* * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | Transcriber's Note: | | | | Inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | Obvious typographical errors have been corrected. For | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * Lessons of the War with Spain And Other Articles Lessons of the Warwith Spain _And Other Articles_ BYALFRED T. MAHAN, D. C. L. , LL. D. Captain United States Navy AUTHOR OF "THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER, " "THE INFLUENCEOF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783, " "THE INFLUENCEOF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, ""THE LIFE OF NELSON, THE EMBODIMENT OF THESEA POWER OF GREAT BRITAIN, " AND OFA "LIFE OF FARRAGUT" BOSTONLITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY1899 _Copyright, 1898, 1899, _BY THE S. S. MCCLURE CO. _Copyright, 1898, _BY HARPER AND BROTHERS _Copyright, 1899, _BY THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW PUBLISHING CO. _Copyright, 1899, _BY JOHN R. DUNLAP _Copyright, 1899, _BY ALFRED T. MAHAN _All rights reserved_ University PressJOHN WILSON AND SON, CAMBRIDGE, U. S. A. PREFACE The original intention, with which the leading articles of the presentcollection were undertaken, was to elicit some of the lessonsderivable from the war between the United States and Spain; but in theprocess of conception and of treatment there was imparted to them thefurther purpose of presenting, in a form as little technical and asmuch popular as is consistent with seriousness of treatment, some ofthe elementary conceptions of warfare in general and of naval warfarein particular. The importance of popular understanding in such mattersis twofold. It promotes interest and induces intelligent pressure uponthe representatives of the people, to provide during peace theorganization of force demanded by the conditions of the nation; and italso tends to avert the unintelligent pressure which, when war exists, is apt to assume the form of unreasoning and unreasonable panic. As aBritish admiral said two hundred years ago, "It is better to bealarmed now, as I am, than next summer when the French fleet may be inthe Channel. " Indifference in times of quiet leads directly toperturbation in emergency; for when emergency comes, indifference isfound to have resulted in ignorance, and fear is never so overpoweringas when, through want of comprehension, there is no check upon theluxuriance of the imagination. It is, of course, vain to expect that the great majority of men shouldattain even an elementary knowledge of what constitutes the strengthor weakness of a military situation; but it does not seem extravagantto hope that the individuals, who will interest themselves thus far, may be numerous enough, and so distributed throughout a country, as toconstitute rallying points for the establishment of a sound publicopinion, and thus, in critical moments, to liberate the responsibleauthorities from demands which, however unreasonable, norepresentative government can wholly withstand. The articles do not in any sense constitute a series. Written forvarious occasions, at various times, there is in them no sequence oftreatment, or even of conception. Except the last, however, they allhave had a common origin in the war with Spain. This may seem somewhatquestionable as regards the one on the Peace Conference; but, withoutassuming to divine all the motives which led to the call for thatassembly, the writer is persuaded that between it and the war therewas the direct sequence of a corollary to its proposition. Thehostilities with Spain brought doubtless the usual train ofsufferings, but these were not on such a scale as in themselves toprovoke an outcry for universal peace. The political consequences, onthe other hand, were much in excess of those commonly resultant fromwar, --even from maritime war. The quiet, superficially peacefulprogress with which Russia was successfully advancing her boundariesin Asia, adding gain to gain, unrestrained and apparentlyirrestrainable, was suddenly confronted with the appearance of theUnited States in the Philippines, under conditions which madeinevitable both a continuance of occupancy and a great increase ofmilitary and naval strength. This intrusion, into a sphere hithertoalien to it, of a new military power, capable of becoming one of thefirst force, if it so willed, was momentous in itself; but it wasattended further with circumstances which caused Great Britain, andGreat Britain alone among the nations of the earth, to appear thefriend of the United States in the latter's conflict. How thisfriendliness was emphasized in the Philippines is a matter of commonreport. Coincident with all this, though also partly preceding it, has beenthe growing recognition by the western nations, and by Japan, of theimminence of great political issues at stake in the near future ofChina. Whether regarded as a field for commerce, or for the exerciseof the varied activities by which the waste places of the earth areredeemed and developed, it is evidently a matter of economical--andtherefore of political--importance to civilized nations to prevent thetoo preponderant control there of any one of their number, lest theenergies of their own citizens be debarred from a fair opportunity toshare in these advantages. The present conditions, and the recentmanifestations of antagonism and rivalry, are too well known forrepetition. The general situation is sufficiently understood, yet itis doubtful whether the completeness and rapidity of the revolutionwhich has taken place in men's thoughts about the Pacific are dulyappreciated. They are shown not only by overt aggressive demands ofvarious European states, or by the extraordinary change of sentimenton the subject of expansion that has swept over America, but veryemphatically by the fact, little noted yet well assured, that leadingstatesmen of Japan--which only three years ago warned the UnitedStates Government that even the annexation of Hawaii could not by herbe seen with indifference--now welcome our presence in thePhilippines. This altered attitude, on the part of a people of such keenintelligence, has a justification which should not be ignored, and asignificance which should not be overlooked. It bears vivid testimonyto the rate at which events, as well as their appreciation of eventsand of conditions, have been advancing. It is one of the symptoms of agathering accord of conviction upon a momentous subject. At such atime, and on such a scene, the sympathetic drawing together of the twogreat English-speaking nations, intensely commercial and enterprising, yet also intensely warlike when aroused, and which exceed all othersin their possibilities of maritime greatness, gave reason forreflection far exceeding that which springs from imaginativecalculations of the future devastations of war. It was a direct resultof the war with Spain, inevitably suggesting a probable drift towardsconcurrent action upon the greatest question of the immediate future, in which the influence of force will be none the less real becausesedulously kept in the background of controversies. If, however, theorganic development of military strength could be temporarily arrestedby general agreement, or by the prevalence of an opinion that war ispractically a thing of the past, the odds would be in favor of thestate which at the moment of such arrest enjoys the most advantageousconditions of position, and of power already created. In reproducing these articles, the writer has done a little editing, of which it is needless to speak except in one respect. His views onthe utility of coast fortification have met with pronounced adversecriticism in some quarters in England. Of this he has neither causenor wish to complain; but he is somewhat surprised that his opinionson the subject here expressed are thought to be essentially opposed tothose he has previously avowed in his books, --the Influence ofSea-Power upon History, and upon the French Revolution. While whollyconvinced of the primacy of the navy in maritime warfare, andmaintaining the subordination to it of the elements of power whichrest mainly upon land positions, he has always clearly recognized, andincidentally stated, not only the importance of the latter, but thegeneral necessity of affording them the security of fortification, which enables a weaker force to hold its own against sudden attack, and until relief can be given. Fortifications, like natural accidentsof ground, serve to counterbalance superiority of numbers, or otherdisparity of means; both in land and sea warfare, therefore, and inboth strategy and tactics, they are valuable adjuncts to a defence, for they constitute a passive reinforcement of strength, whichliberates an active equivalent, in troops or in ships, for offensiveoperations. Nor was it anticipated that when coast defence byfortification was affirmed to be a nearly constant element, the word"constant" would be understood to mean the same for all countries, orunder varying conditions of popular panic, instead of applying to thedeliberate conclusions of competent experts dealing with a particularmilitary problem. Of the needs of Great Britain, British officers should be the bestjudge, although even there there is divergence of opinion; but to hisown countrymen the author would say that our experience has shown thatadequate protection of a frontier, by permanent works judiciouslyplanned, conduces to the energetic prosecution of offensive war. Thefears for Washington in the Civil War, and for our chief seaports inthe war with Spain, alike illustrate the injurious effects ofinsufficient home defence upon movements of the armies in the field, or of the navies in campaign. In both instances dispositions of themobile forces, vicious from a purely military standpoint, were imposedby fears for stationary positions believed, whether rightly orwrongly, to be in peril. For the permission to republish these articles the author begs tothank the proprietors of the several periodicals in which they firstappeared. The names of these, and the dates, are given, together withthe title of each article, in the Table of Contents. CONTENTS LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 1898. McClure's Magazine, December, 1898-April, 1899. PAGE INTRODUCTORY: COMPREHENSION OF MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS POSSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE, AND IMPORTANT TO THE NATION 3 I. How the Motive of the War gave Direction to its Earlier Movements. --Strategic Value of Puerto Rico. --Considerations on the Size and Qualities of Battleships. --Mutual Relations of Coast Defence and Navy 21 II. The Effect of Deficient Coast-Defence upon the Movements of the Navy. --The Military and Naval Conditions of Spain at the Outbreak of the War 53 III. Possibilities open to the Spanish Navy at the Beginning of the War. --The Reasons for Blockading Cuba. --First Movements of the Squadrons under Admirals Sampson and Cervera 90 IV. Problems presented by Cervera's Appearance in West Indian Waters. --Movements of the United States Divisions and of the _Oregon_. --Functions of Cruisers in a Naval Campaign 126 V. The Guard set over Cervera. --Influence of Inadequate Numbers upon the Conduct of Naval and Military Operations. --Cámara's Rush through the Mediterranean, and Consequent Measures taken by the United States 170 THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR 207 North American Review, October, 1899. THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES 241 Engineering Magazine, January, 1899. DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES OF SHIPS OF WAR 257 Scripps-McRae Newspaper League, November, 1898. CURRENT FALLACIES UPON NAVAL SUBJECTS 277 Harpers' Monthly Magazine, June, 1898. MAPS ISLAND OF CUBA _To face page_ 59 THE CARIBBEAN SEA _To face page_ 113 LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN AND OTHER ARTICLES LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN INTRODUCTORY COMPREHENSION OF MILITARY AND NAVAL MATTERS POSSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE, AND IMPORTANT TO THE NATION. It is somewhat of a commonplace among writers upon the Art of War, that with it, as with Art in general, the leading principles remainunimpaired from age to age. When recognized and truly mastered, notheld by a passive acquiescence in the statements of another, butreally appropriated, so as to enter decisively into a man's habit ofthought, forming in that direction the fibre of his mind, they notonly illuminate conditions apparently novel, by revealing theessential analogies between them and the past, but they supply theclue by which the intricacies of the present can best be threaded. Nothing could be more utterly superficial, for instance, than theremark of a popular writer that "the days of tacks and sheets"--ofsailing ships, that is--"have no value as lessons for the days ofsteam and armor. " Contrast with such an utterance the saying of thegreat master of the art, --Napoleon: "If a man will surprise thesecrets of warfare, let him study the campaigns of Hannibal and ofCæsar, as well as those of Frederick the Great and my own. " Comprehension of warfare, therefore, consists, first, in theapprehension and acceptance--the mental grasp--of a few simple generalprinciples, elucidated and formulated by admitted authorities upon thesubject, and, second, in copious illustration of these principles bythe application of them to numerous specific instances, drawn fromactual experiences of war--from history. Such illustration, adequatelydeveloped by exposition of facts and of principles in the severalcases, pointing out, where necessary, substantial identity underlyingsuperficial diversity, establishes gradually a body of precedents, which reinforce, by all the weight of cumulative authority, theprinciple that they illuminate. Thus is laid the substantialfoundation upon which the Art of War securely rests. It is perhapsadvisable--though it should be needless--to say that, when a studenthas achieved such comprehension, when his mind has mastered theprinciples, and his memory is richly stored with well-orderedprecedents, he is, in war, as in all other active pursuits of life, but at the beginning of his labors. He has girded on his armor, but hehas not yet proved it, --far less is qualified to boast as one about toput it off after a good life's fight. It remains yet to be seenwhether he has the gifts and the manhood to use that which he haslaboriously acquired, or whether, as happens with many other menapparently well qualified, and actually well furnished with the rawmaterial of knowledge in various professions, he will be unable toturn power into success. This question trial alone can decide in eachindividual case; but while experience thus forces all to realize thatknowledge does not necessarily imply capacity to use it, that theremay be foundation upon which no superstructure will be raised, few--and those not the wisest--are inclined to dispute that antecedenttraining, well-ordered equipment, where other things are equal, doesgive a distinct advantage to the man who has received it. The blazeof glory and of success which, after forty years of patient waiting, crowned the last six months of Havelock's life, raising him fromobscurity to a place among the immortals, attests the rapidity withwhich the perfect flower of achievement can bud and fully bloom, when, and only when, good seed has been sown in ground fitly prepared. There are two principal methods of imparting the illustrations that, in their entirety, compose the body of precedents, by which theprimary teachings of the Art of War are at once elucidated andestablished. By the first, the several principles may be separatelystated, more or less at large, each being followed closely by theappropriate illustrations, drawn, as these in such a treatment mostsuitably may, from different periods and from conditions which on thesurface appear most divergent. Or, on the other hand, the consecutivenarrative of a particular series of operations may be given, in suchdetail as is necessary, accompanied by a running commentary orcriticism, in which the successive occurrences are brought to the testof recognized standards; inference being drawn, or judgment passed, accordingly. The former is the more formal and methodical; it servesbetter, perhaps, for starting upon his career the beginner whoproposes to make war the profession of his life; for it provides him, in a compact and systematic manner, with certain brief rules, by theuse of which he can most readily apply, to his subsequent reading ofmilitary history, criteria drawn from the experience of centuries. Heis thus supplied, in short, with digested knowledge. But digestion byother minds can in no wise take the place of assimilation performed byone's own mental processes. The cut and dried information of thelecture room, and of the treatise, must in every profession besupplemented by the hard work of personal practice; and failing theexperience of the campaign, --of actual warfare, --the one school ofprogress for the soldier or seaman is to be found in the study ofmilitary and naval history, which embodies the experience of others. To such study the second method contributes; it bears to the first therelation of an advanced course. Nor let it be supposed that the experience of others, thus imparted, is a poor substitute for that acquired by the actual hard work of thefield, or of the ocean. By the process, the fruit possibly may not befully matured; but it arrives at that perfection of form whichrequires but a few suns to ripen. This, moreover, if not the only wayby which experience in the art of directing operations of war--ofcommand-in-chief--can be stored, is by far the most comprehensive andthorough; for while utility cannot be denied to annual manoeuvres, andto the practice of the sham battle, it must be remembered that these, dealing with circumstances limited both in time and place, give a verynarrow range of observation; and, still more important, as wasremarked by the late General Sherman, the moral elements of danger anduncertainty, which count for so much in real warfare, cannot beadequately reproduced in mimic. The field of military history, on theother hand, has no limit short of the military experience of the race;it records the effect of moral influences of every kind, as well as ofthe most diverse material conditions; the personal observation of eventhe greatest of captains is in comparison but narrow. "Whatexperience of command, " says one of the most eminent, "can a generalhave, before he is called to command? and the experience of what onecommander, even after years of warfare, can cover all cases?"Therefore he prescribes study; and as a help thereto tells the storyof one of his most successful campaigns, accompanying it with acommentary in which he by no means spares himself. Napoleon abounds inthe same sense. "On the field of battle the happiest inspiration isoften but a recollection, "--not necessarily of one's own past; and headmitted in after years that no finer work had been done by him thanin his first campaign, to which he came--a genius indeed, but--withthe acquisitions chiefly of a student, deep-steeped in reading andreflection upon the history of warfare. The utility of such study of military history to the intending warrioris established, not only by a few such eminent authorities, but by aconsensus among the leading soldiers and seamen of our own day, whether they personally have, or have not, had the opportunity ofcommand in war. It may be asserted to be a matter of contemporaryprofessional agreement, as much as any other current opinion that nowobtains. In such study, native individual capacity and individualtemperament will largely affect inference and opinion; not onlycausing them to differ more or less, but resulting frequently indirect opposition of conclusion. It cannot be otherwise; for, like allother callings of active life, war is a matter, not merely ofknowledge and of general principles, but of sound judgment, withoutwhich both information and rules, being wrongly applied, becomeuseless. Opinions, even of the most eminent, while accorded therespect due to their reputation, should therefore be brought to thetest of personal reflection. The study of the Art and History of War is pre-eminently necessary tomen of the profession, but there are reasons which commend it also, suitably presented, to all citizens of our country. Questionsconnected with war--when resort to war is justifiable, preparation forwar, the conduct of war--are questions of national moment, in whicheach voter--nay, each talker--has an influence for intelligent andadequate action, by the formation of sound public opinion; and publicopinion, in operation, constitutes national policy. Hence it isgreatly to be desired that there should be more diffused interest inthe critical study of warfare in its broader lines. Knowledge oftechnical details is not necessary to the apprehension of the greatergeneral principles, nor to an understanding of the application ofthose principles to particular cases, when made by individualstudents, --officers or others. The remark is sometimes heard, "Whenmilitary or naval officers agree, Congress--or the people--may beexpected to act. " The same idea applied to other professions--waitingfor universal agreement--would bring the world to a standstill. Bettermust be accepted without waiting for best. Better is more worth havingto-day than best is the day after the need has come and gone. Hesitation and inaction, continued till the doctors agree, may resultin the death of the patient; yet such hesitation is almost inevitablewhere there is no formed public opinion, and quite inevitable wherethere is no public interest antecedent to the emergency arising. It may be due to the bias of personal or professional inclination thatthe present writer believes that military history, --including thereinnaval, --simply and clearly presented in its leading outlines, divestedof superfluous and merely technical details, would be found to possessan interest far exceeding that which is commonly imagined. The logicalcoherence of any series of events, as of any process of Nature, possesses an innate attraction for the inquisitive element of whichfew intelligent minds are devoid. Unfortunately, technical men areprone to delight in their technicalities, and to depreciate, with theadjective "popular, " attempts to bring their specialties within thecomprehension of the general public, or to make them pleasing andattractive to it. However it may be with other specialties, theutility of which is more willingly admitted, the navy and army in ourcountry cannot afford to take such an attitude. The brilliant, butvague, excitement and glory of war, in its more stirring phases, touches readily the popular imagination, as does intense action ofevery description. It has all the charm of the dramatic, heightened bythe splendor of the heroic. But where there is no appeal beyond theimagination to the intellect, such impressions lack distinctness, andleave no really useful results. While there is a certain exaltation insharing, through vivid narrative, the emotions of those who have bornea part in some deed of conspicuous daring, the fascination does notequal that wrought upon the intellect, as it traces for the first timethe long-drawn sequence by which successive occurrences are seen toissue in their necessary results, or causes apparently remote toconverge upon a common end, and understanding succeeds to the previoussense of bewilderment, which is produced by military events as toocommonly treated. There is, moreover, no science--or art--which lends itself to suchexposition more readily than does the Art of War. Its principles areclear, and not numerous. Outlines of operations, presented inskeleton, as they usually may be, are in most instances surprisinglyclear; and, these once grasped, the details fall into place with areadiness and a precision that convey an ever increasing intellectualenjoyment. The writer has more than once been witness of the pleasurethus occasioned to men wholly strangers to military matters; apleasure partly of novelty, but which possesses the elements ofendurance because the stimulus is one that renews itself continually, opening field after field for the exercise of the mind. If such pleasure were the sole result, however, there might bewell-founded diffidence in recommending the study. The advantageconferred upon the nation by a more wide-spread and intelligentunderstanding of military matters, as a factor in national life thatmust exist for some ages to come, and one which recent events, so farfrom lessening, have rendered more conspicuous and more necessary, affords a sounder ground for insisting that it is an obligation ofeach citizen to understand something of the principles of warfare, andof the national needs in respect of preparation, as well as thrillwith patriotic emotion over an heroic episode or a brilliant victory. It is with the object of contributing to such intelligentcomprehension that the following critical narrative, which firstappeared in one of our popular monthlies, is again submitted to thepublic in its present form. It professes no more than to be anattempt, by a student of military as well as naval warfare, topresent a reasoned outline of a part of the operations of the war, interspersed with such reflections upon naval warfare, in its generalsand its particulars, as have arisen naturally in the course of thestory. The method adopted, consequently, is the second of thosementioned in the beginning of these remarks; a consecutive narrative, utilized as a medium for illustrating the principles of war. Theapplication of those principles in this discussion represents theviews of one man, believed by him to be in accordance with aconsiderable body of professional thought, although for this he has nocommission to speak; but to some of them also there is, in otherquarters, a certain distinct professional opposition. The aim of the author here, as in all his writings, has been so topresent his theme as to invest it with the rational interest attachingto a clear exposition of causes and effects, as shown in a series ofevents. Where he may have failed, the failure is in himself, not inhis subject. The recent Spanish-American War, while possessing, asevery war does, characteristics of its own, differentiating it fromothers, nevertheless, in its broad analogies, falls into line withits predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades theart from its beginnings unto this day. It has, moreover, the specialvalue of illustrating the reciprocal needs and offices of the army andthe navy, than which no lesson is more valuable to a nation situatedas ours is. Protected from any serious attempt at invasion by ourisolated position, and by our vast intrinsic strength, we arenevertheless vulnerable in an extensive seaboard, greater, relativelyto our population and wealth--great as they are--than that of anyother state. Upon this, moreover, rests an immense coasting trade, theimportance of which to our internal commercial system is now scarcelyrealized, but will be keenly felt if we ever are unable to insure itsfreedom of movement. We also are committed, inevitably and irrevocably, to an over-seapolicy, to the successful maintenance of which will be needed, notonly lofty political conceptions of right and of honor, but also thepower to support, and if need be to enforce, the course of actionwhich such conceptions shall from time to time demand. Suchmaintenance will depend primarily upon the navy, but not upon italone; there will be needed besides an adequate and extremely mobilearmy, and an efficient correlation of the one with the other, basedupon an accurate conception of their respective functions. The truecorrective to the natural tendency of each to exaggerate its ownimportance to the common end is to be found only in some generalunderstanding of the subject diffused throughout the body of thepeople, who are the ultimate arbiters of national policy. In short, the people of the United States will need to understand, notonly what righteousness dictates, but what power, military and naval, requires, in order duly to assert itself. The disappointment andimpatience, now being manifested in too many quarters, over theinevitable protraction of the military situation in the Philippines, indicates a lack of such understanding; for, did it exist, men wouldnot need to be told that even out of the best material, of which wehave an abundance, a soldier is not made in a day, nor an army in aseason; that when these, the necessary tools, are wanting, or areinsufficient in number, the work cannot but lag until they aresupplied; in short, that in war, as in every calling, he who wills theend must also understand and will the means. It was the same with thewide-spread panic that swept along our seaboard at the beginning ofthe late war. So far as it was excusable, it was due to the want ofprevious preparation; so far as it was unreasonable, it was due toignorance; but both the want of preparation and the ignorance were theresult of the preceding general indifference of the nation to militaryand naval affairs, an indifference which necessarily had found itsreflection in the halting and inadequate provisions made by Congress. Although changes and additions have been introduced where it hasseemed expedient, the author has decided to allow these articles tostand, in the main, substantially as written immediately after theclose of hostilities. The opening paragraphs, while less applicable, in their immediate purport, to the present moment, are neverthelessnot inappropriate as an explanation of the general tenor of the workitself; and they suggest, moreover, another line of reflection uponthe influence, imperceptibly exerted, and passively accepted in men'sminds, by the quiet passing of even a single calendar year. The very lapse of time and subsidence of excitement which tend toinsure dispassionate and impartial treatment by the historian, and ajuster proportion of impression in spectators, tend also to produceindifference and lethargy in the people at large; whereas in fact theneed for sustained interest of a practical character still exists. Intelligent provision for the present and future ought now to succeedto the emotional experiences of the actual war. The reading public hasbeen gorged and surfeited with war literature, a fact which has beenonly too painfully realized by publishers and editors, who purvey forits appetite and have overstocked the larder. Coincident with this hascome an immense wave of national prosperity and consequent businessactivity, which increasingly engross the attention of men's minds. Sofar as the mere movement of the imagination, or the stirring of theheart is concerned, this reaction to indifference after excessiveagitation was inevitable, and is not in itself unduly to be deplored;but it will be a matter, not merely of lasting regret, but ofpermanent harm, if the nation again sinks into the general apathyconcerning its military and naval necessities which previouslyexisted, and which, as the experience of Great Britain has shown, isunfortunately characteristic of popular representative governments, where present votes are more considered than future emergencies. Notthe least striking among the analogies of warfare are the sufferingsundergone, and the risks of failure incurred, through imperfectorganization, in the Crimea, and in our own recent hostilities withSpain. And let not the public deceive itself, nor lay the faultexclusively, or even chiefly, upon its servants, whether in themilitary services or in the halls of Congress. The one and the otherwill respond adequately to any demand made upon them, if the means areplaced betimes in their hands; and the officers of the army and navycertainly have not to reproach themselves, as a body, with officialfailure to represent the dangers, the exposure, and the needs of thecommonwealth. It should be needless to add that circumstances now aregreatly changed, through the occurrences of last year; and thathenceforth the risks from neglect, if continued, will vastly exceedthose of former days. The issue lies with the voters. I HOW THE MOTIVE OF THE WAR GAVE DIRECTION TO ITS EARLIER MOVEMENTS. --STRATEGIC VALUE OF PUERTO RICO. -- CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SIZE AND QUALITIES OF BATTLESHIPS. --MUTUAL RELATIONS OF COAST DEFENCE AND NAVY. It is a common and a true remark that final judgment cannot be passedupon events still recent. Not only is time required for the mereprocess of collecting data, of assorting and testing the numerousstatements, always imperfect and often conflicting, which form thematerial for history, but a certain and not very short interval mustbe permitted to elapse during which men's brains and feelings mayreturn to normal conditions, and permit the various incidents whichhave exalted or depressed them to be seen in their totality, as wellas in their true relative importance. There are thus at least twodistinct operations essential to that accuracy of judgment to whichalone finality can be attributed, --first, the diligent and close studyof detail, by which knowledge is completed; and, second, a certaindetachment of the mind from the prejudgments and passions engenderedby immediate contact, a certain remoteness, corresponding to the ideaof physical distance, in virtue of which confusion and distortion ofimpression disappear, and one is enabled not only to distinguish thedecisive outlines of a period, but also to relegate to their trueplace in the scheme subordinate details which, at the moment ofoccurrence, had made an exaggerated impression from their verynearness. It is yet too soon to look for such fulness and justness of treatmentin respect to the late hostilities with Spain. Mere literal truth ofnarrative cannot yet be attained, even in the always limited degree towhich historical truth is gradually elicited from a mass of partialand often irreconcilable testimony; and literal truth, when presented, needs to be accompanied by a discriminating analysis and estimate ofthe influence exerted upon the general result by individualoccurrences, positive or negative. I say positive or negative, for weare too apt to overlook the vast importance of negative factors, ofinaction as compared to action, of things not done in comparison withthose that were done, of mistakes of omission as contrasted with thoseof commission. Too frequently men, spectators or actors in careersessentially of action, imagine that a safe course is being heldbecause things continue seemingly as they were; whereas, at least inwar, failure to dare greatly is often to run the greatest of risks. "Admiral Hotham, " wrote Nelson in 1795, "is perfectly satisfied thateach month passes without any losses on our side. " The result of thispurely negative conduct, of this military sin of mere omission, wasthat Bonaparte's great Italian campaign of 1796 became possible, thatthe British Fleet was forced to quit the Mediterranean, and the map ofEurope was changed. It is, of course, a commonplace that things neverreally remain as they were; that they are always getting better orworse, at least relatively. But while it is true that men must perforce be content to wait a whilefor the full and sure accounts, and for the summing up which shallpass a final judgment upon the importance of events and upon thereputations of the actors in them, it is also true that in the driveof life, and for the practical guidance of life, which, like time andtide, waits for no man, a rapid, and therefore rough, but still aworking decision must be formed from the new experiences, andinferences must be drawn for our governance in the present and thenear future, whose exigencies attend us. Absolutely correctconclusions, if ever attained in practical life, are reached by aseries of approximations; and it will not do to postpone action untilexhaustive certainty has been gained. We have tried it at least oncein the navy, watching for a finality of results in the experimentalprogress of European services. What the condition of our own fleet wasat the end of those years might be fresh in all our memories, if wehad time to remember. Delayed action maybe eminently proper at onemoment; at another it may mean the loss of opportunity. Nor is theprocess of rapid decision--essential in the field--wholly unsafe incouncil, if inference and conclusion are checked by reference towell-settled principles and fortified by knowledge of the experienceof ages upon whose broad bases those principles rest. Pottering overmechanical details doubtless has its place, but it tends to foster ahesitancy of action which wastes time more valuable than the resultantgain. The preceding remarks indicate sufficiently the scope of these papers. It is not proposed to give a complete story of the operations, forwhich the material is not yet available. Neither will it be attemptedto pronounce decisions absolutely final, for the time is not yet ripe. The effort will be rather to suggest general directions to thought, which may be useful to a reader as he follows the many narratives, official or personal, given to the public; to draw attention to factsand to analogies; to point out experiences, the lessons from which maybe profitable in determining the character of the action that mustspeedily be taken to place the sea power of the Republic upon a propermaterial basis; and, finally, to bring the course of this war intorelation with the teachings of previous history, --the experiences ofthe recent past to reinforce or to modify those of the remoter past;for under superficial diversity, due to differences of conditions, there often rests fundamental identity, the recognition of whichequips the mind, quickens it, and strengthens it for grappling withthe problems of the present and the future. The value of history to usis as a record of human experience; but experiences must beunderstood. The character and the direction of the first movements of the UnitedStates in this conflict with Spain were determined by the occasion, and by the professed object, of the hostilities. As frequentlyhappens, the latter began before any formal declaration of war hadbeen made; and, as the avowed purpose and cause of our action were notprimarily redress for grievances of the United States against Spain, but to enforce the departure of the latter from Cuba, it followedlogically that the island became the objective of our militarymovements, as its deliverance from oppression was the object of thewar. Had a more general appreciation of the situation been adopted, aview embracing the undeniable injury to the United States, from thethen existing conditions, and the generally iniquitous character ofSpanish rule in the colonies, and had war for these reasons beendeclared, the objective of our operations might have been differentlychosen for strategic reasons; for our leading object in such casewould not have been to help Cuba, but to constrain Spain, and tocompel her to such terms as we might demand. It would have been open, for instance, to urge that Puerto Rico, being between five and sixhundred miles from the eastern end of Cuba and nearly double thatdistance from the two ports of the island most important toSpain, --Havana on the north and Cienfuegos on the south, --would beinvaluable to the mother country as an intermediate naval station andas a base of supplies and reinforcements for both her fleet and army;that, if left in her undisturbed possession, it would enable her, practically, to enjoy the same advantage of nearness to the greatscene of operations that the United States had in virtue of ourgeographical situation; and that, therefore, the first objective ofthe war should be the eastern island, and its reduction the firstobject. The effect of this would have been to throw Spain back uponher home territory for the support of any operations in Cuba, thusentailing upon her an extremely long line of communications, exposedeverywhere throughout its course, but especially to the molestation ofsmall cruisers issuing from the harbors of Puerto Rico, which flankthe routes, and which, upon the supposition, would have passed intoour hands. This view of the matter was urged upon the writer, a fewdays before hostilities began, by a very old and intelligent navalofficer who had served in our own navy and in that of the ConfederateStates. To a European nation the argument must have been quitedecisive; for to it, as distant, or more distant than Spain from Cuba, such an intermediate station would have been an almost insurmountableobstacle while in an enemy's hands, and an equally valuable base ifwrested from him. To the United States these considerations wereapplicable only in part; for, while the inconvenience to Spain wouldbe the same, the gain to us would be but little, as our lines ofcommunication to Cuba neither required the support of Puerto Rico, norwere by it particularly endangered. This estimate of the military importance of Puerto Rico should neverbe lost sight of by us as long as we have any responsibility, director indirect, for the safety or independence of Cuba. Puerto Rico, considered militarily, is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian canal, andto our Pacific coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and thebeyond; and there is for us the like necessity to hold and strengthenthe one, in its entirety and in its immediate surroundings, that thereis for Great Britain to hold the other for the security of herposition in Egypt, for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the controlof the route to India. It would be extremely difficult for a Europeanstate to sustain operations in the eastern Mediterranean with aBritish fleet at Malta. Similarly, it would be very difficult for atransatlantic state to maintain operations in the western Caribbeanwith a United States fleet based upon Puerto Rico and the adjacentislands. The same reasons prompted Bonaparte to seize Malta in hisexpedition against Egypt and India in 1798. In his masterly eyes, asin those of Nelson, it was essential to the communications betweenFrance, Egypt, and India. His scheme failed, not because Malta wasless than invaluable, but for want of adequate naval strength, without which no maritime position possesses value. There were, therefore, in America two possible objectives for theUnited States, in case of a war against Spain waged upon grounds atall general in their nature; but to proceed against either was purelya question of relative naval strength. Unless, and until, the UnitedStates fleet available for service in the Caribbean Sea was strongenough to control permanently the waters which separated the Spanishislands from our territory nearest to them, the admitted vastsuperiority of this country in potential resources for land warfarewas completely neutralized. If the Spanish Navy preponderated overours, it would be evidently impossible for transports carrying troopsand supplies to traverse the seas safely; and, unless they could sodo, operations of war in the enemy's colonies could neither be begunnor continued. If, again, the two fleets were so equally balanced asto make the question of ultimate preponderance doubtful, it wasclearly foolish to land in the islands men whom we might be compelled, by an unlucky sea-fight, to abandon there. This last condition was that which obtained, as war became imminent. The force of the Spanish Navy--on paper, as the expression goes--wasso nearly equal to our own that it was well within the limits ofpossibility that an unlucky incident--the loss, for example, of abattleship--might make the Spaniard decisively superior in nominal, oreven in actual, available force. An excellent authority told thewriter that he considered that the loss of the _Maine_ had changed thebalance--that is, that whereas with the _Maine_ our fleet had beenslightly superior, so after her destruction the advantage, stillnominal, was rather the other way. We had, of course, a well-foundedconfidence in the superior efficiency of our officers and men, and inthe probable better condition of our ships and guns; but where so muchis at stake as the result of a war, or even as the unnecessaryprolongation of war, with its sufferings and anxieties, the only saferule is to regard the apparent as the actual, until its reality hasbeen tested. However good their information, nations, like fencers, must try their adversary's force before they take liberties. Reconnaissance must precede decisive action. There was, on the partof the Navy Department, no indisposition to take risks, providedsuccess, if obtained, would give an adequate gain. It was clearlyrecognized that war cannot be made without running risks; but it wasalso held, unwaveringly, that no merely possible success justifiedrisk, unless it gave a fair promise of diminishing the enemy's navalforce, and so of deciding the control of the sea, upon which the issueof the war depended. This single idea, and concentration of purposeupon it, underlay and dictated every step of the Navy Department fromfirst to last, --so far, at least, as the writer knows, --and it must beborne in mind by any reader who wishes to pass intelligent judgmentupon the action or non-action of the Department in particularinstances. It was this consideration that brought the _Oregon_ from the Pacificto the Atlantic, --a movement initiated before hostilities opened, though not concluded until after they began. The wisdom of the stepwas justified not merely, nor chiefly, by the fine part played by thatship on July 3, but by the touch of certainty her presence imparted tothe grip of our fleet upon Cervera's squadron during the precedingmonth, and the consequent power to move the army without fear by seato Santiago. Few realize the doubts, uncertainties, and difficultiesof the sustained watchfulness which attends such operations