INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH

BY

GENERAL SIR JOHN ADYE, G. C. B. , R. A. 

WITH A MAP

PREFACE

The subject of our policy on the North-West frontier of India is one ofgreat importance, as affecting the general welfare of our EasternEmpire, and is specially interesting at the present time, when militaryoperations on a considerable scale are being conducted against acombination of the independent tribes along the frontier. 

It must be understood that the present condition of affairs is no meresudden outbreak on the part of our turbulent neighbours. Its causes liefar deeper, and are the consequences of events in bygone years. 

In the following pages I have attempted to give a short historicalsummary of its varying phases, in the hope that I may thus assist thepublic in some degree to understand its general bearings, and to form acorrect opinion of the policy which should be pursued in the future. 

JOHN ADYE, _General_. 

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

EVENTS PRIOR TO, AND INCLUDING, FIRST AFGHAN WAR OF 1839-41

Proposed Invasion of India by Napoleon I. --Mission of Burnes to Cabul--Its Failure--Hostility of Russia and Persia--First Afghan War, 1839-41--Its Vicissitudes and Collapse. 

CHAPTER II

EVENTS PRIOR, AND LEADING UP, TO SECOND AFGHAN WAR

Conquest of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand by Russia--British Conquest ofScinde and the Punjaub--Our Policy with the Frontier Tribes--Treaty of1857 with Dost Mahomed--Shere Ali succeeds as Ameer, 1868--War of 1878--Abdul Rahman becomes Ameer--Withdrawal of British Army from Afghanistan, 1881. 

CHAPTER III

FRONTIER POLICY SINCE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, INCLUDING EXPEDITION TO CHITRAL

Further Advance of Russia--Merv Occupied--Sir West Ridgeway's FrontierCommission of 1885--The Durand Agreement with Abdul Rahman--The ChitralExpedition of 1895--Its Results--Sudden Outbreak of Frontier Tribes, 1897. 

[Illustration: Afghanistan and North-West Frontier of INDIA. ]

INDIAN FRONTIER POLICY

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH

CHAPTER I

EVENTS PRIOR TO, AND INCLUDING, FIRST AFGHAN WAR OF 1839-41

Proposed Invasion of India by Napoleon I. --Mission of Burnes to Cabul--Its Failure--Hostility of Russia and Persia--First Afghan War, 1839-41--Its Vicissitudes and Collapse. 

In considering the important and somewhat intricate subject of policyon the North-Western frontier of our Indian Empire it will be desirable, in the first place, to give a concise history of the events which haveguided our action, and which for many years past have exercised apredominating influence in that part of our Eastern dominion. 

Speaking generally, it may, I think, be said that the main features ofour policy on the North-Western frontier have been determined by thegradual advance of Russia southwards, and partly also by the turbulentcharacter of the people of Afghanistan, and of the independent tribeswho inhabit the great region of mountains which lie between Russia andourselves. 

These two circumstances--the first having been the most powerful--haveled us into great wars and frontier expeditions, which as a rule havebeen costly, and in some cases unjust, and their consequences have nottended to strengthen our position either on the frontier or in Indiaitself. 

It will be well therefore to give an outline of the Russian conquestsin Central Asia to the north of Afghanistan, and also of our dealingswith the rulers of Cabul in bygone years, and we shall then be betterable to judge of our present position, and to determine the principleswhich should guide our North-Western frontier policy. 

One of the first threats of invasion of India early in the century wasplanned at Tilsit, and is thus described by Kaye:[Footnote: _Historyof the War in Afghanistan_] 'Whilst the followers of Alexander andNapoleon were abandoning themselves to convivial pleasures, thosemonarchs were spending quiet evenings together discussing their futureplans, and projecting joint schemes of conquest. It was then that theymeditated the invasion of Hindostan by a confederate army uniting on theplains of Persia; and no secret was made of the intention of the twogreat European potentates to commence in the following spring a hostiledemonstration--Contre les possessions de la compagnie des Indes. '

The peril, however, was averted by a treaty at Teheran in March 1809, in which the Shah of Persia covenanted not to permit any European forcewhatever to pass through Persia towards India, or towards the ports ofthat country. And so the visionary danger passed away. 

The old southern boundary of Russia in Central Asia extended from thenorth of the Caspian by Orenburg and Orsk, across to the old Mongoliancity of Semipalatinsk, and was guarded by a cordon of forts and Cossackoutposts. It was about 2, 000 miles in length, and [Footnote:_Quarterly Review_, Oct. 1865. ] 'abutted on the great KirghisSteppe, and to a certain extent controlled the tribes pasturing in thevicinity, but by no means established the hold of Russia on thatpathless, and for the most part lifeless, waste. '

During all the earlier years of the century, while we were establishingour power in India, constant intrigues and wars occurred in Persia, Afghanistan, and Central Asia; and rumours were occasionally heard ofthreats against ourselves, which formed the subject of diplomatictreatment from time to time; but in reality the scene was so distantthat our interests were not seriously affected, and it was not until1836 that they began to exercise a powerful influence as regards ourpolicy on the North-West frontier. 

In that year Lord Auckland was Governor-General, and Captain AlexanderBurnes was sent on a commercial mission up the Indus, and through theKyber Pass, to Cabul, where he was received in a friendly manner by theAmeer Dost Mahomed. It must be borne in mind that neither Scinde nor thePunjaub was then under our rule, so that our frontiers were still fardistant from Afghanistan. It was supposed at the time that Russia wasadvancing southward towards India in league with Persia, and the missionof Burnes was in reality political, its object being to induce the Ameerto enter into a friendly alliance. 

Dost Mahomed was quite willing to meet our views, and offered to giveup altogether any connection with the two Powers named. It, however, soon became apparent that our interests were by no means identical; hisgreat object, as we found, being to recover the Peshawur district, whichhad been taken a few years previously by Runjeet Singh, while we, on theother hand, courted his friendship chiefly in order that his countrymight prove a barrier against the advance of Russia and Persia. 

These respective views were evidently divergent and the issuesdoubtful; when suddenly a Russian Envoy (Vicovitch), also on a so-calledcommercial mission, arrived at Cabul, offering the Ameer money andassistance against the Sikhs. This altered the aspect of affairs. Burneswrote to the Governor-General that the Russians were evidently trying tooutbid us. Still some hope remained, until definite instructions arrivedfrom Lord Auckland declining to mediate with or to act against RunjeetSingh, the ruler of the Punjaub. The Ameer felt that we made greatdemands on him but gave him nothing in return. It then became evidentthat the mission of Burnes was a failure, and in April 1838 he returnedto India. It was our first direct effort to provide against a distantand unsubstantial danger, and it failed; but unfortunately we did nottake the lesson to heart. 

In the meantime the Shah of Persia, instigated by Russia, besiegedHerat, but after months of fruitless effort, and in consequence of oursending troops to the Persian Gulf, the Shah at length withdrew his army. 

It was not only the hostile efforts of the Shah on Herat in 1838 whichwere a cause of anxiety to the Indian Government; but, as Kayewrites, [Footnote: Kaye's _War in Afghanistan. _] 'far out in thedistance beyond the mountains of the Hindoo Koosh there was the shadowof a great Northern army, tremendous in its indistinctness, sweepingacross the wilds and deserts of Central Asia towards the frontiers ofHindostan. ' That great Northern army, as we know now, but did not knowthen, was the column of Perofski, which had left Orenburg for theattempted conquest of Khiva, but which subsequently perished fromhardships and pestilence in the snowy wastes of the Barsuk Desert, northof the Aral. 

In view of all the circumstances--of the supposed designs of Russia andPersia, and of the hostility and incessant intrigues in Afghanistan--theGovernment of India were sorely perplexed, and opinions amongst theauthorities widely differed as to the policy to be pursued. LordAuckland, however, at length decided on the assemblage of a Britishforce for service across the Indus. In his manifesto issued in December1838 he first alluded to the Burnes mission, and the causes of itsfailure. He then referred to the claims of Shah Soojah, a former rulerof Afghanistan (who had been living for some years in exile within ourterritories) and said we had determined, in co-operation with the Sikhs, to restore him to power as Ameer of Cabul. 

It was arranged that Shah Soojah should enter Afghanistan with his owntroops, such as they were, supported by a British army marching throughScinde and Beloochistan. The Governor-General expressed a hope thattranquillity would thus be established on the frontier, and a barrierformed against external aggression; and he ended by pro claiming thatwhen the object was accomplished the British army would be withdrawn. 

