KHARTOUM CAMPAIGN

1898

OR THE

RE-CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN

BY

BENNET BURLEIGH. 

AUTHOR OF "SIRDAR AND KHALIFA. "

WITH MAPS, PLANS OF BATTLE, AND NUMEROUSILLUSTRATIONS

SECOND IMPRESSION. 

LONDON: CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED1899

PREFACE. 

By the overthrow of Mahdism, the great region of Central Africa hasbeen opened to civilisation. From the date of the splendid victory ofOmdurman, 2nd September 1898, may be reckoned the creation of a vastSoudan empire. At so early a stage, it is idle to speculate whetherthe country will be held as a British possession, or as a province ofEgypt. "The land of the blacks, " and their truculent Arab despoilers, has the intrinsic qualities that secure distinction. Given peace, itmay be expected that the mixed negroid races of the Upper Nile willprove themselves as orderly and industrious as they are conspicuouslybrave. Whoever rules them wisely, will have the control of the bestnative tribes of the Dark Continent, the raw material of a mightystate. This, too, is foreshadowed; the dominant power in CentralNorthern Africa, if no farther afield, will have its capital inKhartoum, "Ethiopia will soon stretch out her hands unto God. "

The recent events which have so altered the condition of affairs uponthe Upper Nile, deserve more than ephemeral record. A campaign so fullof inspiriting incident, a victory which has brought presage of agreat and prosperous Soudan, merits re-telling. Through half a scoreof battles or more, from the beginning to the death of Mahdism, I havefollowed British and Egyptian troops into action against thedervishes. I knew General Hicks, and had the luck to miss accompanyinghis ill-fated expedition. In the present volume, "Khartoum Campaign, "the narrative of the reconquest is completed, the history beingcarried to the occupation of Fashoda and Sobat, including thewithdrawal of Major Marchand's French mission. I have made use of mytelegrams and letters to the _Daily Telegraph_, London, and the fullnotes I made from day to day during the campaign. Besides, I havequoted in certain cases from official sources, and given extracts fromverbal and written communications made to me by distinguished officersengaged in the operations. 

For use of maps, sketches, and photographs, I am indebted to theproprietors of the _Daily Telegraph_, to Mr Ross of _Black and White_, Surgeon-General William Taylor, Colonel Frank Rhodes, Lieutenant E. D. Loch, Grenadier Guards, Mr Francis Gregson, Mr Munro of Dingwall, N. B. , and others. 

 BENNET BURLEIGH. 

LONDON, _December 1898_. 

CONTENTS. 

 PAGE

 CHAPTER I. 

 INTRODUCTORY--REVIEW OF THE FIELD, 1

 CHAPTER II. 

 DAYS OF WAITING AND PREPARATION, 14

 CHAPTER III. 

 MUSTERING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF MAHDISM, 35

 CHAPTER IV. 

 BY THE WAY--FROM CAIRO TO DAKHALA, 45

 CHAPTER V. 

 DAKHALA CAMP: GOSSIP AND DUTY, 63

 CHAPTER VI. 

 MARCHING IN THE SOUDAN--FROM DAKHALA TO WAD HABESHI, 75

 CHAPTER VII. 

 WITH THE ARMY IN THE FIELD--WAD HAMID TO EL HEJIR, 92

 CHAPTER VIII. 

 EL HEJIR TO UM TERIF--INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS, 105

 CHAPTER IX. 

 ADVANCE TO KERRERI--SKIRMISHING WITH THE ENEMY, 119

 CHAPTER X. 

 THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--FIRST PHASE OF THE FIGHT, 135

 CHAPTER XI. 

 BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--_continued. _--THE CAVALRY FIGHTS--MACDONALD'S SAVING ACTION, 167

 CHAPTER XII. 

 STORIES OF THE BATTLE--OMDURMAN, 199

 CHAPTER XIII. 

 CLOSE OF CAMPAIGN--GORDON MEMORIAL SERVICE, KHARTOUM, 228

 CHAPTER XIV. 

 KHARTOUM MEMORIAL COLLEGE--THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES, 263

 CHAPTER XV. 

 THE FASHODA AFFAIR--A RED BRITISH LINE THROUGH AFRICA, 295

 POSTSCRIPT, 334

ILLUSTRATIONS. 

 PAGE

 Brigadier-General H. A. Macdonald, C. B. , D. S. O. , _Frontispiece_

 Bennet Burleigh, _To face page_ 1

 Headquarters, Wady Halfa, 9

 Darmali (British Brigade Summer Quarters), 23

 Group of Staff Officers--Colonel Wingate in Centre, 34

 Street in Dakhala, 53

 Troops going to Wad Habeshi, 58

 Wood Station (_en route_ to Omdurman), 69

 Loading Up--Breaking Camp, 77

 21st Lancers--Advance Guard, 81

 Halt by the Way, 87

 Slatin Pasha (on Foot), 89

 Artillery going towards Omdurman, 125

 Battle of Omdurman--Zereba Action, 151

 Macdonald's Brigade advancing, 182

 Sirdar directing Advance on Omdurman, 183

 Khalifa's Captured Standard (Sirdar extreme left), 195

 Chief Thoroughfare, Omdurman (Mulazim Wall, left; Osman Digna's House, right), 196

 Effect of Shell Fire upon Wall (Mulazim Enclosure), 197

 Khalifa's House, 217

 Mahdi's Tomb--Effect of Lyddite Shells, 219

 Interior Mahdi's Tomb (Grille around Sarcophagus), 221

 Khalifa's Gallows (cutting down his Last Victim), 223

 Neufeld on Gunboat "Sheik"--Cutting off his Ankle-Irons, 225

 Khalifa's Chief Eunuch (surrenders in British Camp), 229

 Fresh Batch Wounded and Unwounded Dervish Prisoners, Omdurman, 4th September 1898, 231

 Neufeld, with Abyssinian Wife and Children; also Fellow Prisoner, 241

 Distant View, Khartoum (from Blue Nile), 255

 Hoisting Flags, Khartoum, 259

 Col. H. Macdonald at Omdurman, with Officer and Non-Commissioned Officer of 1st Brigade, 291

MAPS AND PLANS. 

 General View Plan, "A, " _page_ 173

 Zereba Plan, "B, " " 179

 First Attack on Macdonald's Brigade, "C, " Plate 1, " 187

 Second Attack on Macdonald's Brigade, "D, " Plate 2, " 191

KHARTOUM CAMPAIGN. 

CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTORY. --REVIEW OF FIELD. 

It is an easier and kindlier duty to set forth facts than to proclaimopinions and pronounce judgments. Before Tel-el-Kebir was fought inSeptember 1882 and the Egyptian army beaten and disbanded, theinsurrection headed by the Mahdi or False Prophet had begun. In thedisrupted condition of affairs which succeeded Arabi Pasha's defeat byBritish arms the dervish movement made further rapid progress. To SirEvelyn Wood, V. C. , at the close of 1882, was assigned the task, asSirdar or Commander-in-Chief of the Khedivial troops, of forming areal native army. It was that distinguished soldier, aided by anexceptionally able staff, who first took in hand the re-organisationand proper training of the fellaheen recruits. By dint of drill, discipline and stiffening with British commissioned andnon-commissioned officers he soon made passable soldiers of the"Gippies. " The new army was at first restricted to eight battalionsof Egyptian infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and four batteries ofartillery. Although there were Soudanese amongst Arabi's troops, theywere mostly gunners. It was not until May 1884 that the first "black"regiment was raised. Yet it had been notorious that the Soudanese werethe only Khedivial soldiers who made anything of a stubborn standagainst us in the 1882 campaign. The blacks who came down with theSalahieh garrison on the 9th of August 1882, and joined in thesurprise attack upon General Graham's brigade then in camp atKassassin, were not easily driven off. The large body of Egyptianinfantry and cavalry, although supported by several Krupp batterieswhich, issuing from the Tel-el-Kebir lines, assailed us in front, werereadily checked and pushed back. It was our right rear that the"blacks" and others forming the Salahieh column menaced, and itrequired some tough fighting before Sir Baker-Russell with his cavalryand horse artillery was able to drive them off. In truth, the "blacks"held on long after the main body of Arabi's force had abandoned theirintention of driving the British into the Suez Canal or the sea. 

The first Soudanese battalion was recruited and mustered-in at Suakim. It got the next numeral in regimental order, and so became known asthe "Ninth. " Many of the blacks who enlisted in the Ninth--Dinkas, Shilluks, Gallas, and what not--were deserters from the Mahdi'sbanner, or dervishes who had been taken prisoners at El Teb and Tamai. It has never yet been deemed advisable to enrol any of the Arabtribesmen in the Khedivial regular army. Hadendowa, Kababish, Jaalin, Baggara, and many other clans, lack no physical qualifications for amilitary career. Their desperate courage in support of a cause theyhave at heart is an inspiration of self-immolation. But they are asuncertain and difficult to regulate by ordinary methods of disciplineas the American Red Indian, and so are only fitted for irregularservice. In March 1885 General Sir Francis Grenfell succeeded to theSirdarship. With tact and energy he carried still further forward theexcellent work of his predecessor. Four additional Soudanesebattalions were created during his term, and the army was strengthenedand better equipped for its duties in many other respects. Sir Francishad the satisfaction of leading his untried soldiers against thedervishes, and winning brilliant victories and, in at least oneinstance, over superior numbers. He it was, who, at Toski in August1889, routed an invading army of dervishes, whereat was killed theirfamous leader Wad en Nejumi. That battle put an end to the dream ofthe Mahdists to overrun and conquer Egypt and the world. The Khalifathereafter found his safest policy, unless attacked, was to let theregular Egyptian forces severely alone. 

It was shown that, when well handled, the fellaheen and the blackscould defeat the dervishes. Lord Kitchener of Khartoum became Sirdarin the spring of 1892. His career in the land of the Nile may bebriefly summarised: first as a Lieutenant, then successively asCaptain, Major, Colonel and General, that Royal Engineer Officer from1882 has been actively employed either in Egypt proper or the Soudan. He has, during that interval, been entrusted with many perilous anddelicate missions and independent commands. Whatever was given him todo was carried through with zeal and resolution. In his time alsolittle by little the Khedivial forces have been increased. A sixthSoudanese battalion was raised in 1896, and in that and the followingyear four additional fellaheen battalions were added to the army. Whenthe Khartoum campaign began, the total muster-roll of the regulartroops was eighteen battalions of infantry, ten squadrons of cavalry, a camel corps of eight companies, five batteries of artillery, together with the customary quota of engineers, medical staff, transport, and other departmental troops. There was a railwayconstruction battalion numbering at least 2000 men, but they werenon-combatants. As the whole armed strength of Egypt was, for theoccasion, practically called into the field, the peace of the Deltahad to be secured by other means. A small armed body called the CoastGuard and the ordinary police, apart from the meagre British garrison, were responsible for public tranquillity. The re-organisation andincrease of the Coast Guard, which was decided on, into an army of8000 men, was a brilliant idea, and one of the recent master-strokesof Lord Cromer and the Sirdar. It is ostensibly a quasi-civil force, and it was formed and equipped without the worry of internationalqueries and interference. The Coast Guard is mainly composed of pickedmen, including old soldiers and reservists. Their duties carry theminto the interior as well as along the sea-coast, for, partly onaccount of the salt tax, there are revenue defaulters along theborders of the Nile as well as by the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Theyare dressed like soldiers and are armed with Remingtons. 

Mohammed Achmed, who called himself the Mahdi, or the last of theprophets, whose mission was to convert the world to Islamism, was anative of Dongola. He was born near El Ordeh, or New Dongola, in 1848, and was the son of a carpenter. In person, he was above the mediumheight, robust, and with a rather handsome Arab cast of features. During 1884 I saw his brother and two of his nephews in a villagesouth of El Ordeh. All of them were tall stalwart men, light ofcomplexion for Dongolese, courteous and hospitable to strangers. Mohammed Achmed, from his youth, evinced a taste for religious studiescoupled with the ascetic extravagances of a too emotional nature. FromKhartoum to Fashoda he acquired a great reputation for sanctity. Religious devotees gathered around him and followed him to his retreatupon the island of Abba. There he, in May 1881, first announced hisclaims as the true Mahdi. His barefaced assertions of special divinecommand and guidance found credulous believers. With the wisdom of theserpent he had added to his influence and security as a prophet bymarrying daughters of Baggara sheiks, _i. E. _ chiefs. Mohammed Achmedwas a vigorous and captivating preacher, learned in all the literatureof the Koran, ever ready with apt and telling quotations. His earlyteaching was decidedly socialistic, including a command for theoverthrow of the then existing civil state. His principles have beensummed up officially as "an insistence upon universal law andreligion--his own--with community of goods, and death to all whorefused adherence to his tenets. " Unfortunately, "opportunity" playedinto his hands. The misrule of the Pashas, the burden of over-taxationcoupled with the legal suppression of the slave trade, and thedemoralisation of the Egyptian forces enabled Mohammed Achmed to rebelsuccessfully. Troops sent against him were defeated and annihilated. Towns capitulated to his arms and within a period of two years theinhabitants of the Soudan were hailing him as the true Mahdi, theirinvincible deliverer. With the capture of Khartoum, on the morning ofthe 26th of January 1885, and the abandonment of the Soudan and itspopulation--the Egyptian frontier being fixed by British Governmentorder at Wady Halfa--the over-lordship of that immense region from theSecond Cataract to the Equatorial Lakes was yielded to the so-calledMahdi Mohammed Achmed did not long enjoy his conquests. Success killedhim as it has done many a lesser man. For a season he gave himself upto a life of indolence and the grossest lust. On the 22nd of June1885, less than six months after Gordon's head had been struck off andbrought to him, the Mahdi suddenly died. It is said by some that hisdeath was due to smallpox, by others that one of his women captivespoisoned him in revenge for the murder of her relatives. His demisewas kept secret for a time by his successor Abdullah, the chiefKhalifa, and the other dervish leaders. It was given out that theMahdi's spirit had been called to Heaven for a space but would soonreturn to lead his hosts to fresh triumphs and further fat spoils. Atomb was erected over the place where his body lay, and the legend ofhis mission was taken over by Abdullah, who also in due season hadvisions and communicated reputed divine ordinances to the dervishes. Abdullah, who was ignorant, illiterate and cruel, far beyond his deadmaster--"the cruellest man on earth, " Slatin Pasha dubbed him, --by hisexactions and treacheries soon overreached himself. Events werehastening to the overthrow of Mahdism. Sheiks and tribes fell awayfrom the Khalifa and returned to the fold of orthodox Mohammedanism. By 1889, as an aggressive force seeking to enlarge its boundaries, Mahdism was spent. Thereafter, stage by stage, its power dwindled, although Omdurman, the dervish capital, remained the headquarters ofthe strongest native military power that North Africa has ever known. 

Lord Cromer has been blamed for many things he did, and much that heleft undone, during the earlier days of Mahdism. A fuller knowledge ofthe whole circumstances justifies my saying that, as custodian of_British interests_, he acted throughout with singular prudence andgreat forbearance. It was not with his wish or approval that severalof the untoward expeditions against the dervishes were undertaken. Itis permissible to regret that, from a variety of causes, the BritishGovernment engaged in more than one ill-considered and irresolutecampaign for the destruction of Mahdism. Much treasure and countlessthousands of lives were foolishly squandered and all without theleast compensating advantage. The barren results of the Soudancampaigns directed from the War Office in Pall Mall form too painful asubject for discussion. It is only fair to say, that the militaryofficials' hands may have been much hampered from Downing Street. 

[Illustration: HEADQUARTERS, WADY HALFA. ]

As I have stated elsewhere, it was not until 1896 that the seriousreconquest of the Soudan was begun. Before then there had been, as MrGladstone after all appropriately termed them, "military operations, "but not a state of war. He might have called them "blood-spillingenterprises, " for they were only that and no more. The re-occupationof the province of Dongola in 1896, freed the Nile up to Merawi, andgave the disaffected Kababish, Jaalin and riverain tribesmen a chanceof reverting to their allegiance to the Khedive. It also enabled theSirdar to pass his gunboats farther up the river. Another gain issuingfrom the forward movement was that his right was secured from seriousattack. Then followed the building of the wonderful Wady Halfa directdesert railway towards Abu Hamid, Berber, and Dakhala at the mouth ofthe Atbara. It was the 1897 campaign which put all these places intothe Sirdar's hands. During that year's high Nile, he passed hisgunboats over the long stretch of cataracts betwixt Merawi and AbuHamid, and ran them up the river where they co-operated with the landforces, regulars and friendlies. Nay more, the steamers were set to doa double duty: convey stores to the advanced posts and assail andharass the dervishes, pushing as far south as Shendy and Shabluka, the Sixth Cataract. By prodigies of labour and enterprise the railroadwas speedily constructed to Abu Hamid, then on to Berber, and thenceto Dakhala. The whole situation became greatly simplified the momentthe line reached Abu Hamid. From the first, the question of dealing adeath-blow to Mahdism with British-led troops had turned upon thesolution of the transport problem. The through rail and riverconnection once established from Cairo _viâ_ Wady Halfa to Abu Hamidput an end forever to all serious difficulty of providing adequatesupplies for the troops. From Abu Hamid the Nile is navigable farsouth for many months during the year. Then again, the occupation ofAbu Hamid unlocked the Korosko desert caravan route and drew more waryand recanting dervishes away from the Khalifa. Following the captureof Abu Hamid, Berber was promptly taken for Egypt by the friendlies, and the Suakim-Berber trade route, which had been closed for manyyears, was re-opened. 

The end was slowly drawing near, for the Sirdar was closing the linesand mustering his forces for a final blow. Railroad construction wentforward apace. At the rate of from one to two miles a day track waslaid so as to get the line up to Dakhala. Meanwhile, workshops werebeing erected at suitable points, and three additional screw gunboats, built in England, were re-fitted for launching. The flotilla wasbecoming formidable; it comprised 13 vessels, stern-wheelers andscrew-steamers, all armed with cannon and machine guns and protectedby bullet-proof shields. 

Believing there was a chance to wreck the railroad and captureoutposts and stores, Mahmoud, a nephew and favourite general of theKhalifa's, led a powerful dervish army from Shendy north to raid thecountry to and beyond Berber. In spite of the gunboats, afterdisposing of the recalcitrant Jaalins, Mahmoud crossed the Nile atMetemmeh to the opposite bank. Accompanied by the veteran rebel, OsmanDigna, he quitted Aliab, marching to the north-east with 10, 000infantry, riflemen and spearmen, ten small rifled brass guns and 4000cavalry. It was his intention to cross the Atbara about 30 miles upfrom the Nile, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Sirdar'sdetached and outlying troops, killing them in detail. He reckoned tooconfidently and without full knowledge. Using the steamers and therailways the Sirdar quickly concentrated his whole force, bringing menrapidly up from Wady Halfa and the province of Dongola. The entrenchedEgyptian camp at the junction of the Atbara with the Nile wasstrengthened, and General Gatacre's brigade of British troops wasmoved on to Kunur, where Macdonald's and Maxwell's brigades alsorepaired. Mahmoud had ultimately to be attacked in his own chosenfortified camp. His army was destroyed and he himself was takenprisoner. So closed the unexpected Atbara campaign in March last. Thereafter, as the Khalifa showed no intention of inviting freshdisaster by sending down another army to attack, the Sirdar despatchedhis troops into summer rest-camps. Dry and shady spots were selectedby the banks of the Nile between Berber and Dakhala. One or another ofthe numberless deserted mud villages was usually chosen forheadquarters and offices. With these for a nucleus, the battalion orbrigade encampment was pitched in front and the quarters were fencedabout with cut mimosa thorn-bush, forming a zereba. All along theUpper Nile, wherever there is a strip of cultivable land, or wherewater can be easily lifted from the river or wells for irrigation, there the natives had villages of mud and straw huts. In many places, for miles following miles, these hamlets fringe the river's banks, sheltered amidst groves of mimosa and palms. The fiendish cruelty andwanton destructiveness of the dervishes, who, not satiated withslaughtering the villagers--men, women and children--further gluttedtheir fury by firing the homesteads and cutting down the date palms, resulted in depopulating the country. Ignorant and fanatical in theirreligious frenzy to convert mankind to their new-found creed, theMahdists held that the surest way to rid the world forthwith of allunbelievers lay in making earth too intolerable to be lived in. 

These native dwellings, when cleaned, were not uncomfortable abodes. As the flat roofs were thickly covered with mats and grass whilst, except the doorway, the openings in the mud-walls were small, theywere even in the glare of noontide heat, pleasantly cool and shady. The troops found that straw huts or tukals afforded far betterprotection than the tents from the sun and from dust-storms. So itcame about that, copying the example set by the fellaheen and blacksoldiers, "Tommy Atkins" also built himself shelters, and "lean-to's"of reeds, palm leaves and straw. Drills and field exercises wererelaxed, and the troops had time to rig up alfresco stages andtheatres and to enjoy variety entertainments provided by comrades withtalent for minstrelsy and the histrionic arts. Meanwhile thepreparations for the final campaign against Mahdism were notslackened. Vast quantities of supplies and material of war were storedat Dakhala. Outposts were pushed forward and Shendy was occupied, whilst Metemmeh was held by friendly Jaalin tribesmen, who hadsuffered much at the Khalifa's hands. The Bayuda desert route also hadbeen cleared of dervishes by these and by neighbouring tribesmen. Onthe direct track from Korti to Omdurman, outlying wells and oases werein possession of the Kababish and their allies who had broken awayfrom Abdullah's tyranny. The whirligig of time had transformed theequality preachings, and "unity in the faith" of Mahdism into theunbridled supremacy of the Baggara and especially the Taaisha branchof that sept over all the people of the Soudan. They alone werelicensed to rob, ravish and murder with impunity. It was the naturalsequence of lawless society. Once the foe they leagued to plunder andkill had been disposed of, they turned and rent each other. Abdullahbeing a Taaisha, he, as a prop to his own pretensions, set them inauthority over all the races of the Soudan. One by one, however, Arabclansmen and blacks repented and deserted Mahdism. 

The time was ripe for ending the mad mutiny against government andcivilisation. July is the period of high Nile in the upper reaches, and the Sirdar planned that his army should be ready to move forwardby then. At that date all was in readiness. The Egyptian army whichwas to take the field consisted of one division of four brigades, eachof four battalions with artillery, cavalry and camelry. Besides thesethere were two brigades of British infantry--Gatacre's division--aregiment of British cavalry, the 21st Lancers, and two and a halfEnglish batteries, with many Maxims. It was known that Abdullah hadcalled into Omdurman all his best men and meant giving battle. 

CHAPTER II. 

DAYS OF WAITING AND PREPARATION. 

"Everything comes to him who waits, " but the weariness of it issometimes terrible. Oftentimes waiting is vain, without accompanimentof hard work. The Sirdar made deliberate choice to carve out a careerin Egypt. He did so in the dark days when the outlook was the reverseof promising, in nearly every aspect, to a man of action. Abdicationof our task of reconstruction was in the air, the withdrawal of theBritish army of occupation a much-talked-of calamity. Through everyphase of the situation, Kitchener stuck to his guns, keeping tohimself his plans for the reconquest of the Soudan. He wrought andwatched while he waited, selecting and surrounding himself with ableofficers, and exacting from each diligence and obedience in thedischarge of their duties. The Dongola campaign and the fortuitous oneof the Atbara against Mahmoud greatly strengthened his position. Theremight be further delay, but his triumphal entry into Omdurman and thedownfall of the Khalifa were certain. The Sirdar had but to ask, toreceive all the material and men he wished for. He adhered to hisearly decision to employ only as many British troops as were actuallynecessary to stiffen the Khedivial army, and no more. 

After the battle and victory of the Atbara in the spring, the Britishtroops, or Gatacre's brigade, marched back from Omdabiya by easystages to the Nile. The wounded and sick were conveyed into the basehospital at Dakhala, whence they were afterwards sent down toGinenetta or, as it then was, Rail-head. From that point they were, aseach case required, forwarded by train and steamboat to Wady Halfa andCairo. It was at Darmali, 12 miles or more north of Dakhala, that theBritish soldiers went into summer-quarters. On the 14th of April thebrigade mustered 3818 strong, made up as follows:--833 Camerons, 826Seaforths, 969 Lincolns, and 665 Warwicks. Two companies of Warwickshad been left in the Dongola province when the advance was made. Besides the muster of battalions enumerated, the brigade included aMaxim battery, detachments of the Army Service Corps, and otherdetails. The "Tommies" settled down in camp, living under peaceconditions, for with the rout of Mahmoud's men, the nearest dervishforce worth considering was as far off as Shabluka Cataract. Everybodywas bidden to make himself as snug as possible. Outlying houses andwalls were thrown down to secure a free circulation of air. As forsunlight, that was shut out wherever practicable. The first homedrafts to make up for losses arrived at Darmali on the 23rd of April. About 130 men then joined. It was thought desirable to maintain theBritish battalions at their full strength, and some of them musterednearly one thousand strong. As the percentage of sick was continuous, and the rate increased as the campaign progressed, the actual roll ofmen "fit for duty" grew less as we neared Omdurman. Of course, "youths, " and all the "weedy ones, " were in the first instancerejected by the army doctors, and were never permitted to go to thefront. Men over 25 years of age were preferred, and it so happenedthat both the Grenadier Guards and the Northumberland Fusiliers had ahigh average of relatively old soldiers, and consequently few sick. From the end of April until the end of May, dull hot days in theSoudan, leave was granted to officers to run down to Alexandria andhave a "blow" at San Stefano, by the sea-side. There were quite anumber of deaths in the brigade shortly after the men got into camp, the customary reaction having set in on account of the exposure andstrain precedent to the victory of the Atbara. To reduce the numbersquartered at Darmali, the Lincolns and Warwicks, on the 19th of April, were marched a mile farther north along the Nile, to Es Selim, wherethey formed a separate encampment, the Camerons and Seaforthsremaining at the first-named place. The average daily number of sickin the brigade at that period was 100 to 150. On one occasion therewere 190 men reported unfit for duty. Most of the cases were not of aserious nature, and the patients speedily recovered and returned totheir places in the ranks. There was no lack of stores and evendainties at the camps, for supplies were carried up by caravan, escorted by Jaalin friendlies, from Berber and elsewhere. Much of thesickness in the army was probably due to the men recklessly drinkingunboiled and unfiltered Nile water. At that season the river had sunkinto its narrowest bed, and there were backwashes and sluggishchannels full of light-green tinted water. More filters were procured, and extra care was taken with all the water used for domesticpurposes. 

In May there were route marches twice a week, the brigade going off at5. 30 a. M. And returning about 7. 30 a. M. , all in the cool of themorning or such bearable temperature as there was in the 24 hours'daily round in that month. During these exercises the troops hadplenty of firing practice, being taught to blaze away at bushes, andoccasionally at targets representing dervishes. In that way theremainder of the million of tip-filed Lee-Metford bullets weredisposed of, for it had been arranged that there was to be a newcartridge case for the Omdurman campaign. The latest pattern"man-stopper" was a bullet fashioned with a hollow or crater at thepoint, the nickel casing being perforated. 

So the days droned past for the British soldiers, with little to dobeyond essaying the impossible of trying to keep cool. It was oftenotherwise with the Egyptians, for they had to assist in getting therailroad through to Dakhala from Ginenetta, in forwarding boats andstores, and later on in establishing wood stations and cutting fuelfor the steamers. The first of the tropical summer rain showers fellat Darmali on the 27th of May. On the 18th of June Major-GeneralGatacre went off on a shooting excursion up the Atbara, taking withhim a party of ten officers and a few orderlies. They found relativelylittle big game but plenty of gazelle and birds. The bodies of theslain in Mahmoud's zereba at Omdabiya still lay where they fell, unburied, but dried up and mummified by the sun. Natives had strippedthe place and carried off everything left behind by us. A number ofdervishes were seen lurking about, part of the defeated army of theenemy, who were afraid to return to Omdurman, anticipating that theKhalifa would have them killed. Indeed, it appeared that numbers ofthe runaways had settled down at New Hilgi, and were attempting tocultivate. As for the four or five thousand dervish cavalry thatMahmoud had with him, they also never returned to Omdurman. Quiteprobably they made their way back to their original homes in smallbands, rightly believing that Mahdism was doomed. Assured of pardonand good treatment at our hands, fourteen of the Mahdists and a numberof women came in with General Gatacre's people. No attempt was made bythe dervishes in the neighbourhood to "snipe" the party. They returnedto Darmali on the 27th of June. With the sun gone north came therising of the Nile and fresh breezes. The gunboats kept diligentlypatrolling the river, watching for any signs of movement on the partof the Khalifa and his forces. The enemy were reported to be gatheringin large numbers at Omdurman for the coming conflict. As Shendy washeld by a small force of Egyptians, and Metemmeh nominally by theJaalin for us, frequent visits were made to those posts. Later on, other shooting parties went up to Omdabiya and found that there was anincrease in the numbers of natives about, and that flocks and herdswere to be seen grazing in the vicinity. The tribesmen showed thatthey had abandoned the Khalifa by tearing the dervish patches offtheir clothing. All being quiet, and peace assured in the Dongolaprovince, the two detached companies of the Warwickshire left Kortiand joined their comrades in Es Selim camp. 

July was a very busy month. The river flotilla and transport servicehad all to be thoroughly organised for the impending advance. Gunboatsreceived the final touches and completed their armament. The steamers, barges and giassas, native sailing craft, underwent thorough repair. More and still more munitions of war and provisions were sent forwardand stored at Dakhala. That post grew into a formidable camp. Thethree new twin-screw gunboats built on the Thames, besides othership-work reconstruction, were put together near Abadia, a villageabove the Fifth Cataract and north of Berber. The railroad had beenhastily laid and completed to Abadia after the battle of Atbara. Thither the sections of the barges and steamers needed for thecampaign had been sent by rail from Wady Halfa. Before that date, engineering and other workshops had been erected at Abadia, which, because of its favourable position, was chosen for a permanent campand industrial centre. Base-hospitals, too, were built there, in orderthat the wounded and sick might travel as far as possible by water. Astonishing as had been the rapidity with which the Wady Halfa AbuHamid portion of the desert railroad was laid, smarter work still wasdone carrying the line through to the Atbara. The utmost energy wasput forth, after the defeat of Mahmoud, by the Director of Railways, Major Girouard, R. E. , to get the track completed to Dakhala, thejunction of the Atbara with the Nile. Not only the railroad battalion, which was nearly 3000 strong, but every available Khedivial soldier, laboured in some way or other at the task. They put their hearts andthews to the toil, for it was recognised that its completion not onlysolved the transport problem, but was a swift and sure means of returnto Egypt. The railroad battalion worked wonders in grading and laying. Fellaheen and negro, they showed a vim and intelligence intrack-making that Europeans could not surpass. Native lads, some intheir early teens, clothed with little beyond a sense of their ownimportance and "army ammunition boots, " many sizes too big for theirfeet, adjusted the fish-plates and put on the screw nuts. Then, forthose who bore the heavy burden of rails and sleepers and carriedmaterial for the road bed, there were licensed fools, mummers, anddroll mimics, who by their antics revived the lagging spirits of thegangs. There is an unsuspected capacity for mimicry in what are calledsavage men. I have seen Red Indians give excellent pantomimicentertainments, and aborigines in other lands exhibit high mummingtalent. In the railroad battalion there was an eccentric negro who wasa very king of jesters. From the Sirdar and the Khalifa downwards--forhe was an ex-dervish and had played pranks in Omdurman--none escapeda parodying portrayal of their mannerisms. He imitated the tones oftheir voice and twisted and contorted his face and body to resemblethe originals. Nothing was sacred from that mimic any more than from asapper. He showed us Osman Digna's little ways, and gave ghastlyimitations of trials, mutilations and executions by hanging in theMahdist camps. And these things were for relaxation, though maybe theyserved as a reminder of the dervishes' brutal rule. There werevexations and jokes of another sort for Major Girouard and those heldtightly responsible for the rapid construction and regular running ofthe material trains, as indeed all trains were. When the line had beenlaid beyond Abu Dis, for a time known as Rail-head, the camp andquarters were moved on to the next station. Abu Dis sank in dignityand population until only a corporal and two men were left to guardthe place and work the sidings. The desert railway being a singletrack, frequent sidings are indispensable for the better running oftrains. All the control for working the system was vested in the WadyHalfa officials. One night there came to them over the wires analarmist message to send no more trains to Abu Dis. It was thecorporal who urgently rang up his chiefs. What could it mean? Had theydeserted, or, more likely, were the dervishes raiding the district? Ademand was made from Wady Halfa for the corporal to explain what hadhappened. His answer was naive, if not satisfactory: "The wild beastshave come down from the hills, and we really cannot accept any trainsfrom any direction. " "What do you mean?" was again queried back. Sothe corporal and his two men responded: "Sir, there are wild beastsall around the hut and tent; what can we do? We dare not stir out. ""Light fires, you magnoons, " (fools), was the final rejoinder, and thetrain service went forward as usual. It appeared that the hyenas andwolves, wont to snap up a living around the men's camp, bereft oftheir pickings were in a state of howling starvation, and had turnedup and made an appeal, by no means mute, to the station guard, whichthe latter failed to understand or appreciate. In a remarkably shortspace of time the hyenas and pariah dogs had adopted the habit ofscavengering around all the camps and snifting along the track, afterthe trains, for stray scraps. 

[Illustration: DARMALI (BRITISH BRIGADE SUMMER QUARTERS). ]

I returned to Cairo early in July, where, having paid into theFinancial Military Secretary's hands the Ł50 security required of warcorrespondents, intended to cover cost of railway fares south of WadyHalfa, and for any forage drawn from the stores, I received theofficial permit to proceed to the front. All the restrictions as tothe number of correspondents allowed up, which were imposed during theAtbara campaign, were singularly enough removed, and the "very opendoor" policy substituted. In consequence, there was a large number, over sixteen in all, of so-called representatives of the press at thefront. As an old correspondent aptly observed, some of themrepresented anything but journals or journalism, the name of anewspaper being used merely as a cover for notoriety and medalhunting. Having secured my warrant to join the Sirdar's army, Istarted from Cairo for Assouan and Wady Halfa. The headquarters atthat date were still in Wady Halfa. On the 21st of July the firstdetachments of the reinforcements that were to make up the Britishforce to a division, which Major-General Gatacre was to command, leftCairo for the south. Thereafter, nearly day by day up to the 9th ofAugust inclusive, troops were sent forward. These consisted ofartillery, cavalry, the 21st Lancers, baggage animals, RoyalEngineers, Army Service Corps, Medical Corps, and the four battalionsof infantry which were to form the second British brigade. The brigadein question comprised 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, the 1stNorthumberland Fusiliers, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, and the 2ndBattalion Rifle Brigade, together with a battery of Maxims manned by adetachment of the Royal Irish Fusiliers. Brigadier-General theHonourable N. G. Lyttelton, C. B. , commanded the second brigade, whilstMajor-General Gatacre's former command, the 1st British Brigade, wastaken over by Brigadier-General J. Wauchope. The first brigade wasmade up of the Lincolns, Warwicks, Seaforths, and Camerons, with sixMaxims. To prepare for eventualities, and clench the special traininghe had bestowed upon his men, Major-General Gatacre issued a printedslip of notes, or hints, to his men. I give the salient points of thatproduction:--

"1. As the strength of a European force lies in the occupation of andin movement over open ground, which gives it advantage of fire, so thestrength of a dervish force lies in fighting in depressions of theground, or in a jungle country out of which they can pour suddenly andquickly their thousands of spear-armed warriors, who, unless checkedby a murderous fire, constitute a grave danger, even to a perfectlydisciplined force. 

"It follows, then, that a force halted for the night must always beprotected where possible by a zereba, which will check under fire theattacking dervishes. 

"2. That a cleared zone be prepared along outer edge of the zereba. 

"3. That a force, when moving, should march at a respectful distancefrom jungle cover. 

"4. It should have the ground in its front and on its flanks searchedout by cavalry, mounted infantry, or native levies. 

"5. That when mounted troops have found the enemy, they mustinvariably clear the front of the infantry to enable the latter to usetheir rifles. 

"6. That brigades must be so trained that each battalion andindividual soldier must know how to get into the best formation withthe least possible delay for meeting the attack of the spearmen, who, it must be remembered, can move at least three times as quickly as aBritish soldier can double. 

"To carry out the above, a high standard of training and steadiness isrequired, and battalions must be provided with a liberal supply ofcutting tools, felling axes, hand axes and bill hooks to enable them, the instant the battalion marches into bivouac, to cut down smalltrees or strong branches of prickly trees with which to construct athorn fence. 

"Piquets must be withdrawn at dusk, otherwise they might getsurrounded and cut off, or, in falling back, would possibly sufferfrom the defenders of the zereba. 

"The protection of the zereba against surprise must depend on thevigilance of its sentries and piquets which line the fence, and whosestrength will naturally depend on the proximity of the dervishes tothe force. With reliable information, and the ground properlyreconnoitred, a patrol of ten men per company, patrolling constantlyand noiselessly along the inner edge of the zereba, is adequate, solong as the enemy's dem is say 15 miles distant (a day's march); whennearer than this, the strength of the piquets to remain awake andunder arms will depend upon the circumstances of the moment. 

"All night duties of this nature should be found by companies, so thatportions of the line along its whole length shall be on duty. Words ofcommand and orders must be given in a low tone; there must be noshouting and no fires burning till the hour arrives for making themorning tea. Men should always be allowed to smoke, but should bewarned of the danger of fire in zereba by a cigarette or match-endthrown into dry grass. 

"Officers must sleep immediately behind their men; a certain numberwill always be on duty. 

"All, officers and men, must sleep in their clothes, boots andaccoutrements, and each man must have his rifle with him. None butsentries' should be loaded, and bayonets should not be fixed, even bythe patrols, except when there is expectancy of attack. Under nocircumstances should men sleep with their bayonets fixed, or seriousaccidents will occur. 

"And here, one word about 'alarms. ' I do not refer to the assembly bybugle sound, but what is ordinarily called a panic, in other words adisgraceful absence of discipline and self-control, which, whileruining the reputation of the corps concerned as a reliable battalion, may be the cause of serious mischief, and must be disastrous to theconfidence the General Officer places in its officers and men. 

"One of the great advantages accruing to an army on service is theclose association of the officer with the man; each learns somethingfrom the other, and the officer will, in after years, appreciate thevalue of the habit he gets into of talking to his men and of storingup in his mind all sorts of dodges and hints, which assist troops inthe field to make themselves comfortable; more than this, it is in thefield only that the officer can get the opportunity of instilling intothe men's minds the necessity for deliberation under fire, the highstandard of the regiment, its past history, its superiority ineverything to all other regiments in the division, and his confidencein his men to maintain such a standard of excellence. In manyexpeditions it has happened that shots have been fired at nothing, night after night, thus disturbing the whole force; such bad habitsmust be firmly checked. "

Before leaving Cairo I had the opportunity of witnessing a trial ofthe new siege guns that were to be used in levelling the walls anddefences of Omdurman. To the eastward of Abbassieh barracks, near therifle ranges, 150 feet of stone wall had been erected. It was areplica of part of the structure which the Khalifa had built aroundthe tomb of the Mahdi, his own grounds, that of his body-guard, andthe more important buildings situated in the centre of the dervishcapital. 

The stout rectangular wall at Omdurman stood with its narrowest sidefacing the Nile, and its longest sides ran inland from the river forabout a mile. It was twelve feet in height, and even more in places, ten feet in thickness at the base, tapering to six feet at the top. Itwas a well-made structure, laid in mortar and faced on either sidewith dressed limestone blocks. 

Shortly after six a. M. On the morning of 22nd July, a large number ofofficers assembled at the Abbassieh ranges to watch the result of theexperiments of the sham bombardment. Lieutenant-General Sir FrancisGrenfell and staff, Major-General Lyttelton, and many others werepresent. It was arranged that the new 5-inch howitzer battery, withthe "Lyddite" or high explosive shells, was to make the first attemptto breach or throw down the wall. There were six of these newhowitzers, and they were worked by the 37th Field Battery, commandedby Major Elmslie. Except that the bore was larger, there was little todistinguish the pieces from the 15-lb. Maxim-Nordenfeldt automaticrecoil guns used at the battle of the Atbara. The latter cannon, however, only used cordite, whereas the 5-inch howitzer shells arefilled with a picric compound resembling M. Turpin's melinite. Forover ten years Russia has had 100-lb. Howitzer batteries in the field, firing high explosives. It was the Sirdar who insisted upon thenecessity of being supplied with these light and handy cannon. Neitherthe velocity nor the range of their shell-fire is great, but it isenough--4000 yards or thereby--for all practical purposes, and isfairly accurate. The explosion of the picric shells was very violent, and the danger area about 300 yards from where they burst. It has beenfound that, with about six or eight mules to draw the guns, thebattery was quite mobile. Egyptian drivers were employed, though themen serving the guns were all British artillerymen. Even the driversof the 32nd Field Battery, commanded by Major Williams, had "gippy"teamsters. Both batteries were drawn by smart Cyprus mules. Thehowitzers opened fire at 750 yards from the wall. With few exceptions, the Lyddite shells hit the mark. Range is given more by increase ordiminution of the charge than elevation or depression of thehowitzers. The guns kicked viciously and ran back at each discharge. Bursting violently, the shells threw out big sheets of tawny flame, followed by showers of stones and a cloud of dust and brownish smoke. It was possible to see the missiles in their flight and note wherethey struck. As each shell rushed through the air it made a noise notunlike an express train passing under a bridge. There were salvoes oftwo or three guns, and huge chunks were knocked out of the wall. Pieces of flying débris frequently dropped at no great distance fromthe gunners. It was plain that the shells were bursting upon impact, and only blowing away the face of the wall to the depth of but a footor two. Had there been thick shells with retarding fuses the structuremight have been breached in two or three rounds. 

After a preliminary ten rounds had been fired, the wall was closelyinspected. It was seen that infantry might have clambered over thedébris to the top of the structure and jumped down upon the otherside. A strange feature was that wherever the "Lyddite" explosivefailed to detonate the stones and ground around had been transformedto a deep chrome colour. The battery was moved closer, to about 350yards from the wall, and the firing was recommenced at that range. Much better results were obtained, and the upper part of the wall wasknocked away, and easy, practicable breaches made. One of the otheradvantages of these new guns is that with reduced firing charges theybecome reliable mortars, and the high explosive shells can be droppedover a wall or building, so as to drive the defenders from theirworks. Not a man would have escaped injury had there been an enemybehind the wall, for blocks of stone were scattered in all directions. When the howitzers had finished their practice, six rounds were firedfrom two 40-lb. Armstrong guns, which were also ordered to assist inbreaching Omdurman's walls. Next to the 7-lb. Screw guns the 40-lb. Armstrong is reputed to be the most accurate shooting cannon in theBritish service. Mounted on lofty carriages, these siege guns werelaid to fire at 800 yards range. Oddly enough, one of the 40-lbs. Scored as high a percentage of misses as the howitzers. The greatvelocity of the 40-lb. Shells, filled with the slower-burstinggunpowder, carried them well into the part of the wall aimed at, withthe result that, in a few seconds, they made a good breach. Themorning's experiments were concluded by a detachment of the RoyalIrish Fusiliers, under Captain Churches, firing their Maxims againsttargets representing bands of dervishes, the dummy enemy being, asusual, riddled with bullets. 

From Cairo to Dakhala, evidence was not lacking that the form andmovement of preparations for the general advance were growing apace. Every train and boat going south was overloaded with officers, men, and transport animals, together with munitions of war galore for thecampaign. The gunboats and deserters brought in reports that thedervishes were concentrating at Omdurman. The strongly defensiblepositions of Shabluka, together with the mud forts, had been evacuatedby the dervishes. Very quickly the Sirdar sent small bodies of troopsup stream to occupy suitable positions for wood-cutting and formingadvance camps. In that way the river pass at the Sixth Cataract wasseized without the long anticipated fight for that difficult bit ofcountry. The Nile highway was at length in the Sirdar's undisputedpossession up to within thirty miles of Omdurman. 

There is no dustier journey by rail, or one of an altogether moreuncomfortable nature, than from Cairo to Shellal. It is bad enough inthe so-called winter season, for you have to breathe an atmosphere ofdust the whole way, and are powdered and almost suffocated before youreach Luxor. The same trip taken in midsummer, in the stuffy, crowdedcarriages of the Egyptian lines, is real martyrdom, or something akinthereto. High speed or over twenty-five miles an hour is notattempted. Although the journey ordinarily occupies thirty-two hours, I was forty hours _en route_. There are no refreshment-bars orrestaurants for the supply of palatable food or drink for the fierceneeds of the passengers. I made some provision for the trip, andmanaged to survive it, as I have done before, but I cannot forget itstortures any more than the newest of new-comers. Not until we reachedAssouan could we secure a fair supply of water and get a bath and anenjoyable meal. That same afternoon, I, with three othercorrespondents, was allowed to take passage on barge No. 9, which, with two giassas, was taken in tow up to Wady Halfa by a sternwheeler. Among others proceeding on the craft to join the army wereMajor-General Wauchope and Surgeon-General Taylor, and a number ofother army medicoes, fresh in their new dignity as officers of the"Royal Army Medical Corps. " Under the instruction of Surgeon-GeneralTaylor, Surgeon-Major Wilson was good enough to present each of uswith a packet of first field dressings, a kindness which Iappreciated, but of which I hoped not to have need. 

[Illustration: GROUP OF STAFF OFFICERS. --COLONEL WINGATE IN CENTRE. ]

CHAPTER III. 

MUSTERING FOR THE OVERTHROW OF MAHDISM. 

A hackneyism lacks the picturesqueness of originality, but is asuseful in its way as a public road to a desired destination. Thequotation which I am at the moment anxious to make use of is, "Themills of the gods grind slowly, but they grind exceeding small. " Timethe avenger had all but fulfilled the meed of punishment for the evilday of 26th January 1885, when the streets of Khartoum ran with blood, and the headless body of General Gordon was left to be hacked and hewnby ferocious hordes of dervishes. Major-General Sir Herbert H. Kitchener had so managed that the decisive blow should be delivered inthe most effective manner. Stage by stage he had moved forward andimproved his lines of communication. The advanced base, or point ofdeparture for the campaign, was no longer Wady Halfa, or Korti in theprovince of Dongola, as in 1884, but Dakhala. Nay, with theunassailable power and command of the Nile his flotilla gave him, itmight be said the real base of the Sirdar's army was where he chose tofix it, even hard by Omdurman. As for the Khalifa, ruined to someextent by years of successes and easy victories, he was committing thefatal military error of over-confidence. He had drawn around him fromall parts of the Soudan the best of his trusty warriors, the pick ofthe fighting tribes of Africa. The leaders were mostly sheiks who weretoo far committed to hope for pardon and restoration, in the event ofdefeat, from the Khedivial Government. Besides, there were stillplenty of ignorant fanatics amongst the chosen "Ansar, " or servants ofGod, to fire the naturally truculent mass of armed men. 

To ensure the smashing of the Mahdists, the Sirdar was leading thelargest and best equipped expedition ever seen south of Wady Halfa. The river flotilla comprised eleven well-armed steam gunboats. For thetransport of troops and stores beyond Dakhala he had numberless nativecraft, giassas, nuggars, several steamers, and specially constructediron barges. What with their crews and detachments of British gunners, engineers, and infantry, each gunboat had a fighting force of about100 men aboard. These vessels could easily have carried many morehands; indeed, the newest type of Nile men-o'-war, the twin-screwsteamers, were built to convey a thousand soldiers. The land forcesincluded over 8000 British troops and fully 15, 000 Egyptian andSoudanese soldiery. In artillery the army was exceptionally strong. Lieut. -Colonel C. J. Long, R. A. , commanding that arm, had practicallyeight batteries and ten Maxims at his disposal, not counting themachine guns, Maxims, attached to the British division. The artilleryincluded the 32nd Field Battery R. A. Of six 15-pounders under MajorWilliams; the 37th Field Battery R. A. Of six 5-inch howitzers underMajor Elmslie, and two 40-pounders R. A. Armstrong guns under Lieut. Weymouth. There were also, No. 1 Egyptian Horse Artillery Battery(Krupps) under Major Young, R. A. , of six guns; No. 2 Egyptian Field(mule) Battery under Major Peake, consisting of six 12˝-pounderMaxim-Nordenfeldt automatic recoil guns, firing when necessary adouble shell, and Egyptian Field Batteries Nos. 3, 4, and 5, each ofsix of the same type of guns, under Captain C. G. Stewart, R. A. , MajorLawrie, R. A. , and Major de Rougemont, R. A. , and two 6-centimetresKrupps on mules. The ten Maxims, or at least six of them, were mountedupon galloping carriages drawn by horses. On these vehicles or limbersthe gunners could remain in position and bring the weapons into actionat any moment. Captain Franks had the control of these machine guns, two of which were, nominally, attached to each Egyptian battery. Besides the four brigades of Khedivial infantry, together withartillery, cavalry, and camelry, and minor details, the Egyptian armyalso included a large transport column of some 2800 camels and aboutas many men. 

A new solar-hat, a poke-bonnet sort of head-gear, was designed andtied on the pates of one thousand transport camels as an experiment toprevent sickness and sunstroke. Although the brutes have the smallestmodicum of brains, they are very liable to attacks of illness fromheat-exhaustion. That they are born in the tropics confers noimmunity. Strange to say, on the march south from Assouan, of athousand and odd only one animal succumbed to sunstroke, and that wasa camel that had no sun-bonnet. If anything could have added to thenaturally lugubrious expression of those lumbering freight carriers, it was the jaunty poke-bonnets with the attenuated "Oh, let us bejoyful" visages grinning beneath. The transport department was managedby Colonel F. W. Kitchener, brother of the Sirdar. His care it was, when the army actually took the field, to see that the supplies offood, forage, and ammunition advanced with the columns. As a matter offact, in that respect the campaign, as at the Atbara, was admirablyordered, and the troops lacked for nothing in reason. There were fewmules and donkeys employed in the baggage trains, the bulk of thestores being camel-borne. It was the free and full use of watertransport, by the Nile, that enabled supplies to be sent on rapidlyand regularly with the army when the troops advanced beyond Rail-head. Besides the regular army which was to proceed up the left or west bankand attack Omdurman, there was a column of armed friendlies who wereto operate against the dervishes quartered between Shendy andKhartoum, by the east or right bank of the Nile. Nor were the bands oftribesmen upon that shore the only auxiliaries who had volunteered toassist in overthrowing Mahdism. Jaalin scouts and runners putthemselves under the Sirdar's orders to scour the front and flanks ofthe army, at least up to Kerreri. Colonel Parsons, R. A. , was to leada mixed force of fellaheen soldiers, Abyssinian levies, ex-ItalianAscari, and Arabs from Kassala to attack Gedarif and menace Khartoumfrom the east. 