as the"bottling" of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Sampson; for "bottling" ahostile fleet does not resemble the chance and careless shoving of acork into a half-used bottle, --it is rather like the wiring down ofchampagne by bonds that cannot be broken and through which nothing canooze. This it is which constitutes the claim of the AmericanCommander-in-Chief upon the gratitude of his countrymen; for to hisskill and tenacity in conducting that operation is primarily due theearly ending of the war, the opportunity to remove our strickensoldiery from a sickly climate, the ending of suspense, and the savingof many lives. "The moment Admiral Cervera's fleet was destroyed, "truly said the London "Times" (August 16), "the war was practically atan end, unless Spain had elected to fight on to save the point ofhonor;" for she could have saved nothing else by continued war. To such successful operation, however, there is needed not only shipsindividually powerful, but numbers of such ships; and that the numbersof Sampson's fleet were maintained--not drawn off to other, thoughimportant, operations--even under such sore temptation as the dash ofCámara's fleet from Cadiz towards the Philippines, was due to theDepartment's ability to hold fast the primary conception ofconcentration upon a single purpose, even though running thereby sucha risk as was feared from Cámara's armored ships reaching Dewey'sunarmored cruisers before they were reinforced. The chances of therace to Manila, between Cámara, when he started from Cadiz, and thetwo monitors from San Francisco, were deliberately taken, in order toensure the retention of Cervera's squadron in Santiago, or itsdestruction in case of attempted escape. Not till that wassufficiently provided for would Watson's division be allowed todepart. Such exclusive tenacity of purpose, under suspense, is moredifficult of maintenance than can be readily recognized by those whohave not undergone it. To avoid misconception, it should be added herethat our division at the Philippines was not itself endangered, although it was quite possible that Manila Bay might have to betemporarily abandoned if Cámara kept on. The movements of the monitorswere well in hand, and their junction assured, even under the controlof a commander of less conspicuous ability than that already shown byAdmiral Dewey. The return of the united force would speedily haveensured Cámara's destruction and the restoration of previousconditions. It is evident, however, that a certain amount of nationalmortification, and possibly of political complication, might haveoccurred in the interim. The necessity and the difficulty of thus watching the squadrons of anenemy within his ports--of "blockading" them, to use a commonexpression, of "containing" them, to conform to a strictly accuratemilitary terminology--are more familiar to the British naval mind thanto ours; for, both by long historical experience and by present-dayneeds, the vital importance of so narrowly observing the enemy'smovements has been forced upon its consciousness. A committee of verydistinguished British admirals a few years since reported that, havingin view the difficulty of the operation in itself, and the chances ofthe force detailed falling below its _minimum_ by accidents, or byabsence for coal or refits, British naval supremacy, vital to theEmpire, demanded the number of five British battleships to three ofthe fleet thus to be controlled. Admiral Sampson's armored shipsnumbered seven to Cervera's four, a proportion not dissimilar; butthose seven were all the armored ships, save monitors, worthless forsuch purpose, that the United States owned, or would own for somemonths yet to come. It should be instructive and convincing to theAmerican people to note that when two powerful armored ships of theenemy were thus on their way to attack at one end of the world anadmiral and a division that had deserved so well of their country, ourwhole battle-fleet, properly so called, was employed to maintain offSantiago the proportions which foreign officers, writing long beforethe conditions arose, had fixed as necessary. Yet the state with whichwe were at war ranks very low among naval Powers. The circumstance possesses a furthermost practical present interest, from its bearing upon the question between numbers and individualsize in the organization of the naval line of battle; for the everimportunate demand for increase in dimensions in the single ship isalready upon the United States Navy, and to it no logical, no simplyrational, limit has yet been set This question may be stated asfollows: A country can, or will, pay only so much for its war fleet. That amount of money means so much aggregate tonnage. How shall thattonnage be allotted? And, especially, how shall the total tonnageinvested in armored ships be divided? Will you have a few very bigships, or more numerous medium ships? Where will you strike your meanbetween numbers and individual size? You cannot have both, unless yourpurse is unlimited. The Santiago incident, alike in the battle, in thepreceding blockade, and in the concurrent necessity of sendingbattleships to Dewey, illustrates various phases of the argument infavor of numbers as against extremes of individual size. Heavier shipswere not needed; fewer ships might have allowed some enemy to escape;when Cervera came out, the _Massachusetts_ was coaling at Guantanamo, and the _New York_ necessarily several miles distant, circumstanceswhich, had the ships been bigger and fewer, would have taken muchmore, proportionately, from the entire squadron at a critical moment. Above all, had that aggregate, 65, 934 of tonnage, in seven ships, beendivided among five only, of 13, 000 each, I know not how the two shipsthat were designated to go with Watson to the Philippines couldpossibly have sailed. The question is momentous, and claims intelligent and immediatedecision; for tonnage once locked up in a built ship cannot be got outand redistributed to meet the call of the moment. Neither may menevade a definite conclusion by saying that they will have bothunlimited power--that is, size--and unlimited number; for this theycannot have. A decision must be reached, and upon it purpose must beconcentrated unwaveringly; the disadvantages as well as the advantagesof the choice must be accepted with singleness of mind. Individualsize is needed, for specific reasons; numbers also are necessary. Between the two opposing demands there is doubtless a mean ofindividual size which will ensure the maximum offensive power _of thefleet_; for that, and not the maximum power of the single ship, isthe true object of battleship construction. Battleships in all agesare meant to act together, in fleets; not singly, as mere cruisers. A full discussion of all the considerations, on one side or the other, of this question, would demand more space, and more of technicaldetail, than the scope of these papers permits. As with mostconclusions of a concrete character dealing with contradictoryelements, the result reached will inevitably be rather anapproximation than an absolute demonstrable certainty; a broad generalstatement, not a narrow formula. All rules of War, which is not anexact science, but an art, have this characteristic. They do not tellone exactly how to do right, but they give warning when a step isbeing contemplated which the experience of ages asserts to be wrong. To an instructed mind they cry silently, "Despite all plausiblearguments, this one element involved in that which you are thinking todo shows that in it you will go wrong. " In the judgment of the writer, two conditions must be primarily considered in determining a class ofbattleship to which, for the sake of homogeneousness, most of thefleet should conform. Of these two, one must be given in generalterms; the other can be stated with more precision. The chiefrequisite to be kept in view in the battleship is the offensive powerof the fleet of which it is a member. The aggregate gun-power of thefleet remaining the same, the increase of its numbers, by limiting thesize of the individual ships, tends, up to a certain point, toincrease its offensive power; for war depends largely uponcombination, and facility of combination increases with numbers. Numbers, therefore, mean increase of offensive power, other thingsremaining equal. I do not quote in defence of this position Nelson'ssaying, that "numbers only can annihilate, " because in his dayexperience had determined a certain mean size of working battleship, and he probably meant merely that preponderant numbers of that typewere necessary; but weight may justly be laid upon the fact that ourforerunners had, under the test of experience, accepted a certainworking mean, and had rejected those above and below that mean, savefor exceptional uses. The second requisite to be fulfilled in the battleship is knowntechnically as coal endurance, --ability to steam a certain distancewithout recoaling, allowing in the calculation a reasonable margin ofsafety, as in all designs. This standard distance should be thegreatest that separates two coaling places, as they exist in thescheme of fortified coaling ports which every naval nation shouldframe for itself. In our own case, such distance is that from Honoluluto Guam, in the Ladrones, --3, 500 miles. The excellent results obtainedfrom our vessels already in commission, embodying as they do thetentative experiences of other countries, as well as the reflectivepowers of our own designers, make it antecedently probable that 10, 000and 12, 000 tons represent the extremes of normal displacementadvantageous for the United States battleship. When this limit isexceeded, observation of foreign navies goes to show that the numbersof the fleet will be diminished and its aggregate gun-power notincreased, --that is, ships of 15, 000 tons actually have little moregun-power than those of 10, 000. Both results are deviations from theideal of the battle-fleet already given. In the United States Navy thetendency to huge ships needs to be particularly watched, for we havea tradition in their favor, inherited from the successes of our heavyfrigates in the early years of this century. It must be recalled, therefore, that those ships were meant to act singly, but that longexperience has shown that for fleet operations a mean of size givesgreater aggregate efficiency, both in force and in precision ofmanoeuvre. In the battleship great speed also is distinctly secondaryto offensive power and to coal endurance. To return from a long digression. Either Cuba or Puerto Rico might, inan ordinary case of war, have been selected as the first objective ofthe United States operations, with very good reasons for eitherchoice. What the British island Santa Lucia is to Jamaica, whatMartinique would be to France, engaged in important hostilities in theCaribbean, that, in measure, Puerto Rico is to Cuba, and was to Spain. To this was due the general and justifiable professional expectationthat Cervera's squadron would first make for that point, although theanchorage at San Juan, the principal port, leaves very much to bedesired in the point of military security for a fleet, --a fact thatwill call for close and intelligent attention on the part of theprofessional advisers of the Navy Department. But, while either of theSpanish islands was thus eligible, it would have been quite out of thequestion to attempt both at the same time, our navy being only equalto the nominal force of Spain; nor, it should be added, could adecided superiority over the latter have justified operations againstboth, unless our numbers had sufficed to overbear the whole of thehostile war fleet at both points. To have the greater force and thento divide it, so that the enemy can attack either or both fractionswith decisively superior numbers, is the acme of military stupidity;nor is it the less stupid because in practice it has been frequentlydone. In it has often consisted the vaunted operation of "surroundingan enemy, " "bringing him between two fires, " and so forth; pompous andtroublesome combinations by which a divided force, that couldperfectly well move as a whole, starts from two or three widelyseparated points to converge upon a concentrated enemy, permitting himmeanwhile the opportunity, if alert enough, to strike the divisions indetail. Having this obvious consideration in mind, it is curious now to recallthat in the "North American Review, " so lately as February, 1897, appeared an article entitled, "Can the United States afford to fightSpain?" by "A Foreign Naval Officer, "--evidently, from internalindications, a Spaniard, --in which occurred this brilliant statement:"For the purposes of an attack upon Spain in the West Indies, theAmerican fleet would necessarily divide itself into two squadrons, oneostensibly destined for Puerto Rico, the other for Cuba. .. . Spain, before attempting to inflict serious damage upon places on theAmerican coast, would certainly try to cut off the connection betweenthe two American squadrons operating in the West Indies, and to attackeach separately. " The remark illustrates the fool's paradise in whichmany Spaniards, even naval officers, were living before the war, as isevidenced by articles in their own professional periodicals. Toattribute such folly to us was not complimentary; and I own myremarks, upon first reading it, were not complimentary to the writer'sprofessional competency. All reasons, therefore, combined to direct the first movement of theUnited States upon Cuba, and upon Cuba alone, leaving Spain inundisputed possession of such advantages as Puerto Rico might give. But Cuba and Puerto Rico, points for attack, were not, unluckily, theonly two considerations forced upon the attention of the UnitedStates. We have a very long coast-line, and it was notorious that thedefences were not so far advanced, judged by modern standards, as toinspire perfect confidence, either in professional men or in theinhabitants. By some of the latter, indeed, were displayed evidencesof panic unworthy of men, unmeasured, irreflective, and thereforeirrational; due largely, it is to be feared, to that false gospel ofpeace which preaches it for the physical comfort and ease of mindattendant, and in its argument against war strives to smotherrighteous indignation or noble ideals by appealing to the fear ofloss, --casting the pearls of peace before the swine of self-interest. But a popular outcry, whether well or ill founded, cannot be whollydisregarded by a representative Government; and, outside of thedangers to the coast, --which, in the case of the larger cities atleast, were probably exaggerated, --there was certainly an opportunityfor an enterprising enemy to embarrass seriously the great coastingtrade carried on under our own flag. There was much idle talk, inSpain and elsewhere, about the injury that could be done to UnitedStates commerce by scattered cruisers, commerce-destroyers. It wasoverlooked that our commerce under our own flag is inconsiderable:there were very few American ships abroad to be captured. But thecoasting trade, being wholly under our own flag, was, and remains, anextremely vulnerable interest, one the protection of which will makeheavy demands upon us in any maritime war. Nor can it be urged thatthat interest alone will suffer by its own interruption. The bulkycargoes carried by it cannot be transferred to the coastwise railroadswithout overtaxing the capacities of the latter; all of which means, ultimately, increase of cost and consequent suffering to the consumer, together with serious injury to all related industries dependent uponthis traffic. Under these combined influences the United States Government founditself confronted from the beginning with two objects of militarysolicitude, widely divergent one from the other, both in geographicalposition and in method of action; namely, the attack upon Cuba and theprotection of its own shores. As the defences did not inspireconfidence, the navy had to supplement their weakness, although it isessentially an offensive, and not a defensive, organization. Upon thisthe enemy counted much at the first. "To defend the Atlantic coasts incase of war, " wrote a Spanish lieutenant who had been Naval Attaché inWashington, "the United States will need one squadron to protect theport of New York and another for the Gulf of Mexico. But if thesquadron which it now possesses is devoted to the defence of New York(including Long Island Sound), the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico mustbe entirely abandoned and left at the mercy of blockade andbombardment. " Our total force for the order of battle, prior to thearrival of the _Oregon_, was nominally only equal to that of theenemy, and, when divided between the two objects named, the halveswere not decisively superior to the single squadron underCervera, --which also might be reinforced by some of the armored shipsthen in Spain. The situation, therefore, was one that is notinfrequent, but always embarrassing, --a double purpose and a singleforce, which, although divisible, ought not to be divided. It is proper here to say, for the remark is both pertinent and mostimportant, that coast defences and naval force are not interchangeablethings; neither are they opponents, one of the other, butcomplementary. The one is stationary, the other mobile; and, howeverperfect in itself either may be, the other is necessary to itscompleteness. In different nations the relative consequence of the twomay vary. In Great Britain, whose people are fed, and their rawmaterials obtained, from the outside world, the need for a fleetvastly exceeds that for coast defences. With us, able to live offourselves, there is more approach to parity. Men may even differ as towhich is the more important; but such difference, in this question, which is purely military, is not according to knowledge. In equalamounts, mobile offensive power is always, and under all conditions, more effective to the ends of war than stationary defensive power. Why, then, provide the latter? Because mobile force, whatever shapeit take, ships or men, is limited narrowly as to the weight it canbear; whereas stationary force, generally, being tied to the earth, isrestricted in the same direction only by the ability of the designerto cope with the conditions. Given a firm foundation, whichpractically can always be had, and there is no limit to the amount ofarmor, --mere defensive outfit, --be it wood, stone, bricks, or iron, that you can erect upon it; neither is there any limit to the weightof guns, the offensive element, that the earth can bear; only theywill be motionless guns. The power of a steam navy to move ispractically unfettered; its ability to carry weight, whether guns orarmor, is comparatively very small. Fortifications, on the contrary, have almost unbounded power to bear weight, whereas their power tomove is _nil_; which again amounts to saying that, being chained, theycan put forth offensive power only at arm's length, as it were. Thusstated, it is seen that these two elements of sea warfare are in thestrictest sense complementary, one possessing what the other has not;and that the difference is fundamental, essential, unchangeable, --notaccidental or temporary. Given local conditions which are generallyto be found, greater power, defensive and offensive, can beestablished in permanent works than can be brought to the spot byfleets. When, therefore, circumstances permit ships to be squarelypitted against fortifications, --not merely to pass swiftly bythem, --it is only because the builders of the shore works have not, for some reason, possibly quite adequate, given them the power torepel attack which they might have had. It will not be asserted thatthere are no exceptions to this, as to most general rules; but as abroad statement it is almost universally true. "I took the liberty toobserve, " wrote Nelson at the siege of Calvi, when the commandinggeneral suggested that some vessels might batter the forts, "that thebusiness of laying wood against walls was much altered of late. "Precisely what was in his mind when he said "of late" does not appear, but the phrase itself shows that the conditions which induced anymomentary equality between ships and forts when brought within rangewere essentially transient. As seaports, and all entrances from the sea, are stationary, itfollows naturally that the arrangements for their defence also should, as a rule, be permanent and stationary, for as such they arestrongest. Indeed, unless stationary, they are apt not to bepermanent, as was conclusively shown in the late hostilities, whereall the new monitors, six in number, intended for coast defence, werediverted from that object and despatched to distant points; two goingto Manila, and stripping the Pacific coast of protection, so far asbased upon them. This is one of the essential vices of a system ofcoast defence dependent upon ships, even when constructed for thatpurpose; they are always liable to be withdrawn by an emergency, realor fancied. Upon the danger of such diversion to the local security, Nelson insisted, when charged with the guard of the Thames in 1801. The block ships (floating batteries), he directed, were on no accountto be moved for any momentary advantage; for it might very well beimpossible for them to regain their carefully chosen positions whenwanted there. Our naval scheme in past years has been seriouslydamaged, and now suffers, from two misleading conceptions: one that anavy is for defence primarily, and not for offensive war; the other, consequent mainly upon the first, that the monitor, being strongerdefensively than offensively, and of inferior mobility, was the besttype of warship. The Civil War, being, so far as the sea wasconcerned, essentially a coast war, naturally fostered this opinion. The monitor in smooth water is better able to stand up to shore gunsthan ships are which present a larger target; but, for all that, it ismore vulnerable, both above water and below, than shore guns are ifthese are properly distributed. It is a hybrid, neither able to bearthe weight that fortifications do, nor having the mobility of ships;and it is, moreover, a poor gun-platform in a sea-way. There is no saying of Napoleon's known to the writer more pregnant ofthe whole art and practice of war than this, "Exclusiveness of purposeis the secret of great successes and of great operations. " If, therefore, in maritime war, you wish permanent defences for yourcoasts, rely exclusively upon stationary works, if the conditionsadmit, not upon floating batteries which have the weaknesses of ships. If you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the seas, relyexclusively upon ships that have the qualities of ships and not offloating batteries. We had in the recent hostilities 26, 000 tons ofshipping sealed up in monitors, of comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic and the Pacific. There was not an hour from first tolast, I will venture to say, that we would not gladly have exchangedthe whole six for two battleships of less aggregate displacement; andthat although, from the weakness of the Spanish defences, we were ableto hug pretty closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanishguns at Santiago kept our fleet at a greater distance, we should havelamented still more bitterly the policy which gave us sluggishmonitors for mobile battleships. II THE EFFECT OF DEFICIENT COAST-DEFENCE UPON THE MOVEMENTS OF THE NAVY. --THE MILITARY AND NAVAL CONDITIONS OF SPAIN AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR. The unsatisfactory condition of the coast defences, whereby the navylost the support of its complementary factor in the scheme of nationalsea power, imposed a vicious, though inevitable, change in theinitial plan of campaign, which should have been directed in fullforce against the coast of Cuba. The four newer monitors on theAtlantic coast, if distributed among our principal ports, were notadequate, singly, to resist the attack which was suggested by thepossibilities of the case--though remote--and still more by the panicamong certain of our citizens. On the other hand, if the four weremassed and centrally placed, which is the correct disposition of anymobile force, military or naval, intended to counteract the attack ofan enemy whose particular line of approach is as yet uncertain, theirsluggishness and defective nautical qualities would make themcomparatively inefficient. New York, for instance, is a singularlycentral and suitable point, relatively to our northern Atlanticseaboard, in which to station a division intended to meet and thwartthe plans of a squadron like Cervera's, if directed against our coastports, in accordance with the fertile imaginations of evil which werethe fashion in that hour. Did the enemy appear off either Boston, theDelaware, or the Chesapeake, he could not effect material injurybefore a division of ships of the _Oregon_ class would be upon him;and within the limits named are found the major external commercialinterests of the country as well as the ocean approaches along whichthey travel. But had the monitors been substituted for battleships, not to speak of their greater slowness, their inferiority as steadygun-platforms would have placed them at a serious disadvantage if theenemy were met outside, as he perfectly well might be. It was probably such considerations as these, though the writer wasnot privy to them, that determined the division of the battle fleet, and the confiding to the section styled the Flying Squadron thedefence of the Atlantic coast for the time being. The monitors wereall sent to Key West, where they would be at hand to act againstHavana; the narrowness of the field in which that city, Key West, andMatanzas are comprised making their slowness less of a drawback, whilethe moderate weather which might be expected to prevail would permittheir shooting to be less inaccurate. The station of the FlyingSquadron in Hampton Roads, though not so central as New Yorkrelatively to the more important commercial interests, upon which, ifupon any, the Spanish attack might fall, was more central as regardsthe whole coast; and, above all, was nearer than New York to Havanaand to Puerto Rico. The time element also entered the calculations inanother way, for a fleet of heavy ships is more certainly able to putto sea at a moment's notice, in all conditions of tide and weather, from the Chesapeake than from New York Bay. In short, the positionchosen may be taken to indicate that, in the opinion of the NavyDepartment and its advisers, Cervera was not likely to attempt a dashat an Atlantic port, and that it was more important to be able toreach the West Indies speedily than to protect New York or Boston, --aconclusion which the writer entirely shared. The country, however, should not fail to note that the division of thearmored fleet into two sections, nearly a thousand miles apart, thoughprobably the best that could be done under all the circumstances ofthe moment, was contrary to sound practice; and that the conditionswhich made it necessary should not have existed. Thus, deficient coastprotection reacts unfavorably upon the war fleet, which in all itsmovements should be free from any responsibility for the mere safetyof the ports it quits. Under such conditions as then obtained, itmight have been possible for Spain to force our entire battle fleetfrom its offensive undertaking against Cuba, and to relegate it tomere coast defence. Had Cervera's squadron, instead of beingdespatched alone to the Antilles, been recalled to Spain, as it shouldhave been, and there reinforced by the two armored ships whichafterwards went to Suez with Cámara, the approach of this compact bodywould have compelled our fleet to concentrate; for each of ourdivisions of three ships--prior to the arrival of the _Oregon_--wouldhave been too weak to hazard an engagement with the enemy's six. Whenthus concentrated, where should it be placed? Off Havana, or atHampton Roads? It could not be at both. The answer undoubtedly shouldbe, "Off Havana;" for there it would be guarding the most importantpart of the enemy's coast, blocking the access to it of the Spanishfleet, and at the same time covering Key West, our naval base ofoperations. But if the condition of our coast defences at allcorresponded to the tremors of our seaport citizens, the Governmentmanifestly would be unable to hold the fleet thus at the front. Hadit, on the contrary, been impossible for an enemy's fleet to approachnearer than three miles to our sea-coast without great and evidentdanger of having ships damaged which could not be replaced, and ofwasting ammunition at ranges too long even for bombardments, theSpanish battle fleet would have kept away, and would have pursued itsproper object of supporting their campaign in Cuba by driving off ourfleet--if it could. It is true that no amount of fortification willsecure the coasting trade beyond easy gunshot of the works; but as theenemy's battle fleet could not have devoted itself for long tomolesting the coasters--because our fleet would thereby be drawn tothe spot--that duty must have devolved upon vessels of another class, against which we also would have provided, and did provide, by thesquadron of cruisers under Commodore Howell. In short, proper coastdefence, the true and necessary complement of an efficient navy, releases the latter for its proper work, --offensive, upon the openseas, or off the enemy's shores. [Illustration: Map of Cuba (map)] The subject receives further illumination when we consider, inaddition to the hypothetical case just discussed, --the approach of sixSpanish ships, --the actual conditions at the opening of the campaign. We had chosen Cuba for our objective, had begun our operations, Cervera was on his way across the ocean, and our battle fleet wasdivided and posted as stated. It was reasonable for us to estimateeach division of our ships--one comprising the _New York_, _Iowa_, and_Indiana_, the other the _Brooklyn_, _Massachusetts_, and _Texas_--asable to meet Cervera's four, these being of a class slightly inferiorto the best of ours. We might at least flatter ourselves that, to usea frequent phrase of Nelson's, by the time they had soundly beaten oneof these groups, they would give us no more trouble for the rest ofthe year. We could, therefore, with perfect military propriety, haveapplied the two divisions to separate tasks on the Cuban coast, if ourown coast had been adequately fortified. The advantage--nay, the necessity--of thus distributing ourbattleships, having only four enemies to fear, will appear from aglance at the map of Cuba. It will there be seen that the island isparticularly narrow abreast of Havana, and that from there, for acouple of hundred miles to the eastward, extends the only tolerablydeveloped railroad system, by which the capital is kept incommunication with the seaports, on the north coast as far as Sagua laGrande, and on the south with Cienfuegos and Batabano. Thisnarrowness, and the comparative facility of communication indicated bythe railroads, enabled Spain, during her occupation, effectually toprevent combined movements between the insurgents in the east andthose in the west; a power which Weyler endeavored to increase by the_trocha_ system, --a ditch or ditches, with closely supporting works, extending across the island. Individuals, or small parties, might slipby unperceived; but it should have been impossible for any seriousco-operation to take place. The coast-wise railroads, again, keptHavana and the country adjacent to them in open, if limited, communication with the sea, so long as any one port upon their linesremained unblockaded. For reasons such as these, in this belt of land, from Havana to Sagua and Cienfuegos, lay the chief strength of theSpanish tenure, which centred upon Havana; and in it the greatestpart of the Spanish army was massed. Until, therefore, we were readyto invade, which should not have been before the close of the rainyseason, the one obvious course open to us was to isolate the capitaland the army from the sea, through which supplies of all kinds--dailybread, almost, of food and ammunition--were introduced; for Cuba, inthese respects, produces little. To perfect such isolation, however, it was necessary not only to placebefore each port armed cruisers able to stop merchant steamers, butalso to give to the vessels so stationed, as well on the south as onthe north side, a backbone of support by the presence of an armoredfleet, which should both close the great ports--Havana andCienfuegos--and afford a rallying-point to the smaller ships, ifdriven in by the appearance of Cervera's division. The mainfleet--three armored ships--on the north was thus used, although theblockade, from the fewness of available cruisers, was not at firstextended beyond Cardenas. On the south a similar body--the FlyingSquadron--should from the first have been stationed beforeCienfuegos; for each division, as has been said, could with militarypropriety have been risked singly against Cervera's four ships. Thiswas not done, because it was possible--though most improbable--thatthe Spanish squadron might attempt one of our own ports; because wehad not perfect confidence in the harbor defences; and because, also, of the popular outcry. Consequently, the extremely important port ofCienfuegos, a back door to Havana, was blockaded only by a few lightcruisers; and when the Spanish squadron was reported at Curaçao, thesehad to be withdrawn. One only was left to maintain in form theblockade which had been declared; and she had instructions to clearout quickly if the enemy appeared. Neither one, nor a dozen, of suchships would have been the slightest impediment to Cervera's enteringCienfuegos, raising our blockade by force; and this, it is needless toadd, would have been hailed in Spain and throughout the Continent ofEurope as a distinct defeat for us, --which, in truth, it would havebeen, carrying with it consequences political as well as military. This naval mishap, had it occurred, would have been due mainly toinadequate armament of our coasts; for to retain the Flying Squadronin the Chesapeake, merely as a guard to the coasting trade, would havebeen a serious military error, subordinating an offensiveoperation--off Cienfuegos--to one merely defensive, and not absolutelyvital. "The best protection against an enemy's fire, " said Farragut, "is a well-directed fire from our own guns. " Analogically, the bestdefence for one's own shores is to harass and threaten seriously thoseof the opponent; but this best defence cannot be employed to theutmost, if the inferior, passive defence of fortification has beenneglected. The fencer who wears also a breastplate may be looser inhis guard. Seaports cannot strike beyond the range of their guns; butif the great commercial ports and naval stations can strikeeffectively so far, the fleet can launch into the deep rejoicing, knowing that its home interests, behind the buckler of the fixeddefences, are safe till it returns. The broader determining conditions, and the consequent dispositionsmade by the Government of the United States and its naval authorities, in the recent campaign, have now been stated and discussed. In themis particularly to be noted the crippling effect upon naval operationsproduced by the consciousness of inadequate coast defences of thepermanent type. The sane conclusion to be drawn is, that whilesea-coast fortification can never take the place of fleets; thatwhile, as a defence even, it, being passive, is far inferior to theactive measure of offensive defence, which protects its own interestsby carrying offensive war out on to the sea, and, it may be, to theenemy's shores; nevertheless, by the fearless freedom of movement itpermits to the navy, it is to the latter complementary, --completes it;the two words being etymologically equivalent. The other comments hitherto made upon our initial plan ofoperations--for example, the impropriety of attempting simultaneousmovements against Puerto Rico and Cuba, and the advisability ornecessity, under the same conditions, of moving against bothCienfuegos and Havana by the measure of a blockade--were simplyspecial applications of general principles of warfare, universallytrue, to particular instances in this campaign. They addressthemselves, it may be said, chiefly to the soldier or seaman, asillustrating his especial business of directing war; and while theirvalue to the civilian cannot be denied, --for whatever reallyenlightens public opinion in a country like ours facilitates militaryoperations, --nevertheless the function of coast defence, ascontributory to sea power, is a lesson most necessary to be absorbedby laymen; for it, as well as the maintenance of the fleet, is in thisage the work of peace times, when the need of preparation for war istoo little heeded to be understood. The illustrations of theembarrassment actually incurred from this deficiency in the latehostilities are of the nature of an object lesson, and as such shouldbe pondered. At the same time, however, that attention is thus called to theinevitable and far-reaching effect of such antecedent neglects, shownin directions where men would not ordinarily have expected them, it isnecessary to check exaggeration of coast defence, in extent or indegree, by remarking that in any true conception of war, fortification, defence, inland and sea-coast alike, is of value merelyin so far as it conduces to offensive operations. This isconspicuously illustrated by our recent experience. The great evil ofour deficiencies in coast armament was that they neutralizedtemporarily a large part of our navy; prevented our sending it toCuba; made possible that Cervera's squadron, during quite an interval, might do this or that thing of several things thus left open to him, the result of which would have been to encourage the enemy, andpossibly to produce political action by our ill-wishers abroad. Directly upon this consideration--of the use that the Flying Squadronmight have been, if not held up for coast defence--follows the furtherreflection how much more useful still would have been a thirdsquadron; that is, a navy half as large again as we then had. Expecting Cervera's force alone, a navy of such size, free fromanxiety about coast defence, could have barred to him San Juan dePuerto Rico as well as Cienfuegos and Havana; or had Cámara beenjoined to Cervera, as he should have been, such a force would haveclosed both Cienfuegos and Havana with divisions that need not havefeared the combined enemy. If, further, there had been a fourthsquadron--our coast defence in each case remaining the same--ourevident naval supremacy would probably have kept the Spanish fleet inEurope. Not unlikely there would have been no war; in which event, theanti-imperialist may observe there would, thanks to a great andprepared navy, have been no question of the Philippines, and possiblynone of Hawaii. In short, it is with coast defence and the navy as it is with numbers_versus_ size in battleships. Both being necessary, the question ofproportion demands close attention, but in both cases the same singleprinciple dominates: offensive power, not defensive, determines theissues of war. In the solution of the problem, the extent to be givencoast defence by fortification depends, as do all military decisions, whether of preparation or of actual warfare, upon certainwell-recognized principles; and for a given country or coast, sincethe natural conditions remain permanent, the general dispositions, andthe relative power of the several works, if determined by men ofcompetent military knowledge, will remain practically constant duringlong periods. It is true, doubtless, that purely military conclusionsmust submit to some modification, in deference to the liability of apopulation to panics. The fact illustrates again the urgent necessityfor the spread of sound elementary ideas on military subjects amongthe people at large; but, if the great coast cities are satisfied oftheir safety, a government will be able to resist the unreasonableclamor--for such it is--of small towns and villages, which areprotected by their own insignificance. The navy is a more variableelement; for the demands upon it depend upon external conditions of apolitical character, which may undergo changes not only sudden, butextensive. The results of the war with Spain, for instance, haveaffected but little the question of passive coast defence, byfortification or otherwise; but they have greatly altered thecircumstances which hitherto have dictated the size of our activeforces, both land and sea. Upon the greater or less strength of thenavy depends, in a maritime conflict, the aggressive efficiency whichshortens war, and so mitigates its evils. In the general question ofpreparation for naval war, therefore, the important centres andinternal waterways of commerce must receive local protection, wherethey are exposed to attack from the sea; the rest must trust, and canin such case safely trust, to the fleet, upon which, as the offensivearm, all other expenditure for military maritime efficiency should bemade. The preposterous and humiliating terrors of the past months, that a hostile fleet would waste coal and ammunition in shellingvillages and bathers on a beach, we may hope will not recur. Before proceeding to study the operations of the war, the military andnaval conditions of the enemy at its outbreak must be brieflyconsidered. Spain, being a state that maintains at all times a regular army, respectable in numbers as well as in personal valor, had at thebeginning, and, from the shortness of the war, continued to the end tohave a decided land superiority over ourselves. Whatever we might hopeeventually to produce in the way of an effective army, large enoughfor the work in Cuba, time was needed for the result, and time was notallowed. In one respect only the condition of the Peninsula seems tohave resembled our own; that was in the inadequacy of the coastdefences. The matter there was even more serious than with us, because not only were the preparations less, but several largesea-coast cities--for instance, Barcelona, Malaga, Cadiz--lieimmediately upon the sea-shore; whereas most of ours are at the headof considerable estuaries, remote from the entrance. The exposure ofimportant commercial centres to bombardment, therefore, was for themmuch greater. This consideration was indeed so evident, that there wasin the United States Navy a perceptible current of feeling in favor ofcarrying maritime war to the coast of Spain, and to its commercialapproaches. The objection to this, on the part of the Navy Department, was, withslight modifications, the same as to the undertaking of operationsagainst Puerto Rico. There was not at our disposition, either inarmored ships or in cruisers, any superfluity of force over and abovethe requirements of the projected blockade of Cuba. To divert shipsfrom this object, therefore, would be false to the golden rule ofconcentration of effort, --to the single eye that gives light inwarfare. Moreover, in such a movement, the reliance, as represented inthe writer's hearing, would have been upon moral effect, upon thedismay of the enemy; for we should soon have come to the end of ourphysical coercion. As Nelson said of bombarding Copenhagen, "We shouldhave done our worst, and no nearer friends. " The influence of moraleffect in war is indisputable, and often tremendous; but like somedrugs in the pharmacopoeia, it is very uncertain in its action. Theother party may not, as the boys say, "scare worth a cent;" whereasmaterial forces can be closely measured beforehand, and their resultsreasonably predicted. This statement, generally true, is historicallyespecially true of the Spaniard, attacked in his own land. Thetenacity of the race has never come out so strongly as under suchconditions, as was witnessed in the old War of the Spanish Succession, and during the usurpation of Napoleon. On the other hand, such an enterprise on our part, if directed againstSpanish commerce on the seas, as was suggested by several excellentofficers, would have had but a trivial objective. The commerce ofSpain was cut up, root and branch, by our expeditions against hercolonies, Cuba and Manila; for her most important trade depended uponmonopoly of the colonial markets. The slight stream of trafficmaintained in Spanish bottoms between the English Channel and thePeninsula, was so small that it could readily have been transferred toneutral ships, whose flag we had for this war engaged should protectenemy's goods. Under these circumstances, the coasts of thePhilippines and of Cuba were to us the coast of Spain, and far moreconveniently so than that of the home country would have been. ASpanish merchant captain, writing from Barcelona as early as the 7thof May, had said: "At this moment we have shut up in this port the[steam] fleets of five transatlantic companies, " which he names. "Thesailing-vessels are tied up permanently. Several [named] ships havefallen into the hands of the enemy. Meantime the blockade of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila continues, at least for our flag, and maritimecommerce is at a standstill. In Barcelona some foreign firms, exporters to the Philippines, have failed, as well as severalcustom-house brokers, owing to the total cessation of mercantilemovement. The losses already suffered by our trade are incalculable, amounting to much more than the millions needed to maintain ahalf-dozen armored ships, which would have prevented the Yankees fromdaring so much. " These vessels continued to lie idle in Barcelonauntil the dread of Commodore Watson's threatened approach caused themto be sent to Marseilles, seeking the protection of the neutral port. A few weeks later the same Spanish writer comments: "The result of ourmistakes, " in the management of the navy, "is the loss of the marketsof Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, and, in