LESSONS OF THE WAR

Being Comments from Week to Week to the Relief of Ladysmith

by

SPENSER WILKINSON

WestminsterArchibald Constable & CompanyPhiladelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 

1900

PREFACE

The history of a war cannot be properly written until long after itsclose, for such a work must be based upon a close study of the militarycorrespondence of the generals and upon the best records, to be had ofthe doings of both sides. Nor can the tactical lessons of a war be fullyset forth until detailed and authoritative accounts of the battles areaccessible. 

But for the nation the lessons of this war are not obscure, at any ratenot to those whose occupations have led them to indulge in any closestudy of war. 

Since the middle of December I have written a daily introduction to thetelegrams for one of the morning papers. Before I contemplated that workI had undertaken for my friend Mr. Locker, the Editor of _The LondonLetter_, to write a weekly review of the war. 

Many requests have been made to me by publishers for a volume on thehistory of the war, with which, for the reasons given above, it isimpossible at present to comply; but to the proposal of my old friends, Messrs. Archibald Constable and Co. , to reprint my weekly reviews from_The London Letter_, the same objections do not hold. 

In revising the articles, I have found but few alterations necessary. My views have not changed, and to make the details of the battlesaccurate would hardly be practicable without more information than islikely to be at hand until after the return of the troops. 

S. W. 

March 9th, 1900

CONTENTS

THE EVE OF WAR

THE MILITARY ISSUES

A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN

PLAYING WITH FIRE

HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY

TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?

BULLER'S PROBLEM

FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS

THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS

THE NATION'S PROBLEM

MORE AWAKENING

THE NATION'S BUSINESS

WANTED, THE MAN

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

THE DECISIVE BATTLE

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS

THE ELEVENTH HOUR

TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN

A COMMANDER

CRONJE'S SEDAN

THE BOER DEFEATS

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER

THE EVE OF WAR

The next six weeks will be an anxious time for the British Empire. Thewar which begins as I write between three and four on Wednesdayafternoon, October 11th, 1899, is a conflict for supremacy in SouthAfrica between the Boer States, their aiders and abettors, and theBritish Empire. In point of resources the British Empire is soincomparably stronger than the Boer States that there ought to be nopossibility of doubt about the issue. But the Boer States with all theirresources are actually in the theatre of war, which is, separated by thewide oceans from all the sources of British power, from Great Britain, from India, from the Australian and Canadian colonies. Thereinforcements ordered on September 8th have not yet all arrived, though the last transports are due to arrive during the next four orfive days. After that no further reinforcements can be expected for amonth, so that during the next few weeks the whole strength of theBoers, so far as it is available at all, can be employed against a merefragment of the British power. To the gravity of this situation it wouldbe folly to shut our eyes. It contains the possibility of disaster, though what the consequences of disaster now would involve must for thepresent be left unsaid. Yet it may be well to say one word on the originof the unpleasant situation which exists, in order to prevent needlessmisgivings in case the first news should not be as favourable as we allhope. There is no sign of any mistake or neglect in the militarydepartment of the Army. The quantity and character of the force requiredto bring the war to a successful issue has been most carefully estimatedin advance; every preparation which forethought can suggest has beenthought out, so that the moment the word was given by the supremeauthority, the Cabinet, the mobilisation and despatch of the forcescould begin and proceed without a hitch. The Army was never in bettercondition either as regards the zeal and skill of its officers from thehighest to the lowest, the training and discipline of the men, or theorganisation of all branches of the service. Nor is the presentcondition of the Army good merely by comparison with what it was twentyyears ago. A very high standard has been attained, and those who havewatched the Army continuously for many years feel confident that allranks and all arms will do their duty. The present situation, in whichthe Boers start favourably handicapped for five weeks certain, is theforeseen consequence of the decision of the Cabinet to postpone themeasures necessary for the defence of the British colonies and forattack upon the Boer States. This decision is not attributable toimperfect information. It was regarded as certain so long ago asDecember last, by those in a position to give the best forecast, thatthe Boers of both States meant war with the object of establishing Boersupremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly and deliberately takenupon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are now run. In thisdeliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for hoping thatthe risks are not so great as they seem. 

The two Boer Republics are well supplied with money, arms, andammunition, and I believe have collected large stores of supplies. Theirarmies consist of their burghers, with a small nucleus of professionalartillery, officers, and men. The total number of burghers of bothStates is about fifty thousand, and that number is swollen by theaddition of non-British Uitlanders who have been induced to take arms bythe offer of burghership. The two States are bound by treaty to stand orfall together, and the treaty gives the Commander-in-Chief of botharmies to the Transvaal Commander-in-Chief, who is however, bound toconsult his subordinate colleague of the Orange Free State. The whole ofthe fifty thousand burghers cannot take the field. Some must remain towatch the native population, which far outnumbers the burghers and isnot well affected. Some must be kept to watch the Basutos, who areanxious to raid the Free State, and there will be deductions for sickand absentees as well as for the necessary duties of civiladministration. The forts of Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Bloemfonteinrequire permanent garrisons. In the absence of the accurate dataobtainable in the case of an army regularly organised into tactical andadministrative units, the most various estimates are current of theforce that the two States can put into the field as a mobile armyavailable for attack as well as for defence. I think thirty-fivethousand men a safer estimate than twenty-five thousand. The Boers arefighting for their political existence, which to their minds isidentical with their monopoly of political rights, and therefore theirStates will and must exert themselves to the uttermost. This view isconfirmed by the action of the British military authorities, whoestimate the British force necessary to disarm the Boer States at overseventy thousand men, a number which would seem disproportionate to aBoer field force of only twenty-five thousand. The British forces now inSouth Africa are in two separate groups. In Natal Sir George White hassome ten thousand regular troops and two thousand volunteers, theregulars being eight or nine infantry battalions, four regiments ofcavalry, six field batteries, and a mounted battery. He appears to haveno horse artillery. In the Cape Colony there are seven Britishbattalions and, either landed or on passage, three field batteries. Apart of this force is scattered in small garrisons of half a battalioneach at points on the railways leading to the Free State--Burghersdrop, Naauwpoort, and Kimberley. At Mafeking Colonel Baden-Powell has raised alocal force and has fortified the place as well as its resourcespermit. A force of Rhodesian volunteers is moving from Buluwayo towardsTuli, on the northern border of the Transvaal. There are volunteer corpsin the Cape Colony with a total of some seven thousand men, but it isnot clear whether the Schreiner Ministry, whose sympathies with theBoers are undisguised, has not prevented the effective arming of thesecorps. 

The reports of the distribution of the Boer forces on the frontiers mustbe taken with caution. Apparently there are preparations for the attackof Mafeking and of Kimberley, and it is open for the Boers to bringagainst either or both of these places forces largely outnumbering theirdefenders. Both places are prepared for defence against ordinary fieldforces. The actions at these places cannot very greatly affect thegeneral result. Their nearness to the frontier makes it likely that thefirst engagements will take place on this border. On the other side ofthe theatre of war the Boers may be expected to invade Natal and toattack Sir George White, whose forces a few days ago were dividedbetween positions near Ladysmith and Glencoe, places nearly thirty-fivemiles apart. The bulk of the Boer forces are deployed on two sides ofthe angle formed by the Natal border, where it meets the frontiers ofthe Transvaal and of the Free State. From the Free State borderLadysmith is about twenty-five miles distant in a straight line, andfrom the Transvaal border near Vryheid to Ladysmith is about twice thatdistance. If the Boers move on Thursday morning they would be ableeasily to collect their whole force at Ladysmith on Sunday morning, supposing the country contained no British troops. By Sunday, therefore, the Boer commander, if he knows his business, ought to be able to attackSir George White with a force outnumbering the British by something liketwo to one. 

If I were a Cabinet Minister I should not sleep for the next few days, but as an irresponsible citizen I trust that the Boers will be shockedto find how much better the British soldier shoots in 1899 than he didin 1881. 

THE MILITARY ISSUES

_October 18th_, 1899

When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousandBritish troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for sixweeks the British forces in the theatre of war could not besubstantially increased. As they were of opinion that no settlement ofthe dispute satisfactory to England could possibly be satisfactory tothemselves they had resolved upon fighting. If we assume, as we arebound to do, that they had really faced the situation and thought itout, they must have had in their minds some course of action by which ifthey should begin the war on October 11th they would be likely to gaintheir end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the Transvaal. Theycould hardly expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate peace, butthey might hope to make the occupation of their country so difficultthat Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment ofsuccess. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more thanto gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might crippleGreat Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Powermight interfere. 

If before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers coulddestroy a considerable fraction of the British forces now in SouthAfrica, their chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatlyimproved. These forces were in two groups. There was the small army ofSir George White in Natal, something more than fifteen thousand men, andthere were the detached parties holding points on the colonial railwaysystem, Naauwport, De Aar, Orange River, Kimberley and Mafeking. Thesedetachments, however, are largely made up of local levies, and the totalnumber of British troops among them can hardly amount to threethousand. The whole set might be captured or otherwise swept from theboard without any material improvement in the Boer position. Sir RedversBuller is not tied to the line of railway which most of the detachmentsguard, and the disappearance both of the railway and of its protectorswould be merely a temporary inconvenience to the British. But if duringthe six weeks' respite it were possible to destroy Sir George White'sforce the position would be very substantially changed. The confidenceof the Boers would be so increased as to add greatly to their fightingpower, the difficulties of Sir Redvers Buller would be multiplied, theprobability of outside intervention might be brought nearer, and theArmy of invasion to be eventually resisted would be weaker by somethinglike a quarter. For these reasons I think Sir George White's force thecentre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it theircase is hopeless; if they can crush it they may have hopes of ultimatesuccess. That was the bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago, and it still holds good. The week's news does not enable us to judgewhether the Boers have grasped it. You can never be too strong at thedecisive point, and a first-rate general never lets a single man go awayfrom his main force except for a necessary object important enough to beworth the risk of a great failure. The capture of Mafeking, ofKimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, would not compensate the Boersfor failure in Natal. Neither Colonel Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewichwould be likely to make a serious inroad into Boer territory. I shouldtherefore have expected the Boers merely to watch these places withparties hardly larger than patrols and to have thrown all their energyinto a determined attack on Sir George White. But they seem to have sentconsiderable bodies, in each case several thousand men, against bothMafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have asuperabundance of force at their disposal or that they have failed togrip the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and theirtroops upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to bethe true interpretation. 

If the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisiveblow, its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as youcan, for in war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easyto judge whether the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission. When the ultimatum expired his forces were spread along the border lineof the Free State and the Transvaal, so that a forward movement wouldconcentrate them in the northern triangle of Natal. The advance has notbeen resisted, and at the end of a week the Transvaal wing of thecombined army has reached a point a few miles north of Glencoe, whilethe bulk of the Free State wing is still behind the passes. The movementhas not been rapid, but as the ground is difficult--marches through amountainous country and in bad weather always take incomparably longerthan is expected--the delay may be due not to lack of energy but to theinevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time throws no lighton the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels rapidity in thedecisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying with theArmy, the country, and the weather. 

Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until SirRedvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent theBoers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could begained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of theBoer party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly SirGeorge White may be expected to take the first opportunity of showingthe Boers that his men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagementsuch as might commit a fraction of his force against the Boer main body. The detachment which was a few days ago near Glencoe may be expected, asthe Boer advance continues, to act as a rear guard, of which thebusiness is to delay the enemy without running too great a risk of beingitself cut off, or as an advance guard, which is to be reinforced sosoon as the general drift of the Boer movements has been made out. Thenext few days can hardly pass without an engagement in this quarter ofNatal, and the first serious engagement will throw a flood of light uponthe aims of both generals and upon the quality of the troops of bothsides. Meantime the incidents of last week, the wreck of the armouredtrain, and the attacks which have probably been made upon Mafeking andKimberley, are of minor importance. 

A very serious piece of news, if it should be confirmed, is that theBasutos have begun to attack the Free State. The British authoritieshave exerted themselves to the utmost to prevent this and to keep theKaffir population quiet. The mere fact of the existence all over SouthAfrica of a Kaffir population outnumbering Boers and British togethermade it an imperative duty of both white races to come to a peacefulsettlement. This was as well known to the Boers as to the British, andforms an essential factor in any judgment on the action which has causedand precipitated the conflict. 

A WEEK'S CAMPAIGN

_October 25th_, 1899

The Boer Commander-in-Chief has beyond doubt grasped the situation. Histotal force seems to be larger than was usually expected and to exceedmy own rough estimate of thirty-five thousand men, the balance to hisadvantage being due probably to the British efforts to keep the Basutosfrom attacking the Free State. Thus the Boers have been able to overruntheir western and southern borders in force sufficient to make apretence of occupying a large extent of territory in which only theimportant posts specially prepared by the British for defence continueto hold out. Of these posts, however, Mafeking and Kimberley are as yetthe only ones that have been attacked or threatened. 

For operations in the northern corner of Natal the Boer commander wasable to collect some thirty thousand men, who on the eve of hostilitieswere posted in separate columns upon the various routes leading from theFree State and from the Transvaal into the triangle of northern Natal. This triangle is like a letter _A_, the cross-stroke being the range ofhills known as the Biggarsberg, which is intersected near the centre ona north and south line by the head-stream of the Waschbank River forminga pass through which run the railway and the Dundee-Ladysmith road. North of the Biggarsberg the gates of the frontier are Muller's Pass, Botha's Pass, the Charlestown road, Wool's Drift, and De Jager's Drift, of which Landman's Drift is a wicket-gate. At each of these points, except perhaps Muller's Drift, of which I have seen no specific mention, the Boers had a column waiting. South of the Biggarsberg are on theeast Rorke's Drift, and on the west the passes of Ollivier's Hoek, Bezuidenhout, Tintwa, Van Reenen, De Beers, Bramkock, and Collins. Atall these points there were Boer gatherings, though on the west the FreeStaters, having their headquarters at Albertina, were likely to puttheir main column on the road leading through Van Reenen's Pass toLadysmith. 

By Thursday morning the Boer advance had developed. The columns fromBotha's Pass, Charlestown, and Wool's Drift had advanced throughNewcastle, where they had converged, and moved south along the mainroad. The Landman's Drift column had moved towards Dundee, the Rorke'sDrift column had pushed some distance towards the west, and the forcesfrom Albertina had showed the heads of their columns on the Natal sideof the passes. 

The British force was divided between Dundee and Ladysmith. TheBiggarsberg range, the cross-line of the A, is about fifty miles long. It is traversed from north to south by three passes. In the centre runsthe railway through a defile. Twelve miles to the west of the railwayruns the direct Newcastle-Ladysmith road; eight miles to the east runsthe road Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee-Helpmakaar. A third road runs fromDe Jager's Drift through Dundee to Glencoe and thence follows therailway to Ladysmith. Dundee is about five miles from Glencoe on a spurof the Biggarsberg range. Between the two places by the Craigie Burn wasthe camp of Sir Penn Symons, who had under him the eighth brigade (fourbattalions), three batteries, the 18th Hussars, and a portion of theNatal Mounted Volunteers, in all about four thousand men. Thirty-fivemiles away at Ladysmith, the junction of the Natal and Free Staterailways, as well as of the Natal and Free State road systems, SirGeorge White had a larger force, the seventh brigade, three fieldbatteries, a mountain battery, the Natal battery, two or three cavalryregiments, the newly-raised Imperial Light Horse, and some NatalMounted Volunteers. It is not clear whether there were more infantrybattalions and it seems probable that one battalion and perhaps abattery were at Pietermaritzburg. The Ladysmith force was at least sixthousand five hundred strong, and its total may have been as high aseight thousand. 

The Boer plan was dictated by the configuration of the frontier and ofthe obstacles and communications in Northern Natal. The various columnsto the north of the Biggarsberg had only to move forward in order toeffect their junction on the Newcastle-Dundee road, and their advancesouthwards on that road would enable them at Dundee to meet the columnfrom Landman's Drift. The movement, if well timed, must lead to anenveloping attack upon Sir Penn Symons, whose brigade would thus have toresist an assault delivered in the most dangerous form by a force oftwenty thousand men. From the point of view of the BoerCommander-in-Chief, the danger was that the Glencoe and Dundee forceshould escape his blow by retiring to Ladysmith, or should be reinforcedby the bulk of the Ladysmith force before his own combined blow could bedelivered. It was essential for him to keep Sir George White atLadysmith and also to cut the communications between Glencoe andLadysmith. Accordingly, on Wednesday, the 18th, the Free State forcesfrom Albertina, the heads of whose columns had been shown on Tuesday, moved forward towards Acton Homes and Bester's Station, and led SirGeorge White to hope for the opportunity to strike a blow at them onThursday, the 18th. At the same time a detachment from the main columnwas pushed on southwards, and was able on Thursday, while Sir GeorgeWhite was watching the Free State columns, to reach theGlencoe-Ladysmith line near Elandslaagte, to break it up, and to takeposition to check any northward movement from Ladysmith. Everything wasthus ready for the blow to be struck at Dundee, but by some want ofconcert the combination was imperfect. On Friday morning the Landman'sDrift column, which had been reinforced during the previous days by apart of the Newcastle column, was in position on the two hills to theeast of Dundee, and began shelling the British camp at long range. Atthe same time the column from the north was within an easy march fromthe British position. Sir Penn Symons decided promptly to attack theLandman's Drift column and to check the northern column's advance. Threebattalions and a couple of batteries were devoted to the attack of theBoer position, while a battalion and a battery were sent along the northroad to delay the approaching column. Both measures were successful. Theattack on the Boer position of Talana or Smith's Hill was a sample ofgood tactical work, in which the three arms, or if mounted infantry maybe considered a special arm, the four arms, were alike judiciously andboldly handled. The co-operation of rifle and gun, of foot and horse, was well illustrated, and the Boer force was after a hard fight drivenfrom its position and pursued to the eastward. Unhappily, Sir PennSymons, who himself took charge of the fight, was mortally wounded atthe moment of victory, leaving the command of the force in the hands ofthe brigadier, Lieut. -Colonel Yule. The northern Boer column seems tohave disappeared early in the day. Possibly only its advance guard waswithin striking distance and had no orders to make an independent attackon the British delaying force. 

On Saturday morning Sir George White sent a small force of cavalry andartillery to reconnoitre along the line of the interrupted railway. Sometwo thousand Boers were found in position near Elandslaagte, andaccordingly during the day the British were reinforced by road and railfrom Ladysmith, until in the afternoon the Boer position could beattacked by two battalions, three batteries, two cavalry regiments, anda regiment and a half of mounted infantry--about three thousand fivehundred men. The Boers were completely crushed and a large number ofprisoners taken, including the commander and the commanding officer ofthe German contingent. The British loss, however, as at Glencoe, washeavy, especially in officers. The force returned on Sunday toLadysmith. 

The British force at Dundee-Glencoe was thus still isolated, and untilnow no detailed account of its movements has reached England. OnSaturday it was again attacked and, there is reason to believe, it againrepulsed a large Boer force, probably the main northern column. OnSunday also the attack seems to have been renewed, this time apparentlyby two columns, one of which may have been composed of Free State troopsfrom Muller's Pass. Either on Sunday or Monday General Yule determinedto withdraw from a position in which he could hardly hope withoutdestruction to resist the overwhelming numbers brought to bear againsthim, especially as the Boer forces, either from the direction ofMuller's Pass or from Bester's Station, were threatening his line ofretreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road. Accordingly, leaving in hospitalat Dundee those of his wounded who could not be moved, he retired alongthe Helpmakaar road, which he followed as far as Beith, about fourteenmiles from Dundee, and near there he bivouacked on Monday night. OnTuesday he continued his march from Beith towards Ladysmith, expectingto reach Sunday's River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George White, informed of this movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force tothe west of the Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning tointerpose between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smartattack at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat ofGeneral Yule's brigade. 

