgrand tactics, the movements of the different armies and corps beingdictated and governed by the same general laws that have so longobtained, simplicity of combination and manoeuvre, and theconcentration of a numerically superior force at the vital point. 

After my brief trip to Versailles, I remained in Paris till thelatter part of March. In company with Mr. Washburn, I visited thefortifications for the defense of the city, and found them to beexceptionally heavy; so strong, indeed, that it would have been veryhard to carry the place by a general assault. The Germans, knowingthe character of the works, had refrained from the sacrifice of lifethat such an attempt must entail, though they well knew that many ofthe forts were manned by unseasoned soldiers. With only a combathere and there, to tighten their lines or repulse a sortie, theywisely preferred to wait till starvation should do the work withlittle loss and absolute certainty. 

The Germans were withdrawn from Paris on the 3d of March, and nosooner were they gone than factional quarrels, which had been goingon at intervals ever since the flight of the Empress and the fall ofher regency on the 4th of September, were renewed with revolutionarymethods that eventually brought about the Commune. Having witnessedone or two of these outbreaks, and concluding that while suchturbulence reigned in the city it would be of little profit for me totarry there, I decided to devote the rest of the time I could be awayfrom home to travel in England, Ireland, and Scotland. My journeysthrough those countries were full of pleasure and instruction, but asnothing I saw or did was markedly different from what has been sooften described by others, I will save the reader this part of myexperience. I returned to America in the fall, having been absent alittle more than a year, and although I saw much abroad of absorbinginterest, both professional and general, yet I came back to my nativeland with even a greater love for her, and with increased admirationfor her institutions.