consequence, thedeath of our merchant marine. " Inquiries were addressed by the stateto the Chambers of Commerce, for suggestions as to the opening of newmarkets, to compensate for the existing suspension of communicationswith "the over-sea provinces. " With such results from our operations in the Antilles and thePhilippines, there was no inducement, and indeed no justification, forsending cruisers across the ocean, until we had enough and to sparefor the blockade of Cuba and Puerto Rico. This was at no time thecase, up to the close of the war, owing to a combination of causes. The work of paralyzing Spanish trade was being effectually done bythe same measures that tended to strangle the Spanish armies in Cubaand the Philippines, and which, when fully developed, would entirelysever their necessary communications with the outside world. Besidesall this, the concentration of our efforts upon Cuba, with asubsequent slight extension to the single port of San Juan in PuertoRico, imposed upon Spain the burden of sustaining the war betweenthree and four thousand miles from home, and spared us the likeadditional strain. Every consideration so far entertained, therefore, of energy as well as of prudence, dictated the application of all thepressure at our disposal at the beginning of hostilities, and untilthe destruction of Cervera's squadron, upon Cuba, and in a very minordegree upon Puerto Rico. Indeed, the ships placed before San Juan werenot for blockade, properly so called, but to check any mischievousdisplay of energy by the torpedo cruiser within. After thus noting briefly the conditions of the enemy's coast defencesand commerce, there remains to consider the one other element of hissea power--the combatant navy--with regard to its force and to itsdisposition when war began. As was before said, the disparity between the armored fleets of thetwo nations was nominally inconsiderable; and the Spaniards possessedone extremely valuable--and by us unrivalled--advantage in a nearlyhomogeneous group of five[1] armored cruisers, very fast, and verysimilar both in nautical qualities and in armament. It is difficult toestimate too highly the possibilities open to such a body of ships, regarded as a "fleet in being, " to use an expression that many of ourreaders may have seen, but perhaps scarcely fully understood. The phrase "fleet in being, " having within recent years gained muchcurrency in naval writing, demands--like the word "jingo"--precisenessof definition; and this, in general acceptance, it has not yetattained. It remains, therefore, somewhat vague, and so occasionsmisunderstandings between men whose opinions perhaps do not materiallydiffer. The writer will not attempt to define, but a briefexplanation of the term and its origin may not be amiss. It was firstused, in 1690, by the British admiral Lord Torrington, when defendinghis course in declining to engage decisively, with an inferior force, a French fleet, then dominating in the Channel, and under cover ofwhich it was expected that a descent upon the English coast would bemade by a great French army. "Had I fought otherwise, " he said, "ourfleet had been totally lost, and the kingdom had lain open toinvasion. As it was, most men were in fear that the French wouldinvade; but I was always of another opinion, for I always said thatwhilst we had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make anattempt. " A "fleet in being, " therefore, is one the existence and maintenance ofwhich, although inferior, on or near the scene of operations, is aperpetual menace to the various more or less exposed interests of theenemy, who cannot tell when a blow may fall, and who is thereforecompelled to restrict his operations, otherwise possible, until thatfleet can be destroyed or neutralized. It corresponds very closely to"a position on the flank and rear" of an enemy, where the presence ofa smaller force, as every military student knows, harasses, and mayeven paralyze offensive movements. When such a force is extremelymobile, as a fleet of armored cruisers may be, its power of mischiefis very great; potentially, it is forever on the flank and rear, threatening the lines of communications. It is indeed as a threat tocommunications that the "fleet in being" is chiefly formidable. The theory received concrete and convincing illustration during therecent hostilities, from the effect exerted--and justly exerted--uponour plans and movements by Cervera's squadron, until there had beenassembled before Santiago a force at once so strong and so numerous asto make his escape very improbable. Even so, when a telegram wasreceived from a capable officer that he had identified by night, offthe north coast of Cuba, an armored cruiser, --which, if of that class, was most probably an enemy, --the sailing of Shafter's expedition wasstopped until the report could be verified. So much for the positive, material influence--in the judgment of the writer, the reasonableinfluence--of a "fleet in being. " As regards the moral effect, theeffect upon the imagination, it is scarcely necessary more than toallude to the extraordinary play of the fancy, the kaleidoscopiceffects elicited from our own people, and from some foreign critics, in propounding dangers for ourselves and ubiquity for Cervera. Againstthe infection of such tremors it is one of the tasks of those inresponsibility to guard themselves and, if possible, their people. "Don't make pictures for yourself, " was Napoleon's warning to hisgenerals. "Every naval operation since I became head of the governmenthas failed, because my admirals see double and have learned--where Idon't know--that war can be made without running risks. " The probable value of a "fleet in being" has, in the opinion of thewriter, been much overstated; for, even at the best, the game ofevasion, which this is, if persisted in, can have but one issue. Thesuperior force will in the end run the inferior to earth. In themeanwhile, however, vital time may have been lost. It is conceivable, for instance, that Cervera's squadron, if thoroughly effective, might, by swift and well-concealed movements, have detained our fleet in theWest Indies until the hurricane of September, 1898, swept over theCaribbean. We had then no reserve to replace armored ships lost ordamaged. But, for such persistence of action, there is needed in eachunit of the "fleet in being" an efficiency rarely attainable, andliable to be lost by unforeseen accident at a critical moment. Whereeffect, nay, safety, depends upon mere celerity of movement, as inretreat, a crippled ship means a lost ship; or a lost fleet, if thebody sticks to its disabled member. Such efficiency it is probableCervera's division never possessed. The length of its passage acrossthe Atlantic, however increased by the embarrassment of frequentlyrecoaling the torpedo destroyers, so far over-passed the extremecalculations of our naval authorities, that ready credence was givento an apparently authentic report that it had returned to Spain; themore so that such concentration was strategically correct, and it wasincorrect to adventure an important detachment so far from home, without the reinforcement it might have received in Cadiz. This delay, in ships whose individual speed had originally been very high, hasbeen commonly attributed in our service to the inefficiency of theengine-room force; and this opinion is confirmed by a Spanish officerwriting in their "Revista de la Marina. " "The Americans, " he says, "keep their ships cruising constantly, in every sea, and thereforehave a large and qualified engine-room force. We have but fewmachinists, and are almost destitute of firemen. " This inequality, however, is fundamentally due to the essential differences ofmechanical capacity and development in the two nations. An amusingstory was told the writer some years ago by one of our consuls inCuba. Making a rather rough passage between two ports, he saw anelderly Cuban or Spanish gentleman peering frequently into theengine-room, with evident uneasiness. When asked the cause of hisconcern, the reply was, "I don't feel comfortable unless the man incharge of the engines talks English to them. " When to the need of constant and sustained ability to move at highspeed is added the necessity of frequent recoaling, allowing thehostile navy time to come up, it is evident that the active use of a"fleet in being, " however perplexing to the enemy, must be bothanxious and precarious to its own commander. The contest is one ofstrategic wits, and it is quite possible that the stronger, thoughslower, force, centrally placed, may, in these days of cables, be ableto receive word and to corner its antagonist before the latter canfill his bunkers. Of this fact we should probably have received a veryconvincing illustration, had a satisfactory condition of our coastdefences permitted the Flying Squadron to be off Cienfuegos, or evenoff Havana, instead of in Hampton Roads. Cervera's entrance toSantiago was known to us within twenty-four hours. In twenty-four moreit could have been communicated off Cienfuegos by a fast despatchboat, after which less than forty-eight would have placed our divisionbefore Santiago. The uncertainty felt by Commodore Schley, when hearrived off Cienfuegos, as to whether the Spanish division was insideor no, would not have existed had his squadron been previouslyblockading; and his consequent delay of over forty-eight hours--withthe rare chance thus offered to Cervera--would not have occurred. Tocoal four great ships within that time was probably beyond theresources of Santiago; whereas the speed predicated for our ownmovements is rather below than above the dispositions contemplated toensure it. The great end of a war fleet, however, is not to chase, nor to fly, but to control the seas. Had Cervera escaped our pursuit at Santiago, it would have been only to be again paralyzed at Cienfuegos or atHavana. When speed, not force, is the reliance, destruction may bepostponed, but can be escaped only by remaining in port. Let it not, therefore, be inferred, from the possible, though temporary, effect ofa "fleet in being, " that speed is the chief of all factors in thebattleship. This plausible, superficial notion, too easily accepted inthese days of hurry and of unreflecting dependence upon machinery asthe all in all, threatens much harm to the future efficiency of thenavy. Not speed, but power of offensive action, is the dominant factorin war. The decisive preponderant element of great land forces hasever been the infantry, which, it is needless to say, is also theslowest. The homely summary of the art of war, "To get there firstwith the most men, " has with strange perverseness been so distortedin naval--and still more in popular--conception, that the second andmore important consideration has been subordinated to the former andless essential. Force does not exist for mobility, but mobility forforce. It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy inturn arrives, you have also the most men, --the greater force. This isespecially true of the sea, because there inferiority of force--of gunpower--cannot be compensated, as on land it at times may be, byjudiciously using accidents of the ground. I do not propose to fallinto an absurdity of my own by questioning the usefulness of higherspeed, _provided_ the increase is not purchased at the expense ofstrictly offensive power; but the time has come to say plainly thatits value is being exaggerated; that it is in the battleship secondaryto gun power; that a battle fleet can never attain, nor maintain, thehighest rate of any ship in it, except of that one which at the momentis the slowest, for it is a commonplace of naval action that fleetspeed is that of the slowest ship; that not exaggerated speed, butuniform speed--sustained speed--is the requisite of the battle fleet;that it is not machinery, as is often affirmed, but brains and guns, that win battles and control the sea. The true speed of war is notheadlong precipitancy, but the unremitting energy which wastes notime. For the reasons that have been given, the safest, though not the mosteffective, disposition of an inferior "fleet in being" is to lock itup in an impregnable port or ports, imposing upon the enemy theintense and continuous strain of watchfulness against escape. This itwas that Torrington, the author of the phrase, proposed for the timeto do. Thus it was that Napoleon, to some extent before Trafalgar, butafterward with set and exclusive purpose, used the French Navy, whichhe was continually augmenting, and yet never, to the end of his reign, permitted again to undertake any serious expedition. The meremaintenance of several formidable detachments, in apparent readiness, from the Scheldt round to Toulon, presented to the British so manypossibilities of mischief that they were compelled to keep constantlybefore each of the French ports a force superior to that within, entailing an expense and an anxiety by which the Emperor hoped toexhaust their endurance. To some extent this was Cervera's positionand function in Santiago, whence followed logically the advisabilityof a land attack upon the port, to force to a decisive issue asituation which was endurable only if incurable. "The destruction ofCervera's squadron, " justly commented an Italian writer, before theresult was known, "is the only really decisive fact that can resultfrom the expedition to Santiago, because it will reduce to impotencethe naval power of Spain. The determination of the conflict willdepend throughout upon the destruction of the Spanish sea power, andnot upon territorial descents, although the latter may aggravate thesituation. " The American admiral from before Santiago, when urging theexpedition of a land force to make the bay untenable, telegraphed, "The destruction of this squadron will end the war;" and it did. In other respects it is probable that the Spanish admiral had littleconfidence in a squadron which, whatever the courage or otherqualities of the officers and seamen, had never manoeuvred togetheruntil it left the Cape de Verde Islands. Since its destruction, awriter in a Spanish naval magazine has told the following incident:"A little more than a year ago we visited General Cervera in LaCarraca, [the Cadiz arsenal], and we said to him: 'You appear to beindicated, by professional opinion, for the command of the squadron incase war is declared. ' 'In that case, ' he replied, 'I shall accept, knowing, however, that I am going to a Trafalgar. ' 'And how could thatdisaster be avoided?' 'By allowing me to expend beforehand fiftythousand tons of coal in evolutions and ten thousand projectiles intarget practice. Otherwise we shall go to a Trafalgar. Remember what Isay. '" It is curious to contrast with this well-founded fear of anexperienced and gallant officer, expressed in private conversation, the opinion of another Spanish officer, lately Minister of Marine, reported to the Madrid public through a newspaper, --the "Heraldo, " ofApril 6, 1898. It illustrates, further, the curious illusionsentertained in high quarters in Spain: "We had an opportunity to-day of talking for a long time with GeneralBeranger, the last Secretary of the Navy under the ConservativeCabinet. To the questions which we directed to him concerning theconflict pending with the United States, he was kind enough to informus that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. .. . 'We shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give you myreasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevailson our warships; and the second, as soon as fire is opened, the crewsof the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know thatamong them are people of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadrondetained at Cape de Verde, and particularly the destroyers, shouldhave, and could have, continued the voyage to Cuba, since they havenothing to fear from the American fleet. '" The review from which Cervera's opinion is quoted has, since thedisasters to the Spanish Navy, been full of complaints and of detailedstatements concerning the neglect of the navy, both in its materialand in drills, during the antecedent months of peace, owing to thepractice of a misplaced, if necessary, economy. But that economy, itis justly argued, would not have been required to a disabling degree, if so disproportionate an amount of money had not been expended uponthe army, by a state whose great colonial system could in war besustained only by a fleet. "In more than a year, " writes a captain inthe Spanish Navy, "we have had only one target practice, and thatlimited in extent, in order to expend the least possible amount ofammunition. " The short brilliant moments of triumph in war are thesign and the seal of the long hours of obscure preparations, of whichtarget practice is but one item. Had even the nominal force of Spainbeen kept in efficient condition for immediate action, the task of theUnited States would have been greatly prolonged and far from so easyas it has been since declared by those among our people who delight tobelittle the great work our country has just achieved, and toundervalue the magnanimity of its resolution to put a stop to outragesat our doors which were well said to have become intolerable. Neitherby land nor by sea was the state of the case so judged by professionalmen, either at home or abroad. It was indeed evident that, if wepersevered, there could be but one issue; but this might have beenpostponed, by an active opponent, long enough to have disheartened ournation, if it was as easily to be discouraged by the difficulties anddangers, now past, as it is in some quarters represented again to beby the problems arising out of the war and its conquests. Suchdiscouragement, perplexity, and consequent frustration of theadversary's purposes are indeed the prime function of a "fleet inbeing, "--to create and to maintain moral effect, in short, rather thanphysical, unless indeed the enemy, yielding to moral effect, divideshis forces in such wise as to give a chance for a blow at one portionof them. The tendency to this also received illustration in our war. "Our sea-coast, " said a person then in authority to the presentwriter, "was in a condition of unreasoning panic, and fought to havelittle squadrons scattered along it everywhere, according to thetheory of defence always favored by stupid terror. " The "stupidity, "by all military experience, was absolute--unqualified; but the NavyDepartment succeeded in withstanding the "terror"--the moraleffect--so far as to compromise on the Flying Squadron; a rationalsolution, though not unimpeachable. We thus, instead of a half-dozennaval groups, had only two, the combination of which might perhaps beeffected in time enough. FOOTNOTES: [1] In this number is included the _Emperador Carlos V. _; which, however, did not accompany the other four under Cervera. III POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO THE SPANISH NAVY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. --THE REASONS FOR BLOCKADING CUBA. --FIRST MOVEMENTS OF THE SQUADRONS UNDER ADMIRALS SAMPSON AND CERVERA. For the reasons just stated, it was upon Cervera's squadron that theattention of instructed military students was chiefly turned at theoutset of the war. Grave suspicions as to its efficiency, indeed, werefelt in many quarters, based partly upon actual knowledge of theneglect of the navy practised by the Spanish Government, and partlyupon the inference that the general incapacity evident for years pastin all the actions of the Spanish authorities, and notably in Cuba, could not but extend to the navy, --one of the most sensitive anddelicate parts of any political organization; one of the first to goto pieces when the social and political foundations of a State areshaken, as was notably shown in the French Revolution. But, thoughsuspected, the ineffectiveness of that squadron could not be assumedbefore proved. Until then--to use the words of an Italian writer whohas treated the whole subject of this war with comprehensive andinstructive perspicacity--Spain had "the possibility of contesting thecommand of the sea, and even of securing a definite preponderance, bymeans of a squadron possessed of truly exceptional characteristics, both tactical and strategic, "--in short, by means of a "fleet inbeing. " It is true that in this estimate the writer quoted included the_Carlos V. _, a new and high-powered armored cruiser, and also a numberof protected cruisers and of torpedo vessels, of various kinds, allpossessing a rate of speed much superior to the more distinctlyfighting ships in which consisted the strength of the United Statessquadrons. Such a fleet, homogeneous in respect to the particularfunction which constitutes the power of a "fleet in being, " whoseeffectiveness lies in its legs and in its moral effect, in its powerto evade pursuit and to play upon the fears of an enemy, should becapable of rapid continuous movement; and such a fleet Spain actuallypossessed when the war broke out--only it was not ready. "Thissplendid fleet, " resumed our Italian critic, giving rein, perhaps, toa Southern imagination, but not wholly without just reason, "would bein a condition to impose upon the enemy the character which theconflict should assume, alike in strategy and in tactics, and therebycould draw the best and greatest advantage from the actual situation, with a strong probability of partial results calculated to restore theequilibrium between the two belligerent fleets, or even of successesso decisive, if obtained immediately after the declaration of war, asto include a possibility of a Spanish preponderance. " The presentwriter guards himself from being understood to accept fully thisextensive programme for a fleet distinctly inferior in actualcombative force; but the general assumption of the author quotedindicates the direction of effort which alone held out a hope ofsuccess, and which for that reason should have been vigorouslyfollowed by the Spanish authorities. As the Spanish Navy--whatever its defects in organization andpractice--is not lacking in thoughtful and instructed officers, it isprobable that the despatch of Cervera with only four ships, instead ofat least the five armored cruisers well qualified to act together, which he might have had, not to speak of the important auxiliariesalso disposable, was due to uninstructed popular and politicalpressure, of the same kind that in our country sought to force thedivision of our fleet among our ports. That the Spanish Government wasthus goaded and taunted, at the critical period when Cervera was lyingin Santiago, is certain. To that, most probably, judging from thewords used in the Cortes, we owe the desperate sortie which deliveredhim into our hands and reduced Spain to inevitable submission. "Thecontinuance of Cervera's division in Santiago, and its apparentinactivity, " stated a leading naval periodical in Madrid, issued twodays before the destruction of the squadron, "is causing markedcurrents of pessimism, and of disaffection towards the navy, especially since the Yankees have succeeded in effecting theirproposed landing. This state of public feeling, which has beenexpressed with unrestricted openness in some journals, has beensanctioned in Congress by one of the Opposition members uttering veryunguarded opinions, and reflecting injuriously upon the navy itself, as though upon it depended having more or fewer ships. " The Ministerof Marine, replying in the Cortes, paraphrased as follows, withoutcontradiction, the words of this critic, which voiced, as it wouldappear, a popular clamor: "You ask, 'Why, after reaching Santiago, hasthe squadron not gone out, and why does it not now go out?' Why dofour ships not go out to fight twenty? You ask again: 'If it does notgo out, if it does not hasten to seek death, what is the use ofsquadrons? For what are fleets built, if not to be lost?' We are boundto believe, Señor Romero Robledo, that your words in this case expressneither what you intended to say nor your real opinion. " Nevertheless, they seem not to have received correction, nor to have been retracted;and to the sting of them, and of others of like character, isdoubtless due the express order of the Ministry under which Cerveraquitted his anchorage. Like ourselves, our enemy at the outset of the war had his fleet intwo principal divisions: one still somewhat formless and as yetunready, but of very considerable power, was in the ports of thePeninsula; the other--Cervera's--at the Cape Verde Islands, apossession of Portugal. The latter was really exceptional in itsqualities, as our Italian author has said. It was exceptional in ageneral sense, because homogeneous and composed of vessels of veryhigh qualities, offensive and defensive; it was exceptional also, astowards us in particular, because we had of the same class but twoships, --one-half its own force, --the _New York_ and the _Brooklyn_;and, moreover, we had no torpedo cruisers to oppose to the three whichaccompanied it. These small vessels, while undoubtedly an encumbranceto a fleet in extended strategic movements in boisterous seas, becausethey cannot always keep up, are a formidable adjunct--tactical incharacter--in the day of battle, especially if the enemy has none ofthem; and in the mild Caribbean it was possible that they might notgreatly delay their heavy consorts in passages which would usually beshort. The two main divisions of the Spanish fleet were thus about fifteenhundred miles apart when war began on the 25th of April. Theneutrality of Portugal made it impossible for Cervera to remain longin his then anchorage, and an immediate decision was forced upon hisGovernment. It is incredible that among the advisers of the Ministerof Marine--himself a naval officer--there was no one to point out thatto send Cervera at once to the Antilles, no matter to what port, wasto make it possible for the United States to prevent any futurejunction between himself and the remaining vessels of their navy. Thesquadron of either Sampson or Schley was able to fight him on terms ofreasonable equality, to say the least. Either of our divisions, therefore, was capable of blockading him, if caught in port; and itwas no more than just to us to infer that, when once thus cornered, weshould, as we actually did at Santiago, assemble both divisions, so asto render escape most improbable and the junction of a reinforcementpractically impossible. Such, in fact, was the intention from the veryfirst: for, this done, all our other undertakings, Cuban blockade andwhat not, would be carried on safely, under cover of our watchingfleet, were the latter distant ten miles or a thousand from such otheroperations. The writer, personally, attaches but little importance tothe actual consequences of strictly offensive operations attempted bya "fleet in being, " when of so inferior force. As suggested by Spanishand foreign officers, in various publications, they have appeared tohim fantastic pranks of the imagination, such as he himself indulgedin as a boy, rather than a sober judgment formed after consideringboth sides of the case. "I cannot but admire Captain Owen's zeal, "wrote Nelson on one occasion, "in his anxious desire to get at theenemy, but I am afraid it has made him overleap sandbanks and tides, and laid him aboard the enemy. I am as little used to find out theimpossible as most folks, and I think I can discriminate between theimpracticable and the fair prospect of success. " The potentialities ofCervera's squadron, after reaching the Spanish Antilles, must beconsidered under the limitations of his sandbanks and tides; oftelegraph cables betraying his secrets, of difficulties and delays incoaling, of the chances of sudden occasional accidents to which allmachinery is liable, multiplied in a fleet by the number of vesselscomposing it; and to these troubles, inevitable accompaniments ofsuch operations, must in fairness be added the assumption ofreasonable watchfulness and intelligence on the part of the UnitedStates, in the distribution of its lookouts and of its ships. The obvious palliative to the disadvantage thus incurred by Spainwould have been to add to Cervera ships sufficient to force us atleast to unite our two divisions, and to keep them joined. This, however, could not be done at once, because the contingent in Spainwas not yet ready; and fear of political consequences and publiccriticism at home, such as that already quoted, probably deterred theenemy from the correct military measure of drawing Cervera's squadronback to the Canaries, some eight hundred or nine hundred miles; oreven to Spain, if necessary. This squadron itself had recently beenformed in just this way; two ships being drawn back from the Antillesand two sent forward from the Peninsula. If Spain decided to carry onthe naval war in the Caribbean, --and to decide otherwise was toabandon Cuba in accordance with our demand, --she should have sent allthe armored ships she could get together, and have thrown herselffrankly, and at whatever cost, upon a mere defensive policy for herhome waters, relying upon coast defences--or upon mere luck, if needwere--for the safety of the ports. War cannot be made without runningrisks. When you have chosen your field for fighting, you mustconcentrate upon it, letting your other interests take their chance. To do this, however, men must have convictions, and conviction mustrest upon knowledge, or else ignorant clamor and contagious panic willsweep away every reasonable teaching of military experience. And soCervera went forth with his four gallant ships, foredoomed to his fateby folly, or by national false pride, exhibited in the form ofpolitical pressure disregarding sound professional judgment andmilitary experience. We were not without manifestations here of thesame uninstructed and ignoble outcry; but fortunately our homeconditions permitted it to be disregarded without difficulty. Nevertheless, although under circumstances thus favorable we escapedthe worst effects of such lack of understanding, the indications weresufficient to show how hard, in a moment of real emergency, it will befor the Government to adhere to sound military principles, if therebe not some appreciation of these in the mass of the people; or, atthe very least, among the leaders to whom the various parts of thecountry are accustomed to look for guidance. It may be profitable at this point to recall a few dates; after whichthe narrative, avoiding superfluous details, can be continued in suchoutline as is required for profitable comment, and for eliciting themore influential factors in the course of events, with the consequentmilitary lessons from them to be deduced. On April 20th the President of the United States approved the jointresolution passed by the two Houses of Congress, declaring theindependence of Cuba, and demanding that Spain should relinquish herauthority there and withdraw her forces. A blockade, dated April 22nd, was declared of the north coast of Cuba, from Cardenas on the east toBahia Honda, west of Havana, and of the port of Cienfuegos on thesouth side of the island. On April 25th a bill declaring that warbetween the United States and Spain existed, and had existed since the21st of the month, was passed by Congress and approved the sameevening by the President, thus adding another instance to the nowcommonplace observation that hostilities more frequently precede thanfollow a formal declaration. On April 29th, Admiral Cervera'sdivision--four armored cruisers and three torpedo destroyers--quittedthe Cape de Verde Islands for an unknown destination, and disappearedduring near a fortnight from the knowledge of the United Statesauthorities. On May 1, Commodore Dewey by a dash, the rapidity andaudacity of which reflected the highest credit upon his professionalqualities, destroyed the Spanish squadron at Manila, therebyparalyzing also all Spanish operations in the East. The Government ofthe United States was thus, during an appreciable time, and as itturned out finally, released from all military anxiety about thecourse of events in that quarter. Meantime the blockade of the Cuban coasts, as indicated above, hadbeen established effectively, to the extent demanded by internationallaw, which requires the presence upon the coast, or before the port, declared blockaded, of such a force as shall constitute a manifestdanger of capture to vessels seeking to enter or to depart. In thereserved, not to say unfriendly, attitude assumed by many of theEuropean States, the precise character of which is not fully known, and perhaps never will be, it was not only right, but practicallynecessary, to limit the extent of coast barred to merchant ships tothat which could be thus effectually guarded, leaving to neutralgovernments no sound ground for complaint. Blockade is one of therights conceded to belligerent States, by universal agreement, whichdirectly, as well as indirectly, injures neutrals, imposing pecuniarylosses by restraints upon trade previously in their hands. The ravagesof the insurrection and the narrow policy of Spain in seeking tomonopolize intercourse with her colonies had, indeed, alreadygrievously reduced the commerce of the island; but with our war therewas sure to spring up a vigorous effort, both legal and contraband, tointroduce stores of all kinds, especially the essentials of life, thesupply of which was deficient. Such cargoes, not being clearlycontraband, could be certainly excluded only by blockade; and thelatter, in order fully to serve our military objects, needed at theleast to cover every port In railway communication with Havana, wherethe bulk of the Spanish army was assembled. This it was impossible toeffect at the first, because we had not ships enough; and therefore, as always in such cases, a brisk neutral trade, starting from Jamaicaand from Mexico, as well as from Europe and the North AmericanContinent, was directed upon the harbors just outside the limits ofthe blockade, --towards Sagua la Grande and adjacent waters in thenorth, and to Batabano and other ports in the south. Such trade wouldbe strictly lawful, from an international standpoint, unless declaredby us to be contraband, because aiding to support the army of theenemy; and such declarations, by which provisions are included in theelastic, but ill-defined category of contraband, tend always toprovoke the recriminations and unfriendliness of neutral states. Blockade avoids the necessity for definitions, for by it all goodsbecome contraband; the extension of it therefore was to us imperative. As things were, although this neutral trade frustrated our purposes toa considerable degree, it afforded us no ground for complaint. On thecontrary, we were at times hard driven by want of vessels to avoidlaying ourselves open to reclamation, on the score of the blockadebeing invalid, even within its limited range, because ineffective. This was especially the case at the moment when the army was beingconvoyed from Tampa, as well as immediately before, and for some daysafter that occasion: before, because it was necessary then to detachfrom the blockade and to assemble elsewhere the numerous small vesselsneeded to check the possible harmful activity of the Spanish gunboatsalong the northern coast, and afterwards, because the preliminaryoperations about Santiago, concurring with dark nights favorable toCervera's escape, made it expedient to retain there many of thelighter cruisers, which, moreover, needed recoaling, --a slow businesswhen so many ships were involved. Our operations throughoutlabored--sometimes more, sometimes less--under this embarrassment, which should be borne in mind as a constant, necessary, yet perplexingelement in the naval and military plans. The blockade, in fact, whilethe army was still unready, and until the Spanish Navy came withinreach, was the one decisive measure, sure though slow in its working, which could be taken; the necessary effect of which was to bring theenemy's ships to this side of the ocean, unless Spain was prepared toabandon the contest. The Italian writer already quoted, a fair critic, though Spanish in his leanings, enumerates among the circumstancesmost creditable to the direction of the war by the Navy Department theperception that "blockade must inevitably cause collapse, given theconditions of insurrection and of exhaustion already existing in theisland. " From this specific instance, the same author, whose military judgmentsshow much breadth of view, later on draws a general conclusion which iswell worth the attention of American readers, because much of ourpublic thought is committed to the belief that at sea private property, so called, --that is, merchant ships and their cargoes, --should not beliable to capture in war; which, duly interpreted, means that thecommerce of one belligerent is not to be attacked or interrupted by theother. "Blockade, " says our Italian, "is the fundamental basis of theconflict for the dominion of the seas, when the contest cannot bebrought to an immediate issue;" that is, to immediate battle. Blockade, however, is but one form of the unbloody pressure brought to bear uponan enemy by interruption of his commerce. The stoppage of commerce, inwhole or in part, exhausts without fighting. It compels peace withoutsacrificing life. It is the most scientific warfare, because the leastsanguinary, and because, like the highest strategy, it is directedagainst the communications, --the resources, --not the persons, of theenemy. It has been the glory of sea-power that its ends are attained bydraining men of their dollars instead of their blood. Eliminate theattack upon an enemy's sea-borne commerce from the conditions of navalwar, --in which heretofore it has been always a most importantfactor, --and the sacrifice of life will be proportionately increased, for two reasons: First, the whole decision of the contest will restupon actual conflict; and, second, failing decisive results in battle, the war will be prolonged, because by retaining his trade uninjured theenemy retains all his money power to keep up his armed forces. The establishment and maintenance of the blockade therefore was, inthe judgment of the present writer, not only the first step in order, but also the first, by far, in importance, open to the Government ofthe United States as things were; prior, that is, to the arrival ofCervera's division at some known and accessible point. Its importancelay in its twofold tendency; to exhaust the enemy's army in Cuba, andto force his navy to come to the relief. No effect more decisive thanthese two could be produced by us before the coming of the hostilenavy, or the readiness of our own army to take the field, permittedthe contest to be brought, using the words of our Italian commentator, "to an immediate issue. " Upon the blockade, therefore, the generallyaccepted principles of warfare would demand that effort should beconcentrated, until some evident radical change in the conditionsdictated a change of object, --a new objective; upon which, whenaccepted, effort should again be concentrated, with a certain amountof "exclusiveness of purpose. " Blockade, however, implies not merely a sufficient number of cruisersto prevent the entry or departure of merchant ships. It furtherimplies, because it requires, a strong supporting force sufficient toresist being driven off by an attack from within or from without theport; for it is an accepted tenet of international law that a blockaderaised by force ceases to exist, and cannot be consideredre-established until a new proclamation and reoccupancy of the groundin force. Hence it follows that, prior to such re-establishment, merchant vessels trying to enter or to depart cannot be captured invirtue of the previous proclamation. Consequent upon this requirement, therefore, the blockades on the north and on the south side, to besecure against this military accident, should each have been supportedby a division of armored ships capable of meeting Cervera's divisionon fairly equal terms; for, considering the sea distance betweenCienfuegos and Havana, one such division could not support bothblockades. It has already been indicated why it was impossible so tosustain the Cienfuegos blockaders. The reason, in the last analysis, was our insufficient sea-coast fortification. The Flying Squadron waskept in Hampton Roads to calm the fears of the seaboard, and to checkany enterprise there of Cervera, if intended or attempted. The otherdivision of the armored fleet, however, was placed before Havana, where its presence not only strengthened adequately the blockadingforce proper, but assured also the safety of our naval base at KeyWest, both objects being attainable by the same squadron, on accountof their nearness to each other. It should likewise be noticed that the same principle of concentrationof effort upon the single purpose--the blockade--forbade, _a priori_, any attempts at bombardment by which our armored ships should bebrought within range of disablement by heavy guns on shore. If theblockade was our object, rightly or wrongly, and if a blockade, to besecure against serious disturbance, required all the armored ships atour disposal, --as it did, --it follows logically and rigorously that torisk those ships by attacking forts is false to principle, unlessspecial reasons can be adduced sufficiently strong to bring suchaction within the scope of the principle properly applied. It is herenecessary clearly to distinguish. Sound principles in warfare are asuseful and as necessary as in morals; when established, thepresumption in any case is all on their side, and there is no one ofthem better established than concentration. But as in morals, so inwar, the application of principle, the certainty of right, is notalways clear. Could it always be, war would be an exact science; whichit is not, but an art, in which true artists are as few as in paintingor sculpture. It may be that a bombardment of the fortifications ofHavana, or of some other place, might have been expedient, for reasonsunknown to the writer; but it is clearly and decisively his opinionthat if it would have entailed even a remote risk of serious injury toan armored ship, it stood condemned irretrievably (unless it conducedto getting at the enemy's navy), because it would hazard themaintenance of the blockade, our chosen object, upon which our effortsshould be concentrated. [2] There is concentration of purpose, as wellas concentration in place, and ex-centric action in either sphere iscontrary to sound military principle. The question of keeping the armored division under Admiral Sampson inthe immediate neighborhood of Havana, for the purpose of supportingthe blockade by the lighter vessels, was one upon which some diversityof opinion might be expected to arise. Cervera's destination wasbelieved--as it turned out, rightly believed--to be the West Indies. His precise point of arrival was a matter of inference only, as infact was his general purpose. A natural surmise was that he would gofirst to Puerto Rico, for reasons previously indicated. But if coalenough remained to him, it was very possible that he might push on atonce to his ultimate objective, if that were a Cuban port, thusavoiding the betrayal of his presence at all until within strikingdistance of his objective. That he could get to the United Statescoast without first entering a coaling port, whence he would bereported, was antecedently most improbable; and, indeed, it was fairto suppose that, if bound to Havana, coal exigencies would compel himto take a pretty short route, and to pass within scouting range of theWindward Passage, between Cuba and Haïti. Whatever the particularcourse of reasoning, it was decided that a squadron under AdmiralSampson's command should proceed to the Windward Passage for thepurpose of observation, with a view to going further eastward if itshould appear advisable. Accordingly, on the 4th of May, five daysafter Cervera left the Cape de Verde, the Admiral sailed for theappointed position, taking with him all his armored sea-goingships--the _Iowa_, the _Indiana_, and the _New York_--and twomonitors, the _Amphitrite_ and the _Terror_. Of course, some smallercruisers and a collier accompanied him. It is almost too obvious for mention that this movement, if undertakenat all, should be made, as it was, with all the force disposable, thisbeing too small to be safely divided. The monitors promptly, thoughpassively, proceeded to enforce another ancient maritimeteaching, --the necessity for homogeneousness, especially of speed andmanoeuvring qualities, in vessels intending to act together. Ofinferior speed at the best, they had, owing to their small coalendurance, and to minimize the delay in the progress of the wholebody, consequent upon their stopping frequently to coal, to be towedeach by an armored ship, --an expedient which, although the best thatcould be adopted, entailed endless trouble and frequent stoppagesthrough the breaking of the tow-lines. [Illustration: The Caribbean Sea (map)] Shortly before midnight of May 7th, the squadron was twenty milesnorth of Cape Haïtien, about six hundred sea miles east of Havana. Itwas there learned, by telegrams received from the Department, that noinformation had yet been obtained as to the movements of the Spanishdivision, but that two swift steamers, lately of the AmericanTransatlantic line, had been sent to scout to the eastward ofMartinique and Guadaloupe. The instructions to these vessels were tocruise along a north and south line, eighty miles from the islandsnamed. They met at the middle once a day, communicated, and then wentback in opposite directions to the extremities of the beat. In casethe enemy were discovered, word of course would be sent from thenearest cable port to Washington, and to the Admiral, if accessible. The two vessels were directed to continue on this service up to acertain time, which was carefully calculated to meet the extremepossibilities of slowness on the part of the Spanish division, ifcoming that way; afterwards they were to go to a given place, andreport. It may be added that they remained their full time, and yetmissed by a hair's breadth sighting the enemy. The captain of one ofthem, the _Harvard_, afterwards told the writer that he believedanother stretch to the south would have rewarded him with success. Thecase was one in which blame could be imputed to nobody; unless it wereto the Spaniards, in disappointing our very modest expectationsconcerning their speed as a squadron, which is a very different thingfrom the speed of a single ship. Among the telegrams received at this time by the Admiral from theDepartment were reports of rumors that colliers for the Spanishdivision had been seen near Guadaloupe; also that Spanish vesselswere coaling and loading ammunition at St. Thomas. Neither of thesewas well founded, nor was it likely that the enemy's division wouldpause for such purpose at a neutral island, distant, as St. Thomas is, less than one hundred miles from their own harbors in Puerto Rico. Immediately after the receipt of these telegrams, the Admiral summonedall his captains between 12 and 4 A. M. , May 9th, to a consultationregarding the situation. He then decided to go on to San Juan, thechief seaport of Puerto Rico, upon the chance of finding the Spanishsquadron there. The coaling of the monitors, which had begun when thesquadron stopped the previous afternoon, was resumed next morning. At11. 