This was indeed a momentous decision. The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir Henry Fane, had already given an adverse opinion, saying that 'everyadvance you make beyond the Sutlej in my opinion adds to your militaryweakness. '

On the decision becoming known in England many high authorities, andthe public generally, disapproved, of the expedition. The Duke ofWellington said that 'our difficulties would commence where our militarysuccesses ended, ' and that 'the consequences of crossing the Indus once, to settle a Government in Afghanistan, will be a perennial march, intothat country. ' The Marquis Wellesley spoke of 'the folly of occupying aland of rocks, sands, deserts, and snow. ' Sir Charles Metcalfe from thefirst protested, and said, 'Depend upon it, the surest way to bringRussia down upon ourselves is for us to cross the Indus and meddle withthe countries beyond it. ' Mr. Elphinstone wrote: 'If you send 27, 000 menup the Bolam to Candahar, and can feed them, I have no doubt you cantake Candahar and Cabul and set up Soojah, but as for maintaining him ina poor, cold, strong, and remote country, among a turbulent people likethe Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless. If you succeed youwill I fear weaken the position against Russia. The Afghans are neutral, and would have received your aid against invaders with gratitude. Theywill now be disaffected, and glad to join any invader to drive you out. '

Mr. Tucker, of the Court of Directors, wrote to the Duke of Wellington:'We have contracted an alliance with Shah Soojah, although he does notpossess a rood of ground in Afghanistan, nor a rupee which he did notderive from our bounty as a quondam pensioner. ' He added, that 'even ifwe succeed we must maintain him in the government by a large militaryforce, 800 miles from our frontier and our resources. '

The above were strong and weighty opinions and arguments against therash and distant enterprise on which the Government of India were aboutto embark. But there is more to be said. Independently of the result inAfghanistan itself, it must be borne in mind that the proposed line ofmarch of the army necessarily led through Scinde and Beloochistan, countries which (whatever their former position may have been) were thenindependent both of the Ameer and of ourselves. 

The force from Bengal, consisting of about 9, 500 men of all arms, with38, 000 camp followers, accompanied by Shah Soojah's levy, leftFerozepore in December, and crossing the Indus, arrived at Dadur, theentrance to the Bolam Pass, in March 1839. Difficulties with the Ameersof Scinde at once arose, chiefly as to our passage through theirterritories; but their remonstrances were disregarded, and they wereinformed that 'the day they connected themselves with any other Powerthan England would be the last of their independence, if not of theirrule. ' [Footnote: Kaye's _War in Afghanistan_. ]

The army then advanced through the Bolam, and reached Quetta on March26th. But here again obstacles similar in character to those justdescribed occurred, and Sir Alexander Burnes visited the ruler ofBeloochistan (the Khan of Khelat), demanding assistance, especially asto supplies of food. The Prince, with prophetic truth, pointed out thatthough we might restore Shah Soojah, we would not carry the Afghans withus, and would fail in the end. He alluded to the devastation which ourmarch had already caused in the country; but having been granted asubsidy, unwillingly consented to afford us assistance; and the army, leaving possible enemies in its rear, passed on, and reached Candaharwithout opposition in April. At the end of June it recommenced its marchnorthwards, and Ghuznee having been stormed and captured, our troopswithout further fighting arrived at Cabul on April 6. Dost Mahomed, deserted for the time by his people, fled northward over the HindooKoosh, finding a temporary refuge in Bokhara, and Shah Soojah reigned inhis stead. 

So far the great expedition had apparently accomplished its object, andthe success of the tripartite treaty between ourselves, the Sikhs, andthe new Ameer had been successfully carried out, almost entirely, however, by ourselves as the pre-dominant partner. 

The time therefore would seem to have arrived when, in fulfilment ofLord Auckland's proclamation, the British army should be withdrawn fromAfghanistan. For the moment this appeared to be the case. But in realityit was not so, and our position soon became dangerous, then critical, and at last desperate. In the first place, the long line ofcommunication was liable at any time to be interrupted, as alreadymentioned; then, again, the arrival of Shah Soojah had excited noenthusiasm; and the very fact that we were foreigners in language, religion and race, rendered our presence hateful to his subjects. Inshort, the new Ameer was, and continued to be, a mere puppet, supportedin authority by British bayonets. 

These conditions were apparent from the first day of his arrival, andgrew in intensity until the end. Shah Soojah himself soon discoveredthat his authority over his people was almost nominal; and although hechafed at our continued presence in the country, he also felt that theday of our departure would be the last of his reign, and that ourwithdrawal was under the circumstances impossible. But the situation wasequally complicated from our own point of view. If, as originallypromised, the British troops were withdrawn, the failure of theexpedition would at once become apparent by the anarchy which wouldensue. On the other hand, to retain an army in the far-distant mountainsof Afghanistan would not only be a breach of faith, but, while entailingenormous expense, would deprive India of soldiers who might be requiredelsewhere. 

After lengthy consideration, it was decided to reduce the total of ourforce in the country, while retaining a hold for the present on Cabul, Ghuznee, and Candahar, together with the passes of the Kyber and Bolam. In short, the British army was weakly scattered about in a region ofmountains, amongst a hostile people, and with its long lines ofcommunication insufficiently guarded. Both in a military and a politicalpoint of view the position was a false and dangerous one. 

General Sir John Keane, who was about to return to India, writing atthe time, said 'Mark my words, it will not be long before there is heresome signal catastrophe. ' During the summer of 1840 there were troublesboth in the Kyber and Bolam passes. In the former the tribes, incensedat not receiving sufficient subsidies, attacked the outposts andplundered our stores; while in Beloochistan matters were so serious thata British force was sent, and captured Khelat, the Khan being killed, and part of his territory handed over to Shah Soojah. [Footnote: In thelife of Sir Robert Sandeman, recently published, it is stated that thealleged treachery of Mehrab Khan, which cost him his life, was onsubsequent inquiry not confirmed. ] Rumours from Central Asia also addedto our anxieties. Although the failure of the Russian attempt on Khivabecame known some months later, it excited apprehension at the timeamongst our political officers in Cabul. Sir Alexander Burnes, duringthe winter of 1839, expressed opinions which were curiously inconsistentwith each other. 'I maintain, ' he said, 'that man to be an enemy to hiscountry who recommends a soldier to be stationed west of the Indus;'while at the same moment he advocated the advance of our troops overthe Hindoo Koosh into Balkh, so as to be ready to meet the Russians inthe following May. 

Sir William McNaghten, the chief political officer in Cabul, went stillfurther, and in April 1840 not only urged a march on Bokhara, but alsocontemplated sending a Mission to Kokand, in order, as he said, 'tofrustrate the knavish tricks of the Russians in that quarter. '

Our position, however, at that time was sufficiently precarious withoutadding to our anxieties by distant expeditions in Central Asia, even hadthe Russians established themselves in the Principalities, which at thattime was not the case. Not only was Afghanistan itself seething withtreachery and intrigues from one end to the other, but the Sikhs in thePunjaub, our nominal allies, had, since the death of Runjeet Singh, become disloyal and out of hand. Beloochistan was in tumult; the tribesin the Kyber, ever ready for mischief, incessantly threatened ourcommunications; so that we were certainly in no condition to enter uponfurther dangerous expeditions against distant imaginary foes. 

Sir Jasper Nicholls, the Commander-in-Chief, strongly objected to anyadvance. 'In truth, ' he said, 'we are much weaker now than in 1838. '

During the latter months of 1840, and in 1841, matters became steadilyworse, and all Afghanistan seemed ripe for revolt. 'We are in a stewhere, ' wrote Sir William McNaghten in September; 'it is reported thatthe whole country on this side the Oxus is up in favour of Dost Mahomed, who is certainly advancing in great strength. ' Again, in a letter toLord Auckland, he said 'that affairs in this quarter have the worstpossible appearance'--and he quoted the opinion of Sir WilloughbyCotton, that 'unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengthened wecannot hold the country. '

At this critical period, however, Dost Mahomed was heavily defeated atBamian, on the Hindoo Koosh, voluntarily surrendering shortlyafterwards, and for the moment prospects looked brighter; but the cloudssoon gathered again, and the end was at hand. 