The Boer Commander-in-Chief has thus, apparently, failed in his attemptto crush one wing of the British force, and has accomplished no morethan bringing about its return to the main body, which must have been apart of the original British plan, unless it was thought that a Britishbrigade was capable of defeating four times its own number of Boers. 

The net result hitherto seems to be that the Boers have had thestrategical and the British the tactical advantage. The British troopshave proved their superiority; the Boers have shown that even againsttroops of better training, spirit, and discipline, numbers must tell, especially if directed according to a sound though not alwaysperfectly-executed plan. 

PLAYING WITH FIRE

_November 1st_, 1899

The first week's campaign, dimly seen through scanty information, givesa peculiar impression of the two armies. The British force seems like anathlete in fine training but without an idea except that ofself-preservation, while the Boer army resembles a burly labourer, clumsy in his movements, but knowing very well what he wants. TheBritish force at first is divided upon a front of forty miles, each ofits halves looking away from the other, so that there is littleattention to the weak point of such a front, the communication betweenits parts. The first event is the cutting of this communication (on the19th), and not until the 21st is there an attempt to clear it, and thatattempt, though it leads to a severe blow against the interposing Boerforce (Elandslaagte), is not successful, for the communication haseventually to be sought on another route behind the direct one. The Boeridea is, after severing the connection between the British halves, tocrush the weaker Dundee portion; but the execution is imperfect, so thatSir Penn Symons has the opportunity, which he seizes instantly, todefeat and drive off one of the columns before the other can assist it. His successor, General Yule, the heir to his design, is no soonerconvinced by this move to Glencoe that his line of junction withLadysmith is threatened with attack by a great superiority than he setsout by the nearest way still open to him to rejoin the main body. TheLadysmith force covers this march by a shielding movement (Reitfontein)and the junction of the two British halves is effected. From Dundee toLadysmith is forty miles, and General Joubert unopposed would havecovered the distance in three days. He was before Dundee on Saturday, the 21st, and there was no sign of him before Ladysmith until Saturday, the 28th, or Sunday, the 29th. The original division of the Britishforce and the Battle of Glencoe thus produced a delay of several days inthe Boer advance: more could not have been expected from it. This firstimpression ought to be supplemented by a consideration of Sir GeorgeWhite's peculiarly difficult position, on which I will venture a word ortwo. 

The Government, by its action in the first half of September, decidedthat Sir George White must defend Natal for about five weeks[A] withsixteen thousand men against the bulk of the Boer army, which waslikely to be double his own force. It was evidently expected that heshould hold his ground near Ladysmith and thereby cover Natal to thesouth of the Tugela. This double task was quite disproportionate to hisforce. If Ladysmith had been a fortress, secure for a month or twoagainst assault, and able to take care of itself, the field force usingit as a base could no doubt have covered Natal. But in the absence of astrong place there were only two ways by which a small force could delaythe Boer invasion. The force might let itself be invested and therebyhold a proportion of the Boer army, leaving the balance to raid where itcould, or the campaign must be conducted as a retreat from position toposition. For a general with ten thousand men and only two hundred milesof ground behind him to carry on a retreat in the face of a force doublehis own so as to make it last five, weeks and to incur no disaster wouldbe a creditable achievement. Sir John Moore is thought to have shownjudgment and character by his decision to retreat before a greatlysuperior force, commanded it is true by Napoleon himself. Moore when hedecided to retreat was about as far from Corunna as Dundee is fromDurban, and Moore's retreat took nineteen days. He had the sympathy ifnot the effective help of the population, and was thought to have beenclever to get out of the trap laid for him. Sir George White seems tohave been expected as a matter of course to resist the Boer army, toprevent the overrunning of Natal by the Boers, and to preserve his ownforce from the beginning of October to the middle of November. [B] TheGovernment expected the Boers to attack as soon as they should hear ofthe calling out of the Reserves, that being the reason why the Reserveswere not called out earlier. Therefore Sir George White's campaign wastimed to last from October 9th to November 15th (December 15th). Iconclude that the force to be given to Sir George White was fixed byLord Lansdowne at haphazard, and that the calculations of the militarydepartment were put on one side, this unbusinesslike way of playing withNational affairs and with soldier's lives being veiled from theSecretary of State's mind by the phrase, "political reasons. " But the"political reason" for exposing a Nation's troops to unreasonable risksand to needless loss must be bad reason and bad policy. Mr. Wyndham hashad the courage to assert that there was no haphazard, that his chiefknew quite well what he was doing, and that "the policy which theGovernment adopted was deliberately adopted with the fullest knowledgeof possible consequences. " If these words in Mr. Wyndham's speech ofOctober 20th mean anything, they mean that Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Wyndham intended Sir George White to be left for a month to fightagainst double his number of Boers; that they looked calmly forward tothe terrible losses and all the risks inseparable from such conditions. That being the case, it seems to me that it is Mr. Wyndham's duty, andif he fails, Lord Lansdowne's duty, to tell the country plainly whetherin that deliberate resolve Lord Wolseley was a partner or an overruledprotester. Ministers have a higher duty than that to their party. TheNation has as much confidence in Lord Rosebery as in Lord Salisbury andthe difference in principle between the two men is a vanishing quantity. A change of ministry would be an inconvenience, but no more. But if thepublic comes to believe, what I am sure is untrue, that the militarydepartment at the War Office has blundered, the consequences will be sograve that I hardly care to use the word which would describe them. 

I accept the maxim that it is no use crying over spilt milk or even overspilt blood, but the maxim does not hold when the men whose decisionseems inexplicable are in a position to repeat it on a grander scale. The temper of the Boers as early as June left no doubt in any SouthAfrican mind that if equality of rights and British supremacy were tobe secured it would have to be by the sword. The Government alone amongthose who cared for the Empire failed to realise this in time. That hasbeen admitted. The excess of hope for peace has been condoned and isbeing atoned for on the battlefields of Natal. But to-day the temper ofEurope leaves no room for doubt that, in case of a serious reverse inNatal, Europe if it can will interfere. Have Mr. Goschen and LordLansdowne worked out that problem, or is there to be a repetition in thecase of the continental Powers--an adversary very different from theBoers--of patience, postponement, and haphazard? It is not the situationin South Africa that gives its gravity to the present aspect of things, but the situation in Europe. Upon the next fortnight's fighting in Natalmay turn the fate not merely of Natal and of South Africa, but of theBritish Empire. That this must be the case was plain enough atChristmas, and has been said over and over again. Yet this was thecrisis which was met by sending to the decisive point a reinforcementof ten thousand men to do the best they could along with the sixthousand already there during a five weeks' campaign. 

After reconnaissance on Friday and Saturday (October 27th-8th) SirGeorge White, finding a large Boer force in front of him at Ladysmith, determined to hit out on Monday. Suppose Ladysmith to be the centre of acompass card, the Boers were spread across the radii from N. To E. SirGeorge meaning to clear the Boers from a position near N. E. Prepared tomove forward towards N. E. And towards E. , sending in each directionabout a brigade of infantry and a brigade division of field artillery. He sent two battalions and a mounted battery towards N. The party sentto N. Started after dark on Sunday; the other parties, making ready inthe night, set forward at dawn. There was no enemy in position at N. E. The force sent towards E. Pushed back a Boer force, which retreated onlyto enable a second Boer force to take the British E. Column inflank--apparently its left flank. The N. E. Column had to be brought upto cover the retirement of the E. Column. When these two columnsreturned to Ladysmith the N. Column was still out. Long after dark SirGeorge White learned that the N. Column, which had lost its battery andits reserve rifle ammunition by a stampede of the mules, had beensurrounded by a far stronger Boer force, had held its ground until thelast cartridge was gone, and that then the survivors had acceptedquarter and surrendered. 

Sir George White manfully takes upon himself the blame for thismisfortune. His portentous blunders were in sending out the party to adistance and in taking no steps to keep in communication with it or tosupport it. The detachment of a small party to a distant point is ahabit of Indian warfare. It is out of place against an enemy of Europeanrace, for the detachment is sure to be destroyed if the enemy has acapable commander. Every man in the Ladysmith force will have felt onTuesday that the commander had make mistakes which he ought not to havemade. The question is what effect this consciousness will have upon thespirits of the force. 

Sir George White was reinforced before and during the action, abattalion of rifles having arrived in the morning and a party ofbluejackets with heavy quick-firers coming up during the day. Furtherreinforcements were sent towards him from the squadron after the action, so that his force is still about sixteen thousand. If he does not electto retreat, a course which might demoralise the troops, he may well beable to defend Ladysmith until relieved; but the first business of thetroops now on their way out will be to relieve him, and until that hasbeen arranged for, it is to be feared that Mafeking and Kimberley mustwait. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote A: Thirteen weeks, as we now (March) know from the officialcorrespondence. ]

[Footnote B: I should have said December. ]

HOW WEAK POLICY LEADS TO BAD STRATEGY

_November 8th_, 1899

The war is doing us good. It is giving us the beginnings of politicaleducation in a department that has been utterly neglected. It may beworth while to review the whole situation of to-day, and to ask how theman in the street can lend a helping hand. 

The British Government, primarily representing the people of GreatBritain, has for many years been an affair of party; the dominant ideaof the party leaders has been when out of office to get in, and when into stay. The way to manage this was to cajole the man in the street, andas he was a busy man getting his living and not much concerned aboutwatching the whole globe, the party leaders made bids for his support;votes to be distributed on the principle that one man was as good asanother; taxation to be made light for him, and, consequently, as themoney had to be found, heavy for some one else. Each party offered whatit sincerely believed to be for the general good; but the kind ofgeneral good thought of was the personal improvement or comfort of eachindividual or of a mass of individuals. While this was going on inBritish towns and counties, something was happening on the neglectedglobe. There was a large part of the British Nation living on othercontinents without votes in any British town or county, yet looking tothe British Government to champion something they loved, which has cometo be called the Empire. There were also great nations emulating theBritish in the notion that the world was their inheritance, and thatthey would take possession of a fair share of it. Their quarrels haddriven them to perfect their armies and to build navies. Each of themwas annoyed to find that in the scramble for the heritage some one hadbeen before them. On the best plots the British flag was flying, yetGreat Britain had not much Army and was very careless about her Navy. The strong powers began to elbow her a little. The British Governmentwas not disturbed by these hints from the globe. A Government made by aParliament in which every member represented a town or a county or ascrap of a town or county, and in which no one represented the Nation, no one the Empire, and no one the Globe, felt bound to keep its eye upontowns and counties, the Opposition benches, and the next election. Whyshould it stand up for the British outside, and why concern itself aboutother Powers looking round the globe for claims to peg out? Thecolonists who looked to the British Government for championship weresnubbed; the foreign Powers working for elbow-room were politely madeway for, or if they brushed against the British coat-sleeve and causedan exclamation received a meek apology. This was the normal frame ofmind of British party leaders and ministers, from which they have neverquite emerged. They were asleep, dreaming of a parochial millennium. 

But outside of cabinets there were a few men who used their eyes. SirCharles Dilke took a turn round the globe, and when he came back said"Greater Britain. " That was an idea, and ideas are like the plague--theyare catching. Sir John Seeley took a tour through the history of thelast three centuries, and said "Expansion of England"; that meantcontinuity in the Nation's life not merely in space but in time. Whatever the cause, a few years ago there set in an epidemic of freshideas, tending to reveal the Nation as more than a crowd of individualsand the Empire as the Nation's work and the Nation's cause. TheGovernment did all it could to resist the infection. Instead of standingup for the Empire it was bent on passing measures in the sense of itsown party. It ran away from Russia, from France, and from Germany. Butthe new ideas grew; every globetrotter became a Nationalist and anImperialist, and shed his party skin. Then came Fashoda, and LordRosebery's action in that matter killed what was left of party. 

The case of the British in South Africa cried aloud for British action. But the Government was still hidebound in bad traditions, thinking thatdemocracy means the tail wagging the dog, not seeing that if thestatesman leads straight along the path of duty the Nation is sure tofollow him. Happily, a statesman was sent to Cape Town, probably becausethe Cabinet hardly realised how big a man he was. Sir Alfred Milnermastered his case, thought out his cause, and at the opportune momentput it before the Government. The first result was the Bloemfonteinconference. There, with the prescience and the strength of a Cavour or aBismarck, Milner put the issue: either the minimum concession which willsecure the political equality of the two races or war. Kruger'sobstinate refusal of the concessions required showed plainly that itwould be war. There was only one possible way of averting war; if fiftythousand men had been at once sent to South Africa, Kruger and hispeople would have known where they were, and might have acceptedpossible terms, those offered at Bloemfontein. The moment of thebreaking off of the conference was the crisis, and to appreciate men youmust watch them in a crisis. Mr. Balfour expressed his unboundedconfidence in Kruger's sweet reasonableness and in the justice of theBritish cause; he could not believe there would be war. Mr. Chamberlainentered into ambiguous negotiations, beginning in a way that madeeveryone, especially Kruger, imagine that the Government would acceptless than the Bloemfontein minimum. Of preparing to coerce the Boersthere was no sign. The Boers began to get their forces in order. InEngland big speeches were made; "hands" were "put to the plough"; but atthe end of July no military force was made ready. At length, when Natalappealed for protection against the Boer army, ten thousand men wereordered so as to bring up the garrison of the colony to some seventeenthousand. After the ten thousand not another man was sent until October20th. 

The present situation is the necessary outcome of the Government'saction between the beginning of June and October 7th, when the ordersfor calling out the Reserves and for mobilisation were issued. TheCabinet's decisions involved that Sir George White with his small forceshould have to bear the brunt of the Boer attack from the outbreak ofhostilities until the time when the Army Corps should be landed andready to move. That was at least five weeks[C] of which three haveelapsed, and in the three weeks Sir George White, after one or twoinitial mishaps of no great consequence by themselves, is invested atLadysmith, while Mafeking and Kimberley are waiting for relief, and theFree State Boers are invading the northern provinces of Cape Colony andtrying to enlist the doubtful Dutch farmers. This is not a pleasantsituation for the Nation that declares itself the paramount Power inSouth Africa. Three questions may be discussed with regard to it: Whatare the risks still run, what are the probabilities, and how can we helpto prevent such a situation from recurring?

To see what has been risked on the chance that the force under SirGeorge White may hold its own we must look from the Boer side. The Boercommander hopes, or ought to hope, to destroy Sir George White's forcebefore it can be relieved. He has a chance of succeeding in this, for aninvesting force has with modern arms a great advantage over the force itsurrounds. The outside circle is so much larger than the inside one thatit can bring many more rifles into play; it exposes no flanks, and theinterior force cannot attack it without exposing one or both flanks. With anything like equal skill and determination the surrounding forceis sure to win in time. But if the time is limited the surrounding forcemust hurry the result by assaults, in which it loses the advantage ofthe defensive. If Joubert and his men have the courage and determinationto make repeated assaults it may go hard with the defenders ofLadysmith. But the defenders hitherto have had the counterbalancingadvantage of a superior artillery. I think it reasonable to expect thatwith the better discipline of his force, its greater cohesion andmobility and the high spirit which animates it, Sir George White will beable to defy the Boers for many weeks. But suppose the unexpected tohappen, as it sometimes does in war, and Sir George White's resistanceto be overcome? Such a victory would have a tremendous effect upon thehopes and spirits of the Boers. It would almost double the fightingvalue of their army, and would probably bring to their side many oftheir colonial kinsmen. Joubert would become more daring, and, if SirRedvers Buller had divided his force, would attack its nearest portionwith a prospect of success. The failure of Sir Redvers Buller wouldthen not be outside the bounds of possibility. What that would involvethere is no need to expound--the Empire would be in peril of itsexistence. We may feel pretty sure that things will not come to such apass; that another week will show Sir George White well holding his ownand a part of the Army Corps preparing to move. Yet it would be prudentto guard against accidents by sending further troops to the Cape. Tenthousand men ordered now would be at Cape Town by the middle ofDecember; but every delay in ordering them will mean, in case theyshould in December be wanted, a period of suspense like that throughwhich we are now passing. 

The moral of the present situation seems to me to be that we shouldscrutinise our political personages, noting which of them have betrayedtheir inability to see what was happening and to look ahead, bringingdown their figures in our minds to their natural size, and exaltingthose who have shown themselves equal to their tasks. The man in thestreet might do well to consider whether the great departments ofGovernment, such as the War Office and the Army, should for ever beentrusted to men who have not even a nodding acquaintance with thebusiness which their departments have to transact, the business calledWar. Success in that as in other business depends on putting knowledgein power. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote C: We now know that the time was thirteen weeks. ]

TWO VIEWS OR TRUE VIEWS?

_November 15th, _ 1899

October 11th saw the opening of hostilities, and of the first chapter ofthe war, the conflict between Sir George White with sixteen thousand menand General Joubert with something like double that number. The firstchapter had three sections: First, the unfortunate division of SirGeorge White's force and the isolation of and unsuccessful attack uponhis right wing; secondly, the reunion of his wings at Ladysmith;thirdly, the concentration of the Boers against the force at Ladysmithand the surrounding or investment of Sir George White. This thirdsection is not yet ended, but the gathering of the forces at Cape Townand at Port Natal points to its conclusion and to the opening of thesecond chapter. The arrival of the first portion of the transportflotilla is the only important change since last week. 

I thought from the beginning that the division of Sir George White'sforce was strategically unsound, and the position of Ladysmith a bad onebecause it lent itself to investment. It is now known that the divisionof forces and the decision to hold Ladysmith, even until it should beturned and surrounded, was due not to strategical but to what are calledpolitical considerations. The Government of Natal thought that if thetroops were withdrawn from Glencoe--Dundee, or the whole forcecollected, say at Colenso instead of Ladysmith, the appearance ofretreat would have a bad effect on the natives, the Kaffirs, and perhapsthe Dutch farmers. Accordingly, out of deference to the view of thelocal Government, the General consented to do his work in what he knewto be the wrong way. This is a perfect specimen of the way in which warsare "muddled"--I borrow the expression from Lord Rosebery--and itdeserves thinking over. 

No popular delusion is more extraordinary and none more widespread thanthe notion that there are two ways of looking at a war, one the militaryaspect and the other the governmental or civil aspect, that both arelegitimate, and that, as the Government is above the general, in case ofa clash the military view must fall into the background. This notion isquite wrong, and the more important the position of the men who have gotit into their heads, the more harm it does. There is only one right wayof looking at war, and that consists in seeing it as it is. If two menboth take a true view of an operation of war, they will agree, whetherthey are both soldiers, both civilians, or one a soldier and the other acivilian. It does not matter what you call their view, but, as a soldierwho knows his business ought to have true views about it, the propername for the true view is the military view. If the civil view is adifferent one it must be wrong. In this case the belief that a retreatfrom a position to which troops had been sent would have a bad effectwas no doubt founded on fact. But for that reason the troops ought notto have been sent there until it was ascertained that the forward movewas consistent with the best plan of campaign. Some person other thanthe general charged with the defence of Natal had been arranging histroops for him without consulting him, and had done it badly. Then camethe question of moving them back, and the probable "bad effect" wasraised as a scarecrow. But the reply to that was that the bad effect ofretreat is not half so bad as the bad effect of defeat, or of theembarrassments of a position which, being strategically wrong, mayinvolve mishaps. 