15, May 9th, a telegram from the Department reported a story, "published in the newspapers, " that the Spanish division had been seenon the night of the 7th, near Martinique. The Department's telegrambetrayed also some anxiety about Key West and the Havana blockade;but, while urging a speedy return, the details of the Admiral'smovements were left to his own discretion. The squadron then stoodeast, and on the early morning of the 12th arrived off San Juan. Anattack upon the forts followed at once, lasting from 5. 30 to 7. 45A. M. ; but, as it was evident that the Spanish division was not there, the Admiral decided not to continue the attack, although satisfiedthat he could force a surrender. His reasons for desisting are givenin his official report as follows:-- "The fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding the place; that part [of the squadron] would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the Flying Squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such a force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, --made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative. " It will be noted that the Admiral's conclusions, as here given, coincided substantially with the feeling of the Department asexpressed in the telegram last mentioned. The squadron started backimmediately to the westward. During the night of this same day, Thursday, May 12th, towards midnight, reliable information wasreceived at the Navy Department that Cervera's squadron had arrivedoff Martinique, --four armored cruisers and three torpedo destroyers, one of the latter entering the principal port of the island. The movements of the Spanish division immediately preceding itsappearance off Martinique can be recovered in the main from the log ofthe _Cristobal Colon_, which was found on board that ship by theUnited States officers upon taking possession after her surrender onJuly 3. Some uncertainty attends the conclusions reached from itsexamination, because the record is brief and not always precise in itsstatements; but, whatever inaccuracy of detail there may be, thegeneral result is clear enough. At noon on May 10th the division was one hundred and thirty miles eastof the longitude of Martinique, and fifteen miles south of itssouthernmost point. Being thus within twelve hours' run of the island, Admiral Cervera evidently, and reasonably, considered that he mightnow be in the neighborhood of danger, if the United States Governmenthad decided to attempt to intercept him with an armored division, instead of sticking to the dispositions known to him when hesailed, --the blockade of Cuba and the holding the Flying Squadron inreserve. In order not to fall in with an enemy unexpectedly, especially during the night, the speed of the division was reduced tosomething less than four knots, and the torpedo destroyer _Terror_ wassent ahead to reconnoitre and report. The incident of her separatingfrom her consorts is not noted, --a singular omission, due possibly toits occurring at night and so escaping observation by the _Colon_; butit is duly logged that she was sighted "to port" next morning, May11th, at 9 A. M. , and that, until she was recognized, the crew weresent to their quarters for action. This precaution had also beenobserved during the previous night, the men sleeping beside theirguns, --a sufficient evidence of the suspicions entertained by theSpanish Admiral. At 10 A. M. --by which hour, or very soon afterwards, the communicationof the _Terror_ with the Admiral recorded by the log must have takenplace--there had been abundance of time since daybreak for a 15-knottorpedo destroyer, low-lying in the water, to remain unseen withineasy scouting distance of Martinique, and thence to rejoin thesquadron, which would then be forty or fifty miles distant from theisland. She could even, by putting forth all her speed, havecommunicated with the shore; possibly without the knowledge of theAmerican representatives on the spot, if the sympathies of theinhabitants were with the Spaniards, as has been generally believed. However that may be, shortly after her junction the division wentahead again seven knots, the speed logged at noon of May 11th, which, as steam formed, was increased to ten knots. At 4 P. M. Martinique wasabeam on the starboard hand--north. At sundown the ships went togeneral quarters, and the crews were again kept at their guns duringthe night. By this time Cervera doubtless had been informed thatSampson's division had gone east from Cuba, but its destination couldhave been only a matter of inference with him, for the attack upon SanJuan did not take place till the following morning. The fact ofkeeping his men at quarters also justifies the conclusion that he wasthus uncertain about Sampson, for the stationariness of the FlyingSquadron would be known at Martinique. After mentioning that the ship's company went to quarters, the log ofthe _Colon_ adds: "Stopped from 5. 15 to 6 A. M. " Whether the 5. 15 wasA. M. Or P. M. , whether, in short, the squadron continued practicallymotionless during the night of May 11th-12th, can only be conjectured, but there can be little doubt that it did so remain. The Spaniardsstill observe the old-fashioned sea-day of a century ago, abandonedlong since by the British and ourselves, according to which May 12thbegins at noon of May 11th. A continuous transaction, such as stoppingfrom evening to morning, would fall, therefore, in the log of the sameday, as it here does; whereas in a United States ship of war, evenwere our records as brief and fragmentary as the _Colon's_, the factof the stoppage, extending over the logs of two days, would have beenmentioned in each. It is odd, after passing an hour or two in puttingthis and that together out of so incomplete a narrative, to findrecorded in full, a few days later, the following notable incident:"At 2. 30 P. M. Flagship made signal: 'If you want fresh beef, sendboat. ' Answered: 'Many thanks; do not require any. '" Log-books dostate such occurrences, particularly when matters of signal; but thenthey are supposed also to give a reasonably full account of each day'simportant proceedings. Whatever the movements back and forth, or the absence of movement, bythe Spanish ships during the night, at 7. 10 A. M. The next day, May12th, while Sampson's division was still engaged with the forts at SanJuan, they were close to Martinique, "four miles from Diamond Rock, " adetached islet at its southern end. The next entry, the first for thesea-day of May 13th, is: "At 12. 20 P. M. Lost sight of Martinique. " Asthe land there is high enough to be visible forty or fifty miles underfavorable conditions, and as the squadron on its way to Curaçaoaveraged 11 knots per hour, it seems reasonable to infer that theSpanish Admiral, having received news of the attack on San Juan, though possibly not of the result, had determined upon a hastydeparture and a hurried run to the end of his journey, before he couldbe intercepted by Sampson, the original speed of whose ships wasinferior to that of his own, and whom he knew to be hampered bymonitors. The Spaniards did not take coal at Martinique. This may have been dueto refusal by the French officials to permit it, according to a commonneutral rule which allows a neutral only to give enough to reach thenearest national port. As the ships still had enough to reach Curaçao, they had more than enough to go to Puerto Rico. It may very well be, also, that Cervera, not caring to meet Sampson, whose force, countingthe monitors, was superior to his own, thought best to disappear atonce again from our knowledge. He did indeed prolong his journey toSantiago, if that were his original destination, by nearly two hundredmiles, through going to Curaçao; not to speak of the delay there incoaling. But, if the Dutch allowed him to take all that he wanted, hewould in his final start be much nearer Cuba than at Martinique, andhe would be able, as far as fuel went, to reach either Santiago, Cienfuegos, or Puerto Rico, or even Havana itself, --all whichpossibilities would tend to perplex us. It is scarcely probable, however, that he would have attempted the last-named port. To do so, not to speak of the greater hazard through the greater distance, would, in case of his success, not merely have enabled, but invited, the United States to concentrate its fleet in the very best positionfor us, where it would not only have "contained" the enemy, but havebest protected our own base at Key West. In the absence of certain knowledge, conjectural opinions, such as thewriter has here educed, are not unprofitable; rather the reverse. Toform them, the writer and the reader place themselves perforce nearlyin Cervera's actual position, and pass through their own minds thegrist of unsolved difficulties which confronted him. The result ofsuch a process is a much more real mental possession than is yieldedby a quiet perusal of any ascertained facts, because it involves anargumentative consideration of opposing conditions, and not a merepassive acceptance of statements. The general conclusion of thepresent writer, from this consideration of Cervera's position, and ofthat of our own Government, is that the course of the Spanish Admiralwas opportunist, solely and simply. Such, in general, and necessarily, must be that of any "fleet in being, " in the strict sense of thephrase, which involves inferiority of force; whereas the strongerforce, if handled with sagacity and strength, constrains the weakerin its orbit as the earth governs the moon. Placed in an extremelyfalse position by the fault, militarily unpardonable, of hisGovernment, Admiral Cervera doubtless did the best he could. That inso doing he caused the United States authorities to pass through somemoments of perplexity is certain, but it was the perplexity ofinterest rather than of apprehension; and in so far as the latter wasfelt at all, it was due to antecedent faults of disposition on our ownpart, the causes of which have been in great measure indicatedalready. The writer is not an angler, but he understands that there isan anxious pleasure in the suspense of playing a fish, as in anyimportant contest involving skill. To say that there was any remarkable merit in the movements of theSpanish Admiral is as absurd as to attribute particular cleverness toa child who, with his hands behind his back, asks the old conundrum, "Right or left?" "It is all a matter of guess, " said Nelson, "and theworld attributes wisdom to him who guesses right;" but all the same, by unremitting watchfulness, sagacious inference, and diligentpursuit, he ran the French fleet down. At Martinique, Admiral Cerverahad all the West Indies before him where to choose, and the UnitedStates coast too, conditioned by coal and other needs, foreseen orunforeseen. We ran him down at Santiago; and had he vanished fromthere, we should have caught him somewhere else. The attempt of theSpanish authorities to create an impression that some marvellous featof strategy was in process of execution, to the extreme discomfitureof the United States navy, was natural enough, considering the straitsthey were in, and the consciousness of the capable among them that asquadron of that force never should have been sent across the sea;but, though natural, the pretension was absurd, and, though echoed byall the partisan Press in Europe, it did not for a moment impose astrue upon those who were directing the movements of the United Statesships. FOOTNOTES: [2] A principal object of these papers, as has been stated, is to forma correct public opinion; for by public opinion, if misguided, greatembarrassment is often caused to those responsible for the conduct of awar. As concrete examples teach far better than abstract principles, the writer suggests to the consideration of his readers how seriouslywould have been felt, during the hostilities, the accident which befellthe battleship _Massachusetts_, on Dec. 14, 1898, a month after theabove sentences were written. An injury in battle, engaged withoutadequate object, would have had the same effect, and beenindefensible. IV PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY CERVERA'S APPEARANCE IN WEST INDIAN WATERS. --MOVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DIVISIONS AND OF THE OREGON. --FUNCTIONS OF CRUISERS IN A NAVAL CAMPAIGN. The departure of Admiral Cervera from Martinique for Curaçao wasalmost simultaneous with that of Admiral Sampson from San Juan for KeyWest. The immediate return of the latter to the westward was dictatedby reasons, already given in his own words, the weight of which hedoubtless felt more forcibly because he found himself actually so faraway from the centre of the blockade and from his base at Key West. When he began thus to retrace his steps, he was still ignorant ofCervera's arrival. The following night, indeed, he heard from apassing vessel the rumor of the Spanish squadron's regaining Cadiz, with which the Navy Department had been for a moment amused. Hestopped, therefore, to communicate with Washington, intending, if therumor were confirmed, to resume the attack upon San Juan. But on themorning of the 15th--Sunday--at 3. 30, his despatch-boat returned tohim with the official intelligence, not only of the enemy's being offMartinique, but of his arrival at Curaçao, which occurred shortlyafter daylight of the 14th. The same telegram informed him that theFlying Squadron was on its way to Key West, and directed him to regainthat point himself with all possible rapidity. Cervera left behind him at Martinique one of his torpedo destroyers, the _Terror_. A demonstration was made by this vessel, probably, though it may have been by one of her fellows, before St. Pierre, --another port of the island, --where the _Harvard_ was lying;and as the latter had been sent hurriedly from home with but atrifling battery, some anxiety was felt lest the enemy might score apoint upon her, if the local authorities compelled her to leave. Ifthe Spaniard had been as fast as represented, he would have had anadvantage over the American in both speed and armament, --very seriousodds. The machinery of the former, however, was in bad order, and shesoon had to seek a harbor in Fort de France, also in Martinique; afterwhich the usual rule, that two belligerents may not leave the sameneutral port within twenty-four hours of each other, assured the_Harvard_ a safe start. This incident, otherwise trivial, is worthy ofnote, for it shows one of the results of our imperfect nationalpreparation for war. If the conditions had allowed time to equip the_Harvard_ with suitable guns, she could have repulsed such an enemy, as a ship of the same class, the _St. Paul_, did a few weeks later offSan Juan, whither the _Terror_ afterwards repaired, and where sheremained till the war was over. The news of Cervera's appearance off Martinique was first received atthe Navy Department about midnight of May 12th-13th, nearly thirty-sixhours after the fact. As our representatives there, and generallythroughout the West Indies, were very much on the alert, it seems notimprobable that their telegrams, to say the least, were not givenundue precedence of other matters. That, however, is one of thechances of life, and most especially of war. It is more to thepurpose, because more useful to future guidance, to consider thegeneral situation at the moment the telegram was received, the meansat hand to meet the exigencies of the case, and what instructive lightis thereby thrown back upon preceding movements, which had resulted inthe actual conditions. Admiral Cervera's division had been at Martinique, and, after a briefperiod of suspense, was known to have disappeared to the westward. Thedirection taken, however, might, nay, almost certainly must, bemisleading, --that was part of his game. From it nothing could bedecisively inferred. The last news of the _Oregon_ was that she hadleft Bahia, in Brazil, on the 9th of the month. Her whereabouts andintended movements were as unknown to the United States authorities asto the enemy. An obvious precaution, to assure getting assistance toher, would have been to prescribe the exact route she should follow, subject only to the conditional discretion which can never wisely betaken from the officer in command on the spot. In that way it wouldhave been possible to send a division to meet her, if indications atany moment countenanced the suspicion entertained by some--the authoramong others--that Cervera would attempt to intercept her. Aftercareful consideration, this precaution had not been attempted, because the tight censorship of the Press had not then beeneffectually enforced, and it was feared that even so vital and evidenta necessity as that of concealing her movements would not availagainst the desire of some newspapers to manifest enterprise, atwhatever cost to national interests. If we ever again get into aserious war, a close supervision of the Press, punitive as well aspreventive, will be one of the first military necessities, unless thetone and disposition, not of the best, but of the worst, of itsmembers shall have become sensibly improved; for occasionalunintentional leakage, by well-meaning officials possessing moreinformation than native secretiveness, cannot be wholly obviated, andmust be accepted, practically, as one of the inevitable difficultiesof conducting war. The _Oregon_, therefore, was left a loose end, and was considered tobe safer so than if more closely looked after. From the time she leftBahia till she arrived at Barbados, and from thence till she turned upoff Jupiter Inlet, on the Florida coast, no one in Washington knewwhere she was. Nevertheless, she continued a most important andexposed fraction of the national naval force. That Cervera had turnedwest when last seen from Martinique meant nothing. It was moresignificant and reassuring to know that he had not got coal there. Still, it was possible that he might take a chance off Barbados, trusting, as he with perfect reason could, that when he had waitedthere as long as his coal then on hand permitted, the Britishauthorities would let him take enough more to reach Puerto Rico, asthey did give Captain Clark sufficient to gain a United States port. When the _Oregon_ got to Barbados at 3. 20 A. M. Of May 18th, less thansix days had elapsed since Cervera quitted Martinique; and the twoislands are barely one hundred miles apart. All this, of course, isvery much more clear to our present knowledge than it could possiblybe to the Spanish Admiral, who probably, and not unnaturally, thoughtit far better to get his "fleet in being" under the guns of a friendlyport than to hazard it on what might prove a wild-goose chase; for, after all, Captain Clark might not have gone to Barbados. It may be interesting to the reader to say here that the NavyDepartment, --which was as much in the dark as Cerverahimself, --although it was necessarily concerned about the _Oregon_, andgave much thought to the problem how best to assure her safety, wascomforted by the certainty that, whatever befell the ship, the nationalinterests would not be gravely compromised if she did meet the enemy. The situation was not novel or unprecedented, and historical precedentsare an immense support to the spirit in doubtful moments. Conscious ofthe power of the ship herself, and confident in her captain andofficers, whom it knew well, the Department was assured, to use wordsof Nelson when he was expecting to be similarly outnumbered, "Before weare destroyed, I have little doubt but the enemy will have their wingsso completely clipped that they will be easily overtaken. " Such oddsfor our ship were certainly not desired; but, the best having been donethat could be in the circumstances, there was reasonable ground tobelieve that, by the time the enemy got through with her, they wouldnot amount to much as a fighting squadron. Some little while after the return of Admiral Sampson's squadron toNew York, the writer chanced to see, quoted as an after-dinner speechby the chief engineer of the _Oregon_, the statement that CaptainClark had communicated to his officers the tactics he meant to pursue, if he fell in with the Spanish division. His purpose, as so explained, deserves to be noted; for it assures our people, if they need anyfurther assurance, that in the single ship, as in the squadrons, intelligent skill as well as courage presided in the councils of theofficers in charge. The probability was that the Spanish vessels, though all reputed faster than the _Oregon_, had different rates ofspeed, and each singly was inferior to her in fighting force, inaddition to which the American ship had a very heavy stern battery. The intention therefore was, in case of a meeting, to turn the sternto the enemy and to make a running fight. This not only gave asuperiority of fire to the _Oregon_ so long as the relative positionslasted, but it tended, of course, to prolong it, confining the enemyto their bow fire and postponing to the utmost possible the time oftheir drawing near enough to open with the broadside rapid-firebatteries. Moreover, if the Spanish vessels were not equally fast, and if their rate of speed did not much exceed that of the _Oregon_, both very probable conditions, it was quite possible that in thecourse of the action the leading ship would outstrip her followers somuch as to be engaged singly, and even that two or more might thus besuccessively beaten in detail. If it be replied that this is assuminga great deal, and attributing stupidity to the enemy, the answer isthat the result here supposed has not infrequently followed uponsimilar action, and that war is full of uncertainties, --an instanceagain of the benefit and comfort which some historical acquaintancewith the experience of others imparts to a man engaged with presentperplexities. Deliberately to incur such odds would be unjustifiable;but when unavoidably confronted with them, resolution enlightened byknowledge may dare still to hope. An instructive instance of drawing such support from the very fountainheads of military history, in the remote and even legendary past, isgiven by Captain Clark in a letter replying to inquiries from thepresent writer:-- "There is little to add to what you already know about the way I hoped to fight Cervera's fleet, if we fell in with it. What I feared was that he would be able to bring his ships up within range together, supposing that the slowest was faster than the _Oregon_; but there was the chance that their machinery was in different stages of deterioration, and there was also the hope that impetuosity or excitement might after a time make some press on in advance of the others. I, of course, had in mind the tactics of the last of the Horatii, and hopefully referred to them. The announcement Milligan (the chief engineer) spoke of was made before we reached Bahia, I think before we turned Cape Frio, as it was off that headland that I decided to leave the _Marietta_ and _Nictheroy_, (now the _Buffalo_), and to push on alone. You may be sure that was an anxious night for me when I decided to part company. The Department was, of course, obliged to leave much to my discretion, and I knew that the Spaniards might all close to rapid-fire range, overpower all but our turret guns, and then send in their torpedo boats. " It was upon the _Marietta_ that he had previously depended, in ameasure, to thwart the attacks of these small vessels; but in such acontest as that with four armored cruisers she could scarcely count, and she was delaying his progress in the run immediately before him. "The torpedo boat [he continues] was a rattlesnake to me, that I feared would get in his work while I was fighting the tiger; but I felt that the chances were that Cervera was bound to the West Indies, and so that the need of the _Oregon_ there was so great that the risk of his turning south to meet me should be run, so I hurried to Bahia, and cabled to the Department my opinion of what the _Oregon_ might do alone and in a running fight. .. . My object was to add the _Oregon_ to our fleet, and not to meet the Spaniards, if it could be avoided. " It may be added that in this his intention coincided with the wish ofthe Department. "So when, in Barbados, the reports came off that the Spanish fleet (and rumors had greatly increased its size) was at Martinique, that three torpedo boats had been seen from the island, I ordered coal to be loaded till after midnight, but left soon after dark, started west, then turned and went around the island"--that is, well to the eastward--"and made to the northward. " This was on the evening of May 18th. Six days later the ship was offthe coast of Florida, and in communication with the Department. The _Oregon_ may properly be regarded as one of the three principaldetachments into which the United States fleet was divided at theopening of the eventful week, May 12th-19th, and which, however theymight afterwards be distributed around the strategic centre, --which wehad chosen should be about Havana and Cienfuegos, --needed to bebrought to it as rapidly as possible. No time was avoidably lost. Onthe evening of May 13th, eighteen hours after Cervera's appearance atMartinique was reported, the two larger divisions, under Sampson andSchley, were consciously converging upon our point of concentration atKey West; while the third, the _Oregon_, far more distant, was alsomoving to the same place in the purpose of the Department, though, asyet, unconsciously to herself. Sampson had over twenty-four hours'start of the Flying Squadron; and the distances to be traversed, fromPuerto Rico and Hampton Roads, were practically the same. [3] But theformer was much delayed by the slowness of the monitors, and, great ashe felt the need of haste to be, and urgent as was the Department'stelegram, received on the 15th, he very properly would not allow hisvessels to separate until nearer their destination. Precautionaryorders were sent by him to the _Harvard_ and _Yale_--two swiftdespatch vessels then under his immediate orders--to coal to theutmost and to hold themselves at the end of a cable ready forimmediate orders; while Commodore Remey, commanding at Key West, wasdirected to have every preparation complete for coaling the squadronon the 18th, when it might be expected to arrive. The _St. Louis_, avessel of the same type as the _Harvard_, met the Admiral while thesetelegrams were being written. She was ordered to cut the cables atSantiago and Guantanamo Bay, and afterwards at Ponce, Puerto Rico. The Flying Squadron had sailed at 4 P. M. Of the 13th. Its fightingforce consisted of the _Brooklyn_, armored cruiser, flagship; the_Massachusetts_, first-class, and the _Texas_, second-class, battleships. It is to be inferred from the departure of these vesselsthat the alarm about our own coast, felt while the whereabouts of thehostile division was unknown, vanished when it made its appearance. The result was, perhaps, not strictly logical; but the logic of thestep is of less consequence than its undoubted military correctness. We had chosen our objective, and now we were concentrating upon it, --ameasure delayed too long, though unavoidably. Commodore Schley wasdirected to call off Charleston for orders; for, while it is essentialto have a settled strategic idea in any campaign, it is alsonecessary, in maritime warfare, at all events, to be ready to change apurpose suddenly and to turn at once upon the great objective, --whichdominates and supersedes all others, --the enemy's navy, when areasonable prospect of destroying it, or any large fraction of it, offers. When Schley left Hampton Roads, it was known only that theSpanish division had appeared off Martinique. The general intention, that our own should go to Key West, must therefore be held subject topossible modification, and to that end communication at a half-waypoint was imperative. No detention was thereby caused. At 4. 30 P. M. Ofthe 15th the Flying Squadron, which had been somewhat delayed by tenhours of dense fog, came off Charleston Bar, where a lighthousesteamer had been waiting since the previous midnight. From the officerin charge of her the Commodore received his orders, and at 6 P. M. Wasagain under way for Key West, where he arrived on the 18th, anticipating by several hours Sampson's arrival in person, and by aday the coming of the slower ships of the other division. But if it is desirable to ensure frequent direct communication withthe larger divisions of the fleet, at such a moment, when theirmovements must be held subject to sudden change to meet the as yetuncertain developments of the enemy's strategy, it is still moreessential to keep touch from a central station with the swift singlecruisers, the purveyors of intelligence and distributors of theinformation upon which the conduct of the war depends. If the broadstrategic conception of the naval campaign is correct, and theconsequent action consistent, the greater fighting units--squadrons orfleets--may be well, or better, left to themselves, after the initialimpulse of direction is given, and general instructions have beenissued to their commanders. These greater units, however, cannotusually be kept at the end of a telegraph cable; yet they must, through cables, maintain, with their centres of intelligence, communication so frequent as to be practically constant. The FlyingSquadron when off Cienfuegos, and Admiral Sampson's division at thetime now under consideration, while on its passage from San Juan toKey West, are instances in point. Conversely, dependence may be placedupon local agents to report an enemy when he enters port; but when atsea for an unknown destination, it is necessary, if practicable, toget and keep touch with him, and to have his movements, actual andprobable, reported. In short, steady communication must be maintained, as far as possible, between the always fixed points where the cablesend, and the more variable positions where the enemy's squadrons andour own are, whether for a stay or in transit. This can be done onlythrough swift despatch vessels; and for these, great as is the needthat no time be wasted in their missions, the homely proverb, "morehaste, less speed, " has to be kept in mind. To stop off at a waysideport, to diverge even considerably from the shortest route, may oftenbe a real economy of time. The office of cruisers thus employed is to substitute certainty forconjecture; to correct or to confirm, by fuller knowledge, theinferences upon which the conduct of operations otherwise so muchdepends. Accurate intelligence is one of the very first _desiderata_of war, and as the means of obtaining and transmitting it are never inexcess of the necessities, those means have to be carefullyadministered. Historically, no navy ever has had cruisers enough;partly because the lookout and despatch duties themselves are soextensive and onerous; partly because vessels of the class are wantedfor other purposes also, --as, for instance, in our late war, for theblockade of the Cuban ports, which was never much more thantechnically "effective, " and for the patrolling of our Atlanticseaboard. True economical use of the disposable vessels, obtaining thelargest results with the least expenditure of means never adequate, demands much forethought and more management, and is best effected byso arranging that the individual cruisers can be quickly got hold ofwhen wanted. This is accomplished by requiring them to call at cableports and report; or by circumscribing the area in which they are tocruise, so that they can be readily found; or by prescribing thecourse and speed they are to observe, --in short, by ensuring a prettyclose knowledge of their position at every moment. For the purposes of intelligence, a cruiser with a roving commission, or one which neglects to report its movements when opportunity offers, is nearly useless; and few things are more justly exasperating thanthe failure of a cruiser to realize this truth in practice. Of course, no rule is hard and fast to bind the high discretion of the officersenior on the spot; but if the captains of cruisers will bear in mind, as a primary principle, that they, their admirals, and the centraloffice, are in this respect parts of one highly specialized and mostimportant system in which co-operation must be observed, discretionwill more rarely err in these matters, where errors may be so serious. That with a central office, admirals, and captains, all seeking thesame ends, matters will at times work at cross purposes, only provesthe common experience that things will not always go straight herebelow. When Nelson was hunting for the French fleet before the battleof the Nile, his flagship was dismasted in a gale of wind off Corsica. The commander of the frigates, his lookout ships, having becomeseparated in the gale, concluded that the Admiral would have to returnto Gibraltar, and took his frigates there. "I thought he knew mebetter, " commented Nelson. "Every moment I have to regret the frigateshaving left me, " he wrote later; "the return to Syracuse, " due to wantof intelligence, "broke my heart, which on any extraordinary anxietynow shows itself. " It is not possible strictly to define officialdiscretion, nor to guard infallibly against its misuse; but, all thesame, it is injurious to an officer to show that he lacks soundjudgment. When the Flying Squadron sailed, there were lying in Hampton Roadsthree swift cruisers, --the _New Orleans_, the _St. Paul_, and the_Minneapolis_. Two auxiliary cruisers, the _Yosemite_ and the _Dixie_, were nearly but not quite ready for sea. It was for some time justlyconsidered imperative to keep one such ship there ready for animmediate mission. The _New Orleans_ was so retained, subject tofurther requirements of the Department; but the _Minneapolis_ and the_St. Paul_ sailed as soon as their coaling was completed, --withintwenty-four hours of the squadron. The former was to cruise betweenHaïti and the Caicos Bank, on the road which Cervera would probablyfollow if he went north of Haïti; the other was to watch between Haïtiand Jamaica, where he might be encountered if he took the WindwardPassage, going south of Haïti. At the time these orders were issuedthe indications were that the Spanish division was hanging aboutMartinique, hoping for permission to coal there; and as both of ourcruisers were very fast vessels and directed to go at full speed, thechances were more than good that they would reach their cruisingground before Cervera could pass it. These intended movements were telegraphed to Sampson, and it wasadded, "Very important that your fast cruisers keep touch with theSpanish squadron. " This he received May 15th. With his still imperfectinformation he gave no immediate orders which would lose him his holdof the _Harvard_ and the _Yale_; but shortly after midnight helearned, off Cape Haïtien, that the Spanish division was to have leftCuraçao the previous evening at six o'clock--only six hours beforethis despatch reached him. He at once cabled the _Harvard_ and the_Yale_, to which, as being under his immediate charge, the Departmenthad given no orders, to go to sea, the former to cruise in the MonaPassage, to detect the enemy if he passed through it for Puerto Rico, the _Yale_ to assist the _St. Paul_ at the station of which he hadbeen notified from Washington. The Department was informed by him ofthese dispositions. Sampson at the same time cabled Remey at Key Westto warn the blockaders off Cienfuegos--none of which were armored--ofthe possible appearance of the enemy at that port. In this step he hadbeen anticipated by the Department, which, feeling the urgency of thecase and uncertain of communicating betimes through him, had issued anorder direct to Remey, thirty-six hours before, that those ships, witha single exception, should be withdrawn; and that the vessels on thenorth coast should be notified, but not removed. These various movements indicate the usefulness and the employments ofthe cruiser class, one of which also carried the news to Cienfuegos, another along the north coast, while a third took Sampson's telegramsfrom his position at sea to the cable port. Owing to our insufficientnumber of vessels of the kind required, torpedo boats, of great speedin smooth water, but of delicate machinery and liable to seriousretardation in a sea-way, were much used for these missions, to thegreat hurt of their engines, not intended for long-continued highexertion, and to their own consequent injury for their particularduties. The _St. Paul's_ career exemplified also the changes ofdirection to which cruisers are liable, and the consequent necessityof keeping them well in hand both as regards position and preparation, especially of coal. Between the time the _Minneapolis_ sailed and herown departure, at 6 P. M. , of May 14th, the news of the Spanishdivision's arrival at Curaçao was received; and as there had beenprevious independent information that colliers had been ordered tomeet it in the Gulf of Venezuela, only a hundred miles from Curaçao, the conclusion was fair that the enemy needed coal and hoped to get itin that neighborhood. Why else, indeed, if as fast as reported, andaware, as he must be, that Sampson was as far east as San Juan, had henot pushed direct for Cuba, his probable objective? In regard tocolliers being due in the Gulf of Venezuela, the reports provedincorrect; but the inference as to the need of coal was accurate, andthat meant delay. The _St. Paul_ was therefore ordered to Key West, instructions being telegraphed there to coal her full immediately onarriving. She would there be as near the Windward Passage as Curaçaois, and yet able, in case of necessity, to proceed by the YucatanPassage or in any direction that might meanwhile become expedient. Itmay be added that the _St. Paul_ reached Key West and was coaled readyfor sea by the evening of May 18th, four days from the time she leftHampton Roads, a thousand miles distant. While on her passage, the Department had entertained the purpose ofsending her to the Gulf of Venezuela and adding to her the _Harvard_and the _Minneapolis_, the object being not only to find the enemy, ifthere, but that one of the three should report him, while the othertwo dogged his path until no doubt of his destination could remain. Their great speed, considered relatively to that which the enemy hadso far shown, gave reasonable probability that thus his approachcould be communicated by them, and by cables, throughout the wholefield of operations, with such rapidity as to ensure cornering him atonce, which was the first great essential of our campaign. A cruiserreporting at Cape Haïtien was picked up and sent to the _Minneapolis_, whose whereabouts was sufficiently known, because circumscribed, andshe received her orders; but they served only to develop the weaknessof that ship and of the _Columbia_, considered as cruisers. The coalleft after her rapid steaming to her cruising ground did not justifythe further sweep required, and her captain thought it imperative togo first to St. Thomas to recoal, --a process which involved more delaythan on the surface appears. The bunkers of this ship and of hersister, the _Columbia_, are minutely subdivided, --an arrangement verysuitable, even imperative, in a battleship, in order to localizestrictly any injury received in battle, but inconsequent and illogicalin a vessel meant primarily for speed. A moment's reflection upon theservices required of cruisers will show that their efficiency does notdepend merely upon rapid going through the water, but upon promptreadiness to leave port, of which promptness quick coaling is a mostimportant factor. This is gravely retarded by bunkers much subdivided. The design of these two ships, meant for speed, involves this lack offacility for recoaling. There is, therefore, in them a grave failurein that unity of conception which should dominate all designs. The movements, actual and projected, of the cruisers at this momenthave purposely been dwelt upon at some length. Such movements and themanagement of them play a most important part in all campaigns, and itis desirable that they should be understood, through illustration suchas this; because the provision for the service should be antecedentlythorough and consistent in plan and in execution, in order toefficiency. Confusion of thought, and consequent confusion of object, is fatal to any conception, --at least, to any military conception; itis absolutely opposed to concentration, for it implies duality ofobject. In the designing of a cruiser, as of any class of warship, thefirst step, before which none should be taken, is to decide theprimary object to be realized, --what is this ship meant to do? Tothis primary requirement every other feature should be subordinated. Its primacy is not only one of time, but of importance also. Therecognition, in practice, of this requisite does not abolish norexclude the others by its predominance. It simply regulates theirdevelopment; for they not only must not militate against it, they mustminister to it. It is exactly as in a novel or in a work of art, forevery military conception, from the design of a ship up, should be awork of art. Perfection does not exclude a multiplicity of detail, butit does demand unity of motive, a single central idea, to which alldetail is strictly accessory, to emphasize or to enhance, --not todistract. The cruiser requirements offer a concrete illustration ofthe application of this thought. Rapidity of action is the primaryobject. In it is involved both coal endurance and facility forrecoaling; for each economizes time, as speed does. Defensivestrength--of which subdivision of coal bunkers is an element--conducesonly secondarily to rapidity of movement, as does offensive power;they must, therefore, be very strictly subordinated. They must notdetract from speed; yet so far as they do not injure that, theyshould be developed, for by the power to repel an enemy--to avertdetention--they minister to rapidity. With the battleship, in thiscontrary to the cruiser, offensive power is the dominant feature. While, therefore, speed is desirable to it, excessive speed is notadmissible, if, as the author believes, it can be obtained only atsome sacrifice of offensive strength. When Admiral Sampson sent off the telegrams last mentioned, beforedaylight of May 16th, the flagship was off Cape Haïtien. During herstoppage for this purpose, the squadron continued to stand west, inorder not to increase the loss of time due to the slowness of themonitors, through which the progress of the whole body did not exceedfrom seven to eight sea miles per hour. Cape Haïtien is distant fromKey West nearly seven hundred miles; and throughout this distance, being almost wholly along the coast of Cuba, no close telegraphiccommunication could be expected. At the squadron's rate of advance itcould not count upon arriving at Key West, and so regaining touch withWashington, before the morning of the 19th, and the Department wasthus notified. Thirty-six hours later, at 11. 