There was a degree of soreness in several British battalions at notbeing allowed to bear part in the campaign. The troops forming theArmy of Occupation believed that they should have had the first call. Among these were the Royal Irish Fusiliers. It had been anticipatedthat as they were next on the army list for active foreign service, they would certainly not be passed over. Instead of receiving ordersto march, they were left severely alone, another Fusilier battalionbeing sent in their place. The proceeding gave rise to much bickeringand bitterness in certain quarters. An attempt, I believe, was made tosend half of the Royal Irish Fusiliers to the front, but that fellthrough owing to various causes. According to the War Officerequirements, the Royal Irish Fusiliers were not in a satisfactorycondition. There were serious drawbacks which would have terriblymilitated against the effective employment of the battalion as afirst-class fighting unit. Individually, the men were all right, butthe battalion record in certain respects was held to be very faulty. Ihave no wish to cavil at the War Office authorities' honest desire toserve the public and yet temper their judgment with mercy toindividuals. But the case was one where they should not havetemporised in any way. As matters turned out, the Royal IrishFusiliers were very angry at being passed over at the eleventh hourfor another regiment. For several generations they have never had achance of being in action. They were fairly spoiling for a fight, andit was hard, at the last moment, to have the road to glory closed intheir faces for the deficiencies of the few. 

He whom Arabs and blacks of the whole Soudan call the "Grand Master ofthe Art of Flight, " our old friend Osman Digna, was with the Khalifain Omdurman. Osman was wily and experienced, and his counsel, had itbeen listened to by his chief, would have added to the difficulties ofcarrying the Mahdist stronghold by assault. I have some knowledge ofthat astute ex-slavedealer and trader's ways in the Eastern Soudan andelsewhere. He, many years ago, even condescended to honour me with hiscorrespondence and an invitation to join the true believers, _i. E. _, the Mahdists. I have no doubt he meant well, but the land and thedervishes were alike abhorrent to me. Osman had quietly come to thewise conclusion that Mahdism was near its end. With his usualprescience he made his own arrangements without consulting theKhalifa. Early in the year he had all his women and children and suchwealth as he could smuggle out of the country sent over to Jeddah. There his family are now living under the protection of some of hisold friends and kinsmen. When Omdurman fell he had no intention, theHadendowas said, of sharing the Khalifa's further fortunes in hidingamong the wilds of Kordofan. He would instead try and escape acrossthe Red Sea and rejoin his family. The Arab clansmen are like theHielan' caterans; they may fight and quarrel with one another, butunless there is a blood feud it is unlikely they will help either theEnglish or the Egyptians to bag old Osman Digna. If the Turk gets himfor a subject, well, the Sublime Porte is likely to be deeply sorryfor it later on. "Fresh troubles in Yemen, " or elsewhere in theArabian Peninsula, will be amongst the headlines of news from thatquarter once Osman the plotter finds his feet again after his lastflight. After the Atbara he just missed being taken by the skin of histeeth, so to speak. His camp letters and private correspondence wereall secured. It was in this way: When the news of the Atbara victoryreached Kassala, Captain Benson and a party of about 200 Abyssinianirregulars set out to see whether Osman Digna and his more immediatefollowers were not trying to make their way back to Omdurman, viâAderamat and Abu Delek. It may be recollected that the fugitive Shiekhhad established a camp at the last-named place after he had beendriven out of the Eastern Soudan. Sure enough, Captain Benson and theirregulars came up with Osman Digna and 400 of his people encampednear the Atbara. They called on them to surrender, but that they wouldnot do. A running fight began, in the course of which Osman, hisnephew Mousa and many more escaped. The Abyssinians, however, killedand captured over 200 of the dervish leader's followers, and returnedin triumph with the captives and spoils. I am told that Mousa Digna, though he watched the fight in question, never fired a shot. The talegoes, that he has never drawn sword or trigger against us since wegave him his life at the battle of Gemaizeh, near Suakin. Thatmorning I found Mousa, shot through the stomach, reclining upon theground. He was still truculent, and brandishing his spear. TheSoudanese were anxious to despatch him forthwith, and fired severalshots at him, the aim of which I spoiled by direct interference. I hadeven then difficulty in getting Mousa to lie down quietly, having toshow him my revolver. Finally, he partly realised the situation. Hewas taken up, carried into Suakin, carefully attended to, fed upon amilk diet, and, in the end, recovered and returned to his Uncle Osmanand the dervishes. It has always been upon my mind that I was thereininstrumental in furnishing a dervish recruit to the cause of furiousanarchy, and I am relieved to think Mousa is not without compunction, if not a decent modicum of conscience. But your proper Hadendowa isnot a Baggara. 

"Three removals are worse than a fire, " and it is much the same incampaigning. Constant trudging to and fro, making and breaking campswith the hardships of marches and raw ground for bivouacs, furnish abigger mortality bill than an ordinary battle. One of the smart thingsdone by the Sirdar, which served to show that he had closely knit allthe ends of the new frontier lines together, was to bring troops upfrom the Dongola province and the Red Sea Littoral, to swell thestrength of his army in the field. The 5th Egyptian battalion underColonel Abd El Borham marched across from Suakin to Berber in eighteendays. It was not by any means sought to make it a forced march. TheFifth was accompanied by a company, 100 men and animals, of the CamelCorps and had 40 baggage camels for ordinary transport. Leisurely, dayby day, they tramped along over the 250 odd miles of rock and sandthat intervene betwixt the Nile and the sea. Hadendowa and Bishaimtribesmen were friendly, and scouts led them in the best trackswhether they tramped by night or by day. At one place they had to makea long forced march as the water in the wells had been exhausted by aprevious caravan. In time to come, with a little outlay, new wellswill be dug and an abundant supply of water provided along the wholeroute. Later on, the 5th Egyptian battalion marched up from Berber toDakhala camp. The men were tall, muscular fellaheen. They were, as hasbecome the custom in Egypt since the army has been officered by theQueen's soldiers, played into quarters on this occasion by a nativeSoudanese band to the swinging tune of "O, dem Golden Slippers. "

It is warm enough in Lower Egypt in July to be uncomfortable, and toturn the most obdurate into a melting mood. Assouan has the deservedreputation of being hotter in that month than Aden, the Persian Gulf, or--well, any other hot place. So, as I have said before, the Britishtroops were not required to do more than the minimum of duty at thatperiod. Decidedly "circumstances alter cases, " even in mattersmilitary. I hope I may be pardoned for these recurring quotations andsaws. The intolerably fervent solar heat of the Soudan at that seasondid not admit of much originality in thought, expression, or act. Oneof my companions was a veritable modern Sancho Panza, and in one'slimp, mental, noontide condition his sapient "instances" werecatching. When he left Cairo, as he confided to me, though it was warmenough there, he decided not to buy too thin clothing lest he mightcatch cold. He therefore purchased articles that even in England wouldbe called woolly and comfortable. Later on, as he reclined upon hiscouch in a thrice-raised Turkish bath temperature, he lamented that he"could not catch cold" even in a state of nature or next to it. He nolonger wondered at Sydney Smith's wish to sit in his bones, andthought that expression would have acquired additional force if thewitty divine had added "packed in ice. "

CHAPTER IV. 

BY THE WAY--FROM CAIRO TO DAKHALA. 

Ten days from London to the junction of the Atbara with the Nile: sofar from England and yet so near. By-and-by, no doubt, the Brindisimail, speeding in connection with the Khartoum express, will make therun in seven or eight days. From England to Port Said is now but amatter of four days by the new Peninsular and Oriental service. Ittook me six days from Cairo to reach Dakhala. The officials prefer toknow the place as "Atbara Camp. " There is no absolute rule for thebestowal of proper names, or at least no practice one need care aboutin the Soudan, so I prefer to dub the locality by its native title ofDakhala, or Dakhelha. It saves a word in telegraphing, and there ismore fitness in calling that dusty, dirty enclosure by the lesseuphonious name. 

One could not but note what a wondrous change in the military andpolitical situation had been wrought in the land since 1884-85. Railways had solved every difficulty of dealing with the dervishes. Quite easily nowadays the remote provinces of the whilom greatEgyptian equatorial empire can be reached and governed. With ordinarycare under the altered conditions millions of Arabs and blacks can betransformed from chronic-rebellious into trusty loyal subjects. Therehas been bloodguiltiness and to spare in the Soudan since 1883-84, therefore the rehabilitation of the country through the setting up ofjust government will be in the nature of discharging a duty longincumbent upon Great Britain. From the Atbara southward, the Niles andtheir tributaries are open to steam navigation the year round. Thepossession of these noble waterways, which extend over thousands ofmiles, includes the fee-simple of sovereignty in the fertile lands ofthe two Nile basins and their commerce. By admirable foresight andindomitable Anglo-Saxon persistence the Sirdar had achieved a uniqueposition in African conquest. He had got together an armed force "fitto go anywhere and to do anything. " The heart of Africa was his, toloose or to bind. Of all the terrible railway rides in the world, fordirt and discomfort, none compares with the trip from Cairo to Luxorand Assouan. The carriages are stuffy and unclean, and during thewhole journey one stifles in an opaque atmosphere of grit mixed withthe sweepings of the ages. The calcined earths quickly cushion theseats, powder you from head to foot, and fill your pockets and everyother receptacle with soil enough to make you feel like a landedproprietor--or, at any rate, rich enough in loam to lay out a suburbangarden. With all the accessories at hand for the creation of an acridand measureless thirst, neither the railway authorities nor privateenterprise have had the wit as yet to provide travellers with themeans of mitigating their sufferings. It is little short of a horrorto think of that journey of over forty hours' duration, which had tobe endured without the succour to be found in a refreshment-roomwhere, for a consideration, could be got a sparkling cool drink or amouthful of passable victuals. Were it to take me a month to travelthe distance by river, if time permitted I had rather adventure nexttime upon the Nile than ever go by train over that line again. Iconfess I have made the journey by rail frequently but it becomesreally more unendurable each trip. Of course I laid in stores ofliquids and solids for the voyage. I ought to have known better, butone thinks nothing of the toothache when it is past. The mineralwaters became too hot to drink, and not quite near enough theboiling-point to make good tea of, whilst, as for the provisions, suchas got not too high, were so swathed in layers of questionable dustand grit as to be repulsive. Keeping even passably tidy wasimpossible, and in personal cleanliness a London scavenger could givea traveller by rail from Cairo to Assouan many points. It was at WadyHalfa that I got booked in the way-bill for Dakhala, or Atbara Camp, 390 miles away. The construction of the Halfa-Atbara line was, as Ihave said before, a masterpiece of military strategy, the credit forwhich is due to the Sirdar. By-and-by a railway bridge will span theAtbara at Dakhala, and the iron way will be laid into Khartoum. The170 miles betwixt the Atbara and Khartoum offer no difficulties, andthe line will be laid within a year from the time when the money isgranted the Sirdar for its construction. 

Since the foregoing was written, the requisite amount has been votedLord Kitchener of Khartoum, and the contracts for material have beenissued and signed. About a quarter of a million sleepers have to bedelivered in Egypt before the end of June 1899. The Atbara and fortysmall khors will be bridged, and the work be completed in twelvemonths. It is intended that the terminus shall be on the east bankopposite Khartoum. 

All the trains on the Halfa-Atbara line carried goods, ordinarypassengers being incidental. Four of my colleagues, Major Sitwell, ofthe Egyptian army, and myself got places in a horse-box. In the nexttruck to us, likewise a horse-box, were five English officers, returning to duty with Gatacre's, or rather Wauchope's, brigade atDarmali. In that same horse-box truck we five contrived to cook, eat, sleep, and dress for two round days, for, as I have stated, there wereno restaurants or buffets within 1000 miles of the desert railway. Thewayside stations were but sidings or halting-places where thelocomotives drew coal and water, of which small supplies were usuallystored under an Egyptian corporal's guard. Ours was a long and heavytrain, and more than once on the up grade to No. 6 or Summit stationout from Halfa the engine came to a standstill, "to recover itsbreath, " as the negroes said. In the horse-box we got along togetherfor the most part very comfortably, accommodating ourselves to thesituation. Such a picnic as we had then made it less of a puzzle tothe common understanding how certain creatures are able to do with atight-fitting shell for their house and home. If Major Girouard, R. E. , had not left the direction of the Soudan military railways--whichunder the Sirdar he built--to join the Board of the Egyptian lines, weshould, I believe, have had better provision made for passengers. Ziehs, or porous native clay-jars to hold cool drinking water, andvarious other little accessories to lighten the hardships of the tripwould surely have been provided. Later on, the officials took care tohave ziehs and plenty of cool drinking water in the carriages andtrucks of all trains carrying troops, so that the men had at leastplenty to drink. 

On our way up we passed Wauchope's brigade encamped at Es Selim andDarmali. Colonel Macdonald's 1st and Colonel Maxwell's 2nd KhedivialBrigades started to march from Berber to Dakhala about that time, theend of July. Many of the British soldiers, so as not to sleep upon theground, had built for themselves benches of mud or sun-dried bricks, whereon they spread their blankets. The plan secured some immunityfrom such crawling things as scorpions and snakes. Sun-baked mud inthe Soudan is a hard and decently clean material for bench or bed. TheTheatres Royal, Darmali and Es Selim, were in full swing, though itwas very 'dog-days' weather. Officers liberally patronised the men'sentertainments and occasionally held jollifications of their own. There were a good many who exercised the cheerful spirit of MarkTapley under the trials of the Soudan. Lively and original skits andverses were given at these symposiums. Here are a few verses of atopical song on the refractory blacks and fellaheen fallen under thecondemnation of either the civil or military law and forced to hardlabour. It was written and frequently sung by a clever young engineerofficer:--

 We're convicts at work in the Noozle, We carry great loads on our backs, And often our warders bamboozle, And sleep 'neath mountains of sacks. 

 Chorus: Ri-tooral il looral, &c. 

(The Noozle is the commissariat depôt. )

 We convicts start work at day dawning, Boilers we mount about noon, Sleepers we load in the morning, And rails by the light of the moon. 

 Our warders are blacks, who cry Masha! (march), And strike us if we don't obey, Or else he's a Hamla Ombashi, Who allows us to fuddle all day. 

Hamla Ombashi is a corporal of the transport service, and "fuddle" isto sit down. It was the chorus with spoken words interlarded thatcaught on astonishingly, and showed that the men's lungs were inmagnificent condition. Another howler, but by another author, was"Roll on to Khartoum. " Here is a specimen verse and the chorus:--

 Come, forward march, and do your duty, Though poor your grub, no rum, bad 'bacca, Step out, for fighting and no booty, To trace a free red line thro' Africa. 

 No barney, boys, give over mousing, True Britons are ye from hill and fen, Now rally lads, and drop all grousing, And pull together like soldier-men. 

 Chorus. 

 Then roll on, boys, roll on to Khartoum, March ye and fight by night or by day, Hasten the hour of the Dervishes' doom, Gordon avenge in old England's way. 

"Grousing" is Tommy Atkins for grumbling, which is an Englishman'sbirthright. As for no rum, subsequently the men were allowed two totsa week; Wednesdays and Saturdays were, I think, the days of issue. Less than half a gill was each man's share. I am inclined to believehad there been a daily issue of the same quantity of rum it had beenbetter, and the young soldiers might have escaped with less fever. 

Dakhala had undergone many changes since March. It was bigger in everyrespect, but no better as a camping-ground. Truth to tell, it was sobad as to be well-nigh intolerable. The correspondents' quarters wereexceptionally vile, the location being the worst possible within thelines. We had no option, and so had to pitch our tents behind thenoozle in a ten-acre waste of dirtiest, lightest loam, which swishedaround in clouds by day and night, making us grimy as coal-heavers, powdering everything, even our food and drink, with gritty dust andcovering us in our blankets inches deep. The river breeze was barredfrom us, and the green and fresher banks of the Atbara and the Nile, beyond the fort, were for other than correspondents' camps. Many rowsof mud huts had been built in the interior. As for the sun-dried brickparapets and ramparts of the fortifications, these were alreadycrumbling to ruin or being cast down for use in newer structures. Thelofty wooden lookout staging, called the Eiffel Tower, had beenremoved, and its timbers converted to other purposes. On thecompletion of the railway to Dakhala, Abadia had become but asecondary workshop centre. Newer and larger shipbuilding yards andengine works were erected by the Atbara. Under Lieutenant Bond, R. N. , and Mr Haig gunboats, steamers, barges and sailing craft were put inthorough order, native artisans toiling day and night. The clang ofhammermen, riveters, carpenters and caulkers resounded along the riverfront. The Dakhala noozle was an immense depôt, stuffed full of grain, provisions, ammunition boxes, ropes, wires, iron, medical stores andother material, like one of the great London docks. As usual theindefatigable Greek trader had adventured upon the scene. North of thefortified lines, with the help of the natives he had run up a mudtown. It consisted of a double row of one-storeyed houses, betweenwhich ran a street of nearly 300 yards. The place, known as thebazaar, was a hive of stores, wretched cafés, and the like. As theSirdar had had all the beer and liquor in the place seized and putunder seal before the advent of Mr T. Atkins, there was little to behad in Dakhala bazaar besides a not too pure soda-water, coffee, sardines, beans, maccaroni, oil, tobacco and matches. 

[Illustration: STREET IN DAKHALA. ]

For six weeks southerly winds blew almost daily. South of 17 degrees, the northerly breeze does not commence to blow before the end ofAugust. It was warm, extremely warm, under the burning tropical sun. The heat bore down like a load upon head and shoulders and envelopedus like a blast from a roaring furnace. About noontide it wasordinarily 120 degrees Fahr. In my tent. Still, I am sure it was by nomeans so oppressive as at Korti in March 1885. The Atbara and the Nilehelped to temper the fiery glow that radiated from the desert rocksand sands. At best, the heat is a sore trial, but to be borne withmore patience than the "devils" and sand storms that bother by nightas well as by day. Snow-drifts are mild visitations of Providencecompared with a dust storm or whirlwind. These latter would smotheryou, if you would let them, quicker and less respectably than a shroudof snow. Jack Frost bites mildly, preferring to do his serious work bydulling the nerves; but the Dust Devil is a cruel tormentor from firstto last. You may bury your head in folds of cloth and mosquitonetting, and sweat and stifle in the attempt, but he snuffs you andpowders you all the same. He puffs his finest clouds in your face, andround and round you till you find bedding and clothing are no moreprotection against him than they are against the Röntgen ray. Oneparticular night he came in great strength to Dakhala, heaped waves ofsand over us, dug great hollows around our quarters, and completed hisdiabolical games by completely overturning two of my colleagues'tents. I saw my friends emerge from the ruins of canvas, bedding, andboxes, wild, half-clad, terra-cotta figures, such as may have escapedfrom the destruction of Pompeii. But the human mind is a curiousthing. It does not acknowledge defeat easily, and so a victim said tome he had pulled his tent down to keep it from falling. The Dust Devilhad nothing to do with it. 

Early in August the situation assumed a peculiar interest to us of thefourth estate. We were told that the troops were shortly going forwardto rendezvous at Nasri Island, whereas it was a matter of notorietythat Wad Habeshi, which was further south, had been selected as theadvanced camp for the army on leaving Dakhala. Of course, not one wordof the true state of matters were we permitted to wire home. Detachments, true enough, had been sent ahead to "cut wood" and set upa camp upon Nasri Island. But that was merely to have a securesecondary depôt and hospital station. It had been ascertained afterthe occupation of Shendy that the dervishes were in no great strengthat Shabluka or the Sixth Cataract. They occasionally sent down about athousand Baggara horsemen to that place, and their riders scoutedaround the bluff rocks and hills bordering the Nile on either side ofthe "bab, " or water-gateway and rapids of Shabluka. As a rule, onlyabout two hundred of them ever crossed to the east bank. The othershung around on the west bank, and built low walls for riflemen and duga number of trenches and then returned to Omdurman. A few hundred onlyremained to guard the forts and the narrow fairway. Much labour hadbeen expended and considerable rude skill shown by the enemy inbuilding bastions and other defensive works at various places on theriver, --particularly in the Shabluka gorge and before Omdurman. Whythe Khalifa committed the blunder of making no adequate preparationfor defending the pass at Shabluka it is difficult to understand. Onlyone conclusion suggests itself. He was probably afraid to trust hisfollowers so far from his sight, lest the negroes should desert. Wecontinually heard from our own blacks that most of Abdullah's_jehadieh_ Soudani riflemen would come over to us the first chancethey got. Major-Generals Hunter and Gatacre, having learned that thedervish infantry had been withdrawn from Shabluka, scouted south up tothe cataract and selected Wad Habeshi as a suitable camp andrendezvous. That village, or rather district, is on the west bank, south of Nasri Island and but fifteen miles north of Shabluka. 

A big zereba was made at Wad Habeshi and trenches were dug. The place, in short, long before the British troops stirred south beyond Dakhala, was turned into a fortified post and made the real rendezvous of theSirdar's army. 

[Illustration: TROOPS GOING TO WAD HABESHI. ]

On 2nd August, in the face of a strong south wind, the 1st and 2ndKhedivial brigades, respectively Colonel Macdonald's and ColonelMaxwell's, embarked in very close order on steamers and giassas forWad Habeshi. The distance was about 140 miles by water from Dakhala, but it took the gunboats and their tows over three days to get there, for the craft were deeply ladened with men and stores. The soupywhirling Nile flood washed the decks of the steamers almost from stemto stern. It was little short of the rarest good fortune there was noaccident by the way. Everybody turned out to see the brigades off. Merrily stepped the black battalions, their women-folk raising theusual shrill cry of jubilation, whilst the bands played the favouriteair, "O, dem Golden Slippers. " Regimental bands do droll thingsoccasionally. I remember in the year of the Dongola Campaign and thecholera visitation, 1896, a grim blunder made by a native battalion'sband. The serious surroundings of those days led me to say nothing ofthe matter at that time. Military interments, in cholera cases, wereordinarily made very early in the morning or late in the afternoon, just before sunset. A popular native Egyptian officer fell a victim tothe epidemic one afternoon. The sun had but set when the funeralparty, headed by the full regimental band, were seen hastening towardsthe cemetery, for there was no time to lose. The tune actually beingplayed was not the "Dead March in Saul" but "Up I came with my littlelot. " When the gunboats started up the Nile for Wad Habeshi, towingalongside barges and giassas, all the crafts crammed with men andstores, more than one of the fellaheen battalions were regaled withthe full strains of "'E dunno were 'e are. "

By the end of July the Egyptian cavalry--nine squadrons--under ColonelBroadwood, with the camel corps under Major Tudway, the horseartillery and one or two batteries, had been ferried across fromDakhala to the west bank. On the 4th of August the whole of themounted force named, about 2000 strong, started to march along thebank to Wad Habeshi. Going along the bank means, at high Nile, leadingthe troops upon a course half to a full mile from the river so as toavoid creeks and overflows and, at same time, secure the advantage ofmoving upon the more open ground beyond the zone of cultivation, outupon the edge of the bare desert. It was also early in August that thelast of the fourteen double-decked iron barges, designed for theconveyance of troops, was finished at Dakhala. Except the surplus andreserve stores everything was put to instant service. As good a marchin its way, if not better in some respects than that of the 5thEgyptian battalion from Suakin to Berber, was the tramp of the 17thEgyptian--also a fellaheen regiment--from Merawi to Dakhala. Theymade a record rapid tramp, following the Nile, up to Dakhala. 

At Dakhala I frequently saw and conversed with the Sirdar, GeneralsRundle and Gatacre, Colonels Wingate and Slatin Pasha. There seemed noreason to doubt but that the Khalifa would remain at Omdurman and giveus a fight. Abdullah the Taaisha gave out as widely as he could thathe meant actual business and dying if necessary at the Mahdi's tomb. His women-folk had not then been sent away, and that looked promisingfor battle. We heard that he was building more stout walls and diggingnumberless trenches for defence. Of ammunition for small arms and hisordinary brass rifled guns we were told he had no lack. For the threeor four excellent batteries of Krupps he possessed he had but sixtyrounds per cannon--enough, with good common and shrapnel shell, had hemade right use of his means, to have made matters unpleasant for usuntil our gunners and Maxims found the range. It was regarded asdoubtful whether he would be able to employ any of the machine guns inthe dervish armoury. Of all Gordon's "penny steamers" only one, it wassaid, was serviceable, and she was kept under steam night and day atOmdurman. 

Though he kept a bold front, blustered, and promised his adherents noend of good things, and told them that, as in 1884-85, it was God'swill to turn the English back at the eleventh hour, Khalifa Abdullahwas truly in a parlous state. With all the Sirdar's care, we could notkeep from the dervish leader the extent of our preparations orforwardness for the advance. As usual, Sir Herbert Kitchener was wellahead of the time planned for moving on. We learned that, barunforeseen accidents and delays, the whole of his army would be infront of Omdurman in a little over one month from the 1st of August. Two dates in September were given for the fall of that stronghold. Itturned out to be neither. Kordofan had become openly rebelliousagainst the Khalifa. A caravan of over 1140 people, with women, children and cattle marching overland, had arrived from that remoteregion at Korti in the Dongola province. The multitude, who wereaccompanied by many influential sheikhs flying from Mahdist misrule, sent a deputation to the Sirdar asking his assistance to take and holdEl Obeid. As if that were not enough in the way of shutting the doorbehind the Khalifa, sheikhs came down from the Blue Nile provinces, seeking protection. Help was given to them, and bodies of friendlieswere got together to seize Senaar and other important places. The Nilewas running very swift and full in August, the current moving at fullysix miles an hour past Dakhala. In July the Atbara, which had againbegun slowly to flow, suddenly rose, the muddy water roaring along ina series of terraced wave-walls. Its 300-yards wide bed, where itjoined the Nile, was within a few minutes choked with the tawny floodup to nearly the top of the 30-foot banks on either side. Burstinginto the Nile the sea of soup seemed to push its way in a well-definedstream nearly across the 1200-yards broad bosom of the Father ofWaters. 

The first half of the 2nd Battalion of the Rifle Brigade arrived onthe 2nd of August at Dakhala, during a blustering dust-storm. For allthat, black and travel-stained, they were glad to detrain, and to plodthrough the sand, and breast the laden atmosphere, in order to getinto camp hard by the Atbara. The following day the remainder of thebattalion marched in under somewhat pleasanter conditions. Everybodyturned out to cheer the smart, soldierlike detachments. On the 6thinst. The first half of the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards arrived, and later on the remainder. The Sirdar and Generals Rundle andGatacre, and the staffs went to greet them. A finer and more stalwartbody of troops was never seen in the Soudan. Native opinion was morethan favourable respecting them, and I heard observations on all sidesthat the Khalifa had no men he could set against them. The Sirdar andGeneral Gatacre also expressed themselves much pleased with theappearance of the Grenadiers, who looked like seasoned soldiers andcame in without a sick man in their ranks. 

CHAPTER V. 

DAKHALA CAMP: GOSSIP AND DUTY. 

Dirt is the essence of savagery, and there is a superfluity of both inthe Soudan. I have no desperate wish so to describe the vileness ofthe surroundings of the correspondents' camp at Dakhala that evencasual thinkers will sniff at it. The place was bad enough in allconscience, and, mayhap, therein I have said all that is necessary. Asfor the worry of our lives, squatted as we were in the least agreeablequarter of the big rectangular fort, long will the memory of thosedays and nights burden our existence. What a time I had on those sandand dust heaps, where every puff of wind and every footfall raisedclouds of pulverised cosmos. For two weeks, amid the wretched scene, hideous by night as by day, I persisted in existing. It was a huge penwith men, horses, camels, donkeys, dogs and poultry hobnobbing amid adaily wreckage of old provision tins, garbage of soiled forage andstable-sweepings and whatnot. All that, with a temperature of 116degrees to 120 degrees Fahr. In the shade, wore the temper and addedamazingly to the consumption of wet things. At the Grenadier Guards'mess one sultry evening they consumed twenty-eight dozen of sodas, andit was not a record night. Without giving anybody's secret away, I maysay I know a gentleman who could polish off three dozen at a sitting, and unblushingly call for more. These are details of more interest toteetotalers than to the general public. Yet, not to let the subjectpass without a word of caution to afflicted future travellers in theSoudan, the inordinate use of undiluted mineral waters of nativemanufacture is most dangerous to health. 

We correspondents had to wink both eyes in much of our telegraphicnews from the front, for military reasons. The press censor wasColonel Wingate, chief of the Intelligence Department. In his absence, Major-General Rundle, chief of staff, usually acted. Personally, either gentleman was all that could be desired. Both were alike readyand courteous in the discharge of their at all times rather onerousduty, giving frequent audience to the numerous contingent of eagernewsmen, garrulous and prodigal with pencil and pen. Some of thenew-comers to the business felt sorely hit, because they wereprecluded from writing at large upon all subjects connected with thecampaign. The excision of their copy grieved and hurt them as much asif they had been subjected to a real surgical amputation. Yet thosetwo officers but obeyed orders, for after all, and under everycircumstance, the Sirdar, as I am well aware, was the real censor. Itis perhaps fairly open to argument whether the course adopted indealing with correspondents' copy was wise or necessary in a waragainst an ignorant and savage foe. There was, at least, one officialblunder which gave occasion for much annoyance, and ought to have beenpromptly remedied, or better still, never committed. It was expectedof Colonel Wingate, the censor, that amid multifarious importantresponsibilities as chief of the Intelligence branch he should findtime daily to peruse and correct tens of thousands of words, oftencrabbedly written, in press messages. With the approach of the day ofbattle, his own department taxed more and more his entire attention, and side by side the correspondents' telegrams grew in length andimportance. The task of proper censorship under such conditions wasimpossible for any human being to discharge adequately. On thataccount the public interest suffered, for press matters were oftenneither promptly nor fully despatched. As a rule, the correspondentswere left in blissful ignorance of what had been cut out of theircopy, as well as of the exact nature of the residuum transmitted. Besides these grievances there was one of favouritism alleged, but ofthat there is always more or less in every phase of life andassociation. All told, it may be thought that the correspondents'complaints were of no very serious character. That depends on how theyare looked at. I have no taste for cavilling or grumbling over eventsthat are past. Surely, however, there is a middle way somewhere to befound between the absolutism of a general in the field, who may gagthe correspondents or treat them as camp followers, and the clearright of the British public under our free institutions to have newsdealing with the progress of their arms rapidly transmitted home. Iam well aware of the grave responsibilities that hedge acommander-in-chief, and the cruel injury that an unrestrainednon-combatant may do him by recklessly writing on subjects calculatedto jeopardise the success of a campaign and hazard countless lives andfortunes. The latter is an remote possibility. A commander-in-chiefhas to consider that any enemy worth his salt is usually kept informedby spies and deserters, and press-men who are known and cognisant oftheir duty are no more likely to betray secrets to their country'senemies than any officer or soldier in the Queen's service. Andnowadays the private correspondence from troops in the field cannot besuppressed, and it is often published. Commanders of armies willeither have to accept the presence of recognised writers, over whomthey can exercise some control, or instead stand powerless before adangerous flood of random army letters poured into the public press. The case can be met with judgment and care--plus penalties wheredeserved. I am bringing no charges here, but discussing a vexed andwithal important question. I am glad to say that during the OmdurmanCampaign there was no attempt, within my knowledge, of muzzling thepress. This does not bear upon the Fashoda incident, but that camelater. 

Nasri Island as a base of concentration was, as I have intimated, ablind. Although we correspondents were not permitted to go up theriver, or indeed move beyond the Atbara, until the Sirdar andheadquarters had started, yet we kept ourselves fully informed of allthat was happening at the front. There had been one or two littleskirmishes between bands of mounted dervishes and our wood-cuttingparties of Khedivial infantry. In these encounters our men hadgenerally the best of the fighting, and the Baggara horsemeninvariably retreated with a few empty saddles. In July Major-GeneralsHunter and Gatacre had, during a small reconnaissance, proceeded asfar up as Shabluka Cataract or Rapid on one of the gunboats. Theenemy, it was seen, were in no great strength there, and the sevenwell-planned, thick-walled mud forts blocking the passage were weaklyheld. Those two officers landed with a small body of troops andsurveyed a suitable camping site, at what they called Wad Hamid, butwhich, in reality, was north of that place and close to Wad Habeshi. The object was to find a spot easily accessible by river and land, andwith not too much bush about. At that season, the Nile having in manyplaces overflowed its lower borders, marshes extended for miles alongthe ordinarily solid river banks. Wad Habeshi was merely a nativewood-cutting station at first, but little by little troops appeared onthe scene, and a large entrenched camp, with lines extending forseveral miles, was duly formed. At the end of July two steamers, whichhad made the perilous voyage up the Nile from the province of Dongola, came in and made fast alongside the mud bars at Dakhala. 

It was still early in August when all the four battalions ofMajor-General Hon. N. G. Lyttelton's Second British Brigade reachedDakhala. They were quartered in a cool and cleanly camp by the Atbara, to the south-east of the fortified lines. The 21st Lancers alsoarrived at Dakhala in due course. Major Williams' Field Battery, the32nd R. A. Of 15-pounders; Major Elmslie's 37th R. A. , with the new50-pounder Howitzers firing Lyddite shells; and Lieut. Weymouth's two40-pounder Armstrong guns, besides other cannon and Maxims, werelikewise on time. Very smartly the batteries and Maxims were stowedaboard native craft, which were taken in tow by gunboats to Wad Hamid. Detachments of gunners accompanied the pieces and carriages, but themajority of the artillerymen were ferried to the west bank, whencethey marched overland to the new camp. It was at Wad Habeshi that thearmy was first actually marshalled as a concrete force, and forthwithtook the field. Not a moment was lost by day or night in moving menand supplies onward. The little paddle steamer captured from thedervishes during the 1896 Dongola Expedition, which had been repairedand sent to Dakhala, was continually carrying troops and stores fromthe east to the west bank. As the Nile was running at the rate of sixmiles an hour in its wide bed, the "El Tahara, " as the craft wascalled, had to make a big circuit to effect a passage. The "El Tahara"was one of the boats General Gordon built at Khartoum but never livedto launch. As she was a new craft, the Mahdi changed her name, callingher "The Maid, " instead of "Khartoum, " as it had been intended to dubher. She was an excellent vessel, with fine engines much too powerfulfor her frame. 

[Illustration: WOOD STATION (EN ROUTE TO OMDURMAN). ]

Both Surgeon-General Taylor, on behalf of the British division, andSurgeon-Colonel Gallwey, for the Egyptian troops, completed theirarrangements for succouring the sick and wounded upon the march fromShabluka to the attack upon Omdurman. Adequate provision was made forfield hospitals, floating hospitals and relief stations, for medicalofficers, and attendants, with cradlets and stretchers, to follow eachmilitary unit into action. For the British infantry it meant, substantially, that behind each battalion a medical officer and twonon-commissioned officers should march, accompanied by six camelsbearing cacolets, and men with nine stretchers. A somewhat modifiedscheme was got out for the cavalry and artillery, as well as for theother Khedivial troops. In the anticipated action before Omdurman, temporary operating stations were to be set up, out of ordinaryrifle-range, and native craft, which had been fitted up with cots, were to be brought as near the scene as practicable to receive thewounded. 

An attempt made to lay a cable from Dakhala to the west bank was notover successful. It was found that the great sag, caused by thecurrent, carried the cable down stream, so the whole length ran outbefore the opposite bank was reached. The steamer "Melik" was thetelegraph ship, and paid the cable out from a wooden reel placed onher stern quarter. A few days after the failure she was employedpicking up the wire, most of which was recovered by Captain Manifold, R. E. , who was the director of military telegraphs in the last as inthe three previous expeditions against the dervishes. The recoveredline was relaid across the Atbara, which is barely a third of thewidth of the Nile. From the south bank of the Atbara two land linespass up the east shore of the Nile. Upon a lofty corresponding pair oftrestles an overhead wire was also hung across the smaller river. Afew miles south of Dakhala a cable had been laid to an island andthence to the west bank. From the latter point an ordinary land wireran along the desert to Metemmeh. Later on it was laid to Omdurman. The line was put down step by step as the troops advanced. Thus analternative system of telegraphic communication with Khartoum wasearly provided for. 

It stirred the blood of everybody in our dull camp to see detachmentafter detachment of the second British brigade detrain. Most of usturned out and like schoolboys followed the drums and fifes as theyplayed the troops to their camping-ground. A half-battalion of theGrenadier Guards, led by Colonel Villiers-Hatton, arrived at Dakhalaon the 6th of August. Hale and strong the big fellows looked in theircampaigning khaki. "First-class fighting material, " as Arabs andnegroes, who are by no means poor judges, were openly heard to confessin their interchange of confidences. There is always much camp chaffand yarning amongst "Tommies"--and their officers, too, for thatmatter--at the expense of England's picked battalions. "Have you seenthe 'Queen's Company, ' my man, " asked a subaltern of the Grenadiersone day of a private in the Northumberland Fusiliers. Now the "Queen'sCompany" are all over six feet in stature, and there was a friendlyrivalry in grenadiership between them and certain Fusilier regiments. The question was asked when the troops were marching over undulatingbut rather bare ground where the tufted grass was little over kneehigh. It happened the officer had been detached on other duty, and wasanxious to rejoin his command. "I think, sir, " said the Northumbrian, saluting respectfully, "that they have got lost in the long grass. "The subaltern looked unutterable things, but the "Tommy" held astoical face and said not a word more till the officer went off tohunt anew for his men. For all the chaff, every one was glad to seethe Guards, and to speak of them as the Queen's soldiers. Of thesecond brigade General Gatacre said that a better body of troops couldnot be wished for by any general. 

I rode out to several of the brigade field-days, or rather, mornings, for there was plenty of drilling and field exercises for Lyttelton'smen. The brigade was repeatedly practised in attack formation againstimaginary bodies of dervishes, as well as at assaulting supposedworks. On more than one of these occasions the gallant Colonel of theGuards, not having his charger up at that date, led his Grenadiersafoot, and once, at any rate, was mounted on donkey-back. Particularism gets lost in the desert. In the manoeuvres the troopswere usually led in line, the flanks being supported by two or threecompanies in quarter column, and the centre having in rear a fewsections of companies ready to fill gaps. Save for a little noise inpassing orders, the result of a fast-becoming obsolete school oftraining, even captious criticism could find no actual fault withtheir work. Advancing across wadies and scaling knolls upon thedesert, the troops were instructed to open fire with ball cartridge. The range given was 500 yards, and the ammunition used was thetip-filed Lee-Metford bullets. As at the Atbara, without halting, theline moved slowly on, the front rank firing as at a battue, each manindependently. There were a few section volleys tried, the soldierspausing for an instant to deliver their fire. Once or twice also, therear rank was closed up, and joined in the fusilade. One effect was toparalyse the deer and birds within range. I noticed that the tip-filedbullets did not usually spread, and that their man-stopping qualitywas something of a myth. Even the dum-dum does not invariably "set up"on striking an object. For the Omdurman Campaign a new hollow-nosedbullet was issued for the Lee-Metfords. So far as I was able tojudge, it generally spread on hitting, and made a deadly wound, tearing away bone and flesh at the point of exit. 

On the 12th of August the 21st Lancers, together with camel and muletransport animals, were crossed to the west bank in readiness formarching to Wad Hamid. Saturday, the 13th August, was a very busy dayat Dakhala. On that date the Sirdar went by steamer to the front, direct to Wad Habeshi. It was given out he was merely going on aflying visit for inspection. There was renewed active drilling oftroops. Eight steamers that came down were reloaded and sent back withtroops and stores in the course of twenty-four hours. General Gatacrewent to Darmali, and there assisted in the embarkation of his oldbrigade, Major-General A. Wauchope's. The task was effected within thecourse of twelve hours, the Camerons, Seaforths, Lincolns andWarwicks, with their kits and supplies, being densely packed upon thesteamers "Zafir, " "Nazir, " "Fatah, " and the barges and giassas, whichthese craft towed. Had the Thames Conservancy writs run on the Nilethere would have been terrible fines exacted for unlawfulovercrowding. On the 14th August these stern-wheelers, heavily ladenwith Wauchope's men, steamed at a fast rate past the Atbara camp, ontheir way south. These craft, the first of which took part in the 1896Dongola Expedition, turned out to be really the most useful anddependable of the whole Nile flotilla. They steamed remarkably well, towed splendidly, and were, besides, good fighting craft. The threeAdmiralty-designed twin-screw steamers, "Sheikh" "Sultan" and "Melik, "were not as fast as had been expected; they could not tow anyreasonably big load, and, though they were stuffed with manynovelties, few of the innovations were of the least practical value. They needed all their engine power to steam and when under weigh hadnone to spare for driving the circular saws to cut firewood for fuel, or to start the dynamos to work the search lights with which they werefitted. Major Collinson, commanding the 4th Khedivial Brigade, leftAtbara camp for the front with the 17th and 18th Battalions, or halfhis force, the 1st and 5th Battalions having preceded him some timepreviously. 

CHAPTER VI. 

MARCHING IN THE SOUDAN--FROM DAKHALA TO WAD HABESHI. 

What a land the Soudan is! As a sorely-tried friend said to me, afterpassing a succession of sleepless nights owing to the dust and rainstorms, and overburdened days because of the heat, "What do theBritish want in this country? Is it the intention of the Government todo away with capital punishment and send all felons here? I am notsurprised the camel has the hump. I would develop one here myself. What an accursed country!" Yes, it is not an elysium; and when oneallows the dirt, heat, and discomfort to wither all power ofendurance, the Soudan becomes a horror and anathema, particularly inthe summer time. Now, the camel is to me the personification of animalwretchedness, a fit creature for the wilderness. The Arabs have alegend that the Archangel Michael, anxious to try his skill atcreative work, received permission to make an attempt, and the camelwas the issue of his bungling handiwork. Poor brute, his capacity forenjoyment is, perhaps, the most restricted of the whole animalkingdom. Ferocious of aspect, with a terrible voice, he isnevertheless the most timid of beasts, and his fine air of haughtysuperciliousness is, like the rest, but a sham. It might be fanciedthat he is for ever nursing some secret grief, for he takes youunawares by lying down and suddenly dying. Yet that is ordinarily buthis method of proclaiming an attack of indigestion. 

[Illustration: LOADING UP--BREAKING CAMP. ]

I struck my tent at Dakhala on the 15th of August, packed my gear, andduring the course of the day crossed over to the west bank with myservants, horses, camels and other belongings. Having obtainedpermission from headquarters to go up to the front, I decided to go byland, marching with the cavalry and guns, for I was not free to travelexcept in their company, at least until we reached Metemmeh but ofthat anon. The column in question was under Colonel Martin of the 21stLancers, and comprised three squadrons of that regiment, or about 300men mounted upon Arab horses; three batteries, the 32nd R. A. , the 37thR. A. (howitzers), and the Egyptian Horse Artillery; two Maxims withdivision and transport trains, and a number of officers' led horses. As I have already explained, the guns of the 32nd and 37th fieldbatteries, together with the limbers and ammunition, were sent on toWad Habeshi by water. There was much merrymaking as usual thatevening, for we were to start on the morrow. I squatted like many morein the low rough scrub by the river's brink with my caravan around me. During the evening I went out to dine with some officer friends. As Ihad over a mile to walk to their pitch, the poor glare of the campfires made the darkness more inky, and I had sundry narrow escapesfrom tumbling into ditches and water holes. Our bivouac was anill-omened beginning to the route march of the column under ColonelMartin. One of the periodical summer gales came on, raising whirlwindsof dust and sand. To complete our discomfiture a thunderstormfollowed, and there was a heavy sprinkling of rain for herbage, buttoo much for men. Truly, misfortunes rarely befall singly. It was abig Nile year, not a flood, but enough and to spare. A blessing, nodoubt, for Lower Egypt, but a calamity for us, for during the nightthe river rose 2 feet, and overflowed its low, level banks. The wateroverran part of the camping ground, compelling many a drenched soldierto shift his quarters hurriedly. We got through the dark and troublousnight somehow, though keenly vexed by the muttered discontent of thecamels, and the persistent, blatant, variegated amorous braying of 500donkeys. A cat upon the tiles, a Romeo, was to this as a tin whistleto a trombone. Sleep was a nightmare. It was after six a. M. Before thehead of the column moved out towards the desert track. The rear didnot get away before eight o'clock, much too late an hour for marchingin the Soudan. The weather was hot, the sun scorching despite a brisksoutherly breeze. Lieutenant H. M. Grenfell had charge of the fineCyprus mule train for carrying the British divisional baggage. Therewas with the column a great following of native servants mounted uponsturdy Soudan donkeys. The gawky camel shuffles along, a picture ofwoe with a load of 2 cwt. To 4 cwt. , whilst the little moke tripssmartly with almost an equal weight upon his back. Two Jaalin guideswere supposed to show us the shortest and best track. Major Mahan, ofthe Egyptian Cavalry, had been told off to keep an eye on them and toassist us generally during the march. Two squadrons of Lancers rode infront, whilst the rest of the troopers were supposed to protect theflanks and act as "whippers-in" to the column. Fortunately, there wasno enemy nearer than Kerreri or Omdurman, for our line was usuallystretched out for a great distance; two, three, and four miles oftenintervened between the head and rear of the column. 

After a few days of such marching as we had, straggling became thenormal condition of affairs, except so far as the leading squadrons ofLancers were concerned. The last three days of the journey, in fact, became a sort of "go-as-you-please" tramp. To inexperience and want ofwise forethought may be set down most of the difficulties, hardships, and losses that befell that column on its 140-mile march south, whereof later. 

During the earlier portion of our first day's march (16th August) thetrack lay along the edge of a pebbly desert, which left but a skirtingof one to three miles of loam and rank vegetation between itsmeasureless sterility and the tawny Nile waters. The small roundedpebbles and the fine sand of the Nubian wilderness were surelyfashioned in some great lake or sea of a prehistoric past. Far as wewere from the dervishes, a childish terror of them was entertained bythe servants. At the last moment several domestics decamped, my cookamong them. I rode back three miles to catch the rascal. With unwontedalacrity and prescience he had recrossed to the opposite bank before Iarrived at the place of bivouac, and, having no time, I had to retracemy steps without his enforced attendance. It had been arranged thatthe column should only go fifteen miles the first day. What withwinding and twisting to avoid flooded khors or shallow gulleys wemarched over twenty miles I fancy. At any rate, with no protractedhalting for meals or for baiting the animals, we trudged on throughoutthe heat and worry of the day until sunset. It was putting both menand animals to the severest possible strain, and few of the soldiers, at least, had had any preliminary hardening, for they had beentravelling for days by boat and train and were out of condition. As arule, the Lancers trotted a few miles ahead, halted, dismounted, andwaited for the convoy to come up. Then they would ride on again, halt, and so on, repeating the proceeding many times during each day'smarch. From start to finish the column was ever a loosely-jointedbody. The pace was slow, little more than 2ź miles an hour, though SirHerbert Stewart's Bayuda desert column managed to average upon alonger and almost waterless route, from Korti to Metemmeh, 2ž miles anhour. In that campaign, however, most of our marching was done duringthe cooler hours of very early morning and late eventide. 

The head of the column turned in towards the river about three p. M. Onthe 16th, at Makaberab, or, as the natives call it, Omdabiya--_i. E. _, the place of hyenas. For over a mile, men and animals had to maketheir way through halfa-grass scrub, and then over bare alluvial land, deeply sun-cracked and scored in all directions. The ground wascris-crossed like a chessboard, the lines being a foot to two feetapart, and four to six inches wide, and several feet in depth. Therewere numberless spills through these pitfalls. One camel snapped hisleg, and many mules and horses were strained and lamed. It was indeedfat land, and had formerly grown cotton. The cracks, as we foundlater, were full of scorpions. During that night's bivouac, and in theearly morning, very many men and animals were stung by these venomouspests. Only one soldier succumbed from a scorpion sting during thecampaign. The pain of the wound is as an intense burning or wounding, and continues troublesome for hours. Ammonia was freely used by thedoctors when the stings were severe, but where whisky could be got, that was preferred. 

[Illustration: 21ST LANCERS--ADVANCE GUARD. ]

We were early astir on the 17th inst. , but it was not until daylightor 5. 30 a. M. That it was safe for the column to pick its way out ofthe field of cracks. Why the spot was selected, except as an earthlytrial, I am unable to state, officially or otherwise. Hard by, oneither hand, there was solid and most passable ground for bivouacking. We had a good many stragglers on the 16th inst. , most of whom camerather late tumbling and grumbling to supper and bed on the rough dankground. Others lost their way and wandered to the Nile, where theywere guided by natives, and later were lucky to get a lift to thefront upon gunboats. Two men of the 21st Lancers left upon the desertwith a sick comrade down with sunstroke, watched him die, and, scraping a grave, buried him where he expired. Lieutenant WinstonChurchill, who was detained until late at Dakhala, in trying to followus, lost his way, and had to pass the night alone upon the desert. Hesat holding his horse till daybreak, and then, burning with thirst, made his way to the Nile. Subsequently he hired a native guide and wasenabled to come up with the column on the afternoon of the 17th. Spending the night alone upon the desert has been many times my lot inSoudan campaigns. 

During Wednesday's march, 17th August, we crossed the low shoulders ofmany rocky ridges. They are called "jebels" (hills), but most of them, including Jebel Egeda, which we passed, are little, if any, higherthan Primrose-Hill, London, though it is not a conical, but a long, barn-roofed range. Near there I saw an enormous native cemetery. Itextended to perhaps fifty acres, the pebble-covered mounds over thegraves dotting the bare desert and the sides of the hills. I have animpression that there are ancient funeral mounds near there, and thatthe burying-place of Aliab is older than the invasion of the ArabJaalin. There were fragments of sculptured stones, granite, and blocksof sandstone, and I noticed one broken memorial slab covered withGreek characters. Farther on we had to turn aside to avoid wadies andkhors, up which the Nile had flowed. We were able to water the animalsat some of those places. The mules and horses buried their noses inthe flood and drank greedily, and the camels also had a fine, long-necked thirst. We were ourselves too parched to care about theimpurities of the Nile, and soldiers and officers swallowed greatdraughts of the soupy stuff. 

Late in the afternoon of the 17th the column turned to the river tobivouac at Kitaib, a twenty-two miles journey for the day. Too late itwas found that the ration depôt there, from which the column was todraw fresh supplies, was upon the farther side of a newly-made inlet. The column had to repack, and turn west to round the creek. We reachedKitaib No. 2 about six p. M. Part of the battery mules and transport, however, got leave to remain at the first halting-place, as they stoodin no need of supplies, and I unpacked by myself, bivouacking under aclump of tall mimosa trees hard by a vast deserted village and a longgrove of date palms. I believe that over a score of men lost the roadthat night and ultimately wandered to the river and got to the frontby steamer. There were several cases of heat exhaustion and sunstroke, but happily few of a serious nature. Two troopers, who flounderedthrough the marshy land, got taken aboard a gunboat when they wereutterly prostrate. Others, whose horses went lame or had to be killed, were ordered down to the Nile to secure passage on as best they could. In the darkness, as I was eating my evening meal by candle-light, twoLancers shouted and rode up. They had the too common but true story totell of having missed the track. I found supper and breakfast forthem, and started them off with their troop at eight o'clock nextmorning, the 18th August, for the column left Kitaib at a late hour. My servants were glad of the soldiers' arrival, for they were terriblyafraid of robbers, the district being infested with marauding natives. During the night several fugitives from Omdurman passed us goingnorth. Eighteen Shaggieh, who had escaped in a sail-boat, were butfour days out from Khartoum. They professed to be delighted to getaway. The Khalifa, they said, had ordered every sail-boat to go southof Khartoum. Taking advantage of a thunderstorm, they headed downstream and got away. According to them, the dervishes were killing allthe Jaalin who were suspected of trying to escape north, and theShaggieh and other northern tribesmen stood in little better plight. All natives, other than blacks and Baggara, who could get away fromOmdurman were running off, as they believed the fall of the dervishrule was assured. The Khalifa's son, Osman, whose title was SheikhEd-Din, wanted to make terms. For months the youth had been indisgrace, but his father had reinstated him in the position ofCommander-in-Chief of the Forces. Osman openly declared that fightingagainst the Sirdar and the English was hopeless, and that it was wiserto try and treat with us. Khalifa Abdullah and his brother Yacoub, however, would not hear of treating for peace, urging that their ownpeople in that event would kill them. The only possible course was warto the death. From an excellent source I learned that the dervisheswere well supplied with guns and ammunition, and that the Khalifa hadabout five millions sterling of treasure laid by. 