The Governor-General of India had throughout the whole war wisely andsteadfastly resisted the proposed further operations in Central Asia;and the Court of Directors in London wrote as follows: 'We pronounce ourdecided opinion that, for many years to come, the restored monarchy willhave need of a British force in order to maintain peace in its ownterritory, and prevent aggression from without. ' And they go on: 'Weagain desire you seriously to consider which of the two alternatives (aspeedy retreat from Afghanistan, or a considerable increase of themilitary force in that country) you may feel it your duty to adopt. Weare convinced that you have no middle course to pursue with safety andwith, honour. ' The Government of India, hesitating to the last, failedin adopting either of the alternatives. 

In November, 1841, Sir Alexander Burnes was treacherously murdered by amob in Cabul, which was followed by an insurrection, and the defeat ofour troops. General Elphinstone, who was in command, writing to Sir W. McNaghten on November 24, said that 'from the want of provisions andforage, the reduced state of our troops, the large number of wounded andsick, the difficulty of defending the extensive and ill-situatedcantonment we occupy, the near approach of winter, our communicationscut off, no prospect of relief, and the whole country in arms againstus, I am of opinion that it is not feasible any longer to maintain ourposition in this country, and that you ought to avail yourself of theoffer to negotiate that has been made to you. '

This was conclusive. Our Envoy early in December met the Afghan chiefs, and agreed that we should immediately evacuate the country, and thatDost Mahomed, who was in exile in India, should return. On December 23, Sir William McNaghten was treacherously murdered at a conference withthe Afghan Sirdars, within sight of the British cantonment, and thencame the end. 

The British force at Cabul, leaving its guns, stores and treasurebehind, commenced its retreat on January 6, 1842; but incessantlyattacked during its march, and almost annihilated in the Koord CabulPass, it ceased to exist as an organised body. General Elphinstone andother officers, invited to a conference by Akbar Khan, were forciblydetained as hostages, and on January 13 a solitary Englishman (Dr. Brydon) arrived at Jellalabad, being, with the exception of a fewprisoners, the sole remaining representative of the force. 

I have given this short sketch of the first Afghan war because, disastrous as it was, the causes of our failure were due throughout farmore to rash and mistaken policy than to any shortcomings of the Britishtroops engaged. Kaye in his 'History' gives a clear summary of itsoriginal object and unfortunate results: 'The expedition across theIndus was undertaken with the object of creating in Afghanistan abarrier against encroachment from the west. ' 'The advance of the Britisharmy was designed to check the aggression of Persia on the Afghanfrontier, and to baffle Russian intrigues by the substitution of afriendly for an unfriendly Power in the countries beyond the Indus. After an enormous waste of blood and treasure, we left every town andvillage of Afghanistan bristling with our enemies. Before the Britisharmy crossed the Indus the English name had been honoured inAfghanistan. Some dim traditions of the splendour of Mr. Elphinstone'sMission had been all that the Afghans associated with their thoughts ofthe English nation, but in their place we left galling memories of theprogress of a desolating army. '

The history of the war from first to last deserves carefulconsideration; and if the lessons taught by it are taken to heart, theywill materially assist in determining the principles which, should guideour policy on the North-West frontier of India. 

CHAPTER II

EVENTS PRIOR, AND LEADING UP, TO SECOND AFGHAN WAR

Conquest of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand by Russia--British Conquest ofScinde and the Punjaub--Our Policy with the Frontier Tribes--Treaty of1857 with Dost Mahomed--Shere Ali succeeds as Ameer, 1868--War of 1878--Abdul Rahman becomes Ameer--Withdrawal of British Army from Afghanistan, 1881. 

For a few years subsequent to the war, our frontier policy happilyremained free from complications, and it will be desirable now to refershortly to the progress of Russia in Central Asia, and of her conquestsof the decaying Principalities of Khiva, Bokhara and Kokand. 

Previous to 1847 the old boundary line of Russia south of Orenburgabutted on the great Kirghis Steppe, a zone [Footnote: ParliamentaryPapers: _Afghanistan_, 1878. ] (as the late Sir H. Rawlinson toldus) of almost uninhabited desert, stretching 2, 000 miles from west toeast, and nearly 1, 000 from north to south, which had hitherto acted asa buffer between Russia and the Mahomedan Principalities below the Aral. 

[Footnote: Extract from _Quarterly Review_, October 1865. ]'It wasin 1847, contemporaneously with our final conquest of the Punjaub, thatthe curtain rose on the aggressive Russian drama in Central Asia whichis not yet played out. Russia had enjoyed the nominal dependency of theKirghis-Kozzacks of the little horde who inhabited the western divisionof the great Steppe since 1730; but, except in the immediate vicinity ofthe Orenburg line, she had little real control over the tribes. In 1847-48, however, she erected three important fortresses in the very heart ofthe Steppe. These important works--the only permanent constructionswhich had hitherto been attempted south of the line--enabled Russia, forthe first time, to dominate the western portion of the Steppe and tocommand the great routes of communication with Central Asia. But theSteppe forts were after all a mere means to an end; they formed theconnecting link between the old frontiers of the empire and the long-coveted line of the Jaxartes, and simultaneously with their erectionarose Fort Aralsk, near the embouchure of the river. '

The Russians having thus crossed the great desert tract and establishedthemselves on the Jaxartes (Sir Daria), from that time came permanentlyinto contact with the three Khanates of Central Asia, and their progresssince that date has been comparatively easy and rapid. 

The Principalities had no military organisation which would enable themto withstand a great Power; their troops and those of Russia werefrequently in conflict of late years; but the battles were in a militarysense trivial; and the broad result is, that Russia has been for someyears predominant throughout the whole region; and her frontiers are nowcontinuous with the northern provinces of both Afghanistan and Persia. It is this latter point which is the important one, so far as we areconcerned, but before entering into its details, it will be well toconsider the nature of the great country over which Russia now rules. 

Until within the last few years our information as to its generalcharacter was very limited; but the accounts of numerous recenttravellers all concur in describing it as consisting for the most partof sterile deserts, deficient in food, forage, fuel and water. Thereare a certain number of decayed ancient cities here and there, and thereare occasional oases of limited fertility, but the general conditionsare as just described. With the exception of the one railway from theCaspian to Samarcand, the means of transport are chiefly pack animals. Speaking roughly, the dominions of Russia in Central Asia, south ofOrenburg, may be taken as almost equal in geographical extent to thoseof our Indian Empire; but there is this striking difference between thetwo, that whilst the population of India is computed at 250 millions, that of Central Asia, even at the highest computation, is only reckonedat four or five millions, of whom nearly half are nomadic--that is, theywander about, not from choice, but in search of food and pasturage. Theextreme scantiness of the population is of itself a rough measure of thegeneral desolation. 

The military position of Russia in Central Asia, therefore, is that ofa great but distant Power, which during the last fifty years has overrunand taken possession of extended territories belonging to fanaticalMahomedan tribes. The people themselves are, many of them, warlike andhostile; but they are badly armed, have no discipline, training, orleaders, and are not therefore in a position to withstand the advance ofregular troops. Consequently Russia is enabled to hold the country witha comparatively small force of scattered detachments, which are, however, supplied with arms, munitions and stores under greatdifficulties from far distant centres, and her troops are practicallyincapable of concentration. Indeed the farther they go the weaker theybecome; the very magnitude of the area being an additional cause ofweakness. This is a condition somewhat precarious in itself, and wouldcertainly not appear to be an alarming one as a basis of attack againstour Empire, even were India close at hand. 

While Russia, however, was completing the subjugation of thePrincipalities, and advancing her frontiers until they becameconterminous with the northern provinces of Afghanistan and Persia, theGovernment of India, by the great wars of 1843 and 1849, having annexedScinde and the Punjaub, advanced our frontiers in a similar manner, sothat the people both of Beloochistan and Afghanistan, hitherto farremote from our dominions, now became our neighbours. 

In the life of Sir Robert Sandeman recently published, a veryinteresting account is given, not only of the nature of the countryalong the border, but of the policy pursued for many years with theindependent tribes. It says: 'By the conquest of Scinde in 1843, and theannexation of the Punjaub in 1849, the North-West frontier of India wasadvanced across the river Indus to the foot of the rocky mountains whichseparate the plains of the Indus valley from the higher plateaus ofAfghanistan and Khelat. These mountain ranges formed a vast irregularbelt of independent or semi-independent territory, extending fromCashmere southward to the sea near Kurrachee, a total length of about1, 200 miles. ' The belt of territory above described was 'inhabited byfierce marauding tribes, often at war with each other, ever and anonharrying the plains of the Punjaub and Scinde, and the constant terrorof the trade caravans during their journey through the passes. '

The policy pursued for many years is thus described: 'The disasters ofthe first Afghan war, and the tragical episode of Khelat, were fresh inmen's recollections, and created a strong feeling against politicalinterference with tribes beyond our border'. . . . 'Accordingly, from thevery first, the system of border defence maintained by the PunjaubGovernment was not purely military, but partly military, partlypolitical and conciliatory. While the passes were carefully watched, every means was taken for the promotion of friendly intercourse. ' Roadswere made, steamers started on the Indus, and inundation canalsdeveloped along the border. 

So long as they were friendly the tribesmen had free access to ourterritory, could hold land, enlist in our army, and make free use of ourmarkets. As a result, the deadly hatred formerly prevailing between theSikhs and the hill tribes soon disappeared; raids became exceptional;cultivation increased; the bazaars of our frontier stations teemed withAfghans, with trains of laden camels, who at the close of the seasonreturned laden with our goods. Disputes were voluntarily referred byindependent tribesmen for the arbitration of British officers. Such, (itis stated in the life of Sir Robert Sandeman) were the results ofLawrence's frontier policy, and no words are required to emphasise theseexcellent arrangements, which remained in force for many years. 

Before leaving this part of the subject, it may be as well toanticipate a little and to allude to the successful part taken by SirRobert Sandeman in 1876 on his appointment as our agent to the Khan ofKhelat. It is important in the first place to mention, that whilst inAfghanistan the tribes all along the frontier were for the most partindependent of the Ameer of Cabul, and were ruled by their own 'jirgahs'or councils, in Beloochistan the mode of government was so far differentthat the chiefs, whilst acknowledging the Khan as their hereditaryruler, were entitled, not only to govern their own tribes, but to takepart in the general administration of the country as the constitutionaladvisers of the paramount chief. The dangers arising from the vicinityof three powerful kingdoms, Persia, Afghanistan, and Scinde, had nodoubt led them to perceive the necessity of co-operation, which wasestablished about the middle of the eighteenth century. Although theconstitution as above described secured to the confederated tribesnearly a century of prosperity and peaceful government, it so happenedthat for some years before 1876, owing to the weakness of the thenruler, and partly to turbulence of the chiefs, the government of thecountry fell into disorder, and the commerce through the Bolam Passaltogether ceased. 

From 1872 to 1876 Lord Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and one of hislast acts before leaving was the appointment of Colonel Sandeman as ourEnvoy, with a view to mediate between the Khan and his subordinates, andwhich proved successful. The principal terms which were finally acceptedby the Khan and his tribal chiefs were, that their foreign policy was tobe under our guidance, and we were also to be the referee in case ofinternal disputes; that the commerce of the Bolam was to be opened andprotected, the annual subsidy hitherto granted to the Khan of5, 000_l_. Being doubled to cover the necessary expenditure; and, finally, that a British Agent with a suitable contingent should beestablished at Quetta. It is important to observe that the negotiationswere conducted throughout in a spirit of conciliation, and that theirbeneficial results remain in force to the present day. 

The policy pursued for many years on the Afghan frontier, althoughregulated by the same general principles as in Khelat, was notaltogether so rapidly accomplished, or so entirely successful. Thecircumstances were in some degree different and less simple. In thefirst place the frontier was 800 miles long, and was inhabited by Afghantribes, who were more predatory and intractable than the Beloochees;they were not only independent of each other, but for the most partacknowledged no allegiance to the Ameer of Cabul. Border disputestherefore had to be settled with individual chiefs; and no opportunitywas offered for our mediation in internal feuds, or for joint agreementon external policy, as was so successfully accomplished by Sandeman inBeloochistan. There was no general federation with which we could enterinto negotiation. As a consequence, we were compelled to maintain alarge force and fortified posts along the frontier; and many punitiveexpeditions became necessary from time to time against lawless offendingtribes. Still, on the whole, and considering the difficulties of thesituation, the policy of conciliation, subsidies, and of non-interference with their internal affairs, gradually succeeded; raidsonce chronic became exceptional, and were dealt with rather as mattersof frontier policy than of war. [Footnote: See Parliamentary Papers:_Afghanistan, _ 1878, page 30, and _Beloochistan, _ No. 3, 1878. ]

It must also be remembered, as an additional complication, that inannexing the Punjaub, although it is essentially the country of theSikhs, who are Hindoos, the inhabitants of the trans-Indus districts arefor the most part what are termed Punjaubee Mussulmen, that is, Afghans, in race, religion and language. 

From what has been said as to our dealings with the border tribes, itwill be evident that while our difficulties were continuous and oftenserious, still, they were chiefly local; and that the defence of theEmpire on that frontier against foreign aggression depended in a greatmeasure on our relations with the ruler of Afghanistan itself. When DostMahomed, after the great war, returned in 1843 to his former position asAmeer of that distracted country, it was hardly to be expected that, although acquiescing in his reinstatement, we should be regarded by himin a friendly light; still, some years passed away without any importantchange in our relative positions, one way or the other. 

In 1855, Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General, and a treaty was madewith Dost Mahomed, by which both parties agreed to respect each other'sterritories. In January, 1857, a still more important one followed. Wewere then once more at war with Persia; and at a meeting between SirJohn Lawrence and the Ameer, an agreement was entered into that DostMahomed, acting in co-operation with us, should receive 10, 000_l_. A month for military purposes, to continue during the war; that Englishofficers should reside in his country temporarily, to keep the IndianGovernment informed, but not to interfere with the administration, andthat when peace ensued they should be withdrawn, and a native agentalone remain as our representative. [Footnote: In view of the strongobjection to the presence of English officers in Afghanistan, Sir JohnLawrence intimated to the Viceroy of India that he had given anassurance to Dost Mahomed that it should not be enforced unlessimperatively necessary. ]

It is important to note that this friendly treaty was made at Peshawur, just before the great Mutiny, and that the Ameer, though urged by hispeople to attack us in our hour of danger, remained faithful, and wouldnot allow them to cross the border. 

Dost Mahomed died in June, 1863, and for some years after his deathfamily feuds and intestine wars occurred as to his successor, duringwhich we carefully abstained from interference, and were prepared toacknowledge the _de facto_ ruler. Ultimately, in 1868, his sonShere Ali established his authority in Afghanistan, and was acknowledgedaccordingly. Lord Lawrence was then the Viceroy, and in a despatch tothe Secretary of State expressed his views as regards the advances ofRussia. After pointing out that they were now paramount in Central Asia, he suggested a mutual agreement as to our respective spheres andrelations with the tribes and nations with whom we were now both incontact, and he went on to welcome the civilising effect of Russiangovernment over the wild tribes of the Steppes, and pointed out that ifRussia were assured of our loyal feeling in these matters, she wouldhave no jealousy in respect of our alliance with the Afghans. 

The Secretary of State (Sir Stafford Northcote) replied 'that theconquests which Russia had made, and apparently is still making, inCentral Asia, appear to be the natural result of the circumstances inwhich she finds herself placed, and to afford no ground whatever forrepresentations indicative of suspicion or alarm on the part of thiscountry. ' It is a great misfortune that such sensible, conciliatoryviews did not continue to guide our policy in the events which a fewyears later led us into the second great war in Afghanistan. 

Shere Ali did not inherit the great qualities of his father, and wasalso somewhat discontented that we had not abetted his cause during theinternal troubles in Afghanistan. However, in 1869 he met Lord Mayo atUmballa, and after careful discussion it was agreed that we shouldabstain from sending British officers across the frontier and frominterfering in Afghan affairs; that our desire was that a strong, friendly, and independent Government should be established in thatcountry. It was further decided to give Shere Ali considerable pecuniaryassistance, and presents of arms from time to time. The Ameer, whilegratified at these results, wished us also to give a dynastic pledge asto his lineal descendants, which, however, was not acceded to. In 1873Lord Northbrook was Viceroy of India, and a further conference tookplace at Simla with the Ameer's Prime Minister, chiefly as to thenorthern Afghan frontier in Badakshan and Wakkan, which were at the timesomewhat uncertain, and a matter of dispute with Russia. 

This somewhat delicate question was, however, settled in a friendlymanner by Lord Granville, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Prince Gortschakoff's final despatch to him on the subject was asfollows: [Footnote: _Central Asia_, 1873--c. 699. ] 'The divergencewhich existed in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned tothe dominion of Shere Ali. The English Government includes within themBadakshan and Wakkan, which according to our views enjoyed a certainindependence. Considering the difficulty experienced in establishing thefacts in all their details in those distant parts; considering thegreater facilities which the British Government possesses for collectingprecise detail, and above all considering our wish not to give to thisquestion of detail greater importance than is due to it, we do notrefuse to accept the boundary line laid down by England. We are the moreinclined to this act of courtesy as the English Government engages touse all its influence with Shere Ali in order to induce him to maintaina peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measuresof aggression or further conquest. This influence is indisputable. It isbased, not only on the material and moral ascendency of England, butalso on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted to her. Such beingthe case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenanceof peace. '

Prince Gortschakoff admitted more than once that the Emperor of Russialooked upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere of Russianinfluence, and within that of ours; at the same time, claiming similarindependence for Russia in Central Asia. 

During the next few years, subsequent to the Simla conference, ShereAli, though he had received considerable assistance from us, both inmoney and arms, was not altogether satisfied, and one or two incidentsoccurred during that period which gave him umbrage. Lord Northbrook, the Viceroy in 1875, was not unaware of the somewhat cold and capriciousspirit of the Ameer, but in writing to London he pointed out that ShereAli's situation was difficult, not only from the risk of revolution athome, but also of attack from abroad, but that on the whole he was to berelied on. 

A change, however, was coming over the scene, and our policy revertedfrom conciliation to compulsion. It was a critical period in the historyof frontier policy, and demands careful consideration. 

It must not be forgotten that although amongst those best qualified tojudge the majority had long been opposed to advance and conquest interritories beyond our North-West frontier, and entertained but littlefear of Russian aggressive power, still there were others--men of longexperience, who had filled high positions in India--who held differentviews; and it is probable that not only successive British Governments, but the public generally, who have no time for carefully weighing thediverse aspects of the subject, were influenced sometimes one way, sometimes another. In the many difficulties connected with our world-wideEmpire this must always be more or less the case. For instance, thelate Sir H. Rawlinson, a few years before the second Afghan war, took avery alarmist view of the progress of Russia, not only in Central Asiabut also in Asia Minor. He considered that her advance from Orenburg wasonly part of one great scheme of invasion; and he averred that theconquest of the Caucasus had given her such a strong position that therewas no military or physical obstacle to the continuous march of Russiafrom the Araxes to the Indus. [Footnote: Parliamentary Papers, _Afghanistan_, 1878. ] He described it as the unerring certainty ofa law of nature. But, throughout, he ignores distances, blots out themountains, deserts, and arid plains of Persia and Afghanistan, and takesno account of the warlike races who would bar the path. It requires avery large map to embrace all the details of this widespread strategy. 

Some account has already been given of the weakness, in a militarypoint of view, of Russia in Central Asia, and of the distance of herscattered troops from the main resources of the Empire. But, inaddition, it must be remembered that the mountains of Afghanistan alsoform a natural and enduring barrier against a further advance. The greatHindoo Koosh range, running all along the northern part of that country, forms indeed the real scientific frontier between the two Empires, thefew passes over its snowy crests ranging from 12, 000 to 18, 000 feethigh, and only open for a few months in the year. 

Another supposed line of advance for a Russian army, namely by thePamirs, has of late years been brought forward; but its main featuresare more discouraging than those of any other. This elevated regionconsists of a mass of bare snow-capped mountains attaining elevations ofover 25, 000 feet, intersected by plateaux almost as devoid of vegetationas the mountains themselves. The lakes are about 12, 000 feet above thesea, the population is scanty, and consists chiefly of nomads in searchof food and pasture during the short summer; so that although theRussians might, if unopposed, possibly move in small isolateddetachments carrying their own food and munitions over the Pamirs, itwould only be to lose themselves in the gorges of the Himalayas. 

The conditions above mentioned are for the most part permanent. Russiamay not, and probably has not, any intention of trying to invade andconquer India--but she has not the power, which is a far more importantconsideration. 

To return to the position of affairs previous to the second Afghan war. [Footnote: See _Afghanistan_, 1878, published by Secretary of Statefor India, p. 128 et seq. ] Early in 1875, Lord Northbrook, the Governor-General, received a despatch from the Government at home, pointing outthat the information received from Afghanistan, not only in respect tointernal intrigues but also as regards the influence of foreign Powers, was scanty, and not always trustworthy. He was, therefore, instructed toprocure the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agencyat Herat, and also at Candahar. 

The Viceroy of India and his Council having consulted variousexperienced officers on the subject, replied in June, that in theiropinion the present time and circumstances were unsuitable for takingthe initiative. They pointed out that the Sirdars and many of the peopleof Afghanistan would strongly object, and that in the Ameer's somewhatinsecure position he could not afford to disregard their feelings inthe matter. They advised patience and conciliation. 

In November 1875 a second despatch was received from England, reiterating the necessity of more complete information as toAfghanistan, especially in view of recent Russian advances in CentralAsia; and the Viceroy was directed to send a Mission to Cabul withoutdelay, to confer with the Ameer on Central Asia, and requesting thatBritish officers should be placed on the frontier to watch the course ofevents. 

The Government of India, in January 1876, again urged theundesirability of forcing the hands of the Ameer, and pointed out thathis objections to English officers were not from a feeling ofdisloyalty, and that to force his hands was not desirable. They did notapprehend any desire of interference on the part of Russia, and theyconcluded by alluding to the careful conciliatory policy carried out byLords Canning, Lawrence, and Mayo, as giving the best promise of peace, and satisfactory results in Afghanistan. Consequently they deprecatedthe proposed action by the Home Government in forcing British officersupon Shere Ali. In April 1876 Lord Northbrook quitted India, and wassucceeded by Lord Lytton; and a further reply from Lord Salisbury, theSecretary of State for India, was received by the Viceroy. It reiteratedthat the Government at home considered our trans-frontier relationsunsatisfactory; that permanent British Agencies should be established inAfghanistan; and that we were willing to afford the Ameer materialsupport against unprovoked aggression, our object being to maintain astrong and friendly Power in that country. The despatch went on to saythat should the Ameer decline to meet our request, he should be informedthat he was isolating himself from us at his peril. 

The next step was taken in May, when the Ameer was invited to receive aspecial Mission, which he politely declined. In October our native Agentat Cabul came to Simla and had an interview with Lord Lytton, whoreiterated the demands of the British Government, pointing out that inthe event of a refusal there was nothing to prevent our joining Russiain wiping Afghanistan out of the map altogether, of which Shere Ali wasduly informed. In January 1877 a final effort was made to come to terms, and Sir Lewis Pelly and the Afghan Prime Minister, Noor Mahomed, had aconference at Peshawur. The first, and indeed the only point discussed, was the demand that British representatives should reside inAfghanistan, which was a _sine qua non_. Noor Mahomed patheticallypleaded that Lords Lawrence, Mayo, and Northbrook, successive Viceroys, had all in turn promised that this should not be insisted on; and heended by saying that Shere Ali would rather perish than submit. It wasevident that further discussion was useless, and the conference wasclosed; Noor Mahomed, who was ill, dying shortly afterwards. In March1877 our native Agent at Cabul was withdrawn, and direct communicationwith Shere Ali ceased. 

I have given the above _resume_ of the correspondence in 1875-77, and of the abortive efforts to induce the Ameer to comply with ourdemands, because it is evident that if he continued to resist compulsionmust almost inevitably ensue. At about the same time, Quetta, in theBolam, was occupied by a considerable British force, which was naturallyregarded as a threat on Afghanistan. A concentration of troops also tookplace in the Northern Punjaub, and preparations were made for theconstruction of bridges over the Indus. All these were indications ofcoming war. It must also be noted that our relations with Russia inEurope were much strained at the time, so that probably the preparationsin India were in some degree due to the apprehension of war in otherparts of the world. 

In the summer of 1878 a Russian Envoy arrived at Cabul, which under thecircumstances is hardly to be wondered at. Some months however elapsed, and it was not until November 1878 that war was declared. Lord Lytton, the Viceroy, in his proclamation stated: 'That for ten years we hadbeen friendly to Shere Ali; had assisted him with money and arms; andhad secured for him formal recognition of his northern frontier byRussia. ' It went on to state, that in return he had requited us withactive ill-will; had closed the passes and allowed British traders to beplundered; and had endeavoured to stir up religious hatred against us. It then pointed out that whilst refusing a British Mission he hadreceived one from Russia; and ended by saying that we had no quarrelwith the Afghans, but only with Shere Ali himself. 

From official correspondence published subsequently [Footnote:Parliamentary Papers, _Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 2. --c. 2811. ] itappeared that in entering Afghanistan our chief object at the outset wasto establish what was called a strategical triangle, by the occupationof Cabul, Ghuznee and Jellalabad; and it was stated that by holding thisposition, entrenched behind a rampart of mountains, we should have thepower of debouching on the plains of the Oxus against Russia in CentralAsia! 'It is difficult, ' said Lord Lytton, 'to imagine a more commandingstrategical position. ' The events of the war, however, soon put an endto this somewhat fanciful strategy. 

In November 1878 the British forces entered the country by three mainroutes, the Kyber, the Koorum, and the Bolam, and hard fighting at onceensued on the two northern ones. The results were immediate: Shere Alifled northwards, and died soon after. His son, Yakoob Khan, assumedtemporarily the position of Ameer, but in the convulsed state of thecountry lie possessed little real power or authority. In May, 1879, hemet the British authorities at Gundamuk, and after considerablediscussion signed a treaty, the chief points of which were as follows:--The foreign affairs of Afghanistan were to be under our guidance; and weundertook to support the Ameer against foreign aggression; Britishagents were to reside in the country; the Koorum, Pisheen, and SibiValleys were assigned to the British Government; and finally, YakoobKhan was to receive an annual subsidy of 60, 000_l_. 

So far, it would appear as if the campaign had at once realised themain objects of British policy; but tragic events rapidly followed, active hostilities were resumed, and the Treaty of Gundamuk became merewaste paper. 

As a first result of the treaty, Sir Louis Cavagnari [Footnote:_Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 1. ] was appointed our Envoy, andaccompanied by a few officers and a small escort, arrived at Cabul inJuly, being received in a friendly manner by the Ameer; althoughinfluences adverse to his presence in the capital soon became apparent. Suddenly, on September 3, the British Residency was attacked by severalAfghan regiments, and after a desperate resistance, Cavagnari and thewhole of his officers and escort perished. 

This deplorable event, of course, upset all previous arrangements, andled to an immediate resumption of hostilities. Our troops at onceadvanced and captured Cabul, Yakoob Khan voluntarily abdicating andbecoming an exile in India. Ghuznee also was occupied shortly afterwardsby our advance from Candahar. 

The Government of India, in a despatch in January, 1880, pointed outthat, in view of the complete change in the political situation, it wasnecessary, in the first place, fully to establish our military positionin the country. They acknowledged that the hopes entertained ofestablishing a strong, friendly, and independent kingdom on our frontierhad collapsed; and that Afghanistan had fallen to pieces at the firstblow, its provinces being now disconnected and masterless. In view ofthese unexpected results, they went on to recommend the permanentseparation of the provinces under separate rulers; and having regard tothe special difficulties connected with Herat, advocated its beinghanded over to Persia!

This was indeed a policy of despair!

Lord Hartington, who had become Secretary of State for India, writingin May, 1880, summed up the situation as follows :--'It appears that asthe result of two successful campaigns, of the employment of an enormousforce, and of the expenditure of large sums of money, all that has yetbeen accomplished has been the disintegration of the State which it wasdesired to see strong, friendly and independent; the assumption of freshand unwelcome liabilities in regard to one of its provinces, and acondition of anarchy throughout the remainder of the country. '

Long and careful consideration was naturally given to the solution ofthe difficulty in which this country found itself owing to the untowardcircumstances just related. Two important decisions were howeverultimately arrived at: [Footnote: _Afghanistan_, 1881, No. 1. ]

1. That authority in Afghanistan, and the unity of its provinces, should as far as possible be restored by the appointment of a new Ameer;and Abdul Rahman, a nephew of Shere Ali, who had been for twelve yearsan exile in Bokhara, was invited to Cabul, and was supported by us inassuming the title. 

The chief conditions were, that his foreign policy was to be under ourguidance, that no English officers were to reside as our representativesin Afghanistan, and that he was to receive a subsidy. 

2. That the British troops should be withdrawn as soon as thepacification of the country would permit. This decision was recommendednot only by the Viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, but by the higherofficers who had held command during the war. Sir Donald Stewart, whowas in chief command, and Sir Frederick Roberts, both, concurred in ourwithdrawal from the country; the Kyber Pass was to be held by subsidisedtribes, and the Koorum Valley to be altogether abandoned; theindependence of the tribes being in each case recognised. Sir JohnWatson, who was in command in that valley, pointed out that as a routefrom India into Afghanistan it was practically useless. As a furtherargument in favour of withdrawal, it may be well to allude to the factthat the men of our native regiments were sick of serving inAfghanistan, far away from their homes, and that it would be impoliticto keep them there. 

Some differences of opinion existed as to whether we should relinquishpossession of Candahar; but as it was 400 miles from the Indus, in aforeign country, and as our remaining there would not only be hateful tothe Afghans, but in a military sense would be dangerous and costly, itsfinal abandonment was decided on; the valley of Pisheen, betweenCandahar and Quetta, being alone retained by the British Government. 

So ended the great war of 1878-80. At its close we had over 70, 000 menin Afghanistan, or on the border in reserve; and even then we reallyonly held the territory within range of our guns. The whole country hadbeen disintegrated and was in anarchy; whilst the total cost of the warexceeded twenty millions sterling, being about the same amount as hadbeen expended in the former great war of 1839-41. 

The military operations in themselves had been conducted throughoutwith great skill in a most difficult country, and the troops, bothBritish and Native, had proved themselves admirable soldiers; but asregards the policy which led us into war, it appears to have been asunjust in principle as it was unfortunate in result. The facts, however, speak for themselves. 

CHAPTER III

FRONTIER POLICY SINCE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, INCLUDING EXPEDITION TO CHITRAL

Further Advance of Russia--Merv Occupied--Sir West Ridgeway's FrontierCommission of 1885--The Durand Agreement with Abdul Rahman--The ChitralExpedition of 1895: its Results--Sudden Outbreak of Frontier Tribes, 1897. 

The reaction after the war naturally inclined the authorities in bothcountries to leave frontier policy alone, at all events for the time. Our professed object for years had been to make Afghanistan strong, friendly, and independent. The first had certainly not beenaccomplished, and the other two were doubtful. Still, by patience, conciliation, and subsidies, we might hope in the course of time thatthe wounds we had inflicted would gradually be healed, and a more stablecondition ensue. For a short period it was so; but then the old bugbearof Russian advance over the dreary wastes of Central Asia againsupervened, and exercised its malign influence on our policy. 

In 1881 and the following years, Russia, whilst completing herconquests, and improving her communications in the south-western part ofCentral Asia, became involved in somewhat prolonged hostilities with theTekke-Turcomans, ending in their subjugation, and in the occupation ofthe long, desolate strip of country extending eastwards from theCaspian, which had hitherto been independent. A railway was graduallyconstructed from the vicinity of Kras-novodsk, on the Caspian, towardsSamarcand. Merv, formerly a city of importance, but of late a merevillage in the desert, was also occupied. These acquisitions of Russia, accomplished in districts far removed from India, would not appear toinvolve any special consideration on our part; but as the southernfrontiers of Russia thus became conterminous for a long distance withNorthern Persia, and also with some districts of Afghanistan, their newposition was regarded as possibly involving designs against our IndianEmpire, and remonstrances were made by us, more especially as regardsthe occupation of Merv. [Footnote: _Central Asia_, No. 2, 1885. ]

In a strategical point of view the question would not appear to be ofmuch importance, and would probably have dropped; but early in 1885 theRussians attacked and drove the Afghan troops out of Penjdeh, a small, hitherto almost unknown village in the desert. It was a high-handedmeasure, and the relations between the two Governments, British andRussian, which were already rather strained, became critical, and war atone moment appeared to be almost inevitable. 

It is not necessary, nor would it be desirable, now to recapitulate thedetails of this serious crisis; because, happily, owing to the prudenceexercised by both Governments, the danger gradually passed away, a JointCommission being agreed on, to meet on the frontier, and to report as toits delimitation. It may, however, be as well to mention that it seemsrather doubtful whether Penjdeh at the time absolutely belonged toAfghanistan. Frontiers in the East are proverbially uncertain andshifting, and in our own official maps, not very long before theoccurrences in question, it was marked as outside the Afghan border. Colonel Stewart, reporting in 1884 on the northern frontier ofAfghanistan, and alluding to Penjdeh, said that it was inhabited byTurcomans, and he thus described the position: 'The state of affairsseems to have been that the Turcomans acknowledged that they weresquatting on Afghan land, and were liable to pay taxes, and each yearthey paid something as an acknowledgment of Afghan rights; but so longas this was done, the Afghans looked upon them as a protection againstthe Tekke further north, and left them very much to themselves. '

The appointment of a Joint Commission of Russian and British officersto delimit the northern frontiers of Afghanistan proved of great value, not only in gaining information regarding districts hitherto but littleknown, but also because its conjoint work tended to engender feelings ofrespect and goodwill between the two nations concerned. 

Its labours commenced in the autumn of 1885, and the report of Sir WestRidgeway, the British Commissioner, is full of interest andencouragement. In an article in the 'Nineteenth Century' of October, 1887, on the completion of his work, he gives some details of thecountry, and also of the position of Russia in Central Asia, which areworth quoting. As to the Afghan border he says: 'The three or fourhundred miles of country through which the new north-western frontier ofAfghanistan runs is a sandy, treeless, waterless desert, except where itis traversed from south to north by the Heri-Rood, the Murghab and theOxus. The only cultivable ground is on the banks of these rivers; but inspring time, after the winter snows have melted, the intervening plainsafford good grazing for sheep. ' But perhaps the most important part ofhis article is his view of the position of Russia in Central Asia: 'Ifany Russian general, ' he writes, 'were so reckless as to attempt theinvasion of India, and relying on the single line of lightly constructedrails which connects the Caspian with the Oxus, and which are liable insummer to be blocked by the moving sands of the desert, and in winter bythe falling snows of Heaven--if, relying on this frail and precariousbase, he were to move an army through the barren plains bordering theOxus, and leaving in his rear the various hostile and excited races ofCentral Asia, he were to cross the difficult passes of the Hindoo Koosh, and entangle his army in the barren mountain homes of the fanatical andtreacherous Afghan, then indeed our fortunate generals may wellcongratulate themselves that the Lord has delivered the enemy into theirhand. . . . '

Whilst, however, his conclusions as to the military weakness of Russiain that part of the world are clear and decisive enough, he at the sametime does full justice to the good work which she is carrying out inthat vast area. He says: 'Hitherto Russia's advance in Central Asia hasbeen the triumph of civilisation. Wherever she has planted her flagslavery has ceased to exist. This was keenly brought home to us in thecourse of our travels. For hundreds of miles before we reached Herat wefound the country desolated and depopulated by Turcoman raids, whileeven in the Herat valley we continually came across the fathers andbrothers of men who had been carried off from their peaceful fields byman-stealing Turcomans, and sold into slavery many hundred miles away. All this has ceased since the Russian occupation of Merv; the cruelslave trade has been stamped out. . . . '

Lord Salisbury, speaking in 1887, at the conclusion of the frontierdelimitation, happily described the situation as follows: 'I value thesettlement for this reason--not that I attach much importance to thesquare miles of desert land with which we have been dealing, and whichprobably after ten generations of mankind will not yield the slightestvalue to any human being: but the settlement indicates on both sidesthat spirit which in the two Governments is consistent with continuedpeace. There is abundant room for both Governments, if they would onlythink so. . . . ' What a pity that some statesman could not have persuadedEngland to that effect fifty years before!

During the next few years no events of special importance occurred toaffect our general frontier policy in India, so far as Russia andAfghanistan proper are concerned. The ample information we now possessof the relative power and position of each country, and the experiencegained in bygone wars, enable us to form a correct judgment of the greatstrength of our Empire in the East; and it is to be hoped that in thefuture we shall hear less of those alarmist views which have sofrequently led us into erroneous policy and untoward expeditions. 

Russia and England are now, happily, on friendly terms, and AbdulRahman, the Ameer of Cabul, although his position is difficult in themidst of a turbulent people, has proved himself a loyal neighbour. 

But another cloud has appeared on the horizon, and our troubles withthe intervening frontier tribes are now apparently worse than ever. Fromaccounts already given of those who dwell along the border, it isevident that although our differences with them, during past years, havebeen frequent and often serious, they have been more or less of a localcharacter. Troublesome as our neighbours have proved, still they have nopower of inflicting serious injury, or of endangering our rule. Underthese circumstances, the best policy, whilst firmly repressing theirpredatory instincts, is to leave them alone. 

In the absence of full official information as to the origin of recentdifficulties, which have culminated in the present frontier war, it isonly possible to speak in general terms. It may be mentioned, in thefirst place, that owing to the uncertain line of demarcation between theterritories of the Ameer of Cabul and those of his independent tribalneighbours, constant feuds and local hostilities occurred from time totime in the mountains; and with a view of defining their respectivespheres, the Government of India, in 1893, sent a Mission to Cabul forthe purpose. This in itself would appear to have been a reasonable step;and the 'Durand Agreement' which ensued (but which has not beenpublished) would, it was hoped, tend to a cessation of conflicts betweenthe Ameer's subjects and their neighbours. But there is a further aspectof the question. So far as is known, not only were the respectiveborders laid down, but it is understood that in many cases theintervening tribes are now assumed to be what is termed 'within thesphere of British influence. ' In maps recently published, presumablywith some authority, vast mountainous districts are now included in thissomewhat mysterious phrase. For instance, the Koorum Valley, the SamanaRange, the countries of the Afredis and the Mohmunds, the districts ofChitral, Bajour, Dir, Swat, Bonair, and others, are all included withinit; and in many instances fortified positions, occupied by Britishtroops, are to be found either within or along their borders. 

Surely this opens out a wide question, and it would be interesting toknow whether, in the discussions at Cabul, the chiefs of the interveningtribes were present, and whether they acquiesced, not only in the newboundaries, but also in being included as within our sphere ofinfluence? It is evident it should have been a tripartite, and not adual, agreement. It is perfectly well known, and has been proved by longexperience, that these frontier tribes value their independence andliberties, beyond everything else, and will not submit peacefully tointerference; and if they were not consulted in the arrangements justdescribed, we may begin to trace the origin of the present crisis. 

Although, as I have explained, we are unable, from want of officialinformation, to deal fully with, the larger topic of recent borderpolicy, we have, at all events, ample details as regards the Chitralquestion in the Parliamentary Papers published [Footnote: _North-WestFrontier, Chitral_, 1895. ] in 1895. It appears that so long ago as1876 the ruler of Chitral voluntarily tendered his allegiance to theMaharajah of Cashmere, and endeavoured, but without success, to persuadethe neighbouring chiefs of Swat, Bajour, and Dir, to follow his example. Now Chitral and Cashmere are not only far apart, but are separated bylofty mountain ranges, inhabited by other tribes, so that this suddenoffer of vassalage seems rather inexplicable. It transpired, however, afew years afterwards, that his real motive in seeking the friendship ofCashmere was due to his fear of aggression by the Ameer ofCabul. [Footnote: _Ibid_, page 46. ]

The Government of India at the time encouraged this somewhatsentimental friendship, and in order to obtain influence over theintervening tribes established a fort at Gilgit, in an almostinaccessible position, not far from the snowy crests of the HindooKoosh. The position, however, proved to be costly, and also dangerousfrom unfriendly neighbours, and, as after three years' experience nospecial object was attained, it was withdrawn in 1881. 

In 1889 the old fears of possible Russian aggression again revived, andGilgit was reoccupied with a strong detachment of Cashmere troops, accompanied by several English officers. The Government of India pointedout that the development of Russian military resources in Asia renderedit necessary to watch the passes over the mountains, in order to preventwhat was called a _coup de main_ from the north. In short, theydreaded the march of a Russian army over the Pamirs and the Hindoo Koosh--a region where Nature has constructed for us perhaps one of the mostformidable frontiers in the world. 

Friendship with the ruler of Chitral was also cultivated. He was givenan annual subsidy, and a present of 500 Sniders; being visited also byEnglish officers. It was even contemplated at the time to construct adirect road from his capital to our frontier near Peshawur; but as hewas suspicious, and as his neighbours in Swat, Bajour, and others wouldprobably have objected, the suggestion was happily postponed. 

In October 1892 the ruler of Chitral died, and after the usual familycontests and intrigues, Nizamul-Mulk, his son, established hisauthority in the country. 

In January, 1893, Dr. Robertson arrived at Chitral as ourrepresentative, accompanied by two officers and fifty Sikhs. Although hewas received in a friendly manner by the new ruler, his account of thestate of affairs in April was discouraging and ominous. He wrote: 'Weseem to be on a volcano here. Matters are no longer improving; theatmosphere of Chitral is one of conspiracy and intrigue. ' A few weekslater he gave a more cheerful account, and although he described thepeople as fickle, he considered that Englishmen were safe. It becameevident, however, that the Nizam-ul-Mulk was weak and unpopular, and Dr. Robertson described the country as 'in a distracted state, and torn byfactions. '

The reports of our Agent, in short, would seem to prove that he was ina false and dangerous position, with a small escort, far away in themountains, about 200 miles from our frontier. 

In January, 1895, the Nizam was murdered by his brother, and the wholecountry at once again fell into anarchy. Dr. Robertson, who had beentemporarily absent, but had returned in February, was besieged in afort, with his escort, which, however, had been increased to about 290men. The crisis had come at last, and there was no time to spare. 

A strong force under Sir Robert Low was assembled at Peshawur, andcrossed the frontier on April 1. It must be pointed out that, inproceeding to Chitral, the British troops had necessarily to passthrough a difficult mountainous country inhabited by independent tribes;and the Government of India issued a proclamation in which they pointedout that their sole object 'is to put an end to the present and toprevent any future unlawful aggression on Chitral territory, and that assoon as this object has been attained the force would be withdrawn. ' Theproclamation went on to say, that the Government 'have no intention ofpermanently occupying any territory through which Mura Khan's misconductmay now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence ofthe tribes. '

The military operations were conducted with great skill and rapidity, and Dr. Robertson's small garrison, which at one time had been hardpressed, was saved: a small force under Colonel Kelly, which had leftGilgit, having by a daring and successful march arrived just before themain body from Peshawur. 

The short campaign having thus accomplished its object, the gradualwithdrawal of the British troops in accordance with the proclamationwould seem to have been a natural sequence. In the weak, distractedstate of the country, and in the assumed necessity of not losing ourinfluence in those distant regions, the Government of India, however, considered that a road from our frontier to Chitral should be made, andcertain positions retained in order to guard it. This vital questionhaving been carefully considered at home, the Secretary of State forIndia, on June 13, 1895, telegraphed to the Viceroy that her Majesty'sGovernment regretted they were unable to concur in the proposal. He wenton to say that no 'military force or European Agent shall be kept atChitral; that Chitral should not be fortified; and that no road shall bemade between Peshawur and Chitral. ' He added that all positions beyondour frontier should be evacuated as speedily as circumstances allowed. 

It so happened that within a few days of this important decision achange of Government occurred at home, and the question wasreconsidered; and on August 9, fresh instructions were telegraphed toIndia, by which it was ordered that British troops should be stationedat the Malakund Pass, leading into Swat, and that other posts up to, andincluding, Chitral, should also be held, and a road made through thecountry. In short the previous decision was entirely reversed. 

Before going further it may be as well to point out that this is nomere question between one political party and another. It goes farbeyond that, and we may feel assured that in considering the subject, both Governments were actuated by a desire to do what was consideredbest in the interests of the Indian Empire. 

Still, it is I think impossible not to regard the ultimate decision asvery unfortunate, and as likely to lead to serious consequences. In amere military point of view, it was a repetition of the policy pursuedof recent years of establishing isolated military posts in countriesbelonging to others, or in their vicinity; inevitably tending toaggravate the tribes, and which in time of trouble, instead ofincreasing our strength, are and have been the cause of anxiety toourselves. Therefore, not only as a matter of policy, but in a purelymilitary sense, the arrangement was dangerous. 

I would further observe that many officers, both civil and military, men of the highest character and long experience in the Punjaub and itsborders, did not hesitate to express their opinions at the time, thatretribution would speedily follow; and their anticipations appear now tohave been verified. Suddenly, not many weeks ago, the people of Swat, who were said to be friendly, violently attacked our position on theMalakund, losing, it is said, 3, 000 men in the attempt; and also nearlycaptured a fortified post a few miles distant at Chakdara. Not onlythat, but this unexpected outbreak was followed by hostilities on thepart of the tribes in Bajour, and by the Mohmunds north, of Peshawur, and also by the Afredis, who, subsidised by us, had for years guardedthe celebrated Kyber. Again, the tribes of the Samana range, and othersto the west of Kohat, rose in arms; and a very large force of Britishtroops had to be pushed forward in all haste to quell this greatcombined attack on the part of our neighbours. General Sir NevilleChamberlain, perhaps the greatest living authority on frontierquestions, has written quite recently, pointing out that neverpreviously had there been a semblance of unity of action amongst thedifferent tribesmen. [Footnote: _Saturday Review_, 30th Oct. 1897. ]

There surely must have been some very strong feeling of resentment andinjustice which brought so many tribesmen for the first time to combinein opposition to what they evidently considered an invasion of theircountry. As regards the Afredis, who are spoken of as treacherous andfaithless, it must be borne in mind that in 1881 we specially recognisedtheir independence, [Footnote: _Afghanistan_ No. 1, 1881, page 57. ]and have ever since subsidised them for the special purpose of guardingthe commerce through the Kyber; a duty which they have faithfullycarried out until the present summer. Lord Lytton, who was Viceroy whenthe arrangement was proposed at the end of the war, wrote in 1880[Footnote: _Ibid_, page 62. ]--'I sincerely hope that the Governmentof India will not be easily persuaded to keep troops permanentlystationed in the Kyber. I feel little doubt that such a course wouldtend rather to cause trouble than to keep order. Small bodies of troopswould be a constant provocation to attack; large bodies would die likeflies. . . . '

'I believe that the Pass tribes themselves, if properly managed, willprove the best guardians of the Pass, and be able, as well as willing, to keep it open for us, if we make it worth their while to do so. . . . 'Many of these very men, and those of other tribes on the frontier, havefor years enlisted in our ranks, and have proved to be good soldiers. Irepeat that some strong cause must have influenced them suddenly tobreak out into war. 

Until the present military operations have been brought to a close, anduntil full official information has been given of the circumstanceswhich have led to them, it is not possible to pronounce a finaljudgment; still, it seems to me, that we have strong grounds forbelieving that the border policy of late years has in many instancesbeen too aggressive and regardless of the rights of the tribes; and thatthe course finally pursued of the retention of fortified posts throughSwat and Bajour to Chitral, has been the ultimate cause which hasexcited the people against us, and produced so great and costly a borderwar. It must also not be forgotten, that even now we are merely on thefringe, as it were, of the question; and that if we persist in forcingourselves forward, we shall have many a costly campaign to undertake faraway in distant, little-known regions, more difficult and moreinaccessible even than those in which we now find ourselves. 

On the whole it appears to me that we should as far as possiblewithdraw our isolated posts, so many of which, are either within thetribal country or along its borders. It is sometimes argued that anywithdrawal on our part would have a demoralising effect on the tribes, who would ascribe our retirement to inability to maintain our positions. [Footnote: _Chitral_, 1895, page 62. ] The best reply will perhapsbe to quote the words of Lord Hartington, when under similarcircumstances it was decided in 1881 to retire from Candahar. He said:[Footnote: _Afghanistan_, No. 1, 1881, page 92. ] 'The moral effectof a scrupulous adherence to declarations which have been made, and astriking and convincing proof given to the people and princes of Indiathat the British Government have no desire for further annexation ofterritory, could not fail to produce a most salutary effect, in removingthe apprehensions, and strengthening the attachment of our native alliesthroughout India, and on our frontiers. . . . '

These remarks may now be brought to a close. My object throughout hasbeen to give an historical summary of the various wars and expeditionsin which we have been engaged during the present century on the North-West frontier of India; and of the causes which have led to them. Myobservations are founded on Parliamentary official papers, and on otherworks of authority; and I hope they may prove useful to the public, whohave not, as a rule time to study the intricate details of thisdifficult subject. I have endeavoured to prove that the tribes on thefrontier, and the people of Afghanistan, have no real power of injuringour position in India; and turbulent as they may be, a policy ofpatience, conciliation, and subsidies, is far more likely to attain ourobject than incessant costly expeditions into their mountains. Ourinfluence over them is already great, and is increasing year by year. Bycarefully maintaining the principles I have sketched out, we shallgradually obtain their friendship, and also their support, should otherdangers ever threaten our dominions. 

We are the rulers of a great Empire in the East, with its heavy dutiesand responsibilities, and in devoting ourselves to the welfare of themillions under our sway, and in developing the resources of the country, we shall do far more for the happiness of the people and the security ofthe Empire than by squandering our finances in constant expeditionsbeyond its borders.