30 A. M. , May 17th, beingthen in the Old Bahama Channel, between Cuba and the Bahama Banks, theAdmiral felt that his personal presence, under existing conditions, was more necessary near Havana and Key West. Leaving the division, therefore, in charge of the senior officer, Captain Evans, of the_Iowa_, he pushed forward with the flagship _New York_, the fastest ofthe armored vessels. Six hours later he was met by the torpedo boat_Dupont_, bringing him a telegram from the Department, dated the 16th, forwarded through Key West, directing him to send his most suitablearmored ship ahead to join the Flying Squadron. This order was basedon information that Cervera was bringing munitions of war essential tothe defence of Havana, and that his instructions were peremptory toreach either Havana or a port connected with it by railroad. Suchcommands pointed evidently to Cienfuegos, which place, moreover, wasclearly indicated from the beginning of the campaign, as already shownin these papers, as the station for one division of our armoredfleet. The Department could calculate certainly that, by the time its messagereached Sampson, his division would be so far advanced as to ensureinterposing between Havana and the Spaniards, if the latter came bythe Windward Passage--from the eastward. It was safe, therefore, or atleast involved less risk of missing the enemy, to send the FlyingSquadron to Cienfuegos, either heading him off there, or with a chanceof meeting him in the Yucatan Channel, if he tried to reach Havana bygoing west of Cuba. But as Cienfuegos was thought the more likelydestination, and was for every reason a port to be effectuallyblockaded, it was desirable to reinforce Schley, not by detaining him, under the pressing need of his getting to Cienfuegos, but by abattleship following him as soon as possible. Of course, such a shipmight be somewhat exposed to encountering the enemy's divisionsingle-handed, which is contrary to rule. But rules are made to bebroken on occasion, as well as to be observed generally; and again, and always, war cannot be made without running risks, of which thegreatest is misplaced or exaggerated caution. From the moment theSpanish ships were reported at Curaçao, a close lookout had beenestablished in the Yucatan Channel. By his personal action, in quitting his squadron in order to hastenforward, Admiral Sampson had anticipated the wishes of the Department. At 4 P. M. , May 18th, he reached Key West, where he found the FlyingSquadron and the _St. Paul_, anchored in the outer roads. His owntelegrams, and those from the Secretary of the Navy, had ensuredpreparations for coaling all vessels as they arrived, to the utmostrapidity that the facilities of the port admitted. The _St. Paul_, whose orders had been again changed, sailed the same evening for CapeHaïtien. The Flying Squadron started for Cienfuegos at 9 A. M. Thefollowing day, the 19th, and was followed twenty-six hours later bythe battleship _Iowa_. Shortly after the Admiral left the fleet, ithad been overtaken by the torpedo boat _Porter_, from Cape Haïtien, bearing a despatch which showed the urgency of the general situation, although it in no way fettered the discretion of the officer incharge. Captain Evans, therefore, very judiciously imitated Sampson'saction, quitted the fleet, and hastened with his own ship to KeyWest, arriving at dark of the 18th. Being a vessel of large coalendurance, she did not delay there to fill up, but she took with herthe collier _Merrimac_ for the ships before Cienfuegos. The remainder of Sampson's division arrived on the 19th. The monitors_Puritan_ and _Miantonomoh_, which had not been to San Juan, sailed onthe 20th for the Havana blockade, where they were joined before noonof the 21st by the _Indiana_, and the _New York_, the latter havingthe Admiral on board. Commodore Schley, with the Flying Squadron, arrived off Cienfuegos toward midnight of the same day. The _Iowa_, came up twelve hours later, about noon of the 22nd, and some four orfive light cruisers joined on that or the following days. On the 24ththe _Oregon_ communicated with Washington off Jupiter Inlet, on theeast coast of Florida. Her engines being reported perfectly ready, after her long cruise, she was directed to go to Key West, where shecoaled, and on the 28th left for the Havana blockade. It is difficultto exaggerate the honor which this result does to Chief EngineerMilligan and to the officers responsible under him for the conditionof her machinery. The combination of skill and care thus evidenced isof the highest order. Such, in general outline, omitting details superfluous to correctcomprehension, was the course of incidents on our side, in the Cubancampaign, during the ten days, May 12th-21st; from the bombardment ofSan Juan de Puerto Rico to the establishment of the two armoreddivisions in the positions which, under better conditions of nationalpreparation, they should have occupied by the 1st of the month. All iswell that ends well--so far at least as the wholly past is concerned;but for the instruction of the future it is necessary not to cast thepast entirely behind our backs before its teachings have been ponderedand assimilated. We cannot expect ever again to have an enemy soentirely inapt as Spain showed herself to be; yet, even so, Cervera'sdivision reached Santiago on the 19th of May, two days before ourdivisions appeared in the full force they could muster before Havanaand Cienfuegos. Had the Spanish Admiral been trying for one of thoseports, even at the low rate of speed observed in going from Curaçaoto Santiago--about seven and five-tenth knots--he could have leftCuraçao on the evening of May 15th, and have reached Cienfuegos on the21st, between midnight and daybreak, enabling him to enter the harborby 8 A. M. --more than twelve hours before the arrival there of ourFlying Squadron. The writer assumes that, had our coast defences been such as to putour minds at ease concerning the safety of our chief seaboard cities, the Flying Squadron would from the first have been off Cienfuegos. Heis forced to assume so, because his own military conviction has alwaysbeen that such would have been the proper course. Whatever _coup demain_ might have been possible against a harbor inadequately defendedas were some of ours, --the fears of which, even, he consideredexaggerated, --no serious operations against a defended seaboard werepossible to any enemy after a transatlantic voyage, until recoaled. Itwould have been safe, militarily speaking, to place our two divisionsbefore the ports named. It was safer to do so than to keep one atHampton Roads; for offence is a safer course than defence. Consider the conditions. The Spaniards, after crossing the Atlantic, would have to coal. There were four principal ports at which theymight do so, --Havana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and San Juan de PuertoRico. The first two, on the assumption, would be closed to them, unless they chose to fight a division so nearly equal to their ownforce that, whatever the result of the battle, the question of coalingwould have possessed no further immediate interest for them. Santiagoand San Juan, and any other suitable eastern port open to them--ifsuch there was--were simply so many special instances of a particularcase; and of these San Juan was the most favorable to them, because, being the most distant, it ensured more time for coaling and gettingaway again before our divisions could arrive. After their departurefrom Curaçao was known, but not their subsequent intentions, and whileour divisions were proceeding to Havana and Cienfuegos, measures wereunder consideration at the Navy Department which would have made iteven then difficult for them to escape action, if they went to SanJuan for coal; but which would have raised the difficult close to thepoint of the impossible, had our divisions from the first been placedbefore Havana and Cienfuegos, which strategic conditions dictated, butfears for our own inadequately defended coast prevented. To ensure this result, the contemplated method, one simply ofsustained readiness, was as follows. Adequate lookouts around PuertoRico were to be stationed, by whom the enemy's approach would bedetected and quickly cabled; and our two divisions were to be keptready to proceed at an instant's notice, coaled to their best steaminglines, as far as this was compatible with a sufficiency of fuel tohold their ground after arriving off San Juan. Two of our fastestdespatch vessels, likewise at their best steaming immersion, were tobe held at Key West ready to start at once for Cienfuegos to notifythe squadron there; two, in order that if one broke down on the way, one would surely arrive within twenty-four hours. Thus planned, thereceipt of a cable at the Department from one of the lookouts offPuerto Rico would be like the touching of a button. The Havanadivision, reached within six hours, would start at once; that atCienfuegos eighteen hours after the former. Barring accidents, weshould, in five days after the enemy's arrival, have had off San Juanthe conditions which it took over a week to establish at Santiago;but, allowing for accidents, there would, within five days, have beenat least one division, a force sufficient to hold the enemy in check. Five days, it may be said, is not soon enough. It would have beenquite soon enough in the case of Spaniards after a sea voyage oftwenty-five hundred miles, in which the larger vessels had to sharetheir coal with the torpedo destroyers. In case of a quicker enemy ofmore executive despatch, and granting, which will be rare, that afleet's readiness to depart will be conditioned only by coal, and notby necessary engine repairs to some one vessel, it is to be remarkedthat the speed which can be, and has been, assumed for our ships inthis particular case, nine knots, is far less than the most modestdemands for a battleship, --such as those made even by the presentwriter, who is far from an advocate of extreme speed. Had not ourdeficiency of dry docks left our ships very foul, they could havecovered the distance well within four days. Ships steady at thirteenknots would have needed little over three; and it is _sustained_ speedlike this, not a spurt of eighteen knots for twelve hours, that iswanted. No one, however, need be at pains to dispute thatcircumstances alter cases; or that the promptness and executiveability of an enemy are very material circumstances. Similarly, although the method proposed would have had probable success at SanJuan, and almost certain success at any shorter distance, it would attwo thousand miles be very doubtfully expedient. Assuming, moreover, that it had been thought unadvisable to moveagainst San Juan, because doubtful of arriving in time, what wouldhave been the situation had Cervera reached there, our armoreddivisions being off Havana and Cienfuegos? He would have been watchedby the four lookouts--which were ordered before Santiago immediatelyupon his arrival there--and by them followed when he quitted port. Four leaves a good margin for detaching successively to cable portsbefore giving up this following game, and by that time his intentionswould be apparent. Where, indeed, should he go? Before Havana andCienfuegos would be divisions capable of fighting him. Santiago, orany eastern port, is San Juan over again, with disadvantage ofdistance. Matanzas is but Havana; he would find himself anticipatedthere, because one of those vessels dogging his path would havehurried on to announce his approach. Were his destination, however, evidently a North Atlantic port, as some among us had fondly feared, our division before Havana would be recalled by cable, and that beforeCienfuegos drawn back to Havana, leaving, of course, lookouts beforethe southern port. Cienfuegos is thereby uncovered, doubtless; buteither the Spaniard fails to get there, not knowing our movements, or, if he rightly divines them and turns back, our coast is saved. Strategy is a game of wits, with many unknown quantities; as Napoleonand Nelson have said--and not they alone--the unforeseen and chancemust always be allowed for. But, if there are in it no absolutecertainties, there are practical certainties, raised by experience tomaxims, reasonable observance of which gives long odds. Prominentamong these certainties are the value of the offensive over thedefensive, the advantage of a central position, and of interior lines. All these would have been united, strategically, by placing ourarmored divisions before Havana and Cienfuegos. As an offensive step, this supported, beyond any chance of defeat, the blockade of the Cubancoast, as proclaimed, with the incidental additional advantage thatKey West, our base, was not only accessible to us, but defendedagainst serious attack, by the mere situation of our Havana squadron. Central position and interior lines were maintained, for, Havana beingnearly equidistant from Puerto Rico and the Chesapeake, the squadronscould be moved in the shortest time in either direction, and theycovered all points of offence and defence within the limits of thetheatre of war by lines shorter than those open to the enemy, which iswhat "interior lines" practically means. If this disposition did possess these advantages, the questionnaturally arises whether it was expedient for the Havana division, before Cervera's arrival was known, and with the Flying Squadron stillat Hampton Roads, to move to the eastward to San Juan, as was done. The motive of this step, in which the Navy Department acquiesced, wasthe probability, which must be fully admitted, that San Juan wasCervera's primary destination. If it so proved, our squadron would benearer at hand. It was likely, of course, that Cervera would firstcommunicate with a neutral port, as he did at Martinique, to learn ifthe coast were clear before pushing for San Juan. The result of hisgoing to the latter place would have been to present the strategicproblem already discussed. Cervera heard that our fleet was at San Juan, went to Curaçao, andafterwards to Santiago, because, as the Spanish Minister of Marinedeclared in the Cortes, it was the only port to which he could go. OurAdmiral's official report, summing up the conditions after thebombardment of San Juan, as they suggested themselves to his mind atthe time, has been quoted in a previous section. In the present wehave sought to trace as vividly as possible the hurried and variousmeasures consequent upon Cervera's movements; to reproduce, if may be, the perplexities--the anxieties, perhaps, but certainly not theapprehensions--of the next ten days, in which, though we did not fearbeing beaten, we did fear being outwitted, which is to no managreeable. If Sampson's division had been before Havana and Schley's at HamptonRoads when Cervera appeared, the latter could have entered San Juanundisturbed. What could we then have done? In virtue of our centralposition, three courses were open. 1. We could have sent our Havanadivision to San Juan, as before proposed, and the Flying Squadrondirect to the same point, with the disadvantage, however, as comparedwith the disposition advocated last, that the distance to it fromHampton Roads is four hundred miles more than from Cienfuegos. 2. Wecould have moved the Havana Squadron to San Juan, sending the FlyingSquadron to Key West to coal and await further orders. This is only amodification of No. 1. Or, 3, we could have ordered the FlyingSquadron to Key West, and at the same moment sent the Havana divisionbefore Cienfuegos, --a simultaneous movement which would have effecteda great economy of time, yet involved no risk, owing to the distanceof the Spanish division from the centre of operations. Of these three measures the last would have commended itself to thewriter had Cervera's appearance, reported at Martinique, left it atall doubtful whether or not he were aiming for Havana or Cienfuegos. In our estimation, that was the strategic centre, and therefore to becovered before all else. So long as Cervera's destination was unknown, and might, however improbable, be our coast, there was possiblejustification for keeping the Flying Squadron there; the instant hewas known to be in the West Indies, to close the two Cuban portsbecame the prime necessity. But had he entered San Juan withoutprevious appearance, the first or the second should have been adopted, in accordance with the sound general principle that the enemy's fleet, if it probably can be reached, is the objective paramount to allothers; because the control of the sea, by reducing the enemy's navy, is the determining consideration in a naval war. Without dogmatizing, however, upon a situation which did not obtain, it appears now to the writer, not only that the eastward voyage of ourHavana division was unfortunate, viewed in the light of subsequentevents, but that it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistakebecause inconsistent with a well-founded and generally acceptedprinciple of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by theconditions. The principle is that which condemns "eccentric"movements. The secondary definition of this word--"odd" or"peculiar"--has so dislodged all other meanings in common speech thatit seems necessary to recall that primarily, by derivation, itsignifies "away from the centre, " to which sense it is confined intechnical military phrase. Our centre of operations had been fixed, and rightly fixed, at Havana and Cienfuegos. It was subject, properly, to change--instant change--when the enemy's fleet was known to bewithin striking distance; but to leave the centre otherwise, on acalculation of probabilities however plausible, was a proposition thatshould have been squarely confronted with the principle, which itselfis only the concrete expression of many past experiences. It is farfrom the writer's wish to advocate slavery to rule; no bondage is morehopeless or more crushing; but when one thinks of acting contrary tothe weight of experience, the reasons for such action should be mostclosely scrutinized, and their preponderance in the particular casedetermined. These remarks are offered with no view of empty criticism of amistake--if such it were--in which the writer was not without hisshare. In military judgments error is not necessarily censurable. Oneof the greatest captains has said: "The general who has made nomistake has made few campaigns. " There are mistakes and mistakes;errors of judgment, such as the most capable man makes in the courseof a life, and errors of conduct which demonstrate essential unfitnessfor office. Of the latter class was that of Admiral Byng, when heretired from Minorca; a weakness not unparalleled in later times, butwhich, whatever the indulgence accorded to the offender, is a militarysin that should for itself receive no condonement of judgment. Asinstances of the former, both Nelson and Napoleon admitted, to quotethe latter's words: "I have been so often mistaken that I no longerblush for it. " My wish is to illustrate, by a recent particularinstance, a lesson professionally useful to the future, --the value ofrules. By the disregard of rule in this case we uncovered both Havanaand Cienfuegos, which it was our object to close to the enemy'sdivision. Had the latter been more efficient, he could have reachedone or the other before we regained the centre. Our movement wascontrary to rule; and while the inferences upon which it was basedwere plausible, they were not, in the writer's judgment, adequate toconstitute the exception. FOOTNOTES: [3] The distance from Hampton Roads to Key West is increased, owing tothe adverse current of the Gulf Stream through much of the route. V THE GUARD SET OVER CERVERA. --INFLUENCE OF INADEQUATE NUMBERS UPON THE CONDUCT OF NAVAL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS. --CÁMARA'S RUSH THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN, AND CONSEQUENT MEASURES TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES. The result of the various movements so far narrated was to leave theFlying Squadron May 22nd, off Cienfuegos, and Admiral Sampson'sdivision off Havana, on the 21st. The latter was seriously diminishedin mobile combatant force by the removal of the _Iowa_, detached tothe south of the island to join the ships under Schley. It wasconfidently expected that there, rather than at any northern port, the enemy would make his first appearance; and for that reason theFlying Squadron was strengthened by, and that off Havana deprived of, a vessel whose qualities would tell heavily in conflict with an activeantagonist, such as a body of armored cruisers ought to be. Only bygreat good fortune could it be expected that the monitors, upon whichSampson for the moment had largely to depend, could impose anengagement upon Cervera's division if the latter sought to enterHavana by a dash. By taking from the Admiral his most powerful vessel, he was exposed to the mortification of seeing the enemy slip by andshow his heels to our sluggish, low-freeboard, turreted vessels; butthe solution was the best that could be reached under the conditions. It was not till the 28th of the month that the junction of the_Oregon_ put our division before Havana on terms approaching equalityas regards quickness of movement. On the 19th of May the Department received probable, but not certain, information that the enemy's division had entered Santiago. This, asis now known, had occurred on the early morning of the same day. Singularly enough, less than twenty-four hours before, on the 18th, the auxiliary steamer _St. Louis_, Captain Goodrich, lately one of theAmerican Transatlantic liners, had been close in with the mouth ofthis port, which had hitherto lain outside our sphere of operations, and had made a determined and successful attempt to cut the telegraphcable leading from Santiago to Jamaica. In doing this, the _St. Louis_, which, like her sister ships (except the _St. Paul_), had notyet received an armament suitable to her size or duties, lay forthree-quarters of an hour under the fire of the enemy, at a distanceof little over a mile. Fortunately a six-inch rifled gun on the Socapabattery, which was then being mounted, was not ready until thefollowing day; and the _St. Louis_ held her ground without injuryuntil a piece had been cut out of the cable. In this work she wasassisted by the tug _Wompatuck_, Lieutenant-Commander Jungen. The twovessels then moved away to Guantanamo Bay, having been off Santiagonearly forty-eight hours. It may certainly be charged as good luck toCervera that their departure before his arrival kept our Governmentlong in uncertainty as to the fact, which we needed to know in themost positive manner before stripping the Havana blockade in order toconcentrate at Santiago. The writer remembers that the captain of the_St. Louis_, having soon afterwards to come north for coal, found itdifficult to believe that he could have missed the Spanish vessels byso little; and the more so because he had spent the 19th offGuantanamo, less than fifty miles distant. By that time, however, ourinformation, though still less than eye-witness, was so far probableas to preponderate over his doubts; but much perplexity would havebeen spared us had the enemy been seen by this ship, whose great speedwould have brought immediate positive intelligence that all, and notonly a part, had entered the port. On this point we did not obtaincertainty until three weeks later. In yet another respect luck, as it is commonly called, went against usat this time. The _Wompatuck_ was sent by Captain Goodrich into themouth of the harbor at Guantanamo to attempt to grapple the cablethere. The tug and the _St. Louis_ were both forced to retire, not bythe weight of fire from the coast, but by a petty Spanish gunboat, aided by "a small gun on shore. " Could this fact have beencommunicated to Commodore Schley when he decided to return to Key Weston the 26th, on account of the difficulty of coaling, he might haveseen the facility with which the place could be secured and utilizedfor a coaling station, as it subsequently was by Admiral Sampson, andthat there thus was no necessity of starting back some seven hundredmiles to Key West, when he had with him four thousand tons of coal ina collier. When the lower bay was occupied, on the 8th of June, ourattacking vessels were only the naval unprotected cruiser _Marblehead_and the auxiliary cruiser _Yankee_, the former of which was with theFlying Squadron during its passage from Cienfuegos to Santiago, andthroughout the subsequent proceedings up to Sampson's arrival off thelatter port. No resistance to them was made by the Spanish gunboat, before which the vulnerable and inadequately armed _St. Louis_ and_Wompatuck_ had very properly retired. Although the information received of Cervera's entering Santiago wasnot reliable enough to justify detaching Sampson's ships from beforeHavana, it was probable to a degree that made it imperative to watchthe port in force at once. Telegrams were immediately sent out toassemble the four auxiliary cruisers--_St. Paul_, _St. Louis_, _Harvard_, and _Yale_--and the fast naval cruiser _Minneapolis_ beforethe mouth of the harbor. The number of these ships shows theimportance attached to the duty. It was necessary to allow largely forthe chapter of accidents; for, to apply a pithy saying of the Chief ofthe Naval Bureau of Equipment, --"the only way to have coal enough isto have too much, "--the only way to assemble ships enough when thingsgrow critical, is to send more than barely enough. All those thatreceived their orders proceeded as rapidly as their conditionsallowed, but the Department could not get hold of the _St. Louis_. This failure illustrates strongly the remark before made concerningthe importance of knowing just where cruisers are to be found; for ofall the five ships thus sought to be gathered, the _St. Louis_ was, atthe moment, the most important, through her experience of thedefenceless state of the harbor at Guantanamo, which she could havecommunicated to Schley. The latter, when he arrived off Santiago onthe evening of the 26th, found the _Minneapolis_, the _St. Paul_, andthe _Yale_ on the ground. The _Harvard_ had already been there, buthad gone for the moment to St. Nicolas Mole, with despatches that theCommodore had sent before him from Cienfuegos. She joined the squadronagain early next day, May 27th. On the morning of the 25th, the _St. Paul_ had captured the Britishsteamer _Restormel_, with 2, 400 tons of coal for the Spanish squadron. This vessel had gone first to Puerto Rico, and from there had beendirected to Curaçao, where she arrived two days after Cervera haddeparted. When taken she reported that two other colliers were inPuerto Rico when she sailed thence. This would seem to indicate thatthat port, and not Santiago, had been the original destination of theenemy, for it would have been quite as easy for the colliers to go toSantiago at once; probably safer, for we were not then thinking ofSantiago in comparison with San Juan. This conjecture is strengthenedby the fact that there were only 2, 300 tons of Cardiff coal inSantiago, a condition which shows both how little the SpanishGovernment expected to use the port and how serious this capture atthis instant was to the enemy. The intention of Commodore Schley to return to Key West precipitatedthe movement of Admiral Sampson, with his two fastest ships, toSantiago; but the step would certainly have been taken as soon as thedoubt whether all the Spanish division had entered was removed. TheDepartment, under its growing conviction that the enemy was there, hadalready been increasingly disturbed by the delay of the FlyingSquadron before Cienfuegos. This delay was due to the uncertainty ofits commander as to whether or not Cervera was in the latter port; norwas there then known reason to censure the decision of the officer onthe spot, whose information, dependent upon despatch vessels, or uponlocal scouting, was necessarily, in some respects, more meagre thanthat of the Department, in cable communication with many quarters. Nevertheless, he was mistaken, and each succeeding hour made themistake more palpable and more serious to those in Washington; not, indeed, that demonstrative proof had been received there--far fromit--but there was that degree of reasonable probability whichjustifies practical action in all life, and especially in war. Therewas not certainty enough to draw away our ships from beforeHavana, --to the exposure also of Key West, --but there was quitesufficient certainty to take the chance of leaving Cienfuegos andgoing off Santiago; for, to put the case at its weakest, we could notclose both ports, and had, therefore, to make a choice. Against therisk of the enemy trying to dash out of Santiago and run for someother point, provision was made by a telegram to the _Yale_ to informevery vessel off Santiago that the Flying Squadron was off Cienfuegos, and that orders had been sent it to proceed with all possible despatchoff Santiago. If, therefore, the enemy did run out before the arrivalof Schley, our scouts would know where to look for the latter; thatis, somewhere on the shortest line between the two ports. The embarrassment imposed upon the Department, under the telegram thatthe Flying Squadron was returning to Key West, was increased greatlyby the fact that the five cruisers ordered before the port weregetting very short of coal. If the squadron held its ground, this wascomparatively immaterial. It would be injurious, unquestionably, tothe communications and to the lookout, but not necessarily fatal tothe object in view, which was that Cervera should not get out withouta fight and slip away again into the unknown. But, if the squadronwent, the cruisers could not stay, and the enemy might escapeunobserved. Fortunately, on second thoughts, the Commodore decided toremain; but before that was known to the Department, Sampson had beendirected, on May 29th, to proceed with the _New York_ and the_Oregon_, the latter of which had only joined him on the 28th. Thetelegram announcing that the Flying Squadron would hold on came indeedbefore the two ships started, but it was not thought expedient tochange their orders. Word also had then been received that two of theSpanish division had been sighted inside from our own vessels, andthough this still left a doubt as to the whereabouts of the others, itremoved the necessity of covering Key West, which had caused theDepartment, on the first knowledge of Schley's returning, to limit itsorders to Sampson to be ready to set out for Santiago the instant theFlying Squadron returned. By the departure of the _New York_ and the_Oregon_, the _Indiana_ was left the only battleship to the westward. Her speed was insufficient to keep up with the two others, and it wasdetermined to employ her in convoying the army when it was ready, --aduty originally designed for Sampson's division as a whole. Admiral Sampson with his two ships arrived off Santiago on the 1st ofJune at 6 A. M. , and established at once the close watch of the portwhich lasted until the sally and destruction of Cervera's squadron. "From that time on, " says the Spanish Lieutenant Muller, who was inthe port from the first, as second in command of the naval forces ofthe province, "the hostile ships, which were afterwards increased innumber, established day and night a constant watch, withoutwithdrawing at nightfall, as they used to do. " Into the particulars ofthis watch, which lasted for a month and which effectively preventedany attempt of the enemy to go out by night, the writer does notpurpose to enter, as his object in this series of papers is rather toelicit the general lessons derivable from the war than to give thedetails of particular operations. It is only just to say, however, that all the dispositions of the blockade, --to use the common, butnot strictly accurate, expression, --from the beginning of June to theday of the battle, were prescribed by the commander-in-chief on thespot, without controlling orders, and with little, if any, suggestionon the subject from the Department. The writer remembers none; but hedoes well remember the interest with which, during the dark nights ofthe month, he watched the size of the moon, which was new on the 18th, and the anxiety each morning lest news might be received of asuccessful attempt to get away on the part of the enemy, whose reputedspeed so far exceeded that of most of our ships. It was not then knownthat, by reason of the methods unremittingly enforced by our squadron, it was harder to escape from Santiago by night than by day, because ofthe difficulty of steering a ship through an extremely narrow channel, with the beam of an electric light shining straight in the eyes, aswould there have been the case for a mile before reaching the harbor'smouth. The history of the time--now nearly a year--that has elapsed sincethese lines were first written, impels the author, speaking as acareful student of the naval operations that have illustrated the pasttwo centuries and a half, to say that in his judgment no more onerousand important duty than the guard off Santiago fell upon any officerof the United States during the hostilities; and that the judgment, energy, and watchfulness with which it was fulfilled by AdmiralSampson merits the highest praise. The lack of widely diffused popularappreciation of military conditions, before referred to in thesepapers, has been in nothing more manifest than in the failure torecognize generally, and by suitable national reward, both thedifficulty of his task, and that the dispositions maintained by himensured the impossibility of Cervera's escaping undetected, as well asthe success of the action which followed his attempt at flight. Thismade further fighting on Spain's part hopeless and vindicated, ifvindication were needed, the Department's choice of thecommander-in-chief; but, as a matter of fact, the reply of that greatadmiral and experienced administrator, Lord St. Vincent, when he sentNelson to the Nile, meets decisively all such cases: "Those who areresponsible for results"--as the Navy Department (under thePresident), was--"must be allowed the choice of their agents. " Thewriter may perhaps be excused for adding, that, having had no share, direct or indirect, in this selection, which entirely preceded hisconnection with the Department, he can have no motive ofself-justification regarding an appointment for which he could deserveneither credit nor blame. The office of the Navy Department at that moment, so far as Santiagoitself was concerned, was chiefly administrative: to maintain thenumber of ships and their necessary supplies of coal, ammunition, andhealthy food at the highest point consistent with the requirements ofother parts of the field of war. During the month of June, being, asit was, the really decisive period of the campaign, these demands forincrease of force naturally rose higher in every quarter. A numerousconvoy had to be provided for the army expedition; the battle fleethad to be supplemented with several light cruisers; it became evidentthat the sphere of the blockade must be extended, which meant manymore ships; and in the midst of all this, Cámara started for Suez. Allthis only instances the common saying, "It never rains but it pours. "Our battle fleet before Santiago was more than powerful enough tocrush the hostile squadron in a very short time, if the latterattempted a stand-up fight. The fact was so evident that it wasperfectly clear nothing of the kind would be hazarded; but, nevertheless, we could not afford to diminish the number of armoredvessels on this spot, now become the determining centre of theconflict. The possibility of the situation was twofold. Either theenemy might succeed in an effort at evasion, a chance which requiredus to maintain a distinctly superior force of battleships in order toallow the occasional absence of one or two for coaling or repairs, besides as many lighter cruisers as could be mustered for purposes oflookout, or, by merely remaining quietly at anchor, protected fromattack by the lines of torpedoes, he might protract a situation whichtended not only to wear out our ships, but also to keep them thereinto the hurricane season, --a risk which was not, perhaps, adequatelyrealized by the people of the United States. It is desirable at this point to present certain other elements of thenaval situation which weightily affected naval action at the moment, and which, also, were probably overlooked by the nation at large, forthey give a concrete illustration of conditions which ought toinfluence our national policy, as regards the navy, in the present andimmediate future. We had to economize our ships because they were toofew. There was no reserve. The Navy Department had throughout, andespecially at this period, to keep in mind, not merely the exigenciesat Santiago, but the fact that we had not a battleship in the homeports that could in six months be made ready to replace one lost orseriously disabled, as the _Massachusetts_, for instance, not longafterwards was, by running on an obstruction in New York Bay. Surpriseapproaching disdain was expressed, both before and after thedestruction of Cervera's squadron, that the battle fleet was not sentinto Santiago either to grapple the enemy's ships there, or to supportthe operations of the army, in the same way, for instance, thatFarragut crossed the torpedo lines at Mobile. The reply--and, in thewriter's judgment, the more than adequate reason--was that the countrycould not at that time, under the political conditions which thenobtained, afford to risk the loss or disablement of a singlebattleship, unless the enterprise in which it was hazarded carried areasonable probability of equal or greater loss to the enemy, leavingus, therefore, as strong as before relatively to the naval power whichin the course of events might yet be arrayed against us. If we lostten thousand men, the country could replace them; if we lost abattleship, it could not be replaced. The issue of the war, as a wholeand in every locality to which it extended, depended upon naval force, and it was imperative to achieve, not success only, but successdelayed no longer than necessary. A million of the best soldiers wouldhave been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea. Dewey hadnot a battleship, but there can be no doubt that that capable admiralthought he ought to have one or more; and so he ought, if we had hadthem to spare. The two monitors would be something, doubtless, whenthey arrived; but, like all their class, they lacked mobility. When Cámara started by way of Suez for the East, it was no moreevident than it was before that we ought to have battleships there. That was perfectly plain from the beginning; but battleships no morethan men can be in two places at once, and until Cámara's movement hadpassed beyond the chance of turning west, the Spanish fleet in thePeninsula had, as regarded the two fields of war, the West Indies andthe Philippines, the recognized military advantage of an interiorposition. In accepting inferiority in the East, and concentrating ouravailable force in the West Indies, thereby ensuring a superiorityover any possible combination of Spanish vessels in the latterquarter, the Department acted rightly and in accordance with soundmilitary precedent; but it must be remembered that the Spanish Navywas not the only possibility of the day. The writer was not in aposition to know then, and does not know now, what weight the UnitedStates Government attached to the current rumors of possible politicalfriction with other states whose people were notoriously sympathizerswith our enemy. The public knows as much about that as he does; but itwas clear that if a disposition to interfere did exist anywhere, itwould not be lessened by a serious naval disaster to us, such as theloss of one of our few battleships would be. Just as in themaintenance of a technically "effective" blockade of the Cuban ports, so, also, in sustaining the entireness and vigor of the battle fleet, the attitude of foreign Powers as well as the strength of theimmediate enemy had to be considered. For such reasons it wasrecommended that the orders on this point to Admiral Sampson should beperemptory; not that any doubt existed as to the discretion of thatofficer, who justly characterized the proposition to throw the shipsupon the mine fields of Santiago as suicidal folly, but because it wasfelt that the burden of such a decision should be assumed by asuperior authority, less liable to suffer in personal reputation fromthe idle imputations of over-caution, which at times were ignorantlymade by some who ought to have known better, but did not. "The matteris left to your discretion, " the telegram read, "except that theUnited States armored vessels must not be risked. " When Cervera's squadron was once cornered, an intelligent opponentwould, under any state of naval preparedness, have seen theadvisability of forcing him out of the port by an attack in the rear, which could be made only by an army. As Nelson said on one occasion, "What is wanted now is not more ships, but troops. " Under fewconditions should such a situation be prolonged. But the reasonsadduced in the last paragraph made it doubly incumbent upon us tobring the matter speedily to an issue, and the combined expeditionfrom Tampa was at once ordered. Having in view the number of hostiletroops in the country surrounding Santiago, as shown by the subsequentreturns of prisoners, and shrewdly suspected by ourselves beforehand, it was undoubtedly desirable to employ a larger force than was sent. The criticism made upon the inadequate number of troops engaged inthis really daring movement is intrinsically sound, and would bewholly accurate if directed, not against the enterprise itself, butagainst the national shortsightedness which gave us so trivial an armyat the outbreak of the war. The really hazardous nature of themovement is shown by the fact that the column of Escario, threethousand strong, from Manzanillo, reached Santiago on July 3rd; toolate, it is true, abundantly too late, to take part in the defence ofSan Juan and El Caney, upon holding which the city depended for foodand water; yet not so late but that it gives a shivering suggestionhow much more arduous would have been the task of our troops hadEscario come up in time. The incident but adds another to history'slong list of instances where desperate energy and economy of time havewrested safety out of the jaws of imminent disaster. The occasion wasone that called upon us to take big risks; and success merelyjustifies doubly an attempt which, from the obvious balance ofadvantages and disadvantages, was antecedently justified by itsnecessity, and would not have been fair subject for blame, even had itfailed. The Navy Department did not, however, think that even a small chanceof injury should be taken which could be avoided; and it may beremarked that, while the man is unfit for command who, on emergency, is unable to run a very great risk for the sake of decisive advantage, he, on the other hand, is only less culpable who takes even a smallrisk of serious harm against which reasonable precaution can provide. It has been well said that Nelson took more care of his topgallantmasts, [4] in ordinary cruising, than he did of his whole fleet whenthe enemy was to be checked or beaten; and this combination ofqualities apparently opposed is found in all strong militarycharacters to the perfection of which both are necessary. It wasdetermined, accordingly, to collect for the transports a numerousnaval guard or convoy, to secure them against possible attacks by theSpanish gunboats distributed along the north coast of Cuba, by whichroute the voyage was to be made. The care was probably thoughtexcessive by many and capable men; but the unforeseen is everhappening in war. Here or there a young Spanish officer mightunexpectedly prove, not merely brave, as they all are, butenterprising, which few of them seem to be. The transport fleet had nohabit of manoeuvring together; the captains, many of them, werewithout interest in the war, and with much interest in their owners, upon whom they commonly depended for employment; straggling, and panicin case of attack, could be surely predicted; and, finally, as wescarcely had men enough for the work before them, why incur the hazardof sacrificing even one ship-load of our most efficient but all toosmall regular army? For such reasons it was decided to collect adozen of the smaller cruisers, any one of which could handle a Spanishgunboat, and which, in virtue of their numbers, could be sodistributed about the transports as to forestall attack at all points. The mere notoriety that so powerful a flotilla accompanied themovement was protection greater, perhaps, than the force itself; forit would impose quiescence even upon a more active enemy. As a furthermeasure of precaution, directions were given to watch also the torpedodestroyer in San Juan during the passage of the army. The _Indiana_, as has been said, formed part of the convoy; the dispositions andorder of sailing being arranged, and throughout superintended, by hercommanding officer, Captain Henry C. Taylor. On Saturday, June 4th, Commodore Remey, commanding the naval base atKey West, telegraphed that the naval vessels composing the convoywould be ready to sail that evening. The army was embarked and readyto move on the 8th, but early that morning was received the report, alluded to in a previous paper, that an armored cruiser with threevessels in company had been sighted by one of our blockading fleetthe evening before, in the Nicolas Channel, on the north coast ofCuba. Upon being referred back, the statement was confirmed by theofficer making it, and also by another vessel which had passed overthe same ground at nearly the same time. The account being thus bothspecific and positive, the sailing of the transports wascountermanded, --the naval vessels of the convoy being sent out fromKey West to scour the waters where the suspicious ships had been seen, and Admiral Sampson directed to send his two fastest armored vesselsto Key West, in order that the expedition might proceed in force. TheAdmiral, being satisfied that the report was a mistake, of a charactersimilar to others made to him at the same time, did not comply; adecision which, under the circumstances of his fuller knowledge, mustbe considered proper as well as fortunate. The incident was mortifyingat the time, and--considering by how little Escario arrivedlate--might have been disastrous; but it is one of those in which itis difficult to assign blame, though easy to draw a very obvious moralfor outlooks. The expedition finally got away from Tampa on the 14th of June, andarrived off Santiago on the 20th. The process of collecting andpreparing the convoy, the voyage itself, and the delay caused by thefalse alarm, constituted together a period of three weeks, duringwhich the naval vessels of the expedition were taken away from theblockade. Some days more were needed to coal them, and to get themagain to their stations. Meanwhile it was becoming evident that thelimits of the blockade must be extended, in order that full benefitmight be derived from it as a military measure. The southern ports ofCuba west of Santiago, and especially the waters about the Isle ofPines and Batabano, which is in close rail connection with Havana, were receiving more numerous vessels, as was also the case with Saguala Grande, on the north. In short, the demand for necessaries wasproducing an increasing