LACHES

OR COURAGE

By Plato

Translated by Benjamin Jowett

INTRODUCTION. 

Lysimachus, the son of Aristides the Just, and Melesias, the son ofthe elder Thucydides, two aged men who live together, are desirous ofeducating their sons in the best manner. Their own education, as oftenhappens with the sons of great men, has been neglected; and they areresolved that their children shall have more care taken of them, thanthey received themselves at the hands of their fathers. 

At their request, Nicias and Laches have accompanied them to see a mannamed Stesilaus fighting in heavy armour. The two fathers ask the twogenerals what they think of this exhibition, and whether they wouldadvise that their sons should acquire the accomplishment. Nicias andLaches are quite willing to give their opinion; but they suggest thatSocrates should be invited to take part in the consultation. He is astranger to Lysimachus, but is afterwards recognised as the son of hisold friend Sophroniscus, with whom he never had a difference to thehour of his death. Socrates is also known to Nicias, to whom he hadintroduced the excellent Damon, musician and sophist, as a tutor for hisson, and to Laches, who had witnessed his heroic behaviour at the battleof Delium (compare Symp. ). 

Socrates, as he is younger than either Nicias or Laches, prefers towait until they have delivered their opinions, which they give in acharacteristic manner. Nicias, the tactician, is very much in favour ofthe new art, which he describes as the gymnastics of war--useful whenthe ranks are formed, and still more useful when they are broken;creating a general interest in military studies, and greatly adding tothe appearance of the soldier in the field. Laches, the blunt warrior, is of opinion that such an art is not knowledge, and cannot be of anyvalue, because the Lacedaemonians, those great masters of arms, neglectit. His own experience in actual service has taught him that thesepretenders are useless and ridiculous. This man Stesilaus has been seenby him on board ship making a very sorry exhibition of himself. Thepossession of the art will make the coward rash, and subject thecourageous, if he chance to make a slip, to invidious remarks. And nowlet Socrates be taken into counsel. As they differ he must decide. 

Socrates would rather not decide the question by a plurality of votes:in such a serious matter as the education of a friend's children, hewould consult the one skilled person who has had masters, and has worksto show as evidences of his skill. This is not himself; for he has neverbeen able to pay the sophists for instructing him, and has never hadthe wit to do or discover anything. But Nicias and Laches are olderand richer than he is: they have had teachers, and perhaps have madediscoveries; and he would have trusted them entirely, if they had notbeen diametrically opposed. 

Lysimachus here proposes to resign the argument into the hands of theyounger part of the company, as he is old, and has a bad memory. Heearnestly requests Socrates to remain;--in this showing, as Nicias says, how little he knows the man, who will certainly not go away until hehas cross-examined the company about their past lives. Nicias has oftensubmitted to this process; and Laches is quite willing to learn fromSocrates, because his actions, in the true Dorian mode, correspond tohis words. 

Socrates proceeds: We might ask who are our teachers? But a better andmore thorough way of examining the question will be to ask, 'What isVirtue?'--or rather, to restrict the enquiry to that part of virtuewhich is concerned with the use of weapons--'What is Courage?' Lachesthinks that he knows this: (1) 'He is courageous who remains at hispost. ' But some nations fight flying, after the manner of Aeneas inHomer; or as the heavy-armed Spartans also did at the battle of Plataea. (2) Socrates wants a more general definition, not only of militarycourage, but of courage of all sorts, tried both amid pleasures andpains. Laches replies that this universal courage is endurance. But courage is a good thing, and mere endurance may be hurtful andinjurious. Therefore (3) the element of intelligence must be added. Butthen again unintelligent endurance may often be more courageous thanthe intelligent, the bad than the good. How is this contradiction to besolved? Socrates and Laches are not set 'to the Dorian mode' of wordsand actions; for their words are all confusion, although their actionsare courageous. Still they must 'endure' in an argument about endurance. Laches is very willing, and is quite sure that he knows what courage is, if he could only tell. 

Nicias is now appealed to; and in reply he offers a definition whichhe has heard from Socrates himself, to the effect that (1) 'Courage isintelligence. ' Laches derides this; and Socrates enquires, 'What sortof intelligence?' to which Nicias replies, 'Intelligence of thingsterrible. ' 'But every man knows the things to be dreaded in his ownart. ' 'No they do not. They may predict results, but cannot tell whetherthey are really terrible; only the courageous man can tell that. ' Lachesdraws the inference that the courageous man is either a soothsayer or agod. 

Again, (2) in Nicias' way of speaking, the term 'courageous' must bedenied to animals or children, because they do not know the danger. Against this inversion of the ordinary use of language Laches reclaims, but is in some degree mollified by a compliment to his own courage. Still, he does not like to see an Athenian statesman and generaldescending to sophistries of this sort. Socrates resumes the argument. Courage has been defined to be intelligence or knowledge of theterrible; and courage is not all virtue, but only one of the virtues. The terrible is in the future, and therefore the knowledge of theterrible is a knowledge of the future. But there can be no knowledge offuture good or evil separated from a knowledge of the good and evilof the past or present; that is to say, of all good and evil. Courage, therefore, is the knowledge of good and evil generally. But he who hasthe knowledge of good and evil generally, must not only have courage, but also temperance, justice, and every other virtue. Thus, a singlevirtue would be the same as all virtues (compare Protagoras). And afterall the two generals, and Socrates, the hero of Delium, are still inignorance of the nature of courage. They must go to school again, boys, old men and all. 

Some points of resemblance, and some points of difference, appear inthe Laches when compared with the Charmides and Lysis. There is lessof poetical and simple beauty, and more of dramatic interest and power. They are richer in the externals of the scene; the Laches has more playand development of character. In the Lysis and Charmides the youths arethe central figures, and frequent allusions are made to the place ofmeeting, which is a palaestra. Here the place of meeting, which is alsoa palaestra, is quite forgotten, and the boys play a subordinate part. The seance is of old and elder men, of whom Socrates is the youngest. 

First is the aged Lysimachus, who may be compared with Cephalus in theRepublic, and, like him, withdraws from the argument. Melesias, who isonly his shadow, also subsides into silence. Both of them, by theirown confession, have been ill-educated, as is further shown by thecircumstance that Lysimachus, the friend of Sophroniscus, has neverheard of the fame of Socrates, his son; they belong to differentcircles. In the Meno their want of education in all but the arts ofriding and wrestling is adduced as a proof that virtue cannot be taught. The recognition of Socrates by Lysimachus is extremely graceful; and hismilitary exploits naturally connect him with the two generals, ofwhom one has witnessed them. The characters of Nicias and Laches areindicated by their opinions on the exhibition of the man fighting inheavy armour. The more enlightened Nicias is quite ready to accept thenew art, which Laches treats with ridicule, seeming to think that this, or any other military question, may be settled by asking, 'What do theLacedaemonians say?' The one is the thoughtful general, willing to availhimself of any discovery in the art of war (Aristoph. Aves); the otheris the practical man, who relies on his own experience, and is theenemy of innovation; he can act but cannot speak, and is apt to lose histemper. It is to be noted that one of them is supposed to be a hearer ofSocrates; the other is only acquainted with his actions. Laches is theadmirer of the Dorian mode; and into his mouth the remark is put thatthere are some persons who, having never been taught, are better thanthose who have. Like a novice in the art of disputation, he is delightedwith the hits of Socrates; and is disposed to be angry with therefinements of Nicias. 