From Kitaib can be seen the dozen pyramids of Meroe, part of thekingdom of the famous Queen of Sheba. To right and left upon theopposite bank are catacombs, ruins of old temples, towns and forts ofa bygone civilisation. The country on both sides of the Nile in thatregion has spacious alluvial belts, big as the Fayoum and assusceptible to the arts of the cultivator. Such hills as there arerise for the most part abruptly from flat land capable of limitlessirrigation. To anticipate somewhat: the region, south of Abu Hamed, upto and even beyond Khartoum, has all the natural advantages of LowerEgypt and something more. Berber is but 245 miles from Suakin. TheNubian kingdom of antiquity, or that of the Queen of Sheba, must havebeen of enormous extent, marvellous fertility and great richness. Ethiopia may yet fulfil the prophecy. From Kitaib we marched abouteighteen miles to Maguia, passing through a forest of mimosa bush, thetrack but rarely branching out amongst the halfa-grass upon the moreopen country. About three p. M. The column turned in towards a sidestream and settled down near the village of Maguia. The wind rose asusual at night, yet for all that the bivouac was fairly good, andthere was plenty of grazing. Next day, the 19th, we managed to make anearly start, getting away about 5. 30 a. M. The distance to be traversedwas but fourteen or sixteen miles, and the column reached thehalting-place, Magawiya, about two p. M. We made our way over broken, cracked ground to the river's edge, and there bivouacked under theshade of a magnificent forest of stately date palms. The ripeningfruit had been extensively plucked by thieving natives, but there wasenough left for our men. It was a most picturesque scene for a camp, but an unwholesome place for all that. It was given out that thecolumn was to rest a day at Magawiya, as the place was a wood and foodsupply depôt. During the course of the evening the sternwheeler"Kaibur" came in, and a sick officer, Lieutenant Russell, and about ascore or more of men were sent back upon her to Dakhala, or Atbaracamp. It merits record that a party of Egyptian gunners carried upon anative bed or angreeb a sick British artilleryman from Maguia toMagawiya, from bivouac to bivouac. That was something like goodcomradeship and _esprit de corps_. 

[Illustration: HALT BY THE WAY. ]

At nightfall the column was formed up so that the men slept upon theground within supporting distance of each other. Sentries and patrolsalso were set, but the force was not one, I fancy, that would havebeen able to offer a stubborn resistance to a surprise party ofdervishes. On Saturday, the 20th of August, as was anticipated, thetroops remained in camp and enjoyed much needed rest and opportunitiesfor washing. Several gunboats and steamers passed us during the daygoing south, including one upon which were a number of correspondentswho were enjoying their _dolce far niente_ under awnings in a breezydraught with inexhaustible supplies of filtered and mineral waters. Wesaw the Grenadier Guards, the Lincolns, and other battalions pass us, and steam slowly up stream towards Wady Hamed. On Sunday, the 21st, areally early start for the first time was effected. We were to marchas far as Abu Kru that day, and encamp near the spot held by Stewart'shandful of men in 1885. Major Williams, R. A. , went off with hisbattery, the 32nd, at 3. 30 a. M. , and the 37th battery accompanied him. Lieutenant H. Grenfell got away at four a. M. , and the Lancers at 5. 20a. M. I pushed ahead of the troops in order to have time to revisitsome of the old ground I had been over with the Desert Column in1884-85. It was odd, that though hundreds still survived who marchedwith Sir Herbert Stewart, there were but fifteen persons in the wholeof the Sirdar's army who got through to Metemmeh. Of those still lesswent in and left with the force that fought at Abu Klea and Abu Kru. Of the very numerous body of correspondents there were but two. Iregretted that there were not several score or more of old officersand men who went through the terrible Bayuda Desert campaign. Most ofthem would have sacrificed much to have been in at the death ofMahdism. 

[Illustration: SLATIN PASHA (ON FOOT). ]

Metemmeh had been made a slaughter-pen by the dervishes under Mahmoud. It was truly an awful Golgotha. Dead animals lay about in alldirections in thousands, without and within the long, straggling, deserted town. I rode up and looked at the remains of the little fortand the loopholed walls on the south end of Metemmeh, close to which Ihad ridden on 21st January 1885, and got hotly fired at for my pains. Then I walked over the ruins of the Guards' triangular fort at Gubat. The place was still capable of defence, and the trenches andrifle-pits were much as we left them on 13th February with GeneralBuller. As for the graves, they were intact. The big earthwork we allhelped to raise near the river was covered with water, except a cornerof the western parapet. It was, however, partly thrown down, and theditch and slopes were overgrown with grass and bushes. Then I rodeaway to Abu Kru battle-field and had a look at what remained of thezereba, the little detached fort I had asked might be built, and thegraves of our dead. Some of these had been rifled. Heaps of deadanimal bones lay about, for we lost many camels that 19th January1885. The enemy had gathered up and buried all their own dead. Soovergrown was the place that it was barely recognisable. I stood, however, again where Stewart received his fatal wound, where Cameron, of the _Standard_, and St Leger Herbert lay with soldier comrades, and I wandered round to where Lord Charles Beresford worked theGardners against the dervishes outside Metemmeh, whilst I found therange for him through my glasses, by watching the spatter of thebullets upon the sand. That night my thoughts were full of bygonescenes and doings in the most heroic campaign of modern history, Stewart's magnificent ride from Korti to Metemmeh. There came back tome the pain felt on the receipt of the evil news of Gordon's death, brought to us by Stuart Wortley, and of the slaughter at Khartoum, allof which might so easily have been averted but for----

On Monday, 22nd August, the batteries again got away before theLancers, starting at 3. 30 and four a. M. The day's march was to Agaba, about twenty-six miles, and the next day's about nineteen to WadHabeshi. Wady Hamed, which is nearer Jebel Atshan, was where one ofGordon's steamers, the "Tal Howeiya, " returning with Sir CharlesWilson's party, was wrecked on 29th January 1885. Making a détour intothe desert on quitting Abu Kru, I left Colonel Martin's column, androde on with one native servant to Wady Hamed. As a matter of fact, the camp was neither at Wad Habeshi nor Wady Hamed, but between thetwo. The latter, however, was the official name. But that my man wasvery apprehensive of meeting patrolling dervishes, I would have riddendirect across country, starting from a point opposite Nasri Island, where the depôt of supplies was. On the pretext of watering the horseshe got me back to the river. The consequence was that I rode overfifty miles on Monday. However, I managed to reach Wady Hamed beforesunset. On my way in I met the Sirdar, out, as usual, on an inspectingtour. He was good enough to greet me kindly and direct me to thecorrespondents' camp; those of my comrades of the Press who voyaged bysteamer had just arrived. The new camp was an immense place over threemiles long. It was a zerebaed enclosure lying along the margin of theNile in a field of halfa-grass broken up with clumps of palms andmimosa. The country all around was as a vast prairie. Beyond the reachof the Nile's overflow the sand and loam was bare of vegetation. Theriver was studded with scores of verdant islands, and to the south wecould see the peaks and ridges of Shabluka, through which the Nile, when in flood, surges like a mill race between narrow rocky barriers. 

CHAPTER VII. 

WITH THE ARMY IN THE FIELD--WAD HAMID TO EL HEJIR. 

Wad Hamid was a camp of magnificent distances, restful to the eyes butdistressful to the feet. The soil was rich loam, and at no remote datehad been mostly under cultivation. There were several pretty clumps ofdhoum palms, and a few scraggy mimosa by the river's margin. Oftree-shade for the troops there was practically none. Much of thethorny bush had been cut to form a zereba. In fact, there were twozerebas, the British division having a dividing line between theirquarters and those of the Khedivial force. There was also a semblanceof cleared roadways about the camp, but the ground was too spacious tobe easily made snug and tidy. Wad Hamid camp was quite five milesnearer to Omdurman than Wad Habeshi. We were within the long stretchknown as the Shabluka or Sixth Cataract. For 15 miles or thereaboutsthe Nile pours in deep, strong flood through a narrow valley, which inplaces contracts to a gorge or cańon. The channel is studded withislets and rocks, and at one point the river races through awedge-shaped cleft, apparently little more than 100 yards in width. 

After my long ride in from Metemmeh I had to let my horse rest for twodays. So until my servants arrived with my spare led horses I had togo about afoot. My camels and baggage were with the column. It wasmore of a hardship tramping from place to place in the hot dusty campthan roughing it upon the bare ground and living upon scratch andscrappy meals of biscuit, "bully beef, " and sardines, till my men camein, put up my tent, and cooked my food. The British division was atthe south end of the long rectangular encampment. An interval of amile or more separated the divisional headquarters, whilst some of thebattalions had their lines 2 miles apart. Beyond all, another 2 milesoff, was the camel corps bivouacking by the rocks and foothills of theShabluka range. Their only shade from the noon-day glare was such asthey could get behind detached black granitic boulders and blocks. WadHamid camp, viewed not too closely, was a pleasing picture set in abackground of dark hills with a bordering of wide tawny river flowingin front. There were a good many tents in the British lines, butrelatively few in the Khedivial, for there fellaheen and Soudani hadsheltered themselves as usual under palm leaf and grass huts, orbeneath their brown soldier blankets. It was one of the clevercampaigning dodges recently taught the native soldiers by ourofficers, to attach loops of twine or tape along the edges of theirspare blankets, so that these coverings could be quickly lacedtogether and spread over light bamboos or sticks, forming verycomfortable quarters. The Sirdar's headquarters tents were alwaysdistinguishable by the big waving Egyptian flag, a crescent and staron a red ground, and near it a bigger "drapeau rouge" flaunted thetalismanic lettering--"Intelligence Headquarters. " BeforeMajor-General Gatacre's divisional headquarters flapped Britain'semblem, a full-sized Union Jack. Major-General A. Hunter's tent had anEgyptian flag dangling from a native spear, and the Brigade-Commandersall had their respective colours planted before their quarters. Colonel H. A. Macdonald, "Fighting Mac, " had a characteristic brigadebanner, readily distinguishable. It was an ensign made up of foursquares or blocks of different colours, the colours of the respectivebattalions of the command. To descend to particulars, besides theSirdar's and the Generals' flags, there were battalion and companycolours, and hospital, artillery, engineer, and various other flags. In the Khedivial army the battalions were known by numerals from 1 to18. The Arabic numeral of each native battalion was worn by the men ontheir tall fezes and the khaki covers for the head-gear. It was foundnecessary to devise a head-covering to shield the men from sunstroke. That worn over the fez could be so adjusted as to afford shade for thenape of the neck, and in front a scoop for the eyes, so that thearticle became transmogrified into something between a kepi and ahelmet. The British "Tommies'" khaki helmet-covers were ornamentedwith coloured cotton patches and regimental badges. Of course theobject of the patches was to enable officers and men to identifyeasily their respective commands. The Rifles wore a square dark greenpatch, which the Soudan sun bleached to a pea green. The LancashireFusiliers wore a yellow square patch, and the Northumberland Fusiliersa red diagonal band round the helmet. As for the Grenadier Guardstheir insignia was a jaunty red and blue rosette. In Wauchope'sbrigade the Lincolns sported a plain square white patch, the Warwicksa red square, the Seaforths a white plume, nicknamed the "duck'stuft, " and the Camerons a "true blue" square patch. 

The rapid thrusting forward of his whole army from Darmali and Dakhalawithin a period of ten days was not the least astonishing andbrilliant strategical feat achieved by the Sirdar. In that space oftime troops, stores, and all the impedimenta for an army of 25, 000 menhad been moved forward about 150 miles in an enemy's country. No doubthe knew his foe; he certainly always had them under the closestobservation. For that reason the Sirdar was able to do things, and diddo them, that other Generals would have blundered over. The greatriver before the camp, with its flotilla of gunboats, looking likeAmerican river-steamers, the forest of masts, the lofty poles of thelateen-rigged giassas, and the abundance of commodious barges gave abroad hint how the transport of so many men and so much material hadbeen so smartly effected. Provisions, forage, ammunition, all on themost liberal scale, he had got together. With the troops there were tobe carried supplies for fifteen days, and enough to last as longagain were to be accumulated upon Royan Island at the south end of theSixth Cataract. Placing the reserve supplies and base hospitals uponislands meant that both would be safe from any raiding dervishes. Beyond Wad Hamid everybody was to move in the lightest possible order. Officers had to limit their baggage, so that it should not weigh morethan 60 lbs. , and the men were to march in the lightest of kits. Cameltransport was cut down, and all animals not absolutely necessary wereto be left behind. For the conveyance of the baggage of each Britishbattalion 32 camels were allowed. All the men's heavy baggage, overcoats, knapsacks, kit bags were sent on by river transport innative craft. A blanket a-piece was what the men had, and that wascarried for them by the baggage camels. Quite enough for any Europeanto carry in the Soudan in August were his clothes, rifle, accoutrements, and 100 rounds of ball cartridge. The native battalionshad assigned to each command 39 to 42 camels, as well as two giassasor nuggars. These carried all the regimental belongings, and also mostof the men's things, for the Khedivial troops never marched with kits, blankets, or any encumbrances upon them. Clad in comfortable knittedjerseys, with breeches, putties, and good serviceable high-lows, themen of the native regiments stride freely along, each bearing onlyrifle, bayonet, and ammunition. 

The massing of the forces at Wad Hamid was all but complete. Part ofthe Rifle Brigade, detained on the river by storms and contrary headwinds, were the only absentees. On the opposite bank of the Nile hadbeen mustered the mixed body of friendly natives, who, accompanied andsupported by a gunboat, were to clear that side of the dervishes whenthe Sirdar advanced. It was known that they would have to deal with, probably, 1000 Mahdists under Zeki Osman. Our allies included Ababdeh, Bisharin, Jaalin, Shaggieh, Shukrieh, Aburin, and other tribesmen lednominally by Abdul Azim, the brave Ababdeh Sheikh. They were armedwith Remington rifles, but carried in addition their own swords andspears. That they might be better led and prove to be of real value, Major Stuart-Wortley, with Lieut. Charles Wood as his A. D. C. , was sentacross to take the command. Wortley was received with everydemonstration of heartiness by the Sheikhs, who placed themselves andtheir followers entirely under that able officer's orders. Thefriendlies were most enthusiastic and eagerly asked to be led againsttheir dervish enemies. As these allies and the Sirdar's forces were tomarch by the river's margin when possible, signalling would be nearlyalways practicable between them. Telegraphic communication was openedto Wad Hamid from Dakhala by Captain Manifold, R. E. , and his sappersalmost as soon as the troops got into camp. With much hard work theline had been put upon poles as far south as Nasri. When the armysubsequently advanced, as poles were not readily procurable the bareiron telegraphic wire was laid upon the ground. In the crisp, hotatmosphere of the Soudan, as there is little leakage, long distancescan be worked through an unprotected wire laid upon the desert. Whenthere were rain-storms of course telegraphic communication over suchlines became impossible. 

On 23rd August, the day following my arrival at Wad Hamid, the Sirdarheld a great review of his army. At 6 o'clock in the morning the forcewas paraded upon the open desert a mile and half inland from the Nile. Réveille had been at an hour before sunrise. It was a pleasantmorning, for a fresh breeze was blowing, and the air was agreeablycool. Several of the younger soldiers, however, succumbed to theeffects of the tropical sun during the few hours the troops were keptemployed, and they had to be carried back to camp. Although thecavalry, with part of the artillery and Maxims, did not parade, therewas a big enough force upon the ground to make an imposing display. The army was drawn up in line with a front over a mile in length. Major-General Gatacre's division was upon the left, with the GrenadierGuards forming his right. The Queen's soldiers were ranged in mass ofcompanies, column of fours right, whilst the native soldiery werebrigaded in line, Macdonald upon the extreme right, with Collinson'sbrigade in reserve. The troops wheeled into column, deployed, changedfront, and engaged in firing exercise. As might have been expected, there was more celerity and accuracy in changing formation displayedby the British than in the native brigades. All the men were very keenat their work, the expectation of being about to engage the enemydoubtless lending special interest to their field-day. The camp, asall camps ever were, was full of strange yarns--"shaves" about whatwas going on at Omdurman, and the Khalifa's intentions. "Abdullahwould fight? No, he would run away; he was laying down mines in theNile to blow up our gunboats. A Tunisian had devised a torpedo, but asit was being lowered from a dervish boat, the machine exploded, andthe engineer was hoisted with his own petard. " Then there were storiesof extraordinary discoveries of precious minerals--gold mines by thescore. Two young officers, who wished some fun with a distinguishedmilitary gentleman not unconnected with South Africa, persisted infinding diamonds, pieces of rock-crystal, which, with an air ofmystery and importance, they submitted to his contemptuous inspection. But a Major had the better of the expert on one occasion. He vowed hehad found diamonds, genuine diamonds, upon the open desert, as good asany in South Africa or anywhere else; that he would be sworn toforfeit Ł50 if the expert did not endorse his judgment. He had pickedup in one small spot no less than five. Burning with impatience to seethese precious jewels, the expert begged for just one peep at them. The Major gratified him with some feigned reluctance; produced a "fiveof diamonds, " a castaway from some "Tommy's" pack of cards. 

On the night of the 23rd of August Wad Hamid camp was swept by afierce storm of wind and rain. The temperature dropped 22°, and itbecame positively chilly. As we were within the rainy belt, whichextends up to 17° North, visitations of that sort during the summerwere to be expected. The troops bore the discomfort of cold and wetclothes uncomplainingly, waiting for daybreak, and the tardy sun, toget dry and warm. Bugle calls were a work of supererogation on themorning of Wednesday, 24th August, everybody having been astir longbefore réveille. It had been given out in general orders--one of thosegracious niceties of military courtesy never exhibited to thecorrespondents in these later Soudan campaigns--that the Khedivialtroops were to proceed that day to the south of Shabluka Cataract. Thejourney thither was to be made by the army in two stages, and theBritish division was to follow on Thursday. Wad Bishari, abouthalf-way, was the first portion, and there the men were to bivouac onenight. Next day they were to complete the distance, making a détour toavoid the rough hills of Shabluka, and going into a new camp laid outat El Hejir. At 5 a. M. Macdonald's and Lewis's brigades paraded, andunder the command of Major-General Hunter, stepped off. So the end atlast began to loom in sight. Major-General Gatacre wished to go partof the way the same day, in order to reduce the distance to bemarched, but the Sirdar put his veto thereon, observing that if the"Tommies" could not do a little march of 13 miles, they could not walkany distance. In the afternoon, at 4 o'clock, the remainder of theKhedivial division--Maxwell's and Collinson's brigades--set out forWad Bishari to join their comrades. The men were in fine spirits asthey left, cheering and singing to the strains of their bands as theygaily marched away. Some of the Egyptian soldiers were told off toremain at the worst places of the Cataract to assist in towing thenative craft through the rapids. 

The bugles called the men of Lyttelton's brigade to duty at 3 a. M. OnThursday, the 25th of August. I cannot say that the call awoke themfrom slumber, for all night there had been most disturbing noisescoming from the riverside, where native soldiers were reloadinggiassas with stores going forward to Royan Island, for that new depôt. Royan occupies a position at the south gateway of Shabluka. It is afinely conspicuous island, for upon the north end there is a loftybarn-roofed jebel or hill. From the summit of Jebel Royan, at analtitude of 600 feet, can be seen 40 miles away the outlines ofOmdurman and Khartoum--that is in the morning or evening, when thedistorting freaks of the mirage are not in evidence. The steamboatskippers who had ten-horse power steam sirens, used them, after themanner of their kind, and made night doubly hideous. At 3 a. M. Beganour orchestra in the 2nd British brigade lines. All the camels, horsesand mules had to be watered and fed. The cheerful camels then had tobe loaded, that operation being carried on as usual with a terriblegrunting chorus, all the brutes taking part. The gunboats got offbefore daylight. At five o'clock sharp, ere it was full daylight, Lyttelton's men started, marching off in three parallel columns, eachbattalion having its own advance guard. Four Maxims were with thebrigade. Behind the infantry was part of the Egyptian transporttrain. The Sirdar inspected the column, and saw them started fairly onthe way to Wad Bishari. Major-General Gatacre, as usual, rode out withthem to the bivouac, and then galloped back to camp. The troops werein great glee at setting off. The men marched briskly, their officerstramping beside them. On the whole, the track was tolerable, mostlycompact sand and gravel. In some places, however, it was rough andfull of loose stones, and the sand lay deep and soft in several khorsand wadies that had to be crossed. The worst bit was in the secondday's march into El Hejir, where a détour had to be made to avoid theShabluka Hills. 

At 5 in the afternoon of the 25th of August the 1st British brigade, Major-General Wauchope's men, also left for El Hejir _viâ_ Bishari. The "Rifles" or, rather, half the battalion, marched with them. Owingto various causes, the "Rifles" were not all assembled with theBritish division until the army reached El Hejir. In the end, thesecond half of the battalion of that crack corps was transported bywater direct to El Hejir. They had quite a grievous mishap at WadHamid. The upper part of a barge, on which many of the men's kits andcoats were stored, collapsed, and most of the articles fell into theriver and were lost. Wauchope's brigade marched forward in fiveparallel columns, with intervals for deploying between each. The menturned towards the west to get clear of the cultivable belt, for thetrack afforded easier going along the margin of the desert. Behind thebrigade, protected by the usual rear-guard, were six Maxims, themedica corps, a transport column, and a numerous following of nativeservants riding on heavily laden donkeys. The battalion bands playedfavourite regimental tunes as the men marched away. The pipers of theCamerons gave the "Earl of Mansfield, " whilst, with fifes and drums, the Seaforths' pipers skirled "Black Donald of Balloch. " News washeliographed into Wad Hamid headquarters before we left that thegunboats had seized Royan Island and established a post there, thenatives not disputing possession. 

By the end of that week, 27th August, Wad Hamid camp was evacuated. Nasri Island, however, was retained as a depôt, and a small force wasleft there. On Friday, the 26th of August, after a great fantasia andwar-dance, Stuart Wortley's column of armed friendlies moved south. That evening they encountered and drove back a small body of dervishhorsemen. On our side of the Nile, part of the cavalry had beenscouting up to 10 miles south of El Hejir. Captain Haig, with asquadron of Egyptian horse, fell in with a small body of Baggara underSheikh Yunis, and had a brush with them, one or two being wounded oneither side. The Sirdar and headquarters embarked at 9 a. M. , 27thAugust, on the gunboat "Fatah, " to steam through Shabluka. I left WadHamid the same day with one servant, rode through to El Hejir, 22miles, and arrived in the afternoon, having ridden out of my way tosee the narrower gorges of the Cataract. The spaciousness of theprevious camp was conspicuously absent at El Hejir. In rather thickbush and on partly overflowed alluvial ground, the lines were drawnclosely together. As the river kept rising, it soon became difficult, without making a considerable détour, to pass from one part to anotherof the ground by the water's margin. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

EL HEJIR TO UM TERIF--INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS. 

Your Arab is picturesque but poisonous: a fine specimen of a man, though his usefulness in the economy of things is not apparent, atleast upon the surface. He dislikes steady, hard work, is a dreamerwith a deeply religious tinge, but all the same cruel and remorselessin the pursuit of any object. We were well into the region that he hadruled and ruined: a country capable of easily producing wealth, charred and laid waste. The indigenous negro, on the other hand, isnot averse to toil, --nay, generally delights in it under normalconditions, --is simple in his tastes, true in his conduct according tohis lights, and readily turned to better things. Your Arab seems to bethe reverse of all that, and yet he is a delightful person in his way, though a belated savage. Burned villages, blackened hearths, destruction on every hand, these were the telltale evidences beforeour eyes of what the Khalifa and his hordes had achieved. Behind allthat there were the ruins of a great and long departed civilisationthat the early flood of Arab invasion doubtless did something todestroy. Once again, as in the Atbara campaign, was the army closelyfollowed by bands of the faithful wives of the black soldiers. Thesewomen as aforetime pitched their camp ordinarily half a mile or so inrear of the men's, choosing broken ground and thick bush through whichthey could escape if attacked by dervish raiders. In rude huts andshelters built with their own hands amid the thorny mimosa and dhoumpalms, they washed, ground corn, made bread, cooked food, patched andmended, and waited upon their uxorious soldier lords. "If handsomewere what handsome does, " these negresses would have been beautiful, but they were very far from it, poor creatures, except as I hope inthe eyes of their husbands. Talk of the cares of a young family, noteven that vexed their stout hearts and merry natures nor made them lagin marching to war with their spouses. Alas! even the pains and toilsof maternity were fought down by young negro mothers, and I had myattention called more than once to women with almost new-born babiesin their arms trudging along to keep up with the army. In such casesthe women and men generously did all in their power to lighten theburden of the new mothers. Their household goods were borne upon otheralready overloaded backs, and if a donkey was procurable the motherand child were set to ride upon its back. 

El Hejir camp was fenced about with a stout hedge of cut mimosa. Besides that there were several smaller zerebas enclosing differentcommands and several of the headquarters. There was plenty of halfagrass for grazing and an abundance of mimosa for firewood for themen's cooking pots and the steamers' boilers. Roads had been laid out, and troughs of mud were built, at which the horses and camels werewatered, for the river's bank was unsafe. The site of the camp was notunattractive. In front the great river was dotted with luxuriantislands. On the left hand rose Jebel Royan, a Bass-rock-like hillrising from Royan island around which the Nile flowed like a sea. Again the Khedivial division had sheltered itself in straw huts, tukals and under blanket shelters. The British soldier had a few tentsand much uncovered ground at his disposal for bivouac. It may be addedthat the health and general spirits of the army were splendid. 

At El Hejir the press correspondents, or at any rate thoserepresenting the big dailies, except the _Times_, discovered they hada grievance. The news agencies shared that feeling with theircolleagues. Even into war the affairs of business life obtrude. It isnot an unmixed evil to have a grievance; trouble and ridicule come ofhaving too many at the same time. I drafted a letter to ColonelWingate on the subject--a sort of "Round Robin" which the majority ofthe correspondents signed, after which it was given to that gentleman, who stood in a sort of god-fatherly position to us. A form of telegramwas also written and handed him for his visé, that it might beforwarded, though in somewhat slightly altered phraseology, to each ofour journals. These papers explain themselves, and as they have neverseen the light and the incident is as yet one of the unrecorded eventsof the campaign, I append them:--

 "(CABLEGRAM) _Daily Telegraph_, LONDON. 

 "Matter-Notoriety, _Times_ has two correspondents here although one, Howard, ostensibly represents _New York Herald_, but all his messages are addressed _Times_, London, where read. I suggest your getting _World_ or other American newspaper, which would give advantage additional correspondent. Recollect all telegrams are despatched in sections of 200 words. _Times_ therefore gets 400 words messages. Correspondents have lodged formal complaint. 

 "BURLEIGH. "El Hejir. "

The following is a copy of the letter handed in:--

 "_28th August, 1898_, "EL HEJIR CAMP. 

 "Sir, --It has been a matter of notoriety for some days that the _London Times_ has two correspondents with the Sirdar's army, Colonel F. Rhodes and the Hon. Hubert Howard. No doubt it may be said that the latter represents the _New York Herald_ to which he is nominally accredited. We are, however, well aware that his dispatches are forwarded directly to the _Times_ Office where it is not over-straining the question to say that they are there read and used. Under the rules, all telegraphic messages must be delivered in sections of 200 words, each correspondent being only permitted to send in rotation that number of words and no more. 

 "The fact that the _Times_ has practically two representatives to other newspapers' one gives them a manifestly unfair advantage. 

 "We need scarcely state, that in a campaign of this importance the British public are most keenly interested. Our Editors would have sent out, had not the military regulations precluded their doing so, more than one representative from each newspaper or agency to accompany the army. We respectfully submit that it is our duty to claim equal facilities with the _Times_, and we ask you to take such action as may be necessary, that our employers shall not be placed at any disadvantage. --Yours respectfully, "To Colonel Wingate, "Chief Intelligence Department. "

It was a fine way of spending the Sunday, but really we were all toobusy to bear the troops company at any of the services that day. Colonel Wingate laid the matter before the Sirdar, who struck with thejustice of our plea summoned us all before him, when we stated ourcase anew. He gave his decision, that the _Times_ correspondents twainshould only have the right to send 100 words each by telegram. Wedisclaimed having any desire to curtail their letter-writing. That didnot matter. The affair I am glad to say was conducted throughout withmuch good feeling, both Colonel Frank Rhodes and Mr Hubert Howardacknowledging the right of our contention, and the affair gave rise tono break in friendship. Colonel F. Rhodes acted very promptly andgenerously, for before the Sirdar gave his decision he came to us andoffered his individual undertaking, that he would decline to send aline by telegraph, leaving to Mr Howard the sole right to wire. 

On Saturday the 27th August, whilst the deeply laden stern gunboat"Zafir" with giassas in tow alongside was coming up the river, shesuddenly commenced to sink. The water rushed over her fore-deck, andthe officers, soldiers and crew were unable to beach her on the eastbank before she went down. Indeed there was a scurry to get into thegiassas and cut them loose lest they also should be lost. The vesselwent down about ten miles north of Shendy, subsiding in water 30 feetdeep, and only part of her funnel and upper structure remainedvisible. With her there was temporarily lost over 70 tons of stores, including much ammunition and many bales of clothing. She had beenchosen by Commander Keppel, R. N. , as the flag-ship of the flotilla andwas rightly regarded by the "Admiral" as a fine vessel. It appearedthat through over-loading and rough weather water got into the hold, and within two minutes, or before anything could be done to save her, she sank. Captain Prince Christian Victor was aboard, he having beenassigned to duty with the "Admiral, " for the craft carried a number ofsoldiers as well as an ordinary crew. Both the Prince and CommanderKeppel had narrow escapes. Providentially, no lives were lost, everybody being picked up by the giassas or managing to scrambleashore. As soon as possible afterwards operations were commenced torecover part of the cargo. The ship was secured from drifting by ahawser being passed around her standing gear, and made fast to stouttrees ashore. Then some of the natives dived and several of the Maximsand boxes of ammunition were salved. As for the craft there wasnothing to be done under the circumstances but to place a guard andwait until the fall of the Nile enabled her to be unloaded andrefloated. Whilst Commander Keppel and his officers and crew weremaking the best of it, the little ex-dervish steamer "El Tahara" hovein sight with Major-General Rundle and several officers on board. Shelent all the assistance possible and then taking in tow the giassaswith Prince Christian Victor, Commander Keppel and the rest of theshipwrecked crew, except the guard left behind, the "Tahara" with anextra head of steam, churned up to El Hejir. 

I think there had been an intention at headquarters to make a fewdays' stay at El Hejir, and get the army well in hand before goingcloser to the enemy. The gunboats began embarking all their ammunitionand commenced putting up their extra bullet proof protecting shields. But the Nile persisted in rising and again flooding part of our camp, interposing once more between the British and Egyptian lines a broadarm of water. So again the army was ordered to "move on. " Drills andsundry other plans for exercises fell through and special precautionswere taken to guard camps and convoys from surprise as the army drewnearer to Omdurman. 

On Sunday, 28th August, at 3. 40 a. M. , the bugles were sounding in theEgyptian portion of El Hejir camp. It was nearly an hour later beforeréveille went in the British lines and the Lincolns made us think ofour sins and forswear all sleep by playing their awakening air, "OldMan Barry. " By 5 a. M. , Major-General Hunter's division of fourbrigades, with bands playing, were streaming out of their zerebaopenings and taking the broad, well-worn tracks across the sand andgravel ridges towards Um Terif. Macdonald's brigade was in the van, and was followed in order by Lewis's, Maxwell's, and Collinson's, withthe baggage of each brigade behind the command. The guns were upon theright of the division, the steamers covering the left. As for thecavalry and camelry, spread over a wide front, their duty was tosearch for the enemy and make sure the troops should have amplewarning of the approach of any dervishes. The two military attachés, Major Calderari, Italian, and Captain Von Tiedmann, German, rode onwith the native troops. It was a cool morning and the battalionsheaded by their bands playing all the while marched as if going to areview. The Soudan soldiers' wives turned out again and mustered alongthe line of route just beyond the camp confines. As the battalionspassed them, they shouted and gesticulated to their husbands, callingon them to behave like men and not turn back in battle. Yet probablyover half of these same doughty black soldiers had been dervishesbefore they came over to us. "Victory or death, " was the cry of thesefiery Amazons to their warrior lovers. He would have been recreantindeed or a marvellously brave man that would have returned to one ofthem a confessed runaway from battle. It was not surprising that theSirdar did not object to their presence in the field, and occasionallysaw that they were helped with rations when food was not otherwiseprocurable. 

The desertion of El Hejir proceeded apace. In the afternoon of Sundayat four o'clock, when the fierce heat of day had declined, Major-General Gatacre's division in its turn marched off to Um Terif. The brigades moved onward in parallel columns, with the artillery inthe interval and the 21st Lancers covering the front, flanks and rearof the infantry. Tommy was jubilant and carolled, as he tramped, topical songs and patriotic ditties. He heeded not the boisteroussouth wind that ladened the atmosphere with dust till there wasdarkness as of a city fog. Battle-day and settling of old scores wasnear, and withal the end of the campaign, so he pounded along. It wasa rough tramp by the light of a growing moon. About 9 p. M. Theyreached their camping and were assigned their usual position, facingsouth, the side nearest the enemy. There was necessarily some delay asthe battalions were being told off to their assigned limits where eachhad to pass the night ready to spring to arms. Detachments weredetailed to cut bush and form a zereba, whilst others attended to theindispensable culinary department. 

Each day our cavalry had seen slowly retiring before them a few of themounted dervish patrols. Nearing Um Terif, the enemy's scouts becamemore numerous and inquisitive. Whilst a company of the LancashireFusiliers stood on guard during the making of the zereba the infantryhad their first encounter with a dervish. From the desert there came arush and rattling over the gravel and loose stones, as from astampeded horse or mule. It was coming in their direction but neithersentry nor main body thought of challenging. In an instant a mountedBaggara dashed past the sentries and ran plump against a corner of thecompany bowling over two or three men. Whether it was a deliberatemadcap charge, or the fellow was bolting from the other battalions andlost his way is never likely to be known. Possibly he did notanticipate finding British troops three-quarters of a mile from theriver. At any rate he dropped or threw his spear wildly, then, wheeling about, galloped back into darkness almost before the factthat he was an enemy had been realised. The men's rifles wereunloaded, so the dervish was not fired upon. And had they beenloaded, under the circumstances even then the officer, as he informedme, would have hesitated to shoot, lest he should unnecessarily alarmthe whole camp. The spear left behind by the dervish horseman was oneof the lighter barbed-edge kind. 

Um Terif camp was not a pleasant location. There was overflowed landbetween the troops and the river, and the ground we had to bivouacupon was rough. On Monday morning, the 29th August, before full dawn, four squadrons of Egyptian horse and four companies of Tudway's CamelCorps proceeded on a reconnaissance towards the Kerreri. Thetwin-screw gunboat "Melik" also steamed up the river a few miles, butneither quest resulted in adding much to the information alreadypossessed as to the Khalifa's intentions and exact whereabouts. Whether or not we were to have our first battle at Kerreri none knew. The fact was that during the night there had been a violentthunderstorm accompanied by wind and rain. Daylight came with acessation of rain but the gale blew steadily from the south, raisingquite a sea on the Nile and a fog of sand and dust on land. It wasimpossible to see or move any distance with security, and that was nodoubt the cause why the reconnaissances in both instances drew blank. 

Formal councils of war were rare events during the campaign. A chatwith his officers, the eliciting of their opinions off-hand and awatchful pair of eyes in every direction early and late, was enoughfor the Sirdar. The delays caused by the storms however were becomingembarrassing, and it was certain the men's health would suffer ifthey were compelled to linger much longer _en route_. Still it waswell to be quite ready before pushing in to attack the Khalifa whoselarge army, it was reported, would fight desperately. At a council ofwar held on Monday, August 29th, at which all the Generals, includingthe Brigadiers, were present, it was decided to remain until the nextday in Um Terif. The flotilla had been unable to concentrate in time, the strong current and head wind making most of the vessels undulylate in arriving from El Hejir. A piece of good news came to us fromthe friendlies over the river. They were wont to march abreast withus, moving up the east bank. We could usually see them across the halfmile or more of water that intervened, streaming along in theirconspicuous garments under the mimosa and palms, or treading throughthe bush and long grass. On their way to their encampment oppositethey had fallen in with a small band of dervishes who were busilylooting a village. The natives of the place had offended the Khalifaby absenting themselves from Omdurman, and so were being cruellymaltreated. Major Stuart-Wortley's Arabs ran forward and opened asharp rifle fire upon the raiders, who replied with a few shots andthen bolted. A hot pursuit was instituted and five of the dervishfootmen were caught. The friendlies also had the luck to capture adervish sailing boat laden with grain. That evening at sunset, a fewBaggara horsemen and footmen were seen upon the nearest hills watchingthe Sirdar's camp. 

It was at Um Terif that the army, with all its equipment, was for thefirst time got together within the confines of the same encampment. From there also it set out next day in battle array, ready toencounter the Khalifa's full strength. In the clear atmosphere of theearly morning and in the late afternoon when the bewildering mirageand dancing haze had vanished, from any knoll could be seen the largevillage of Kerreri. There the Mahdists had built a strong mud-walledfort by the bank of the Nile. They had besides blocked the road with amilitary camp big enough to shelter in huts and tukals severalthousand men. Information brought us by natives, spies and deserters, was to the effect, that only a small body of dervishes had been leftat Kerreri under Emir Yunis for the purpose of observing the movementsof our army. Kerreri, which the Arabs pronounce with a prolonged Doricor Northumbrian roll of the r's, as though there were at least a dozenof them in the word, is upon the margin of a belt of rough gravel, stone, and low detached hills that extend to the southward, toOmdurman and beyond. The alluvial strip by the Nile, along which wehad marched so many days, gave place to ridges and hummocks of sand, gravel, and rock. 

So we waited impatiently at Um Terif for the flotilla with the fifteendays' supplies on board. Meanwhile the axes of an army of soldierwood-choppers were clanging upon the hard timber, which was beingfelled for firewood. The ruin of agriculture had meant the growth ofbush, and there was an abundance of useful mimosa and sunt growing onthe alluvial lands by the river. 

I ought to reproach myself, but I don't, for not having written of theaggravating southern gale with its accompaniment of drifts of horriddust and sand as the "terrible khamseen" or sirocco. Travellers' talesabout having to bury yourself in the sand, or at least swathe head andbody in folds of cloth, in order to avoid being choked with grit, Iknow. The real thing is bad enough without resorting to poetic orjournalistic licence, though some will do that anyhow. It issufficiently trying to grow hot and perspire so freely that thedriving dust, the scavenger drift of chaos and the ages, caught by themoisture, courses down the features and trickles from the hands in somany miniature turbid streamlets. During a dust-storm everybody hasthe appearance of a toiling hodman. Feminine relations would have wepthad they seen and recognised their soldier lads in that sorry state. Even the dashing officers and men of the Grenadier Guards ceased to beobjects of admiration, and the War Office would have howled withexquisite torture at sight of their hair and clothes. Speak ofwrapping clothes around head or body to keep out the dust? It is sheernonsense to prate so. Why it is hard enough to gape and gasp and catcha mouthful of sanded breath, without that added worry. There isnothing for it, but to grin and bear it and get through with theswallowing of that proverbial peck of dust in a life-time, as quicklyand quietly as possible. 

The fighting gunboats or armed flotilla consisted of the "Sultan, "Lieutenant Cowan, R. N. ; "Sheik, " Lieutenant Sparks, R. N. ; "Melik, "Major Gordon, R. E. ; "Fatah, " Lieutenant Beatty, R. N. ; "Nazir, "Lieutenant Hon. Hood, R. N. ; "El Hafir" ("El Teb"), Lieutenant Stavely, R. N. ; "Tamai, " Lieutenant Talbot, R. N. ; "Metemmeh, " LieutenantStevenson, R. E. ; and "Abu Klea, " Captain Newcombe, R. E. On the loss ofthe "Zafir, " Commander Keppel, R. N. , transferred his flag to the"Sultan, " one of the new twin-screw gunboats. 

CHAPTER IX. 

ADVANCE TO KERRERI--SKIRMISHING WITH THE ENEMY. 

"Death and his brother sleep" can only be staved off; they overcome inthe end. The tired soldiers dropped into profound slumber, althoughthe night of the 29th August at Um Terif was boisterous and the cruelenemy near. It was one of the real surprises of the campaign, that theMahdists never really harassed us, or ventured to rush our lines undercover of night, or in the fog of a dust storm. It has often been toohastily assumed that the dervishes never attacked by night. By theNile and in the Eastern Soudan they repeatedly pushed attacks undercover of darkness, or worried their opponents by persistentsniping, --as for instance at Tamai, before Suakin and Abu Klea. Thenagain, their final and successful assault upon Khartoum was deliveredat dawn. Hicks Pasha's force was hammered early and late. It is allthe more strange, therefore, that they left the Sirdar's army severelyalone, never practising their familiar harassing tactics and seekingto secure an advantage. Numerous, swift of foot, with spears andswords, the odds would have been much more in their favour had theycome down like wolves in the night. It is difficult to say exactlywhat would have happened, and it is not pleasant to contemplate whatmight have befallen. In such a conflict the Sirdar's losses would havebeen great. Could it have been that the Khalifa believed some of thestories set about that our army intended paying him a surprise visitby night, as we did Mahmoud, and so he kept his men in camp quietlywaiting for us. The utmost precautions were taken by the Sirdar andhis generals to protect the lines. A strong zereba surrounded thecamp; sentries were doubled, and active patrols were on the alert allnight. The gale continued until after sunset, when heavy rain cloudsgathered, obscuring the moonlight. By and by there came on a violentand protracted thunderstorm, accompanied by an almost continuousdeluge. There was nothing to be done but to lie fast wrapped in greatcoat or blanket and await the passing of the hours, wet, chilled, ruminating on all sorts of queer subjects. I managed to undo a cornerof my packed tent and under it obtained relative warmth, and drynessin spots. 

The persistence of that storm bred despair. It was nearly 8 a. M. OnTuesday the 30th August, when, having drenched us all to the marrow, the rain ceased. The sun, although two hours high, was battling with afine mist. It was in a perfect downpour of rain at four o'clock in themorning, that réveille had been sounded. And it was in sludge andslush camels and mules were fed and loaded, and horses baited andsaddled. By 5. 20 a. M. The army was at length on the march out ofcamp, our faces set towards a village called Merreh, best indicatedupon the maps as Seg or Sheikh el Taib, the latter being the name of alow hill. The distance the force was expected to trudge was abouteight miles, but the overflowed land put two miles more on. Whendaylight came we could see Abdul Azim's friendlies upon the oppositeside of the Nile. Led by Major Stuart-Wortley, with whom wereLieutenant R. Wood and Captain Buckle, the camels of their column keptpace with ours. Closely skirting the east bank that day, Abdul Azim'swarriors had their right supported by one of the gunboats. 

With the Sirdar and staff riding at the head of the infantry columns, the army advanced in the formation in which it had been determined toattack the enemy at Kerreri. Once more our mounted troops pushed farahead, covering a wide stretch of country, the 21st Lancers underColonel Martin on the left, the Egyptian cavalry under ColonelBroadwood and eight companies of the Camel Corps under Major Tudway onthe extreme right. The infantry presented a front of three brigadesmarching in échelon. A battery of artillery was attached to eachinfantry brigade except Collinson's brigade. Three battalions weredetached from the whole force to guard the baggage and transport whichfollowed in the rear. In front on the left, or nearest the Nile, wasWauchope's brigade. The four British battalions thereof marched sideby side in column, the Lincolns upon the right, the Warwicks on theleft, with the Seaforths and Camerons between them. To the right ofWauchope's brigade was Maxwell's, and next it Lewis's Khedivialbrigades. Behind each of the three leading brigades above named(reading from left to right) were Lyttelton's, Collinson's, andMacdonald's commands. Seen upon the desert the army had the appearanceof a huge square with front a mile broad. The day being cloudy, andcooler than usual for the season, General Gatacre and his brigadiersvoted at a council to extend the march. That course was adopted, thearmy keeping on, but with very many brief halts for the brigades toregain their formation. By the extra tramp the troops were enabled topass beyond the broad margin of thick bush out upon the comparativelyopen, pebbly, and rocky ground, which sloped to a narrow strip ofsoft, wet loam fringing the river. About 1 p. M. , when still fully onemile north of the hill of Sheikh el Taib, the army halted and a campwas made. Access to the Nile was very difficult, for overflowed, boggyland interposed. Roads, however, were made with cut bush, and theanimals were led over them to be watered. During the army's march theLancers scoured the country far in front. They managed to get intotouch with some dervish patrols whilst scouting. The opposing trooperslooked at each other from relatively open ground, and standingseparated by only a few hundred yards. One Baggara horseman camewithin 150 yards of our men. The Lancers, keen to engage with steel, did not attempt to fire upon their intrusive foemen, but innocentlytried instead to bag them. Several times our troopers advanced to thecharge, but the enemy, when the Lancers sought to put hands upon them, were gone. That day the Baggara horsemen were met with in far greaternumbers than previously. By instructions, the Lancers rushed one ofthe many small villages, or groups of native mud-dwellings and beehivestraw huts that dotted the sparse bush-land a mile or more inland fromthe river beyond Sheikh el Taib. Several of the enemy hastened away, and in one of the huts a man in dervish dress was found awaiting thetroops. He turned out to be a secret agent of Colonel Wingate'sIntelligence Department. The spy in question was a Shaggieh, namedEshanni, and but thirty hours out from Omdurman. I was led tounderstand that he gave much valuable information as to the positionand strength of the Khalifa's force and the state of affairs inOmdurman. We were told that the Khalifa meant to attack us at or nearKerreri. There was an old-time prophecy of the Persian SheikhMorghani, whose tomb is near Kassala, that the English soldiers wouldone day fight at Kerreri. Mahomed Achmed and Abdullah had furtheradded to the prediction that there they were to be attacked anddefeated by the dervishes under the Khalifa. Kerreri plain, therefore, had become a sort of holy place of pilgrimage to the Mahdists. It wascalled the "death place of all the infidels, " and thither at leastonce a year repaired the Khalifa and his following to look over thecoming battle-ground and render thanks in anticipation for thewholesale slaughter of the unbelievers and the triumph of the trueMoslems. 

All except those on duty were abed by last post on 30th August atSheikh el Taib camp. Lights were ordered out, and the camp for a timerelapsed into darkness and silence. Headquarters and all other tentshad been struck and packed. During the night there was shooting, thecrack of the musketry sounding relatively near, but occasioning littleannoyance. The bullets were badly aimed if directed against theBritish quarters. Whether the firing was really meant for "sniping" bythe dervishes, or was only a note of warning to their friends of ourpresence, was not easy to decide with any degree of certainty. Therewas no big roll of wounded to test the enemy's intent by, and a laterincipient alarm caused in another part of the camp in the small hourswas possibly all a mistake. One thing the dervishes did do. After themanner of hill-men, they lit beacon fires on the rocky ridges aroundus to warn the Khalifa of our whereabouts. 

[Illustration: ARTILLERY GOING TOWARDS OMDURMAN. ]

That night the camp lines had been drawn still closer than ever, only260 yards' front being given to each battalion. On the morning of 31stthe troops were early astir. By 5. 30 a. M. The main body, following themounted troops, had faced to the right, and were marching to thewestward so as to clear the bush and get out upon the open deserttracks leading to Omdurman. The ground the army passed over wasbroken, and there was scrub with several small khors to cross, so theforce proceeded slowly and cautiously. Four of the gunboats steamed upthe river, keeping abreast of our widely spread out cavalry. About sixo'clock the Lancers had again ascended to the top of El Taib, a hillfrom which at that hour I was enabled to get a view of the dervishcamp. It appeared to be about ten miles due south. The Mahdists weredisposed in three long dense lines, at almost right angle to theriver. They were partly hidden among the low scrub west of Kerreritown or village, their right being quite 2000 yards from the Nile, which showed they had a wholesome respect for the gunboats. Flags andhelios were speedily busy in the hands of our signalmen sending backinformation to the Sirdar. Seeing groups of dervishes within range, aswell as bands of Baggara horsemen, the gunboats opened fire from their15-pounders and Maxims shortly after 7 a. M. , driving the enemy'snearest patrols into hiding or out of range. 

In one of the numberless villages passed, there were several mutilatedand charred human bodies, victims of dervish suspicion, greed andcruelty. Pushing well ahead on our right the Khedivial mounted forcegot a chance to send a few volleys into groups of Abd el Baki'sscouts. That Emir commanded the dervish outlying forces. It was stillquite early when after an easy journey of eight miles the infantryturned aside towards the river. The army was halted at a place calledSururab, a few miles north of Kerreri. Why it was called Sururab Iknow not, nor have I found the name on any map; but that was theofficial designation given to the place where the force subsequentlybivouacked. The only reasonable fault to be found with Sururab wasthat the river banks were exceedingly difficult of access. Our campswere getting from bad to worse. That day flocks of huge vultures wereto be seen circling overhead as the army advanced. It may have beenour approach that disturbed them from their carrion feasts in thedevastated villages and the abandoned dervish camps. Omdurman itselfmust also have long been a choice feeding place for them. 

Once more the Sirdar's army had to spend an uncomfortable night. Thefew tents that had been carried so far afield belonged toheadquarters, generals, commanding officers, and correspondents. Theywere more of a burden than a comfort, for all canvas had to be struckby last post, and thereafter neither lights nor loud talking werepermitted. The native troops' low shelter tents made out of theirspare rough blankets were allowed to pass unchallenged. It was anothernight to be remembered which the army passed at Sururab. Early in theevening the clouds gathered, and a series of violent thunderstorms, accompanied by heavy rain, continued almost without cessation throughthe weary, lagging hours. Rolled in their blankets, the soldiers, wetted through, lay upon the sodden ground. Such of us as couldcrawled under sheets of canvas or waterproofs, but these affordedlittle protection from the driving sheets of falling water. FromSirdar to private none escaped a thorough wetting. The enemy, had hechosen, might have advanced from Kerreri or Omdurman, and been upon usere an alarm could have been given. Shortly after sunset everybody hadto be within the zereba. All openings in the hedge were thereafterstopped up, and no one was allowed outside before réveille. Officersand men of Gatacre's division had as usual to sleep in their placeslying down in the ranks fully dressed, with their arms beside them, ready to spring to attention. Sentinels and patrols, watchful andobservant, moved noiselessly about throughout the whole night. True, there were outside a few of Slatin's most trusted native friends, chiefly Jaalin, set to listen and raise an outcry if the Khalifa'sdervishes came down upon us under cover of the inky night. But I hadgrave doubts whether these native allies would have been of anyservice, as the likelihood was that they were huddled under some rockor tree, shivering in their wraps and sheepskins. Had the Khalifa beenastute or a tactician he would have attacked our camp at Sururab thatnight or early next morning. He must have succeeded, at any rate, ingetting close enough to us without our hearing a note of warning tohave placed his army upon a practical equality with ours in point ofvalue of rifle fire. The Remington at 300 yards is as good as theLee-Metford for killing or wounding. His superiority in numbers andmobility would have been all in his favour. Luckily, it was not to be. We were again allowed to sleep in such peace as the elements wouldpermit. The fact remains that the dervishes lost another of theseveral excellent chances they had to do us signal hurt. 