supply, dependent upon Jamaica and Mexico inthe south, upon Europe and North American ports in the north, and thewhole was developing into a system which would go far to defeat ouraims, unless counteracted by more widespread and closer-knit measureson our part. It was decided, therefore, to proclaim a blockade of thesouth coast of Cuba from Cape Cruz, a little west of Santiago, to CapeFrances, where the foul ground west of the Isle of Pines terminates. The Isle of Pines itself was to be seized, in order to establish therea secure base, for coal and against hurricanes, for the small vesselswhich alone could operate in the surrounding shoal water; and anexpedition, composed mainly of the battalion of marines, was actuallyon the way for that purpose when the protocol was signed. During thethree weeks occupied by the preparation and passage of the Santiagoexpedition, the blockade had been barely "effective, " technically; itcould not at all be considered satisfactory from our point of view, although we were stripping the coast defence fleet of its cruisers, one by one, for the service in Cuba. Our utmost hope at the time, andwith every available vessel we could muster, was so far to satisfy theclaims of technicality, as to forestall any charges of ineffectivenessby neutrals, whose cruisers at times seemed somewhat curious. In the midst of all this extra strain Cámara's squadron left Cadiz andmade its hurried rush eastward. One effect of this was to release, and instantly, all the patrol vessels on our northern coast. Thesewere immediately ordered to Key West for blockade duty, CommodoreHowell also going in person to take charge of this work. On the otherhand, however, uneasiness could not but be felt for Dewey in caseCámara actually went on, for, except the monitor _Monterey_, we couldget no armored ship out before the two Spanish armored vesselsarrived; and if they had the same speed which they maintained toSuez--ten knots--it was doubtful whether the _Monterey_ wouldanticipate them. It may be mentioned here, as an interestingcoincidence, that the same day that word came that Cámara had startedback for Spain, a telegram was also received that the _Monterey_ hadhad to put back to Honolulu, for repairs to the collier whichaccompanied her. This, of course, was news then ten days old, communication from Honolulu to San Francisco being by steamer, not bycable. The strengthening of our blockade by the vessels of the northernpatrol fleet was therefore the first and, as it proved, the onlylasting result of Cámara's move. What the object was of that singular"vagabondaggio, " as it is not inaptly called by an Italian critic, isto the author incomprehensible, to use also the qualifying word of thesame foreign writer. That the intention was merely to provoke us tosome "eccentric" movement, by playing upon our fears about our forcesat Manila, would be perfectly reconcilable with going as far as PortSaid, and remaining there for some days, as was done, in difficulty, actual or feigned, about getting coal; but why the large expense wasincurred of passing through the canal, merely to double the amount byreturning, is beyond understanding. It may have been simply to carrybluff to the extreme point; but it is difficult not to suspect somemotive not yet revealed, and perhaps never to be known. Possibly, however, the measures taken by ourselves may have had uponthe Spanish Government the effect which, in part, they were intended toproduce. A squadron of two battleships and four cruisers, drawn fromAdmiral Sampson's fleet, was constituted to go to Manila by way ofSuez, under the command of Commodore Watson, until then in charge ofthe blockade on the north coast of Cuba. Colliers to accompany thesewere at the same time prepared in our Atlantic ports. Upon therepresentations of the Admiral, he was authorized to suspend thesailing of the detachment until all the armored vessels were fullycoaled, in order to ensure maintaining before Santiago for aconsiderable period the five that would be left to him. To thismodification of the first order contributed also the darkness of thenights at that moment; for the moon, though growing, was still young. But, as our object was even more to prevent Cámara from proceeding thanto send the reinforcement, it was desired that these dispositionsshould have full publicity, and, to ensure it the more fully, Watsonwas directed to go in all haste to Santiago with his flagship, the_Newark_, to take over his new command, the avowed objective of whichwas the Spanish coast, then deprived of much of its defence by thedeparture of Cámara's ships, and most imperfectly provided with localfortifications. Had Cámara gone on to the East, Watson would havefollowed him, and, although arriving later, there was no insuperabledifficulty to so combining the movements of our two divisions--Dewey'sand Watson's--as to decide the final result, and to leave Spain withouther second division of ships. Cámara's delay at the Mediterranean end of the Canal, which extendedover several days, suggested either doubts as to the reality of hisrumored destination, or a belief that the equipment andpreparation--in coal especially--for so distant an expedition had beenimperfect. This contributed to postpone Watson's departure, and thefirst passage of the Canal (July 2nd) by the Spaniards coincided indate very closely with the destruction of their other division underCervera. After the action off Santiago the battleships needed to beagain supplied with ammunition, and before that could be effectedCámara was on his way back to Spain. This abandonment by the enemy of their projected voyage to Manilaconcurred with the critical position of the army before Santiago topostpone the project of reinforcing Dewey, who no longer neededbattleships so far as his immediate operations were concerned. Besides, the arrival of both the _Monterey_ and the _Monadnock_ wasnow assured, even if the enemy resumed his movement, which wasscarcely possible. When Santiago fell, however, it was felt to benecessary to re-establish our fleet in the Pacific, by way either ofthe Straits of Magellan or of the Suez Canal. The latter was chosen, and the entire battle fleet--except the _Texas_, rejected on accountof her small coal endurance--was directed to join the movement and toaccompany some distance within the straits the two battleships which, with their smaller cruisers and colliers, were to go to Manila. Thepreparations for this movement were kept secret for quite a time, under the cover of an avowed intention to proceed against Puerto Rico;but nothing, apparently, can wholly escape the prying curiosity of thePress, which dignifies this not always reputable quality with thetitle of "enterprise. " No great harm resulted; possibly even theevident wish of the Government for secrecy, though thus betrayed, mayhave increased the apprehension of the enemy as to the damage intendedto their coasts. On the latter point the position of our Government, as understood bythe writer, was perfectly simple. In case the enemy refused peace whenresistance was obviously and utterly hopeless, bombardment of aseaport might be resorted to, but with the utmost reluctance, andmerely to compel submission and acquiescence in demonstrated facts. Itis not possible to allow one's own people to be killed and theirsubstance wasted merely because an adversary will not admit he iswhipped, when he is. When our fleet reached the Spanish coast thatcase might have arisen; but probably the unwillingness of ourGovernment so to act would have postponed its decision to the verylast moment, in order to spare the enemy the final humiliation ofyielding, not to reasonable acceptance of facts, but to direct threatof violence. The purpose of bombardment, so freely asserted by thePress, was one of the numerous baseless discoveries with which itenlightened its reader during the hostilities, --mixtures of truth anderror, so ingeniously proportioned as to constitute an antidote, thanwhich none better could then be had against its numerousindiscretions. The determining factor in this proposed movement of the battle fleetas a whole was the necessity, or at least the advantage, ofreinforcing Dewey, and of placing two battleships in the Pacific. Itwas not thought expedient now to send them by themselves, as at firstproposed, for the reason already given in another instance in thispaper; that is, the impropriety of taking even a small risk, ifunnecessary. Cámara's two ships had now returned to Spain, and therewere besides in the ports of the Peninsula other armed vessels, which, though evidently unfit for a distant voyage, might be good for somework in the Straits of Gibraltar, where our two ships must pass. Thatthe latter would beat them all, if assembled, we quite believed, as wehad hoped that the _Oregon_ might do had she met Cervera; but the_Oregon_ could not be helped without neglecting more immediatelypressing duties, whereas, at the end of July, there was nothing todetain our heavy ships in the West Indies. It was determined, therefore, to keep them massed and to send them across the ocean. Itwas probable, nearly to the extent of absolute certainty, that neitherbefore nor after the separation of the division bound for the Eastwould the entire Spanish Navy venture an attack upon the formidableforce thus confronting its ports. To ensure success without fightingis always a proper object of military dispositions; and, moreover, there were reasons before alluded to for maintaining in perfectintegrity vessels whose organized fighting efficiency had now beenfully vindicated to the world. Even during peace negotiations, one'sposition is not injured by the readiness of the battle fleet. Inshort, it should be an accepted apothegm, with those responsible forthe conduct of military operations, that "War is business, " to whichactual fighting is incidental. As in all businesses, the true aim isthe best results at the least cost; or, as the great French admiral, Tourville, said two centuries ago, "The best victories are those whichexpend least of blood, of hemp, and of iron. " Such results, it istrue, are more often granted to intelligent daring than to excessivecaution; but no general rule can supersede the individual judgmentupon the conditions before it. There are no specifics in warfare. To this main reason, others less immediately important concurred. Theships would be taken out of a trying climate, and removed from thechance of hurricanes; while the crews would receive a benefit, thevalue of which is avouched by naval history, in change of scene, ofoccupation, and of interests. The possibility of the enemy attemptingto divert us from our aim, by sending vessels to the West Indies, wasconsidered, and, although regarded as wildly improbable, provisionagainst it was made. As Nelson wrote to his commander-in-chief beforethe advance on Copenhagen: "There are those who think, if you leavethe Sound open, that the Danish fleet may sail from Copenhagen to jointhe Dutch or French. I own I have no fears on that subject; for it isnot likely that whilst their capital is menaced with an attack, ninethousand of her best men should be sent out of the kingdom. " It wasstill less probable that Spain in the present case would attempt anydiversion to the West Indies, and the movement of our heavy-armoredvessels to her shores could now justly be considered to cover all ouroperations on this side of the Atlantic. The detailed arrangementsmade for frequent communication, however, would have kept theDepartment practically in touch with our fleet throughout, and haveenabled us to counteract any despairing effort of the enemy. FOOTNOTES: [4] The lighter upper masts, upon which speed much depended in moderateweather. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE MORAL ASPECT OF WAR To determine the consequences of an historical episode, such as therecent Peace Conference at The Hague, is not a matter for prophecy, but for experience, which alone can decide what positive issues, forgood or for ill, shall hereafter trace their source to this beginning. The most that the present can do is to take note of the point so farreached, and of apparent tendencies manifested; to seek for the lattera right direction; to guide, where it can, currents of generalthought, the outcome of which will be beneficial or injurious, according as their course is governed by a just appreciation offundamental truths. The calling of the Conference of The Hague originated in an avoweddesire to obtain relief from immediate economical burdens, by theadoption of some agreement to restrict the preparations for war, andthe consequent expense involved in national armaments; but before itsmeeting the hope of disarmament had fallen into the background, thevacant place being taken by the project of abating the remoter evilsof recurrent warfare, by giving a further impulse, and a more clearlydefined application, to the principle of arbitration, whichthenceforth assumed pre-eminence in the councils of the Conference. This may be considered the point at which we have arrived. Theassembled representatives of many nations, including all the greatestupon the earth, have decided that it is to arbitration men must lookfor relief, rather than to partial disarmament, or even to an arrestin the progress of preparations for war. Of the beneficence of thepractice of arbitration, of the wisdom of substituting it, whenpossible, for the appeal to arms, with all the misery therefromresulting, there can be no doubt; but it will be expected that in itsapplication, and in its attempted development, the tendencies of theday, both good and bad, will make themselves felt. If, on the onehand, there is solid ground for rejoicing in the growing inclinationto resort first to an impartial arbiter, if such can be found, whenoccasion for collision arises, there is, on the other hand, cause forserious reflection when this most humane impulse is seen to favormethods, which by compulsion shall vitally impair the moral freedom, and the consequent moral responsibility, which are the distinguishingglory of the rational man, and of the sovereign state. One of the most unfortunate characteristics of our present age is thedisposition to impose by legislative enactment--by externalcompulsion, that is--restrictions of a moral character, which areeither fundamentally unjust, or at least do not carry with them themoral sense of the community, as a whole. It is not religious faithalone that in the past has sought to propagate itself by force of law, which ultimately is force of physical coercion. If the religiousliberty of the individual has been at last won, as we hope forever, itis sufficiently notorious that the propensity of majorities to controlthe freedom of minorities, in matters of disputed right and wrong, still exists, as certain and as tyrannical as ever was the will ofPhilip II. That there should be no heretic within his dominion. Manycannot so much as comprehend the thought of the English Bishop, thatit was better to see England free than England sober. In matters internal to a state, the bare existence of a law imposes anobligation upon the individual citizen, whatever his personalconviction of its rightfulness or its wisdom. Yet is such obligationnot absolute. The primary duty, attested alike by the law and thegospel, is submission. The presumption is in favor of the law; and ifthere lie against it just cause for accusation, on the score either ofjustice or of expediency, the interests of the Commonwealth and theprecepts of religion alike demand that opposition shall be conductedaccording to the methods, and within the limits, which the law of theland itself prescribes. But it may be--it has been, and yet again maybe--that the law, however regular in its enactment, and thereforeunquestionable on the score of formal authority, either outragesfundamental political right, or violates the moral dictates of theindividual conscience. Of the former may be cited as an instance theStamp Act, perfectly regular as regarded statutory validity, whichkindled the flame of revolution in America. Of the second, theFugitive Slave Law, within the memory of many yet living, is aconspicuous illustration. Under such conditions, the moral right ofresistance is conceded--nay, is affirmed and emphasized--by the moralconsciousness of the races from which the most part of the Americanpeople have their origin, and to which, almost wholly, we owe ourpolitical and religious traditions. Such resistance may be passive, accepting meekly the penalty for disobedience, as the martyr who forconscience' sake refused the political requirement of sacrificing tothe image of the Cæsar; or it may be active and violent, as when ourforefathers repelled taxation without representation, or when men andwomen, of a generation not yet wholly passed away, refused to violatetheir consciences by acquiescing in the return of a slave to hisbondage, resorting to evasion or to violence, according to theirconditions or temperaments, but in every case deriving the sanctionfor their unlawful action from the mandate of their personalconscience. And let it be carefully kept in mind that it is not the absolute rightor wrong of the particular act, as seen in the clearer light of alater day, that justified men, whether in the particular instancescited, or in other noteworthy incidents in the long series of steps bywhich the English-speaking races have ascended to their presentpolitical development. It is not the demonstrable rightfulness of aparticular action, as seen in the dispassionate light of the arbiter, posterity, that has chiefly constituted the merit of the individualrebel against the law in which he beheld iniquity; the saving salt, which has preserved the healthfulness of the body politic, has beenthe fidelity to Conscience, to the faithful, if passionate, arbiter ofthe moment, whose glorious predominance in the individual or in thenation gives a better assurance of the highest life than does theclearest intellectual perception of the rightfulness, or of theexpediency, of a particular course. One may now see, or think that hesees, as does the writer, with Lincoln, that if slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. It was not so clear half a century ago; and while nohonor is too great for those early heroes, who for this sublimeconviction withstood obloquy and persecution, legal and illegal, itshould be never forgotten that the then slave States, in theirresolute determination to maintain, by arms, if need be, and againstsuperior force, that which they believed to be their constitutionalpolitical right, made no small contribution to the record of fidelityto conscience and to duty, which is the highest title of a nation tohonor. Be it by action or be it by submission, by action positive orby action negative, whatsoever is not of faith--of conviction--is sin. The just and necessary exaltation of the law as the guarantee of trueliberty, with the consequent accepted submission of the individual toit, and the recognized presumption in favor of such submission, havetended to blind us to the fact that the individual, in our highestconsciousness, has never surrendered his moral freedom, --hisindependence of conscience. No human law overbears that supremeappeal, which carries the matter from the tribunal of man into thepresence of God; nor can human law be pleaded at this bar as theexcuse for a violation of conscience. It is a dangerous doctrine, doubtless, to preach that there may be a "higher law" than obedienceto law; but truth is not to be rejected because dangerous, and thetime is not long past when the phrase voiced a conviction, theforcible assertion of which brought slavery to an end forever. The resort to arms by a nation, when right cannot otherwise beenforced, corresponds, or should correspond, precisely to the acts ofthe individual man which have been cited; for the old conception of anappeal to the Almighty, resembling in principle the mediæval trial bybattle, is at best but a partial view of the truth, seen from one sideonly. However the result may afterwards be interpreted as indicativeof the justice of a cause, --an interpretation always questionable, --astate, when it goes to war, should do so not to test the rightfulnessof its claims, but because, being convinced in its conscience of thatrightfulness, no other means of overcoming evil remains. Nations, like men, have a conscience. Like men, too, the light ofconscience is in nations often clouded, or misguided, by passion or byinterest. But what of that? Does a man discard his allegiance toconscience because he knows that, itself in harmony with right, itsmessage to him is perplexed and obscured by his own infirmities? Notso. Fidelity to conscience implies not only obedience to itsdictates, but earnest heart-searching, the use of every means, toascertain its true command; yet withal, whatever the mistrust of themessage, the supremacy of the conscience is not impeached. When it isrecognized that its final word is spoken, nothing remains butobedience. Even if mistaken, the moral wrong of acting againstconviction works a deeper injury to the man, and to his kind, than canthe merely material disasters that may follow upon obedience. Even thematerial evils of war are less than the moral evil of compliance withwrong. "Yes, my friend, " replied to me a foreign diplomatist to whom I wassaying some such things, "but remember that only a few years ago theconscience of your people was pressing you into war with Great Britainin the Venezuelan question. " "Admitting, " I replied, "that the firstnational impulse, the first movement of the conscience, if you like, was mistaken, --which is at least open to argument, --it remains thatthere was no war; time for deliberation was taken, and more than thatcan be asked of no conscience, national or personal. But, further, had the final decision of conscience been that just cause for warexisted, no evil that war brings could equal the moral declensionwhich a nation inflicts upon itself, and upon mankind, by deliberateacquiescence in wrong, which it recognizes and which it might right. "Nor is this conclusion vitiated by the fact that war is made at timesupon mistaken conviction. It is not the accuracy of the decision, butthe faithfulness to conviction, that constitutes the moral worth of anaction, national or individual. The general consciousness of this truth is witnessed by a commonphrase, which excludes from suggested schemes of arbitration allquestions which involve "national honor or vital interests. " No onething struck me more forcibly during the Conference at The Hague thanthe exception taken and expressed, although in a very few quarters, tothe word "honor, " in this connection. There is for this good reason;for the word, admirable in itself and if rightly understood, has lostmaterially in the clearness of its image and superscription, by muchhandling and by some misapplication. Honor does not forbid a nation toacknowledge that it is wrong, or to recede from a step which it hastaken through wrong motives or mistaken reasons; yet it has at timesbeen so thought, to the grievous injury of the conception of honor. Itis not honor, necessarily, but sound policy, which prescribes thatpeace with a semi-civilized foe should not be made after a defeat;but, however justifiable the policy, the word "honor" is defaced bythus misapplying it. The varying fortunes, the ups and downs of the idea of arbitration atthe Conference of The Hague, as far as my intelligence could followthem, produced in me two principal conclusions, which so far confirmedmy previous points of view that I think I may now fairly claim forthem that they have ripened into _opinions_, between which word, andthe cruder, looser views received passively as _impressions_, I havebeen ever careful to mark a distinction. In the first place, compulsory arbitration stands at present no chance of generalacceptance. There is but one way as yet in which arbitration can becompulsory; for the dream of some advanced thinkers, of anInternational Army, charged with imposing the decrees of anInternational Tribunal upon a recalcitrant state, may be dismissed asbeing outside of practical international politics, until at least thenations are ready for the intermediate step of moral compulsion, imposed by a self-assumed obligation--by a promise. Compulsoryarbitration as yet means only the moral compulsion of a pledge, takenbeforehand, and more or less comprehensive, to submit to arbitrationquestions which rest still in the unknown future; the very terms ofwhich therefore cannot be foreseen. Although there is a certain activecurrent of agitation in favor of such stipulations, there is nogeneral disposition of governments to accede, except under very narrowand precise limitations, and in questions of less than secondaryimportance. Secondly, there appears to be, on the other hand, a much greaterdisposition than formerly to entertain favorably the idea ofarbitration, as a means to be in all cases considered, and wherepossible to be adopted, in order to solve peaceably difficulties whichthreaten peace. In short, the consciences of the nations are awake tothe wickedness of unnecessary war, and are disposed, as a generalrule, to seek first, and where admissible, the counterpoise of animpartial judge, where such can be found, to correct the bias ofnational self-will; but there is an absolute indisposition, aninstinctive revolt, against signing away, beforehand, the nationalconscience, by a promise that any other arbiter than itself shall beaccepted in questions of the future, the import of which cannot yet bediscerned. Of this feeling the vague and somewhat clumsy phrase, "national honor and vital interests, " has in the past been theexpression; for its very indeterminateness reserved to conscience inevery case the decision, --"May another judge for me here, or must I bebound by my own sense of right?" Under these circumstances, and having reached so momentous a stage inprogress as is indicated by the very calling together of a worldconference for the better assuring of peace, may it not be well for usto pause a moment and take full account of the idea, Arbitration, onthe right hand and on the left? Noble and beneficent in its trueoutlines, it too may share, may even now be sharing, the liability ofthe loftiest conceptions to degenerate into catchwords, or into cant. "Liberty, what crimes have been wrought in thy name!" and does notreligion share the same reproach, and conscience also? Yet will we notaway with any of the three. The conviction of a nation is the conviction of the mass of theindividuals thereof, and each individual has therefore a personalresponsibility for the opinion he holds on a question of greatnational, or international, moment. Let us look, each of us, --andespecially each of us who fears God, --into his own inner heart, andask himself how far, in his personal life, he is prepared to acceptarbitration. Is it not so that the reply must be, "In doubtfulquestions of moment, wherever I possibly can, knowing my necessary, inevitable proneness to one-sided views, I will seek an impartialadviser, that my bias may be corrected; but when that has been done, when I have sought what aid I can, if conscience still commands, it Imust obey. From that duty, burdensome though it may be, no man canrelieve me. Conscience, diligently consulted, is to the man the voiceof God; between God and the man no other arbiter comes. " And if thisbe so, a pledge beforehand is impossible. I cannot bind myself for afuture of which I as yet know nothing, to abide by the decision ofany other judge than my own conscience. Much humor--less wit--has beenexpended upon the Emperor of Germany's supposed carefulness to rejectarbitration because an infringement of his divine rights; a phrasewhich may well be no more than a blunt expression of the sense that nothird party can relieve a man from the obligations of the position towhich he is called by God, and that for the duties of that positionthe man can confidently expect divine guidance and help. Be that as itmay, the divine right of conscience will, among Americans, receiverare challenge. It has been urged, however, that a higher organization of the nations, the provision of a supreme tribunal issuing and enforcing judgments, settling thereby quarrels and disputed rights, would produce for thenations of the earth a condition analogous to that of the individualcitizen of the state, who no longer defends his own cause, nor isbound in conscience to maintain his own sense of right, when the lawdecides against him. The conception is not novel, not even modern;something much like it was put forth centuries ago by the Papacyconcerning its own functions. It contains two fallacies. First, thesubmission of the individual citizen is to force, to the constitutionof which he personally contributes little, save his individual andgeneral assent. To an unjust law he submits under protest, doubtlessoften silent; but he submits, not because he consents to the wrong, whether to himself personally or to others, but because he cannot helpit. This will perhaps be denied, with the assertion that willing, intelligent submission to law, even when unjust, is yielded by mostfor the general good. One has, however, only to consider thedisposition of the average man to evade payment of taxes, to recognizehow far force daily enters into the maintenance and execution of law. Nations, on the contrary, since no force exists, or without theirvolition can exist, to compel them to accept the institution of anauthority superior to their own conscience, yield a willingacquiescence to wrong, when they so yield in obedience to an externalauthority imposed by themselves. The matter is not helped by the factof a previous promise to accept such decisions. The wrong-doing of anindividual, in consequence of an antecedent promise, does not relievethe conscience thus rashly fettered. The ancient warning still stands, "Suffer not thy mouth to cause thy flesh to sin. " For the individualor the nation, arbitration is not possible where the decision mayviolate conscience; it therefore can be accepted only when it is knownthat interest merely, not duty, will be affected by the judgment, andsuch knowledge cannot exist antecedent to the difficulty arising. There is a further--a second--fallacy in the supposed analogy betweenthe submission of individuals to law, and the advocated submission ofstates to a central tribunal. The law of the state, overwhelming as isits power relatively to that of the individual citizen, can neitherbind nor loose in matters pertaining to the conscience. Still less canany tribunal, however solemnly constituted, liberate a state from itsobligation to do right; still less, I say, because the state retains, what the individual has in great part lost, the power to maintain whatit believes to be right. Many considerations may make it more right--Ido not say _more expedient_--for a man or for a nation, to submit to, or to acquiesce in, wrong than to resist; but in such cases it isconscience still that decides where the balance of justice turnsdistinctly to the side of wrong. It is, I presume, universallyadmitted, that occasions may arise where conscience not onlyjustifies, but compels, resistance to law; whether it be the Christiancitizen refusing to sacrifice, or the free citizen to subject himselfto unconstitutional taxation, or to become the instrument of returningthe slave to his master. So also for the Christian state. Existingwrong may have to be allowed, lest a greater wrong be done. Conscienceonly can decide; and for that very reason conscience must be keptfree, that it may decide according to its sense of right, when thecase is presented. There is, therefore, the very serious consideration attendant uponwhat is loosely styled "compulsory" arbitration, --arbitrationstipulated, that is, in advance of a question originating, or of itsconditions being appreciated, --that a state may thereby do that whicha citizen as towards the state does not do; namely, may voluntarilyassume a moral obligation to do, or to allow, wrong. And it must beremembered, also, that many of the difficulties which arise amongstates involve considerations distinctly beyond and higher than law asinternational law now exists; whereas the advocated PermanentTribunal, to which the ultra-organizers look, to take cognizance ofall cases, must perforce be governed by law as it exists. It is not, in fact, to be supposed that nations will submit themselves to atribunal, the general principles of which have not been crystallizedinto a code of some sort. A concrete instance, however, is always more comprehensible andinstructive than a general discussion. Let us therefore take theincidents and conditions which preceded our recent war with Spain. Thefacts, as seen by us, may, I apprehend, be fairly stated as follows:In the island of Cuba, a powerful military force, --government itscarcely could be called, --foreign to the island, was holding a smallportion of it in enforced subjection, and was endeavoring, unsuccessfully, to reduce the remainder. In pursuance of this attempt, measures were adopted that inflicted immense misery and death upongreat numbers of the population. Such suffering is indeed attendantupon war; but it may be stated as a fundamental principle ofcivilized warfare that useless suffering is condemned, and it hadbecome apparent to military eyes that Spain could not subdue theisland, nor restore orderly conditions. The suffering was terrible, and was unavailing. Under such circumstances, does any moral obligation lie upon apowerful neighboring state? Or, more exactly, if there is borne inupon the moral consciousness of a mighty people that such an afflictedcommunity as that of Cuba at their doors is like Lazarus at the gateof the rich man, and that the duty of stopping the evil rests uponthem, what is to be done with such a case of conscience? Could thedecision of another, whether nation or court, excuse our nation fromthe ultimate responsibility of its own decision? But, granting that itmight have proved expedient to call in other judges, when we had fullknowledge of the circumstances, what would have been our dilemma if, conscience commanding one course, we had found ourselves antecedentlybound to abide by the conclusions of another arbiter? For let us notdeceive ourselves. Absolutely justifiable, nay, imperative, as most ofus believe our action to have been, when tried at the bar ofconscience, no arbitral court, acceptable to the two nations, wouldhave decided as our own conscience did. A European diplomatist ofdistinguished reputation, of a small nation likeliest to be unbiassed, so said to me personally, and it is known that more than one of ourown ablest international lawyers held that we were acting in defianceof international law as it now exists; just as the men who resistedthe Fugitive Slave Law acted in defiance of the statute law of theland. Decision must have gone against us, so these men think, on thelegal merits of the case. Of the moral question the arbiter could takeno account; it is not there, indeed, that moral questions must findtheir solution, but in the court of conscience. Referred toarbitration, doubtless the Spanish flag would still fly over Cuba. There is unquestionably a higher law than Law, concerning obedience towhich no other than the man himself, or the state, can give account toHim that shall judge. The freedom of the conscience may be fettered orsigned away by him who owes to it allegiance, yet its supremacy, though thus disavowed, cannot be overthrown. The Conference at TheHague has facilitated future recourse to arbitration, by providingmeans through which, a case arising, a court is more easilyconstituted, and rules governing its procedure are ready to hand; butit has refrained from any engagements binding states to have recourseto the tribunal thus created. The responsibility of the state to itsown conscience remains unimpeached and independent. The progress thusmade and thus limited is to a halting place, at which, whether wellchosen or not, the nations must perforce stop for a time; and it willbe wise to employ that time in considering the bearings, alike of thatwhich has been done, and of that which has been left undone. Our own country has a special need thus carefully to consider thepossible consequences of arbitration, understood in the sense of anantecedent pledge to resort to it; unless under limitations verycarefully hedged. There is an undoubted popular tendency in directionof such arbitration, which would be "compulsory" in the highest moralsense, --the compulsion of a promise. The world at large, and weespecially, stand at the opening of a new era, concerning whoseproblems little can be foreseen. Among the peoples, there ismanifested intense interest in the maturing of our nationalconvictions, as being, through Asia, new-comers into activeinternational life, concerning whose course it is impossible topredict; and in many quarters, probably in all except Great Britain, the attitude toward us is watchful rather than sympathetic. Theexperience of Crete and of Armenia does not suggest beneficent resultsfrom the arbitration of many counsellors; especially if contrastedwith the more favorable issue when Russia, in 1877, acting on her ownsingle initiative, forced by the conscience of her people, herselfalone struck the fetters from Bulgaria; or when we ourselves lastyear, rejecting intermediation, loosed the bonds from Cuba, and liftedthe yoke from the neck of the oppressed. It was inevitable that thoughts like these should recur frequently toone of the writer's habit of thought, when in constant touch with theatmosphere that hung around the Conference, although the latter was byit but little affected. The poet's words, "The Parliament of man, thefederation of the world, " were much in men's mouths this past summer. There is no denying the beauty of the ideal, but there was apparentalso a disposition, in contemplating it, to contemn the slow processesof evolution by which Nature commonly attains her ends, and to imposeat once, by convention, the methods that commended themselves to thesanguine. Fruit is not best ripened by premature plucking, nor can thegoal be reached by such short cuts. Step by step, in the past, man hasascended by means of the sword, and his more recent gains, as well aspresent conditions, show that the time has not yet come to kick downthe ladder which has so far served him. Three hundred years ago, thepeople of the land in which the Conference was assembled wrenched withthe sword civil and religious peace and national independence from thetyranny of Spain. Then began the disintegration of her empire, and thedeliverance of peoples from her oppression, but this was completedonly last year, and then again by the sword--of the United States. In the centuries which have since intervened, what has not "justice, with valor armed, " when confronted by evil in high places, founditself compelled to effect by resort to the sword? To it was due thebirth of our own nation, not least among the benefits of which was thestern experience that has made Great Britain no longer the mistress, but the mother, of her dependencies. The control, to good from evil, of the devastating fire of the French Revolution and of Napoleon wasdue to the sword. The long line of illustrious names and deeds, ofthose who bore it not in vain, has in our times culminated--if indeedthe end is even yet nearly reached--in the new birth of the UnitedStates by the extirpation of human slavery, and in the downfall, butyesterday, of a colonial empire identified with tyranny. What thesword, and it supremely, tempered only by the stern demands of justiceand of conscience, and the loving voice of charity, has done for Indiaand for Egypt, is a tale at once too long and too well known forrepetition here. Peace, indeed, is not adequate to all progress; thereare resistances that can be overcome only by explosion. What meansless violent than war would in a half-year have solved the Caribbeanproblem, shattered national ideas deep rooted in the prepossessions ofa century, and planted the United States in Asia, face to face withthe great world problem of the immediate future? What but war rent theveil which prevented the English-speaking communities from seeing eyeto eye, and revealed to each the face of a brother? Little wonder thata war which, with comparatively little bloodshed, brought suchconsequences, was followed by the call for a Peace Conference! Power, force, is a faculty of national life; one of the talentscommitted to nations by God. Like every other endowment of a complexorganization, it must be held under control of the enlightenedintellect and of the upright heart; but no more than any other can itbe carelessly or lightly abjured, without incurring the responsibilityof one who buries in the earth that which was intrusted to him foruse. And this obligation to maintain right, by force if need be, whilecommon to all states, rests peculiarly upon the greater, in proportionto their means. Much is required of those to whom much is given. Soviewed, the ability speedily to put forth the nation's power, byadequate organization and other necessary preparation, according tothe reasonable demands of the nation's intrinsic strength and of itsposition in the world, is one of the clear duties involved in theChristian word "watchfulness, "--readiness for the call that may come, whether expectedly or not. Until it is demonstrable that no evilexists, or threatens the world, which cannot be obviated withoutrecourse to force, the obligation to readiness must remain; and, whereevil is mighty and defiant, the obligation to use force--that is, war--arises. Nor is it possible, antecedently, to bring theseconditions and obligations under the letter of precise and codifiedlaw, to be administered by a tribunal; and in the spirit legalism ismarked by blemishes as real as those commonly attributed to"militarism, " and not more elevated. The considerations whichdetermine good and evil, right and wrong, in crises of national life, or of the world's history, are questions of equity often toocomplicated for decision upon mere rules, or even principles, of law, international or other. The instances of Bulgaria, of Armenia, and ofCuba, are entirely in point, and it is most probable that thecontentions about the future of China will afford furtherillustration. Even in matters where the interest of nations isconcerned, the moral element enters; because each generation in itsday is the guardian of those which shall follow it. Like allguardians, therefore, while it has the power to act according to itsbest judgment, it has no right, for the mere sake of peace, to permitknown injustice to be done to its wards. The present strong feeling, throughout the nations of the world, infavor of arbitration, is in itself a subject for congratulation almostunalloyed. It carries indeed a promise, to the certainty of which nopaper covenants can pretend; for it influences the conscience byinward conviction, not by external fetter. But it must be rememberedthat such sentiments, from their very universality and evidentlaudableness, need correctives, for they bear in themselves a greatdanger of excess or of precipitancy. Excess is seen in thedisposition, far too prevalent, to look upon war not only as an evil, but as an evil unmixed, unnecessary, and therefore alwaysunjustifiable; while precipitancy, to reach results considereddesirable, is evidenced by the wish to _impose_ arbitration, toprevent recourse to war, by a general pledge previously made. Bothframes of mind receive expression in the words of speakers, among whoma leading characteristic is lack of measuredness and of proportion. Thus an eminent citizen is reported to have said: "There is no moreoccasion for two nations to go to war than for two men to settle theirdifficulties with clubs. " Singularly enough, this point of viewassumes to represent peculiarly Christian teaching, willingly ignorantof the truth that Christianity, while it will not force the conscienceby other than spiritual weapons, as "compulsory" arbitration might, distinctly recognizes the sword as the resister and remedier of evilin the sphere "of this world. " Arbitration's great opportunity has come in the advancing moralstandards of states, whereby the disposition to deliberate wrong-doinghas diminished, and consequently the occasions for redressing wrong byforce the less frequent to arise. In view of recent events however, and very especially of notorious, high-handed oppression, initiatedsince the calling of the Peace Conference, and resolutely continuedduring its sessions in defiance of the public opinion--theconviction--of the world at large, it is premature to assume that suchoccasions belong wholly to the past. Much less can it be assumed thatthere will be no further instances of a community believing, conscientiously and entirely, that honor and duty require of it acertain course, which another community with equal integrity may holdto be inconsistent with the rights and obligations of its own members. It is quite possible, especially to one who has recently visitedHolland, to conceive that Great Britain and the Boers are alikesatisfied of the substantial justice of their respective claims. It ispermissible most earnestly to hope that, in disputes between sovereignstates, arbitration may find a way to reconcile peace with fidelity toconscience, in the case of both; but if the conviction of conscienceremains unshaken, war is better than disobedience, --better thanacquiescence in recognized wrong. The great danger of undiscriminatingadvocacy of arbitration, which threatens even the cause it seeks tomaintain, is that it may lead men to tamper with equity, to compromisewith unrighteousness, soothing their conscience with the belief thatwar is so entirely wrong that beside it no other tolerated evil iswrong. Witness Armenia, and witness Crete. War has been