When a civil government moves troops in connection with war it ought tomove them to the right places; that is according to sound strategy orsound military principles. In short, whoever deals in war ought tounderstand war. The reader may think that a commonplace, but in realityit is like too many commonplaces--a truth that very important peopleforget at critical moments. The first principle of action in war is tohave two men to one at the decisive point. How comes it, then, that forsix weeks Sir George White has to defend Natal with one against two?Evidently the first principle has been violated. It came about exactlyin the same way as the putting one of Sir George White's brigades atDundee. The Government managed it; it was a fragment of the civil viewof war. How long, then, the reader may ask, should the civil view of warbe allowed scope and when should the military view be called in? Let mebe permitted to alter the labels and instead of "military view" to say"view based upon knowledge"; and instead of "civil view" to say, "viewnot based upon knowledge. " I think that all dealings in war should beguided by the view based upon knowledge and that the other view shouldbe for ever left out of account. 

My unpopular belief that nobody should meddle with the management of awar unless he understands it is, I admit, most uncomfortable, for as awar is always managed by the Government I am obliged to think that everyGovernment ought to understand war. But in this country the Governmentis entrusted to a Committee of Peers and Members of Parliament, none ofwhom is supposed to be able to take a military view of war. If my beliefis right, a British Cabinet is very liable to take a civilian view, andthe consequences might be awkward. In fact they are awkward, as theSouth African war up to date abundantly reveals. 

The military view of war is that it consists in the employment of forceto compel an adversary to do your will. The employment of force isrequired in the management of a Nation's affairs when the Nation hasquite made up its mind to have something done which another Nation orState has made up its mind shall not be done. When there is thispoint-blank conflict of wills, and neither side can give way, there mustbe war; and the military view is that when you see war coming you shouldget your troops into their places, because the first moves are the mostimportant, and a bad first move is very apt to lead to checkmate. 

In the case of South Africa the true view was taken at the right time bySir Alfred Milner. He was instructed that Great Britain would take upthe Uitlander's cause, and sent to Bloemfontein to see whether PresidentKruger was prepared for an equitable settlement. He proposed such asettlement, and, as President Kruger declared the terms impossible, hemade it plain that if there were no settlement on such lines as he hadsuggested, there must be war. That was the true view, and the momentwhen the conference was broken off was the moment for Great Britain toget her forces ready with all convenient speed. But Mr. Balfour on theday when he heard the news took a civilian view; instead of looking thewar in the face he expressed the hope that President Kruger would changehis mind. That hope the Government cherished, as we now know, until theend of the first week of September, when the Boer forces were so far onin their preparations that Natal had been begging for protection. TheGovernment then sent ten thousand men, making the sixteen thousand ofSir George White. Yet the Government at that time had before it themilitary view that to compel the Boers to accept Great Britain's willseventy thousand men would be required. Evidently, then, the sending ofthe ten thousand arose not from the military view, but the civil viewthat war is a disagreeable business, and that it is to be hoped therewill be none of it, or at any rate as little as possible. 

The misfortunes in Natal will probably be repaired and the war in timebrought to its conclusion--the submission of the Boers to GreatBritain's will. But suppose the dispute had been with a great Power, andthat in such a case the military view had been shut out from the day thenegotiations began until the great Power was ready? The result must havebeen disaster and defeat on a great scale. Disaster and defeat on agreat scale are as certain to come as the sun to rise to-morrow morningunless the Government arranges to take the military view of war into itsmidst. There will have to be a strategist in the Cabinet if the BritishEmpire is to be maintained. This is another unpopular view and ishateful to all politicians, who declare that it is unconstitutional. Butit does not, in fact, involve any constitutional change, far less changethan has been made since 1895 at the instance of Mr. Balfour; and itwould be better to alter a little the system of managing the Nation'saffairs than to risk the overthrow of the Empire. 

BULLER'S PROBLEM

_November 22nd_, 1899

The six weeks of anxious waiting are over, and to-day the second chapterof the war begins. On either side of the Boer States a division of SirRedvers Buller's force is now in touch with the enemy, and at eitherpoint there may be a battle any day. 

The small British forces sent out or organised on the spot before thedeclaration of war have kept the enemy's principal forces occupied untilnow, so that he has been unable to make any decisive use of the marginof superiority which he possessed over and above what was needed to keepthe British detachments where they were. The resisting power of thesedetachments is, however, not inexhaustible; they have kept at bay for aconsiderable time forces much more numerous than themselves, and thefirst move required of the fresh British forces is to take the pressureoff them and to combine with them. The centre of gravity is in Natal, for there is the principal Boer army, probably two-thirds of the wholeBoer power, and there, too, a whole British division is invested. Apalpable success here for either side must go far to decide the issue ofthe war. 

General Joubert's force in Natal is so strong that while keeping hisgrip upon Ladysmith, where Sir George White has not less than tenthousand men, he has been able to move south with a considerable force, perhaps fifteen thousand men, to oppose Sir C. F. Clery's advance. SirC. F. Clery has already at least seven, and possibly nine, strongbattalions, to which within a day or two three more will be added, andperhaps as many as thirty-six guns, with parties of bluejackets andvarious Natal levies. His interest is to delay battle until all hisforce has come up. The advanced troops seem to be spread along the linefrom Mooi River to Estcourt, and the Boer forces are facing them on along line to the east of the railway from a point beyond Estcourt to apoint below Mooi River. The Boers are on the flank from which theirattack would be most dangerous, and seem to aim at interposing betweenthe parts of Sir C. F. Clery's force, and at a convergent attack insuperior strength upon his advance guard at Estcourt. 

I should have expected the advance parties of Sir C. F. Clery's force tohave fallen back as the Boers approached. The attempt to keep up theconnection between the parts of a concentrating force by means of therailway strikes me as very dangerous from the moment that the enemy isin the neighbourhood. The important thing for Sir C. F. Clery is notwhether his battle takes place twenty miles nearer to Ladysmith ortwenty miles farther away, but that it should be an unmistakablevictory, so that after it the Boer force engaged should be unable tooffer any further serious hindrance to his advance. To gain an end ofthis kind a general should not merely bring up all the troops from therear, falling back for them if necessary, but should take care that nonecan be cut off by the enemy in his front. A decisive victory by Sir C. F. Clery or by Sir Redvers Duller, who may feel this action to be soimportant as to justify his presence, would leave no doubt as to theissue of the war. An indecisive battle would postpone indefinitely therelief of Ladysmith and leave the future of the campaign in suspense. Defeat would be disastrous, for it would probably involve the ultimateloss of Sir George White's force. For these reasons I regard the battleshortly to be fought in Natal as the first decisive action of the war, and am astonished that a larger proportion of Sir Redvers Buller's forcehas not been sent to take part in it. 

The whole business of a commander-in-chief in war is to find out thedecisive point and to have the bulk of his forces there in time. If hecan do that on the half-dozen occasions which make the skeleton of awar he has fulfilled his mission. He never need do anything else, forall the rest can be done by his subordinates. Not every commanderfulfils this simple task because not every one refuses to let himself bedistracted. All sorts of calls are made upon him to which he finds ithard to be deaf; very often he is doubtful whether one or anothersubordinate is competent, and then he is tempted to do thatsubordinate's work for him. That is always a mistake because it meansneglect of the commander's own work, which is more important. 

The task, though it appears simple is by no means easy, as the presentwar and the present situation show. While the fate of the Empire hangsin the balance between Ladysmith and Pietermaritzburg, a good dealdepends on the course of events between Kimberley and Queenstown. In thenorthern part of Cape Colony the Dutch inhabitants are naturally dividedin their sympathies, and the loyally disposed have been sorely tried bythe long weeks of waiting for some sign of Great Britain's power. Nonehas yet been forthcoming. They know that Kimberley is besieged and thatthe British Government has done little for its defence. During the lastweek or two they have been threatened by the Free State Boers, and haveseen Stormberg and other places evacuated by the British. At length theFree State Boers have come among them, marched into their towns, proclaimed the annexation of the country, and commandeered the citizens. If this goes on the Boer armies will soon be swelled to great dimensionsby recruits from the British colony, a process which cannot go on muchlonger without shaking the faith of the whole Dutch population in thesupremacy of Great Britain. Some manifestation of British strength, energy, and will is evidently urgently needed in this region. Moreover, Kimberley is hard beset, and its fall would seem to the wholecountryside to be the visible sign of a British collapse. No wonder, then, that Sir Redvers Duller has sent Lord Methuen as soon as he couldbe ready to the relief of Kimberley. The column consists of the Brigadeof Guards, the Ninth Brigade, made up of such battalions as were at handto replace Hildyard's brigade (sent to Natal), of a naval detachment, acavalry regiment, and two or three batteries, besides local levies. Kimberley is five or six days' march from Orange River, and at somepoint on the way the Boers will no doubt try to stop the advance. I feelconfident that Lord Methuen, whom I know as an accomplished tactician, will so win his battle as not to need to do the same work twice over. 

The advance of Lord Methuen's division renders imperative the protectionof the long railway line from Cape Town to Orange River. This seems tobe entrusted to General Forestier-Walker's forces, reduced to twobattalions, and to General Wauchope's Highland brigade. One battaliononly is with General Gatacre at Queenstown, and two battalions ofGeneral Lyttelton's brigade which have reached Cape Town are as yetunaccounted for in the telegrams. 

How, then, if all his forces are thus employed could Sir Redvers Buller, by taking thought, have added anything to Sir C. F. Clery's force on theMooi River? The answer is that a commander's decision must usually be achoice of risks. To have sent on to Natal a part of the troops now inCape Colony would have been to have increased the danger of the CapeDutch going over to the Boers. Which was the less of two possibleevils--the spread of disaffection in the Cape Colony or the loss of SirGeorge White's force? No one at home can decide with confidence becausethe knowledge here available of the situation in either colony is verylimited. Subject to this reserve, I should be disposed to think thedanger in Natal the more serious, and the chance of losing ColonelKekewich's force a mere trifle in comparison with the defeat of GeneralJoubert, for the effect of Joubert's defeat would be felt on the OrangeRiver, whereas the relief of Kimberley can hardly produce an appreciableeffect on the situation in Natal. 

The difficult problem of which General Buller is now giving his solutionhas been created for him by the Government, which from June to Octoberwas playing with a war which according to its own admissions it did notseriously mean. "Mistakes in the original assembling of armies canhardly be repaired during the whole course of the campaigns, but allarrangements of this sort can be considered long beforehand and--if thetroops are ready for war and the transport service is organised--mustlead to the result intended. " So wrote Moltke in 1874 in one of the mostfamous passages ever published. If last spring the Government or eventhe Secretary of State for War alone had been in earnest, had been doingwhat plain duty required, the nature and conditions of the South Africanwar would have been thought out, and the military judgment which was toconduct it would have been set to devise the proper opening. That wouldhave consisted in landing simultaneously, thirty thousand men at Durbanand forty thousand at the Cape. These forces would not have movedforward until they were complete and ready, and though the Boers mightmeantime have overrun their borders, the British advance when it camewould have been continuous, irresistible, and decisive. Instead of thatthe Government gave the Boers notice in June that there might be war, sothat the Boers had the whole summer to get ready. 

When in September the Government began to think of action the only ideawas defending Natal. But this defence was not thought of as part of awar. The idea never seems to have occurred to the Government that theneed for defence in Natal could not arise except in case of war, andthat then to defend Natal would be impracticable except by beating theBoer army. Accordingly, the handful of troops in Natal were postedwithout regard to the probable outlines of the war, and therefore, wrongly posted. The consequence was that when war came they could not beconcentrated except at the cost of fighting and loss, and of a retreatwhich gave the enemy the belief that he had won a victory. Even then thepoint held--Ladysmith--was too far north and liable to be turned. Allthese mistakes, made before Sir George White arrived, were evident tothat general when he first reached Ladysmith, but they could not then beremedied, and he had to do, and has done, the best he could in thecircumstances. The fact of Sir George White's investment compels SirRedvers Buller to begin his campaign with the effort to relieve him, andthe fact that Kimberley is held by a weak force compels him to dividehis force when his one desire certainly must have been to keep itunited. In the expected battle at Mooi River Sir Redvers Buller will betrying to make up for the faulty arrangements of September. The desireto hold as much of the railway as possible--also due to the falseposition of Sir George White's force--has, perhaps, led GeneralHildyard to spread out his force over too long a line. But, in spite ofthe difficulties created by errors at the start, I am not without hopesthat these remarks will soon be put out of date by a decisive Britishvictory. 

FIGHTING AGAINST ODDS

_November 29th_, 1899

Two factors in the present war were impressed upon my mind at thebeginning: first, that the British Army was never in better condition asregards the zeal and skill of its officers, the training and disciplineof the men, and the organisation of the field services; secondly, thatthe Government had deliberately handicapped that Army by giving theBoers many weeks' clear start in which to try with their whole forces tooverwhelm the small British parties sent out at haphazard to delay them. The whole course of events up to now has been underlining these twojudgments. The British troops gave proof of their qualities at TalanaHill, at Elandslaagte, and on the trying retreat from Dundee. There isno more difficult task in war than a frontal attack upon a positiondefended by the repeating rifle. Good judges have over and over againpronounced it impossible. But the British troops have done it again andagain. General Hildyard's attack on Beacon Hill, an arduous action for adefinite purpose which was effected--the re-opening of the railway fromEstcourt towards the south--was a creditable achievement on the Natalside. On the Cape side Lord Methuen's advance from Orange River is anexample of the greatest determination and energy coupled with caution onthe part of the general, and of the most brilliant courage on the partof the troops. I thought it probable that so skilful a tactician as LordMethuen would combine flank with frontal attacks. It seems that theconditions gave him little or no opportunity to do that, and he has hadthree times to assault and drive back a well-posted enemy. At Belmont, on the 23rd, and at Enslin, on the 25th, Lord Methuen had a numericalsuperiority large enough to justify an attack in which heavy loss was tobe expected. The losses were not exceptionally great, and this factproves that the British troops are of very much higher quality thantheir adversaries. At Modder River, on the 28th, the numbers werepractically equal. The Boers were strongly entrenched and concealed, andcould not be out-flanked. That they were driven back at all is as prouda record for our troops as any army could desire, for the attackingforce ought to have been destroyed. The engagement may well have been"one of the hardest and most trying in the annals of the British Army, "and if the victory is a glory to the soldiers, the resolve to attack insuch conditions reveals in Lord Methuen the strength of character whichis the finest quality of a commander. 

If it is well that we at home should appreciate the splendid results ofmany years of good teaching given to the officers and men of the Army, results to be attributed in great part, though not exclusively, to theefforts of Lord Wolseley and his school, it is no less our duty to facesquarely the fact that the Nation has not done its duty by this Army. The Nation in this sense means the people acting through the Government. To see how the Government has treated the Army we have only to surveythe situation in South Africa. Fifty thousand men were ordered out onOctober 7th, --an Army Corps, a cavalry division and troops for the lineof communications. The design was that, with the communications coveredby the special troops sent for that duty, the Army Corps and the cavalrydivision, making together a body of forty thousand men, should cross theOrange River and sweep through the Free State towards Pretoria, whileNatal was protected by a special force there posted. 

But long before the Army Corps was complete this plan had been torn topieces by the Boers. Sir George White's force, being hardly more than athird the strength of the army with which the Boers invaded Natal, couldnot stop the invasion, though it could hold out when surrounded andinvested. 

Accordingly the first task of Sir Redvers Buller was to stem the floodof Boer invasion in. Natal and to relieve Sir George White. For thispurpose he is none too strong with three out of the six infantrybrigades that make up the Army Corps. The remaining three brigades couldnot carry out the original programme of sweeping through the Free State, and meantime the Boers have overrun the great district between Colesbergand Barkly East, between the Orange River and the Stormberg range. General Gatacre with a weak brigade at Queenstown is watching thisinvasion which as yet he seems hardly strong enough to repel. The restof the troops are required in the protection of the railways, of thedepôt of stores at De Aar, and the bridge at Orange River. ButKimberley was invested and Mafeking in danger, and the effect of thefall of either of them upon the Cape Dutch might be serious. Somethingmust be done. Accordingly Lord Methuen with two brigades set out towardsKimberley. His task is both difficult and dangerous; he has not merelyto break the Boer resistance by sheer hard fighting, but to run the riskthat Boer forces from other quarters, perhaps from the army invadingCape Colony, may be brought up in his rear, and that he may in this waybe turned, enveloped, and invested. The scattering of forces is due tothe initial error of sending too small a force to Natal, and of makingno provision for its reinforcement until after a six weeks' interval. The consequence is that instead of our generals being able to attack theBoers with the advantage of superior numbers, with the concomitant powerof combining flank and frontal attacks, and with the possibility of thusmaking their victories decisive by enveloping tactics or by effectivepursuit, the British Army has to make attack after attack againstprepared fronts, which though they prove its valour can lead to nodecisive results, except at the cost of quite disproportionate losses. 

It is possible, and indeed we all hope that the Boer forces, at firstunder-estimated, may now be over-estimated, and that Sir Kedvers Buller, whose advance is probably now beginning, will not have to deal withsuperior numbers. In that case his blows will shatter the Boer army inNatal, so that by the time he has joined hands with Sir George White theenemy will feel himself overmastered, will lose the initiative, andbegin to shrink from the British attacks. That state of things in Natalwould lighten Lord Methuen's work. But it would be rash to assume suchfavourable conditions. We must be prepared for the spectacle of hard andprolonged fighting in Natal, and for the heavy losses that accompany it. The better our troops come out of their trials the more are we bound toask ourselves how it came about that they were set to fight underdifficulties, usually against superior numbers, though the British forcedevoted to the war was larger than the whole Boer army? The cause ofthis is that a small force was sent out on September 8th, and nothingmore ordered until October 7th, and the cause of that arrangement wasthat the Government, as Mr. Balfour has naively told us, never believedthat there would be a war, or that the Free State would join theTransvaal, until the forces of both States were on the move. Ourstatesmen negotiated through June, July, and August, talked in July of"putting their hands to the plough, " and yet took no step to meet thepossibility that the Boers would prove in earnest and attack the Britishcolonies until the Boer riflemen were assembling at Standerton andpatrolling into Natal. Does not this argue a defect in the training ofour public men, a defect which may be described as ignorance of thenature of war and of the way in which it should be provided for? Mr. Balfour admits that his eyes have been opened, but does not that implythat they had been shut when they ought to have been open? If themembers of the Government failed to take the situation seriously inJune, what is to be thought of the members of the Opposition, some ofwhom even now cannot see that the choice was between abandoning Empireand coercing the Boers? The moral is that we should, if possible, strengthen the Government by sending to Parliament representatives ofthe younger school, which is National and Imperialist rather thanConservative or Liberal. 

THE DELAY OF REINFORCEMENTS

_December 7th_, 1899

The conditions in South Africa are still critical; indeed, more so thanever. There are three campaigns in progress, and, though there are goodgrounds for hoping that in each case the balance will turn in favour ofthe British, the hope rests rather upon faith than upon that numericalsuperiority which it is the first duty of a Government to give to itsgenerals. 

Lord Methuen's advance came to a pause after the battle of Modder River, now nine days ago. There appear to have been good reasons for the delay. First of all, it is necessary that when, or soon after, Kimberley isreached the railway to De Aar should be available both for the removalof non-combatants, and for the transport of provisions, ammunition andguns. This involves the repair in some way of the bridge at ModderRiver. Next, it was proved-by that battle, in which the Boer force waslarge enough to make the victory most difficult, and by the arrivalafter the battle of fresh Boer forces, that Lord Methuen's force was notstrong enough for its work. If a whole day and heavy loss were needed tobring about the retreat of eleven thousand Boers from a preparedposition it might be impracticable for Lord Methuen without more forceto drive away fifteen or eighteen thousand Boers from a preparedposition at Spytfontein, and the possibility of such a body of Boersbeing at that point had to be reckoned with. Lord Methuen needed moreinfantry, more artillery, and more cavalry. Of none of the three armshad General Forestier-Walker any abundant supply. If he has sent on, besides a cavalry regiment, the whole of the Highland brigade and threebatteries of artillery, Lord Methuen would be none too strong. It isessential that, having started, he should defeat the Boers again andreach Kimberley, for a failure would be a disaster. I have greatconfidence in Lord Methuen and his troops; what determination andbravery can do they will accomplish, and I feel pretty sure that in aday or two we shall have news of another victory and of the relief ofKimberley. But why has the paramount power in South Africa sent a finegeneral and splendid troops to face heavy odds and to run the risk offinding themselves over-tasked by superior numbers?

If we put the most liberal construction on General Walker's account ofwhat he has done to reinforce Lord Methueh there are now fifteenbattalions, five batteries, and two cavalry regiments north of De Aar. To protect the great depôt of military stores at De Aar and the railwayfrom that point to the Cape a considerable force is needed, and to stemthe tide of Boer invasion and Dutch disaffection, which has spread fromthe Orange River to Tarkastad and Dordrecht, from Colesberg to BarklyEast, a further large force is badly wanted. But in the whole of CapeColony south of the Orange River there appear to be only ninebattalions, perhaps a couple of regiments of cavalry, and on the mostfavourable assumption five batteries. Of these battalions Sir WilliamGatacre has half-a-dozen on the lines running north from Algoa Bay andEast London, the greater part at Putters Kraal, north of Queenstown. This is a tiny force with which to clear an invaded and disaffected areaof twelve thousand square miles. We may be perfectly certain that SirWilliam Gatacre will do the best that can be done with his force, andif that should be more than his numbers alone would lead us to expectthe reason will be that Lord Methuen's victories will have made the FreeState Boers uneasy about their road home. A fresh victory near Kimberleyand the effectual relief of that place will lighten Sir WilliamGatacre's load. 

The centre of gravity is in Natal, where the greater part of the Boerarmy and the greater part of the British force in South Africa areconfronting one another. There are three British divisions, strong ininfantry but weak in artillery, and there is cavalry enough for a strongdivision. But one of the divisions has been invested and bombarded withmore or less persistence since the beginning of November, and the othertwo are not yet known to be quite ready to move. Sir George White'sforce is reported to be on short rations, and some of the messages fromcorrespondents in Ladysmith declared a week ago that it was high timefor relief to come. The force can hardly be as yet near the limit of itsresisting powers, but it is evidently nearing the stage when afterrelief it will need rest and recuperation instead of being ready for avigorous and prolonged advance. General Buller with two divisions willshortly set out to force the passage of the Tugela and to fight his wayround Ladysmith, either on the east or on the west, so as to cut offeither the retreat to the Free State or that to the Transvaal of theBoer army. If Sir Redvers Buller can in this way win a victory in whichthe enemy is not merely pushed back, but controlled in his choice of thedirection of his retirement, the issue of the campaign in Natal will besettled, and the British Commander will be able to consider his greatpurpose--the crushing of the Boer armies. The long wrestle between SirGeorge White and the Boers has no doubt produced a state of exhaustionon both sides, and by the time the decision comes exhaustion will beturned into collapse. If, as we trust, it should be a Boer collapse, SirRedvers Buller's best policy, if practicable, will be to follow up asuccess with the utmost promptitude and vigour, to push on through themountains, and open a doorway into the country beyond them. A check toSir Redvers Buller's advance would be disastrous. He can take no moretroops from the Cape. The fifth division can hardly be at his disposalbefore Christmas, for the first transport did not start till November24th, and the last has not yet left. But a check means insufficientforce, and is as a rule to be made good only by reinforcement. It isclear, then, that Sir Redvers Buller must not be checked; he must crossthe Tugela and must win his battle. I think that with his twentythousand men he may be trusted to do both, even if the Boer force is aslarge as the highest estimates that have been given. 

The four decisions pending--at Kimberley, north of Queenstown, atLadysmith, and on the Tugela--are here represented as all doubtful. I donot expect any of them to go wrong, but it is wise before a fight toreckon with possibilities, and where the enemy, stubborn, well-armed, and skilful, has also the advantage of numbers, it would be folly not toconsider the possibility that he may hold his ground. There are elementsof success on the British side that should not be forgotten. The Britishsoldier to-day, as in the past, proves to be a staunch support to anygeneral. To-day, however, he has leaders who, taking them all round, areprobably better qualified than any of their predecessors. The divisionalgenerals are all picked for their known grip of the business of war;among the brigadiers there are such devoted students of their professionas Lyttelton and Hildyard, and the younger officers of to-day are morezealous in their business and better instructed than at any previousperiod. There should be less in this war than in any that the BritishArmy has waged of that incompetence of the subordinates which in pastcampaigns has often caused the commanders more anxiety than all theenemy's doings. 

Yet at every point the Boers appear to outnumber our troops. Thequestion arises how this came about; either the Government has not senttroops enough, or the force given to the Commander-in-Chief has beenwrongly distributed. Sir Redvers Buller has done the best he could indifficult conditions. Ladysmith had to be relieved, and he has takenmore than half of his force for the purpose. He might have wished totake a third division, but if he had done so Kimberley might havefallen, and the rising at the Cape have spread so fast and so far thatthe defeat of Joubert would not have restored the balance. Accordinglythe smaller half of the force was left in the Cape Colony. Here alsothere were two tasks. To push back the invasion was a slow business, andif meantime Kimberley had fallen, the insurrection would have becomegeneral. Accordingly a minimum force was set to stem the invasion and amaximum force devoted to the relief of Kimberley. The difficulties, therefore, arose not merely from the strategy in South Africa but fromthe delay of the Government to send enough troops in time. The fact thatSir George White with a small force was left for two months unsupportedproduced the rising at the Cape, and compelled the division of theBritish Army Corps, in, consequence of which the whole force is reducedto a perilous numerical weakness at each of four points. But the ArmyCorps, the cavalry division, and the force for the line ofcommunications, have now to wait three weeks before they can bestrengthened. It was known to the Government before the end of Octoberthat Ladysmith would be invested and need relief, that the Cape Dutchwould rise, and that unless Kimberley were helped the rising wouldbecome dangerous. Yet the despatch of the first transport of the fifthdivision was delayed until November 24th. Has the Government even nowbegun to take the war seriously? Do the members of the Cabinet at thiseleventh hour understand that failure to crush the Boers meansbreakdown for the Empire, and that a prolonged struggle with themcarries with it grave danger of the intervention of other Powers? DoesLord Lansdowne continue to direct the movement of reinforcementsaccording to his own unmilitary judgment modified by that of one or moreof his unmilitary colleagues? I decline to believe that Lord Wolseleyhas arranged or accepted without protest this new system of sending outthe Army in fragments, each of which may be invested or used up beforethe next can arrive. 

THE NATION'S PROBLEM

_December 14th_, 1899

The failure of Lord Methuen's attack at Magersfontein has brought hometo every mind the extreme gravity of the situation in South Africa, andit seems most likely that in the western theatre of war the crisis hasissued in a decision unfavourable to the British cause. 

It is well to keep the whole before our eyes even when examining a part, so I begin with a bird's-eye view. In Natal Sir Redvers Buller seems tobe ready, and to be about to strike, for the advance of Barton's brigadetowards Colenso must be the prelude to the advance of the main body tothe right or the left to cross the Tugela above or below the brokenrailway bridge. If Sir Redvers Buller is so fortunate as to bring theprincipal Boer army to an action and to defeat it so thoroughly asseriously to impair its fighting power, the balance in the easterntheatre of war will have turned, and attention may be concentrated uponthe restoration of the position in the west. There the balance hasturned the wrong way. General Gatacre's defeat at Stormberg would not bea very serious matter, for his force was small, were it not that itdamages the credit of British generalship, and that it must have given agreat stimulus not only to the Free State army but to the rebellion ofthe Cape Boers. For the Boers Stormberg is a great victory, which willencourage them to fresh enterprises in a country where at least everysecond Dutch farmer is their friend and ally. They may, therefore, beexpected to turn their attention as soon as they can to Lord Methuen'scommunications. This probability rendered Lord Methuen's position atModder River doubly critical. On Sunday he was ready, and set out totest his fate. On Tuesday he was back again in his camp, the measure ofhis defeat being given by his assurance that in his camp he was inperfect security. Those are ominous words, for they have not the air ofthe man who does not know that he is beaten, and who means to try againat once. It is, however, conceivable that, as the defeat seems to havebeen caused by an inexplicable blunder, the marching of a brigade in thedark in dense formation close up to the muzzles of the enemy's rifles, the effort may be made to attack again with better dispositions. Asecond attack would, of course, be attended with twofold risks, but ifit has no chance of success the defeat already suffered must be reckoneda disaster. If Lord Methuen is definitely beaten, Kimberley must be setdown as lost, and the question is of the safety of Lord Methuen'sdivision. In that case to remain at Modder River is to court investment, which would last for many weeks. The risk would not be justified unlessthere is in the camp an ample store of supplies and ammunition, and eventhen it is not clear what purpose it would serve. If, therefore, thedefeat is decisive the proper course is a retreat to a position of whichthe communications can be protected, and which cannot easily be turned. The whole situation, then, is failure in the Cape Colony on both lines, coupled with an impending action in Natal, of which, until it is over, afavourable result, though there is reason to hope for it, had better notbe too lightly assumed. Yet the British purpose of the war is toestablish the British power in South Africa on a firm basis: the onlyway to prepare that basis being to crush the military power of the twoRepublics. The British forces now in South Africa are clearly not strongenough to do their work. What is the Nation to do in order to accomplishthe task which it has undertaken?

A nation can act only through its Government, and, as at this moment theBritish Nation is united in the resolve to fight this war out, theGovernment has, without looking back, to give a lead. The first thing isfor the Cabinet to convince the public that it is doing all that can bedone, and doing it in the right way. But the public does not trust itsown judgment. That much-talked-of person the man in the street does notfancy himself a general, and is not over-fond of the militarycritic--the unfortunate man whose duties have compelled him to try toqualify himself, to form a judgment about war. There is a sound instinctthat war is a special business, and that it should be managed accordingto the judgment of those who are masters of the trade; not those whocan write about it, but those who have practised it and proved theircapacity. But those men, the generals who are, believed to have a graspof the way to carry a war through, are all outside the Cabinet. TheCabinet has its chosen expert adviser, the Commander-in-Chief; butrumour or surmise hints that his advice has been by no means uniformlyfollowed. Surely the wisest course which the Cabinet could now adoptwould be to call Lord Wolseley to their board as an announcement and aguarantee that in the prosecution of the war his judgment was given itstrue place, and that nothing thought by him necessary or desirable wasbeing left undone. If the military judgment holds that more force isrequired the extra force must be provided. There are, after the RegularArmy and the Marines, the whole of the Militia, the Volunteers, andthousands of trained men in the British colonies. There is nodifficulty, seeing that the Nation is determined to keep on its course, about drawing upon these forces to any extent that may be required. Ifthere are constitutional forms to be fulfilled they can be fulfilled; ifParliamentary sanction is needed it can be had for the asking. 

At the present rate of consumption the fifth division will hardly havebeen landed before its energies will be absorbed, and unless Sir RedversBuller is peculiarly fortunate during the next few days, the fifth andsixth divisions together will not be enough to change the presentadverse situation into one of decided British preponderance. Thereshould be at the Cape a reservoir of forces upon which the BritishCommander should be able to draw until he can drive the enemy beforehim. When that stage comes the flow of reinforcements might besuspended, but to stay or delay it before that stage has been reached isto court misfortune. 

Something might probably be done to block the channel through which theenemy derives some of his resources and some of his information. Thetelegraph cable at Delagoa Bay might with advantage have its shore endlifted into a British man-of-war. There must be ways and means ofstopping all intercourse through Portuguese territory between theTransvaal and the sea. That this is desirable is manifest, and to suchcases may be applied the maxim, "Where there is a will there is a way. "

The idea seems to be spreading that this war must lead to a thoroughoverhauling and recasting of the British military organisation. But ifyou are to make a bigger army, an army better suited to the times and tothe needs of the Nation, you must begin by getting a competentarmy-creating instrument. You cannot expect a Cabinet of twelve oreighteen men ignorant of war to create a good war-fighting machine. Youcannot entrust the organisation of your Army to any authority but theGovernment, for the body that creates your Army will govern you. Theonly plan that will produce the result required is to give authorityover the making and using of the Army to a man or men who understandWar--War as it is to-day. In short, a Nation that is liable to Warrequires men of War in its Government, and, in the case of GreatBritain, the place for them is in the Cabinet. The traditional practiceof having a civilian Minister inside the Cabinet with all the authority, and a soldier with all the knowledge outside the Cabinet, was devisedfor electioneering purposes, and not for war. The plan has answered itsobject very well for many years, having secured Cabinets against anyintrusion of military wisdom upon their domestic party felicity. But nowthat the times have changed, and that the chief business of a Cabinet isto manage a war, it seems unwise to keep the military judgment lockedout. Party felicity was valuable some years ago when there was a demandfor it; but the fashions have changed. To-day the article in demand isnot eloquence nor the infallibility of "our side, " whichever that maybe; the article in demand to-day is the organisation of victory. That isnot to be had at all the shops. Those who can supply it are veryspecial men, who must be found and their price paid. The Nation hasgiven bail for the production of this particular article, and if it isnot forthcoming in time the forfeit must be paid. The bail is theBritish Empire. 

MORE AWAKENING

_December 21st_, 1899

A week ago, while we were thinking over failure in the Cape Colony onboth lines of advance, we could still hope for success on whatcircumstances had made the most important line, in Natal. But now therehas been failure in Natal also. 

Of the battle of Colenso Sir Redvers Buller's telegraphic despatch, though it probably does the commander less justice than he would havereceived at the hands of any other narrator, gives an authoritative ifmeagre account. The attack seems to have been planned rather as areconnaissance in force, to be followed up in case it should revealpossibilities of victory, than as a determined effort on whicheverything was to be staked. In all probability this form of action wasinevitable in the conditions. The Boers held a strong position, coveredin front by a river fordable at only two points. Such a position canhardly be reconnoitred except by attack. It could not be turned exceptby a long flank march, which, if successful would have occupied severaldays, during which the camp and railhead would have to be stronglyguarded. There is reason to believe that the force in Natal has not thetransport necessary to enable it to leave the railway for several days, during which it would be a flying column. Moreover, the Boers, being allmounted, could always place themselves across the path of any advance. Accordingly it is at least premature to assume that any course otherthan that which he adopted was open to Sir Redvers Buller. The mishap toa portion of the artillery will be better understood when the fullstory of the battle is accessible. Meanwhile Sir Redvers Buller'swithdrawal of the troops when he saw that success was unattainable haspreserved his force, and he is now awaiting reinforcement before againattempting an advance. The critical element in the position of affairsin Natal lies in the fact that time runs against the British. SirRedvers Buller and the Government no doubt know pretty accurately thedate up to which Sir George White can hold Ladysmith. If by that date hehas neither been relieved nor succeeded in fighting his way to theTugela his situation will be desperate. 

Lord Methuen has probably been as much hampered as Sir Redvers Buller bywant of transport. He, too, will not forget the importance of preservinghis force and his liberty of action, and will retire rather than awaitinvestment. 

Through the mists which always shroud a war during its progress the factis beginning to be visible that the British generals have been from thebeginning paralysed not, as anxious observers are always prone toconclude, by any want of knowledge or energy, but by the nature of theimplement in their hands. They have to fight an enemy of unprecedentedmobility. The Boers are all horsemen and can ride from point to pointmore than twice as fast as the British infantry can march; they live inBritish territory by requisitions or loot, and therefore can limit theirtransport train. But the British forces are restricted to a little morethan two miles an hour and to twelve or fifteen miles a day according tothe ground. There is everywhere a deficiency if not a complete lack oftransport, said to be due to the action of the Treasury during thesummer, and therefore every column is dependent for its food andammunition upon a line of railway, which a handful of Boers may at anymoment and at any point in its hundreds of miles temporarily interrupt. These considerations should be kept in view not merely in reviewing theconduct of the campaign and the work of the British generals, but aboveall in the preparations now being pushed forward throughout the Empire. The project of a Corps of Imperial Yeomanry is a step in the rightdirection. If it is to contribute to success due importance must begiven in the selection of the men to straight shooting, without whichgood riding can be of little use. Equally important, too, is theselection of leaders. The home-trained officer, however good, must notbe exclusively relied upon. Every local war we have had, beginning withthe campaigns against the French in America which led to the SevenYears' War, has proved the necessity of giving full scope to localexperience and local instincts. Old and new instances abound of the wayin which the neglect of the feelings of colonists and of their specialqualifications for special work rankles in breasts of a colonialpopulation. If, then, the new Yeomanry are to be of real service inSouth Africa and to deserve the name Imperial a proportion of theirofficers of all grades should be men of colonial birth and colonialexperience. The South African troops now at the front have done fineservice, and some of their officers might be promoted and transferred tothe new Yeomanry, their places being filled by promotions in the corpswhich they leave. The preparation of transport ought not to lag behindthe despatch of reinforcements. At the earliest possible moment theattempt should be made to send into the enemy's territory a great raidof horsemen, on the model of the raids of the American Civil War. A bodyof several thousand mounted men should march right through a part of theFree State, living upon the country, consuming every scrap of food, andclearing out every farm of all its provisions. If that operation can berepeated two or three times a belt of country will be left across whichthe Boers without transport will not be able to move, while the British, properly equipped, will not be delayed by its exhaustion. 

The plan adopted by the authorities for raising a volunteer contingentis more significant for the future of the National defences than has yetbeen realised. Each volunteer battalion is to supply a company to itsline battalion in the field and to keep a second company ready at homein reserve. Thus the volunteer force is to be used by being absorbedinto the Army. That leads inevitably to the amalgamation of thevolunteers with the regular Army, and is a death-blow to the specificcharacter of each of them. It means that henceforth the British Army, like other armies, will be homogeneous, containing no other categoriesthan men with the colours and men in reserves, classified according tothe immediacy of their liability to be called up. The volunteercommanding officer disappears, and with him the volunteer officer assuch. For now that it is known that the Government will employnon-professional officers only as company officers under professionalfield officers, no one will take a volunteer commission with the idea ofserving for many years from subaltern to commanding officer. What hashitherto been the volunteer force will therefore become a forceadministered by professional paid officers. It will cost more, and itwill become a branch of the Army. In short, the Government hasunwittingly taken a step of which the inevitable consequence isconscription. 

But from this follows another change, equally unsuspected by theMinistry. The day that the Nation discovers, as it is now beginning todiscover, that war makes its claims on every man and on every household, there will be no more toleration of the unskilled management that isinseparable from the practice of choosing a. Secretary of State for Warfor his ignorance of the subject. The British Nation is at lengthopening its eyes to the truth that war is a serious matter, and that theneglect of it in peace is costly in blood and perilous to the bodypolitic. When its eyes are wide open it will insist on putting knowledgein power over the Army and the Navy. Thus is coming about, to theinfinite benefit of the community, the overthrow of that noxious sham, the party politician. 

Late in the day, when the position has become what it is, theGovernment has thought of the elementary principle that if you want tocarry on a war you should begin by finding a commander in whom you haveconfidence. Accordingly at the eleventh hour Ministers have rememberedthat the Nation trusts Lord Roberts. This is proof positive that theGovernment was not in earnest before the late reverses, for had theybeen serious they would have appointed Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchenerat the outset. The precedent is useful by what it suggests; for, ifduring a war you can strengthen the military direction by giving theauthority to the man recognised as the most competent, you may alsostrengthen the political direction by a similar procedure. The Cabinethas thus, perhaps without suspicion of what it was doing, set before theNation the true problem: "Wanted, a Ministry competent in the managementof war. "

THE NATION'S BUSINESS

_December 28th_, 1899

War is the Nation's business and, when it comes, the most important partof the Nation's business. A Nation that for many years neglects thisbranch of its affairs is liable to suffer to any extent. The proverb, "astitch in time saves nine, " gives a very fair idea of the proportionbetween the amount of effort required in a properly-prepared andwell-conducted war, and the amount required when there has been previousneglect. 

There must be some way in which a national affair of such importance canbe properly managed, and just now it might be well to consider how anation can manage a war. Certainly not by the methods of politicaldecision to which recent developments of democracy have accustomed us. You cannot fight a campaign by consulting the constituencies or even theHouse of Commons before deciding whether a general shall move to hisright or his left, shall advance or retire, shall seek or shall avoid abattle. Neither can you settle by popular vote whether you will makeguns of wire or of fluid compressed steel, what formations your infantryshall adopt, whether the soldier is to give six hours a week to shootingand one to drill, or six to drill and one to shooting. 

Yet all these questions and many others must be settled, some duringpeace and some during war, and they must be settled correctly or elsethere will be defeat. In political matters the accepted test of what iscorrect is the opinion of the majority as expressed by votes in ageneral election, but in war the test of what is correct is the resultproduced upon the enemy. If his guns out-range yours, if his troops atthe point of collision defeat yours, there has been some error in thepreparation or in the direction, unless indeed the enemy is a State somuch stronger than your own that it was folly to go to war at all, andin that case there must have been an error of policy. The decisions uponwhich successful war depends turn upon matters which have no relationto the wishes or feelings of the majority; matters not of opinion but offact; matters about which eloquence is no guide, and in regard to whichthe truth cannot be ascertained from the ballot box, but only by thehard labour of prolonged study after previous training. For success inwar depends upon the troops being armed with the best weapons of theday, upon their being trained to use them in the most appropriatemanner, upon the amount of knowledge and practice possessed by thegenerals; upon a correct estimate of the enemy's forces, of theirarmament and tactics, and upon a true insight into the policy of thePowers with which quarrels are possible. 

A year ago it was known to many persons in this country, and theGovernment was informed by those whose, special duty it was to give theinformation, that the Boer States aimed at supremacy in South Africa, that they were heavily armed, that a large force would be required todefeat them, and that to postpone the quarrel would make the inevitablewar still more difficult. It was well understood also that thedifficulty lay in the probability that if a small force were sent itwould be exposed to defeat, while if a large one were sent its despatchwould precipitate the war. These were the facts known more than a yearago to those who wanted to know. Is it not clear that the Government'smanagement has been based upon something other than the facts; that theGovernment was all the time basing its action not upon the facts butupon speculations as to what might come out of future ballot-boxes? Theywere attending to their own mission, that of keeping in office, butneglecting the Nation's necessary business, that of dealing promptlywith the Boer assault upon British supremacy in South Africa. Theexplanation is simple. Every man in the Cabinet has devoted his lifesince he has been grown up to the art of getting votes for his party, either at the polls or in Parliament. Not one of them has given histwenty years to studying the art of managing a war. 

But a war cannot possibly be well managed by anyone who is not a masterof the art. Now and then there has been success by an amateur--a personwho, without being a soldier by profession, has made himself one; such aperson, for example, as Cromwell. Apart from rare instances of thatsort, the only plan for a Government which does not include among itsmembers a soldier, professional or amateur, is to choose a soldier ofone class or the other and to delegate authority to him. But this plandoes not always succeed, because sometimes a Government composed of menwho know nothing of war postpones calling in the competent man until toolate. There have been in our time two instances of this plan, onesuccessful and the other a failure. In 1882 Mr. Gladstone's Cabinetdrifted against its will and to its painful surprise into the Egyptianwar. The Cabinet when it saw that war had come gave Lord Wolseley afree hand and he was able to save them by the victory of Tel-el-Kebir. Ayear or two later, being anxious to avoid a Soudan war, they driftedslowly into it; but this time they were too late in giving Lord Wolseleyfull powers, and he was unable to save Gordon and Khartoum solelybecause he had not been called upon in time. The best analogy to thecourse then pursued is that of a sick person whose friends attempt toprescribe for him themselves until the disease takes a palpably virulentform, when they send for a doctor just in time to learn that thepatient's life could have been saved by proper treatment a week earlier, but that now there is no hope. For war requires competent management inadvance. There are many things which must be done, if they are to bedone in time, before the beginning of hostilities, and the more distantthe theatre of war the more necessary it may be to take measuresbeforehand. 

The management of a war can never be taken out of the hands of theGovernment, because the body which decides when to make preparationsis, by the fact that it has the power of making that decision, thesupreme authority. If, therefore, a Nation wishes to have reasonableassurance against defeat it must take means to provide the supremeauthority with a military judgment. The British system for a, long timeprofessed to do this by giving the Secretary of State for War a militaryadviser who was Commander-in-Chief. Such a plan might have worked oncondition that the Secretary of State kept the Commander-in-Chief fullyinformed of the state of negotiations with other Powers, and invariablyfollowed his advice in all matters relating to possible wars. Thecondition has never been fulfilled, and for many years, as there were noserious wars, the mischief of the neglect was not apparent except to thefew who understood war, and who have for many years been anxious. But in1895 the present Cabinet began its career under the inspiration of Mr. Balfour, who knows nothing of war, by giving the Secretary of Stateabsolute authority over the Army and all preparations for war so far asthe Army is concerned, and by formally declaring that the Secretary ofState could please himself whether he followed the advice of theCommander-in-Chief. Thus the Nation in its indifference allowed the fateof its next war to be entrusted to hands not qualified to direct a war, and allowed itself to be deprived of the means of knowing whose advicewas being followed in regard to the preparation of its defences. At thesame time a Committee of Defence was formed of members of the Cabinet, acommittee of untrained men, to settle the broad lines of the Nation'spreparations for the maintenance of the Empire. The results of theseremarkable arrangements are now manifest, and yet the cry is that thereis to be no change in the Government. 

But unless there is a thorough change as soon as possible, unless stepsare taken to find a man competent in the management of war and to givehim a place in the Cabinet, where he can keep the naval and militarypreparations abreast of the policy, or check, a policy for the executionof which adequate preparation cannot be made, what guarantee can theNation have that it will not shortly have a second war on its hands, orthat the war now begun will be brought to a successful end?

But if war as a branch of the Nation's affairs ought to be entrusted toa man competent in that branch, what about the tradition that anypolitician of eminence in the party is fit to be the Cabinet Minister atthe head of any branch of the public service? Is it not the truth thatthis tradition is bad and should be got rid of, and that every branch ofthe Nation's business has suffered from the practice of giving authorityfor its direction to a minister who has not been trained to understandit? The war will have been a great benefit if it leads to the universalrecognition of the plain fact that Jack of all trades is master ofnone, and that no branch of the public service can possibly be welldirected unless its director is thoroughly conversant with the businesswith which he is entrusted. So soon as the Nation grasps the idea thatdemocracy can fulfil its mission only when the electors are resolved tochoose leaders by their qualification for the work they have to do, theBritish Nation will resume the lead among the nations of the world. 

WANTED, THE MAN

_January 5th_, 1900

There has been no substantial, visible change in the military situationsince the battle of Colenso on December 15th. The actions of GeneralFrench at Colesberg and of Colonel Pilcher at Sunnyside are valuablemainly as evidence that with sound tactics the Boers are by no meansinvincible, and that British troops only require intelligent leading tobe as capable of the best work as any troops in the world. GeneralFrench, however, until the hour at which I write had not finished hiswrestle with the Boers at Colesberg, and until it is over no militaryaction can be classed either as success or failure. Colonel Pilcher'sopponents were colonial rebels, probably not as good as Transvaal Boers, who have had in peace more rifle practice. The losses were small, proving that the resistance of the enemy was by no means desperate, andas the retreating force was not pursued the defeat was not crushing. Colonel Pilcher by the temporary occupation of Douglas reaped the fruitsof his victory, but the whole small campaign is of no very greatimportance, as the possession of the triangle between the railway andthe Riet and Orange Rivers depends in the ultimate issue not upon theevent of local skirmishes, but on the issue of the decisive fightingbetween the British Army and the forces of the Republics. Lord Methuen'scommunications appear to be now well organized and guarded, so that hisposition need cause no special anxiety. A good deal depends on theoutcome of the struggle between General French and the Colesberg Boers, for, while a Boer defeat would render the line from the Cape to OrangeRiver quite safe, a Boer victory would endanger not only Naauwpoort butDe Aar. General Gatacre's cue should be to risk nothing. If he waitswhere he is and merely holds his own until the sixth division is readyfor use no harm will have been done; if he makes any mistakes theconsequences may be more than the sixth division can remedy. The centreof interest still lies between Ladysmith and Frere. The tone of thetelegrams from Ladysmith, which declare that though the bombardment hasbeen more effective since Christmas, and through dysentary and entericfever are busy, "all is yet well, " proves that the situation of SirGeorge White's force is critical, and may at any moment becomedesperate. The Boers by occupying and fortifying positions south of theTugela have taken the best means of making sure that Sir RedversBuller's advance, even if successful, shall be delayed and the timetaken over it prolonged. The Boer commander sees clearly that hispresent object is to delay Sir Redvers Buller, so as to gain the timeneeded to bring about the fall of Ladysmith. If that can be secured thenext question will be how to damage Sir Redvers Buller. Of the prospectsof Sir Redvers Buller's attack no estimate can be made. He is strongerthan he was by the greater part of Sir Charles Warren's division, and itis to be hoped, by plenty of heavy artillery and by an organisedtransport; but the Boers are stronger than they were by a new position, by three weeks of fortification, and by the consciousness of their lastvictory. Upon Sir Redvers Buller's fate depends more than anyone caresto say. If he wins and relieves Ladysmith the success of Great Britainin the war will be assured, though the operations may be prolonged formonths; but if he should again fail there is no prospect of successexcept by exertions of which the Government as yet has not shown thefaintest conception. His action can hardly be completed in a singlebattle or in a day; the first telegrams, therefore, need not necessarilybe taken as giving the result; more probably his operations, except inthe most unfavourable case, will be continuous for something like aweek. 

For the Nation there is a question even more vital than the fate of SirRedvers Buller, and more practical. Nothing that was at home can do canaffect the impending battle by the Tugela. The issue of that battle, asof the war, though it is not yet known and can be revealed only by theevent, is in reality already settled, for it depends on the proportionof the forces of the two sides, which has been determined by Britishstrategy and cannot now be modified, upon the qualities, armament, andtraining of the troops, which are the results of the conditions of theirenlistment, organisation, and education, and upon the judgment and willof Sir Redvers Buller, also the outcome of his training and of the Armysystem. But whatever happens on the Tugela the British Nation has itsto-morrow, a very black one in case of a defeat, and a very difficultone even in case of victory, for all the great Powers are for evercompetitors for the possession and government of the world, and GreatBritain having shown a weakness, expected by others though unsuspectedby her own people, will in future be hard beset. The Russians have justmoved a division from the Caucasus towards the Afghan frontier, whichportends trouble for India. The Austrians, as well as the Germans aresetting out to build an extra fleet--what for? Because the AustrianGovernment, like the German and Italian Governments, know, what ourrecent Governments have never known, that Great Britain has for two orthree centuries been the balance weight or fly-wheel of the Europeanmachine, by reason of the prescience with which her Navy was handled. Those Governments now see that statesmanship has gone from us; theydivine that the great Navy we now possess cannot be used by a timid andignorant Government, and that no reliance can be placed upon GreatBritain to play her own true game. Accordingly, they see that they muststrengthen their own navies with a view to the possible collapse of theBritish Power. In the near future the maintenance of the British Empiredepends upon the Nation's having a Government at once far-seeing andresolute, capable of great resolves and prompt action. Of such aGovernment there is, however, no immediate prospect. The present Cabinethas given its testimonials: a challenge sent to the Boers by aGovernment that did not know it was challenging anyone, that did notknow the adversary's strength, nor his determination to fight; and a warbegun in military ignorance displayed by the Cabinet, and carried on byhalf measures until the popular determination compelled three-quartermeasures. Does anyone suppose that this Cabinet, that did not know itsmind till the Boers declared war, knows or will know its mind about theconflict with Russia in Asia, or about any other of the troubles, foreseen and unforeseen, which await us? A victory in Natal would savethe Cabinet and drown the voices of its critics; and in that case thepresent leaders will infallibly go halting and irresolute into thegreater contests that are coming. A defeat in Natal would destroy theGovernment at once if there were before the public a single man in whosejudgment and character there was confidence; but there is no such man, and, as the Opposition leaders are discredited by their conduct inregard to the quarrel with the Boers, the present set will remain attheir posts to continue the traditional policy of waiting to be drivenby public opinion. The Nation, therefore, has before it a necessary taskas urgent as that of reinforcing the Army in the field, which is to findthe man in whose judgment as to war and policy as well as in whosecharacter it can place confidence. 

The man to be trusted is, unfortunately, not Lord Wolseley. I have foryears fought his battle by urging that the Government ought to followthe advice of its military adviser, a theory of which the corollary isthat the adviser must resign the moment he is overruled. I have nevermeant that the adviser is to be a dictator, nor that the Cabinet shouldfollow advice of the soundness of which it is not convinced. The Cabinethas the responsibility and ought never to act without full conviction. The expert who cannot convince a group of intelligent non-experts that anecessary measure is necessary is not as expert as he should be; and ifhe still retains his post after he has been overruled on a measure whichhe regards as necessary he has not the strength of character which isindispensable for great responsibility. Now, though the relation betweena Cabinet and its advisers ought to be secret, in the present case eachside has let the cat out of the bag. Lord Wolseley's friends defend himby declaring that he has been overruled. But that defence kills him. Ifhe has been overruled on a trifle it does not matter, and the defenceis a quibble; if he has been overruled on an essential point why is hestill Commander-in-Chief? No answer can be devised that is not fatal tohis case. Lord Lansdowne's friend, for such Lord Ernest Hamilton may bepresumed to be, says: "Supposing, for the sake of argument, that theshort-comings of the War Office in and before the present war were duenot to neglect of military counsels, but to the adoption of suchcounsels, contrary to the more far-seeing judgment of the civil side. "That is a condemnation of the civilian Minister and of the Cabinet, forno man in charge of the Nation's affairs ought to take theresponsibility for a decision of the soundness of which he is notconvinced. If Lord Lansdowne disagreed with Lord Wolseley and was notprepared to ask for that officer's retirement, why did he not himselfretire rather than make himself responsible for measures which hethought wrong or mistaken? These are not personal criticisms or attacks. Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne have both of them in the past renderedsplendid services to the Nation. But the Empire is at stake, and awriter's duty is to set forth and apply the principles which he believesto be sound, without being a respecter of persons yet with that respectfor every man, especially for every public man, which is the besttradition of our National life. What at the present moment ought not tobe tolerated is what Lord Ernest Hamilton suggests, an attack upon thegenerals at the front, to save the War Office or the Cabinet; and whatis needed is that the Ministers should choose a war adviser who canconvince them, even though to find him they have to pass over a hundredgenerals and select a colonel, a captain, or a crammer. 

THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR

_January 11th_, 1900

The arrival of Lord Roberts at Cape Town announces the approachingbeginning of a new chapter in the war, though the second chapter is notyet quite finished. 

The first chapter was the campaign of Sir George White with sixteenthousand men against the principal Boer army. It ended with Sir GeorgeWhite's being surrounded in Ladysmith and there locked up. 

The second chapter began with the arrival of. Sir Redvers Buller at CapeTown. It may be reviewed under two headings: the conception and theexecution of the operations. When Sir Redvers Buller reached the Cape, the force which he was expecting, and of which he had the control, consisted altogether of nearly sixty thousand regular troops, besidesCape and colonial troops. There was an Army Corps, thirty-five thousand, a cavalry division, five thousand, troops for the defence ofcommunications, ten thousand, and troops at the Cape amounting to eightthousand, some of whom were at Mafeking and Kimberley. After deductingfourteen thousand men for communications and garrisons at the Cape, thecommander had at his disposal for use in the field about forty-fourthousand regular troops arranged as a cavalry brigade, seven brigades ofinfantry, and corps troops. 

There were many tasks before the British general. Southern Natal wasbeing invaded and had to be cleared of the enemy; the Cape Colony, too, had to be freed from its Boer visitors, and the rising of the Cape Dutchstopped. Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking were all awaiting relief, and last, but not least, the Boer armies had to be beaten, and the twoRepublics conquered. The strategical problem was how to accomplish allthese tasks at once, if possible, and if that could not be done, to sortthem in order of importance and deal with them in that order. Theessential thing was not to violate any of those great principles whichthe experience of a hundred wars and the practice of a dozen greatgenerals have proved to be fundamental. The leading principle is thatwhich enjoins concentration of effort in time, space, and object. Do onething at a time and do it with all your might. If the list of tasks beexamined it will be seen that there is a connection between them all, and that the connecting link is the Boer army. Suppose the Boer army tobe removed from the scene every one of the other aims would be easy ofaccomplishment. There would then be no invaders in either colony;Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking would be safe, and the troops inthose places free to march where they pleased; the Cape rising could besuppressed at leisure, and the British general could at his conveniencego to Pretoria and set up a fresh government. No other of the tasks hadthis same quality of dominating the situation; any one of them might beaccomplished without great or immediate effect upon those that wouldremain. For this reason wisdom prescribed as the simplest way ofaccomplishing the seven or eight tasks the accomplishment of the firstor last, the destruction of the Boer army. That army was in three parts:there was a fraction on the western border of the Free State, a fractionsouth of the Orange River, and the great bulk of the whole force was innorthern Natal. Destroy the principal mass, and you could then at yourleisure deal with the two smaller pieces. Everything pointed to anattempt to crush the Boer army then in Natal. 

There were two ways of getting at that army which was holding Ladysmithin its grip. One was along the railway from Durban, one hundred andeighty-nine miles long; it was sure to bring the British Army face toface with the Boers at the Tugela. That point reached, either the Boerswould stand to fight and, therefore, give the opportunity of crushingthem, or they would retreat, in which case Ladysmith would be relieved, and the British force, strengthened by White's division, would bewithin three hundred miles of Pretoria. A great victory in Natal wouldsave Natal, stop the Cape rising, and, if followed up, draw the Boerforces away from Kimberley and the Cape Colony. 

The other way was to follow the railway line or lines from the Capeports, to collect the Army on the Orange River and advance toBloemfontein, and thence towards Pretoria or towards the western exitsfrom the passes through the Drakensberg mountains. This plan, however, gave no immediate certainty of an opportunity to attack the Boer army. The British force could be assembled on the Orange River no sooner thanon the south bank of the Tugela. But from the Orange River toBloemfontein there would be a march of one hundred and twenty miles, andthe Boer army was not at Bloemfontein. There was a probability that whenthe British force reached Bloemfontein the Boer army might leave Natal, but the probability did not amount to certainty; it rested upon a guessor hypothesis of what the Boer general or the Free State Government andits troops would think. Supposing, however, that these persons did notthink as was expected; that they determined to complete the conquest ofNatal (except Durban, which was protected by the fleet), and to keeptheir grip upon Ladysmith, at any rate until the British force wasnearing the passes of the Drakensberg or crossing the Vaal, and then, but not till then, to retreat to Middleburg? In that case the purpose ofthe advance, the crushing of the Boer army, might be deferred for a verylong time, and meanwhile every one of the minor tasks, except the reliefof Kimberley and the repulse of the Free State invaders of the Cape, would be left over. Ladysmith might fall, and its fall stimulate theCape rising and endanger the communications of the British forceadvancing north of the Orange River. 

These were the two plans, and I confess that my own judgment at thebeginning of November inclined to the former, though, as I am awarethat most of those whose strategical judgment I respect hold a decidedopinion the other way, I cannot be dogmatic. The prevalent opinionattaches more importance than I can persuade myself to do to thedifficulties of the hilly and mountainous country of northern Natal. There is, moreover, a reserve imposed upon observers at home by ourignorance of the state of the transport services of the British forces. No concentration of troops is profitable if the troops when collectedcannot be fed. 

Subject to these reserves it may be said that Sir Redvers Buller at thebeginning of November had to choose between two lines of operations, that by Natal and that by the Cape. The cardinal principle is that youmust never divide your force between two lines of operations unless itis large enough to give you on each of the two lines an assuredsuperiority to the enemy's whole force. Sir Redvers Buller's design, however, violated this principle. He neither determined upon action withall his might through the Cape Colony nor upon action with all hismight through Natal, but divided his effort, directing four of his sevenbrigades to Natal and the other three towards the Orange River; half hiscavalry brigade going to Colesberg, and a mixed force of thecommunication troops to Sterkstrom on the East London line. 

This design gave no promise of effecting the dominant task, the crushingof the Boer army, though it aimed at grappling in detail with several ofthe subordinate tasks; but its execution proved as indecisive as itsconception. In Natal the main force under Sir Redvers Buller himselfcompletely failed in the attack on the Boer army at Colenso on December15th; Lord Methuen's advance for the relief of Kimberley came to astandstill at the Modder River, and met with a serious repulse atMagersfontein; while the smaller parties of Gatacre and French have madelittle headway against the Free State troops and the rebellious Capefarmers. 

The fifth division, the bulk of which was directed to Natal, has beenadded to Sir Redvers Buller's force, without having enabled him as yetto strike the decisive blow or even to prevent a determined assault uponLadysmith by the Boer army. That assault is believed to be nowimpending, and its delivery will close the second chapter of the war. IfSir Redvers Buller can win his battle in Natal while Sir George White isstill unconquered, the military power of the Boers will receive a greatshock, and the issue of the war will no longer be doubtful, though itsend may be distant. But if Sir Redvers Buller should again fail theresult must be to leave Sir George White's force in extreme peril, togive the Boer forces the spirit of a veteran and victorious army, and toencourage the Dutch element at the Cape to take an active part againstthe British. 

This is the situation which confronts Lord Roberts on his arrival at theCape. The problem bears a general resemblance to that which Sir RedversBuller had to solve at the beginning of November, but there areimportant differences. Lord Roberts has in hand only a brigade, thetwelfth or first of the sixth division, which has just reached CapeTown; he has to expect the rest of the sixth division, the seventh, apossible eighth, and a considerable extra force of mounted troops and ofartillery; but the arrival of these forces will be gradual, and he willhave no mass of fresh troops until the beginning of next month. Eventhen he may not have the means of feeding on the march the newly-arriveddivisions. Meantime a British victory in Natal would be more valuable, aBritish defeat there more disastrous than ever. The effort ought to bemade if there is a reasonable probability of success, for though failurewould have disastrous consequences, material and moral, the admission ofhelplessness involved in making no attempt would depress the hearts ofthe British troops perhaps as fatally as a lost battle. 

The first decision required is whether Sir Redvers Buller's force is totry its fate once more. In all probability that decision has been madewhile Lord Roberts was at sea, and according to the event will be thesituation with which the new Commander-in-Chief will have to deal. Avictory in Natal will make his task easy; a failure will put before hima problem the fortunate solution of which would be a triumph for anycommander. 

THE DECISIVE BATTLE

_January 18th_, 1900

Yesterday began the action upon which in all probability depends thefuture course of the war. By the time these lines are in the reader'shands more will be known of the battle that can be guessed to-day by thewisest, though several days may pass before the result is fully known. 

Sir Redvers Buller on Wednesday, the 10th, had under his command threeinfantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, some two thousand mountedinfantry, and probably altogether about eighty guns. Clery's divisionconsists of Hildyard's and Lyttelton's brigades; the third division, comprising Hart's and Barton's brigades, is not known to have had acommander appointed; Warren's division is composed of Woodgate's brigadeand of half of Coke's brigade, to which another half may have been addedby taking two battalions which have been some time in Natal, and belongneither to Clery's nor to the third division. The whole force ought tobe thirty thousand strong for a fight, taking the division at ninethousand instead of ten thousand, for though there have been lossesthere have also been drafts to fill up gaps. A party of mounted troopsprobably one thousand strong is reported to have been detached a fewdays ago by rail to Stanger on the coast near the mouth of the Tugela, and thence to have disappeared on a mission of which the purpose is asyet unknown, though it looks like a raid upon the railway between Dundeeand Newcastle. The strength of the Boers in Natal has never beenaccurately known, and the estimates differ widely, ranging fromthirty-five thousand to more than double that number. Sir George Whitemay have nine thousand effectives at Ladysmith and might be contained byfifteen thousand Boers, perhaps by a smaller number. There will, therefore, be available against Sir Redvers Buller a force on the lowestestimate about equal to his own, and possibly outnumbering it by two toone. 

On Wednesday, the 10th, the British force started westward. No telegramas yet gives its distribution, but it is plain that Clery's and Warren'sdivisions moved out, together with the cavalry brigade and whatevermounted infantry had not been sent south. Hart's and Barton's brigades, or one of them, with a proportion of artillery may be assumed to havebeen left in the entrenchments which face Colenso and cover the Britishline of communications by the railway. On Thursday morning LordDundonald with the cavalry brigade and some of the mounted infantry wasin possession of the hills overlooking Potgieter's Drift and of the pontor ferry-boat. The same day the infantry or the leading division, Clery's, was in the hills north of Springfield. Lord Dundonald's forcecommanded the river at Potgieter's Drift, and the crossing there wasthus assured. A pause of four days followed: a pause probably not ofinaction, but of strenuous preparation in order to make the finaladvance vigorous. During those days, no doubt, supplies would beaccumulated at Springfield Bridge Camp, at Spearman's Farm, and at somepoint near to the next drift to the west. This would save delays whenthe advance began, for if the force depended upon magazines at Frere thetransport would break down in the advance beyond the Tugela, whereas ifthe transport had in the later stages merely to start from the southside of the Tugela, the force could be kept supplied for a few days. Lord Dundonald was engaged in strengthening his position at Zwart's Kop, so that in any case there would be a secure retreat across the river ifneed be. The river itself seems also to have been properly reconnoitred. 

The enemy's position could be seen four or five miles to the north, andhe was known on Thursday to be strongly entrenched. A passage forWarren's division was chosen at Trichardt's Drift five miles abovePotgieter's and near to Wagon Drift which is marked on the sketch mapissued by the Intelligence Division. From Trichardt's Drift there isevidently a road leading into the Bethany-Dewdrop Road, and parallel tothat which runs from Potgieter's Drift. On Tuesday, the 16th, Lyttelton's brigade of infantry with a battery of howitzers crossed theTugela at Potgieter's Drift and gained a line of hills to the north, probably the edge of the plateau on which lies the Boer position. Thetelegrams say nothing of bridge-making at Potgieter's Drift, but areexplicit as to the crossing of at least some of the artillery. OnWednesday General Lyttelton shelled the Boer position with howitzers andnaval guns without drawing a reply. This silence of the Boer guns iscorrect for the defenders of a position, as a reply would enable theassailant to fix the position of the guns and to concentrate his fireupon them. The same day (Wednesday) Warren's division crossed the Tugelaat Trichardt's Drift, and driving in the enemy's outposts secured alodgment on the low wooded hills about a mile north of the river; thisdivision, after its advance guard had crossed, was passed over by apontoon bridge. The remainder of yesterday may have been spent inreconnaissance, bridge building--for an army that has crossed a riverneeds to have behind it as many bridges as possible--in bringing up allthe forces destined for the battle, perhaps including Hildyard'sbrigade, and in making complete arrangements for the attack which wasprobably delivered this morning. 

Sir Redvers Buller has aimed his blow in a right direction, for, if itcan be delivered with effect, if he can drive the Boers back, their armywill be in a perilous situation. The plan evidently is that whileClery's division holds the Boers in front, Warren's should strike upontheir right flank. If, then, the combined attack of the two divisionsforces the Boers back the situation would be that the Boer army wouldhave to retreat eastward across the Klip River, its retreat in any otherdirection being barred by the defences of Ladysmith, by Warren's andClery's divisions, and by the British force in the lines at Chieveley. In such a situation a forced retreat would be disastrous for the Boers, as Sir Redvers Buller's two divisions would be nearer to the Boer lineof retreat through Glencoe than the Boer army. 

Of the probabilities of success it would be rash to speak. But thoughnumbers are against the British we must never forget the splendidqualities which British troops have displayed in the past and which, asthe actions of this war have proved, are possessed by our officers andmen to-day. The experiences of the last few weeks have taught them whatare the formations to avoid and have shown them that they shoot at leastas well as the Boers. We may, therefore, hope for victory even againstnumbers. 

But even if Sir Redvers Buller finds positions as strong as that atColenso, the Boers will probably be baulked of their prey, the garrisonof Ladysmith. Sir George White has with him the flower of the BritishArmy, and he does not mean to be reduced by degrees to the extremity offamine and helplessness. During Sir Redvers Buller's attack theLadysmith's force will not be idle, but will attack the Boers who areinvesting the place. Signals must have been prearranged between the twocommanders, and it can hardly be doubted that if and when Sir GeorgeWhite should have reason to believe that Sir Redvers Buller may beunable to force his way through the Boer positions he would himself setout to cut his way through the investing lines, and at whateversacrifice to carry the remnant of his force into Sir Redvers Buller'scamp, and thus to vindicate the honour of the British arms and thecharacter of the British soldier. 

SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS

_January 25th_, 1900

The decisive operation is proceeding slowly but surely. On Wednesday, the 10th, Lord Dundonald reached the south bank of the Tugela atPotgieter's Drift, and on Thursday a brigade of infantry was up withhim. A week later, on Wednesday, the 17th, Lyttelton's brigade crossedby the drift, and Warren's wing of the Army began the passage by apontoon bridge at Trichardt's or Wagon Drift. On Thursday, the 18th, Dundonald was on the high road west of Acton Homes, and drove away aparty of Boers. 

North of the Tugela there is a great crescent-shaped plateau three orfour miles across at the widest part. The crescent has its convex sideto the south-west. One of its horns touches the Acton Homes--Ladysmithroad; its broadest part bulges south towards the river bank betweenWagon Drift and the loop near Potgieter's Drift; its other limb isbroken into irregular heights, Brakfontein kopje apparently marking itssouth-eastern apex. On the concave north-eastern side Spion Kop is aboutat the centre, and is four miles north of Wagon Drift. The plateau isthree or four hundred feet above the river and Spion Kop about the sameheight above the plateau. Near the northern apex rises the BlaauwbankRiver, which flows eastward towards Ladysmith along the foot of an eastand west range, a spur from the Drakensberg mountains jutting out so asto separate the Van Reenen's road and valley from the valley followed bythe Acton Homes--Ladysmith road. 

When Warren crossed the river he found the western half of the crescentheld by the enemy. 

Whatever his original design, which may have been to take his wholeforce to Acton Homes, and then march eastward along the road, he had todrive the Boers from the plateau. His action was deliberate, withouthurry, but without waste of time. The troops had been prepared fortactics better suited to their weapons, the bullet and the shell, to theenemy's weapons, and to the ground, than the rapid advance and charge, which was the plan of earlier actions in this war. The view that thebullet should do its work before the appeal to the bayonet is made hadat length asserted itself. Moreover, the need for method in attack hadbeen recognised; first reconnaissance, then shelling; during theshelling the deployment of the infantry in extended and flexible order, then the musketry duel supported by the artillery; and then, as theinfantry fire proves stronger than the enemy's, an advance from point topoint in order to bring it to closer and more deadly range; last of all, if and where it may be needed, the charge. These sound tactics--theonly tactics appropriate to modern firearms--cannot be hurried, for tocharge men armed with the magazine rifle and not yet shaken is tosacrifice your troops to their own bravery. 

Warren's attack then was rightly deliberate. On Friday, the 19th, he wasreconnoitring and feeling for the enemy. On Saturday the shooting matchbegan. It was continued throughout Sunday, and was not over on Tuesday. During these days the British were making way, gradually and not withoutloss, but steadily. There were, no doubt, pauses for renewing order, forreinforcing, and for securing the ground won. On Tuesday evening SpionKop was still held by the Boers, who seem even then not to have beendriven off the plateau, but to have been clinging to its eastern edge. On Tuesday night Spion Kop was taken. It was assaulted, probably in thedark, by surprise, and the Boers driven off. Even on Wednesday the Boerswere tenaciously resisting the advance, making heavy attacks on SpionKop and using their artillery with effect. At midnight betweenWednesday and Thursday Sir Redvers Duller telegraphed home Sir CharlesWarren's opinion that the enemy's position had been rendered untenable, and added his own judgment of the behaviour of the British troops in thewords, "the men are splendid. "

All through the week Lyttelton's brigade has been facing a force of theenemy on the eastern limb of the plateau in front of Potgieter's Drift. He has not pressed an attack but has kept his infantry back, not pushingthem forward to close range, but contenting himself with shelling theBoer positions. 

Sir Redvers Buller before the troops left the camps beside the railwayhad six infantry brigades. There are indications in the telegrams of areorganisation and redistribution of battalions among the brigades, sothat it is hardly safe to speak with certainty as to the presentcomposition and distribution of the commands. Apparently the left wingunder Warren consists of three or four infantry brigades, the cavalrybrigade, and most of the mounted infantry, and five or six batteries. Sir Charles Warren himself appears to keep the general direction of thiswing in his own hands. Sir F. Clery either commands a division (twobrigades), the third brigade being led by its brigadier, under SirCharles Warren's direction, or Sir F. Clery is supervising the whole ofthe infantry advance. Lyttelton has his own brigade, and Barton'sbrigade covers the railhead at Chieveley. That accounts for five of thesix brigades. The sixth is Coke's, of Warren's division. We do not atpresent know whether this is with Warren on the left wing or with Dulleras a general reserve to be put in to the fight at the decisive moment. 

The great difficulties of day-after-day fighting, which has beenregarded for some years as the normal character of future battles, is tosecure for the men the food and rest without which they must sooncollapse, and to ensure the continuous supply of ammunition. If thesedifficulties can be overcome Sir Redvers Bullers has a good chance ofsuccess in his endeavour to relieve Ladysmith. Once driven from theplateau by Warren, the Boers must retire several miles before they canreach a second defensive position, and their retirement may be hastenedby pressure on their flanks, which is to be expected from Dundonald'smounted infantry and cavalry, probably now on the right or northernflank of the Boer line, as well as from Lyttelton on their left. A smallreinforcement would give a fresh impetus to the British advance. IfCoke's brigade has not yet been engaged Sir Redvers Buller will knowwhen and where to use it--either to reinforce Lyttelton for a blowagainst the Boer line of retreat or to reinforce Warren's left. Thearrival of the _Kildonan Castle_ at Durban this morning, as far as weknow, with drafts for some of the battalions, is better than nothing, for the drafts will give fresh vigour to the bodies that receive them. They cannot reach the fighting line before Saturday, but their arrivalthen may be most opportune. Still better would it be if a fresh brigadeshould arrive while the struggle continues. There was at least a brigadeavailable at Cape Town a few days ago, and it could not have been betteremployed than in strengthening Buller at any point where he can feed it, at Chieveley if not as a reinforcement to Warren or Lyttelton, for afresh brigade at Chieveley would enable Barton to put pressure on theBoers in his front. 

Supposing that Warren has by this time compelled the retreat of theBoers from the plateau for which he has been fighting, what can theBoers do to resist Buller's further advance? They must try to hold asecond position. Two such positions appear to be open to them, if we mayjudge by the not very full maps available. The line of hills fromBulbarrow Hill on the north to the hill near Arnot Hill Farm on thesouth might give good opportunities for defence; it blocks the road toLadysmith, for the Boers occupying the line would be right across theseroads. Another plan would be for the Boers to retreat to the north-easton to the east and west ridge, which commands from the north the ActonHomes--Dewdrop road. If the Boers took this position the roads toLadysmith, or to the rear of the investing lines, would be open. But SirRedvers Buller could not advance along them with the Boer forcesmenacing his flank, and he would be obliged either to attack them or tocontain them by extending a force along their front to hold its groundagainst them while he pushed the rest of his force towards Ladysmith. Whether this would be a prudent plan for the Boers depends upon theirnumbers, and if they are strong enough they might combine both plans. 

It is, however, by no means certain that Lord Dundonald is unable toprevent the Boers from crossing the Blaauwbank Spruit. He has not beenheard of for a week, and has had plenty of time to have his force inposition to the north of Clydesdale Farm, unless, indeed, he has beenkept in hand behind Warren's left flank ready for pursuit after thecapture of the great plateau. 

The situation continues to be critical, and must be so until the fateof Ladysmith is decided. Our own men are justifying to the full theconfidence reposed in them; what men can do they will accomplish. Butthe Boers are fighting stubbornly, and may be able to wear out SirRedvers Buller's force before their own resistance collapses. We at homemust wait patiently, hoping for the best but prepared for fresh efforts. At least we ought all now to realise that the splendid behaviour of oursoldiers in the field lays upon us as citizens the duty of securing forthe future the best possible treatment of those who are so generous oftheir lives. 

THE ELEVENTH HOUR

_February 1st_, 1900

If on Tuesday the Bank of England had announced that it could not meetits obligations I imagine that there would have been a certain amount ofuneasiness in the City and elsewhere, and that some at least of the richmen to be found in London would have put their heads together to seewhat could be done to meet a grave emergency. 

On Tuesday a failure was indeed announced--a failure which must involvethe Bank of England and most of the great banking and tradingcorporations of this country. But no one seems to have taken action uponit, and I see no visible sign of general alarm. The Prime Minister, speaking in his place in the House of Lords and on behalf of theNational Government, said: "I do not believe in the perfection of theBritish Constitution as an instrument of war ... It is evident there issomething in your machinery that is wrong. " That was Lord Salisbury'sexplanation and defence of the failure of his Government in thediplomacy which preceded the war, in the preparations for the war, andin the conduct of the war. It was a declaration of bankruptcy--a plainstatement by the Government that it cannot govern. The announcement wasnot made to Parliament with closed doors and the reporters excluded. Itwas made to the whole world, to the British Nation, and to all therivals of Great Britain. Parliament did not take any action upon thedeclaration. No committee of both Houses was formed to consider howwithout delay to make a Government that can govern. The ordinary normalroutine of public and private life goes on. Thus in the crisis of theNation's fate we are ungoverned and unled, and to all appearance we arecontent to be so, and the leader-writers trained in the tradition ofrespectable formalism interpret the Nation's apathy as fortitude. 

Lord Salisbury's confession of impotence was true. From the beginningto the end of this business the Government has lacked the manliness todo its plain duty. In the first half of July, before the officialreports of the Bloemfontein conference were published, everyone but thedisciples of Mr. Morley knew that the only honourable course, after theGovernment's declaration prior to the conference and after what theretook place, was to insist on the acceptance by the South AfricanRepublic of the Bloemfontein proposals and to back up that insistence byadequate military preparations. It is admitted that this was not done, and what is the excuse now made? Mr. Balfour told the House of Commonson Tuesday, January 30th, that if in August a vote of credit had beendemanded "we should not have been able to persuade the House that thenecessity for the vote was pressing and urgent. " The Government chargedwith the defence of the Empire excuses itself for not having madepreparations for that task on the ground that perhaps the House ofCommons would not have given its approval. Yet the Government had agreat majority at its back, and there is no instance in recent times ofa vote of credit having been rejected by the House of Commons. Thisshameful cowardice was exhibited although, as we now know but could notthen have imagined, the Government had in its possession the protest ofthe Government of Natal against the intention of the Imperial Governmentto abandon the northern portion of that colony. The Natal Ministers onJuly 25th confidentially communicated their extreme surprise at learningthat in case of sudden hostilities it would not be possible with thegarrison and colonial forces available to defend the northern portion ofthe colony. 

After shilly-shallying from May to September the Government began itspreparations, and the Boers as soon as they were ready began the war. Ofthe conduct of the war the readers of _The London Letter_ have had anaccount week by week, as to the truth of which they can judge forthemselves, for the facts are there by which it can be tested. Theattempt has been made to refrain from any criticism which could hurt thefeelings of the generals, who are doing their duty to the best of theirpower in most trying circumstances. But is it not plain that the BritishArmy has been hampered by a lack of sound strategy and of sound tacticssuch as indicate prolonged previous neglect of these branches of studyand training? Who is responsible to the Nation for the training of theArmy? The Government and the Government alone. If any militaryofficer has not done his work effectively--if, for example, theCommander-in-Chief has not taught his generals rightly or notselected them properly--who is responsible to Parliament for that?Not the officer, even if he be the Commander-in-Chief, for theCommander-in-Chief is the servant of the Cabinet and responsible to theCabinet, which if it were dissatisfied with him ought to have dismissedhim. Authority over the Army is in the hands of the Secretary of Statefor War as the delegate of the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne has held his postonly since 1895, and cannot be held responsible for the training of theolder generals; but before him came Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who forsome years had charge of the preparation of the Army for war as thedelegate of the late Cabinet. For the state of the Army, for thestrategical and tactical training which has resulted in so manyfailures, the politicians of both front benches, who in turn haveneglected these vital matters, are responsible. 

Here we are, then, in the middle of the war, without a Government, butwith a body of men who fill the place of a Government while admittingthemselves incompetent to do the work entrusted to them and for whichthey are paid. The war so far has consisted of a succession of repulses, which at any moment may culminate in disaster. Sir Redvers Buller hastwice led his Army to defeat and is about to lead it a third time--towhat? Possibly to victory; we all hope that it may be to victory. Butpossibly to a third defeat which would mean not merely the loss of theforce at Ladysmith; it would mean that Sir Redvers Buller's Army in itsturn would need succour, and that the plan, so much favoured by thestrategists of the Army, of a march through the Free State would behampered. For the final and decisive defeat of Sir Redvers Buller wouldbe followed by the long-deferred general rising of the Cape Dutch, andprobably enough by the action of one or more of the European Powers. _The Times_ of to-day announces that a foreign Government has ordered alarge supply of steam coal from the Welsh collieries. That can mean butone thing, that some foreign Power is getting its Navy ready for action. 

What, then, is the situation to-day? That any day may bring the gravestnews from South Africa, to be followed possibly by an ultimatum from aforeign coalition. In that event the Nation will have to choose betweenabandoning its Empire in obedience to foreign dictation, an abandonmentwhich would mean National ruin, and a war for existence, a war for whichno preparation has been made, which the Government is incompetent toconduct, and which would begin by a naval conflict during which it wouldbe impossible to assist the Army in South Africa. That is the situation. It may take a turn for better; you cannot be quite sure that a stormwhich you see brewing may not pass off, but the probabilities are thatthe struggle for existence is at hand. What then is our duty, the dutyof every one of us? To support the Government which cannot govern? Notfor a moment, but to get rid of it as soon as possible and to make atonce a Government that will try. Lord Rosebery at least sees thesituation and understands the position. There is no other public man whocommands such general confidence, and it is practically certain that ifthe Cabinet were compelled to resign by an adverse vote of the House ofCommons Lord Rosebery would be the first statesman to be consulted bythe Queen. Lord Rosebery could make a Government to-morrow if he wouldignore parties and pick out the competent men wherever they are to befound. Any new Cabinet, except one containing Mr. Morley or Sir HenryCampbell-Bannerman, would be given a chance. The House of Commons wouldwait a few weeks to see how it bore itself. If there were promptevidences of knowledge and will in the measures adopted, even thoughhalf the Ministers or all of them except Lord Rosebery were new men, there would soon be a feeling of confidence, and the Nation, knowingthat it was led, would respond with enthusiasm. In that case GreatBritain might make a good fight, though no one who knows the state ofour preparations and those of the rest of the world will make a sanguineprediction as to the result. 

TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN

_February 8th_, 1900

Sir Redvers Buller on Monday set out on his third attempt to relieveLadysmith. He appears to have made a feint against the Boer positionnorth of Potgieter's Drift, and, while there attracting the attention ofthe Boers by the concentrated fire of many guns, to have pushed a forceof infantry and artillery across the river to the right of Potgieter'sDrift. This force, of which the infantry belongs to Lyttelton's brigade, carried and defended against counter attack a hill called Vaal Krantz, at the eastern end of the Brakfontein ridge. To the east of Vaal Krantzruns a good road to Ladysmith, along which the distance from the Tugelato Sir George's White's outposts is about ten miles. To the east againof the road is a hill called Dorn Kop. Here the Boers have an artilleryposition which seems to command Vaal Krantz, and they probably have theusual infantry trenches. The Boer position then faces the Tugela andruns from Spion Kop on the west, the Boer left, to Dorn Kop on the east, the Boer right. Sir Redvers Buller's attack is an attempt to pierce thecentre of this position. 

To break the centre of an enemy's line, to pour your forces into andthrough the gap, and then roll up the more important of his dividedwings, is an operation which if it can be successfully executed makes adecisive victory; if followed up it ruins the enemy's army. But it is inmodern conditions the most difficult form of attack. The long range ofmodern weapons, of guns that kill at two miles and of rifles that killat a mile--to take a moderate estimate of their power--enables thedefender to concentrate upon any attack against his centre the fire ofall the rifles in his front line for a couple of miles, and of all theguns standing on a length of four miles. A similar concentration of fireis only occasionally and temporary possible for the assailant, though ifit should happen that the ground exposes a point of the defender's lineto such concentric fire, while it protects some points held by theassailant, the attack would have a prospect of success. But the momentthe point of attack is recognised by the defender he will collect everyavailable battery and rifleman from all parts of his line and place themon that portion of his front which commands the path of the assailant. To prevent this the assailant must engage the defender along his wholeline so that all the defending forces are fully occupied and there arenone to spare for the critical point or region. 

Sir Redvers Buller's task is rendered harder by the fact that his owntroops before they can attack must cross the Tugela. He has two bridgesat the point here supposed to have been selected for the main attack, but troops can hardly cross a bridge at a quicker rate than a brigade anhour, and as the Boers ride faster than the British infantry can walk, and as the British troops south of the river cannot effectually engagethe Boers, it will not have been easy so to occupy the enemy along thewhole front as to prevent his massing guns and rifles--at any raterifles--to defend his centre. 

So much for the initial difficulties, which seem by a combination offeint and surprise to have been so far overcome on Monday that theadvanced British troops effected a lodgment in the centre of the Boerposition, from which a counter-attack failed to eject them. The nextthing is, as the British force is brought across the river, to attackone of the Boer wings while containing or keeping back the other. Beforethis, can be done the enemy's centre must really be pierced, so thattroops can be poured through the gap to turn the flank of one of theenemy's divided halves. This piercing is most difficult in theconditions of to-day, for the enemy by establishing a new firing linebehind the point carried by our troops may be able to enclose in asemicircle of fire the party that has made its way into the position. Against such an enveloping fire it is a hard task to make headway. 

All these aspects of his problem a General thinks out before he starts;he does not make his attempt unless and until he sees his way to meetthe various difficulties, both those inherent in the nature of theoperation and those that arise from the local conditions and from thecharacter of the particular enemy. The difficulties are therefore notreasons why General Buller should not succeed, but their considerationmay help to show why with the best previous deliberation and with thebravest of troops he may perhaps not be able to break the Boerresistance. 

There is one feature of his task that is perhaps not fully appreciatedby the public. In order to relieve Ladysmith he must thoroughly defeatand drive away the Boer army--must, so to speak break its back. For, supposing he could clear a road to Ladysmith and march there, leavingthe Boer army in position on one or both sides of his road, his positionon reaching the place would be that he would have to fight his way backagain, and that unless he could then defeat the Boers his Army would belost, for it would be cut off from its supplies. The relief of Ladysmithand the complete defeat of the Boer army are therefore synonymous terms. There is, however, a sense in which a partial defeat of the Boers wouldbe of use. If the Boer army, though not driven off, were yet fullyabsorbed in its struggle with Sir Redvers Bullet and had drawn to itsassistance some portion of the force investing Ladysmith, it might bepossible for Sir George White to make a sortie and to break through theinvesting lines. To that case, however, the term "the relief ofLadysmith" could hardly be correctly applied. 

How far Sir George White can co-operate with Sir Redvers Buller dependspartly upon the mobility of his force. His horses after three months inLadysmith can hardly be in much condition, even supposing that they havenot already begun to be used as food for the troops. Supposing thereare horses enough for the field guns, and that the naval guns andmountain guns were destroyed at the last moment before the sortie. Themen and the field artillery would then have to make a night attack, followed by a march of about seven miles in trying conditions, and by asecond attack in which they would join hands with Sir Redvers Buller. This does not imply exertions impossible to troops like Sir GeorgeWhite's, and such a move perhaps offers the best way out of thedifficulties of the situation. If in that case Sir George White made forthe north side of Dorn Kop a part of the Boer army would probably bedestroyed, and the loss which the British force would have sufferedwould thus to some extent be made up for. It is presumed that SirRedvers Buller and Sir George White, who are able to communicate withone another, have a cipher which enables them to inform each otherwithout informing the enemy. 

Any plan which will unite Sir George White's force, or the bulk of it, with that of Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela will simplify the wholeproblem of the War. Lord Roberts is preparing for an advance in forcefrom the Orange River, which will sooner or later transfer the centre ofgravity to the western theatre of War, in which the British troops willnot be confronted by the difficulties of an unknown or very imperfectlyknown mountainous region. The movements now taking place in the CapeColony are the preliminaries to that advance. The method, the only rightmethod, is to use the reinforcements that have arrived--the sixth andseventh divisions--to secure a preponderance first at one point and thenat another, instead of distributing them evenly over the whole area andthe various points of contact. The idea would seem to be, first, tostrengthen General French until he has crushed the Boer force with whichhe is dealing, then to use his troops to secure the defeat of the Boerswho are opposing Sir William Gatacre, and then to cross the OrangeRiver with three divisions and deal a blow against the Boer army that isnow between the Riet River and Kimberley. This plan of beating in detailthe Boer forces in the western theatre of war, if carried out so as tolead in each case to a crushing defeat of the Boers, would be theprelude to a collision between the main Boer army and a British forceits superior in every respect. The first certain evidence that some suchidea is at the foundation of the new operations may be hailed as thebeginning of victory. For the present it is enough to know that thedeparture of Lord Roberts from Cape Town augurs the opening of anenergetic campaign with that unity of direction in a strong hand whichis the first element of success in war. 

A COMMANDER

_February 15th_, 1900

In war, as in other great enterprises, the first element of success isunity of direction in a strong hand. The reason is that whenever theco-operation of large numbers is involved the needful concentration ofpurpose can be supplied only by the head man, the leader or director. Concentration of purpose means in war the arrangement in due perspectiveof all the various objectives, the selection of the most important ofthem, the distribution of forces according to the importance of theblows to be delivered, of which some one is always decisive. To thedecisive point, then, the bulk of the forces are directed, and at otherpoints small forces are left to make shift as well as they can, unless, indeed, there is a superabundance of force--not a common phenomenon. 

The same principle of concentration prescribes that action when oncebegun should, at any rate at the decisive point, be sudden, rapid, andcontinuous. These fundamental ideas are illustrated by the practice ofall the great commanders, and there is perhaps no better definition of agreat commander than one whose action illustrates the simple principlesof war. Lord Roberts is once more revealing to his countrymen the natureof these principles. The tangled mass of the war has suddenly becomesimplified, and there is clearness where there was confusion. 

The Commander-in-Chief reached Cape Town on January 10th, and foundlarge forces dispersed over a front of two or three hundred miles, thereinforcements at sea, and the transport still in a state very likeconfusion. By February 6th, two or three weeks earlier than wasanticipated by those at home who had the most perfect confidence in him, he was on his way to the front, enabling those at home to draw thecertain inference that all was ready, the divisions assembled, and thetransport in order. While he was travelling the six hundred miles fromCape Town to the Modder River various preliminary moves which he hadordered were in course of execution. There had been a large display ofBritish infantry near Colesberg, covering the withdrawal of GeneralFrench and the cavalry division. This had the effect of causing theBoers to reinforce Colesberg, probably by detachments fromMagersfontein. The British infantry, however, was there only to lure theBoers; it was composed of parts of the sixth division on the way furthernorth, and only a small infantry force was left to hold the reinforcedBoers in check. The next move was a reconnaissance in force from ModderRiver to Koodoosberg Drifts, which drew Commandant Cronje's attentionand some of his troops to his right flank. The reconnaissance had thefurther object of inspiriting the Highland Brigade which had been sobadly damaged at Magersfontein, and of establishing good relationsbetween these troops and their new commander, General Mac Donald. Ontheir return to camp a short address from Lord Roberts had the effectupon them that Napoleon's proclamations used to produce on the Frenchtroops. A day or two was spent in completing the organisation of theforce at Modder River, where a new division, the ninth, had been formedprobably of troops brought up from the communications. The mountedinfantry were also brigaded, as had been those at Orange River Station. Meantime various movements had been going on of which the details as yetare unreported. Two infantry divisions, the sixth and seventh, the lasttwo from England, were moving towards the Riet River to the East ofJacobsdal. The point or points from which they started are not known, nor the direction of their march, which was screened by the cavalrydivision and perhaps also by a brigade of mounted infantry. At any rateon Sunday, the 11th inst. , Hannay's brigade of mounted infantry fromOrange River, on the march to Ramdam, had to cover its right flankagainst a party of Boers. Ramdam is not to be found, but if it is onthe Riet above Jacobsdal the probability is that Hannay's brigade wascovering the right flank of the infantry divisions. 

On Monday French with his cavalry brigade seized a drift or ford acrossthe Riet ten or a dozen miles above Jacobsdal, and the two infantrydivisions were so close behind him that on Tuesday Lord Roberts couldreport them both encamped beyond the river. On Tuesday French was offagain to the north with a cavalry brigade, a mounted infantry brigade, and a horse artillery brigade, a second cavalry brigade, under ColonelGordon moving on his right. By half-past five French was across theModder River, having forced a drift and seized the hills beyond so as tosecure the passage for the infantry, while Gordon had seized two driftsfurther to the west. Between them the two cavalry commanders hadcaptured five Boer laagers, and the slightness of the opposition theyencounter proves that the Boers were completely surprised. On Wednesdaymorning the sixth division was on the march to follow the cavalry, andthe seventh division was to take the same direction on Wednesdayafternoon. 

These are all the facts reported until now, Thursday afternoon. Let ussee what they mean. First of all, Lord Roberts has chosen his objective, the Boer force before Kimberley, on the right flank of the Boer frontStormberg--Colesberg--Magersfontein. A blow delivered here and followedby a march into the Free State places Lord Roberts on the communicationsof the Boers now at Stormberg and Colesberg and between the two halvesof the Boer army, of which one is on the border of Cape Colony and theother in Natal. The objective, therefore, has been chosen withstrategical insight. In the next place forces have been concentrated forthe blow. Lord Roberts has four infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, and at least one brigade of mounted infantry, his total strengthamounting to at least fifty thousand men. Then there has been a skilfuland successful attempt to distract the enemy's attention, to concealfrom him the nature of the movement and the force to be employed, andlast, but not least, there has been the suddenness and the rapidity ofmovement essential to surprise. These are the proofs of that breadth andsimplicity of conception and of that mastery in execution which are themarks of the best generalship. 

But there is in the best work more than breadth of mind and strength ofhand. The details fit in with the design and repay the closest scrutiny. The march of twenty-five thousand men round Jacobsdal towards the Moddertactically turns the Boer position at Magersfontein, so that it need notbe carried by a frontal attack. But it also places the British force onthe direct line of the Boer communications with Bloemfontein, and ifCommandant Cronje values these communications he must either make aprecipitate retreat by Boshof, offering his flank during the process toattack by French, or must attack the sixth and seventh divisions ontheir march from the Riet to the Modder. But in either case he has toreckon with the Guards and ninth divisions which are not mentioned inthe telegrams, but which are assuredly not idle. Lord Methuen has longheld a crossing on to the peninsula or Doab between the two rivers, andthe advance of a division into this peninsula must compel the promptevacuation of Jacobsdal or bring about the ruin of any Boer force there, while at the same time it would increase the weight of troops thatintervene between Magersfontein and Bloemfontein. A single division is amore than ample force to cover the British railhead at Modder River. Commandant Cronje may elect to fight where he is, which would be tocourt disaster, for he would be attacked from the east in great force, with no retreat open except to the west away from his base, and with aconsiderable river, the Vaal, to cross. Such a retreat after a lostbattle and under the pressure of pursuit would be ruin to his army. Hemay move off by Boshof, but that would be impracticable unless thestart were made soon after the first news of the British advance. OnWednesday he would have only the mounted troops to deal with; even onThursday (to-day) the sixth division could hardly be used with effect onthe north bank of the Modder, but on Friday he would have the sixth andseventh divisions to reckon with. Probably his best course would be toretire before he can be attacked to Barkly, on the right bank of theVaal. He would there be in a position most difficult to attack, and yethis presence there on the flank of any British advance either to thenorth or to the east would make it impossible to neglect him. Hisdecision has been taken before now, or this opinion would have beensuppressed out of deference to the anxiety of those who imagine thatstrategical advice is telegraphed from London to the Boer headquarters. 

Of the effect of the new move upon the general course of the war itwould be premature to enlarge. We must wait and see the close of thefirst act. The most effective issue of this week's movements would be abattle leading to the thorough defeat, the military destruction, of theBoer army before Kimberley. A less valuable result would be the raisingof the siege of Kimberley without fighting, a result which is not to bepreferred, because a force that retires before battle has to be foughtlater on. For this reason the true Boer game is to retreat in time. 

It will be interesting to watch the effect of the new campaign upon theripening resolve of the British Nation to have, its Army set in order. Upon many minds, and no doubt upon Ministers and their adherents, theimpression made by success in the field will be that reform is needless. The true impression would be that it is as urgent as before, and thatthe right way to begin is to give authority to the right man, thecommander who is now revealing his strength. 

CRONJE'S SEDAN

_February 22nd_, 1900

A week ago the news was that Lord Roberts had begun his movement, thathe was moving with fifty thousand men against Commandant Cronje, andthat General French with the cavalry division had crossed the Modder, the sixth and seventh divisions following him between the Riet and theModder. 

The great object was to strike down Cronje's force before it couldreceive help, and the design must have been to cut off his retreat tothe eastward. On Thursday, the 15th, French marched from the Modder toAlexandersfontein, attacked the rear of the Boer line investingKimberley, and in the evening entered the town. He had left the sixthdivision at the drifts of the Modder. This movement of French's appearedto imply that Cronje's army was known to be retreating to the west ornorth-west, and that French took the road through Kimberley as theshortest way to reach a position where that retreat could beintercepted. It could hardly be imagined that the move was made for thesake of Kimberley, of which the relief was assured whether Cronje stoodto fight or retreated in any direction. The essential thing was to findwhere Cronje's force was--if it was at Magersfontein to surround it ordrive it to the west; if elsewhere to delay it with the cavalry andpursue it with the infantry. But Cronje was not found. When French wasin Kimberley, Cronje, retreating eastwards, passed through the fifteenmiles gap between the town and Kelly-Kenny. Kelly-Kenny on Fridaydiscovered this and set off in pursuit while French was following a Boerforce retreating northwards, probably part of the force that hadinvested Kimberley. Kelly-Kenny shelled the Boer laager and captured anumber of waggons, but the Boers retreated eastwards along the northbank of the Modder with Kelly-Kenny at their heels. To assistKelly-Kenny French was recalled from the north, and Macdonald with theHighland Brigade pushed out by a forced march from Jacobsdal. Accountsdiffer as to the site of the fighting, but there was a three days'running fight, during which Cronje may have crossed the Modder andapproached Paardeberg or may have been stopped on the north bank. TheBoer reports, which imply at least that Cronje was hard pressed, weresent off before the finish, and the first British official reports, consisting only in a list of officers killed and wounded, show that eachof the three infantry brigades had hard fighting with considerablelosses. 

Of eight infantry brigades with which Lord Roberts began his movementthree were engaged against Cronje; one has probably been sent toKimberley, with which town railway communication has been re-opened, sothat it will be soon an advanced base for the Army. Lord Roberts, therefore, who was at Paardeberg on Monday evening, may have had withhim four brigades or two divisions, representing twenty thousand men, besides the three brigades engaged, which represented before the battlesomething like fifteen thousand. 

Of French and the cavalry division there is no report. The Boers publisha telegram from Commandant de Wet, who seems to have brought upreinforcements while Cronje's action was in progress on Sunday. 

The Boer commander evidently counted on reinforcements from allquarters; a party from Colesberg cut off a British waggon train at theRiet on or about Friday, the 16th, and reinforcements from Natal arrivedduring Cronje's action. Lord Roberts has thus drawn the Boers away fromthe circumference towards the centre. He has lightened the tasks ofBuller, Clements, Gatacre, and Brabant, but has thereby brought thechief load on to his own shoulders. It seems a misfortune that Cronjewas able to escape eastwards from Magersfontein, though it would bewrong until full knowledge of what took place is obtained to assume thatthis could have been avoided. 

Cronje, however, has not been able to make good his escape. A Renter'stelegram from Paardeberg dated. Tuesday explicitly states that Cronje'sforce was enclosed and remained enclosed. Lord Roberts on Tuesdayreported that after examination of the enemy's position byreconnaissance in force, he decided to avoid the heavy loss involved inan assault, but to bombard the enemy and to turn his attention to theapproaching reinforcements. The result was that the reinforcements weredriven off and dispersed with heavy loss to them and trifling loss tothe British. This seems to have been effected on Tuesday. Boer prisonersreported that they have come from Ladysmith, and the commander of thereinforcements is said to have been Commandant Botha, who was last heardof at Spion Kop. On Tuesday also the shelling of Cronje's position issaid to have induced him to ask for an armistice, which must be assumedto be the prelude to a surrender; at any rate the request would hardlybe granted except to settle the terms of a capitulation or to enable theBoer general to be told that unconditional surrender was the onlyalternative to a continuance of the bombardment. 

The advance into the Free State implied that Lord Roberts meant to takethe benefit of acting on "interior lines, " that is, in plain English, of getting in between his enemies and striking them in turn before theycan unite or combine. This plan required him with his main body toattack the enemy's reinforcements in detail as they came up. In that wayhe secured time for the completion of the action against Cronje, andupon its favourable issue he will be master of the situation. 

In Natal the situation has been changed by the action of Lord Roberts. The two Boer Republics are well aware that they must stand or falltogether. Either the Boer Commander-in-Chief has decided to strike atLord Roberts, in which case he must move the bulk of his force into theFree State, or he hopes to be in time to resist Lord Roberts aftermaking an end of Sir George White. In the former case he must raise thesiege of Ladysmith, for he cannot carry it on without a strong coveringforce to resist Sir Redvers Buller. Then there will be forty thousandBritish troops in Natal, whose advance will be almost as dangerous asthat of Lord Roberts. In the latter case there can be little chance of asuccessful resistance to Lord Roberts, whose advance northwards fromBloemfontein would in due time compromise the safety of the Boer army. The reports do not enable us to feel sure which decision has been taken. Sir Redvers Buller's telegram of Wednesday to the effect that one of hisdivisions had crossed the Tugela and was opposed only by a rear guardlooks very like a Boer withdrawal from Natal. A later unofficialtelegram, describing a very strong position north of the Tugela held bythe Boers to cover the siege, suggests that the Boer commander is againtrying to lead his adversary into attack upon a prepared position. Eachcase has its favourable aspect. If the Boers are raising the siege theforces of Buller and White will in a few days be united, and need onlygood leading to force the passes and invade either the Free State or theTransvaal. If the Boers are determined to hold on to Ladysmith, theycannot effectively check the advance of Lord Roberts. 

While the war is going on the Nation ought to set its military forces inorder. The Militia should be formed into divisions for the field and beshipped off to manoeuvring grounds at the Cape; they can be brought homeas soon as it is certain they will not be wanted. The Volunteers couldsoon be formed into an army if the War Office would carry out themeasures which have for years been urged upon it by Volunteer officers. The first step is to give the officers the authority which has hithertobeen withheld from them, so that by its exercise they may form theircharacters; the second to give them the best instruction andencouragements to learn; the third to find them ground for ranges, forfield firing and for manoeuvres. A minister of war who combinedknowledge of war and of the Volunteers with a serious purpose would beable in two months to infuse the whole Volunteer force with the rightideal, and then, by mobilising them for another two months, to transformthem into an army. It is for the Navy and the Ministry of ForeignAffairs to secure the four months that are needed. 

THE BOER DEFEATS

_March 1st_, 1900

February has made up for the blunders of August and September, andretrieved the disasters of October, November, and December. 

On Tuesday the 27th, Commandant Cronje with four thousand men, theremains of his army, surrendered to Lord Roberts at Paardeberg; the sameday, Sir Redvers Duller attacked and carried the Boer position nearPieters, in front of Ladysmith, and on Wednesday the 28th, LordDundonald with two mounted regiments, entered Ladysmith. 

The fighting in the Free State and in Natal has been simultaneous, andit may be worth while briefly to review the two campaigns. Lord Robertsset out from Modder River on Monday the 12th. On that day began themarch of his force to the attack of Cronje. French with the cavalryseized Dekiel's Drift on the Riet and was followed by two infantrydivisions. Next day, Tuesday the 13th, French was holding the drifts ofthe Modder, and on Thursday morning the sixth division was at KlipDrift. Thereupon French pushed on with his cavalry to Kimberley. Thesame night Cronje marched off between Kimberley and Klip Drift, makingeastwards along the north bank of the Modder, which he was to cross nearPaardeberg. But his march was discovered. He was followed and attackedon Friday the 10th by the advance guard of the sixth division, whichdetained him at the crossing of the river. The Highland Brigade made aforced march to intercept him on the south bank, and between Friday andSunday, the 16th and 18th, he was surrounded and driven back into aposition formed by the river banks. Here, from the 17th to the 27th, heheld out against a bombardment, while the British forces, pushing theirtrenches gradually nearer, were preparing for an assault. Lord Robertshad brought up the bulk of his force, and parried with ease the attacksof two or three parties of Boers who came up in succession to Cronje'sassistance; some of them having been sent for the purpose from NorthernNatal. On Tuesday, February 27th, the anniversary of Majuba, Cronjesurrendered. 

The effects of this campaign against Cronje were felt at once in variousparts of the theatre of war. The advance of Lord Roberts and the retreatof Cronje carried with them the relief of Kimberley. It drew away theBoers from the Colesberg district, so that on the 26th General Clementswas able to enter Colesberg, which had been evacuated, and on the 27th, to move his troops forward from Arundel to Rensburg. 

Lord Roberts had arranged for other action simultaneous with his own. OnFriday, the 16th, General Brabant with his Cape Mounted Divisionattacked the Boers near Dordrecht and defeated them. A week later he wasin Jamestown, the Boers were retreating towards the Orange River, andthe rebels in Barkly East were asking for terms, receiving the answerthat there were no terms but unconditional surrender. 

On Wednesday the 14th, while French was leading the advance fromDekiel's Drift to the Modder, Sir Redvers Buller took Hussar Hill, north-east of Chieveley. Four days later, on Sunday the 18th, he foughta considerable battle at Monte Cristo, a point of the Inhlawe range, thecapture of which turned Hlangwane Hill and led to its capture next day, Monday the 19th. On Tuesday the 20th, Buller's advance guard crossed theTugela near Colenso. On Wednesday the 21st, the river was bridged, andthree brigades crossed to the north bank. The fighting then becamecontinuous. On Friday there was a determined attack by the Irish brigadeupon a Boer position west of the railway near Pieters. The assaultfailed and the troops suffered heavily, but the British force maintainedthe general line of front which it had gained. On Monday the 26th, afresh bridge was thrown across the Tugela, a mile or two east of therailway line, and on Tuesday the 27th, Pieters Hill, east of PietersStation, in the prolongation of the Boer front, was stormed by GeneralBarton, whereupon the whole British force renewed the attack in frontupon the Boer positions west of the railway and carried them, dispersingthe enemy. It now seems that this was the decisive attack, for the nextevening, Wednesday the 28th, Dundonald with two mounted regiments was inLadysmith, and to-day Sir Redvers Buller with his Army Corps movedforwards towards Nelthorpe, the last railway station before Ladysmith. 

On Wednesday morning Sir Redvers Buller reported a considerable force ofthe enemy still on and under Bulwana Mountain, to the east of Ladysmith. His task and that of his Army Corps is to inflict what damage he canupon that force of the enemy, taking from Sir George White whateverassistance that officer and his troops can give, and leaving to theauxiliary services the work of attending to the sick and wounded inLadysmith and the provisioning of the troops and the town. A part of SirGeorge White's force is, no doubt, still fit for action so soon as itssupply of cartridges can be renewed. The most effective plan wouldprobably be to leave a strong rearguard at Nelthorpe, and to push onwith the main body and the bulk of the artillery through Ladysmith tothe assault of one of the Boer positions on the north side of the town. This would compel the Boers to abandon Bulwana, perhaps to leave behindtheir heavy guns; would, if successful, prevent their retreat by thedirect road into the Free State, and might greatly embarrass or, atleast, harass their retreat through the Biggarsberg. 

The defeat of the Boer army in Natal and the relief of Ladysmith is agreat blow to the Boer cause. It frustrates the hopes of the Boers forthe one great success on which they were to some extent justified incounting, and makes an end of their plan of campaign. 

A few days will be needed to repair the railway from the Tugela toLadysmith, and to build a temporary railway bridge at Colenso. By thattime the force of Sir George White and Sir Redvers Buller will berested, refreshed, and reorganised, forming an army of from thirty-fivethousand to forty thousand men. In the Free State Lord Roberts hasprobably forty-five thousand. The collapse of the Boer invasion of CapeColony points to the early reopening of the railways from Naauwpoort andSterkstrom to Norval's Pont and Bethulie, the repair of the railwaybridges over the Orange River, and the concentration at Bloemfontein ofsixty thousand men, with the railway from the Orange River working andguarded behind them, possibly with a new line of railway from ModderRiver or Kimberley to Bloemfontein as an additional resource. Theadvance of Lord Roberts with sixty thousand men to the Vaal River mustopen to Sir Redvers Buller the passes of the Drakensberg range from VanReenen's to Lang's Nek, and between the two forces the Boer army must becrushed. The Boers may abandon the attempt at resistance by battle, andmay confine themselves to the defence of Pretoria, to raids on theBritish communications, and to the various devices of irregular warfare. But the British forces will shortly have at their disposal as manymounted men as the Boers, so that even irregular warfare can but leadto their destruction in detail. 

The only hope for the Boer cause now rests upon the intervention ofother Powers, and the crucial moment for the British Government is athand. That the Nation is resolved to brook no intervention is absolutelycertain, and that it is ready to make great sacrifices and great effortsto resist any attempt at intervention seems equally beyond doubt. Hasthe Government appreciated either the needs of the situation or thetemper of the Nation? Intervention if offered will be proposed suddenly, and foreign action, if it is contemplated at all, will follow upon theheels of the rejection of the proposals. If, then, fleets have still tobe completed for sea, plans of campaign to be matured and adopted, and aVolunteer Army to be improvised, the great war will find us as unreadyand as much surprised as did the supposed small war five months ago. 

The measures required are, first of all, to settle the distribution offleets for all eventualities, to commission every ship in the navy andto have all the fleets ready in their intended stations, so that only anorder by cable may be needed to set them to work; secondly, to have allthe coast defences manned and ready thirdly, to have the volunteerbrigades encamped in the defensive positions round London, for whichthey are destined; and, lastly, but not least, to have the rest of theforces at home encamped near great railway centres as field divisions ofregulars, field divisions of militia, and field divisions of volunteers, with ammunition, transport and supplies attached to them. If thesemeasures had already been carried out there would be no intervention. Ifthey are now carried out without loss of time, intervention may beprevented. If they are much longer postponed intervention becomesprobable; the great war may be expected, and no man can foretell whetherthe British Empire, if again taken by surprise and unready, can weatherthe storm. 

THE COLLAPSE OF THE BOER POWER

_March 8th_, 1900

Lord Roberts yesterday defeated the Boers near Poplar's Drift. In orderto measure the importance of the event it may be well to begin by arough general survey of the condition of affairs. 

There have long been signs that the Boer Power was subjected to a verygreat strain by the effort made to hold, against ever-increasing Britishforces, a number of points upon the circumference of a very large area. The Boers were attacking Mafeking and Kimberley, and covering theiraction at both points by forces intended to delay the relieving columns. They were also endeavouring to support rebellion throughout a greattract of country in the Cape Colony, extending from Prieska on the westto the Basuto border on the east, and covering the rebels by partiesposted to resist the advance of Gatacre and French along the railwaysfrom the south coast to the Orange River. These two groups ofenterprises were but the subordinate features of a campaign in which theprincipal undertaking was the reduction of Ladysmith, which involved aprolonged and stubborn resistance to the repeated assaults of SirRedvers Buller. 

Thus the Boer Governments, or their commander-in-chief, set out at thebeginning to do many things at the same time. There were few Britishtroops in the country, and there was the possibility of great success, at least in the shape of the occupation of territory, before the Britishforces could be assembled. But shortly after the arrival of Sir RedversBuller's Army Corps it began to be evident that the Boer forces werebalanced by the British. There was a pause in the movements. The Britishmade little headway and the Boers none. Yet, as both sides were doingtheir best, it was clear that the Boers required the utmost exertion ofall their energies to maintain the equilibrium. This condition may besaid to have lasted from about the middle of December to the middle ofFebruary. During those two months, however, while the Boers were atfull tension, the British were gathering new forces behind their frontline, which itself was all the time receiving gradual accessions ofstrength. 

When Lord Roberts with fifty thousand men burst through the Boer cordonand destroyed the force with which Cronje had been covering the siege ofKimberley, the Boers had no reserve of force with which to fill up thegap. Every man sent to Cronje's assistance had to be taken from someother post where he was sorely needed. The detachments sent from Natalinto the Free State left the Natal Army, already wearied by its longunsuccessful siege of Ladysmith, and by Buller's persistent attacks, tooweak to continue at once the siege and the resistance to Buller. But thetwo tasks were inseparable, and when Buller renewed his attack and drovethe Boers from their posts south of the Tugela, the Boer army of Natalfound itself able to cover its retreat only by a last desperaterearguard action at Pieters. 

Defeat in the Free State and collapse in Natal were accompanied by theabandonment of the effort to support the rebellion in Cape Colony. 

This general breakdown following upon prolonged over-exertion, andaccompanied in the two principal regions by complete defeat, must havehad its effects on the spirits of the troops. Hope must be gone anddespair at hand, and the consequent diminution of power is sure to beconsiderable. There is no sign as yet of any strong leadership such ascould to some extent restore the fortunes of the Boer army. The retreatbeyond the Orange River has been gradual; the siege of Mafeking has notbeen abandoned, and there is no sign of a determined concentration offorces to oppose Lord Roberts. 

Since the surrender of Cronje on February 27th, Lord Roberts has beencompleting his supplies, and probably making good the damage to histransport caused by the loss of a convoy on the Riet River. He has alsobrought up the Guards Brigade as a reinforcement. A few days ago thecamp was moved forward from Paardeberg to Osfontein, and beyondOsfontein the Boers were observed collecting their troops from day today and extending their position, which ran roughly north and southacross the Modder. Yesterday Lord Roberts advanced to the attack withthree and a half infantry divisions, a cavalry division and a brigade ofmounted infantry. The cavalry, followed by an infantry division, turnedthe enemy's left flank, and by noon the enemy's army was in full retreattowards the north and east, pursued by the British. The Boers have thistime not ventured to stand to fight. They have seen themselves assailedin front by a force which must have greatly outnumbered them at the sametime that their flank was turned by a force as mobile as their own. Their precipitate retreat coming after their late defeats must increasetheir demoralisation, and it will hardly be practicable for them to makea fresh stand east of the Free State Railway. Lord Roberts will be onthe railway with the bulk of his force by Saturday or Sunday, and hispresence there will complete the break up of the Boer defences of theOrange River. 

The situation of the Boers is now, as far as it depends on themselves, desperate. They can hardly collect forty thousand men for a decisivebattle, and are confronted by two armies, each of which has thatstrength, the one nearing Bloemfontein, the other at Ladysmith. LordRoberts, when he reaches the railway, will probably call up from theOrange River such additional forces as are not required as garrisons inCape Colony. His numbers can be fed by constant small reinforcements, while the Boers have no means of increasing their numbers. With eachsucceeding week, therefore, the British will grow stronger and the Boersfewer. The utmost that the Boer commander-in-chief can expect toaccomplish is to delay that advance to Pretoria which he cannot prevent. 

He may perhaps bring about the fall of Mafeking, if he chooses todispense for a few weeks longer with the reinforcements which CommandantSnyman by raising the siege could bring to his main army. There wasindeed some days ago an unofficial report that a strong column wasmoving north from Kimberley. If that were true the destination of thecolumn must have been Mafeking, but it is not clear what its compositioncould be. The Guards Brigade being at Poplar's Drift there would be leftthe other brigade of the first division, and that may be on its waytowards the north. Resistance was expected at the passage of the Vaal atFourteen Streams, but that point must have already been reached. Probably nothing will be heard of this column until it has accomplishedits task, except in the not very probable event of hard fighting betweenWinsorton and Mafeking. Colonel Baden-Powell is known to be very hardpressed, being short of provisions and of troops. It is certain thecolumn will make every effort to reach Mafeking in time, but thedistance is great. The best chance of success would be found in thedespatch of a large body of mounted troops to move in the fashion of thegreat raiding expeditions of the American Civil War; but it is doubtfulwhether sufficient mounted troops were or are available. 

Apart from their own resources the Boers may hope for help from outside. They have from the beginning looked for the intervention of some greatPower, for the assistance of the Dutch party at the Cape, and for suchaction by the British Opposition as might embarrass the Government inits resolve to prosecute the war to its logical conclusion. 

Intervention will not be undertaken by any Power that is not prepared togo to war, and does not see a fair prospect of success in an attack uponthe British Empire. Intervention therefore will be prevented if the Navyis kept ready for any emergency, and if the Government measures forarming the Nation are so carried out as to convince continental Powersthat they will produce an appreciable result. That conviction does notyet exist, but it is not too late to create it. 

The Cape Dutch will not be able to embarrass a British Government thatknows its own mind and is resolved to treat them fairly while assertingits authority in the Transvaal and the Free State. The peace at anyprice party at home is trying hard to press its false doctrines, but inthe present temper of the Nation has no chance of success, provided onlythat the Government carries out without hesitation or vacillation thepolicy to which it is by all its action committed, of bringing theterritories of the Boer Republics under British administration so soonas the military power of the Boers has been broken.