In the discussion of the main thesis of the Dialogue--'What is Courage?'the antagonism of the two characters is still more clearly brought out;and in this, as in the preliminary question, the truth is parted betweenthem. Gradually, and not without difficulty, Laches is made to pass onfrom the more popular to the more philosophical; it has never occurredto him that there was any other courage than that of the soldier; andonly by an effort of the mind can he frame a general notion at all. Nosooner has this general notion been formed than it evanesces before thedialectic of Socrates; and Nicias appears from the other side with theSocratic doctrine, that courage is knowledge. This is explained to meanknowledge of things terrible in the future. But Socrates denies that theknowledge of the future is separable from that of the past and present;in other words, true knowledge is not that of the soothsayer but of thephilosopher. And all knowledge will thus be equivalent to all virtue--aposition which elsewhere Socrates is not unwilling to admit, but whichwill not assist us in distinguishing the nature of courage. In this partof the Dialogue the contrast between the mode of cross-examination whichis practised by Laches and by Socrates, and also the manner in whichthe definition of Laches is made to approximate to that of Nicias, areworthy of attention. 

Thus, with some intimation of the connexion and unity of virtue andknowledge, we arrive at no distinct result. The two aspects of courageare never harmonized. The knowledge which in the Protagoras is explainedas the faculty of estimating pleasures and pains is here lost in anunmeaning and transcendental conception. Yet several true intimations ofthe nature of courage are allowed to appear: (1) That courage ismoral as well as physical: (2) That true courage is inseparable fromknowledge, and yet (3) is based on a natural instinct. Laches exhibitsone aspect of courage; Nicias the other. The perfect image and harmonyof both is only realized in Socrates himself. 

The Dialogue offers one among many examples of the freedom with whichPlato treats facts. For the scene must be supposed to have occurredbetween B. C. 424, the year of the battle of Delium, and B. C. 418, theyear of the battle of Mantinea, at which Laches fell. But if Socrateswas more than seventy years of age at his trial in 399 (see Apology), hecould not have been a young man at any time after the battle of Delium. 

LACHES, OR COURAGE. 

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE:

 Lysimachus, son of Aristides. Melesias, son of Thucydides. Their sons. Nicias, Laches, Socrates. 

LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the exhibition of the man fighting in armour, Nicias and Laches, but we did not tell you at the time the reason why myfriend Melesias and I asked you to go with us and see him. I think thatwe may as well confess what this was, for we certainly ought not to haveany reserve with you. The reason was, that we were intending to ask youradvice. Some laugh at the very notion of advising others, and when theyare asked will not say what they think. They guess at the wishes of theperson who asks them, and answer according to his, and not according totheir own, opinion. But as we know that you are good judges, and willsay exactly what you think, we have taken you into our counsels. Thematter about which I am making all this preface is as follows: Melesiasand I have two sons; that is his son, and he is named Thucydides, after his grandfather; and this is mine, who is also called after hisgrandfather, Aristides. Now, we are resolved to take the greatest careof the youths, and not to let them run about as they like, which is toooften the way with the young, when they are no longer children, but tobegin at once and do the utmost that we can for them. And knowing youto have sons of your own, we thought that you were most likely to haveattended to their training and improvement, and, if perchance you havenot attended to them, we may remind you that you ought to have done so, and would invite you to assist us in the fulfilment of a common duty. Iwill tell you, Nicias and Laches, even at the risk of being tedious, how we came to think of this. Melesias and I live together, and our sonslive with us; and now, as I was saying at first, we are going to confessto you. Both of us often talk to the lads about the many noble deedswhich our own fathers did in war and peace--in the management of theallies, and in the administration of the city; but neither of us has anydeeds of his own which he can show. The truth is that we are ashamed ofthis contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for lettingus be spoiled in the days of our youth, while they were occupied withthe concerns of others; and we urge all this upon the lads, pointing outto them that they will not grow up to honour if they are rebellious andtake no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may, perhaps, become worthy of the names which they bear. They, on theirpart, promise to comply with our wishes; and our care is to discoverwhat studies or pursuits are likely to be most improving to them. Someone commended to us the art of fighting in armour, which he thought anexcellent accomplishment for a young man to learn; and he praised theman whose exhibition you have seen, and told us to go and see him. Andwe determined that we would go, and get you to accompany us; and we wereintending at the same time, if you did not object, to take counsel withyou about the education of our sons. That is the matter which we wantedto talk over with you; and we hope that you will give us your opinionabout this art of fighting in armour, and about any other studies orpursuits which may or may not be desirable for a young man to learn. Please to say whether you agree to our proposal. 

NICIAS: As far as I am concerned, Lysimachus and Melesias, I applaudyour purpose, and will gladly assist you; and I believe that you, Laches, will be equally glad. 

LACHES: Certainly, Nicias; and I quite approve of the remark whichLysimachus made about his own father and the father of Melesias, andwhich is applicable, not only to them, but to us, and to every one whois occupied with public affairs. As he says, such persons are too aptto be negligent and careless of their own children and their privateconcerns. There is much truth in that remark of yours, Lysimachus. Butwhy, instead of consulting us, do you not consult our friend Socratesabout the education of the youths? He is of the same deme with you, and is always passing his time in places where the youth have any noblestudy or pursuit, such as you are enquiring after. 

LYSIMACHUS: Why, Laches, has Socrates ever attended to matters of thissort?

LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus. 

NICIAS: That I have the means of knowing as well as Laches; for quitelately he supplied me with a teacher of music for my sons, --Damon, thedisciple of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, aswell as a musician, and a companion of inestimable value for young menat their age. 

LYSIMACHUS: Those who have reached my time of life, Socrates and Niciasand Laches, fall out of acquaintance with the young, because they aregenerally detained at home by old age; but you, O son of Sophroniscus, should let your fellow demesman have the benefit of any advice which youare able to give. Moreover I have a claim upon you as an old friend ofyour father; for I and he were always companions and friends, and to thehour of his death there never was a difference between us; and now itcomes back to me, at the mention of your name, that I have heard theselads talking to one another at home, and often speaking of Socratesin terms of the highest praise; but I have never thought to ask themwhether the son of Sophroniscus was the person whom they meant. Tell me, my boys, whether this is the Socrates of whom you have often spoken?

SON: Certainly, father, this is he. 

LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted to hear, Socrates, that you maintain the nameof your father, who was a most excellent man; and I further rejoice atthe prospect of our family ties being renewed. 

LACHES: Indeed, Lysimachus, you ought not to give him up; for I canassure you that I have seen him maintaining, not only his father's, butalso his country's name. He was my companion in the retreat from Delium, and I can tell you that if others had only been like him, the honourof our country would have been upheld, and the great defeat would neverhave occurred. 

LYSIMACHUS: That is very high praise which is accorded to you, Socrates, by faithful witnesses and for actions like those which they praise. Letme tell you the pleasure which I feel in hearing of your fame; and Ihope that you will regard me as one of your warmest friends. You oughtto have visited us long ago, and made yourself at home with us; but now, from this day forward, as we have at last found one another out, do as Isay--come and make acquaintance with me, and with these young men, thatI may continue your friend, as I was your father's. I shall expect youto do so, and shall venture at some future time to remind you of yourduty. But what say you of the matter of which we were beginning tospeak--the art of fighting in armour? Is that a practice in which thelads may be advantageously instructed?

SOCRATES: I will endeavour to advise you, Lysimachus, as far as I can inthis matter, and also in every way will comply with your wishes; but asI am younger and not so experienced, I think that I ought certainly tohear first what my elders have to say, and to learn of them, and if Ihave anything to add, then I may venture to give my opinion to them aswell as to you. Suppose, Nicias, that one or other of you begin. 

NICIAS: I have no objection, Socrates; and my opinion is that theacquirement of this art is in many ways useful to young men. It is anadvantage to them that among the favourite amusements of their leisurehours they should have one which tends to improve and not to injuretheir bodily health. No gymnastics could be better or harder exercise;and this, and the art of riding, are of all arts most befitting to afreeman; for they only who are thus trained in the use of arms arethe athletes of our military profession, trained in that on which theconflict turns. Moreover in actual battle, when you have to fight in aline with a number of others, such an acquirement will be of some use, and will be of the greatest whenever the ranks are broken and you haveto fight singly, either in pursuit, when you are attacking some one whois defending himself, or in flight, when you have to defend yourselfagainst an assailant. Certainly he who possessed the art could not meetwith any harm at the hands of a single person, or perhaps of several;and in any case he would have a great advantage. Further, this sort ofskill inclines a man to the love of other noble lessons; for every manwho has learned how to fight in armour will desire to learn the properarrangement of an army, which is the sequel of the lesson: and when hehas learned this, and his ambition is once fired, he will go on to learnthe complete art of the general. There is no difficulty in seeing thatthe knowledge and practice of other military arts will be honourable andvaluable to a man; and this lesson may be the beginning of them. Let meadd a further advantage, which is by no means a slight one, --that thisscience will make any man a great deal more valiant and self-possessedin the field. And I will not disdain to mention, what by some may bethought to be a small matter;--he will make a better appearance at theright time; that is to say, at the time when his appearance will striketerror into his enemies. My opinion then, Lysimachus, is, as I say, thatthe youths should be instructed in this art, and for the reasons whichI have given. But Laches may take a different view; and I shall be veryglad to hear what he has to say. 

LACHES: I should not like to maintain, Nicias, that any kind ofknowledge is not to be learned; for all knowledge appears to be a good:and if, as Nicias and as the teachers of the art affirm, this use ofarms is really a species of knowledge, then it ought to be learned; butif not, and if those who profess to teach it are deceivers only; or ifit be knowledge, but not of a valuable sort, then what is the use oflearning it? I say this, because I think that if it had been reallyvaluable, the Lacedaemonians, whose whole life is passed in finding outand practising the arts which give them an advantage over other nationsin war, would have discovered this one. And even if they had not, stillthese professors of the art would certainly not have failed to discoverthat of all the Hellenes the Lacedaemonians have the greatest interestin such matters, and that a master of the art who was honoured amongthem would be sure to make his fortune among other nations, just as atragic poet would who is honoured among ourselves; which is the reasonwhy he who fancies that he can write a tragedy does not go aboutitinerating in the neighbouring states, but rushes hither straight, andexhibits at Athens; and this is natural. Whereas I perceive that thesefighters in armour regard Lacedaemon as a sacred inviolable territory, which they do not touch with the point of their foot; but they makea circuit of the neighbouring states, and would rather exhibit toany others than to the Spartans; and particularly to those who wouldthemselves acknowledge that they are by no means first-rate in the artsof war. Further, Lysimachus, I have encountered a good many of thesegentlemen in actual service, and have taken their measure, which I cangive you at once; for none of these masters of fence have ever beendistinguished in war, --there has been a sort of fatality about them;while in all other arts the men of note have been always those who havepractised the art, they appear to be a most unfortunate exception. For example, this very Stesilaus, whom you and I have just witnessedexhibiting in all that crowd and making such great professions ofhis powers, I have seen at another time making, in sober truth, aninvoluntary exhibition of himself, which was a far better spectacle. Hewas a marine on board a ship which struck a transport vessel, and wasarmed with a weapon, half spear, half scythe; the singularity of thisweapon was worthy of the singularity of the man. To make a long storyshort, I will only tell you what happened to this notable inventionof the scythe spear. He was fighting, and the scythe was caught in therigging of the other ship, and stuck fast; and he tugged, but was unableto get his weapon free. The two ships were passing one another. He firstran along his own ship holding on to the spear; but as the other shippassed by and drew him after as he was holding on, he let the spearslip through his hand until he retained only the end of the handle. The people in the transport clapped their hands, and laughed at hisridiculous figure; and when some one threw a stone, which fell on thedeck at his feet, and he quitted his hold of the scythe-spear, the crewof his own trireme also burst out laughing; they could not refrain whenthey beheld the weapon waving in the air, suspended from the transport. Now I do not deny that there may be something in such an art, as Niciasasserts, but I tell you my experience; and, as I said at first, whetherthis be an art of which the advantage is so slight, or not an art atall, but only an imposition, in either case such an acquirement is notworth having. For my opinion is, that if the professor of this art be acoward, he will be likely to become rash, and his character will be onlymore notorious; or if he be brave, and fail ever so little, other menwill be on the watch, and he will be greatly traduced; for there is ajealousy of such pretenders; and unless a man be pre-eminent in valour, he cannot help being ridiculous, if he says that he has this sort ofskill. Such is my judgment, Lysimachus, of the desirableness of thisart; but, as I said at first, ask Socrates, and do not let him go untilhe has given you his opinion of the matter. 

LYSIMACHUS: I am going to ask this favour of you, Socrates; as is themore necessary because the two councillors disagree, and some one is ina manner still needed who will decide between them. Had they agreed, noarbiter would have been required. But as Laches has voted one way andNicias another, I should like to hear with which of our two friends youagree. 

SOCRATES: What, Lysimachus, are you going to accept the opinion of themajority?

LYSIMACHUS: Why, yes, Socrates; what else am I to do?

SOCRATES: And would you do so too, Melesias? If you were deliberatingabout the gymnastic training of your son, would you follow the advice ofthe majority of us, or the opinion of the one who had been trained andexercised under a skilful master?

MELESIAS: The latter, Socrates; as would surely be reasonable. 

SOCRATES: His one vote would be worth more than the vote of all us four?

MELESIAS: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And for this reason, as I imagine, --because a good decision isbased on knowledge and not on numbers?

MELESIAS: To be sure. 

SOCRATES: Must we not then first of all ask, whether there is any one ofus who has knowledge of that about which we are deliberating? If thereis, let us take his advice, though he be one only, and not mind therest; if there is not, let us seek further counsel. Is this a slightmatter about which you and Lysimachus are deliberating? Are you notrisking the greatest of your possessions? For children are your riches;and upon their turning out well or ill depends the whole order of theirfather's house. 

MELESIAS: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Great care, then, is required in this matter?

MELESIAS: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Suppose, as I was just now saying, that we were considering, or wanting to consider, who was the best trainer. Should we not selecthim who knew and had practised the art, and had the best teachers?

MELESIAS: I think that we should. 

SOCRATES: But would there not arise a prior question about the nature ofthe art of which we want to find the masters?

MELESIAS: I do not understand. 

SOCRATES: Let me try to make my meaning plainer then. I do not thinkthat we have as yet decided what that is about which we are consulting, when we ask which of us is or is not skilled in the art, and has or hasnot had a teacher of the art. 

NICIAS: Why, Socrates, is not the question whether young men ought orought not to learn the art of fighting in armour?

SOCRATES: Yes, Nicias; but there is also a prior question, which Imay illustrate in this way: When a person considers about applying amedicine to the eyes, would you say that he is consulting about themedicine or about the eyes?

NICIAS: About the eyes. 

SOCRATES: And when he considers whether he shall set a bridle on a horseand at what time, he is thinking of the horse and not of the bridle?

NICIAS: True. 

SOCRATES: And in a word, when he considers anything for the sake ofanother thing, he thinks of the end and not of the means?

NICIAS: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: And when you call in an adviser, you should see whether he toois skilful in the accomplishment of the end which you have in view?

NICIAS: Most true. 

SOCRATES: And at present we have in view some knowledge, of which theend is the soul of youth?

NICIAS: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And we are enquiring, Which of us is skilful or successful inthe treatment of the soul, and which of us has had good teachers?

LACHES: Well but, Socrates; did you never observe that some persons, who have had no teachers, are more skilful than those who have, in somethings?

SOCRATES: Yes, Laches, I have observed that; but you would not be verywilling to trust them if they only professed to be masters of their art, unless they could show some proof of their skill or excellence in one ormore works. 

LACHES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: And therefore, Laches and Nicias, as Lysimachus and Melesias, in their anxiety to improve the minds of their sons, have asked ouradvice about them, we too should tell them who our teachers were, if wesay that we have had any, and prove them to be in the first place menof merit and experienced trainers of the minds of youth and also to havebeen really our teachers. Or if any of us says that he has no teacher, but that he has works of his own to show; then he should point outto them what Athenians or strangers, bond or free, he is generallyacknowledged to have improved. But if he can show neither teachers norworks, then he should tell them to look out for others; and not run therisk of spoiling the children of friends, and thereby incurring themost formidable accusation which can be brought against any one by thosenearest to him. As for myself, Lysimachus and Melesias, I am thefirst to confess that I have never had a teacher of the art of virtue;although I have always from my earliest youth desired to have one. ButI am too poor to give money to the Sophists, who are the only professorsof moral improvement; and to this day I have never been able to discoverthe art myself, though I should not be surprised if Nicias or Laches mayhave discovered or learned it; for they are far wealthier than I am, and may therefore have learnt of others. And they are older too; so thatthey have had more time to make the discovery. And I really believe thatthey are able to educate a man; for unless they had been confident intheir own knowledge, they would never have spoken thus decidedly ofthe pursuits which are advantageous or hurtful to a young man. I reposeconfidence in both of them; but I am surprised to find that they differfrom one another. And therefore, Lysimachus, as Laches suggested thatyou should detain me, and not let me go until I answered, I in turnearnestly beseech and advise you to detain Laches and Nicias, andquestion them. I would have you say to them: Socrates avers that he hasno knowledge of the matter--he is unable to decide which of you speakstruly; neither discoverer nor student is he of anything of the kind. But you, Laches and Nicias, should each of you tell us who is the mostskilful educator whom you have ever known; and whether you invented theart yourselves, or learned of another; and if you learned, who were yourrespective teachers, and who were their brothers in the art; and then, if you are too much occupied in politics to teach us yourselves, let usgo to them, and present them with gifts, or make interest with them, or both, in the hope that they may be induced to take charge of ourchildren and of yours; and then they will not grow up inferior, anddisgrace their ancestors. But if you are yourselves original discoverersin that field, give us some proof of your skill. Who are they who, having been inferior persons, have become under your care good andnoble? For if this is your first attempt at education, there is a dangerthat you may be trying the experiment, not on the 'vile corpus' of aCarian slave, but on your own sons, or the sons of your friend, and, as the proverb says, 'break the large vessel in learning to make pots. 'Tell us then, what qualities you claim or do not claim. Make them tellyou that, Lysimachus, and do not let them off. 

LYSIMACHUS: I very much approve of the words of Socrates, my friends;but you, Nicias and Laches, must determine whether you will bequestioned, and give an explanation about matters of this sort. Assuredly, I and Melesias would be greatly pleased to hear you answerthe questions which Socrates asks, if you will: for I began by sayingthat we took you into our counsels because we thought that you wouldhave attended to the subject, especially as you have children who, likeour own, are nearly of an age to be educated. Well, then, if you have noobjection, suppose that you take Socrates into partnership; and do youand he ask and answer one another's questions: for, as he has well said, we are deliberating about the most important of our concerns. I hopethat you will see fit to comply with our request. 

NICIAS: I see very clearly, Lysimachus, that you have only knownSocrates' father, and have no acquaintance with Socrates himself: atleast, you can only have known him when he was a child, and may havemet him among his fellow-wardsmen, in company with his father, at asacrifice, or at some other gathering. You clearly show that you havenever known him since he arrived at manhood. 

LYSIMACHUS: Why do you say that, Nicias?

NICIAS: Because you seem not to be aware that any one who has anintellectual affinity to Socrates and enters into conversation withhim is liable to be drawn into an argument; and whatever subject he maystart, he will be continually carried round and round by him, until atlast he finds that he has to give an account both of his present andpast life; and when he is once entangled, Socrates will not let him gountil he has completely and thoroughly sifted him. Now I am used to hisways; and I know that he will certainly do as I say, and also thatI myself shall be the sufferer; for I am fond of his conversation, Lysimachus. And I think that there is no harm in being reminded of anywrong thing which we are, or have been, doing: he who does not fly fromreproof will be sure to take more heed of his after-life; as Solon says, he will wish and desire to be learning so long as he lives, and will notthink that old age of itself brings wisdom. To me, to be cross-examinedby Socrates is neither unusual nor unpleasant; indeed, I knew all alongthat where Socrates was, the argument would soon pass from our sons toourselves; and therefore, I say that for my part, I am quite willing todiscourse with Socrates in his own manner; but you had better ask ourfriend Laches what his feeling may be. 

LACHES: I have but one feeling, Nicias, or (shall I say?) two feelings, about discussions. Some would think that I am a lover, and to others Imay seem to be a hater of discourse; for when I hear a man discoursingof virtue, or of any sort of wisdom, who is a true man and worthy ofhis theme, I am delighted beyond measure: and I compare the man and hiswords, and note the harmony and correspondence of them. And such an oneI deem to be the true musician, attuned to a fairer harmony than that ofthe lyre, or any pleasant instrument of music; for truly he has in hisown life a harmony of words and deeds arranged, not in the Ionian, or inthe Phrygian mode, nor yet in the Lydian, but in the true Hellenic mode, which is the Dorian, and no other. Such an one makes me merry with thesound of his voice; and when I hear him I am thought to be a loverof discourse; so eager am I in drinking in his words. But a man whoseactions do not agree with his words is an annoyance to me; and thebetter he speaks the more I hate him, and then I seem to be a hater ofdiscourse. As to Socrates, I have no knowledge of his words, but of old, as would seem, I have had experience of his deeds; and his deeds showthat free and noble sentiments are natural to him. And if his wordsaccord, then I am of one mind with him, and shall be delighted to beinterrogated by a man such as he is, and shall not be annoyed at havingto learn of him: for I too agree with Solon, 'that I would fain growold, learning many things. ' But I must be allowed to add 'of the goodonly. ' Socrates must be willing to allow that he is a good teacher, or Ishall be a dull and uncongenial pupil: but that the teacher is younger, or not as yet in repute--anything of that sort is of no account withme. And therefore, Socrates, I give you notice that you may teach andconfute me as much as ever you like, and also learn of me anything whichI know. So high is the opinion which I have entertained of you eversince the day on which you were my companion in danger, and gave a proofof your valour such as only the man of merit can give. Therefore, saywhatever you like, and do not mind about the difference of our ages. 

SOCRATES: I cannot say that either of you show any reluctance to takecounsel and advise with me. 

LYSIMACHUS: But this is our proper business; and yours as well as ours, for I reckon you as one of us. Please then to take my place, and findout from Nicias and Laches what we want to know, for the sake of theyouths, and talk and consult with them: for I am old, and my memory isbad; and I do not remember the questions which I am going to ask, orthe answers to them; and if there is any interruption I am quite lost. I will therefore beg of you to carry on the proposed discussion byyour selves; and I will listen, and Melesias and I will act upon yourconclusions. 

SOCRATES: Let us, Nicias and Laches, comply with the request ofLysimachus and Melesias. There will be no harm in asking ourselvesthe question which was first proposed to us: 'Who have been our owninstructors in this sort of training, and whom have we made better?' Butthe other mode of carrying on the enquiry will bring us equally to thesame point, and will be more like proceeding from first principles. For if we knew that the addition of something would improve some otherthing, and were able to make the addition, then, clearly, we mustknow how that about which we are advising may be best and most easilyattained. Perhaps you do not understand what I mean. Then let me make mymeaning plainer in this way. Suppose we knew that the addition of sightmakes better the eyes which possess this gift, and also were able toimpart sight to the eyes, then, clearly, we should know the nature ofsight, and should be able to advise how this gift of sight may be bestand most easily attained; but if we knew neither what sight is, nor whathearing is, we should not be very good medical advisers about the eyesor the ears, or about the best mode of giving sight and hearing to them. 

LACHES: That is true, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: And are not our two friends, Laches, at this very momentinviting us to consider in what way the gift of virtue may be impartedto their sons for the improvement of their minds?

LACHES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: Then must we not first know the nature of virtue? For how canwe advise any one about the best mode of attaining something of which weare wholly ignorant?

LACHES: I do not think that we can, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, we may presume that we know the nature ofvirtue?

LACHES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And that which we know we must surely be able to tell?

LACHES: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: I would not have us begin, my friend, with enquiring aboutthe whole of virtue; for that may be more than we can accomplish; letus first consider whether we have a sufficient knowledge of a part; theenquiry will thus probably be made easier to us. 

LACHES: Let us do as you say, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Then which of the parts of virtue shall we select? Must wenot select that to which the art of fighting in armour is supposed toconduce? And is not that generally thought to be courage?

LACHES: Yes, certainly. 

SOCRATES: Then, Laches, suppose that we first set about determining thenature of courage, and in the second place proceed to enquire how theyoung men may attain this quality by the help of studies and pursuits. Tell me, if you can, what is courage. 

LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I see no difficulty in answering; he is a manof courage who does not run away, but remains at his post and fightsagainst the enemy; there can be no mistake about that. 

SOCRATES: Very good, Laches; and yet I fear that I did not expressmyself clearly; and therefore you have answered not the question which Iintended to ask, but another. 

LACHES: What do you mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain; you would call a man courageouswho remains at his post, and fights with the enemy?

LACHES: Certainly I should. 

SOCRATES: And so should I; but what would you say of another man, whofights flying, instead of remaining?

LACHES: How flying?

SOCRATES: Why, as the Scythians are said to fight, flying as well aspursuing; and as Homer says in praise of the horses of Aeneas, that theyknew 'how to pursue, and fly quickly hither and thither'; and he passesan encomium on Aeneas himself, as having a knowledge of fear or flight, and calls him 'an author of fear or flight. '

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, and there Homer is right: for he was speaking ofchariots, as you were speaking of the Scythian cavalry, who have thatway of fighting; but the heavy-armed Greek fights, as I say, remainingin his rank. 

SOCRATES: And yet, Laches, you must except the Lacedaemonians atPlataea, who, when they came upon the light shields of the Persians, aresaid not to have been willing to stand and fight, and to have fled; butwhen the ranks of the Persians were broken, they turned upon them likecavalry, and won the battle of Plataea. 

LACHES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: That was my meaning when I said that I was to blame in havingput my question badly, and that this was the reason of your answeringbadly. For I meant to ask you not only about the courage of heavy-armedsoldiers, but about the courage of cavalry and every other style ofsoldier; and not only who are courageous in war, but who are courageousin perils by sea, and who in disease, or in poverty, or again inpolitics, are courageous; and not only who are courageous against painor fear, but mighty to contend against desires and pleasures, eitherfixed in their rank or turning upon their enemy. There is this sort ofcourage--is there not, Laches?

LACHES: Certainly, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: And all these are courageous, but some have courage inpleasures, and some in pains: some in desires, and some in fears, andsome are cowards under the same conditions, as I should imagine. 

LACHES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: Now I was asking about courage and cowardice in general. And Iwill begin with courage, and once more ask, What is that common quality, which is the same in all these cases, and which is called courage? Doyou now understand what I mean?

LACHES: Not over well. 

SOCRATES: I mean this: As I might ask what is that quality which iscalled quickness, and which is found in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning, and in many other similar actions, or ratherwhich we possess in nearly every action that is worth mentioning ofarms, legs, mouth, voice, mind;--would you not apply the term quicknessto all of them?

LACHES: Quite true. 

SOCRATES: And suppose I were to be asked by some one: What is thatcommon quality, Socrates, which, in all these uses of the word, you callquickness? I should say the quality which accomplishes much in a littletime--whether in running, speaking, or in any other sort of action. 

LACHES: You would be quite correct. 

SOCRATES: And now, Laches, do you try and tell me in like manner, Whatis that common quality which is called courage, and which includes allthe various uses of the term when applied both to pleasure and pain, andin all the cases to which I was just now referring?

LACHES: I should say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul, ifI am to speak of the universal nature which pervades them all. 

SOCRATES: But that is what we must do if we are to answer the question. And yet I cannot say that every kind of endurance is, in my opinion, to be deemed courage. Hear my reason: I am sure, Laches, that you wouldconsider courage to be a very noble quality. 

LACHES: Most noble, certainly. 

SOCRATES: And you would say that a wise endurance is also good andnoble?

LACHES: Very noble. 

SOCRATES: But what would you say of a foolish endurance? Is not that, onthe other hand, to be regarded as evil and hurtful?

LACHES: True. 

SOCRATES: And is anything noble which is evil and hurtful?

LACHES: I ought not to say that, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Then you would not admit that sort of endurance to becourage--for it is not noble, but courage is noble?

LACHES: You are right. 

SOCRATES: Then, according to you, only the wise endurance is courage?

LACHES: True. 

SOCRATES: But as to the epithet 'wise, '--wise in what? In all thingssmall as well as great? For example, if a man shows the quality ofendurance in spending his money wisely, knowing that by spending he willacquire more in the end, do you call him courageous?

LACHES: Assuredly not. 

SOCRATES: Or, for example, if a man is a physician, and his son, or somepatient of his, has inflammation of the lungs, and begs that he may beallowed to eat or drink something, and the other is firm and refuses; isthat courage?

LACHES: No; that is not courage at all, any more than the last. 

SOCRATES: Again, take the case of one who endures in war, and is willingto fight, and wisely calculates and knows that others will help him, and that there will be fewer and inferior men against him than there arewith him; and suppose that he has also advantages of position; would yousay of such a one who endures with all this wisdom and preparation, that he, or some man in the opposing army who is in the oppositecircumstances to these and yet endures and remains at his post, is thebraver?

LACHES: I should say that the latter, Socrates, was the braver. 

SOCRATES: But, surely, this is a foolish endurance in comparison withthe other?

LACHES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Then you would say that he who in an engagement of cavalryendures, having the knowledge of horsemanship, is not so courageous ashe who endures, having no such knowledge?

LACHES: So I should say. 

SOCRATES: And he who endures, having a knowledge of the use of thesling, or the bow, or of any other art, is not so courageous as he whoendures, not having such a knowledge?

LACHES: True. 

SOCRATES: And he who descends into a well, and dives, and holds out inthis or any similar action, having no knowledge of diving, or thelike, is, as you would say, more courageous than those who have thisknowledge?

LACHES: Why, Socrates, what else can a man say?

SOCRATES: Nothing, if that be what he thinks. 

LACHES: But that is what I do think. 

SOCRATES: And yet men who thus run risks and endure are foolish, Laches, in comparison of those who do the same things, having the skill to dothem. 

LACHES: That is true. 

SOCRATES: But foolish boldness and endurance appeared before to be baseand hurtful to us. 

LACHES: Quite true. 

SOCRATES: Whereas courage was acknowledged to be a noble quality. 

LACHES: True. 

SOCRATES: And now on the contrary we are saying that the foolishendurance, which was before held in dishonour, is courage. 

LACHES: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And are we right in saying so?

LACHES: Indeed, Socrates, I am sure that we are not right. 

SOCRATES: Then according to your statement, you and I, Laches, are notattuned to the Dorian mode, which is a harmony of words and deeds; forour deeds are not in accordance with our words. Any one would say thatwe had courage who saw us in action, but not, I imagine, he who heard ustalking about courage just now. 

LACHES: That is most true. 

SOCRATES: And is this condition of ours satisfactory?

LACHES: Quite the reverse. 

SOCRATES: Suppose, however, that we admit the principle of which we arespeaking to a certain extent. 

LACHES: To what extent and what principle do you mean?

SOCRATES: The principle of endurance. We too must endure and perseverein the enquiry, and then courage will not laugh at our faint-heartednessin searching for courage; which after all may, very likely, beendurance. 

LACHES: I am ready to go on, Socrates; and yet I am unused toinvestigations of this sort. But the spirit of controversy has beenaroused in me by what has been said; and I am really grieved at beingthus unable to express my meaning. For I fancy that I do know the natureof courage; but, somehow or other, she has slipped away from me, and Icannot get hold of her and tell her nature. 

SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, should not the good sportsman follow thetrack, and not be lazy?

LACHES: Certainly, he should. 

SOCRATES: And shall we invite Nicias to join us? he may be better at thesport than we are. What do you say?

LACHES: I should like that. 

SOCRATES: Come then, Nicias, and do what you can to help your friends, who are tossing on the waves of argument, and at the last gasp: you seeour extremity, and may save us and also settle your own opinion, if youwill tell us what you think about courage. 

NICIAS: I have been thinking, Socrates, that you and Laches are notdefining courage in the right way; for you have forgotten an excellentsaying which I have heard from your own lips. 

SOCRATES: What is it, Nicias?

NICIAS: I have often heard you say that 'Every man is good in that inwhich he is wise, and bad in that in which he is unwise. '

SOCRATES: That is certainly true, Nicias. 

NICIAS: And therefore if the brave man is good, he is also wise. 

SOCRATES: Do you hear him, Laches?

LACHES: Yes, I hear him, but I do not very well understand him. 

SOCRATES: I think that I understand him; and he appears to me to meanthat courage is a sort of wisdom. 

LACHES: What can he possibly mean, Socrates?

SOCRATES: That is a question which you must ask of himself. 

LACHES: Yes. 

SOCRATES: Tell him then, Nicias, what you mean by this wisdom; for yousurely do not mean the wisdom which plays the flute?

NICIAS: Certainly not. 

SOCRATES: Nor the wisdom which plays the lyre?

NICIAS: No. 

SOCRATES: But what is this knowledge then, and of what?

LACHES: I think that you put the question to him very well, Socrates;and I would like him to say what is the nature of this knowledge orwisdom. 

NICIAS: I mean to say, Laches, that courage is the knowledge of thatwhich inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything. 

LACHES: How strangely he is talking, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: Why do you say so, Laches?

LACHES: Why, surely courage is one thing, and wisdom another. 

SOCRATES: That is just what Nicias denies. 

LACHES: Yes, that is what he denies; but he is so silly. 

SOCRATES: Suppose that we instruct instead of abusing him?

NICIAS: Laches does not want to instruct me, Socrates; but having beenproved to be talking nonsense himself, he wants to prove that I havebeen doing the same. 

LACHES: Very true, Nicias; and you are talking nonsense, as I shallendeavour to show. Let me ask you a question: Do not physicians knowthe dangers of disease? or do the courageous know them? or are thephysicians the same as the courageous?

NICIAS: Not at all. 

LACHES: No more than the husbandmen who know the dangers of husbandry, or than other craftsmen, who have a knowledge of that which inspiresthem with fear or confidence in their own arts, and yet they are notcourageous a whit the more for that. 

SOCRATES: What is Laches saying, Nicias? He appears to be sayingsomething of importance. 

NICIAS: Yes, he is saying something, but it is not true. 

SOCRATES: How so?

NICIAS: Why, because he does not see that the physician's knowledge onlyextends to the nature of health and disease: he can tell the sick man nomore than this. Do you imagine, Laches, that the physician knows whetherhealth or disease is the more terrible to a man? Had not many a manbetter never get up from a sick bed? I should like to know whether youthink that life is always better than death. May not death often be thebetter of the two?

LACHES: Yes certainly so in my opinion. 

NICIAS: And do you think that the same things are terrible to those whohad better die, and to those who had better live?

LACHES: Certainly not. 

NICIAS: And do you suppose that the physician or any other artist knowsthis, or any one indeed, except he who is skilled in the grounds of fearand hope? And him I call the courageous. 

SOCRATES: Do you understand his meaning, Laches?

LACHES: Yes; I suppose that, in his way of speaking, the soothsayers arecourageous. For who but one of them can know to whom to die or to liveis better? And yet Nicias, would you allow that you are yourself asoothsayer, or are you neither a soothsayer nor courageous?

NICIAS: What! do you mean to say that the soothsayer ought to know thegrounds of hope or fear?

LACHES: Indeed I do: who but he?

NICIAS: Much rather I should say he of whom I speak; for the soothsayerought to know only the signs of things that are about to come to pass, whether death or disease, or loss of property, or victory, or defeatin war, or in any sort of contest; but to whom the suffering or notsuffering of these things will be for the best, can no more be decidedby the soothsayer than by one who is no soothsayer. 

LACHES: I cannot understand what Nicias would be at, Socrates; for herepresents the courageous man as neither a soothsayer, nor a physician, nor in any other character, unless he means to say that he is a god. Myopinion is that he does not like honestly to confess that he is talkingnonsense, but that he shuffles up and down in order to conceal thedifficulty into which he has got himself. You and I, Socrates, mighthave practised a similar shuffle just now, if we had only wanted toavoid the appearance of inconsistency. And if we had been arguing in acourt of law there might have been reason in so doing; but why shoulda man deck himself out with vain words at a meeting of friends such asthis?

SOCRATES: I quite agree with you, Laches, that he should not. Butperhaps Nicias is serious, and not merely talking for the sake oftalking. Let us ask him just to explain what he means, and if he hasreason on his side we will agree with him; if not, we will instruct him. 

LACHES: Do you, Socrates, if you like, ask him: I think that I haveasked enough. 

SOCRATES: I do not see why I should not; and my question will do forboth of us. 

LACHES: Very good. 

SOCRATES: Then tell me, Nicias, or rather tell us, for Laches and Iare partners in the argument: Do you mean to affirm that courage is theknowledge of the grounds of hope and fear?

NICIAS: I do. 

SOCRATES: And not every man has this knowledge; the physician and thesoothsayer have it not; and they will not be courageous unless theyacquire it--that is what you were saying?

NICIAS: I was. 

SOCRATES: Then this is certainly not a thing which every pig would know, as the proverb says, and therefore he could not be courageous. 

NICIAS: I think not. 

SOCRATES: Clearly not, Nicias; not even such a big pig as theCrommyonian sow would be called by you courageous. And this I say not asa joke, but because I think that he who assents to your doctrine, thatcourage is the knowledge of the grounds of fear and hope, cannot allowthat any wild beast is courageous, unless he admits that a lion, or aleopard, or perhaps a boar, or any other animal, has such a degree ofwisdom that he knows things which but a few human beings ever knowby reason of their difficulty. He who takes your view of courage mustaffirm that a lion, and a stag, and a bull, and a monkey, have equallylittle pretensions to courage. 

LACHES: Capital, Socrates; by the gods, that is truly good. And I hope, Nicias, that you will tell us whether these animals, which we all admitto be courageous, are really wiser than mankind; or whether you willhave the boldness, in the face of universal opinion, to deny theircourage. 

NICIAS: Why, Laches, I do not call animals or any other things whichhave no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous, but only fearless and senseless. Do you imagine that I should calllittle children courageous, which fear no dangers because they knownone? There is a difference, to my way of thinking, between fearlessnessand courage. I am of opinion that thoughtful courage is a qualitypossessed by very few, but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought, are very common qualities possessed by manymen, many women, many children, many animals. And you, and men ingeneral, call by the term 'courageous' actions which I call rash;--mycourageous actions are wise actions. 

LACHES: Behold, Socrates, how admirably, as he thinks, he dresseshimself out in words, while seeking to deprive of the honour of couragethose whom all the world acknowledges to be courageous. 

NICIAS: Not so, Laches, but do not be alarmed; for I am quite willing tosay of you and also of Lamachus, and of many other Athenians, that youare courageous and therefore wise. 

LACHES: I could answer that; but I would not have you cast in my teeththat I am a haughty Aexonian. 

SOCRATES: Do not answer him, Laches; I rather fancy that you are notaware of the source from which his wisdom is derived. He has got allthis from my friend Damon, and Damon is always with Prodicus, who, ofall the Sophists, is considered to be the best puller to pieces of wordsof this sort. 

LACHES: Yes, Socrates; and the examination of such niceties is a muchmore suitable employment for a Sophist than for a great statesman whomthe city chooses to preside over her. 

SOCRATES: Yes, my sweet friend, but a great statesman is likely to havea great intelligence. And I think that the view which is implied inNicias' definition of courage is worthy of examination. 

LACHES: Then examine for yourself, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: That is what I am going to do, my dear friend. Do not, however, suppose I shall let you out of the partnership; for I shallexpect you to apply your mind, and join with me in the consideration ofthe question. 

LACHES: I will if you think that I ought. 

SOCRATES: Yes, I do; but I must beg of you, Nicias, to begin again. Youremember that we originally considered courage to be a part of virtue. 

NICIAS: Very true. 

SOCRATES: And you yourself said that it was a part; and there were manyother parts, all of which taken together are called virtue. 

NICIAS: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Do you agree with me about the parts? For I say that justice, temperance, and the like, are all of them parts of virtue as well ascourage. Would you not say the same?

NICIAS: Certainly. 

SOCRATES: Well then, so far we are agreed. And now let us proceed astep, and try to arrive at a similar agreement about the fearful and thehopeful: I do not want you to be thinking one thing and myself another. Let me then tell you my own opinion, and if I am wrong you shall set meright: in my opinion the terrible and the hopeful are the things whichdo or do not create fear, and fear is not of the present, nor of thepast, but is of future and expected evil. Do you not agree to that, Laches?

LACHES: Yes, Socrates, entirely. 

SOCRATES: That is my view, Nicias; the terrible things, as I should say, are the evils which are future; and the hopeful are the good or not evilthings which are future. Do you or do you not agree with me?

NICIAS: I agree. 

SOCRATES: And the knowledge of these things you call courage?

NICIAS: Precisely. 

SOCRATES: And now let me see whether you agree with Laches and myself asto a third point. 

NICIAS: What is that?

SOCRATES: I will tell you. He and I have a notion that there is not oneknowledge or science of the past, another of the present, a third ofwhat is likely to be best and what will be best in the future; butthat of all three there is one science only: for example, there is onescience of medicine which is concerned with the inspection of healthequally in all times, present, past, and future; and one science ofhusbandry in like manner, which is concerned with the productions of theearth in all times. As to the art of the general, you yourselves will bemy witnesses that he has an excellent foreknowledge of the future, andthat he claims to be the master and not the servant of the soothsayer, because he knows better what is happening or is likely to happen in war:and accordingly the law places the soothsayer under the general, and notthe general under the soothsayer. Am I not correct in saying so, Laches?

LACHES: Quite correct. 

SOCRATES: And do you, Nicias, also acknowledge that the same science hasunderstanding of the same things, whether future, present, or past?

NICIAS: Yes, indeed Socrates; that is my opinion. 

SOCRATES: And courage, my friend, is, as you say, a knowledge of thefearful and of the hopeful?

NICIAS: Yes. 

SOCRATES: And the fearful, and the hopeful, are admitted to be futuregoods and future evils?

NICIAS: True. 

SOCRATES: And the same science has to do with the same things in thefuture or at any time?

NICIAS: That is true. 

SOCRATES: Then courage is not the science which is concerned with thefearful and hopeful, for they are future only; courage, like the othersciences, is concerned not only with good and evil of the future, but ofthe present and past, and of any time?

NICIAS: That, as I suppose, is true. 

SOCRATES: Then the answer which you have given, Nicias, includes only athird part of courage; but our question extended to the whole nature ofcourage: and according to your view, that is, according to your presentview, courage is not only the knowledge of the hopeful and the fearful, but seems to include nearly every good and evil without reference totime. What do you say to that alteration in your statement?

NICIAS: I agree, Socrates. 

SOCRATES: But then, my dear friend, if a man knew all good and evil, and how they are, and have been, and will be produced, would he not beperfect, and wanting in no virtue, whether justice, or temperance, or holiness? He would possess them all, and he would know which weredangers and which were not, and guard against them whether they weresupernatural or natural; and he would provide the good, as he would knowhow to deal both with gods or men. 

NICIAS: I think, Socrates, that there is a great deal of truth in whatyou say. 

SOCRATES: But then, Nicias, courage, according to this new definition ofyours, instead of being a part of virtue only, will be all virtue?

NICIAS: It would seem so. 

SOCRATES: But we were saying that courage is one of the parts of virtue?

NICIAS: Yes, that was what we were saying. 

SOCRATES: And that is in contradiction with our present view?

NICIAS: That appears to be the case. 

SOCRATES: Then, Nicias, we have not discovered what courage is. 

NICIAS: We have not. 

LACHES: And yet, friend Nicias, I imagined that you would have made thediscovery, when you were so contemptuous of the answers which I made toSocrates. I had very great hopes that you would have been enlightened bythe wisdom of Damon. 

NICIAS: I perceive, Laches, that you think nothing of having displayedyour ignorance of the nature of courage, but you look only to seewhether I have not made a similar display; and if we are both equallyignorant of the things which a man who is good for anything should know, that, I suppose, will be of no consequence. You certainly appear to mevery like the rest of the world, looking at your neighbour and not atyourself. I am of opinion that enough has been said on the subject whichwe have been discussing; and if anything has been imperfectly said, thatmay be hereafter corrected by the help of Damon, whom you think to laughdown, although you have never seen him, and with the help of others. Andwhen I am satisfied myself, I will freely impart my satisfaction to you, for I think that you are very much in want of knowledge. 

LACHES: You are a philosopher, Nicias; of that I am aware: neverthelessI would recommend Lysimachus and Melesias not to take you and me asadvisers about the education of their children; but, as I said at first, they should ask Socrates and not let him off; if my own sons were oldenough, I would have asked him myself. 

NICIAS: To that I quite agree, if Socrates is willing to take themunder his charge. I should not wish for any one else to be the tutorof Niceratus. But I observe that when I mention the matter to him herecommends to me some other tutor and refuses himself. Perhaps he may bemore ready to listen to you, Lysimachus. 

LYSIMACHUS: He ought, Nicias: for certainly I would do things for himwhich I would not do for many others. What do you say, Socrates--willyou comply? And are you ready to give assistance in the improvement ofthe youths?

SOCRATES: Indeed, Lysimachus, I should be very wrong in refusing to aidin the improvement of anybody. And if I had shown in this conversationthat I had a knowledge which Nicias and Laches have not, then I admitthat you would be right in inviting me to perform this duty; but as weare all in the same perplexity, why should one of us be preferredto another? I certainly think that no one should; and under thesecircumstances, let me offer you a piece of advice (and this need not gofurther than ourselves). I maintain, my friends, that every one of usshould seek out the best teacher whom he can find, first for ourselves, who are greatly in need of one, and then for the youth, regardless ofexpense or anything. But I cannot advise that we remain as we are. Andif any one laughs at us for going to school at our age, I would quote tothem the authority of Homer, who says, that

'Modesty is not good for a needy man. '

Let us then, regardless of what may be said of us, make the education ofthe youths our own education. 

LYSIMACHUS: I like your proposal, Socrates; and as I am the oldest, I amalso the most eager to go to school with the boys. Let me beg a favourof you: Come to my house to-morrow at dawn, and we will advise aboutthese matters. For the present, let us make an end of the conversation. 

SOCRATES: I will come to you to-morrow, Lysimachus, as you propose, Godwilling.