avoided; butwhat of the national consciences that beheld such iniquity andwithheld the hand? NOTE. --This paper was the means of bringing into the author's hands a letter by the late General Sherman, which forcibly illustrates how easily, in quiet moments, men forget what they have owed, and still owe, to the sword. From the coincidence of its thought with that of the article itself, permission to print it here has been asked and received. NEW YORK, February 5th, 1890. DEAR GENERAL MEIGS, --I attended the Centennial Ceremonies in honor of the Supreme Court yesterday, four full hours in the morning at the Metropolitan Opera House, and about the same measure of time at the Grand Banquet of 850 lawyers in the evening at the Lenox Lyceum. The whole was superb in all its proportions, but it was no place for a soldier. I was bidden to the feast solely and exclusively because in 1858 for a few short months I was an attorney at Leavenworth, Kansas. The Bar Association of the United States has manifestly cast aside the Sword of Liberty. Justice and Law have ignored the significance of the Great Seal of the United States, with its emblematic olive branch and thirteen arrows, "all proper, " and now claim that, without force, Law and moral suasion have carried us through one hundred years of history. Of course, in your study you will read at leisure these speeches, and if in them you discover any sense of obligation to the Soldier element, you will be luckier than I, a listener. From 1861 to 1865 the Supreme Court was absolutely paralyzed; their decrees and writs were treated with contempt south of the Potomac and Ohio; they could not summon a witness or send a Deputy Marshal. War, and the armed Power of the Nation, alone removed the barrier and restored to the U. S. Courts their lawful jurisdiction. Yet, from these honied words of flattery, a stranger would have inferred that at last the lawyers of America had discovered the sovereign panacea of a Government without force, either visible or in reserve. I was in hopes the Civil War had dispelled this dangerous illusion, but it seems not. You and I can fold our hands and truly say we have done a man's share, and leave the consequences to younger men who must buffet with the next storms; but a Government which ignores the great truths illuminated in heraldic language over its very Capitol is not yet at the end of its woes. With profound respect, W. T. SHERMAN. THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO THEIR NEW DEPENDENCIES In modern times there have been two principal colonizing nations, which not merely have occupied and administered a great transmarinedomain, but have impressed upon it their own identity--the totality oftheir political and racial characteristics--to a degree that is likelyto affect permanently the history of the world at large. These two nations, it is needless to say, are Great Britain and Spain. Russia, their one competitor, differs from them in that her sustainedadvance over alien regions is as wholly by land as theirs has been bysea. France and Holland have occupied and administered, and continueto occupy and administer, large extents of territory; but it isscarcely necessary to argue that in neither case has the racepossessed the land, nor have the national characteristics beentransmitted to the dwellers therein as a whole. They have realized, rather, the idea recently formulated by Mr. Benjamin Kidd for thedevelopment of tropical regions, --administration from without. The unexpected appearance of the United States as in legal control oftransmarine territory, which as yet they have not had opportunityeither to occupy or to administer, coincides in time with the finaldownfall of Spain's colonial empire, and with a stage in the upwardprogress of that of Great Britain, so marked, in the contrast itpresents to the ruin of Spain, as to compel attention and comparison, with an ultimate purpose to draw therefrom instruction for the UnitedStates in the new career forced upon them. The larger colonies ofGreat Britain are not indeed reaching their majority, for that theydid long ago; but the idea formulated in the phrase "imperialfederation" shows that they, and the mother country herself, havepassed through and left behind the epoch when the accepted thought inboth was that they should in the end separate, as sons leave thefather's roof, to set up, each for himself. To that transition phasehas succeeded the ideal of partnership, more complex indeed anddifficult of attainment, but trebly strong if realized. The terms ofpartnership, the share of each member in the burdens and in theprofits, present difficulties which will delay, and may prevent, theconsummation; time alone can show. The noticeable factor in thischange of mind, however, is the affectionate desire manifested by bothparent and children to ensure the desired end. Between nations longalien we have high warrant for saying that interest alone determinesaction; but between communities of the same blood, and when the tiesof dependence on the one part are still recent, sentiments--love andmutual pride--are powerful, provided there be good cause for them. Andgood cause there is. Since she lost what is now the United States, Great Britain has become benevolent and beneficent to her colonies. It is not in colonies only, however, that Great Britain has beenbeneficent to weaker communities; nor are benevolence and beneficencethe only qualities she has shown. She has been strong also, --strong inher own interior life, whence all true strength issues; strong in thequality of the men she has sent forth to colonize and to administer;strong to protect by the arm of her power, by land, and, above all, bysea. The advantage of the latter safeguard is common to all herdependencies; but it is among subject and alien races, and not incolonies properly so called, that her terrestrial energy chieflymanifests itself, to control, to protect, and to elevate. Of thesefunctions, admirably discharged in the main, India and Egypt are theconspicuous illustrations. In them she administers from without, andcannot be said to colonize, for the land was already full. Conspicuous result constitutes example: for imitation, if honorable;for warning, if shameful. Experience is the great teacher, and is atits best when personal; but in the opening of a career such experienceis wanting to the individual, and must be sought in the record ofother lives, or of other nations. The United States are just about toenter on a task of government--of administration--over regions which, in inhabitants, in climate, and in political tradition, differessentially from themselves. What are the conditions of success? We have the two great examples. Great Britain has been, in the main, and increasingly, beneficent and strong. Spain, from the very first, as the records show, was inhumanly oppressive to the inferior races;and, after her own descendants in the colonies became aliens in habitto the home country, she to them also became tyrannically exacting. But, still more, Spain became weaker and weaker as the years passed, the tyranny of her extortions being partially due to exigencies of herpolitical weakness and to her economical declension. Let us, however, not fail to observe that the beneficence, as well as the strength, ofGreat Britain has been a matter of growth. She was not always what shenow is to the alien subject. There is, therefore, no reason todespair, as some do, that the United States, who share her traditions, can attain her success. The task is novel to us; we may make blunders;but, guided by her experience, we should reach the goal more quickly. And it is to our interest to do so. Enlightened self-interest demandsof us to recognize not merely, and in general, the imminence of thegreat question of the farther East, which is rising so rapidly beforeus, but also, specifically, the importance to us of a strong andbeneficent occupation of adjacent territory. In the domain of color, black and white are contradictory; but it is not so with self-interestand beneficence in the realm of ideas. This paradox is now toogenerally accepted for insistence, although in the practical life ofstates the proper order of the two is too often inverted. But, wherethe relations are those of trustee to ward, as are those of any statewhich rules over a weaker community not admitted to the fullprivileges of home citizenship, the first test to which measures mustbe brought is the good of the ward. It is the first interest of theguardian, for it concerns his honor. Whatever the part of the UnitedStates in the growing conflict of European interests around China andthe East, we deal there with equals, and may battle like men; but ournew possessions, with their yet minor races, are the objects only ofsolicitude. Ideas underlie action. If the paramount idea of beneficence becomes anational conviction, we may stumble and err, we may at times sin, orbe betrayed by unworthy representatives; but we shall advanceunfailingly. I have been asked to contribute to the discussion of thismatter something from my own usual point of view; which is, ofcourse, the bearing of sea power upon the security and the progress ofnations. Well, one great element of sea power, which, it will beremembered, is commercial before it is military, is that there beterritorial bases of action in the regions important to its commerce. That is self-interest. But the history of Spain's decline, and thehistory of Great Britain's advance, --in the latter of which the sternlesson given by the revolt of the United States is certainly aconspicuous factor, as also, perhaps, the other revolt known as theIndian Mutiny, in 1857, --alike teach us that territories beyond thesea can be securely held only when the advantage and interests of theinhabitants are the primary object of the administration. Theinhabitants may not return love for their benefits, --comprehension orgratitude may fail them; but the sense of duty achieved, and thesecurity of the tenure, are the reward of the ruler. I have understood also that, through the pages of "The EngineeringMagazine, " I should speak to the men who stand at the head of thegreat mechanical industries of the country, --the great inventors andthe leaders in home development, --and that they would be willing tohear me. But what can I say to them that they do not know? Their ownbusinesses are beyond my scope and comprehension. The opportunitiesoffered by the new acquisitions of the United States to the pursuitswith which they are identified they can understand better than I. Neither is it necessary to say that adequate--nay, great--navaldevelopment is a condition of success, although such an assertion ismore within my competence, as a student of navies and of history. Thatform of national strength which is called sea power becomes now doublyincumbent. It is needed not merely for national self-assertion, butfor beneficence; to ensure to the new subjects of the nation peace andindustry, uninterrupted by wars, the great protection against which ispreparation--to use that one counsel of Washington's which theanti-imperialist considers to be out of date. I have, therefore, but one thing which I have not already often saidto offer to such men, who affect these great issues through their ownaptitudes and through their far-reaching influence upon publicopinion, which they touch through many channels. Sea power, as anational interest, commercial and military, rests not upon fleetsonly, but also upon local territorial bases in distant commercialregions. It rests upon them most securely when they are extensive, andwhen they have a numerous population bound to the sovereign country bythose ties of interest which rest upon the beneficence of the ruler;of which beneficence power to protect is not the least factor. Merejust dealing and protection, however, do not exhaust the demands ofbeneficence towards alien subjects, still in race-childhood. The firmbut judicious remedying of evils, the opportunities for fuller andhappier lives, which local industries and local development afford, these also are a part of the duty of the sovereign power. Above all, there must be constant recognition that self-interest and beneficencealike demand that the local welfare be first taken into account. It ispossible, of course, that it may at times have to yield to thenecessities of the whole body; but it should be first considered. The task is great; who is sufficient for it? The writer believesfirmly in the ultimate power of ideas. Napoleon is reported to havesaid: "Imagination rules the world. " If this be generally so, howmuch more the true imaginations which are worthy to be called ideas!There is a nobility in man which welcomes the appeal to beneficence. May it find its way quickly now to the heads and hearts of theAmerican people, before less worthy ambitions fill them; and, aboveall, to the kings of men, in thought and in action, under whoseleadership our land makes its giant strides. There is in this noQuixotism. Materially, the interest of the nation is one with itsbeneficence; but if the ideas get inverted, and the nation sees in itsnew responsibilities, first of all, markets and profits, withincidental resultant benefit to the natives, it will go wrong. Throughsuch mistakes Great Britain passed. She lost the United States; shesuffered bitter anguish in India; but India and Egypt testify to-dayto the nobility of her repentance. Spain repented not. The examplesare before us. Which shall we follow? And is there not a stimulus to our imagination, and to high ambition, to read, as we easily may, how the oppressed have been freed, and thedegraded lifted, in India and in Egypt, not only by politicalsagacity and courage, but by administrative capacity directing thegreat engineering enterprises, which change the face of a land andincrease a hundredfold the opportunities for life and happiness? Theprofession of the writer, and the subject consequently of most of hiswriting, stands for organized force, which, if duly developed, is theconcrete expression of the nation's strength. But while he has neverconcealed his opinion that the endurance of civilization, during afuture far beyond our present foresight, depends ultimately upon dueorganization of force, he has ever held, and striven to say, that suchforce is but the means to an end, which end is durable peace andprogress, and therefore beneficence. The triumphs and the sufferingsof the past months have drawn men's eyes to the necessity for increaseof force, not merely to sustain over-sea dominion, but also to ensuretimely use, in action, of the latent military and naval strength whichthe nation possesses. The speedy and inevitable submission of Spainhas demonstrated beyond contradiction the primacy of navies indetermining the issue of transmarine wars; for after Cavité andSantiago had crippled hopelessly the enemy's navy, the end could notbe averted, though it might have been postponed. On the other hand, the numerical inadequacy of the troops sent to Santiago, and theirapparently inadequate equipment, have shown the necessity for greaterand more skilfully organized land forces. The deficiency of the UnitedStates in this respect would have permitted a prolonged resistance bythe enemy's army in Cuba, --a course which, though sure ultimately tofail, appealed strongly to military punctilio. These lessons are so obvious that it is not supposable that thenational intelligence, which has determined the American demand forthe Philippines, can overlook them; certainly not readers of thecharacter of those to whom this paper is primarily addressed. But whenall this has been admitted and provided for, it still remains thatforce is but the minister, under whose guardianship industry does itswork and enjoys peaceably the fruits of its labor. To the mechanicalindustries of the country, in their multifold forms, our newresponsibilities propound the questions, not merely of naval andmilitary protection, but of material development, which, firstbeneficent to the inhabitants and to the land, gives also, andthereby, those firm foundations of a numerous and contentedpopulation, and of ample local resources, upon which alone militarypower can securely rest. DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES OF SHIPS OF WAR DISTINGUISHING QUALITIES OF SHIPS OF WAR From the descriptions of warships usually published, it wouldnaturally be inferred that the determination of their variousqualities concern primarily the naval architect and the marineengineer. This is an error. Warships exist for war. Their powers, being for the operations of war, are military necessities, theappreciation of which, and the consequent qualities demanded, aremilitary questions. Only when these have been decided, upon militaryreasons, begins the office of the technologist; namely, to produce thequalities prescribed by the sea officer. An eminent British navalarchitect used to say, "I hold that it is the part of the navalofficers to tell us just what qualities--speed, gun-power, armor, coalendurance, etc. --are required in a ship to be built, and then leave itto us to produce the ship. " These words distinguish accurately andsummarily the functions of the military and the technical experts inthe development of navies. It is from the military standpoint, solely, that this article is written. The military function of a navy is to control the sea, so far as thesea contributes to the maintenance of the war. The sea is the theatreof naval war; it is the field in which the naval campaign is waged;and, like other fields of military operations, it does not resemble ablank sheet of paper, every point of which is equally important withevery other point. Like the land, the sea, as a military field, hasits important centres, and it is not controlled by spreading yourforce, whatever its composition, evenly over an entire field ofoperations, like butter over bread, but by occupying the centres withaggregated forces--fleets or armies--ready to act in masses, invarious directions from the centres. This commonplace of warfare isits first principle. It is called concentration, because the forcesare not spread out, but drawn together at the centres which for themoment are most important. Concentrated forces, therefore, are those upon which warfare dependsfor efficient control, and for efficient energy in the operations ofwar. They have two chief essential characteristics: force, which isgained by concentration of numbers; and mobility, which is the abilityto carry the force rapidly, as well as effectively, from the centre toany point of the outlying field where action, offensive or defensive, becomes necessary. It is essential to keep in mind both these factors, and to study them in their true mutual relations of priority, in orderand in importance, --force first, mobility second; for the force doesnot exist for the mobility, but the mobility for the force, which itsubserves. Force without mobility is useful; even though limited, asin coast fortifications; mobility without force is almost useless forthe greater purposes of war. Consequently, when it is found, as isfrequently the case, that one must yield somewhat, in order to thefull development of the other, it is extreme mobility, extreme speed, which must give way to greater force. This caution may seem superfluous, but it is not so; for in thepopular fancy, and in the appreciation of the technical expert, andto some extent also in the official mind as well, --owing to thatpeculiar fad of the day which lays all stress on machinery, --mobility, speed, is considered the most important characteristic in every kindof ship of war. Let the reader ask himself what is the most pronouncedimpression left upon his mind by newspaper accounts of a new ship. Isit not that she is expected to make so many knots? Compared with that, what does the average man know of the fighting she can do, when shehas reached the end of that preposterously misleading performancecalled her trial trip? The error is of the nature of a half-truth, themost dangerous of errors; for it is true that, as compared with landforces, the great characteristic of navies is mobility; but it is nottrue that, between different classes of naval vessels, the swiftestare the most efficient for control of the sea. Force is for that thedetermining element. Keeping these relations of force and mobility constantly in mind, there is a further consideration, easily evident, but which needs tobe distinctly stated and remembered. When a ship is once built, shecannot be divided. If you have on land concentrated ten thousand men, you can detach any fraction of them you wish for a particular purpose;you can send one man or ten, or a company, or a regiment. You can, inshort, make of them any fresh combination you choose. With ships, theleast you can send is one ship, and the smallest you have may be morethan you wish to spare. From this (as well as for other reasons)arises a necessity for ships of different classes and sizes, whichmust be determined beforehand. The determination must be reached notmerely by _a priori_ reasoning, as though the problem were wholly new;but regard must be had to the experience of the past, --to the teachingof history. History is experience, and as such underlies progress, just as the cognate idea, experiment, underlies scientific advance. Both history and reasoning, of the character already outlined in thesepapers, concur in telling us that control of the sea is exercised byvessels individually very large for their day, concentrated intobodies called fleets, stationed at such central points as theemergency demands. Our predecessors of the past two centuries calledthese vessels "ships of the line of battle, " from which probablyderives our briefer modern name "battleship, " which is appropriateonly if the word "battle" be confined to fleet actions. Among the naval entities, fleets are at once the most powerful and theleast mobile; yet they are the only really determining elements innaval war. They are the most powerful, because in them areconcentrated many ships, each of which is extremely strong forfighting. They are the least mobile, because many ships, which mustkeep together, can proceed only at the rate of the slowest among them. It is natural to ask why not build them all equally fast? The replyis, it is possible to do so within very narrow limits, but it is notpossible to keep them so. Every deterioration, accident, or adverseincident, which affects one involves all, as regards speed, though notas regards fighting force. In our recent war, when an extensiveoperation was contemplated, the speed of one battleship reduced thecalculated speed of the fleet by one knot, --one sea mile per hour. But, it may be urged, will not your slowest speed be much increased, if every vessel be originally faster? Doubtless; but speed meanstonnage, --part of the ship's weight devoted to engines; and weight, ifgiven to speed, is taken from other qualities; and if, to increasespeed, you reduce fighting power, you increase something you cannotcertainly hold, at the expense of something at once much moreimportant and more constant--less liable to impairment. In theoperation just cited the loss of speed was comparatively of littleaccount; but the question of fighting force upon arrival was serious. An escape from this dilemma is sought by the advocates of very highspeed for battleships by increasing the size of the individual ship. If this increase of size is accompanied by increase of speed, but notproportionately of fighting power, the measure, in the opinion of thewriter, stands self-condemned. But, granting that force gains equallywith speed, there is a further objection already mentioned. Theexigencies of war demand at times division, as well as concentration;and, in fact, concentration, properly understood, does not meankeeping ships necessarily within sight of one another, but so disposedthat they can unite readily at will, --a consideration which spaceforbids me more than to state. Now, a big ship cannot be divided intotwo; or, more pertinently, eight ships cannot be made into ten whenyou want two bodies of five each. The necessity, or supposednecessity, of maintaining the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads duringthe late hostilities exactly illustrates this idea. Under all theconditions, this disposition was not wholly false to concentration, rightly considered; but had the ships been fewer and bigger, it couldnot have been made. The net result, therefore, of the argument, supported, as the writerbelieves, by the testimony of history, is: (1) that a navy whichwishes to affect decisively the issues of a maritime war must becomposed of heavy ships--"battleships"--possessing a maximum offighting power, and so similar in type as to facilitate thatuniformity of movement and of evolution upon which concentration, onceeffected, must depend for its maintenance, whether during a passage orin actual engagement; (2) that in such ships, regarded as fightingfactors, which is their primary function, size is limited, as to theminimum, by the advisability of concentrating as much fighting poweras possible under the hand of a single captain; but, on the otherhand, size is also limited, as to its maximum, by the need ofretaining ability to subdivide the whole fleet, according toparticular exigencies; (3) as regards that particular form of mobilitycalled speed, the writer regards it as distinctly secondary for thebattleship; that, to say the least, the present proportions of weightassigned to fighting force should not be sacrificed to obtain increaseof speed. Neither should the size of the individual ships be increasedmerely to obtain rates of speed higher than that already shown by someof our present battleships. Concerning that particular function of mobility which is called coalendurance, --that is, the ability to steam a certain distance withoutstopping to recoal, --the convenience to military operations of such aquality is evident; but it is obvious that it cannot, with the fuelsnow available, be possessed beyond very narrow limits. A battleshipthat can steam the greatest distance that separates two fortifiedcoaling stations of her nation, with a reasonable margin above that tomeet emergencies, will evidently be able to remain for a long whilewith the fleet, when this is concentrated to remain under reducedsteam at a particular point. The recoaling of ships is a difficultywhich must be met by improving the methods of that operation, not bysacrificing the military considerations which should control the sizeand other qualities of the vessel. It is the belief of the writer that ten thousand tons represent verynearly the minimum, and twelve thousand the maximum, of size for thebattleship. Our present battleships fall within those limits, and, although less uniform in their qualities than might be desired, theygive perfectly satisfactory indications that the requisite qualitiescan all be had without increase of size. When more is wanted--and weshould always be striving for perfection--it should be sought in theimprovement of processes, and not in the adding of ton to ton, like aman running up a bill. It is the difference between economy andextravagance. Into battleships such as these should go the greaterproportion of the tonnage a nation gives to its navy. Ships sodesigned may reach the ground of action later than those which havemore speed; but when they arrive, the enemy, if of weaker fightingpower, must go, and what then has been the good of their speed? Waris won by holding on, or driving off; not by successful running away. An important consideration in determining the necessary composition ofa navy is the subdivision of fighting power into offensive anddefensive. The latter is represented chiefly by armor, the former byguns; although other factors contribute to both. The relativeimportance of the two depends upon no mere opinion of the writer, butupon a consensus of authority practically unanimous, and which, therefore, demands no argument, but simple statement. Offensiveaction--not defensive--determines the issues of war. "The best defenceagainst the enemy's fire is a rapid fire from our own guns, " was apithy phrase of our Admiral Farragut; and in no mere punning sense itmay be added that it is for this reason that the rapid-fire gun of thepresent day made such big strides in professional favor, the instantit was brought to the test of battle. The rapid-fire gun is smallerthan the great cannon mounted in the turrets; but, while the latterhave their proper usefulness, the immensely larger number ofprojectiles fired in a given time, and valid against the targetpresented to them, makes the rapid-fire battery a much strongerweapon, offensively, than the slow-acting giants. Here is the greatdefect of the monitor, properly so-called; that is, the low-freeboardmonitor. Defensively, the monitor is very strong; offensively, judgedby present-day standards, it is weak, possessing the heavy cannon, butdeficient in rapid fire. Consequently, its usefulness is limitedchiefly to work against fortifications, --a target exceptional inresistance, and rarely a proper object for naval attack. It is theopinion of the writer that no more monitors should be built, except asaccessory to the defence of those harbors where submarine mines cannotbe depended upon, --as at San Francisco and Puget Sound. It should beadded that the monitor at sea rolls twice as rapidly as thebattleship, which injuriously affects accuracy of aim; that is, offensive power. The general principle of the decisive superiority of offensive powerover defensive is applicable throughout, --to the operations of a war, to the design of a battleship, to the scheme of building a whole navy. It is to the erroneous belief in mere defence that we owe much of thefaith in the monitor, and some of the insistence upon armor; while thecry that went up for local naval defence along our coast, when warthreatened in the spring of 1898, showed an ignorance of the firstprinciples of warfare, which, if not resisted, would have left usimpotent even before Spain. Brief mention only can be given to the other classes of vessels neededby the navy. Concerning them, one general remark must be made. Theyare subsidiary to the fighting fleet, and represent rather thatsubdivision of a whole navy which is opposed to the idea ofconcentration, upon which the battleship rests. As already noted, abuilt ship cannot be divided; therefore, battleships must besupplemented by weaker or smaller vessels, to perform numerousdetached and often petty services. From this characteristic of detachment--often singly--importantengagements will rarely be fought by these smaller vessels. Therefore, in them fighting power declines in relative importance, and speed, toperform their missions, increases in proportion. As their essentialuse is not to remain at the centres, but to move about, they arecalled generically cruisers, from the French word _croiser_, --tocross. They cross back and forth, they rove the sea, --despatch boats, lookouts, scouts, or raiders. They are the cavalry of the fleet. Prominent among these in modern navies is the so-called "armored"cruiser, --a type to which belonged the four principal vessels ofCervera's squadron. The name itself is interesting, as indicating theinveterate tendency of mankind to straddle, --the reluctance to chooseone of two opposite things, and frankly to give up the other. Armor, being an element of fighting power, belongs properly to the battleshiprather than the cruiser; and in the latter, if the weight spent inarmor detracts from speed or coal endurance, it contravenes theleading idea of a cruiser, --mobility. But, while the name isincongruous, the type has its place as an armored vessel, though notas a cruiser. In our service at least--where it is represented by the_New York_ and the _Brooklyn_--it is practically a second-classbattleship, in which weight taken from fighting power is given toenginery and to speed. The advantage arising from this is purelytactical; that is, it comes into play only when in touch with theenemy. The armored cruiser belongs with the fleet, therefore hersuperior speed does not tell in making passages; but when fleets arein presence, or in the relative conditions of chase and pursuit, thereis an advantage in being able to throw to the front, rear, or flanks, vessels which on a pinch can either fight or fly. This, be it noted inpassing, is no new thing, but as old as naval history. A squadron offast battleships of the day, thrown to the front of a fleet to harassthe flanks of the enemy, is a commonplace of naval tactics, alike ofgalleys and sailing ships. Off Santiago, the _New York_ and _Brooklyn_were, by Admiral Sampson, placed on the flanks of his squadron. Whichever way Cervera turned he would find a vessel of speed andfighting power equal to those of his own ships. Though unequal infighting power to a first-class battleship, many circumstances mayarise which would justify the armored cruiser in engaging one, provided her own fleet was in supporting distance. From their hybridtype, and from the exceptional circumstances under which they can beused, the tonnage put into these vessels should be but a smallpercentage of that given to the battle fleet, to which, and not to thecruisers, they really belong. Concerning all other cruisers, mobility, represented in speed and coalendurance, is the chief requisite. Notwithstanding occasionalaberrations in the past, the development of the cruiser classes may besafely entrusted by the public to the technical experts; provided itbe left to naval officers, military men, to say what qualities shouldpredominate. Moreover, as such vessels generally act singly, it is ofless importance that they vary much in type, and the need ofsubdivision carries with it that of numerous sizes; but battleships, including armored cruisers, are meant to work together, and insistenceshould be made upon homogeneousness, especially in manoeuvringqualities. To sum up: the attention of the public should be centred upon thearmored fleet, to which the bulk of expenditure should be devoted; themonitor, pure and simple, --save for very exceptional uses, --should beeliminated; the development of the true cruiser, --not armored, --bothin type and in numbers, does not require great interest of thepublic; much of the duties of this class, also, can be dischargedfairly well by purchased vessels, although such will never have theproportion of fighting power which every type of ship of war shouldpossess. As a rule, it is undesirable that a military force, land orsea, should have to retreat before one of equal size, as auxiliarycruisers often would. CURRENT FALLACIES UPON NAVAL SUBJECTS CURRENT FALLACIES UPON NAVAL SUBJECTS All matters connected with the sea tend to have, in a greater or lessdegree, a distinctly specialized character, due to the unfamiliaritywhich the sea, as a scene of _action_, has for the mass of mankind. Nothing is more trite than the remark continually made to navalofficers, that life at sea must give them a great deal of leisure forreading and other forms of personal culture. Without going so far asto say that there is no more leisure in a naval officer's life than insome other pursuits--social engagements, for instance, are largelyeliminated when at sea--there is very much less than persons imagine;and what there is is broken up by numerous petty duties and incidents, of which people living on shore have no conception, because they haveno experience. It is evident that the remark proceeds in most casesfrom the speaker's own consciousness of the unoccupied monotony of anocean passage, in which, unless exceptionally observant, he has noteven detected the many small but essential functions discharged by theofficers of the ship, whom he sees moving about, but the aim of whosemovements he does not understand. The passenger, as regards theeconomy of the vessel, is passive; he fails to comprehend, often evento perceive, the intense functional activity of brain and body whichgoes on around him--the real life of the organism. In the progress of the world, nautical matters of every kind are tomost men what the transactions of a single ship are to the passenger. They receive impressions, which they mistake for opinions--a mostcommon form of error. These impressions are repeated from mouth tomouth, and having the common note of superficial observation, they arefound to possess a certain resemblance. So they serve mutually tofortify one another, and to constitute a _quasi_ public opinion. Therepetition and stereotyping of impressions are greatly forwarded bythe system of organized gossip which we call the press. It is in consequence of this, quite as much as of the extravagancesin a certain far from reputable form of journalism, that the power ofthe press, great as it unquestionably still is, is not what it shouldbe. It intensifies the feeling of its own constituents, who usuallytake the paper because they agree with it; but if candidrepresentation of all sides constitutes a fair attempt to instruct thepublic, no man expects a matter to be fairly put forward. So far doesthis go, in the experience of the present writer, that one of the mostreputable journals in the country, in order to establish a certainextreme position, quoted his opinion in one paragraph, while omittingto give the carefully guarded qualification expressed in the verysucceeding paragraph; whereby was conveyed, by implication, theendorsement of the extreme opinion advocated, which the writercertainly never held. Direct misrepresentation, however, whether by commission or byomission, careless or wilful, is probably less harmful than theindirect injury produced by continual repetition of unintentionalmisconceptions. The former occurs generally in the case of living, present-moment questions; it reaches chiefly those already convinced;and it has its counteraction in the arguments of the other party, which are read by the appropriate constituency. The real work of thosequestions of the day goes on behind the scenes; and the press affectsthem, not because of its intrinsic power, but only in so far as it isthought to represent the trend of thought in a body of voters. Onsubjects of less immediate moment, as military and naval mattersare--except when war looms near, and preparation is too late--men'sbrains, already full enough of pressing cares, refuse to work, andsubmit passively to impressions, as the eye, without conscious action, takes note of and records external incidents. Unfortunately theseimpressions, uncorrected by reflection, exaggerated in narration, andintensified by the repetition of a number of writers, come toconstitute a body of public belief, not strictly rational in its birthor subsequent growth, but as impassive in its resistance to argumentas it was innocent of mental process during its formation. The intention of the present paper is to meet, and as far as possibleto remove, some such current errors of the day on navalmatters--popular misconceptions, continually encountered inconversation and in the newspapers. Accepting the existence of the navy, and the necessity for itscontinuance--for some starting-point must be assumed--the errors to betouched upon are: 1. That the United States needs a navy "for defence only. " 2. That a navy "for defence only" means for the immediate defence ofour seaports and coast-line; an allowance also being made forscattered cruisers to prey upon an enemy's commerce. 3. That if we go beyond this, by acquiring any territory overseas, either by negotiation or conquest, we step at once to the need ofhaving a navy larger than the largest, which is that of Great Britain, now the largest in the world. 