Réveille went at 3. 45 a. M. On 1st September. Little need of it therewas, for the men were astir, trying to keep warm by stamping about. Inthe driving rain and slush the army got ready to march forward. Theboats, as usual, were sent on with the surplus stores, whilst the mencarried one day's emergency rations in their haversacks, and two days'ordinary food was taken upon the camels of each battalion. Once morethe brigades marched in échelon. Gatacre's division was leading asbefore on the left, with Wauchope's brigade in front, and Lyttelton'sbehind. Steadily, deliberately, the armed tide of men flowed over theundulating plain, down into shallow khors, swelling through the scrub, their serried ranks always plainly to be seen. I went forward againwith the cavalry, accompanying the 21st Lancers, who were upon theleft front. The Egyptian troopers and the camelry went to their usualplace upon the right. In a short time we found that the dervishadvanced camp west of Kerreri had been abandoned, the enemy havingfallen back and joined their main force under the Khalifa nearerOmdurman. Word was sent back to the Sirdar that the track was clear ofthe enemy, and so the skirmish before getting into camp, which all theinfantry expected with some degree of confidence and elation, did nothappen. By 10 a. M. The army had wheeled into the lines assigned it inthe southward portion of the scattered village of Kerreri. Once moreboth wings rested upon the Nile, Gatacre's division in front (south), Macdonald's brigade at the north, with Collinson's brigade within andin reserve. The army encamped in an irregular triangular enclosure, onone side being the river, our flanks and face being protected by thegunboats. Our zereba outline was something like a broken-backedpyramid. 

Whilst the infantry were settling down in camp at Kerreri the cavalrywere pushing in the enemy's outposts. The British division cut andbuilt around their front a good stout thorny zereba. Lyttelton'sbrigade and three batteries were placed nearest the river. Upon theirright was Wauchope's brigade, next to it was Maxwell's and Lewis'sbrigades, and then to the right, Macdonald's crack command. Collinson's brigade was held in reserve within the zereba; ColonelsMaxwell, Lewis and Macdonald had their front protected by a doubleline of ordinary shelter-trenches dug in the loose sand and gravel. The British Tommies had no trench. Going forward a mile or so torejoin the cavalry I climbed the rugged granitic slopes of SurghamHill. Like most of the "jebels, " or mounts, in this region, comparedwith the spacious wilderness about them they are but toy hills. Fewof them are much over 150 feet high, large as they often loom in thedeceiving light of the Soudan. Many are but 50 feet in height, andthere are regular, peaky, and prettily-shaped little mountain ranges, the summits of which overtop the plain but five to ten yards. Suchhills children might build in play by the sea-shore. Surgham was quitea big one, and the signallers soon took possession of it, flagging and"helioing" back to camp. From its top I was enabled to see Omdurman, with Khartoum in the distance. The Mahdi's white, cone-shaped tomb, its dome girt with rings, and ornamented with brazen finials, globeand crescent, shone not six miles away in the midst of miles of mudand straw huts. Four arabesque finials rose, one from each corner ofthe supporting wall. Before the town was a wall of white tents, theoriginal camping ground of the Khalifa's levies and reinforcementsdrawn from distant garrisons. Midway to Omdurman, or within threemiles of where I stood, was the whole dervish army. Clearly they hadmoved out from the city, and were organised as a force prepared forinstant battle. Their tents, camels, and impedimenta had been leftbehind. Only a few low shelter-tents marked the lines in which theKhalifa's army lay in the sparse bush. There were flags and banners byhundreds, indicating the position of the leaders, chiefs and lesseremirs. The Khalifa's great black banner, with its Arabic letteringsewn in the same material, was displayed from a lofty bamboo pole, planted in the dense central part of the force. To the left of it, our right, were green and blue flags of the Shereef, or secondKhalifa, and Osman or Sheikh Ed Din, the Khalifa's son andgeneralissimo of his army. Osman, we heard, had been reinstated inparental favour, for he had fallen from grace for advising his fatherto make peace with the Sirdar. As in a daisy-pied field, there weredervish battle flags everywhere among the thick, swart lines that inrows barred our way to Omdurman. The banners were in all colours andshades, shapes, and sizes, but only the Khalifa's was black. The forcewas apparently drawn up in five bodies or divisions. Abdullah's, inthe centre, must have numbered fully 10, 000 men. Counting as carefullyas I could, I estimated the enemy who were to be seen as at leastnumbering 30, 000, and, perhaps, 35, 000 men. Horsemen and camelmencould be seen moving about their lines, and here and there othersriding, native fashion, on donkey-back. It seemed to be awell-organised, intelligently-handled enemy we had in front. 

Thereafter I rode onward and joined the farthest Lancers' outposts. Small parties of dervishes, mostly Jaalin and blacks, who were caughtby the troopers, but had perhaps purposely given the Khalifa the slip, were rounded up and sent back under escort as prisoners. Meanwhileboth the British and Khedivial mounted troops kept pushing on, drivingin the enemy's scouts. By noon there had been a series of attempts onour side to charge, but the foemen always gave way. The Egyptiancavalry under Colonel Broadwood and the camelry under Major Tudway, making a wide détour, got close to the dervish left, and engaged theenemy occasionally with rifles and Maxims. But the enemy's horse cameout in strength, supported by footmen, and threatened them, soBroadwood's men had to fall back. 

Four of the Sirdar's gunboats, which had meanwhile steamed ahead, werebriskly battering the Mahdist riverside forts. These works, like thoseabandoned to us at Shabluka Cataract and Kerreri, were strong, well-built earthen bastions, with flanking curtains. The centralsemicircular portion was pierced with three embrasures for ordnance, but so badly made as to admit of but a limited area of fire. Eachcurtain was loopholed for musketry. There was a deep, wide trenchbefore the works, the parapet of which was about ten feet high, whilstthe walls of earth were about three yards in thickness. Despite theskill shown in the construction and placing of the forts, thegunboats, by bringing their Maxims and quick-firing guns to bear, passed them unscathed. There were Krupp guns mounted in most of theseworks, but not a steamer was hit. Another event of even greaterimportance was meanwhile happening. From the first it had been plannedthat the Lyddite guns and the 40-pounder Armstrong cannon should beemployed to batter down or breach the Khalifa's walls. The howitzerswere sent on by one of the gunboats to be landed on Tuti Island, whichis opposite Khartoum, for that purpose. But it was found the maps werewrong, and a better position was selected within suitable range on thesolid land of the east bank. As for the 40-pounders it was found tooinconvenient to tranship such heavy ordnance. 

The battery firing the 50-lb. Lyddite shells having found the range, about 3000 yards, opened fire upon Omdurman. In quick succession rapidsplashes of lurid flame burst in the town, followed by great clouds ofdust and whirling stones. I watched them training the howitzers on thegreat wall and the whited sepulchre of the false prophet. With thethird shot they struck the base and anon the top of the Mahdi's tomb, smashing the structure, and bringing down the uppermost cap of it. Thenature of the bombardment and its success was galling to the dervishforce, as could be seen by the commotion it excited in the city andtheir camp. Our cavalry on the left got to skirmishing again with theenemy's outposts, on which we had closed to within 800 yards. Bodiesof their horsemen came out and drove our advanced scouts in. Then, three squadrons of the Lancers were led forward by Colonel Martin, andthe enemy once more retired. This, seemingly, was too much for theKhalifa, so his whole army was set in motion against us. They came ondeliberately, but smartly, their infantry trying to surround and cutour troopers off. Dismounting part of his men, Colonel Martinmaterially delayed the enemy's advance, for the dervishes sent outlines of black riflemen to deal with the Lancers. A rattling skirmishat 500 to 800 yards ranges was in a few minutes in full progress. Newswas sent back to the Sirdar that the enemy's army were coming on _enmasse_, and step by step Colonel Martin's troops were retired towardsMount Surgham and the river. Our retreat was pressed, and the regimenthad to mount and trot off behind the shelter of Surgham to avoid thevigorous advance of the dervishes. Among our mounted troops there wererelatively few losses, although the enemy must have sufferedconsiderably. I noticed many of them being knocked over by theLancers' fire. Before 3 p. M. The Sirdar had all his infantry and gunsin position, awaiting the expected attack within his lines at Kerreri. A few mud-huts on the south face of the zereba materially added to thestrength of the position. Our cavalry had all to continue retiring, and ultimately the Lancers went down to the river so as to clear thefront of the army. Surgham Hill was occupied by a few of thedervishes. From there they must have had an excellent view of ourcamp; indeed, they had as good a panoramic peep at us as we had atthem. For some reason the Khalifa thought better of attacking us thatday, and so halted with his main body quite out of range. Towardssunset his men gradually retired, going back to their former position. They had left their camp-fires burning, and their chunks of meat andcakes of rough grain cooking under the supervision of slaves andfollowers when they came out against the Lancers. So it happened onthe eve of the coming battle both armies rested quietly in theirrespective camps, eating, sleeping, and the devout praying, within afive miles' march of each other. For supper our men had stringy bullybeef and biscuit or bread. The dervishes had hunks of freshly roastedmutton, goat and cattle, done on the embers, and bannocks of dhurameal. Extra precautions were again observed to secure the Sirdar'sarmy from any night attack. 

CHAPTER X. 

THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--FIRST PHASE OF THE FIGHT. 

In this and the succeeding chapter, the account given of the victoryof Omdurman is substantially the same as that which appeared in thecolumns of various issues of the _Daily Telegraph_. The narrative, although hastily prepared, gives an accurate description of the fight, and copies of it not being now procurable, I venture to make use ofit, adding only here and there lines of new matter. I have reserved toa later chapter the personal narratives of officers who were in theaction, and who have kindly supplied me with particulars of the partborne by the gunboats, the cavalry, and Major Stuart-Wortley'sfriendlies. With these I have coupled various details drawn from myown observation. I found that through errors in transmission of themessages, or mistakes in dealing with them, part of my copy had gotcredited to other sources. 

 OMDURMAN, _2nd September 1898_. 

The supreme and greatest victory ever achieved by British arms in theSoudan has been won by the Sirdar's ever-victorious forces, after oneof the most picturesque battles of the century. At last! After fifteenvexatious years spent in trying to get here, an Anglo-Egyptian armyhas recovered Khartoum and occupied Omdurman. Gordon has been avengedand justified. The dervishes have been overwhelmingly routed, Mahdismhas been "smashed, " whilst the Khalifa's capital of Omdurman has beenstripped of its barbaric halo of sanctity and invulnerability. Striking and dramatic as has been the manner in which the ending ofthe curse of the Soudan has come about, the tale need lose none of itsforce by being simply told. The grandeur of the plain story requiresno straining after catchwords. Of those who with Sir Herbert Stewart'sdesert column toiled and fought to reach Metemmeh in January 1885, less than a dozen are with the Sirdar's army, and of these but three, including the writer, were correspondents. But to the narrative of thebattle which, at a stroke, has broken down the potent savage barriersof blood and cruelty, and re-opened the heart of the great Africancontinent to the sweetening influences of civilised government. 

Storm and cloud had passed. The moon rose early on the night of 1stSeptember. It shone brightly over and around our bivouac, south ofKerreri village, or near Um Mutragan, according to the cartographers. The north end of our camp lines approached the river just 500 yardssouth of the ruined dervish redoubt of Kerreri. Sentinels were postedalong the irregular-shaped triangle, or, shall I call it, brokensemi-circle, within which the army lay. The sentries had a fair rangeof view to their front. Men on the lookout also occupied the roofs ofthe few native mud-huts at the south-western corner of the camp. FourJaalin scouts were sent forward to Surgham Hill to listen, and toapprise the troops of any movement on the part of the Khalifa's army. Other friendlies lay about outside, hearkening and watching, to warnus of any attempt of the enemy to surprise the zereba. The sentrieswere bid to shoot at any man rushing singly upon him, and to fire uponlarge bodies advancing at the double. Men running in, however, inpairs, were either to be challenged or allowed to come in withoutbeing fired on. Such was the simple yet ample arrangement. Toanticipate somewhat, it so happened that about midnight there was somefiring, and the four Jaalin "smellers of danger and dervishes" uponJebel Surgham came sprinting in, a four-in-hand, and cleared the broadcut mimosa hedge that was piled before the lines of Gatacre'sdivision, at a bound. The time they made broke all records. 

From the north to the south end along the river the camp was about onemile in length, and its greatest width about 1200 yards. There were afew mud-huts within the space enclosed by mimosa and the double lineof shallow shelter-trenches. The cut bushes were piled in front of theBritish troops, who were facing Omdurman and the south; the trenchescovered the approach from the west and north where the Khedivialtroops stood on guard. Neither extremity of the lines of defence, zereba or trench, quite extended to the river. Openings of aboutthirty to fifty yards were left. Besides these there were other smallpassage-ways left open during daylight, but closed at night. Near theriver facing south the ground was rough, and there were several huts, so that the security of the camp was not imperilled by the failure tocarry the hedge or trenches to the Nile's brink. Lyttelton's brigadewere placed upon the left south front. Wauchope's men continued theline to the right. In the south gap were three companies of the 2ndBattalion Rifle Brigade, their left resting on the river. On theirimmediate right were three batteries--the 32nd Field Battery ofEnglish 15-pounders, under Major Williams; two Maxim-Nordenfeldtmountain batteries, 12˝-pounders, respectively under Captains Stewartand de Rougemont; and six Maxims under Captain Smeaton. Later on theseguns and Maxims during the first stage of the battle--for the actionresolved itself into a double event ere the combat ceased--werewheeled out until they were firing almost at right angles to thezereba line. On the right of the guns, in succession, were theremainder of the Rifles, the Lancashire Fusiliers, the NorthumberlandFusiliers, and the Grenadier Guards. In the interval between GeneralLyttelton's brigade and General Wauchope's, which stood next to it, were two Maxims. Then came the Warwicks, Camerons, Seaforths, andLincolns. To the Lincolns' right, where the trenches began and theline faced nearly west, was Colonel Maxwell's brigade. BetweenWauchope's and Maxwell's brigades were two Maxims, and, I think, for atime during the first attack made by the dervishes, the two-gun mulebattery of six-centimetre Krupp guns. To complete the tale of the gunsplaced for defending the camp, there was Major Lawrie's battery ofMaxim-Nordenfeldts on the right of Maxwell's brigade next Macdonald's, and on the north side, near the right of the position facing west, Major Peake's battery of Maxim-Nordenfeldts. These guns had done sowell at the Atbara, that the Sirdar promptly increased his artilleryby adding three batteries of that class. Maxwell's brigade wascomposed of three Soudanese and one Egyptian battalion, viz. , 8thEgyptian, and 12th, 13th, and 14th Soudanese. Farther north, to theright of Colonel Maxwell's men, was Lewis Bey's brigade of Egyptiantroops--the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Battalions. The 15th Battalion wasa fine lot, mostly reservists. Upon the farthest west and northernface of the protected camp was. Colonel Macdonald's oft-tried andfamous fighting brigade, made up of the 9th, 10th, and 11th Soudanese, with the true-as-steel 2nd Egyptians. Within the wall of hedge, trenches, and armed infantry, in reserve, was another brigade, the 4thKhedivial, commanded by Major Collinson. It was made up of the 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian battalions. The two last-named wererelatively newly-raised regiments, but were composed of finesoldierly-looking fellaheen. The divisional brigade and battalioncommanders and staff were:--British division, Major-General Gatacrecommanding; staff: Major Robb, D. A. G. ; Captain R. Brooke, A. D. C. ;Lieuts. Cox and Ingle, orderly officers; Surgeon-Colonel MacNamara, P. M. O. First British Infantry brigade, Brigadier-General A. Wauchope;staff: Major Doyle Snow, brigade-major; Captain Rennie, A. D. C. ;Surgeon-Lieut. -Colonel Sloggett, P. M. O. Second brigade, Brigadier-General, Hon. N. G. Lyttelton; staff: Major A Court, brigade-major; Captain Henderson, A. D. C. Surgeon-General W. Taylor wasthe principal medical officer of the British division. Lieut. -ColonelC. J. Long, R. A. , commanded all the artillery. Khedivialtroops--Infantry division, Major-General A. Hunter, commanding; staff:Surgeon-Colonel Gallwey, P. M. O. ; Captain Kincaid, D. A. G. ; Lieut. Smythe, A. D. C. 1st brigade, Brigadier H. A. Macdonald; Major C. KeithFalconer, brigade-major. 2nd brigade, Brigadier Lewis; 3rd brigade, Brigadier Maxwell; 4th brigade, Brigadier Collinson. 

The battalion commanders of British troops were:--Grenadier Guards, Lieut. -Colonel Villiers-Hatton; Lancashire Fusiliers, Lieut. -ColonelCollingwood; Northumberland Fusiliers, Lieut. -Colonel C. G. C. Money;Rifle Brigade, Colonel Howard; Warwickshires, Lieut. -Colonel Forbes;Lincolns, Lieut. -Colonel Louth; Camerons, Lieut. -Colonel G. L. C. Money; Seaforths, Lieut. -Colonel Murray. Those of the Khedivialbattalions were:--Macdonald's brigade, Majors Pink, 2nd Egyptian;Walter, 9th Soudanese; Nason, 10th Soudanese; Jackson, 11th Soudanese. Lewis's brigade, Majors Sellem, 3rd Egyptian; Sparkes, 4th Egyptian;Fatby Bey, 7th Egyptian; and Major Hickman, 15th Egyptian. Maxwell'sbrigade, Majors Kalousie, 8th Egyptian; Townsend, 12th Soudanese;Smith-Dorian, 13th Soudanese; Shekleton, 14th Soudanese. Collinson'sbrigade, Captains (O. C. 's) Bainbridge, 1st Egyptian; Abd El GervadBorham, 5th Egyptian; Bunbury, 17th Egyptian; and Matchell, 18thEgyptian. 

The troops were ranged two deep in front with a partial second doubleline or supports placed twenty yards or so behind them. These assistedin the fight to pass ammunition to the firing line and carry back thedead and wounded. Somewhat removed from the zereba and trenches, andnearer the Nile were the hospitals, the transport, the stores, nearly3000 camels, and about 500 mules. The Egyptian cavalry and camelrywere picketed at the north of the camp, and the 21st Lancers at thesouth end, both being within the lines. All along the river's bankbeside the camp were moored the gunboats, steamers and barges, with afleet of a hundred or more native sailing boats, at once a means ofdefence and a supply column. The gunboat "Melik" was moored a fewhundred yards south of where the Rifles were posted. Occasionally theflotilla flashed their search-lights upon Jebel Surgham, and swept thescrub and desert in front of the troops. The enemy's scouts, however, were never disclosed in the radii of the electric beams. In fact, thefirst notice we had that the dervishes were about to inspect ourenvironment was the impetuous incoming of our friendlies from JebelSurgham and the cracking of snipers' guns in the bush mingled with thebuzzing of bullets overhead. A battalion rose quietly from the ground, for the troops slept clear of the hedge, and went forward a few pacesto man the zereba. On learning what was actually taking place theyreturned to their blankets and to sleep. 

For all the row the dervish spies, snipers and others made, the armywas not really disturbed. Once more we had to thank fortune that theenemy made no vigorous attempt to assail the camp during the night. True, earlier in the evening a few badly-directed rifle-shots had comewhistling across the zereba. Prowling dervish scouts had evenoccasionally crept close enough to draw upon themselves the attentionof our double sentries and alert patrols. A small section volley atone period of the night was fired at a knot of the enemy's would-bebush-whackers. The unusual rattle of musketry caused an incipientalarm in one of the battalions. Tommy, however, behaved well, collectively, never stirring, but waiting "for orders. " The peace ofthe night hours was, I repeat, never seriously broken, theAnglo-Egyptian army enjoying their needed sleep. After midnight thingsquieted down and from the dervish camp no sound was carried to us bythe soft south wind. All was absolutely still in that direction. Thenoggara or war-drum was a dead thing, beating not to quarters, as wehad heard it during the day when out with the cavalry. Nor was thedeep-bayed booming of the ombeyas, or elephant horns, re-echoing torally the tribesmen under their leaders' banners. 

It was 3. 40 a. M. On 2nd September when the bugles called the 22, 000men of the Sirdar's army from slumber. Quickly the troops were astir, and the camp full of bustling preparation. It was given out that wewere not to move forward quite as early as usual. But circumstancesalter cases, and very soon loads and saddles were adjusted with extracare. Everything was made as trim as possible, and belts were buckledtightly for action. There was a sense and expectancy of coming battleabroad, and an eager desire permeating all ranks to have it out withthe dervishes then or never. It had come at length to be generallyaccepted that the enemy would not bolt nor slip through our fingers, but would accept the gage of battle which the Sirdar meant shortly togive him. We were going to march out, attack, and storm the Khalifaand his great army in their chosen lines and trenches. In a way wefelt half-heartedly grateful to our sportsmanlike enemy for not havingharassed our marches or bivouacs. We were, within the next hour or so, to have yet more to thank the dervishes and their Khalifa for. TrulyAbdullah was amazingly ignorant of war tactics, or astoundinglyconfident in the prowess of his arms. From the reckless, magnificentmanner in which the dervishes comported themselves in the earlierstages of the fight that ensued, I incline to the belief that theKhalifa and his men, true to their crass, credulous notions, wereoverweeningly confident in themselves. A fatal fault, they underratedtheir opponents. His Emirs, Jehadieh, and Baggara had so often provedthemselves invincible in their combats against natives of the Soudan, that they had come to hold that none would face their battle shock. There was pride of countless triumphs, and the long enjoyment ofdespotic lordship that hardened their wills and thews to win victoryor perish. I failed later to see the old fanaticism that once madethem, though pierced through and through with bayonet or sword, fighttill the last heart-throb ceased. Let me not be misunderstood. Despitetheir possible doubts about the Khalifa's divine mission, the dervisharmy fought with courage and dash until they were absolutely broken. Their personal hardihood bravely compared with the days of Tamai andAbu Klea. It was when the fight was nearly over that there wereevidences of that of which there was so little in the old days, viz. , that a large remnant would accept life at our hands. Again, as thesequel showed, the Sirdar's star was in the ascendant. 

Everything was in readiness in our camp by 5 a. M. Camels, horses, mules, and donkeys had been watered and fed, and the men had disposedof an early breakfast of cocoa or tea, coarse biscuit, and tinnedmeat. Infantry and artillery had made sure of their full supply ofammunition, and the reserve was handy to draw more from. Tommy Atkinscarried 100 rounds of the new hollow-nosed Lee-Metford cartridges. Behind him were mules loaded with a further twenty rounds for him. TheKhedivial soldiers had 120 rounds of Martini-Henry cartridges. To harkback: at 4. 30 a. M. , ere dawn had tinged the east, the Sirdar badeColonel Broadwood, commanding the Egyptian cavalry, send out twosquadrons to ascertain what the enemy was about. Thereupon onesquadron rode off to the hills on the west--known locally as SouthKerreri jebels, but marked on most maps as Um Mutragan. Besides beingmisnamed, they are plotted in out of place and as if the range trendedeast and west. It runs nearly north and south. Kerreri hills were lowand black, like most of the jebels thereabout. They stand fully twomiles west of the Nile. Another squadron, under Captain Hon. E. Baring, proceeded south to Jebel Surgham, the low hill, about one milein front of the British division. I have written about it before. Surgham was used for heliograph and flag signalling on the 1st, theprevious day, and is the last of the detached hills or ranges lyingnear the river on the north towards Omdurman. The squadron going westsoon reached South Kerreri hill, and reported that the enemy werestill in camp. It was early, and not clear daylight, and the distanceto the Khalifa's encampment was greater from South Kerreri hill thanthat from Jebel Surgham to where the dervishes lay in the bush andhollows around Wady Shamba. Captain Baring's party, on the other hand, met with small patrols of the enemy near Jebel Surgham. Turning thehill at a few minutes past five o'clock, in the yet slanting daylight, he at once detected that the Khalifa's army, which had apparently beenlargely reinforced during the night, was marching forward to attackus. Gallopers and orderlies came riding back furiously with the newsfor the Sirdar. Sir Herbert Kitchener, Major-General Rundle, and thewhole headquarters staff were already mounted. Colonel Broadwood wasdespatched to verify the startling report, and to bring in furtherparticulars. Meantime the preparations on our side for an advancewere suspended, and guns, Maxims, and infantry moved up and wheeledinto positions upon the firing line. Ominous was that silent march ofsix paces to their front made by the British infantry to get close tothe zereba and the clearing for action of Maxims and cannon, and theexamining of the breeches of the Lee-Metfords. For the first time themagazines were to be used. The Khedivial soldiers swarmed into theirtrenches. Anon, the Tommy Atkinses were ordered to lie down behindtheir hedge of cut mimosa to rest and wait. From a little distance, nodoubt, our camp looked silent, deserted, and as void of danger as anyother part of the plain. Standing a few yards behind each command wereplaced in reserve sometimes two, sometimes three companies, which hadbeen withdrawn from the battalion on their immediate front. Thesereserves were to fill gaps or stiffen the firing line, should it betoo closely pressed. With the companies in reserve were the stretchersand bearers. A little farther back was the British divisional fieldhospital, planted in a congeries of native dirt-huts. The scatteredmud-huts within the lines afforded excellent cover to the sick andwounded, as well as a degree of protection for the camels, horses, mules, and donkeys picketed near the middle ground of the camp. 

Colonel Broadwood returned swiftly with the news that the wholedervish army was really in motion, and that if it held upon itsapparent course its right wing would pass about 500 yards to the westof Jebel Surgham. That hill was within easy shelling distance fromthe gunboats, and the solitary instance of prudence that the dervisheshad so far shown was to keep far enough inland to render theassistance of the flotilla of as little help as possible to us. Somethere were who thought that Jebel Surgham should have been made thecentral stronghold of our camp, and that the army ought to have sleptbehind it on the previous night. The wisdom of that suggestion wasmost doubtful. Where we were the gunboats could more easily cover thewhole position. 

It was about 5 a. M. When the 21st Lancers started forward to undertaketheir daily task of scouting and covering the left flank of theSirdar's army. They reached Jebel Surgham a few minutes later andrelieved Captain Baring's squadron, which at once rode away and joinedthe remaining squadrons of Egyptian cavalry on South Kerreri hill, whither Colonel Broadwood had by that time gone with his troopers. Every inch of Surgham hill and the yellow sand ridges, gravel mounds, and shallow khors to the south and west of it had been explored by theLancers the day before. Riding straight out from the zereba ere thefaintly-glowing dawn had come, I joined the Lancers on Surgham. Adismounted squadron occupied part of the southern slopes, a troop ormore were on the higher points and summit keeping sharp eyes on theenemy. Flag-signallers were preparing for work at the place where theday before helios had been busy flashing news from gunboats andcavalry to the headquarters. As I climbed the rugged slopes of JebelSurgham leading my horse, I heard a mighty rumbling as of tempestuousrollers and surf bearing down upon a rock-bound shore. When I had gonebut a few strides farther there burst upon my sight a moving, undulating plain of men, flecked with banners and glistening steel. Who should count them? They were compact, not to be numbered. Theirfront from east to west extended over three miles, a dense massflowing towards us. It was a great, deep-bodied flood, rather than anavalanche, advancing without flurry, solidly, with presage of power. The sound of their coming grew each instant louder, and becamearticulate. It was not alone the reverberation of the tread of horsesand men's feet I heard and seemed to feel as well as hear, but avoiced continuous shouting and chanting--the dervish invocation andbattle challenge, "Allah el Allah! Rasool Allah el Mahdi!" theyreiterated in vociferous rhymed rising measure, as they swept over theintervening ground. Their ranks were well kept, the serried linesmarching with military regularity, with swaying of flags andbrandishing of big-bladed, cruel spears and two-edged swords. Emirsand chiefs on horseback rode in front and along the lines, gesticulating and marshalling their commands. Mounted Baggara trottedabout along the inner lines of footmen. There were apparently asbefore five great divisions in the dervish army. The Khalifa's corpswas near the right centre, with his son, Sheikh Ed Din's division onhis left. The relative positions of the great chiefs were readilyrecognisable by their banners, which were carried in the midst oftheir chosen body-guards. Khalifa Abdullah's great black banner, black-lettered with texts from the Koran and the Mahdi's sayings, wasupheld by his Mulazimin. It flew, spread out, flaunting in the wind, acclaimed by his followers. The flag was about two yards square, andwas supported on a 20-feet bamboo pole, ornamented at top with asilver bowl and spandrel, as well as a tassel. The force marching withit must have numbered 20, 000 armed men, besides servants andfollowers. His son, Osman, known as Sheikh Ed Din, and the nominalcommander-in-chief of the dervish armies, led into battle a divisionof the Jehadieh (riflemen) and spearmen, together 15, 000 strong. Hisforce was ranged under blue, green, yellow, and white banners. Withhim was Khalil, the second Khalifa, Osman Azrak, Emir Yunis, AbdelBaki, and other noted chiefs of the Baggara. Yacoub, the notoriousbrother of the Khalifa Abdullah, commanded the big column upon hisrelative's right hand. Still farther to their right were the divisionsled by Wad Helu and Wad Melik. The joint forces of these twainprobably numbered 12, 000 or 14, 000 men. Besides the main army therewas a second line, possibly made up from the Omdurman populace, with abaggage train of camels and donkeys. I found out subsequently that theenemy were amply provisioned. Camels and donkeys carried water andgrain, mostly dhura, for the Khalifa's army. The dervishes, as a rule, had their goatskin wallets filled with grain, onions, and a piece ofroasted meat. 

The battle of Omdurman began at 5. 30 a. M. With a salvo of six gunsfrom Major Elmslie's battery on the east Nile bank. They were firedfrom the 5-inch howitzers, which sent a half-dozen of 50-lb. Lydditeshells hurtling around the tomb and the Khalifa's quarters. Like aspouting volcano, clouds of flame, stones, and dust burst from out thecity. The line of strong forts before the town and upon Tuti islandhad been silenced by them and the gunboats the previous day. Althoughthe dervishes had built stout works, and had plenty of cannon andammunition, they made a wretchedly bad stand against the gunboats, injuring none of them. The overpowering weight as well as the accuracyof our steamers' fire ended the naval part of the battle almost assoon as it was begun. Quick-firers and Maxims were trained to bearinto the embrasures of the Khalifa's forts. As a consequence, theenemy's gunners were only able to fire a few wild rounds at thevessels. Jealous and suspicious of everyone, Abdullah left his arsenalfull of unemployed batteries, Krupps, and machine guns, and only tookthree of either of the latter weapons with him into the field againstus. After the labour too of taking them there, he made but little useof them. As I learned, the Greeks, some thirty-five, and allable-bodied men, had to march out of Omdurman and follow the Khalifato battle. I by no means, I think, over-estimate the enemy's numberswhen I state that there were 50, 000 dervishes of sorts who advancedagainst us, sworn to leave not a single soul alive in the Sirdar'sarmy. Abdullah, professedly sanguine of success, had bade the mollahsand others attend him at noon prayers in the mosque and Mahdi's tomb, where he would go to worship immediately after his victory. He hadreturned into town, and spent part of the night of 1st and 2ndSeptember in his own house. 

[Illustration: BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--ZEREBA ACTION. ]

The gunboats, which had gone on that morning, joined in the renewedbombardment of Omdurman, begun by Major Elmslie. But it was only for ashort space, for the Sirdar recalled the steamers by signal to assistin repelling the attack when it was seen the Khalifa meant givingbattle. Three squadrons of Lancers halted on the northern side ofJebel Surgham. A troop of them pushed on to the sandy ridgessouth-west of Surgham hill. Part of them dismounted, and with muchhardihood began firing at about 1000 yards' range at the oncomingdervishes. It was as if a few men afoot were seeking to interpose tohold back the invading ocean. Instantly dervish riflemen and horsemenshot out from the Khalifa's lines and came streaming to engage thehandful of troopers. The skirmishing Lancers desisted, mounted, androde back to their main body. Of those of the Lancers who stood it outlongest were the groups upon the top of Surgham and upon its easternside. Colonel Martin got his four squadrons together as the dervishesdrew in towards him. The enemy's right was now thrown forward, facingstraight for the angle of the camp where the British division stood. At a swinging gait came the vast army of Mahdism. I was still nearSurgham and believed that I could discern the Khalifa himself in thecentre of a jostling, excited throng of footmen and horsemen. He wasseated upon a richly caparisoned Arab steed, guarded on all sides bystalwart natives armed with rifles and swords. A troop of mountedEmirs in front and a big retinue of Baggara and other chiefs onhorseback riding behind surely proclaimed him to be Abdullah, theMahdi's successor. Far before him was borne his terrible black banner. Around him religious dervishes screamed, gesticulated, and shouted"Allah's" name, confident that they had come out to see theannihilation of the invading infidels. Had it not been long foretoldthat the victorious battle would be fought at Kerreri, which everafter should be known among the faithful as "the death-field of theinfidels"? Were not the white stones there already to mark our graves?I was fortunate to be able to scan the nearest of the dervish columns, from a distance of but 800 yards. The battle was about to open infierce earnest. Away went the Lancers at the gallop, back to thezereba, but, edging towards the river, to clear our infantry's frontand line of fire. It was around the left of the 2nd battalion of theRifle Brigade that the troopers passed in. I took a somewhat shorter, hasty cut, entering the zereba near where the three batteries stood, on the British left. Away off upon and under Um Mutragan, the Egyptianmounted troops, the nine squadrons of cavalry, eight companies of theCamel Corps, and the horse artillery, all under Colonel Broadwood, were pluckily endeavouring to tackle the left wing of the Khalifa'sforces. They held on, perhaps, too long; at any rate, until most ofthem were in a position of serious danger. As their fight and the moreimportant general action happened at the same time, I must deferfurther description of it for the moment. 

It was a magnificent spectacle that rose before the Sirdar's army asthe dervish columns came sweeping into view, filling the landscapebetween Surgham and Um Mutragan. In that great multitude were gatheredthe fiercest, most sanguinary body of savage warriors the world hasever held or known. Arabs and blacks, chosen by Abdullah himself, picked out because of their tried courage, strength, and devotion--theflower of the fighting Soudan tribes. Under other conditionsAbdullah's army might have matched itself to win against double theirnumber of any men similarly armed. Fearless of danger, agile yetstrong, each man carried with him into the fight the conviction thatthe Khalifa would conquer. A great shout of exultation went up fromthe dervish legions when they saw, ranged in the low ground beforethem, the Sirdar's, small army, their imagined prey. There was amighty waving of banners and flashing of steel when, breaking into arun, they bent forward to close upon us. The British division rose totheir feet to be ready, and the Khedivial troops closed up theirranks. There was a murmur of satisfaction from Gatacre's division andreal cries of delight from the black troops on seeing the enemy werecoming to attack. Never was there a grander, more imposing militantdisplay seen than when the great dervish army rushed to engage, heedless of life or death. In an instant the Sirdar, who stood nearthe right of Wauchope's brigade, passed an order for the threebatteries on the left--Major Williams', Stewart's, de Rougemont's--toopen fire. The guns were laid at 2800 yards, a range the delight ofgunners, and sighted to the west of Surgham, where the black flag andthe largest mass of the enemy were. The hour was 6. 35 a. M. Almost atthe first shot the true range was found. Quick as thought thereafterthe eighteen guns on our left began raining fire, iron, and lead uponthe leading and main columns of the enemy. Two batteries to the rightand many of the Maxims added to the fury of the fearful death-dealingstorm bursting over and amongst the dervish ranks. The long 15-pounderEnglish field cannon hit with the precision of match rifles, and weredischarged as though they had been quick-firing guns. As for thestinging Maxim-Nordenfeldts, with their big single and bigger doubleshells, they bucked and jumped like kicking horses, yet were fired sofast that the barrels must have been well-nigh red-hot. The air wastorn with hurtling shell at the first awful salvo, when shrapnel burstin all directions, smiting the dervishes as with Heaven'sthunderbolts, and strewing the ground with maimed and dead. Theleading columns paused as if they had received a shock, or had stoppedto catch breath. Hundreds had been slain in that one discharge, andthe fire was rapidly increasing, not slackening. Disregarding theirdead and wounded, the dervishes closed their ranks as with one accord, and came on with fresh energy. Their banner-bearers and the Baggarahorsemen pushed to the front, doubtless to further encourage the stilldauntless footmen. Surely there never was wilder courage displayed. In the face of a fire that mowed down battalions and smashed greatgaps into their columns they flinched not nor turned. Noticing theenemy's persistency, the Sirdar sent bidding General Lyttelton trythem with long-range volleys from the Lee-Metfords. Major Lord EdwardCecil took the message, and Lieutenant H. M. Grenfell got the rangefrom the gunners. The Grenadier Guards, who had the honour of beingthe first of our infantry to engage, were ordered to fire sectionvolleys to their right at the Khalifa's division; the range 2700yards. Standing up and pointing their rifles over the hedge theyblazed away very steadily at the dervishes. Occasionally they caughtand slew a group, but at that period it was difficult to make out, even through good field-glasses, whether the infantry fire was reallyeffective. There was no doubt about what the gunners were doing, forhorses and riders and footmen were bowled over or sank to the groundas shrapnel and common shell struck their ranks. The artillerymeninvariably trained their weapons to bear upon the front of the densestof the dervish columns, seeking to pulverise them. As for theMaxims--and I closely watched the effect of their fire through myglasses--I am compelled to say that they often failed to settle uponthe swarming foe. At any rate, their effectiveness was not equal towhat might have been expected. Would the Khalifa succeed, in the faceof such an awful cannonade, in reaching the zereba with a corporal'sguard? But after all, it usually takes tons of iron and lead to kill aman. There was marvellous vitality in the dervish masses. Thousandswere knocked over by the screaming, bursting shells, which made hillsand plain ring with thunderous uproar. But numbers of the apparentlykilled were merely wounded, and they speedily rose and truculentlyhastened forward anew with their fellow-tribesmen. A diversion thattold momentarily in the enemy's favour occurred. The extreme dervishright at that moment appeared climbing the slopes of Jebel Surgham. Emir Melik's wing, hidden from view by that intervening high ground, had, as it came on, been reinforced by a part of Yacoub's division. Byother accounts Osman Digna, as well, had united forces with Melik. There suddenly sprang into threatening proximity before us, a force ofat least fifteen odd thousand men, with a wide surf-line of white, red, and gold lettered banners, less than a mile away. Brandishingtheir weapons and shouting "Allah!" down the slopes they ran towardsthe zereba. Emirs rode in front, and gaunt, black riflemen sped likehounds, keeping pace with the horses. The guns of one battery, thenanother, and finally all three, upon General Lyttelton's left, wereturned upon them. Maxims also were swung round, and the long-distancevolleys were dropped for shorter ranges. The dervish main columnswhich had got shelter in low khors re-appeared, and without pausejoined in the hot rush for our zereba. Our elated foemen evidentlythought they would at last be able to close with us. In theirignorance they reckoned not with the accuracy and discipline of theBritish infantry fire. Nor had they then learned to dread theterrible bullets of our men's Lee-Metford rifles. Later in the day, aswell as on the following one, I heard many expressions of regret fromwounded and unwounded dervishes that they were so mad as to charge thewhite soldiers, whose bullets rarely missed. The light was good, thehour about 7 a. M. , and the ranges shifted rapidly from 1700 yards to1500 yards, 1200 yards down to 1000 yards. Guns, Maxims, and rifleswere blazing in fullest fury at the enemy, as, in their heroic effort, they sought to charge home upon us. From wing to wing Gatacre'sdivision was firing sharply, a blaze of flame, section volleys andindependently. The Grenadier Guardsmen's shooting was noted asconspicuously steady and deadly effective. Except the two companies ofthe Rifles on the left, who, owing to the nature of the ground ontheir front, could do little, the British infantry were hotlyoccupied. Rifles became too warm to be held, and were in some caseschanged for those of rear-rank men's. In one or two instances thereserves closed up, to give every soldier an opportunity of beingactually engaged. They took the place of sections in the firing lines, whilst their comrades fell back and refilled their cartridge pouches. The Lancers sent forward a dismounted squadron or two which filled thegap between the zereba and the Nile, whilst the gunboats "Melik" and"Sultan" moved in and took part in that stage of the battle. And stillthe dervishes got nearer, swinging up their left, for their right wasnow fairly held by the British fire. Colonels Maxwell's and Lewis'sbrigades had to address themselves to the task of checking theKhalifa's attack. Colonel Long had so disposed the cannon and Maximsthat the guns rendered invaluable help. At that period the main bodyof the dervishes moved forward more carefully, taking cover andevidently watching the issue of Yacoub's and Wad Melik's assaultingcolumns. 

The army of white flags, led by Yacoub and Wad Melik, exhibited dash, courage, and persistence. Never was a column of men so hammered andmutilated and probably so surprised. They were torn and thrown aboutas puppets before the hurricane of shell fire, and laid in windrowslike cut grain before the hail of the Lee-Metfords. Twelve hundredshort yards away, Surgham's bare slopes were being literally coveredwith corpses and writhing wounded. In sheer blundering brutishness, the ferocious dervishes tried to stem the storm. Wave followed wave ofmen, they surged together, inviting greater disaster, but alwaysstriving to get nearer us. Their front had covered the whole slopes ofJebel Surgham and their left overlapped part of the Khalifa's right. Death was reaping a gigantic harvest. Hecatombs of slain were beingspread everywhere in front. The fight was terrible, the slaughterdreadful. So far we had scarcely suffered loss, only a few of theenemy's riflemen having paused and thought of firing at us. Musketsthey had discharged in the air, after their manner, when advancingfrom their encampment. But that is one of their customs, employed towork up a proper warlike ardour. Viewed from our side, it had been sofar the least dangerous battle ever soldier bore part in. For five, ten minutes, less or more--the drama being enacted was too fearful andfascinating for one to take note of time--Yacoub and his legions stillstrove to breast the whirlwind of destruction involving them. Battered, torn, rent into groups, the survivors at length began tomove off rapidly across our front, to their left. As yet there was norunning away, they were but changing direction and massing at anotherpoint. With, if possible, swifter, deadlier fire they were followedand driven. Maxims, Lee-Metfords, and Martini-Henrys from Maxwell'sbrigade shattered the loose and weakened dervish columns. The fewrounds fired back at us by the enemy from their Krupp gun and rifledcannon, which were stationed near the Khalifa's banner during thefirst part of the action, did no harm. In fact, their shells burst twoor three hundred yards short of the zereba. At first they weremistaken for badly-aimed shells fired by the gunboats, from which afew pitched near us, or by the batteries upon our left. For a momentthe Sirdar was wroth at what was fancied to be our gunners' blunderingpractice. It was quickly discovered, however, that the particularshells in question were aimed by the dervishes. Very soon, --whethersettled by our guns, our Maxims, or by infantry volleys, I knownot, --the dervish cannon and their foolish efforts to shell our linestroubled us no more. We knew afterwards that they had also got one oftheir 5-barrelled Nordenfeldts to work for a while. Nobody in ourranks, I think, was actually aware of the fact at the time, soindifferent was the aiming and so bad the handling of the gun. 

Still, the crucial stage of the first action was not over. The SheikhEd Din had driven the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps from UmMutragan, inflicting loss upon them and getting temporary possessionof several guns of the horse battery. He was following them upvigorously, and the Camel Corps, protected by the gunboats' fire, wasseeking shelter near the river and close to the north end of thezereba, where it luckily succeeded in getting. It was after sevena. M. , and Colonel Broadwood's troopers were trying to shake offflanking parties of the enemy as they rode to the north, towards ourprevious camp. Our batteries were still pounding the Khalifa's mainbody, which had got to within 1400 yards of the south-western angle ofthe zereba. Wavering, and driven before the murderous tornado ofexploding bombs and pitiless lead, they too swung round and made forcover beyond range, flying towards the west and slightly to the rear. Yacoub and Melik followed the black flag in the same direction, andthe dervish left wing edged off to Um Mutragan. They had come, firstof all, direct, as if intending to assault the western angles of thezereba. Then Yacoub and Melik had led them to the right, so that theycovered Surgham and came on in front of the British division. Blindlythey had stumbled into the impassable fire from the south face of ourlines and ultimately relinquishing the task had hastened, as I havestated, across our front towards their main body. The guns and Maximswithal of Wauchope's and Maxwell's infantry, must have weakened thehope in the Khalifa's breast of closing with us. Although the rangewas longer, the central columns had been subjected to almost asdestructive a cannonading as the dervishes on Surgham's slopes got. Sofar it had been a gunner's day, and to the artillery in thepreliminary stages, if not--with one exception--in the later, belongedthe full honours of the fight. At length with one mind, banner-bearersand all, swiftly the dervish columns, remaining intact, faced to theleft, and moved behind the western hills. There was a pause, a respitefor some minutes, which their jehadieh and others left upon the fieldof battle profited by to crawl upon their stomachs to within 800 yardsless or more of the zereba, and open a sharp rifle fire upon us. Volley firing and shell firing dislodged many of them, but others keptpotting away, increasing our casualty returns, particularly in the1st, or Wauchope's brigade. Just then the battle broke out withgreater fury than ever. What happened in the dervish army may beguessed. Out of immediate danger and re-formed, the Khalifa and Yacoubdetermined upon a second attack. With a rush like a mountain torrentthree columns spouted from shallow ravines, and at a break-neck runcame forward. Part of Wad Melik's men uprose from the west sides ofSurgham, the Khalifa and Yacoub came upon us from the south-west, anda smaller body from the west. In half delirium and full frenzy onrushed the dervishes. Our guns, knowing the range to a nicety--forthey were able to see landmarks put down the day before--hurled atthem avalanches of shell. The vivid air blazed and shook, and thehail of Lee-Metfords cut, like mighty scythes, lanes in the columnsmassed ten-deep. Greater resolution and bravery no men ever possessed. In face of destruction and death they continued their wild race. Butthey were thinning or being thinned as they drew nearer. When about1100 yards away a body of horsemen, two hundred or so, the Khalifa'sown tribesmen, Taaisha Baggara, chiefs and Emirs, setting spurs totheir horses charged direct for the zereba. Cannon and Maxims smashedthem, infantry bullets beat against and pierced through them. At everystride their numbers diminished, horses and riders being literallyblown over or cut and thrown down. Undaunted a remnant held on towithin two or three hundred yards of Colonel Maxwell's line, where thelast of the gallant foemen tumbled and bit the dust. Partly encouragedby the self-sacrificing devotion of the horsemen, the footmenfollowed. The black flag was carried to within 900 yards of ColonelMaxwell's left. Learning from their earlier failure, the Khalifa's mendirected their attack upon the Egyptian troops. But the Britishdivision's cross-fire smote them, and the guns and Maxims knocked allcohesion out of their ranks. Still defiantly they set their standardsand died around them. Then I noted there were again signs of waveringamongst the main body, who were hanging back. The big black flag wasstuck in a heap of stones, and the more devoted sought to rally there. Abdullah himself and his chiefs endeavoured to collect the brokencolumns. It was attempted in the face of a bombardment that would haveshaken a city, and a fusilade that ought to have mown down everyblade of halfa-grass near. But Maxwell's men seemed not quite to getthe range. The flag and flagstaff were riddled with bullet holes, andthe dead were being piled around. Still, dervish after dervish sprangto uphold the black banner of Mahdism. A herculean black grasped thestaff in one hand, and leaned negligently against it for what appearedto be the space of five or ten minutes, --probably less than oneminute, --ere the soldiers managed to give him his final quietus. Thenit was that the remnant of the army of the Khalifa began to melt away. It was more than human nature could bear. The dense columns had shrunkto companies, the companies to driblets, which finally fled westwardto the hills, leaving the field white with jibbeh-clad corpses like alandscape dotted with snowdrifts. 

It was about eight o'clock, and the first action was virtually overand won. Good fortune, as the Sirdar admitted, had in many respectsattended him. With a trifling loss of a few hundred men he haddiscomfited and slain 10, 000 of the great dervish army. Presumably, Abdullah had lost the flower of his brave and devoted troops. Therewere yet a thousand or more of Jehadieh lying about under coverpotting at the zereba. Many of them shammed being wounded to getcloser to us. Sharp volleys and more shell-fire duly disposed of thosedetermined snipers. It was from that source, during the criticalstages of the battle when the infantry were stopping the Khalifa'scolumns, that our chief casualties occurred. Some of thesesharpshooters crept to within 800 yards of the British lines, and upto 400 yards from Maxwell's. It was from them that Captain Caldecottreceived his death-wound and the Cameron losses came. I could not butobserve the fact, as I walked and rode about behind the firing linesduring the action. Still, the battle of Omdurman has the right to beconsidered from the victor's point of view the safest action everfought. The Warwick loss in the first action was one officer killedand two men wounded; the Camerons, one man killed and two officers andeighteen men wounded--Colonel Money had two horses shot under him, asat the Atbara; the Seaforths had eighteen men wounded; and theLincolns ten men wounded. In General Lyttelton's brigade the GrenadierGuards had one officer, Captain Bagshot, and four men wounded; theNorthumberland Fusiliers had but one man wounded; the LancashireFusiliers four men wounded; and the Rifles six men wounded. 

CHAPTER XI. 

THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN--_Continued. _

THE CAVALRY FIGHTS--MACDONALD'S SAVING ACTION. 

Before I deal with the second phase of the battle, there is somethingmore to be said of the first. So far I have but written of theinfantry and the artillery. It is no easy task to give a succinctaccount of a whole catalogue of events happening at the same time overso widespread a field. The battle of Omdurman was full of incident andof Homeric combats. Whilst we in the zereba were awaiting, ready andconfident of the issue, the oncoming of the enemy, the two regimentsof Egyptian cavalry and the Camel Corps, which had advanced on theright to Um Mutragan hills, --South Kerreri jebels, --like the 21stLancers at El Surgham on the left were opposing the dervish advance. Their orders were to check the dervish left. The nine squadrons oftroopers with Colonel Broadwood remained on the plain, but the CamelCorps, seven companies, with four Maxims, and the horse battery wentup the west shoulder of one of the Um Mutragan hills. As the dervisheswere advancing very rapidly, the four Maxims under Captain Frankswere recalled into the zereba before they had fired a shot, or erethe mounted troops got into action. Three dismounted squadrons ofEgyptian troopers thereupon went forward and temporarily occupied theposition which had been assigned to the Maxims. The Camel Corps werealready afoot, and had lined the crest and slopes of the hill, waitingto fire as soon as the Mahdists came within range. When the bigcolumns of the dervishes, led by the Sheikh Ed Din, Khalifa Khalil andAli Wad Helu, approached nearer, Major Young's horse battery of sixguns began shelling them at 1500 yards range. The Camel Corps thenopened a sharp fusilade, and within a few minutes a brisk fight wasgoing on. But the enemy neither halted nor stayed in face of the fire. It only served to quicken their pace, and they ran forward shootingrapidly the while. An order was sent to the Camel Corps to retire atonce, as the dervishes were seen to be trying to cut them off byadvancing on both sides of the hill. Before the order carried byLieutenant Lord Tullibardine actually reached them, they had sufferedseverely and were falling back. A large number of men and camels hadbeen hit. The cavalry endeavoured to relieve the pressure. Ultimately, though hotly pressed by the dervishes who got to within a few hundredyards, the Horse Artillery and the Camel Corps took up a secondposition upon a ridge fully half a mile to the rear. From the zerebawe could see that the mounted troops were being hurried, and that theaction taking place was an exceedingly sharp one. In fact, before theguns and the Camel Corps got into position upon the second ridge, thedervishes were firing at them from the summit and slopes of UmMutragan. Major Young had only fired a round or two from his guns whenthe enemy were but 600 yards off. The dervishes were swarming alongthe eastern sides of Um Mutragan, running direct for the guns and theCamel Corps. Colonel Broadwood formed his cavalry up to charge, andMajor Mahan led his regiment of "Gippy" troopers forward. But adetachment of the Camel Corps under Captain Hopkinson pluckily stoodtheir ground, covering the retirement of their comrades and thebatteries down the very rough slope. Unfortunately, Captain Hopkinsonwas severely wounded, and a native officer and a number of men werekilled. Falling back along the east and north sides of the hill theforce was sorely pressed by the enemy, and a series of brave andbristling hand-to-hand encounters took place. Near the crest of ahill, one of the "wheelers" of the horse battery was shot. The tracescould not be cut in time, so the gun had to be abandoned. At thecritical moment another gun collided with it, and was upset beside thefirst, so both pieces, with, later on, a third, fell temporarily intothe dervishes' hands. They did nothing with them. Colonel Broadwood, on finding the enemy pushing so determinedly, as though they hadstruck the whole of the Sirdar's army, directed the Camel Corps toretire to the zereba. Luckily, two of the gunboats, getting sight andrange of the eager dervishes who were hunting the camelmen, beganfiring with every piece of armament they could bring to bear. Iassume they saved the situation, for the Camel Corps were hardpressed, and lost eighty men before they got to the river and into asafe position under the shelter of the gunboats and Macdonald'sbrigade, which was at the north end of the zereba. The myth of a CamelCorps as a useful fighting unit had been exploded. Meantime, ColonelBroadwood's troopers rode away to the north, trying to shake offoutflanking parties of dervishes. The Sheikh Ed Din and Khalilcontinued to pursue the cavalry with great eagerness and venom. Several times bodies of 200 and 300 Baggara horsemen threatened tocharge, but Majors Mahan and Le Gallias turning upon these riders sentthem flying back helter-skelter. For five miles the cavalry was, so tospeak, driven from pillar to post by the dervish infantry. When thepursuit had been pressed four miles, and more, north of the zereba, Major Mahan succeeded in clearing the flanks, whereupon the dervishesgave up the chase and sat down to rest. One advantage came of thehot-headed pursuit; it led two columns of the enemy away, and only aportion of those dervish commands got back in time to engage in theassault upon the zereba. 

When the Khalifa Abdullah, who escaped being killed, retired with hisshattered army after their futile attack behind the western hills alittle south of Um Mutragan, it was thought that the fighting spirithad been knocked out of the enemy. There was no assurance that if theSirdar and his men followed after the Khalifa the dervishes would riska second battle. They had the legs of us, and would presumably usethem to run away, or to harass us if we went after them into thewilderness. Discreetly and shrewdly the Sirdar decided to march hisarmy straight into Omdurman, but six miles distant. We were able tomove upon inside lines and over open ground, so that if the Khalifameant to race us for the place he would have to fight at adisadvantage. The command was issued about 8. 30 to prepare to marchout of camp for Omdurman. Our wounded, who had been borne from thefield on stretchers, were put upon the floating hospitals. ColonelCollinson's brigade was told off to guard stores and material to beleft behind for a time. Ammunition was drawn from the reserve storesafloat, and the supply columns' boxes were refilled, as well as thebattery limbers and the men's pouches. The army was again equipped foraction as though it had not fired a shot. Camels were reloaded, andall was in readiness for a start. We could see bodies of the enemystill flaunting their banners, and watching our every movement fromthe western hills. Wounded dervishes were crawling and draggingwearily back from their fated field towards Omdurman. There was theoccasional crack of a rifle as some dervish sniped us, or invited ashot from the Egyptian battalions. Many of our black soldiers actuallywept with vexation on being withdrawn from the firing line to makeroom for guns and Maxims. One man, who declared he had not fired ashot, was only comforted on being assured that the battle was notaltogether over, that his chance would come later. 

I think it was about 9 a. M. When the Sirdar's army, re-formed formarching, stepped clear of the zereba and the trenches. The order ofadvance for the infantry was as before, in échelon of brigades, theBritish being on the left and in front. Lyttelton's 2nd brigade wasleading, Wauchope's was behind it. On the right were Maxwell's andLewis's brigades. Macdonald was to look after our extreme right rearflank, whilst Collinson followed in the gap nearer the river. Lyttelton's brigade was directed to pass to the left, east of JebelSurgham, Maxwell's left was to extend to and pass over the hill, whilst Lewis and Macdonald would sweep part of the valley betweenSurgham and South Kerreri. Such was the general direction to be taken, exposing a front measured on the bias, of fully one mile. Once morethe 21st Lancers trotted out towards Jebel Surgham to make sure therewere no large bodies of the enemy in hiding. Keeping somewhat closerto the river than previously, and avoiding the main field of battle, they passed to the east of the hill. Part of their duty was to check, if possible, any attempt of the enemy to fall back into Omdurman, orat least delay such an operation. Great numbers of scattered dervisheswere seen, some of whom fired at the troopers. Keeping on until abouthalf a mile or more south of Surgham, a small party of dervishcavalry, about thirty, and what was thought to be a few footmen, wereseen hiding in a depression or khor. Colonel Martin determined to pushthe party back and interpose his regiment between them and Omdurman. Afew spattering shots came from the khor, as the four squadrons formedin line to charge. "A" squadron, under Major Finn, was on theright, next it was "B" squadron, commanded by Major Fowle. On the leftof "B" was "D, " or the made-up squadron, led by Captain Eadon, and "C"squadron, under Captain Doyne, was on the extreme left. 

[Illustration: A. 

GENERAL VIEW PLAN. 

MACDONALD'S FIGHT AND 21ST LANCERS' CHARGE. ]

Leading the regiment forward at a gallop from a point 300 yards away, the Lancers dashed at the enemy, who at once opened a sharp musketryfire upon our troopers. A few casualties occurred before the dervisheswere reached, but the squadrons closed in and setting the spurs intotheir horses rushed headlong for the enemy. In an instant it was seenthat, instead of 200 men, the 21st had been called upon to chargenearly 1500 fierce Mahdists lying concealed in a narrow, but in placesdeep and rugged, khor. In corners the enemy were packed nearly fifteendeep. Down a three-foot drop went the Lancers. There was a moment orso of wild work, thrusting of steel, lance, and sword, and rapidrevolver shooting. Somehow the regiment struggled through, and up thebank on the south side. Nigh a score of lances had been left indervish bodies, some broken, others intact. Lieutenant Wormwald made apoint at a fleeing Baggara, but his sabre bent and had to be laidaside. Captain Fair's sword snapped over dervish steel, and he flungthe hilt in his opponent's face. Major Finn used his revolver, missingbut two out of six shots. Colonel Martin rode clean through without aweapon in his hand. Then the regiment rallied 200 yards beyond theslope. Probably 80 dervishes had been cut or knocked down by theshock. But the few seconds' bloody work had been almost equallydisastrous for the Lancers. Lieutenant R. Grenfell and fifteen men hadbeen left dead in the khor. It so happened that the squadrons on thetwo wings had comparatively easy going and did not strike the densestgroups of the enemy. Squadrons "D" and "B" fared badly, andparticularly Lieutenant Grenfell's troop, of whom ten men fell withthat officer. In their front was a high rough bank of boulders, almostimpassable for a horse. They were cut down and hacked by the enemy. His brother, Lieutenant H. M. Grenfell, subsequently recovered hiswatch, which had been thrust through by a dervish lance point and hadstopped at 8. 40 a. M. Young Robert Grenfell was probably struck frombehind with a Mahdist sword blade, and killed instantly as his chargerwas endeavouring to scramble up the wall of loose stones and rock. Melées were taking place to right and left, every trooper having anydifficulty in getting out of the khor being instantly surrounded bymounted dervishes and footmen. Lieutenant Nesham in leading his troopwas savagely attacked. His helmet was cut off his head, and he waswounded severely upon the left forearm and right leg. The bridle reinsof his charger were cut, but he piloted the animal safely through. "B"and "D" squadrons lost respectively nine killed and eleven wounded, and seven killed and eight wounded. Lieutenant Molyneux, R. H. G. , hadhis horse knocked over. He called to a trooper not to leave him, andthe man replied, "All right, sir, I won't leave you. " Together theyhad a busy time. Two dervishes attacked the lieutenant; he shot one, but the other cut him over the right arm, causing him to drop hisrevolver. He then ran for it and got away. Lieutenants Brinton andPirie received wounds. Private Ives of "A" squadron picked up awounded comrade in the nullah, and got chased and separated from hisregiment. He reached the infantry covered with his comrade's blood. The latter was killed, but Ives was not seriously hurt. 

Lieutenant Montmorency, having got through safely, turned back to lookfor his troop-sergeant Carter. Captain Kenna went with him. At themoment they were not aware that young Grenfell had fallen. LieutenantsT. Connally and Winston Churchill also turned about to rescue twonon-commissioned officers of their respective troops. They succeededin their laudable task. Surgeon-Captain Pinches, whose horse had beenshot under him on the north side of the khor, was saved by the pluckof his orderly, Private Peddar, who brought him out on his horse. Meanwhile, Captain Kenna and Lieutenant Montmorency, who wereaccompanied by Corporal Swarbrick, saw Lieutenant Grenfell's body andtried to recover it. They fired at the dervishes with their revolvers, and drove them back. Dismounting, Montmorency and Kenna tried to liftthe body upon the lieutenant's horse. Unluckily, the animal tookfright and bolted. Swarbrick went after it. Major Wyndham, the secondin command of the Lancers, had his horse shot in the khor. He was oneof the few who escaped after such a calamity. The animal fortunatelycarried him across, up, and beyond the slope ere it dropped downdead. Lieutenant Smith, who was near, offered him a seat, and theMajor grasped the stirrup to mount. Just then--for these events havetaken longer in telling than in happening--Montmorency and Kenna foundthe dervishes pressing them hard, both being in instant danger ofbeing killed. Swarbrick had brought back the horse, and Kenna turnedto Major Wyndham and gave him a seat behind, then leaving Grenfell'sbody they rejoined their command. Proceeding about 300 yards to thesouth-east from the scene of the charge, Colonel Martin dismounted hiswhole regiment, and opened fire upon the dervishes. Getting intoposition where his men could fire down the khor, a detachment oftroopers soon drove away the last of the enemy. Thereupon a partyadvanced and recovered the bodies of Lieutenant Grenfell and theothers who had fallen in the khor. 

[Illustration: B. 

THE ZAREBA BEFORE THE BATTLE. ]

It was a daring, a great feat of arms for a weakened regiment of 320men to charge in line through a compact body of 1500 dervish footmen, packed in a natural earthwork. Perhaps it is even a more remarkablefeat that they were able to cut their way through with only a loss of22 killed and 50 officers and men wounded and 119 casualties inhorseflesh. Many of the poor beasts only lived long enough to carrytheir riders out of the jaws of death. One cannot refuse to admire thegallant deed, which probably had as good an effect upon the enemy as abigger victory of our arms; but the obvious comment will be that madeabout the Balaclava charge--equally heroic, and not, I honestly think, less useful--"C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre. " Onsearching the ground inside the khor sixty dead dervishes were foundwhere the central squadrons passed over. A small heap lay aroundLieutenant Grenfell and his troop. Four of our men were found alive, but died before they could be moved. A sword-cut had cleft youngGrenfell's head and given him a painless death. The bodies were, asusual, full of sword-cuts and spear-thrusts inflicted by the enemybefore and after the victims had breathed their last. 

EGYPTIAN HEROISM. 

[Illustration: MACDONALD'S BRIGADE ADVANCING. ]

It is a long tale I am telling, but yet the most brilliant and heroicepisode of a day so full of glowing incident remains to be told. About9. 20 a. M. The Sirdar led his troops slowly forward towards Omdurman. Great as the slaughter had been, thousands of dervishes could be seenstill watching us from the western hills. Behind them they hadre-formed again into compact divisions. The Sirdar's direction, I havesaid, was that his troops were to swing clear of the zereba and marchin échelon with the 2nd British brigade leading Moving out a fewhundred yards, Lyttelton's brigade, which, as before, marched in fourparallel columns of battalions, the Guards on the right, swung to theleft. They were making to pass Surgham, leaving it upon their right. The 1st British brigade, Major-General Wauchope's, was behind, and hadturned to the left to follow the 2nd brigade. Behind, in succession, were Maxwell's, Lewis's, and Macdonald's Egyptian or Khedivialbrigades. The nature of the ground forced some of them out of theirtrue relative positions. Macdonald had marched out due west. Thedervishes, like wolves upon the scent for prey, suddenly sprang fromunexpected lairs. With swifter feet and fiercer courage than ever theydashed for the comparatively isolated brigade of Colonel Macdonald. Although I was far away at the moment with the 1st or Lyttelton'sbrigade, the shouts, the noise of the descending tornado reached methere. From behind the southern slope of Um Mutragan hills the Khalifawas charging Macdonald with an intact column of 12, 000 men, thebanner-bearers and mounted Emirs again in the forefront. A broadstream, running from the south and the east, of dervishes who had lainhidden sprang up and ran to strike in upon the south-east corner ofMacdonald's brigade. Worse still, Sheikhs Ed Din and KhalifaKhalil, returned from chasing the Egyptian cavalry, were hasteningwith their division at full speed to attack him in rear. Scarcely asoul in the Sirdar's army, from the leader down, but saw theunexpected singular peril of the situation. I turned to a friend andsaid, "Macdonald is in for a terrible time. Will any get out of it?"Then I rode at a gallop, disregarding the venomous dervishes hangingabout, up the slopes of Surgham, where, spread like a picture, thescene lay before me. Prompt in execution, the Sirdar rapidly issuedorders for the artillery and Maxims to open fire upon the Khalifa'sbig column. Eagerly he watched the batteries coming into action. Atthe same moment the remaining brigades were wheeled to face west, andMajor-General Wauchope's was sent back at the double to help thestaunch battalions of Colonel Macdonald, now beset on all sides. Fortunately Macdonald knew his men thoroughly, for he had had thetraining of all of them, the 9th, 10th, 11th Soudanese, and the 2ndEgyptians under Major Pink. No force could have been in time to savethem had they not fought and saved themselves. Lewis's brigade wasnearest, but it was almost a mile away, and the dervishes were wont tomove so that ordinary troops seemed to stand still. And Lewis, forreasons of his own, determined to remain where he was. 

[Illustration: SIRDAR DIRECTING ADVANCE ON OMDURMAN. ]

[Illustration: C. 

PLATE I. 

MACDONALD'S BRIGADE. 

FIRST ATTACK. KHALIFA'S DIVISION. ]

Indecision or flurry would have totally wrecked Macdonald's brigade, but happily their brigadier well knew his business. An order was senthim which, had it been obeyed, would have ensured inevitable disasterto the brigade, if not a catastrophe to the army. He was bade toretire by, possibly, his division commander. Macdonald knew betterthan attempt a retrograde movement in the face of so fleet and daringa foe. It would have spelled annihilation. The sturdy Highlandmansaid, "I'll no do it. I'll see them d----d first. We maun just fight. "And meanwhile Major-General A. Hunter was scurrying to hurry upreinforcements--a wise measure. Other messages which could not reachMacdonald in time were being sent to him by the Sirdar to try and holdon, that help was coming. Yes; but the surging dervish columns wereconverging upon the brigade upon three sides. Surely it would beengulfed and swept away was the fear in most minds. And what otherwreck would follow? Ah! that could wait for answer. It was a crucialmoment. A single Khedivial brigade was going to be tested in a wayfrom which only British squares had emerged victorious. Mostfortunately, Colonel Long, R. A. , had sent three batteries to accompanyColonel Macdonald's brigade, namely, Peake's, Lawrie's, and deRougemont's. The guns were the handy and deadly Maxim-Nordenfeldt(12˝-pounders). Macdonald had marched out with the 11th Soudanese onhis left, the 2nd Egyptian, under Major Pink, in the centre, and the10th Soudanese on the right, all being in line. Behind the 10th, incolumn, were the 9th Soudanese. Major Walter commanded the 9th, MajorNason the 10th, and Major Jackson the 11th Soudanese battalions. Goingforward to meet the Khalifa's force Colonel Macdonald threw hiswhole brigade practically into line, disregarding for the moment theassaulting columns of Sheikh Ed Din, which providentially were alittle behind in the attack. The batteries went to the front inopenings between the battalions and smote the faces of the dervishcolumns. Steadily the infantry fired, the blacks in their own petfashion independently, the 2nd Egyptians in careful, well-aimedvolleys. Afar we could see and rejoice that the brigade was giving amagnificent account of itself. The Khalifa's dervishes were beinghurled broadcast to the ground. Major Williams at last with his15-pounders, our other batteries, and the Maxims were finding therange and ripping into shreds the solid lines of dervishes. Still theenemy pressed on, their footmen reaching to within 200 yards ofMacdonald's line. Scores of Emirs and lesser leaders, with spearmenand swordsmen, fell only a few feet from the guns and the unshakenKhedivial infantry. It is said one or two threw spears across theindomitable soldiery, and other dervishes turned the flanks, but wereinstantly despatched. A few salvoes and volleys shook the looserattacking columns of dervishes. The Khalifa's division had at lengthreceived such a surfeit of withering fire that the rear lines began tohold back, and the desperate rushes of the chiefs and their personalretainers grew fewer and feebler. But Sheikh Ed Din was at lengthwithin 1000 yards running with his confident legions to encompass anddestroy the 1st Khedivial brigade. Macdonald, as soon as he saw thathe could hold his own against the whole array of the Khalifa'spersonally commanded divisions, threw back his right, the 9th, and oneand then another battery. He was now fairly beset on all sides, butfighting splendidly, doggedly. The dervishes, taking fresh courage, made redoubled efforts to destroy him. It was by far the finest, themost heroic struggle of the day. A second battalion, the famousfighting 11th Soudanese, under Jackson, which lost so heavily atAtbara, swung round and interposed itself to Khalil's and Sheikh EdDin's fierce followers. Furious as was the blast of lead and iron, thedervishes had all but forged in between the 9th and 11th battalions, when the 2nd Egyptian, wheeling at the double, filled the gap. Withouthesitation the fellaheen, let it be said, stood their ground, and, full of confidence, called to encourage each other, and gave shot andbayonet point to the few more truculent dervishes who, escaping shotand shell, dashed against their line. 

[Illustration: D. 

PLATE II. 

MACDONALD'S BRIGADE. 

SECOND ATTACK. SHEIKH ED DIN'S MEN. ]

It was a tough, protracted struggle, but Colonel Macdonald was slowly, determinedly, freeing himself and winning all along the line. TheCamel Corps came out to his assistance, and formed up some distanceoff on the right of the 11th Soudanese. Shells and showers of bulletsfrom the Maxims on the gunboats drove back the rear lines of Sheikh EdDin's men. Three battalions of Wauchope's got up to assist incompleting the rout of the Khalifa. The Lincolns, doubling to theright, got in line on the left of the Camel Corps, and assisted infinishing off the retreating bands of the Khalifa's son. I then sawthe dervishes for the first time in all those years of campaignsturn tail, stoop, and fairly run for their lives to the shelter ofthe hills. It was a devil-take-the-hindmost race, and the only one Iever saw them engage in through half a score of battles. Beyond allelse the double honours of the day had been won by Colonel Macdonaldand his Khedivial brigade, and that without any help that need beweighed against the glory of his single-handed triumph. He achievedthe victory entirely off his own bat, so to speak, proving himself atactician and a soldier as well as what he has long been known to be, the bravest of the brave. I but repeat the expressions in everybody'smouth who saw the wonderful way in which he snatched success from whatlooked like certain disaster. The army has a hero and a thoroughsoldier in Macdonald, and if the public want either they need seek nofarther. I know that the Sirdar and his staff fully recognised thenature of the service he rendered. A non-combatant general officer whowitnessed the scene declared one might see 500 battles and never suchanother able handling of men in presence of an enemy. When the finalrout of the dervishes had been achieved it was about 10 a. M. TheSirdar wheeled his brigades to the left, into their original position, and marched them straightway towards Omdurman. Passing slowly over thebattle-field the awful extent of the carnage was made evident. In myfirst wires I insisted that our total casualties were about 500, andthe enemy's over 10, 000 slain. Macdonald lost about 128 men. Isubsequently ascertained that the total of our killed and wounded wasabout 524. The dervish killed certainly numbered over 15, 000, andtheir wounded probably as many more. Mahdism had been more than"smashed, " it had been all but extirpated. So may all plagues end. 

[Illustration: KHALIFA'S CAPTURED STANDARD (SIRDAR EXTREME LEFT). ]

On the march the British troops having to swing aside from where theKhalifa's black flag still stood, it fell into the hands of anEgyptian brigade, and was conveyed to the Sirdar by Captain Sir HenryRawlinson and Major Lord Edward Cecil. It was given to an Egyptianorderly to carry behind the headquarters staff. Unfortunately, itattracted the attention of some of our own people on the gunboats whowere unaware it had been captured. Several rounds were fired at thesupposed dervishes following it, and then it was discreetly furled fora time. By midday the army had arrived at the northern outskirts ofOmdurman, where the troops were halted near the Nile to obtain foodand water. I rode forward and saw that there were thousands ofdervishes in the town, many of them Baggara. The cavalry were sent asspeedily as possible, after watering and feeding the horses, towardsthe south side of the town, and the gunboats were ordered up theriver. Several deputations of citizens, Greeks and natives, came outand saw Slatin Pasha and the Sirdar. It was stated that the peoplewould surrender, and that there would be no difficulty in occupyingthe place. The Khalifa, it was said, was in his house and must yield. Slatin Pasha, by the way, had gone over the battle-field andidentified many of the slain Emirs. At 4. 20 p. M. , with two batteries, several Maxims and Colonel Maxwell's brigade leading, the Sirdar rodedown the great north thoroughfare towards the central part of thesqualid town. The houses, or more accurately huts, were full ofdervishes, hundreds of whom were severely wounded. Women and childrenflocked into the streets, raising cries of welcome to us. Of all thevile, dirty places on earth, Omdurman must rank first. There was noeffort at sanitary observances, and dead animals, camels, horses, donkeys, dogs, goats, sheep, cattle, in all stages of putrefaction, lay about the streets and lanes. There were dead men, women, andchildren, too, lying in the open. 

[Illustration: CHIEF THOROUGHFARE, OMDURMAN. 

(MULAZIM WALL, LEFT. OSMAN DIGNA'S HOUSE, RIGHT. )]

[Illustration: EFFECT OF SHELL FIRE UPON WALL (MULAZIM ENCLOSURE). ]

We passed the big rectangular stone wall enclosing the Khalifa'sspecial quarters. Within its area were his Mulazimin or body-guards'quarters, his granaries, treasuries, arsenal, the Mahdi's tomb, andthe great praying square, misnamed the Mosque. Except the tomb, theKhalifa's and his sons' houses, the town was void of buildings of anystyle or finish. I admit the great stone wall was of good masonry, andso was the well-finished praying-square wall. The Sirdar and partywere frequently shot at, particularly on nearing the Khalifa'squarters. Abdullah slipped out with his treasures as the Sirdararrived at his gate. It was long after sunset and dark when, withdifficulty, the prison was reached, and Charles Neufeld brought outof his loathsome den, where he had spent eleven years in chains. Helooked well, notwithstanding his long and irksome captivity, feeling, as he said, like a man drunk with new wine, on account of his release. That night I helped to relieve him from his fetters, freeing the limbsfrom the heavy bar and chains. Tired, worn out, without water or food, the Sirdar and his staff, as well as many more of us, were glad toescape out of Omdurman back to where the British camp was pitched inthe northern outskirts. There I and others lay down and fell asleep onthe bare desert, hoping to wake and find that our servants andbaggage had turned up. Two of my colleagues had fared worse than Ithat day. Colonel F. Rhodes, of the _Times_, had been shot in theshoulder within the zereba early in the fight, and the Hon. HubertHoward, of the _New York Herald_, was killed almost under my eyes, inthe paved courtyard of the Khalifa, opposite the Mahdi's tomb. Such isthe hasty record of as exciting and interesting a battle and a day'scampaigning as it ever fell to mortal man to witness. Neither in myexperience nor in my reading can I recall so strange and picturesque aseries of incidents happening within the brief period of twelvehours. 

CHAPTER XII. 

STORIES OF THE BATTLE--OMDURMAN. 

There are numberless incidents and details remaining untold of thegreat battle and the fall of Omdurman. So singular and interesting anaction is almost without parallel. "That villainous gunpowder" offormer days was so sparingly used in the fight by the Sirdar's armythat every part of the battle-field could be plainly seen. In thefirst stage the heaviest firing was by the British; the Lee-Metfordswith cordite made little or no smoke. Maxwell's men of the Khedivialarmy, with their Martini-Henrys, never fired so fast as to cause anythick white cloud to shut out the view and hang between them and theenemy. Lewis's and Macdonald's brigades were never very heavilyengaged whilst the troops remained zerebaed. Perhaps it was the lightsouth wind which blew the men's rifle smoke behind us at once, butthat was not what I thought. There seemed to be none to blow away. Irecall that in the thick of the battle of Tamai with Davis's square, and at Abu Klea, the smoke cloud that hung like a curtain before oureyes was a source of danger. Save for the erratic, occasional whizzingof the enemy's bullets, the thud of a hit and the dropping, welteringin his blood, of a man here and there, watched from our firing linesthe combat enlisted and fascinated the attention with barely asuggestion of danger to the onlooker. Few will ever see again so greatand brave a show. A vast army, with a front of three miles, coveringan undulating plain--warriors mounted and afoot, clad in quaint andpicturesque drapery, with gorgeous barbaric display of banners, burnished metal, and sheen of steel--came sweeping upon us with thespeed of cavalry. Half-a-dozen batteries smote them, a score of Maximsand 10, 000 rifles unceasingly buffeted them, making great gaps andrending their ranks in all directions. With magnificent courage, without pause, the survivors invariably drew together, furiously, frenziedly running to cross steel with us. Their ardour and maddevotion won admiration on all sides in our own ranks. Poor, misguidedJehadieh and hocussed Arabs of the spacious and cruel Soudan! Withsuch troops disciplined and trained by English officers the policingof Africa would be an easy affair. Try and try as they did, they couldnot moving openly pass through our blasts of fire. Some few there werewho got by subtler means to within 600 yards of the British front and200 yards from Maxwell's blacks, there to yield their lives. 

Among the earliest, if not the first man, wounded in the zereba on 2ndSeptember was Corporal Mackenzie, of "C" Company Seaforth Highlanders. About 6. 10 a. M. He was hit in the leg by a ricochet. The wound wasdressed, and Mackenzie stuck to his post. At 6. 30 a. M. , when theaction was almost in full swing, as Private Davis and Corporal Taylor, R. A. M. C. , were carrying a wounded soldier upon a stretcher to thedressing hospital, Davis was shot through the head and killed, andTaylor was severely wounded in the shoulder. 

Whilst our batteries were hurling death and destruction from thezereba at the Khalifa's army, Major Elmslie's battery of 50-pounderhowitzers was battering the Mahdi's tomb to pieces and breaching thegreat stone wall in Omdurman. The practice with the terrible Lydditeshells was better than before, and the dervishes, even more clearlythan we, must have seen from the volcanic upheavals when the missilesstruck, that their capital was being wrecked. It must have beensomething of a disillusion to many of them to note that the sacredtomb of their Mahdi was suffering most of all from the infidels' fire. Several of the gunboats assisted in the bombardment, but their chiefduty was to drive all bodies of the enemy away from the river. MajorElmslie threw altogether some 410 Lyddite shells into Omdurman. Mostof them detonated, but there were a few that merely flared. It was thefumes from these that imparted a chrome colour to the surroundingearth and stonework. Why the Khalifa did not make greater use of hisartillery and musketry became more of a puzzle than ever when we sawhow well provided he was in both respects. He had a battery ofexcellent big Krupps that were never fired, besides eight or tenmachine guns. As for rifles, his men must have carried at least 25, 000into action against us. Had they employed these in "sniping" as atAbu Kru, the Sirdar would have had to march out and attack them. 

The victory of Omdurman owed much to the masterly serving of theartillery. Even in Macdonald's severely contested action, the threebatteries of Maxim-Nordenfeldt 12˝-pounders did much to save thesituation. These were Peake's, Lawrie's, and de Rougemont's, with, inthe latter part of the fight, three Krupp guns of the horse artillery. The Camel Corps also brought up two Maxims to help at the close of thebattle to repulse Sheikh Ed Din. Macdonald handled his guns assuperbly as he did his infantry. At the Atbara against Mahmoud, thelight powerful Maxim-Nordenfeldts had proved that they could besuccessfully fought side by side with infantry. Between the battalionintervals, therefore, the dauntless gunners stood firing point-blankat the dervish columns. Throughout the battle Major Williams' 32ndField Battery, R. A. , fired 420 rounds. Three of the Maxim-Nordenfeldtbatteries (all Egyptian) fired 100 rounds per gun, whilst MajorLawrie's battery, No. 4 Egyptian, also Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns, firedover that number, or 900 rounds in all. All these batteries were ofsix guns each. Captain Smeaton fired from his six Maxims, stationed inthe zereba south-east corner, 54, 000 rounds. One of the wants muchfelt by the gunners was the need of more shrapnel during the action. Twice at least the allowance supply was temporarily exhausted. Yet itis not to be assumed on that account that the reserve ammunition wasdifficult to be got at or that the firing lines were insufficientlyfed. The arrangements in these respects were admirable. During thezereba action, the Grenadier Guards fired the largest number ofrounds. The Camerons fired 34 rounds per man. Five companies of theLincolns in the firing line, 32 rounds each man. The NorthumberlandFusiliers fired in all 1200 rounds, and the Lancashire Fusiliers 400rounds. 

Many of our wounded were hit with bullets from elephant guns, brasscased Mausers, Remingtons, and repeating rifles. The great majority ofthe dervishes carried Remingtons, and these, as a rule, were inpassably good condition. Probably they were officers or crack shotsamong the Jehadieh and Arabs that fired into the zereba with the smallbore Mausers. Most of their shooting was too high, though thedirection was right enough. When the first phase of the action ceasedat 8. 30 a. M. , hundreds, if not thousands of wounded dervishes upon thefield rose and moved away. Some of these were seen going back towardsOmdurman, others walked towards the west to rejoin their friends. Noattempt was made on our side to molest them, the order to "cease fire"having been given. It was either then or a little earlier that thelarge body of natives, possibly camp followers, behind the Khalifa'sforce, melted away, flowing back to the town. At that time some of ourarmy camp followers, or servants, went forward from the zereba to pickup trophies from the field. A party of four went towards a small groupof dead dervishes lying about 300 yards on the left front of Maxwell'sbrigade. I noticed them picking up spears and swords. A correspondentrode out to join them, Mr Bennett Stanford, who was formerly in the"Royals. " In company with another colleague I rode out from theBritish lines to join him, curious to see the effect of our fire. Atthe moment a dervish arose, apparently unwounded, and spear in handcharged the servants, who incontinently bolted back to the zereba. Mycompanion also turned back, but I was yet over 200 yards away, and sorode forward. One of the men attacked by the dervish was a nativenon-commissioned officer. He had followed the others out. Droppingupon his knee he aimed at the dervish, but his Martini-Henry missedfire. He fired again and missed, then, the dervish being very nearhim, ran for the zereba. Mr Bennett Stanford, who was splendidlymounted, with a cocked four-barrelled Lancaster pistol aimeddeliberately at the dervish, who turned towards him. Waiting till thejibbeh-clad warrior was but a score of paces or so off, Mr Stanfordfired, and appeared to miss also, for the dervish without halt rushedat him, whereupon he easily avoided him, riding off. Then the dervishturned to the soldier who, encumbered with his rifle, did not runswiftly. By that time I had drawn up so as to interpose between them, passing beyond the dervish. I pulled up my rather sorry nag--my bestwas for carrying despatches--and took deliberate aim. The dervishturned upon me as I wished. I fired and believe hit him, and as myhorse was jibbing about fired a second shot from my revolver with lesssuccess, then easily got out of the dervish's reach. He had a heavyspear and showed no sign of throwing it as I rode away, keeping wellout of his reach. The camp followers by then were all safe, and so wasthe native soldier, Mr Dervish having the field very much to himself. Thereupon an A. D. C. , Lieutenant Smyth, came galloping out and ridinghard past, fired at the fellow but missed. Checking his horseLieutenant Smyth wheeled it about, and he and the dervish collided. The man, who by this time appeared somewhat weak, grabbed theLieutenant and strove to drive his lance into him. With greathardihood Lieutenant Smyth fired his revolver in the dervish's face, killing him instantly. It was a wondrous narrow escape for theLieutenant. The instant afterwards I asked him if he had been badlywounded, but he declared that he was untouched, a statement I couldscarcely credit, and so repeated my question in another form, toreceive a similar answer. In the excitement of the moment he no doubtdid not feel the slight spear wound he actually received upon the arm, which saved him from the thrust aimed at his body. An examination ofthe dead dervish showed he had received four bullet wounds. 

The following is a brief and well-balanced account of the charge ofthe Lancers furnished me by an officer who was present:--"We movedalong to the left--_i. E. _, east of Surgham--following up the enemy onthat flank. Our object was to prevent them retiring into Omdurman or, at any rate, delay their retreat. A body of dervishes were seencrouching not far off to the right. Colonel Martin determined to pushthe enemy back and interpose between them and the town. The regiment, of four squadrons, was wheeled into line. When 300 yards off westarted to charge, and were met by a heavy musketry fire from theenemy. At first it was ill-directed, but very soon casualties occurredin our ranks from it. Instead of a few dervishes, we tumbled upon over500 hidden in a fold of the ground. They were in a khor, or nullah, into which we had to drop, and they lined it twenty deep in places. Our weight, however, carried us through. The dervishes, when we struckthem, did not break, but "bunched" together, showing no fear ofcavalry. There was half a minute's hacking, cutting, spearing, andshooting in all directions; then we cleared them, and rallied on thefar side. Halting about 300 yards off, men were dismounted, and weopened a sharp fire from our carbines on the enemy, driving them tothe westward in ten minutes. The charge was really successful in itsobject, as the retirement from that part of the field into Omdurmanwas stopped. We left perhaps sixty dervishes on the field in thecharge, and killed about 100 more with our subsequent fire. " Thedervish leader who was sitting on a fine black Dongolawi horse waskilled in the melée. A trooper met him in the khor and ran him throughwith his spear. 

By far the finest feature of that morning of battles was the actionfought by Colonel Macdonald with his brigade. The dervish forces thatsought to crush him numbered fully 20, 000 men. To oppose them he hadbut four battalions, or in all less than 3000 Soudanese and Egyptiansoldiers. With a tact, coolness, and hardihood I have never seenequalled, Colonel Macdonald manoeuvred and fought his men. Theyresponded to his call with confidence and alacrity begotten of longacquaintance and implicit faith in their leader. He had led several ofthe battalions through a score of fierce fights and skirmishes, alwaysemerging and covering himself and his men with glory, honour andvictory. All of them knew him, they were proud of him, and reposedimplicit confidence in their general. Unmistakably the Khalifa and hisson, the Sheikh Ed Din, thought that their fortunate hour hadcome--that, in detail, they would destroy first Macdonald, then one byone the other Khedivial brigades. What might have been, had father andson arrived at the same time and distance on both sides of Macdonald, as they evidently intended, I will not venture to discuss. Happily theonslaughts of the wild, angry dervishes did not quite synchronise, andColonel Macdonald was able to devote virtually his whole firingstrength to the overthrow of the Khalifa's division ere rapidlyturning about first one then another of his battalions to deal withthe Sheikh Ed Din's unbroken columns. The enemy on both sides got veryclose in, hundreds of them being killed almost at the feet of the menof the 1st Khedivial brigade. Dervish spears were thrown into and overthe staunch and unyielding Soudanese and Fellaheen soldiery. Peake's, Lawrie's, and de Rougemont's batteries stood their ground, side byside with the infantry, never wavering, firing point-blank upon thedervish masses. Majors Jackson, Nason, and Walter were, as usual, proud of the steadiness of their blacks--the 11th, 10th, and 9thbattalions--whilst Major Pink, of the 2nd Egyptian, was elated withthe stout way his soldiers doubled, wheeled, and at a critical momentrushed to fill up a gap near one of the batteries. The "Gippies"looked without flinching straight into the eyes of the dervishes, andfired volleys that would have done credit to a British regiment. Thehulking, physically strong "Fellah" had at last taken the measure ofhis enemy, and meant to prove himself the better man of the two. Andhe did--delighted with himself and his comrades, calling to them, chiding the dervishes, and stepping out of the ranks to meet theonrush of those of the enemy who came near, to stop it with bullet orbayonet. But chief of all was Macdonald, going hither and thither andissuing his orders as if on parade, with a sharp snap to each command. Two armies saw it all, and one at least admired his intrepid valour. One hundred black-flag Taaisha, the Khalifa's own Baggara tribesmenand part of his body-guard, charged impetuously. Spurring their horsesto their utmost speed leading the footmen, down they came straight forthe brigade. Cannon, Maxims, and rifles roared, and, bold as theTaaisha rode, neither horse nor man lived to get within one hundredyards of our Soudanese and Gippies. Steady as a gladiator, with whatto some of us looked like inevitable disaster staring him in the face, Colonel Macdonald fought his brigade for all it was worth. He quicklymoved upon the best available ground, formed up, wheeled about, andstood to die or win. He won practically unaided, for the pinch was allbut over when the Camel Corps, hurrying up, formed upon his right, after he had faced about to receive the Sheikh Ed Din's onslaught. TheLincolns, who arrived later on, helped to hasten the flight of theenemy, whose repulse was assured ere they or any of Wauchope's brigadewere within 1200 yards of Macdonald. Lewis's brigade were not evenable to assist so much, and such outside help as came in time to be ofuse was in the first instance from the guns of Major Williams' andanother battery, and the Maxims upon the left near Surgham hurriedforward by the Sirdar himself, as I saw. General Hunter came over tothe headquarters-staff galloping to get assistance, and rode back withWauchope's brigade, which doubled for a considerable distance, soserious was the situation and nervous the tension of that thrillingten minutes. Had the brilliant, the splendid deed of arms wrought byMacdonald been done under the eyes of a sovereign, or in some otherarmies, he had surely been created a General on the spot. If thepublic are in search of the real hero of the battle of Omdurman therehe is, ready made--one who committed no blunder to be redeemed bycourageous conduct afterwards. He boldly exercised his right ofpersonal judgment in a moment of extreme peril, and the result amplyjustified the soundness of his decision. 

It was about 11. 50 a. M. When the Sirdar wheeled his army about toresume the march upon Omdurman. The dervishes who had escapedslaughter had bent their bodies and run from the fatal field, goingfar off behind the western range of hills. Moving slowly and inéchelon, as when we first set out, we passed over part of thebattle-field. Groups of unwounded dervishes, who insisted on fightingand sniping the troops, had to be dealt with as well as all others whopersisted in being truculent. Like everybody else at the head of thecolumn, I was shot at repeatedly. All of the enemy, however, whoshowed the least disposition to surrender were left unmolested. Hundreds of dervishes who had been wounded hobbled on in front of ourarmy. We could see the Khalifa's forces behind the hills watching usand streaming upon a parallel line towards Omdurman. But the dervisheswere no longer in compact military array or ranged in division underchiefs. They were mostly scattered in small groups and bands spreadover a very wide area. It was a rabble, and had lost semblance ofbeing an army with power of concerted action. When Macdonald's fightwas over, the Egyptian cavalry under Colonel Broadwood returned andformed up near the camelry. They, with the Camel Corps, moved forwardon the right as before during the final advance upon the Khalifa'scapital. Men and horses had done a week of the hardest kind of work, but both were yet willing and full of spirit. As for the 21st Lancers, the few mounts remaining fit for work scarcely counted as a cavalryforce. The gunboats and the infantry saw to our left, which was notdifficult, for upon that hand the country was quite bare. About 2 p. M. The army reached the northern outskirts of Omdurman, the Britishdivision upon the left. Gatacre's men were nearest the Nile, Maxwelland Lewis being almost opposite one of the main thoroughfares of thetown. A halt for water--the great necessity--food, and rest wasordered. Parties were instantly detailed to fill water-bottles andfantasses, iron tanks. The cooks, too, got to work, and fires werekindled with wood torn from neighbouring huts, and a meal wasprepared. Under the burning sunshine, down upon the loose dirt andgravel, officers and men sprawled to rest themselves. There was a verymuddy creek or inset near, and thither went thousands, parched withthirst, to drink, not hesitatingly but gulping down copious draughtsof water, tough and thick as from a clay puddle. I wandered with myhorse a little way into the town, and ultimately down towards the mainstream of the Nile, where the water was cleaner and cooler than by thehalting-place. There were plenty of dervishes to be seen about, looking from lanes and walls, but they were far from beingparticularly aggressive at that part of the town. Indeed, severallarge groups of men, Arabs and negroes, came up bearing white rags onsticks in front of them. I went forward and met parties of them, andadvised them to go into the British lines, where the soldiers wouldreceive them as friends. Watering my horse, I let him feed on grass bythe river's brink, filled my water-bottle, and then returned by acircuitous route. The natives were not all inclined to be friendly, for a few preferred shooting at the stranger. But their practice wasvery bad. 

Returning to where the troops still lay, I found that a fresh movementwas afoot. Report had been brought that hundreds of lesser sheikhs andleaders were in the town ready to surrender with their followers iftheir lives would be spared. The assurance sought was quickly conveyedto them. Slatin Pasha, who had been indefatigable on the battle-field, watching the course of events and locating the commands of the variousimportant dervish chiefs, had received news that the Khalifa was stillin the town. The Pasha, on passing over the field, had searched aroundthe black flag and other noted leaders' banners to see who lay there. In the heaped dead about the Khalifa's flag he had seen Yacoub, Abdullah's brother, and many more leaders, but the arch head ofMahdism, the Sheikh Ed Din and Osman Digna were nowhere to be found. Amongst the dead Emirs identified were Osman Azrak, leader of thecavalry, Wad el Melik, Ali Wad Helu, Yunis, Ibrahim Khalil, Mahmoud'sbrother, el Fadl, Osman Dekem, Zaki Ferar, Abu Senab, Mousa Zacharia, and Abd el Baki. The Khalifa had come into action riding a horse. Asthat did not suit him he changed for a camel and, finding the latterposition too dangerously conspicuous, rode off the field ondonkey-back. Perhaps the most concise summing up of the battle fellfrom a "Tommy's" lips: "Them dervishes are good uns, and no mistake. They came on in thousands on thousands to lay us out, but we shiftedthem fast enough. "

It was not quite four o'clock, afternoon. Slatin Pasha had got newsfrom former friends that the fugitives and townspeople would gladlysurrender, so the sooner the Sirdar marched in and took possession thebetter. True, the Khalifa with several hundreds of followers, ormayhap a thousand or more, was yet within the central part ofOmdurman. Most of his Jehadieh, it was urged, would give in at once ifan opportunity were afforded them, and Abdullah could be caught. WithMaxwell's brigade, Major Williams' battery and several Maxims, theSirdar and headquarters staff pushed along the wide thoroughfare thatleads from the north past the west end of the great rectangular wall, towards the Mosque inclosure and Mahdi's tomb. The infantry, guns, andMaxims preceded but a few paces in front. Vile beyond description wasOmdurman, its dwellings, streets, lanes, and spaces. Beasts pay moreregard to sanitation than dervishes. Pools of slush and stagnant waterabounded. Dead animals in all stages of decomposition lay there inhundreds and thousands. There were besides littering the place camels, horses, donkeys, dead and wounded fresh from the battle-field. Andthere were many other ghastly sights. Dead and wounded dervishes layin pools of blood in the roadway. Several of the dying enemy grimlysaluted the staff as we passed. An Emir who, horribly mauled by ashell, lay pinned under his dead horse waved his hand and fell back acorpse. Our guns and Maxims had opened once or twice to turn the armedfugitives from the town. The compounds and huts were full of woundedand unwounded dervishes, most of the latter having Remingtons andwaist-belts full of cartridges, besides carrying spears and swords. In the open thoroughfares there were many bodies of women and childrenlying stark and stiff. The majority of these victims were young girls. Many of the poor creatures had evidently been running towards theriver to try and escape when caught and killed by jealous and cruelmasters or husbands. The scenes were shocking, the smells abominableand quite overpowering to many who sought to ride in with the General. 

There was something like a reception for the Sirdar on his enteringthe town. The women and children, mostly slaves, filled thethoroughfares, and in their peculiar guinea-fowl cackling fashioncheered the troops. Notables in jibbehs, which they had not yet hadtime to turn inside out, as nearly every native did afterwards, cameand salaamed, smote their breasts, and kissed the hands and even thegarments' hem of the Sirdar and his staff. In truly Oriental fashionthey completed the ceremonial of obeisance and fealty by throwing dustupon their already frowsy enough heads. It was curious to watch thevarious recognitions extended to Slatin, and how the latter did notforget his old friends, who had been kind to him, or his Easternmanners in exchanging courtesies. When they realised that we were notcannibals, which they did very quickly, and that the Khalifa andothers must have deceived them, they ran about amongst the troops. Itwas with difficulty at times the ranks were kept clear of them. OurWestern leniency surprised them. The Sirdar shook hands with certainof the notables, including several of the Greeks and Jaalin. One ofthe most extraordinary incidents was the appearance of the Khalifa'sown band with drums and horns to play in the 13th Soudanese. Evidentlyit was a case of black relations, for they played the battalion, MajorSmith-Dorian's, out as well as into town on the following day. 

The people were ordered to carry the good news about that none whogave up their arms would be killed or hurt, and that there was nointention on our part to sack the town or injure anybody. What? Acaptured city in the Soudan not to be given over to the victorioustroops to do with as they liked! I am sure the natives of both sexeswere amazed. And I cannot say all looked quite satisfied at theannouncement. The crowd in the streets quickly increased; theyevidently believed that we meant them no harm, and that they could doas they liked. In the bombardment the Lyddite shells had knocked downa gateway leading into the buildings and square mile of town enclosedby the great rectangular stone wall built by the Khalifa. For a spaceof fifty yards, several big holes had been blown in the structure, which was fourteen feet high and over four feet in thickness. Some ofthese breaches led into the beit-el-mal, or public granary. A fewwretched, hungry slaves ventured to help themselves to the grain, chiefly dhura, that had partly poured out into the street. No oneinterfered with them. Within half an hour all the women and childrenin the town apparently, to the number of several thousands, wererunning pell-mell to loot the granary. Men also joined in plunderingthe Khalifa's storehouse. They ran against our horses, tripped overeach other and fell in their crazy haste to fill sacks, skins, andnondescript vessels of all sorts--metal, wood and clay--with grain. Women staggered under burdens that would assure their households offood for months. It became a saturnalia and jubilee for the long, half-starved slaves, men and women. By-and-by looting became moregeneral. The houses of Emirs who had run away or been killed wereentered and plundered by the populace. Donkeys were caught and loadedwith spoils of war, and driven off to huts on the outskirts near wherethe troops bivouacked after their long and fatiguing day. During theearlier part of that night there was much noise and hubbub in Omdurmanwith constant firing of rifles. Maxwell's men, however, assisted bynumbers of friendly Jaalin, finally succeeded in enforcing somethinglike order and peace. 

[Illustration: KHALIFA'S HOUSE. ]

After the reception near the centre of the town the Sirdar proceededwith part of Colonel Maxwell's brigade along the west side of the bigwall. Osman Digna's house was passed on the way. We got as far as thesouth-west corner into full view of the Mahdi's tomb, which was about400 yards to the east. In the same direction and equidistant was theKhalifa's house. Beside us was the Praying Square or Mosque, a spaceof bare ground of about ten acres or so in extent. As soon as thetroops got beyond the big wall and in sight of the tomb and Khalifa'shouse, a brisk fusilade from Remingtons by the Jehadieh body-guardprotecting Abdullah was opened against us. Fortunately, the big stonewall was not loopholed on either side. Indeed there appeared to be noprovision for its defenders to fire from it unless they mounted tothe top. The Sirdar and staff fell back, and the guns and Maxims wentforward a little. Maxwell's men then dealt with the enemy, and theSirdar, still led by Slatin Pasha, whom the dervishes called"Saladin, " turned back to try and make his way through the breaches inthe north wall. Troops were sent in to clear the compound ofdervishes, most of whom surrendered at once. But exit upon the southside was barred by interior walls and gates. Then the Sirdar essayedgoing along by the river's margin between the wall, the Nile, and theforts, to turn the south-east angle. A sharp and accurate fire fromthe Jehadieh stopped that advance for a time. Gunboats were orderedforward to drive the dervishes from their cover. The soldiers pushedfarther through the compound, and the gunboats swept the Jehadieh withMaxims and quick-firing cannon. About 5 p. M. , with the shadows rapidlylengthening, the rough way between the river and the great wall waspartly cleared of the enemy. Thereupon the Sirdar and staff forded adirty, wide creek, the crossing being girth high, and trotted a fewhundred yards up stream. With double teams, four guns of the 32ndBattery, Major Williams', were got across the pool, accompanying theheadquarters. 

Entering a gateway through the outer rectangular wall, the force movedtowards the Mahdi's tomb and the Khalifa's chief residence or palace. The Sirdar and staff reined up before Abdullah's doorway, for thedervish leader's house was surrounded by an inner wall and varioussmall buildings. We were in a higgledy-piggledy looking corner, surrounded by rough shelters or stables for animals, horses andcamels, and the unfinished but covered approaches to the Mahdi's tomb. The staff sat on horseback facing the doorway and dwelling; I pulledin opposite beside an angle of the wall. Upon the Sirdar's right weresome corrugated iron roofed sheds, and a little in front the PrayingSquare. Behind was the Mahdi's tomb, and at no great distance variousimportant dervish buildings. Abdullah had so planted himself that hehad easy and private access to all places of public resort as well asthe official quarters. 

[Illustration: MAHDI'S TOMB--EFFECT OF LYDDITE SHELLS. ]

Slatin Pasha, Colonel Maxwell, and several soldiers, with one or twoothers, went in and searched for the Khalifa. A few minutes previouslyhe had slipped out by a back door with the more important part of hispersonal treasures. His harem had been sent away earlier in the day. Mr Hubert Howard, correspondent of the _New York Herald_ and theLondon _Times_, was near the headquarters staff. He came over to whereI was and chatted. To a companion who had joined me he offered somecigarettes. He said it had been a splendid day, and he had seen much. Nothing could have been better than the way things turned out, and hewas glad he had been through it from first to last, cavalry chargeincluded. Then he said he would like to get a photograph or two of thesurroundings and the Khalifa's house. I told him the light was spentand he could get no good results. He said he would try, and rodeinside the courtyard. A minute or less later, there was the roar andcrash of a shrapnel shell, which burst over our heads in verydangerous proximity. The iron and bullets struck the walls and rattledupon the corrugated iron roofs alongside. "That, " I said to mycompanion and an artillery officer hard by, "was one of our own guns. "The officer, Major Williams, I think, replied he feared indeed that itwas so. A similar opinion was apparently entertained by the Sirdar andstaff, for gallopers were sent to the officer in charge of the twoguns of the 32nd Battery left on the west side of the wall in the mainthoroughfare, to cease firing at once. Before riding up to theKhalifa's door the Sirdar had hailed the gunboats, and one of them, the "Sultan, " came near enough inshore for us to converse with thoseon board and for the commander to receive orders to stop all firing atAbdullah's quarters. A few seconds after the first shrapnel burst, another pitched over our heads, aimed apparently like the previous oneat the Khalifa's compound. Indeed, it appeared so later, for those ofour men at the south-west corner of the wall saw a number of armedJehadieh who were gathering behind Abdullah's compound. The Maximsalso opened fire on what was probably a body of the enemy coveringAbdullah's retirement, and who, at any rate, were firing at thetroops. Immediately after the second shell exploded the Sirdar andheadquarters rode off, returning by the road we entered, to the mainthoroughfare upon the west side of the enclosing wall. I remained afew minutes longer, two shells bursting overhead in the interval, andwith my companion retraced our steps, rejoining the headquarters'following. Mr Hubert Howard was struck upon the side of the head by abullet or fragment of a shell and killed instantly. His body wasremoved and covered up by Colonel Maxwell and his men. 

[Illustration: INTERIOR MAHDI'S TOMB (GRILLE AROUND SARCOPHAGUS). ]

[Illustration: KHALIFA'S GALLOWS (CUTTING DOWN HIS LAST VICTIM). ]

Arrangements were made for the instant pursuit of the Khalifa, who, Iwas told, only left his palace about five o'clock or sometime after wehad penetrated into Omdurman. Notables and dervishes who came in to uswere freely used by the staff to run hither and thither conveyingintimation to all their friends, that the war being over they shouldlay down their arms. In that way the news of the collapse of Mahdismwas widely spread, and bands of thirty and forty of the Jehadieh andeven of the Baggara surrendered. The presence of our Soudanesesoldiers facilitated matters, for they saw in them, at any rate, countrymen. I had no difficulty in persuading several large groups ofdervishes, whom I could see from my horse inside their compounds, tocome out into the lanes or roadway and lay down their rifles. By suchmeans the headquarters' advance through the town was made possible andrelatively easy. The sun had set and darkness was upon us before theSirdar and staff, going at times in single file, reached the commonprison where the Assouan merchant, Charles Neufeld, was confined. Whilst accompanying a convoy of rifles presented by the EgyptianGovernment in 1886 to Sheikh Saleh of the friendly Kabbabish tribe, Neufeld had been captured by a party of dervishes. Like the otherEuropean prisoners who fell into their hands, he had undergone greathardships and experienced all the trials of misfortune. Neufeld andseveral hundred natives who had incurred the Khalifa's ire or distrustwere found in a pestilential enclosure less than an acre in extent, surrounded by mud-walls. All of them wore heavy leg chains, and afew were handcuffed besides. The principal jail deliveries were bydisease and the gallows; the latter were almost daily in use. Threerough sets of them stood together near the great wall. Limbs of treesstuck into the ground, with a cross-piece overhead, that was how thegallows were fashioned. A last victim of the Khalifa was cut downshortly after the troops entered Omdurman. 

[Illustration: NEUFELD ON GUNBOAT "SHEIK"--CUTTING OFF HISANKLE-IRONS. ]

Neufeld was found under a mat-covered lean-to built against themud-wall. There was no other protection for the prisoners fromsunshine or rain than coarse worn matting spread upon sticks and laidagainst the walls. The enclosure was without any sanitary arrangementswhatever. A well had been dug near the middle of the yard and fromthere the prisoners drew all the water they used. The Sirdar conversedwith the prisoner, and a fruitless effort was made to find the jailerand have Neufeld's irons removed. Ultimately, when night had quitefallen and it was pitch dark, Neufeld was set upon an officer's horse, and the Sirdar and headquarters bringing him with them rode outside towhere the main body of the army was bivouacking upon the desert, northof Omdurman. Later on I found means to have Neufeld's irons removed. He had three sets of leg irons fastened round his ankles; a heavy barweighing fourteen pounds, and two thick chains above that. The heavyrings upon the legs we could not get off without other appliances thana hammer and iron wedge, so they were left to be removed next day onthe gunboat "Sheik. " It was found necessary on that occasion to gripthe rings in a vice and cut them with a cold chisel. We, however, sofreed his limbs that he could walk. Having written a second batch ofdespatches by the light of a guttering candle and handed them to thepress censor, we lay down in our clothes to try and sleep--no easything to do when you had to hold the bridle of your hungry horse thewhile, and other equally restless Arab steeds were, after theirmanner, seeking to eat him or kick him to pieces. We were without foodor water, for in the thrice altered camping grounds our servants hadgot lost. In a flurry between dozing and waking we spent the night, hoping for the morrow. When it came there was daylight but nobreakfast. Indeed, it was not until the afternoon of the 3rd Septemberthat our servants and baggage re-appeared. 

CHAPTER XIII. 

CLOSE OF CAMPAIGN. --GORDON MEMORIAL SERVICE, KHARTOUM. 

[Illustration: KHALIFA'S CHIEF EUNUCH (SURRENDERS IN BRITISH CAMP). ]

Although the beginning of a campaign often drags, the ending isusually abrupt. With the defeat and flight of Abdullah, Mahdism becamea thing of the past. True, there were several minor engagements foughtlater against isolated recalcitrant bodies of dervishes who were tooloyal to their old leaders. But these affairs in no way affected theresult achieved upon the battle-field of Omdurman. During the night orearly morning of the 2nd and 3rd of September, Colonel Macdonald'sbrigade advanced into the city to help to keep the peace, and tosecure the surrender of all the armed bands of the enemy. Large bodiesof dervishes were still moving about both within and without Omdurman. I had myself seen many hundreds of natives set out about dusk torevisit the battle-field in search of plunder, to rescue woundedfriends, and to bury their dead kinsmen. Those who showed a peaceabledisposition were not molested, but all with arms were arrested andpenned under guards in the Praying Square. Many prisoners were securedon the battle-field, but relatively only a few thousands. On 3rdSeptember and following days enormous numbers surrendered, coming intotown or being sent in by the cavalry and friendlies. In fact, theybecame so numerous that it was found almost impossible to deal withthem. When dervishes of the Jaalin and other tribes that had abandonedMahdism came in they were at once told to behave themselves, and wereallowed to go where they liked. The townsfolk and others who wished tobe let alone, turned their jibbehs inside out, at once a renunciationof the Khalifa and his works as well as a sanitary gain. Some therewere who, averse to over-cleanliness, simply tore the dervish patchesoff their dress, thus also resuming their fealty to the Khedive. Theroll of prisoners, however, in spite of convenient blindness inletting all the lesser men who wished to escape do so, swelled toabout 11, 000. In a house to house visitation the more important rebelsheikhs and Baggara in hiding were caught and kept under arrest withtheir followers. All the Greeks and the local chiefs whom Slatin Pashaknew to be secretly inimical to the dervish rule, were from the firstsecured safe permits and absolute liberty. Among them were many of theMahdi's relatives, former rulers of tribes, and Emirs once high inpower. Of wounded dervishes over 9000 were treated by the British andEgyptian Army Medical Staffs, although the doctors' hands were busyenough for two days with our own sick and wounded. 

[Illustration: FRESH BATCH WOUNDED AND UNWOUNDED DERVISH PRISONERS, OMDURMAN, 4TH SEPT. 1898. ]

Within twenty-four hours after the Sirdar's entry Omdurman began toassume the signs of orderly government. Thousands of the prisoners aswell as the natives were set to work to clean up the place. Thewounded were all carried into temporary hospitals and the dead weredecently interred in Moslem burial-places out upon the desert. Thenthe thoroughfares were scrupulously scavengered by gangs ofyesterday's furious foemen, blacks and Baggara. The dead things wereput under ground, and the stagnant pools were drained or filled in. Within a week it became actually possible to walk without an attack ofviolent nausea in Omdurman. Visits were constantly paid to thebattle-field for the double purpose of rescuing any woundeddervishes there might be and counting the dead. The large number ofthe enemy who for days survived shocking wounds, to which a Europeanwould have instantly or speedily succumbed, was appalling. Thesewretched creatures had been seen crawling or dragging themselves formiles to get to the Nile for water or into villages for succour. Foodand water were sent out to them by the Sirdar's orders on the dayafter the battle, when it was seen that the natives gave neither heednor help to other than their own immediate kinsmen upon the field. Even in the town rations were distributed to the needy. The gunboatsgoing up and down the river saw many sorry sights. Wounded dervisheswere lying by hundreds along the river's bank. Some, whose thirst hadmaddened them, had drunk copiously, and then swooned and died, theirheads and shoulders covered with water and the rest of their bodiesstretched upon the strand. General Gatacre and Lieut. Wood on ridingto revisit the zereba near Kerreri, met a dervish, part of one ofwhose legs had been blown off by a shell. The man was hobbling along, leaning upon a broken spear handle, making for Omdurman, with his limbburned and roughly tied up. They gave him food and water and passed onmeeting others. A mile away, the mounted orderly drew the General'sattention to an object upon the ground with the exclamation: "Blest ifit isn't that bloke's foot!" which sure enough was the case. A numberof officers were told off to count the enemy's dead upon thebattle-field. Sections of the ground were assigned to each. The actualcount was 10, 800 dead bodies, which did not include all the slain, for there were those who died in Omdurman, and afar upon the desert. One of the officers wrote, "I won't enter into details of our day'swork. It suffices to say, that a piece of cotton-wool soaked ineucalyptus placed in the nostrils and an ample supply of neat brandywere only just sufficient to keep us on our legs for the six hoursthat we were at the job. " He and two others had undertaken to make asketch in addition to helping to count the slain. Unfortunately, thesketch was lost. 

And all might have been otherwise, for the Sirdar offered before thebattle to treat with the Khalifa. Here is the copy of the letter, astranslated and published, bearing upon the subject. 

 "_30th August 1898. _ "Viz. , 11 Rabi Akhar, "1316 (M. E. )

 "From the Sirdar of the Troops, Soudan, "To Abdulla, son of Mohamed El-Taaishi, Head of the Soudan. 

 "Bear in your mind that your evil deeds throughout the Soudan, particularly your murdering a great number of the Mohammedans without cause or excuse, besides oppression and tyranny, necessitated the advance of my troops for the destruction of your throne, in order to save the country from your devilish doings and iniquity. Inasmuch as there are many in your keeping for whose blood you are held responsible--innocent, old, and infirm, women and children and others--abhorring you and your government, who are guilty of nothing; and because we have no desire that they should suffer the least harm, we ask you to have them removed from the Dem (literally, enclosure) to a place where the shells of guns and bullets of rifles shall not reach them. If you do not do so, the shells and bullets cannot recognise them and will consequently kill them, and afterwards you will be responsible before God for their blood. 

 "Stand firm you and your helpers only in the field of battle to meet the punishment prepared for you by the praised God. But if you and your Emirs incline to surrender to prevent blood being shed, we shall receive your envoy with due welcome, and be sure that we shall treat you with justice and peace. 

 "(Sealed) KITCHENER, "Sirdar of the Troops in the Soudan. "

Colonel Maxwell was appointed Commandant of Omdurman, and his brigadewas quartered in the town, detachments occupying the principalbuildings. Among the places so held were the Arsenal, the Khalifa'sand his son the Sheikh Ed Din's houses, the Treasury, Tomb and Mosqueenclosure. The rest of the troops were moved two miles to the north ofthe town, where a camp was formed along the river bank. Omdurman wastoo abominably dirty to risk keeping a single soldier in the placeother than was absolutely necessary. Not an hour was wasted. TheSirdar's practice was--abundant work for each day and all plansprepared ahead for the next. The submission of sheikhs and theirfollowers had to be received, the pursuit of the Khalifa pressed, wounded dervishes and prisoners provided for, as well as the thousandsof poor in Omdurman helped in various ways. Then there had to bearranged-for the disposal of the spoils of war, repatriation for manyof Abdullah's enforced subjects, the formal re-occupation of Khartoum, and the immediate despatch back to Lower Egypt of the British troopswhose services were no longer required. All this and much more wasdone, nor am I aware that anything was neglected, not even thecorrespondents, who were evidently too seldom far removed from theGeneral's thoughts. Hurrying into the town early on Saturday morning, 3rd September, to attend Howard's funeral, I found that within half anhour after sunrise all the dead dervishes, with the murdered women andchildren, had been removed to the native burial-grounds outsideOmdurman. In my rambles in the capital that day I visited the only twopassable dwellings in the place, Abdullah's and his son Osman's. Bothhouses had a pretence of tidiness and comfort, particularly the SheikhEd Din's. There were paved courtyards, doors, windows with shutters, plastered walls, cupboards, benches, and ottomans. In each there wereseveral rooms furnished in a rude style with articles of Europeanmanufacture. Of glass-ware, crockery, and large mirrors there was anabundance. The Khalifa's favourite reception-room and a chamber in theharem were almost covered with big looking-glasses. Angry Jaalin andothers who had forced an entrance on the previous day, or else mayhapthe Lyddite bombs, had smashed the mirrors and most of the domesticware into atoms. Spears and swords had been freely used to hack thefurniture and fittings about. A wealth of printed and manuscript booksand papers in Arabic characters were scattered, torn, and thrown intoa shed. 

The kitchens, stables and outhouses were odorously barbaric insqualor. They were in strange contrast to any of the rooms in therabbit warren of attached dwelling-places within the Khalifa's privatecompound. Around the Mahdi's tomb were great splashes of human blood. On the previous evening I had seen many dead dervishes lying in thatvicinity. In their credulous faith in Mohamed Achmed they had flockedthere for safety, only to be killed by our fire. Of 120 who werepraying around the tomb when a 50-lb. Lyddite shell burst, buteighteen escaped alive, and these were sorely wounded. The tomb, carefully stuccoed over inside and out, was built of stone andwell-burned bricks. The base of the square wall from which thecone-shaped dome sprang was over six feet thick, the vaulted rooftapering to about eighteen inches at the apex. Great holes had beenknocked in the north-east side, and the rubbish had tumbled in, breaking the brass and iron grille round the catafalque. Beneath, covered by two huge blocks of stone, lay Mohamed Achmed's remains. Early that day violent hands were laid on the brass rails in the outerwindows and grille. The catafalque was stripped of its black and redcloth covering, and the wood-work was totally destroyed. All theyellow lettered panels, with texts from the Koran and the Mahdi'sprayer-book, as well as the blue and yellow scroll work, were smashedor carried off by relic-hunters. The false prophet was so speedilydiscredited that not a dervish amongst the tens of thousands butregarded these and the subsequent proceedings with completeindifference. To destroy utterly the legend of Mohamed Achmed'smission, when the British troops had returned to Cairo the Mahdi'sbody was disinterred. It had been roughly embalmed and the featureswere said to be recognisable. The common people who saw the remainsalmost doubted their senses, for it had been given out that the Mahdihad merely gone off on a visit to heaven and would shortly return. That his body was found surprised them, as they thought he had gonealoft in the flesh, the object of the tomb being to mark the spotwhere he took leave of the earth and would return to it. Perhaps itmay be deplored that Mohamed Achmed's remains were broken up, partbeing cast into the Nile, whilst the head and other portions of thebody were retained for presentation, it is said, to medical colleges. There were those who thought that the wisest course would have been toexpose the remains for all to see them who cared to, and then to handthem over to the natives to bury in one of their cemeteries as if hehad been an ordinary man. But the Soudan is not Europe, nor are itsinhabitants amenable to measures eminently satisfactory to civilisednorthern races. The tomb was subsequently levelled to the ground by anexplosion of gun-cotton and the débris was cleared away. 

I had a good look over the Khalifa's war arsenal. There were plenty ofcannon, old and new, as well as machine guns, rifles, pistols, andfowling pieces of all kinds. Musical instruments, war-drums, elephants' tusks used as horns, coats of chain-mail old and new, andsteel helmets. Most of the latter are quite modern, being part of 600supplied by a London firm of sword makers--Wilkinson & Co. , Pall Mall, to a former Khedive's body-guard. Somehow these plate and chaincrusader-like head-pieces seem all to have drifted south. There werehundreds of dervish battle flags, including several duplicate blacksilk banners such as the Khalifa carried during the action, andthousands of native spears, swords, and shields. In short, it would beeasier to tell what was not in that extraordinary storehouse than whatwas. Among other articles I saw were: Ivory, powder, percussion caps, old lead, copper, tin, bronze, cloth, looms, pianos, sewing machines, agricultural implements, boilers, steam-engines, ostrich feathers, gum, hippopotamus hides, iron and wooden bedsteads, drums, bugles, field glasses--Lieutenant Charles Grenfell's, lost at El Teb in theEastern Soudan in 1883, were found there--bolts, zinc, rivets, paints, india-rubber, leather, boots, knapsacks, water-bottles, flags, andclothes. There were three state coaches--one of them might at a pinchhave served for the Lord Mayor--and an American buggy. They needed alittle retrimming, but there was harness and material enough to haverigged out the four vehicles in style. In short, the arsenal held thejettisoned cargo of the whole aforetime Egyptian Soudan, with muchbesides drawn from Abyssinia and Central Africa. Truly, the Khalifamust have been a strange man, with a fine acquisitive instinctabnormally cultivated. 

[Illustration: NEUFELD, WITH ABYSSINIAN WIFE AND CHILDREN; ALSO FELLOWPRISONER. ]

Neufeld, quite contrary to Slatin Pasha's way of speaking, declared tome that the Khalifa was not at all a bad sort of man, nor anexceptionally cruel Arab task-master, and certainly not a monster. TheKhalifa, he said, had often come and chatted with him. Abdullah hadvowed to him, that if he were able to have his own way he would make aclose friend of him, and have him always near his person. The Khalifaasserted he liked white men, admired their knowledge and ability, andwould, were he permitted, have many of them in Khartoum. As everybodyknew, he befriended the Greeks, because he could do that with safety, for the natives were not so jealous of them as of other white men. TheTaaisha were, he declared, absurdly suspicious of his intercourse withNeufeld, and were always bringing him tales, to try and get him tokill all the white men without exception. His countrymen's jealous, narrow fanaticism annoyed him, but what, he asked, could he do, for hewas very much in their power, and unable to afford to fly in theirfaces? Abdullah often spoke thus, according to Neufeld, and, as thelatter also said, frequently that leader of the fanatical dervishesexhibited keen interest in acquiring information about Europe and itspeople. He hoped to make peace some day with the outside world, and beallowed thereafter to rule the Soudan. All this, I submit, is ratherpuzzling, in view of the filthy den the Khalifa kept Neufeld shut upin, and the manner in which he loaded him with heavy leg-irons. Duringhis captivity, Neufeld had with him an Abyssinian girl, or ratherwoman. She was taken prisoner with him. Thereafter she devotedlyministered to his wants, fetched water and food, and made, under histuition, really eatable bread. Neufeld, who said he met me in 1884-85, up the Nile, when he was attached to the army, gave me a piece of thisbread, and I found it quite palatable. Yeast is easily made in theSoudan with sour dough and sugar. 

As arsenals mayhap date back to the eras of Tubal Cain and Vulcan, itwas to be expected the Khalifa would also have his modern smithy. Hemade his own gunpowder, shells, and bullets, and the metallic casesfor his troops' Remington rifles. The country was laid undercontribution to supply copper for that purpose, and he essayed thefilling of percussion caps with fulminate, not over successfully Ihope. He had his cartridge manufactory, and a very well equippedengineer shop as well. Yea, the potentate was setting up a Zoo, wherein I saw three young lions chained to posts by neck collars, asthough those savage beasts were watch-dogs. As for the engineer shop, with foundry and smithy attached, the Beit el Mauna, it was part of acleverly planned square of buildings with a river frontage and aspacious yard. The designer was one El Osta Abdullah, a formeremployee of General Gordon's in Khartoum Arsenal. There were severalsteam engines; the principal one driving the main shafting was of 28horse-power. The fly-wheel was 4 feet in diameter. There were fivelathes, one cat-head lathe--36 inch, three drills, and other toolsincluding a slotting machine, all in perfect going order. Themachinery had formed part of the dismantled Khartoum Arsenal, and hadbeen removed into Omdurman to be nearer the watchful eyes of Yacoub, who superintended the workshops, though destitute of mechanicalknowledge. El Osta was the foreman and had numbers of natives, freeand prisoners, under him. There were plenty of crucibles for iron aswell as brass smelting. The blasts of furnaces and smithy fires wereserved from fanners driven by machinery. There were paint shops andstores, the floors of which were laid in bricks. In truth, the arsenalwas in process of extension. Two more engines for the shop were incourse of completion. The steamers disabled or wrecked in the 1885campaign had all been recovered and overhauled by the dervishes. Theywere sagacious enough to make use of all the skilled labour to befound amongst the Turkish and Egyptian prisoners who fell into theirhands. Although the Khalifa's river steamers, recaptured by theSirdar, could steam fully as well as ever, their hulls and decks weredreadfully rotten and dilapidated, not a pound of paint nor any freshtimber having been used upon them in all the intervening years. 

"Is that mean, dirty compound, with those squalid mud-huts, facing theKhalifa's big wall, Osman Digna's house?" I asked. "Yes, " said mynative informant, "that is the house of the robber-chief, OsmanDigna. " I entered and found within only a few wretched slaves and poorHadendowas. Osman, like the Khalifa, had given us the slip, leavingbehind such of his people as he thought of no value, and hurrying awaywith all his women and treasure towards the south. They had horses andcamels, and upon the best of them they decamped. Several of thenotorious Osman Digna's tribal retainers were caught. These wretchedHadendowas were, I was told, glad to be permitted subsequently toreturn to their own country. Over 300 Abyssinians were amongst ourprisoners. They had volunteered or been coerced into joining thedervish ranks. All of them were surprised to find themselves kindlytreated. In due course, those who cared to go--men, women andchildren--were provided with free passages back to Abyssinia. TheSirdar held several receptions, whereat the principal native leadersand sheikhs attended. Amongst others delighted at the overthrow of theKhalifa were all the survivors of the old Khedivial army, who had beenabandoned to their fate for years. Of these were the whilom Governorof Senaar, a native artillery officer who had been with Hicks Pasha, and Gordon Pasha's native medical attendant. 

During the week after the battle the British and Khedivial troops, bybrigades, made triumphal marches into and through Omdurman. Proceedingfrom our camp with flags flying and bands playing, they went along themain thoroughfares to the Tomb and Mosque, returning by a circuitousroute to quarters. The ex-dervishes and other natives flocked inthousands to see the finely-equipped and well-disciplined battalionsled by the Sirdar. It was an exhibition of power they quiteunderstood, and one which won from them open praise at the gallantbearing of our soldiery. The immediate effect was to produce a feelingof deep respect for the authority of the new order of things. 

When it was found that the Khalifa had escaped by the south end ofOmdurman, Colonel Broadwood, with his two regiments of Egyptiancavalry and the Camel Corps, started in pursuit. Gunboats alsoproceeded up the White Nile to head off the fugitives. Unfortunatelyas there had been a very general rainfall, the desert routes towardsKordofan were not absolutely waterless. The cavalry soon found thatthey were upon a hot trail; and men, women, and children, who had beenunable to keep pace with the flying Khalifa and Osman Digna, werepicked up. Some of these, no doubt, had purposely given their masterthe slip. It was in that way that Abdullah's chief wife, the Sheikh EdDin's mother, was caught and brought in by the "friendlies. " One poorwoman, just confined, had the babe, a male, taken away by her lord, whilst she was left to shift for herself. Happily, her life was saved. 

As I have said relatively little about the Egyptian cavalry, I willlet one of their officers tell what they did. Colonel Broadwood hadunder him a magnificent body of officers, British and Egyptian. Captain Legge of the 20th Hussars was the brigade-major. The narrativein question was given to me a few days after the victory. 

"The Sirdar's orders on the morning of the battle to Colonel Broadwoodwere, to take up successive positions on his (the Sirdar's) rightflank, and to prevent the enemy's left from overlapping too far. Thefear was that the dervishes might attack upon the north or weakestside of the zereba. After rejoining the infantry towards the end ofthe assault made on Macdonald's brigade we were formed into two lines. Turning our backs to the Nile, that is, facing west, we galloped inpursuit of the retreating dervishes. For four miles we rode forwardwithout check. Then we wheeled to the left, towards Omdurman, andswept the country on the right front of the Sirdar over a width offour miles. We were shot at repeatedly, and sometimes heavily, bybands of fugitives, but we never drew rein, using lance and sword uponall who showed fight. In that draw we made 1000 prisoners, breakingthe Remingtons of those who had rifles and sending our captives underescort of a squadron to the Sirdar. When close to Omdurman we cameacross a large body of dervishes full of 'buck. ' Four of our squadronswent for them. They charged clean through them, wheeled, and chargedback again. That took the sting out of them, though there were stillindividual dervishes who would keep trying to charge us. ColonelBroadwood came up at that juncture with the supports, whereupon theenemy all bolted for the hills. At 2 p. M. We reported to headquarters, and, following the infantry, went to water our horses at the Nile. Thesame afternoon we passed through part of Omdurman and went out uponthe open desert to the south-west. At 6. 30 p. M. Slatin Pasha broughtus orders to start immediately in pursuit of the Khalifa. We went onas best we could until 8. 30 p. M. , without food or water. Trying to runin towards the river to procure both, for a gunboat was to carry oursupplies, we found it was impossible to get within two miles of theNile owing to the overflow having turned the margin into boggy land. Besides, the bushy inaccessible ground was teeming with hostiledervishes. We had missed our way. Without off-saddling, we bivouackedwhere we were, forming square. At 4 a. M. We mounted and rode on, going until 8. 30 a. M. , when we got down to the river. There SlatinPasha quitted us, returning to Omdurman. We halted for an hour, watered and fed our poor horses, and had a bite for ourselves. Then weremounted and rode fifteen miles farther south. We had reached a pointjust thirty-five miles south of Omdurman. Our horses had been goingalmost continuously for four days previously, the forage was finished, and the animals exhausted, so we again halted. Supplies had beenordered forward to that spot, but the overflow prevented us from beingable to get near enough the native boats to draw upon them for stores. We decided to bivouac there and take our chance of being able somehowto get at the boats. Next morning we were ordered back into Omdurman. Slatin Pasha had learned from fugitives and natives that the Khalifawas still twenty-five miles ahead of us. Abdullah had with him 100Taaisha Baggara, and had procured fresh camels and horses, so was'going strong, ' too good for us to catch up. The riverside countrypeople could not credit that we had defeated the Khalifa and takenOmdurman. On our way back we picked up six of Osman Digna'sHadendowas. They said Osman was riding with the Khalifa, showing himthe tracks and bypaths, with all of which he was familiar. We heardthat neither Osman nor the Khalifa was wounded, and that Sheikh Ed Dinwas likewise untouched. "

It has been too readily accepted that the Black, although anincomparably fine infantry-man, would not make a good trooper. Thereare Blacks and Blacks as there are "Browns and Browns. " Many of thenegroid races of the Central Soudan are excellent horsemen. The dashof the Khalifa's mounted men was superb. So it came about that afterOmdurman the Sirdar decided to reinforce the Egyptian cavalry with anewly raised squadron or two composed entirely of Blacks. Ex-dervishesof suitable smartness and physique were permitted to join the newbody, the ranks of which were filled in a very short time, forhundreds eagerly volunteered. The accounts I have since heard of the1st Black Cavalry are eminently favourable. There can be no doubtabout one thing, --whatever may be said of fellaheen troopers, theBlacks will charge home. 

Another matter that merits a little more detail is the action foughtby Major Stuart Wortley's "friendlies, " and the work accomplished bythe flotilla under Commander Keppel, R. N. It was the gunboats thattransported the British infantry from their camps at Dakhala andDarmali so smartly to Wad Habeshi. Their assistance in that respectreduced the campaign from one of months to days, and lessened therisks to the troops. Eight steamers arrived at Dakhala on oneoccasion, and the transport department did its duty so well that theywere loaded and despatched back up stream within twenty-four hours. Royan Island had not only been made a depôt of stores, but asanatorium where sick officers and men were sent as a "pick 'em up. "An order from the Sirdar on the 30th of August was wired to Royan, tofind 235 men and 8 officers who were well enough to man the gunboats, to be in short amateur marines. At that date there were 327 sick uponthe island. Most of them were eager to get to the front, but thedoctors would not certify that any of them were able to bear thefatigue of marching. There was therefore great rejoicing among themore convalescent, for they had begun to despair of seeing the fight. The hospital state showed that there were then at Royan 46 men of theWarwicks, 69 of the Lincolns, 62 of the Seaforths, 36 of the Camerons, 19 of the Grenadier Guards, 42 of the Northumberland Fusiliers, 42 ofthe Lancashire Fusiliers, and 21 of the Rifles. From 25 to 40 men weremarched on board each of the gunboats the same day. Captain Fergusonof the Northumberland Fusiliers became marine officer on board the"Sultan, " Lieutenant Allardice went to the "Sheik, " Lieutenant Seymourof the Grenadier Guards to the "Melik, " Captain Ritchie to the"Nazir, " Lieutenant Arbuthnot to the "El Hafir, " and LieutenantJackson and other officers respectively to the "Tamai, " "Fatah, ""Metemmeh, " etc. 

On the 31st of August the "Melik" kept abreast of the cavalry actingas a screen. At noon of the same day the "Sultan" and the "Melik" and"Nazir" were sent to shell the dervish tents and tukals seen to theeast of Kerreri village. The enemy were found in some force, about3500 strong. Eight or ten shrapnel were fired into their zerebaedcamp. Right in the middle of the tents the first shell burst. Thedervishes struck their camp instantly, and mounted men and footmen ranto the hills, their flight quickened by the gunboats' Maxims. Theirzereba was burned. South Kerreri village was found unoccupied. Thesteamers proceeded a little further up stream, had a look at TutiIsland, and on the west bank caught sight of a body of dervishes, EmirZaccharia's men, who also had a taste of shrapnel and Maxims. 

On the 1st of September at 5. 30 a. M. The steamers "Sultan, " "Melik, ""Sheik, " "Nazir, " "Fatah, " "Tamai, " and "Abu Klea" went again up theriver to destroy the forts and land the 50-pounder Lyddite howitzerbattery on Tuti Island, whence it was to shell Omdurman. Major StuartWortley and part of his force were also to be transferred to thatisland to support Major Elmslie's battery and clear off any dervishes. It was found, as I have already stated, that Tuti was unsuitable as aposition, and the Lyddite guns were landed instead upon the east orright bank of the river. The "Sultan" opened the attack, firing at theforts and pitching shells into Omdurman. In a short time the othergunboats came to her assistance, and the mud forts, of which therewere a dozen or more, were promptly silenced. Several of the dervishgunners' shells, however, only missed the steamers that were theirtarget by a very few yards. Happily the embrasures of the forts wereso badly made, that the enemy had but a small angle of fire. It was inmore than one instance impossible for the dervish guns to train exceptstraight to their front. The flotilla passed down behind Tuti Island, going by the east bank, and were brought-to below the island. Therethe 37th R. A. Battery was landed, and the Lyddite shell fire wasdirected against the great wall and the Mahdi's tomb, the range of thelatter being 3200 yards. Many dervishes were seen in and aroundOmdurman, and a number were noticed upon the right bank. Two of thegunboats remained all night to protect the Lyddite battery, usingtheir electric search-lights to detect any lurking dervishes. Thesteamers fired that day several hundred shells and 8000 rounds fromtheir Maxims. Captain Prince Christian Victor was attached on boardthe "Sultan, " and Prince Teck, who had a sharp attack of fever and hadtemporarily to abandon his squadron in the Egyptian cavalry, saw thatand the next day's battle from one of the other gunboats. 

On the 2nd of September the "Melik" ran a little way up stream beforesunrise and then returned. In the first stage of the battle the"Nazir, " "Fatah, " "Sheik, " "El Hafir" and another protected the southfront of the Sirdar's camp, whilst the "Sultan, " "Melik" and "Tamai"guarded the north end of it. There were over 100 shells were firedfrom the "Sultan" at 3000 to 2800 yards ranges. The "Melik" found theenemy's columns with their quick-firing 15 pounders at under 1500yards range on one occasion. During the second phase of the battle, the "Melik" dropped again down stream, and struck Sheikh Ed Din'scolumn as the enemy advanced to attack Macdonald's brigade, treatingthe dervishes to all her artillery. When Omdurman was occupied by thetroops the flotilla again rendered valuable help. After the action thegunboats were sent, part up the White, part up the Blue Nile, to carrythe good news and break up any dervish camps. The "Sultan, " "Melik, ""Sheik, " "Nazir, " and "Fatah" proceeded up the White Nile. CommanderKeppel went 115 miles south of Omdurman. He saw but few of the enemy. The country was much overflowed, the river was nearly 6 miles wide inseveral places, the wooded banks and bush being under water. 

On the 2nd of September Major Stuart Wortley and his friendlies had abrisk engagement with Emir Isa Zaccharia. Major Elmslie had begun theday's battle at 5. 30 a. M. With a salvo of his six guns, throwing the50 lb. Lyddite shells into Omdurman. Wortley's friendlies, later on, advanced in fine style, in open order, and drove about 800 Jehadiehout of a village. About 350 were killed, including their leader. Theremainder bolted off towards the Blue Nile, pursued by the Jaalin andothers. At the close of the action Major Wortley, Captain Buckle, Lieut. C. Wood, and two non-commissioned English officers walked downtowards the point from which Major Elmslie's battery was firing. Theywere seen and charged by about twenty-five dervish horsemen. Luckily, heavy, boggy land intervened, and Lieut. Wood and Major Wortleydropped the leading horsemen, when some of the Jaalin rallied and cameto their assistance. The rout of the Baggara was completed, thedervish horsemen leaving eleven dead upon the field. 

On Sunday morning, 4th September, the Press were invited byHeadquarters to go over by steamer to Khartoum. We were told that anofficial ceremony which we ought not to miss was about to take place. There were an unusual number of correspondents. The previousrestrictions and military objections to their presence had been maderidiculous by the widest throwing open of the door to all. The Sirdarand Headquarters embarked upon the "Melik. " We found thatrepresentative detachments from all the commands in the army werebeing ferried over in boats and giassas towed by the steamers. Fromevery British battalion there were present eighty-one officers andmen. The 21st Lancers were represented by ten officers and twenty-fournon-commissioned officers and men. Two officers and seven men weresent by each battery of artillery, and two officers and five men fromthe Maxim batteries. There were also representative sections from theKhedivial forces. As the steamers drew up alongside the stone-wallquay before the ruined Government House where General Gordon made hislast stand, the soldiers were seen to be already in position. Therewas but little space between the quay wall and the buildings, for thedébris of bricks and stone from the overturned structure nearlyblocked up the former open promenade facing the muddy Blue Nile. Theruined walls and forts looked picturesque in their deep setting ofdark-green palms, mimosa, and tall orange-trees. Compared withtreeless, brown, arid Omdurman, Khartoum wore an air of romance andloveliness that well became such historic ground. An odour of blossomand fruit was wafted from the wild and spacious Mission and GovernmentHouse gardens, which even the dervishes had not been able to wrecktotally. 

[Illustration: DISTANT VIEW, KHARTOUM (FROM BLUE NILE). ]

Two flagstaffs had been erected upon the top of the one-storied wallfronting the Blue Nile. The Sirdar ranged facing the building and theflagstaffs. Behind him were the Headquarters Staff, the Generals ofdivision, and others. To his left, formed up at right angles, were therepresentative detachments of the Egyptian army, the 11th Soudanese, with their red heckles in their fezzes, in the front line. Upon theSirdar's right were the detachments of Gatacre's division, each inits regimental order of seniority. Standing a few paces in front ofthe Sirdar, but facing him, upon a mound of earth and bricks, were thefour chaplains attached to the British infantry--Presbyterian, Churchof England, Roman Catholic, and Wesleyan. _En passant_, though it isan army secret, in nothing was the Sirdar's power and strong will moremanifest than in securing the presence that day in amity of the fourrepresentatives of religion. One of the reverend gentlemen, presumablyon the strength of the superior claims of his orthodoxy, refused tojoin in any service in which clergymen of any other denomination borea part. The Sirdar sent a peremptory order, without a word ofexplanation, for that cleric to embark forthwith and return to Cairo. Instead, he hastened to Headquarters and made his peace, and had theorder withdrawn. Upon their right was a small body of Royal Engineerofficers, Gordon's own corps. A hundred natives or more had gatheredon the outside, wondering what was going to happen. The Sirdar himselfhad been the first to land upon the quay and walk towards thebuilding, the windows of which Gordon had caused to be filled in tostop entrance of the dervish bullets from Tuti. There were plenty ofmarks of the enemy's musketry fire, as well as the dents of shell andround shot. The former official entrance was within a litteredcourtyard upon the opposite side of the building. It was whilstdescending the interior stairway to meet the dervishes that Gordon washacked and slain by the fierce fanatics and his body cast into thecourtyard. 

Ten o'clock was the official hour notified for the ceremonial, whichcommenced upon a signal from the Sirdar. A British band played a fewbars of "God Save the Queen. " Whilst all were saluting, LieutenantStavely, R. N. , and Captain J. Watson, A. D. C. , standing on the westside of the wall ran up a brilliant silk Union Jack to the top oftheir flagstaff, hauling the halyard taut as the flag flapped smartlyin the breeze. It had barely begun to ascend when Lieutenant Milfordand Effendi Bakr, at the adjacent pole, ran up the Egyptian flag. Thereupon an Egyptian band played at some length the Khedivial hymn. At its close the Sirdar called for three cheers for "The Queen, " whichwere given voluminously, even the natives shouting, though, perhaps, they didn't quite know why. Three cheers for the Khedive were alsoheartily given. Meantime the "Melik's" quick-firing guns were rollingout a royal salute, and, as usual with them, making things jump aboardthe lightly built craft and smashing glass and crockery in alldirections. 

[Illustration: HOISTING FLAGS, KHARTOUM. ]

Ere the echo of cannon had died away another ceremony had begun. TheBritish band played softly the "Dead March in Saul, " and every headwas bared in memory of Gordon. His funeral obsequies were at lasttaking place upon the spot where he fell. Then the Egyptian bandplayed their quaint funeral march, and the native men and women, understanding that, and whom it was played for, raised theirprolonged, shrill, wailing cry. Count Calderai, the Italian MilitaryAttaché, who stood near the Sirdar, was deeply affected, whilst Countvon Tiedmann, the German Attaché, who appeared in his magnificentwhite Cuirassier uniform on the occasion, was even more keenlyimpressed, a soldier's tears coursing down his cheeks. But there!Other eyes were wet, and cheeks too, as well as his, and bronzedveterans were not ashamed of it either. Sadness and bitter memories!So the Gordon legend, if you will, shall live as long as the Englishname endures. A brief pause, and in gentle voice and manner the Rev. John M. Sims, Presbyterian Chaplain--Gordon's faith--broke thesilence. In his brief prayer he said: "Our help is in the name of theLord who made heaven and earth. " Then he observed, "Let us hear God'sword as written for our instruction, " reading from Psalm XV. Thefollowing verses: "Lord, who shall abide in Thy tabernacle? Who shalldwell in Thy holy hill? He that walketh uprightly, and workethrighteousness, and speaketh the truth in his heart. He that backbitethnot with his tongue, nor doeth evil to his neighbour, nor taketh up areproach against his neighbour. In whose eyes a vile person iscontemned; but he honoureth them that fear the Lord. He that swearethto his own hurt, and changeth not. He that putteth not out his moneyto usury, nor taketh reward against the innocent. He that doeth thesethings shall never be moved. " "And to God's great name shall be allthe praise and glory, world without end. Amen. " When Mr Sims hadconcluded, the Rev. A. W. B. Watson, Church of England Chaplain, recited the Lord's Prayer. Following him the Rev. R. Brindle, RomanCatholic Chaplain, prayed, saying: "O Almighty God, by whoseprovidence are all things which come into the lives of men, whether ofsuffering which Thou permittest, or of joy and gladness which Thougivest, look down, we beseech Thee, with eyes of pity and compassionon this land so loved by that heroic soul whose memory we honourbefore Thee this day. Give back to it days of peace. Send to it rulersanimated by his spirit of justice and righteousness. Strengthen themin the might of Thy power, that they may labour in making perfect thework to which he devoted and for which he gave his life. And grant tous, Thy servants, that we may copy his virtues of self-sacrifice andfortitude, so that when Thou callest we may each be able to answer, 'Ihave fought the good fight, '--a blessing which we humbly ask in thename of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Amen. "

When Father Brindle had concluded, the pipers, accompanied by muffleddrums, played the Coronach as a lament. The weird Highland minstrelsyseemed quite in keeping with the place and solemn scene. Then theKhedivial band played a hymn tune, "Thy Will be Done, " and the sadceremony was closed to the boom of minute guns. Generals Rundle, Gatacre, and Hunter then stepped forward and congratulated the Sirdarupon the successful completion of his task, and the commandingofficers and others, following their example, did the same. SirHerbert acknowledged their greeting, and announced that the men wouldbe allowed to break off for half an hour or so to go over the ruinsand gardens if they wished. Everybody availed himself of theopportunity. In a few minutes a throng of officers and men who hadscrambled over the débris filled the roofless rooms and packed thestairway where Gordon was struck down. I was surprised to find thateven the youngest, most callow soldiers knew their Khartoum and thestory of Gordon's fight and death. So deep and far had the taletravelled. There were speculations and suggestions as to how the endexactly came about that were a revelation to me, so full ofinformation and pregnant of observation were many of the men'sremarks. Throng succeeded throng in the rooms and stairways, whilstothers went to explore the outhouses and the gardens. The passionflowers and the pomegranates were in bloom, but the oranges and limeswere in fruit. Leaves and buds were plucked by all of us as souvenirs. Brigade-Major Snow, who was with the Camel Corps in 1884-85 across theBayuda desert, produced a tiny bottle of champagne that was to havebeen drunk in Khartoum when we got there. He opened it, and shared thedriblet with a few of the old campaigners. By one p. M. We were allback again in Omdurman, leaving behind two companies of the 11thBattalion to hold Khartoum for the two flags, the hoisting of which, side by side, the Egyptians regarded as natural and most proper. 

CHAPTER XIV. 

KHARTOUM MEMORIAL COLLEGE. --THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES. 

It was decided by the Sirdar, from whom no successful appeal waspossible, that, after the occupation of Khartoum, the warcorrespondents had no longer any pretext for remaining in the country. There were no questions raised by the military to excuse their ruling. No more was heard about the difficulties of transport, the scarcity ofprovisions, and everything being required for the soldiers. Had notthe keen Greek sutlers, as usual, followed the army in shoals, managing somehow to convey themselves and their goods to the front? Wehad not been two days encamped at Omdurman before some of thesetraders arrived, and, dumping their sacks and boxes by the wayside, started selling forthwith. The natives, too, speedily reassured, brought out and squatted before baskets of dates, onions, and othercomestibles they were anxious to dispose of for English or Egyptianmoney. Rightly contemning the Khalifa's coinage as practicallyvalueless, they refused to accept it in payment, and proffered to sellall they possessed at the price of old copper. The British troopsmade their triumphal entry into Omdurman on the 5th of September, andseveral of the correspondents left for England the same day. We whoremained had a sort of Hobson's choice, either to return to Cairo onthe 8th September or to remain in Omdurman out of which we should notbe allowed to stir until all the British troops had gone, when weshould have to leave with the last batch. Which course we should adoptwas with fine humour left to be decided by a majority of ourselves. For once the Press was practically unanimous and elected to shake thedust of the Soudan from their feet, and so it came about that the warcorrespondents had to fold their tents and go, disposing of theirquadrupeds as best they could. There was no alternative in the case ofthe horses between accepting any price for them or shooting them, for, in the Soudan, there being no grazing, a horse must have a master orstarve. I disposed of a Ł40 animal for Ł1 and got but little more forthree others. The camels and stores fetched somewhat better prices. Our servants we took back to their homes. 

Yet for sundry reasons I was anxious to be allowed to remain longer inthe Soudan. There was news of fighting and movement up the Blue Nile. Emir Ahmed Fadl bringing a force of 3000 dervishes from Gedarif toassist the Khalifa had been driven back by the gunboat "Sultan. " Moreimportant still, rumours had reached us that the French, underMarchand, were at Fashoda. I knew that the Sirdar intended sending aforce upon the gunboats up the White Nile to Fashoda and Sobat, so Imade both verbal and written requests to the General for permission toaccompany the expedition. That, I was told, could not be granted. Wehad full confirmation of the fact that Major Marchand was at Fashodabrought down to Omdurman on the 7th September by the dervish steamer"Tewfikieh. " I boarded her and had a long chat with the captain (reis)and members of the crew, all of whom wore jibbehs. The little craftwas an ex-Thames, above-the-bridges, penny steamer with Penn'soscillating engines. She was one of the boats Gordon sent fromKhartoum in 1884 to meet the Desert Column at Metemmeh. She was, ifpossible, more dilapidated-looking than ever. By guarded questioning Iascertained that the "Tewfikieh" was three days out from Fashoda. Sheand the "Safieh, " another dervish steamer, had been hotly fired uponby the French who were occupying the old Egyptian fort with 100Senegalese or natives of Timbuctoo. A number of local natives, Shilluks, who had long been hostile to the dervishes, wereco-operating with the strangers. The reis accurately described theFrench flag which was flying over the works and the appearance of theEuropeans. I was also able to procure several of the Lebel riflebullets that had entered the upper structure of the steamer. Thecensor struck out from my telegrams all allusion to the presence ofthe French at Fashoda, and I had to wait until I returned to LowerEgypt to transmit the news to London. I openly held that the Fashodaaffair should be promptly and fully disclosed to the British public, and I acted upon that conviction. 

The "Safieh" remained up the Nile, making fast to the bank about 100miles north of Fashoda, to await the return of the "Tewfikieh" withorders from the Khalifa and reinforcements to destroy the French. Nodoubt there was an attempt made to carry out an Anglophobe idea ofeffecting a friendly alliance with the Mahdists so as to secure toFrance the right of access to the Nile and the Bahr el Ghazal. It wasan effort to achieve the impossible, to negotiate a treaty with wildbeasts. Had the dervishes, or even the "Safieh's" people who weredrumming up recruits, been granted a fortnight to do it in theMarchand expedition would have been totally destroyed. The "Tewfikieh"arrived in a dust-storm and passed the Sirdar's gunboats unseen, andit was not until she got to Omdurman that the dervish reis and crewrealised what had happened. With quick wit the skipper acted, forthose who go upon waters are of a catholicity of creed andgood-fellowship very different from ordinary landsmen. He ran hiscraft to the bank, landed with one of his crew and paid a visit toheadquarters, where he surrendered himself and his craft. Both were atonce accepted, and during the course of the same day the "Tewfikieh"again hoisted the Khedivial flag and was employed in towing and ferrywork. The captain and crew stood by their ship working her, and thoughdressed as dervishes were on the flotilla muster-roll for wages andrations. The like befell the other dervish steamers that came intothe Sirdar's hands. For two days there was a sale of the lootcaptured by the army. Arms, drums, flags, and nearly all the smallerarticles found in the arsenal were auctioned. Some Ł4000 or more ofivory and other merchandise were put aside. On the first day bigprices were paid by officers and men for trophies, but the followingday spears and swords were sold for trifling sums. The money derivedfrom the sale was set aside for distribution as prize money. All thebattalions, batteries, and corps had, however, free gifts of guns, flags, or other trophies for souvenirs. On the afternoon of the 8thSeptember the correspondents and their belongings proceeded on thehorribly frowsy, rat-overrun, dervish steamer "Bordein" to Dakhala, the railhead. The steamer was packed upon and below deck with Britishsoldiers, about 50 of whom were sick, whilst several were wounded. Stowed almost like cattle, sitting, squatting, lying anywhere, anyhow, without shade or shelter, we underwent two days of it on board. It wasfound necessary to tie up occasionally for wood (fuel), and at nightthe steamer was always moored to the bank. These occasions providedthe needed opportunity to prepare and partake of meals, and find spaceto sleep upon the shore. But it was war-time, and extra roughing-it isalways an accompaniment of the game in uncivilised countries. Within aweek, thanks to the desert railway and the post-boats, we were backenjoying the delicious flesh-pots of Egypt, first on board MessrsCook's magnificent Nile steamers, and thereafter in Shepheard's hotel, Cairo. 

On the way down I saw something and heard more of the excellentbase-hospital established at Abadia, of which Lieut. -Col. Clery, R. A. M. C. , was in charge. Landing stages had been erected for receivingthe sick and wounded, and wells were dug from which, owing toinfiltration, clear water was drawn for use in the hospital. Allwater, however, used for food or drink was in addition filtered andboiled. The percentage of recovery by patients was eminentlysatisfactory. Major Battersby, R. A. M. C, had a Röntgen Ray apparatuswhich was employed in twenty-two cases to locate bullets andfractures. In connection with the treatment of the sick and wounded, it is to be regretted that earlier and greater use was not made of theNational Aid Society's offer to provide steamers properly fitted forcarrying invalids. A railway journey in Egypt or the Soudan is, at thebest, a painful experience for even those who are well. From Assouanto Cairo every invalided soldier could and should have beentransported by water, on just such a craft as the hospital, "Mayflower, " which the Society promptly and admirably equipped themoment the authorities gave their consent. As early as June 1898Lieut. -Col. Young, on behalf of the Red Cross Society, wroteintimating a desire to assist, entirely at their own expense, in theexpedition. This application met with a refusal, and it was not untilthe 1st of August 1898 that the Foreign Office replied to a subsequentappeal that the Sirdar would gladly accept their proffer. Had thematter been settled in June, instead of August, there could have beenthree hospital ships plying, enough to transport every sick soldierby water. By the 6th of September the "Mayflower" was ready with acrew and a complement of nurses. The army provided their own medicalstaff, the Society running the steamer and supplying the cuisine, which was under the direction of a French "chef. " The "Mayflower" wasable to convey, in most comfortable quarters, with every possibleattention to their needs, seventy-two sick and wounded soldiers. Pjamas, socks, shirts and other necessaries were given free to everypatient. The steamer did good service, making at least three roundtrips to bring down patients. 

The wounds received in battle had scarce been dressed before theSirdar was seeking to give effect to his schemes for the well-being ofthe Soudanese. Means were taken for the speedy connecting by telegraphof Suakin and Berber, Suakin, Kassala, Gedarif, Khartoum. The wirefrom Dakhala to Nasri was brought on to Omdurman a few days after thevictory. Arrangements were further made to bridge the Atbara and carryforward the Wady Halfa-Abu Hamed-Dakhala line along the east bank to apoint upon the Blue Nile opposite Khartoum. That railway will becompleted in 1899, and there will be through train service from WadyHalfa to the junction of the two Niles. With the suitable steamersalready in hand, there should be, all the year round, watercommunication up the Blue Nile for hundreds of miles, and upon theWhite Nile, with a few porterages, to the Great Equatorial Lakes, andwest through the Bahr el Ghazal country. So much was for commerce, formaterial benefaction, but there was besides recognition of what wasdue to higher needs. I knew the Sirdar had long entertained the ideaof fitly commemorating General Gordon's glorious self-abnegation instriving to help the natives, single-handed, fighting unto deathignorance and fanaticism. A scheme that would provide for theeducation of the youth of the Soudan, conveying to them the stores ofknowledge taught in the colleges of civilised countries, was what heaimed at. The desired institution should be founded in Khartoum, whichwas to become a centre of light and guidance for the new nation beingborn to rule Central Africa. As the Mussulman is nothing if notfanatical whenever religious questions are introduced, it was to be afoundation solely devoted to teaching exact knowledge without any"ism. "

I had the opportunity afforded me of several conversations with theSirdar upon the subject so dear to him, "a Gordon Memorial College inKhartoum. " The substance of these interviews I cabled fully to the_Daily Telegraph_, which, with most other journals, warmly advocatedthe carrying out of the scheme. It was certain that Gordon andKhartoum would remain objects of interest to our race, and that publicsentiment demanded the erection of some proper memorial of the sadpast. Nothing better than the founding of a People's College could bethought of. Lamentable ignorance of the world and all therein was andyet is the direct curse of the land. The natives have had noopportunity of learning anything beyond the parrot-smattering of theKoran, the one book of Moslem schools. The rudimentary knowledgecommon to British schoolboys transcends all the learning of the wisein the Soudan. The people, Arabs and blacks, are docile and capable ofreadily learning everything taught in the ordinary scholasticcurriculum at home. With a minimum annual income of Ł1500 a year, teachers and apparatus could, it was said, be provided, although inaddition five or six thousand pounds sterling would be required forpreliminary outlay. The land and part of the necessary buildings, theSirdar intimated, would probably be presented as a gift by theEgyptian Government. It would be futile, as all knew, trying tosucceed with a staff of native teachers. Tribal relations and othercauses stood in the way, and unless the college was to be doomed tofailure it would have to be launched and conducted by virile Europeanprofessors. Much if not all of the food required for the staff andscholars could be purchased cheaply or might be raised in the collegegrounds by the pupils themselves. Technical training would be taughthand in hand with the ordinary courses. These were the outlines of theSirdar's communications, who, by the way, at that date was alreadybeing known as Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. It having been noticed thatcertain dignitaries and others were, through the press, ruining thescheme by attempts to foist upon it theological and medical schools, acomplete answer was found for their statements by a near relative ofGordon Pasha. In the course of conversation he referred to what I knewto be the facts, that the British and Egyptian army doctors whereverstationed in the Soudan, or from Assouan south, were wont to givemedicines and professional services to the civil population free ofcharge. General Gordon, I was authorised to state, was nonarrow-spirited Christian, for he always put the need of givingeducation before attempts at proselytising. It is not generally knownamongst strait-laced sectarians or churchmen that Gordon Pasha, at hisown expense, built a mosque for the devout Mohammedans whom he ruled, and that his name, as worthy to be remembered in Moslem annals, isinscribed upon the walls of the Mosque at Mecca. That General Gordonwas a staunch Christian goes without saying, but he was no churl whocould not esteem and respect the faith of his fellow-men. But the caseis well summed up in Lord Kitchener's subsequent letter to the press. 

The Sirdar wrote:--

 "SIR, --I trust that it will not be thought that I am trespassing too much upon the goodwill of the British public, or that I am exceeding the duties of a soldier, if I call your attention to an issue of very grave importance arising immediately out of the recent campaign in the Soudan. That region now lies in the pathway of our Empire, and a numerous population has become practically dependent upon men of our race. 

 "A responsible task is henceforth laid upon us, and those who have conquered are called upon to civilise. In fact, the work interrupted since the death of Gordon must now be resumed. 

 "It is with this conviction that I venture to lay before you a proposal which, if it met with the approval and support of the British public and of the English-speaking race, would prove of inestimable benefit to the Soudan and to Africa. The area of the Soudan comprises a population of upwards of three million persons, of whom it may be said that they are wholly uneducated. The dangers arising from that fact are too obvious and have been too painfully felt during many years past for me to dwell upon them. In the course of time, no doubt, an education of some sort, and administered by some hands, will be set on foot. But if Khartoum could be made forthwith the centre of an education supported by British funds and organised from Britain, there would be secured to this country indisputably the first place in Africa as a civilising power, and an effect would be created which would be felt for good throughout the central regions of that continent. I accordingly propose that at Khartoum there should be founded and maintained with British money a college bearing the name of the Gordon Memorial College, to be a pledge that the memory of Gordon is still alive among us, and that his aspirations are at length to be realised. 

 "Certain questions will naturally arise as to whom exactly we should educate, and as to the nature of the education to be given. Our system would need to be gradually built up. We should begin by teaching the sons of the leading men, the heads of villages, and the heads of districts. They belong to a race very capable of learning and ready to learn. The teaching, in its early stages, would be devoted to purely elementary subjects, such as reading, writing, geography, and the English language. Later, and after these preliminary stages had been passed, a more advanced course would be instituted, including a training in technical subjects specially adapted to the requirements of those who inhabit the Valley of the Upper Nile. The principal teachers in the college would be British and the supervision of the arrangements would be vested in the Governor-General of the Soudan. I need not add that there would be no interference with the religion of the people. 

 "The fund required for the establishment of such a college is Ł100, 000. Of this, Ł10, 000 would be appropriated to the initial outlay, while the remaining Ł90, 000 would be invested, and the revenue thence derived would go to the maintenance of the college and the support of the staff of teachers. It would be clearly impossible at first to require payment from the pupils, but as the college developed and the standard of its teaching rose, it would be fair to demand fees in respect of this higher education, which would thus support itself, and render the college independent of any further call upon the public. It is for the provision of this sum of Ł100, 000 that I now desire to appeal, on behalf of a race dependent upon our mercy, in the name of Gordon, and in the cause of that civilisation which is the life of the Empire of Britain. 

 "I am authorised to state that Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to become the patron of the movement. His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has graciously consented to become vice-patron. 

 "I may state that a general council of the leading men of the country is in course of formation. Lord Hillingdon has kindly consented to accept the post of hon. Treasurer. The Hon. George Peel has accepted to act as hon. Secretary, and all communications should be addressed to him at 67, Lombard Street, London, E. C. Subscriptions should be paid to the Sirdar's Fund for the 'Gordon Memorial College' at Khartoum, Messrs Glyn, Mills, Currie, & Co. , 67, Lombard Street, London, E. C. 

 "Enclosed herewith is a letter from the Marquis of Salisbury, in which he states that this scheme represents the only policy by which the civilising mission of this country can effectively be accomplished. His lordship adds that it is only to the rich men of this country that it is possible for me to look, yet I should be glad for this appeal to find its way to all classes of our people. 

 "I further enclose a letter from the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, whose devotion to the cause of Africa has been not the least of her magnificent services. I forward, besides, an important telegram from the Lord Mayor of Liverpool, and letters of great weight from the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and the Lord Provost of Glasgow. I would venture to address myself to the other great municipalities of the Kingdom. 

 "Above all, it is in the hands of the Press of this country that I place this cause. I look with confidence to your support in the discharge of this high obligation. --I have the honour to remain, yours faithfully, "(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM. "

Lords Salisbury and Rosebery, and many more distinguished personages, followed the example of the Sovereign and the Prince of Wales andbecame supporters of the proposed institution. In the Metropolis aswell as in all the chief towns of the Kingdom the matter was taken upenthusiastically. An influential committee was formed. Thesubscriptions were showered in from home and abroad, wherever theEnglish tongue was spoken and Gordon had been known. In less than amonth the Ł100, 000, and considerably more, were subscribed, and theestablishment of the Memorial College assured. 

Lieut. -Colonel C. S. B. Parsons, R. A. , Governor of Kassala and the RedSea littoral, to whom I have previously referred when we wereadvancing against Omdurman, was menacing the dervish outpost ofGedarif. Later on, when Ahmed Fadl was marching to reinforce hismaster the Khalifa, Colonel Parsons was leading his Egyptians, Abyssinian irregulars, and friendlies from Kassala up the head watersor khor of the Atbara, far to the southward, and thence to a tributaryof the Blue Nile where the enemy had long had a garrison. The fifteenyears' campaign against Mahdism was nigh over, but not quiteconcluded, with the victory of Omdurman. On receiving the check fromthe gunboats, Fadl and his dervishes retreated up the Blue Nile towhere they had come from, their own country upon the borders ofAbyssinia. News seems to have reached them of Colonel Parsons'advance, and it became a race for Gedarif. The Egyptians had a goodstart, and managed to reach and capture the place and occupy the twoforts, one on either side of the river, or, what it is morefrequently, the khor, before the dervishes got back. Fadl was a manof mettle and resolutely assaulted the town and forts of which he hadso long been governor. A desperate action ensued, but Fadl was beatenoff with a loss of 700, it is said, in killed and wounded. Thecasualties in Colonel Parsons' force were about 100. But thedervishes, though severely beaten, soon returned to attack the forts. With increased numbers they sat down before the place and began toharass sorely the Egyptian troops, cutting their communications withKassala, whence by wire to Massowah over the Italian lines and up theRed Sea to Egypt the Sirdar was able to keep in touch with ColonelParsons. They endeavoured again, on several occasions, to storm one orother of the forts, which were about half a mile apart, but happilythey were invariably repulsed. Still they persisted in their tacticsof worrying, evidently determined to recapture the place. At lastmatters grew so serious that Major-General Rundle was sent with abrigade of infantry and several batteries to deal with Ahmed Fadl'sdervishes. Advancing up the Blue Nile in gunboats, the Egyptian forcecleared the banks of all the many wandering armed bands of the enemy. Through the aid of the wily Abyssinian scouts, information was sent toand received from Colonel Parsons and a plan arranged for catchingFadl and his men between two attacking columns. Seventeen hundred menof the Omdurman force attacked the dervishes on one side, whilstColonel Parsons' garrison assailed them from the other. The enemy werecompletely routed and scattered in all directions. Hundreds ofdervishes were slain, and ultimately many who escaped were so closelypressed by friendlies and Abyssinians that they surrendered. Athousand fugitive Baggara or so vainly tried to make their way up theBlue Nile, in order to retire to their former country in Kordofan. They were caught crossing far up stream, near Rosaires, by ColonelLewis, vigorously attacked, defeated, and finally scattered. Thus thelast dervish army in the field was destroyed, and the countryreclaimed to the side of peace, order, and civilised government. 

The following are the official despatches of Lieutenant-General SirFrancis Grenfell, who commanded the British troops in Egypt, and ofthe Sirdar, relating to the battle of Omdurman:--

 THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES. 

 Headquarters, Cairo, _September 16, 1898_. 

 SIR, --1. I have the honour to forward a despatch from Major-General Sir H. Kitchener, K. C. B. , Sirdar, describing the later phases of the Soudan Campaign, and the final action on 2nd September. 

 2. The Sirdar, in this despatch, recounts in brief, simple terms the events of the closing phase of one of the most successful campaigns ever conducted by a British General against a savage foe, resulting in the capture of Omdurman, the destruction of the dervish power in the Soudan, and the reopening of the waterway to the Equatorial Provinces. 

 3. The concentration of the army on the Atbara was carried out to the hour, and the arrangements for the transport of the force to the vicinity of the battle-field were made by the Sirdar and his staff with consummate ability. All difficulties were foreseen and provided for, and, from the start of the campaign to its close at Omdurman, operations have been conducted with a precision and completeness which have been beyond all praise; while the skill shown in the advance was equalled by the ability with which the army was commanded in the field. 

 The Sirdar's admirable disposition of the force, the accurate fire of the artillery and Maxims, and the steady fire discipline of the infantry, assisted by the gunboats, enabled him to destroy his enemy at long range before the bulk of the British and Egyptian force came under any severe rifle fire, and to this cause may be attributed the comparatively small list of casualties. Never were greater results achieved at such a trifling cost. 

 4. The heavy loss in killed and wounded in the 21st Lancers is to be deeply regretted. But the charge itself, against an overwhelming force of sword and spear men over difficult ground, and under unfavourable conditions, was worthy of the best traditions of British cavalry. 

 5. As regards the force employed, I can say with truth that never, in the course of my service, have I seen a finer body of troops than the British contingent of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry placed at the disposal of the Sirdar, as regards physique, smartness, and soldierlike bearing. The appearance of the men speaks well for the present recruiting department, and was a source of pride to every Englishman who saw them. 

 6. While thoroughly endorsing the Sirdar's recommendations, I desire to call attention to the good work done by Major-General Henderson, C. B. , and staff at Alexandria, who conducted the disembarkation of the force, and by my own staff at Cairo. 

 On Colonel H. Cooper, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. -Colonel L. A. Hope, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, fell the brunt of the work in the despatch of the British Division to the front. 

 I also desire to acknowledge the services of Brevet-Colonel A. O. Green, Commanding Royal Engineer; Surgeon-General H. S. Muir, M. D. , Principal Medical Officer; Lieut. -Colonel F. O. Leggett, Army Ordnance Department; Colonel F. Treffry, Army Pay Department; Veterinary-Captain Blenkinsop, and the junior officers of the various departments. 

 Major Williams, my C. R. A. , was indefatigable in organising the mule transport for the 32nd and 37th Field Batteries. 

 7. I have received the greatest assistance from the Egyptian Railway Administration in the movements of the troops both going south and returning. 

 Thanks to the admirable system organised by Iskander Bey Fahmy, the traffic manager, all the services were rapidly and punctually carried out. 

 8. I am sending this despatch home by my _Aide-de-camp_, Lieutenant H. Grenfell, 1st Life Guards, who acted as Orderly Officer to Brigadier-General Honourable N. G. Lyttelton, C. B. , commanding Second British Brigade in the Soudan. --I have, &c. , FRANCIS GRENFELL, Lieutenant-General, Commanding in Egypt. 

The despatch from Major-General Sir Herbert Kitchener, Sirdar, toLieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, commanding in Egypt, was asfollows:--

 Omdurman, _September 5, 1898_. 

 SIR, --It having been decided that an expeditionary force of British and Egyptian troops should be sent against the Khalifa's army in Omdurman, I have the honour to inform you that the following troops were concentrated at the North End of the Sixth Cataract, in close proximity to which an advanced supply depôt had been previously formed at Nasri Island. 

 BRITISH TROOPS. --21st Lancers; 32nd Field Battery, Royal Artillery; 37th Howitzer Battery, Royal Artillery; 2 40-prs. , Royal Artillery. Infantry Division:--1st Brigade: 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders, 6 Maxims, Detachment Royal Engineers. 2nd Brigade: 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 4 Maxims, Detachment Royal Engineers. 

 EGYPTIAN TROOPS. --9 Squadrons, Cavalry; 1 Battery, Horse Artillery; 4 Field Batteries; 10 Maxims; 8 Companies, Camel Corps. 1st Brigade: 2nd Egyptian Battalion; 9th, 10th, and 11th Soudanese Battalions. 2nd Brigade: 8th Egyptian Battalion; 12th, 13th, and 14th Soudanese Battalions. 3rd Brigade: 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Egyptian Battalions. 4th Brigade: 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian Battalions. Camel Transport. 

 On 24th August the troops began moving by successive divisions to Jebel Royan, where a depôt of supplies and a British communication hospital of two hundred beds were established. 

 On 28th August, the army marched to Wadi el Abid, and on the following day proceeded to Sayal, from whence I despatched a letter to the Khalifa, warning him to remove his women and children, as I intended to bombard Omdurman unless he surrendered. 

 Next day the army marched to Sururab, and on September 1 reached the village of Egeiga, two miles south of the Kerreri hills, and within six miles of Omdurman. Patrols of the enemy's horsemen were frequently seen during the march falling back before our cavalry, and their outposts being driven in beyond Egeiga, our advanced scouts came in full view of Omdurman, from which large bodies of the enemy were seen streaming out and marching north. 

 At noon, from the slopes of Jebel Surgham, I saw the entire dervish army some three miles off advancing towards us, the Khalifa's black flag surrounded by his Mulazimin (body-guard) being plainly discernible. I estimated their numbers at 35, 000 men, though, from subsequent investigation, this figure was probably under-estimated, their actual strength being between forty and fifty thousand. From information received, I gather that it was the Khalifa's intention to have met us with this force at Kerreri, but our rapid advance surprised him. 

 The troops were at once disposed around the village of Egeiga, which formed an excellent position with a clear field of fire in every direction, and shelter-trenches and zerebas were prepared. 

 At 2 p. M. Our vedettes reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. Information was received that the Khalifa contemplated a night attack on our position, and preparations to repel this were made, at the same time the Egeiga villagers were sent out to obtain information in the direction of the enemy's camp with the idea that we intended a night attack, and, this coming to the Khalifa's knowledge, he decided to remain in his position; consequently, we passed an undisturbed night in the zereba. 

 Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, which had shelled the dervish advanced camp near Kerreri on 31st August, proceeded at daylight on 1st September, towing the Howitzer Battery to the right bank, whence, in conjunction with the Irregulars under Major Stuart Wortley, their advance south was continued. After two forts had been destroyed and the villages gallantly cleared by the Irregulars, the Howitzers were landed in a good position on the right bank, from whence an effective fire was opened on Omdurman, and, after a few rounds, the conspicuous dome over the Mahdi's tomb was partially demolished, whilst the gunboats, steaming past the town, also effectually bombarded the forts, which replied with a heavy, but ill-directed fire. 

 At dawn on the following morning (2nd September), our mounted patrols reported the enemy advancing to attack, and by 6. 30 a. M. The Egyptian Cavalry, which had been driven in, took up a position with the Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and four Maxims on the Kerreri ridge on our right flank. 

 At 6. 40 a. M. The shouts of the advancing dervish army became audible, and a few minutes later their flags appeared over the rising ground, forming a semi-circle round our left and front faces. The guns of the 32nd Field Battery opened fire at 6. 45 a. M. At a range of two thousand eight hundred yards, and the dervishes, continuing to advance rapidly, delivered their attack with all their accustomed dash and intrepidity. In a short time the troops and Maxims on the left and front were hotly engaged, whilst the enemy's riflemen, taking up positions on the slopes of Jebel Surgham, brought a long-range fire to bear on the zereba, causing some casualties, and their spearmen, continually reinforced from the rear, made attempt after attempt to reach our lines. 

 Shortly after 8. 0 a. M. The enemy's main attack was repulsed. At this period a large and compact body of dervishes was observed attempting to march round our right, and advancing with great rapidity they soon became engaged with our mounted troops on the Kerreri ridge. One of the gunboats which had been disposed to protect the river flanks at once proceeded down stream to afford assistance to the somewhat hardly-pressed mounted troops, and coming within close range of the dervishes inflicted heavy loss on them, upwards of 450 men being killed in a comparatively circumscribed area. The Artillery and Maxims on the left face of the zereba also co-operated, and the enemy was forced to retire again under cover of the hills. 

 All attacks on our position having failed, and the enemy having retired out of range, I sent out the 21st Lancers to clear the ground on our left front and head off any retreating dervishes from the direction of Omdurman. After crossing the slopes of Jebel Surgham they came upon a body of dervishes concealed in a depression of the ground; these they gallantly charged, but finding, too late to withdraw, that a much larger body of the enemy lay hidden, the charge was pressed home through them, and, after rallying on the other side, they rode back, driving off the dervishes, and remaining in possession of the ground. Considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy; but I regret to say that here fell Lieutenant R. Grenfell (12th Lancers) and twenty men. 

 Meanwhile I had ordered the army to follow in échelon of brigades from the left. At 9. 30 a. M. The front brigades having reached the sand ridge running from the west end of Jebel Surgham towards the river, a halt was ordered to enable the rear brigades to get into position, and I then received information that the Khalifa was still present in force on the left slopes of Surgham; a change of front half-right of the three leading brigades was, therefore, ordered, and it was during this movement that Macdonald's brigade became hotly engaged, whilst taking up position on the right of the échelon. 

 Learning from General Hunter, who was with Macdonald's brigade, that he might require support, I despatched Wauchope's brigade to reinforce him, and ordered the remaining brigades to make a further change half-right. 

 No sooner had Macdonald repelled the dervish onslaught than the force, which had retired behind the Kerreri hills, emerged again into the plain and rapidly advanced to attack him, necessitating a further complete change of front of his brigade to the right. This movement was admirably executed, and now, supported by a portion of Wauchope's brigade on the right and by Lewis's brigade enfilading the attack on the left, he completely crushed this second most determined dervish charge. 

 Meantime Maxwell's and Lyttelton's brigades had been pushed on over the slopes of Jebel Surgham, and driving before them the dervish forces under the Khalifa's son, Osman Sheikh ed Din, they established themselves in a position which cut off the retreat on Omdurman of the bulk of the dervish army, who were soon seen streaming in a disorganised mass towards the high hills many miles to the west, closely pursued by the mounted troops, who cleared the right front and flanks of all hesitating and detached parties of the enemy. 

 The battle was now practically over, and Lyttelton's and Maxwell's brigades marched down to Khor Shambat, in the direction of Omdurman, which was reached at 12. 30 p. M. , and here the troops rested and watered. The remainder of Hunter's division and Wauchope's brigade reached the same place at 3 p. M. 

 At 2 p. M. I advanced with Maxwell's brigade and the 32nd Field Battery through the suburbs of Omdurman to the great wall of the Khalifa's enclosure, and, leaving two guns and three battalions to guard the approaches, the 13th Soudanese Battalion and four guns (32nd Field Battery) were pushed down by the north side of the wall to the river, and, accompanied by three gunboats which had been previously ordered to be ready for this movement, these troops penetrated the breaches in the wall made by the howitzers, marched south along the line of forts, and turning in at the main gateway found a straight road leading to the Khalifa's house and Mahdi's tomb; these were speedily occupied, the Khalifa having quitted the town only a short time before our entry, after a vain effort to collect his men for further resistance. 

 The gunboats continued up the river clearing the streets of dervishes, and, having returned to the remainder of the brigade left at the corner of the wall, these were pushed forward, and occupied all the main portions of the town. Guards were at once mounted over the principal buildings and Khalifa's stores, and after visiting the prison and releasing the European prisoners, the troops bivouacked at 7 p. M. Around the town, after a long and trying day, throughout which all ranks displayed qualities of high courage, discipline, and endurance. 

 The gunboats and Egyptian Cavalry and Camel Corps at once started in pursuit south; but owing to the exhausted condition of the animals and the flooded state of the country, which prevented them from communicating with the gunboat carrying their forage and rations, they were reluctantly obliged to abandon the pursuit after following up the flying Khalifa for 30 miles through marshy ground. The gunboats continued south for 90 miles, but were unable to come in touch with the Khalifa, who left the river and fled westward towards Kordofan, followed by the armed friendly tribes who took up the pursuit on the return of the mounted troops. 

 Large stores of ammunition, powder, some sixty guns of various sorts, besides vast quantities of rifles, swords, spears, banners, drums, and other war materials, were captured on the battle-field and in Omdurman. 

 The result of this battle is the practical annihilation of the Khalifa's army, the consequent extinction of Mahdism in the Soudan, and the submission of the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian authority. This has re-opened vast territories to the benefits of peace, civilisation, and good government. 

 On 4th September the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted with due ceremony on the walls of the ruined Palace of Khartoum, close to the spot where General Gordon fell, and this event is looked upon by the rejoicing populations as marking the commencement of a new era of peace and prosperity for their unfortunate country. 

 It would be impossible for any Commander to have been more ably seconded than I was by the General Officers serving under me. Major-Generals Hunter, Rundle, and Gatacre have displayed the highest qualities as daring and skilful leaders, as well as being endowed with administrative capabilities of a high order. It is in the hands of such officers that the Service may rest assured their best interests will, under all circumstances, be honourably upheld, and while expressing to them my sincere thanks for their cordial co-operation with me, I have every confidence in most highly recommending the names of these General Officers for the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government. 

 The manner in which the Brigadiers handled their respective brigades, their thorough knowledge of their profession, and their proved skill in the field, mark them out, one and all, as fitted for higher rank, and I have great pleasure in submitting their names for favourable consideration:--Brigadier-Generals N. G. Lyttelton and A. G. Wauchope; Lieutenant-Colonels J. G. Maxwell, H. A. Macdonald, D. F. Lewis and J. Collinson. 

 Macdonald's brigade was highly tested, bearing the brunt of two severe attacks delivered at very short intervals from different directions, and I am sure it must be a source of the greatest satisfaction to Colonel Macdonald, as it is to myself and the whole army, that the very great care he has for long devoted to the training of his brigade has proved so effectual, enabling his men to behave with the greatest steadiness under most trying circumstances, and repelling most successfully two determined dervish onslaughts. 

 I should also mention under this category the excellent services performed by Colonel R. H. Martin, commanding 21st Lancers; by Lieut. -Colonel Long, commanding the combined British and Egyptian Artillery; and by Lieut. -Colonel R. G. Broadwood, commanding the Egyptian Cavalry; as well as by Major R. J. Tudway, commanding the Camel Corps. I consider that these various arms could not have been more efficiently commanded than they were throughout the recent operations. The best result was, I believe, attained, and it is due to the skilful handling of their respective commands that the dervish defeat was so complete. 

 The Medical Department was administered with ability and skill by Surgeon-General Taylor, Principal Medical Officer, who was well assisted by Colonel M'Namara, whilst the medical organisation of the Egyptian Army fully maintained its previous excellent reputation under the direction of Lieut. -Colonel Gallwey and his staff. The general medical arrangements were all that could have been desired, and I believe the minimum of pain and maximum of comfort procurable on active service in this country was attained by the unremitting energy, untiring zeal, and devotion to their duty of the entire medical staff. 

 Owing to the long line of communications by rail, river, and desert, the work of maintaining a thoroughly efficient supply and transport system, both by land and water, was arduous in the extreme, and that a large British and Egyptian force was brought up to within striking distance of Khartoum, amply supplied with all its requirements, reflects the greatest credit on the supply and transport system. I wish to cordially thank the officers of the Supply, Transport and Railway Departments for the satisfactory results which have attended their labours. 

 I consider that the excellent ration which was always provided kept the men strong and healthy and fit to endure all the hardships of an arduous campaign, enabling them, at a critical moment, to support the exceptional fatigue of continuous marching and fighting for some fourteen hours during the height of a Soudan summer. 

 The Intelligence Department were, as usual, thoroughly efficient, and their forecasts of the intentions and actions of the enemy were accurate. Colonel Wingate and Slatin Pacha worked indefatigably, and, with their staff, deserve a prominent place amongst those to whom the success of the operations is due. 

 The excellent service performed by the gunboats under Commander Keppel and his subordinate officers of the Royal Navy is deserving of special mention. These gunboats have been for a long time past almost constantly under fire; they have made bold reconnaissances past the enemy's forts and rifle pits, and on the 1st and 2nd September, in conjunction with the Irregular levies under Major Stuart Wortley, and the Howitzer Battery, they materially aided in the capture of all the forts on both banks of the Nile, and in making the fortifications of Omdurman untenable. In bringing to notice the readiness of resource, daring, and ability of Commander Keppel and his officers, I wish also to add my appreciation of the services rendered by Engineer E. Bond, Royal Navy, and the engineering staff, as well as of the detachments of the Royal Marine Artillery and the gun crews, who have gained the hearty praise of their commanders. 

 The Rev. R. Brindle, the Rev. J. M. Simms, the Rev. A. W. B. Watson, and the Rev. O. S. Watkins won the esteem of all by their untiring devotion to their sacred duties and by their unfailing and cheerful kindness to the sick and wounded at all times. 

 To all my personal staff my thanks are specially due for the great assistance they at all times rendered me. 

 In conclusion, I have great pleasure in expressing my appreciation of the services rendered by the detachments of the Royal Engineers, Army Ordnance Corps, and Telegraph and Postal Departments. 

The names of a large number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who had been brought to the Sirdar's notice for good servicewere appended to the despatch. 

Two other documents call for notice, the Queen's message and theSirdar's general order to his army after the victory. 

 "From the Queen to the Sirdar, Khartoum. --I congratulate you and all your brave troops under fire on the brilliant success which you have achieved. I am grieved for the losses which have been sustained, but trust the wounded are doing well. --VICTORIA. "

 "The Sirdar congratulates all the troops upon their excellent behaviour during the general action to-day, resulting in the total defeat of the Khalifa's forces and worthily avenging Gordon. The Sirdar regrets the loss that has occurred, and, while warmly thanking the troops, wishes to place on record his admiration for their courage, discipline, and endurance. 

 "(Signed) H. M. L. RUNDLE. "

Long lists of honours and promotions were subsequently published inthe _Gazette_. Of these, the more prominent officers who received suchrecognition of their distinguished services were as follows: TheSirdar was raised to the peerage as Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. Inaddition thereto the dignity G. C. B. Was conferred upon the Sirdar, andSir Francis Grenfell. Major-Generals W. F. Gatacre, A. Hunter, and H. M. L. Rundle were created K. C. B. 's, and the dignity of Companion ofthe Bath was granted to Surgeon-General William Taylor, Colonel V. Hatton, Colonel L. C. Money, Colonel T. E. Verner, Colonel W. H. M'Namara, R. A. M. C. , Lieut. -Col. R. A. Hope, Lieut. -Col. Collingwood, Lieut. -Col. D. F. Lewis, Lieut. -Col. J. Collinson, Lieut. -Col. W. E. G. Forbes, Lieut. -Col. M. Q. Jones, Lieut. -Col. F. R. South, Lieut. -Col. R. H. Martin, Lieut. -Col. W. G. C. Wyndham, and CommanderC. R. Keppel, R. N. Colonel F. R. Wingate was made a Knight Commanderof the Order of St Michael and St George, and a like dignity wasconferred upon Colonel R. Slatin Pasha. Distinguished Service Orderswere granted to the Rev. R. Brindle, Lieut. -Col. C. V. F. Townshend, Lieut. -Col. G. A. Hughes, Lieut. -Col. C. J. Blomfield, Lieut. -Col. F. Lloyd, Major E. J. M. Stuart Wortley, Major E. M. Wilson, R. A. M. C. , Major G. Cockburn, Major Hon. C. Lambton, Major N. E. Young, Major C. E. Laurie, and Major F. J. Maxse, Captain C. C. Fleming, R. A. M. C. , Lieutenant G. C. M. Hall, Lieutenant F. Hubbard. The Khedive conferredthe Medjidieh and Osmanlieh orders on a large number of officers. Others, whose names did not appear in the order list, figured in thatof army promotions. Victoria Crosses were given to Captain P. A. Kenna, 21st Lancers, Lieutenant R. H. L. J. De Montmorency, 21stLancers, Private Thomas Byrne, 21st Lancers (for turning back in thecharge and rescuing Lieutenant Molyneux), Captain N. M. Smyth, 2ndDragoon Guards. 

Lieut. -Col. H. A. Macdonald, C. B. , D. S. O. , was made an extra A. D. C. Tothe Queen. 

The Sirdar on his return to Lower Egypt met with an enthusiasticreception. Lord Cromer, Sir Francis Grenfell and all the notables inCairo met him and the troops turned out to escort him to hisresidence. He was entertained in Cairo at a grand banquet. When hevisited England even a heartier and grander welcome was extended tothe victor of Omdurman and the destroyer of Mahdism. The publicacclaimed him, and honours and dignities were showered upon him ere hereturned to resume his self-imposed task of reconstructing the Soudan. 

Colonel Hector A. Macdonald alone seems as yet to have had extended tohim scant military recognition of his invaluable services. The post ofA. D. C. To Her Majesty is a coveted dignity, but a mere honoraryoffice, carrying neither pay nor emolument. Indeed it is the otherway, for the accessories required to bedeck the person will cost atleast Ł25. But the fact cannot be forgotten, or cried down, thatColonel Macdonald saved the situation. He fought a single-handedbattle against tremendous odds and won. First he faced the Khalifa andfought him to a finish, and then faced about and served Sheikh EdDin's unbeaten dervishes in much the same fashion. For reasons thatcould be given, and which reflect no discredit upon the otherbrigadier, Colonel Lewis' force was not moved promptly up toMacdonald's support. Honour lists and promotion lists still keepcropping up, and possibly the military authorities are yetdeliberating what is the right thing to do in Macdonald's case. In theScotch press, and particularly in that of the Far North, there hasbeen much adverse comment on the ungenerous treatment accorded theircountryman. The Highlanders, as is their nature, write and speakpassionately of the matter, and pertinently ask if the authoritieswish no more Highland recruits. From the paper of his own district, the Dingwall _North Star_, I quote the following lines:--

 "In glen and clachan, England's tardy debt The clansmen's pride will adequately pay: Round Nor'land hearths when lamplit nights are long, Thy fame shall ever live in many a tale and song. "

The battle of Omdurman was not the only occasion in which ColonelMacdonald has exhibited magnificent tactical skill combined withsoldierly dash and undaunted courage. It is not so long since theAtbara was fought, and in half a score of engagements before that hequitted himself equally well. He was deservedly promoted from theranks, and to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts is due the credit of havingdiscovered and properly appreciated the gallant Highlandman. Hisrecord is one for any man to be proud of, for to his own hand he oweshis present distinguished position. I again quote from the _NorthStar_:--

 "Colonel Macdonald was born at Rootfield, in the parish of Urquhart, in the county of Ross and Cromarty, and on the property of Mr Mackenzie of Allangrange. He began life as a stable-boy with Bailie Robertson, of the National Hotel, Dingwall, when tenant of the farm of Kinkell, Conon Bridge. At the age of seventeen he went to Inverness and became an apprentice draper with Mr William Mackay, late of the Clan Tartan Warehouse. In this capacity he served two years, but finding mercantile life distasteful to him, he enlisted in the 92nd Regiment. Here his qualities procured for him rapid promotion. He successively and successfully discharged the duties of drill-instructor, pay-sergeant, and other non-commissioned offices, and held the rank of colour-sergeant at the commencement of the Afghan campaign, wherein he repeatedly so greatly distinguished himself. 

 "Macdonald's first engagement with an enemy was at Jagi Thanni. On that occasion General Roberts, escorted by the 9th Lancers and 5th Punjaub Cavalry, advanced from Ali Kheyl to Kushi, and, while passing by Jagi Thanni, he was attacked by about 2000 Mangals and Machalgah Ghilzais, who there lay in ambush. Fortunately, early intimation of the Mangals' hostile intentions reached Fort Karatiga, a mile or two off, and a party of 45 men of the 3rd Sikhs, under Jemander Shere Mahomed Khan, was at once sent out to reconnoitre, and, as firing was soon afterwards heard in the direction the party had gone, Colour-Sergeant Macdonald promptly turned out with 18 men of his own regiment, and overtaking the Sikhs, he took over command of the whole, and, gallantly leading his little force across a difficult river and up a steep hill, he boldly attacked and dislodged the enemy from a strong position on the crest, but not before four of the Sikhs were killed, and Deputy-Surgeon-General Townsend, who rode near General Roberts, severely wounded. The enemy's loss here was about 30 killed. Macdonald's brilliant services on this occasion averted something like a disaster. In a Divisional Order, Roberts wrote:--'The above non-commissioned officer and a native officer, with a handful of soldiers, drove before them a large body of Mangals, who had assembled to stop the road, . . . The great coolness, judgment, and gallantry with which they behaved. ' In his despatch, dated Cabul, 15th October, and published in the _Gazette_, General Roberts further said:--'Meanwhile, a warm engagement had for some time been carried on in the direction of Karatiga, and presently large numbers of the enemy were seen retreating before a small detachment of the 92nd Highlanders and 3rd Sikhs, which had been sent out from Karatiga, and which was, with excellent judgment and boldness, led up a steep spur commanding the defile. The energy and skill with which this party was handled reflected the highest credit on Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald, 92nd Highlanders, and Jemander Shere Mahomed, 3rd Sikhs. But for their excellent services on this occasion, it might probably have been impossible to carry out the programme of our march. ' In the same _Gazette_ was published another despatch from Sir F. Roberts, dated Cabul, 20th October, in which he says:--'Colour-Sergeant H. Macdonald, a non-commissioned officer, whose excellent and skilful management of a small detachment when opposed to immensely superior numbers in the Hazardarakht defile was mentioned in my despatch of the 16th instant, here again distinguished himself. ' This refers to his conduct at Charasiab, at the close of which action our brave countryman was sent for by Roberts, who publicly complimented and thanked him personally for 'the ability and intelligence with which he handled the party under his command' at the battle. Macdonald's commission was conferred on the recommendation of General Roberts, that distinguished officer having witnessed repeated proofs of his valour and capacity. "

In 1885 Colonel Macdonald joined the then reorganised EgyptianConstabulary and received rapid promotion. From these, on otherchanges being made, he passed into the Khedivial army, drilling andtraining new Soudanese levies. So thorough a soldier is too valuableto be longer left in the Soudan now that peace is assured. 

[Illustration: COL. H. MACDONALD AT OMDURMAN, WITH OFFICER ANDNON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER OF 1ST BRIGADE. ]

CHAPTER XV. 

THE FASHODA AFFAIR. --A RED BRITISH LINE THROUGH AFRICA. 

France is following in the footsteps of Spain. A fatality dogs herschemes of empire and colonisation. In truth she has no colonies--theyare but military possessions. She has set her face, alone and inconjunction with others, in America, Asia, and Africa to hoop ourenterprises in with bands of iron. Failure attended her policy acrossthe Atlantic, in India, in Burmah, and but the other day at Fashoda. Her object in that last instance was to connect her possessions inWest and East Africa, so that the red British lines which are steadilyextending from North and South Africa should never be joined. Franceis the largest holder of territory upon the Dark Continent, and sheprobably regarded that fact as the best justification for her subtlemove, through the Marchand and Abyssinian Missions, to add still moreto her dominions. She had been permitted to hoop us about at Bathurstand Sierra Leone upon the West Coast and has all but completed thesame process round Ashantee and the Niger countries, not to speak ofelsewhere. Madagascar she had grabbed without a shadow of excuse, buttime and South African civilisation will make it a bigger Cuba. Already her failures at government in that vast African island aregrievous. Less than five years ago, to use a phrase I have employedelsewhere, property and life were ridiculously safe in that country. But then the Hovas and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony ruled the land. Other changes predicted have come about there. The one native whoshowed honesty and courage in successfully opposing them at Tamatavethe French subsequently executed. The Queen and Prime Minister werebanished. Speaking English, the chief foreign language spoken, hasbeen tabooed. Natives who are heard using it, or suspected ofemploying our mother tongue, are thrust into prison and kept there, _pour encourager les autres_, until they promise to discontinuespeaking it. Association of natives with English or Americans rendersthem marked persons. The Protestant missions are regarded as centresof treason and enmity to French authority. Quickly, as foretold, hascome about their reward(?) for non-interference politically in theearly days of French intrigue. Had they insisted, with the BritishGovernment of a bygone day, in saving the island for the Malagasy, they would have succeeded. Our commerce has also had to suffer, forthe French _instruct_ the natives that they must only buy articles ofFrench manufacture. The native who purchases British or American goodssoon discovers, from the severe handling he receives through the localofficials, that he has made a serious mistake. Robbery andlawlessness are rife, and in many places neither life nor property issafe beyond rifle-shot of the French garrisons. The facts arenotorious and are in possession of the Foreign Office in DowningStreet. 

It had leaked out a day or two after the battle that the Sirdarintended accompanying the expedition to Fashoda. The troops ordered toproceed up the Nile with him were paraded outside Omdurman on themorning of the 8th of September. These were 600 men of the 11thSoudanese under Major Jackson, 600 men of the 13th Soudanese underMajor Smith Dorrian, 100 men of the Cameron Highlanders under Captainthe Hon. A. D. Murray, and Captain Peake's battery of 12˝-pounderMaxim-Nordenfeldt guns. At the same time the force that was to be sentacross to reoccupy and assist in rebuilding the ruined Governmentbuildings in Khartoum also turned out for inspection. Nothing was leftto chance. Care was taken that only those fit and well should proceedon the gunboats and barges to Fashoda. Provision was made that thework of reconstruction should go on in his absence, and that Khartoumand Omdurman should be left in a proper state of defence. A great airof official mystification and secrecy prevailed respecting everythingthat happened at that time. Particulars were difficult to glean of theactual condition of affairs up the Blue and White Niles. Even theplans for the removal of the military headquarters and there-establishment of the central authority in Khartoum were sealedagainst us. As the telegraph service was in the Sirdar's hands, muchof the pains bestowed to keep news from us was surely unnecessary. But the Sirdar has a way of bestowing confidences on no one--simplyissuing orders when the occasion arrives. 

Since my return to England a reference to the correspondence disclosedin the official despatches or Fashoda Blue-book proves the correctnessof the information that reached me even at that early stage. From thesummary of the documents which appeared in the _Daily Telegraph_ of10th October, we learn that "before the battle of Omdurman LordSalisbury had given instructions to the Sirdar through Lord Cromer, "as follows:--

 "It is desirable that you should be placed in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the line of action to be followed in the event of Khartoum being occupied at an early date by the forces now operating in the Soudan under the command of Sir Herbert Kitchener. 

 "Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate that after the occupation of Khartoum any further military operations on a large scale, or involving any considerable expense, will be undertaken for the occupation of the provinces to the south. But the Sirdar is authorised to send two flotillas, one up the White and the other up the Blue Nile. 

 "You are authorised to settle the composition of these two forces in consultation with the Sirdar. 

 "Sir Herbert Kitchener should in person command the White Nile flotilla as far as Fashoda, and may take with him a small body of British troops, should you concur with him in thinking such a course desirable. 

 "The officer in command of the Blue Nile flotilla is authorised to go as far as the foot of the cataract, which is believed to commence about Rosaires. He is not to land troops with a view to marching beyond the point on the river navigable for steamers. Should he, before reaching Rosaires, encounter any Abyssinian outposts, he is to halt, report the circumstance, and wait for further instructions. 

 "In dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who may be encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley. "

Although everybody engaged in the Fashoda expedition was repeatedlywarned not to disclose anything about it, and to forget all they hadseen or heard, I was enabled very shortly after the event to wire, dayby day, the whole story of the enterprise. It was General Grant, who, during the Civil War in the United States of America, terribly vexedat the newspaper correspondents, on one occasion vowed he would sendthem all away and not have a press-man in his army. "Then, General, "said the American journalist addressed, "may I ask what are you goingto do without soldiers, every man of them can speak and write?"General Grant saw the absurdity of the position and smiled, and therewas an end of the matter. It was, perhaps, a choice of one of twoevils, either accepting and making the best of the situation to allowthe trained journalists to remain, or to prepare to meet a tremendousinundation of wild letter-writing from all ranks that would find itsway into the public press and do incalculable harm. "Other times, other manners, " and those modern generals discredit themselves whofail to recognise at the close of the nineteenth century that theschoolmaster and the press must be reckoned with. 

The information given me by the reis of the "Tewfikieh" provedaccurate in almost every detail. I confess that, at the time, knowingthe Arab indifference to exactness in dates, I did not credit hisassertion that Marchand had reached Fashoda six weeks before thedervishes attacked him. Floating down stream in a small steam launch, aluminum row-boats, and other craft, the Frenchmen arrived off Fashodaon the 10th of July. In 1892-93 the French Government had begunsending military or quasi-scientific missions from the west and eastAfrican coasts to obtain treaties and pre-emption claims to territoryin the interior. That the French flag should wave from sea to sea wastheir confessed desire. Their incentive was to forestall and annoyGreat Britain and render worthless the blood and treasure our countrymight spend in smashing the dervishes. Major Marchand set out from thewest coast or French Congo in 1896, with a small body of Europeans andabout 500 Senegalese troops. With indomitable zeal and courage hepushed east, reaching the vast basin lands of the Bahr el Ghazal aftersore hardships and the loss of many of his men, chiefly from sickness. The spirit that animated the leader and his followers may be gatheredfrom the following lines which were written some time ago by anon-commissioned officer of Senegalese Rifles to his relatives. 

 "We have no rest, not even for a single day, as a moment's delay might render all our exertions useless. All that we shall have done will be wasted if the English or others occupy our route when we want to pass. When you read this letter we shall either be on the Nile or our bones will be slowly whitening in the Egyptian brushwood under a torrid sun. I verily believe that if we are destroyed I shall retain regret for our failure in another world. "

Fashoda is 444 miles by river south of Omdurman. It is situated uponthe west bank, on a low headland which at high Nile becomes an island. Before the Mahdist rising, Fashoda was a fortified Egyptian stationwith a garrison of 1000 men, and a native population of nearly 4000. The place was enclosed within a ditch and a sun-dried brick wall. Fromits position it commanded the passage of the Nile, which was less thanhalf a mile in width. The dervishes allowed the place to fall intoruins, only maintaining a very small garrison--less than 100 men--toraid for grain to supply Omdurman with, and to collect revenue fromthe native boats. Like the rest of the Soudan, the Shilluk country, inwhich Fashoda is situated, had suffered terribly and been sadlydepopulated. The country of the Shilluk negroes used to extend forseveral hundred miles northward down the left bank of the Nile fromthe Bahr el Ghazal. It was but a strip, ten miles or so in width, their nearest neighbours, with whom they were usually at war, beingthe Baggara Arabs. Like so many other riverain tracts susceptible ofcultivation, it once teemed with people, the villages along the banksappearing to be one continuous row of dwellings. Helped by theShilluks, Major Marchand had no difficulty in capturing Fashoda. Theold fortification was built upon the only accessible strip of dryland, at high Nile, available for miles along the bank in thatvicinity. Seen from the river, the works consisted of a rectangularmud-wall about 200 yards in length, protected by horse-shoe bastionsat the corners. The Khalifa being as usual in need of supplies sentout a small foraging expedition many weeks before our arrival on thescene. Starting in the steamers "Safieh" and "Tewfikieh, " theycollected grain and cattle, shipping them down to Omdurman. Learningthat Europeans had been seen at Fashoda, part of the force proceededthere, and engaged the French, attacking them by land and water. Thedate was the 25th of August. Behaving with great steadiness, andhelped by Shilluks, after a stiff fight the dervishes were driven off, after losing a number of men, by Marchand's little garrison. "If theyhad had cannon, " said the dervish skipper to me, "they fired so wellthat they would have sunk our steamers. " The dervish captains then rantheir boats down stream to collect their followers and return toassault the position. About 100 miles north the "Safieh" stopped tocollect the raiders, who numbered about a thousand with four brassguns. 

At six o'clock on the morning of the 10th September, the Sirdar setout from Omdurman with his expeditionary force. The troops wereembarked upon the gunboats "Sultan, " "Sheik, " "Fatah, " and bargestowed by these vessels. Colonel Wingate, Major Lord Edward Cecil, Captain J. K. Watson, A. D. C. , and other officers, accompanied theGeneral on the stern-wheel steamer "Dal, " which had for armamentseveral Maxims. A Union Jack, as well as an Egyptian flag, was hoistedon the boat. Abundance of ammunition and two months' provisions forthe force were carried on the steamers and tows. The steamers wentalong very leisurely, going only by daylight. In the afternoon, ortowards sunset, the flotilla made fast to some suitable bank. Thetroops then formed a sort of camp, and parties went out with saws andaxes to cut timber for fuel for the boilers. The hard gummy mimosa andsunt, when there is not too much sap in it, burns fiercely with a glowalmost equal to ordinary coal. South of Omdurman, the river stillbeing in full flood, the Nile had overspread the low banks for miles. There were places where it resembled a lake, two to six miles wide, dotted with islands. Landing was not always easily effected, for thebanks were frequently marshy. There was plenty of good sizable wood tobe had all along the river, the only difficulty being to reach and cutit. More than once, in order to "fill up" the vessels for next day'ssteaming, the Camerons and Soudanese soldiers laboured far into thenight, hewing and carrying timber for fuel by candle-light and theelectric beam. Nearing Fashoda the Nile in places ran through channelsbut 400 yards in width. The water was deep and relatively clear, witha current of but two miles or less an hour. Unfortunately, it rainedheavily nearly every night, and the troops quartered upon the bargesgot drenched to the skin, the water pouring, in so many shower-baths, through the cracked boarded coverings. It is a peculiarity of mosttropical climates, that Jupiter Pluvius does most of his work betweenthe hours of sunset and sunrise. The natives met with as a rule weredisposed to be friendly. Those with whom the men talked would notquite credit the statement that the Khalifa had been defeated, hisarmy destroyed, and that he had run away. On Saturday the 17thSeptember, the gunboat "Abu Klea" caught up with and joined theflotilla. 

During the same night, dervish deserters, blacks, and Arabs came in. They stated that a short way further up there was a camp of the enemy. On Sunday morning, 18th September, when near Kaka, some 65 miles northof Fashoda, the dervish steamer "Safieh" was sighted, lying at theeast bank close by the enemy's camp. The "Sultan" forged ahead andbegan shelling the enemy with all her guns, using the Maxims as well. With great alacrity the dervishes on shore replied, if indeed they didnot fire first. A few shots also came from the "Safieh. " With theirrifled guns from behind screens of bushes the enemy bravely stood up, making excellent practice at the gunboats. The "Sultan" had severalvery narrow escapes, shells passing close over her bows and stern. When the other gunboats got up, what with cannon, quick-firing guns, and Maxims brought to bear upon the dervish camp, it was speedilywrecked and torn. The enemy bolted into the bush, leaving over 200dead and wounded behind, including several Baggara and the chief Emir. A few shells from the "Sultan" had hulled and shattered the "Safieh, "so the victory was complete. Detachments were landed from the gunboatsand the dervishes driven still further afield. Their camp was lootedand burned, and the "Safieh" and several nuggars temporarily repairedand sent down to Omdurman. It was found that the patch put upon the"Safieh's" boiler by chief-engineer Benbow in 1885 was intact. Thatsteamer went to rescue Sir Charles Wilson's party who were wrecked ontheir return from Khartoum. Near Shabluka she was attacked by adervish fort and hulled. Lord Charles Beresford, who was in command, stuck to the vessel after the boiler blew up, and during the night itwas repaired. On Sunday, 18th September, the Sirdar despatched aShilluk runner to go by land with a letter to Major Marchand tellinghim of the approach of the Egyptian flotilla. Next morning a reply wasbrought out to the "Dal" when it was within sight of Fashoda by anofficer in a row-boat flying the French flag, that the garrison wouldreceive him as a friendly visitor. Major Marchand furthermore declaredthat by treaty the territory belonged to France and he hadcommunicated the fact to his Government, sending his despatchesthrough Abyssinia. Precise details of what had been done wereincluded. 

It was 10 a. M. Of the 19th September when the expedition reachedFashoda and saw the French flag flying over the fort. A Senegalesesentry was walking beneath the tricolor, and a row of these blackriflemen's heads peeped from the walls and trenches. All of them hadevidently been turned out under arms. Apparently there were about 300people--not more--in the fortification. Steaming close in withoutbeing hailed, the vessels hove to opposite the works. A row-boatmanned by Senegalese pushed from the shore and made for the "Dal. "From the stern staff drooped the French flag, and by the tiller satMajor Marchand and an officer, M. Germain. The Major was dressed in asuit of white ducks. Below the medium height, of spare habit, withsomething like Dundreary side whiskers, he looked elderly and worn, almost twice his years, for he is still a young man. As he steppedaboard the steamer, he was received at the side. He and his companionshook hands with the Sirdar and the other members of the headquartersstaff. A relatively brief conference ensued, at which the Sirdarstated the object of his mission and his official instructions torecover the lost provinces for Egypt. He intended, he said, to occupyand hold them. Major Marchand intimated that he had established aprior claim for his Government, and had entered into treaties with thelocal rulers securing rights for France to the country along the Nilesouth and through the Bahr el Ghazal. He had established posts atMeshra er Rek and elsewhere in that region. Without express orders tothe contrary from his Government, he would not abandon the oldEgyptian fort, nor concede an inch of the territory he had acquired. The Sirdar said he meant to land, and although he would avoid acollision if possible with the Major and his party, yet he would notbe dissuaded from carrying out his orders because it might beunpleasant. Would, he asked, the Major oppose him with force; hismeans were inadequate to do so with any hope of success. MajorMarchand replied, "No, " he was not in a position to justify anyattempt to contend with arms against the strong flotilla and land armythat could be brought against him by the Sirdar. Still, he wouldneither yield nor withdraw without the order of his Government. TheSirdar stated he was not adverse to letting the two Governmentssettle the matter, meantime they as soldiers could remain on amicableterms. In the course of an hour or so he would land his troops andoccupy a position as near the fort as possible. Major Marchandprotested, but said that he, under the circumstances, would have toaccept the situation. 

Refreshments are always in order on board a ship where the Royal Navyis in command. Over a friendly glass of champagne Marchand and theSirdar chatted on topics of general interest. The Major intimated thathe was rather short of ammunition and stores. He had sent his steamlaunch south to try and bring up supplies and reinforcements from hisother stations. The doctor was anxious to obtain the assistance andadvice of some of the British medical staff as to the best treatmentof beri-beri or sleeplessness sickness, which had appeared among them. Several of the mission had succumbed to that weird disease. It is notunknown in the United Kingdom, a case having recently occurred atRichmond Asylum, Dublin. After spending about half an hour on board, Major Marchand and M. Germain, accompanied by Colonel Wingate andCommander Keppel, went ashore together in the row-boat. Landing at thefort, the party were received by the garrison with military honours. The two British officers were shown every courtesy, and escorted overthe works, which had been considerably strengthened. A morass or smalllagoon cut the fortification off in rear from the mainland. It was aposition which could not easily have been carried by assault, but wasindefensible against cannon. The Senegalese Tirailleurs forming thegarrison were paraded for their inspection. There appeared to be about120 of them, all stalwart, soldierly fellows, beside whom theFrenchmen looked shrunken and diminutive. In addition to theSenegalese, or rather natives of Timbuctoo, for such they were, about150 Shilluks and nondescript natives made up the remainder of thegarrison. Including Major Marchand there were nine Europeans, or fivecommissioned and four non-commissioned officers. Of four others whohad succumbed on the way, two died of beri-beri, one was killed by afall from a tree, and a third by a crocodile. The Nile in thatvicinity was found to be teeming with animal life. Not only crocodilesbut hippopotami were seen by those on board the flotilla. 

Eventually the five steamers crept as close inshore towards the northend of the fort as the shallow overflown land admitted. ColonelWingate and Commander Keppel having returned on board, all the troopswere ordered to disembark. The steamers were made fast to the banks, and planks were placed ashore. They were of little use, for officersand men had to flounder and wade through the shallows before theyreached firm ground 300 yards from the bank. Four of the guns ofPeake's battery were also landed. The force having been formed up wasmarched a short distance to the south. It was halted behind andexactly covering the French position from the land side, the flanksoverlapping and enclosing the old line of Egyptian works. A tallflag-pole which was brought ashore was set up on a ruined bastion inline with the French tricolor and about 300 yards behind it. Then theSirdar and staff came and stood around the pole. An instant later, theorder having been given, the Egyptian flag was hoisted to the top, andthe Soudanese bands played a few bars of the Khedivial anthem. Ere themusic ceased, the Sirdar, setting the example, called for three cheersfor His Highness the Khedive. The British flag, the Union Jack, wasmeanwhile flying inshore from the "Dal. " None of the French officersattended the ceremony, but the Senegalese and the natives watched theproceedings with great interest. In fact, as many of the soldiers ofthe 11th and 13th Soudanese battalions were Shilluks, there had beennumerous greetings and interchanges of courtesy between them. Theworthy old Lieutenant Ali Gaffoon, a Shilluk, who had been in hisyouth a sheikh and soldier, and who had fought in Mexico forMaximilian, and since entered the Khedive's service, soon had crowdsof his countrymen and countrywomen flocking to see him. Immediatelyafter the flag was hoisted, Major Jackson was appointed commandant ofthe Fashoda district, and left with a garrison of the 11th Soudanesebattalion and four guns of Captain Peake's battery. A large quantityof stores of various kinds was landed for their use. Meanwhile ECompany of the Cameron Highlanders and the rest of the troops returnedon board ship. The bands and pipers again played as the troops marchedaway, the Highlandmen stepping off to the tune of the "Cameron Men. " ECompany of the Camerons numbered exactly 100 rank and file under fiveofficers: Captain Hon. A. Murray, Lieutenants Hoare, Cameron, Alderson, and Surgeon-Captain Luther. 

The fraternisation of the Soudanese soldiers and the Shilluks becamethorough. An informal reception of the natives, sheikhs, and headmen, some of whom were attended by their wives, was held by the Sirdarashore and afterwards on board the "Dal. " It was observed that, although hundreds of natives were seen, they were only brought forwardin batches of less than a dozen to be presented. Besides, aconsiderable interval always elapsed before the arrival of thesucceeding groups. Ali Gaffoon and his countrymen-comrades in theranks, with pardonable tribal pride, were adverse to bringing theirrelatives and friends forward until the natives put on some clothes. For that purpose they had borrowed or got together about a dozen Arabdresses of kinds, wherewith to cover the bodies and limbs of theunsophisticated Shilluks. The national costume for men is a state ofnudity, but they occasionally sprinkle their bodies with red or greyashes. The women usually wear scant leather or thong aprons. When theSirdar ascertained the true cause of the delay, time pressing, heintimated he would waive for the nonce their putting on of ceremonialattire. "Let them all come as they are, " and they did. They evincedthe liveliest interest and pleasure in all they saw and heard in campand aboard ship. The chiefs declared they had signed no treaty withthe French nor conceded any of their country. All of them assertedthat they were subjects of the Khedive, to whom they renewed theirallegiance forthwith. The French mission had been short of food andthey had helped them only by giving supplies. Incidentally it may bestated that the Shilluk country is exceedingly fertile. At one time itwas the most densely populated region of the Soudan for its acreage, containing a population of over 2, 000, 000 souls, living under anancient dynasty of kings. From 1884 the Shilluks repeatedly warredwith the dervishes. In 1894 they rose again and fought for a long timebefore their Queen was slain and they were put down. On that occasionthe Mahdists behaved with more than usual ferocity, putting thousandsto the sword. Strange to say, great numbers of Shilluks, like otherSoudan blacks, fought against us under the Khalifa's banners. Themoment, however, they were captured, with great readiness theyenlisted in the Khedivial army. Latterly so many deserters andprisoners brought by their friends offered themselves as soldiers, that only the smartest and strongest were chosen. 

That afternoon the "Dal" and two of the gunboats left Fashoda andsteamed away up the Nile towards Sobat. Before leaving, the Sirdarsent a formal written document to Major Marchand, protesting againstany usurpation by another Power of the rights of Great Britain andEgypt to the Nile Valley. He stated that he would refuse to recognisein any way French authority in the country. There was found to belarge quantities of grass weed and sudd in the Nile at no greatdistance from Fashoda. In several places the clear channels were lessthan 150 yards wide. As the steamers made southing, the river becamenarrower and the obstacles to navigation more serious--floatingislands of weeds and banked sudd blocking the fairway, leaving it but50 yards or less in width. It is about 62 miles from Fashoda to theSobat river, that Abyssinian tributary to the Nile. There was formerlyan Egyptian station and fort on the neck of land at the junction ofthe two rivers. Other stations were also held by Khedivial troopsfurther up the river in the old days before the Mahdi's rebellion. Itwas on the 20th September, the date as officially given, that theflotilla reached Sobat. The place was overgrown with bush, as comparedwith what had formerly been the case. Only a few natives were seenupon the mainland and islands, and they were friendly disposed. TheSobat, though but 150 yards or so wide, is 30 feet deep when in flood. Its yellow stream runs at two knots an hour, the current driving farinto the wider and slacker waters of the Nile, which is aboutthree-quarters of a mile wide at that point. The banks wereaccessible, and a landing of the troops was much more easily effectedthan had been the case at Fashoda. As soon as the soldiers and the tworemaining guns of Captain Peake's battery were got ashore, theEgyptian flag was formally hoisted and greeted. It was the Sirdar whodirected the whole proceedings. The ceremonial observance attendingthe re-occupation was precisely similar to that which had taken placeat Fashoda. Major Smith Dorian was placed in command of the post anddistrict. Three companies of the 13th Soudanese were left as agarrison together with the two Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns. A gunboat wasalso detailed to proceed a little way up the Sobat and the Bahr elGhazal. 

Next morning the vessels having been filled up with fuel, the Sirdar, with the Camerons and the remainder of the troops not detached forgarrison duty, steamed away back towards Omdurman. No news hadpenetrated to that remote region about the overthrow of the dervishesand very little was known about the passing mission under MajorMarchand. The same day, 21st September, Fashoda was reached, and ashort stay was made. All was quiet and the two flags were flying justas the Sirdar had left them. But the place had been transformed allthe same. A military camp had arisen that looked like a village. Tukals and shelters covered the clearing behind the French lines. Trenches also had been dug and Marchand's party were completely hemmedin from the landward side as well as by water, the gunboatscontrolling the river. The Shilluks had all gone over and putthemselves under Major Jackson and the Khedivial flag. A sort ofbazaar had been started and the country was already making for peace. There was universal rejoicing at the downfall of the Khalifa. Adetermination was expressed of promptly dealing with him or OsmanDigna, should either of them pass that way. The new twin-screwgunboats "Sultan" and "Sheik" had nine days' rations for troops putaboard. They were then detached, being ordered to remain behind forpatrol duty. Their instructions were to keep the river and banks clearof all armed bands of dervishes, and, if necessary, afford assistanceto the posts at Sobat and Fashoda. They were also bidden to preventthe transport of war material, or conveyance of reinforcements, exceptby accredited Khedivial officers. The Sirdar in a note informed MajorMarchand that he had prohibited the transport of all war material uponthe Nile. Thereafter the Sirdar resumed the journey downstream. Thelong and fertile island of Abba--it extends for 20 miles--was passedwithout seeing anything of the fugitive Khalifa and his followers. Itwas to Abba island the Mahdi went, and it was there the rebellionfirst broke out. Subsequently it was ascertained that Abdullah andOsman Digna with their retainers sought shelter in the heavy woodsopposite Abba island, and they were stated to be in hiding there atthe end of December 1898. The Sirdar and headquarters got back toOmdurman on the 25th of September. 

Popular feeling ran very high at home when it was ascertained that, despite repeated notification, the French had tried to grasp thefruits of the British victory over the dervishes. A Liberal statesmanhad, years before, declared, that any attempt on the part of France tooccupy the Upper Nile valley lands would be regarded as an unfriendlyact by this country. Conservative statesmen had endorsed that officialpronouncement; yet, in face of these declarations, the thing had beendone with every evidence of a fine contempt for British feeling andself-respect. The enemies of England in Egypt and elsewhere weresniggering. Our diplomatic and military chiefs were making unusualefforts to keep the Marchand affair a profound secret. At every stagedown the Nile from Omdurman to Cairo, the Camerons and all who hadbeen to Fashoda and Sobat were officially warned to keep the matter aprofound secret. The case I thought was too serious to be left hiddenin the breasts of a few where the issues involved were so tremendous. So I openly set myself to learning what had happened, and wiring everyscrap of information for publication. Several officers were sent downfrom Omdurman with special despatches. Long before they arrived evenin Cairo, cypher messages extending to many folios had been forwardedday after day direct from Khartoum to Downing Street. 

The Sirdar reached Cairo on the 6th of October and left for England onthe 21st of the same month. By that time much had happened. Theofficial despatches had been published in a Parliamentary paper andthere were ominous preparations for war in both France and GreatBritain. Fleets were being got ready for sea and feverish activityprevailed in Gallic and British arsenals. The insistence of theParisian Ministers in seeking to have other questions discussed sideby side with the demand for the evacuation of Fashoda and theirdilatory tactics but increased the feeling of irritation in the UnitedKingdom. Statesmen seemed to be undecided and diplomacy, as usual, revolving in a circle. Happily, this country was never better preparedfor war, and that in the end, as has so often been the case, provedthe best advocate for peace. It would be uncharitable to emphasise thefact of the French Government slipping away from one after another ofthe positions they had taken up in reference to the whole question. That being Frenchmen they felt acutely the false moves they had madegoes without saying. Whilst war was impending and the FrenchGovernment seemed bent upon driving our Government to that point, theanti-British Pashas and the Gallic set in Egypt were jubilant. TheTurkish Pashas and Beys were openly chuckling and romancing aboutunheard-of things. It is in Egypt, as it is in Armenia and was in theBalkans: the Turk is the enemy of good government and freedom for thepeople. A check to British policy and rule meant to them a possiblereturn of the old corrupt days when they did as they liked, treatingfellaheen and negroes as slaves. Had Great Britain in this instanceyielded a jot of her just rights to the intriguing and bellicosespirit of French officialism Egypt would have been made an impossibleplace for our countrymen to remain in. Being in Cairo and Alexandriaat the time I was privately assured by scores of my countrymen, men inbusiness and in public offices, that they would be obliged to quitEgypt if France succeeded in her pretensions to the Nile Valley. Pettyannoyances, tyranny, all manner of injustice and even violence wouldbe resorted to, to force them to leave and to drive British intereststo the wall. 

I avail myself again of the excellent synopsis of the officialdespatches dealing with the Fashoda incident, which appeared in the_Daily Telegraph_. The Parliamentary papers in question were issued onthe 9th of October last. The official papers opened with a despatchfrom Sir Edmund Monson to the Foreign Secretary, bearing date December10, 1897. Therein the British Ambassador says:--

 "The despatches which I have recently addressed to your lordship respecting the reports of the massacre of the Marchand Expedition, and the comments made in connection with this rumoured disaster by the French Press, will have already shown your lordship how necessary it has become to remind the French Government of the views held by that of Her Majesty as to their sphere of influence in the Upper Nile Valley; and it has been with great satisfaction that I have found myself so promptly authorised to make a communication upon the subject to M. Hanotaux. Made in the way in which it has been suggested by your lordship, I see no reason why this communication should prejudice the chances of our coming to a satisfactory arrangement upon the question with which we are dealing in connection with the situation in West Africa. "

Sir Edmund Monson enclosed in the despatch a copy of a note he hadaddressed to M. Hanotaux, at that period French Minister of ForeignAffairs, as follows:--

 "The other point to which it is necessary to advert is the proposed recognition of the French claim to the northern and eastern shores of Lake Chad. If other questions are adjusted, Her Majesty's Government will make no difficulty about this condition. But in doing so they cannot forget that the possession of this territory may in the future open up a road to the Nile; and they must not be understood to admit that any other European Power than Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of the Nile. The views of the British Government upon this matter were plainly stated in Parliament by Sir Edward Grey some years ago during the Administration of the Earl of Rosebery, and were formally communicated to the French Government at the time. Her Majesty's present Government entirely adhere to the language that was on this occasion employed by their predecessors. "

To this M. Hanotaux replied:--

 "In any case the French Government cannot, under present circumstances, refrain from repeating the reservations which it has never failed to express every time that questions relating to the Valley of the Nile have been brought forward. Thus, in particular, the declarations of Sir Edward Grey, to which the British Government has referred, gave rise to an immediate protest by our representative in London, the terms of which he repeated and developed in the further conversations which he had at the Foreign Office on the subject. I myself had occasion, in the sitting of the Senate on April 5, 1895, to make, in the name of the Government, declarations to which I consider that I am all the more justified in referring from the fact that they have called forth no reply from the British Government. "

The speech to which M. Hanotaux refers is published at length in anappendix, and, so far from being a reply to Sir Edward Grey, it givesthe French position completely away. 

 "I now come, gentlemen, " he said, "to the question of the Upper Nile. I will explain the situation to the Senate in a few words; for I think it will be useful to complete the explanations which M. De Lamarzelle has already given on this subject. Between the country of the lakes and the point of Wady Halfa, on the Nile, extends a vast region, measuring twenty degrees of latitude, or 2000 kilometres, that is, more than the breadth of Western Europe from Gibraltar to Dunkirk. In this region there is at this moment, perhaps, not a single European; in any case, there does not exist any power derived, by any title, from a European authority. It is the country of the Mahdi! Now, gentlemen, it is the future of this country which fills with an uneasiness, which we may describe as at least premature, the minds of a certain number of persons interested in Africa. The Egyptians who occupied this vast domain for a considerable time have moved to the north. Emin Pasha himself was compelled to withdraw. The rights of the Sultan and the Khedive alone continue to exist over the regions of the Soudan and of Equatorial Africa. "

That is to say, after the Mahdi, who was the _de facto_ ruler, theauthority over the whole basin of the Upper Nile reverted to theKhedive and the Sultan as his suzerain, which is exactly the positiontaken up by Lord Salisbury in his despatch of September 9, 1898. 

Major Marchand has had various titles conferred upon him, and in thepenultimate despatch contained in the papers he is described by LordSalisbury as "a French explorer who is on the Upper Nile in adifficult position. " To M. Delcassé, however, is reserved the honourof giving him an official designation. On September 7 the FrenchForeign Minister, in an interview with Sir E. Monson, after handsomelycomplimenting the British Government on the victory of Omdurman, expressed his anxiety about a possible meeting of the Sirdar and M. Marchand. 

 "Should he (M. Marchand) be met with, his Excellency said that he had received instructions to be most careful to abstain from all action which might cause local difficulties, and that he had been enjoined to consider himself as an 'emissary of civilisation' without any authority whatever to decide upon questions of right, which must properly form the subject of discussion between Her Majesty's Government and that of the French Republic. 

 "M. Delcassé therefore begged me to inform your lordship of this fact, and expressed the hope that the commander of Her Majesty's naval forces on the river might be instructed to take no steps which might lead to a local conflict with regard to such questions of right. "

It may be remarked, in passing, that this view of the position of theemissary of civilisation does not tally with that which M. Marchandsubsequently gave to the Sirdar, to whom he stated "that he hadreceived precise orders for the occupation of the country and thehoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at Fashoda, and added that, without the orders of his Government, which, however, he expected, would not be delayed, it was impossible for him to retirefrom the place. "

The instructions given by Lord Salisbury, through Lord Cromer, to theSirdar, have been given elsewhere in this chapter. 

On September 11 our Ambassador informed M. Delcassé of the advance ofthe Sirdar up the Nile, and on the 18th the French Foreign Ministerstated further:--

 "As a matter of fact, there is no Marchand Mission. In 1892 and 1893 M. Liotard was sent to the Upper Ubanghi as Commissioner, with instructions to secure French interests in the north-east. M. Marchand had been appointed one of his subordinates, and received all his orders from M. Liotard. There could be no doubt that for a long time past the whole region of the Bahr-el-Ghazal had been out of the influence of Egypt. "

Sir E. Monson left M. Delcassé in no doubt as to the view HerMajesty's Government took of the situation. Of the interview referredto, he reports to Lord Salisbury as follows, under date September22:--

 "Although his Excellency made two or three allusions to the reasons for which, in his opinion, the French might consider that the region in question was open to their advance, he himself volunteered the suggestion that discussion between us would be inopportune. 

 "In this I, of course, concurred, reminding him of the terms of your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst. ; but I told him, as emphatically as I could, that I looked upon the situation at Fashoda, if M. Marchand had occupied that town, as very serious, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government would certainly not acquiesce in his remaining there, nor would they consent to relinquishing the claims of Egypt to the restoration of all the country latterly subject to the Khalifa, which had heretofore been a portion of her territory. I felt it to be my duty, I said, to speak with extreme frankness, and to assure him that on this point no compromise would be possible. 

 "M. Delcassé listened to me with grave attention, but his reply was chiefly to the effect that if the two Governments discussed the matter with calmness and a sincere desire to avoid a conflict, there could be no doubt of our arriving at a peaceable and satisfactory solution. France does not desire a quarrel. In saying this he could speak with absolute certainty. All his colleagues in the Government are, like himself, anxious for good relations with England. If this anxiety is reciprocated on the other side of the Channel (and the tone of the English Press inspires him with doubts of this) there can be no danger. 

 "I replied that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to pick a quarrel with France, but that nothing could be gained by my concealing from him the gravity of the situation as I regarded it, or the fixed determination of Her Majesty's Government to vindicate claims of the absolute justice of which they hold that there can be no question. I, of course, avoided the use of any expression which might sound like a menace, but short of this I did my best to make my declaration of the impossibility of the French being allowed to remain at Fashoda as clear and distinct as could be expressed in words. "

On 25th September, the day the expedition returned from Fashoda toOmdurman, Mr Rennell Rodd, who during the absence of Lord Cromer inEurope was in charge of affairs in Egypt, telegraphed to LordSalisbury the following despatch, which had been received from theSirdar:--

 "I found at Fashoda, whence I have just returned, M. Marchand with 8 officers and 120 men. The French flag had been hoisted over the old Government buildings in which they were located. I sent a letter announcing my approach on the day before my arrival at Fashoda. On the following morning, September 19, a reply was brought to me from M. Marchand by a small rowing-boat carrying the French flag. It stated that he had arrived at Fashoda on July 10, having been instructed by his Government to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal up to the confluence of the Bahr-el-Jebel, and also the Shilluk country on the left bank of the White Nile as far as Fashoda. It went on to say that he had concluded a treaty with the Shilluk chiefs by which they placed the country under the protection of France, and that he had sent this treaty to his Government for ratification by way of Abyssinia, as well as by the Bahr-el-Ghazal. He described his fight with the dervishes on August 25, and stated that, in anticipation of a second and more serious attack, he had sent his steamer south for reinforcements, but that our arrival had prevented a further attack. 

 "When we arrived at Fashoda, M. Marchand and M. Germain came on board our steamer, and I at once informed them that the presence of a French party at Fashoda and in the Nile valley must be considered as a direct infringement of the rights of Egypt and of the British Government, and I protested in the strongest terms against the occupation of Fashoda by M. Marchand and his party, and the hoisting of the French flag in the dominions of his Highness the Khedive. M. Marchand stated, in reply, that he had received precise orders for the occupation of the country and the hoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at Fashoda, and added that, without the orders of his Government, which, however, he expected would not be delayed, it was impossible for him to retire from the place. I then inquired of him whether, in view of the fact that I was accompanied by a superior force, he was prepared to resist the hoisting of the Egyptian flag at Fashoda. He hesitated, and replied that he could not resist. The Egyptian flag was then hoisted, about 500 yards south of the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the old Egyptian fortifications, commanding the only road which leads into the interior from the French position. The latter is entirely surrounded to the north by impassable marshes. 

 "Before leaving for the south I handed to M. Marchand a formal written protest on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and Egypt against any occupation of any part of the Nile valley by France, as being an infringement of the rights of those Governments. I added that I could not recognise the occupation by France of any part of the Nile valley. 

 "I left at Fashoda a garrison of one Soudanese battalion, four guns, and a gunboat under Major Jackson, whom I appointed Commandant of the Fashoda district, and I proceeded to Sobat, where the flag was hoisted and a post established on September 20. We did not see or hear anything of the Abyssinians on the Sobat, but were informed that their nearest post was about 350 miles up that river. The Bahr-el-Jebel being entirely blocked by floating weed, I gave orders for a gunboat to patrol up the Bahr-el-Ghazal in the direction of Meshra-er-Rek. As we passed Fashoda on the return journey north, I sent M. Marchand a letter stating that all transport of war material on the Nile was absolutely prohibited, as the country was under military law. The chief of the Shilluk tribe, accompanied by a large number of followers, has come into Major Jackson's camp. He entirely denies having made any treaty with the French, and the entire tribe express the greatest delight at returning to allegiance to us. 

 "M. Marchand is in want of ammunition and supplies, and any that may be sent to him must take months to arrive at their destination. He is cut off from the interior, and is quite inadequately provided with water transport. Moreover, he has no following in the country, and nothing could have saved his expedition from being annihilated by the dervishes if we had been a fortnight later in crushing the Khalifa. "

The gist of this despatch was communicated to the French Government, accompanied by a notification that the Sirdar's "language andproceedings" had the complete approval of Lord Salisbury. M. Delcasséwas evidently at his wits' end to escape from an _impasse_ which waschiefly of his own creation. 

In an interview with Sir E. Monson on September 27 he wished to putoff a final decision till he had received the despatches which M. Marchand had forwarded in duplicate by way of the French Congo andAbyssinia respectively. 

 "To gain time, M. Delcassé, " writes our Ambassador, "wished that I should request your lordship to consent to a telegram being sent by the French agent at Cairo to Khartoum, to be forwarded from thence up the Nile to Fashoda. The telegram would contain instructions to M. Marchand to send at once one of the French officers serving on his mission to Cairo with a copy of his above-mentioned report, so that the French Government might learn its contents as soon as possible. They were, of course, ready to bear all the expense. 

 "Stress was laid by M. Delcassé upon the great desire entertained at Paris to prevent any serious difficulty from arising; at the same time, he felt convinced, especially in view of the conduct of the Sirdar at Fashoda, acting as he undoubtedly was under instructions, that Her Majesty's Government were as anxious as the French Government to avoid a conflict. 

 "I told M. Delcassé in reply that I must conclude from the language which he had held that the French Government had decided that they would not recall M. Marchand before receiving his report, and I asked if I was right in this conclusion. I pointed out to his Excellency that M. Marchand himself is stated to be desirous of retiring from his position, which appeared to be a disagreeable one. Such being the case, I must urgently press him to tell me whether he refused at once to recall M. Marchand. 

 "After considering his reply for some few minutes, his Excellency said that he himself was ready to discuss the question in the most conciliatory spirit, but I must not ask him for the impossible. 

 "I pointed out that your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst. , which I had communicated to him at the time, had made him aware that Her Majesty's Government considered that there could be no discussion upon such questions as the right of Egypt to Fashoda. "

To this Lord Salisbury replied next day:

 "Her Majesty's Government cannot decline to assist in forwarding a message from the French Agent in Egypt to a French explorer who is on the Upper Nile in a difficult position, and your Excellency is authorised to inform M. Delcassé that Her Majesty's Acting Agent at Cairo will be instructed to transmit to Omdurman immediately any such message, and at the same time to request Sir H. Kitchener to forward it thence to its destination by any opportunity which may be available. 

 "Her Majesty's Government do not desire to be made acquainted with the purport of the message. But you must explain that they are unable to accept any responsibility for the results to the safety or health of the explorer which the delay in quitting his present situation may bring about. "

The official papers closed with the following laconic despatch fromLord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, bearing date 3rd October. 

 "I request your Excellency to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in accordance with his wish, his message for M. Marchand has been transmitted to Khartoum, and will be forwarded thence to its destination. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, you should state to M. Delcassé that the fact of Her Majesty's Government having complied with his Excellency's request in regard to the transmission of the message does not imply the slightest modification of the views previously expressed by them. You should add that, whether in times of Egyptian or Dervish dominion, the region in which M. Marchand was found has never been without an owner, and that, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, his expedition into it with an escort of 100 Senegalese troops has no political effect, nor can any political significance be attached to it. "

In the appendix were given past speeches and despatches by M. Decrais, M. Hanotaux, Lord Kimberley, Sir E. Grey, etc. 

The rest can be quickly told. Military and naval preparations for warin both countries were redoubled and the public tone was bellicose. Consols were affected and war appeared almost inevitable. It wasan occasion for union among all who rightly set patriotism aboveparty. Lord Rosebery, Late Premier, with splendid grace anddisinterestedness, in a speech, 13th October, voiced the sentiment ofthe masses and classes. His lordship said:--

 "Behind the policy of the British Government in this matter there is the untiring and united strength of the nation itself. (Cheers. ) It is the policy of the last Government deliberately adopted and sustained by the present Government. (Cheers. ) That is only a matter of form, but it is the policy of the nation itself, and no Government that attempted to recede from or palter with that policy would last a week. (Loud cheers. ) I am perfectly certain that no idea or intention of any weakening on this point or this question has entered the head of Her Majesty's present advisers. "

Messages were transmitted up the Nile to Major Marchand at Fashoda. Inresponse thereto he sent Captain Baratier down with despatches. Thatofficer arrived with Slatin Pasha in Cairo on the 20th October. Hisdespatches were wired to Paris, for which Baratier himself startednext day. It happened that the Sirdar, who also left for England onthat date, was a fellow-traveller with him. Another hitch occurred, the French Government stating that Marchand's report made no allusionto the meeting with the Sirdar at Fashoda. That they would have towait for before giving an answer. Marchand, it was alleged, had nothad time to bring his report down to date, when Baratier left him. They had not long to wait, for suddenly the announcement was sprungthat Major Marchand, acting on his own volition, had left Fashoda andwas coming down by Khedivial transport, to Cairo. He arrived in thatcity on the evening of 3rd November, and got a deservedly heartyreception from the English as well as the French community. Prominentofficials, civil and military, were there to greet the brave and hardyexplorer. His companion, Captain Baratier, who had been to Paris andhad hastened back intending to return to Fashoda, met the Major nextday in Cairo. But on the very day that Major Marchand reached Cairo, the French Government had issued an official note stating it had beendecided to evacuate Fashoda, as the position had been reporteduntenable. So saying "No, no, they would ne'er consent, " theyconsented. 

At the Mansion House banquet given to the Sirdar, on 4th November, Lord Salisbury said:--

 "I received from the French Ambassador this afternoon the information that the French Government had come to the conclusion that the (Fashoda) occupation was of no sort of value to the French Republic, and they thought that under those circumstances, to persist in an occupation which only cost them money and did harm, merely because some of their advisers thought they would be an unwelcome neighbour, would not show the wisdom with which the French Republic has uniformly been guided. They have done what I believe every Government would have done in the same position--they have resolved that the occupation must cease. A formal intimation to that effect was made to me this afternoon, and it has been conveyed to the French authorities at Cairo. I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that all causes of controversy are by this removed between the French Government and ourselves. It is probably not so, and it may be that we shall have many discussions in the future, but a cause of controversy of a singularly acute and somewhat dangerous character has been removed, and we cannot but congratulate ourselves upon it. "

In the same connection it is of interest to learn what Major Marchandhad to say. The full text of his speech made at a banquet given to himand Captain Baratier by the French Club at Cairo on the 7th Octoberappeared in the Press. In the presence of the Acting French DiplomaticAgent and others, Major Marchand said:--

 "Monsieur le Ministre de France, Monsieur le Président, Messieurs--There are two reasons why you will not expect a speech from me. In the first place I am only a soldier and no orator; and then one cannot be talkative on a day of reflection, a day which brings to me personally a great sorrow, the official abandonment of Fashoda. Fashoda! it was only a point--it is true that it synthetised everything. But if we lose the point we abandon nothing of our thesis. To reflect is not to despair--on the contrary. The experiences of this world teach us that the sum of our sorrows is not greater than that of our joys. The more the black period may be prolonged the more quickly will approach the dawn of proud aspirations at length realised. And the granite Sphinx which near at hand dreams on the desert sands, the Sphinx which saw the passage of Bonaparte, which saw Lesseps and his work, has not yet uttered its last word, has not murmured the supreme sentence. The more fiercely evil fortune may pursue us the more should we call to our aid the great hopes which swell the heart and fortify the will. The French colony in Cairo, moreover, has shown more than ten times over already that it knows no discouragement. I should like, my dear and valiant compatriots, to give you some small recompense. Listen! When, nearly three years ago, the Congo-Nile mission left France, it was not in order to make a more or less famous journey of exploration. No, its aim was far higher. You have already guessed it. Why, then, proclaim it here? We desired (here the speaker paused a moment) to carry across French Africa to the French in Egypt a hand-grip from the French of France. The road was long, sometimes hard; we have reached our destination, however, since I have the honour to greet you here to-day. Do you not see a symbol in this? Fortune, which detests broad and easy paths, is perhaps at this moment on her way, bringing you the succour so patiently looked for. We must never despair, and who can say that the Sphinx may not be about to smile? It is for this that I have come to tell you that if we are few to-day we shall be many to-morrow--who forget nothing, who abandon nothing. It is with this thought that I drink to your health, gentlemen, the health of the French colony in Egypt. To the Greater France!"

It is easy to feel great sympathy with so gallant and hardy a soldier, who, having successfully accomplished the perilous mission entrustedto him by his Government, found support denied him and his workfruitless. Major Marchand and Captain Baratier again availedthemselves of the Egyptian military transport to return to theircomrades. At half-past 8 a. M. , 11th December, the French hauled downtheir flag at Fashoda, and left for the Sobat river. They wereintending to make their way up that stream to the nearest Abyssinianpost, and thereafter, striking through Menelik's country, hoped toarrive on the East African coast at Djibutil. Their sick comrades theyentrusted to the Egyptian military authorities to send home by theNile through Lower Egypt. The invalided Frenchmen and Senegalese inquestion reached Cairo at the end of the year. 

Perhaps it was only to be expected that the French press andpoliticians would display increased virulence against this countryover the Fashoda settlement. But their persistence in that course, andthe fact of their present extraordinary naval expenditure, can onlymean getting ready for war against Great Britain. This may lead ourpeople to consider whether it would not be cheapest and wisest tosettle the quarrel off-hand. True, delay makes for peace, but a peacethat is to be a struggle to overtop one another in armaments may bemore costly in every sense than sharp and decisive warfare. The chiefcause of the soreness in France against us is our presence in Egypt. Yet the French have no such vital interest there as this country has. To many of our colonies and dependencies the shortest way lies throughEgypt. Again, the French form quite a minority in numbers and wealthamong the foreign communities in Egypt. Since 1882, the year ofoccupation, Great Britain has been careful to avoid interference withthe privileges and rights of all foreigners. In what communitycontrolled by France through sixteen years would it have been allowedthat an alien language should be maintained in use in public places. No official step has been taken to diminish the use of French instreet nomenclature, or public conveyances, or public departments inEgypt until last year. Arabic is the language of the people, andEnglish is the language of commerce in the country. A sensible changein the direction indicated is at last evident, even in Cairo andAlexandria. Shops and warehouses are displaying Anglo-Saxon signs, andthe natives are discarding French and are speaking English as the oneforeign language necessary to acquire. 

There has been talk among our neighbours of emulating the Sirdar'senterprise and founding French colleges at Khartoum and Fashoda. Buturged by less disinterested motives they may find it necessary insteadto devote their funds to the cultivation of the Gallic tongue in Lowerand Upper Egypt, rather than in the Soudan. In the year 1897, inTantah, the third largest town in the Delta, there were 130 scholarslearning French and but 40 studying English. In 1898 there were 98 atthe English classes and but a moiety at the French. The scholasticyear 1899, according to the officials of the Public InstructionDepartment, will see a farther and even more serious decline in thestudy of the French language. The French officials themselves arepainfully aware that the Gallic speech, for colloquial intercoursebetween educated natives and Europeans, is doomed if matters continueas at present. In Assouan, where during 1897 much the same state ofthings prevailed as at Tantah; in 1898 there were 118 scholarslearning English and but three at the French classes. 

Until quite recently, it was wont to be the case in Lower Egypt thatthere were always two pupils learning French to one devoting attentionto acquiring English. In Upper Egypt of late years the difference hadnot been so marked, the proportion of French and English studentsbeing about equal. These figures refer to primary classes in UpperEgypt, and to secondary, as well as primary, classes in Cairo andAlexandria. As a matter of fact, the results of the examinations didnot follow in quite the same proportion in the Delta. About threepupils have passed in French to two in English. Shortly after thebattle of Omdurman, applications had to be made for entrance into theschool classes for English and French tuition. In a great number ofschools, in both Upper and Lower Egypt, especially in the strongholdof the French tongue--the Delta--not a single application was made bycandidates for entrance to the second primaries, in which Frenchteaching begins. That means to say that there will a dearth andpractically a cessation of French teaching in 1899 in the primaryschools, and subsequently, or in 1900, the year of the ExpositionUniverselle at Paris, a total discontinuance of it in the secondaryschools. Taking the secondary schools examinations throughout thewhole of Lower Egypt by themselves, I learn that in 1898, althoughthere were a larger proportion of candidates for French certificatesof proficiency, yet the numbers that actually passed in each languagewere about the same. The Examining Commissioners are Egyptian, English, and French. 

It is in Egypt as in certain other countries. The great ambition ofevery lad is to get into the Government service, and failing that tobecome a lawyer. Law schools are therefore well attended. Heretoforebudding lawyers have been taught in French classes only. AnEnglish-speaking law section was started in 1898. The natives arequick to appreciate any change which is to their advantage. Pupils inthe secondary schools have now opened to them careers which haveheretofore been closed. There is in truth a silent, but certain to beeffective, educational and social revolution begun in Egypt. No morewill every whim and caprice of those who seek to obstruct the advanceof the Egyptians be tolerated. In 1899 for the first time examiningeducational centres will be established at Assouan and Suakin. Allthose south of Assiut will be for English students only, for Frenchwill be quite dropped. Not only will there be a college at Khartoumbut one at Kassala, where English as well as Arabic will be taught. Ina new and thorough manner has the regeneration of Egypt and the Soudanbeen undertaken. The dream of a red English through-traffic line fromCairo to Cape Town will have a speedy realisation. Possibly withineighteen months the railway will be carried to the Sobat. Certainlybefore 1899 is ended there will be through communication withKhartoum. Mr Cecil Rhodes is busy with his South African lines, whichby that time should be up to the Zambesi, and within three years afterthere will possibly be open rail and water communication from theMediterranean to Cape Town. But before then the telegraph wire willbind North and South Africa together, and to the United Kingdom. 

POSTSCRIPT. 

This volume was written and in the printer's hands when an article bya Mr E. N. Bennett appeared in the columns of _The ContemporaryReview_, entitled "After Omdurman. " That gentleman made a series ofgrave charges reflecting upon the Anglo-Egyptian arms, not only duringthe Khartoum Expedition, but also on their conduct in Egypt and theSoudan since 1882. In the _Daily Telegraph_ and elsewhere I havedeservedly stigmatised Mr Bennett's allegations as untrue, stupid, andwantonly mischievous. 

In the pages of _The Khartoum Campaign, 1898_, can be read thedetailed version of events which happened in the field "before" aswell as "after" Omdurman. I venture to think that abundant refutationwill be found in the Work of most of Mr Bennett's scandalousassertions. Although it may seem to lend further temporary importanceto what that gentleman has written, as his accusations were madepublic under the cover of a respectable magazine, perhaps a few wordsmore may not be out of place. 

Mr Bennett's article was seemingly framed on the specious pretext of, under a discussion of the principles of international law, questionsof belligerency, Geneva Convention rules, and so forth, to basethereon a claim for the treatment of dervishes as combatants entitledto all the amenities of civilised warfare. Several pages of hiscomposition are given up to treating upon that matter. For instance, he says--"Moreover, it is worth remembering that the dervishes werenot 'savages' in the sense in which the word is applied to thefollowers of a Lobengula or a Samory. On the contrary, they satisfiedall the requirements for recognition as an armed force. " Now, that isan aspersion upon Lobengula and Samory in particular. For unredeemeddevilishness, the dervishes have had no equals. The fact is, that theMahdists made it a constant practice to ruthlessly slaughter allprisoners in battle, wounded or unwounded; to enslave, torture, ormurder their enemies, active or passive; to loot and to burn; to slaychildren and debauch women. To set up a pretext that such monsters areentitled to the grace and consideration of the most humane laws, is tobeggar commonsense and yap intolerable humbug. Yet Britishself-respect was such, Mr Bennett to the contrary notwithstanding, that the dervishes were treated as men, and not as wild beasts. 

Started upon his false pursuit, Mr Bennett proceeds from error toerror, abounding in reckless misstatements, atrocious imputations, andscattering charges void of truth. As briefly as possible, I will dealwith his accusations. One of his first deliverances is asfollows:--"It is, of course, an open secret that in all our Soudanbattles the enemy's wounded have been killed. The practice has, eversince the days of Tel-el-Kebir, become traditional in Soudanesewarfare. After the battle of Atbara, it was announced that 3000dervishes had been killed. There was practically no mention of thewounded. . . . How, then, was it that no wounded were accounted for atthe Atbara?" Again he writes:--"But I cannot help thinking that if thekilling of the wounded had been sternly repressed at Tel-el-Kebir andduring the earlier Soudan campaigns, our dervish enemies would havelearned to expect civilised treatment, " etc. Gaining courage, probablyfrom his own audacity, Mr Bennett had the hardihood to virtuallydeclare that the cruelties permitted by British officers made thedervishes what they were. 

Now, I went through the 1882 war in Egypt as well as most of thecampaigns in the Soudan. I am therefore in a better position than heto declare, that his allegations are a perversion of the truth. It wasneither the practice at Tel-el-Kebir nor subsequent thereto forBritish led troops to kill wounded men. The insinuation that they didso, or connived at such slaughter, is a stupid or a maliciousfalsehood. In every battle within the period referred to, largenumbers of wounded and unwounded prisoners were taken, and invariablygreat lenience was shown. Surgical treatment also was, wheneverpossible, always promptly rendered. Indeed, they were in countlesscases treated as tenderly as our own wounded. This further: in actionthere are no soldiers less prone to needless blood-spilling, or menreadier to forgive and forget, than "Tommy Atkins. " Official returnsexist setting at rest the fiction about Tel-el-Kebir and the Soudanbattles. At Tel-el-Kebir many thousand prisoners were made, and inother engagements our hands were always full of dervish wounded. AtEl Teb, Tamai, Abu Klea, Abu Kru, Gemaizeh, Atbara, and elsewhere, wounded dervishes fell into our hands, and received every attentionfrom the medical staff. And in some of these actions our troops werethemselves in sore straits. Several hundred dervishes were picked upwithin and without the Atbara dem, including the leader Mahmoud andhis two cousins. Be it remembered, our troops only remained there afew hours, marching back to the Nile. 

Still further abominable charges Mr Bennett lays at the door of hiscountrymen who command British and Khedivial troops. The Sirdarhimself is included in his rigmarole of accusations. But whetherdealing with particulars or the general course of events, Mr Bennettdiscloses that he has scarcely a nodding acquaintanceship with truth. He has said:--"This wholesale slaughter was not confined to Arabservants, " _i. E. _, killing wounded dervishes. "The Soudanese seemed torevel in the work, and continually drove their bayonets through menwho were absolutely unconscious. . . . This unsoldierly work was not evenleft to the exclusive control of the black troops; our Britishsoldiers took part in it. "

On whatever ground Mr Bennett may seek to support these assertions, they are unwarranted and untruthful libels. There was no wholesaleslaughter of wounded dervishes, nor was there anything done in theleast justifying or providing a decent pretext for that ferociousaccusation. Very many thousands of dervish wounded fell into our handsthat day and later. Officers have written to the press, denying thesecharges and the rest of Mr Bennett's tale of monstrosity. The Sirdarhimself has confirmed by a personal cablegram my refutation of them. Here is another of Mr Bennett's suggestions of evil-doing, by innuendoand assertion:--"It was stated that orders had been given to kill thewounded. " And, "If the Sirdar really believes that the destruction ofthe wounded was a military necessity, " etc. Can colossal crassness gofurther? There is not and never was a scintilla of truth for thecharge of wholesale slaughtering of wounded dervishes, nor that theSirdar ever issued such an order, or that any reputable person everreceived it, or ever had it hinted to him. The accusation is anunmitigated untruth, and absolutely at variance with all that was saidand done by the Sirdar before and during the course of the battle andthe pursuit. I certainly never heard of the matter until Mr Bennettmade the accusation, and I cannot trace its authorship beyond himself. From the Sirdar down, contradictions of the charge have deservedlybeen slapped in Mr Bennett's face. 

But it is almost sheer waste of words to follow and refute line byline the article "After Omdurman. " Other of Mr Bennett's accusationswere: that the 21st Lancers, on the way to the front, robbedhen-roosts and stricken villagers; that once in Omdurman the Soudanesetroops abandoned discipline, looted, ravished, and murdered the wholenight long; that on land and water our cannon and Maxims weredeliberately turned upon unarmed flying inhabitants, massacring, without pity, men, women, and children. An these charges had beentrue, I should have hastened to denounce the culprits, whoever theywere, in the interests of humanity and country. Happily, Mr Bennett'stale is utterly without foundation, whatever reflection that castsupon his condition. The Lancers passed through nothing but desertedvillages, where there were neither natives nor roosts to rob, even hadthey been so disposed. As for the Soudanese troops, their disciplinethroughout was perfect; there was no looting, no ravishing nor murderdone by them or any other divisions of the soldiery. Nor did ourgunners on shore or afloat ever fire upon unarmed people. Let it berecalled that those whom Mr Bennett so flippantly accuses arehonourable gentlemen and fellow-countrymen. Three things in thisconnection are worthy of special note. When the first dervish attackupon our zereba was repulsed and Wad Melik's dead, dying and shammingwarriors carpeted the north slopes of Jebel Surgham and the plain infront. "Cease fire" was sounded. Thereafter the dervishes arose fromthe ground in hundreds and thousands and walked off, without awakeninga renewal of our fire from cannon, Maxims, or rifles. At the entryinto Omdurman the artillery and gunboats were ordered to be carefulhow they fired, and grave risks were incurred by the Sirdar and staffin personally counselling to friend and foe a cessation of fighting. 

Inaccuracy and sensationalism Mr Bennett is welcome to, and to thesort of notoriety it has brought him. Cheap maudlin sentiment mayprofess a pity for those "dervish homes ruined" by the successes ofBritish arms. The dervishes in their day had no homes. Nay, they madehonest profession that their mission was to destroy other people's, and do without carking domesticity, as that detracted from the meritof preparation for paradise. As I have elsewhere said, one of the"fads" of the day is to hold that liberalism of mind is alwayscharacterised by being a friend to every country and race but yourown. Exact truth is as illusive to discovery by that as otherpernicious methods. That there may have been one or two instances ofcruelty practised on the battle-field is possible. Something of thekind always takes place in warfare as in everyday life. But only theamateur would magnify a few instances into a catalogue of charges. Alas! you cannot eliminate from armies, any more than from ordinarycommunities, the foolish, insane, and criminal. 

 THE AUTHOR. 

LONDON, _February 1899_. 

THE END. 

NEILL AND COMPANY, LTD. , PRINTERS, EDINBURGH. 

_FOURTH IMPRESSION NOW READY. _

SIRDAR AND KHALIFA;

OR THE

RE-CONQUEST OF THE SOUDAN. 

BY

BENNET BURLEIGH. 

WITH PORTRAITS, NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS, MAPS, AND PLAN OF BATTLE. 

DEMY 8vo, 12s. 

THE DAILY NEWS says:--"Picturesque, spirited, and trustworthynarrative. . . . The book comprises a summary of the military situation, and a glance at the probable course of the renewed operations whichare now on the point of commencing. "

THE PALL MALL GAZETTE says:--"Nothing could be more timely. It isunnecessary at this time of day to speak of Mr Burleigh's familiarstyle . . . Always to the point, clear, and vigorous; or of hismatter--the matter of an experienced, shrewd, and fearless warcorrespondent. The book is just the book for the occasion, and willmake the tale that is coming directly more real to many of us. MrBurleigh gives a few useful introductory chapters dealing withprevious events, and a very interesting account of a trip to Kassala, 'our new possession'; but in the main it is the story of the AtbaraCampaign. The book makes good reading, entirely apart from its timelyinstructiveness. "

THE ST JAMES'S GAZETTE says:--"Its real value to the judicious readerlies in the fact that it is a faithful record by a highly skilledobserver of the day-by-day life of an Anglo-Egyptian Army engaged indesert warfare. The country itself--river and wilderness--the rivalleaders, the soldiery, their appearance, arms, and uniform, theireating and drinking, their lying down and their rising up, theirmarching and the final rush of battle--these are all here before us ina living picture, making the book in reality an invaluable 'vademecum' for those who wish to realise just what it is that our men aredoing to-day between the Atbara and Omdurman. "

THE WESTMINSTER GAZETTE says:--"The book is profoundly interesting. Readers familiar with the author's letters in _The Daily Telegraph_ donot need to be told that he is a master of vivid and picturesquenarrative. Mr Burleigh has been an eye-witness during the course ofall the campaigns in the Soudan in which British troops have beenemployed, and therefore writes out of full knowledge and experience. "

THE MORNING POST says:--"Many chapters are devoted to the AtbaraCampaign and the incidents connected with it, the storming ofMahmoud's entrenched Camp on the 7th of April last, and interviewswith that Emir after he was taken prisoner. Mr Burleigh's book, itwill be sufficient to say, should prove very useful to all who followthe progress of the Force now advancing on Omdurman. In asupplementary chapter will be found official despatches, and the workis provided with a map of the Soudan, and plans of the Battle of theAtbara and of the Island of Meroe, showing positions before thebattle. The illustrations are numerous. Among them is a frontispieceportrait of the Sirdar. "

THE DAILY CHRONICLE says:--"We are given a connected and verycomprehensible account of all the operations up to the destruction ofMahmoud's host and the Sirdar's triumphant return to Berber. . . . Thedescription of the main battle itself is very vivid and complete. "

THE SCOTSMAN says:--"Mr Bennet Burleigh's new volume, 'Sirdar andKhalifa, ' comes just in the nick of time. Its object is to recount thestory of the reconquest of the Soudan up to the Battle of Atbara. . . . Avery readable book. "

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH says:--"Readers of _The Daily Telegraph_ will notbe chary of accepting our estimate of the value of this book when weremind them that its author is Mr Bennet Burleigh, who has actedthroughout the numerous campaigns which have been waged in the Soudanas the War Correspondent of this journal, and gained himself awell-merited reputation for his pluck in the face of the enemy, hisendurance of hardship and fatigue, his excellence of judgment, and hisgraphic descriptions of the shock of battle. . . . It only remains to saythat this book is well illustrated, handsomely printed, and is inevery way a worthy record of a brief but memorable campaign. "