4. That the difficulty of doing this, and the expense involved, arethe greater because of the rapid advances in naval improvement, whichit is gravely said make a ship obsolete in a very few years; or, touse a very favorite hyperbole, she becomes obsolete before she can belaunched. The assertion of the rapid obsolescence of ships of warwill be dwelt upon, in the hopes of contravening it. 5. After this paper had been written, the calamity to the UnitedStates ship _Maine_, in the harbor of Havana, elicited, from themourning and consternation of the country, the evident tokens of otherunreasoning apprehensions--springing from imperfect knowledge andvague impressions--which at least should be noticed cursorily, and ifpossible appeased. _First_, the view that the United States should plan its navy--innumbers and in sizes of ships--for defence only, rests upon aconfusion of ideas--a political idea and a military idea--under theone term of "defence. " Politically, it has always been assumed in theUnited States, and very properly, that our policy should never bewantonly aggressive; that we should never seek our own advantage, however evident, by an unjust pressure upon another nation, much lessby open war. This, it will be seen, is a political idea, one whichserves for the guidance of the people and of the statesmen of thecountry in determining--not _how_ war is to be carried on, which is amilitary question, but--under what circumstances war is permissible, or unjust. This is a question of civil policy, pure and simple, and byno means a military question. As a nation, we have always vehementlyavowed that we will, and do, act justly; in practice, like otherstates, and like mankind generally, when we have wanted anything verybadly, we have--at least at times--managed to see that it was justthat we should have it. In the matter of general policy our hands areby no means clean from aggression. General Grant, after retiring frompublic life, maintained that the war with Mexico was an unjust war; astigma which, if true, stains our possession of California and muchother territory. The acquisition of Louisiana was as great an outrageupon the technical rights of Spain as the acquisition of Hawaii wouldbe upon the technical rights of the fast-disappearing aborigines; andthere can be little doubt that, although we did not go to war withSpain to get Florida, we made things so uncomfortable for her that shewas practically forced at last to get out. It does not follownecessarily that any of these actions were wrong, even if we considerthat the so-called _legal_ rights of Mexico and Spain were set asideby the strong hand; for law is simply an invention of mankind tosecure justice, and when justice, the natural rights of the greaternumber, is prevented by the legal, not the natural, rights of a few, the latter may be set aside, as it is at every election, where largeminorities of people are forced to submit to what they considergrievous wrong. The danger incurred by overleaping law to secure whatis right may be freely admitted; but no great responsibility, such asthe use of power always is, can be exercised at all without somedanger of abuse. However, be that as it may, there can be no questionthat in times past we have aggressed upon the legal rights of otherstates; and in the annexation of Louisiana we infringed the letter ofour own Constitution. We broke the law in order to reach an endeminently beneficial to the majority of those concerned. Nevertheless, while thus aggressive on occasion, warring for offence and not fordefence only, it is distinctly a good thing that we hold up the ideal, and persuade ourselves that we cherish it; that we prepare means ofwar only for defence. It is better honestly to profess a highstandard, even if we fall from it at times, than wilfully to adopt alower ideal of conduct. The phrase "War for defence only" conveys, therefore, a politicalidea, and, as such, a proper and noble idea. Unfortunately, in ourcountry, where almost all activities fall under two chiefheads--politics and business--politics, the less sensitively organizedbut more forceful of the two, intrudes everywhere and masterseverything. We dread standing armies. Why? Because standing armies, being organized masses of men, trained to obey capable leaders, mayovercome the resistance of a people which is far greater in numbers, but unorganized. What are our politics now but organized masses ofmen, habituated to obey their leaders, among whom to change their voteis stigmatized as the treason of an Arnold, and between which thepopular will is driven helplessly from side to side, like ashuttlecock between two battledores? Politics cleans our streets, regulates our education, and so on; it is not to be wondered at thatit intrudes into the military sphere, with confidence all the greaterbecause it is there especially ignorant. Let there be nomisunderstanding, however. It is perfectly right that the policy ofthe country should dictate the character and strength of the militaryestablishment; the evil is when policy is controlled by ignorance, summed up in a mistaken but captivating catchword--"for defence only. " Among all masters of military art--including therein naval art--it isa thoroughly accepted principle that mere defensive war means militaryruin, and therefore national disaster. It is vain to maintain amilitary or naval force whose power is not equal to assuming theoffensive soon or late; which cannot, first or last, go out, assailthe enemy, and hurt him in his vital interests. A navy for defenceonly, in the _political_ sense, means a navy that will only be used incase we are forced into war; a navy for defence only, in the_military_ sense, means a navy that can only await attack and defendits own, leaving the enemy at ease as regards his own interests, andat liberty to choose his own time and manner of fighting. It is to be observed also that the most beneficial use of a militaryforce is not to _wage_ war, however successfully, but to _prevent_war, with all its suffering, expense, and complication ofembarrassments. Of course, therefore, a navy for defence only, fromwhich an enemy need fear no harm, is of small account in diplomaticrelations, for it is nearly useless as a deterrent from war. Whateverthere may be in our conditions otherwise to prevent states fromattacking us, a navy "for defence only" will not add to them. For mereharbor defence, fortifications are decisively superior to ships, except where peculiar local conditions are found. All our greatestcities on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts can be locally defended betterby forts than by ships; but if, instead of a navy "for defence only, "there be one so large that the enemy must send a great many shipsacross the Atlantic, if he sends any, then the question whether he canspare so great a number is very serious, considering the ever-criticalcondition of European politics. Suppose, for instance, we could puttwenty battleships in commission for war in thirty days, and that wehad threatening trouble with either Germany, France, Great Britain, orRussia. There is not one of these, except Great Britain, that couldafford to send over here twenty-five battleships, which would be thevery fewest needed, seeing the distance of their operations fromhome; while Great Britain, relying wholly on her navy for theintegrity of her empire, equally cannot afford the hostility of anation having twenty battleships, and with whom her points ofdifference are as inconsequential to her as they are with us. It should be remembered, too, that any war which may arise with thenaval nations of Europe--or with Japan, which will soon rank withthem--will not be with reference to our own territories, but to ourexternal relations. In the Monroe doctrine, as now understood andviewed in the light of the Venezuela incident, with the utterancesthen made by our statesmen of all parties, we have on hand one of thebiggest contracts any modern state has undertaken. Nor may weanticipate from other nations the easy acquiescence of Great Britain. The way the latter sticks by Canada should warn us that we prevailedin Venezuela because the matter to her was not worth war. GreatBritain is gorged with land. Her statesmen are weary of looking afterit, and of the persistence with which one advance compels another. Itis not so with Germany and France. The latter is traditionally ourfriend, however, and her ambitions, even when she held Canada, haveever pointed east rather than west. But how about Germany? It is thefashion here to proclaim the Emperor a fool, for his shibboleth isimperialistic and not republican; but if he be, it is with the follyof the age on the European Continent--the hunger for ships, colonies, and commerce, after which the great Napoleon so hankered, and uponwhich the prosperity of Great Britain has been built. Ships, colonies, commerce, mean to a European nation of to-day justwhat our vast, half-improved, heavily tariffed territory means to us. They mean to those nations room to expand, land wherewith to portionoff the sons and daughters that cannot find living space at home, widespread political and international influence, through bloodaffiliation with prosperous colonies, the power of which, in thesentiment of brotherhood, received such illustration in the Queen'sJubilee--one of the most majestic sights of the ages; for no Romantriumph ever equalled for variety of interest the Jubilee, in whichnot victorious force, but love, the all-powerful, was the tie thatknit the diversities of the great pageant into one coherent, livingwhole. What political power is stable save that which holds men'shearts? And what holds men's hearts like blood-relationship, permittedfree course and given occasional manifestation and exchange? Germancolonies, like unto those of Great Britain--such is the foolishday-dream of the German Emperor, if folly it be; but if he be a fool, he knows at least that reciprocal advantage, reciprocal interests, promote the exchange of kindly offices, by which has been kept alivethe love between Englishmen at home and Englishmen in the colonies. Heknows, also, that such advantages derive from power, from force--notforce exerted necessarily but force possessed--and that force, power, depends not upon fleets and armies only, but upon positions also--warbeing, as Napoleon used to say, "a business of positions"--one ofthose pregnant phrases of the great captain upon which a man maymeditate many hours without exhausting it. A state that aims atmaritime power and at colonial empire, as Germany unquestionably--nay, avowedly--now does, needs not only large and widely dispersedcolonies; she further needs influence upon those routes of commercewhich connect together countries and colonies, and for that she wantspossession of minor points, whose value is rather military thancommercial, but which essentially affect the control of the sea and ofthe communications. Now the secrets of the Emperor and of his more confidential advisersare not all worn upon the sleeve, as might be inferred from theaudacity and apparent imprudence of occasional utterances. It isknown, however, not only from his words, which might be discounted, but from his acts, that he wants a big navy, that he has meddled inSouth Africa, and that he has on a slight pretext, but not, it maywell be believed, in any frivolous spirit, seized Kiao-chou, in China. What all this means to himself can be only a matter of inference. Thepresent writer, after inquiring in quarters likely to be wellinformed, has been able to obtain nothing more positive thandeductions, reasonably made, by men whose business it is to watchcurrent events in Europe; but the idea has long been forming in theminds of political thinkers, looking not only upon the moves of thepolitical chess-board as they superficially appear in each day's news, and are dictated largely by momentary emergencies, but seeking also todetect the purpose and temperament of the players--be they men inpower or national tendencies--that the German Emperor is butcontinuing and expanding a scheme of policy inherited from hispredecessors in the government of the state. Nay, more; it is thoughtthat this policy represents a tendency and a need of the German peopleitself, in the movement towards national unity between its racialconstituents, in which so great an advance has already beenaccomplished in the last thirty years. Elements long estranged, but ofthe same blood, can in no way more surely attain to community ofinterest and of view than by the development of an external policy, ofwhich the benefits and the pride may be common to all. True unityrequires some common object, around which diverse interests may clingand crystallize. Nations, like families, need to look outsidethemselves, if they would escape, on the one hand, narrowself-satisfaction, or, on the other, pitiful internal dissensions. The far-reaching external activities fostered in Great Britain by herinsular position have not only intensified patriotism, but have givenalso a certain nobility of breadth to her statesmanship up to themiddle of this century. Why, then, should not Germany, whose political unity was effected neartwo centuries after that of Great Britain, do wisely in imitating apolicy whereby the older state has become an empire, that stilltravels onward to a further and greater unity, which, if realized, shall embrace in one fold remote quarters of the world? Where is thefolly of the one conception or of the other? The folly, if it provesuch, has as yet no demonstrable existence, save in the imaginationsof a portion of the people of the United States, who, clinging tocertain maxims of a century ago--when they were quite applicable--orviolently opposed to any active interest in matters outside our familyof States, find that those who differ from themselves are, ifAmericans, jingoes, and if foreigners, like the present EmperorWilliam and Mr. Chamberlain, fools. The virtues and the powers of theBritish and German peoples may prove unequal to their ambitions--timealone can show; but it is a noble aim in their rulers to seek toextend their influence, to establish their positions, and to knit themtogether, in such wise that as races they may play a mighty part inthe world's history. The ambition is noble, even if it fail; if itsucceed, our posterity may take a different view of its folly, and ofour own wisdom in this generation. For there are at least two steps, in other directions than those asyet taken, by which the Emperor, when he feels strong enough atsea--he is yet scarcely in middle life--might greatly and suddenlyincrease the maritime empire of Germany, using means which are by nomeans unprecedented, historically, but which would certainly arousevehement wrath in the United States, and subject to a severe test ourmaxim of a navy for defence only. There is a large and growing Germancolony in southern Brazil, and I am credibly informed that there is adistinct effort to divert thither, by means direct and indirect, aconsiderable part of the emigration which now comes to the UnitedStates, and therefore is lost politically to Germany--for she has, ofcourse, no prospect of colonization here. The inference is that theEmperor hopes at a future day, for which he is young enough to wait, to find in southern Brazil a strong German population, which in duetime may seek to detach itself from the Brazilian Republic, as Texasonce detached itself from Mexico; and which may then seek politicalunion with Germany, as Texas sought political union with the UnitedStates, to obtain support against her former owners and masters. Without advancing any particular opinion as to the advisablegeographical limits of the Monroe doctrine, we may be pretty sure thatthe American people would wordily resent an act which in our presswould be called "the aggression of a European military monarchy uponthe political or territorial rights of an American republic. " Thisalso could be accompanied with the liberal denunciation of William II. Which now ornaments our editorial columns; but hard words break nobones, and the practical question would remain, "What are you going todo about it?" with a navy "for defence only. " If you cannot offendGermany, in the military sense of "offend"--that is, if you cannotseek her out and _hurt_ her--how are you going to control her? Incontemplation of the future contingencies of our national policy, letus contrast our own projected naval force with that now recommended tothe German Reichstag by the Budget Committee, despite the manyprophecies that the Emperor could not obtain his desired navy. "TheBudget Committee of the Reichstag to-day adopted, in accordance withthe government proposals, parts of the naval bill, fixing the numberof ships to be held in readiness for service as follows: 1 flagship, 18 battleships, 12 large cruisers, 30 small cruisers, 8 coast-defenceironclads, and 13 gunboats, besides torpedo-boats, schoolships, andsmall gunboats. "[5] That these numbers were fixed with reference tothe United States is indeed improbable; but the United States shouldtake note. A second means of expanding Germany as a colonial power would be toinduce the Dutch--who are the Germans of the lower Rhine and the NorthSea--to seek union with the German Empire, the empire of the Germansof the upper Rhine, of the Elbe, and of the Baltic. This, it may besaid, would be far less difficult in consummation than the scheme lastsuggested; for in Brazil, as in the United States and elsewhere, theGerman emigrant tends to identify himself with the institutions hefinds around him, and shows little disposition to politicalindependence--a fact which emphasizes the necessity of strictly Germancolonies, if the race, outside of Europe, is not to undergo politicalabsorption. The difficulties or the advantages which the annexation ofHolland might involve, as regards the political balance of power inEurope, and the vast Asiatic colonies of the Dutch--Sumatra, Java, NewGuinea, etc. --are a consideration outside the present scope ofAmerican policy; but the transaction would involve one little incidentas to which, unlike southern Brazil, a decided opinion may beexpressed, and that incident would be the transference of the islandof Curaçao, in the West Indies, to Germany. If Curaçao and itspolitical tenure do not fall within the purview of the Monroedoctrine, the Monroe doctrine has no existence; for the island, thoughsmall, has a wellnigh impregnable harbor, and lies close beside theroutes to the Central American Isthmus, which is to us what Egypt andSuez are to England. But what objection can we urge, or what can wedo, with a navy "for defence only, " in the military sense of the word"defence"? The way out of this confusion of thought, the logical method ofreconciling the political principle of non-aggression with a navalpower capable of taking the offensive, if necessary, is to recognize, and to say, that defence means not merely defence of our territory, but defence of our just national interests, whatever they be andwherever they are. For example, the exclusion of direct Europeanpolitical control from the Isthmus of Panama is as really a matter ofnational defence as is the protection of New York Harbor. Take this asthe political meaning of the phrase "a navy for defence only, " andnaval men, I think, must admit that it is no longer inapplicable as amilitary phrase, but expresses adequately the naval needs of thenation. But no military student can consider efficient a force solimited, in quantity or in quality, that it must await attack beforeit can act. Now admitting this view as to the scope of the word "defence, " what isthe best method of defending your interests when you know thatanother intends to attack them? Is it to busy yourself withprecautions here, and precautions there, in every direction, to headhim off when he comes? Or is it to take the simpler means of sopreparing that you have the power to hurt him, and to make him afraidthat, if he moves, he will be the worse hurt of the two? In lifegenerally a man who means mischief is kept in check best by fear ofbeing hurt; if he has no more to dread than failure to do harm, noreason to apprehend receiving harm, he will make his attempt. Butwhile this is probably true of life in general, it is notably true ofwarfare. The state which in war relies simply upon defending itself, instead of upon hurting the enemy, is bound to incur disaster, and forthe very simple reason that the party which proposes to strike a blowhas but one thing to do; whereas he who proposes only to ward offblows has a dozen things, for he cannot know upon which interest, of adozen that he may have, the coming blow may fall. For this reason, again, a "navy for defence only" is a wholly misleading phrase, unlessdefence be construed to include _all_ national interests, and not onlythe national territory; and further, unless it be understood that thebest defence of one's own interests is power to injure those of theenemy. In the summary of points to be dealt with has been included theopinion that offensive action by a navy may be limited to merelypreying upon the enemy's commerce--that being considered not only areal injury, but one great enough to bring him to peace. Concerningthis, it will suffice here to say that national maritime commerce doesnot consist in a number of ships sprinkled, as by a pepper-pot, overthe surface of the ocean. Rightly viewed, it constitutes a greatsystem, with the strength and weakness of such. Its strength is thatpossessed by all organized power, namely, that it can undergo a gooddeal of local injury, such as scattered cruisers may inflict, causinginconvenience and suffering, without receiving vital harm. A strongman cannot be made to quit his work by sticking pins in him, or bybruising his shins or blacking his eyes; he must be hit in a vitalpart, or have a bone broken, to be laid up. The weaknesses ofcommerce--the fatally vulnerable parts of its system--are thecommercial routes over which ships pass. They are the bones, theskeleton, the framework of the organism. Hold them, break them, andcommerce falls with a crash, even though no ship is taken, but alllocked up in safe ports. But to effect this is not the work ofdispersed cruisers picking up ships here and there, as birds pick upcrumbs, but of vessels massed into powerful fleets, holding the sea, or at the least making the highways too dangerous for use. A navy soplanned is for defence indeed, in the true sense that the best defenceis to crush your enemy by depriving him of the use of the sea. We now come to the assertion that if the United States takes to itselfinterests beyond the sea--of which Hawaii is an instance--it not onlyadds to its liabilities, which is true, but incurs an unnecessaryexposure, to guard against which we need no less than the greatestnavy in the world. It might be retorted that, willy-nilly, we already, by generalnational consent, have accepted numerous external interests--embracedunder the Monroe doctrine; and that, as regards Hawaii, many even whoreject annexation admit that our interests will not tolerate any othernation taking those islands. But how shall we enforce even thatlimited amount of interest if any other power--Great Britain, Germany, or Japan--decide to take, and the islanders acquiesce? In such caseswe should even be worse off, militarily, than with annexationcompleted. Let us, however, put aside this argument--of the manyalready existing external interests--and combat this allegation, thatan immense navy would be needed, by recurring to the true militaryconception of defence already developed. The subject will thus tend tounity of treatment, centring round that word "defence. " Effectivedefence does not consist primarily in power to protect, but in powerto injure. A man's defence against a snake, if cornered--if he musthave to do with it--is not to protect himself, but to kill the snake. If a snake got into the room, as often happens in India, the positionshould not be estimated by ability to get out of the room one's self, but by power to get rid of the snake. In fact, a very interestingillustration of the true theory of defence is found in a casual remarkin a natural history about snakes--that comparatively few aredangerous to man, but that the whole family is protected by the fearthose few inspire. If attacked by a dog, safety is not sought chieflyin the means of warding him off, but by showing him the meanspossessed of hurting him, as by picking up a stone; and with a man, where an appeal lies to the intelligence, the argument from power toinjure is peculiarly strong. If a burglar, thinking to enter a room, knows that he may--or will--kill the occupant, but that the latter maybreak his leg, he will not enter. The game would not be worth thecandle. Apply this thought now to the United States and its naval needs. AsGreat Britain is by very far the greatest naval power, let us take herto be the supposed enemy. If we possessed the Hawaiian Islands, andwar unhappily broke out with Great Britain, she could now, if shedesired, take them without trouble, so far as our navy is concerned;so could France; so possibly, five years hence, could Japan. That is, under our present conditions of naval weakness, either France or GreatBritain could spare ships enough to overcome our force, withoutfatally crippling her European fleet; whereas, were our navy half thesize of the British, she could not afford to send half her fleet sofar away from home; nor, if we had half ours in the Pacific and halfin the Atlantic, could she afford to send one-third or one-fourth ofher entire navy so far from her greater interests, independent of thefact that, even if victorious, it would be very badly used before ourforce was defeated. Hawaii is not worth that to Great Britain; whereasit is of so much consequence to us that, even if lost, it wouldprobably be returned at a peace, as Martinique and Guadeloupeinvariably have been to France. Great Britain would not find its valueequivalent to our resentment at her holding it. Now the argument as tothe British fleet is still stronger as to France, for she is asdistant as Great Britain and has a smaller navy. The argument isdifferent as regards Japan, for she is nearer by far than they, onlyhalf as far again as we, and that power has recently given us anintimation which, if we disregard, we do so in face of the facts. Herremonstrance about the annexation of Hawaii, however far it went, gaveus fair warning that a great naval state was about to come into beingin the Pacific, prepared to watch, and perhaps to contest, our actionin what we thought our interests demanded. From that instant the navyof Japan becomes a standard, showing, whether we annex the islands ornot, a minimum beneath which our Pacific fleet cannot be allowed tofall, without becoming a "navy for defence only, " in the very worstsense. This brief train of reasoning will suggest why it is not necessary tohave a navy equal to the greatest, in order to insure that sense offear which deters a rival from war, or handicaps his action in war. The biggest navy that ever existed cannot all be sent on one mission, in any probable state of the political world. A much smaller force, favorably placed, produces an effect far beyond its proportionatenumbers; for, to quote again Napoleon's phrase, "War is a business ofpositions. " This idea is by no means new, even to unprofessional men;on the contrary, it is so old that it is deplorable to see suchfatuous arguments as the necessity of equalling Great Britain's navyadduced against any scheme of external policy. The annexation ofHawaii, to recur to that, may be bad policy for many reasons, of whichI am no good judge; but, as a naval student, I hesitate not to saythat, while annexation _may_ entail a bigger navy than is demandedfor the mere exclusion of other states from the islands--though Ipersonally do not think so--it is absurd to say that we should need anavy equal to that of Great Britain. In 1794 Gouverneur Morris wrotethat if the United States had twenty ships of the line in commission, no other state would provoke her enmity. At that time Great Britain'snavy was relatively more powerful than it is now, while she and Francewere rivalling each other in testing the capacity of our country tostand kicking; but Morris's estimate was perfectly correct, and showshow readily a sagacious layman can understand a military question, ifonly he will put his mind to it, and not merely echo the press. GreatBritain then could not--and much more France could not--afford to havetwenty ships of the line operating against her interests on the otherside of the Atlantic. They could not afford it in actual war; theycould not afford it even in peace, because not only might war arise atany time, but it would be much more likely to happen if either partyprovoked the United States to hostility. The mere menace of such aforce, its mere existence, would have insured decent treatmentwithout war; and Morris, who was an able financier, conjectured thatto support a navy of such size for twenty years would cost the publictreasury less than five years of war would, --not to mention theprivate losses of individuals in war. All policy that involves external action is sought to be discreditedby this assertion, that it entails the expense of a navy equal to thegreatest now existing on the sea, no heed being given to the fact thatwe already have assumed such external responsibilities, if any weightis to be attached to the evident existence of a strong popular feelingin favor of the Monroe doctrine, or to Presidential or Congressionalutterances in the Venezuela business, or in that of Hawaii. Theassertion is as old as the century; as is also the complementaryignorance of the real influence of an inferior military or naval forcein contemporary policy, when such force either is favored by position, or can incline decisively, to one side or the other, the scales in adoubtful balance. To such misapprehensions we owed, in the early partof this century, the impressment of hundreds of American seamen, andthe despotic control of our commerce by foreign governments; to this, the blockading of our coasts, the harrying of the shores of ChesapeakeBay, the burning of Washington, and a host of less rememberedattendant evils. All these things might have been prevented by thetimely maintenance of a navy of tolerable strength, deterring thewarring powers from wanton outrage. In the present day the argument that none but the greatest navy is ofany avail, and that such is too expensive for us to contemplate--as itprobably is--is re-enforced by the common statement that the shipbuilt to-day becomes obsolete in an extremely short time, the periodstated being generally a rhetorical figure rather than an exactestimate. The word "obsolete" itself is used here vaguely. Strictly, it means no more than "gone out of use;" but it is understood, correctly, I think, to mean "become useless. " A lady's bonnet maybecome obsolete, being gone out of use because no longer in fashion, though it may still be an adequate head-covering; but an obsolete shipof war can only be one that is put out of use because it is useless. Aship momentarily out of use, because not needed, is no more obsoletethan a hat hung up when the owner comes in. When a ship is calledobsolete, therefore, it is meant that she is out of use for the samereason that many old English words are--because they are no longergood for their purpose; their meaning being lost to mankind ingeneral, they no longer serve for the exchange of thought. In this sense the obsolescence of modern ships of war is just one ofthose half-truths which, as Tennyson has it, are ever the worst oflies; it is harder to meet and fight outright than an unqualifieduntruth. It is true that improvement is continually going on in thevarious parts of the complex mechanism which constitutes a modern shipof war; although it is also true that many changes are made which arenot improvements, and that reversion to an earlier type, theabandonment of a once fancied improvement, is no unprecedentedincident in recent naval architecture and naval ordnance. Therevulsion from the monitor, the turreted ship pure and simple, to thebroadside battery analogous to that carried by the old ships ofFarragut and Nelson, is one of the most singular and interestingchanges in men's thoughts that the writer has met, either in hisexperience or in his professional reading. The day can be recalledwhen the broadside battleship was considered as dead asCock-Robin--her knell was rung, and herself buried without honors;yet, not only has she revived, but I imagine that I should have a veryrespectable following among naval officers now in believing, as I do, that the broadside guns, and not those in the turrets, are the primarybattery of the ship--primary, I mean, in fighting value. Whatever theworth of this opinion, --which is immaterial to the presentcontention, --a change so radical as from broadside battery to turretedships, and from the latter back to broadside, though without entirelygiving up turrets, should cause some reasonable hesitancy in imputingobsoleteness to any armored steamship. The present battleshipreproduces, in essential principles, the ships that preceded theepoch-making monitor--the pivot guns of the earlier vessels beingrepresented by the present turrets, and their broadsides by thepresent broadside. The prevalence of the monitor type was aninterlude, powerfully affecting the development of navies, but makingnothing obsolete. It did not effect a revolution, but amodification--much as homoeopathy did in the "regular practice. " There is, of course, a line on one side of which the term "obsolete"applies, but it may be said that no ship is obsolete for whichfighting-work can be found, with a tolerable chance--a fightingchance--of her being successful; because, though unequal to this orthat position of exposure, she, by occupying an inferior one, releasesa better ship. And here again we must guard ourselves from thinkingthat inferior force--inferior in number or inferior in quality--has_no_ chance against a superior. The idea is simply another phase of "anavy equal to the greatest, " another military heresy. A ship under theguns of one thrice her force, from which her speed cannot carry her, is doubtless a lost ship. She may be called even obsolete, though shebe the last product of naval science, just from a dock-yard. Beforesuch extreme conditions are reached, however, by a ship or a fleet, many other factors than merely relative force come into play;primarily, man, with all that his personality implies--skill, courage, discipline, --after that, chance, opportunity, accidents oftime, accidents of place, accidents of ground, --the wholeunforeseeable chapter of incidents which go to form military history. A military situation is made up of many factors, and before a ship canbe called obsolete, useless to the great general result, it must bedetermined that she can contribute no more than zero to either side ofthe equation--or of the inequality. From the time she left the handsof the designers, a unit of maximum value, throughout the period ofher gradual declension, many years will elapse during which a shiponce first-rate will be an object of consideration to friend and foe. She will wear out like a garment, but she does not necessarily becomeobsolete till worn out. It may be added that the indications now arethat radical changes of design are not to be expected shortly, andthat we have reached a type likely to endure. A ship built five yearshence may have various advantages of detail over one now about to belaunched, but the chances are they will not be of a kind that reversethe odds of battle. This, of course, is only a forecast, not anassertion; a man who has witnessed the coming and going of the monitortype will forbear prophecy. Now, as always, the best ships in the greatest number, as on shore thebest troops in the greatest masses, will be carried as speedily aspossible, and maintained as efficiently as possible, on the front ofoperations. But in various directions and at various points behindthat front there are other interests to be subserved, by vessels ofinferior class, as garrisons may be made up wholly or in part oftroops no longer well fitted for the field. But should disaster occur, or the foe prove unexpectedly strong, the first line of reserved shipswill move forward to fill the gaps, analogous in this to the variouscorps of reserved troops who have passed their first youth, with whichthe Continental organizations of military service have made usfamiliar. This possibility has been recognized so well by modern navalmen that some even have looked for decisive results, not at the handsof the first and most powerful ships, but from the readiness andnumber of those which have passed into the reserve, and will come intoplay after the first shock of war. That a reserve force should decidea doubtful battle or campaign is a frequent military experience--aninstance of superior staying power. There is no reason, therefore, to worry about a ship becomingobsolete, any more than there is over the fact that the best suit ofto-day may be that for the office next year, and may finally descendto a dependent, or be cut down for a child. Whatever money a nation iswilling to spend on maintaining its first line of ships, it is notweaker, but stronger, when one of these drops into the reserve and isreplaced by a newer ship. The great anxiety, in truth, is not lest theships should not continue valid, but lest there be not trained menenough to man both the first line and the reserve. Here the present article, as at first contemplated, would have closed;but the recent disaster to the _Maine_ has produced its own crop ofsudden and magnified apprehensions. These, to the professional mind, are necessarily a matter of concern, but chiefly because they haveshowed the seeds of a popular distrust before sown in men's minds. Asevinced, however, they too are fallacies born of imperfect knowledge. The magnitude of the calamity was indisputable; but the calmself-possession of the nation and of the better portion of the press, face to face with the possible international troubles that mightensue, contrasted singularly with the unreasoned imaginations thatimmediately found voice concerning the nature and dangers ofbattleships. The political self-possession and dignity reposed uponknowledge--not, indeed, of the eventual effect upon our internationalrelations--but knowledge, bred of long acquaintance with publicaffairs, that, before further action, there must be investigation; andthat after investigation, action, if it must follow, would be takenwith due deliberation. So men were content to wait for justice topursue its even course. But the fact that such an appalling catastrophe had befallen onebattleship fell upon the minds imperfectly informed in naval matters, and already possessed by various exaggerated impressions, looselypicked up from time to time. Men knew not what to think, and sothought the worst--as we are all apt to do when in the dark. It ispossible that naval officers, being accustomed to live over amagazine, and ordinarily to eat their meals within a dozen yards ofthe powder, may have a too great, though inevitable, familiarity withthe conditions. There is, however, no contempt for them among us; andthe precautions taken are so well known, the remoteness of danger sowell understood, that it is difficult to comprehend the panic terrorthat found utterance in the remarks of some men, presumably wellinformed on general matters. It is evidently a very long and quiteillogical step to infer that, because the results of an accident maybe dreadful, therefore the danger of the accident occurring at all isvery great. On land, a slight derangement of a rail, a slight obstacleon a track, the breaking of a wheel or of an axle, may plunge arailroad train to frightful disaster; but we know from annualexperience that while such accidents do happen, and sometimes withappalling consequences, the chance of their happening in a particularcase is so remote that we disregard it. At sea, every day of everyyear for centuries back, a couple of hundred warships--to speakmoderately--have been traversing the ocean or lying in port, like the_Maine_, with abundance of powder on board; and for the last quarterof a century very many of these have been, and now are, essentially ofthe type of that unfortunate vessel. The accident that befell her, ifits origin be precisely determined, may possibly impose some furtherprecaution not hitherto taken; but whatever the cause may prove tohave been, it is clear that the danger of such an event happening isat no time great, because it is almost, if not quite, unprecedentedamong the great number of warships now continuously in service. Similarly, on the seas, the disasters to the _Ville du Havre_, to the_Oregon_, and, only three years ago, to the _Elbe_, show the terrificresults of collision, to which every ship crossing the ocean isliable. Collisions between vessels less known than those named are ofweekly occurrence. Yet no general outcry is raised against the generalsafety of the transatlantic liners. People unconsciously realize that, where accidents are so infrequent, the risk to themselves in theindividual case is slight, though the results, when they happen, aredreadful. Men know instinctively that the precautions taken must bepractically adequate, or safety would not be the almost universal rulewhich it is. It should be remembered, too, that the present battleship is not asudden invention, springing up in a night, like Jonah's gourd, ornewly contrived by a council sitting for the purpose, like a brand-newConstitution of the French Revolution. The battleship of to-day is theoutcome of a gradual evolution extending over forty years. Itsdevelopment has been governed by experience, showing defects orsuggesting improvements; and the entire process has been superintendedby men of the highest practical and scientific intelligence, navalarchitects and seamen, constantly exchanging ideas, not only withtheir own countrymen, but, through the scientific publications of theday, with the whole world. What Ruskin said of the old ship of theline is still more true of the modern battleship: no higher exhibitionof man's creative faculties is probably anywhere to be found. In view, therefore, of its genesis, and of the practical results of yearlycruisings, the battleship in its service of peace is entitled to theconfidence we give to the work of competent men in all departments;nor should that confidence be withdrawn because of a singleoccurrence, if the _Maine_ prove to have fallen victim to internalaccident. If, on the other hand, her destruction proceeded from anexternal cause, --that is, if she fell as ships fall in war, --it maysafely be said that, in actions between ships, no means of injury nowin use on shipboard could effect the instantaneous and widespreaddestruction manifested in her case, unless by a shell finding its wayto her magazine. This is a remote possibility, though it exists; butwhen it comes to fighting, men must remember that it is not possibleto make war without running risks, and that it is highly improbablethat one-tenth as many seamen will die from the explosion of their ownmagazines, so occasioned, as from the direct blow of the enemy'sprojectiles. NOTE. --Since this article was written, in January, 1898, it has become known that the attitude of Japan towards the United States, regarded as a power of the Pacific, has been reversed, and that--as already remarked in the preface to this volume--her leading statesmen, instead of resenting the annexation of Hawaii, now welcome cordially the advance of the United States to the Philippines. This change, occurring as it has within four years, affords a striking indication of the degree to which the attention of mankind has been aroused by the character of Russia's progress in northeastern Asia, and upon the Pacific, as well as of the influence thereby exerted upon the currents of men's thoughts, and upon international relations. FOOTNOTES: [5] From a telegram from Berlin of March 2, 1898. [Illustration] _Uniform with "Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles. "_ THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN SEA POWER, Present and Future. By CAPT. A. T. MAHAN. With two maps showing strategic points. Crown 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $2. 00. CONTENTS I. The United States Looking Outward. II. Hawaii and our Sea Power. III. The Isthmus and our Sea Power. IV. Anglo-American Alliance. V. The Future in Relation to American Naval Power. VI. Preparedness for Naval War. VII. A Twentieth Century Outlook. VIII. Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. All the civilized world knows Captain Mahan is an expert on navalmatters. His present position on the Board of Strategy, directing theAmerican fleets, has made him even more conspicuous than usual. Thesepapers, in the light of the present war, prove Captain Mahan a mostsane and sure prophet. It seems hard to imagine any topics morefascinating at the present time. No romance, no novel, could possiblyequal such essays as these, by such an author, in present publicinterest. So many of his theories have come to reality as to bepositively remarkable. --_The Criterion. _ The last paper, "Strategic Features of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulfof Mexico, " written only last year, deals with problems that nowconfront the people of the United States in the shape of practicalquestions that will have to be decided for the present and the future. It is well within the bounds of truth to say that an intelligentcomprehension of these questions is not possible without a reading ofthe present volume. --_Philadelphia Inquirer. _ His paper on Hawaii is timely at this moment, as it treats of theannexation of the Sandwich Islands from the point of view which ourstatesmen might well take, rather than from the professional viewwhich a naval officer might be expected to hold. --_PhiladelphiaTelegraph. _ The substance of all these essays concerns every intelligent voter inthis country. --_Boston Herald. _ LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers254 Washington Street, Boston. THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783. By CAPT. A. T. MAHAN. With 25 charts illustrative of great navalbattles. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $4. 00. Captain Mahan has been recognized by all competent judges, not merelyas the most distinguished living writer on naval strategy, but as theoriginator and first exponent of what may be called the philosophy ofnaval history. --_London Times. _ No book of recent publication has been received with such enthusiasmof grateful admiration as that written by an officer of the AmericanNavy, Captain Mahan, upon Sea Power and Naval Achievements. It simplysupplants all other books on the subject, and takes its place in ourlibraries as the standard work. --DEAN HOLE, in "_More Memories_. " An altogether exceptional work; there is nothing like it in the wholerange of naval literature. .. . The work is entirely original inconception, masterful in construction, and scholarly inexecution. --_The Critic. _ Captain Mahan, whose name is famous all the world over as that of theauthor of "The Influence of Sea Power upon History, " a work, or rathera series of works, which may fairly be said to have codified the lawsof naval strategy. --_The Westminster Gazette. _ An instructive work of the highest value and interest to students andto the reading public, and should find its way into all the librariesand homes of the land. --_Magazine of American History. _ A book that must be read. _First_, it must be read by allschoolmasters, from the head-master of Eton to the head of thehumblest board-school in the country. No man is fit to train Englishboys to fulfil their duties as Englishmen who has not marked, learned, and inwardly digested it. _Secondly_, it must be read by everyEnglishman and Englishwoman who wishes to be worthy of that name. Itis no hard or irksome task to which I call them. The writing isthroughout clear, vigorous, and incisive. .. . The book deserves andmust attain a world-wide reputation. --COLONEL MAURICE, _of the BritishArmy, in the "United Service Magazine_. " LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers254 Washington Street, Boston THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER upon the French Revolution and Empire. By CAPT. A. T. MAHAN. With 13 maps and battle plans, 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $6. 00. A highly interesting and an important work, having lessons andsuggestions which are calculated to be of high value to the people ofthe United States. His pages abound with spirited and careful accountsof the great naval battles and manoeuvres which occurred during theperiod treated. --_New York Tribune. _ Captain Mahan has done more than to write a new book upon navalhistory. He has even done more than to write the best book that hasever been written upon naval history, though he has done thislikewise; for he has written a book which may be regarded as foundinga new school of naval historical writing. Captain Mahan's volumes arealready accepted as the standard authorities of their kind, not onlyhere, but in England and in Europe generally. It should be a matter ofpride to all Americans that an officer of our own navy should havewritten such books. --THEODORE ROOSEVELT, in "_Political ScienceQuarterly_. " THE LIFE OF NELSON: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. By CAPT. A. T. MAHAN. With 19 portraits and plates in photogravure and21 maps and battle plans. 2 vols. 8vo. Cloth, gilt top. $8. 00. Captain Mahan's work will become one of the greatest navalclassics. --_London Times. _ The greatest literary achievement of the author of "The Influence ofSea Power upon History. " Never before have charm of style, perfectprofessional knowledge, the insight and balanced judgment of a greathistorian, and deep admiration for the hero been blended in anybiography of Nelson. --_London Standard. _ LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers254 Washington Street, Boston CAPTAIN MAHAN'S LIFE OF NELSON NEW POPULAR EDITIONCOMPLETE IN ONE VOLUME THE LIFE OF NELSON. The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain. By CAPT. A. T. MAHAN. With 12 portraits and plates in half-tone and aphotogravure frontispiece. Crown 8vo. Cloth. 750 pages, $3. 00. It is not astonishing that this standard life is already passing intoa new edition. It has simply displaced all its predecessors exceptone, that of Southey, which is the vade-mecum of British patriotism, astimulant of British loyalty, literature of high quality, but in nosense a serious historical or psychological study. .. . The reader willfind in this book three things; an unbroken series of verifiedhistorical facts related in minute detail; a complete picture of thehero, with every virtue justly estimated but with no palliation ofweakness or fault; and lastly a triumphant vindication of a thesesnovel and startling to most, that the earth's barriers arecontinental, its easy ad defensible highways those of the tracklessocean. .. . Captain Mahan has revealed the modern world toitself. --_American Historical Review, July, 1899. _ Captain Mahan's masterly life of Nelson has already taken its place asthe final book on the subject. --_Mail and Express_, New York. One never tires of reading or reflecting upon the marvellous career ofHoratio Nelson, the greatest sea captain the world has known. CaptainMahan has written the best biography of Lord Nelson that has yet beengiven to the world. --_Chicago Evening Post. _ His biography is not merely the best life of Nelson that has ever beenwritten, but it is also perfect, and a model among all the biographiesof the world. --_Pall Mall Gazette. _ LITTLE, BROWN, & COMPANY, Publishers254, Washington Street, Boston * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | Typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | Page 31: Reconnoissance replaced with Reconnaissance | | Page 297: transferrence replaced with transference | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ * * * * *