[Illustration: LORD JOHN RUSSELL(_From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making of Italy_")]

_EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS_

GREAT BRITAINANDTHE AMERICANCIVIL WAR

TWO VOLUMES BOUND AS ONE

PREFACE

This work was begun many years ago. In 1908 I read in the British Museummany newspapers and journals for the years 1860-1865, and then planned asurvey of English public opinion on the American Civil War. In thesucceeding years as a teacher at Stanford University, California, thepublished diplomatic correspondence of Great Britain and of the UnitedStates were studied in connection with instruction given in the field ofBritish-American relations. Several of my students prepared excellenttheses on special topics and these have been acknowledged where used inthis work. Many distractions and other writing prevented the completionof my original plan; and fortunately, for when in 1913 I had at lastbegun this work and had prepared three chapters, a letter was receivedfrom the late Charles Francis Adams inviting me to collaborate with himin preparing a "Life" of his father, the Charles Francis Adams who wasAmerican Minister to Great Britain during the Civil War. Mr. Adams hadrecently returned from England where he had given at Oxford University aseries of lectures on the Civil War and had been so fortunate as toobtain copies, made under the scholarly supervision of Mr. WorthingtonC. Ford, of a great mass of correspondence from the Foreign Office filesin the Public Record Office and from the private papers in thepossession of various families. 

The first half of the year 1914 was spent with Mr. Adams at Washingtonand at South Lincoln, in preparing the "Life. " Two volumes werecompleted, the first by Mr. Adams carrying the story to 1848, thesecond by myself for the period 1848 to 1860. For the third volume Ianalysed and organized the new materials obtained in England and we wereabout to begin actual collaboration on the most vital period of the"Life" when Mr. Adams died, and the work was indefinitely suspended, probably wisely, since any completion of the "Life" by me would havelacked that individual charm in historical writing so markedlycharacteristic of all that Mr. Adams did. The half-year spent with Mr. Adams was an inspiration and constitutes a precious memory. 

The Great War interrupted my own historical work, but in 1920 I returnedto the original plan of a work on "Great Britain and the American CivilWar" in the hope that the English materials obtained by Mr. Adams mightbe made available to me. When copies were secured by Mr. Adams in 1913 arestriction had been imposed by the Foreign Office to the effect thatwhile studied for information, citations and quotations were notpermissible since the general diplomatic archives were not yet open tostudents beyond the year 1859. Through my friend Sir Charles Lucas, thewhole matter was again presented to the Foreign Office, with an exactstatement that the new request was in no way related to the proposed"Life" of Charles Francis Adams, but was for my own use of thematerials. Lord Curzon, then Foreign Secretary, graciously approved therequest but with the usual condition that my manuscript be submittedbefore publication to the Foreign Office. This has now been done, and nosingle citation censored. Before this work will have appeared thelimitation hitherto imposed on diplomatic correspondence will have beenremoved, and the date for open research have been advanced beyond 1865, the end of the Civil War. 

Similar explanations of my purpose and proposed work were made throughmy friend Mr. Francis W. Hirst to the owners of various private papers, and prompt approval given. In 1924 I came to England for further studyof some of these private papers. The Russell Papers, transmitted to thePublic Record Office in 1914 and there preserved, were used through thecourtesy of the Executors of the late Hon. Rollo Russell, and with thehearty goodwill of Lady Agatha Russell, daughter of the late EarlRussell, the only living representative of her father, Mr. RolloRussell, his son, having died in 1914. The Lyons Papers, preserved inthe Muniment Room at Old Norfolk House, were used through the courtesyof the Duchess of Norfolk, who now represents her son who is a minor. The Gladstone Papers, preserved at Hawarden Castle, were used throughthe courtesy of the Gladstone Trustees. The few citations from thePalmerston Papers, preserved at Broadlands, were approved byLieut. -Colonel Wilfred Ashley, M. P. 

The opportunity to study these private papers has been invaluable for mywork. Shortly after returning from England in 1913 Mr. Worthington Fordwell said: "The inside history of diplomatic relations between theUnited States and Great Britain may be surmised from the officialarchives; the tinting and shading needed to complete the picture must besought elsewhere. " (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 478. ) Mr. C. F. Adams declared (_ibid. _, XLVII, p. 54) that without these papers". . . The character of English diplomacy at that time (1860-1865) cannotbe understood. . . . It would appear that the commonly entertainedimpressions as to certain phases of international relations, and theproceedings and utterances of English public men during the progress ofthe War of Secession, must be to some extent revised. "

In addition to the new English materials I have been fortunate in thegenerosity of my colleague at Stanford University, Professor Frank A. Golder, who has given to me transcripts, obtained at St. Petersburg in1914, of all Russian diplomatic correspondence on the Civil War. Manyfriends have aided, by suggestion or by permitting the use of notes andmanuscripts, in the preparation of this work. I have sought to make dueacknowledgment for such aid in my foot-notes. But in addition to thosealready named, I should here particularly note the courtesy of the lateMr. Gaillard Hunt for facilities given in the State Department atWashington, of Mr. Herbert Putnam, Librarian of Congress, for thetranscript of the Correspondence of Mason and Slidell, ConfederateCommissioners in Europe, and of Mr. Charles Moore, Chief of ManuscriptsDivision, Library of Congress, for the use of the Schurz Paperscontaining copies of the despatches of Schleiden, Minister of theRepublic of Bremen at Washington during the Civil War. Especially thanksare due to my friend, Mr. Herbert Hoover, for his early interest in thiswork and for his generous aid in the making of transcripts which wouldotherwise have been beyond my means. And, finally, I owe much to theskill and care of my wife who made the entire typescript for the Press, and whose criticisms were invaluable. 

It is no purpose of a Preface to indicate results, but it is my hopethat with, I trust, a "calm comparison of the evidence, " now for thefirst time available to the historian, a fairly true estimate may bemade of what the American Civil War meant to Great Britain; how sheregarded it and how she reacted to it. In brief, my work is primarily astudy in British history in the belief that the American drama had aworld significance, and peculiarly a British one. 

EPHRAIM DOUGLASS ADAMS. 

_November 25, 1924_

CONTENTS OF VOLUME ONE

CHAPTER PAGE

 I. BACKGROUNDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 II. FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61 . . . 35 III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861 . . . . . . 76 IV. BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD . . . . . . . . . . 113 V. THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION . . . . . . . 137 VI. BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON, AND MERCIER . . . . 172 VII. THE "TRENT" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203VIII. THE BLOCKADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 IX. ENTER MR. LINDSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PART ONE

LORD JOHN RUSSELL . . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece__From Trevelyan's "Garibaldi and the Making ofItaly_"

LORD LYONS (1860) . . . . . . . . . _facing p_. 42_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons" (EdwardArnold & Co_. )

SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K. C. M. G. . . . . . " 90_From Lady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K. C. M. G. : An Autobiography"_ (_John Murray_)

WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD . . . . . . . . " 114_From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons"_ (_EdwardArnold & Co. _)

C. F. ADAMS . . . . . . . . . . . " 138_From a photograph in the United States Embassy, London_

JAMES M. MASON . . . . . . . . . . " 206_From a photograph by L. C. Handy, Washington_

"KING COTTON BOUND" . . . . . . . . " 262_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of"Punch"_

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUNDS

In 1862, less than a year after he had assumed his post in London, theAmerican Minister, Charles Francis Adams, at a time of depression andbitterness wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "That Great Britain did, in the most terrible moment of our domestic trial in struggling with amonstrous social evil she had earnestly professed to abhor, coldly andat once assume our inability to master it, and then become the onlyforeign nation steadily contributing in every indirect way possible toverify its judgment, will probably be the verdict made against her byposterity, on calm comparison of the evidence[1]. " Very different werethe views of Englishmen. The historian, George Grote, could write: "Theperfect neutrality [of Great Britain] in this destructive war appears tome almost a phenomenon in political history. No such forbearance hasbeen shown during the political history of the last two centuries. It isthe single case in which the English Government and public--generally someddlesome--have displayed most prudent and commendable forbearance inspite of great temptations to the contrary[2]. " And Sir WilliamHarcourt, in September, 1863, declared: "Among all Lord Russell's manytitles to fame and to public gratitude, the manner in which he hassteered the vessel of State through the Scylla and Charybdis of theAmerican War will, I think, always stand conspicuous[3]. "

Minister Adams, in the later years of the Civil War, saw reason somewhatto modify his earlier judgment, but his indictment of Great Britain waslong prevalent in America, as, indeed, it was also among the historiansand writers of Continental Europe--notably those of France and Russia. To what extent was this dictum justified? Did Great Britain in spite ofher long years of championship of personal freedom and of leadership inthe cause of anti-slavery seize upon the opportunity offered in thedisruption of the American Union, and forgetting humanitarian idealisms, react only to selfish motives of commercial advantage and nationalpower? In brief, how is the American Civil War to be depicted byhistorians of Great Britain, recording her attitude and action in bothforeign and domestic policy, and revealing the principles of herstatesmen, or the inspirations of her people?

It was to answer this question that the present work was originallyundertaken; but as investigation proceeded it became progressively moreclear that the great crisis in America was almost equally a crisis inthe domestic history of Great Britain itself and that unless this werefully appreciated no just estimate was possible of British policy towardAmerica. Still more it became evident that the American Civil War, asseen through British spectacles, could not be understood if regarded asan isolated and unique situation, but that the conditions preceding thatsituation--some of them lying far back in the relations of the twonations--had a vital bearing on British policy and opinion when thecrisis arose. No expanded examination of these preceding conditions ishere possible, but it is to a summary analysis of them that this firstchapter is devoted. 

 * * * * *

On the American War for separation from the Mother Country it isunnecessary to dilate, though it should always be remembered that bothduring the war and afterwards there existed a minority in Great Britainstrongly sympathetic with the political ideals proclaimed inAmerica--regarding those ideals, indeed, as something to be striven forin Britain itself and the conflict with America as, in a measure, aconflict in home politics. But independence once acknowledged by theTreaty of Peace of 1783, the relations between the Mother Country andthe newly-created United States of America rapidly tended to adjustthemselves to lines of contact customary between Great Britain and anyother Sovereign State. Such contacts, fixing national attitude andpolicy, ordinarily occur on three main lines: governmental, determinedby officials in authority in either State whose duty it is to secure thegreatest advantage in power and prosperity for the State; commercial, resulting, primarily, from the interchange of goods and the businessopportunities of either nation in the other's territory, or from theirrivalry in foreign trade; idealistic, the result of comparativedevelopment especially in those ideals of political structure whichdetermine the nature of the State and the form of its government. Themore obvious of these contacts is the governmental, since the attitudeof a people is judged by the formal action of its Government, and, indeed, in all three lines of contact the government of a State isdirectly concerned and frequently active. But it may be of service to aclearer appreciation of British attitude and policy before 1860, if theintermingling of elements required by a strict chronological account ofrelations is here replaced by a separate review of each of the threemain lines of contact. 

Once independence had been yielded to the American Colonies, theinterest of the British Government rapidly waned in affairs American. True, there still remained the valued establishments in the West Indies, and the less considered British possessions on the continent to thenorth of the United States. Meanwhile, there were occasional frictionswith America arising from uncertain claims drawn from the formercolonial privileges of the new state, or from boundary contentions notsettled in the treaty of peace. Thus the use of the Newfoundlandfisheries furnished ground for an acrimonious controversy lasting eveninto the twentieth century, and occasionally rising to the danger point. Boundary disputes dragged along through official argument, surveycommissions, arbitration, to final settlement, as in the case of thenorthern limits of the State of Maine fixed at last by the Treaty ofWashington of 1842, and then on lines fair to both sides at any time inthe forty years of legal bickering. Very early, in 1817, an agreementcreditable to the wisdom and pacific intentions of both countries, wasreached establishing small and equal naval armaments on the Great Lakes. The British fear of an American attack on Canada proved groundless astime went on and was definitely set at rest by the strict curb placed bythe American Government upon the restless activities of such of itscitizens as sympathized with the followers of McKenzie and Papineau inthe Canadian rebellion of 1837[4]. 

None of these governmental contacts affected greatly the British policytoward America. But the "War of 1812, " as it is termed in the UnitedStates, "Mr. Madison's War, " as it was derisively named by Torycontemporaries in Great Britain, arose from serious policies in whichthe respective governments were in definite opposition. Briefly, thiswas a clash between belligerent and neutral interests. Britain, fightingat first for the preservation of Europe against the spread of Frenchrevolutionary influence, later against the Napoleonic plan of Empire, held the seas in her grasp and exercised with vigour all the accustomedrights of a naval belligerent. Of necessity, from her point of view, and as always in the case of the dominant naval belligerent, shestretched principles of international law to their utmost interpretationto secure her victory in war. America, soon the only maritime neutral ofimportance, and profiting greatly by her neutrality, contested point bypoint the issue of exceeded belligerent right as established ininternational law. America did more; she advanced new rules and theoriesof belligerent and neutral right respectively, and demanded that thebelligerents accede to them. Dispute arose over blockades, contraband, the British "rule of 1756" which would have forbidden American tradewith French colonies in war time, since such trade was prohibited byFrance herself in time of peace. But first and foremost as touching thepersonal sensibilities and patriotism of both countries was the Britishexercise of a right of search and seizure to recover British sailors. 

Moreover this asserted right brought into clear view definitely opposedtheories as to citizenship. Great Britain claimed that a man once born aBritish subject could never cease to be a subject--could never "alienatehis duty. " It was her practice to fill up her navy, in part at least, bythe "impressment" of her sailor folk, taking them whenever needed, andwherever found--in her own coast towns, or from the decks of her ownmercantile marine. But many British sailors sought security from suchimpressment by desertion in American ports or were tempted to desert toAmerican merchant ships by the high pay obtainable in therapidly-expanding United States merchant marine. Many became bynaturalization citizens of the United States, and it was the duty ofAmerica to defend them as such in their lives and business. Americaultimately came to hold, in short, that expatriation was accomplishedfrom Great Britain when American citizenship was conferred. On shorethey were safe, for Britain did not attempt to reclaim her subjectsfrom the soil of another nation. But she denied that the American flagon merchant vessels at sea gave like security and she asserted a navalright to search such vessels in time of peace, professing her completeacquiescence in a like right to the American navy over British merchantvessels--a concession refused by America, and of no practical valuesince no American citizen sought service in the British merchant marine. 

This "right of search" controversy involved then, two basic points ofopposition between the two governments. First America contested theBritish theory of "once a citizen always a citizen[5]"; second, Americadenied any right whatever to a foreign naval vessel in _time of peace_to stop and search a vessel lawfully flying the American flag. The_right of search in time of war_, that is, a belligerent right ofsearch, America never denied, but there was both then and later muchpublic confusion in both countries as to the question at issue since, once at war, Great Britain frequently exercised a legal belligerentright of search and followed it up by the seizure of sailors alleged tobe British subjects. Nor were British naval captains especially carefulto make sure that no American-born sailors were included in theirimpressment seizures, and as the accounts spread of victim after victim, the American irritation steadily increased. True, France was also anoffender, but as the weaker naval power her offence was lost sight of inview of the, literally, thousands of _bona fide_ Americans seized byGreat Britain. Here, then, was a third cause of irritation connectedwith impressment, though not a point of governmental dispute as toright, for Great Britain professed her earnest desire to restorepromptly any American-born sailors whom her naval officers had seizedthrough error. In fact many such sailors were soon liberated, but alarge number either continued to serve on British ships or to languishin British prisons until the end of the Napoleonic Wars[6]. 

There were other, possibly greater, causes of the War of 1812, most ofthem arising out of the conflicting interests of the chief maritimeneutral and the chief naval belligerent. The pacific presidentialadministration of Jefferson sought by trade restrictions, using embargoand non-intercourse acts, to bring pressure on both England and France, hoping to force a better treatment of neutrals. The United States, divided in sympathy between the belligerents, came near to disorder anddisruption at home, over the question of foreign policy. But through allAmerican factions there ran the feeling of growing animosity to GreatBritain because of impressment. At last, war was declared by America in1812 and though at the moment bitterly opposed by one section, NewEngland, that war later came to be regarded as of great national valueas one of the factors which welded the discordant states into a nationalunity. Naturally also, the war once ended, its commercial causes werequickly forgotten, whereas the individual, personal offence involved inimpressment and right of search, with its insult to national pride, became a patriotic theme for politicians and for the press. To deny, infact, a British "right of search" became a national point of honour, upon which no American statesman would have dared to yield to Britishovertures. 

In American eyes the War of 1812 appears as a "second war ofIndependence" and also as of international importance in contesting anunjust use by Britain of her control of the seas. Also, it is to beremembered that no other war of importance was fought by America untilthe Mexican War of 1846, and militant patriotism was thus centred on thetwo wars fought against Great Britain. The contemporary British viewwas that of a nation involved in a life and death struggle with a greatEuropean enemy, irritated by what seemed captious claims, developed towar, by a minor power[7]. To be sure there were a few obstinate Toriesin Britain who saw in the war the opportunity of smashing at one blowNapoleon's dream of empire, and the American "democratic system. " TheLondon _Times_ urged the government to "finish with Mr. Bonaparte andthen deal with Mr. Madison and democracy, " arguing that it should beEngland's object to subvert "the whole system of the Jeffersonianschool. " But this was not the purpose of the British Government, norwould such a purpose have been tolerated by the small but vigorous Whigminority in Parliament. 

The peace of 1814, signed at Ghent, merely declared an end of the war, quietly ignoring all the alleged causes of the conflict. Impressment wasnot mentioned, but it was never again resorted to by Great Britain uponAmerican ships. But the principle of right of search in time of peace, though for another object than impressment, was soon again asserted byGreat Britain and for forty years was a cause of constant irritation anda source of danger in the relations of the two countries. Stirred byphilanthropic emotion Great Britain entered upon a world crusade for thesuppression of the African Slave Trade. All nations in principlerepudiated that trade and Britain made treaties with various maritimepowers giving mutual right of search to the naval vessels of each uponthe others' merchant vessels. The African Slave Trade was in factoutlawed for the flags of all nations. But America, smarting under thememory of impressment injuries, and maintaining in any case the doctrinethat in time of peace the national flag protected a vessel frominterference or search by the naval vessels of any other power, refusedto sign mutual right of search treaties and denied, absolutely, such aright for any cause whatever to Great Britain or to any other nation. Being refused a treaty, Britain merely renewed her assertion of theright and continued to exercise it. 

Thus the right of search in time of peace controversy was not ended withthe war of 1812 but remained a constant sore in national relations, forBritain alone used her navy with energy to suppress the slave trade, andthe slave traders of all nations sought refuge, when approached by aBritish naval vessel, under the protection of the American flag. IfBritain respected the flag, and sheered off from search, how could shestop the trade? If she ignored the flag and on boarding found aninnocent American vessel engaged in legal trade, there resulted claimsfor damages by detention of voyage, and demands by the AmericanGovernment for apology and reparation. The real slave trader, seizedunder the American flag, never protested to the United States, norclaimed American citizenship, for his punishment in American law forengaging in the slave trade was death, while under the law of any othernation it did not exceed imprisonment, fine and loss of his vessel. 

Summed up in terms of governmental attitude the British contention wasthat here was a great international humanitarian object frustrated by anabsurd American sensitiveness on a point of honour about the flag. Afterfifteen years of dispute Great Britain offered to abandon any claim to aright of _search_, contenting herself with a right of _visit_, merely toverify a vessel's right to fly the American flag. America asserted thisto be mere pretence, involving no renunciation of a practice whoselegality she denied. In 1842, in the treaty settling the Maine boundarycontroversy, the eighth article sought a method of escape. Jointcruising squadrons were provided for the coast of Africa, the Britishto search all suspected vessels except those flying the American flag, and these to be searched by the American squadron. At once PresidentTyler notified Congress that Great Britain had renounced the right ofsearch. Immediately in Parliament a clamour was raised against theGovernment for the "sacrifice" of a British right at sea, and LordAberdeen promptly made official disclaimer of such surrender. 

Thus, heritage of the War of 1812 right of search in time of peace was asteady irritant. America doubted somewhat the honesty of Great Britain, appreciating in part the humanitarian purpose, but suspicious of anulterior "will to rule the seas. " After 1830 no American politicalleader would have dared to yield the right of search. Great Britain forher part, viewing the expansion of domestic slavery in the UnitedStates, came gradually to attribute the American contention, not topatriotic pride, but to the selfish business interests of theslave-holding states. In the end, in 1858, with a waning Britishenthusiasm for the cause of slave trade suppression, and withrecognition that America had become a great world power, Britain yieldedher claim to right of search or visit, save when established by Treaty. Four years later, in 1862, it may well have seemed to British statesmenthat American slavery had indeed been the basic cause of America'sattitude, for in that year a treaty was signed by the two nations givingmutual right of search for the suppression of the African Slave Trade. In fact, however, this was but an effort by Seward, Secretary of Statefor the North, to influence British and European opinion against theseceding slave states of the South. 

The right of search controversy was, in truth, ended when American powerreached a point where the British Government must take it seriously intoaccount as a factor in general world policy. That power had beensteadily and rapidly advancing since 1814. From almost the first momentof established independence American statesmen visualized theseparation of the interests of the western continent from those ofEurope, and planned for American leadership in this new world. Washington, the first President, emphasized in his farewell address thedanger of entangling alliances with Europe. For long the nations ofEurope, immersed in Continental wars, put aside their rivalries in thisnew world. Britain, for a time, neglected colonial expansion westward, but in 1823, in an emergency of European origin when France, commissioned by the great powers of continental Europe, intervened inSpain to restore the deposed Bourbon monarchy and seemed about tointervene in Spanish America to restore to Spain her revolted colonies, there developed in Great Britain a policy, seemingly about to drawAmerica and England into closer co-operation. Canning, for Britain, proposed to America a joint declaration against French intervention inthe Americas. His argument was against the principle of intervention;his immediate motive was a fear of French colonial expansion; but hisultimate object was inheritance by Britain of Spain's dying influenceand position in the new world. 

Canning's overture was earnestly considered in America. Theex-Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, recommended its acceptance, butthe Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, opposed this, favouringrather a separate declaration by the United States, and of this opinionwas also President Monroe. Thus arose the Monroe Doctrine announcingAmerican opposition to the principle of "intervention, " and declaringthat the American continents were no longer to be regarded as open tofurther colonization by European nations. The British emergencysituation with France, though already quieted, caused Monroe's Messageto be greeted in England with high approval. But Canning did not soapprove it for he saw clearly that the Monroe Doctrine was a challengenot merely to continental Europe, but to England as well and he sethimself to thwart this threatening American policy. Had Canning's policybeen followed by later British statesmen there would have resulted aserious clash with the United States[8]. 

In fact the Monroe Doctrine, imposing on Europe a self-denying policy ofnon-colonial expansion toward the west, provided for the United Statesthe medium, if she wished to use it, for her own expansion in territoryand in influence. But for a time there was no need of additionalterritory for that already hers stretched from the Atlantic to the RockyMountains, two-thirds of the way from ocean to ocean. Her population wasgrowing fast. But four millions at the time of the Revolution, therewere thirteen millions in 1830, and of these nearly a third were alreadyacross the Appalachian range and were constantly pressing on towards newlands in the South and West. The Monroe Doctrine was the first definitenotice given to Europe of America's preconceived "destiny, " but theearlier realization of that destiny took place on lines of expansionwithin her own boundaries. To this there could be no governmentalobjection, whether by Great Britain or any other nation. 

But when in the decade 1840 to 1850, the United States, to the view ofBritish statesmen, suddenly startled the world by entering upon a policyof further territorial expansion, forsaking her peaceful progress andturning toward war, there was a quick determination on a line of Britishpolicy as regards the American advance. The first intimation of the newAmerican policy came in relation to the State of Texas which hadrevolted from Mexico in 1836, and whose independence had been generallyrecognized by 1842. To this new state Britain sent diplomatic andconsular agents and these reported two factions among the people--oneseeking admission to the American Union, one desiring the maintenanceof independence. 

In 1841 Aberdeen had sent Lord Ashburton to America with instructions tosecure, if possible, a settlement of all matters in dispute. Here was agenuine British effort to escape from national irritations. But beforethe Treaty of 1842 was signed, even while it was in the earlier stagesof negotiation, the British Government saw, with alarm, quite newquestions arising, preventing, to its view, that harmonious relationwith the United States the desire for which had led to the Ashburtonmission. This new development was the appearance of an American feverfor territorial expansion, turning first toward Texas, but soon voicedas a "manifest destiny" which should carry American power andinstitutions to the Pacific and even into Central America. Among theseinstitutions was that of slavery, detested by the public of GreatBritain, yet a delicate matter for governmental consideration since thegreat cotton manufacturing interests drew the bulk of their supplies ofraw cotton from the slave-holding states of America. If Texas, herself acotton state, should join the United States, dependence upon slave-growncotton would be intensified. Also, Texas, once acquired, what was thereto prevent further American exploitation, followed by slave expansion, into Mexico, where for long British influence had been dominant?

On the fate of Texas, therefore, centred for a time the whole Britishpolicy toward America. Pakenham, the British minister to Mexico, urged aBritish pressure on Mexico to forgo her plans of reconquering Texas, andstrong British efforts to encourage Texas in maintaining herindependence. His theory foreshadowed a powerful buffer Anglo-Saxonstate, prohibiting American advance to the south-west, releasing Britainfrom dependence on American cotton, and ultimately, he hoped, leadingTexas to abolish slavery, not yet so rooted as to be ineradicable. Thispolicy was approved by the British Government, Pakenham was sent toWashington to watch events, a _chargé_, Elliot, was despatched to Texas, and from London lines were cast to draw France into the plan and toforce the acquiescence of Mexico. 

In this brief account of main lines of governmental contacts, it isunnecessary to recite the details of the diplomatic conflict, for suchit became, with sharp antagonisms manifested on both sides. The basicfact was that America was bent upon territorial expansion, and thatGreat Britain set herself to thwart this ambition. But not to the pointof war. Aberdeen was so incautious at one moment as to propose to Franceand Mexico a triple guarantee of the independence of Texas, if thatstate would acquiesce, but when Pakenham notified him that in this case, Britain must clearly understand that war with America was not merelypossible, but probable, Aberdeen hastened to withdraw the plan ofguarantee, fortunately not yet approved by Mexico[9]. 

The solution of this diplomatic contest thus rested with Texas. Did shewish annexation to the United States, or did she prefer independence?Elliot, in Texas, hoped to the last moment that Texas would chooseindependence and British favour. But the people of the new state werelargely emigrants from the United States, and a majority of them wishedto re-enter the Union, a step finally accomplished in 1846, after tenyears of separate existence as a Republic. The part played by theBritish Government in this whole episode was not a fortunate one. It isthe duty of Governments to watch over the interests of their subjects, and to guard the prestige and power of the state. Great Britain had aperfect _right_ to take whatever steps she chose to take in regard toTexas, but the steps taken appeared to Americans to be based upon apolicy antagonistic to the American expansion policy of the moment. TheGovernment of Great Britain appeared, indeed, to have adopted a policyof preventing the development of the power of the United States. Then, fronted with war, she had meekly withdrawn. The basic British publicfeeling, fixing the limits of governmental policy, of never again beingdrawn into war with America, not because of fear, but because ofimportant trade relations and also because of essential liking andadmiration, in spite of surface antagonisms, was not appreciated inAmerica. Lord Aberdeen indeed, and others in governmental circles, pleaded that the support of Texan independence was in reality perfectlyin harmony with the best interests of the United States, since it wouldhave tended toward the limitation of American slavery. And in the matterof national power, they consoled themselves with prophecies that theAmerican Union, now so swollen in size, must inevitably split into two, perhaps three, rival empires, a slave-holding one in the South, freenations in North and West. 

The fate of Texas sealed, Britain soon definitely abandoned allopposition to American expansion unless it were to be attemptednorthwards, though prophesying evil for the American madness. Mexico, relying on past favours, and because of a sharp controversy between theUnited States and Great Britain over the Oregon territory, expectedBritish aid in her war of 1846 against America. But she was sharplywarned that such aid would not be given, and the Oregon dispute wassettled in the Anglo-Saxon fashion of vigorous legal argument, followedby a fair compromise. The Mexican war resulted in the acquisition ofCalifornia by the United States. British agents in this province ofMexico, and British admirals on the Pacific were cautioned to take noactive steps in opposition. 

Thus British policy, after Texan annexation, offered no barrier toAmerican expansion, and much to British relief the fear of the extensionof the American plans to Mexico and Central America was not realized. The United States was soon plunged, as British statesmen had prophesied, into internal conflict over the question whether the newly-acquiredterritories should be slave or free. 

The acquisition of California brought up a new problem of quick transitbetween Atlantic and Pacific, and a canal was planned across CentralAmerica. Here Britain and America acted together, at first in amity, though the convention signed in 1850 later developed discord as to theBritish claim of a protectorate over the Atlantic end of the proposedcanal at San Juan del Nicaragua. But Britain was again at war in Europein the middle 'fifties, and America was deep in quarrel over slavery athome. On both sides in spite of much diplomatic intrigue and ofmanifestations of national pride there was governmental desire to avoiddifficulties. At the end of the ten-year period Britain ceded toNicaragua her protectorate in the canal zone, and all causes offriction, so reported President Buchanan to Congress in 1860, werehappily removed. Britain definitely altered her policy of opposition tothe growth of American power. 

In 1860, then, the causes of governmental antagonisms were seemingly allat an end. Impressment was not used after 1814. The differing theoriesof the two Governments on British expatriation still remained, butBritain attempted no practical application of her view. The right ofsearch in time of peace controversy, first eased by the plan of jointcruising, had been definitely settled by the British renunciation of1858. Opposition to American territorial advance but briefly manifestedby Britain, had ended with the annexation of Texas, and the fever ofexpansion had waned in America. Minor disputes in Central America, related to the proposed canal, were amicably adjusted. 

But differences between nations, varying view-points of peoples, frequently have deeper currents than the more obvious frictions ingovernmental act or policy, nor can governments themselves fail to reactto such less evident causes. It is necessary to review the commercialrelations of the two nations--later to examine their political ideals. 

In 1783 America won her independence in government from a colonialstatus. But commercially she remained a British colony--yet with adifference. She had formed a part of the British colonial system. Allher normal trade was with the mother country or with other Britishcolonies. Now her privileges in such trade were at an end, and she mustseek as a favour that which had formerly been hers as a member of theBritish Empire. The direct trade between England and America was easilyand quickly resumed, for the commercial classes of both nations desiredit and profited by it. But the British colonial system prohibited tradebetween a foreign state and British colonies and there was one channelof trade, to and from the British West Indies, long very profitable toboth sides, during colonial times, but now legally hampered by Americanindependence. The New England States had lumber, fish, and farm productsdesired by the West Indian planters, and these in turn offered neededsugar, molasses, and rum. Both parties desired to restore the trade, andin spite of the legal restrictions of the colonial system, the trade wasin fact resumed in part and either permitted or winked at by the BritishGovernment, but never to the advantageous exchange of former times. 

The acute stage of controversy over West Indian trade was not reacheduntil some thirty years after American Independence, but the uncertaintyof such trade during a long period in which a portion of it consistedin unauthorized and unregulated exchange was a constant irritant to allparties concerned. Meanwhile there came the War of 1812 with itspreliminary check upon direct trade to and from Great Britain, and itsfinal total prohibition of intercourse during the war itself. In 1800the bulk of American importation of manufactures still came from GreatBritain. In the contest over neutral rights and theories, Jeffersonattempted to bring pressure on the belligerents, and especially onEngland, by restriction of imports. First came a non-importation Act, 1806, followed by an embargo on exports, 1807, but these were sounpopular in the commercial states of New England that they werewithdrawn in 1810, yet for a short time only, for Napoleon tricked theUnited States into believing that France had yielded to Americancontentions on neutral rights, and in 1811 non-intercourse wasproclaimed again with England alone. On June 18, 1812, America finallydeclared war and trade stopped save in a few New England ports whererebellious citizens continued to sell provisions to a blockading Britishnaval squadron. 

For eight years after 1806, then, trade with Great Britain had steadilydecreased, finally almost to extinction during the war. But Americarequired certain articles customarily imported and necessity now forcedher to develop her own manufactures. New England had been the centre ofAmerican foreign commerce, but now there began a trend towardmanufacturing enterprise. Even in 1814, however, at the end of the war, it was still thought in the United States that under normal conditionsmanufactured goods would again be imported and the general cry of"protection for home industries" was as yet unvoiced. Nevertheless, agroup of infant industries had in fact been started and clamoured fordefence now that peace was restored. This situation was not unnoticed inGreat Britain where merchants, piling up goods in anticipation of peaceon the continent of Europe and a restored market, suddenly discoveredthat the poverty of Europe denied them that market. Looking withapprehension toward the new industries of America, British merchants, following the advice of Lord Brougham in a parliamentary speech, dumpedgreat quantities of their surplus goods on the American market, sellingthem far below cost, or even on extravagant credit terms. One object wasto smash the budding American manufactures. 

This action of British merchants naturally stirred some angry patrioticemotions in the circles where American business suffered and a demandbegan to be heard for protection. But the Government of the UnitedStates was still representative of agriculture, in the main, and while aTariff Bill was enacted in 1816 that Bill was regarded as a temporarymeasure required by the necessity of paying the costs of the recent war. Just at this juncture, however, British policy, now looking again towarda great colonial empire, sought advantages for the hitherto neglectedmaritime provinces of British North America, and thought that it hadfound them by encouragement of their trade with the British West Indies. The legal status of American trade with the West Indies was now enforcedand for a time intercourse was practically suspended. 

This British policy brought to the front the issue of protection inAmerica. It not only worked against a return by New England frommanufacturing to commerce, but it soon brought into the ranks ofprotectionists a northern and western agricultural element that had beenaccustomed to sell surplus products to West Indian planters seekingcheap food-stuffs for their slaves. This new protectionist element wasas yet not crystallized into a clamour for "home markets" foragriculture, but the pressure of opinion was beginning to be felt, andby 1820 the question of West Indian trade became one of constantagitation and demanded political action. That action was taken on linesof retaliation. Congress in 1818 passed a law excluding from Americanports any British vessel coming from a port access to which was deniedto an American vessel, and placing under bond in American ports Britishvessels with prohibition of their proceeding to a British port to whichAmerican vessels could not go. This act affected not merely direct tradewith the West Indies, but stopped the general custom of British ships oftaking part cargoes to Jamaica while _en route_ to and from the UnitedStates. The result was, first, compromise, later, under Huskisson'sadministration at the British Board of Trade, complete abandonment byBritain of the exclusive trade basis of her whole colonial system. 

The "retaliatory system" which J. Q. Adams regarded as "a new declarationof independence, " was, in fact, quickly taken up by other non-colonialnations, and these, with America, compelled Great Britain to take stockof her interests. Huskisson, rightly foreseeing British prosperity asdependent upon her manufactures and upon the carrying trade, stated inParliament that American "retaliation" had forced the issue. Freedom oftrade in British ports was offered in 1826 to all non-colonial nationsthat would open their ports within one year on terms of equality toBritish ships. J. Q. Adams, now President of the United States, delayedacceptance of this offer, preferring a treaty negotiation, and wasrebuffed by Canning, so that actual resumption of West Indian trade didnot take place until 1830, after the close of Adams' administration. That trade never recovered its former prosperity. 

Meanwhile the long period of controversy, from 1806 to 1830, hadresulted in a complete change in the American situation. It is not asufficient explanation of the American belief in, and practice of, thetheory of protection to attribute this alone to British checks placedupon free commercial rivalry. Nevertheless the progress of Americatoward an established system, reaching its highest mark for years in theTariff Bill of 1828, is distinctly related to the events just narrated. After American independence, the partially illegal status of West Indiantrade hampered commercial progress and slightly encouraged Americanmanufactures by the mere seeking of capital for investment; the neutraltroubles of 1806 and the American prohibitions on intercourse increasedthe transfer of interest; the war of 1812 gave a complete protection toinfant industries; the dumping of British goods in 1815 stirredpatriotic American feeling; British renewal of colonial systemrestrictions, and the twelve-year quarrel over "retaliation" gave timefor the definite establishment of protectionist ideas in the UnitedStates. But Britain was soon proclaiming for herself and for the worldthe common advantage and the justice of a great theory of free trade. America was apparently now committed to an opposing economic theory, thefirst great nation definitely to establish it, and thus there resulted aclear-cut opposition of principle and a clash of interests. From 1846, when free trade ideas triumphed in England, the devoted British freetrader regarded America as the chief obstacle to a world-wide acceptanceof his theory. 

The one bright spot in America, as regarded by the British free trader, was in the Southern States, where cotton interests, desiring noadvantage from protection, since their market was in Europe, attackedAmerican protection and sought to escape from it. Also slave supplies, without protection, could have been purchased more cheaply from Englandthan from the manufacturing North. In 1833 indeed the South had forced areaction against protection, but it proceeded slowly. In 1854 it wasSouthern opinion that carried through Congress the reciprocity treatywith the British American Provinces, partly brought about, no doubt, bya Southern fear that Canada, bitter over the loss of special advantagesin British markets by the British free trade of 1846, might join theUnited States and thus swell the Northern and free states of the Union. Cotton interests and trade became the dominant British commercial tiewith the United States, and the one great hope, to the British minds, ofa break in the false American system of protection. Thus both ineconomic theory and in trade, spite of British dislike of slavery, theexport trading interests of Great Britain became more and more directedtoward the Southern States of America. Adding powerfully to this was thedependence of British cotton manufactures upon the American supply. TheBritish trade attitude, arising largely outside of direct governmentalcontacts, was bound to have, nevertheless, a constant and importantinfluence on governmental action. 

Governmental policy, seeking national power, conflicting trade andindustrial interests, are the favourite themes of those historians whoregard nations as determined in their relations solely by economiccauses--by what is called "enlightened self-interest. " But governments, no matter how arbitrary, and still more if in a measure resting onrepresentation, react both consciously and unconsciously to a publicopinion not obviously based upon either national or commercial rivalry. Sometimes, indeed, governmental attitude runs absolutely counter topopular attitude in international affairs. In such a case, thehistorical estimate, if based solely on evidences of governmentalaction, is a false one and may do great injustice to the essentialfriendliness of a people. 

How then, did the British people, of all classes, regard America before1860, and in what manner did that regard affect the British Government?Here, it is necessary to seek British opinion on, and its reaction to, American institutions, ideals, and practices. Such public opinion canbe found in quantity sufficient to base an estimate only in travellers'books, in reviews, and in newspapers of the period. When all these arebrought together it is found that while there was an almost universalBritish criticism of American social customs and habits of life, due tothat insularity of mental attitude characteristic of every nation, making it prefer its own customs and criticize those of its neighbours, summed up in the phrase "dislike of foreigners"--it is found thatBritish opinion was centred upon two main threads; first America as aplace for emigration and, second, American political ideals andinstitutions[10]. 

British emigration to America, a governmentally favoured colonizationprocess before the American revolution, lost that favour after 1783, though not at first definitely opposed. But emigration still continuedand at no time, save during the war of 1812, was it absolutely stopped. Its exact amount is unascertainable, for neither Government keptadequate statistics before 1820. With the end of the Napoleonic warsthere came great distress in England from which the man of energy soughtescape. He turned naturally to America, being familiar, by hearsay atleast, with stories of the ease of gaining a livelihood there, andinfluenced by the knowledge that in the United States he would findpeople of his own blood and speech. The bulk of this earlier emigrationto America resulted from economic causes. When, in 1825, one energeticMember of Parliament, Wilmot Horton, induced the Government to appoint acommittee to investigate the whole subject, the result was a mass oftestimony, secured from returned emigrants or from their letters home, in which there constantly appeared one main argument influencing thelabourer type of emigrant; he got good wages, and he was supplied, as afarm hand, with good food. Repeatedly he testifies that he had "threemeat meals a day, " whereas in England he had ordinarily received but onesuch meal a week. 

Mere good living was the chief inducement for the labourer type ofemigrant, and the knowledge of such living created for this typeremaining in England a sort of halo of industrial prosperity surroundingAmerica. But there was a second testimony brought out by Horton'sCommittee, less general, yet to be picked up here and there as evidenceof another argument for emigration to America. The labourer did notdilate upon political equality, nor boast of a share in government, indeed generally had no such share, but he did boast to his fellows athome of the social equality, though not thus expressing it, which wasall about him. He was a common farm hand, yet he "sat down to meals"with his employer and family, and worked in the fields side by side withhis "master. " This, too, was an astounding difference to the mind of theBritish labourer. Probably for him it created a clearer, if notaltogether universal and true picture of the meaning of Americandemocracy than would have volumes of writing upon politicalinstitutions. Gradually there was established in the lower orders ofBritish society a visualization of America as a haven of physicalwell-being and personal social happiness. 

This British labouring class had for long, however, no medium ofexpression in print. Here existed, then, an unexpressed public opinionof America, of much latent influence, but for the moment largelynegligible as affecting other classes or the Government. A moreimportant emigrating class in its influence on opinion at home, thoughnot a large class, was composed about equally of small farmers and smallmerchants facing ruin in the agricultural and trading crises thatfollowed the end of the European war. The British travellers' booksfrom 1810 to 1820 are generally written by men of this class, or byagents sent out from co-operative groups planning emigration. Generallythey were discontented with political conditions at home, commonlyopposed to a petrified social order, and attracted to the United Statesby its lure of prosperity and content. The books are, in brief, asuperior type of emigrant guide for a superior type of emigrant, examining and emphasizing industrial opportunity. 

Almost universally, however, they sound the note of superior politicalinstitutions and conditions. One wrote "A republican finds here ARepublic, and the only Republic on the face of the earth that everdeserved the name: where all are under the protection of equal laws; oflaws made by Themselves[11]. " Another, who established an English colonyin the Western States of Illinois, wrote of England that he objected to"being ruled and taxed by people who had no more right to rule and taxus than consisted in the power to do it. " And of his adopted country heconcludes: "I love the Government; and thus a novel sensation isexcited; it is like the development of a new faculty. I am become apatriot in my old age[12]. " Still another detailed the points of hiscontent, "I am here, lord and master of myself and of 100 acres ofland--an improvable farm, little trouble to me, good society and a goodmarket, and, I think, a fine climate, only a little too hot and dry insummer; the parson gets nothing from me; my state and road taxes andpoor rates amount to §25. 00 per annum. I can carry a gun if I choose; Ileave my door unlocked at night; and I can get snuff for one cent anounce or a little more[13]. "

From the first days of the American colonial movement towardindependence there had been, indeed, a British interest in Americanpolitical principles. Many Whigs sympathized with these principles forreasons of home political controversy. Their sympathy continued afterAmerican independence and by its insistent expression brought outequally insistent opposition from Tory circles. The British homemovement toward a more representative Government had been temporarilychecked by the extremes into which French Liberalism plunged in 1791, causing reaction in England. By 1820 pressure was again being exerted byBritish Liberals of intelligence, and they found arguments in suchreports as those just quoted. From that date onward, and especially justbefore the passing of the Reform Bill of 1832, yet always a factor, theexample of a prosperous American democracy was an element in Britishhome politics, lauded or derided as the man in England desired or not anexpansion of the British franchise. In the earlier period, however, itis to be remembered that applause of American institutions did not meanacceptance of democracy to the extent of manhood franchise, for no suchfranchise at first existed in America itself. The debate in England wassimply whether the step forward in American democracy, was an argumentfor a similar step in Great Britain. 

Books, reviews and newspapers in Great Britain as the political quarrelthere grew in force, depicted America favourably or otherwise accordingto political sympathies at home. Both before and after the Reform Billof 1832 this type of effort to mould opinion, by citation of America, was widespread. Hence there is in such writing, not so much theexpression of public opinion, as of propaganda to affect that opinion. Book upon book, review upon review, might be quoted to illustrate this, but a few notable examples will suffice. 

The most widely read and reviewed book on the United States before1840, except the humorous and flippant characterization of America byMrs. Trollope, was Captain Basil Hall's three-volume work, published in1829[14]. Claiming an open mind, he expected for his adverse findings areadier credence. For adverse to American political institutions thesefindings are in all their larger applications. In every line Hallbetrays himself as an old Tory of the 'twenties, fixed in his belief, and convinced of the perfection and unalterableness of the BritishConstitution. Captain Hamilton, who wrote in 1833, was more frank inavowal of a purpose[15]. He states in his preface:

 ". . . When I found the institutions and experiences of the United States deliberately quoted in the reformed parliament, as affording safe precedent for British legislation, and learned that the drivellers who uttered such nonsense, instead of encountering merited derision, were listened to with patience and approbation by men as ignorant as themselves, I certainly did feel that another work on America was yet wanted, and at once determined to undertake a task which inferior considerations would probably have induced me to decline. "

Harriet Martineau, ardent advocate of political reform at home, found inthe United States proofs for her faith in democracy[16]. Captain Marryatbelittled Miss Martineau, but in his six volumes proved himself less acritic of America than an enemy of democracy. Answering a review of hisearlier volumes, published separately, he wrote in his concludingvolume: "I candidly acknowledge that the reviewer is right in hissupposition; my great object has been to do serious injury to the causeof democracy[17]. "

The fact was that British governing and intellectual classes weresuffering a recoil from the enthusiasms leading up to the step towarddemocracy in the Reform of 1832. The electoral franchise was stilllimited to a small minority of the population. Britain was still ruledby her "wise men" of wealth and position. Meanwhile, however, just atthe moment when dominant Whig influence in England carried through thatstep forward toward democratic institutions which Whigs had long laudedin America, the latter country had progressed to manhood suffrage, or asnearly all leading Englishmen, whether Whig or Tory, regarded it, hadplunged into the rule of the mob. The result was a rapid lessening inWhig ruling-class expression of admiration for America, even before longto the complete cessation of such admiration, and to assertions in GreatBritain that the Reform of 1832 was "final, " the last step towarddemocracy which Britain could safely take. It is not strange that thebooks and reviews of the period from 1830 to 1840, heavily stress thedangers and crudity of American democracy. They were written for whatwas now a nearly unanimous British reading public, fearful lest Radicalpressure for still further electoral reform should preach the example ofthe United States. 

Thus after 1832 the previous sympathy for America of one section of theBritish governing class disappears. More--it is replaced by a critical, if not openly hostile attitude. Soon, with the rapid development of thepower and wealth of the United States, governing-class England, of allfactions save the Radical, came to view America just as it would haveviewed any other rising nation, that is, as a problem to be studied forits influence on British prosperity and power. Again, expressions inprint reflect the changes of British view--nowhere more clearly than intravellers' books. After 1840, for nearly a decade, these are devoted, not to American political institutions, but to studies, many of themvery careful ones, of American industry and governmental policy. 

Buckingham, one-time member of Parliament, wrote nine volumes of suchdescription. His work is a storehouse of fact, useful to this day to theAmerican historical student[18]. George Combe, philosopher andphrenologist, studied especially social institutions[19]. Joseph Sturge, philanthropist and abolitionist, made a tour, under the guidance of thepoet Whittier, through the Northern and Eastern States[20]. Featherstonaugh, a scientist and civil engineer, described the Southernslave states, in terms completely at variance with those of Sturge[21]. Kennedy, traveller in Texas, and later British consul at Galveston, andWarburton, a traveller who came to the United States by way of Canada, an unusual approach, were both frankly startled, the latter professedlyalarmed, at the evidences of power in America[22]. Amazed at the energy, growth and prosperity of the country and alarmed at the anti-Britishfeeling he found in New York City, Warburton wrote that "they[Americans] only wait for matured power to apply the incendiary torch ofRepublicanism to the nations of Europe[23]. " Soon after this was writtenthere began, in 1848, that great tide of Irish emigration to Americawhich heavily reinforced the anti-British attitude of the City of NewYork, and largely changed its character. 

Did books dilating upon the expanding power of America reflect Britishpublic opinion, or did they create it? It is difficult to estimate suchmatters. Certainly it is not uninteresting that these books coincided inpoint of time with a British governmental attitude of opposition, thoughon peaceful lines, to the development of American power, and to theadoption to the point of faith, by British commercial classes, of freetrade as opposed to the American protective system. But governingclasses were not the British public, and to the great unenfranchisedmass, finding voice through the writings of a few leaders, theprosperity of America made a powerful appeal. Radical democracy wasagain beginning to make its plea in Britain. In 1849 there was publisheda study of the United States, more careful and exact than any previousto Bryce's great work, and lauding American political institutions. Thiswas Mackay's "Western World, " and that there was a public eager for suchestimate is evidenced by the fact that the book went through fourBritish editions in 1850[24]. At the end of the decade, then, thereappeared once more a vigorous champion of the cause of Britishdemocracy, comparing the results of "government by the wise" withalleged mob rule. Mackay wrote:

 "Society in America started from the point to which society in Europe is only yet finding. The equality of men is, to this moment, its corner-stone . . . That which develops itself as the sympathy of class, becomes in America the general sentiment of society. . . . We present an imposing front to the world; but let us tear the picture and look at the canvas. One out of every seven of us is a pauper. Every six Englishmen have, in addition to their other enormous burdens, to support a seventh between them, whose life is spent in consuming, but in adding nothing to the source of their common subsistence. "

British governing classes then, forgoing after 1850 opposition to theadvance of American power, found themselves involved again, as before1832, in the problem of the possible influence of a prosperous Americandemocracy upon an unenfranchised public opinion at home. Also, for allEnglishmen, of whatever class, in spite of rivalry in power, of opposingtheories of trade, of divergent political institutions, there existed avague, though influential, pride in the advance of a people of similarrace, sprung from British loins[25]. And there remained for allEnglishmen also one puzzling and discreditable American institution, slavery--held up to scorn by the critics of the United States, difficultof excuse among her friends. 

Agitation conducted by the great philanthropist, Wilberforce, had earlycommitted British Government and people to a crusade against the Africanslave trade. This British policy was clearly announced to the world inthe negotiations at Vienna in 1814-15. But Britain herself stillsupported the institution of slavery in her West Indian colonies and itwas not until British humanitarian sentiment had forced emancipationupon the unwilling sugar planters, in 1833, that the nation was morallyfree to criticize American domestic slavery. Meanwhile greatemancipation societies, with many branches, all virile and active, hadgrown up in England and in Scotland. These now turned to an attack onslavery the world over, and especially on American slavery. The greatAmerican abolitionist, Garrison, found more support in England than inhis own country; his weekly paper, _The Liberator_, is full of messagesof cheer from British friends and societies, and of quotations from asympathetic, though generally provincial, British press. 

From 1830 to 1850 British anti-slavery sentiment was at its height. Itwatched with anxiety the evidence of a developing struggle over slaveryin the United States, hopeful, as each crisis arose, that the freeNorthern States would impose their will upon the Southern Slave States. But as each crisis turned to compromise, seemingly enhancing the powerof the South, and committing America to a retention of slavery, thehopes of British abolitionists waned. The North did indeed, to Britishopinion, become identified with opposition to the expansion of slavery, but after the "great compromise of 1850, " where the elder Americanstatesmen of both North and South proclaimed the "finality" of thatmeasure, British sympathy for the North rapidly lessened. Moreover, after 1850, there was in Britain itself a decay of general humanitariansentiment as regards slavery. The crusade had begun to seem hopeless andthe earlier vigorous agitators were dead. The British Government stillmaintained its naval squadron for the suppression of the African slavetrade, but the British official mind no longer keenly interested itselfeither in this effort or in the general question of slavery. 

Nevertheless American slavery and slave conditions were still, after1850, favourite matters for discussion, almost universally critical, byEnglish writers. Each renewal of the conflict in America, even thoughlocal, not national in character, drew out a flood of comment. In thepublic press this blot upon American civilization was a steady subjectfor attack, and that attack was naturally directed against the South. The London _Times_, in particular, lost no opportunity of presenting thematter to its readers. In 1856, a Mr. Thomas Gladstone visited Kansasduring the height of the border struggles there, and reported hisobservations in letters to the _Times_. The writer was wholly on theside of the Northern settlers in Kansas, though not hopeful that theKansas struggle would expand to a national conflict. He constantlydepicted the superior civilization, industry, and social excellence ofthe North as compared with the South[26]. 

Mrs. Stowe's _Uncle Tom's Cabin_ excited greater interest in Englandthan in America itself. The first London edition appeared in May, 1852, and by the end of the year over one million copies had been sold, asopposed to one hundred and fifty thousand in the United States. But ifone distinguished writer is to be believed, this great British interestin the book was due more to English antipathy to America than toantipathy to slavery[27]. This writer was Nassau W. Senior, who, in1857, published a reprint of his article on "American Slavery" in the206th number of the _Edinburgh Review_, reintroducing in his bookextreme language denunciatory of slavery that had been cut out by theeditor of the _Review_[28]. Senior had been stirred to write by thebrutal attack upon Charles Sumner in the United States Senate after hisspeech of May 19-20, 1856, evidence, again, that each incident of theslavery quarrel in America excited British attention. 

Senior, like Thomas Gladstone, painted the North as all anti-slavery, the South as all pro-slavery. Similar impressions of Britishunderstanding (or misunderstanding) are received from the citations ofthe British provincial press, so favoured by Garrison in his_Liberator_[29]. Yet for intellectual Britain, at least--that Britainwhich was vocal and whose opinion can be ascertained in spite of thisconstant interest in American slavery, there was generally a fixedbelief that slavery in the United States was so firmly established thatit could not be overthrown. Of what use, then, the further expenditureof British sympathy or effort in a lost cause? Senior himself, at theconclusion of his fierce attack on the Southern States, expressed thepessimism of British abolitionists. He wrote, "We do not venture to hopethat we, or our sons, or our grandsons, will see American slaveryextirpated, or even materially mitigated[30]. "

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: State Department, Eng. , Vol. LXXIX, No. 135, March 27, 1862. ]

[Footnote 2: Walpole, _Russell_, Vol. II, p. 367. ]

[Footnote 3: _Life of Lady John Russell_, p. 197. ]

[Footnote 4: There was a revival of this fear at the end of the AmericanCivil War. This will be commented on later. ]

[Footnote 5: This was the position of President and Congress: yet theUnited States had not acknowledged the right of an American citizen toexpatriate himself. ]

[Footnote 6: Between 1797 and 1801, of the sailors taken from Americanships, 102 were retained, 1, 042 were discharged, and 805 were held forfurther proof. (Updyke, _The Diplomacy of the War of 1812_, p. 21. )]

[Footnote 7: The people of the British North American Provinces regardedthe war as an attempt made by America, taking advantage of the Europeanwars, at forcible annexation. In result the fervour of the United EmpireLoyalists was renewed, especially in Upper Canada. Thus the same twowars which fostered militant patriotism in America against England hadthe same result in Canadian sentiment against America. ]

[Footnote 8: Temperley, "Later American Policy of George Canning" in_Am. Hist. Rev. _, XI, 783. Also _Cambridge History of British ForeignPolicy_, Vol. II, ch. 2. ]

[Footnote 9: Much has recently been published on British policy inTexas. See my book, _British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846_, Johns Hopkins Press, Balt. , 1910. Also Adams, Editor, _British Diplomatic Correspondence concerning the Republic of Texas_, The Texas State Historical Association, Austin, Texas, 1918. ]

[Footnote 10: In my studies on British-American relations, I have readthe leading British reviews and newspapers, and some four hundredvolumes by British travellers. For a summary of the British travellersbefore 1860 see my article "The Point of View of the British Travellerin America, " in the _Political Science Quarterly_, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, June, 1914. ]

[Footnote 11: John Melish, _Travels_, Vol. I, p. 148. ]

[Footnote 12: Morris Birkbeck, _Letters from Illinois_, London, 1818, p. 29. ]

[Footnote 13: Letter in Edinburgh _Scotsman_, March, 1823. Cited by_Niles Register_, Vol. XXV, p. 39. ]

[Footnote 14: _Travels in North America_, 1827-28, London, 1829. ]

[Footnote 15: Captain Thomas Hamilton, _Men and Manners in America_, Edinburgh and London, 1833. 2 vols. ]

[Footnote 16: _Society in America_, London, 1837. 3 vols. _Retrospect ofWestern Travel_, London, 1838. 2 vols. ]

[Footnote 17: Captain Frederick Marryat, _A Diary in America, withRemarks on Its Institutions_, Vol. VI, p. 293. ]

[Footnote 18: James Silk Buckingham, _America, Historical, Statistic andDescriptive_, London, 1841-43. 9 vols. ]

[Footnote 19: _Notes on the United States of North America during aphrenological visit_, 1838-9-40, Edinburgh, 1841. 3 vols. ]

[Footnote 20: _A Visit to the United States in 1841_, London, 1842. ]

[Footnote 21: George William Featherstonaugh, _Excursion through theSlave States_, London, 1844. 2 vols. ]

[Footnote 22: William Kennedy, _Texas: The Rise, Progress and Prospectsof the Republic of Texas_, London, 1841. 2 vols. George Warburton, _Hochelaga: or, England in the New World_, London, 1845. 2 vols. ]

[Footnote 23: Warburton, _Hochelaga_, 5th Edition, Vol. II, pp. 363-4. ]

[Footnote 24: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World: or, Travels throughthe United States in 1846-47_, London, 1849. ]

[Footnote 25: This is clearly indicated in Parliament itself, in thedebate on the dismissal by the United States in 1856 of Crampton, theBritish Minister at Washington, for enlistment activities during theCrimean War. --_Hansard_, 3rd. Ser. , CXLIII, 14-109 and 120-203. ]

[Footnote 26: Gladstone's letters were later published in book form, under the title _The Englishman in Kansas_, London, 1857. ]

[Footnote 27: "The evil passions which 'Uncle Tom' gratified in Englandwere not hatred or vengeance [of slavery], but national jealousy andnational vanity. We have long been smarting under the conceit ofAmerica--we are tired of hearing her boast that she is the freest andthe most enlightened country that the world has ever seen. Our clergyhate her voluntary system--our Tories hate her democrats--our Whigs hateher parvenus--our Radicals hate her litigiousness, her insolence, andher ambition. All parties hailed Mrs. Stowe as a revolter from theenemy. " Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 38. ]

[Footnote 28: The reprint is without date, but the context shows theyear to be 1857. ]

[Footnote 29: For example the many British expressions quoted inreference to John Brown's raid, in _The Liberator_ for February 10, 1860, and in succeeding issues. ]

[Footnote 30: Senior, _American Slavery_, p. 68. ]

CHAPTER II

FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF IMPENDING CONFLICT, 1860-61. 

It has been remarked by the American historian, Schouler, thatimmediately before the outbreak of the Civil War, diplomaticcontroversies between England and America had largely been settled, andthat England, pressed from point to point, had "sullenly" yielded underAmerican demands. This generalization, as applied to what were, afterall, minor controversies, is in great measure true. In larger questionsof policy, as regards spheres of influence or developing power, orprinciples of trade, there was difference, but no longer any essentialopposition or declared rivalry[31]. In theories of government there wassharp divergence, clearly appreciated, however, only in governing-classBritain. This sense of divergence, even of a certain threat from Americato British political institutions, united with an established opinionthat slavery was permanently fixed in the United States to reinforcegovernmental indifference, sometimes even hostility, to America. TheBritish public, also, was largely hopeless of any change in theinstitution of slavery, and its own active humanitarian interest waswaning, though still dormant--not dead. Yet the two nations, to a degreenot true of any other two world-powers, were of the same race, hadsimilar basic laws, read the same books, and were held in close touch atmany points by the steady flow of British emigration to theUnited States. 

When, after the election of Lincoln to the Presidency, in November, 1860, the storm-clouds of civil strife rapidly gathered, the situationtook both British Government and people by surprise. There was not anyclear understanding either of American political conditions, or of theintensity of feeling now aroused over the question of the extension ofslave territory. The most recent descriptions of America had agreed inassertion that at some future time there would take place, in allprobability, a dissolution of the Union, on lines of diverging economicinterests, but also stated that there was nothing in the Americansituation to indicate immediate progress in this direction. Grattan, along-time resident in America as British Consul at Boston, wrote:

 "The day must no doubt come when clashing objects will break the ties of common interest which now preserve the Union. But no man may foretell the period of dissolution. . . . The many restraining causes are out of sight of foreign observation. The Lilliputian threads binding the man mountain are invisible; and it seems wondrous that each limb does not act for itself independently of its fellows. A closer examination shows the nature of the network which keeps the members of this association so tightly bound. Any attempt to untangle the ties, more firmly fastens them. When any one State talks of separation, the others become spontaneously knotted together. When a section blusters about its particular rights, the rest feel each of theirs to be common to all. If a foreign nation hint at hostility, the whole Union becomes in reality united. And thus in every contingency from which there can be danger, there is also found the element of safety. " Yet, he added, "All attempts to strengthen this federal government at the expense of the States' governments must be futile. . . . The federal government exists on sufferance only. Any State may at any time constitutionally withdraw from the Union, and thus virtually dissolve it[32]. "

Even more emphatically, though with less authority, wrote one CharlesMackay, styled by the American press as a "distinguished British poet, "who made the usual rapid tour of the principal cities of America in1857-58, and as rapidly penned his impressions:

 "Many persons in the United States talk of a dissolution of the Union, but few believe in it. . . . All this is mere bravado and empty talk. It means nothing. The Union is dear to all Americans, whatever they may say to the contrary. . . . There is no present danger to the Union, and the violent expressions to which over-ardent politicians of the North and South sometimes give vent have no real meaning. The 'Great West, ' as it is fondly called, is in the position even now to arbitrate between North and South, should the quarrel stretch beyond words, or should anti-slavery or any other question succeed in throwing any difference between them which it would take revolvers and rifles rather than speeches and votes to put an end to[33]. "

The slavery controversy in America had, in short, come to be regarded inEngland as a constant quarrel between North and South, but of noimmediate danger to the Union. Each outbreak of violent Americancontroversy produced a British comment sympathetic with the North. Theturmoil preceding and following the election of Lincoln in 1860, on theplatform of "no extension of slavery, " was very generally noted by theBritish press and public, as a sign favourable to the cause ofanti-slavery, but with no understanding that Southern threat would atlast be realized in definite action. Herbert Spencer, in a letter of May15, 1862, to his American friend, Yeomans, wrote, "As far as I had themeans of judging, the feeling here was at first _very decidedly_ on theside of the North[34] . . . " The British metropolitan press, in nearlyevery issue of which for at least two years after December, 1860, thereappeared news items and editorial comment on the American crisis, was atfirst nearly unanimous in condemning the South[35]. The _Times_, withaccustomed vigour, led the field. On November 21, 1860, it stated:

 "When we read the speech of Mr. Lincoln on the subject of Slavery and consider the extreme moderation of the sentiments it expresses, the allowance that is made for the situation, for the feelings, for the prejudices, of the South; when we see how entirely he narrows his opposition to the single point of the admission of Slavery into the Territories, we cannot help being forcibly struck by the absurdity of breaking up a vast and glorious confederacy like that of the United States from the dread and anger inspired by the election of such a man to the office of Chief Magistrate. . . . We rejoice, on higher and surer grounds, that it [the election] has ended in the return of Mr. Lincoln. We are glad to think that the march of Slavery, and the domineering tone which its advocates were beginning to assume over Freedom, has been at length arrested and silenced. We rejoice that a vast community of our own race has at length given an authoritative expression to sentiments which are entertained by everyone in this country. We trust to see the American Government employed in tasks more worthy of a State founded on the doctrines of liberty and equality than the invention of shifts and devices to perpetuate servitude; and we hear in this great protest of American freedom the tardy echo of those humane doctrines to which England has so long become a convert. "

Other leading journals, though with less of patronizingself-complacency, struck the same note as the _Times_. The _Economist_attributed Lincoln's election to a shift in the sympathies of the "lowerorders" in the electorate who had now deserted their former leaders, theslave-owning aristocracy of the South, and allied themselves with therefined and wise leaders of the North. Lincoln, it argued, was not anextremist in any sense. His plan of action lay within the limits ofstatesmanlike moderation[36]. The _Saturday Review_ was less sure thatEngland should rejoice with the North. British self-esteem had sufferedsome hard blows at the hands of the Democratic party in America, but atleast England knew where Democrats stood, and could count on no morediscourtesy or injustice than that inflicted in the past. The Republicanparty, however, had no policy, except that of its leader, Seward, andfrom him might be expected extreme insolence[37]. This was a very earlyjudgment of Seward, and one upon which the _Saturday Review_ preeneditself later, as wholly justified. The _Spectator_, the only one of thefour journals thus far considered which ultimately remained constant inadvocacy of the Northern cause, was at first lukewarm in comment, regarding the 1860 election, while fought on the slavery issue, as inreality a mere contest between parties for political power[38]. 

Such was the initial attitude of the English press. Each press issuefor several weeks harped on the same chord, though sounding varyingnotes. If the South really means forcible resistance, said the _Times_, it is doomed to quick suppression. "A few hundred thousand slave-owners, trembling nightly with visions of murder and pillage, backed by adissolute population of 'poor whites, ' are no match for the hardy andresolute populations of the Free States[39], " and if the South hoped forforeign aid it should be undeceived promptly: "Can any sane man believethat England and France will consent, as is now suggested, to stultifythe policy of half a century for the sake of an extended cotton trade, and to purchase the favours of Charleston and Milledgeville byrecognizing what has been called 'the isothermal law, which impelsAfrican labour toward the tropics' on the other side of theAtlantic[40]?" Moreover all Americans ought to understand clearly thatBritish respect for the United States "was not due to the attitude ofthe South with its ruffian demonstrations in Congress. . . . All that isnoble and venerable in the United States is associated with its FederalConstitution[41]. "

Did the British public hold these same opinions? There is no directevidence available in sufficient quantity in autobiography or lettersupon which to base a conclusion. Such works are silent on the strugglein America for the first few months and presumably public opinion, lessinformed even than the press, received its impressions from the journalscustomarily read. Both at this period and all through the war, also, itshould be remembered, clearly, that most newspapers, all the reviews, infact nearly all vehicles of British expression, were in the early'sixties "in the hands of the educated classes, and these educatedclasses corresponded closely with the privileged classes. " The moredemocratic element of British Society lacked any adequate pressrepresentation of its opinions. "This body could express itself by suchcomparatively crude methods as public meetings and demonstrations, butit was hampered in literary and political expression[42]. " The opinionof the press was then, presumably, the opinion of the majority of theeducated British public. 

Thus British comment on America took the form, at first ofmoralizations, now severe toward the South, now indifferent, yet verygenerally asserting the essential justice of the Northern position. Butit was early evident that the newspapers, one and all, were quiteunprepared for the determined front soon put up by South Carolina andother Southern States. Surprised by the violence of Southerndeclarations, the only explanation found by the British press was thatpolitical control had been seized by the uneducated and lawless element. The _Times_ characterized this element of the South as in a state ofdeplorable ignorance comparable with that of the Irish peasantry, a"poor, proud, lazy, excitable and violent class, ever ready with knifeand revolver[43]. " The fate of the Union, according to the _SaturdayReview_, was in the hands of the "most ignorant, most unscrupulous, andmost lawless [class] in the world--the poor or mean whites of the SlaveStates[44]. " Like judgments were expressed by the _Economist_ and, moremildly, by the _Spectator_[45]. Subsequently some of these journalsfound difficulty in this connection, in swinging round the circle toexpressions of admiration for the wise and powerful aristocracy of theSouth; but all, especially the _Times_, were skilled by long practicein the journalistic art of facing about while claiming perfectconsistency. In denial of a Southern right of secession, also, they werenearly a unit[46], though the _Saturday Review_ argued the case for theSouth, making a pointed parallel between the present situation and thatof the American Colonies in seceding from England[47]. 

The quotations thus far made exhibit for the leading papers an initialconfusion and ignorance difficult to harmonize with the theory of an"enlightened press. " The Reviews, by the conditions of publication, cameinto action more slowly and during 1860 there appeared but one article, in the _Edinburgh Review_, giving any adequate idea of what was reallytaking place in America[48]. The lesser British papers generallyfollowed the tone of the leading journals, but without either greatinterest or much acumen. In truth the depth of British newspaperignorance, considering their positiveness of utterance, appears utterlyastonishing if regarded from the view-point of modern historicalknowledge. But is this, after all, a matter for surprise? Was there notequal confusion at least, possibly equal ignorance, in America itself, certainly among the press and people of the Northern States? They alsohad come by experience to discount Southern threats, and were slow tounderstand that the great conflict of ideals and interests was atlast begun. 

The British press both influenced and reflected educated class opinion, and, in some degree, official opinion as well. Lord John Russell at theForeign Office and Lord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, wereexchanging anxious letters, and the latter was sending home reportsremarkable for their clear analysis of the American controversy. Yeteven he was slow to appreciate the inevitability of secession. 

[Illustration: LORD LYONS (_From a photograph taken at Boston, U. S. A. , in 1860) (From Lord Newton's "Life of Lord Lyons, " by kind permission_)]

Other officials, especially those in minor positions in the UnitedStates, showed a lack of grasp of the situation similar to that of thepress. An amusing illustration of this, furnishing a far-fetched view ofcauses, is supplied in a letter of February 2, 1860, from Consul Bunch, at Charleston, S. C. , to Lord Lyons, the British Minister atWashington[49]. Bunch wrote describing a dinner which had been given theevening before, by the Jockey Club of Charleston. Being called upon fora speech, he had alluded to the prizes of the Turf at home, and hadreferred especially to the Plates run for the various British colonies. Continuing, he said:

 "'. . . I cannot help calling your attention to the great loss you yourselves have suffered by ceasing to be a Colonial Dependency of Great Britain, as I am sure that if you had continued to be so, the Queen would have had great pleasure in sending you some Plates too. '

 "Of course this was meant for the broadest sort of joke, calculated to raise a laugh after dinner, but to my amazement, the company chose to take me literally, and applauded for about ten minutes--in fact I could not go on for some time. "

Bunch evidently hardly knew what to make of this demonstration. He couldwith difficulty believe that South Carolina wished to be re-annexed as acolony of Great Britain, and comments upon the episode in a somewhathumorous vein. Nevertheless in concluding his letter, he solemnlyassures Lord Lyons that

 ". . . The Jockey Club is composed of the 'best people' of South Carolina--rich planters and the like. It represents, therefore, the 'gentlemanly interest' and not a bit of universal suffrage. "

It would be idle to assume that either in South Carolina or in Englandthere was, in February, 1860, any serious thought of a resumption ofcolonial relations, though W. H. Russell, correspondent of the _Times_, reported in the spring, 1861, that he frequently heard the samesentiment in the South[50]. For general official England, as for thepress, the truth is that up to the time of the secession of SouthCarolina no one really believed that a final rupture was about to takeplace between North and South. When, on December 20, 1860, that State insolemn convention declared the dissolution "of the Union now existingbetween South Carolina and the other States, under the name of the'United States of America, '" and when it was understood that otherSouthern States would soon follow this example, British opinion believedand hoped that the rupture would be accomplished peaceably. Until itbecame clear that war would ensue, the South was still damned by thepress as seeking the preservation of an evil institution. Slavery waseven more vigorously asserted as the ignoble and sole cause. In thenumber for April, 1861, the _Edinburgh Review_ attributed the wholedifficulty to slavery, asserted that British sympathy would be with theanti-slavery party, yet advanced the theory that the very dissolution ofthe Union would hasten the ultimate extinction of slavery since economiccompetition with a neighbouring free state, the North, would compel theSouth itself to abandon its beloved "domestic institution[51]. "

Upon receipt of the news from South Carolina, the _Times_, in a long andcarefully worded editorial, took up one by one the alleged causes ofsecession, dismissed them as inadequate, and concluded, ". . . We cannotdisguise from ourselves that, apart from all political complications, there is a right and a wrong in this question, and that the rightbelongs, with all its advantages, to the States of the North[52]. " Threedays later it asserted, "The North is for freedom of discussion, theSouth represses freedom of discussion with the tar-brush and thepine-fagot. " And again, on January 10, "The Southern States expectedsympathy for their undertaking from the public opinion of this country. The tone of the press has already done much to undeceive them. . . . "

In general both the metropolitan and the provincial press expressedsimilar sentiments, though there were exceptions. The _Dublin News_published with approval a long communication addressed to Irishmen athome and abroad: ". . . There is no power on earth or in heaven which cankeep in peace this unholy co-partnership. . . . I hope . . . That the Northwill quietly permit the South to retire from the confederacy and bearalone the odium of all mankind[53]. . . . " The _Saturday Review_ thoughtthat deeper than declared differences lay the ruling social structure ofthe South which now visioned a re-opening of the African Slave Trade, and the occupation by slavery of the whole southern portion of NorthAmerica. "A more ignoble basis for a great Confederacy it is impossibleto conceive, nor one in the long run more precarious. . . . Assuredly itwill be the Northern Confederacy, based on principles of freedom, with apolicy untainted by crime, with a free working-class of white men, thatwill be the one to go on and prosper and become the leader of the NewWorld[54]. " The _London Chronicle_ was vigorous in denunciation. "Nocountry on the globe produces a blackguardism, a cowardice or atreachery, so consummate as that of the negro-driving States of the newSouthern Confederacy"--a bit of editorial blackguardism in itself[55]. The _London Review_ more moderately stigmatized slavery as the cause, but was lukewarm in praise of Northern idealisms, regarding the wholematter as one of diverging economic systems and in any case asinevitably resulting in dissolution of the Union at some time. Theinevitable might as well come now as later and would result in benefitto both sections as well as to the world fearing the monstrous empire ofpower that had grown up in America[56]. 

The great bulk of early expressions by the British press was, in truth, definitely antagonistic to the South, and this was particularly true ofthe provincial press. Garrison's _Liberator_, advocating extremeabolition action, had long made a practice of presenting excerpts fromBritish newspapers, speeches and sermons in support of its cause. In1860 there were thirty-nine such citations; in the first months of 1861many more, all condemning slavery and the South. For the most part thesecitations represented a comparatively unknown and uninfluential section, both in politics and literature, of the British people. Matthew Arnoldwas among the first of men of letters to record his faith that secessionwas final and, as he hoped, an excellent thing for the North, looking tothe purity of race and the opportunity for unhampered advance[57]. IfEnglish writers were in any way influenced by their correspondents inthe United States they may, indeed, have well been in doubt as to theorigin and prospects of the American quarrel. Hawthorne, but recently athome again after seven years' consulship in England, was writing thatabolition was not a Northern object in the war just begun. Whittierwrote to _his_ English friends that slavery, and slavery alone, was thebasic issue[58]. But literary Britain was slow to express itself save inthe Reviews. These, representing varying shades of British upper-classopinion and presenting articles presumably more profound than thenewspaper editorials, frequently offered more recondite origins of theAmerican crisis. The _Quarterly Review_, organ of extreme Conservatism, in its first article, dwelt upon the failure of democratic institutions, a topic not here treated at length since it will be dealt with in aseparate chapter as deserving special study. The _Quarterly_ is also thefirst to advance the argument that the protective tariff, advocated bythe North, was a real cause for Southern secession[59]; an idea mademuch of later, by the elements unfriendly to the North, but nothitherto advanced. In these first issues of the Reviews for 1861, therewas frequently put forth the "Southern gentlemen" theory. 

 "At a distance of three thousand miles, the Southern planters did, indeed, bear a resemblance to the English country gentleman which led to a feeling of kinship and sympathy with him on the part of those in England who represented the old traditions of landed gentility. This 'Southern gentleman' theory, containing as it did an undeniable element of truth, is much harped upon by certain of the reviewers, and one can easily conceive of its popularity in the London Clubs. . . . The 'American, ' so familiar to British readers, during the first half of the century, through the eyes of such travellers as Mrs. Trollope, now becomes the 'Yankee, ' and is located north of Mason and Dixon's line[60]. "

Such portrayal was not characteristic of all Reviews, rather of the Toryorgans alone, and the Radical _Westminster_ took pains to deny the truthof the picture, asserting again and again that the vital and sole causeof the conflict was slavery. Previous articles are summed up in that ofOctober, 1863, as a profession of the _Westminster's_ opinionthroughout: ". . . The South are fighting for liberty to found a SlavePower. Should it prove successful, truer devil's work, if we may use themetaphor, will rarely have been done[61]. "

Fortunate would it have been for the Northern cause, if British opiniongenerally sympathetic at first on anti-slavery grounds, had not soonfound cause to doubt the just basis of its sympathy, from the trend ofevents in America. Lincoln had been elected on a platform opposing thefurther territorial expansion of slavery. On that point the North wasfairly well united. But the great majority of those who voted forLincoln would have indignantly repudiated any purpose to take activesteps toward the extinction of slavery where it already existed. Lincolnunderstood this perfectly, and whatever his opinion about the ultimatefate of slavery if prohibited expansion, he from the first took theground that the terms of his election constituted a mandate limiting hisaction. As secession developed he rightly centred his thought and efforton the preservation of the Union, a duty imposed by his election to thePresidency. 

Naturally, as the crisis developed, there were many efforts at stillanother great compromise. Among the friends of the outgoing President, Buchanan, whose term of office would not expire until March 4, 1861, there were still some Southern leaders, like Jefferson Davis, seekingeither a complete surrender to Southern will, or advantages for Southernsecurity in case secession was accomplished. Buchanan appealedhysterically to the old-time love of the Union and to the spirit ofcompromise. Great congressional committees of both Senate and House ofRepresentatives were formed seeking a solution. Crittenden for theborder states between North and South, where, more than anywhere else, there was division of opinion, proposed pledges to be given to theSouth. Seward, long-time champion of the anti-slavery North, was activein the Senate in suggestion and intrigue seemingly intended toconciliate by concessions. Charles Francis Adams, early a Free Soiler, in the House of Representatives Committee conducted his Republicancolleagues along a path apparently leading to a guarantee of slavery asthen established[62]. A constitutional amendment was drafted to thiseffect and received Lincoln's preliminary approval. Finally Lincoln, inhis inaugural address, March 4, 1861, declared:

 "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. "

It should be no matter for surprise, therefore, that, as these effortswere observed in Great Britain, a note of uncertainty began to replacethe earlier unanimity of opinion that the future of slavery was at stakein America. This offered an easy excuse for a switch-about of sympathyas British commercial and other interests began to be developed, andeven dismayed the ardent friends of the anti-slavery North. Meanwhilethe Government of Great Britain, from the very first appearance of thecloud of civil war, had focused its attention on the point of what theevents in America portended to British interests and policy. This is thebusiness of governments, and their agents would be condemned asinefficient did they neglect it. But did British governmental policy gobeyond this entirely justifiable first thought for immediate Britishinterests to the point of positive hope that England would find anadvantage in the breaking up of the great American Republic? Americanopinion, both then and later, believed Great Britain guilty of thisoffence, but such criticism was tinged with the passions of the CivilWar. Yet a more impartial critic, though possibly an unfriendly onebecause of his official position, made emphatic declaration to likeeffect. On January 1, 1861, Baron de Brunow, Russian Ambassador atLondon, reported to St. Petersburg that, "the English Government, at thebottom of its heart, desires the separation of North America into tworepublics, which will watch each other jealously and counterbalance onethe other. Then England, on terms of peace and commerce with both, would have nothing to fear from either; for she would dominate them, restraining them by their rival ambitions[63]. "

If, however, one turns from the surmises of foreign diplomats as to thesprings of British policy, to the more authentic evidence of officialand private diplomatic correspondence, there is found no proof for suchaccusations. Certainty neither Lord John Russell, Foreign Secretary, norLord Lyons, British Minister at Washington, reveal any animus againstthe United States. Considering his many personal ties with leaders ofboth factions Lyons, from the first, reported events with wonderfulimpartiality, and great clarity. On November 12, 1860, he sent toRussell a full description of the clamour raised in the South over theelection of Lincoln, enumerated the resignation of Federal officials(calling these "ill-judged measures"), and expressed the opinion thatLincoln was no Radical. He hoped the storm would blow over withoutdamage to the Union[64]. Russell, for his part, was prompt to instructLyons and the British consuls not "to seem to favour one party ratherthan the other, " and not to express opinions or to give advice, unlessasked for by the State Governments, in which case the advice should beagainst all violent action as tending toward civil war[65]. 

This bare statement may indeed be interpreted as indicating an eagerreadiness on Russell's part to accept as final the dissolution of theUnion, but such an interpretation is not borne out by a reading of hisinstructions. Rather he was perplexed, and anxious that British agentsshould not gain the ill-will of either American faction, an ill-willthat would be alike detrimental in the future, whether the Unionremained unbroken or was destroyed. 

Strict instructions against offering advice are therefore repeatedfrequently[66]. Meanwhile the first concrete problem requiring Britishaction came from the seizure by South Carolina of the Federal customshouse at the port of Charleston, and the attempt of the Stateauthorities to collect port dues customarily paid to Federal officials. British shipowners appealed to Consul Bunch for instructions, he toLyons, and the latter to the American Secretary of State, Judge Black. This was on December 31, 1860, while Buchanan was still President, andBlack's answer was evasive, though asserting that the United States musttechnically regard the events in South Carolina as acts of violentrebellion[67]. Black refused to state what action would be taken ifBunch advised British shipowners to pay, but a way out of theembarrassment was found by advising such payment to State authorities"under protest" as done "under compulsion. " To one of his letters toBunch on this topic, Lyons appended an expression indicative of his ownearly attitude. "The domestic slavery of the South is a bitter pillwhich it will be hard enough to get the English to swallow. But if theSlave Trade is to be added to the dose, the least squeamish Britishstomach will reject it[68]. "

Nevertheless the vigorous action of South Carolina, soon followed byother Southern States, made a deep impression on Russell, especiallywhen compared with the uncertainty and irresolution manifested in theattempted compromise measures of Northern statesmen. In a private letterto Lyons, January 10, 1861, he wrote "I do not see how the United Statescan be cobbled together again by any compromise. . . . I cannot see anymode of reconciling such parties as these. The best thing _now_ wouldbe that the right to secede should be acknowledged. . . . I hope sensiblemen will take this view. . . . But above all I hope no force will beused[69]. " And again twelve days later, "I suppose the break-up of theUnion is now inevitable[70]. " To Russell, as to most foreign observers, it seemed that if the South with its great wealth, its enormous extentof territory, and its five and one-half millions of population, weredetermined to leave the Union, no force whatever could compel a return. History failed to record any revolution on so large a scale which hadnot succeeded. His desire, therefore, was that the North would yield tothe inevitable, and would not plunge into a useless civil war disastrousalike to the prosperity of America and of foreign nations. Russell'sfirst hope was that the South would forgo secession; his second, thisaccomplished, that there would be no war, and in this sense heinstructed Lyons. The latter, less expectant of peaceful separation, andmore aware of the latent power of the North, maintained throughout hisentire service at Washington that there was at least a _chance_ that theNorth could subdue the South by might of arms[71], but he also, lookingto British interests, saw his early duty, before war broke, in cautioussuggestions against forcible Northern action. Thus from January toMarch, 1861, British effort and indirect advice were based on the hopethat British trade interests might escape the tribulations inevitablefrom a civil conflict in America. Beyond that point there was no graspof the complications likely to arise in case of war, and no clearformulation of British policy[72]. 

In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and officialBritish opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any determinedNorthern effort to recover the South. Early British attitude was, therefore, based on a misconception. As this became clear, publicopinion began to break from a united humanitarian pro-Northern sentimentand to show, in some quarters, quite another face. Even as early asJanuary the _Economist_ expressed wonder that the Northern States hadnot availed themselves gladly of the chance to "shake off such anincubus, and to purify themselves of such a stain[73]. " and a monthlater professed to believe that Great Britain would willingly permit theNorth to secure compensation for loss of territory by annexingCanada--provided the Canadians themselves desired it. This, it wasargued, would directly benefit England herself by cutting down militaryexpenditures[74]. The _London Press_ indulged in similar speculation, though from the angle of a Canadian annexation of the Northern States, whose more sober citizens must by now be weary of the sham of Americandemocracy, and disgusted with the rowdyism of political elections, which"combine the morals of a horse race, the manners of a dog fight, thepassions of a tap-room, and the emotions of a gambling house[75]. "Probably such suggestions had little real purpose or meaning at themoment, but it is interesting that this idea of a "compensation" inCanada should have been voiced thus early. Even in the United States thesame thought had occurred to a few political leaders. Charles Sumnerheld it, though too wise, politically, to advance it in the face of thegrowing Northern determination to preserve the Union. It lay at thebottom of his increasing bitterness toward his old friend CharlesFrancis Adams, now busy in schemes intended, apparently, to restore theUnion by compromise, and it led Sumner to hope for appointment asMinister to England[76]. 

The chief organ of British upper-class opinion, the _Times_, was one ofthe first to begin the process of "face about, " as civil war in Americaseemed imminent[77]. Viewed from the later attitude of the _Times_, theearlier expressions of that paper, and in truth of many Britishjournals, seem merely the customary platitudinous British holding up ofhorrified hands at American slavery. On January 19, 1861, a strongeditorial still proclaimed the folly of South Carolina, as acting"without law, without justice, " but displayed a real dismay at thepossible consequences of war to British trade and commerce. On January22, the _Times_ reprinted an article from the _Economist_, on a probablecessation of cotton supply and editorially professed great alarm, evenadvocating an early recognition of the Southern confederacy if needed tomaintain that supply. From this time on there is no further note in the_Times_ of the righteousness of the Northern cause; but while it isstill asserted that war would be folly, the strength of the South, itssuperiority as a military nation, are depicted. 

A long break of nearly six weeks follows with little editorial comment. Soon the correspondence from New York, previously written by BancroftDavis, and extremely favourable to the Northern cause, was discontinued. W. H. Russell, the famous war correspondent of the Crimea, was summonedto London and, according to his own story, upon being given papers, clippings, and correspondence (largely articles from the _New YorkHerald_) supporting the right of the South to secede, hastily took hisdeparture for America to report upon the situation[78]. He sailed fromQueenstown on March 3, and arrived in New York on March 16. At last onMarch 12, the _Times_ took positive ground in favour of the justice ofthe Southern cause. 

 "No treachery has been at work to produce the disruption, and the principles avowed are such as to command the sympathies of every free and enlightened people. Such are the widely different auspices under which the two rival Republics start into existence. But mankind will not ultimately judge these things by sympathies and antipathies; they will be greatly swayed by their own interest, and the two Republics must be weighed, not by their professions or their previous history, but by the conduct they pursue and the position they maintain among the Powers of the earth. Their internal institutions are their own affair; their financial and political arrangements are emphatically ours. Brazil is a slave-holding Empire, but by its good faith and good conduct it has contrived to establish for itself a place in the hierarchy of nations far superior to that of many Powers which are free from this domestic contamination. If the Northern Confederacy of America evinces a determination to act in a narrow, exclusive, and unsocial spirit, while its Southern competitor extends the hand of good fellowship to all mankind, with the exception of its own bondsmen, we must not be surprised to see the North, in spite of the goodness of its cause and the great negative merit of the absence of Slavery, sink into a secondary position, and lose the sympathy and regard of mankind. "

This to Northern view, was a sad relapse from that high moral toneearlier addressed to the South notifying slave-holders that Englandwould not "stultify the policy of half a century for the sake of anextended cotton trade[79]. "

The _Economist_, with more consistency, still reported the violence andrecklessness of the South, yet in logical argument proved to its ownsatisfaction the impossibility of Northern reconquest, and urged apeaceful separation[80]. The _Spectator_, even though pro-Northern, hadat first small hope of reunion by force, and offered consolation in thethought that there would still remain a United States of America"strong, powerful and free; all the stronger for the loss of the BlackSouth[81]. " In short from all quarters the public press, whatever itssympathy, united in decrying war as a useless effort doomed to failureif undertaken in the hope of restoring the Union. Such public opinion, however, was not necessarily governmental opinion. The latter was indeedmore slow to make up its mind and more considerate in expressing itself. When it became clear that in all probability the North would fight, there was still no conception, any more than in the United Statesitself, of the duration and intensity of the conflict. Indeed, Russellyet hoped, as late as the end of January, that no protracted war wouldoccur. Nevertheless he was compelled to face the situation in itsrelation to British commerce. 

On February 16, Russell addressed Lyons on that aspect of possible warwhich would at once call for a determination of British policy. "Aboveall things, " he wrote, "endeavour to prevent a blockade of the Southerncoast. It would produce misery, discord, and enmity incalculable[82]. "Within a week Forster, a thorough friend of the North throughout thewhole war, was interrogating the Ministry in the House of Commons inregard to the situation at Charleston, and expressing the hope thatEngland would not in any way attempt to interfere[83]. This was thefirst reference in Parliament, its sittings but just renewed after thelong vacation, to the American conflict, but British commercialinterests were being forced to a keener attention, and already men inmany circles were asking themselves what should be the propergovernmental attitude; how soon this new Southern Confederacy couldjustly claim European recognition; how far and how fast Europeangovernments ought to go in acknowledging such a claim; what ought to bethe proper policy and position of a neutral power; whether, indeed, adeclaration of neutrality ought to be issued. 

With these questions rapidly coming to the front, it became importantfor British statesmen to know something about the leaders in this newSouthern movement, the attitude of the people in general, and thepurposes of the new Government. Here, unfortunately, Lord Lyons couldbe no guide. The consuls in the South, however, were in a position togive their impressions. On February 28, 1861, Bunch wrote to Russell, describing the election of Davis and Stephens[84], to the Presidency andVice-Presidency of the Confederacy, and giving a personalcharacterization of many members of the Government. He was rathercaustic. Davis, he said, was the only _able_ man, and he, unfortunately, was a confirmed "manifest destiny" leader, so much so in fact that Bunchprophesied a renewal of filibustering when once the North had acquiescedin a Southern State and the fear of the North had passed. Bunch had nofaith in any future greatness of the South, asserting that it would be aState despised among nations for its maintenance of slavery, and that itcould not hope for any encouragement or sympathy from the humane nationsof Europe; in fact, his entire characterization was wholly damning tothe South. Yet it is to be noted that he never for a moment questionedthat the South had already actually established its independence. Thishe seems to take for granted. Thus again, and from another quarter, there was presented the double difficulty of England in regard to theCivil War--the difficulty of reconciling sentiments of humanity longpreached by Great Britain, with her commercial interests and hercertainty that a new State was being born. 

For men in the Northern Government Lyons was in a position to report, but up to the end of January he had not written in any great detail withregard to the new administration and its make-up, though on January 7, he had informed Russell that Seward would be the Secretary of State andhad expressed the fear that with regard to Great Britain he would be "adangerous Foreign Minister[85]. " Lincoln was still in Illinois and theconstituency of the Cabinet was yet uncertain, but Seward's voice wassure to be a powerful one. Occasionally Lyons found some opportunity totalk with him. On February 4, 1861, in an official letter to Russell, Lyons reported at length an interview with Seward, in which the latterhad expressed his extreme confidence that the trouble in America was butsuperficial and that union sentiment in the South would soonprevail[86]. In a private letter of the same date, however, Lyonsasserted that Seward was indeed likely to be a very dangerous Secretaryof State. He had told Lyons that if European governments interfered toprotect their commerce, he could unite America by a foreign war in orderto resist such interference[87]. Again, on February 12, while himselfexpressing hope that a solution might be found for the difficulties inAmerica, Lyons warned Russell that there were those who would solvethese difficulties by a foreign war, especially if foreign governmentsrefused to acknowledge a United States declaration without formalblockade closing the Southern ports[88]. Writing privately, Lyonsexhibited great anxiety in regard to Seward's attitude and suggestedthat the best safeguard would be close union by England and France, forif these two governments took exactly the same stand in regard to trade, Seward would hardly dare to carry out his threat[89]. 

Lyons' letter of February 4 called out from Russell an instruction inwhich it was repeated that advice to either party should be withheld anda strictly neutral attitude maintained, and Russell concluded by anassertion that if the United States attempted a jingo policy towardEngland, the British Cabinet would be tolerant because of its feeling ofstrength but that "blustering demonstrations" must not be carried toofar[90]. Even as early as December, 1860, Russell had foreseen thepossibility of what he considered a mere jingo policy for home effect inAmerica. Now, however, upon the repeated expression of fears from Lyonsthat this might be more than mere "bunkum, " Russell began to instructLyons not to permit English dignity to be infringed, while at the sametime desiring him to be cautious against stirring American antagonism. Lyons' earlier disquietude seems, indeed, to have passed away for atime, and on February 26 he wrote that everyone was waiting to see whatLincoln would do when inaugurated, that there was still hope ofcompromise, and that in his own view this was still possible. In thisletter the tone is more important than the matter, and so far as Lyonsis concerned the tone is all distinctly hopeful, all favourable to aresumption of normal relations between the North and South. He at leasthad no hope of disruption, and no happiness in it[91]. 

Before this communication could reach England Russell had thoroughlyawakened to the seriousness of the American situation in relation toBritish foreign trade. On March 9, writing privately to Lyons, hestated, "I hope you are getting on well with the new President. If heblockades the Southern ports we shall be in a difficulty. But accordingto all American doctrine it must be an actual blockade kept up by anefficient force[92]. " Thus, before any act had really occurred inAmerica, the matter of a blockade was occupying the attention of Britishstatesmen. One difficulty at the time was that there was no one inEngland qualified to speak for the new administration at Washington. Dallas, the American Minister appointed under the Buchananadministration, while, unlike some other diplomatic representativesabroad, faithful to the cause of the United States, was nevertheless notwholly trusted by Lincoln or by Seward, and was thus handicapped inrepresenting to Russell American conditions or intentions. Indeed he hadvery little communication with Russell. Adams' nomination to England wasknown to Lyons on March 20, for on that day he telegraphed to Russell, "Mr. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, is appointed Minister inLondon. I think it a very good appointment[93]. " This news was receivedin London on April 2, but over six weeks were yet to elapse before Adamsreached his post. The appointment of Adams, however, seemed to Lyons amatter of congratulation in his hope that no vicious anti-British policywould be indulged in by Seward. Ten days after his telegram, he wrote atlength to Russell, making an excellent statement and analysis in regardto the character of Adams. 

 "Mr. Adams is son of John Quincy Adams, the fifth P. Of the U. S. , and grandson of John Adams, the second P. The grandfather was the first Am. Minister in England. The father was one of the Plenipotentiaries who signed in London the Convention of the 3rd July, 1815. Mr. Adams as a member of the H. Of R. For one of the districts of Mass. , acted with the less violent section of the 'Republican' Party. During the last session of Congress he made a very remarkable speech on the state of the Union, denying the reasonableness of the complaints of the Southern States, but stating his desire that every concession not inconsistent with honour and principle should be made to them. He is considered to be a man of great independence of character, and has the reputation of being very tenacious of his own opinions. In manner he is quiet and unassuming. He is a man of good fortune. Mrs. Adams comes of a considerable family in Mass. , of the name of Brooks. The late wife of Mr. Edward Everett, who, as your L. Is aware, has held the offices of Minister in London and Secretary of State, was her sister[94]. "

Similar characterizations were being forwarded at almost the same timeby Bunch in regard to the Southern Commissioners, now being despatchedto London, but they were not so favourable. Mann, wrote Bunch, was theson of a "bankrupt grocer. " His personal character was "not good, " yethe alone of the three Commissioners appointed had had diplomaticexperience. Yancey, it was stated, was an able lawyer, a stirringorator, and a recognized leader of the secession movement, but he wasalso extremely pro-slavery in his views, had expressed himself in favourof a renewal of the slave trade, and throughout his career had been a"manifest destiny" man. Of Rost, Bunch had no knowledge. In conclusionBunch described the extreme confidence expressed in the South in "KingCotton, " and in rather bitter criticism stated that the SouthernCommissioners thought even England, the foe of slavery, would now becompelled to bend the knee and recognize the South in order to getcotton[95]. 

The Northern British Consuls on the other hand took an astonishinglypro-Northern view of the whole situation. Archibald, consul at New York, wrote to Russell soon after the fall of Sumter, an exceedingly strongstatement of his faith in the power of the North and its fixed andunalterable determination to force the South back into the Union, hisconfidence in Northern success, and his belief in the justice of theNorthern cause. He ventured to suggest the proper policy for England topursue, viz. , to offer immediately her services in mediation but whollyand clearly on the side of the North. He stated that if England did notfeel free to offer mediation, she should at least show "such aconsistent and effective demonstration of sympathy and aid" for theNorth as would help in shortening the war[96]. The British Consul atBoston wrote to Russell in much the same vein. So far, indeed, did thesemen go in expressing their sympathy with the North, that Lyons, on April27, commented to Russell that these consuls had "taken the Northern WarFever, " and that he had mildly reproved Archibald[97]. 

With the inauguration of Lincoln on March 4, and the installation ofSeward as Secretary of State, it was possible for Lyons to become moreactive in his efforts to prevent a disruption of British Trade. On March20 he told Seward in a confidential conversation:

 ". . . If the United States determined to stop by force so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might happen. 

 ". . . It was, however, a matter of the greatest consequence to England to procure cheap cotton. If a considerable rise were to take place in the price of cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from the Southern Ports, an immense pressure would be put upon Her Majesty's Government to use all the means in their power to open those ports. If Her Majesty's Government felt it to be their duty to do so, they would naturally endeavour to effect their object in a manner as consistent as possible, first with their friendly feelings towards both Sections of this Country, and secondly with the recognized principles of International Law. As regards the latter point in particular, it certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the only way, would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy[98]. "

This was plain speaking, and Lyons' threat of recognizing the South didnot at the moment stir Seward to any retort. But five days later, onMarch 25, Lyons gave a dinner to Seward and a number of the foreignMinisters, and there Seward's violent talk about seizing any and allships that tried to trade with the South, even if there was no blockade, made Lyons very anxious. As a host he diverted the conversation lest itbecome too acrimonious, but he himself told Seward

 ". . . That it was really a matter so very serious that I was unwilling to discuss it; that his plan seemed to me to amount in fact to a paper blockade of the enormous extent of coast comprised in the seceding States; that the calling it an enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to increase the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in the dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation or of submitting to the interruption of their commerce[99]. "

Lyons' advice to Russell was that no rebuff should be given the SouthernCommissioners when they arrived in London, but that they be treatedwell. This, he thought, might open Seward's eyes to his folly. StillLyons did not yet fully believe that Seward would be so vigorous as hislanguage seemed to imply, and on March 29 he wrote that "prudentcounsels" were in the ascendant, that there would be no interferencewith trade "_at present_, " and that a quieter tone was everywhereperceptible in Washington[100]. 

From the point of view of the British Minister at Washington, thedanger spot in relations between the United States and Great Britain layin this matter of interference with trade to Southern ports. Naturally, and as in duty bound, he sought to preserve that trade. At first, indeed, he seems to have thought that even though a civil war reallyensued the trade might continue uninterrupted. Certainly he bore hardand constantly on this one point, seeking to influence not onlyofficials at Washington but the public press. Thus, in a letter to Bunchdated April 12, 1861, at a time when he knew that W. H. Russell, the_Times_ correspondent, would shortly appear in Charleston, he instructedBunch to remember that in talking to Russell he must especially impresshim with the idea that any interruption of trade might and probablywould result in a British recognition of the South. Lyons wrote, ". . . The _only_ chance, if chance there still be of preventing aninterruption of the English commerce with the S. Is the fear entertainedhere, that it would lead to our recognizing the S. C. [101]" In thesewords is revealed, however, as in other communications from Lyons, thefact that he was striving to prevent an interruption of trade ratherthan that he was convinced such interruption ought to result in aBritish recognition of the South. Indeed, as will be seen, when theblockade was at last declared, Lyons thought it no cause for recognitionand was most tolerant of its early ineffectiveness. 

While Lyons was thus keeping in close touch with Seward, the relationsbetween England and America at London were exceedingly meagre. All thatthe American Minister Dallas knew of Russell's intentions is summed upin his despatches to Seward of March 22 and April 9, 1861[102]. On theformer date, he gave an account of an interview with Russell in whichthe latter simply refused to pledge himself against a recognition ofthe Confederacy; in the latter, presenting a long memorial written bySeward to all of the larger European Governments arguing in friendlyspirit the cause of the North, Dallas reported that he drew from Russellmerely a general expression of England's kindly feeling towards theUnited States and her hope that there might still be a peacefulsolution. Russell again refused to make any pledge in regard to Englishpolicy. In this interview it was tacitly agreed that it would be betterfor Great Britain to await Adams' arrival before taking any definiteaction, or so at least Dallas understood Russell--though the latterlater denied that any pledge of delay was given. There is no doubt, however, that in Russell's mind, whatever he might say to Dallas, theseparation in America was an accomplished fact and the hope of GreatBritain was centred upon the idea of a peaceful separation. 

Up to and including April 1, indeed, Lyons had been reporting that nodefinite stand was yet being taken by the American Government. At thesame time Russell was continuing his instructions to Lyons to recommendconciliation "but never to obtrude advice unasked[103]. " Yet Russell wasnot wholly undisturbed by the reports of Seward's quarrelsome attitude, for in a private letter of the same date as the preceding, he wrote toLyons, "I rely upon your wisdom, patience, and prudence, to steer usthrough the dangers of this crisis. If it can possibly be helped Mr. Seward must not be allowed to get us into a quarrel. I shall see theSoutherners when they come, but not officially, and keep them at aproper distance[104]. " It is an interesting query, whether this fearthus expressed of Seward's temper was not of distinct benefit to theUnited States at the moment when the Southern Commissioners arrived inEngland. The inference would seem to be clear, that in spite of Lyons'advice to treat them well, the effect upon Russell of Seward's attitudewas to treat them coolly. Russell was indeed distinctly worried bySeward's unfriendly attitude. 

In the meantime the British press and public, while still uncertain anddivided as to the merits of the conflict were now substantially a unitin accepting separation as final. The _Times_, with judicial ponderositydeclared: "The new nationality has been brought forth after a very shortperiod of gestation. . . . And the Seceding States have now constitutedthemselves a nation[105] . . . " At the other end of the scale in newspaper"tone, " the _London Press_ jeered at the Northern American eagle ashaving "had his tail pulled out and his wings clipped--yet the meek birdnow holds out his claws to be pared, with a resignation that would bedegrading in the most henpecked of domestic fowls[106]. " Having nowveered about to expressions of confidence in the permanency of theSouthern Confederacy the _Times_ was also compelled to alter its opinionof Southern Statesmen. An editorial gave high praise to the ConfederateCongress sitting at Montgomery, stated its personnel to be far superiorto that of the Congress at Washington, yet was unable to resist makingthe customary reference to manners traditionally American;

 "With regard to the Congress itself, we cannot refrain from quoting the _naďve_ testimony of a visitor in its favour. 'Gentlemen here [Montgomery] who have spent much time in Washington city declare that they have never witnessed such industry, care, propriety, courtesy, and pleasant Congressional action. _Not one member has appeared in his seat under the influence of liquors or wines_, not a harsh word has been uttered in debate, and all exhibit the most unflagging energy and determination[107]. '"

The most of the British press quickly followed the lead of the _Times_, forgot its previous dictum that the South was in the control of"ignorant ruffians, " and dilated upon the statemanlike directness andsagacity of Southern leaders as contrasted with the stupidity of theNorth, displayed in its tariff policy[108]. A few journals thought thatthe North might eventually win in a prolonged struggle but that such avictory would be disastrous to the principles of federalism[109], and, in any case, that this civil war was one without "a noble cause tosustain either side[110]. " By May nearly all the older journals werealigned on the right of the South to secede, and on the fact of asuccessful secession, though still differing as to the basic causes andessential justice involved. In this same month, however, there emerged afew vigorous champions of the Northern cause and prospects. In April the_Spectator_ agreed that the Great Republic was at an end[111]; in May iturged the North to fight it out with hope, asserting a chance ofultimate victory because of superior resources and the sympathy of allEuropean nations[112]. A small newspaper of limited circulation, the_Morning Star_, organ of John Bright, had from the first championed theNorthern cause. Now, as the armed conflict broke in America, it wasjoined by a more important paper, the _Daily News_, which set itself thetask of controverting the _Times_. Moreover the _Daily News_ was all themore influential in that it was not uncritical of the North, yetconsistently, throughout the war, expressed sympathy for the cause andprinciples behind the efforts of the Northern Government. Selling for alow price, twopence-halfpenny, the _Daily News_, like the _Westminster_among the Reviews, appealed to a broader and more popular constituencythan the older publications, especially to a constituency not yet vocal, since still unrepresented, in Parliament[113]. 

The _Daily News_ was fortunate in having, after 1862, the best-informedNew York correspondent writing to the London press. This was anIrishman, E. L. Godkin, who, both at home and in America, was theintimate friend of literary men, and himself, later, a great moulder ofpublic opinion[114]. Harriet Martineau further aided the _Daily News_ bycontributing pro-Northern articles, and was a power in Radicalcircles[115]. But literary England in general, was slow to expressitself with conviction, though Robert Browning, by April, 1861, wasfirmly determined in his pro-Northern sentiment. In August he waswriting in letters of the "good cause[116]. " But Browning was a rareexception and it was not until the Civil War had been under way for manymonths that men of talent in the non-political world were drawn to makecomment or to take sides. Their influence at the outset wasnegligible[117]. 

In spite of press utterances, or literary silence, alike indicative ofa widespread conviction that Southern independence was assured, therestill remained both in those circles where anti-slavery sentiment wasstrong, and in others more neutral in sympathy, a distaste for thenewly-born State as the embodiment of a degrading institution. Lincoln'sinaugural address denying an intention to interfere with slavery was aweapon for the friends of the South, but it could not wholly still thatissue. Even in the _Times_, through the medium of W. H. Russell'sdescriptive letters, there appeared caustic criticisms. He wrote in his"Diary, " "I declare that to me the more orderly, methodical, and perfectthe arrangements for economizing slave labour . . . Are, the more hatefuland odious does slavery become[118], " and in his letter of May 8, fromMontgomery, having witnessed an auction sale of slaves he stated:

 "I am neither sentimentalist nor Black Republican, nor negro worshipper, but I confess the sight caused a strange thrill through my heart. I tried in vain to make myself familiar with the fact that I could, for the sum of $975, become as absolutely the owner of that mass of blood, bones, sinew, flesh and brains as of the horse which stood by my side. There was no sophistry which could persuade me the man was not a man--he was, indeed, by no means my brother, but assuredly he was a fellow creature[119]. "

This was hard printing for the _Times_, in its new advocacy of theSouth, and Russell's description was made much of by the _WestminsterReview_ and other publications that soon began to sound again the"issue" of slavery[120]. Yet the _Westminster_ itself in the samearticle decried the folly of the Northern attempt at reconquest. So alsothought even John Bright at the moment, when expressing himselfprivately to friends in America[121]. 

Slavery, then, still remained an issue before the British public, but ofwhat use was it to upbraid the South, if a new world State were in factborn? And if a State in power, why not give it prompt recognition? Theextreme British anti-slavery opponents feared that this was just whatthe Government was inclined to do, and with promptness. Here and theremeetings were hurriedly called to protest against recognition[122]. Thisfear was unfounded. Neither in London nor at Washington was there anyofficial inclination to hasten recognition. Lyons had held up to Sewardthe logic of such action, if British trade were illegally interferedwith. By April 9 Lyons was aware that the so-called Radical Party in theCabinet would probably have its way, that conciliation would no longerbe attempted, and that a coercive policy toward the South was soon tofollow. On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people inWashington seemed so convinced that Europe would _not_ interfere toprotect its trade that they were willing to venture any act embarrassingto that trade. He himself was still insisting, but with dwindlingconfidence, that the trade must not be interfered with under anycircumstances. And in a second letter of this same date, he repeated toRussell his advice of treating the Southern Commissioners withdeference. Any rebuff to them, he asserts again, will but increase theNorthern confidence that they may do anything without provoking theresistance of England[123]. 

Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for all itwas worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet if thatinjury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of nations) hedid not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant precipitate action byGreat Britain. When indeed the Southern capture of Fort Sumter inCharleston harbour finally brought the actual clash of arms, Lyonsexpressed himself with regard to other elements in the strugglepreviously neglected in his correspondence. On April 15 describing toRussell the fall of Sumter, he stated that civil war had at last begun. The North he believed to be very much more powerful than the South, theSouth more "eager" and united as yet, but, he added, "the taint ofslavery will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilizedworld. " It was true that "commercial intercourse with the cotton Statesis of vital importance to manufacturing nations[124]. . . . " but Lyons wasnow facing an actual situation rather than a possible one, and as willbe seen later, he soon ceased to insist that an interruption of this"commercial intercourse" gave reasonable ground for recognition ofthe South. 

With the fall of Fort Sumter and the European recognition that a civilwar was actually under way in America, a large number of new and vexingproblems was presented to Russell. His treatment of them furnishes thesubject matter of later chapters. For the period previous to April, 1861, British official attitude may be summed up in the statement thatthe British Minister at Washington hoped against hope that some solutionmight be found for the preservation of the Union, but that at the sametime, looking to future British interests and possibly believing alsothat his attitude would tend to preserve the Union, he assertedvehemently the impossibility of any Northern interference with Britishtrade to Southern ports. Across the water, Russell also hoped faintlythat there might be no separation. Very soon, however, believing thatseparation inevitable and the disruption of the Union final, he fixedhis hope on peaceful rather than warlike secession. Even of this, however, he had little real expectation, but neither he nor anyone elsein England, nor even in America, had any idea that the war would be along and severe one. It is evident that he was already considering thearrival of that day when recognition must be granted to a new, independent and slave-holding State. But this estimate of the future isno proof that the Russian Ambassador's accusation of Britishgovernmental pleasure in American disruption was justified[125]. Russell, cautious in refusing to pledge himself to Dallas, was usingexactly such caution as a Foreign Secretary was bound to exercise. Hewould have been a rash man who, in view of the uncertainty andirresolution of Northern statesmen, would have committed Great Britainin March, 1861, to a definite line of policy. 

On April 6, Russell was still instructing Lyons to recommendreconciliation. April 8, Dallas communicated to Russell an instructionfrom Seward dated March 9, arguing on lines of "traditional friendship"against a British recognition of the Confederacy. Russell again refusedto pledge his Government, but on April 12 he wrote to Lyons that BritishMinisters were "in no hurry to recognize the separation as complete andfinal[126]. " In the early morning of that same day the armed conflict inAmerica had begun, and on the day following, April 13, the firstSouthern victory had been recorded in the capture of Fort Sumter. Theimportant question which the man at the head of the British ForeignOffice had now immediately to decide was, what was to be England'sattitude, under international law, toward the two combatants inAmerica. In deciding this question, neither sentiment nor ideals ofmorality, nor humanitarianism need play any part; England's _first_ needand duty were to determine and announce for the benefit of her citizensthe correct position, under International law, which must be assumed inthe presence of certain definite facts. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 31: Dr. Newton asserts that at the end of the 'fifties GreatBritain made a sharp change of policy. (_Cambridge History of BritishForeign Policy_, Vol. II, p. 283. )]

[Footnote 32: Thomas Colley Grattan, _Civilized America_, 2 vols. 2nded. , London, 1859, Vol. I, pp. 284-87. The first edition was printed in1859 and a third in 1861. In some respects the work is historicallyuntrustworthy since internal evidence makes clear that the greater partof it was written before 1846, in which year Grattan retired from hispost in Boston. In general he wrote scathingly of America, and as hisson succeeded to the Boston consulship, Grattan probably thought itwiser to postpone publication. I have found no review of the work whichtreats it otherwise than as an up-to-date description of 1859. This factand its wide sale in England in 1860-61, give the work importance asinfluencing British knowledge and opinions. ]

[Footnote 33: Charles Mackay, _Life and Liberty in America: or, Sketchesof a Tour in the United States and Canada in 1857-8_, one vol. , NewYork, 1859, pp. 316-17. Mackay was at least of sufficient repute as apoet to be thought worthy of a dinner in Boston at which there werepresent, Longfellow, Holmes, Agassiz, Lowell, Prescott, Governor Banks, and others. He preached "hands across the seas" in his public lectures, occasionally reading his poem "John and Jonathan"--a sort of advancecopy of Kipling's idea of the "White Man's Burden. " Mackay's concludingverse, "John" speaking, was:

 "And I have strength for nobler work Than e'er my hand has done, And realms to rule and truths to plant Beyond the rising sun. Take you the West and I the East; We'll spread ourselves abroad, With trade and spade and wholesome laws, And faith in man and God. "]

[Footnote 34: Duncan, _Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer_, Vol. I, p. 140. ]

[Footnote 35: R. C. Hamilton, Manuscript Chapters and Notes on "TheEnglish Press and the Civil War. " Mr. Hamilton was at work on thissubject, as a graduate student, but left Stanford University beforecompleting his thesis. His notes have been of considerable value, bothfor suggested citations from the English Press, and for points ofinterpretation. ]

[Footnote 36: _Economist_, November 24, 1860. Six months later, however, the _Economist_ pictured Lincoln as merely an unknown "sectionalist, "with no evidence of statesmanship--_Economist_, June 1, 1861. ]

[Footnote 37: _Saturday Review_, November 24, 1860. ]

[Footnote 38: _Spectator_, November 24, 1860. ]

[Footnote 39: The _Times_, November 26, 1860. ]

[Footnote 40: _Ibid. _, November 29, 1860. ]

[Footnote 41: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 42: R. L. Duffus, "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on theAmerican Civil War, " p. 2. A thesis presented in fulfilment of therequirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Stanford University, 1911. This thesis is in manuscript. It is a valuable study of theReviews and of the writings of men of letters. Hereafter cited as Duffus"English Opinion. "]

[Footnote 43: The _Times_, January 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 44: _Saturday Review_, January 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 45: _Economist_, December 8, 1860. _Spectator_, January 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 46: _Spectator_, December 1, 1860. _Times_, January 29, 1861. _Economist_, May 25, 1861. ]

[Footnote 47: _Saturday Review_, January 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 48: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 112, p. 545. ]

[Footnote 49: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 50: Russell, _My Diary North and South_, Boston, 1863, p. 134. "Then cropped out again the expression of regret for the rebellion of1776, and the desire that if it came to the worst, England would receiveback her erring children, or give them a prince under whom they couldsecure a monarchical form of government. There is no doubt about theearnestness with which these things are said. " Russell's _Diary_ islargely a condensation of his letters to the _Times_. In the letter ofApril 30, 1861 (published May 28), he dilates to the extent of a columnon the yearning of South Carolina for a restoration of colonialrelations. But Consul Bunch on December 14, 1860, reported a Charlestonsentiment very different from that of the Jockey Club in February. Hewrote to Lyons:

 "The church bells are ringing like mad in celebration of a newly revived festival, called 'Evacuation Day, ' being the _nefastus ille dies_ in which the bloody Britishers left Charleston 78 years ago. It has fallen into utter disuse for about 50 years, but is now suddenly resuscitated apropos _de_ nothing at all. "

In this same letter Bunch described a Southern patriotic demonstration. Returning to his home one evening, he met a military company, which fromcuriosity he followed, and which

 "drew up in front of the residence of a young lawyer of my friends, after performing in whose honour, through the medium of a very brassy band, a Secession Schottische or Palmetto Polka, it clamorously demanded his presence. After a very brief interval he appeared, and altho' he is in private life an agreeable and moderately sensible young man, he succeeded, to my mind at any rate, in making most successfully, what Mr. Anthony Weller calls 'an Egyptian Mummy of his self. ' the amount of balderdash and rubbish which he evacuated (_dia stomatos_) about mounting the deadly breach, falling back into the arms of his comrades and going off generally in a blaze of melodramatic fireworks, really made me so unhappy that I lost my night's rest. So soon as the speech was over the company was invited into the house to 'pour a libation to the holy cause'--in the vernacular, to take a drink and spit on the floor. "

Evidently Southern eloquence was not tolerable to the ears of theBritish consul. Or was it the din of the church bells rather than theclamour of the orator, that offended him? (_Lyons Papers_. )]

[Footnote 51: _Edinburgh Review_, Vol. 113, p. 555. ]

[Footnote 52: The _Times_, January 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 53: Letter to _Dublin News_, dated January 26, 1861. Cited in_The Liberator_, March 1, 1861. Garrison, editor of _The Liberator_, wasthen earnest in advocating "letting the South go in peace" as a goodriddance. ]

[Footnote 54: _Saturday Review_, March 2, 1861, p. 216. ]

[Footnote 55: _London Chronicle_, March 14, 1861. Cited in _TheLiberator_, April 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 56: _London Review_, April 20, 1861. Cited in Littel's _LivingAge_, Vol. LXIX, p. 495. The editor of the _Review_ was a Dr. Mackay, but I have been unable to identify him, as might seem natural from hisopinions, as the Mackay previously quoted (p. 37) who was later New Yorkcorrespondent of the _Times_. ]

[Footnote 57: Matthew Arnold, _Letters_, Vol. I. , p. 150. Letter to Mrs. Forster, January 28, 1861. ]

[Footnote 58: Julian Hawthorne, _Nathaniel Hawthorne and his Wife_, Vol. II, pp. 271-78. _Life and Letters of John Greenleaf Whittier_, Vol. II, pp. 439 seq. ]

[Footnote 59: _Quarterly Review_, Vol. 110, p. 282. July, 1861. ]

[Footnote 60: Duffus, "English Opinion, " p. 7. ]

[Footnote 61: _Westminster_, Vol. LXXX, p. 587. ]

[Footnote 62: Adams' course was bitterly criticized by his formerintimate friend, Charles Sumner, but the probable purpose of Adams was, foreseeing the certainty of secession, to exhibit so strongly thearrogance and intolerance of the South as to create greater unity ofNorthern sentiment. This was a purpose that could not be declared andboth at home and abroad his action, and that of other formeranti-slavery leaders, for the moment weakened faith that the North wasin earnest on the general issue of slavery. ]

[Footnote 63: _Services rendered by Russia to the American People duringthe War of the Rebellion_, Petersburg, 1904, p. 5. ]

[Footnote 64: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States, " No. 1. ]

[Footnote 65: _Ibid. _, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, December 26, 1860. ]

[Footnote 66: _Ibid. _, Russell to Lyons, No. 9, January 5, 1861, and No. 17, February 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 67: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Lords_, Vol. XVIII. Correspondence with U. S. Government respecting suspension of FederalCustoms House at the Port of Charleston. Nos. 1 and 3. ]

[Footnote 68: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Bunch, December 12, 1860. ]

[Footnote 69: _Ibid. _, The same day official instructions were sentpermitting Bunch to remain at Charleston, but directing him, if asked torecognize South Carolina, to refer the matter to England. F. O. , Am. , Vol. 754, No. 6. Russell to Lyons, January 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 70: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, January 22, 1861. ]

[Footnote 71: This view was not shared by Lyons' colleagues atWashington. The Russian Minister, Stoeckl, early declared the Unionpermanently destroyed, and regretting the fact, yet hoped the Northwould soon accept the inevitable and seek close co-operation with theSouth in commerce and in foreign relations. This view was repeated byhim many times and most emphatically as late as the first month of 1863. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F. O. , January 29-February 10, 1863. No. 342. ) It was not until September, 1863, that Stoeckl ventured to hopefor a Northern reconquest of the South. I am indebted to Dr. Frank A. Golder, of Stanford University, for the use of his notes and transcriptscovering all of the Russian diplomatic correspondence with the UnitedStates, 1860-1865. In the occasional use made of this material theEnglish translation is mine. ]

[Footnote 72: Stoeckl reported that at a dinner with Lyons, at which he, Mercier and Seward were the guests, Seward had asserted that if CivilWar came all foreign commerce with the South would be interrupted. Tothis Lyons protested that England could not get along without cotton andthat she would secure it in one way or another. Seward made no reply. (_Ibid. _, March 25-April 9, 1861, No. 810. )]

[Footnote 73: _Economist_, January 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 74: _Ibid. _, February 23, 1861. ]

[Footnote 75: _London Press_, March 23, 1861. Cited in Littell's _LivingAge_, Vol. LXIX, p. 438. ]

[Footnote 76: Before Adams' selection as Minister to England was decidedupon, Sumner's Massachusetts friends were urging him for the place. Longfellow was active in this interest. _H. W. Longfellow_, by SamuelLongfellow, Vol. II, pp. 412-13. ]

[Footnote 77: John Bright later declared "his conviction that theleading journal had not published one fair, honourable, or friendlyarticle toward the States since Lincoln's accession to office. " Dasent, _Life of Delane_, Vol. II, p. 38. The time is approximately correct, butthe shift in policy began earlier, when it came to be feared that theNorth would not submit to peaceable secession. ]

[Footnote 78: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. I, pp. 344-45. ]

[Footnote 79: See _ante_, p. 40. ]

[Footnote 80: _Economist_, March 2, 1861. ]

[Footnote 81: _Spectator_, March 16, 1861. ]

[Footnote 82: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 83: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXI, p. 814. February 22, 1861. William E. Forster was of Quaker descent and had early taken part inpublic meetings called to express humanitarian sentiment. From 1850 onhe was an acceptable public speaker in all matters liberal, as freetrade, social reform, and anti-slavery. Elected to Parliament in 1859and again in 1861 from Bradford, where he was engaged in business as awoollen manufacturer, he sought, after the fashion of new Members, acause to represent and found it in championship of the North. Havinggreat native ability, as shown by his later distinguished career, it wasthe good fortune of the United States thus to enlist so eager achampion. Forster and John Bright were the two leading "friends of theNorth" in Parliament. The latter already had established reputation, butwas more influential out of Parliament than in it. Forster, with areputation to make, showed skill in debate, and soon achieved prestigefor himself and his American cause. Henry Adams, son and privatesecretary of the American Minister to England, once told the writer thathe regarded Forster's services as, on the whole, the most valuablerendered by any Englishman to the North. ]

[Footnote 84: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 780, No. 30. ]

[Footnote 85: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I, p. 30. ]

[Footnote 86: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 760, No. 40. ]

[Footnote 87: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 88: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 760, No. 59. ]

[Footnote 89: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, February 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 90: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States, " No. 17. Russell toLyons, February 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 91: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 761, No. 78. Received March 11. It iscurious that in the first period of the war Lyons made no extendedcharacterization of Lincoln. Probably his contacts with the newPresident were insufficient to justify it. The first record of personalimpressions was that made by W. H. Russell and later printed in his"Diary" but not reproduced in his letters to the _Times_. Russell wastaken to the White House. "Soon afterwards there entered, with ashambling, loose, irregular, almost unsteady gait, a tall, lank, leanman, considerably over six feet in height, with stooping shoulders, longpendulous arms, terminating in hands of extraordinary dimensions, which, however, were far exceeded in proportion by his feet. . . . The impressionproduced by the size of his extremities, and by his flapping andwide-projecting ears, may be removed by the appearance of kindliness, sagacity, and awkward bonhomie of his face . . . Eyes dark, full, anddeeply set, are penetrating, but full of an expression which almostamounts to tenderness. . . . A person who met Mr. Lincoln in the streetwould not take him to be what--according to usages of Europeansociety--is called a 'gentleman' . . . But, at the same time, it would notbe possible for the most indifferent observer to pass him in the streetwithout notice. "--_My Diary_, I, pp. 37-8. ]

[Footnote 92: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 93: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 761. ]

[Footnote 94: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 762, No. 122. March 30, 1861. ReceivedApril 16. ]

[Footnote 95: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 780, No. 37. March 21, 1861. ReceivedApril 9. ]

[Footnote 96: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 778, No. 26. April 24, 1861. ]

[Footnote 97: Russell Papers. ]

[Footnote 98: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 26, 1861. Printedin Newton, _Lord Lyons_, Vol. I. , p. 31. ]

[Footnote 99: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 100: Russell Papers. ]

[Footnote 101: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 102: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, pp, 80-81. ]

[Footnote 103: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 754, No. 79. Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861. ]

[Footnote 104: Lyons Papers, Russell to Lyons, April 6, 1861. ]

[Footnote 105: The _Times_, February 26, 1861. ]

[Footnote 106: _London Press_, March 30, 1861, Cited in Littell's_Living Age_, Vol. 69, p. 379. ]

[Footnote 107: The _Times_, March 26, 1861. ]

[Footnote 108: _Saturday Review_, May 11, 1861, pp. 465-6. ]

[Footnote 109: _Economist_, May 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 110: _Examiner_, January 5 and (as quoted) April 27, 1861. Cited in Littell's _Living Age_, Vol. 68, p. 758 and Vol. 69, p. 570. ]

[Footnote 111: _Spectator_, April 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 112: _Ibid. _, May 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 113: These four publications, the _Spectator_, the_Westminster_, the _Daily News_, and the _Morning Star_, were theprincipal British pro-Northern organs. In addition _The Liberator_ namesamong the lesser and provincial press the following: _Nonconformist, British Standard, Dial, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, NewcastleChronicle, Caledonian Mercury_ and _Belfast Whig_. Duffus, "EnglishOpinion, " p. 40. ]

[Footnote 114: Godkin had joined the staff of the _Daily News_ in 1853. During the Crimea War he was special war correspondent. He had travelledextensively in America in the late 'fifties and was thoroughly wellinformed. From 1862 to 1865 his letters to the _Daily News_ were ofgreat value in encouraging the British friends of the North. In 1865Godkin became editor of the New York _Nation_. ]

[Footnote 115: W. E. Forster said of her, "It was Harriet Martineau alonewho was keeping English opinion about America on the right side throughthe Press. " The _Daily News_ Jubilee Edition, p. 46. ]

[Footnote 116: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, Vol. II, p. 92. ]

[Footnote 117: Moncure D. Conway's _Autobiography_ asserts thattwo-thirds of the English authors "espoused the Union cause, some ofthem actively--Professor Newman, Mill, Tom Hughes, Sir Charles Lyell, Huxley, Tyndall, Swinburne, Lord Houghton, Cairns, Fawcett, FredericHarrison, Leslie Stephen, Allingham, the Rossettis, " Vol. I, p. 406. This is probably true of ultimate, though not of initial, interest andattitude. But for many writers their published works give no clue totheir opinions on the Civil War--as for example the works of Dickens, Thackeray, William Morris, or Ruskin. See Duffus, "English Opinion, "p. 103. ]

[Footnote 118: Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 398. ]

[Footnote 119: The _Times_, May 30, 1861. ]

[Footnote 120: _Westminster Review_, Vol. 76, pp. 487-509, October, 1861. ]

[Footnote 121: Bright to Sumner, September 6, 1861. Cited in Rhodes, _United States_, Vol. III, p. 509. ]

[Footnote 122: A meeting held in Edinburgh, May 9, 1861, declared thatanti-slavery England ought never to recognize the South. Reported in_Liberator_, May 31, 1861. ]

[Footnote 123: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 762, Nos. 141 and 142. ]

[Footnote 124: _Ibid. _, No. 146. ]

[Footnote 125: See _ante_, pp. 50-51. ]

[Footnote 126: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " Nos. 24, 25 and 26. ]

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A POLICY, MAY, 1861

In June, 1859, a short-lived Conservative Government under theleadership of Lord Derby had been replaced by a "coalition" LiberalGovernment, at the head of which stood Palmerston, but so constitutedthat almost equal influence was attributed to the Foreign Secretary, Lord John Russell. Both men had previously held the Premiership, and, asthey represented different wings of the Whig-Liberal party, it wasprophesied by political wiseacres that personal friction would soon leadto a new disruption. Nor were the possible elements of discord confinedto these two. Gladstone, formerly a Peelite Tory, and for a timeuncertain whether to return to the Tory fold or to join the Liberals, had yielded to Palmerston's promise of a free hand in financial matters, and had joined the Ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer. Opposed tohim in a certain sense, as the rival claimant for political leadershipamong the younger group, was Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Home Secretaryuntil July, 1861, thereafter until his death in April, 1863, Secretaryfor War. Acting in some degree as intermediary and conciliator betweenthese divergent interests stood Lord Granville, President of Council, then a "Conservative-Liberal, " especially valuable to the Cabinet forthe confidence reposed in him by Queen Victoria and Prince Albert. 

In 1861 Palmerston was seventy-seven years old. Long before this he hadbuilt his popularity upon a vigorous British "patriotism, " assertive ofEngland's honour and jealous for British advantage. Now, however, ashead of a Government requiring the most delicate handling to maintainitself, he devoted his energies to details of political management inwhich he had great skill. His ambition was, primarily, to retain office, and in this purpose he was fortunate because, unknown to his ministerialcolleagues, he had received an indirect pledge from Lord Derby, theOpposition leader, that there would be, for a time at least, nodetermined effort to unseat him so long as his Ministry brought forwardno Bill for a further expansion of the franchise. In the unwillingnessto make any further adventure toward an expanded democracy Palmerstonwas wholly at one with Derby. Of like opinion, though less strongly so, was Russell, whose popular nickname, "Finality John, " gained by hisassertion that the Reform Bill of 1832 was England's last step towarddemocracy, sufficiently indicates his stand on the franchisequestion. In fact every member of the Cabinet belonged to the"Conservative-Liberal" group, though with shades of political faith, andnone were really Liberals--far less Radicals. The outspoken Radicals inParliament, like John Bright, and his friend Cobden, who had refused totake office under Palmerston, gave a lukewarm support to the Ministry, but would not pledge themselves to steadfast adherence. They had hopesof Gladstone, believed that he would ultimately come into their group, but meanwhile watched with anxiety his delighted immersion, as indeedPalmerston desired it, in the details of financial management to theexclusion of other questions. 

The matter of ministerial and general British attitude toward democracyas affecting British policy during the American Civil War will beconsidered in a later chapter. In the spring of 1861 it had not become aclear-cut British opinion and did not, so far as historical evidence candetermine, affect early governmental policy toward America. Theoutstanding feature of the British Government in 1861 is that it wasmade up of various so-called "Liberal" elements, the representatives ofeach of which carried on the business of his own department much as hepleased. Palmerston's was, of course, the deciding opinion, whenever hecared to express it, but this he did but rarely. His great concern wasto keep his all-star associates running smoothly together and thus togive no occasion for parliamentary criticism and attack. It followedthat Russell, eight years the junior of Palmerston, was in foreignaffairs more powerful and independent than is customary. Indeed theGovernment was at times spoken of as the "Palmerston-Russell Ministry. "These two were the leaders of the team; next came Gladstone andCornewall Lewis, rivals of the younger generation, and each eager tolead when their elders should retire from harness. Gladstone's greatability was already recognized, but his personal political faith was notyet clear. Lewis, lacking his rival's magnetic and emotional qualities, cold, scholarly, and accurate in performance, was regarded as astatesman of high promise[127]. Other Cabinet members, as is the customof coalitions, were more free in opinion and action than in a strictparty ministry where one dominating personality imposes his will uponhis colleagues. 

Lord John Russell, then, in foreign policy, was more than the main voiceof the Government; rather, save in times of extreme crisis, governmentalforeign policy was Russell's policy. This was even more true as regardsAmerican than European affairs, for the former were little understood, and dependence was necessarily placed upon the man whose business it wasto be familiar with them. Indeed there was little actual parliamentaryor governmental interest, before midsummer of 1861, in the Americanquestion, attention in foreign affairs being directed toward Italianexpansion, to the difficulties related to the control of the Ionianislands, and to the developing Danish troubles in Schleswig-Holstein. Neither did the opposition party venture to express a policy as regardsAmerica. Lord Derby, able but indolent, occasionally indulged in causticcriticism, but made no attempt to push his attack home. Malmesbury, hisformer Foreign Secretary, was active and alert in French affairs, butgave no thought to relations across the Atlantic[128]. Disraeli, Toryleader in the Commons, skilfully led a strong minority in attacks on theGovernment's policy, but never on the American question, thoughfrequently urged to do so by the friends of the South. In short for thefirst year of the Civil War, 1861, the policy of Great Britain towardAmerica was the policy of Lord John Russell, unhampered by friendor foe. 

This being the case, what did Russell know about the American crisis?Briefly, no more than has already been stated as derived from thereports of British officials in the United States, and from the pages ofthe public press. The salient facts known to Russell were few. Lincoln'sCabinet had been named. Lincoln himself was absolutely an unknownquantity, but it was unbelievable that a man of his origins and historycould be more than a mere figurehead--an opinion then held as widely inAmerica as in England. But someone must determine American policy, andby universal consent, this would be Seward. 

The new Secretary of State was at the moment better known in Englandthan any other American statesman, with the possible exception ofCharles Sumner, whose visits and personal contacts had established acircle of British friendships. Both men were accepted as champions ofanti-slavery, Sumner for his vigorous denunciations and his so-called"martyrdom" under the physical violence of the South Carolinan, Brooks;and Seward for his clever political anti-Southern leadership in theUnited States Senate. But Seward's reputation in this respect was offsetby the belief that he was anti-British in his personal sentiments, or atleast that he was very ready to arouse for political ends the customaryanti-British sentiment of his Irish constituents in the State of NewYork. In 1860, on the occasion of the visit to the United States of thePrince of Wales, Seward is alleged to have stated to the Duke ofNewcastle that in case he became Secretary of State it would then"become my duty to insult England, and I mean to do so"--a threat, whether jocose or not, that aroused much serious and anxious speculationin British governmental circles[129]. Moreover Seward's reputation wasthat of a wily, clever politician, rather unscrupulous in methods whichBritish politicians professed to disdain--a reputation serving to dimsomewhat, as indeed it did in America also, the sincere idealisms andpatriotism of the statesman. Altogether, Seward was regarded in GreatBritain as a rather dangerous man, yet as the inevitable guiding powerin the new Republican administration. 

This estimate was shared by many in the United States also, but not byall. The new American Minister to London, Charles Francis Adams, himselfa most stiffly upright politician, both regarded Seward as the onlypossible leader of Republican party policy and rejoiced that this wasso, having great confidence in his chief's integrity and wisdom. Adamshimself was well suited to his new post. He was known as having early in1849 fought the battle of anti-slavery as a "Free Soil Whig, " and lateras a leading Republican member of Congress from Massachusetts. Principally, however, he was suited to his post by education, family, and character. He had been taken as a boy to Russia during his father'sministry at St. Petersburg, and later had been educated in England. Hisfather and grandfather, John Quincy Adams and John Adams, bothPresidents of the United States, had both, also, been American Ministersat London. Intensely patriotic, but having wide acquaintance throughtraining and study with European affairs, especially those of Britain, and equipped with high intellectual gifts, Adams was still furtherfitted to his new post by his power of cool judgment and carefulexpression in critical times. His very coolness, sometimes appearing ascoldness and stiff dignity, rendered him an especially fit agent to dealwith Russell, a man of very similar characteristics. The two men quicklylearned to respect and esteem each other, whatever clash arose innational policies. 

But meanwhile Adams, in April, 1861, was not yet arrived in London. TheSouthern Government organized at Montgomery, Alabama, but soontransferred to Richmond, Virginia, was headed by Jefferson Davis asPresident and Alexander Stephens as Vice-President. Neither man was wellknown in England, though both had long been prominent in Americanpolitics. The little British information on Davis, that he had served inthe United States Senate and as a Cabinet member, seemed to indicatethat he was better fitted to executive duties than his rival, Lincoln. But Davis' foreign policy was wholly a matter for speculation, and hisCabinet consisted of men absolutely unknown to British statesmen. Intruth it was not a Cabinet of distinction, for it was the misfortune ofthe South that everywhere, as the Civil War developed, Southerngentlemen sought reputation and glory in the army rather than inpolitical position. Nor did President Davis himself ever fully grasp theimportance to the South of a well-considered and energetic foreignpolicy. At first, indeed, home controversy compelled anxious attentionto the exclusion of other matters. Until war cemented Southernpatriotism, Davis, himself regarded as an extremist, felt it necessaryin denial of an asserted unreasonableness of personal attitude, toappoint to office men known for their earlier moderate opinions on bothslavery and secession[130]. "The single exception to this generalpolicy[131]" was the appointment as agents to Europe of Yancey, Rost andMann, all of them extreme pro-slavery men and eager secessionists. Ofthese Mann was the only one with any previous diplomatic experience. Yancey's choice was particularly inappropriate, for he at least wasknown abroad as the extreme fire-eating Southern orator, demanding forten years past, that Southern action in defence of states rights andSouthern "interests, " which now, at last, the South was attempting[132]. 

Yancey and Rost, starting on their journey on March 16, reached Londonon April 29[133]. Meanwhile in this same month of April, conditions inAmerica, so long confused and uncertain, were being rapidly clarified. The South, earlier than the North, had come to a determined policy, forwhile during January and February, at the Montgomery convention, therehad been uncertainty as to actively applying the doctrinaire right ofsecession, by March the party of action had triumphed, and though therewas still talk of conferences with the North, and commissioners actuallyappointed, no real expectation existed of a favourable result. In theNorth, the determination of policy was more slowly developed. Lincolnwas not inaugurated until March 4, and no positive pronouncement wasearlier possible. Even after that date uncertainty still prevailed. European correspondents were reporting men like Sumner as willing to letthe South go in peace. The Mayor of New York City was discussing theadvisability of a separate secession by that financial centre fromNation and State alike--and of setting up as a "free town. " Seward, justappointed Secretary of State, was repudiating in both official andprivate talk any intention to coerce the South by force of arms[134]. Itis no wonder that British statesmen were largely at sea over theAmerican situation. 

But on April 13, 1861, the Stars and Stripes floating over Fort Sumterin Charleston harbour was lowered in surrender of a Federal fortressunder the armed attack of the newly-born Confederacy. That event droveaway as by magic the uncertainty of the North, and removed the lastvestiges of Southern doubt. A great wave of militant patriotism sweptover both sections[135]. Hurriedly both North and South prepared forwar, issuing calls for volunteers and organizing in all accustomedwarlike preparations. The news of Sumter reached London on April 27, andthat civil war seemed certain was known on April 29. On April 17, Davis, since the South lacked a navy, approved a proclamation offering to issueletters of marque and reprisal. On April 19 Lincoln proclaimed aNorthern intention to treat as pirates any privateers acting under suchletters, and also gave notice of a blockade of Southern ports, to beinstituted later. Thus suddenly, so it seemed to British officials andpublic after the long delay and uncertainty of months, events in Americahad precipitated a state of war, though in fact there were still toelapse other months in which both North and South laboured to transforma peaceful society into one capable of waging effective battle. 

The result of this sudden change in the American horizon was to alter, almost as quickly, the previous delay in outlining a British policy, though, presumably, the British Government, while waiting the turn ofevents, had given careful consideration to the steps required of it injust such a situation as had now arisen. Certainly both Lyons andRussell had been deeply anxious for some time, and had visualized aproper British policy. The movement in Great Britain now became rapid. On April 29, Malmesbury, in the Lords, spoke of the news of civil warwhich had arrived "this morning, " and asked if the Government had triedto prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with other powers tocheck it. Wodehouse, replying for the Government, stated that the UnitedStates as an independent State would have resented any suggestions fromGreat Britain, and that Lyons had been instructed to be extremelycareful about offering advice unless "asked for by the contendingparties themselves. " Both speakers commented on the "ties of blood"rendering Britain especially anxious in this American quarrel, andregretted the conflict[136]. Malmesbury's query as to the approach toanother government, meaning France, was evaded. That some such approach, in accordance with the earlier advice of Lyons[137], had already beenmade, is evident from the fact that three days later, on May 1, Dallaslearned from Russell of the plan of joint action with France, thoughwhat that action would be was not made clear[138]. As Dallas' report wassoon the basis of an American complaint shortly to be considered, theparagraph referring to this matter is important:

 "The solicitude felt by Lord John Russell as to the effect of certain measures represented as likely to be adopted by the President induced him to request me to call at his private residence yesterday. I did so. He told me that the three representatives of the Southern confederacy were here[139]; that he had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so, _unofficially_; that there existed an understanding between this government and that of France which would lead both to take the same course as to recognition, whatever that course might be; and he then referred to the rumour of a meditated blockade of Southern ports and their discontinuance as ports of entry--topics on which I had heard nothing. But as I informed him that Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention to be on his way hither, in the steamship 'Niagara, ' which left Boston on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive in less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th instant, his lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be further postponed, at his lordship's suggestion. "

May 3rd, Russell held an unofficial interview with the two Southerncommissioners in fact arrived, Yancey and Rost. As reported bythem[140], Russell listened with attention to their representation, butmade no informing comment. They argued the constitutional right ofsecession, depicted the firm determination of the South, were confidentof early acquiescence by the North, and especially laid stress on theSouthern desire for free trade. Russell's own report to Lyons on thisinterview and on one held six days later, May 9, is in substantialagreement, but much more is made by him than by the Commissioners of aquestion put by Russell as to a Southern plan of reviving the Africanslave-trade[141]. Yancey and Rost denied this and asserted "that theyhad prohibited the slave-trade, and did not mean to revive it. " Theirreport to Richmond does not depict this matter as of specialsignificance in the interview; Russell's report to Lyons lays stressupon it. The general result of the interview was that Russell listened, but refused, as to Dallas, to make any pledge on recognition. But theSouthern Commissioners came away with a feeling of confidence and werecontent to wait on British action[142]. 

On this same day, May 3, Russell received from the Attorney-General amemorandum in reply to a query as to recognizing the belligerency of theSouth and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque andreprisal. The memorandum notes that Southern privateering would bedangerous to British commerce with the North, but sees no help for it. "The best solution, " wrote the Attorney-General, "would be for theEuropean nations to determine that the war between the two Confederaciesshall be carried on on the principles of 'Justum Bellum, ' and shall beconducted according to the rules of the Treaty of Paris. Recognize theSouthern States as a Belligerent on this condition only[143]. " The nextday, referring to this memorandum, Russell wrote Lyons that the lawofficers "are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War in Americaas regular war[144], " but he does _not_ comment on the legal advice topress the South to abandon privateering before recognizing herbelligerent rights, for this is the only meaning that can be attached tothe last sentence quoted from the Attorney-General's memorandum. Thisadvice, however, in view of the opinion that there was "no help for it, "was presumably but a suggestion as to a possible diplomatic manoeuvrewith little confidence that it would succeed. The "best solution" wasnot the probable one, for the South, without a navy, would not readilyyield its only naval weapon. 

In these few days British policy was rapidly matured and announced. Theletter of May 4 to Lyons, stating the Civil War to be a "regular war"was followed on May 6 by a formal instruction giving Lyons advancenotice of the determination reached by the Cabinet to recognize thebelligerent rights of the South. Russell indulged in many expressions ofregret and sympathy, but Lyons was not to conceal that this Britishaction represented the Government's view of the actualities of theAmerican situation. Yet while Lyons was not to conceal this opinion hewas not instructed to notify Seward, officially, of the recognition ofSouthern belligerency[145]. Here was a correct understanding of thedifficulty of the diplomatic position at Washington, and a permittedavoidance by Lyons of dangerous ground[146]. Russell was not then awareof the tenacity with which Seward was to cling to a theory, not yetclearly formulated for foreign governments, that the Civil War was arebellion of peoples rather than a conflict of governments, but he doesappear to have understood the delicacy of formal notification to theconstituted government at Washington[147]. Moreover his instructionswere in line with the British policy of refusing, at present, arecognition of Southern sovereignty. 

On the same day, May 6, a copy of the instructions to Lyons was sent toCowley, British Ambassador at Paris, directing him to request France tojoin, promptly, in recognizing Southern belligerent rights. Cowley wasalso instructed that the blockade and privateering required precautionsby European governments, and it was suggested that France and Englandunite in requesting both belligerents to accede to the second and thirdarticles of the Declaration of Paris[148]. These articles refer to theexemption from capture, except contraband, of enemy's goods under aneutral flag, and of neutral goods under an enemy's flag[149]. This day, also, Russell stated in Parliament that England was about to recognizethe belligerent rights of the South, and spoke of the measure as anecessary and inevitable one. May 7, Cowley notified Russell thatThouvenel, the French Foreign Minister, was in complete agreement withEngland's policy[150], and on May 9, in a more extended communication, Cowley sent word of Thouvenel's suggestion that both powers issue adeclaration that they "intended to abstain from all interference, " andthat M. De Flahault, French Ambassador at London, had been giveninstructions to act in close harmony with Russell[151]. 

The rapidity of movement in formulating policy in the six days from May1 to May 6, seems to have taken the British public and press somewhat bysurprise, for there is a lack of newspaper comment even after Russell'sparliamentary announcement of policy on the last-named date. But on May9 the _Times_ set the fashion of general approval in an editorialstating that Great Britain was now coming to see the American conflictin a new light--as a conflict where there were in fact no such idealsinvolved as had been earlier attributed to it. Southern rights were nowmore clearly understood, and in any case since war, though greatly to beregretted, was now at hand, it was England's business to keep strictlyout of it and to maintain neutrality[152]. This generalization was nodoubt satisfactory to the public, but in the Government and inParliament men who were thinking seriously of specific difficultiesrealized that the two main problems immediately confronting a Britishneutral policy were privateering and blockade. The South had declaredits _intention_ to use privateers. The North had declared its_intention_, first to hang those who engaged in privateering, and secondto establish a blockade. Neither declaration had as yet been putinto effect. 

The first action of the British Government was directed towardprivateering. On May 1, Russell sent a note to the Lords Commissionersof the Admiralty calling attention to the Southern plan to issue lettersof marque and reprisal and directing that reinforcements be sent to theBritish fleet in American waters. This was prompt action on unofficialinformation, for Davis' proclamation bore date of April 17, and Lyons'despatch containing copies of it, sent on April 22, was not received byRussell until May 10[153]. Ordinary news from the United States requiredten days to get into print in London[154], but official messages mightbe sent more rapidly by way of telegraph to Halifax, thence by steamerto Liverpool and by telegraph again to London. In case the telegram toHalifax coincided with the departure of a fast vessel the time wasoccasionally reduced to seven days, but never less. At the best theexact information as to the contents of the Davis and Lincolnproclamations of April 17 and 19 respectively, could have been receivedonly a few days before the order was issued to reinforce theBritish fleet. 

[Illustration: _Photo: F. Hollyer_. SIR WILLIAM GREGORY, K. C. M. G. (_FromLady Gregory's "Sir William Gregory, K. C. M. G. : An Autobiography, " bykind permission_)]

The next day, May 2, Ewart, in the Commons, asked "if Privateers sailingunder the flag of an unrecognized Power will be dealt with as Pirates, "thus showing the immediate parliamentary concern at the Davis andLincoln proclamations. Russell stated in reply that a British fleet hadbeen sent to protect British interests and took occasion to indicateBritish policy by adding, "we have not been involved in any way in thatcontest by any act or giving any advice in the matter, and, for God'ssake, let us if possible keep out of it[155]. " May 6, Gregory, a friendof the South, who had already given notice of a motion for therecognition of the Confederacy as an independent State, asked whetherthe United States had been informed that a blockade of Southern portswould not be recognized unless effective, and whether there would beacquiescence in the belligerent right of the South to issue letters ofmarque and reprisal[156]. Russell replied that Lincoln had _not_ beeninformed that a blockade must be effective to be respected since theWashington Government did not need to be told of an international rulewhich it had itself long proclaimed. As to the second point, he nowannounced what heretofore had not been clearly stated, that Southernprivateers could not be regarded by Great Britain as pirates, for if soregarded Britain would herself have to treat them as pirates and wouldthus be unneutral. This was in fact, in spite of Northern bitteraccusations that Britain was exhibiting governmental sympathy with theSouth by her tolerance of the plan of Southern privateering, aninescapable conclusion. Russell added, however, that the matter ofprivateering involved some new questions under the Declaration of Parisupon which the Government had not yet decided what stand to take[157]. It was on this same day, in fact, that Russell had instructed Cowley totake up with France the question of the Declaration of Paris[158], Privateering and blockade, declared in America months before there wasany possibility of putting them into effect, and months before therewere any military operations in the field, forced this rapid Europeanaction, especially the action of Great Britain, which, more than anyother European nation, feared belligerent interference with her carryingand export trade. How was the British Government to know that Daviswould not bend every energy in sending out privateers, and Lincoln toestablish a blockade? The respective declarations of Davis and Lincolnwere the _first_ evidences offered of belligerent status. It wasreasonable to assume that here would come the first energetic efforts ofthe belligerents. Nor was British governmental intelligence sufficientlyinformed to be aware that Davis, in fact, controlled few ships thatcould be fitted out as privateers, or that two-thirds of the Northernnavy was at the moment widely scattered in foreign seas, makingimpossible a prompt blockade. 

To the British view the immediate danger to its commercial interests layin this announced maritime war, and it felt the necessity of definingits neutral position with speed. The underlying fact of the fixity ofSouthern determination to maintain secession had in the last few weeksbecome clearly recognized. 

Moreover the latest information sent by British officials in America, some of it received just before the issue of the Proclamation ofNeutrality, some just after, was all confirmative of the rapid approachof a great war. A letter from Bunch, at Charleston, was received on May10, depicting the united Southern will to resist Northern attack, andasserting that the South had no purpose save to conduct a strictlydefensive war. Bunch was no longer caustic; he now felt that a newnation was in process of birth[159]. May 4, Monson, writing fromWashington, and just returned from a trip through the South, in thecourse of which he had visited Montgomery, stated "_no reconstruction_of the Union is possible, " and added that there was no danger of aservile insurrection, a matter that now somewhat began to disturb theBritish Government and public[160]. A few days later on, May 12, Lyonsexpressed his strong sympathy with the North for reasons ofanti-slavery, law, and race, but added that he shrank from expressionsof sympathy for fear of thus encouraging the Northern Cabinet in itsplan of prosecuting civil war since such a war would be frightful in itsconsequences both to America and to England[161]. 

Such reports if received before the issue of the Proclamation ofNeutrality must have strengthened the feeling that prompt action wasnecessary; if received later, they gave confidence that that action hadbeen wise. May 9, Forster asked in the Commons a series of questions asto the application of the British Foreign Enlistment Act in the Americancrisis. What would be the status of British citizens serving onConfederate privateers? How would the Government treat citizens whoaided in equipping such privateers? Did not the Government intend totake measures to prevent the infringement of law in British ports? Herewas pressure by a friend of the North to hasten an official announcementof the policy already notified to Parliament. Sir George Lewis repliedstating that the Government was about to issue a general proclamationwarning British subjects not to take any part in the war[162]. Similarquestions were asked by Derby in the Lords on May 10, and received asimilar answer[163]. The few days' delay following Russell's statementof May 6 was due to consideration given by the Law Officers to the exactform required. The Proclamation as issued was dated May 13, and wasofficially printed in the _London Gazette_ on May 14. 

In form and in substance the Proclamation of Neutrality did not differfrom customary usage[164]. It spoke of the Confederacy as "statesstyling themselves the Confederate States of America, " prohibited toEnglishmen enlistment on either side, or efforts to enlist others, orequipment of ships of war, or delivery of commissions to such ships. Warvessels being equipped in British ports would be seized and forfeited tothe British Government. If a belligerent war-ship came into a Britishport, no change or increase of equipment was to be permitted. If asubject violated the Proclamation he was both punishable in Britishcourts and forfeited any claim to British protection. The Parliamentarydiscussion on May 16 brought out more clearly and in general unanimityof opinion the policy of the Government in application of theProclamation; the South was definitely recognized as a belligerent, butrecognition of independence was for the future to determine; the rightof the South to send out privateers was regretfully recognized; suchprivateers could not be regarded as pirates and the North would have noright to treat them as such, but if the North in defiance ofinternational opinion did so treat them, Great Britain had at leastwarned its subjects that they, if engaged in service on a Southernprivateer, had no claim to British protection; a blockade of the Southto be respected must be effective at least to the point where a vesselattempting to pass through was likely to be captured; the plan ofblockading the entire Southern coast, with its three thousand miles ofcoast line, was on the face of it ridiculous--evidence that Members ofParliament were profoundly ignorant of the physical geography of theSouthern seaboard[165]. 

The Parliamentary discussion did not reveal any partiality for one sidein the American quarrel above the other. It turned wholly on legalquestions and their probable application. On May 15 Russell sent toLyons the official text of the Proclamation, but did not instruct him tocommunicate it officially to Seward, leaving this rather to Lyons'discretion. This was discretionary in diplomatic usage since in strictfact the Proclamation was addressed to British subjects and need not becommunicated officially to the belligerents. In the result thediscretion permitted to Lyons had, an important bearing, for recognitionof Southern belligerency was opposed to the theory upon which theNorthern Government was attempting to proceed. Lyons did not then, orlater, make official communication to Seward of the Proclamation[166]. The fact soon appeared that the United States seriously objected to theProclamation of Neutrality, protesting first, its having been issued atall, and, in the second place, resenting what was considered its"premature" announcement by a friendly nation. This matter developed soserious a criticism by both American Government and public, both duringand after the Civil War, that it requires a close examination. Did theBritish Government exhibit an unfriendly attitude toward the North by a"premature" Proclamation of Neutrality?

On May 13 the new American Minister landed at Liverpool, and on themorning of the fourteenth he was "ready for business" in London[167], but the interview with Russell arranged for that day by Dallas wasprevented by the illness of Russell's brother, the Duke of Bedford[168]. All that was immediately possible was to make official notification ofarrival and to secure the customary audience with the Queen. This waspromptly arranged, and on May 16 Adams was presented, Palmerstonattending in the enforced absence of Russell. Adams' first report toSeward was therefore brief, merely noting that public opinion was "notexactly what we would wish. " In this he referred to the utterances ofthe press, particularly those of the _Times_, which from day to day andwith increasing vigour sounded the note of strict neutrality in a"non-idealistic" war. On May 30 the _Times_, asserting that both partiesin America were bidding for English support, summed up public opinionas follows:

 "We have been told, in fact, by Northern politicians, that it does not become us to be indifferent, and by Southern leaders that they are half inclined to become British once more. Both sides are bidding for us, and both sides have their partisans over here. On such perilous ground we cannot walk too warily. 

 "For our own part, we are free to confess that the march of events has induced us to regard the dispute as a more commonplace kind of quarrel than it at first appeared to be. The real motives of the belligerents, as the truth transpires; appear to be exactly such motives as have caused wars in all times and countries. They are essentially selfish motives--that is to say, they are based upon speculations of national power, territorial aggrandizement, political advantage, and commercial gain. Neither side can claim any superiority of principle, or any peculiar purity of patriotism. . . . 

 "We certainly cannot discover in these arguments anything to remove the case from the common category of national or monarchical quarrels. The representations of the North might be made word for word by any autocrat or conqueror desirous of 'rectifying' his frontier, consolidating his empire, or retaining a disaffected province in subjection. The manifestos of the South might be put forth by any State desirous of terminating an unpleasant connexion or exchanging union for independence. . . . 

 "It is just such a question as has been left times out of mind in this Old World to the decision of the sword. The sword will be the arbitrator in the New World too; but the event teaches us plainly enough that Republics and Democracies enjoy no exemption from the passions and follies of humanity. "

Under these impressions Adams presented himself on May 18 for his firstinterview with Russell[169]. He stated that he had come with the ideathat there was

 ". . . . Little to do beyond the duty of preserving the relations actually existing between the two nations from the risk of being unfavourably affected by the unfortunate domestic disturbances prevailing in my own country. It was not without pain that I was compelled to admit that from the day of my arrival I had felt in the proceedings of both houses of Parliament, in the language of Her Majesty's ministers, and in the tone of opinion prevailing in private circles, more of uncertainty about this than I had before thought possible, "

Adams then inquired whether the replies given by Russell to Dallasrefusing to indicate a policy as to recognition of the South implied aBritish purpose "to adopt a policy which would have the effect to widen, if not to make irreparable, a breach [between North and South] which webelieved yet to be entirely manageable by ourselves. "

Russell here replied that "there was no such intention"; he had simplymeant to say to Dallas that the British Government "were not disposed inany way to interfere. " To this Adams answered that:

 ". . . . It was deserving of grave consideration whether great caution was not to be used in adopting any course that might, even in the most indirect way, have an effect to encourage the hopes of the disaffected in America. . . . It was in this view that I must be permitted to express the great regret I had felt on learning the decision to issue the Queen's proclamation, which at once raised the insurgents to the level of a belligerent State, and still more the language used in regard to it by Her Majesty's ministers in both houses of Parliament before and since. Whatever might be the design, there could be no shadow of doubt that the effect of these events had been to encourage the friends of the disaffected here. The tone of the press and of private opinion indicated it strongly. "

Russell's answer was that Adams was placing more stress on recent eventsthan they deserved. The Government had taken the advice of the LawOfficers and as a result had concluded that "as a question merely of_fact_, a war existed. . . . Under such circumstances

 it seemed scarcely possible to avoid speaking of this in the technical sense as _justum bellum_, that is, a war of two sides, without in any way implying an opinion of its justice, as well as to withhold an endeavour, so far as possible, to bring the management of it within the rules of modern civilized warfare. This was all that was contemplated by the Queen's proclamation. It was designed to show the purport of existing laws, and to explain to British subjects their liabilities in case they should engage in the war. "

To this Adams answered ". . . That under other circumstances

 I should be very ready to give my cheerful assent to this view of his lordship's. But I must be permitted frankly to remark that the action taken seemed, at least to my mind, a little more rapid than was absolutely called for by the occasion. . . . And furthermore, it pronounced the insurgents to be a belligerent State before they had ever shown their capacity to maintain any kind of warfare whatever, except within one of their own harbours, and under every possible advantage. It considered them a marine power before they had ever exhibited a single privateer on the ocean. . . . The rule was very clear, that whenever it became apparent that any organized form of society had advanced so far as to prove its power to defend and protect itself against the assaults of enemies, and at the same time to manifest a capacity to maintain binding relations with foreign nations, then a measure of recognition could not be justly objected to on any side. The case was very different when such an interference should take place, prior to the establishment of the proof required, as to bring about a result which would not probably have happened but for that external agency. "

This representation by the American Minister, thus early made, containsthe whole argument advanced against the British Proclamation ofNeutrality, though there were many similar representations made atgreater length both by Adams later, and by Seward at Washington. Theyare all well summarized by Bernard as "a rejection . . . Of theproposition that the existence of war is a simple matter of fact, to beascertained as other facts are--and an assertion . . . Of the dogma thatthere can be no war, so far as foreign nations are concerned, and, therefore, no neutrality, so long as there is a sovereignty _dejure_[170]. " But in this first representation Adams, in the main, laidstress upon the _haste_ with which the Proclamation of Neutrality hadbeen issued, and, by inference, upon the evidence that Britishsympathies were with the South. 

One British journal was, indeed, at this very moment voicing exactlythose opinions advanced by Adams. The _Spectator_ declared that whilethe Proclamation, on the face of it, appeared to be one of strictneutrality, it in reality tended "directly to the benefit of theSouth[171]. " A fortnight later this paper asserted, "The quarrel, coverit with cotton as we may, is between freedom and slavery, right andwrong, the dominion of God and the dominion of the Devil, and the dutyof England, we submit, is clear. " She should, even though forced todeclare her neutrality, refuse for all time to recognize theslave-holding Confederacy[172]. But the _Spectator_ stood nearly alonein this view. The _Saturday Review_ defended in every respect the issueof the Proclamation and added, "In a short time, it will be necessaryfurther to recognize the legitimacy of the Southern Government; but theUnited States have a right to require that the acknowledgment shall bepostponed until the failure of the effort which they assert or believethat they are about to make has resulted in an experimental proof thatsubjugation is impossible[173]. " A few provincial papers supported theview of the _Spectator_, but they were of minor importance, andgenerally the press heartily approved the Proclamation. 

At the time of Adams' interview with Russell on May 18 he has justreceived an instruction from Seward written under the impression arousedby Dallas' report of Russell's refusal on April 8 to make any pledge asto British policy on the recognition of Southern independence. Sewardwas very much disturbed by what Russell had said to Dallas. In thisinstruction, dated April 27[174], he wrote:

 "When you shall have read the instructions at large which have been sent to you, you will hardly need to be told that these last remarks of his lordship are by no means satisfactory to this government. Her Britannic Majesty's government is at liberty to choose whether it will retain the friendship of this government by refusing all aid and comfort to its enemies, now in flagrant rebellion against it, as we think the treaties existing between the two countries require, or whether the government of Her Majesty will take the precarious benefits of a different course. 

 "You will lose no time in making known to Her Britannic Majesty's Government that the President regards the answer of his lordship as possibly indicating a policy that this government would be obliged to deem injurious to its rights and derogating from its dignity. "

Having promptly carried out these instructions, as he understood them, Adams soon began to report an improved British attitude, and especiallyin the Government, stating that this improvement was due, in part, tothe vigour now being shown by the Northern Government, in part "to asense that the preceding action of Her Majesty's ministers has beenconstrued to mean more than they intended by it[175]. " But atWashington the American irritation was not so easily allayed. Lyons wasreporting Seward and, indeed, the whole North, as very angry with theProclamation of Neutrality[176]. On June 14, Lyons had a longconversation with Seward in which the latter stubbornly denied that theSouth could possess any belligerent rights. Lyons left the conferencefeeling that Seward was trying to divide France and England on thispoint, and Lyons was himself somewhat anxious because France was so longdelaying her own Proclamation[177]. To meet the situation, he andMercier, the French Minister, went the next day, June 15, on an officialvisit to Seward with the intention of formally presenting the BritishProclamation and Thouvenel's instructions to Mercier to support it[178]. But Seward "said at once that he could not receive from us acommunication founded on the assumption that

 the Southern Rebels were to be regarded as Belligerents; that this was a determination to which the Cabinet had come deliberately; that he could not admit that recent events had in any respect altered the relations between Foreign Powers and the Southern States; that he would not discuss the question with us, but that he should give instructions to the United States Ministers in London and Paris who would thus be enabled to state the reasons for the course taken by their Government to Your Lordship and to M. Thouvenel, if you should be desirous to hear them. . . . He should not take Official cognizance of the recognition of the Belligerent Rights of Southern Rebels by Great Britain and France, unless he should be forced to do so by an Official communication addressed to the Government of the United States itself. "

In the result the two Ministers submitted their papers to Seward "forhis own use only. " They did not regard the moment well chosen "to bepunctilious. " Lyons reported that Seward's language and demeanourthroughout the interview were "calm, friendly, and good humoured, " butthe fact remained that the United States had not been officiallynotified of the Proclamation of Neutrality, and that the AmericanGovernment, sensitive to popular excitement in the matter and committedto the theory of a rebellion of peoples, was thus left free to continueargument in London without any necessity of making formal protest and oftaking active steps to support such protest[179]. The official relationwas eased by the conciliatory acquiescence of Lyons. The public anger ofAmerica, expressed in her newspapers, astonished the British press and, temporarily, made them more careful in comment on American affairs. The_Times_ told its readers to keep cool. "It is plain that the utmost careand circumspection must be used by every man or party in England toavoid giving offence to either of the two incensed belligerents[180]. "In answer to the Northern outcry at the lack of British sympathy, itdeclared "Neutrality--strict neutrality--is all that the United StatesGovernment can claim[181]. "

While the burden of American criticism was thus directed toward theBritish recognition of Southern belligerency, there were two othermatters of great moment to the American view--the attitude of theBritish Government toward Southern privateers, and the hearing given byRussell to the Confederate envoys. On the former, Seward, on May 21, wrote to Adams: "As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgentservice, you will say that this is a question exclusively our own. Wetreat them as pirates. They are our own citizens, or persons employed byour own citizens, preying on the commerce of our country. If GreatBritain shall choose to recognize them as lawful belligerents and givethem shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the law of nations affordsan adequate and proper remedy[182]. " This was threatening language, butwas for Adams' own eye, and in the next sentence of his letter Sewardstated that avoidance of friction on this point was easy, since in 1856Great Britain had invited the United States to adhere to the Declarationof Paris everywhere abolishing privateering, and to this the UnitedStates was now ready to accede. 

What Seward really meant to accomplish by this was not made clear forthe question of privateering did not constitute the main point of hisbelligerent letter of May 21. In fact the proposed treatment ofprivateers as pirates might have resulted in very serious complications, for though the Proclamation of Neutrality had warned British subjectsthat they would forfeit any claim to protection if they engaged in theconflict, it is obvious that the hanging as a pirate of a British seamanwould have aroused a national outcry almost certain to have forced theGovernment into protest and action against America. Fortunately thecooler judgment of the United States soon led to quiet abandonment ofthe plan of treating privateers as pirates, while on the other point ofgiving "shelter" to Confederate privateers Seward himself received fromLyons assurance, even before Adams had made a protest, that no suchshelter would be available in British ports[183]. 

In this same letter of May 21 Seward, writing of the rumour that theSouthern envoys were to be received by Russell "unofficially, "instructed Adams that he must use efforts to stop this and that: "Youwill, in any event, desist from all intercourse whatever, unofficial aswell as official, with the British Government, so long as it shallcontinue intercourse of either kind with the domestic enemies of thiscountry. " Here was a positive instruction as to the American Minister'sconduct in a given situation, and a very serious instruction, nearlyequivalent to "taking leave" after a rupture of diplomatic relations, but the method to be used in avoiding if possible the necessity of theserious step was left to Adams' discretion. Well might Adams' comment, when reporting the outcome, that this was the "most delicate portion ofmy task[184]. " Adams again went over with Russell the suspicion as toBritish intentions aroused in America by the Queen's Proclamation, butadded that he had not been able to convince himself of the existence ofan unfriendly design. "But it was not to be disguised that the fact ofthe continued stay of the pseudo-commissioners in this city, and stillmore the knowledge that they had been admitted to more or lessinterviews with his lordship, was calculated to excite uneasiness. Indeed, it had already given great dissatisfaction to my Government. Iadded, as moderately as I could, that in all frankness any furtherprotraction of this relation could scarcely fail to be viewed by us ashostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding actionaccordingly. " Russell replied that both France and England had long beenaccustomed to receive such persons unofficially, as in the case of"Poles, Hungarians, Italians, etc. , " to hear what they had to say. "Butthis did not imply recognition in their case any more than in ours. Headded that he had seen the gentlemen once some time ago, and once moresome time since; he had no expectation of seeing them any more[185]. "

For the moment, then, a matter which under Seward's instructions mighthave brought on a serious crisis was averted by the tact of Adams andthe acquiescence of Russell. Yet no pledge had been given; Russellmerely stated that he had "no expectation" of further interviews withthe Southern commissioners; he was still ready to hear from them inwriting. This caused a division of opinion between the commissioners;Yancey argued that Russell's concession to Adams was itself a violationof the neutrality the British Government had announced, and that itshould be met by a formal protest. But the other members insisted on areference to Richmond for instructions[186]. On the same day that Adamsreported the result to Seward he wrote privately to his son in Boston:

 "My position here thus far has not been difficult or painful. If I had followed the course of some of my colleagues in the diplomatic line, this country might have been on the high road to the confederate camp before now. It did not seem to me to be expedient so to play into the hands of our opponents. Although there has been and is more or less of sympathy with the slave-holders in certain circles, they are not so powerful as to overbear the general sentiment of the people. The ministry has been placed in rather delicate circumstances, when a small loss of power on either extreme would have thrown them out[187]. "

In Adams' opinion the Liberals were on the whole more friendly, atleast, to the North than were the Conservatives, and he thereforeconsidered it best not to press too harshly upon the Government. 

But the concluding sentence of this same letter was significant: "I waitwith patience--but as yet I have not gone so far as to engage a housefor more than a month at a time. . . . " He might himself be inclined toview more leniently the Proclamation of Neutrality and be able to findexcuses for the alleged haste with which it had been issued, but hisinstructions required strong representations, especially on the latterpoint. Adams' report to Seward of June 14, just noted, on the interviewwith Russell of June 12, after treating of privateering and the Southerncommissioners, turns in greater length to the alleged pledge of delaygiven by Russell to Dallas, and to the violation of that pledge in ahasty issue of the Proclamation. He renews attack on the line alreadytaken on May 18[188]. From this time on, throughout and after the war, this criticism was repeatedly made and with increasing bitterness. British friends of the North joined in the American outcry. By merereiteration it became in the popular mind on both sides of the Atlantican accepted and well-founded evidence of British governmentalunfriendliness in May, 1861. At the conclusion of the Civil War, JohnBright in Parliament, commenting on the causes of American ill-will, declared that the Government of 1861, knowing that Adams was on his way, should in mere courtesy, have waited his arrival. Then, said Bright, theProclamation, entirely justifiable in itself, might have been issuedwithout offence and without embittering the United States[189]. 

Had in fact a "pledge to wait" been given to Dallas; and was theProclamation hasty and premature? Russell always denied he had given anysuch pledge, and the text of Dallas' report of the interview of May 1would seem to support that denial[190]. On that day Russell for thesecond time told Dallas that England would not commit herself, as yet, as regards Southern recognition, clearly meaning a recognition of_sovereignty_, not of belligerency, and immediately asked Dallas whatthe rumours of a blockade meant. Dallas replied that he had noinformation on this point, and Russell "acquiesced in the expediency ofdisregarding mere rumour, and waiting the full knowledge to be broughtby my successor. The motion, therefore, of Mr. Gregory may be furtherpostponed, at his lordship's suggestion. "

The unprejudiced interpretation of this report is merely that Russellrefrained from pressing Dallas about a matter--blockade--of which Dallasknew nothing, agreeing that this would be explained by Adams, andespecially that he let Dallas understand that Gregory's motion, whichwas one for _recognizing the independence and sovereignty of the South_, would be postponed. If there was a pledge here it was a pledge not torecognize Southern sovereignty until after Adams' arrival. 

But even if there was no promise of delay "there can be no question, "writes the son of Adams in a brief biography of his father, "that theproclamation of the 13th was issued with unseemly haste. . . . The purposewas manifest. It was to have the status of the Confederacy as abelligerent an accomplished fact before the arrival of the newlyaccredited minister. This precipitate action was chiefly significant asindicating an animus; that animus being really based on . . . The belief, already matured into a conviction, that the full recognition of theConfederacy as an independent power was merely a question of time, andprobably of a very short time[191]. " The author does not, however, support the contemporary American contention that _any_ Proclamation wascontrary to international custom and that no recognition of belligerentstatus was permissible to neutrals until the "insurgents" had forced themother country itself to recognize the division as fully accomplished, even while war still continued. Indeed American practice was flatlycontradictory of the argument, as in the very pertinent example of thepetty Canadian rebellion of 1837, when President Van Buren had promptlyissued a proclamation of neutrality. It is curious that in his severalreplies to Seward's complaints Russell did not quote a letter fromStevenson, the American Minister to London, addressed to Palmerston, May22, 1838. Stevenson was demanding disavowal and disapproval of the"Caroline" affair, and incidentally he asserted as an incontrovertibleprinciple "that civil wars are not distinguished from other wars, as tobelligerent and neutral rights; that they stand upon the same ground, and are governed by the same principles; that whenever a portion of aState seek by force of arms to overthrow the Government, and maintainindependence, the contest becomes one _de facto_ of war[192]. " This wasas exact, and correct, a statement of the British view as could havebeen desired[193]. 

The American Minister, whatever his official representation, did notthen hold, privately, the view of "unfriendly animus. " On July 2, 1861, his secretary son wrote: "The English are really on our side; of that Ihave no doubt whatever. [Later he was less sure of this. ] But theythought that as a dissolution seemed inevitable and as we seemed to havemade up our minds to it, that their Proclamation was just the thing tokeep them straight with both sides, and when it turned out otherwisethey did their best to correct their mistake[194]. " The modernhistorical judgment of the best American writers likewise exonerates theBritish Government of "unfriendly animus[195], " but is still apt torefer to the "premature" issue of the Proclamation. 

This was also John Bright's view. But can Russell and the Government becriticized even as exercising an unwise (not unfriendly) haste? HenryAdams wrote that the British thought the "dissolution seemed inevitable"and "we seemed to have made up our minds to it. " Certainly this was ajustifiable conclusion from the events in America from Lincoln'selection in November, 1860, to his inauguration in March, 1861--and evento a later date, almost in fact to the first week in April. During thisperiod the British Ministry preserved a strictly "hands off" policy. Then, suddenly, actual conflict begins and at once each side in Americaissues declarations, Davis on privateering, Lincoln on blockade andpiracy, indicative that _maritime_ war, the form of war at once mostdangerous to British interests and most likely to draw in Britishcitizens, was the method first to be tried by the contestants. Unlessthese declarations were mere bluff and bluster England could not darewait their application. She must at once warn her citizens and makeclear her position as a neutral. The Proclamation was no effort "to keepstraight with both sides"; it was simply the natural, direct, and promptnotification to British subjects required in the presence of a _defacto_ war. 

Moreover, merely as a matter of historical speculation, it was fortunatethat the Proclamation antedated the arrival of Adams. The theory of theNorthern administration under which the Civil War was begun andconcluded was that a portion of the people of the United States werestriving as "insurgents" to throw off their allegiance, and that therecould be no recognition of any Southern _Government_ in the conflict. Inactual practice in war, the exchange of prisoners and like matters, thistheory had soon to be discarded. Yet it was a far-seeing and wise theorynevertheless in looking forward to the purely domestic andconstitutional problem of the return to the Union, when conquered, ofthe sections in rebellion. This, unfortunately, was not clear to foreignnations, and it necessarily complicated relations with them. Yet underthat theory Adams had to act. Had he arrived before the Proclamation ofNeutrality it is difficult to see how he could have proceeded otherwisethan to protest, officially, against any British declaration ofneutrality, declaring that his Government did not acknowledge a state ofwar as existing, and threatening to take his leave. It would have beenhis duty to _prevent_, if possible, the issue of the Proclamation. Dallas, fortunately, had been left uninformed and uninstructed. Adams, fortunately, arrived too late to prevent and had, therefore, merely tocomplain. The "premature" issue of the Proclamation averted aninevitable rupture of relations on a clash between the American theoryof "no state of war" and the international fact that war existed. Hadthat rupture occurred, how long would the British Government and peoplehave remained neutral, and what would have been the ultimate fate of theUnited States[196]?

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 127: Sir George Cornewall Lewis was better informed in theearly stages of the American conflict than any of his ministerialcolleagues. He was an occasional contributor to the reviews and hisunsigned article in the _Edinburgh_, April, 1861, on "The Election ofPresident Lincoln and its Consequences, " was the first analysis of realmerit in any of the reviews. ]

[Footnote 128: In his _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, Malmesbury makes butthree important references to the Civil War in America. ]

[Footnote 129: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 165. ]

[Footnote 130: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, pp. 227-8. ]

[Footnote 131: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 132: It was generally whispered in Southern political circlesthat Davis sent Yancey abroad to get rid of him, fearing hisinterference at home. If true, this is further evidence of Davis'neglect of foreign policy. ]

[Footnote 133: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604. ]

[Footnote 134: Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, pp. 149-51. ]

[Footnote 135: Possibly the best concise statement of the effect on theNorth is given in Carl Schurz, _Reminiscences_, Vol. II, p. 223. Or seemy citation of this in _The Power of Ideals in American History_, ch. I, "Nationality. "]

[Footnote 136: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , Vol. CLXII, pp. 1207-9. ]

[Footnote 137: See _ante_, p. 60. ]

[Footnote 138: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, pp. 83-4. Dallasto Seward, May 2, 1862. ]

[Footnote 139: An error. Mann did not arrive in London until May 15. DuBose, _Yancey_, p. 604. ]

[Footnote 140: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, Vol. II, p. 34. This report also shows that Mann was not present at thefirst interview with Russell. ]

[Footnote 141: F. O. , America, Vol. 755, No. 128, Russell to Lyons, May11, 1861. This document is marked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and theQueen. " The greater and essential part has been printed in_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on CivilWar in United States. " No. 33. ]

[Footnote 142: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 604. ]

[Footnote 143: Lyons Papers. The copy of the Memorandum sent to Lyons isundated, but from Russell's letter to Lyons of May 4, in which it wasenclosed, it is presumable that the date of May 3 for the Memorandumis correct. ]

[Footnote 144: _Ibid. _, Russell to Lyons, May 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 145: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 755, No. 121, Russell to Lyons, May 6, 1861. ]

[Footnote 146: It is to be remembered that the United States had givenno notice of the existence of a state of war. ]

[Footnote 147: In diplomatic usage official notification of neutralityto a belligerent has varied, but Russell's letters show him to haveappreciated a peculiar delicacy here. ]

[Footnote 148: F. O. , France, Vol. 1376, No. 553. Draft. Printed in_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence onInternational Maritime Law. " No. 1. ]

[Footnote 149: It is interesting that on this same day Lyons was writingfrom Washington advocating, regretfully, because of his sympathy withthe North, a strict British neutrality:

 "The sympathies of an Englishman are naturally inclined towards the North--but I am afraid we should find that anything like a quasi alliance with the men in office here would place us in a position which would soon become untenable. There would be no end to the exactions which they would make upon us, there would be no end to the disregard of our neutral rights, which they would show if they once felt sure of us. If I had the least hope of their being able to reconstruct the Union, or even of their being able to reduce the South to the condition of a tolerably contented or at all events obedient dependency, my feeling against Slavery might lead me to desire to co-operate with them. But I conceive all chance of this to be gone for ever. "

Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 6, 1861. ]

[Footnote 150: F. O. , France, Vol. 1390. No. 677. ]

[Footnote 151: _Ibid. _, No. 684. Printed in part in _ParliamentaryPapers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on InternationalMaritime Law. " No. 3. ]

[Footnote 152: _Times_, May 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 153: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 31. ]

[Footnote 154: So stated by the _Times_, May 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 155: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , Vol. CLXII, pp. 1378-9. This bluntexpression of Great Britain's Foreign Secretary offers an interestingcomparison with the words of the American President Wilson, in aparallel statement at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914. Wilson onAugust 3, 1914, gave a special audience to newspaper correspondents, begging them to maintain an attitude of calm impartiality. On August 4he issued the first of several neutrality proclamations in which, following the customary language of such documents, the people werenotified that neutrality did not restrict the "full and free expressionof sympathies in public and in private. " But on August 18 in an addressto the people of the United States, this legal phraseology, required bytraditional usage was negatived by Wilson's appeal that "we must beimpartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon oursentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed asa preference of one party to the struggle before another. " And threeweeks later, on September 8, came the proclamation setting aside October4 "as a day of prayer to Almighty God, " informing Him that war existedand asking His intervention. Possibly Russell's more blunt and pithyexpression was better suited to the forthrightness of theBritish public. ]

[Footnote 156: Hansard, _ibid_. , pp. 1564-7. Gregory, a"Liberal-Conservative, " though never a "good party man" was thensupporting Palmerston's ministry. He was very popular in Parliament, representing by his prominence in sport and society alike, the"gentleman ruling class" of the House of Commons, and was a valuableinfluence for the South. ]

[Footnote 157: This subject is developed at length in Chapter V on "TheDeclaration of Paris Negotiation. "]

[Footnote 158: See _ante, p_. 88. The chronology of these rapidlysucceeding events is interesting:

 April 29--Malmesbury states in the Lords that "news was received this day. " May 1--Naval reinforcements sent to American waters. May 1--Russell's interview with Dallas. May 2--Russell's plea in Parliament, "For God's sake keep out of it. " May 3--Russell's first interview with Yancey and Rost. May 3--Attorney-General's memorandum. May 4--Russell's note to Lyons that this is a "regular war. " May 6--Cowley instructed to ask France to recognize Southern belligerency. May 6--Lyons notified that England will recognize Southern belligerency. May 6--Russell states in Parliament that privateers can not be treated as pirates. [Presumably, since parliamentary sittings begin in the late afternoons, the instructions to diplomats were drawn before the statement in Parliament. ] May 9--Russell's second interview with Yancey and Rost. May 9--Sir George Lewis announces that a Proclamation of Neutrality will be issued soon. May 13--The Proclamation authorized. May 13--Adams reaches Liverpool. May 14--The Proclamation officially published in the _London Gazette_. May 14--Adams in London "ready for business. "

It would appear that Russell's expressions in Parliament on May 2indicated clearly the purpose of the Government. This was notified toLyons on May 4, which may be taken as the date when the governmentalposition had become definitely fixed, even though official instructionswere not sent Lyons until the 6th. ]

[Footnote 159: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 780, No. 50. Bunch to Russell, April 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 160: F. O. , Am. , 789, Monson to Alston, received May 21. ]

[Footnote 161: F. O. , Am. , 763, No. 197, Lyons to Russell, received May26. The full statement is:

 "To an Englishman, sincerely interested in the welfare of this country, the present state of things is peculiarly painful. Abhorrence of slavery, respect for law, more complete community of race and language, enlist his sympathies on the side of the North. On the other hand, he cannot but reflect that any encouragement to the predominant war feeling in the North cannot but be injurious to both sections of the country. The prosecution of the war can lead only to the exhaustion of the North by an expenditure of life and money on an enterprise in which success and failure would be alike disastrous. It must tend to the utter devastation of the South. It would at all events occasion a suspension of Southern cultivation which would be calamitous even more to England than to the Northern States themselves. "

[Footnote 162: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXII, p. 1763. ]

[Footnote 163: _Ibid. _, pp. 1830-34. In the general discussion in theLords there appeared disagreement as to the status of privateering. Granville, Derby, and Brougham, spoke of it as piracy. Earl Hardwickethought privateering justifiable. The general tone of the debate, thoughonly on this matter of international practice, was favourable tothe North. ]

[Footnote 164: For example see Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, Vol. I, p. 698, for the Proclamation issued in 1813 during theSpanish-American colonial revolutions. ]

[Footnote 165: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXII, pp. 2077-2088. ]

[Footnote 166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 35. Russell toLyons, May 15, 1861. Another reason for Lyons' precaution was that whilehis French colleague, Mercier, had been instructed to support theBritish Proclamation, no official French Proclamation was issued untilJune 10, and Lyons, while he trusted Mercier, felt that this Frenchdelay needed some explanation. Mercier told Seward, unofficially, of hisinstructions and even left a copy of them, but at Seward's request madeno official communication. Lyons, later, followed the same procedure. This method of dealing with Seward came to be a not unusual one, thoughit irritated both the British and French Ministers. ]

[Footnote 167: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 85. Adams toSeward, May 17, 1861. ]

[Footnote 168: Bedford died that day. ]

[Footnote 169: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, pp. 90-96. Adamsto Seward, May 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 170: Bernard, _The Neutrality of Great Britain during theAmerican Civil War_, p. 161. The author cites at length despatches anddocuments of the period. ]

[Footnote 171: _Spectator_, May 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 172: _Spectator_, June 1, 1861. ]

[Footnote 173: _Saturday Review_, June 1, 1861. ]

[Footnote 174: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 82. ]

[Footnote 175: _Ibid. _, p. 98. Adams to Seward, June 7, 1861. See alsop. 96, Adams to Seward, May 31, 1861. ]

[Footnote 176: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 177: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, June 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 178: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 766, No. 282. Lyons to Russell, June 17, 1861. Seward's account, in close agreement with that of Lyons, is in_U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 106. Seward to Adams, June19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 179: Bancroft in his _Seward_ (II, p. 183) prints a portion ofan unpublished despatch of Seward to Dayton in Paris, July 1, 1861, as"his clearest and most characteristic explanation of what the attitudeof the government must be in regard to the action of the foreign nationsthat have recognized the belligerency of the 'insurgents. '"

 "Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor both together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair the sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, nor confer upon them any public rights whatever. From first to last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, for the whole people of the United States, and to make treaties for disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign nations, and shall expect, when the public welfare requires it, foreign nations to respect and observe the treaties. 

 "We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the fundamental statement you assume--namely, that Great Britain and France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent party. True, you say they have so declared. We reply: Yes, but they have not declared so to us. You may rejoin: Their public declaration concludes the fact. We, nevertheless, reply: It must be not their declaration, but the fact, that concludes the fact. "

[Footnote 180: The _Times_, June 3, 1861. ]

[Footnote 181: _Ibid. _, June 11, 1861. ]

[Footnote 182: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 87. ]

[Footnote 183: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 56. Lyons toRussell, June 17, 1861, reporting conference with Seward on June 15. ]

[Footnote 184: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-62_, p. 104. Adams toSeward, June 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 185: Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, takes the view thatthe protests against the Queen's Proclamation, in regard to privateeringand against interviews with the Southern commissioners were allunjustifiable. The first, he says, was based on "unsound reasoning" (II, 177). On the second he quotes with approval a letter from Russell toEdward Everett, July 12, 1861, showing the British dilemma: "Unless wemeant to treat them as pirates and to hang them we could not deny thembelligerent rights" (II, 178). And as to the Southern commissioners heasserts that Seward, later, ceased protest and writes: "Perhaps heremembered that he himself had recently communicated, through threedifferent intermediaries, with the Confederate commissioners toWashington, and would have met them if the President had not forbiddenit. " Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 179. ]

[Footnote 186: Du Bose, _Yancey_, p. 606. ]

[Footnote 187: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters, 1861-1865_, Vol. I, p. 11. Adams to C. F. Adams, Jnr. , June 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 188: See _ante_, p. 98. Russell's report to Lyons of thisinterview of June 12, lays special emphasis on Adams' complaint ofhaste. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondenceon Civil War in the United States, " No. 52. Russell to Lyons, June21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 189: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXVII, pp. 1620-21, March 13, 1865. ]

[Footnote 190: See _ante_, p. 85. ]

[Footnote 191: C. F. Adams, _Charles Francis Adams_, p. 172. In preparinga larger life of his father, never printed, the son later came to adifferent opinion, crediting Russell with foresight in hastening theProclamation to avoid possible embarrassment with Adams on his arrival. The quotation from the printed "Life" well summarizes, however, currentAmerican opinion. ]

[Footnote 192: _U. S. Documents_, Ser. No. 347, Doc. 183, p. 6. ]

[Footnote 193: The United States Supreme Court in 1862, decided thatLincoln's blockade proclamation of April 19, 1861, was "itself officialand conclusive evidence . . . That a state of war existed. " (Moore, Int. Law Digest, I, p. 190. )]

[Footnote 194: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 16. Henry Adams toC. F. Adams, Jnr. ]

[Footnote 195: Rhodes, _History of the United States_, III, p. 420(_note_) summarizes arguments on this point, but thinks that theProclamation might have been delayed without harm to British interests. This is perhaps true as a matter of historical fact, but such fact in noway alters the compulsion to quick action felt by the Ministry in thepresence of probable _immediate_ fact. ]

[Footnote 196: This was the later view of C. F. Adams, Jnr. He came toregard the delay in his father's journey to England as the mostfortunate single incident in American foreign relations during theCivil War. ]

CHAPTER IV

BRITISH SUSPICION OF SEWARD

The incidents narrated in the preceding chapter have been consideredsolely from the point of view of a formal American contention as tocorrect international practice and the British answer to thatcontention. In fact, however, there were intimately connected wth theseformal arguments and instructions of the American Secretary of State aplan of possible militant action against Great Britain and a suspicion, in British Governmental circles, that this plan was being rapidlymatured. American historians have come to stigmatize this plan as"Seward's Foreign War Panacea, " and it has been examined by them ingreat detail, so that there is no need here to do more than state itsmain features. That which is new in the present treatment is the Britishinformation in regard to the plan and the resultant British suspicion ofSeward's intentions. 

The British public, as distinguished from the Government, deriving itsknowledge of Seward from newspaper reports of his career and pastutterances, might well consider him as traditionally unfriendly to GreatBritain. He had, in the 'fifties, vigorously attacked the Britishinterpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and characterized GreatBritain as "the most grasping and the most rapacious Power in theworld"; he had long prophesied the ultimate annexation of Canada to theUnited States; he had not disdained, in political struggles in the Stateof New York, to whip up, for the sake of votes, Irish antagonism toGreat Britain; and more especially and more recently he had beenreported to have expressed to the Duke of Newcastle a belief that civilconflict in America could easily be avoided, or quieted, by fomenting aquarrel with England and engaging in a war against her[197]. Earlierexpressions might easily be overlooked as emanating from a politiciannever over-careful about wounding the sensibilities of foreign nationsand peoples, for he had been even more outspoken against the France ofLouis Napoleon, but the Newcastle conversation stuck in the British mindas indicative of a probable animus when the politician had become thestatesman responsible for foreign policy. Seward might deny, as he did, that he had ever uttered the words alleged[198], and his friend ThurlowWeed might describe the words as "badinage, " in a letter to the London_Times_[199], but the "Newcastle story" continued to be matter forfrequent comment both in the Press and in private circles. 

British Ministers, however, would have paid little attention to Seward'sspeeches intended for home political consumption, or to a careless bitof social talk, had there not been suspicion of other and more seriousevidences of unfriendliness. Lyons was an unusually able andwell-informed Minister, and from the first he had pictured theleadership of Seward in the new administration at Washington, and hadhimself been worried by his inability to understand what policy Sewardwas formulating. But, in fact, he did not see clearly what was going onin the camp of the Republican party now dominant in the North. Theessential feature of the situation was that Seward, generally regardedas the man whose wisdom must guide the ill-trained Lincoln, and himselfthinking this to be his destined function, early found his authoritychallenged by other leaders, and his policies not certain ofacceptance by the President. It is necessary to review, briefly, thesituation at Washington. 

[Illustration: WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD (_From Lord Newton's "Life of LordLyons, " by kind permission_)]

Lincoln was inaugurated as President on March 4. He had been elected asa Republican by a political party never before in power. Many of theleading members of this party were drawn from the older parties and hadbeen in administrative positions in either State or NationalGovernments, but there were no party traditions, save the lately createdone of opposition to the expansion of slavery to the Territories. Allwas new, then, to the men now in power in the National Government, and anew and vital issue, that of secession already declared by sevenSouthern States, had to be met by a definite policy. The importantimmediate question was as to whether Lincoln had a policy, or, if not, upon whom he would depend to guide him. 

In the newly-appointed Cabinet were two men who, in popular estimate, were expected to take the lead--Chase, of Ohio, the Secretary of theTreasury, and Seward, of New York, Secretary of State. Both wereexperienced in political matters and both stood high in the esteem ofthe anti-slavery element in the North, but Seward, all thingsconsidered, was regarded as the logical leading member of the Cabinet. He had been the favoured candidate for Republican Presidentialnomination in 1860, making way for Lincoln only on the theory that thelatter as less Radical on anti-slavery, could be more easily elected. Also, he now held that position which by American tradition was regardedas the highest in the Cabinet. 

In fact, everyone at Washington regarded it as certain that Seward woulddetermine the policy of the new administration. Seward's own attitude iswell summed up in a despatch to his Government, February 18, 1861, byRudolph Schleiden, Minister from the Republic of Bremen. He described aconversation with Seward in regard to his relations with Lincoln:

 "Seward, however, consoled himself with the clever remark, that there is no great difference between an elected president of the United States and an hereditary monarch. The latter is called to the throne through the accident of birth, the former through the chances which make his election possible. The actual direction of public affairs belongs to the leader of the ruling party, here as well as in any hereditary principality. 

 "The future President is a self-made man and there is therefore as little doubt of his energy as of his proverbial honesty ('honest old Abe'). It is also acknowledged that he does not lack common sense. But his other qualities for the highest office are practically unknown. His election may therefore be readily compared with a lottery. It is possible that the United States has drawn the first prize, on the other hand the gain may only have been a small one. But unfortunately the possibility is not excluded that it may have been merely a blank. "

The first paragraph of this quotation reports Seward's opinion; thesecond is apparently Schleiden's own estimate. Two weeks later Schleidensent home a further analysis of Lincoln:

 "He makes the impression of a natural man of clear and healthy mind, great good-naturedness and best intentions. He seems to be fully conscious of the great responsibility which rests upon him. But at the same time it appears as if he had lost some of his famous firmness and resoluteness through the novelty of the conditions which surround him and the hourly renewed attempts from various sides to gain influence over him. He is therefore at present inclined to concede double weight to the superior political experience of his Secretary of State[200]. "

This was written on March 4, and the situation was correctly described. Seward led for the moment, but his supremacy was not unchallenged andsoon a decision was called for that in its final solution was tocompletely overthrow his already matured policy towards the secedingStates. Buchanan had been pressed by South Carolina to yield possessionof federal property in that State and especially to withdraw Federaltroops from Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbour. After some vacillation hehad refused to do this, but had taken no steps to reinforce andre-supply the weak garrison under the command of Major Anderson. OnMarch 5, Lincoln learned that Sumter would soon have to be yieldedunless reinforcements were sent. There followed ten days of delay andindecision; then on March 15 Lincoln requested from each member of hisCabinet an opinion on what should be done. This brought to an issue thewhole question of Seward's policy and leadership. 

For Seward's policy, like that of Buchanan, was one of conciliatorydelay, taking no steps to bring matters to an issue, and trusting totime and a sobering second thought to bring Southern leaders and peopleto a less violent attitude. He sincerely believed in the existence of anas yet unvoiced strong Union sentiment in the South, especially in thoseStates which were wavering on secession. He was holding communications, through intermediaries, with certain Confederate "Commissioners" inWashington, and he had agents in Virginia attempting to influence thatState against secession. To all these Southern representatives he nowconveyed assurances quite without warrant from Lincoln, that Sumterwould be evacuated, acting solely in the belief that his own "policy"would be approved by the President. His argument in reply to Lincoln'scall for an opinion was positive against reinforcing Fort Sumter, and itseemed to meet, for the moment, with the approval of the majority of hisCabinet colleagues. Lincoln himself made no pertinent comment, yet didnot commit himself. 

There the matter rested for a time, for the Confederate Commissioners, regarding Seward's policy of delay as wholly beneficial to the maturingof Southern plans, and Seward "as their cat's-paw[201], " did not care topress for a decision. Moreover, Seward had given a personal pledge thatin case it were, after all, determined to reinforce Sumter, notificationof that determination would at once be given to South Carolina. The dayswent by, and it was not until the last week of March that Lincoln, disillusioned as to the feasibility of Seward's policy of conciliation, reached the conclusion that in his conception of his duty as Presidentof the United States he must defend and retain Federal forts, or attemptto retain them, for the preservation of the Union, and decided toreinforce Fort Sumter. On March 29, the Cabinet assembled at noon andlearned Lincoln's determination. 

This was a sharp blow to Seward's prestige in the Cabinet; it alsothreatened his "peaceful" policy. Yet he did not as yet understand fullythat either supreme leadership, or control of policy, had been assumedby Lincoln. On April 1 he drafted that astonishing document entitled, "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, " which at once revealshis alarm and his supreme personal self-confidence. This documentbegins, "We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet withouta policy either domestic or foreign. " It then advocates as a domesticpolicy, "_Change The Question Before The Public From One Upon Slavery, Or About Slavery_, for a question upon _Union or Disunion_. " Then in asecond section, headed "For Foreign Nations, " there followed:

 "I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once. 

 "I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. 

 "And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France. 

 "Would convene Congress and declare war against them. 

 "But whatever policy we adopt, there must be energetic prosecution of it. 

 "For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly. 

 "Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

 "Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. 

 "It is not in my especial province;

 "But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility[202]. "

Lincoln's reply of the same day, April 1, was characteristically gentle, yet no less positive and definite to any save one obsessed with his ownsuperior wisdom. Lincoln merely noted that Seward's "domestic policy"was exactly his own, except that he did not intend to abandon FortSumter. As to the warlike foreign policy Lincoln pointed out that thiswould be a sharp reversal of that already being prepared in circularsand instructions to Ministers abroad. This was, indeed, the case, forthe first instructions, soon despatched, were drawn on lines ofrecalling to foreign powers their established and long-continuedfriendly relations with the United States. Finally, Lincoln stated asto the required "guiding hand, " "I remark that if this must be done, Imust do it. . . . I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice ofall the Cabinet[203]. "

This should have been clear indication of Lincoln's will to directaffairs, and even to Seward would have been sufficient had he not, momentarily, been so disturbed by the wreck of his pacific policy towardthe South, and as yet so ignorant of the strength of Lincoln's quietpersistence. As it was, he yielded on the immediate issue, the relief ofSumter (though attempting to divert reinforcements to another quarter)but did not as yet wholly yield either his policy of conciliation anddelay, nor give up immediately his insane scheme of saving the Union byplunging it into a foreign war. He was, in fact, still giving assurancesto the Confederate commissioners, through indirect channels, that hecould and would prevent the outbreak of civil war, and in thisconfidence that his ideas would finally control Lincoln he remained upto the second week in April. But on April 8 the first of the shipsdespatched to the aid of Sumter left New York, and on that day GovernorPickens of South Carolina was officially notified of the Northernpurpose. This threw the burden of striking the first blow upon theSouth; if Southern threats were now made good, civil war seemedinevitable, and there could be no peaceful decision of the quarrel. 

The reinforcements did not arrive in time. Fort Sumter, after a day anda half of dogged fighting, was surrendered to the enemy on April 13--foras an enemy in arms the South now stood. The fall of Sumter changed, asin a moment, the whole attitude of the Northern people. There was now anearly unanimous cry for the preservation of the Union _by force_. YetSeward still clung, privately, to his belief that even now the "sobersecond thought" of the South would offer a way out toward reunionwithout war. In official utterances and acts he was apparently incomplete harmony with the popular will to reconquer the South. Davis'proclamation on marque and privateering, of April 17, was answered bythe Lincoln blockade proclamation of April 19. But Virginia had not yetofficially seceded, and until this occurred there seemed to Seward atleast one last straw of conciliation available. In this situationSchleiden, Minister for Bremen, came to Seward on the morning of April24 and offered his services as a mediator[204]. 

Schleiden's idea was that an armistice be agreed upon with the Southuntil the Northern Congress should meet in July, thus giving a breathingspell and permitting saner second judgment to both sides. He hadconsulted with his Prussian colleague, who approved, and he found Sewardfavourable to the plan. Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of theConfederacy, was then at Richmond, and to him, as an old friend, Schleiden proposed to go and make the same appeal. Seward at once tookSchleiden to see Lincoln. The three men, with Chase (and the PrussianMinister) were the only ones in the secret. Lincoln's first comment wasthat he was "willing to make an attempt of contributing to theprevention of bloodshed and regretted that Schleiden had not gone toRichmond without consulting him or Seward. " Lincoln further stated that"he did not have in mind any aggression against the Southern States, butmerely the safety of the Government in the Capitol and the possibilityto govern everywhere, " a concluding phrase that should have enlightenedSchleiden as to Lincoln's determination to preserve the Union. Lincolnsaid he could neither authorize negotiations nor invite proposals, butthat he would gladly consider any such proposals voluntarily made. Schleiden asked for a definite statement as to whether Lincoln wouldrecall the blockade proclamation and sign an armistice if Davis wouldrecall the letters of marque proclamation, but Lincoln refused tocommit himself. 

This was scant encouragement from the President, but Seward stillthought something might result from the venture, and on that evening, April 24, Schleiden started for Richmond, being provided by Seward witha pass through the Union lines. He arrived on the afternoon of thetwenty-fifth, but even before reaching the city was convinced that hismission would be a failure. All along his journey, at each littlestation, he saw excited crowds assembled enthusiastic for secession, bands of militia training, and every indication of preparation for war. Already, on that same day, the Virginia secession ordinance had beenpublished, and the State convention had ratified the provisionalconstitution of the Southern Confederacy. Schleiden immediately notifiedStephens of his presence in Richmond and desire for an interview, andwas at once received. The talk lasted three hours. Stephens was frankand positive in asserting the belief that "all attempts to settlepeacefully the differences between the two sections were futile. " Formalletters were exchanged after this conference, but in these the extent towhich Stephens would go was to promise to use his influence in favour ofgiving consideration to any indication made by the North of a desire"for an amicable adjustment of the questions at issue, " and he waspositive that there could be no return of the South to the Union. 

On the afternoon of April 27 Schleiden was back in Washington. He foundthat three days had made a great change in the sentiment of the Capitol. "During my short absence, " he wrote, "many thousands of volunteers hadarrived from the North. There was not only a feeling of securitynoticeable, but even of combativeness. " He found Seward not at alldisposed to pursue the matter, and was not given an opportunity to talkto Lincoln; therefore, he merely submitted copies of the letters thathad passed between him and Stephens, adding for himself that the Southwas arming _because_ of Lincoln's proclamation calling for volunteers. Seward replied on April 29, stating his personal regards and that he hadno fault to find with Schleiden's efforts, but concluding that Stephens'letters gave no ground for action since the "Union of these States isthe supreme as it is the organic law of this country, " and must bemaintained. 

This adventure to Richmond by the Minister of Bremen may be regarded asSeward's last struggle to carry out his long-pursued policy ofconciliatory delay. He had not officially sent Schleiden to Richmond, but he had grasped eagerly at the opening and had encouraged and aidedSchleiden in his journey. Now, by April 27, hope had vanished, andSeward's "domestic policy, " as set forth in his "Thoughts for thePresident's Consideration" on April 1, was discredited, and inevitably, in some measure, their author also. The dates are important inappreciating Seward's purposes. On April 27, the day of Schleiden'sreturn to Washington, there was sent to Adams that "sharp" despatch, taking issue with British action as foreshadowed by Dallas on April 9, and concluding by instructing Adams to lose no time in warning Russellthat such action would be regarded by the United States as "injurious toits rights and derogating from its dignity[205]. " It appears, therefore, that Seward, defeated on one line of "policy, " eager to regain prestige, and still obsessed with the idea that some means could yet be found toavert domestic conflict, was, on April 27, beginning to pick at thosethreads which, to his excited thought, might yet save the Union througha foreign war. He was now seeking to force the acceptance of the second, and alternative, portion of his "Thoughts for the President. "

Seward's theory of the cementing effect of a foreign war was no secretat Washington. As early as January 26 he had unfolded to Schleiden thisfantastic plan. "If the Lord would only give the United States an excusefor a war with England, France, or Spain, " he said "that would be thebest means of re-establishing internal peace[206]. " Again, on February10, he conversed with Schleiden on the same topic, and complained thatthere was no foreign complication offering an excuse for a break. Lyonsknew of this attitude, and by February 4 had sent Russell a warning, towhich the latter had replied on February 20 that England could afford tobe patient for a time but that too much "blustering demonstration" mustnot be indulged in. But the new administration, as Lincoln had remarkedin his reply to Seward on April 1, had taken quite another line, addressing foreign powers in terms of high regard for establishedfriendly relations. This was the tone of Seward's first instruction toAdams, April 10[207], in the concluding paragraph of which Seward wrote, "The United States are not indifferent to the circumstances of commondescent, language, customs, sentiments, and religion, which recommend acloser sympathy between themselves and Great Britain than either mightexpect in its intercourse with any other nation. " True, on this basis, Seward claimed a special sympathy from Great Britain for the UnitedStates, that is to say, the North, but most certainly the tone of thisfirst instruction was one of established friendship. 

Yet now, April 27, merely on learning from Dallas that Russell "refusesto pledge himself" on British policy, Seward resorts to threats. Whatother explanation is possible except that, seeking to save his domesticpolicy of conciliation and to regain his leadership, he now wasadventuring toward the application of his "foreign war panacea" idea. Lyons quickly learned of the changed tone, and that England, especially, was to hear American complaint. On May 2 Lyons wrote to Russell incypher characterizing Seward as "arrogant and reckless toward ForeignPowers[208]. " Evidently Seward was making little concealment of hisbelligerent attitude, and when the news was received of the speeches inParliament of the first week in May by which it became clear that GreatBritain would declare neutrality and was planning joint action withFrance, he became much excited. On May 17 he wrote a letter homeexhibiting, still, an extraordinary faith in his own wisdom and his ownforeign policy. 

 "A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to save it had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence, needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not do too much for my country, lest some advantage may revert indirectly to my own fame. 

 ". . . They have misunderstood things fearfully, in Europe, Great Britain is in danger of sympathizing so much with the South, for the sake of peace and cotton, as to drive us to make war against her, as the ally of the traitors. . . . I am trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cabinet before it is too late[209]. "

The "bold remonstrance" was the famous "Despatch No. 10, " of May 21, already commented upon in the preceding chapter. But as sent to Adamsit varied in very important details from the draft submitted by Sewardto Lincoln[210]. 

Seward's draft was not merely a "remonstrance"; it was a challenge. Itslanguage implied that the United States desired war, and Seward's planwas to have Adams read the despatch to Russell, give him a copy of it, and then discontinue diplomatic relations so long as Russell held eitherofficial or unofficial intercourse with the Southern Commissioners. Thislast instruction was, indeed, retained in the final form of thedespatch, but here, as elsewhere, Lincoln modified the stiff expressionsof the original. Most important of all, he directed Adams to considerthe whole despatch as for his own guidance, relying on his discretion. The despatch, as amended, began with the statement that the UnitedStates "neither means to menace Great Britain nor to wound thesensibilities of that or any other European nation. . . . The paper itselfis not to be read or shown to the British Secretary of State, nor any ofits positions to be prematurely, unnecessarily, or indiscreetly madeknown. But its spirit will be your guide[211]. " Thus were the teethskilfully drawn from the threat of war. Even the positive instructions, later in the despatch, as to the Southern Commissioners, need not havebeen acted upon by Adams had he not thought it wise to do so. But evenwith alterations, the American remonstrance was so bold as to alarmAdams. On first perusual he wrote in his diary, June 10, "The Governmentseems almost ready to declare war with all the powers of Europe, andalmost instructs me to withdraw from communication with the Ministershere in a certain contingency. . . . I scarcely know how to understand Mr. Seward. The rest of the Government may be demented for all I know; buthe surely is calm and wise. My duty here is in so far as I can do ithonestly to prevent the irritation from coming to a downright quarrel. It seems to me like throwing the game into the hands of the enemy[212]. "

Adams, a sincere admirer of Seward, was in error as to the source ofAmerican belligerent attitude. Fortunately, his judgment of what waswise at the moment coincided with that of Lincoln's--though of this hehad no knowledge. In the event Adams' skilful handling of the situationresulted favourably--even to the cessation of intercourse betweenRussell and the Southern Commissioners. For his part, Lincoln, no morethan earlier, was to be hurried into foreign complications, and Seward's"foreign war panacea" was stillborn. 

The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for Sewardat last realized that the President intended to control policy, andthough it was yet long before he came to appreciate fully Lincoln'scustomary calm judgment, he did understand the relation now establishedbetween himself and his chief. Henceforth, he obeyed orders, thoughfree in suggestion and criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter, avowedly ignorant of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and thealtered despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered themsimple and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise withForeign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a "leak"of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard to DespatchNo. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of influence bySeward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This was particularlytrue of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was against England thatSeward most directed his enmity. There resulted for British diplomatsboth at Washington and in London a deep-seated suspicion of Seward, longafter he had made a complete face-about in policy. This suspicioninfluenced relations greatly in the earlier years of the Civil War. 

On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote a longtwelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of Seward'swarlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly ignorant offoreign countries, and of foreign affairs. " "Seward, having loststrength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking to recoverinfluence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the Cabinet isstrong enough to combat him. " Britain, Lyons thought, should maintain astiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and make close contacts withFrance. He was evidently anxious to impress upon Russell that Sewardreally might mean war, but he declared the chief danger to lie in thefact of American belief that England and France could not be driven intowar with the United States, and that they would submit to any insult. Lyons urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), tocorrect this false impression[213]. Again, on the next day, May 21, theinformation in his official despatch was repeated in a private letter toRussell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as mere bluster. Yethe is not absolutely sure of this, and in any case insists that the bestpreventative of war with the United States is to show that England isready for it[214]. 

It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington. May 22, he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him to makedefensive preparation[215]. The following day he dilated to Russell, privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the bounds ofdecency even in ordinary social intercourse[216] . . . " and in an officialcommunication of this same day he records Washington rumours of abelligerent despatch read by Seward before the Cabinet, of objections byother members, and that Seward's insistence has carried the day[217]. That Seward was, in fact, still smarting over his reverse is shown by aletter, written on this same May 23, to his intimate friend andpolitical adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had evidently cautioned him againstprecipitate action. Seward wrote, "The European phase is bad. But yourapprehension that I may be too decisive alarms me more. Will youconsent, or advise us to consent, that Adams and Dayton have audiencesand compliments in the Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs'[Confederate Secretary of State] emissaries have access to hisbedroom[218]?"

Two interpretations are possible from this: either that Seward knowinghimself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had not yetyielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the changes made in hisDespatch No. 10. The former interpretation seems the more likely, forthough Seward continued to write for a time "vigorous" despatches toAdams, they none of them approached the vigour of even the amendeddespatch. Moreover, the exact facts of the Cabinet of May 21, and thecomplete reversal of Seward's policy were sufficiently known by May 24to have reached the ears of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter toBremen of that date[219]. And on the same day Seward himself toldSchleiden that he did "not fear any longer that it would come to a breakwith England[220]. " On May 27 Lyons himself, though still suspiciousthat an attempt was being made to separate France and England, was ableto report a better tone from Seward[221]. 

British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but theywere disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of theAmerican Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell incomment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These communications are veryunpleasant. It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish anduncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from politicalcalculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222]. " He believedthat more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionarymeasure, but, he added, "the main Force for Defence must, of course, belocal"--a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by BritishMinisters. Russell was less perturbed. He had previously expressedappreciation of Adams' conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made avery favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223], "and he now wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encouragehim in a game of brag with England. . . . I am sorry Seward turns out soreckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man[224]. " But atWashington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As aresult of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, notCabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6, stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by theUnited States against Great Britain appears to me by no meansimpossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225]. "This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon theprobability of war, and ending with Lyons' opinion of how it should beconducted. England should strike at once with the largest possible navalforce and bring the war to an end before the United States couldprepare. Otherwise, "the spirit, the energy, and the resources of thispeople" would make them difficult to overcome. England, on her part, must be prepared to suffer severely from American privateers, and shewould be forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keepingSouthern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter andadvice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled to writeit by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he would exertevery effort and use every method to conciliate America[226]. 

In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that had sorenewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press reception ofthe news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. The Northern people, counting beyond all reasonable expectation upon British sympathy onanti-slavery grounds, had been angrily disappointed, and were at themoment loudly voicing their vexation. Had Seward not already been turnedfrom his foreign war policy he now would have received strong publicsupport in it. But he made no effort to utilize public excitement to hisown advantage in the Cabinet. In England, Adams was able to report onJune 14 that Russell had no intention of holding further interviews withthe Southern Commissioners[227], but before anyone in Washington couldlearn of this there was general knowledge of a changed tone from theSecretary of State, and Lyons' fears were considerably allayed. On June15, occurred that interview between Seward, Lyons, and Mercier, in whichSeward had positively refused to receive the Queen's Proclamation, buthad throughout evinced the greatest courtesy and goodwill. Lyons soreported the conversation[228]. June 15 may, in fact, be taken as thedate when Lyons ceased to be alarmed over an immediate war. Possibly hefound it a little difficult to report so sudden a shift from stormy tofair weather. June 21, he wrote that the "lull" was stillcontinuing[229]. June 24, he at last learned and described at length thedetails of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10[230]. He did notknow the exact date but he expressed the opinion that "a month or threeweeks ago" war was very near--a misjudgment, since it should beremembered that war seemed advisable to one man only--Seward; and thaton this issue he had been definitely cast down from his self-assumedleadership into the ranks of Lincoln's lieutenants. 

Lyons was, then, nearly a month behindhand in exact knowledge ofAmerican foreign policy toward England, and he was in error in thinkingthat an American attack on England was either imminent or intended. Nevertheless, he surely was excusable, considering Seward's prestige andLincoln's lack of it, in reporting as he did. It was long, indeed, before he could escape from suspicion of Seward's purposes, thoughdropping, abruptly, further comment on the chances of war. A monthlater, on July 20, he wrote that Seward had himself asked for aconfidential and unofficial interview, in order to make clear that therenever had been any intention of stirring agitation against England. Personally, Seward took credit for avoiding trouble "by refusing to takeofficial cognizance of the recognition [by England] of the belligerentrights of the South, " and he asked Lyons to explain to Russell thatprevious strong language was intended merely to make foreign Powersunderstand the intensity of Northern feeling[231]. 

Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change, mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone, " and not at all tothe veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the utmostbounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in London, Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of the Queen'sProclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to Adams'representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone" consisted. 

Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons was the receipt of adespatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had reportedthat all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that the knowledgein Washington of the result of their previous interviews had broughtsatisfaction, and Russell, for his part, said that Lyons had "learned, through another member of the diplomatic corps, that no furtherexpression of opinion on the subject in question would benecessary[232]. " This referred, presumably, to the question of Britishintention, for the future, in relation to the Proclamation ofNeutrality. Adams wrote: "This led to the most frank and pleasantconversation which I have yet had with his lordship. . . . I added that Ibelieved the popular feeling in the United States would subside themoment that all the later action on this side was known. . . . My ownreception has been all that I could desire. I attach value to this, however, only as it indicates the establishment of a policy that willkeep us at peace during the continuance of the present convulsion. " Inreply to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after hisinterview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view that theBritish Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel was notdefensible in international law. There was not now, nor later, anyyielding on this point. But, for the present, this was intended forAdams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by a disclaimer, muchas stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great Britain:

 "I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I may at any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or measure of recognition of the insurgents by the government of Great Britain. I write in the same spirit now; and I invoke on the part of the British government, as I propose to exercise on my own, the calmness which all counsellors ought to practise in debates which involve the peace and happiness of mankind[233]. "

Diplomatic correspondence couched in the form of platform oratory leadsto the suspicion that the writer is thinking, primarily, of the ultimatepublication of his despatches. Thus Seward seems to have been laying theground for a denial that he had ever developed a foolish foreign warpolicy. History pins him to that folly. But in another respect theinterview with Lyons on July 20 and the letter to Adams of the dayfollowing overthrow for both Seward and for the United States theaccusations sometimes made that it was the Northern disaster at BullRun, July 21, in the first pitched battle with the South, which mademore temperate the Northern tone toward foreign powers[234]. It is truethat the despatch to Adams was not actually sent until July 26, butinternal evidence shows it to have been written on the 21st before therewas any news from the battle-field, and the interview with Lyons on the20th proves that the military set-back had no influence on Seward'sfriendly expressions. Moreover, these expressions officially made werebut a delayed voicing of a determination of policy arrived at many weeksearlier. The chronology of events and despatches cited in this chapterwill have shown that the refusal of Lincoln to follow Seward'sleadership, and the consequent lessening of the latter's "high tone, "preceded any news whatever from England, lightening the firstimpressions. The Administration at Washington did not on May 21, evenknow that England had issued a Proclamation of Neutrality; it knewmerely of Russell's statement that one would have to be issued; and thefriendly explanations of Russell to Adams were not received inWashington until the month following. 

In itself, Seward's "foreign war panacea" policy does not deserve theplace in history usually accorded it as a moment of extreme crisis inBritish-American relations. There was never any danger of war from it, for Lincoln nipped the policy in the bud. The public excitement inAmerica over the Queen's Proclamation was, indeed, intense; but this didnot alter the Governmental attitude. In England all that the public knewwas this American irritation and clamour. The London press expresseditself a bit more cautiously, for the moment, merely defending thenecessity of British neutrality[235]. But if regarded from the effectupon British Ministers the incident was one of great, possibly evenvital, importance in the relations of the two countries. Lyons had beengravely anxious to the point of alarm. Russell, less acutely alarmed, was yet seriously disturbed. Both at Washington and in London thesuspicion of Seward lasted throughout the earlier years of the war, andto British Ministers it seemed that at any moment he might recoverleadership and revert to a dangerous mood. British attitude towardAmerica was affected in two opposite ways; Britain was determined not tobe bullied, and Russell himself sometimes went to the point of arrogancein answer to American complaints; this was an unfortunate result. Butmore fortunate, and _also a result_, was the British Government'sdetermination to step warily in the American conflict and to give nojust cause, unless on due consideration of policy, for a rupture ofrelations with the United States. Seward's folly in May of 1861, fromevery angle but a short-lived "brain-storm, " served America well in thefirst years of her great crisis. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 197: See _ante_, p. 80. ]

[Footnote 198: Barnes, _Life of Thurlow Weed_, II, p. 378. Seward toWeed, December 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 199: _Ibid. _, p. 355. Weed's letter was on the _Trent_ affair, but he went out of his way to depict Seward as attempting a bit ofhumour with Newcastle. ]

[Footnote 200: Schleiden, a native of Schleswig, was educated at theUniversity of Berlin, and entered the Danish customs service. In theGerman revolution of 1848 he was a delegate from Schleswig-Holstein tothe Frankfort Parliament. After the failure of that revolution hewithdrew to Bremen and in 1853 was sent by that Republic to the UnitedStates as Minister. By 1860 he had become one of the best known andsocially popular of the Washington diplomatic corps, holding intimaterelations with leading Americans both North and South. His reports onevents preceding and during the Civil War were examined in the archivesof Bremen in 1910 by Dr. Ralph H. Lutz when preparing his doctor'sthesis, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den VereinigtenStaaten während des Sezessionskrieges" (Heidelberg, 1911). My facts withregard to Schleiden are drawn in part from this thesis, in part from anarticle by him, "Rudolph Schleiden and the Visit to Richmond, April 25, 1861, " printed in the _Annual Report of the American HistoricalAssociation_ for 1915, pp. 207-216. Copies of some of Schleiden'sdespatches are on deposit in the Library of Congress among the papers ofCarl Schurz. Through the courtesy of Mr. Frederic Bancroft, whoorganized the Schurz papers, I have been permitted to take copies of afew Schleiden dispatches relating to the visit to Richmond, an incidentapparently unknown to history until Dr. Lutz called attention to it. ]

[Footnote 201: This is Bancroft's expression. _Seward_, II, p. 118. ]

[Footnote 202: Lincoln, _Works_, II, 29. ]

[Footnote 203: _Ibid. _, p. 30. ]

[Footnote 204: For references to this whole matter of Schleiden's visitto Richmond see _ante_, p. 116, note 1. ]

[Footnote 205: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 82. This, andother despatches have been examined at length in the previous chapter inrelation to the American protest on the Queen's Proclamation ofNeutrality. In the present chapter they are merely noted again in theirbearing on Seward's "foreign war policy. "]

[Footnote 206: Quoted by Lutz, _Am. Hist. Assn. Rep_. 1915, p. 210. ]

[Footnote 207: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 80. Thisdespatch was read by Seward on April 8 to W. H. Russell, correspondentof the _Times_, who commented that it contained some elements of dangerto good relations, but it is difficult to see to what he could have hadobjection. --Russell, _My Diary_, I, p. 103. ]

[Footnote 208: Russell Papers. ]

[Footnote 209: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 169. ]

[Footnote 210: Yet at this very time Seward was suggesting, May 14, toPrussia, Great Britain, France, Russia and Holland a joint navaldemonstration with America against Japan because of anti-foreigndemonstrations in that country. This has been interpreted as an attemptto tie European powers to the United States in such a way as to hamperany friendly inclination they may have entertained toward theConfederacy (Treat, _Japan and the United States_, 1853-1921, pp. 49-50. Also Dennet, "Seward's Far Eastern Policy, " in _Am. Hist. Rev_. , Vol. XXVIII, No. 1. Dennet, however, also regards Seward's overture as inharmony with his determined policy in the Far East. ) Like Seward'soverture, made a few days before, to Great Britain for a convention toguarantee the independence of San Domingo (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 763, No. 196, Lyons to Russell, May 12, 1861) the proposal on Japan seems to me tohave been an erratic feeling-out of international attitude while in theprocess of developing a really serious policy--the plunging of Americainto a foreign war. ]

[Footnote 211: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 88. The exactfacts of Lincoln's alteration of Despatch No. 10, though soon known indiplomatic circles, were not published until the appearance in 1890 ofNicolay and Hay's _Lincoln_, where the text of a portion of theoriginal draft, with Lincoln's changes were printed (IV, p. 270). GideonWelles, Secretary of the Navy in Lincoln's Cabinet, published a shortbook in 1874, _Lincoln and Seward_, in which the story was told, butwithout dates and so vaguely that no attention was directed to it. Apparently the matter was not brought before the Cabinet and thecontents of the despatch were known only to Lincoln, Seward, and theChairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Sumner. ]

[Footnote 212: C. F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris, " p. 21. Reprint from _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81. ]

[Footnote 213: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 764, No. 206. Confidential. ]

[Footnote 214: Russell Papers. This letter has been printed, in part, inNewton, _Lyons_, I, 41. ]

[Footnote 215: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 216: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, May 23, 1861. ]

[Footnote 217: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 764, No. 209, Confidential, Lyons toRussell, May 23, 1861. A brief "extract" from this despatch was printedin the British _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States, " No. 48. The"extract" in question consists of two short paragraphs only, printed, without any indication of important elisions, in each of theparagraphs. ]

[Footnote 218: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 174. ]

[Footnote 219: Lutz, "Notes. " The source of Schleiden's information isnot given in his despatch. He was intimate with many persons closely intouch with events, especially with Sumner, Chairman of the SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations, and with Blair, a member ofthe Cabinet. ]

[Footnote 220: _Ibid. _, Schleiden to Republic of Bremen, May 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 221: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 179, sets the date as June 8when Seward's instructions for England and France show that he had"recovered his balance. " This is correct for the change in tone ofdespatches, but the acceptance of Lincoln's policy must have beenimmediate. C. F. Adams places the date for Seward's complete change ofpolicy much later, describing his "war mania" as lasting until theNorthern defeat of Bull Run, July 21. I think this an error, andevidence that it is such appears later in the present chapter. SeeCharles Francis Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris, " _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81. ]

[Footnote 222: Russell Papers. ]

[Footnote 223: Lyons Papers, May 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 224: _Ibid. _, Russell to Lyons, May 25, 1861. ]

[Footnote 225: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 765, No. 253. ]

[Footnote 226: _Ibid. _, No. 263, Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861. ]

[Footnote 227: See _ante_, p. 106. ]

[Footnote 228: See _ante_, p. 102. Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181, usingSeward's description to Adams _(U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1861-2, p. 106) of this interview expands upon the Secretary's skill in thuspreventing a joint notification by England and France of their intentionto act together. He rightly characterizes Seward's tactics as"diplomatic skill of the best quality. " But in Lyons' report theemphasis is placed upon Seward's courtesy in argument, and Lyons feltthat the knowledge of British-French joint action had been madesufficiently clear by his taking Mercier with him and by their commonthough unofficial representation to Seward. ]

[Footnote 229: Russell Papers. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 230: _Ibid_, To Russell. Lyons' source of information was notrevealed. ]

[Footnote 231: _Ibid. _, To Russell. ]

[Footnote 232: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 110. ]

[Footnote 233: _Ibid. _, p. 118. To Adams. ]

[Footnote 234: C. F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris. " p. 29, and so argued by the author throughout this monograph. I think thisan error. ]

[Footnote 235: The _Spectator_, friend of the North, argued, June 15, 1861, that the Queen's Proclamation was the next best thing for theNorth to a definite British alliance. Southern privateers could not nowbe obtained from England. And the United States was surely too proud toaccept direct British aid. ]

CHAPTER V

THE DECLARATION OF PARIS NEGOTIATION

If regarded merely from the view-point of strict chronology thereaccompanied Seward's "foreign war" policy a negotiation with GreatBritain which was of importance as the first effort of the AmericanSecretary of State to bring European nations to a definite support ofthe Northern cause. It was also the first negotiation undertaken byAdams in London, and as a man new to the diplomatic service he attachedto it an unusual importance, even, seemingly, to the extent ofpermitting personal chagrin at the ultimate failure of the negotiationto distort his usually cool and fair judgment. The matter in questionwas the offer of the United States to accede by a convention to theDeclaration of Paris of 1856, establishing certain international rulesfor the conduct of maritime warfare. 

This negotiation has received scant attention in history. It failed toresult in a treaty, therefore it has appeared to be negligible. Yet itwas at the time of very great importance in affecting the attitudetoward each other of Great Britain and the United States, and of the menwho spoke for their respective countries. The bald facts of thenegotiation appear with exactness in Moore's _Digest of InternationalLaw_[236], but without comment as to motives, and, more briefly, inBernard's _Neutrality of Great Britain during the American CivilWar_[237], at the conclusion of which the author writes, with sarcasm, "I refrain from any comment on this negotiation[238]. " Nicolay and Hay's_Lincoln_, and Rhodes' _United States_, give the matter but passing andinadequate treatment. It was reviewed in some detail in the Americanargument before the Geneva court of arbitration in the case of the_Alabama_, but was there presented merely as a part of the generalAmerican complaint of British neutrality. In fact, but three historicalstudents, so far as the present writer has been able to discover, haveexamined this negotiation in detail and presented their conclusions asto purposes and motives--so important to an understanding of Britishintentions at the moment when the flames of civil war were rapidlyspreading in America. 

These three, each with an established historical reputation, exhibitdecided differences in interpretation of diplomatic incidents anddocuments. The first careful analysis was presented by Henry Adams, sonof the American Minister in London during the Civil War, and then actingas his private secretary, in his _Historical Essays_, published in 1891;the second study is by Bancroft, in his _Life of Seward_, 1900; whilethe third is by Charles Francis Adams (also son of the AmericanMinister), who, in his _Life_ of his father, published 1900, gave achapter to the subject and treated it on lines similar to those laiddown by his brother Henry, but who, in 1912, came to the conclusion, through further study, that he had earlier been in error and developed avery different view in a monograph entitled, "Seward and the Declarationof Paris. "

[Illustration: C. F. ADAMS (_From a photograph in the United StatesEmbassy, London, by kind permission_)]

If these historiographic details seem unduly minute, partaking as theydo of the nature of a foot-note, in a work otherwise general intreatment, the author's answer is that the personality of two of thewriters mentioned and their intimate knowledge of the effect of thenegotiation upon the mind of the American Minister in London arethemselves important historical data; a further answer is the factthat the materials now available from the British Foreign Officearchives throw much new light both on the course of the negotiation andon British purposes. It is here planned, therefore, first to review themain facts as previously known; second, to summarize the arguments andconclusions of the three historians; third, to re-examine thenegotiation in the light of the new material; and, finally, to expressan opinion on its conduct and conclusions as an evidence ofBritish policy. 

In 1854, during the Crimean War, Great Britain and France, the chiefmaritime belligerents engaged against Russia, voluntarily agreed torespect neutral commerce under either the neutral's or the enemy's flag. This was a distinct step forward in the practice of maritime warfare, the accepted international rules of which had not been formally alteredsince the Napoleonic period. The action of Great Britain was due inpart, according to a later statement in Parliament by Palmerston, March18, 1862, to a fear that unless a greater respect were paid thanformerly to neutral rights, the Allies would quickly win the ill-will ofthe United States, then the most powerful maritime neutral, and wouldrun the danger of forcing that country into belligerent alliance withRussia[239]. No doubt there were other reasons, also, for the barbarousrules and practices of maritime warfare in earlier times were by nowregarded as semi-civilized by the writers of all nations. Certainly theaction of the belligerents in 1854 met with general approval and in theresult was written into international law at the Congress of Paris in1856, where, at the conclusion of the war, the belligerents and someleading neutrals were gathered. 

The Declaration of Paris on maritime warfare covered four points:

 "1. Privateering is, and remains, abolished. 

 "2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. 

 "3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 

 "4. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy[240]. "

This agreement was adopted by Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey, and it was further agreed that a generalinvitation to accede should be extended to all nations, but with theproviso "that the powers which shall have signed it, or which shallaccede thereto, shall not in future enter into any arrangement, concerning the application of the law of neutrals in time of war, whichdoes not rest altogether upon the four principles embodied in the saiddeclaration[241]. " In other words it must be accepted in whole, and notin part, and the powers acceding pledging themselves not to enter intoany subsequent treaties or engagements on maritime law which did notstipulate observance of all four points. Within a short time nearly allthe maritime nations of the world had given official adherence to theDeclaration of Paris. 

But the United States refused to do so. She had long stood in theadvance guard of nations demanding respect for neutral rights. Little bylittle her avowed principles of international law as regards neutrals, first scoffed at, had crept into acceptance in treaty stipulations. Secretary of State Marcy now declared, in July, 1856, that the UnitedStates would accede to the Declaration if a fifth article were added toit protecting all private property at sea, when not contraband. Thiscovered not only cargo, but the vessel as well, and its effect wouldhave been to exclude from belligerent operations non-contraband enemy'sgoods under the enemy's flag, if goods and ship were privately owned. Maritime warfare on the high seas would have been limited to battlesbetween governmentally operated war-ships. Unless this rule were adoptedalso, Secretary Marcy declared that "the United States could not forgothe right to send out privateers, which in the past had proved her mosteffective maritime weapon in time of war, and which, since she had nolarge navy, were essential to her fighting power. "

"War on private property, " said the Americans, "had been abolished onland; why should it not be abolished also on the sea?" The Americanproposal met with general support among the smaller maritime nations. Itwas believed that the one great obstacle to the adoption of Marcy'samendment lay in the naval supremacy of Great Britain, and that obstacleproved insurmountable. Thus the United States refused to accede to theDeclaration, and there the matter rested until 1861. But on April 17Jefferson Davis proclaimed for the Southern Confederacy the issue ofprivateers against Northern commerce. On April 24 Seward instructedrepresentatives abroad, recounting the Marcy proposal and expressing thehope that it still might meet with a favourable reception, butauthorizing them to enter into conventions for American adherence to theDeclaration of 1856 on the four points alone. This instruction was sentto the Ministers in Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Denmark; and on May 10 to the Netherlands. 

Having received this instruction, Adams, at the close of his firstmeeting with Russell on May 18, after having developed at length theAmerican position relative to the issue of the British Proclamation ofNeutrality, briefly added that he was directed to offer adherence bymeans of a convention, to the Declaration of Paris. Russell replied thatGreat Britain was willing to negotiate, but "seemed to desire to leavethe subject in the hands of Lord Lyons, to whom he intimated that he hadalready transmitted authority[242]. . . . " Adams therefore did not pressthe matter, waiting further information and instruction from Washington. Nearly two weeks earlier Russell had, in fact, approached the Governmentof France with a suggestion that the two leading maritime powers shouldpropose to the American belligerents adherence to the second and thirdarticles of the Declaration of Paris. France had agreed and the date ofRussell's instruction to Lyons was May 18, the day of the interview withAdams. Confusion now arose in both London and Washington as to the placewhere the arrangement was to be concluded. The causes of this confusionwill be considered later in this chapter; here it is sufficient to notethat the negotiation was finally undertaken at London. 

On July 18 Russell informed Adams that Great Britain was ready to enterinto a convention with the United States, provided a similar conventionwas signed with France at the same time. This convention, as submittedby Adams, simply recorded an agreement by the two powers to abide by thefour points of the Declaration of Paris, using the exact wording of thatdocument[243]. Adams' draft had been communicated to Russell on July 13. There then followed a delay required by the necessity of securingsimilar action by Dayton, the American Minister at Paris, but on July 29Adams reported to Russell that this had been done and that he was readyto sign. Two days later, July 31, Russell replied that he, also, wasready, but concluded his letter, "I need scarcely add that on the partof Great Britain the engagement will be prospective, and will notinvalidate anything already done[244]. " It was not until August 8, however, that Cowley, the British Ambassador to France, reported thatDayton had informed Thouvenel, French Foreign Minister, that he wasready to sign the similar convention with France[245]. With nounderstanding, apparently, of the causes of further delay, andprofessing complete ignorance of the meaning of Russell's phrase, justquoted[246], Adams waited the expected invitation to an officialinterview for the affixing of signatures. Since it was a condition ofthe negotiation that this should be done simultaneously in London andParis, the further delay that now occurred caused him no misgivings. 

On August 19 Russell requested Adams to name a convenient day "in thecourse of this week, " and prefaced this request with the statement thathe enclosed a copy of a Declaration which he proposed to make inwriting, upon signing the convention. "You will observe, " he wrote, "that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature ofthe engagement to be taken by Her Majesty. " The proposedDeclaration read:

 "In affixing his signature to the Convention of this day between Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order of Her Majesty, that Her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States[247]. "

Under his instructions to negotiate a convention for a pure and simpleadherence to the Declaration of Paris, Adams could not now go on toofficial signature. Nor was he inclined to do so. Sincerely believing, as he stated to Russell in a communication of August 23, that the UnitedStates was "acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish apermanent doctrine for all time, " and with the object of "amelioratingthe horrors of warfare all over the globe, " he objected "to accompanythe act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous, " which on theface of it seemed to imply a suspicion on the part of Great Britain thatthe United States was "desirous at this time to take a part in theDeclaration [of Paris], not from any high purpose or durable policy, butwith the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappystruggle which is going on at home[248]. " He also pointed out thatRussell's proposed declaration either was or was not a part of theconvention. If it was a part then the Senate of the United States mustratify it as well as the convention itself, and he would have gonebeyond his instructions in submitting it. If not a part of theconvention there could be no advantage in making the Declaration since, unratified by the Senate, it would have no force. Adams thereforedeclined to proceed further with the matter until he had received newinstructions from Washington. 

To this Russell answered, August 28, with a very explicit exposition ofhis reasons. Great Britain, he said, had declared her neutrality in theAmerican conflict, thereby recognizing the belligerent rights of theSouth. It followed that the South "might by the law of nations armprivateers, " and that these "must be regarded as the armed vessels of abelligerent. " But the United States had refused to recognize the statusof belligerency, and could therefore maintain that privateers issued bythe Southern States were in fact pirates, and might argue that aEuropean Power signing a convention with the United States, embodyingthe principles of the Declaration of Paris, "would be bound to treat theprivateers of the so-called Confederate States as pirates. " HenceRussell pointed out, the two countries, arguing from contradictorypremises as to the status of the conflict in America, might becomeinvolved in charges of bad faith and of violation of the convention. Hehad therefore merely intended by his suggested declaration to preventany misconception by the United States. 

 "It is in this spirit that Her Majesty's Government decline to bind themselves, without a clear explanation on their part, to a Convention which, seemingly confined to an adoption of the Declaration of Paris of 1856, might be construed as an engagement to interfere in the unhappy dissensions now prevailing in the United States; an interference which would be contrary to Her Majesty's public declarations, and would be a reversal of the policy which Her Majesty has deliberately sanctioned[249]. "

Thus the negotiation closed. Seward in declining to accept the proposeddeclaration gave varying reasons in his instructions to Adams, inLondon, and to Dayton, in Paris, for an exactly similar declaration hadbeen insisted upon by France, but he did not argue the question save ingeneralities. He told Dayton that the supposed possible "intervention"which Great Britain and France seemed to fear they would be called uponto make was exactly the action which the United States desired toforestall, and he notified Adams that he could not consent since theproposed Declaration "would be virtually a new and distinct articleincorporated into the projected convention[250]. " The first formalnegotiation of the United States during the Civil War, and of the newAmerican Minister in London, had come to an inglorious conclusion. Diplomats and Foreign Secretaries were, quite naturally, disturbed, andwere even suspicious of each others' motives, but the public, not at themoment informed save on the American offer and the result, paid littleattention to these "inner circle" controversies[251]. 

What then were the hidden purposes, if such existed, of the negotiatingpowers. The first answer in historical writing was that offered by HenryAdams[252], in an essay entitled "The Declaration of Paris, 1861, " inthe preparation of which the author studied with care all the diplomaticcorrespondence available in print[253]. His treatment presents Russellas engaged in a policy of deception with the view of obtaining anultimate advantage to Great Britain in the field of commercial rivalryand maritime supremacy. Following Henry Adams' argument Russell, on May9, brought to the attention of France a proposal for a joint request onthe American belligerents to respect the second and third articles ofthe Declaration of Paris, and received an acquiescent reply. After somefurther exchanges of proposed terms of instructions to the British andFrench Ministers at Washington, Russell, on May 18, sent a despatch toLyons with instructions for his action. On this same day Russell, in hisfirst interview with Adams, "before these despatches [to Lyons] couldhave left the Foreign Office, " and replying to Adams' proposal tonegotiate on the Declaration of Paris as a _whole_--that is to say, onall four articles--intimated that instructions had already gone toLyons, with directions to assent to any modification of the article onprivateering that the United States might desire. Adams understoodRussell to prefer that the negotiation (for such Adams thought it was tobe) should take place in Washington, and did not press the matter. 

This was deliberate deceit; first in a statement of fact since theinterview with Adams took place at noon on May 18, at Russell's countryhouse nine miles from London, and in all reasonable supposition thedespatch to Lyons would not have been sent until the Foreign Secretary'sreturn to his office; second because Lyons was not instructed to_negotiate_ on the Declaration. The interpretation is justifiedtherefore that Russell "evaded the offer of the United StatesGovernment. " The result of this evasion was delay, but when Sewardlearned from Lyons that he had no authority to negotiate a conventionand Adams received renewed instructions to proceed, the latter "kept histemper, but the affair made a lasting impression on his mind, and shookhis faith in the straightforwardness of the British Government. " Inrenewing his overtures at London, Adams made explanations of theprevious "misunderstanding" and to these Russell replied with further"inaccuracies" as to what had been said at the first interview. 

Thus beginning his survey with an assertion of British deceit andevasion from the very outset, and incidentally remarking that Lyons, atWashington, "made little disguise of his leanings" toward the South, Henry Adams depicts Russell as leading France along a line of policydistinctly unfriendly to the North. Examining each point in thenegotiation as already narrated, he summarized it as follows:

 "The story has shown that Russell and his colleagues . . . Induced the French Government to violate the pledge in the protocol of the Declaration of Paris in order to offer to both belligerents a partial adhesion, which must exclude the United States from a simple adhesion, to the Declaration of Paris, while it placed both belligerents on the same apparent footing. These steps were taken in haste before Adams could obtain an interview. When Adams by an effort unexpected to Russell obtained an interview at Pembroke Lodge at noon of Saturday, May 18, and according to Russell's report of May 21, said that the United States were 'disposed to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, ' Russell evaded the offer, saying that he had already sent sufficient instructions to Lyons, although the instructions were not sufficient, nor had they been sent. When this evasion was afterward brought to his notice by Adams, Russell, revising his report to Lyons, made such changes in it as should represent the first proposal as coming from himself, and the evasion to have come from Adams. When at last obliged to read the American offer, Russell declared that he had never heard of it before, although he had himself reported it to Lyons and Lyons had reported it to him. When compelled to take the offer for consideration, Russell, though always professing to welcome adhesion pure and simple, required the co-operation of Dayton. When Adams overcame this last obstacle, Russell interposed a written proviso, which as he knew from Lyons would prevent ratification. When Adams paid no attention to the proviso but insisted on signature of the treaty, Russell at last wrote a declaration in the nature of an insult, which could not be disregarded[254]. "

In this presentation of the case to the jury certain minor points areinsisted upon to establish a ground for suspicion--as the question ofwho first made the proposal--that are not essential to Henry Adams'conclusions. This conclusion is that "From the delays interposed byRussell, Adams must conclude that the British Cabinet was trying onedevice after another to evade the proposition; and finally, from thewritten declaration of August 19, he could draw no other inference thanthat Russell had resorted to the only defensive weapon left to him, inorder to avoid the avowal of his true motives and policy[255]. " The_motive_ of this tortuous proceeding, the author believed to have been adeep-laid scheme to revive, _after_ the American War was ended, theearlier international practice of Great Britain, in treating as subjectto belligerent seizure enemy's goods under the neutral flag. It was theAmerican stand, argues Henry Adams, that in 1854 had compelled GreatBritain to renounce this practice. A complete American adherence, now, to the Declaration, would for ever tie Britain's hands, but if therewere no such complete adherence and only temporary observation of thesecond article, after the war had resulted in the disruption of theUnited States, thus removing the chief supporter of that article, GreatBritain would feel free to resume her old-time practice when she engagedin war. If Great Britain made a formal treaty with the United States shewould feel bound to respect it; the Declaration of Paris as it stoodconstituted "a mere agreement, which was binding, as Lord Malmesburydeclared, only so long as it was convenient to respect it[256]. " Thusthe second article of the Declaration of Paris, not the first onprivateering, was in the eye of the British Cabinet in the negotiationof 1861. Henry Adams ends his essay: "After the manner in which Russellreceived the advances of President Lincoln, no American Minister inLondon could safely act on any other assumption than that the BritishGovernment meant, at the first convenient opportunity, to revive thebelligerent pretensions dormant since the War of 1812[257]. "

This analysis was published in 1891. Still more briefly summarized itdepicts an unfriendly, almost hostile attitude on the part of Russelland Lyons, deceit and evasion by the former, selfish British policy, andthroughout a blind following on by France, yielding to Russell'sleadership. The American proposal is regarded merely as a simple andsincere offer to join in supporting an improved international practicein war-times. But when Frederic Bancroft, the biographer of Seward, examined the negotiation he was compelled to ask himself whether thiswas all, indeed, that the American Secretary of State had in view. Bancroft's analysis may be stated more briefly[258]. 

Seward's general instruction, Bancroft notes, bore date of April 24, nearly a month before any foreign Power had recognized Southernbelligerent rights; it indicates "a plan by which he hoped to remove allexcuse for such action. " In despatches to Dayton, Seward asserted atwofold motive: "a sincere desire to co-operate with other progressivenations in the melioration of the rigours of maritime war, " and "toremove every cause that any foreign Power could have for the recognitionof the insurgents as a belligerent Power[259]. " This last result was notso clear to Dayton at Paris, nor was the mechanism of operation everopenly stated by Seward. But he did write, later, that the proposal ofaccession to the Declaration of Paris was tendered "as the act of thisFederal Government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyalcitizens. " "It did not, " writes Bancroft, "require the gift of prophecyto tell what would result in case the offer of accession on the part ofthe United States should be accepted[260]. "

Seward's object was to place the European nations in a position wherethey, as well as the United States, would be forced to regard Southernprivateers as pirates, and treat them as such. This was a conceivableresult of the negotiation before European recognition of Southernbelligerency, but even after that recognition and after Dayton hadpointed out the impossibility of such a result, Seward pressed for thetreaty and instructed Dayton not to raise the question with France. Hestill had in mind this main object. "If Seward, " says Bancroft, "had notintended to use the adherence of the United States to the declaration asa lever to force the other Powers to treat the Confederates as pirates, or at least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he might easily andunofficially have removed all such suspicions[261]. " In an interviewwith Lyons on July 6 Seward urged a quick conclusion of the treaty, arguing that its effect upon the revolted states could be determinedafterwards. Naturally Lyons was alarmed and gave warning to Russell. "Probably it was this advice that caused Russell to insist on theexplanatory declaration[262]. "

It would appear, then, that Seward much underestimated the acuteness ofRussell and Thouvenel, and expected them "to walk into a trap. " Norcould his claim "that there was no difference between a nation entirelyat peace and one in circumstances like those of the United States atthis time" be taken seriously. "He was furnishing his opponent withevidences of his lack of candour. " This clouded the effect that wouldhave followed "a wise and generous policy toward neutrals, which haddoubtless been in Seward's mind from the beginning[263]. " In the end heconcluded the negotiation gracefully, writing to Adams a pledge ofAmerican respect for the second and third articles of the Declaration ofParis--exactly that which Lyons had originally been instructed byRussell to secure. 

 "We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag, according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's goods not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's subjects, not contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, though found under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depredations shall be committed by our naval forces or by those of any of our citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels or property of British subjects. Our blockade, being effective, must be respected[264]. "

Thus Bancroft regards Seward's proposals of April 24 as in part theresult of humanitarian motives and in part as having a concealed purposeof Northern advantage. This last he calls a "trap. " And it is to benoted that in Seward's final pledge to Adams the phrase "those of any ofour citizens" reserves, for the North, since the negotiation had failed, the right to issue privateers on her own account. But Russell also, saysBancroft, was not "altogether artless and frank. " He had in view aBritish commercial advantage during the war, since if the United Statesrespected the second and third articles of the Declaration of Paris, and"if Confederate privateers should roam the ocean and seize the ships andgoods of citizens of the North, all the better for other commercialnations; for it would soon cause the commerce of the United States to becarried on under foreign flags, especially the British and French[265]. "Ulterior motive is, therefore, ascribed to both parties in thenegotiation, and that of Seward is treated as conceived at the momentwhen a policy of seeking European friendship was dominant at Washington, but with the hope of securing at least negative European support. Seward's persistence after European recognition of Southern belligerencyis regarded as a characteristic obstinacy without a clear view ofpossible resulting dangerous complications. 

This view discredits the acumen of the American Secretary of State andit does not completely satisfy the third historian to examine theincident in detail. Nor does he agree on the basis of British policy. Charles Francis Adams, in his "Life" of his father, writing in 1899, followed in the main the view of his brother, Henry Adams. But in 1912he reviewed the negotiation at great length with differentconclusions[266]. His thesis is that the Declaration of Parisnegotiation was an essential part of Seward's "foreign war policy, " inthat in case a treaty was signed with Great Britain and France and thenthose Powers refused to aid in the suppression of Southern privateering, or at least permitted them access to British and French ports, a goodground of complaint leading to war would be established. _This_ was theultimate ulterior purpose in Seward's mind; the negotiation was but amethod of fixing a quarrel on some foreign Power in case the UnitedStates should seek, as Seward desired, a cementing of the rift at homeby a foreign war. 

In the details of the negotiation C. F. Adams agrees with Bancroft, butwith this new interpretation. The opening misunderstanding he ascribed, as did Lyons, to the simple fact that Seward "had refused to see thedespatch" in which Russell's proposals were made[267]. Seward'sinstructions of July 6, after the misunderstanding was made clear tohim, pushing the negotiation, were drawn when he was "still riding avery high horse--the No. 10 charger, in fact, he had mounted on the 21stof the previous May[268], " and this warlike charger he continued to rideuntil the sobering Northern defeat at Bull Run, July 21, put an end tohis folly. If that battle had been a Northern victory he would have goneon with his project. Now, with the end of a period of brain-storm andthe emergence of sanity in foreign policy, "Secretary Seward in due time(September 7) pronounced the proposed reservation [by Russell] quite'inadmissible. ' And here the curtain fell on this somewhat prolonged andnot altogether creditable diplomatic farce[269]. "

Incidentally C. F. Adams examined also British action and intention. Lyons is wholly exonerated. "Of him it may be fairly said that hiscourse throughout seems to furnish no ground for criticism[270]. " AndLyons is quoted as having understood, in the end, the real purpose ofSeward's policy in seeking embroilment with Europe. He wrote to Russellon December 6 upon the American publication of despatches, accompanyingthe President's annual message: "Little doubt can remain, after readingthe papers, that the accession was offered solely with the view to theeffect it would have on the privateering operations of the SouthernStates; and that a refusal on the part of England and France, afterhaving accepted the accession, to treat the Southern privateers aspirates, would have been made a serious grievance, if not a ground ofquarrel[271]. . . . " As to Russell, combating Henry Adams' view, it isasserted that it was the great good fortune of the United States thatthe British Foreign Secretary, having declared a policy of neutrality, was not to be driven from its honest application by irritations, norseduced into a position where the continuation of that policy would bedifficult. 

Before entering upon an account of the bearing of the newly availableBritish materials on the negotiation--materials which will in themselvesoffer sufficient comment on the theories of Henry Adams, and in lessdegree of Bancroft--it is best to note here the fallacy in C. F. Adams'main thesis. If the analysis given in the preceding chapter of theinitiation and duration of Seward's "foreign war policy" is correct, then the Declaration of Paris negotiation had no essential relationwhatever to that policy. The instructions to Adams were sent to eightother Ministers. Is it conceivable that Seward desired a war with thewhole maritime world? The date, April 24, antedates any deliberateproposal of a foreign war, whatever he may have been brooding, and infact stamps the offer as part of that friendly policy toward Europewhich Lincoln had insisted upon. Seward's frenzy for a foreign war didnot come to a head until the news had been received of England'sdetermination to recognize Southern belligerency. This was in the secondweek of May and on the twenty-first Despatch No. 10 marked the decline, not the beginning, of a belligerent policy, and by the President'sorders. By May 24 probably, by the twenty-seventh certainly, Seward hadyielded and was rapidly beginning to turn to expressions offriendship[272]. Yet it was only on May 18 that Russell's firstinstructions to Lyons were sent, and not until late in June that the"misunderstanding" cleared away, instructions were despatched by Sewardto push the Declaration of Paris negotiations at London and Paris. Thebattle of Bull Run had nothing to do with a new policy. Thus chronologyforbids the inclusion of this negotiation, either in its inception, progress, or conclusion, as an agency intended to make possible, on justgrounds, a foreign war. 

A mere chronological examination of documents, both printed and inarchives, permits a clearer view of British policy on the Declaration ofParis. Recalling the facts of the American situation known in London itwill be remembered that on May 1 the British Government and Parliamentbecame aware that a civil war was inevitable and that the South plannedto issue privateers. On that day Russell asked the Admiralty toreinforce the British fleet in West Indian waters that British commercemight be adequately protected. Five days later, May 6, he announced inthe Commons that Great Britain must be strictly neutral, and that apolicy of close harmony with France was being matured; and on this dayhe proposed through Cowley, in Paris, that Great Britain and France eachask _both_ the contending parties in America to abide by the second andthird articles of the Declaration of Paris[273]. If there was ulteriormotive here it does not appear in any despatch either then or later, passing between any of the British diplomats concerned--Russell, Cowley, and Lyons. The plain fact was that the United States was not an adherentto the Declaration, that the South had announced privateering, and theNorth a blockade, and that the only portions of the Declaration inregard to which the belligerents had as yet made no statement were thesecond and third articles. 

It was, indeed, an anxious time for the British Government. On May 9Forster asked in the Commons what would be the Government's attitudetoward a British subject serving on a Southern privateer[274]. The nextday in the Lords there occurred a debate the general burden of which wasthat privateering was in fact piracy, but that under the conditions ofthe American previous stand, it could not be treated as such[275]. Bothin the Commons and the Lords speakers were referred to the forthcomingProclamation of Neutrality, but the uncertainty developed in bothdebates is very probably reflected in the new despatch now sent toCowley, on May 11[276]. By that despatch France was asked to send aninstruction to Mercier in Washington similar to a draft instructionintended for Lyons, a copy of which was enclosed to Cowley, the objectbeing to secure from the American belligerents adherence to _all_ thearticles, privateering included, of the Declaration of Paris[277]. 

Whatever Russell's purpose in thus altering his original suggestion, itmet with a prompt check from France. On May 9 Thouvenel had agreedheartily to the proposal of May 6, adding the practical advice that thebest method of approach to the Confederacy would be through the consulsin the South[278]. Now, on May 13, Russell was informed that Thouvenelfeared that England and France would get into serious trouble if theNorth agreed to accede on privateering and the South did not. Cowleyreported that he had argued with Thouvenel that privateers were piratesand ought to be treated as such, but that Thouvenel refused to do morethan instruct Mercier on the second and third articles[279]. For themoment Russell appears to have yielded easily to this French advice. OnMay 13 he had that interview with the Southern commissioners in which hementioned a communication about to be made to the South[280]; and on May15 the London _Times_, presumably reflecting governmental decision, incommenting on the Proclamation of Neutrality, developed at some lengththe idea that British citizens, if they served on Southern privateers, could claim no protection from Great Britain if the North chose to treatthem as pirates. May 16, Cowley reported that Thouvenel had writtenMercier in the terms of Russell's draft to Lyons of the eleventh, butomitting the part about privateering[281], and on this same day Russellsent to Cowley a copy of a _new_ draft of instructions to Lyons, seemingly in exact accord with the French idea[282]. On the seventeenth, Cowley reported this as highly satisfactory to Thouvenel[283]. Finallyon May 18 the completed instruction was despatched. 

It was on this same day, May 18, that Adams had his first interview withRussell. All that had been planned by Great Britain and France had beenbased on their estimate of the necessity of the situation. They had noknowledge of Seward's instructions of April 24. When therefore Adams, toward the conclusion of his interview, stated his authority tonegotiate a convention, he undoubtedly took Russell by surprise. So faras he was concerned a suggestion to the North, the result of anagreement made with France after some discussion and delay, was in factcompleted, and the draft finally drawn _two days before_, on thesixteenth. Even if not actually sent, as Henry Adams thinks, it was acompleted agreement. Russell might well speak of it as an instructionalready given to Lyons. Moreover there were two points in Adams'conversation of the eighteenth likely to give Russell cause for thought. The first was Adams' protest against the British recognition of a statusof belligerency. If the North felt so earnestly about this, had it beenwise to instruct Lyons to make an approach to the South? This requiredconsideration. And in the second place did not Adams' offer again openup the prospect of somehow getting from the North at least a formal andpermanent renunciation of privateering?

For if an examination is made of Russell's instruction to Lyons of May18 it appears that he had not, after all, dropped that reference toprivateering which Thouvenel had omitted in his own instructions toMercier. Adams understood Russell to have said that he "had alreadytransmitted authority [to Lyons] to assent to any modification of theonly point in issue which the Government of the United States mightprefer. On that matter he believed that there would be no difficultywhatever[284]. " This clearly referred to privateering. Russell'sinstructions to Lyons took up the points of the Declaration of Paris inreverse order. That on blockades was now generally accepted by allnations. The principle of the third article had "long been recognized aslaw, both in Great Britain and in the United States. " The secondarticle, "sanctioned by the United States in the earliest period of thehistory of their independence, " had been opposed, formerly, by GreatBritain, but having acquiesced in the Declaration of 1856, "she means toadhere to the principle she then adopted. " Thus briefly stating hisconfidence that the United States would agree on three of the articles, Russell explained at length his views as to privateering in theAmerican crisis. 

 "There remains only to be considered Article I, namely, that relating to privateering, from which the Government of the United States withheld their assent. Under these circumstances it is expedient to consider what is required on this subject by the general law of nations. Now it must be borne in mind that privateers bearing the flag of one or other of the belligerents may be manned by lawless and abandoned men, who may commit, for the sake of plunder, the most destructive and sanguinary outrages. There can be no question, however, but that the commander and crew of a ship bearing a letter of marque must, by the law of nations, carry on their hostilities according to the established laws of war. Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, hold any Government issuing such letters of marque responsible for, and liable to make good, any losses sustained by Her Majesty's subjects in consequence of wrongful proceedings of vessels sailing under such letters of marque. 

 "In this way, the object of the Declaration of Paris may to a certain extent be attained without the adoption of any new principle. 

 "You will urge these points upon Mr. Seward[285]. "

What did Russell mean by this cautious statement? The facts known to himwere that Davis had proclaimed the issue of letters of marque and thatLincoln had countered by proclaiming Southern privateering to bepiracy[286]. He did not know that Seward was prepared to renounceprivateering, but he must have thought it likely from Lincoln'sproclamation, and have regarded this as a good time to strike for anobject desired by all the European maritime nations since 1856. Russellcould not, while Great Britain was neutral, join the United States intreating Southern privateers as pirates, but he here offered to come asclose to it as he dared, by asserting that Great Britain would usevigilance in upholding the law of nations. This language might beinterpreted as intended for the admonition of the North also, but the_facts_ of the then known situation make it applicable to Southernactivities alone. Russell had desired to include privateering in theproposals to the United States and to the South, but Thouvenel'scriticisms forced him to a half-measure of suggestion to the North, anda full statement of the delicacy of the situation in the less formalletter to Lyons accompanying his official instructions. This was alsodated May 18. In it Russell directed Lyons to transmit to the BritishConsul at Charleston or New Orleans a copy of the official instruction"to be communicated at Montgomery to the President of the so-styledConfederate States, " and he further explained his purpose and theBritish position:

 ". . . You will not err in encouraging the Government to which you are accredited to carry into effect any disposition which they may evince to recognize the Declaration of Paris in regard to privateering. . . . 

 "You will clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government cannot accept the renunciation of privateering on the part of the Government of the United States if coupled with the condition that they should enforce its renunciation on the Confederate States, either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, or by interfering with the belligerent operations of vessels holding from them such letters of marque, so long as they carry on hostilities according to the recognized principles and under the admitted liabilities of the law of nations[287]. "

Certainly this was clear enough and was demanded by the British policyof neutrality. Russell had guarded against the complication feared byThouvenel, but he still hoped by a half-pledge to the North and ahalf-threat to the South to secure from both belligerents arenunciation of privateering. In short he was not yet fully convinced ofthe wisdom of the French limitation. Moreover he believed that Thouvenelmight yet be won to his own opinion, for in an unprinted portion of thissame private letter to Lyons of May 18 Russell wrote:

 "I have further to state to you, with reference to my despatch of this day that H. M. Govt. Were in the first instance inclined to propose to both of the contending parties to adopt the first clause of the Declaration of Paris, by which privateering is renounced. But after communication with the French Govt. It appeared best to limit our propositions in the manner explained in my despatch. 

 "I understand however from Lord Cowley that, although M. Mercier is not absolutely instructed to advert to the abolition of privateering, yet that some latitude of action is left to him on that point should he deem it advisable to exercise it[288]. "

Lyons and Mercier saw more clearly than did Russell what was in Seward'smind. Lyons had been instructed in the despatch just cited to use hisown discretion as to joint action with the French Minister so long onlyas the two countries took the same stand. He was to pursue whatevermethod seemed most "conciliatory. " His first private comment onreceiving Russell's instruction was, "Mr. Seward will be furious when hefinds that his adherence to the Declaration of Paris will not stop theSouthern privateering[289], " and in an official confidential despatch ofthe same day, June 4, he gave Russell clear warning of what Sewardexpected from his overture through Adams[290]. So delicate did thematter appear to Lyons and Mercier that they agreed to keep quiet for atime at least about their instructions, hoping to be relieved by thetransfer of the whole matter to London and Paris[291]. But in LondonRussell was at this moment taking up again his favoured purpose. On June6 he wrote to Grey (temporarily replacing Cowley at Paris) that heunderstood a communication had been made in Paris, as in London, for anAmerican adherence to the Declaration of Paris; ". . . It may open the wayto the abolition of Privateering all over the world. But . . . We oughtnot to use any menace to the Confederate States with a view of obtainingthis desirable object[292]. " Evidently, in his opinion, the South wouldnot dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six dayslater, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton inParis had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United Statesthat France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrotethat England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294]. Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objectionto concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he couldnot believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declaredneutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the AmericanSecretary of State. 

Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward hadspecifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signedwould bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southernprivateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was toimpress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification toSeward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and whichwas still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 thetwo Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made thatjoint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them asacting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though heread these for his private information. The remainder of June was spentby Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet notpushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyonstold Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have someintercourse with the South if only for the protection of Britishinterests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut itseyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France weredoing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyonsthereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personalknowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning thenegotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting thispostponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date, indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solutionof the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, theConfederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were tobe instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to the Governorof the State selected, thus avoiding any overture to the ConfederateGovernment[298]. Even with this solution possible they still hesitated, feeling as Lyons wrote "a little pusillanimous, " but believing they hadprevented an explosion[299]. Moreover Lyons was a bit uneasy because ofan important difference, so it seemed to him, in his formal instructionsand those of Mercier. The latter had no orders, as had Lyons, to notifySeward, if the agreement on maritime law was made in Washington, thatsuch agreement would not affect the belligerent right of the South toissue privateers[300]. Apparently Mercier had been given no instructionsto make this clear--let alone any "latitude" to deal withprivateering--although, as a matter of fact, he had already given Sewardhis personal opinion in accord with Lyons' instructions; but this wasnot an official French stand. Lyons was therefore greatly relieved, the"misunderstanding" now cleared away, that new instructions were beingsent to Adams to go on with the convention in London. His onlysubsequent comment of moment was sent to Russell on July 8, when helearned from Seward that Dayton, in Paris, had been directed to raise nofurther question as to what would or would not be demanded of France incase a convention were signed for an American adherence to theDeclaration of Paris. Lyons now repeated his former advice that under nocircumstances should a convention be signed without a distinctdeclaration of no British responsibility or duty as regards Southernprivateers[301]. 

The entire matter was now transferred to London and Paris. Lyons' reportof the misunderstanding and that new instructions were being sent toAdams was received on June 30. Russell replied to Lyons on July 5 thatAdams had "never made any proposition" on the Declaration of Paris, andthat he would now await one[302]. July 11, Adams made his formal offerto sign a convention and communicated a draft of it on the thirteenth. On the day intervening, the twelfth, Russell took a very important stepindicative of his sincerity throughout, of his lack of any ulteriormotive, and of his anxiety to carry through the negotiation with noresulting irritations or complications with the United States. Herecalled his instructions to Lyons about communicating with theConfederacy, stating that in any case he had never intended that Lyonsshould act without first officially notifying Seward. This recall wasnow made, he wrote, because to go on might "create fresh irritationwithout any adequate result, " but if in the meantime Lyons had alreadystarted negotiations with the South he might "proceed in them to theend[303]. "

Having taken this step in the hope that it might avert friction with theUnited States, Russell, now distinctly eager to secure Americanadherence to the Declaration in full, was ready to conclude theconvention at once. The warnings received from many sources did notdismay him. He probably thought that no actual difficulties would ensue, believing that the South would not venture to continue privateering. Even if France were disinclined to make a convention he appears to havebeen ready for signature by Great Britain alone, for on July 15 hetelegraphed Cowley, "I conclude there can be no objection to my signinga Convention with the U. S. Minister giving the adherence of the U. S. Tothe Declaration of Paris so far as concerns Gt. Britain. Answerimmediately by telegraph[304]. " Cowley replied on the sixteenth thatThouvenel could not object, but thought it a wrong move[305]. Cowley ina private letter of the same day thought that unless there were "verycogent reasons for signing a Convention at once with Adams, " it would bebetter to wait until France could be brought in, and he expressed againhis fear of the danger involved in Adams' proposal[306]. The sameobjection was promptly made by Palmerston when shown the draft of areply to Adams. Palmerston suggested the insertion of a statement thatwhile ready to sign a convention Great Britain would do so only at thesame time with France[307]. Thus advised Russell telegraphed in the lateafternoon of the sixteenth to Cowley that he would "wait for yourdespatches to-morrow, " and that no reply had yet been given Adams[308], and on the seventeenth he wrote enclosing a draft, approved byPalmerston and the Queen, stating that Great Britain had no desire toact alone if Dayton really had instructions identical with those ofAdams. He added that if thought desirable Adams and Dayton might beinformed verbally, that the proposed Convention would in no way alterthe Proclamation of Neutrality[309]. 

The remaining steps in the negotiation have already been narrated[310]. Russell informed Adams of the requirement of a similar Frenchconvention, Adams secured action by Dayton, and in spite of continuedFrench reluctance and suspicion[311] all was ready in mid-August for theaffixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previouspromise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicitunderstanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to beattached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Daytonrefused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evidentsincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicionthat was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed"from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of theConvention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaintRussell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap hadbeen prepared[314]. " He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion longsince reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in thisnegotiation. 

But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear thatin its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought ofany definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward ofBritish or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attemptingto secure a friendly attitude by foreign Powers. One means of doing thiswas by giving assurances on maritime law in time of war. True heprobably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressingprivateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers notto recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question ofbelligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first sixmonths of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined tomaintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war hereturned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall theirproclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality asfinal Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completedit would place Great Britain and France in a position where they wouldbe forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aidin suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument, but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was therecall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simplycould not agree to the limiting declaration for it would haveconstituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of theexistence of a state of war. 

In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He acted on the simpleand straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing aconciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rulesadvocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt bothpersonally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directedtoward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of thenegotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So faras the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States wasconcerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in thestraightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministrywas gone[316]. "

And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not, it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved ahigh regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward Britishneutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actuallyeffective, his early order closing British ports to prizes ofConfederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendlyattitude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at themoment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun withthe plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought ofoffensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declarationof Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in aportion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw thelarger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the UnitedStates. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted againstwarnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall theinstruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited byPalmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France, and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limitingdeclaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidenceof any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even ifobstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudginglyadmitting that there had been a "trap, " was as unfortunate for goodunderstanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated, suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutralitycould long be maintained[318]. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 236: VII. , pp. 568-583. ]

[Footnote 237: Ch. 8. ]

[Footnote 238: _Ibid. _, p. 181. ]

[Footnote 239: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, p. 275. ]

[Footnote 240: Text as given in Moore, _Digest_, VII, p. 562. ]

[Footnote 241: _Ibid. _, p. 563. ]

[Footnote 242: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 94. Adams toSeward, May 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 243: Text given in _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, VolXXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 18. ]

[Footnote 244: _Ibid. _, No. 25. ]

[Footnote 245: _Ibid. _, No. 26. ]

[Footnote 246: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 124. Adams toSeward, Aug. 2, 1861. ]

[Footnote 247: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV, "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 28. ]

[Footnote 248: _Ibid. _, No. 31. ]

[Footnote 249: _Ibid. _, No. 32. ]

[Footnote 250: Moore, _Digest_. VII, pp. 578 and 581. ]

[Footnote 251: The point of Russell's Declaration was made very early inthe London press. Thus the _Saturday Review_. June 8, 1861, commentingon the report that America was ready to adhere to the Declaration ofParis, stated that this could have no effect on the present war butwould be welcomed for its application after this war was over. ]

[Footnote 252: In the general American argument before the GenevaArbitration Court it was stated that the practical effect of Britishdiplomacy in this connection was that "Great Britain was thus to gainthe benefit to its neutral commerce of the recognition of the second andthird articles, the rebel privateers and cruisers were to be protectedand their devastation legalized, while the United States were to bedeprived of a dangerous weapon of assault upon Great Britain. " Cited inNicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, IV, p. 280. ]

[Footnote 253: Henry Adams, _Historical Essays_, pp. 237-279. ]

[Footnote 254: _Ibid. _, p. 271. ]

[Footnote 255: _Ibid. _, p. 273. ]

[Footnote 256: _Ibid. _, p. 277. ]

[Footnote 257: This same view was maintained, though without statingdetails, by Henry Adams, as late as 1907. See his "Education of HenryAdams, " Private Edition, p. 128. ]

[Footnote 258: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, Ch. 31. ]

[Footnote 259: Cited by Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 189. ]

[Footnote 260: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 261: _Ibid. _, p. 193. ]

[Footnote 262: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 263: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 264: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, p. 1431 Seward toAdams, Sept. 7, 1861. ]

[Footnote 265: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 196. This speculation is notsupported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose. Whileit may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne outby the new British materials cited later in this chapter. ]

[Footnote 266: C. F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" _Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings_, XLVI, pp. 23-81. ]

[Footnote 267: _Ibid. _, p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyonsof Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Sewardhad refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read andconsidered it in private. Hence he knew _privately_ the facts ofRussell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. Theincident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where Iregard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarilya refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality. Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward tobe approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation, thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 181. )I agree with C. F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as thenegotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for somereason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, causeda transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London andParis. " ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris, " p. 50. )]

[Footnote 268: _Ibid. _, p. 51. ]

[Footnote 269: _Ibid. _, p. 64. ]

[Footnote 270: _Ibid. _, p. 60. ]

[Footnote 271: _Ibid. _, p. 58. ]

[Footnote 272: Bancroft says June 8. But see _ante_, p. 130. ]

[Footnote 273: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 1. It waswith reference to this that Palmerston, on May 5, wrote to Russell: "Ifany step were thought advisable, perhaps the best mode of our feelingour way would be to communicate confidentially with the South by the menwho have come over here from thence, and with the North by Dallas, whois about to return in a few days. Dallas, it is true, is not a politicalfriend of Lincoln, but on the contrary rather leans to the South; butstill he might be an organ, if it should be deemed prudent to take anystep. " (Palmerston MS. )]

[Footnote 274: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , Vol. CLXII, p. 1763. ]

[Footnote 275: _Ibid. _, pp. 1830-34. ]

[Footnote 276: This instruction never got into the printed Parliamentarypapers, nor did any others of the many containing the like suggestion, for they would have revealed a persistence by Russell against Frenchadvice--to which he ultimately was forced to yield--a persistence inseeking to bind the belligerents on the first article of the Declarationof Paris, as well as on articles two and three. The points at whichRussell returned to this idea are indicated in this chapter. ]

[Footnote 277: F. O. , France, Vol. 1376. No. 563. Draft. ]

[Footnote 278: F. O. , France, Vol. 1390. No. 684. Cowley to Russell, May9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 279: F. O. , France, Vol. 1391. No. 713. Cowley to Russell, May13, 1861. ]

[Footnote 280: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II, p. 40. ]

[Footnote 281: F. O. , France, Vol. 1391. No. 733. ]

[Footnote 282: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 5. ]

[Footnote 283: _Ibid. _, No. 6. Note that this and the preceding documentare all that appeared in the Parliamentary Papers. Thouvenel's amendmentof Russell's plan did not appear. ]

[Footnote 284: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2_, Adams to Seward, May 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 285: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 7. ]

[Footnote 286: The text of these proclamations, transmitted by Lyons, had been officially received in London on May 10. ]

[Footnote 287: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 8. ]

[Footnote 288: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 755. No. 139. "Seen by Ld. P. And theQueen. "]

[Footnote 289: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 4, 1861. (Printedin Newton, _Lyons_, I, 42. )]

[Footnote 290: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 12. Marked"Received, " June 17. ]

[Footnote 291: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyons to Russell, June 8, 1861. Also Russell Papers, June 10, 1861. This disinclination to actextended also to the matter of getting in touch with the South, whichthey also postponed. It appeared that Mercier was instructed to orderthe French Consul at New Orleans to go in person to President Davis. Both diplomats were very fearful of an "outbreak" from Seward on thisplanned proposal to the Confederacy. ]

[Footnote 292: F. O. , France, Vol. 1376. No. 35. Draft. "Seen by Ld. Palmerston and the Queen. "]

[Footnote 293: In Washington, so different was the point of view, Lyonsand Mercier were now convinced they could not let Seward know of theproposal to be made to the South. They feared he would send them theirpassports. Mercier in informal talk had explained to Seward hisinstructions on the Declaration of Paris in so far as the North wasconcerned. Lyons and Mercier now planned a joint visit andrepresentation to Seward--that which was actually attempted on June15--but were decided to say nothing about the South, until they learnedthe effect of this "joint proposal. " F. O. , Am. , Vol. 765. No. 262. Lyonsto Russell, June 8, 1861. ]

[Footnote 294: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 10. Russellto Grey, June 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 295: Stoeckl was writing his Government that the state towhich the negotiation had come was full of danger and might lead to aserious quarrel. He thought Russia should keep out of it until resultswere clearer. On this report Gortchakoff margined "C'est aussi monavis. " (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F. O. , June 12-24, 1861. No. 1359. )]

[Footnote 296: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 766. No. 278. ]

[Footnote 297: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 14. Lyons toRussell, June 17, 1861. "Recd. June 30. " It was in this interview thatLyons discovered Seward's misconception as to the position of theproposed negotiation, and made clear to Seward that he had noinstructions to sign a convention. ]

[Footnote 298: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 766. No. 284. ]

[Footnote 299: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 300: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, June 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 301: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 22. Writingprivately on the same day Lyons comments on Mercier's "extreme caution"in his relations with Seward. Lyons implied that all this personal, rather than official communication of documents to Seward was Mercier'sidea, and that he, Lyons, doubted the wisdom of this course, but hadagreed to it because of the desire to act in perfect harmony withFrance. Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, July 8, 1861. ]

[Footnote 302: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 303: F. O. , Am. , Vol 756. No. 227. On this same day Russell waswriting privately to Edward Everett, in Boston, a clear statement of theBritish position, defending the Proclamation of Neutrality and adding, "It is not our practice to treat five millions of freemen as pirates, and to hang their sailors if they stop our merchantmen. But unless wemean to treat them as pirates and to hang them, we could not deny thembelligerent rights. " C. F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris, "pp. 49-50. ]

[Footnote 304: F. O. , France, Vol. 1377. No. 176. Draft. Russell toCowley, July 15, 1861. ]

[Footnote 305: F. O. , France, Vol. 1394. No. 871. ]

[Footnote 306: Russell Papers. Also in a despatch of July 16 Cowleyrepeated his objections and stated that Dayton had not yet approachedFrance. (F. O. , France, Vol. 1394. No. 871. )]

[Footnote 307: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 755. No. 168. Enclosure. Palmerston'sNote to Russell was not sent to Adams but his exact language is used inthe last paragraph of the communication to Adams, November 18, asprinted in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 19. ]

[Footnote 308: F. O. , France, Vol. 1378. No. 730. Russell to Cowley, July17, 1861. Containing draft of telegram sent on 16th at 4. 30 p. M. ]

[Footnote 309: _Ibid. _, No. 729. ]

[Footnote 310: See _ante_ pp. 142-45. ]

[Footnote 311: F. O. , France, Vol. 1394. No. 905. Cowley to Russell, July26, 1861. ]

[Footnote 312: It should be noted that during this period Russelllearned that on July 5, Lyons, before receiving the recall ofinstructions, had finally begun through Consul Bunch at Charleston theovertures to the South. On July 24, Russell approved this action(_Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondencerespecting International Maritime Law. " No. 23. )]

[Footnote 313: F. O. , France, Vol. 1395. No. 1031. Cowley to Russell, August 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 314: Palmerston MS. , Russell to Palmerston, August 26, 1861. ]

[Footnote 315: See C. F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris, "pp. 58 and 74. ]

[Footnote 316: Adams, _Life of C. F. Adams_, p. 209. ]

[Footnote 317: The Confederate Commissions on August 14, 1861, justbefore the critical moment in the Declaration of Paris negotiation, hadmade vigorous protest against this British order, characterizing it asgiving a "favour" to the Government at Washington, and thus as lackingin neutrality. Quoted by C. F. Adams, "Seward and the Declaration ofParis, " p. 31. ]

[Footnote 318: A few facts about Southern privateering not directlypertinent to this chapter are yet not without interest. There was nocase during the Civil War of a vessel actually going out as a privateer(i. E. , a private vessel operating under government letters of marque)from a foreign port. (Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris, " p. 38. ) No Southern privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain_, p. 181). As a result of Seward's generalinstruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with Russia inAugust, but it was not presented by Seward for ratification to theUnited States Senate. Schleiden in a report to the Senate of Bremen atthe time of the _Trent_ affair, Nov. 14, 1861, stated that the RussianAmbassador, von Stoeckl, inquired of Seward "whether the U. S. Wouldequip privateers in case war should break out with England and France. Seward replied 'that is a matter of course. ' Mr. Stoeckl thereuponremarked that in any case no American privateer would be permitted tocruise in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is theonly state that has ports in those regions, would treat them as piratesin accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward thenexclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay aboutit. '" (Schleiden MS. )]

CHAPTER VI

BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER

The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the precedingchapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and Ministers as importantin themselves and as indicative of national policy and purpose. Upon allparties concerned they left a feeling of irritation and suspicion. Butthe public knew nothing of the details of the inconclusive negotiationand the Press merely gave a hint now and then of its reported progressand ultimate failure. Newspapers continued to report the news fromAmerica in unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on FortSumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both sidesin America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in arms forwhich neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln called for75, 000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42, 000 additional. Theregular army was increased by 23, 000 and the navy by 18, 000 men. Navalvessels widely scattered over the globe, were instructed to hasten theirhome-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an available land force, howeverbadly trained and organized, of over 300, 000, though these were widelyscattered from the Potomac in the east to the Missouri in the west. 

In the South, Davis was equally busy, calling at first for 100, 000volunteers to wage defensive battle in protection of the newly-bornConfederacy. The seven states already in secession were soon joined, between May 4 and June 24, by four others, Arkansas, Virginia, NorthCarolina and Tennessee in order, but the border states of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, though strongly sympathetic with the rest of theSouth, were held to the Union by the "border state policy" of Lincoln, the first pronouncement of which asserted that the North had no purposeof attacking slavery where it existed, but merely was determined topreserve the Union. The Northern Congress, meeting in extra session onJuly 4, heartily approved Lincoln's emergency measures. It authorized anarmy of 500, 000, provided for a loan of $200, 000, 000, sanctioned theissue of $50, 000, 000 in Treasury notes and levied new taxes, both directand by tariffs to meet these expenditures. 

In the months preceding the attack on Sumter the fixed determination ofthe South to secede and the uncertainty of the North had led the Britishpress to believe that the decision rested wholly with the South. Now theNorth by its preparations was exhibiting an equally fixed determinationto preserve the Union, and while the British press was sceptical of thepermanence of this determination, it became, for a short time, untileditorial policy was crystallized, more cautious in prophecy. The_Economist_ on May 4 declared that the responsibility for the "fatalstep" rested wholly on Southern leaders because of their passionatedesire to extend the shameful institution of which they were so proud, but that the North must inevitably, by mere weight of population andwealth, be the victor, though this could not conceivably result in anyreal reunion, rather in a conquest requiring permanent militaryoccupation. Southern leaders were mad: "to rouse by gratuitous insultthe mettle of a nation three times as numerous and far more than threetimes as powerful, to force them by aggressive steps into a struggle inwhich the sympathy of every free and civilized nation will be with theNorth, seems like the madness of men whose eyes are blinded and heartshardened by the evil cause they defend. "

Two weeks later, the _Economist_, while still maintaining the justice ofthe Northern cause, though with lessened vigour, appealed to the commonsense of the North to refrain from a civil war whose professed objectwas unattainable. "Everyone knows and admits that the secession is anaccomplished, irrevocable, fact. . . . Even if the North were sure of aneasy and complete victory--short, of course, of actual subjugation ofthe South (which no one dreams of)--the war which was to end in such avictory would still be, in the eyes of prudence and worldly wisdom, anobjectless and unprofitable folly[319]. " But by the middle of June theAmerican irritation at the British Proclamation of Neutrality, loudlyand angrily voiced by the Northern press, had caused a British pressresentment at this "wilful misrepresentation and misjudgment" of Britishattitude. "We _do_ believe the secession of the Slave States to be a_fait accompli_--a completed and irreversible transaction. We believe itto be impossible now for the North to lure back the South into the Unionby any compromise, or to compel them back by any force. " "If this is anoffence it cannot be helped[320]. "

The majority of the London papers, though not all, passed through thesame shifts of opinion and expression as the _Economist_; firstupbraiding the South, next appealing to the North not to wage a uselesswar, finally committing themselves to the theory of an accomplishedbreak-up of the Union and berating the North for continuing, throughpride alone, a bloody conflict doomed to failure. Meanwhile in midsummerattention was diverted from the ethical causes at issue by thepublication in the _Times_ of Motley's letter analysing the nature ofthe American constitution and defending the legal position of the Northin its resistance to secession. Motley wrote in protest against thegeneral British press attitude: "There is, perhaps, a readiness inEngland to prejudge the case; a disposition not to exult in ourdownfall, but to accept the fact[321]. . . . "

He argued the right and the duty of the North to force the South intosubjection. "The right of revolution is indisputable. It is written onthe record of our race. British and American history is made up ofrebellion and revolution. . . . There can be nothing plainer, then, thanthe American right of revolution. But, then, it should be calledrevolution. " "It is strange that Englishmen should find difficulty inunderstanding that the United States Government is a nation among thenations of the earth; a constituted authority, which may be overthrownby violence, as may be the fate of any state, whether kingdom orrepublic, but which is false to the people if it does not its best topreserve them from the horrors of anarchy, even at the cost of blood. "

Motley denied any _right_ of _peaceful_ secession, and hisconstitutional argument presented adequately the Northern view. But hewas compelled also to refer to slavery and did so in the sense ofLincoln's inaugural, asserting that the North had no purpose ofemancipating the slaves. "It was no question at all that slavery withina state was sacred from all interference by the general government, orby the free states, or by individuals in those states; and the ChicagoConvention [which nominated Lincoln] strenuously asserted thatdoctrine. " Coming at the moment when the British press and public wereseeking ground for a shift from earlier pro-Northern expressions ofsympathy to some justification for the South, it may be doubted whetherMotley's letter did not do more harm than good to the Northern cause. His denial of a Northern anti-slavery purpose gave excuse for a, professedly, more calm and judicial examination of the claimed_Southern right_ of secession, and his legal argument could be met, andwas met, with equally logical, apparently, pro-Southern argument as tothe nature of the American constitution. Thus early did the necessity ofLincoln's "border state policy"--a policy which extended even towarnings from Seward to American diplomats abroad not to bring intoconsideration the future of slavery--give ground for foreign denial thatthere were any great moral principles at stake in the American conflict. 

In the meantime the two sections in America were busily preparing for atest of strength, and for that test the British press, reportingpreparations, waited with interest. It came on July 21 in the firstbattle of Bull Run, when approximately equal forces of raw levies, 30, 000 each, met in the first pitched battle of the war, and where theNorthern army, after an initial success, ultimately fled in disgracefulrout. Before Bull Run the few British papers early taking strong groundfor the North had pictured Lincoln's preparations as so tremendous asinevitably destined to crush, quickly, all Southern resistance. The_Daily News_ lauded Lincoln's message to Congress as the speech of agreat leader, and asserted that the issue in America was for all freepeople a question of upholding the eternal principles of liberty, morality and justice. "War for such a cause, though it be civil war, mayperhaps without impiety be called 'God's most perfect instrument inworking out a pure intent[322]. '" The disaster to the Northern army, itsapparent testimony that the North lacked real fighting men, bolsteredthat British opinion which regarded military measures against the Southas folly--an impression reinforced in the next few months by the longpause by the North before undertaking any further great effort in thefield. The North was not really ready for determined war, indeed, untillater in the year. Meanwhile many were the moralizations in the Britishpress upon Bull Run's revelation of Northern military weakness. 

Probably the most influential newspaper utterances of the moment werethe letters of W. H. Russell to the _Times_. This famouswar-correspondent had been sent to America in the spring of 1861 byDelane, editor of the _Times_, his first letter, written on March 29, appearing in the issue of April 16. He travelled through the South, wasmet everywhere with eager courtesy as became a man of his reputation andone representing the most important organ of British public opinion, returned to the North in late June, and at Washington was given intimateinterviews by Seward and other leaders. For a time his utterances werewatched for, in both England and America, with the greatest interest andexpectancy, as the opinions of an unusually able and thoroughly honest, dispassionate observer. He never concealed his abhorrence of slavery, terming apologists of that institution "the miserable sophists whoexpose themselves to the contempt of the world by their paltry theiscleson the divine origin and uses of Slavery[323]. . . . " and writing "dayafter day . . . The impression of my mind was strengthened that 'StatesRights' meant protection to slavery, extension of slave territory, andfree-trade in slave produce with the other world[324]. " But at the sametime he depicted the energy, ability, and determination of the South inhigh colours, and was a bit doubtful of similar virtues in the North. The battle of Bull Run itself he did not see, but he rode out fromWashington to meet the defeated army, and his description of the routedrabble, jostling and pushing, in frenzy toward the Capitol, so ridiculedNorthern fighting spirit as to leave a permanent sting behind it. Atthe same time it convinced the British pro-Southern reader that theNorthern effort was doomed to failure, even though Russell was himselfguarded in opinion as to ultimate result. "'What will England and Francethink of it?' is the question which is asked over and over again, " wroteRussell on July 24[325], expatiating on American anxiety and chagrin inthe face of probable foreign opinion. On August 22 he recorded in hisdiary the beginnings of the American newspaper storm of personal attackbecause of his description of the battle in the _Times_--an attack whichbefore long became the alleged cause of his recall by Delane[326]. Infact Russell's letters added nothing in humiliating description to theoutpourings of the Northern press, itself greedily quoted bypro-Southern foreign papers. The impression of Northern militaryincapacity was not confined to Great Britain--it was general throughoutEurope, and for the remainder of 1861 there were few who ventured toassert a Northern success in the war[327]. 

Official Britain, however, saw no cause for any change in the policy ofstrict neutrality. Palmerston commented privately, "The truth is, theNorth are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by professionalpoliticians, while the South are fighting for what they consider rightlyor wrongly vital interests, " thus explaining to his own satisfaction whya Northern army of brave men had _chosen_ to _run_ away[328], but theGovernment was careful to refrain from any official utterances likely toirritate the North. The battle served, in some degree, to bring into theopen the metropolitan British papers which hitherto professingneutrality and careful not to reveal too openly their leanings, now eachtook a definite stand and became an advocate of a cause. The Duke ofArgyll might write reassuringly to Mrs. Motley to have no fear ofBritish interference[329], and to Gladstone (evidently controverting thelatter's opinion) that slavery was and would continue to be an object inthe war[330], but the press, certainly, was not united either as tofuture British policy or on basic causes and objects of the war. The_Economist_ believed that a second Southern victory like Bull Run, ifcoming soon, would "so disgust and dishearten the shouters for the Unionthat the contest will be abandoned on the instant. . . . Some day, withscarcely any notice, we may receive tidings that an armistice has beenagreed upon and preliminaries of peace have been signed[331]. " JohnBright's paper, the _Morning Star_, argued long and feverishly thatEnglishmen must not lose sight of the fact that slavery was an issue, and made appeal for expressions, badly needed at the moment, ofpro-Northern sympathy[332]. To this _John Bull_ retorted:

 "Nothing can be clearer than this, that black slavery has nothing whatever to do with this Civil War in America. . . . The people of America have erected a political idol. The Northerners have talked and written and boasted so much about their Republic that they have now become perfectly furious to find that their idol can be overthrown, and that the false principles upon which the American Republic is built should be exhibited to the world, that their vaunted democracy should be exposed as a mere bubble or a piece of rotten timber, an abominable and worthless tyranny of the sovereign mob[333]. "

Here was an early hint of the future of democracy as at issue[334]. _John Bull_, the "country squire's paper, " might venture to voice thethought, but more important papers were still cautious in expressing it. W. H. Russell, privately, wrote to Delane: "It is quite obvious, I think, that the North will succeed in reducing the South[335]. " But Delanepermitted no such positive prophecy to appear in the _Times_. Darwin isgood testimony of the all-prevalent British feeling: "I hope to God weEnglish are utterly wrong in doubting whether the North can conquer theSouth. " "How curious it is that you seem to think that you can conquerthe South; and I never meet a soul, even those who would most wish it, who think it possible--that is, to conquer and retain it[336]. "

In September, after the first interest in Bull Run had waned, thereappeared several books and articles on the American question which gaveopportunity for renewal of newspaper comment and controversy. A Dr. Lempriere, "of the Inner Temple, law fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, " published a work, _The American Crisis Considered_, chieflydeclamatory, upholding the right of Southern secession, stating that noone "who has the slightest acquaintance with the political action ofhistory would term the present movement rebellion. " With this the_Spectator_ begged leave to differ[337]. The _Saturday Review_acknowledged that a prolonged war might force slavery and emancipationto the front, but denied them as vital at present, and offered this viewas a defence against the recrimination of Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe, who had accused the paper of unfair treatment in a review of herpamphlet exhibiting emancipation as the object of the North. Under thecaption, "Mrs. Beecher Stowe's Wounded Feelings, " the _Saturday Review_avowed disbelief in the existence of a "Holy War" in America. "The Northdoes not proclaim abolition and never pretended to fight foranti-slavery. The North has not hoisted for its oriflamme the SacredSymbol of Justice to the Negro; its _cri de guerre_ is not unconditionalemancipation. " "The Governmental course of the British nation . . . Is notyet directed by small novelists and their small talk[338]. " ThomasHughes also came in for sarcastic reference in this article, havingpromptly taken up the cudgels for Mrs. Stowe. He returned to the attackthrough the columns of the _Spectator_, reasserting slavery as an issueand calling on Englishmen to put themselves in the place of Americansand realize the anger aroused by "deliberate imputations of meanmotives, " and by the cruel spirit of the utterances. A nation engaged ina life and death struggle should not be treated in a tone of flippantand contemptuous serenity. The British press had chosen "to impute thelowest motives, to cull out and exult over all the meanness, andbragging, and disorder which the contest has brought out, and while wesit on the bank, to make no allowances for those who are struggling inthe waves[339]. "

Besides the _Spectator_, on the Northern side, stood the _Daily News_, declaring that the South could not hold out, and adding, "The Confederate States may be ten millions, but they _are_wrong--notoriously, flagrantly wrong[340]. " The _Daily News_, accordingto its "Jubilee" historians, stood almost alone in steadfast advocacy ofthe Northern cause[341]. This claim of unique service to the North isnot borne out by an examination of newspaper files, but is true if onlymetropolitan dailies of large circulation are considered. The_Spectator_ was a determined and consistent friend of the North. In itsissue of September 28 a speech made by Bulwer Lytton was summarized andattacked. The speaker had argued that the dissolution of the Union wouldbe beneficial to all Europe, which had begun to fear the swollen sizeand strength of the young nation across the Atlantic. He hoped that thefinal outcome would be not two, but at least four separate nations, andstated his belief that the friendly emulation of these nations wouldresult for Americans in a rapid advance in art and commerce such as hadbeen produced in the old commonwealths of Greece. The _Spectator_answered that such a breaking up of America was much more likely toresult in a situation comparable to that in South America, inquiredcaustically whether Bulwer Lytton had heard that slavery was inquestion, and asserted that his speech presumably represented theofficial view of the Tories, and embodied that of the English governingclass[342]. 

In press utterances during the autumn and early fall of 1861 there islittle on British policy toward America. Strict neutrality is approvedby all papers and public speakers. But as the months passed withoutfurther important military engagements attention began to be directedtoward the economic effects on England of the war in America and to theblockade, now beginning to be made effective by the North. The _SaturdayReview_, though pro-Southern, declared for neutrality, but distinguishedbetween strict observance of the blockade and a reasonable recognitionof the _de facto_ government of the Confederacy "as soon as the SouthernStates had achieved for their independence that amount of security withwhich Great Britain had been satisfied in former cases[343]. " Butanother article in the same issue contained a warning against forciblyraising the blockade since this must lead to war with the North, andthat would commend itself to no thoughtful Englishman. Two weeks laterappeared a long review of Spence's _American Union_, a work veryinfluential in confirming British pro-Southern belief in theconstitutional right of the South to secede and in the certainty ofSouthern victory. Spence was "likely to succeed with English readers, because all his views are taken from a thoroughly Englishstandpoint[344]. " The week following compliments are showered upon the"young professor" Montague Bernard for his "Two Lectures on the PresentAmerican War, " in which he distinguished between recognition ofbelligerency and recognition of sovereignty, asserting that the formerwas inevitable and logical. The _Saturday Review_, without directquotation, treated Bernard as an advocate also of the early recognitionof Southern independence on the ground that it was _a fait accompli_, and expressed approval[345]. 

These few citations, taken with intent from the more sober and reputablejournals, summarize the prevailing attitude on one side or the otherthroughout the months from June to December, 1861. All publications hadmuch to say of the American struggle and varied in tone from dignifiedcriticism to extreme vituperation, this last usually being the resort oflesser journals, whose leader writers had no skill in "vigorous" writingin a seemingly restrained manner. "Vigorous" leader writing was acharacteristic of the British press of the day, and when combined with asupercilious British tone of advice, as from a superior nation, gavegreat offence to Americans, whether North or South. But the Britishpress was yet united in proclaiming as correct the governmental policyof neutrality, and in any event Motley was right in stating "the Pressis not the Government, " adding his opinion that "the present EnglishGovernment has thus far given us no just cause of offence[346]. "Meanwhile the Government, just at the moment when the Declaration ofParis negotiation had reached an inglorious conclusion, especiallyirritating to Earl Russell, was suddenly plunged into a sharpcontroversy with the United States by an incident growing out ofRussell's first instructions to Lyons in regard to that negotiation andwhich, though of minor importance in itself, aroused an intensity offeeling beyond its merits. This was the recall by Seward of theexequatur of the British consul Bunch, at Charleston, South Carolina. 

It will be remembered that in his first instruction to Lyons on theDeclaration of Paris Russell had directed that Bunch, at Charleston, becommissioned to seek a Southern official acceptance of the binding forceof the second and third articles, but that Lyons and Mercier, fearingSeward's irritation, had hesitated to proceed in the matter. LaterRussell had recalled his instructions, but before this recall couldreach Lyons the latter had decided to act[347]. On July 5 Lyons gaveexplicit directions to Bunch not to approach the Confederate Governmentdirectly, but to go to Governor Pickens of South Carolina and explainthe matter to him verbally, adding "you should act with great caution, in order to avoid raising the question of the recognition of the newConfederation by Great Britain. " Unfortunately Lyons also wrote, "I amauthorized by Lord John Russell to confide the negotiation on thismatter to you, " thus after all implying that a real _negotiation_ withthe South was being undertaken. On the same day Mercier sent similarinstructions to St. André, the French Acting-Consul at Charleston[348]. Bunch received Lyons' official letter on July 19[349], together with aprivate one of July 5, emphasizing that Bunch was to put nothing inwriting, and that he and his French colleagues were to keep the names ofLyons and Mercier out of any talk, even, about the matter. Bunch was totalk as if his instructions came directly from Russell. Lyons hoped theSouth would be wise enough not to indulge in undue publicity, since if"trumpeted" it might elicit "by such conduct some strong disavowal fromFrance and England. " Both the official and the private letter must, however, have impressed Bunch with the idea that this was after all anegotiation and that he had been entrusted with it[350]. 

Bunch, whose early reports had been far from sympathetic with theSouthern cause, had gradually, and quite naturally from his environment, become more friendly to it[351]. He now acted with promptness and withsome evident exultation at the importance given him personally. Inplace of Governor Pickens an experienced diplomat, William HenryTrescott, was approached by Bunch and Belligny, who, not St. André, wasthen the French agent at Charleston[352]. Trescott went directly toPresident Davis, who at once asked why the British proposal had not beenmade through the Confederate Commissioners in London, and who somewhatunwillingly yielded to Trescott's urging. On August 13 the ConfederateCongress resolved approval of the Declaration of Paris except for thearticle on privateering[353]. Bunch took great pride in the secrecyobserved. "I do not see how any clue is given to the way in which theResolutions have been procured. . . . We made a positive stipulation thatFrance and England were not to be alluded to in the event of thecompliance of the Confederate Govt. [354], " he wrote Lyons on August 16. But he failed to take account either of the penetrating power ofmouth-to-mouth gossip or of the efficacy of Seward's secret agents. Onthis same day, August 16, Lyons reported the arrest in New York, on thefourteenth, of one Robert Mure, just as he was about to take passage forLiverpool carrying a sealed bag from the Charleston consulate to theBritish Foreign Office, as well as some two hundred private letters. Theletters were examined and among them was one which related Bunch'srecent activities and stated that "Mr. B. , on oath of secrecy, communicated to me also that the first step of recognition wastaken[355]. " The sealed bag was sent unopened to be handed by Adams toRussell with an enquiry whether in fact it contained any papers on thealleged "negotiation" with the South. 

Bunch had issued to Mure a paper which the latter regarded as apassport, as did the United States. This also was made matter ofcomplaint by Adams, when on September 3 the affair was presented toRussell. America complained of Bunch on several counts, the threeprincipal ones being (1) that he had apparently conducted a negotiationwith the Confederacy, (2) that he had issued a passport, notcountersigned by the Secretary of State as required by the United Statesrules respecting foreign consuls, (3) that he had permitted the personto whom this passport was issued to carry letters from the enemies ofthe United States to their agents abroad. On these grounds the BritishGovernment was requested to remove Bunch from his office. On firstlearning of Mure's arrest Lyons expressed the firm belief that Bunch'sconduct had been perfectly proper and that the sealed bag would be foundto contain nothing supporting the suspicion of the AmericanGovernment[356]. The language used by Lyons was such as to provide anexcellent defence in published despatches, and it was later so used. Butprivately neither Lyons nor Russell were wholly convinced of thecorrectness of Bunch's actions. Bunch had heard of Mure's arrest onAugust 18, and at once protested that no passport had been given, butmerely a "Certificate to the effect that he [Mure] was a BritishMerchant residing in Charleston" on his way to England, and that he wascarrying official despatches to the Foreign Office[357]. In fact Murehad long since taken out American citizenship papers, and thedistinction between passport and certificate seems an evasion. Officially Lyons could report "it is clear that Mr. Robert Mure, intaking charge of the letters which have been seized, abused Mr. Bunch'sconfidence, for Mr. Bunch had positive instructions from me not toforward himself any letters alluding to military or political events, excepting letters to or from British officials[358]. " This made goodreading when put in the published Parliamentary Papers. But in realitythe sending of private letters by messenger also carrying an officialpouch was no novelty. Bunch had explained to Lyons on June 23 that thiswas his practice on the ground that "there is really no way left for themerchants but through me. If Mr. Seward objects I cannot help it. I mustleave it to your Lordship and H. M. 's Government to support me. My owndespatch to Lord J. Russell I must send in some way, and so I take theresponsibility of aiding British interests by sending the mercantileletters as well[359]. " And in Bunch's printed report to Lyons on Mure'sarrest, his reply as to the private letters was, "I could not considerhim [Mure] as being disqualified from being the bearer of a bag to EarlRussell, by his doing what everyone who left Charleston was doingdaily[360]. . . . "

Officially Lyons, on September 2, had reported a conversation withBelligny, the French Consul at Charleston, now in Washington, writing, "I am confirmed in the opinion that the negotiation, which was difficultand delicate, was managed with great tact and good judgment by the twoConsuls[361]. " But this referred merely to the use of Trescott and itsresults, not to Bunch's use of Mure. The British Government was, indeed, prepared to defend the action of its agents in securing, _indirectly_, from the South, an acknowledgment of certain principles ofinternational law. Russell did not believe that Lincoln was "foolhardyenough to quarrel with England and France, " though Hammond (UnderSecretary of Foreign Affairs) "is persuaded that Seward wishes to pick aquarrel[362]. " Enquiry was promptly made of France, through Cowley, asto her stand in the matter of the consuls at Charleston, Russellintimating by an enquiry (later printed in the Parliamentary Papers), asto the initiation of the Declaration of Paris negotiations, that it wasThouvenel who had first suggested the approach to the South through theConsuls[363]. This was an error of memory[364], and Cowley was perturbedby Thouvenel's reticence in reply to the main question. The latterstated that if a like American demand were made on France "undoubtedlyhe could not give up an Agent who had done no more than execute theorders entrusted to him[365]. " This looked like harmony, but thesituation for the two countries was not the same as no demand had beenmade for the recall of Belligny. Cowley was, in reality, anxious andsuspicious, for Thouvenel, in conversation, attributed Seward's anger toBunch's alleged indiscretions in talk, and made it clear that Francewould not "stand by" unless Seward should protest to France against thefact of a communication (not a _negotiation_) having been held with theConfederacy[366]. Before the French reply was secured Russell hadprepared but not sent an answer to Adams, notifying him that the bagfrom Bunch, on examination, was found not to contain "correspondence ofthe enemies of the Government of the United States" as had beensuspected, and transmitting a copy of Bunch's explanation of the reasonfor forwarding private letters[367]. In another letter to Adams of thesame date Russell avowed the Government's responsibility for Bunch'saction on the Declaration of Paris, and declined to recall him, adding:

 "But when it is stated in a letter from some person not named, that the first step to the recognition of the Southern States by Great Britain has been taken, the Undersigned begs to decline all responsibility for such a statement. 

 "Her Majesty's Government have already recognized the belligerent character of the Southern States, and they will continue to recognize them as belligerents. But Her Majesty's Government have not recognized and are not prepared to recognize the so-called Confederate States as a separate and independent State[368]. "

Adams received Russell's two notes on September 13[369], and merelystated that they would be despatched by the next steamer. That Russellwas anxious is shown by a careful letter of caution to Lyons instructinghim if sent away from Washington "to express in the most dignified andguarded terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must bethe result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retireto Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon cease, and the former friendly relations be restored[370]. " Meantime Russellwas far from satisfied with Bunch, writing Lyons to inform himthat the "statements made in regard to his proceedings requireexplanation[371]. " The failure of Seward to demand Belligny's recallworried Russell. He wrote to Palmerston on September 19, "I cannotbelieve that the Americans, having made no demand on the French todisavow Belligny, or Baligny, will send away Lyons, " and he thought thatSeward ought to be satisfied as England had disavowed the offensive partof Bunch's supposed utterances. He was not in favour of sendingreinforcements to the American stations: "If they do not quarrel aboutBunch, we may rest on our oars for the winter[372]. " There was nothingfurther to do save to wait Seward's action on receipt of the Britishrefusal to recall Bunch. At this moment Lyons at Washington was writingin a hopeful view of "avoiding abstract assertions of principles, " butaccustoming the North to the _practice_ of British recognition ofSouthern belligerent rights[373]. Lyons believed that Seward would notgo further than to withdraw Bunch's exequatur, but he was anxious forthe return of Mercier (long absent with Prince Napoleon), since "ourposition is unluckily not exactly the same with that of France[374]. " OnOctober 12 Lyons conferred at length with Seward on the Bunch matter, asusual, privately and unofficially. Seward dwelt on a letter justreceived from Motley assuring him that Great Britain was not "unfriendlyto the United States, " and "appeared anxious not to pick a quarrel, yethardly knowing how to retract from his original position. " Lyons toldSeward that it would be "impossible to carry on the Diplomaticbusiness . . . On the false hypothesis that the United States Government"did not _know_ England and France had recognized the belligerent rightsof the South, and he urged Russell to get from France an openacknowledgment, such as England has made, that she "negotiated" withthe Confederacy. Lyons thought Mercier would try to avoid this, thusseeking to bring pressure on the British Government to adopt his planof an early recognition of Southern independence. Like Cowley, Lyonswas disturbed at the French evasion of direct support in the Bunchaffair[375]. 

Bunch's formal denial to Lyons of the charges made against him by theUnited States was confined to three points; he asserted his disbeliefthat Mure carried any despatches from the _de facto_ government atRichmond; he protested that "there was not one single paper in my bagwhich was not entirely and altogether on Her Majesty's service"; and heexplained the alleged "passport" was not intended as such, but wasmerely "a certificate stating that Mr. Mure was charged by me withdespatches, " but he acknowledged that in the certificate's descriptionof Mure as a "British merchant" a possible error had been committed, adding, however, that he had supposed anyone would understand, since thewords "British subject" had not been used, that Mure was in reality anaturalized citizen of America[376]. This explanation was received byRussell on October 21. Lyons' comment on Bunch's explanation, madewithout knowledge of what would be Seward's final determination, wasthat if Bunch had any further excuses to make about the private letterscarried by Mure he should drop two weak points in his argument. "I meanthe distinction between B. Merchant and B. S. , and the distinctionbetween a document requesting that the bearer '_may be permitted to passfreely and receive all proper protection and assistance_' and apassport[377]. " Russell, on receipt of Bunch's explanation was alsodissatisfied, first because Bunch had violated Lyons' instructionsagainst entrusting despatches to persons carrying privatecorrespondence, and second, because Bunch "gives no distinct denial" tothe newspaper stories that he had gossiped about his activities and hadstated them to be "a first step toward recognition[378]. " Thesecriticisms were directed entirely to Bunch's conduct subsequent to theoverture to the South; on the propriety of that act Russell supportedBunch with vigour[379]. October 26, Seward read to Lyons the instructionto Adams on the revocation of Bunch's exequatur. The ground taken forthis, reported Lyons, was an evasion of that charge of communicatingwith the South for which Russell had avowed responsibility, and aturning to the charge that Bunch was personally unacceptable longer tothe United States because of his partisanship to the South, as evidencedby various acts and especially as shown by his reported assertion thatGreat Britain had taken "a first step to recognition. " "Never, " wroteLyons, "were serious charges brought upon a slighter foundation. " "Noone who has read Mr. Bunch's despatches to your Lordship and to me canconsider him as in the least degree a partisan of the Southern cause. ""When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. After a short pause I took leave of him courteously, andwithdrew[380]. "

As will have been noted, Lyons had foreseen the American decisionagainst Bunch on purely personal grounds, had been relieved that thiswould be the issue, and had fore-warned Russell. His despatch justcited may be regarded as a suggestion of the proper British refutationof charges, but with acceptance of the American decision. Neverthelesshe wrote gloomily on the same day of future relations with the UnitedStates[381]. At the same time Russell, also foreseeing Seward's action, was not disturbed. He thought it still "not off the cards that theSouthern Confederates may return to the Union. . . . Our conduct must bestrictly neutral, and it will be[382]. " Upon receipt of Lyons' despatchand letter of October 28 Russell wrote to Palmerston, "I do not attachmuch importance to this letter of Lyons. It is the business of Seward tofeed the mob with sacrifices every day, and we happen to be the mostgrateful food he can offer[383]. " For Russell saw clearly that GreatBritain could not object to the removal of Bunch on the purely personalgrounds alleged by Seward. There followed in due course the formalnotification by Adams on November 21, just six days before he learned ofthe _Trent_ affair, which had occurred on November 8. That alarmingincident no doubt coloured the later communications of both parties, forwhile both Adams and Russell indulged in several lengthy argumentativepapers, such as are dear to the hearts of lawyers and diplomats, theonly point of possible further dispute was on the claim of Great Britainthat future occasions might arise where, in defence of Britishinterests, it would be absolutely necessary to communicate with theConfederacy. Adams acknowledged a British duty to protect its citizens, but reasserted the American right to dismiss any British agent whoshould act as Bunch had done. On December 9, Russell closed the matterby stating that he did "not perceive that any advantage would beobtained by the continuance of this correspondence[384]. " Bunch wasexpected to leave Charleston as soon as a safe conveyance could beprovided for him, but this was not immediately forthcoming. In fact heremained at Charleston until February, 1863, actively engaged, butofficial papers were signed by his vice-consul. In the excitement overthe _Trent_, he seems rapidly to have disappeared from the official ashe did from the public horizon[385]. 

The Bunch controversy, seemingly of no great importance in so far as thealleged personal grounds of complaint are concerned, had its realsignificance in the effort of Great Britain to make contact with theSouthern Government--an effort incautiously entered upon, and from whichan attempt to withdraw had come too late. The result was Britishassertion of a right in case of necessity to make such contact, havingrecognized the South as a belligerent, but a discontinuance of thepractice, under the American protest[386]. While this controversy was inprogress the attention of the British Government was directed to aproposal urged by Mercier upon Lyons in Washington, which appeared tohave the support of the French Government. On September 30, Mercier, soLyons reported, had received a private letter from Thouvenel expressinggreat concern over the prospective scarcity of cotton from America, dueto the blockade, and asking Mercier's advice. The latter now informedLyons that his reply had outlined the following steps: first, completeharmony of action between England and France; second, recognition ofSouthern independence; third, refusal longer to recognize the blockade;fourth, England and France to be alert to seize the "favourable moment, "when the North became disheartened, the present moment not being a goodone[387]. This policy Mercier thought so "bold" that the North would bedeterred from declaring war. The two diplomats held long argument overthis suggestion. Lyons acknowledged the general pressure for cotton, butthought there was no need of great alarm as yet and also advanced theidea that in the end Europe would benefit by being forced to developother sources of supply, thus being freed from such exclusivedependence on the United States. Mercier answered that France was indire need and could not wait and he urged that mere recognition of theSouth would not secure cotton--it was necessary also to break theblockade. In comment to Russell, Lyons agreed that this was true, butthought the fact in itself an argument against accepting Mercier'sideas: "The time is far distant when the intervention of England andFrance in the quarrel would be welcomed, or, unless under compulsion, tolerated by the American peoples. " The South had not yet "gone farenough in establishing its independence to render a recognition of iteither proper or desirable for European powers, " and he stated withemphasis that recognition would _not_ end the war unless there was alsoan _alliance_ with the South[388]. 

In the British Cabinet also, at this same time, attention was beingdirected to the question of cotton, not, primarily, by any push from theBritish manufacturing interest, but because of queries addressed to itby the French Minister in London. Russell wrote to Palmerston, referringto the inquiry of Flahault, "I agree with you that the cotton questionmay become serious at the end of the year, " but he added that Lindsayhad informed him that in any case cotton could not be brought in thewinter-time from the interior to the Southern ports[389]. In truth anyserious thought given at this time to the question of cotton appears tobe the result of the French arguments at London and Washingtonadvocating a vigorous American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercierrenewed debate on exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier thistime reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyonsinsisted that the North would most certainly declare war on any powerthat recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause moresuffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortageof cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation indealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony ofattitude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justifiedwhen Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Sewardsaid plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreignpower that tried to interfere and that the only way in which Francecould get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. Heacknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informedMercier that France would at least know there had been a war. On hispart Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possibleoutcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel thatthe true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and"bring about a peaceful separation. " Lyons' comment to Russell is thatSeward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident justification ofLyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had been very eager to learnwhether England knew of Thouvenel's instruction, to which Mercierreplied "no, " and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal toAdams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward--acaution with which Lyons was very content[391]. 

Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in London at arather critical moment. On October 17, just after Adams' complaint aboutBunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward wouldmagnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days beforeBunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" had been received, Russell wrote toPalmerston:

 "There is much good sense in Mercier's observations. But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything, it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton. But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents, Make up your quarrels. We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable. If you accept them, well and good. But, if your adversary accepts them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you may expect to see us your enemies. France would be quite ready to hold this language with us. 

 "If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it would be the end of the year, or immediately before the meeting of Parliament[392]. "

Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhatcarried away by Mercier's suggestion. That it was but a briefly heldthought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393]. Norwas he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was notinclined to alter British policy. October 18, he replied to Russell:

 "As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the conflict between North and South. . . . The only excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening parties if the conflict went on; but in the American case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe. 

 "I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress created by that want was far more serious than it is likely to be. The probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from other quarters. 

 "The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our fellow countrymen[395]. "

In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward, outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepareddespatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks wasone of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if weconsider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemedto ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see whatthe result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]. "Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was nonethe less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention. SinceGreat Britain had taken no part in the French scheme--a point whichSeward was careful to make clear to Dayton--the despatch needs noexpanded treatment here. Its significance is that when reported to Lyonsby Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Ministercould pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier andRussell that Seward's line was exactly that which he had prophesied. Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should notbecome known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any sharein the discussion[397]. 

Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had stillanother communication, and apparently a last on this topic, withMercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground ofnational policy toward America, and in which their divergent viewsbecame very apparent. The arguments were the same, but expressed withmore vigour. Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to "rush" Lyonsinto acquiescence in his policy. Lyons finally observed to him that he"had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty's Government considered thetime was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing theSouth" and asked what good such a step would do anyway. Mercier repliedthat he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so itwould be a step toward settlement. To this Lyons took positiveexception[398]. Lyons' report of this conversation was written onNovember 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurredan event more immediately threatening to British-American relations thanany other during the Civil War. 

The battle of Bull Run had left on British minds an impression ofNorthern incapacity in war--even a doubt of Northern courage anddetermination. On August 19 the Declaration of Paris negotiation, afavourable result from which was eagerly desired by Russell, had failed, as he well knew when he attached to the convention that explanatorystatement limiting its action in point of time. In the end Russell feltthat Britain had just escaped a "trap. " Two weeks after this Russelllearned of the arrest of Mure, and soon of the demand for Bunch'srecall, finally and formally made by Adams on November 21. Just six dayslater, on November 27, London heard of the _Trent_ affair of November 8. It is small wonder that Russell and his colleagues felt an increasinguncertainty as to the intent of the United States, and also anincreasing irritation at having to guard their steps with such care in asituation where they sincerely believed the only possible outcome wasthe dissolution of the American Union. But up to the moment when thenews of the _Trent_ affair was received they had pursued a policy, sothey believed, of strict and upright neutrality, and were fixed in thedetermination not to permit minor controversies or economic advantage todivert them from it. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 319: _Economist_, May 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 320: _Ibid. _, June 29, 1861. ]

[Footnote 321: J. L. Motley, _The Causes of the American Civil War_. Published as a pamphlet. N. Y. , 1861. ]

[Footnote 322: _Daily News_, July 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 323: Russell, _My Diary, North and South_, p. 159, Boston, 1863. This work is in effect a condensation of Russell's letters to the_Times_, but contains many intimate descriptions not given in thenewspaper. ]

[Footnote 324: _Ibid. _, p. 315. ]

[Footnote 325: The _Times_, August 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 326: Russell, _My Diary_, London, 1863, II, p. 296. Thisedition varies somewhat from that published at Boston and previouslycited. The _New York Times_ became Russell's most vicious critic, labelling him "Bull Run Russell, " a name which stuck, and beginning itsfirst article on his sins "The terrible epistle has been read with quiteas much avidity as an average President's message. We scarcelyexaggerate the fact when we say, the first and foremost thought on theminds of a very large portion of our people after the repulse at _Bull'sRun_ was, what will Russell say?" _Ibid. _, p. 297. As to his recallRussell afterwards asserted that it was really due to a variance ofopinion with Delane, the former being really pro-Northern in sympathyand in conviction of ultimate victory. This will be examined later whenRussell's position as an independent editor in London becomesimportant. ]

[Footnote 327: For similar German impressions see G. H. Putnam, _Memoriesof My Youth_, N. Y. , 1914, p. 187. ]

[Footnote 328: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, p. 48. In the same view Russellwrote to Lyons, August 16. "The defeat of Manassas or Bull's Run seemsto me to show a great want of zeal. For I cannot believe the descendantsof the men of 1776 and indeed of 1815 to be totally wanting in courage. "(Lyons Papers. )]

[Footnote 329: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 31. August 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 330: Gladstone Papers, August 29, 1861. ]

[Footnote 331: _Economist_, Aug. 17, 1861. ]

[Footnote 332: _Morning Star_, Sept. 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 333: _John Bull_, Sept. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 334: To be discussed fully in Chapter XVIII. ]

[Footnote 335: Sept. 13, 1861. Dasent, _Delane_, II, p. 34. ]

[Footnote 336: Darwin to Asa Gray, Sept. 17 and Dec. 11, 1861. Cited in_Rhodes_, III, p. 510. ]

[Footnote 337: _Spectator_, Sept. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 338: _Saturday Review_, Sept. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 339: _Spectator_, Sept. 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 340: _Daily News_, Sept. 17 and Oct. 10, 1861. The statementis in reply to an article in the _Times_ of October 9, arguing that evenif the South were regarded as in the wrong, they had ten millions, afact that was conclusive. ]

[Footnote 341: _The Daily News Jubilee_. By Justin McCarthy and John E. Robinson, pp. 69-77. ]

[Footnote 342: _Spectator_, Sept. 28, 1861. ]

[Footnote 343: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 2, 1861. ]

[Footnote 344: _Ibid. _, Nov. 16. Spence's book rapidly went through manyeditions, was widely read, and furnished the argument for many apro-Southern editorial. Spence himself soon became the intimate friendand adviser of Mason, the Confederate envoy to England. ]

[Footnote 345: _Ibid. _, Nov. 23, 1861. The inference from Bernard's laguage is perhaps permissible, but not inevitable. ]

[Footnote 346: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 37. To his mother, Oct. 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 347: See _ante_, Ch. V. ]

[Footnote 348: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting International Maritime Law. " No. 21 andInclosure. Belligny was in fact the French agent at Charleston who actedwith Bunch. ]

[Footnote 349: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 768. No. 392. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 2, 1861. It is interesting to note that fourteen days were here required totransmit a letter that in ordinary times would have reached itsdestination in two days. Lyons states that he does not intend to informMercier of Russell's attempted recall of instructions. ]

[Footnote 350: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 767. No. 324. Inclosure No. 2. Private. Lyons to Bunch, July 5, 1861. Bunch in reporting to Lyons, also used theword "negotiation. "]

[Footnote 351: When Davis proclaimed privateering Bunch had thought thisindicated a "low morality" and that Southern privateers would be inreality pirates. F. O. , Am. , Vol. 763. Inclosure in No. 162. Bunch toRussell, April 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 352: Bancroft's account, _Seward_, II, pp. 197-203, statesthat Pickens was absent from Charleston. Bunch's account privately wasthat he and Belligny thought Pickens "totally unfit to be intrusted withanything in which judgment and discretion are at all necessary. " (LyonsPapers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 16, 1861. )]

[Footnote 353: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 198. ]

[Footnote 354: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons. ]

[Footnote 355: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 4. Adams toRussell, Sept. 3, 1861. ]

[Footnote 356: _Ibid. _, No. 2. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 357: Russell Papers. Bunch to Lyons, Aug. 18, 1861. Copy inLyons to Russell, Aug. 31, 1861. ]

[Footnote 358: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 7. Lyons toRussell, Aug. 23, 1861. ]

[Footnote 359: Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, June 23, 1861. ]

[Footnote 360: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 15. Inclosures. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861. ]

[Footnote 361: _Ibid. _, "Correspondence respecting InternationalMaritime Law. " No. 39. Lyons to Russell. ]

[Footnote 362: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 6, 1861. ]

[Footnote 363: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 6. Russellto Cowley, Sept. 7, 1861. ]

[Footnote 364: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept. 17, 1861. ]

[Footnote 365: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 10. Cowley toRussell, Sept. 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 366: F. O. , France, Vol. 1396. No. 1112. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 10, 1861. Also Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Sept. 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 367: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 9. Russellto Adams, Sept. 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 368: _Ibid. _, No. 8. Two days later, September 11, Russellwrote to Palmerston that Motley was ignorant of Seward's intentions, andthat the Queen wished a modification of the "phrase about not beingprepared to recognize, " but that he was against any change. Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 369: _Ibid. _, No. 12. Adams to Russell. ]

[Footnote 370: Russell to Lyons, Sept. 13, 1861. (Cited in Newton, _Lyons_, I, p. 52. )]

[Footnote 371: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 11. Russellto Lyons, Sept. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 372: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 373: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. _Private_. Sept. 24, 1861. ]

[Footnote 374: _Ibid. _, Sept. 27, 1861. The facts about Belligny were, as reported by Lyons and Cowley, that before Bunch's activities becameknown, the French Consul had been recalled and replaced by another man, St. André. It will have been noted that when Lyons and Mercier senttheir instructions to the consuls at Charleston that of Mercier wasaddressed to St. André. Apparently he had not reached Charleston. Thusthere was no opportunity to demand the recall of Belligny. Bancroft(_Seward_, II, p. 203), unaware of this, presumes that Seward "thoughtit important not to give them (England and France) a common grievance. "]

[Footnote 375: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 376: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 15. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons, Sept. 30, 1861. ]

[Footnote 377: Lyons Papers. Copy, Private and Confidential, Lyons toBunch, Oct. 24, 1861. Bunch was informed in this letter that Mure hadbeen set free. ]

[Footnote 378: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 757. No. 381. Russell to Lyons. Draft. Oct. 26, 1861. ]

[Footnote 379: The criticisms of Lyons and Russell were not printed inthe _Parliamentary Papers_. Bunch did later deny specifically that hehad told anyone of his activities. _(Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 22. Inclosure. Bunch to Lyons. Oct. 31, 1861. )]

[Footnote 380: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 17. Lyonsto Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. There are two interesting unindicatedelisions in the printed text of this letter. Indicating them in bracketsthe sentences run: first:--

"It may seem superfluous to make any observations on the charges broughtagainst Mr. Bunch. [For it is plain that a high-handed proceeding beingdeemed advisable with a view to gratify the American Public, Mr. Bunchhas merely been selected as a safer object of attack than the British orFrench Government. ] I can not help saying that never were more seriouscharges, etc. , " and second:--

"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. [Iallowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me to be apparentin my countenance, but I said nothing. From my knowledge of Mr. Seward'scharacter, I was sure that at the moment nothing which I could say wouldmake so much impression upon him as my maintaining an absolute silence. ]After a short pause, etc. " (F. O. , America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons toRussell, Oct. 28, 1861). ]

[Footnote 381: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861. ]

[Footnote 382: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. ]

[Footnote 383: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. 12. 1861. Headded, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular mixture of thebully and coward. "]

[Footnote 384: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 26. Russellto Adams, Dec. 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 385: Bonham, _British Consuls in the Confederacy_, p. 45. Columbia University, _Studies in History, Economics and Public Law_, XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyonsthought. Lyons had suggested that Bunch be permitted to remain privatelyat Charleston. (_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur. " No. 29. Lyonsto Russell, Dec. 31, 1861. ) That Bunch was after all regarded by theUnited States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curiouscircumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Ministerresident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the UnitedStates and Colombia. " (Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, V, p. 22. )]

[Footnote 386: Bancroft, _Seward, II_, p. 203, says that if GreatBritain ever attempted another negotiation "that British representativeswere careful to preserve perfect secrecy. " I have found no evidence ofany similar communication with the South. ]

[Footnote 387: As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported Mercier asurging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective Governmentsauthority to recognize the South whenever they thought "the right time"had come. Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing thatthe mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass himin his relations with the North. Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea, and added that Russia could well afford to wait until England and Francehad acted. Russia could then also recognize the South without offendingthe North. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F. O. , April 2-14, 1861. No. 863. )]

[Footnote 388: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 389: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 8, 1861. OnOct. 7, Lyons wrote to Head, "If we can get through the winter andspring without American cotton, and keep the peace, we shall attain agreat object. " (Lyons Papers. )]

[Footnote 390: F. O. , America, 772. No. 585. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 391: _Ibid. _, Vol. 773. No. 606. Lyons to Russell. Confidential. Oct. 28, 1861. ]

[Footnote 392: Walpole, _Russell_, II, 344. ]

[Footnote 393: See _ante_, p. 194. ]

[Footnote 394: "The Americans certainly seem inclined to pick a quarrelwith us; but I doubt their going far enough even to oblige us torecognize the Southern States. A step further would enable us to openthe Southern ports, but a war would nevertheless be a great calamity. "(Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 245. Granville to Clarendon. No exact date isgiven but the context shows it to have been in October, 1861. )]

[Footnote 395: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 218-19. On October 30, Russellwrote to Gladstone expressing himself as worried about cotton butstating that the North was about to try to take New Orleans and thusrelease cotton. (Gladstone Papers). ]

[Footnote 396: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 219. Bancroft cites also aletter from Seward to his wife showing that he appreciated thoroughlythe probability of a foreign war if France should press on in theline taken. ]

[Footnote 397: F. O. , America, Vol. 773. No. 623. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, Nov. 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 398: _Ibid. _, No. 634. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 8, 1861. In truth Lyons felt something of that suspicion of Franceindicated by Cowley, and for both men these suspicions date from themoment when France seemed lukewarm in support of England in the matterof Bunch. ]

CHAPTER VII

THE "TRENT"

The _Trent_ affair seemed to Great Britain like the climax of Americanarrogance[399]. The Confederate agents sent to Europe at the outbreak ofthe Civil War had accomplished little, and after seven months of waitingfor a more favourable turn in foreign relations, President Davisdetermined to replace them by two "Special Commissioners of theConfederate States of America. " These were James M. Mason of Virginia, for Great Britain, and John Slidell of Louisiana, for France. Theirappointment indicated that the South had at last awakened to the need ofa serious foreign policy. It was publicly and widely commented on by theSouthern press, thereby arousing an excited apprehension in the North, almost as if the mere sending of two new men with instructions to securerecognition abroad were tantamount to the actual accomplishment oftheir object. 

Mason and Slidell succeeded in running the blockade at Charleston on thenight of October 12, 1861, on the Confederate steamer _Theodora_[400], and arrived at New Providence, Nassau, on the fourteenth, thenceproceeded by the same vessel to Cardenas, Cuba, and from that pointjourneyed overland to Havana, arriving October 22. In the party therewere, besides the two envoys, their secretaries, McFarland and Eustis, and the family of Slidell. On November 7 they sailed for the Danishisland of St. Thomas, expecting thence to take a British steamer forSouthampton. The vessel on which they left Havana was the Britishcontract mail-packet _Trent_, whose captain had full knowledge of thediplomatic character of his passengers. About noon on November 8 the_Trent_ was stopped in the Bahama Channel by the United States sloop ofwar, _San Jacinto_, Captain Wilkes commanding, by a shot across thebows, and a boarding party took from the _Trent_ Mason and Slidell withtheir secretaries, transferred them to the _San Jacinto_, and proceededto an American port. Protest was made both by the captain of the _Trent_and by Commander Williams, R. N. , admiralty agent in charge of mails onboard the ship[401]. The two envoys also declared that they would yieldonly to personal compulsion, whereupon hands were laid upon shouldersand coat collars, and, accepting this as the application of _force_, they were transferred to the _San Jacinto's_ boats. The scene on the_Trent_, as described by all parties, both then and later, partakes ofthe nature of comic opera, yet was serious enough to the participants. In fact, the envoys, especially Slidell, were exultant in the convictionthat the action of Wilkes would inevitably result in the earlyrealization of the object of their journey--recognition of the South, at least by Great Britain[402]. Once on board the _San Jacinto_ theywere treated more like guests on a private yacht, having "seats at thecaptain's table, " than as enemy prisoners on an American war-ship. 

Captain Wilkes had acted without orders, and, indeed, even without anyrecent official information from Washington. He was returning from acruise off the African coast, and had reached St. Thomas on October 10. A few days later, when off the south coat of Cuba, he had learned of theConfederate appointment of Mason and Slidell, and on the twenty-eighth, in Havana harbour, he heard that the Commissioners were to sail on the_Trent_. At once he conceived the idea of intercepting the _Trent_, exercising the right of search, and seizing the envoys, in spite of thealleged objections of his executive officer, Lieutenant Fairfax. Theresult was that quite without authority from the United States NavyDepartment, and solely upon his own responsibility, a challenge wasaddressed to Britain, the "mistress of the seas, " certain to be acceptedby that nation as an insult to national prestige and national pride notquietly to be suffered. 

The _San Jacinto_ reached Fortress Monroe on the evening of November 15. The next day the news was known, but since it was Saturday, few paperscontained more than brief and inaccurate accounts and, there being thenfew Sunday papers, it was not until Monday, the eighteenth, that therebroke out a widespread rejoicing and glorification in the Northernpress[403]. America, for a few days, passed through a spasm ofexultation hard to understand, even by those who felt it, once the firstemotion had subsided. This had various causes, but among them is evidenta quite childish fear of the acuteness and abilities of Mason andSlidell. Both men were indeed persons of distinction in the politics ofthe previous decades. Mason had always been open in his expressedantipathy to the North, especially to New England, had long been aleader in Virginia, and at the time of the Southern secession, was aUnited States Senator from that State. Slidell, a Northerner by birth, but early removed to Louisiana, had acquired fortune in business there, and had for nearly twenty years been the political "boss" of one factionof the Democratic Party in New Orleans and in the State. With muchprevious experience in diplomacy, especially that requiring intrigue andindirect methods (as in the preliminaries of the Mexican War), andhaving held his seat in the United States Senate until the withdrawal ofLouisiana from the Union, he was, of the two men, more feared and moredetested, but both were thoroughly obnoxious to the North. Merely on thepersonal side their capture was cause for wide rejoicing[404]. 

Surprise was also an element in the American elation, for until the newsof the capture was received no portion of the public had given seriousthought to any attempt to stop the envoys. Surprise also played its partwhen the affair became known in England, though in official circlesthere had been some warning. It had already been reported in the Britishpress that Mason and Slidell had run the blockade at Charleston, were inCuba, and were about to set sail for England on the Confederate steamer_Nashville_, but the British Government, considering that the envoysmight perhaps sail rather on the West India Mail Steamer forSouthampton, became much concerned over a possible American interferencewith that vessel. On November 9 Hammond sent an urgent enquiry to theAdvocate-General stating the situation, calling attention to thepresence at Southampton of an American war-vessel, and asking whetherthis vessel, or any other American man-of-war, "would be entitled tointerfere with the mail steamer if fallen in with beyond the territoriallimits of the United Kingdom, that is beyond three miles from theBritish Coast. "

[Illustration: _Photo: Handy, Washington_ JAMES M. MASON]

 "Whether for instance she might cause the West India Mail Steamer to bring to, might board her, examine her Papers, open the Mail Bags and examine the contents thereof, examine the luggage of passengers, seize and carry away Messrs. Mason and Slidell in person, or seize their Credentials and Instructions and Despatches, or even put a Prize Crew on board the West India Steamer and carry her off to a Port of the United States; in other words what would be the right of the American Cruiser with regard to her passengers and crew and lawful papers and correspondence on board our packet on the assumption that the said packet was liable to capture and confiscation on the ground of carrying enemies' despatches; would the Cruiser be entitled to carry the packet and all and everything in her back to America or would she be obliged to land in this Country or in some near port all the people and all the unseizable goods[405]?"

Hammond further stated that Russell was anxious to have an immediatereply, inasmuch as the mail packet was due to arrive in Southampton onNovember 12. The opinion of the law officer consulted is best given inPalmerston's own words in a letter to Delane, Editor of the _Times_:

 "_94 Piccadilly, November 11, 1861_. 

 "MY DEAR DELANE, "It may be useful to you to know that the Chancellor, Dr. Lushington, the three Law Officers, Sir G. Grey, the Duke of Somerset, and myself, met at the Treasury to-day to consider what we could properly do about the American cruiser come, no doubt, to search the West Indian packet supposed to be bringing hither the two Southern envoys; and, much to my regret, it appeared that, according to the principles of international law laid down in our courts by Lord Stowell, and practised and enforced by us, a belligerent has a right to stop and search any neutral not being a ship of war, and being found on the high seas and being suspected of carrying enemy's despatches; and that consequently this American cruiser might, by our own principles of international law, stop the West Indian packet, search her, and if the Southern men and their despatches and credentials were found on board, either take them out, or seize the packet and carry her back to New York for trial. Such being the opinion of our men learned in the law, we have determined to do no more than to order the _Phaeton_ frigate to drop down to Yarmouth Roads and watch the proceedings of the American within our three-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction, and to prevent her from exercising within that limit those rights which we cannot dispute as belonging to her beyond that limit. 

 "In the meanwhile the American captain, having got very drunk this morning at Southampton with some excellent brandy, and finding it blow heavily at sea, has come to an anchor for the night within Calshot Castle, at the entrance of the Southampton river. 

 "I mention these things for your private information. 

 Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON[406]. "

Not completely satisfied with this decision as reported to Delane, andsincerely anxious to avert what he foresaw would be a difficultsituation, Palmerston took the unusual step of writing to Adams on thenext day, November 12, and asking for an interview. His note took Adamsby surprise, but he promptly waited upon Palmerston, and was told of thelatter's disturbance at the presence of the American ship _James Adger_, Captain Marchand commanding, in Southampton Harbour, with the allegedpurpose of stopping the British West India steamer and intercepting thejourney of Mason and Slidell. Palmerston stated that he "did not pretendto judge absolutely of the question whether we had a right to stop aforeign vessel for such a purpose as was indicated, " and he urged onAdams the unwisdom of such an act in any case. "Neither did the objectto be gained seem commensurate with the risk. For it was surely of noconsequence whether one or two more men were added to the two or threewho had already been so long here. They would scarcely make a differencein the action of the Government after once having made up itsmind[407]. "

The interview with Adams, so Palmerston wrote to Delane on the same day, November 12, was reassuring:

 "MY DEAR DELANE, "I have seen Adams to-day, and he assures me that the American paddle-wheel was sent to intercept the _Nashville_ if found in these seas, but not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag. He said he had seen the commander, and had advised him to go straight home; and he believed the steamer to be now on her way back to the United States. This is a very satisfactory explanation. 

 Yours sincerely, PALMERSTON[408]. "

In fact, neither Adams' diary nor his report to Seward recorded quitethe same statement as that here attributed to him by Palmerston, andthis became later, but fortunately after the question of the _Trent_ hadpassed off the stage, a matter of minor dispute. Adams' own statementwas that he had told Palmerston the _James Adger_ was seeking tointercept the _Nashville_ and "had no instruction" to interfere with aBritish Packet--which is not the same as saying that she already hadinstructions "not to meddle with any ship under a foreign flag[409]. "But in any case, it would appear that the British Government had beenwarned by its legal advisers that if that which actually happened in thecase of the _Trent_ should occur, English practice, if followed, wouldcompel acquiescence in it[410]. This is not to say that a first legaladvice thus given on a problematical case necessarily bound theGovernment to a fixed line of action, but that the opinion of theGovernment was one of "no help for it" if the case should actually ariseis shown by the instructions to Lyons and by his reaction. On November16, Hammond wrote to Lyons stating the opinion of the Law Officers that"we could do nothing to save the Packet being interfered with outsideour three miles; so Lord Palmerston sent for Adams, who assured him thatthe American [the _James Adger_] had no instructions to meddle with anyship under English colours . . . That her orders were not to endeavour totake Mason and Slidell out of any ship under foreign colours[411]. " Onreceipt of this letter subsequent to the actual seizure of the envoys, Lyons hardly knew what to expect. He reported Hammond's account toAdmiral Milne, writing that the legal opinion was that "Nothing could bedone to save the Packet's being interfered with outside of the Marineleague from the British Coast"; but he added, "I am not informed thatthe Law Officers decided that Mason and Slidell might be taken out ofthe Packet, but only that we could not prevent the Packet's beinginterfered with, " thus previsioning that shift in British legal opinionwhich was to come _after_ the event. Meanwhile Lyons was so uncertain asto what his instructions would be that he thought he "ought to maintainthe greatest reserve here on the matter of the _Trent_[412]. "

This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous complicationoccurred after the envoys had been seized but some two weeks before thatfact was known in London. "Adams, " wrote Russell, "says it was all afalse alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility and exaggeratednotions[413]. " But Russell was not equally convinced with Adams that theNorth, especially Seward, was so eager for continued Britishneutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of Captain Wilkes' actionwas received, Russell and many others in the Cabinet saw in it acontinuation of unfriendly Northern policy now culminating in a directaffront. Argyll, the most avowed friend of the North in the Cabinet, wasstirred at first to keen resentment, writing "of this wretched piece ofAmerican folly. . . . I am all against submitting to any clean breach ofInternational Law, such as I can hardly doubt this has been[414]. " TheLaw Officers now held that "Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass uponthe issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of sendingthe _Trent_ as a prize into port for judicial adjudication[415]. " Thiswas still later further expanded by an opinion that the envoys could notbe considered as contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the _Trent_as having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel wasto a neutral, not to an enemy port[416]. This opinion would haveprohibited even the carrying of the _Trent_ into an American port fortrial by a prize court. 

But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand uponthe United States. The case was one for a quick demand of promptreparation. Russell's instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, wascouched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor anunfriendly attitude. The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be abreach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred withoutorders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with anapology. If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was topropose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the Britishposition, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copyof it if desired[417]. In another instruction of the same date Russellauthorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward, if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether"the requirements of Her Majesty's Government are substantially compliedwith[418]. " And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyonsinstructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain fromanything like menace[419]. On November 30, also, the Governmenthurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, beganpreparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiatedmunitions and supply activities. Evidently there was at first but fainthope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to beavoided[420]. 

It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almostimmediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons wassoftened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material pointbeing the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes wasunauthorized[421]. That instruction had been sent previous to thereceipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, hestated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strictsilence[422]. Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared therealization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea. " "I wish I coulddivest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake handsover a war with us[423]. " Considering the bitterness of the quarrel inAmerica this was a far-fetched notion. The efforts promptly made by theConfederate agents in London to make use of the _Trent_ affair showedhow little Cowley understood the American temper. Having remained veryquiet since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britainintended remaining strictly neutral[424], they now, on November 27 and30, renewed their argument and application for recognition, but receivedin reply a curt letter declining any official communication with them"in the present state of affairs[425]. "

The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of transportationbefore even the first American reaction to the British demand could bereceived in London gave time for a lessening of excitement and a morecareful self-analysis by British statesmen as to what they really feltand desired. Gladstone wrote: "It is a very sad and heart-sickeningbusiness, and I sincerely trust with you that war may be averted[426]. "Argyll hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the toneof the British press, and stating that he was against standing ontechnical grounds of international law. "War with America is such acalamity that we must do all we can to avoid it. It involves not onlyourselves, but all our North American colonies[427]. " But war seemed toboth men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by CornewallLewis[428] and by Clarendon, the latter standing at the moment in aposition midway between the Whig and Tory parties[429]. Yet Russell, with more cause than others to mistrust Seward's policy, as alsobelieving that he had more cause, personally, to resent it, was lesspessimistic and was already thinking of at least postponing immediatehostilities in the event of an American refusal to make just recompense. On December 16 he wrote to Palmerston: "I incline more and more to theopinion that if the answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensiveanswer, we should send once more across the Atlantic to askcompliance. . . . I do not think the country would approve an immediatedeclaration of war. But I think we must abide by our demand of arestoration of the prisoners. . . . Lyons gives a sad account of Canada. Your foresight of last year is amply justified[430]. " And on December 20he wrote, "Adams' language yesterday was entirely in favour of yieldingto us, if our tone is not too peremptory. . . . If our demands arerefused, we must, of course, call Parliament together. The sixthof February will do. In any other case we must decide according tocircumstances[431]. "

Thus Russell would not have Great Britain go to war with America withoutthe sanction of Parliament, and was seeking reasons for delay. He wasreacting, in fact, to a more sobering second thought which wasexperienced also by nearly everyone, save the eager British"Southerner, " in public and in newspaper circles. The first explosion ofthe Press, on receipt of the news of the _Trent_, had been a terrificone. The British lion, insulted in its chosen field of supremacy, thesea, had pawed the air in frenzy though at first preserving a certainslow dignity of motion. Customary "strong leader-writing" becamevigorous, indeed, in editorial treatment of America and in demand forthe prompt release of the envoys with suitable apology. The close touchof leading papers with Governmental opinion is well shown, as in the_Times_, by the day-to-day editorials of the first week. On November 28there was solemn and anxious consideration of a grave crisis with muchquestioning of international law, which was acknowledged to be doubtful. But even if old British practice seemed to support Captain Wilkes, thepresent was not to be controlled by a discarded past, and "essentialdifferences" were pointed out. This tone of vexed uncertainty changed toa note of positive assurance and militant patriotism on November 30 whenthe Government made its demand. The _Times_ up to December 2, thought itabsolutely certain that Wilkes had acted on authorization, and devotedmuch space to Seward as the evil genius of American warlike policytoward England. The old "Duke of Newcastle story" was revamped. But onDecember 2 there reached London the first, very brief, American news ofthe arrival of the _San Jacinto_ at Fortress Monroe, and this containeda positive statement by Wilkes that he had had no orders. The _Times_was sceptical, but printed the news as having an important bearing, iftrue, and, at the same time, printed communications by "Justicia" andothers advising a "go slowly" policy[432]. Yet all British papersindulged in sharp reflections on American insults, displayed keenresentment, and demanded a prompt yielding to the Governmental demand. 

An intelligent American long resident in London, wrote to Seward onNovember 29: "There never was within memory such a burst of feeling ashas been created by the news of the boarding of [the Trent]. The peopleare frantic with rage, and were the country polled, I fear 999 men outof a thousand would declare for immediate war. Lord Palmerston cannotresist the impulse if he would. " And another American, in Edinburgh, wrote to his uncle in New York: "I have never seen so intense a feelingof indignation exhibited in my life. It pervades all classes, and maymake itself heard above the wiser theories of the Cabinetofficers[433]. " If such were the British temper, it would requireskilful handling by even a pacific-minded Government to avoid war. Evenwithout belligerent newspaper utterances the tone of arrogance as in_Punch's_ cartoon, "You do what's right, my son, or I'll blow you out ofthe water, " portended no happy solution. Yet this cartoon at leastimplied a hope of peaceful outcome, and that this was soon a generalhope is shown by the prompt publicity given to a statement from theAmerican General, Winfield Scott, in Paris, denying that he had said theaction of Captain Wilkes had been decided upon at Washington before hesailed for Europe, and asserting that no orders were given to seize theenvoys on board any British or foreign vessel[434]. Nevertheless, Adams, for the moment intensely aroused, and suspicious of the whole purpose ofBritish policy, could write to his friend Dana in Boston: "Theexpression of the past summer might have convinced you that she [GreatBritain] was not indifferent to the disruption of the Union. In May shedrove in the tip of the wedge, and now you can't imagine that a fewspiders' webs of a half a century back will not be strong enough to holdher from driving it home. Little do you understand of this fast-anchoredisle[435]. "

There can be no doubt that one cause of a more bitter and sharper tonein the British press was the reception of the counter-exultation of theAmerican press on learning of the detention and the exercise of "rightof search" on a British ship. The American public equally went "off itshead" in its expressions. Writing in 1911, the son of the AmericanMinister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, jun. , in 1861, a younglaw-student in Boston, stated: "I do not remember in the whole course ofthe half-century's retrospect . . . Any occurrence in which the Americanpeople were so completely swept off their feet, for the moment losingpossession of their senses, as during the weeks which immediatelyfollowed the seizure of Mason and Slidell[436]. " There were evident twoprincipal causes for this elation. The North with much emotion and highcourage entering in April, 1861, upon the task of restoring the Unionand hoping for quick success, had now passed through a wearisome sixmonths with no evident progress towards its object. Northern failure haddeveloped a deep mortification when, suddenly and unexpectedly, a boldnaval captain, on his own initiative, appeared to have struck a realblow at the South. His action seemed to indicate that the fightingforces of the North, if free from the trammels of Washington red tape, could, and would, carry on energetic war. Certainly it was but a slightincident to create such Northern emotion, yet the result was a suddenlifting from despondency to elation. 

But almost equally with this cause of joy there operated on Americanminds the notion that the United States had at last given to GreatBritain a dose of her own medicine in a previous era--had exercised upona British ship that "right of search" which had been so keenly resentedby America as to have become almost a _permanent_ cause of a sense ofinjury once received and never to be forgotten. There was no clearthinking about this; the obnoxious right of search in times of peace forvagrant seamen, the belligerent right exercised by Britain while Americawas a neutral, the practice of a "right of visit" claimed by Britain asnecessary in suppression of the African Slave Trade--all were confusedby the American public (as they are still in many history textbooks tothis day), and the total result of this mixing of ideas was a generalAmerican jubilation that the United States had now revenged herself forBritish offences, in a manner of which Great Britain could notconsistently complain. These two main reasons for exultation were sharedby all classes, not merely by the uninformed mob of newspaper readers. At a banquet tendered Captain Wilkes in Boston on November 26, GovernorAndrews of Massachusetts called Wilkes' action "one of the mostillustrious services that had made the war memorable, " and added "thatthere might be nothing left [in the episode] to crown the exultation ofthe American heart, Commodore Wilkes fired his shot across the bows ofthe ship that bore the British lion at its head[437]. "

All America first applauded the act, then plunged into discussion of itslegality as doubts began to arise of its defensibility--and wisdom. Itbecame a sort of temporarily popular "parlour game" to argue theinternational law of the case and decide that Great Britain could haveno cause of complaint[438]. Meanwhile at Washington itself there wasevidenced almost equal excitement and approval--but not, fortunately, bythe Department responsible for the conduct of foreign relations. Secretary of the Navy Welles congratulated Wilkes on his "great publicservice, " though criticizing him for not having brought the _Trent_ intoport for adjudication. Congress passed a joint resolution, December 2, thanking Wilkes for his conduct, and the President was requested to givehim a gold medal commemorative of his act. Indeed, no evidence ofapprobation was withheld save the formal approval and avowal of nationalresponsibility by the Secretary of State, Seward. On him, therefore, andon the wisdom of men high in the confidence of the Cabinet, like Sumner, Lyons pinned his faint hope of a peaceful solution. Thoroughly alarmedand despondent, anxious as to the possible fate of Canada[439], headvised against any public preparations in Canada for defence, on theground that if the _Trent_ affair did blow over it should not appearthat we ever thought it an insult which would endanger peace[440]. Thiswas very different from the action and attitude of the Government athome, as yet unknown to Lyons. He wisely waited in silence, advisinglike caution to others, until the receipt of instructions. Silence, atthe moment, was also a friendly service to the United States. 

The earliest American reactions, the national rejoicing, became known tothe British press some six days after its own spasm of anger, and threedays after the Government had despatched its demand for release of theprisoners and begun its hurried military preparations. On December 3 the_Times_ contained the first summary of American press outpourings. Thefirst effect in England was astonishment, followed by renewed and moreintense evidences of a belligerent disposition. Soon, however, therebegan to appear a note of caution and more sane judgment of thesituation, though with no lessening of the assertion that Britain hadsuffered an injury that must be redressed. The American frenzy ofdelight seemingly indicated a deep-seated hostility to Britain that gavepause to British clamour for revenge. On December 4 John Bright made agreat speech at Rochdale, arguing a possible British precedent forWilkes' act, urging caution, lauding American leadership in democracy, and stating his positive conviction that the United States Governmentwas as much astonished as was that of Great Britain by the attack on the_Trent. _[441] To this the _Times_ gave a full column of report onDecember 5 and the day following printed five close-type columns of thespeech itself. Editorially it attacked Bright's position, belittling thespeech for having been made at the one "inconspicuous" place where theorator would be sure of a warm welcome, and asking why Manchester orLiverpool had not been chosen. In fact, however, the _Times_ wasattempting to controvert "our ancient enemy" Bright as an apostle ofdemocracy rather than to fan the flames of irritation over the _Trent_, and the prominence given to Bright's speech indicates a greaterreadiness to consider as hopeful an escape from the existing crisis. 

After December 3 and up to the ninth, the _Times_ was more caustic aboutAmerica than previously. The impression of its editorials read to-day isthat more hopeful of a peaceful solution it was more free to snarl. Butwith the issue of December 10 there began a series of leaders andcommunications, though occasionally with a relapse to the former tone, distinctly less irritating to Americans, and indicating a real desirefor peace[442]. Other newspapers either followed the _Times_, or wereslightly in advance of it in a change to more considerate and peacefulexpressions. Adams could write to Seward on December 6 that he saw nochange in the universality of the British demand for satisfaction of the"insult and injury thought to be endured, " but he recognized in the nextfew days that a slow shift was taking place in the British temper andregretted the violence of American utterances. December 12, he wrote tohis son in America: "It has given us here an indescribably sad feelingto witness the exultation in America over an event which bids fair to bethe final calamity in this contest. . . . " Great Britain "is right inprinciple and only wrong in point of consistency. Our mistake is that weare donning ourselves in her cast-off suit, when our own is better worthwearing[443]. " His secretarial son was more vehement: "Angry and hatefulas I am of Great Britain, I still can't help laughing and cursing at thesame time as I see the accounts of the talk of our people. What a bloodyset of fools they are! How in the name of all that's conceivable couldyou suppose that England would sit quiet under such an insult. _We_should have jumped out of our boots at such a one[444]. "

The British Cabinet members were divided in sentiments of hope orpessimism as to the outcome, and were increasingly anxious for anhonourable escape from a possible situation in which, if they trustedthe observations of Lyons, they might find themselves aiding a slave asagainst a free State. On November 29, Lyons had written a long accountof the changes taking place in Northern feeling as regards slavery. Hethought it very probable that the issue of emancipation would soon beforced upon Lincoln, and that the American conflict would then take on anew and more ideal character[445]. This letter, arriving in the midst ofuncertainty about the _Trent_ solution, was in line with news publishedin the British papers calling out editorials from them largely indisapproval[446]. Certainly Russell was averse to war. If the prisonerswere not given up, what, he asked, ought England then to do? Would it bewise to delay hostilities or to begin them at once?

"An early resort to hostilities will enable us at once to raise theblockade of the South, to blockade the North, and to prevent the egressof numerous ships, commissioned as privateers which will be sent againstour commerce. " But then, there was Canada, at present not defensible. Hehad been reading Alison on the War of 1812, and found that then theAmerican army of invasion had numbered but 2, 500 men. "We may now expect40 or 50, 000[447]. " Two days later he wrote to Gladstone that if Americawould only "let the Commissioners free to go where they pleased, " hewould be satisfied. He added that in that case, "I should be very gladto make a treaty with the U. S. , giving up our pretensions of 1812 andsecuring immunity to persons not in arms on board neutral vessels or topersons going bona fide from one neutral port to another. This would bea triumph to the U. S. In principle while the particular case would bedecided in our favour[448]. "

On Saturday, December 14, the Prince Consort died. It was well-knownthat he had long been a brake upon the wheel of Palmerston's foreignpolicy and, to the initiated, his last effort in this direction--themodification of the instruction to Lyons on the _Trent_--was no secret. There is no evidence that his death made any change in the Britishposition, but it was true, as the American Minister wrote, that "Nowthey [the British public] are beginning to open their eyes to a sense ofhis value. They discover that much of their political quietude has beendue to the judicious exercise of his influence over the Queen and theCourt, and they do not conceal their uneasiness as to the future withouthim[449]. " The nation was plunged into deep mourning, but not todistraction from the American crisis, for on the day when all paperswere black with mourning borders, December 16, they printed the news ofthe approval of Wilkes by the United States Congress, and gave a summaryof Lincoln's message of December 2, which, to their astonishment, madeno mention of the _Trent_ affair. The Congressional approval caused"almost a feeling of consternation among ourselves, " but Lincoln'ssilence, it was argued, might possibly be taken as a good omen, since itmight indicate that he had as yet reached no decision[450]. Evidentlythere was more real alarm caused by the applause given Wilkes by onebranch of the government than by the outpourings of the American press. The next day several papers printed Lincoln's message in full and the_Times_ gave a long editorial analysis, showing much spleen that he hadignored the issue with Great Britain[451]. On the eighteenth thisjournal also called attention, in a column and a half editorial, to thereport of the American Secretary of War, expressing astonishment, notunmixed with anxiety, at the energy which had resulted in the increaseof the army to 700, 000 men in less than nine months. The _Times_continued, even increased, its "vigour" of utterance on the _Trent_, butdevoted most of its energy to combating the suggestions, now being madevery generally, advocating a recourse to arbitration. This would be"weak concession, " and less likely to secure redress and peace for thefuture, than an insistence on the original demands. 

Statesmen also were puzzled by Lincoln's silence. Milner Gibson wrotethat "even though Lyons should come away, I think the dispute may afterall be settled without war[452]. " Cornewall Lewis thought the "last mailfrom America is decidedly threatening, not encouraging[453]. " But onDecember 19, Adams was at last able to give Russell official assurancethat Wilkes had acted without authorization. Russell at once informedLyons of this communication and that he had now told Adams the exactterms of his two instructions to Lyons of November 30. He instructedLyons to accept in place of an apology an explanation that Wilkes'action was unauthorized--a very important further British modification, but one which did not reach Lyons until after the conclusion of theaffair at Washington[454]. Meanwhile a notable change had taken place inAmerican public expressions. It now regarded "the Wilkes affairunfavourably, and would much prefer it had not occurred at all[455], " areaction without question almost wholly caused by the knowledge of theBritish demand and the unanimous support given it by the Britishpublic[456]. On Great Britain the alteration in the American toneproduced less effect than might have been expected, and this because ofthe persistent fear and suspicion of Seward. His voice, it was felt, would in the end be the determining one, and if British belief that hehad long sought an occasion for war was correct, this surely was thetime when he could be confident of popular support. Thurlow Weed, Seward's most intimate political adviser, was now in London andattempted to disabuse the British public through the columns of the_Times_. His communication was printed, but his assertion that Seward'sunfriendly utterances, beginning with the "Newcastle story, " weremisunderstood, did not convince the _Times_, which answered him atlength[457], and asserted its belief ". . . That upon his ability toinvolve the United States in a war with England, Mr. Seward has stakedhis official, and, most probably, also his political existence. " TheDuke of Newcastle's report of Seward's remarks, wrote George Peabodylater, "has strongly influenced the Government in war preparations forseveral months past[458]. " Adams himself, though convinced that Seward'ssupposed animosity "was a mistake founded on a bad joke of his to theDuke of Newcastle, " acknowledged that: "The Duke has, however, succeeded in making everybody in authority here believe it[459]. " Surelyno "joke" to an Englishman ever so plagued an American statesman; butBritish Ministers founded their suspicions on far more serious reasons, as previously related[460]. 

As time passed without an answer from America, British speculationturned to estimates of the probable conditions of a war. These were notreassuring since even though postulating a British victory, it appearedinevitable that England would not escape without considerable damagefrom the American navy and from privateers. Americans were "a powerfuland adventurous people, strong in maritime resources, and participatingin our own national familiarity with the risks and dangers of thedeep[461]. " Englishmen must not think that a war would be fought only onthe shores of America and in Canada. The legal question was re-hashedand intelligent American vexation re-stated in three letters printed inthe _Daily News_ on December 25, 26 and 27, by W. W. Story, an artistresident in Rome, but known in England as the son of Justice Story, whose fame as a jurist stood high in Great Britain[462]. By the lastweek of the year Adams felt that the Ministry, at least, was eager tofind a way out: "The Government here will not press the thing to anextreme unless they are driven to it by the impetus of the wave theyhave themselves created[463]. " He greatly regretted the death of thePrince Consort who "believed in the policy of conciliating the UnitedStates instead of repelling them. " On December 27, Adams wrote Seward:"I think the signs are clear of a considerable degree of reaction. " Healso explained the causes of the nearly unanimous European support ofEngland in this contention: "Unquestionably the view of all othercountries is that the opportunity is most fortunate for obtaining newand large modifications of international law which will hereaftermaterially restrain the proverbial tendency of this country on theocean[464]. "

Adams' estimate was correct. Even the _Morning Post_, generally acceptedas Palmerston's organ[465], and in the _Trent_ crisis the most'vigorous' of all metropolitan journals, commented upon the generalpublic hope of a peaceful solution, but asked on December 30, ". . . Can aGovernment [the American] elected but a few months since by the popularchoice, depending exclusively for existence on popular support, affordto disappoint the popular expectation? The answer to this question must, we fear, be in the negative. . . . " The _Post_ (thereby Palmerston?) didindeed, as later charged, "prolong the excitement, " but not with itsearlier animosity to America. The very fact that the _Post_ was acceptedas Palmerston's organ justified this attitude for it would have beenfolly for the Government to announce prematurely a result of which therewas as yet no definite assurance. Yet _within_ the Cabinet there was amore hopeful feeling. Argyll believed Adams' statement to Russell ofDecember 19 was practically conclusive[466], and Adams himself nowthought that the prevalent idea was waning of an American plan toinflict persistent "indignities" on Britain: "at least in this casenothing of the kind had been intended[467]. " Everyone wondered at andwas vexed with the delay of an answer from America, yet hopefullybelieved that this indicated ultimate yielding. There could be nosurety until the event. Russell wrote to Palmerston on January 7, "Istill incline to think Lincoln will submit, but not until the clock is59 minutes past 11. If it is war, I fear we must summon Parliamentforthwith[468]. "

The last moment for reply was indeed very nearly taken advantage of atWashington, but not to the full seven days permitted for considerationby Russell's November thirtieth instructions to Lyons. These werereceived on December 18, and on the next day Lyons unofficiallyacquainted Seward with their nature[469]. The latter expressedgratification with the "friendly and conciliatory manner" of Lyons andasked for two days' time for consideration. On Saturday, December 21, therefore, Lyons again appeared to make a formal presentation of demandsbut was met with a statement that the press of other business hadprevented sufficient consideration and was asked for a further two days'postponement until Monday. Hence December 23 became the day from whichthe seven days permitted for consideration and reply dated. In themeantime, Mercier, on December 21, had told Seward of the strong supportgiven by France to the British position. 

The month that had elapsed since the American outburst on first learningof Wilkes' act had given time for a cooling of patriotic fever and for asaner judgment. Henry Adams in London had written to his brother that ifthe prisoners were not given up, "this nation means to make war. " Tothis the brother in America replied "this nation doesn't[470], " ananswer that sums up public determination no matter how loud the talk ordeep the feeling. Seward understood the change and had now receivedstrong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton inParis[471], but these were not needed to convince him that America mustyield. Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was inan impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released _if thedemand were made_. The comment of those who were "wise after the event"was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of theprisoners as seized in violation of international law, before anycomplaint could be received from Great Britain. This leaves out ofconsideration the political difficulties at home of an administrationalready seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press thewar, " and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itselfa proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in allprobability have been negatived. Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner inthe Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seemsto have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared theymight become "white elephants. " All that Seward could do at first was tonotify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472]. 

On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to GreatBritain. Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden, earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength ofBritish feeling. Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed againstthe South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can bemade; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concedewhat two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than giveanother nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of yourcountry[473]. " Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence onLincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but thathis task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning'sdiscussion brought no conclusion. Adjournment was taken until the nextday and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade hisassociates to a hearty unanimity on December 26. The American reply inthe form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward onthe 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell. It did notcontain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to bereleased and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to GreatBritain, he considered that British demands were "so far substantiallycomplied with" that he should remain at his post until he receivedfurther orders[474]. 

Seward's reply was immediately printed in the American papers. Lyonsreported that it was very well received and that the public was calm andapparently contented with the outcome[475]. He thought that "thus thepreparation for war . . . Has prevented war. " Seward's argument reviewedat great length all the conditions of the incident, dilated on manypoints of international law both relevant and irrelevant, narrated thepast relations of the two nations on "right of search, " and finally tookthe ground that Mason and Slidell were contraband of war and justlysubject to capture, but that Wilkes had erred in not bringing the_Trent_, with her passengers, into port for trial by an American prizecourt. Therefore the two envoys with their secretaries would be handedover promptly to such persons as Lyons might designate. It was, saysSeward's biographer, not a great state paper, was defective in argument, and contained many contradictions[476], but, he adds, that it wasintended primarily for the American public and to meet the situation athome. Another critic sums up Seward's difficulties: he had to persuade aPresident and a reluctant Cabinet, to support the naval idol of the day, to reconcile a Congress which had passed resolutions highly commendingWilkes, and to pacify a public earlier worked up to fever pitch[477]. Still more important than ill-founded assertions about the nature ofcontraband of war, a term not reconcilable with the _neutral port_destination of the _Trent_, was the likening of Mason and Slidell to"ambassadors of independent states. " For eight months Seward hadprotested to Europe "that the Confederates were not belligerents, butinsurgents, " and now "his whole argument rested on the fact that theywere belligerents[478]. . . . But this did not later alter a return to hisold position nor prevent renewed arguments to induce a recall byEuropean states of their proclamations of neutrality. 

On the afternoon of January 8, a telegram from Lyons was received inLondon, stating that the envoys would be released and the next day camehis despatch enclosing a copy of Seward's answer. The envoys themselvesdid not reach England until January 30, and the delay in their voyagegave time for an almost complete disappearance of public interest inthem[479]. January 10, Russell instructed Lyons that Great Britain waswell satisfied with the fact and manner of the American answer, andregarded the incident as closed, but that it could not agree withportions of Seward's argument and would answer these later. This wasdone on January 23, but the reply was mainly a mere formality and is ofinterest only as revealing a further shift in the opinion of the legaladvisers, with emphasis on the question of what constitutescontraband[480]. Possibly the British Government was embarrassed by thefact that while France had strongly supported England at Washington, Thouvenel had told Cowley ". . . That the conduct pursued by Capt. Wilkes, whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _oras a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation ofall those principles of Maritime international law, which France hadever supported[481] . . . " and had instructed Mercier to so state toSeward. This implied a reflection on former British practice, especiallyas regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizensand is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one mainreason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, wasthe general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerentmaritime power. 

In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had statedthat he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that theywere "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than asdistinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]. " Russell was equally cautious, seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my ownhouse, " on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and afterlistening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing hadhitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to departfrom a position of neutrality[483]. Russell had already suggested thatThouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484]. This procedure does notnecessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it isexactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissionersbefore the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally havebeen expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russelland a Southern representative. That it did not do so is evidence ofRussell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities. Also, in relief at the outcome of the _Trent_, he was convinced, momentarilyat least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded. "Ido not, " he wrote to Gladstone, "believe that Seward has any animosityto this country. It is all buncom" (_sic_)[485]. Apparently it wasbeginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward's "high tone"which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, asespecially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy basedupon one object only--the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuitof this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations thatthe United States was still powerful enough to resent foreigninterference. The final decision in the _Trent_ affair, such was thesituation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone and thatdecision was, from the first, for peace. 

Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome. America ingeneral, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud passed, was bitter. "The feeling against Great Britain is of intense hatred andthe conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must give up thetraitors, put down the rebellion, increase our navy, perfect thediscipline of the 600, 000 men in the field, and then fight GreatBritain[486]. " Lowell, in one of the most emotional of his "BigelowPapers, " wrote, on January 6, 1862:

 "It don't seem hardly right, John, When both my hands was full, To stump me to a fight, John-- Your cousin, tu, John Bull! Ole Uncle S. , sez he, 'I guess We know it now, ' sez he, 'The lion's paw is all the law, Accordin' to J. B. , Thet's fit for you an' me[487]!'"

It was not the demand itself for the release of Mason and Slidell thatin the end so stirred America as the warlike tone of the British pressand the preparations of the Government. Even after their surrenderAmerica was further incensed by British boasting that America hadyielded to a threat of war, as in the _Punch_ cartoon of a penitentsmall boy, Uncle Sam, who "says he is very sorry and that he didn't meanto do it, " and so escapes the birching Britannia was about toadminister. America had, in all truth, yielded to a threat, but dislikedbeing told so, and regarded the threat itself as evidence of Britishill-will[488]. This was long the attitude of the American public. 

In England the knowledge of America's decision caused a great nationalsigh of relief, coupled with a determination to turn the cold shoulderto the released envoys. On January 11, the _Times_ recounted the earliercareers of Mason and Slidell, and stated that these two "more than anyother men, " were responsible for the traditional American "insaneprejudice against England, " an assertion for which no facts were offeredin proof, and one much overestimating the influence of Mason and Slidellon American politics before secession. They were "about the mostworthless booty it would be possible to extract from the jaws of theAmerican lion . . . So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will notgive these fellows anything in the shape of an ovation. " Continuing, the_Times_ argued:

 "What they and their secretaries are to do here passes our conjecture. They are personally nothing to us. They must not suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two of their own Negroes, and, had that been the object of the rescue, the swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have had just the same right to triumphal arches and municipal addresses as Messrs. Mason and Slidell. So, please, British public, let's have none of these things. Let the Commissioners come up quietly to town, and have their say with anybody who may have time to listen to them. For our part, we cannot see how anything they have to tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation. "

This complete reversal, not to say somersault, by the leading Britishnewspaper, was in line with public expressions from all sections savethe extreme pro-Southern. Adams was astonished, writing privately: "Thefirst effect of the surrender . . . Has been extraordinary. The currentwhich ran against us with such extreme violence six weeks ago now seemsto be going with equal fury in our favour[489]. " Officially on the sameday he explained this to Seward as caused by a late development in thecrisis of a full understanding, especially "among the quiet andreligious citizens of the middle classes, " that if Great Britain didengage in war with the United States she would be forced to become theally of a "slave-holding oligarchy[490]. "

Here, in truth, lay the greatest cause of British anxiety during theperiod of waiting for an answer and of relief when that answer wasreceived. If England and America became enemies, wrote Argyll, "wenecessarily became virtually the _Allies_ of the _Scoundrelism_ of theSouth[491]. " Robert Browning, attempting to explain to his friend Storythe British attitude, declared that early in the war Britain was withthe North, expecting "that the pure and simple rights [of anti-slavery]in the case would be declared and vigorously carried out without one letor stop, " but that Lincoln's denial of emancipation as an object hadlargely destroyed this sympathy. Browning thought this an excusablethough a mistaken judgment since at least: "The _spirit_ of all of Mr. Lincoln's acts is altogether against Slavery in the end[492]. " Heassured Story that the latter was in error "as to men's 'fury' here": "Ihave not heard one man, woman or child express anything but dismay atthe prospect of being obliged to go to war on any grounds withAmerica[493]. " And after the affair was over he affirmed: "The purposeof the North is also understood at last; . . . There is no longer thenotion that 'Slavery has nothing to do with it[494]. '"

A few extreme pro-Northern enthusiasts held public meetings and passedresolutions commending the "statesmanlike ability and moderation ofSeward, " and rejoicing that Great Britain had not taken sides with aslave power[495]. In general, however, such sentiments were not_publicly_ expressed. That they were keenly felt, nevertheless, iscertain. During the height of the crisis, Anthony Trollope, then touringAmerica, even while sharing fully in the intense British indignationagainst Captain Wilkes, wrote:

 "These people speak our language, use our prayers, read our books, are ruled by our laws, dress themselves in our image, are warm with our blood. They have all our virtues; and their vices are our own too, loudly as we call out against them. They are our sons and our daughters, the source of our greatest pride, and as we grow old they should be the staff of our age. Such a war as we should now wage with the States would be an unloosing of hell upon all that is best upon the world's surface[496]. "

The expressions of men like Browning and Trollope may not indeed, beregarded as typical of either governmental or general public reactions. Much more exactly and with more authority as representing thatthoughtful opinion of which Adams wrote were the conclusions of JohnStuart Mill. In an article in _Fraser's Magazine_, February, 1862, making a strong plea for the North, he summarized British feeling aboutthe _Trent_:

 "We had indeed, been wronged. We had suffered an indignity, and something more than an indignity, which, not to have resented, would have been to invite a constant succession of insults and injuries from the same and from every other quarter. We could have acted no otherwise than we have done; yet it is impossible to think, without something like a shudder, from what we have escaped. We, the emancipators of the slave--who have wearied every Court and Government in Europe and America with our protests and remonstrances, until we goaded them into at least ostensibly co-operating with us to prevent the enslaving of the negro . . . _we_ should have lent a hand to setting up, in one of the most commanding positions of the world, a powerful republic, devoted not only to slavery, but to pro-slavery propagandism. . . . "

No such protestations of relief over escape from a possible alliancewith the South were made officially by the Government, or in a debateupon the _Trent_, February 6, when Parliament reassembled. In the Lordsthe Earl of Shelburne thought that America should have made a frank andopen apology. The Earl of Derby twitted the United States with havingyielded to force alone, but said the time "had not yet come" forrecognizing the Confederacy. Lord Dufferin expressed great friendshipfor America and declared that Englishmen ought to make themselves betterinformed of the real merits of the Civil War. Earl Granville, speakingfor the Government, laid stress upon the difficulties at home of theWashington administration in pacifying public opinion and asserted apersonal belief that strict neutrality was England's best policy, "although circumstances may arise which may call for a differentcourse. " On the same day in the Commons the debate was of a like generaltenor to that in the Lords, but Disraeli differed from his chief (Derby)in that he thought America had been placed in a very difficult positionin which she had acted very honourably. Palmerston took much credit forthe energetic military preparations, but stated "from that position ofstrict neutrality, it is not our intention to depart "--an importantdeclaration if taken, as apparently it was not, as fixing a policy. Insubstance all speakers, whether Whig or Tory, praised the Government'sstand, and expressed gratification with the peaceful outcome[497]. 

A further debate on the _Trent_ was precipitated by Bright on February17, in connection with the estimates to cover the cost of the militarycontingents sent to Canada. He asserted that England by generouslytrusting to American honour, might have won her lasting friendship, andit is worthy of note that for the first time in any speech made by him_in Parliament_, Bright declared that the war was one for the abolitionof slavery. Palmerston in reply made no comment on the matter ofslavery, but energetically defended the military preparations as anecessary precaution. Bright's speech was probably intended for Americanconsumption with the purpose of easing American ill-will, by showingthat even in Parliament there were those who disapproved of that show offorce to which America so much objected. He foresaw that this would longbe the basis of American bitterness. But Palmerston was undoubtedlycorrect in characterizing Bright's opinion as a "solitary one. " Andlooked at from a distance of time it would seem that a BritishGovernment, impressed as it was with a sense of Seward's unfriendliness, which had not prepared for war when making so strong a demand forreparation, would have merited the heaviest condemnation. If Mill wasright in stating that the demand for reparation was a necessity, then soalso were the military preparations. 

Upon the Government the _Trent_ acted to bring to a head and make moreclear the British relation to the Civil War in America. By November, 1861, the policy of strict neutrality adopted in May, had begun to beweakened for various reasons already recited--weakened not to the pointof any Cabinet member's advocacy of change, but in a restlessness at theslow development of a solution in America. Russell was beginning to_think_, at least, of recognition of the Confederacy. This was clear toLyons who, though against such recognition, had understood the drift, ifSchleiden is to be trusted, of Ministerial opinion. Schleiden reportedon December 31 that Lyons had expressed to him much pleasure at thepeaceful conclusion of the _Trent_ affair, and had added, "England willbe too generous not to postpone the recognition of the independence ofthe South as long as possible after this experience[498]. " But the_Trent_ operated like a thunder-storm to clear the atmosphere. Itbrought out plainly the practical difficulties and dangers, at least asregards Canada, of a war with America; it resulted in a weakening of theconviction that Seward was unfriendly; it produced from the Britishpublic an even greater expression of relief, when the incident wasclosed, than of anger when it occurred; and it created in a section ofthat public a fixed belief, shared by at least one member of theCabinet, that the issue in America was that of slavery, in support ofwhich England could not possibly take a stand. 

This did not mean that the British Government, nor any large section ofthe public, believed the North could conquer the South. But it didindicate a renewed vigour for the policy of neutrality and adetermination not to get into war with America. Adams wrote to Seward, "I am inclined to believe that the happening of the affair of the_Trent_ just when it did, with just the issue that it had, was ratheropportune than otherwise[499]. " Hotze, the confidential agent of theConfederacy in London, stated, "the _Trent_ affair has done usincalculable injury, " Russell is now "an avowed enemy of ournationality[500]. " Hotze was over-gloomy, but Russell himself declaredto Lyons: "At all events I am heart and soul a neutral . . . What a fusswe have had about these two men[501]. "

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 399: The _Trent_ was the cause of the outpouring of morecontemporary articles and pamphlets and has been the subject of morehistorical writing later, than any other incident of diplomaticrelations between the United States and Great Britain during the CivilWar--possibly more than all other incidents combined. The account givenin this chapter, therefore, is mainly limited to a brief statement ofthe facts together with such new sidelights as are brought out byhitherto unknown letters of British statesman; to a summary of Britishpublic attitude as shown in the press; and to an estimate of the _aftereffect_ of the _Trent_ on British policy. It would be of no service tolist all of the writings. The incident is thoroughly discussed in allhistories, whether British or American and in works devoted tointernational law. The contemporary American view is well stated, thoughfrom a strongly anti-British point of view, in Harris, T. L. , _The TrentAffair_, but this monograph is lacking in exact reference for its manycitations and can not be accepted as authoritative. The latest review isthat of C. F. Adams in the _Proceedings_ of the Massachusetts HistoricalSociety for November, 1911, which called out a reply from R. H. Dana, anda rejoinder by Mr. Adams in the _Proceedings_ for March, 1912. ]

[Footnote 400: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, pp. 41-2. )]

[Footnote 401: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_. " No. 1. Inclosure. Williams toPatey, Nov. 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 402: Harris, _The Trent Affair_, pp. 103-109, describes theexact _force_ used. ]

[Footnote 403: Dana, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, pp. 509-22. )]

[Footnote 404: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, pp. 39-40. )]

[Footnote 405: F. O. , America, Vol. 805. Copy, E. Hammond toAdvocate-General, Nov. 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 406: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, p. 54. )]

[Footnote 407: _Ibid. _, pp. 53-4. Adams' Diary MS. Nov. 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 408: _Ibid. _, p. 55. ]

[Footnote 409: A full year later, after the publication of the Americanvolume of despatches for the year 1862, Russell took up this matter withAdams and as a result of an interview wrote to Lyons, November 28, 1862:

"Lord Palmerston stated to Mr. Adams on the occasion in question thatHer Majesty's Government could not permit any interference with anyvessel, British or Foreign, within British waters; that with regard tovessels met with at sea, Her Majesty's Government did not mean todispute the Belligerent right of the United States Ships of War tosearch them; but that the exercise of that right and the right ofdetention in certain conditions must in each case be dealt withaccording to the circumstances of the case, and that it was notnecessary for him to discuss such matters then because they were not inpoint; but that it would not do for the United States Ships of War toharass British Commerce on the High Seas under the pretence ofpreventing the Confederates from receiving things that are Contrabandof War. 

"I took an opportunity of mentioning to Mr. Adams, the account whichLord Palmerston had given me of the language which he had thus held, andMr. Adams agreed in its accuracy. 

"Nothing must be said on this Subject unless the false statements as toLord Palmerston's language should be renewed, when you will state thereal facts to Mr. Seward. " (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 822. No. 295. _Draft_. )

This résumé by Russell contained still other variations from theoriginal reports of both Palmerston and Adams, but the latter did notthink it worth while to call attention to them. ]

[Footnote 410: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 357, is evidently in error instating that the law officers, while admitting the right of an Americanwar vessel to carry the British Packet into an American port foradjudication, added, "she would have no right to remove Messrs. Masonand Slidell and carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursueher voyage. " Certainly Palmerston did not so understand theadvice given. ]

[Footnote 411: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons. F. O. , Private. Nov. 16, 1861. This statement about explicit orders to Captain Marchand "not toendeavour, etc. , " is in line with Palmerston's understanding of theconversation with Adams. But that there was carelessness in reportingAdams is evident from Hammond's own language for "no instructions tomeddle, " which Adams did state, is not the same thing as "instructionsnot to meddle. " Adams had no intent to deceive, but was misunderstood. He was himself very anxious over the presence of the _James Adger_ atSouthampton, and hurried her Captain away. Adams informed Russell thatPalmerston had not understood him correctly. He had told Palmerston, "Ihad seen the Captain's [Marchand's] instructions, which directed him tointercept the _Nashville_ if he could, and in case of inability to doso, to return at once to New York, keeping his eye on such British shipsas might be going to the United States with contraband of war. LordPalmerston's recollections and mine differed mainly in this lastparticular. Lord Russell then remarked that this statement was exactlythat which he had recollected my making to him. Nothing had been said inthe instructions about other British ships. " (State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 78. No. 80. Adams to Seward. Nov. 29. 1861. ) Hammond's letter mentionsalso the excitement of "the Southerners" in England and that they had"sent out Pilot Boats to intercept and warn the Packet. . . . "]

[Footnote 412: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Milne, Dec. 1, 1861. ]

[Footnote 413: _Ibid. _, Russell to Lyons, Nov. 16, 1861. ]

[Footnote 414: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Nov. 29, 1861. ]

[Footnote 415: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, p. 58. )]

[Footnote 416: Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, VII, p. 772. The much arguedinternational law points in the case of the _Trent_ are given _inextenso_ by Moore. ]

[Footnote 417: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_. " No. 2. ]

[Footnote 418: _Ibid. _, No. 4. ]

[Footnote 419: _Ibid. _, No. 29. Inclosure. ]

[Footnote 420: Troops were in fact shipped for Canada. This resulted, after the _Trent_ affair had blown over, in a circumstance whichpermitted Seward, with keen delight, to extend a courtesy to GreatBritain. Bancroft (II, 245) states that these troops "finding the St. Lawrence river full of ice, had entered Portland harbour. Whenpermission was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly orderedthat all facilities should be granted for 'landing and transporting toCanada or elsewhere troops, stores, and munitions of war of every kindwithout exception or reservation. '" It is true that the American pressmade much of this, and in tones of derision. The facts, as reported byLyons, were that the request was merely "a superfluous application froma private firm at Montreal for permission to land some Officers' Baggageat Portland. " (Russell Papers, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 20, 1862. ) Lyonswas much vexed with this "trick" of Seward's. He wrote to theGovernor-General of Canada and the Lieutenant-Governors of Nova Scotiaand New Brunswick, protesting against an acceptance of Seward'spermission, and finally informed Russell that no English troops weremarched across the State of Maine. (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 14, 1862. Also Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Feb. 1, 1862. )]

[Footnote 421: Martin, _Life of the Prince Consort_, V, pp. 418-26. ]

[Footnote 422: Still another letter from Russell to Lyons on November30, but not intended for Seward, outlined the points of complaint andargument, (1) The _San Jacinto_ did not happen to fall in with the_Trent_, but laid in wait for her. (2) "Unnecessary and dangerous Actsof violence" were used. (3) The _Trent_, when stopped was not "searched"in the "ordinary way, " but "certain Passengers" were demanded and takenby force. (4) No charge was made that the _Trent_ was violatingneutrality, and no authority for his act was offered by Captain Wilkes. (5) No force ought to be used against an "_unresisting_ Neutral Ship"except just so much as is necessary to bring her before a prize court. (6) In the present case the British vessel had done nothing, andintended nothing, warranting even an inquiry by a prize court. (7) "Itis essential for British Interests, that consistently with theobligations of neutrality, and of observing any _legal_ and _effective_blockade, there should be communication between the Dominions of HerMajesty and the Countries forming the Confederate States. " These sevenpoints were for Lyons' eye alone. They certainly add no strength to theBritish position and reflect the uncertainty and confusion of theCabinet. The fifth and sixth points contain the essence of what, on moremature reflection, was to be the British argument. (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 758. No. 447. Draft. Russell to Lyons Nov. 30, 1861). ]

[Footnote 423: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 2, 1861. ]

[Footnote 424: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 78. Russell toYancey, Rost and Mann, Aug. 24, 1861. ]

[Footnote 425: _Ibid. _, No. 124. Russell to Yancey, Rost and Mann, Dec. 7, 1861. ]

[Footnote 426: Gladstone Papers. Gladstone to Robertson Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861. ]

[Footnote 427: _Ibid. _, Argyll to Gladstone, Mentone. Dec. 10, 1861. ]

[Footnote 428: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 255. Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 429: _Ibid. _, p. 254. Clarendon to Duchess of Manchester, Dec. 17, 1861. ]

[Footnote 430: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 431: _Ibid. _, Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 432: Many citations from the _Times_ are given in Harris, _TheTrent Affair_, to show a violent, not to say scurrilous, anti-Americanism. Unfortunately dates are not cited, and an examinationof the files of the paper shows that Harris' references are frequentlyto communications, not to editorials. Also his citations give but oneside of these communications even, for as many argued caution and fairtreatment as expressed violence. Harris apparently did not consult the_Times_ itself, but used quotations appearing in American papers. Naturally these would print, in the height of American anti-Britishfeeling, the bits exhibiting a peevish and unjust British temper. TheBritish press made exactly similar quotations from the Americannewspapers. ]

[Footnote 433: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. XLV, p. 43, note. ) John Bigelow, at Paris, reported that the LondonPress, especially the Tory, was eager to make trouble, and that therewere but two British papers of importance that did not join the hue andcry--these being controlled by friends of Bright, one in London and onein Manchester (Bigelow, _Retrospections of An Active Life_, I, p. 384. )This is not exactly true, but seems to me more nearly so than thepicture presented by Rhodes (III, 526) of England as united in a "calm, sorrowful, astonished determination. "]

[Footnote 434: Cowley sent to Russell on December 3, a letter from PercyDoyle recounting an interview with Scott in which these statements weremade. (F. O. , France, Vol. 1399. No. 1404. Inclosure. )]

[Footnote 435: Dec. 13, 1861. C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, p. 95. )]

[Footnote 436: _Ibid. _, p. 37. ]

[Footnote 437: _Ibid. _, p. 49. The _New York Times_, November 19, stated, "We do not believe the American heart ever thrilled with moregenuine delight than it did yesterday, at the intelligence of thecapture of Messrs. Slidell and Mason. . . . We have not the slightest ideathat England will even remonstrate. On the contrary, she will applaudthe gallant act of Lieut. Wilkes, so full of spirit and good sense, andsuch an exact imitation of the policy she has always stoutly defendedand invariably pursued . . . As for Commodore Wilkes and his command, letthe handsome thing be done, consecrate another _Fourth_ of July to him. Load him down with services of plate and swords of the cunningest andcostliest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that achieved sucha victory. " Note the "_Fourth_ of July. "]

[Footnote 438: Lyons Papers. Lousada to Lyons. Boston, Nov. 17, 1861. "Every other man is walking about with a Law Book under his arm andproving the _right_ of the Ss. Jacintho to stop H. M. 's mail boat. "]

[Footnote 439: "Mr. Galt, Canadian Minister, is here. He has frightenedme by his account of the defencelessness of the Province at thismoment. " (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Dec. 3, 1861. )]

[Footnote 440: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Monck, Dec. 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 441: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, p. 189 _seq_. ]

[Footnote 442: Among the communications were several on internationallaw points by "Historicus, " answering and belittling American legalargument. W. V. Harcourt, under this pseudonym, frequently contributedvery acute and very readable articles to the _Times_ on the Americancivil war. The _Times_ was berated by English friends of the North. Cobden wrote Sumner, December 12, "The _Times_ and its yelping imitatorsare still doing their worst. " (Morley, _Cobden_, II, 392. ) Cobden washimself at one with the _Times_ in suspicion of Seward. "I confess Ihave not much opinion of Seward. He is a kind of American Thiers orPalmerston or Russell--and talks Bunkum. Fortunately, my friend Mr. Charles Sumner, who is Chairman of the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, and has really a kind of veto on the acts of Seward, is avery peaceable and safe man. " _(ibid. _, p. 386, to Lieut. -Col. Fitzmayer, Dec. 3, 1861. ) It is interesting that Canadian opinionregarded the _Times_ as the great cause of American ill-will towardBritain. A letter to Gait asserted that the "war talk" was all a "farce"(J. H. Pope to Gait, Dec. 26, 1861) and the Toronto _Globe_ attacked the_Times_ for the creation of bad feeling. The general attitude was thatif _British_ policy resulted in an American blow at Canada, it was aBritish, not a Canadian duty, to maintain her defence (Skelton, _Life ofSir Alexander Tilloch Gait_, pp. 340, 348. ) Yet the author states thatin the beginning Canada went through the same phases of feeling on the_Trent_ as did Great Britain. ]

[Footnote 443: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 81-2. ]

[Footnote 444: _Ibid. _, I, p. 83. Henry Adams to Charles Francis Adams, Jr. , Dec. 13, 1861. ]

[Footnote 445: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Nov. 29, 1861. ]

[Footnote 446: See the _Times_, Dec. 14, 1861. Here for the first timethe _Times_ used the expression "the last card" as applied toemancipation. ]

[Footnote 447: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Dec. 11, 1861. ]

[Footnote 448: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Dec. 13, 1861. Onthe same day Lady Russell wrote Lady Dumfermline: "There can be no doubtthat we have done deeds very like that of Captain Wilkes. . . . But I wishwe had not done them. . . . It is all terrible and awful, and I hope andpray war may be averted--and whatever may have been the first naturalburst of indignation in this country, I believe it would be ready toexecrate the Ministry if all right and honourable means were not takento prevent so fearful a calamity. " (Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, p. 528. ))]

[Footnote 449: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 87. Charles FrancisAdams to his son, Dec. 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 450: The _Times_, Dec. 16, 1861. ]

[Footnote 451: The _Times_ twice printed the full text of the message, on December 16 and 17. ]

[Footnote 452: Gladstone Papers. Milner-Gibson to Gladstone, Dec. 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 453: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 225. Lewis to Clarendon, Dec. 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 454: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_. " No 14. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 19, 1861. The Government did not make public Adams' confirmation of "noauthorization of Wilkes. " Possibly it saw no reason for doing so, sincethis had been established already by Wilkes' own statements. The pointwas later a matter of complaint by Americans, who regarded it asindicating a peevish and unfriendly attitude. (Willard, _Letter to anEnglish Friend on the Rebellion in the United States_, p. 23. Boston, 1862. ) Also by English friends; Cobden thought Palmerston hadintentionally prolonged British feeling for political purposes. "Seward's despatch to Adams on the 19th December [_communicated toRussell_ on the 19th]. . . Virtually settled the matter. To keep alive thewicked passions in this country as Palmerston and his _Post_ did, waslike the man, and that is the worst that can be said of it. " (Morley, _Cobden_, II, p. 389. To Mr. Paulton, Jan. , 1862. )]

[Footnote 455: Davis to Adams. New York. Dec. 21, 1861. C. F. Adams, _TheTrent Affair, (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, p. 107. )]

[Footnote 456: There has crept into American historical writing oflesser authenticity a story that just at this juncture there appeared, in the harbours of New York and San Francisco, Russian fleets whosecommanders let it be understood that they had come under "sealed orders"not to be opened except in a certain grave event and that their presencewas, at least, not an unfriendly indication of Russian sentiment in the_Trent_ crisis. This is asserted to have bolstered American courage andto give warrant for the argument that America finally yielded to GreatBritain from no fear of consequences, but merely on a clearerrecognition of the justice of the case. In fact the story is wholly amyth. The Russian fleets appeared two years later in the fall of 1863, not in 1861. Harris, _The Trent Affair, _ pp. 208-10, is mainlyresponsible for this story, quoting the inaccurate memory of ThurlowWeed. (_Autobiography_, II, pp. 346-7. ) Reliable historians like Rhodesmake no mention of such an incident. The whole story of the Russianfleets with their exact instructions is told by F. A. Colder, "TheRussian Fleet and the Civil War, " _Am. Hist. Rev_. , July, 1915. ]

[Footnote 457: Weed, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 354-61. ]

[Footnote 458: _Ibid. _, p. 365. Peabody to Weed, Jan, 17, 1862. ]

[Footnote 459: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 91. Charles FrancisAdams to his son, Dec. 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 460: See _ante_. Ch. IV. ]

[Footnote 461: The _Times_, Dec. 25, 1861. ]

[Footnote 462: James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, II, pp. 108-9. The letters were sent to Robert Browning, who secured theirpublication through Dicey. ]

[Footnote 463: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair_. Adams to Motley, Dec. 26, 1861. (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, p. 109). ]

[Footnote 464: _Ibid. _, p. 110. ]

[Footnote 465: Palmerston had very close relations with Delane, of the_Times_, but that paper carefully maintained its independence of anyparty or faction. ]

[Footnote 466: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 30, 1861. ]

[Footnote 467: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 78. No. 97. Adams to Seward, Jan. 2, 1862. ]

[Footnote 468: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 469: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 233. Lyons officially reportedthat he carried no papers with him _(Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_. " No. 19. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 19, 1861). Newton (_Lyons_, I, pp. 55-78) showsthat Seward was, in fact, permitted to read the instructions on thenineteenth. ]

[Footnote 470: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, p. 86. C. F. Adams, Jr. , to Henry Adams, Dec. 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 471: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 234. Adams' letter of December3 was received on December 21; Dayton's of December 3, on the 24th. ]

[Footnote 472: Much ink has flowed to prove that Lincoln's was the wiseview, seeing from the first the necessity of giving up Mason andSlidell, and that he overrode Seward, e. G. , Welles, _Lincoln andSeward_, and Harris, _The Trent Affair_. Rhodes, III, pp. 522-24, andBancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 232-37, disprove this. Yet the generalcontemporary suspicion of Seward's "anti-British policy, " even inWashington, is shown by a despatch sent by Schleiden to the Senate ofBremen. On December 23 he wrote that letters from Cobden and Lyndhursthad been seen by Lincoln. 

"Both letters have been submitted to the President. He returned themwith the remark that 'peace will not be broken if England is not bent onwar. ' At the same time the President has assured my informant that hewould examine the answer of his Secretary of State, word for word, inorder that no expression should remain which could create bad bloodanew, because the strong language which Mr. Seward had used in some ofhis former despatches seems to have irritated and insulted England"(Schleiden Papers). No doubt Sumner was Schleiden's informant. At firstglance Lincoln's reported language would seem to imply that he wasputting pressure on Seward to release the prisoners and Schleidenapparently so interpreted them. But the fact was that at the date whenthis was written Lincoln had not yet committed himself to acceptingSeward's view. He told Seward, "You will go on, of course, preparingyour answer, which, as I understood it, will state the reasons why theyought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating thereasons why they ought _not_ to be given up. We will compare the pointson each side. " Lincoln's idea was, in short, to return an answer toGreat Britain, proposing arbitration (Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 234). ]

[Footnote 473: Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLV, 155. Bright toSumner, Dec. 14, 1861. The letters to Sumner on the _Trent_ are allprinted in this volume of the _Proceedings_. The originals are in the_Sumner Papers_ in the library of Harvard University. ]

[Footnote 474: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_. " No. 24. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 475: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 777. No. 807. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861. But he transmitted a few days later, a "shocking prayer" in theSenate on December 30, by the Rev. Dr. Sutherland, which showed a bitterfeeling. "O Thou, just Ruler of the world . . . We ask help of Thee forour rulers and our people, that we may patiently, resolutely, and withone heart abide our time; for it is indeed a day of darkness andreproach--a day when the high principle of human equity constrained bythe remorseless sweep of physical and armed force, must for the moment, succumb under the plastic forms of soft diplomacy" (Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Jan. 3, 1862). ]

[Footnote 476: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 249-53. ]

[Footnote 477: C. F. Adams, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV. P. 75). ]

[Footnote 478: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 250. ]

[Footnote 479: Mason, Slidell, Eustis and McFarland were delivered tothe British ship _Rinaldo_, January 1, 1862. _En route_ to Halifax theship encountered a storm that drove her south and finally brought her toSt. Thomas, where the passengers embarked on a packet for Southampton. ]

[Footnote 480: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence respecting the _Trent_. " Nos. 27 and 35. February 3, Lyons reported that Sumner, in a fireside talk, had revealed that he wasin possession of copies of the Law Officers' opinions given on November12 and 28 respectively. Lyons was astounded and commented that the LawOfficers, before giving any more opinions, ought to know this fact(F. O. , Am. , Vol. 824. No. 76. Lyons to Russell). ]

[Footnote 481: F. O. , France, Vol. 1399. No. 1397. Cowley to Russell, Dec. 3, 1861. The italics are mine. ]

[Footnote 482: Newton, _Lyons_, I, 73. ]

[Footnote 483: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 817. No. 57. Draft. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 11, 1861. ]

[Footnote 484: F. O. , France, Vol. 1419. No. 73. Draft. Russell toCowley, Jan. 20, 1862. ]

[Footnote 485: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 486: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 424. Bowen to Bigelow, Dec. 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 487: _Poems. Bigelow Papers_. "Jonathan to John. " After therelease of the envoys there was much correspondence between friendsacross the water as to the merits of the case. British friends attemptedto explain and to soothe, usually to their astonished discomfiture onreceiving angry American replies. An excellent illustration of this isin a pamphlet published in Boston in the fall of 1862, entitled, Fieldand Loring, _Correspondence on the Present Relations between GreatBritain and the United States of America_. The American, Loring, wrote, "The conviction is nearly if not quite universal that we have foes wherewe thought we had friends, " p. 7. ]

[Footnote 488: Dana, _The Trent Affair. (Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , XLV, pp. 508-22). ]

[Footnote 489: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 99. To his son, Jan. 10, 1862. ]

[Footnote 490: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 78. No. 99. Adams to Seward, Jan. 10, 1862. ]

[Footnote 491: Gladstone Papers. Argyll to Gladstone, Dec. 7, 1861, Alsoexpressed again to Gladstone. _Ibid. _, Jan. 1, 1862. ]

[Footnote 492: James, _William Wetmore Story and His Friends_, II, 105. Browning to Story, Dec. 17, 1861. ]

[Footnote 493: _Ibid. _, p. 109. To Story, Dec. 31, 1861. ]

[Footnote 494: _Ibid. _, p. 110. To Story, Jan. 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 495: _Liberator_, Feb. 7, 1862. Giving an account of a meetingat Bromley-by-Bow. ]

[Footnote 496: Trollope, _North America_ (Chapman & Hall, London, 1862), I, p. 446. Trollope left England in August, 1861, and returned in thespring of 1862. He toured the North and the West, was a close observer, and his work, published in midsummer 1862, was very serviceable to theNorth, since he both stated the justice of the Northern cause andprophesied its victory. ]

[Footnote 497: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXV, p. 12 _seq_. , though notconsecutive as the speeches were made in the course of the debate on theAddress to the Throne. ]

[Footnote 498: Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to the Senate of Bremen. ]

[Footnote 499: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 78. No. 114. Adams to Seward, Feb. 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 500: Pickett Papers. Hotze to Hunter, March 11, 1862. ]

[Footnote 501: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Feb. 8, 1862. ]

CHAPTER VIII

THE BLOCKADE

The six months following the affair of the _Trent_ constituted a periodof comparative calm in the relations of Great Britain and America, butthroughout that period there was steadily coming to the front a Northernbelligerent effort increasingly effective, increasingly a cause fordisturbance to British trade, and therefore more and more a matter foranxious governmental consideration. This was the blockade of Southernports and coast line, which Lincoln had declared _in intention_ in hisproclamation of April 19, 1861. 

As early as December, 1860, Lyons had raised the question of therelation of British ships and merchants to the secession port ofCharleston, South Carolina, and had received from Judge Black an evasivereply[502]. In March, 1861, Russell had foreseen the possibility of ablockade, writing to Lyons that American precedent would at leastrequire it to be an effective one, while Lyons made great efforts toconvince Seward that _any_ interference with British trade would bedisastrous to the Northern cause in England. He even went so far as tohint at British intervention to preserve trade[503]. But on April 15, Lyons, while believing that no effective blockade was possible, thoughtthat the attempt to institute one was less objectionable thanlegislation "closing the Southern Ports as Ports of Entry, " in reality amere paper blockade and one which would "justify Great Britain andFrance in recognizing the Southern Confederacy. . . . " Thus he began toweaken in opposition to _any_ interference[504]. His earlier expressionsto Seward were but arguments, without committing his Government to aline of policy, and were intended to make Seward step cautiously. 

Possibly Lyons thought he could frighten the North out of a blockadecampaign. But when the Civil War actually began and Lincoln, on April19, declared he had "deemed it advisable to set on foot a blockade, " andthat when a "competent force" had been posted "so as to prevent entranceand exit of vessels, " warning would be given to any vessel attempting toenter or to leave a blockaded port, with endorsement on her register ofsuch warning, followed by seizure if she again attempted to pass theblockade, Lyons felt that: "If it be carried on, with reasonableconsideration for Foreign Flags, and in strict conformity with the Lawof Nations, I suppose it must be recognized[505]. " The Proclamationnamed the original seven seceding states, and on April 27 Virginia wasadded. The blockade was actually begun at certain Virginia ports onApril 30, and by the end of May there were a few war-ships off all themore important Southern harbours[506]. This method of putting a blockadeinto effect by warning at the port rather than by a general notificationcommunicated to European governments and setting a date, involved ahardship on British merchants since they were thereby made uncertainwhether goods started for a Southern port would be permitted to enter. In practice vessels on their first departure from a blockaded harbourwere warned and permitted to go out, but those seeking to enter werewarned and turned back. In _effect_, while the blockade was beingestablished, Lincoln's Proclamation had something of the nature for thetimid British merchant, though not for the bold one, of a paperblockade. This was not clearly understood by Lyons, who thought neutralsmust acquiesce, having "exhausted every possible means of opposition, "but who consoled himself with the idea that "for some time yet" Britishtrade could be carried on[507]. 

Lyons was in fact sceptical, as he told Seward in a long conversation onApril 29 of the possibility of blockading a 3, 000 mile coast line, butSeward assured him it would be done and effectively[508]. The Britishpress was equally sceptical, and in any case believed that the war wouldbe of short duration, so that there need be no anxiety over next year'ssupply of cotton[509]. In Parliament Russell took the stand that theblockade, if carried on in accordance with international law and madeeffective, required British recognition and respect. He also defendedLincoln's "notification at the port" method, stating that it might seema hardship, but was perfectly legal[510]. Thus there was early and easyacquiescence in the American effort, but when, in June, there wasrevived a Northern plan to close Southern ports by legislative action, Britain was stirred to quick and vigorous opposition. Lyons learned thata Bill would be introduced in Congress giving the President authority, among other powers, to "proclaim" the ports closed, thus notifyingforeign nations not to attempt to use them. He saw in it an unexpectedapplication of the Northern theory that the South was not a belligerentand had no rights as such, and he regarded it as in effect a paperblockade[511]. 

The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not directthe President to issue a proclamation closing Southern ports--it merelygave him the power to do so. Almost from the first Lyons thought thatLincoln and Seward were too wise to issue such a proclamation[512]. Nevertheless it was his duty to be on guard and to oppose the plan. Forsix weeks there was much communication in regard to the "Southern PortsBill, " as all parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also withCowley in France. The British Foreign Office interest in the matter, almost rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of thesmall importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and thereluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest. Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a "high tone" in officialremonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on Britishrecognition of Southern belligerency. 

Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russelladdressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged astiff protest. Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was seeminglyindifferent. At first he acquiesced in Russell's protest, then drew backand on three separate occasions promised support only to withdraw suchpromise. He was disinclined, said Cowley, to join in a "friendly hint"to America because of the touchy sensibilities lately shown by Seward, and feared a direct protest might result in an American declaration ofwar. In any case why not wait until the President _did_ act, and eventhen the proper method would be a protest rather than "reprisals. " "Iwish, " wrote Cowley, on July 28, "that the French were inclined to bemore _bumptious_, as they seemed to be at first. I would at all timesrather have the task of calming them, than of urging them on[513]. . . . "Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would notobserve a "legislative closing" of Southern ports[514]. On July 12 Lyonstelegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress, and on thesixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much disturbed overits possible consequences since "even Sumner was for it[515], " as thisindicated a real intention to carry it into effect[516]. On August 8, Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to behanded to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercisediscretion as to communicating the despatch[517]. 

The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised inJuly, concluded with language that might well draw out Thouvenel'sobjection to a threat of "reprisals. " It read that "H. M. G. . . . Reserve . . . The right of acting in concert with other Nations inopposition to so violent an attack on the rights of Commercial Countriesand so manifest a violation of International Law[518]. " This high tonehad been modified possibly by French opposition, possibly by Lyons'early opinion that the Bill would not be made operative. Indeed on July24 Russell told Lyons that no final instruction of protest would be senthim until the President actually issued a proclamation[519]. Yet inspite of being fairly well assured that there was no danger in the"Southern Ports Bill, " Russell did send the instruction of August 8, still distinctly "vigorous" in tone, though with no threat of"reprisals. " His reason for doing so is difficult to understand. Certainly he was hardly serious in arguing to Thouvenel that a stiffinstruction would strengthen the hands of the "moderate section" of theAmerican Cabinet[520], or else he strangely misjudged Americantemperament. Probably a greater reason was his wish to be able to printa Parliamentary Paper indicating the watchful care he was exercising inguarding British interests. 

Before Russell's instruction could reach America Seward had voluntarilyreassured Lyons as to American intentions. Lyons reported this, privately, on July 20[521], but on the same day also reported, officially, that two days earlier, that is on the eighteenth, he andMercier had discussed the "Southern Ports" Bill and that as a resultMercier had then gone, that same day, to Seward to state that Francemust regard such a measure as merely a paper blockade[522]. "We were notvery sanguine of success, " wrote Lyons, but Seward "had listened to him[Mercier] with calmness, " and personally seemed disinclined to issue therequired Proclamation. This despatch, making it appear that England andFrance were in close harmony and that Lyons and Mercier were having adifficult time at Washington was printed, later, in the ParliamentaryPapers. It was received by Russell on August 5, and in spite of thereassurances of Lyons' private letter (naturally not for printing)presumably received in the same mail with the official despatch, itfurnished the basis of his "strong" instruction of August 8. 

At Washington also there were indications of an effort to prepare a goodcase for the British public and Parliament. July 23, so Lyons wroteprivately, Seward had prevented the issue of the "Southern Ports"Proclamation[523], and on the next day he was shown by Seward, confidentially, an instruction to Adams and other Ministers abroad inwhich was maintained the right to close the ports by proclamation, butstating the Government's decision not to exercise the right. Lyonsbelieved this was the end of the matter[524]. Yet on August 12, hepresented himself formally at the Department of State and stated that hehad instructions to declare that "Her Majesty's Government wouldconsider a decree closing the ports of the South actually in possessionof the insurgent or Confederate States as null and void, and that theywould not submit to measures taken on the high seas in pursuance of suchdecree. ". . . "Mr. Seward thanked me for the consideration I had shown;and begged me to confine myself for the present to the verbalannouncement I had just made. He said it would be difficult for me todraw up a written communication which would not have the air of athreat. " To this Lyons agreed[525]. 

This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the"forthright yet friendly" tone of British diplomats when dealing withSeward. So also did Russell's instruction of August 8, not yet receivedby Lyons when he took the stage at Washington. Yet there is apossibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his part as Seward hadasked him to play it. On the next day, August 13, he acknowledged thereceipt of Russell's communication of July 24, in which it was statedthat while Great Britain could not acquiesce in the "Southern Ports"Bill _no final instructions_ would be sent until Lincoln issued aProclamation. Lyons now explained, "As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at thismoment opposed to closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to beguided by him for the present as to the mode of communicating yourdecision about the matter[526]. " Is it possible that Seward reallywished to have a "strong, " yet not "too strong" statement from Lyons inorder to combat the advocates of the "Ports" Bill? There are manyramifications of diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government. At any rate on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was noquestion now of issuing the Proclamation[527]. " And on the nineteenthcould write officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeedbeen issued, but without the objectionable fourth section[528]. 

The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more space in theBritish Parliamentary Papers, and excited more attention from theBritish Government than it would seem to have merited from theWashington attitude toward it. The Bill had been drawn by the Secretaryof the Treasury, and its other sections related to methods of meeting asituation where former customs houses and places for the collection ofimport duties were now in the hands of the Confederacy. The fourthsection alone implied a purpose to declare a paper blockade. The ideaof proclaiming closed the Southern ports may have at first received thesanction of Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of awar; or it may have been a part of his "high tone" foreign policy[529], but the more reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one ofmany ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war bythe North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any publicmeans to attack the South. But the interest attached to the measure inthis work is the British attitude. There can be no doubt that Russell, in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of making clear twopoints: first, the close harmony with France--which in fact was not soclose as was made to appear; second, the care and vigour of the ForeignSecretary in guarding British interests. Now in fact British trade wasdestined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not beengreatly hampered. Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockadefeasible. Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the"Southern Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "_regular_blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South:

 "If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3, 000 miles, creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be transhipped. But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530]. "

A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear toRussell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded theremaining 2, 550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export ofcotton in any considerable amount. His bays and creeks did indeed longprovide access to small vessels, but these were not adequate for thetransport of a bulky export like cotton[531]. To Russell, however, theblockade appearing negligible in probable effect and also not open toobjection by neutrals if regularly established, it seemed that anyimmediate danger to British trade was averted by the final Americanaction on the "Southern Ports" Bill. It was not until the blockade didbegin to be thoroughly effective that either the British public orGovernment gave it serious consideration. 

Not again until late November did Russell return with any interest tothe subject of the blockade and then it was again on an American effortwhich seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of blockading squadrons anda plan to remedy this by unusual, even "uncivilized, " if not illegal, methods. This was the "Stone Boat Fleet" plan of blocking Charlestonharbour by sinking vessels across the entrance bar[532]. The plan wasreported by Lyons and the news received in England at the most uncertainmoment as to the outcome of the _Trent_ controversy[533]. British pressand Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because ofthe feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor matter. In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an opinion onthe blockade, answered:

 "I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer your question whether I consider the Blockade effective. It is certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense extent of coast to which it is supposed to apply. I suppose the ships which run it successfully both in and out are more numerous than those which are intercepted. On the other hand it is very far from being a mere Paper Blockade. A great many vessels are captured; it is a most serious interruption to Trade; and if it were as ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis says in his Message, he would not be so very anxious to get rid of it[534]. "

This was a very fair description of the blockade situation. Lyons, unaffected by irritations resulting from the _Trent_, showed the frameof mind of a "determined neutral, " as he was fond of describing himself. His answer was the first given to Russell indicating a possibility thatthe blockade might, after all, become strictly effective and thusexceedingly harmful to British trade. There is no direct _proof_ thatthis influenced Russell to denounce the plan of blocking Southernharbours with stone-laden boats sunk in the channel, but the existenceof such a motive seems probable. Moreover his protest was not made untilDecember 20, the _day after_ he had learned officially from Adams thatWilkes was unauthorized in searching the _Trent_--a day on which strainand uncertainty regarding American intentions were greatly lessened. Russell then wrote to Lyons that he observed it to be stated, "apparently on good authority, " that the declared purpose of the stoneboat fleet was "of destroying these harbours for ever. " Hecharacterized this as implying "utter despair of the restoration of theUnion, " and as being only "a measure of revenge and irremediable injuryagainst an enemy. "

"But even in this view, as a scheme of embittered and sanguinary war, such a measure is not justifiable. It is a plot against the commerce ofnations and the free intercourse of the Southern States of America withthe civilized world. It is a project worthy only of times of barbarism. "

Lyons was instructed to speak in this sense to Seward, who, it washoped, would disavow the project[535]. 

There was nothing in Lyons' despatches, nor in the American newspaperextracts accompanying them, to warrant such accusation andexpostulation. Lyons had merely commented that by some in America theproject had been characterized as "odious and barbarous, " adding, "Thequestion seems to depend on the extent to which the harbours will bepermanently injured[536]. " It will be noted that Russell did not referto information received from Lyons (though it was already in hand), butto "apparently good authority" in justification of his vigorousdenunciation. But like vigour, and like characterization of American"barbarism" did not appear in the British press until after the newsarrived of the release of Mason and Slidell. Then the storm broke, wellsummed up in the Punch cartoon entitled "Retrogression. (A Very SadPicture. ) War Dance of the I. O. U. Indian, " and showing Uncle Sam inwar-feathers and with war-club, in his hand a flag made of the _New YorkHerald_, dancing in glee on the shores of a deserted harbour acrosswhich stretched a row of sunken ships[537]. 

On January 13 the Liverpool Shipowners' Association called the attentionof the Foreign Office to the news that Charleston harbour had beenclosed by stone boats and urged governmental remonstrance[538]. Hammondat once replied quoting the language of Russell's letter of December 20and stating that further representations would be made[539]. On thesixteenth Russell again instructed Lyons to speak to Seward, but now wasmuch less rasping in language, arguing, rather, the injury in the futureto the United States itself in case the harbours were permanentlydestroyed since ". . . The object of war is peace, and the purposes ofpeace are mutual goodwill and advantageous commercial intercourse[540]. "To-day it seems absurd that any save the most ignorant observer shouldhave thought the North contemplated a permanent and revengefuldestruction of Southern port facilities. Nor was there any just groundfor such an extreme British view of the Northern plan. Yet even RobertBrowning was affected by the popular outcry. "For what will you do, " hewrote Story, "if Charleston becomes loyal again[541]?" a queryexpressive of the increasing English concern, even alarm, at the intensebitterness, indicating a long war, of the American belligerents. Howabsurd, not to say ridiculous, was this British concern at an American"lapse toward barbarism" was soon made evident. On January II Lyons, acting on the instructions of December 20, brought up the matter withSeward and was promptly assured that there was no plan whatever "toinjure the harbours permanently. " Seward stated that there had neverbeen any plan, even, to sink boats in the main entrance channels, butmerely the lesser channels, because the Secretary of the Navy hadreported that with the blockading fleet he could "stop up the 'largeholes, '" but "could not stop up the 'small ones. '" Seward assured Lyonsthat just as soon as the Union was restored all obstructions would beremoved, and he added that the best proof that the entrance toCharleston harbour had not been destroyed was the fact that in spite ofblockading vessels and stone boats "a British steamer laden withcontraband of war had just succeeded in getting in[542]. " Again, onFebruary 10, this time following Russell's instruction of January 16, Lyons approached Seward and was told that he might inform Russell that"all the vessels laden with stone, which had been prepared forobstructing the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is notlikely that any others will be used for that purpose[543]. " This was noyielding to Great Britain, nor even an answer to Russell's accusation ofbarbarity. The fact was that the plan of obstruction of harbours, extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been undertaken by theNavy with little expectation of success, and, on the first appearance ofnew channels made by the wash of waters, was soon abandoned[544]. 

The British outcry, Russell's assumption in protest that America wasconducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem at firstglance to have been merely manifestations of a British tendency tomeddle, as a "superior nation" in the affairs of other states and togive unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose civilization waspresumably less advanced than that which stamped the Englishman was, according to Matthew Arnold, traditional--was a characteristic ofBritish public and Government alike[545]. But this is scarcely asatisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the first place itis to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions in an enemy'sharbours in order to render more effective a blockade was no novelty inmaritime warfare, as Russell must have well known, and that there was nomodern record of such obstructions having permanently destroyed aharbour. A far more reasonable explanation is that which connects theenergy of the British Government in opposing a proposed American closingof Southern harbours by Presidential proclamation, with a like energyagainst the stone boat project. The first method was indeed rightlyregarded as a violation of accustomed maritime belligerency, but bothmethods were primarily objectionable in British eyes because they werevery evidently the result of efforts to find a way in which an as yetineffective blockade could be made more rigorous. On the impossibilityof an effective blockade, if conducted on customary lines, the Britishpeople and Foreign Secretary had pinned their faith that there would beno serious interruption of trade. This was still the view in January, 1862, though doubts were arising, and the "stone boat" protest must beregarded as another evidence of watchful guardianship of commerce withthe South. The very thought that the blockade might become effective, inwhich case all precedent would demand respect for it, possibly causedRussell to use a tone not customary with him in upbraiding the North fora planned "barbarity. "

Within three months the blockade and its effectiveness was to be madethe subject of the first serious parliamentary discussion on the CivilWar in America. In another three months the Government began to feel apressure from its associate in "joint attitude, " France, to examineagain with much care its asserted policy of strict neutrality, and thisbecause of the increased effectiveness of the blockade. Meanwhileanother "American question" was serving to cool somewhat Britisheagerness to go hand in hand with France. For nearly forty years sinceindependence from Spain the Mexican Republic had offered a thornyproblem to European nations since it was difficult, in the face of theAmerican Monroe Doctrine, to put sufficient pressure upon her for thesatisfaction of the just claims of foreign creditors. In 1860 measureswere being prepared by France, Great Britain and Spain to act jointly inthe matter of Mexican debts. Commenting on these measures, PresidentBuchanan in his annual message to Congress of December 3, 1860, hadsounded a note of warning to Europe indicating that American principleswould compel the use of force in aid of Mexico if debt-collectingefforts were made the excuse for a plan "to deprive our neighbouringRepublic of portions of her territory. " But this was at the moment ofthe break-up of the Union and attracted little attention in the UnitedStates. For the same reason, no longer fearing an American block tothese plans, the three European Governments, after their invitation tothe United States to join them had been refused, signed a convention, October 31, 1861, to force a payment of debts by Mexico. They pledgedthemselves, however, to seek no accession of territory and not tointerfere in the internal affairs of Mexico. 

In this pledge Great Britain and Spain were sincere. Napoleon III wasnot--was indeed pursuing a policy not at first understood even by hisMinisters[546]. A joint expedition under the leadership of the SpanishGeneral Prim was despatched, and once in Mexico took possession ofcustoms houses and began to collect duties. It soon became evident tothe British and Spanish agents on the spot that France had far otherobjects than the mere satisfaction of debts. The result was a clash ofinterests, followed by separate agreements with Mexico and thewithdrawal of forces by Great Britain and Spain. This difference of viewon Mexican policy had become clear to Cowley, British Ambassador atParis, by January, 1862, and from that month until the end of March hisprivate letters to Russell referring to American affairs in general arealmost wholly concerned with French designs on Mexico. Cowley learnedthat earlier rumours of Napoleon's purpose to place the ArchdukeMaximilian of Austria upon the _Throne_ of Mexico, far from beingunfounded, were but faint indications of a great French "colonialEmpire" scheme, and he thought that there was "some ill-will to theUnited States at the bottom of all this[547]. . . . " He feared that theMexican question would "give us a deal of trouble yet[548], " and byMarch was writing of the "monstrous claims on the Mexican Govt. " made byFrance[549]. 

These reactions of Cowley were fully shared by Russell, and he hastened, in March, to withdraw British forces in Mexico, as also did Spain. GreatBritain believed that she had been tricked into a false position inMexico, hastened to escape from it, but in view of the close relation ofjoint policy with France toward the Civil War in America, undertook nodirect opposition though prophesying an evil result. This situationrequired France to refrain, for a time, from criticism of British policyand action toward the North--to pursue, in brief, a "follow on" policy, rather than one based on its own initiative. On the British side theFrench Mexican policy created a suspicion of Napoleon's hidden purposesand objects in the Civil War and made the British Government slow toaccept French suggestions. The result was that in relation to that warGreat Britain set the pace and France had to keep step--a veryadvantageous situation for the North, as the event was to prove. On thepurely Mexican question Lyons early took opportunity to assure Sewardthat Great Britain was "entirely averse to any interference in theinternal affairs of Mexico, and that nothing could be further from theirwishes than to impose upon the Mexican Nation any Government not of itsown choice[550]. "

British dislike of France's Mexican venture served to swell the breezeof amity toward America that had sprung up once the _Trent_ was beyondthe horizon, and made, temporarily, for smooth sailing in the relationsof Great Britain and the North. Lyons wrote on February 7 that the"present notion appears to be to overwhelm us with demonstrations offriendship and confidence[551]. " Adams' son in London thought "our workhere is past its crisis, " and that, "Our victory is won on this side thewater[552], " while the American Minister himself believed that "theprospect of interference with us is growing more and more remote[553]. "Russell also was optimistic, writing to Lyons, "Our relations have nowgot into a very smooth groove. . . . There is no longer any excitement hereupon the question of America. I fear Europe is going to supplant theaffairs of America as an exciting topic[554], " meaning, presumably, disturbances arising in Italy. On April 4 Adams described his diplomaticduties as "almost in a state of profound calm[555]. "

This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter whatanxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the blockadethere was as yet no inclination seriously to question its legality. Thatthere was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an urgent letter fromWestbury to Palmerston upon the blockade, asserting that if cottonbrought but four pence at Charleston and thirteen pence at Liverpoolthere must be some truth in its alleged effectiveness:

 "I am greatly opposed to any violent interference. Do not let us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that they failed thro' our interference. . . . Patience for a few more weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient policy[556]. "

[Illustration: KING COTTON BOUND: Or, The Modern Prometheus. _Reproducedby permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the blockadeand on British trade interests. But Westbury's "few more weeks" had noplace in Russell's thought, for on February 15 he wrote to Lyons inregard to assertions being made that the blockade was ineffectivebecause certain vessels had eluded it:

 "Her Majesty's Government, however, are of opinion that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international law[557]. "

From this view Russell never departed in official instructions[558]. England's position as the leading maritime Power made it inevitable thatshe should promptly approve the Northern blockade effort and be cautiousin criticizing its legitimate operation. Both her own history andprobable future interests when a belligerent, required such a policy farmore important in the eyes of statesmen than any temporary injury toBritish commerce. English merchants, if determined to trade with theSouth, must take their own risks, and that Russell believed they woulddo so is evidenced by his comment to Adams that it was a tradition ofthe sea that Englishmen "would, if money were to be made by it, sendsupplies even to hell at the risk of burning their sails. "

But trade problems with the South soon brought real pressure on theGovernment. In January, while marking time until Mason should arrive athis post, the Confederate commissioners already in London very nearlytook a step that might have prejudiced the new envoy's position. Theyhad now learned through public documents that Russell had informed Adamshe "had no intention of seeing them again. " Very angry they planned aformal protest to the British Government, but in the end Mann and Rostcounselled silence, outvoting Yancey[559]. On his arrival Mason ignoredthis situation and with cause for, warmly received socially inpro-Southern circles, he felt confident that at least a privatereception would soon be given him by Russell. He became, indeed, somewhat of a social lion, and mistaking this personal popularity forevidence of parliamentary, if not governmental, attitude, was confidentof quick advantages for the South. On the day after his arrival he wroteunofficially to Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State ". . . Although theMinistry may hang back in regard to the blockade and recognition throughthe Queen's speech, at the opening of Parliament next week the popularvoice through the House of Commons will demand both. ". . . "I shall bedisappointed if the Parliament does not insist on definite action by theMinistry[560]. . . . "

Carefully considering the situation and taking the advice of manyEnglish friends, Mason and Slidell agreed that the best line to take wasto lay aside for the moment the claim to recognition and to urgeEuropean repudiation of the blockade. Slidell, arrived in Paris, wroteMason that in his coming interview with Thouvenel he should "make only apassing allusion to the question of recognition, intimating that on thatpoint I am not disposed at present to press consideration. But I shallinsist upon the inefficiency of the blockade, the 'vandalism of thestone fleet, ' etc[561]. " Mason was urged to take a like course withRussell. Both men were much excited by a document a copy of which hadbeen secured by Mann purporting to be a "confidential memorandum"addressed by England to the Continental Powers, asking whether the timehad not come to raise the blockade. No such memorandum existed, butSlidell and Mason believed it genuine[562]. They had great hopes of theopening of Parliament, but when that event took place, February 6, andthe only references in debate were to the _Trent_ and its fortunateoutcome, Mason was puzzled and chagrined. He wrote: "It is thought thatsilence as to the blockade was intended to leave that questionopen[563]. " This, no doubt, was the consolatory explanation of hisfriends, but the unofficial interview with Russell, at his home, onFebruary 10, chilled Mason's hopes. 

As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by Mason onthe blockade, though recognition was asked. His report to Richmond showsthat he proceeded with great caution, omitting portions of hisinstructions on cotton for fear of arousing antagonism, and venturingonly a slight departure by expressing the hope that if Great Britainwished to renew communication with the Confederacy it might be madethrough him, rather than through the British consuls at the South. Russell's "only reply was, he hoped I might find my residence in Londonagreeable. " He refused to see Mason's credentials, stating this to be"unnecessary, our relations being unofficial. " He listened withcourtesy, asked a few questions, but "seemed utterly disinclined toenter into conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, andonly said, in substance, they must await events. " Certainly it was acool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that Russell's"personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy inaction[564]. "But Mason still counted on parliamentary pressure on the Government, andhe was further encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, atLiverpool, stating that he had just received a request to come to London"from a government quarter, of all the _most important_[565]. "

The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself fearedsomewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament. He reported to Mason thatinterviews had taken place with Palmerston and with Russell, that he hadunfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and, while not citing these mendirectly, declared the general "London idea" to be that of"postponement"; since it was inevitable that "the North will break downin a few months on the score of money, " and that "We have only to waitthree months. " Evidently Spence believed he was being used as anintermediary and influential adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuadethem to a period of quiet. This, he thought, was unwise since delaywould be injurious[566]. Of like opinion were the two Members ofParliament who were, throughout Mason's career in England, to be hisclosest advisers. These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former possessingsomewhat of a following in the "gentleman-ruler" class, the latter thelargest shipowner in Great Britain. Their advice also was to press onthe blockade question[567], as a matter of primary British commercialinterest, and they believed that France was eager to follow a Britishlead. This was contrary to Slidell's notion at the moment, but of thisMason was unaware[568]. 

The Government did indeed feel compelled to lay before Parliament thepapers on the blockade. This was a bulky document of one hundred andtwenty-six pages and covered the period from May 3, 1861, to February17, 1862. In it were the details of the institution of the blockade, reports from British consuls on its effectiveness, lists of vesselscaptured and of vessels evading it, all together furnishing a verycomplete view of this, the principal maritime belligerent effort of theNorth[569]. The Blockade Papers gave opportunity for debate, if desired, and especially so as almost at the end of this document appeared thatinstruction of February 15 by Russell to Lyons, which clearly statedBritish acceptance of the blockade as effective. Mason's interview withRussell occurred on the tenth. Five days later, after Spence had beenurged vainly to use his influence for "postponement, " Russell, so itmust appear, gave challenge to pro-Southern sentiment by asserting theeffectiveness of the blockade, a challenge almost immediately made knownto Parliament by the presentation of papers. 

Unless Southern sympathizers were meekly to acquiesce, without furtherprotest, in governmental policy they must now make some decided effort. This came in the shape of a debate in the Commons, on March 7, of amotion by Gregory urging the Government to declare the blockadeineffective[570], and of a similar debate on March 10 in the Lords. Asis inevitable where many speakers participate in a debate the argumentsadvanced were repeated and reiterated. In the Commons important speechesfor the motion were made by Gregory, Bentinck, Sir James Ferguson, LordRobert Cecil and Lindsay, while against it appeared Forster and MoncktonMilnes. The Solicitor-General, Roundell Palmer, presented the Governmentview. Gregory opened the debate by seeking to make clear that whilehimself favourable to recognition of the South the present motion had noessential bearing on that question and was directed wholly to a_fact_--that the blockade was not in reality effective and should not berecognized as such. He presented and analysed statistics to prove thefrequency with which vessels passed through the blockade, using thesummaries given by Mason to Russell in their interview of February 10, which were now before Parliament in the document on the blockade justpresented, and he cited the reports of Bunch at Charleston as furtherevidence. This was the burden of Gregory's argument[571], but he glancedin passing at many other points favourable to the South, commenting onits free trade principles, depicting the "Stone Fleet" as a barbarity, asserting the right of the South to secede, declaring that Franceregarded British attitude as determined by a selfish policy looking tofuture wars, and attacking Seward on the ground of Americaninconsistency, falsely paraphrasing him as stating that "as for allthose principles of international law, which we have ever upheld, theyare as but dust in the balance compared with the exigencies of themoment[572]. " Gregory concluded with the statement that the UnitedStates should be treated "with justice and nothing more. "

When presenting a cause in Parliament its advocates should agree on aline of argument. The whole theory of this movement on the blockade wasthat it was wise to minimize the question of recognition, and Gregoryhad laboured to prove that this was not related to a refusal longer torecognize the blockade. But Bentinck, the second speaker for the motion, promptly undid him for he unhappily admitted that recognition andblockade questions were so closely interwoven that they could not beconsidered separately. This was promptly seized upon by Forster, who ledin opposition. Forster's main argument, however, was a very able tearingto pieces of Gregory's figures, showing that nearly all the allegedblockade runners were in reality merely small coasting steamers, which, by use of shallow inner channels, could creep along the shore and thenmake a dash for the West Indies. The effectiveness of the blockade ofmain ports for ocean-going vessels carrying bulky cargoes was proved, hedeclared, by the price of raw cotton in England, where it was 100 percent. Greater than in the South, and of salt in Charleston, where theimporter could make a profit of 1, 000 per cent. To raise the blockade, he argued, would be a direct violation by Britain of her neutrality. Thereal reason for this motion was not the _ineffectiveness_ of theblockade, but the effectiveness, and the real object an English object, not a Southern one. Gregory was taunted for changing a motion torecognize the Confederacy into the present one because he knew theformer would fail while the present motion was deceitfully intended tosecure the same end. Forster strongly approved the conduct of theGovernment in preserving strict neutrality, alleging that any otherconduct would have meant "a war in which she [England] would have had tofight for slavery against her kinsmen. "

Gregory's speech was cautious and attempted to preserve a judicial toneof argument on fact. Forster's reads like that of one who knows hiscause already won. Gregory's had no fire in it and was characterized byHenry Adams, an interested auditor, as "listened to as you would listento a funeral eulogy. ". . . "The blockade is now universally acknowledgedto be unobjectionable[573]. " This estimate is borne out by the speechfor the Government by the Solicitor-General, who maintained theeffectiveness of the blockade and who answered Gregory's argument thatrecognition was not in question by stating that to refuse longer torecognize the blockade would result in a situation of "armedneutrality"--that is of "unproclaimed war. " He pictured the disgust ofEurope if England should enter upon such a war in alliance "with acountry . . . Which is still one of the last strongholds of slavery"--anadmission made in the fervour of debate that was dangerous as tending totie the Government's hands in the future, but which was, no doubt, merely a personal and carelessly ventured view, not a governmentallyauthorized one. In general the most interesting feature of this debateis the hearty approval given by friends of the North to the Government'sentire line of policy and conduct in relation to America. Their play atthe moment, feeling insecure as to the fixity of governmental policy, was to approve heartily the neutrality now existing, and to make nocriticisms. Later, when more confident of the permanency of Britishneutrality, they in turn became critics on the score of failure, inspecific cases, in neutral duty. 

The Solicitor-General's speech showed that there was no hope for themotion unless it could be made a party question. Of that there was noindication, and the motion was withdrawn. Three days later a similardebate in the Lords was of importance only as offering Russell, since hewas now a member of the upper chamber, an opportunity to speak forhimself. Lord Campbell had disavowed any intention to attack theblockade since Russell, on February 15, had officially approved it, butcriticized the sending to Lyons of the despatch itself. Russell upheldthe strict legality and effectiveness of the blockade, stated that ifEngland sided with the South in any way the North would appeal to aslave insurrection--the first reference to an idea which was to play avery important rôle with Russell and others later--and concluded byexpressing the opinion that three months would see the end of thestruggle on lines of separation, but with some form of union between thetwo sovereignties[574]. Russell's speech was an unneeded but emphaticnegative of the pro-Southern effort. 

Clearly Southern sympathizers had committed an error in tactics bypressing for a change of British policy. The rosy hopes of Mason weredashed and the effect of the efforts of his friends was to force theGovernment to a decided stand when they preferred, as the summons ofSpence to conference makes evident, to leave in abeyance for a time anyfurther declaration on the blockade. The refusal of Mason and hisSouthern friends to wait compelled a governmental decision and theresult was Russell's instruction to Lyons of February 15. The effect ofthe debate on Mason was not to cause distrust of his English advisers, but to convince him that the existing Government was more determined inunfriendliness than he had supposed. Of the blockade he wrote: ". . . Nostep will be taken by this Government to interfere with it[575]. " Hethought the military news from America in part responsible as: "The latereverses at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson have had an unfortunate effectupon the minds of our friends here[576]. . . . " Spence was opposed to anyfurther move in Parliament until some more definite push on theGovernment from France should occur[577]. Slidell, anxiously watchingfrom Paris the effort in England, had now altered his view of policy andwas convinced there was no hope in France until England gave the signal. Referring to his previous idea that the Continent could be put inopposition to Great Britain on the blockade he wrote:

 "I then supposed that the influence of the Emperor was such that any view of the question which he might urge on the British Cabinet would be adopted. I have since had reason to change entirely this opinion. I am now satisfied that in all that concerns us the initiative must be taken by England; that the Emperor sets such value on her good will that he will make any sacrifice of his own opinions and policy to retain it[578]. "

On March 28 he repeated this conviction to Mason[579]. It was a correctjudgment. Mason was thereby exalted with the knowledge that his was tobe the first place in importance in any and all operations intended tosecure European support for the Confederacy, but he could not concealfrom himself that the first steps undertaken in that direction had beenpremature. From this first failure dated his fixed belief, no matterwhat hopes were sometimes expressed later, that only a change ofGovernment in England would help the Southern cause. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 502: See _ante_, p. 52. ]

[Footnote 503: See _ante_, pp. 61 and 65-66. ]

[Footnote 504: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 15, 1861. ]

[Footnote 505: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell. Private. April 23, 1861. ]

[Footnote 506: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain_, pp. 80-1. ]

[Footnote 507: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 508: Bernard, p. 229. ]

[Footnote 509: _Saturday Review_, May 18, 1861. ]

[Footnote 510: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXIII, pp. 188-195. ]

[Footnote 511: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, June 24, 1861. ]

[Footnote 512: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, July 2, 1861. ]

[Footnote 513: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. The importantcorrespondence on this subject is found in: F. O. , France, Vol. 1393. No. 796. Cowley to Russell, July 2, 1861. _Ibid. _, No. 804. Cowley toRussell, July 4, 1861. _Ibid. _, Vol. 1377. No. 704. Russell to Cowley, July 10, 1861. _Ibid. _, Vol. 1394. No. 874. Cowley to Russell, July 17, 1861. _Ibid. _, No. 922. Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. _Ibid. _, No. 923. Confidential Cowley to Russell, July 29, 1861. Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, July 19, 1861. _Ibid. _, Cowley to Russell, July 28, 1861. It is interesting that the promise of France to support England inremonstrance against the "Southern Ports Bill" appears, through Cowley'scommunications, in the printed Parliamentary Papers. A study of thesealone would lead to the judgment that France _had been the first_ toraise the question with England and had heartily supported England. Thefacts were otherwise, though Mercier, without exact instructions fromThouvenel, aided Lyons in argument with Seward (_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the UnitedStates. " No. 68. Lyons to Russell, July 20, 1861). ]

[Footnote 514: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 61. ]

[Footnote 515: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 16, 1861. ]

[Footnote 516: Schleiden reported Seward as objecting to the Bill andSumner as "vainly opposing" it. Sumner had in fact spoken publicly infavour of the measure. Probably he told Schleiden that privately he wasagainst it. Schleiden reported Sumner as active in urging the Cabinetnot to issue a Proclamation closing the ports (Schleiden Papers. Schleiden to Senate of Bremen, July 10 and 19, 1861). Mercier laterinformed Thouvenel that Sumner declared the Bill intended for theNorthern public only, to show administration "energy, " and that therewas never any intention of putting it into effect. F. O. , France, 1394. No. 931. Cowley to Russell, Aug. 1, 1861. ]

[Footnote 517: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " Nos. 70 and 71. Thouvenel did finally consent to support Russell's protest. ]

[Footnote 518: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 755. No. 168. ]

[Footnote 519: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 756. ]

[Footnote 520: F. O. , France, Vol. 1395. No. 967. Cowley to Russell, Aug. 8, 1861. ]

[Footnote 521: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. ]

[Footnote 522: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 68. Lyons toRussell, July 20, 1861. Enclosed was a copy of the six lines ofThouvenel's "instruction" to Mercier, dated July 4, the very brevity ofwhich shows that this was in fact no instruction at all, but merely acomment by Thouvenel to Mercier. ]

[Footnote 523: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, July 30, 1861. ]

[Footnote 524: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, August 1, 1861. ]

[Footnote 525: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 81. Lyons toRussell, Aug. 12, 1861. ]

[Footnote 526: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. Aug. 13, 1861. ]

[Footnote 527: _Ibid. _, Russell Papers. ]

[Footnote 528: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 83. ]

[Footnote 529: Lyons thought this possible. Russell Papers. Lyons toRussell. Private. July 20, 1861. ]

[Footnote 530: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. Aug. 16, 1861. And again he wrote the next day, "To prevent smuggling over 3, 000 milesof coast and 1, 500 miles of land frontier seems to me impossible"(_Ibid. _, Aug. 17, 1861). Russell had received some two weeks earlier, aletter from Bunch at Charleston, urging that England make no objectionto the blockade in order that the South might be taught the lesson that"King Cotton, " was not, after all, powerful enough to compel Britishrecognition and support. He stated that Southerners, angry at thefailure to secure recognition, were loudly proclaiming that they bothcould and would humble and embarrass Great Britain (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 781. No. 82. Bunch to Russell, July 8, 1861). Bunch wrote on July 23 that theSouth planned to hold back its cotton until Great Britain and Franceraised the blockade (_Ibid. _, No. 87). Bunch was now impressed withSouthern determination. ]

[Footnote 531: The seven ports were Norfolk (Virginia), Wilmington(North Carolina), Charleston (South Carolina), Savannah (Georgia), Mobile (Alabama), New Orleans (Louisiana), and Galveston (Texas). ]

[Footnote 532: The first important reference to the blockade aftermid-August, 1861, is in an order to Bunch, conveyed through Lyons, notto give advice to British merchants in Charleston as to blockade runnersthat had gotten into port having any "right" to go out again (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 757. No. 402. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 8, 1861). ]

[Footnote 533: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 125. Lyons toRussell, Nov. 25, 1861. Received Dec. 9. ]

[Footnote 534: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861. ]

[Footnote 535: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 127. ]

[Footnote 536: _Ibid. _, No. 126. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 29, 1861. Received Dec. 12. ]

[Footnote 537: _Punch_, Feb. 1, 1862. ]

[Footnote 538: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 141. ]

[Footnote 539: _Ibid. _, No. 142. Jan. 15, 1861. ]

[Footnote 540: _Ibid. _, No. 143. ]

[Footnote 541: James, _W. W. Story_, II, p. 111, Jan. 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 542: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Correspondence on Civil War in the United States. " No. 153. Lyons toRussell, Jan. 14, 1862. Received Jan. 27. ]

[Footnote 543: _Ibid. , Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Despatch from Lord Lyonsrespecting the Obstruction of the Southern Harbours. " Lyons to Russell, Feb. 11, 1862. Received Feb. 24. ]

[Footnote 544: Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence ofG. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy_, 1861-65, I, p. 79. Du Pontto Fox, Dec. 16, 1861. Hereafter cited as _Fox, Confid. Corresp_. Thisletter shows clearly also that the Navy had no thought of a _permanent_obstruction. ]

[Footnote 545: _Vide_ Arnold, _Friendship's Garland_. ]

[Footnote 546: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 249. Thouvenelcould mistakenly write to Mercier on March 13, 1862. "Nous ne voulonspas cependant imposer une forme de gouvernement aux Mexicains. . . "]

[Footnote 547: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. Jan. 17, 1862. On this same date Thouvenel, writing to Flahault in London, hopedEngland would feel that she had a common interest with France inpreventing Mexico from falling under the yoke of Americans either "unisou secedes. " (Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 226). ]

[Footnote 548: _Ibid. _, Jan. 24, 1862. ]

[Footnote 549: _Ibid. _, March 6, 1862. ]

[Footnote 550: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 825. No. 146. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 28, 1862. The fact that Slidell arrived in France just as Napoleon's plansfor Mexico took clearer form has been made the ground for assumptionsthat he immediately gave assurance of Southern acquiescence andencouraged Napoleon to go forward. I have found no good evidence ofthis--rather the contrary. The whole plan was clear to Cowley bymid-January before Slidell reached Paris, and Slidell's owncorrespondence shows no early push on Mexico. The Confederate agents'correspondence, both official and private, will be much used later inthis work and here requires explanation. But four historical works ofimportance deal with it extensively, (1) Richardson, _Messages andPapers of the Confederacy_, 2 vols. , 1905, purports to include thedespatches of Mason and Slidell to Richmond, but is very unsatisfactory. Important despatches are missing, and elisions sometimes occur withoutindication. (2) Virginia Mason, _The Public Life and DiplomaticCorrespondence of James M. Mason_, 1906, contains most of Mason'sdespatches, including some not given by Richardson. The author also usedthe _Mason Papers_ (see below). (3) Callahan, _The Diplomatic History ofthe Southern Confederacy_, 1901, is the most complete and authoritativework on Southern diplomacy yet published. He used the collection knownas the "Pickett Papers, " for official despatches, supplementing thesewhen gaps occurred by a study of the _Mason Papers_, but his work, narrative in form, permits no extended printing of documents. (4) L. M. Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. (Am. Hist. Rev. Jan. , 1921), is a study drawn from Slidell's private letters in the_Mason Papers_. The Mason Papers exist in eight folios or packages inthe Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress, and in additionthere is one bound volume of Mason's despatches to Richmond. Thesecontain the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell while in Europe. Slidell's letters are originals. Mason's letters are copies in Slidell'shand-writing, made apparently at Mason's request and sent to him in May, 1865. A complete typed copy of this correspondence was taken by me in1913, but this has not hitherto been used save in a manuscript Master'sdegree thesis by Walter M. Case, "James M. Mason, Confederate Diplomat, "Stanford University, 1915, and for a few citations by C. F. Adams, _ACrisis in Downing Street_ (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914). The Mason Papers also contain many letters from Mason's English friends, Spence, Lindsay, Gregory and others. ]

[Footnote 551: Russell Papers. To Russell. Lyons thought France alsoincluded in these demonstrations. ]

[Footnote 552: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 113. Henry Adams toCharles Francis Adams, Jr. , Feb. 14, 1862. ]

[Footnote 553: _Ibid. _, p. 115. To his son, Feb. 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 554: Lyons Papers. March 1, 1862. ]

[Footnote 555: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son. ]

[Footnote 556: Palmerston MS. Feb. 9, 1862. ]

[Footnote 557: Bernard, p. 245. The author agrees with Russell but addsthat Great Britain, in the early stages of the blockade, was indulgentto the North, and rightly so considering the difficulties ofinstituting it. ]

[Footnote 558: He wrote to Mason on February 10, 1863, that he saw "noreason to qualify the language employed in my despatch to Lord Lyons ofthe 15th of February last. " (Bernard, p. 293). ]

[Footnote 559: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, II, p. 155. Yancey and Mann to Hunter, Jan. 27, 1862. ]

[Footnote 560: Mason, _Mason_, pp. 257-8, Jan. 30, 1862. ]

[Footnote 561: Mason Papers. Feb. 5, 1862. ]

[Footnote 562: Mann sent this "confidential memorandum" to JeffersonDavis, Feb. 1, 1862 (Richardson, II, 160). There is no indication of howhe obtained it. It was a fake pure and simple. To his astonishmentSlidell soon learned from Thouvenel that France knew nothing of such amemorandum. It was probably sold to Mann by some enterprising "Southernfriend" in need of money. ]

[Footnote 563: Mason, _Mason_, p. 258. Mason to Hunter, Feb. 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 564: _Ibid. _, pp. 260-62. Mason's despatch No. 4. Feb. 22, 1862. (This despatch is not given by Richardson. ) Slidell was morewarmly received by Thouvenel. He followed the same line of argument andapparently made a favourable impression. Cowley reported Thouvenel, after the interview, as expressing himself as "hoping that in two orthree months matters would have reached such a crisis in America thatboth parties would be willing to accept a Mediation. . . . "

(F. O. , France. , Vol. 1432. No. 132. Confidential. Cowley to Russell, Feb. 10, 1862. )]

[Footnote 565: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Feb. 13, 1862. This wasthat James Spence, author of _The American Union_, a work stronglyespousing the Southern cause. This book was not only widely read inEngland but portions of it were translated into other languages for useon the Continent. Spence was a manufacturer and trader and also operatedin the Liverpool Cotton Exchange. He made a strong impression on Mason, was early active in planning and administering Southern cotton loans inEngland, and was in constant touch with Mason. By Slidell he was muchless favourably regarded and the impression created by his frequentletters to Mason is that of a man of second-rate calibre elated by theprominent part he seemed to be playing in what he took to be the birthof a new State. ]

[Footnote 566: _Ibid. _, Spence to Mason, Feb. 20, 1862. ]

[Footnote 567: Mason, _Mason p_. 258. ]

[Footnote 568: Slidell in France at first took the tack of urging thatContinental interests and British interests in the blockade were"directly antagonistic, " basing his argument on England's forward lookas a sea power (Slidell to Hunter, Feb. 26, 1862. Richardson, II, p. 186). ]

[Footnote 569: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Papersrelating to the Blockade. "]

[Footnote 570: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXV, pp. 1158-1230, and pp. 1233-43. ]

[Footnote 571: Mason's authenticated statistics, unfortunately for hiscause, only came down to Oct. 31, 1861, a fact which might imply thatafter that date the blockade was rapidly becoming effective and whichcertainly did indicate that it was at least sufficiently effective toprevent regular and frequent communications between the government atRichmond and its agents abroad. Did Russell have this in mind when hepromptly incorporated Mason's figures in the papers presented toParliament? These figures showed that according to reports from fourSouthern ports, sixty vessels had entered and cleared between April 29and October 31, 1861; unauthenticated statistics extending to the dateDecember 31, presented by Mason of vessels arrived at and departing fromCuban ports showed forty-eight vessels, each way engaged in blockaderunning. Seven of these were listed as "captured. " Those reaching Cubawere described as twenty-six British, 14 Confederate, 3 Spanish, 3American and 2 Mexican, but in none of these statistics were the namesof the vessels given, for obvious reasons, in the printed paper thoughapparently included in the list submitted by Mason. These figures did infact but reveal a situation existing even after 1861. The Americanblockading fleets had to be created from all sorts of available materialand were slow in getting under way. Regular ships of the old Navy couldnot enforce it being too few in number, and also, at first, directingtheir efforts to the capture of shore positions which would render alarge blockading squadron unnecessary. This proved an abortive effortand it was not until 1862 that the development of a large fleet ofblockaders was seriously undertaken. (See _Fox, Confid. Corresp. _, I, pp. 110, 115, 119 and especially 122, which, May 31, 1862, pays tributeto the energy with which the South for "thirteen long months" haddefended its important port shore lines. ) If Gregory had been able toquote a report by Bunch from Charleston of April 5, 1862, he would havehad a strong argument. "The blockade runners are doing a greatbusiness. . . . Everything is brought in in abundance. Not a day passeswithout an arrival or a departure. The Richmond Government sent about amonth ago an order to Nassau for Medicines, Quinine, etc. It went fromNassau to New York, was executed there, came back to Nassau, thencehere, and was on its way to Richmond in 21 days from the date of theorder. Nearly all the trade is under the British flag. The vessels areall changed in Nassau and Havana. Passengers come and go freely and noone seems to think that there is the slightest risk--which, indeed, there is not. " (Lyons Papers. Bunch to Lyons, April 5, 1862). ]

[Footnote 572: I have nowhere found any such statement by Seward. Gregory's reference is to a note from Seward to Lyons of May 27, 1861, printed in the Blockade Papers. This merely holds that temporary absenceof blockading ships does not impair the blockade nor render "necessary anew notice of its existence. "]

[Footnote 573: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 119-20. Henry Adamsto Charles Francis Adams, Jr. , March 15, 1862. ]

[Footnote 574: This "three months" statement returned to plague Russelllater, British merchants complaining that upon it they had based plansin the belief that the Government had something definite in view. Spence's reference to this "three months" idea, after his conferences inLondon, would indicate that Russell was merely indulging in ageneralization due to the expected financial collapse of the North. TheRussian Ambassador in London gave a different interpretation. He wrotethat the Northern victories in the West had caused Great Britain tothink the time near when the "border states, " now tied to the Union bythese victories, would lead in a pacification on lines of separationfrom the Southern slave states. "It is in this sense, and no other thatRussell's 'three months' speech in the Lords is to be taken. " (Brunow toF. O. , March 3-15, 1862. No. 33). Brunow does not so state, but hisdespatch sounds as if this were the result of a talk with Russell. Ifso, it would indicate an attempt to interpret Lincoln's "border statepolicy" in a sense that would appear reasonable in the British view thatthere could be no real hope at Washington of restoring the Union. ]

[Footnote 575: Mason, _Mason_, p. 264. Despatch No. 6. March 11, 1862. ]

[Footnote 576: _Ibid. _, p. 266. Fort Henry was taken by Grant onFebruary 6 and Fort Donelson on the 15th. The capture of these twoplaces gave an opening for the advance of the Western army southwardsinto Tennessee and Mississippi. ]

[Footnote 577: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, March 18, 1862. ]

[Footnote 578: Richardson, II, 207. Slidell to Hunter, March 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 579: Mason Papers. ]

CHAPTER IX

ENTER MR. LINDSAY

The friendly atmosphere created by the lifting of the threatening_Trent_ episode, appears to have made Secretary Seward believe that themoment was opportune for a renewal of pressure on Great Britain andFrance for the recall of their Proclamations of Neutrality. Seizing uponthe victories of Grant at Forts Henry and Donelson, he wrote to Adams onFebruary 28 explaining that as a result the United States, now havingaccess to the interior districts of Alabama, Mississippi and Arkansas, "had determined to permit the restoration of trade upon our inland waysand waters" under certain limitations, and that if this experimentsucceeded similar measures would be applied "to the country on thesea-coast, which would be some alleviation of the rigour of theblockade. " He added that these "concessions" to foreign nations would"go much further and faster" if those nations would withdraw their"belligerent privileges heretofore so unnecessarily conceded, as weconceive, to the insurgents[580]. " This was large talk for a relativelyunchanged military situation. Grant had as yet but forced open the doorin the West and was still far from having "access to the interiordistricts" of the states named. Lyons, being shown a copy of thisdespatch to Adams, commented to Russell that while it might be said theposition and the spirit of the Northern armies were greatly improved andnotable successes probable, it could not be maintained that hostilitieswere "so near their conclusion or are carried on upon so small a scaleas to disqualify either party for the title of Belligerents[581]. " Lyonsand Mercier were agreed that this was no time for the withdrawal ofbelligerent rights to the South, and when the hint was received that thepurpose of making such a request was in Seward's mind, the news quitetook Thouvenel's breath away[582]. As yet, however, Seward did no morethan hint and Adams was quick to advise that the moment had not yet come"when such a proceeding might seem to me likely to be of use[583]. "

Just at this time Seward was engaged in forwarding a measure no doubtintended to secure British anti-slavery sympathy for the North, yet alsotruly indicative of a Northern temper toward the South and its "domesticinstitution. " This was the negotiation of a Slave-Trade treaty withGreat Britain, by which America joined, at last, the nations agreeing tounite their efforts in suppression of the African Slave Trade. Thetreaty was signed by Seward and Lyons at Washington on April 7. On thenext day Seward wrote to Adams that had such a treaty been ratified "in1808, there would now have been no sedition here, and no disagreementbetween the United States and foreign nations[584], " a melancholyreflection intended to suggest that the South alone had been responsiblefor the long delay of American participation in a world humanitarianmovement. But the real purpose of the treaty, Lyons thought, was "tosave the credit of the President with the Party which elected him if heshould make concessions to the South, with a view of reconstructing theUnion[585]"--an erroneous view evincing a misconception of theintensity of both Northern and Southern feeling if regarded from ourpresent knowledge, but a view natural enough to the foreign observer atthe moment. Lyons, in this letter, correctly stated the risingdetermination of the North to restore the Union, but underestimated therapid growth of an equal determination against a restoration withslavery. The real motive for Seward's eagerness to sign the Slave Tradetreaty was the thought of its influence on foreign, not domestic, affairs. Lyons, being confident that Russell would approve, had taken"the risk of going a little faster" than his instructions hadindicated[586]. 

In this same letter Lyons dwelt upon the Northern elation over recentmilitary successes. The campaign in the West had been followed in theEast by a great effort under McClellan to advance on Richmond up thepeninsula of the James river and using Chesapeake Bay as a means ofwater transportation and supply. This campaign had been threatened bythe appearance of the iron-clad ram _Merrimac_ and her attack on thewooden naval vessels operating in support of McClellan, but on March 9the _Monitor_, a slow-moving floating iron-clad fortress, drove the_Merrimac_ from her helpless prey, and removed the Southern threat toMcClellan's communications. More than any other one battle of the CivilWar the duel between the _Merrimac_ and the _Monitor_ struck theimagination of the British people, and justly so because of itssignificance in relation to the power of the British Navy. It "has beenthe main talk of the town, " wrote Adams, "ever since the news came, inParliament, in the clubs, in the city, among the military and navalpeople. The impression is that it dates the commencement of a new era inwarfare, and that Great Britain must consent to begin over again[587]. "The victory of the _Monitor_ was relatively unimportant in Britisheyes, but a fight between two completely armoured ships, and especiallythe ease with which the _Merrimac_ had vanquished wooden ships on theday previous, were cause of anxious consideration for the future. Russell was more concerned over the immediate lessons of the battle. "Only think, " he wrote, "of our position if in case of the Yankeesturning upon us they should by means of iron ships renew the triumphsthey achieved in 1812-13 by means of superior size and weight ofmetal[588]. "

This, however, was but early and hasty speculation, and while Americaningenuity and experiment in naval warfare had, indeed, sounded thedeath-knell of wooden ships of war, no great change in the character ofnavies was immediately possible. Moreover British shipbuilders couldsurely keep pace in iron-clad construction with America or any othernation. The success of the _Monitor_ was soon regarded by the BritishGovernment as important mainly as indicative of a new energy in theNorth promising further and more important successes on land. TheGovernment hoped for such Northern success not because of any beliefthat these would go to the extent of forcing the South into submission, for they were still, and for a long time to come, obsessed with theconviction that Southern independence must ultimately be achieved. Theidea was, rather, that the North, having vindicated its fighting abilityand realizing that the South, even though losing battle after battle, was stubborn in the will to independence, would reach the conclusionthat the game was not worth the price and would consent to separation. Russell wrote in this vein to Lyons, even though he thought that the"morale of the Southern army seems to be ruined for the time[589]. " Hebelieved that the end of the war would be hastened by Northernvictories, and he therefore rejoiced in them. 

Of somewhat like opinion up to the end of March, 1862, Lyons, in April, began to doubt his previous analysis of Northern temper and to writewarnings that the end was not near. Grant's hard-won victory in the Westat Shiloh, April 6-7, the first great pitched battle of the war, calledout such a flood of Northern expressions of determination to drive thewar to the bitter end as to startle Lyons and cause him, in a remarkablyclear letter of survey, to recast his opinions. He wrote:

 "The general opinion is that the Campaign of this Spring will clear up most of the doubts as to the result of the War. If the Military successes of the North continue, the determination of the South, will (it is asserted) be at last really put to the test. If notwithstanding great Military reverses, the loss of the Border States, and the occupation of the most important points on the Coast, the Southern men hold out, if they destroy as they threaten to do, their cotton, tobacco and all other property which cannot be removed and then retire into the interior with their families and slaves, the Northern Conquests may prove to be but barren. The climate may be a fatal enemy to the Federal Armies. The Northern people may be unable or unwilling to continue the enormous expenditure. They may prefer Separation to protracting the War indefinitely. I confess, however, that I fear that a protraction of the War during another year or longer, is a not less probable result of the present posture of affairs, than either the immediate subjugation of the South or the immediate recognition of its independence[590]. "

This itemization of Southern methods of resistance was in line withConfederate threats at a moment when the sky looked black. There wasindeed much Southern talk of "retiring" into a hypothetical defensibleinterior which impressed Englishmen, but had no foundation ingeographical fact. Meanwhile British attention was eagerly fixed on theNorthern advance, and it was at least generally hoped that theprojected attack on New Orleans and McClellan's advance up the peninsulatoward Richmond would bring to a more definite status the conflict inAmerica. Extreme Southern sympathizers scouted the possibility of anyconclusive Northern success, ignoring, because ignorant, the importanceof Grant's western campaign. They "were quite struck aback" by the newsof the capture of New Orleans, April 25. "It took them three days tomake up their minds to believe it[591], " but even the capture of thisthe most important commercial city of the South was not regarded as ofgreat importance in view of the eastern effort toward Richmond. 

News of the operations in the peninsula was as slow in reaching Englandas was McClellan's slow and cautious advance. It was during this advanceand previous to the capture of New Orleans that two remarkableadventures toward a solution in America were made, apparently wholly onindividual initiative, by a Frenchman in America and an Englishman inFrance. Mercier at Washington and Lindsay at Paris conceived, quiteindependently, that the time had come for projects of foreign mediation. 

French opinion, like that expressed in England, appears to have beenthat the Northern successes in the spring of 1862 might result in such arehabilitation of Northern self-esteem that suggestions of nowrecognizing the _facts_ of the situation and acknowledging theindependence of the South would not be unfavourably received. In thissense Thouvenel wrote to Mercier, privately, on March 13, but wascareful to state that the word "mediation" ought not to be uttered. Hisletter dilated, also, on French manufacturing difficulties at home dueto the lack of cotton[592]. This was in no way an instruction toMercier, but the ideas expressed were broached by him in a conversationwith Seward, only to be met with such positive assertions of intentionand ability soon to recover the South as somewhat to stagger the FrenchMinister. He remarked, according to his report to Thouvenel, that hewished it were possible to visit Richmond and assure himself that therealso they recognized the truth of Seward's statements, upon which thelatter at once offered to further such a trip. Mercier asserted toThouvenel that he was taken by surprise, having foreseen no such eageracquiescence in a suggestion made _without previous thought_, but thaton consideration he returned to Seward and accepted the proposal, outlining the substance of what he intended to say at Richmond. Heshould there make clear that the anxiety of France was above alldirected toward peace as essential to French commercial interests; thatFrance had always regarded the separation of North and South withregret; that the North was evidently determined in its will to restorethe Union; and, in repetition, that France wished to aid in any waypossible the early cessation of war. Seward, wrote Mercier, told him toadd that he, personally, would welcome "the presence in the Senate" ofany persons whom the South wished to elect[593]. 

Mercier, writes Bancroft, "from the first had been an impatientsympathizer with the Confederacy, and he was quite devoid of the balanceand good judgment that characterized Lord Lyons. " "Quite unnecessarily, Seward helped him to make the trip[594]. " A circumstance apparently notknown to Bancroft was Mercier's consultation with Lyons, beforedeparture, in which were revealed an initiative of the adventure, and aproposed representation to the authorities in Richmond materiallydifferent from the report made by Mercier to Thouvenel. These meritexpanded treatment as new light on a curious episode and especially asrevealing the British policy of the moment, represented in the person ofthe British Minister in Washington[595]. 

On April 10 Mercier came to Lyons, told him that he was about to set outfor Richmond and that he had "been for some little time thinking ofmaking this journey. " He told of _making the suggestion to Seward_, andthat this "rather to his surprise" had been "eagerly" taken up. 

 "Monsieur Mercier observed that the object of vital importance to France, and to England also, as he supposed, was to put an end, as soon as possible, to the blockade, and generally to a state of things which caused so grievous an interruption of the trade between Europe and this country. It was, he said, possible that he might hasten the attainment of this object by conferring personally with the Secession leaders. He should frankly tell them that to all appearances their cause was desperate; that their Armies were beaten in all quarters; and that the time had arrived when they ought to come to some arrangement, which would put an end to a state of affairs ruinous to themselves and intolerable to Europe. It was useless to expect any countenance from the European Powers. Those Powers could but act on their avowed principles. They would recognize any people which established its independence, but they could not encourage the prolongation of a fruitless struggle. 

 "Monsieur Mercier thought that if the Confederates were very much discouraged by their recent reverses, such language from the Minister of a great European Power might be a knock-down blow ('Coup d'assommoir' was the expression he used) to them. It might induce them to come to terms with the North. At all events it might lead to an Armistice, under which trade might be immediately resumed. He had (he told me) mentioned to Mr. Seward his notion of using this language, and had added that of course as a Minister accredited to the United States, and visiting Richmond with the consent of the United States Government, he could not speak to the Southern men of any other terms for ending the War than a return to the Union. 

 "Monsieur Mercier proceeded to say that Mr. Seward entirely approved of the language he thus proposed to hold, and had authorized him to say to the Southern leaders, not of course from the United States Government, but from him Mr. Seward, personally, that they had no spirit of vengeance to apprehend, that they would be cordially welcomed back to their Seats in the Senate, and to their due share of political influence. Mr. Seward added that he had not said so much to any other person, but that he would tell Monsieur Mercier that he was willing to risk his own political station and reputation in pursuing a conciliatory course towards the South, that he was ready to make this his policy and to stand or fall by it. "

This was certainly sufficiently strong language to have pleased theAmerican Secretary of State, and if actually used at Richmond to haveconstituted Mercier a valuable Northern agent. It cannot be regarded asat all in harmony with Mercier's previous opinions, nor as expressive ofThouvenel's views. Lyons was careful to refrain from much comment on thematter of Mercier's proposed representations at Richmond. He was moreconcerned that the trip was to be made at all; was in fact much opposedto it, fearing that it would appear like a break in that unity ofFrench-British attitude which was so desirable. Nor was he withoutsuspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separateadvantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with theSouth. Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons toaccompany him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to anyinterference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, theRussian Minister, and that Stoeckl was "pleased with the idea. " Lyonsfrankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity ofdeclining to go and was sorry Mercier was determined to proceed sincethis certainly looked like a break in "joint policy, " and he objectedpositively on the same ground to Stoeckl's going[596]. Mercier yieldedthe latter point, but argued that by informing Seward of hisconsultation with Lyons, which he proposed doing, the former objectionwould be obviated. Finding that Mercier "was bent on going, " Lyonsthought it best not to object too much and confined his efforts todriving home the idea that no opening should be given for a "separateagreement" with the South. 

 "I therefore entered with him into the details of his plans, and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct. I said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to remove from the minds of men in the South, was that it would be possible to inveigle France or any other great European Power into an exclusive Alliance with them. I had reason to believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected by an offer of great commercial privileges to one Power, to the exclusion of others. I hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, or men of his stamp could entertain so foolish a notion, but still it might be well to eradicate it from any mind in which it had found place[597]. "

Lyons saw Mercier "two or three times" between the tenth and fourteenthand on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, "without sayinganything to lead him to suppose that I had any objection to it. " Thiswas intended to preserve the impression of close harmony with France, and Lyons wrote, "I consider that the result of my communications withM. Mercier entitles him to say that he makes his journey to Richmondwith my acquiescence[598]. " Nevertheless he both believed, and declaredto Mercier, that the views expressed on Southern weakening ofdetermination were wholly erroneous, and that neither North nor Southwas ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace. He prophesied failure of Mercier's avowed hopes. His prophecy provedwell founded. On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier's account to him of theresults of the journey. Mercier returned to Washington on April 24, reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same daycalled on Lyons. Having conversed with Benjamin, the new ConfederateSecretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settleddetermination of the South to maintain its independence, even underextreme reverses. Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expectedEuropean assistance, Mercier "replied that the Confederate leadersprofessed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe, " and thatconfident in their own power they "desired no aid. " Cautiously advertingto his suspicion that Mercier's trip might have had in view Frenchcommercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had received anyproposals of benefit in return for recognition. Mercier answered with asimple negative. He then further developed the interview withBenjamin[599]. 

 "He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a friend of the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the particular language which he had intended to hold was entirely inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found the Confederates one and all. It was idle to tell them that they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for making terms with the North. What he had said to them about the recognition of their Independence was that the principal inducement to France to recognize it would be a hope that her doing so would have a great moral effect towards hastening peace; that at this moment it would certainly not have any such effect; that it would embroil France with the United States, and that would be all[600]. "

Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by Mercierto convince the South of the uselessness of further resistance had, infact, been made. In his report to Thouvenel, Mercier stated that he hadapproached Benjamin with the simple declaration "that the purpose of myjourney was merely to assure myself, for myself, of the true conditionof things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it. "Since the proposed strong representations were not reported toThouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of thetrip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to makethem. They bear the appearance of arguments to Seward--and in somedegree also to Lyons--made to secure acquiescence in his plan. Thereport to Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narratedto Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a "principalinducement" thereto[601]. Mercier now declared to Lyons his own views onrecognition:

 "He was himself more than ever convinced that the restoration of the old Union was impossible. He believed that, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would last for years. He conceived that the Independence of the South must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War. The present opportunity would however, he thought, be particularly unfavourable. "

Lyons writes:

 "I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually pursued by France or England, but I told Monsieur Mercier that I entirely agreed with him in thinking that there was nothing to do at the present moment but to watch events. "

On the day following this interview, Lyons spoke to Seward of Mercier'strip and was given a very different view of the situation at Richmond. Seward said:

 "He himself was quite convinced, from Monsieur Mercier's account of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last effort, that their last resources were brought into play; that their last Armies were in the field. If they were now defeated, they would accept the terms which would be offered them. Their talking of retiring into the interior was idle. If the United States were undisputed masters of the Border States and the Sea Coast, there would be no occasion for any more fighting. Those who chose to retire into the interior were welcome to do so, and to stay there till they were tired. "

"The truth, " wrote Lyons, "as to the state of feeling in the Southprobably lies somewhere between Mr. Seward's views and those of MonsieurMercier. " Lyons concluded his report of the whole matter:

 "The result of Monsieur Mercier's journey has been to bring him back precisely to the point at which he was three months ago. The Federal successes which occurred afterwards had somewhat shaken his conviction in the ultimate success of the South, and consequently his opinions as to the policy to be adopted by France. The sentiments he now expresses are exactly those which he expressed at the beginning of the year[602]. "

In other words, Mercier was now again pressing for early recognition ofthe South at the first favourable moment. On Lyons the effect of theadventure to Richmond was just the reverse of this; and on Russell alsoits influence was to cause some doubt of Southern success. Appended toLyons' report stands Russell's initialled comment:

 "It is desirable to know what is the Interior to which the Southern Confederates propose if beaten to retire. If in Arms they will be pursued, if not in Arms their discontent will cause but little embarrassment to their Conquerors. But can the country be held permanently by the U. S. Armies if the Confederates have small bodies in Arms resisting the authority of the U. S. Congress?

 Any facts shewing the strength or weakness of the Union feeling in the South will be of great value in forming a judgment on the final issue. "

Seward, in conversation with Lyons, had said that to avoid publicmisconceptions a newspaper statement would be prepared on Mercier'strip. This appeared May 6, in the New York _Times_, the paper moreclosely Seward's "organ" than any other throughout the war, representingMercier as having gone to Richmond by order of Napoleon and withLincoln's approval to urge the Confederates to surrender and toencourage them to expect favourable terms. Lyons commented on thisarticle that the language attributed to Mercier was "not very unlikethat which he intended to hold, " but that in fact he had not usedit[603]. Nor had Napoleon ordered the move. Indeed everyone in Londonand Paris was much astonished, and many were the speculations as to themeaning of Mercier's unusual procedure. Russell was puzzled, writing"Que diable allait il faire dans cette galére[604]?" and Cowley, atParis, could give no light, being assured by Thouvenel on first rumoursof Mercier's trip to Richmond that "he had not a notion that this couldbe true[605]. " May 1, Cowley wrote, "The whole thing is inexplicableunless the Emperor is at the bottom of it, which Thouvenel thinks is notthe case[606]. " The next day Thouvenel, having consulted Napoleon, wasassured by the latter that "he could not account for Monsieur Mercier'sconduct, and that he greatly regretted it, " being especially disturbedby a seeming break in the previous "complete harmony with the BritishRepresentative" at Washington[607]. This was reassuring to Russell, yetthere is no question that Mercier's conduct long left a certainsuspicion in British official circles. On May 2, also, Thouvenel wroteto Flahault in London of the Emperor's displeasure, evidently with theintention that this should be conveyed to Russell[608]. 

Naturally the persons most excited were the two Confederate agents inEurope. At first they believed Mercier must have had secret orders fromNapoleon, and were delighted; then on denials made to Slidell byThouvenel they feared Mercier was acting in an unfavourable sense asSeward's agent. Later they returned to the theory of Napoleon's privatemanipulation, and being confident of his friendship were content to waitevents[609]. Slidell had just received assurance from M. Billault, through whom most of his information came, "that the Emperor and allthe Ministers are favourable to our cause, have been so for the lastyear, and are now quite as warmly so as they have ever been. M. Thouvenel is of course excepted, but then he has no hostility[610]. " Buta greater source of Southern hope at this juncture was another"diplomatic adventure, " though by no accredited diplomat, whichantedated Mercier's trip to Richmond and which still agitated not onlythe Confederate agents, but the British Ministry as well. 

This was the appearance of the British Member of Parliament, Lindsay, inthe rôle of self-constituted Southern emissary to Napoleon. Lindsay, asone of the principal ship-owners in England, had long been an earnestadvocate of more free commercial intercourse between nations, supportingin general the principles of Cobden and Bright, and being a warmpersonal friend of the latter, though disagreeing with him on theAmerican Civil War. He had been in some sense a minor expert consultedby both French and British Governments in the preparation of thecommercial treaty of 1860, so that when on April 9 he presented himselfto Cowley asking that an audience with the Emperor be procured for himto talk over some needed alterations in the Navigation Laws, the requestseemed reasonable, and the interview was arranged for April 11. On thetwelfth Lindsay reported to Cowley that the burden of Napoleon'sconversation, much to his surprise, was on American affairs[611]. 

The Emperor, said Lindsay, expressed the conviction that re-unionbetween North and South was an impossibility, and declared that he wasready to recognize the South "if Great Britain would set him theexample. " More than once he had expressed these ideas to England, but"they had not been attended to" and he should not try again. Hecontinued:

 ". . . That France ought not to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States, but that the United States ought equally to abstain from all interference in the internal concerns of France; and that His Majesty considered that the hindrance placed by the Northern States upon the exportation of cotton from the South was not justifiable, and was tantamount to interference with the legal commerce of France. "

He also "denied the efficiency of the blockade so established. He hadmade observations in this sense to Her Majesty's Government, but theyhad not been replied to. " Then "His Majesty asked what were the opinionsof Her Majesty's Govt. ; adding that if Her Majesty's Govt. Agreed withhim as to the inefficiency of the blockade, he was ready to send shipsof war to co-operate with others of Her Majesty to keep the Southernports open. " Finally Napoleon requested Lindsay to see Cowley and findout what he thought of these ideas. 

Cowley told Lindsay he did not know of any "offer" whatever having beenmade by France to England, that his (Cowley's) opinion was "that itmight be true that the North and the South would never re-unite, butthat it was not yet proved; that the efficiency of the blockade was alegal and international question, and that upon the whole it had beenconsidered by Her Majesty's Govt. As efficient, though doubtless manyships had been enabled to run it"; and "that at all events there couldnot be a more inopportune moment for mooting the question both of therecognition of the South and of the efficiency of the blockade. Thetime was gone by when such measures could, if ever, have been taken--forevery mail brought news of expeditions from the North acting withsuccess upon the South; and every day added to the efficiency of theblockade"; and "that I did not think therefore that Her Majesty's Govt. Would consent to send a squadron to act as the Emperor had indicated, but that I could only give a personal opinion, which might be correctedif I was in error by Mr. Lindsay himself seeing Lord Russell. "

On April 13th a second interview took place between Lindsay andNapoleon, of which Lindsay reported that having conveyed to NapoleonCowley's denial of any offer made to England, as well as a contrary viewof the situation, Napoleon:

 ". . . Repeated the statement that two long despatches with his opinion had been written to M. De Flahault, which had not been attended to by Her Majesty's Government, and he expressed a desire that Mr. Lindsay should return to London, lay His Majesty's views before Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell, and bring their answers direct to him as quickly as possible, His Majesty observing that these matters were better arranged by private than official hands. . . . Mr. Lindsay said that he had promised the Emperor to be back in Paris on Thursday morning. "

In his letter to Russell, Cowley called all this a "nasty intrigue. "Cowley had asked Thouvenel for enlightenment, and Thouvenel had deniedall knowledge and declared that certainly no such proposals as Lindsayreported the Emperor to have mentioned had ever been sent to England. Cowley wrote:

 "My own conviction is, from Lindsay's conversations with me, which are full of hesitations, and I fear much falsehood hidden under apparent candour, that he has told the Emperor his own views, and that those views are supported by the majority of the people of England, and by the present Opposition in Parliament, who would denounce the blockade if in power; that he has found a willing listener in the Emperor, who would gladly obtain cotton by any means; and I am much mistaken if Lindsay will not attempt to make political capital of his interviews with the Emperor with the Opposition, and that you may hear of it in Parliament. I lose no time therefore, in writing to you as Lindsay goes over to-night, and will probably endeavour to see you and Lord Palmerston as soon as possible[612]. "

The close touch between Lindsay and the Southern agents is shown by hisconveyance to Slidell of the good news. Slidell was jubilant, writingto Mason:

 "Mr. Lindsay has had a long interview with the Emperor who is prepared to act at once decidedly in our favour; he has always been ready to do so and has twice made representations to England, but has received evasive responses. He has now for the third time given them but in a more decided tone. Mr. Lindsay will give you all the particulars. This is entirely confidential but you can say to Lord Campbell, Mr. Gregory, etc. , that I now have positive and _authoritative_ evidence that France now waits the assent of England for recognition and other more cogent measures[613]. "

Two days later Slidell made a report to Benjamin, which was in substancevery similar to that given by Lindsay to Cowley, though more highlycoloured as favourable to the South, but he added an important featurewhich, as has been seen, was suspected by Cowley, but which had not beenstated to him. Napoleon had asked Lindsay to see Derby and Disraeli, theleaders of the parliamentary opposition, and inform them of his views--asuggestion which if known to the British Ministry as coming fromNapoleon could not fail to arouse resentment. Slidell even believedthat, failing British participation, the Emperor might act separately inrecognition of the South[614]. 

April 15, Cowley, having received, privately, Russell's approval of thelanguage used to Lindsay and believing that Thouvenel was about to writeto Flahault on the interviews, felt it "necessary to bring them also onmy part officially to your [Russell's] notice[615]. " This officialreport does not differ materially from that in Cowley's private letterof the thirteenth, but omitted, naturally, aspersions on Lindsay andsuspicions of the use to which he might put his information[616]. Cowleyhad held a long conversation with Thouvenel, in which it was developedthat the source of the Emperor's views was Rouher, Minister of Commerce, who was very anxious over the future of cotton supply. It appeared thatLindsay in conversation with Thouvenel had affirmed that "_I_ [Cowley]_coincided in his views_. " This exasperated Cowley, and he resentedLindsay's "unofficial diplomacy, " telling Thouvenel that he "was placedin a false position by Mr. Lindsay's interference. M. Thouvenelexclaimed that his own position was still more false, and that he shouldmake a point of seeing the Emperor, on the following morning, and ofascertaining the extent of His Majesty's participation in theproceeding. " This was done, with the result that Napoleon acknowledgedthat on Lindsay's request he had authorized him to recount to Russelland Palmerston the views expressed, but asserted that "he had notcharged him to convey those opinions. " Cowley concluded his despatch:

 "Monsieur Thouvenel said that the Emperor did not understand the intricacies of this question--that His Majesty had confounded remarks conveyed in despatches with deliberate proposals--that no doubt the French Government was more preoccupied with the Cotton question than Her Majesty's Government seemed to be, and this he (Thouvenel) had shewn in his communications with M. De Flahault, but that he knew too well the general opinions prevailing in England to have made proposals. Nor, indeed, did he see what proposals could have been made. He had endeavoured to shew both the Emperor and M. Rouher, that to recognize the independence of the South would not bring Cotton into the markets, while any interference with the blockade would probably have produced a collision. At the same time he could not conceal from me the just anxiety he experienced to reopen the Cotton trade. Might not the Northern States be induced to declare some one port Neutral, at which the trade could be carried on?

 I said that the events which were now passing in America demonstrated the prudence of the policy pursued by the two Governments. The recognition of the South would not have prevented the North from continuing its armaments and undertaking the expedition now in progress, and a refusal to acknowledge the blockade as efficient must have been followed by the employment of force, on a question of extreme delicacy[617]. "

Formal approval was given Cowley by Russell on April 16. In this Russellstated that he agreed with Thouvenel the cotton situation was alarming, but he added: "The evil is evident--not equally so the remedy. " Heassured Cowley that "Her Majesty's Government wish to take no step inrespect to the Civil War in America except in concert with France andupon full deliberation[618]. " Meanwhile Lindsay's diplomatic career hadreceived a severe jolt in London. Confidently addressing to Russell arequest for an interview, he received the reply "that I thought the bestway for two Govts. To communicate with each other was through theirrespective Embassies. . . . He [Lindsay] rejoined that he feared you[Cowley] had not stated the reason why the Emperor wished to make theproposal through him rather than the usual channel, and again asked tosee me, but I declined to give any other answer, adding that you and theFrench Ambassr. Could make the most Confidential as well as OfficialCommunications[619]. " This rebuff was not regarded as final, thoughexasperating, by Lindsay, nor by the Confederate agents, all beingagreed that Napoleon was about to take an active hand in their favour. Lindsay returned to Paris accompanied by Mason, and on April 18 hadstill another conversation with Napoleon. He reported Russell's refusalof an interview, and that he had seen Disraeli, but not Derby, who wasill. Disraeli had declared that he believed Russell and Seward to have a"secret understanding" on the blockade, but that if France should make adefinite proposal it would probably be supported by a majority inParliament, and that Russell would be compelled to assent in order toavoid a change of Ministry. In this third interview with Lindsayexpressions of vexation with British policy were used by Napoleon(according to Slidell), but he now intimated that he was waiting tolearn the result of the Northern effort to capture New Orleans, an eventwhich "he did not anticipate, " but which, if it occurred, "might renderit inexpedient to act[620]. "

Evidently the wedge was losing its force. Mason, returning to London, found that the "pulsations" in Paris had no English repetition. He wrotethat Lindsay, failing to reach Russell, had attempted to get atPalmerston, but with no success. Thereupon Lindsay turning to theOpposition had visited Disraeli a second time and submitted to himPalmerston's rebuff. The strongest expression that fell from Disraeliwas--"if it is found that the Emperor and Russell are at issue on thequestion the session of Parliament would not be as quiet as had beenanticipated. " This was scant encouragement, for Disraeli's "if" was allimportant. Yet "on the whole Lindsay is hopeful, " wrote Mason inconclusion[621]. Within a fortnight following arrived the news of thecapture of New Orleans, an event upon which Seward had postulated therelief of a European scarcity of cotton and to Southern sympathizers aserious blow. May 13, Cowley reported that the Emperor had told him, personally, that "he quite agreed that nothing was to be done for themoment but to watch events[622]. " Thouvenel asked Slidell as to theeffect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer, "thatit would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the control ofthe Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would not in any waymodify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on the war even to anextermination[623]. " Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all from hissection, never fully realizing the importance of the ConfederateSouth-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about Richmond, was tellingthe "nervous amongst our friends" that New Orleans would "form a barrenacquisition to the enemy, and will on our side serve only as astimulant[624]. "

If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting repeateddoses in the three months from February to May, 1862. In England, Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory opposition, butthought it wiser to postpone for a time further pressure in thatdirection. May 8, Henry Adams could write to his brother of Britishpublic opinion, "there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong asever that we must ultimately fail[625], " but on May 16, that "the effectof the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet . . . The _Times_ came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; ithad believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them. This morning ithas an article still more remarkable and intimates for the first timethat it sees little more chance for the South. There is, we think, apreparation for withdrawing their belligerent declaration andacknowledging again the authority of the Federal Government over all thenational territory to be absolute and undisputed. One more victory willbring us up to this, I am confident[626]. "

This was mistaken confidence. Nor did governmental reaction keep pacewith Southern depression or Northern elation; the British Ministry wassimply made more determined to preserve strict neutrality and torestrain its French partner in a "wait for events" policy. The "one morevictory" so eagerly desired by Henry Adams was not forthcoming, and theattention, now all focused on McClellan's slow-moving campaign, waitedin vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence ofNorthern power--the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond. McClellan's delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washingtonthat foreign Powers were about to offer mediation. This was treated atsome length in the semi-official _National Intelligencer_ of May 16 inan article which Lyons thought inspired by Seward, stating thatmediation would be welcome if offered for the purpose of re-union, butwould otherwise be resented, a view which Lyons thought fairlyrepresented the situation[627]. 

There can be little doubt that this Washington rumour was largely theresult of the very positive opinion held by Mercier of ultimate Southernsuccess and his somewhat free private communications. He may, indeed, have been talking more freely than usual exactly because of anxiety atNorthern success, for McClellan, so far as was then known, was steadily, if slowly, progressing toward a victory. Mercier's most recentinstruction from Thouvenel gave him no authority to urge mediation, yethe thought the moment opportune for it and strongly urged this plan onLyons. The latter's summary of this and his own analysis of thesituation were as follows:

 "M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility that the South may be victorious both in the battle in Virginia and in that in Tennessee. He is at all events quite confident that whether victorious or defeated, they will not give in, and he is certainly disposed to advise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is, however, very much puzzled to devise any mode of intervention, which would have the effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I should suppose he would think it desirable to go to great lengths to stop the war; because he believes that the South will not give in until the whole country is made desolate and that the North will very soon be led to proclaim immediate emancipation, which would stop the cultivation of cotton for an indefinite time. 

 I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears to me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not see my way to doing any good. 

 If one is to conjecture what the state of things will be a month or six weeks hence, one may "guess" that McClellan will be at Richmond, having very probably got there without much real fighting. I doubt his getting farther this summer, if so far. . . . 

 The campaign will not be pushed with any vigour during the summer. It may be begun again in the Autumn. Thus, so far as Trade and Cotton are concerned, we may be next Autumn, just in the situation we are now. If the South really defeated either or both the Armies opposed to them I think it would disgust the North with the war, rather than excite them to fresh efforts. If the armies suffer much from disease, recruiting will become difficult. The credit of the Government has hitherto been wonderfully kept up, but it would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible, under such circumstances that a Peace Party might arise; and perhaps just _possible_ that England and France might give weight to such a Party[628]. "

In brief, Lyons was all against either intervention or mediation unlessa strong reaction toward peace should come in the North, and even thenregarded the wisdom of such a policy as only "just _possible_. " Nor wasRussell inclined to depart from established policy. He wrote to Lyons atnearly the same time:

 "The news from York Town, New Orleans, and Corinth seems to portend the conquest of the South. We have now to see therefore, whether a few leaders or the whole population entertain those sentiments of alienation and abhorrence which were so freely expressed to M. Mercier by the Confederate Statesmen at Richmond. I know not how to answer this question. But there are other questions not less important to be solved in the North. Will the Abolitionists succeed in proclaiming freedom to the Slaves of all those who have resisted? I guess not. 

 But then the Union will be restored with its old disgrace and its old danger. I confess I do not see any way to any fair solution except separation--but that the North will not hear of--nor in the moment of success would it be of any use to give them unpalatable advice[629]. "

Two days preceding this letter, Thouvenel, at last fully informed ofMercier's trip to Richmond, instructed him that France had no intentionto depart from her attitude of strict neutrality and that it was morethan ever necessary to wait events[630]. 

Mercier's renewed efforts to start a movement toward mediation were thenwholly personal. Neither France nor Great Britain had as yet taken upthis plan, nor were they likely to so long as Northern successes werecontinued. In London, Mason, suffering a reaction from his former highhopes, summed up the situation in a few words: "This Government passiveand ignorant, France alert and mysterious. The Emperor alone knows whatis to come out of it, and he keeps his own secret[631]. " The Southernplay, following the ministerial rebuff to Lindsay, was now to keep quietand extended even to discouraging public demonstrations againstgovernmental inaction. Spence had prevented such a demonstration bycotton operators in Liverpool. "I have kept them from moving as a matterof judgment. If either of the Southern armies obtain such a victory as Ithink probable, then a move of this kind may be made with success andpower, whilst at the wrong time for it havoc only would haveresulted[632]. " The wrong time for Southern pressure on Russell wasconceived by Seward to be the right time for the North. Immediatelyfollowing the capture of New Orleans he gave positive instructions toDayton in Paris and Adams in London to propose the withdrawal of thedeclaration admitting Southern belligerent rights. Thouvenel repliedwith some asperity on the folly of Seward's demand, and made a strongrepresentation of the necessity of France to obtain cotton andtobacco[633]. Adams, with evident reluctance, writing, "I had littleexpectation of success, but I felt it my duty at once to execute theorders, " advanced with Russell the now threadbare and customaryarguments on the Proclamation of Neutrality, and received the usualrefusal to alter British policy[634]. If Seward was sincere in askingfor a retraction of belligerent rights to the South he much mistookEuropean attitude; if he was but making use of Northern victories toreturn to a high tone of warning to Europe--a tone serviceable incausing foreign governments to step warily--his time was well chosen. Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously Seward'srenewal of demand on belligerency. Satisfied that there was no immediatereason to require his presence in America, ill and fearing the heat ofsummer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to take leave of absencefor a trip home. On June 6 he received this permission, evidence thatRussell also saw no cause for anxiety, and on June 13 he took leaveof Lincoln. 

 "I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning. He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em I mean 'em no harm[635]. '"

Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of news on anystriking military event in America. New Orleans was an old story, andwhile in general it was believed that Richmond must fall beforeMcClellan's army, the persistence of Southern fervid declarations thatthey would never submit gave renewed courage to their British friends. Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might be wise, after all, to makesome effort in Parliament, and since the Washington mediation rumourswere becoming current in London also, notice was given of a motiondemanding of the Government that, associating itself with France, anoffer of mediation be made to the contending parties in America. Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and hadfailed. Now the cry was to be "peaceful mediation" to put an end to aterrible war. Friends of the South were not united in this adventure. Spence advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determinedto make the effort[636]. Probably he was still smarting under hisreverse of April. Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp personalclash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be without influenceon governmental attitude--perhaps might even indicate a governmentalpurpose to alter its policy. 

This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston toAdams on the publication in the _Times_ of General Butler's famous orderin New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat as "women of thetown" those women who publicly insulted Northern troops. The Britishpress indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing about this order similarto that on the Northern "barbarity" of the Stone Fleet episode. Palmerston's letters to Adams and the replies received need no furthernotice here, since they did not in fact affect British policy, than toexplain that Palmerston wrote in extreme anger, apparently, and withgreat violence of language, and that Adams replied with equal anger, butin very dignified if irritating terms[637]. In British opinion Butler'sorder was an incitement to his soldiers to commit atrocities; Americansunderstood it as merely an authorization to return insult for insult. Infact the order promptly put a stop to attacks on Northern soldiers, whether by act or word, and all disorder ceased. Palmerston was quick toaccept the British view, writing to Adams, "it is difficult if notimpossible to express adequately the disgust which must be excited inthe mind of every honourable man by the general order of GeneralButler. . . . " "If the Federal government chooses to be served by mencapable of such revolting outrages, they must submit to abide by thedeserved opinion which mankind will form of their conduct[638]. " Thisextraordinary letter was written on June 11. Adams was both angry andperturbed, since he thought the letter might indicate an intention tochange British policy and that Palmerston was but laying the ground forsome "vigorous" utterance in Parliament, after his wont when strikingout on a new line. He was further confirmed in this view by an editorialin the _Times_ on June 12, hinting at a coming mediation, and by newsfrom France that Persigny was on his way to London to arrange such astep. But however much personally aggrieved, Adams was cool as adiplomat. His first step was to write a brief note to Palmerstonenquiring whether he was to consider the letter as addressed to him"officially . . . Or purely as a private expression of sentiment betweengentlemen[639]. "

There is no evidence that Palmerston and Russell were contemplating achange of policy--rather the reverse. But it does appear that Palmerstonwished to be able to state in Parliament that he had taken Adams to taskfor Butler's order, so that he might meet an enquiry already placed onthe question paper as to the Ministry's intentions in the matter. Thisquestion was due for the sitting of June 13, and on that day Russellwrote to Palmerston that he should call Butler's order "brutal" and thatPalmerston might use the term "infamous" if preferred, adding, "I do notsee why we should not represent in a friendly way that the usages of wardo not sanction such conduct[640]. " This was very different from thetone used by Palmerston. His letter was certainly no "friendly way. "Again on the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston:

 "Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the letter you have written him about Butler. 

 I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do nothing more till I had seen or written to you. 

 What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your interpretation of the order. 

 But it is not clear that the President approves of the order, and I think if you could add something to the effect that you respect the Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish to impute to them the fault of Butler it might soothe him. 

 If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the best. But this you may not like to do[641]. "

It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move againstAdams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as to the last, he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving Butler's order, was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, Adams, the suspicionproving unfounded that an immediate change of policy was intended, returned to the attack as a matter of personal prestige. It was notuntil June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams and then in far differentlanguage seeking to smooth the Minister's ruffled feathers, yet makingno apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly respondedwith vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter beingofficial or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previousassertions as "offensive imputations. " He also again approached Russell, who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, buthad received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceedingwas "altogether irregular[642]. " In the end Palmerston was brought, June19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effectstill evading the question put him, though acknowledging that the"Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official organfor communications. . . . " In conclusion he expressed gratification thatreports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's authority at New Orleans hadbeen curtailed by Lincoln. The next day Adams answered interpretingPalmerston as withdrawing his "imputations" but stating plainly that hewould not again submit "to entertain any similar correspondence[643]. "

Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew there wasto be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's whole move mayeven have been intended to ease the pressure for a change in thatpolicy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with Russell, friends ofthe South thought the _Times_ editorial indicated "that some movement isto be made at last, and I doubt not we are to thank the Emperor forit[644]. " But on this day also Russell was advising Palmerston to statein Parliament that "We have not received at present any proposal fromFrance to offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer iton our part[645]. " This was the exact language used by Palmerston inreply to Hopwood[646]. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but wasassured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would "stillhold his motion under consideration[647]. " Lindsay, according to his ownaccount, had talked very large in a letter to Russell, but knewprivately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote forhis motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postponeit[648]. The proposed motion was now one for recognition instead ofmediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer toHopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable tothe South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at themoment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, indespair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with whatprospect of success, to _demand_ recognition from France[649]. Thisalarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urgingagainst such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused therewould be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay'smotion dying away for on consultation with "different parties, includingDisraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck, " it "has been so far reducedand diluted . . . As to make it only expressive of the opinion of theHouse that the present posture of affairs in America made the questionof the recognition of the Confederate States worth the seriousconsideration of the Government. It was so modified to prevent theMinistry making an issue upon it. . . . " There was "no assurance that itwould be sustained . . . Even in that form. " Lindsay had determined topostpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from thisquarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King Cotton' toturn the screw still further[651]. " On June, 20 Lindsay gave this noticeof postponement, and no parliamentary comment was made[652]. It was amoment of extreme depression for the Confederate agents in Europe. Slidell, yielding to Mason's pleas, gave up his idea of demandingrecognition and wrote:

 "The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that we would have done better to withdraw after our first interview with Russell and Thouvenel[653]. "

[Illustration: PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH (_From a photograph by Elliott &Fry, Ltd. _)]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 580: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 41. ]

[Footnote 581: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. March 3, 1862. ]

[Footnote 582: F. O. , France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley to Russell, March 18, 1862. ]

[Footnote 583: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 54. Adams to Seward, March 27, 1862. ]

[Footnote 584: _Ibid. _, p. 65. ]

[Footnote 585: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. April 8, 1862. ]

[Footnote 586: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 587: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 123. To his son, April 4, 1862. ]

[Footnote 588: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 31, 1862. ]

[Footnote 589: Lyons Papers. March 22, 1862. ]

[Footnote 590: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 827. No. 244. Extract. Lyons to Russell, April 11, 1802. ]

[Footnote 591: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 143. Adams to his son, May 16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 592: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 247. ]

[Footnote 593: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, pp. 120-122. Mercicr toThouvenel, April 13, 1862. A translation of this despatch was printed, with some minor inaccuracies, in the New York _Tribune_, Feb. 5, 1863, and of Mercier's report, April 28, on his return from Richmond, on Feb. 9, under the caption "The Yellow Book. " It is interesting that theconcluding paragraphs of this report of April 28, as printed in the_Tribune_, are not given in the printed volume of _DocumentsDiplomatiques_, 1862. These refer to difficulties about cotton and tocertain pledges given by Seward as to cessation of illegal interferenceswith French vessels. How the _Tribune_ secured these paragraphs, ifauthentic, is not clear. The whole purpose of the publication was anattack by Horace Greeley, editor, on Seward in an effort to cause hisremoval from the Cabinet. See Bancroft, _Seward_, II, 371-2. ]

[Footnote 594: Bancroft, _Seward_. II, 298-99. Bancroft's account isbased on the _Tribune_ translation and on Seward's own comments to Weedand Bigelow. _Ibid. _, 371-72. ]

[Footnote 595: Newton. _Lord Lyons_, I, pp. 82-85, gives an account ofthe initiation of Mercier's trip and prints Lyons' private letter toRussell of April 25, describing the results, but does not bring outsufficiently Lyons' objections and misgivings. Newton thinks thatMercier "whether instructed from home or not . . . After the manner ofFrench diplomatists of the period . . . Was probably unable to resist thetemptation of trying to effect a striking _coup_. . . . "]

[Footnote 596: Stoeckl's report does not agree with Mercier's statement. He wrote that he had been asked to accompany Mercier but had refused andreported a conversation with Seward in which the latter declared thetime had not yet come for mediation, that in any case France would notbe accepted in that rôle, and that if ever mediation should becomeacceptable, Russia would be asked to act (Russian Archives, Stoeckl toF. O. , April 23-May 5, 1862. No. 927). ]

[Footnote 597: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 828. No. 250. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, April 14, 1862. ]

[Footnote 598: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 599: This suspicion was a natural one but that it wasunfounded is indicated by Benjamin's report to Slidell of Mercier'svisit, describing the language used in almost exactly the same termsthat Lyons reported to Russell. That little importance was attached byBenjamin to Mercier's visit is also indicated by the fact that he didnot write to Slidell about it until July. Richardson, II, 260. Benjaminto Slidell, July 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 600: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, April 24, 1862. ]

[Footnote 601: _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, pp. 122-124. ]

[Footnote 602: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 828. No. 284. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, April 28, 1862. ]

[Footnote 603: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 829. No. 315. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, May 9, 1862. ]

[Footnote 604: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, May 10, 1862. ]

[Footnote 605: F. O. , France, Vol. 1427. No. 544. Cowley to Russell, April 28, 1862. ]

[Footnote 606: _Ibid. _, Vol. 1438. No. 563. To Russell. Mercier'sconduct appeared to Cowley as "want of courtesy" and "tardy confidence"to Lyons. _Ibid. _, No. 566. May 1, 1862. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 607: _Ibid. _, No. 574. Cowley to Russell, May 2, 1862. ]

[Footnote 608: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, p. 299. ]

[Footnote 609: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 3, 14 and 16, 1862. Mason to Slidell, May 5, 14 and 16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 610: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, May 16, 1862. Billault was amember of the French Ministry, but without portfolio. ]

[Footnote 611: Several accounts have been given of this episode. The twoknown to me treating it at greatest length are (1) Callahan, _DiplomaticHistory of the Southern Confederacy_ and (2) Sears, _A ConfederateDiplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_. Am. Hist. Rev. , Jan. , 1921. Bothwriters drew their information wholly from Confederate documents, using, especially, the private correspondence of Mason and Slidell, and neithertreats the matter from the English view point. I have therefore based myaccount on the unused letters of British officials, citing othermaterials only where they offer a side light. The principal new sourcesare Cowley's private and official letters to Russell. ]

[Footnote 612: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. April 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 613: Mason Papers. April 12, 1862. ]

[Footnote 614: Richardson, II, 239. April 14, 1862. ]

[Footnote 615: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Private. ]

[Footnote 616: F. O. , France, Vol. 1437. No. 497. _Confidential_. Cowleyto Russell April 15, 1862. ]

[Footnote 617: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 618: F. O. , France, Vol. 1422. No. 403. Russell to Cowley, April 16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 619: _Ibid. _, No. 415. Russell to Cowley, April 16, 1862. Whether Napoleon had in fact "charged" Lindsay with a mission mustremain in doubt. Cowley believed Lindsay to have prevaricated--or atleast so officially reported. He had

 "Le 20 Avril, 1862. 

 Mon cher Lord Cowley:

 Je vous remercie de votre billet. J'espčre comme vous que bientôt nos manufactures auront du coton. Je n'ai pas de tout été choqué de ce que Lord Russell n'ait pas reçu Mr. Lindsay. Celui-ci m'avait demandé l'autorisation de rapporter au principal secretaire d'Etat notre conversation et j'y avais consenti et voilŕ tout. 

 Croyez ŕ mes sentiments d'amitié. 

 Napoleon. "]

[Footnote 620: Richardson, II, 239. Slidell to Benjamin, April 18, 1862. New Orleans was captured on April 25. ]

[Footnote 621: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 30, 1862. ]

[Footnote 622: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. ]

[Footnote 623: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, May 14, 1862. ]

[Footnote 624: _Ibid. _, Mason to Slidell, May 14, 1862. ]

[Footnote 625: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 139. ]

[Footnote 626: _Ibid. _, p. 146. ]

[Footnote 627: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 830. No. 338. Lyons to Russell, May 16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 628: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell. Private. May 16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 629: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons. Private. May 17, 1862. ]

[Footnote 630: _Documents Diplomatiques_, 1862, p. 124. May 15. ]

[Footnote 631: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, May 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 632: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 3, 1862. ]

[Footnote 633: F. O. , France, Vol. 1439. No. 668. Cowley to Russell, May23, 1862, and _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 127. Thouvenel toMercier, May 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 634: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862_, pp. 97-99. Adams toSeward, May 22, 1862. ]

[Footnote 635: Newton, _Lord Lyons_, I, 88. ]

[Footnote 636: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, June 11, 1862. ]

[Footnote 637: All the letters are given in Adams, _C. F. Adams_, Ch. XIII. ]

[Footnote 638: _Ibid. _, pp. 248-9. ]

[Footnote 639: _Ibid. _, p. 251. ]

[Footnote 640: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 641: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 642: Adams, _C. F. Adams_, pp. 253-55. ]

[Footnote 643: _Ibid. _, pp. 256-60. ]

[Footnote 644: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 645: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 646: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXVII, p. 543. June 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 647: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 14, 1862. ]

[Footnote 648: _Ibid. _, Lindsay to Mason, June 18, 1862. Lindsay wrote:

 "Lord Russell sent to me last night to get the words of my motion. I have sent them to him to-night, and I have embraced the opportunity of opening my mind to his Lordship. I have told him that I have postponed my motion in courtesy to him--that the sympathy of nine-tenths of the members of the House was in favour of immediate recognition, and that even if the Government was not prepared to accept my motion, a majority of votes might have been obtained in its favour--that a majority of votes _would_ be obtained within the next fortnight, and I expressed the most earnest hope that the Government would move (as the country, and France, are most anxious for them to do so) and thus prevent the necessity of any private member undertaking a duty which belonged to the Executive. 

 "I further told his Lordship that recognition was a _right_ which no one would deny us the form of exercising, that the fear of war if we exercised it was a delusion. That the majority of the leading men in the Northern States would thank us for exercising it, and that even Seward himself might be glad to see it exercised so as to give him an excuse for getting out of the terrible war into which he had dragged his people. I further said, that if the question is settled _without_ our recognition of the South, he might _rest certain_ that the Northern Armies _would_ be marched into Canada. I hope my note may produce the desired results, and thus get the Government to take the matter in hand, for _sub rosa_, I saw that the House was not _yet_ prepared to vote, and the question is far too grave to waste time upon it in idle talk, even if talk, without action, did no harm. "]

[Footnote 649: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, June 17, 1862. ]

[Footnote 650: _Ibid. _, Mason to Slidell, June 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 651: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 652: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXVII, p. 810. ]

[Footnote 653: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 21, 1862. ]

CONTENTS OF VOLUME TWO

CHAPTER PAGE X. KING COTTON . . . . . . . . . . 1 XI. RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN . . . . . . 33 XII. THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION . . . . 75 XIII. THE LAIRD RAMS . . . . . . . . . 116 XIV. ROEBUCK'S MOTION . . . . . . . . 152 XV. THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION . 186 XVI. BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH . . . 219 XVII. THE END OF THE WAR . . . . . . . . 247XVIII. THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE . . . 274 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

PART TWO

PROFESSOR GOLDWIN SMITH . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece__From a photograph by Elliott & Fry, Ltd_. 

JOHN SLIDELL . . . . . . . . . . . _facing p. 24__From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of AbrahamLincoln, " by permission of the Century Co. , NewYork. _

"ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD" . . . . . . . " 102_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of"Punch_"

WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851) . . . . . . " 134_From Reid's "Life of Forster" (Chapman & Hall, Ltd. _)

"THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS--HABET!" . . . . " 248_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of"Punch_"

"BRITANNIA SYMPATHIZES WITH COLUMBIA" . . . " 262_Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of"Punch_"

JOHN BRIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . " 294_From Trevelyan's "Life of John Bright"(Constable & Co. , Ltd_. )

GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

CHAPTER X

KING COTTON

For two weeks there was no lightening of Southern depression in England. But on June 28 McClellan had been turned back from his advance onRichmond by Lee, the new commander of the Army of Virginia, and the muchheralded Peninsular campaign was recognized to have been a disastrousfailure. Earlier Northern victories were forgotten and the campaigns inthe West, still progressing favourably for the North, were ignored ortheir significance not understood. Again, to English eyes, the war inAmerica approached a stalemate. The time had come with the nearadjournment of Parliament when, if ever, a strong Southern effort mustbe made, and the time seemed propitious. Moreover by July, 1862, it washoped that soon, in the cotton districts, the depression steadilyincreasing since the beginning of the war, would bring an ally to theSouthern cause. Before continuing the story of Parliamentary and privateefforts by the friends of the South it is here necessary to review thecotton situation--now rapidly becoming a matter of anxious concern toboth friend and foe of the North and in less degree to theMinistry itself. 

"King Cotton" had long been a boast with the South. "Perhaps no greatrevolution, " says Bancroft, "was ever begun with such convenient andsoothing theories as those that were expounded and believed at the timeof the organization of the Confederacy. . . . In any case, hostilitiescould not last long, for France and Great Britain must have what theConfederacy alone could supply, and therefore they could be forced toaid the South, as a condition precedent to relief from the terribledistress that was sure to follow a blockade[654]. " This confidence wasno new development. For ten years past whenever Southern threats ofsecession had been indulged in, the writers and politicians of thatsection had expanded upon cotton as the one great wealth-producingindustry of America and as the one product which would compel Europeanacquiescence in American policy, whether of the Union, before 1860, orof the South if she should secede. In the financial depression thatswept the Northern States in 1857 _De Bow's Review_, the leadingfinancial journal of the South, declared: "The wealth of the South ispermanent and real, that of the North fugitive and fictitious. Eventsnow transpiring expose the fiction, as humbug after humbugexplodes[655]. " On March 4, 1858, Senator Hammond of South Carolina, asked in a speech, "What would happen if no cotton was furnished forthree years? I will not stop to depict what everyone can imagine, butthis is certain: England would topple headlong and carry the wholecivilized world with her save the South. No, you dare not make war oncotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton _is_King[656]. " Two years later, writing before the elections of 1860 inwhich the main question was that of the territorial expansion ofslavery, this same Southern statesman expressed himself as believingthat "the slave-holding South is now the controlling power of theworld. . . . Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; andwe have sense enough to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carryit out successfully[657]. "

These quotations indicative of Southern faith in cotton might beamplified and repeated from a hundred sources. 

Moreover this faith in the possession of ultimate power went hand inhand with the conviction that the South, more than any other quarter ofthe world, produced to the benefit of mankind. "In the three millionbags of cotton, " said a writer in _De Bow's Review_, "the slave-labourannually throws upon the world for the poor and naked, we are doing moreto advance civilization . . . Than all the canting philanthropists of NewEngland and Old England will do in centuries. Slavery is the backbone ofthe Northern commercial as it is of the British manufacturingsystem[658]. . . . " Nor was this idea unfamiliar to Englishmen. Before theCivil War was under way Charles Greville wrote to Clarendon:

 "Any war will be almost sure to interfere with the cotton crops, and this is really what affects us and what we care about. With all our virulent abuse of slavery and slave-owners, and our continual self-laudation on that subject, we are just as anxious for, and as much interested in, the prosperity of the slavery interest in the Southern States as the Carolinan and Georgian planters themselves, and all Lancashire would deplore a successful insurrection of the slaves, if such a thing were possible[659]. "

On December 20, 1860, South Carolina led the march in secession. Fifteen days earlier the British consul at Charleston, Bunch, reported aconversation with Rhett, long a leader of the Southern cause and now aconsistent advocate of secession, in which Rhett developed a plan ofclose commercial alliance with England as the most favoured nation, postulating the dependence of Great Britain on the South forcotton--"upon which supposed axiom, I would remark, " wrote Bunch, "alltheir calculations are based[660]. " Such was, indeed, Southerncalculation. In January, 1861, _De Bow's Review_ contained an articledeclaring that "the first demonstration of blockade of the Southernports would be swept away by the English fleets of observation hoveringon the Southern coasts, to protect English commerce, and especially thefree flow of cotton to English and French factories. . . . A stoppage ofthe raw material . . . Would produce the most disastrous politicalresults--if not a revolution in England. This is the language of Englishstatesmen, manufacturers, and merchants, in Parliament and at cottonassociations' debates, and it discloses the truth[661]. "

The historical student will find but few such British utterances at themoment, and these few not by men of great weight either in politics orin commerce. The South was labouring under an obsession and prophesiedresults accordingly. So strong was this obsession that governmentalforeign policy neglected all other considerations and the firstCommission to Europe had no initial instructions save to demandrecognition[662]. The failure of that Commission, the prompt Britishacquiescence in the blockade, were harsh blows to Southern confidencebut did not for a long time destroy the faith in the power of cotton. InJune, 1861, Bunch wrote that there was still a firm belief that "GreatBritain will make any sacrifice, even of principle or of honour, toprevent the stoppage of the supply of cotton, " and he enclosed a copy ofan article in the _Charleston Mercury_ of June 4, proclaiming: "Thecards are in our hands, and we intend to play them out to _thebankruptcy of every cotton factory in Great Britain and France, or theacknowledgment of our independence_[663]. " As late as March, 1862, Bunchwas still writing of this Southern faith in cotton and described thenewly-made appointment of Benjamin as Secretary of State as partly dueto the fact that he was the leader of the "King Cotton" theory ofdiplomacy[664]. It was not until the war was well nigh over that Britishpersistence in neutrality, in spite of undoubted hardships caused by thelack of cotton, opened Southern eyes. Pollard, editor of a leadingRichmond newspaper, and soon unfriendly to the administration ofJefferson Davis, summed up in _The Lost Cause_ his earlier criticisms ofConfederate foreign policy:

 "'Cotton, ' said the Charleston _Mercury_, 'would bring England to her knees. ' The idea was ludicrous enough that England and France would instinctively or readily fling themselves into a convulsion, which their great politicians saw was the most tremendous one of modern times. But the puerile argument, which even President Davis did not hesitate to adopt, about the power of 'King Cotton, ' amounted to this absurdity: that the great and illustrious power of England would submit to the ineffable humiliation of acknowledging its dependency on the infant Confederacy of the South, and the subserviency of its empire, its political interests and its pride, to a single article of trade that was grown in America[665]!"

But irrespective of the extremes to which Southern confidence in cottonextended the actual hardships of England were in all truth seriousenough to cause grave anxiety and to supply an argument to Southernsympathizers. The facts of the "Lancashire Cotton Famine" havefrequently been treated by historians at much length[666] and need herebut a general review. More needed is an examination of some of theerroneous deductions drawn from the facts and especially an examinationof the extent to which the question of cotton supply affected ordetermined British governmental policy toward America. 

English cotton manufacturing in 1861 held a position of importanceequalled by no other one industry. Estimates based on varying statisticsdiverge as to exact proportions, but all agree in emphasizing thepre-eminent place of Lancashire in determining the general prosperity ofthe nation. Surveying the English, not the whole British, situation itis estimated that there were 2, 650 factories of which 2, 195 were inLancashire and two adjacent counties. These employed 500, 000 operativesand consumed a thousand million pounds of cotton each year[667]. Aneditorial in the _Times_, September 19, 1861, stated that one-fifth ofthe entire English population was held to be dependent, either directlyor indirectly, on the prosperity of the cotton districts[668], andtherefore also dependent on the source of supply, the Confederate South, since statistics, though varying, showed that the raw cotton suppliedfrom America constituted anywhere from 78 to 84 per cent. Of the totalEnglish importation[669]. 

The American crop of 1860 was the largest on record, nearly 4, 000, 000bales, and the foreign shipments, without question hurried because ofthe storm-cloud rising at home, had been practically completed by April, 1861. Of the 3, 500, 000 bales sent abroad, Liverpool, as usual, receivedthe larger portion[670]. There was, then, no immediate shortage ofsupply when war came in America, rather an unusual accumulation of rawstocks, even permitting some reshipment to the Northern manufacturingcentres of America where the scarcity then brought high prices. Inaddition, from December, 1860, to at least April, 1861, there had beensomewhat of a slump in demand for raw cotton by British manufacturersdue to an over-production of goods in the two previous years. There hadbeen a temporary depression in 1856-57 caused by a general financialcrisis, but early in 1858 restored confidence and a tremendous demandfrom the Far East--India especially--set the mills running again on fulltime, while many new mills were brought into operation. But by May, 1860, the mills had caught up with the heavy demands and the rest of theyear saw uncertainty of operations and brought expressions of fear thatthe "plunge" to produce had been overdone. Manufactured stocks began toaccumulate, and money was not easy since 1860 brought also a combinationof events--deficient grain harvest at home, withdrawal of gold fromEngland to France for investment in French public works, demand ofAmerica for gold in place of goods, due to political uncertaintiesthere--which rapidly raised the discount rate from two and one half percent. In January, 1860, to six in December. By the end of April, 1861, the Board of Trade Returns indicated that the cotton trade was in adangerous situation, with large imports of raw cotton and decreasedexports of goods[671]. The news of war actually begun in America came asa temporary relief to the English cotton trade and in the prospect ofdecreased supply prices rose, saving many manufacturers from impendingdifficulties. A few mills had already begun to work on part-time becauseof trade depression. The _immediate_ effect of Lincoln's blockadeproclamation was to check this movement, but by October it had againbegun and this time because of the rapid increase in the price of rawcotton as compared with the slower advance of the price of goods[672]. 

In substance the principal effect of the War on the English cotton tradefor the first seven or eight months was felt, not in the manufacturingdistricts but in the Liverpool speculative and importing markets of rawcotton. Prices rose steadily to over a shilling a pound in October, 1861. On November 23 there was a near panic caused by rumours of Britishintervention. These were denounced as false and in five days the pricewas back above its previous figure. Then on November 27 came the newsof the _Trent_ and the market was thrown into confusion, not because ofhopes that cotton would come more freely but in fear that war withAmerica would cause it to do so. The Liverpool speculators breathedfreely again only when peace was assured. This speculative Britishinterest was no cause for serious governmental concern and could notaffect policy. But the manufacturing trade was, presumably, a moreserious anxiety and if cotton became hard, or even impossible to obtain, a serious situation would demand consideration. 

In the generally accepted view of a "short war, " there was at first nogreat anticipation of real danger. But beginning with December, 1861, there was almost complete stoppage of supply from America. In the sixmonths to the end of May, 1862, but 11, 500 bales were received, lessthan one per cent. Of the amount for the same six months of the previousyear[673]. The blockade was making itself felt and not merely inshipments from the South but in prospects of Southern production, forthe news came that the negroes were being withdrawn by their mastersfrom the rich sea islands along the coast in fear of their capture bythe Northern blockading squadrons[674]. Such a situation seemed bound inthe end to result in pressure by the manufacturers for governmentalaction to secure cotton. That it did not immediately do so is explainedby Arnold, whose dictum has been quite generally accepted, as follows:

 "The immediate result of the American war was, at this time, to relieve the English cotton trade, including the dealers in the raw material and the producers and dealers in manufactures, from a serious and impending difficulty. They had in hand a stock of goods sufficient for the consumption of two-thirds of a year, therefore a rise in the price of the raw material and the partial closing of their establishments, with a curtailment of their working expenses, was obviously to their advantage. But to make their success complete, this rise in the price of cotton was upon the largest stock ever collected in the country at this season. To the cotton trade there came in these days an unlooked for accession of wealth, such as even it had never known before. In place of the hard times which had been anticipated, and perhaps deserved, there came a shower of riches[675]. "

This was written of the situation in December, 1861. A similar analysis, no doubt on the explanations offered by his English friends, of "thequestion of cotton supply, which we had supposed would speedily havedisturbed the level of their neutral policy" was made by Mason in March, 1862. "Thus, " he concluded, "it is that even in Lancashire and othermanufacturing districts no open demonstration has been made against theblockade[676]. " Manufactures other than cotton were greatly prospering, in particular those of woollen, flax, and iron. And the theory that thecotton lords were not, in reality, hit by the blockade--perhaps profitedby it--was bruited even during the war. _Blackwood's Magazine_, October, 1864, held this view, while the _Morning Post_ of May 16, 1864, went tothe extent of describing the "glut" of goods in 1861, relieved just inthe nick of time by the War, preventing a financial crash, "which mustsooner or later have caused great suffering in Lancashire. "

Arnold's generalization has been taken to prove that the _immediate_effect of the Civil War was to save the cotton industry from greatdisaster and that there _immediately_ resulted large profits to themanufacturers from the increased price of stocks on hand. In fact hisdescription of the situation in December, 1861, as his own later pagesshow, was not applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits areconcerned, until the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863. Forthough prices might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in anylarge quantities before the fall of 1862. There were almost notransactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies[677]. Foreign purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had justbeen abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keento place new orders in a rising and uncertain market. The Englishproducers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking aneffective market. The importance of this in British foreign policy isthat at no time, until the accumulated goods were disposed of, was therelikely to be any trade eagerness for a British intervention in America. Their only fear, says Arnold, was the sudden opening of Southern portsand a rush of raw cotton[678], a sneer called out by the alleged greatlosses incurred and patriotically borne in silence. Certainly inParliament the members from Lancashire gave no sign of discontent withthe Government policy of neutrality for in the various debates onblockade, mediation, and cotton supply but one Member from Lancashire, Hopwood, ever spoke in favour of a departure from neutrality, orreferred to the distress in the manufacturing districts as due to anyother cause than the shortage in cotton caused by the war[679]. 

But it was far otherwise with the operatives of Lancashire. Whatever thecauses of short-time operation in the mills or of total cessation ofwork the situation was such that from October, 1861, more and moreoperatives were thrown out of employment. As their little savingsdisappeared they were put upon public poor relief or upon privatecharity for subsistence. The governmental statistics do not cover, accurately, the relief offered by private charity, but those of publicaid well indicate the loss of wage-earning opportunity. In the so-called"Distressed Districts" of Lancashire and the adjoining counties itappears that poor relief was given to 48, 000 persons in normal times, out of a total population of 2, 300, 000. In the first week of November, 1861, it was 61, 207, and for the first week of December, 71, 593;thereafter mounting steadily until March, 1862, when a temporary peak of113, 000 was reached. From March until the first week in June there was aslight decrease; but from the second week of June poor relief resumed anupward trend, increasing rapidly until December, 1862, when it reachedits highest point of 284, 418. In this same first week of Decemberprivate relief, now thoroughly organized in a great national effort, wasextended to 236, 000 people, making a grand total at high tide ofdistress of over 550, 000 persons, if private relief was not extended tothose receiving public funds. But of this differentiation there is nosurety--indeed there are evidences of much duplication of effort incertain districts. In general, however, these statistics do exhibit thegreat lack of employment in a one-industry district heretofore enjoyingunusual prosperity[680]. 

The manufacturing operative population of the district was estimated atbetween 500, 000 and 600, 000. At the time of greatest distress some412, 000 of these were receiving either public or private aid, thoughmany were working part-time in the mills or were engaged on publicenterprises set on foot to ease the crisis. But there was no starvationand it is absurd to compare the crisis to the Irish famine of the'forties. This was a _cotton_ famine in the shortage of that commodity, but it was not a _human_ famine. The country, wrote John Bright, waspassing through a terrible crisis, but "our people will be kept alive bythe contributions of the country[681]. " Nevertheless a rapid change froma condition of adequate wage-earning to one of dependence on charity--achange ultimately felt by the great bulk of those either directly orindirectly dependent upon the cotton industry--might have been expectedto arouse popular demonstrations to force governmental action directedto securing cotton that trade might revive. That no such popular effectwas made demands careful analysis--to be offered in a later chapter--buthere the _fact_ is alone important, and the fact was that the operativessympathized with the North and put no pressure on the Cabinet. Thus atno time during the war was there any attempt from Lancashire, whether ofmanufacturers or operatives, to force a change of governmentalpolicy[682]. 

As the lack of employment developed in Lancashire public discussion andconsideration were inevitably aroused. But there was little talk ofgovernmental interference and such as did appear was promptly met withopposition by the leading trade journals. July 13, 1861, the _Economist_viewed the cotton shortage as "a _temporary_ and an _immediate_ one. . . . We have--on our hypothesis--to provide against the stoppage of oursupply for _one_ year, and that the very _next_ year. " Would it _pay_, asked Bright, to break the blockade? "I don't think myself it would becheap . . . At the cost of a war with the United States[683]. " This wasalso the notion of the London _Shipping Gazette_ which, whileacknowledging that the mill-owners of England and France were about tobe greatly embarrassed, continued: "_But we are not going to add to thedifficulty by involving ourselves in a naval war with the NorthernStates_[684]. . . . " The _Times_ commented in substance in several issuesin September, 1861, on the "wise policy of working short-time as aprecaution against the contingencies of the cotton supply, and of theglutted state of distant markets for manufactured goods[685]. " October12, the _Economist_ acknowledged that the impatience of some mill-ownerswas quite understandable as was talk of a European compulsion on Americato stop an "objectless and hopeless" quarrel, but then entered upon anelaborate discussion of the principles involved and demonstrated whyEngland ought not to intervene. In November Bright could write: "Thenotion of getting cotton by interfering with the blockade is abandonedapparently by the simpletons who once entertained it, and it is acceptednow as a fixed policy that we are to take no part in yourdifficulties[686]. " Throughout the fall of 1861 the _Economist_ wasdoing its best to quiet apprehensions, urging that due to the "glut" ofmanufactured goods short-time must have ensued anyway, pointing out thatnow an advanced price was possible, and arguing that here was asituation likely to result in the development of other sources of supplywith an escape from the former dependence on America. In view of theactual conditions of the trade, already recounted, these were appealingarguments to the larger manufacturers, but the small mills, running onshort order supplies and with few stocks of goods on hand were lesseasily convinced. They were, however, without parliamentary influenceand hence negligible as affecting public policy. At the opening of thenew year, 1862, Bright declared that "with the spinners andmanufacturers and merchants, I think generally there is no wish for any_immediate_ change[687]. "

Bright's letter of November, 1861, was written before news of the_Trent_ reached England: that of January, 1862, just after thatcontroversy had been amicably settled. The _Trent_ had both divertedattention from cotton and in its immediate result created a generaldetermination to preserve neutrality. It is evident that even withoutthis threat of war there was no real cotton pressure upon theGovernment. With Northern successes in the spring of 1862 hopes werearoused that the war would soon end or that at least some cottondistricts would be captured to the relief of England. Seward held outbig promises based on the capture of New Orleans, and these for a timecalmed governmental apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear thatthe inability to secure the country back of the city, together with theSouthern determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall intothe hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from theMississippi valley[688]. This was still not a matter of _immediate_concern, for the Government and the manufacturers both held the opinionthat it was not lack of cotton alone that was responsible for thedistress and the manufacturers were just beginning to unload theirstocks[689]. But in considering and judging the attitude of the Britishpublic on this question of cotton it should always be remembered thatthe great mass of the people sincerely believed that America wasresponsible for the distress in Lancashire. The error in understandingwas more important than the truth. 

In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards the causesof distress in England is the more important element. The "Cotton Lords"did not choose to reveal it. One must believe that they intentionallydwelt upon the war as the sole responsible cause. In the first importantparliamentary debate on cotton, May 9, 1862, not a word was said of anyother element in the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a wordadvocating a change in British neutral policy[690]. It is to be notedalso that this debate occurred when for two months past, the numbers onpoor relief in Lancashire were temporarily decreasing[691], and thegeneral tone of the speakers was that while the distress was serious itwas not beyond the power of the local communities to meet it. There wasnot, then, in May, any reason for grave concern and Russell expressedgovernmental conviction when he wrote to Gladstone, May 18, "We must, Ibelieve, get thro' the cotton crisis as we can, and promote inland worksand railroads in India[692]. " Moreover the Southern orders to destroycotton rather than permit its capture and export by the Northdisagreeably affected British officials[693]. Up to the end of August, 1862, Russell, while writing much to Lyons on England's necessity forcotton, did not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northernpolicy nor in the sense that British distress demanded special officialconsideration. Such demands on America as were made up to this time camewholly from France[694]. 

It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in July ofthe Southern attack on the Government through Parliament[695]. June hadseen the collapse of Lindsay's initial move, and Palmerston's answer toHopwood, June 13, that there was no intention, at present, to offermediation, appeared final. It was not cotton, but McClellan's defeat, that produced a quick renewal of Lindsay's activities. June 30, Hopwoodhad withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so askedwhether, "considering the great and increasing distress in the country, the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, and thehopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the Government intend totake any steps whatever, either as parties to intervention or otherwise, to endeavour to put an end to the Civil War in America?" This wasdifferently worded, yet contained little variation from his formerquestion of June 13, and this time Palmerston replied briefly that theGovernment certainly would like to mediate if it saw any hope of successbut that at present "both parties would probably reject it. If adifferent situation should arise the Government would be glad toact[696]. " This admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July11, introduced a motion demanding consideration of "the propriety ofoffering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities, " andinsisted upon a debate. 

Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours ofBritish mediation, the end of the month saw them revived. Adams waskeenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 presentedto Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote "under thePresident's instructions" that such recurrent rumours were highlyinjurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid the South hasbeen encouraged and sustained from the first day of secession. Havingdeveloped this complaint at some length Seward went on to a briefthreat, containing the real meat of the despatch, that if foreignnations did venture to intervene or mediate in favour of the South, theNorth would be forced to have recourse to a weapon hitherto not used, namely to aid in a rising of the slaves against their masters. This wasclearly a threat of a "servile war" if Great Britain aided the South--awar which would place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in viewof her anti-slavery sentiments in the past. It is evidence of Adams'discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back frompresentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made theAmerican Minister anxious[697]. No answer was given by Russell for overa month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy. Soonthe indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope ofBritish concurrence. July 11, Slidell informed Mason that Persigny inconversation had assured him "that this Government is now more anxiousthan ever to take prompt and decided action in our favour. " Slidellasked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but acknowledged thateverything depended on Palmerston: "that august body seems to be asafraid of him as the urchins of a village school of the birch of theirpedagogue[698]. "

Unquestionably Persigny here gave Slidell a hint of private instructionsnow being sent by Napoleon to Thouvenel who was on a visit to London. The Emperor telegraphed "Demandez au gouvernement anglais s'il ne croitpas le moment venu de reconnaître le Sud[699]. " Palmerston had alreadyanswered this question in Parliament and Thouvenel was personally verymuch opposed to the Emperor's suggestion. There were press rumours thathe was in London to bring the matter to a head, but his report toMercier was that interference in America was a very dangerous matter andthat he would have been "badly received" by Palmerston and Russell if hehad suggested any change in neutral policy[700]. 

In spite of this decided opposition by the French Minister of ForeignAffairs it is evident that one ground for renewed Southern hopes was theknowledge of the Emperor's private desires. Lindsay chose his time wellfor on July 16 the first thorough report on Lancashire was laid beforeParliament[701], revealing an extremity of distress not previouslyofficially authenticated, and during this week the papers were full ofan impending disaster to McClellan's army. Lyons, now in London, on hisvacation trip, was concerned for the future mainly because of cotton, but did not believe there was much danger of an immediate clash withAmerica[702]. But the great Southern argument of the moment was theNorthern military failure, the ability of the South to resistindefinitely and the hopelessness of the war. On the morning of July 18all London was in excitement over press statements that the latest newsfrom America was not of McClellan's retreat but of the capture of hisentire army. 

Lindsay's motion was set for debate on this same July 18. Adams thoughtthe story of McClellan's surrender had been set afloat "to carry theHouse of Commons off their feet in its debate to-night[703]. " Thedebate itself may be regarded as a serious attempt to push the Ministryinto a position more favourable to the South, and the arguments advancedsurveyed the entire ground of the causes of secession and theinevitability of the final separation of North and South. They need butbrief summary. Lindsay, refusing to accede to appeals for postponementbecause "the South was winning anyway, " argued that slavery was noelement in the conflict, that the Southern cause was just, and thatEngland, because of her own difficulties, should mediate and bring to aconclusion a hopeless war. He claimed the time was opportune sincemediation would be welcomed by a great majority in the North, and hequoted from a letter by a labouring man in Lancashire, stating, "Wethink it high time to give the Southern States the recognition they sorichly deserve. "

Other pro-Southern speakers emphasized Lancashire distress. Gregorysaid: "We should remember what is impending over Lancashire--what want, what woe, what humiliation--and that not caused by the decree of God, but by the perversity of man. I leave the statistics of the pauperismthat is, and that is to be, to my honourable friends, therepresentatives of manufacturing England. " No statistics wereforthcoming from this quarter for not a representative from Lancashireparticipated in the debate save Hopwood who at the very end upbraidedhis fellow members from the district for their silence and wasinterrupted by cries of "Divide, Divide. " Lindsay's quoted letter wasmet by opponents of mediation with the assertion that the operativeswere well known to be united against any action and that they could besustained "in luxury" from the public purse for far less a cost thanthat of a war with America. 

But cotton did not play the part expected of it in this debate. Forsterin a very able speech cleverly keeping close to a consideration of theeffect of mediation on _England_, advanced the idea that such a stepwould not end the war but would merely intensify it and so prolongEnglish commercial distress. He did state, however, that intervention(as distinct from mediation) would bring on a "servile war" in America, thus giving evidence of his close touch with Adams and his knowledge ofSeward's despatch of May 28. In the main the friends of the North werecontent to be silent and leave it to the Government to answer Lindsay. This was good tactics and they were no doubt encouraged to silence byevidence early given in the debate that there would be no positiveresult from the motion. Gregory showed that this was a real _attack_ onthe Government by his bitter criticisms of Russell's "three months"speech[704]. 

At the conclusion of Gregory's speech Lindsay and his friends, theirimmediate purpose accomplished and fearing a vote, wished to adjourn thedebate indefinitely. Palmerston objected. He agreed that everyoneearnestly wished the war in America to end, but he declared that suchdebates were a great mistake unless something definite was to followsince they only served to create irritation in America, both North andSouth. He concluded with a vigorous assertion that if the Ministry wereto administer the affairs of the nation it ought to be trusted inforeign affairs and not have its hands tied by parliamentary expressionsof opinion at inopportune moments. Finally, the South had not yetsecurely established its independence and hence could not be recognized. This motion, if carried, would place England on a definite side and thusbe fatal to any hope of successful mediation or intervention in thefuture. Having now made clear the policy of the Government Palmerstondid not insist upon a division and the motion was withdrawn[705]. 

On the surface Lindsay's effort of July 18 had resulted in ignominiousfailure. Lyons called it "ill-timed. . . . I do not think we know heresufficiently the extent of the disaster [to McClellan] to be able tocome to any conclusion as to what the European Powers should do. " Butthe impression left by the debate that there was a strong parliamentaryopinion in favour of mediation made Lyons add: "I suppose Mercier willopen full cry on the scent, and be all for mediation. I am still afraidof any attempt of the kind[706]. " Very much the same opinion was held byHenry Adams who wrote, "the pinch has again passed by for the moment andwe breathe more freely. But I think I wrote to you some time ago that ifJuly found us still in Virginia, we could no longer escape interference. I think now that it is inevitable. " A definite stand taken by the Northon slavery would bring "the greatest strength in this runningbattle[707]. "

In spite of surface appearances that the debate was "ill-timed" the"pinch" was not in fact passed as the activities of Slidell and Masonand their friends soon indicated. For a fortnight the Cabinet, reactingto the repeated suggestions of Napoleon, the Northern defeats, and thedistress in Lancashire, was seriously considering the possibility oftaking some step toward mediation. On July 16, two days before thedebate in the Commons, Slidell at last had his first personal contactwith Napoleon, and came away from the interview with the conviction that"if England long persists in her inaction he [Napoleon] would bedisposed to act without her. " This was communicated to Mason on July20[708], but Slidell did _not_ as yet see fit to reveal to Mason that inthe interview with Napoleon he had made a definite push for separateaction by France, offering inducements on cotton, a special commercialtreaty, and "alliances, defensive, and offensive, for Mexican affairs, "this last without any authority from Benjamin, the Confederate Secretaryof State. On July 23 Slidell made a similar offer to Thouvenel and leftwith him a full memorandum of the Southern proposal[709]. He wascautioned that it was undesirable his special offer to France shouldreach the ears of the British Government--a caution which he transmittedto Mason on July 30, when sending copies of Benjamin's instructions, butstill without revealing the full extent of his own overturesto Napoleon. 

[Illustration: JOHN SLIDELL (_From Nicolay and Hay's "Life of AbrahamLincoln": The Century Co. New York_)]

In all this Slidell was still exhibiting that hankering to pull off aspecial diplomatic achievement, characteristic of the man, and in line, also, with a persistent theory that the policy most likely to secureresults was that of inducing France to act alone. But he was repeatedlyrunning against advice that France must follow Great Britain, and theburden of his July 20 letter to Mason was an urging that a demand forrecognition be now made simultaneously in Paris and London. Thouvenel, not at all enthusiastic over Slidell's proposals, told him that this wasat least a prerequisite, and on July 23, Slidell wrote Mason the demandshould be made at once[710]. Mason, on the advice of Lindsay, Fitzgerald, and Lord Malmesbury, had already prepared a request forrecognition, but had deferred making it after listening to the debate ofJuly 18[711]. Now, on July 24, he addressed Russell referring to theirinterview of February, 1862, in which he had urged the claims of theConfederacy to recognition and again presented them, asserting that thesubsequent failure of Northern campaigns had demonstrated the power ofthe South to maintain its independence. The South, he wrote, askedneither aid nor intervention; it merely desired recognition andcontinuation of British neutrality[712]. On the same day Mason alsoasked for an interview[713], but received no reply until July 31, whenRussell wrote that no definite answer could be sent until "after aCabinet" and that an interview did not seem necessary[714]. 

This answer clearly indicates that the Government was in uncertainty. Itis significant that Russell took this moment to reply at last toSeward's protestations of May 28[715], which had been presented to himby Adams on June 20. He instructed Stuart at Washington that his delayhad been due to a "waiting for military events, " but that these hadbeen indecisive. He gave a résumé of all the sins of the North as abelligerent and wrote in a distinctly captious spirit. Yet these sinshad not "induced Her Majesty's Government to swerve an inch from animpartial neutrality[716]. " Here was no promise of a continuance ofneutrality--rather a hint of some coming change. At least one member ofthe Cabinet was very ready for it. Gladstone wrote privately:

 "It is indeed much to be desired that this bloody and purposeless conflict should cease. From the first it has been plain enough that the whole question was whether the South was earnest and united. That has now for some months been demonstrated; and the fact thus established at once places the question beyond the region even of the most brilliant military successes[717]. . . . "

Gladstone was primarily influenced by the British commercial situation. Lyons, still in England, and a consistent opponent of a change ofpolicy, feared this commercial influence. He wrote to Stuart:

 ". . . I can hardly anticipate any circumstances under which I should think the intervention of England in the quarrel between the North and South advisable. . . . 

 "But it is very unfortunate that no result whatever is apparent from the nominal re-opening of New Orleans and other ports. And the distress in the manufacturing districts threatens to be so great that a pressure may be put upon the Government which they will find it difficult to resist[718]. "

In Parliament sneers were indulged in by Palmerston at the expense ofthe silent cotton manufacturers of Lancashire, much to the fury ofCobden[719]. Of this period Arnold later sarcastically remarked that, "The representatives of Lancashire in the Houses of Parliament did notpermit the gaieties of the Exhibition season wholly to divert theirattention from the distress which prevailed in the home county[720]. "

Being refused an interview, Mason transmitted to Russell on August 1 along appeal, rather than a demand, for recognition, using exactly thosearguments advanced by Lindsay in debate[721]. The answer, evidentlygiven after that "Cabinet" for whose decision Russell had been waiting, was dated August 2. In it Russell, as in his reply to Seward on July 28, called attention to the wholly contradictory statements of North andSouth on the status of the war, which, in British opinion, had not yetreached a stage positively indicative of the permanence of Southernindependence. Great Britain, therefore, still "waited, " but the timemight come when Southern firmness in resistance would bringrecognition[722]. The tone was more friendly than any expressionshitherto used by Russell to Southern representatives. The reply does notreveal the decision actually arrived at by the Ministry. Gladstone wroteto Argyll on August 3 that "yesterday" a Cabinet had been held on thequestion "to move or not to move, in the matter of the American CivilWar. . . . " He had come away before a decision when it became evident theprevailing sentiment would be "nothing shall be done until both partiesare desirous of it. " Gladstone thought this very foolish; he would haveEngland approach France and Russia, but if they were not ready, waituntil they were. "Something, I trust, will be done before the hotweather is over to stop these frightful horrors[723]. "

All parties had been waiting since the debate of July 18 for theCabinet decision. It was at once generally known as "no step at present"and wisdom would have decreed quiet acquiescence. Apparently oneSouthern friend, on his own initiative, felt the need to splutter. Onthe next day, August 4, Lord Campbell in the Lords moved for theproduction of Russell's correspondence with Mason, making a veryconfused speech. "Society and Parliament" were convinced the war oughtto end in separation. At one time Campbell argued that reconquest of theSouth was impossible; at another that England should interfere toprevent such reconquest. Again he urged that the North was in asituation where she could not stop the war without aid from Europe inextricating her. Probably the motion was made merely to draw fromRussell an official statement. Production of the papers was refused. Russell stated that the Government still maintained its policy of strictneutrality, that if any action was to be taken it should be by all themaritime powers and that if, in the parliamentary recess, any new policyseemed advisable he would first communicate with those powers. He alsodeclared very positively that as yet no proposal had been received fromany foreign power in regard to America, laying stress upon the "perfectaccord" between Great Britain and France[724]. 

Mason commented on this speech that someone was evidently lying andnaturally believed that someone to be Russell. He hoped that Francewould promptly make this clear[725]. But France gave no sign of lack of"perfect accord. " On the contrary Thouvenel even discouraged Slidellfrom following Mason's example of demanding recognition and the formalcommunication was withheld, Mason acquiescing[726]. Slidell thought newdisturbances in Italy responsible for this sudden lessening of Frenchinterest in the South, but he was gloomy, seeing again the frustrationof high hopes. August 24 he wrote Benjamin:

 "You will find by my official correspondence that we are still hard and fast aground here. Nothing will float us off but a strong and continued current of important successes in the field. 

 I have no hope from England, because I am satisfied that she desires an indefinite prolongation of the war, until the North shall be entirely exhausted and broken down. 

 Nothing can exceed the selfishness of English statesmen except their wretched hypocrisy. They are continually casting about their disinterested magnaminity and objection of all other considerations than those dictated by a high-toned morality, while their entire policy is marked by egotism and duplicity. I am getting to be heartily tired of Paris[727]. "

On August 7 Parliament adjourned, having passed on the last day of thesession an Act for the relief of the distress in Lancashire byauthorizing an extension of powers to the Poor Law Guardians. LikeSlidell and Mason pro-Northern circles in London thought that in Augustthere had come to a disastrous end the Southern push for a change inBritish policy, and were jubilant. To be sure, Russell had merelydeclared that the time for action was "not yet" come, but this wasregarded as a sop thrown to the South. Neither in informed Southern norNorthern circles outside the Cabinet was there any suspicion, _except byAdams_, that in the six months elapsed since Lindsay had begun hismovement the Ministry had been slowly progressing in thoughts ofmediation. 

In fact the sentiment of the Cabinet as stated by Gladstone had been_favourable_ to mediation when "both parties were ready for it" and thatsuch readiness would come soon most Members were convinced. This was aconvenient and reasonable ground for postponing action but did notimply that if the conviction were unrealized no mediation would beattempted. McClellan, driven out of the Peninsula, had been removed, andAugust saw the Northern army pressed back from Virginia soil. It was nowWashington and not Richmond that seemed in danger of capture. Surely theNorth must soon realize the futility of further effort, and the reportsearly in July from Washington dilated upon the rapid emergence of astrong peace party. 

But the first panic of dismay once past Stuart sent word of enormous newNorthern levies of men and of renewed courage[728]. By mid-August, writing of cotton, he thought the prospect of obtaining any quantity ofit "seems hopeless, " and at the same time reported the peaceparty fast losing ground in the face of the great energy of theAdministration[729]. As to recognition, Stuart believed: "There isnothing to be done in the presence of these enormous fresh levies, butto wait and see what the next two months will bring forth[730]. " Thehopes of the British Ministry based on a supposed Northern weariness ofthe war were being shattered. Argyll, having received from Sumner aletter describing the enthusiasm and determination of the North, wroteto Gladstone:

 "It is evident, whatever may be our opinion of the prospects of 'the North' that they do not yet, at least, feel any approach to such exhaustion as will lead them to admit of mediation[731]. . . . "

To this Gladstone replied:

 "I agree that this is not a state of mind favourable to mediation; and I admit it to be a matter of great difficulty to determine when the first step ought to be taken; but I cannot subscribe to the opinion of those who think that Europe is to stand silent without limit of time and witness these horrors and absurdities, which will soon have consumed more men, and done ten times more mischief than the Crimean War; but with the difference that there the end was uncertain, here it is certain in the opinion of the whole world except one of the parties. I should be puzzled to point out a single case of dismemberment which has been settled by the voluntary concession of the stronger party without any interference or warning from third powers, and as far as principle goes there never was a case in which warning was so proper and becoming, because of the frightful misery which this civil conflict has brought upon other countries, and because of the unanimity with which it is condemned by the civilized world[732]. "

The renewal of Northern energy, first reports of which were known toRussell early in August, came as a surprise to the British Ministry. Their progress toward mediation had been slow but steady. Lindsay'sinitial steps, resented as an effort in indirect diplomacy and notsupported by France officially, had received prompt rejectionaccompanied by no indication of a desire to depart from strictneutrality. With the cessation in late June of the Northern victoriousprogress in arms and in the face of increasing distress in Lancashire, the second answer to Lindsay was less dogmatic. As given by Palmerstonthe Government desired to offer mediation, but saw no present hope ofdoing so successfully. Finally the Government asked for a free hand, making no pledges. Mason might be gloomy, Adams exultant, but whenAugust dawned plans were already on foot for a decided change. Thesecret was well kept. Four days after the Cabinet decision to wait onevents, two days after Russell's refusal to produce the correspondencewith Mason, Russell, on the eve of departure for the Continent, waswriting to Palmerston:

 "Mercier's notion that we should make some move in October agrees very well with yours. I shall be back in England before October, and we could then have a Cabinet upon it. Of course the war may flag before that. 

 "I quite agree with you that a proposal for an armistice should be the first step; but we must be prepared to answer the question on what basis are we to negotiate[733]?"

The next movement to put an end to the war in America was to come, notfrom Napoleon III, nor from the British friends of the South, but fromthe British Ministry itself. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 654: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 204. ]

[Footnote 655: _De Bow's Review_, Dec. , 1857, p. 592. ]

[Footnote 656: Cited in Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, p. 66. ]

[Footnote 657: _Ibid. _, p. 64. ]

[Footnote 658: Cited in Smith, _Parties and Slavery_, 68. A remarkableexposition of the "power of cotton" and the righteousness of slavery waspublished in Augusta, Georgia, in 1860, in the shape of a volume of ninehundred pages, entitled _Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments_. This reproduced seven separate works by distinguished Southern writersanalysing Slavery from the point of view of political economy, moral andpolitical philosophy, social ethics, political science, ethnology, international law, and the Bible. The purpose of this united publicationwas to prove the rightfulness, in every aspect, of slavery, theprosperity of America as based on cotton, and the power of the UnitedStates as dependent on its control of the cotton supply. The editor wasE. N. Elliot, President of Planters' College, Mississippi. ]

[Footnote 659: Jan. 26, 1861. Cited in Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, p. 237. ]

[Footnote 660: _Am. Hist. Rev. _, XVIII, p. 785. Bunch to Russell. No. 51. Confidential. Dec. 5, 1860. As here printed this letter shows twodates, Dec. 5 and Dec. 15, but the original in the Public Record Officeis dated Dec. 5. ]

[Footnote 661: pp. 94-5. Article by W. H. Chase of Florida. ]

[Footnote 662: Rhett, who advocated commercial treaties, learned fromToombs that this was the case. "Rhett hastened to Yancey. Had he beeninstructed to negotiate commercial treaties with European powers? Mr. Yancey had received no intimation from any source that authority tonegotiate commercial treaties would devolve upon the Commission. 'Whatthen' exclaimed Rhett, 'can be your instructions?' The President, Mr. Yancey said, seemed to be impressed with the importance of the cottoncrop. A considerable part of the crop of last year was yet on hand and afull crop will soon be planted. The justice of the cause and the cotton, so far as he knew, he regretted to say, would be the basis of diplomacyexpected of the Commission" (Du Bose, _Life and Times of Yancey_, 599). ]

[Footnote 663: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 780. No. 69. Bunch to Russell, June 5, 1861. Italics by Bunch. The complete lack of the South in industriesother than its staple products is well illustrated by a request fromCol. Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance to the Confederacy, to Mason, urging himto secure _three_ ironworkers in England and send them over. He wrote, "The reduction of ores with coke seems not to be understood here" (MasonPapers. Gorgas to Mason, Oct. 13, 1861). ]

[Footnote 664: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 843. No. 48. Confidential. Bunch toRussell, March 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 665: p. 130]

[Footnote 666: The two principal British works are: Arnold, _The Historyof the Cotton Famine_, London, 1864; and Watts, _The Facts of the CottonFamine_, Manchester, 1866. A remarkable statistical analysis of theworld cotton trade was printed in London in 1863, by a Southernerseeking to use his study as an argument for British mediation. GeorgeMcHenry, _The Cotton Trade_. ]

[Footnote 667: Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, pp. 263-4. ]

[Footnote 668: Lack of authentic statistics on indirect interests makethis a guess by the _Times_. Other estimates run from one-seventh toone-fourth. ]

[Footnote 669: Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton During the Civil War, " p. 408(in _Iowa Journal of History and Politics_, Vol. 16), 78. 8 per cent. (Hereafter cited as Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton_. ) Scherer, _Cotton as aWorld Power_, p. 264, states 84 per cent, for 1860. Arnold, _CottonFamine_, pp. 36-39, estimates 83 per cent. ]

[Footnote 670: Great Britain ordinarily ran more than twice as manyspindles as all the other European nations combined. Schmidt, _Wheat andCotton_, p. 407, _note_. ]

[Footnote 671: This Return for April is noteworthy as the firstdifferentiating commerce with the North and the South. ]

[Footnote 672: These facts are drawn from Board of Trade Reports, andfrom the files of the _Economist_, London, and _Hunt's MerchantsMagazine_, New York. I am also indebted to a manuscript thesis by T. P. Martin, "The Effects of the Civil War Blockade on the Cotton Trade ofthe United Kingdom, " Stanford University. Mr. Martin in 1921 presentedat Harvard University a thesis for the Ph. D degree, entitled "TheInfluence of Trade (in Cotton and Wheat) on Anglo-American Relations, 1829-1846, " but has not yet carried his more matured study to the CivilWar period. ]

[Footnote 673: Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, p. 89. ]

[Footnote 674: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 843. No. 10. Bunch to Russell, Jan. 8, 1862. Bunch also reported that inland fields were being transformed tocorn production and that even the cotton on hand was deterioratingbecause of the lack of bagging, shut off by the blockade. ]

[Footnote 675: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 81. ]

[Footnote 676: Richardson, II, 198. Mason to Hunter, March 11, 1862. ]

[Footnote 677: Parliamentary Returns, 1861 and 1862. _Monthly Accountsof Trade and Navigation_ (in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Commons_. Vol. LV, and 1863, _Commons_, Vol. LXV). ]

[Footnote 678: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, pp. 174 and 215. ]

[Footnote 679: In 1861 there were 26 Members from Lancashire in theCommons, representing 14 boroughs and 2 counties. The suffrage was suchthat only 1 in every 27 of the population had the vote. For all Englandthe proportion was 1 in 23 (Rhodes, IV, 359). _Parliamentary Papers_, 1867-8, _Lords_, Vol. XXXII, "Report on Boundaries of Boroughs andCounties of England. "]

[Footnote 680: The figures are drawn from (1) Farnall's "Reports onDistress in the Manufacturing Districts, " 1862. _Parliamentary Papers, Commons_, Vol. XLIX, Pt. I, 1863. _Ibid. _, Vol. LII, 1864; and (2) from"Summary of the Number of Paupers in the Distressed Districts, " fromNovember, 1861, to December, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. LII. Farnall'sreports are less exact than the _Summary_ since at times Liverpool isincluded, at times not, as also six small poor-law unions which do notappear in his reports until 1864. The _Summary_ consistently includesLiverpool, and fluctuates violently for that city whenever weatherconditions interfered with the ordinary business of the port. It is astriking illustration of the narrow margin of living wages among thedockers of Liverpool that an annotation at the foot of a column ofstatistics should explain an increase in one week of 21, 000 personsthrown on poor relief to the "prevalence of a strong east wind" whichprevented vessels from getting up to the docks. ]

[Footnote 681: Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 309. To Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862. ]

[Footnote 682: The historians who see only economic causes havemisinterpreted the effects on policy of the "cotton famine. " Recently, also, there has been advanced an argument that "wheat defeatedcotton"--an idea put forward indeed in England itself during the war bypro-Northern friends who pointed to the great flow of wheat from theNorth as essential in a short-crop situation in Great Britain. Mr. Schmidt in "The Influence of Wheat and Cotton on Anglo-AmericanRelations during the Civil War, " a paper read before the AmericanHistorical Association, Dec. 1917, and since published in the _IowaJournal of History and Politics_, July, 1918, presents with much careall the important statistics for both commodities, but his conclusionsseem to me wholly erroneous. He states that "Great Britain's dependenceon Northern wheat . . . Operated as a contributing influence in keepingthe British government officially neutral . . . " (p. 423), a cautiousstatement soon transformed to the positive one that "this fact did notescape the attention of the English government, " since leading journalsreferred to it (p. 431). Progressively, it is asserted: "But it wasNorthern wheat that may well be regarded as the decisive factor, counterbalancing the influence of cotton, in keeping the Britishgovernment from recognizing the Confederacy" (p. 437). "That the wheatsituation must have exerted a profound influence on the government . . . "(p. 438). And finally: "In this contest wheat won, demonstrating itsimportance as a world power of greater significance than cotton" (p. 439). This interesting thesis has been accepted by William Trimble in"Historical Aspects of the Surplus Food Production of the United States, 1862-1902" (_Am. Hist. Assoc. Reports_, 1918, Vol. I, p. 224). I thinkMr. Schmidt's errors are: (1) a mistake as to the time when recognitionof the South was in governmental consideration. He places it inmidsummer, 1863, when in fact the danger had passed by January of thatyear. (2) A mistake in placing cotton and wheat supply on a parity, since the former could not be obtained in quantity from _any_ sourcebefore 1864, while wheat, though coming from the United States, couldhave been obtained from interior Russia, as well as from the maritimeprovinces, in increased supply if Britain had been willing to pay theadded price of inland transport. There was a real "famine" of cotton;there would have been none of wheat, merely a higher cost. (This fact, avital one in determining influence, was brought out by George McHenry inthe columns of _The Index_, Sept. 18, 1862. ) (3) The fact, in spite ofall Mr. Schmidt's suppositions, that while cotton was frequently asubject of governmental concern in _memoranda_ and in private notesbetween members of the Cabinet, I have failed to find one single case ofthe mention of wheat. This last seems conclusive in negation of Mr. Schmidt's thesis. ]

[Footnote 683: Speech at Rochdale, Sept. 1, 1861. Cited in _Hunt'sMerchants Magazine_, Vol. 45, pp. 326-7. ]

[Footnote 684: _Ibid. _, p. 442. ]

[Footnote 685: e. G. , The _Times_, Sept. 19, 1861. ]

[Footnote 686: To Sumner, Nov. 20, 1861. Mass Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 97. ]

[Footnote 687: _Ibid. _, Jan. 11, 1862. Vol. XLV, p. 157. ]

[Footnote 688: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 843. No. 85. Bunch to Russell, June 25, 1862. He reported a general burning of cotton estimating the amount sodestroyed as nearly one million bales. ]

[Footnote 689: Rhodes, III, p. 503, leaves the impression that Englandwas at first unanimous in attributing the cotton disaster to the War. Also, IV, p. 77. I think this an error. It was the general public beliefbut not that of the well informed. Rhodes, Vol. IV, p. 364, says that itwas not until January, 1863, that it was "begun to be understood" thatfamine was not wholly caused by the War, but partly by glut. ]

[Footnote 690: Hansard, 3d. Ser. , CLXVI, pp. 1490-1520. Debate on "TheDistress in the Manufacturing Districts. " The principal speakers wereEgerton, Potter, Villiers and Bright. Another debate on "The CottonSupply" took place June 19, 1862, with no criticism of America. _Ibid. _, CLXVII, pp. 754-93. ]

[Footnote 691: See _ante_, p. 12. ]

[Footnote 692: Gladstone Papers. ]

[Footnote 693: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 843. No. 73. Bunch to Russell, May 12, 1862. A description of these orders as inclusive of "foreign owned"cotton of which Bunch asserted a great stock had been purchased andstored, waiting export, by British citizens. Molyneaux at Savannah madea similar report. _Ibid. _, Vol. 849. No. 16. To Russell, May 10, 1862. ]

[Footnote 694: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 214-18. ]

[Footnote 695: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 228, quotes a song in the"improvised schoolrooms" of Ashton where operatives were being given aleisure-time education. One verse was:

 "Our mules and looms have now ceased work, the Yankees are the cause. But we will let them fight it out and stand by English laws; No recognizing shall take place, until the war is o'er; Our wants are now attended to, we cannot ask for more. "]

[Footnote 696: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXVII, p. 1213. ]

[Footnote 697: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "FurtherCorrespondence relating to the Civil War in the United States. " No. 1. Reed. June 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 698: Mason Papers. ]

[Footnote 699: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, 352. The exactlength of Thouvenel's stay in London is uncertain, but he had arrived byJuly 10 and was back in Paris by July 21. The text of the telegram is ina letter to Flahault of July 26, in which Thouvenel shows himself veryaverse to any move which may lead to war with America, "an adventuremore serious than that of Mexico" (_Ibid. _, p. 353). ]

[Footnote 700: _Ibid. _, p. 349. July 24, 1862. See also résumé inWalpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, II, 55. ]

[Footnote 701: Farnall's First Report. _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Commons_, Vol. XLIX. ]

[Footnote 702: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 5, 1862. 

 "Public opinion will not allow the Government to do more for the North than maintain a strict neutrality, and it may not be easy to do that if there comes any strong provocation from the U. S. . . . "

 "However, the real question of the day is cotton. . . . "

 "The problem is of how to get over _this next_ winter. The prospects of the manufacturing districts are very gloomy. "

 ". . . If you can manage in any way to get a supply of cotton for England before the winter, you will have done a greater service than has been effected by Diplomacy for a century; but nobody expects it. "]

[Footnote 703: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 166. To his son, July 18, 1862. He noted that the news had come by the _Glasgow_ which had sailedfor England on July 5, whereas the papers contained also a telegram fromMcClellan's head-quarters, dated July 7, but "the people here are fullyready to credit anything that is not favourable. " Newspaper headingswere "Capitulation of McClellan's Army. Flight of McClellan on asteamer. " _Ibid. _, 167. Henry Adams to C. F. Adams, Jr. , July 19. ]

[Footnote 704: Gregory introduced a ridiculous extract from the _DubuqueSun_, an Iowa paper, humorously advocating a repudiation of all debts toEngland, and solemnly held this up as evidence of the lack of financialmorality in America. If he knew of this the editor of the small-townAmerican paper must have been tickled at the reverberations ofhis humour. ]

[Footnote 705: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. CLXVIII, pp. 511-549, for the entiredebate. ]

[Footnote 706: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 707: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, I, pp. 168-9. To CharlesFrancis Adams, Jr. , July 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 708: Mason Papers. The larger part of Slidell's letter toMason is printed in Sears, "A Confederate Diplomat at the Court ofNapoleon III, " _Am. Hist. Rev. _, Jan. , 1921, p. 263. C. F. Adams, "ACrisis in Downing Street, " Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, p. 379, is in error in dating this letter April 21, an error for which thepresent writer is responsible, having misread Slidell's difficulthand-writing. ]

[Footnote 709: Richardson, II, pp. 268-289. Slidell to Benjamin, July25, 1862. It is uncertain just when Mason learned the details ofSlidell's offer to France. Slidell, in his letter of July 20, wrote:"There is an important part of our conversation that I will give youthrough Mr. Mann, " who, apparently, was to proceed at once to London toenlighten Mason. But the Mason Papers show that Mann did not go toLondon, and that Mason was left in the dark except in so far as he couldguess at what Slidell had done by reading Benjamin's instructions, sentto him by Slidell, on July 30. These did _not_ include anything onMexico, but made clear the plan of a "special commercial advantage" toFrance. In C. F. Adams, "A Crisis in Downing Street, " p. 381, it isstated that Benjamin's instructions were written "at the time ofMercier's visit to Richmond"--with the inference that they were a resultof Mercier's conversation at that time. This is an error. Benjamin'sinstructions were written on April 12, and were sent on April 14, whileit was not until April 16 that Mercier reached Richmond. To some it willno doubt seem inconceivable that Benjamin should not have informedMercier of his plans for France, just formulated. But here, as inChapter IX, I prefer to accept Mercier's positive assurances to Lyons attheir face value. Lyons certainly so accepted them and there is nothingin French documents yet published to cast doubt on Mercier's honour, while the chronology of the Confederate documents supports it. ]

[Footnote 710: Mason Papers. ]

[Footnote 711: _Ibid. _, Mason to Slidell, July 18 and 19. ]

[Footnote 712: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition. "No. 7. ]

[Footnote 713: _Ibid. _, No. 8. ]

[Footnote 714: _Ibid. _, No. 9. ]

[Footnote 715: See _ante_, p. 18. ]

[Footnote 716: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "FurtherCorrespondence relating to the Civil War in the United States. " No. 2. Russell to Stuart, July 28, 1862. ]

[Footnote 717: Gladstone Papers. To Col. Neville, July 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 718: Lyons Papers. July 29, 1862. ]

[Footnote 719: Malmesbury, _Memoirs of an Ex-Minister_, II, p. 276. July31, 1862. ]

[Footnote 720: Arnold, _Cotton Famine_, p. 175. ]

[Footnote 721: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence with Mr. Mason respecting Blockade and Recognition. "No. 10. ]

[Footnote 722: _Ibid. _, No. 11. ]

[Footnote 723: Gladstone Papers. Also Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, p. 191. ]

[Footnote 724: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXVIII, p. 1177 _seq_. ]

[Footnote 725: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Aug. 5, 1862. ]

[Footnote 726: F. O. , France, Vol. 1443. No. 964. Cowley to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Aug. 20, 1862. Mason toSlidell, Aug. 21. ]

[Footnote 727: Richardson, II, p. 315. ]

[Footnote 728: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 729: _Ibid. _, To Russell, Aug. 18, 1862. ]

[Footnote 730: _Ibid. _, Aug. 26. Stuart's "nothing to be done" refers, not to mediation, but to his idea in June-July that the time was ripefor recognition. He was wholly at variance with Lyons onBritish policy. ]

[Footnote 731: Gladstone Papers. Aug. 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 732: _Ibid. _, Aug. 29, 1862. ]

[Footnote 733: Palmerston MS. Aug. 6, 1862. ]

CHAPTER XI

RUSSELL'S MEDIATION PLAN

The adjournment of Parliament on August 7 without hint of governmentalinclination to act in the American Civil War was accepted by most of theBritish public as evidence that the Ministry had no intentions in thatdirection. But keen observers were not so confident. Motley, at Vienna, was keeping close touch with the situation in England through privatecorrespondence. In March, 1862, he thought that "France and England havemade their minds up to await the issue of the present campaign"--meaningMcClellan's advance on Richmond[734]. With the failure of that campaignhe wrote: "Thus far the English Government have resisted his[Napoleon's] importunities. But their resistance will not lastlong[735]. " Meanwhile the recently established pro-Southern weekly, _TheIndex_, from its first issue, steadily insisted on the wisdom andnecessity of British action to end the war[736]. France was declaredrapidly to be winning the goodwill of the South at the expense ofEngland; the British aristocracy were appealed to on grounds of closesympathy with a "Southern Aristocracy"; mediation, at first objected to, in view of the more reasonable demand for recognition, was in the endthe chief object of _The Index_, after mid-July, when simple recognitionseemed impossible of attainment[737]. Especially British humiliationbecause of the timidity of her statesmen, was harped upon and any publicmanifestation of Southern sympathy was printed in great detail[738]. 

The speculations of Motley, the persistent agitation of _The Index_ are, however, no indication that either Northern fears or Southern hopes werebased on authoritative information as to governmental purpose. The plannow in the minds of Palmerston and Russell and their steps in furtheringit have been the subject of much historical study and writing. It ishere proposed to review them in the light of all available importantmaterials, both old and new, using a chronological order and with morecitation than is customary, in the belief that such citations best tellthe story of this, the most critical period in the entire course ofBritish attitude toward the Civil War. Here, and here only, GreatBritain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in theAmerican conflict[739]. 

Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18, and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for theNorth stood Adams, the American Minister. Of Palmerston's speech hewrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enoughcould be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape willonly be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts. The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]. " At thisvery moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to securegovernmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for theSouth--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea butten days later, July 29. Russell's delay in enforcing Britishneutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter'sfears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward. On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outliningthe exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policyshould occur. As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented toCongress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhatdiscursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on thepossibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom ofsuch interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests. It doesnot read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had givenserious consideration to the supposed danger[741]. But this conveys avery erroneous impression. An unprinted portion of the despatch veryspecifically and in a very serious tone, instructs Adams that ifapproached by the British Government with propositions implyinga purpose:

 "To dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, or even to solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbidden to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain or transmit, any communication of the kind. . . . If you are asked an opinion what reception the President would give to such a proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are not instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it would be entertained. "

This was to apply either to Great Britain alone or acting in conjunctionwith other Powers. Further, if the South should be "acknowledged" Adamswas immediately to suspend his functions. "You will perceive, " wroteSeward, "that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis withthe caution which great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that youwill also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us[742]. "

This serious and definite determination by the North to resent anyintervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fullycommitted to forcible resistance of foreign meddling. Briefly, if theneed arose, the North would go to war with Europe. Adams at least nowknew where he stood and could but await the result. The instruction heheld in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell. Hedid, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with theCabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found thatthe American determination was communicated to the Ministry, thepresumption is that this occurred[743]. Such communication could nothave taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then madeowing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacationand that, apparently, the plan to move _soon_ in the American War was asyet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell. 

Russell's letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of theirdetermination[744]. Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices fromWashington for the exact moment. Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier, that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings eventhough his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strongpersonal objections to any European intervention whatever and especiallyany by Great Britain[746]. Lyons explained his objections to Russell aswell, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also withStoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour ofstraight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure. This, thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than anattempt at mediation[747]. Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a fullmonth in advance of the event, of Lincoln's plan to issue anemancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence ofSeward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as atbest a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and toinfluence foreign governments[749]. Russell was not impressed withStuart's shift from mediation to recognition. "I think, " he wrote, "wemust allow the President to spend his second batch of 600, 000 men beforewe can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750]. " Butthis did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that Octoberwould be a "ripe time. " Soon he was journeying to the Continent inattendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his greatplan[751]. 

Russell's first positive step was taken on September 13. On that datehe wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel, _privately_[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerstoncommenting on the news just received of the exploits of StonewallJackson in Virginia, "it really looks as if he might end the war. InOctober the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753]. " Similar reactionswere expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the samereasons. Palmerston also wrote on September 14:

 "The Federals . . . Got a very complete smashing . . . Even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. "

 "If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?"

Russell replied:

 ". . . I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State. For the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting, of the Cabinet. The 23rd or 30th would suit me for the meeting[755]. "

The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of theunofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest. This, considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made byNapoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm. Cowley reported that he had held along and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediationas instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition "towait to see the result of the elections" in the North. Mercierapparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen theNorthern peace party. Thouvenel's idea was that "if the peace partygains the ascendant, " Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too farcommitted to listen to foreign suggestions, would "probably be setaside. " He also emphasized the "serious consequences" England and Francemight expect if they recognized the South. 

 "I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation, and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it. "

 Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia. 

 ". . . The French Government had some time back sounded that of Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal. . . . "

 "It appears also that there is less public pressure here for the recognition of the South than there is in England[756]. "

Thouvenel's lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russellhad he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight thanformerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary forForeign Affairs. The first was the well-known difference on Americanpolicy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-groundedconviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will, if only England would give the signal. The second circumstance was stillmore important. It was already known through the French press that asharp conflict had arisen in the Government as to Italian policy and allsigns pointed to a reorganization of the Ministry which would excludeThouvenel. Under these circumstances Russell could well afford todiscount Thouvenel's opinion. The extent to which he was ready togo--much beyond either the offer of mediation, or of armistice evidentlyin Cowley's mind--is shown by a letter to Gladstone, September 26. 

 "I am inclined to think that October 16 may be soon enough for a Cabinet, if I am free to communicate the views which Palmerston and I entertain to France and Russia in the interval between this time and the middle of next month. These views had the offer of mediation to both parties in the first place, and in the case of refusal by the North, to recognition of the South. Mediation on the basis of separation and recognition accompanied by a declaration of neutrality[757]. "

The perfected plan, thus outlined, had resulted from a communication toPalmerston of Cowley's report together with a memorandum, proposed to besent to Cowley, but again _privately_[758], addressed to France alone. Russell here also stated that he had explained his ideas to the Queen. "She only wishes Austria, Prussia and Russia to be consulted. I saidthat should be done, but we must consult France first. " Also enclosedwas a letter from Stuart of September 9, reporting Mercier as justreturned from New York and convinced that if advantage were not taken ofthe present time to do exactly that which was in Russell's mind, Europewould have to wait for the "complete exhaustion" of the North[759]. Russell was now at home again and the next day Palmerston approved theplans as "excellent"; but he asked whether it would not be well toinclude Russia in the invitation as a compliment, even though "she mightprobably decline. " As to the other European powers the matter could waitfor an "after communication. " Yet that Palmerston still wished to goslowly is shown by a comment on the military situation in America:

 "It is evident that a great conflict is taking place to the north-west of Washington, and its issue must have a great effect on the state of affairs. If the Federals sustain a great defeat, they may be at once ready for mediation, and the iron should be struck while it is hot. If, on the other hand, they should have the best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow[760]. . . . "

Thus through Palmerston's caution Russia had been added to France inRussell's proposed memorandum and the communication to Cowley had notbeen sent off immediately--as the letter to Gladstone of September 26indicates. But the plan was regarded as so far determined upon that onSeptember 24 Russell requested Lyons not to fix, as yet, upon a date forhis departure for America, writing, "M. Mercier is again looking out foran opportunity to offer mediation, and this time he is not so much outin his reckoning[761]. " Curiously Mercier had again changed his mind andnow thought a proposal of an armistice was the best move, being"particularly anxious that there should be no mention of the word_separation_, " but of this Russell had, as yet, no inkling[762]. Withfull approval of the plan as now outlined, Palmerston wrote toGladstone, September 24, that he and Russell were in complete agreementthat an offer of mediation should be made by the three maritime powers, but that "no actual step would be taken without the sanction of theCabinet[763]. " Two days later Russell explained to Gladstone the exactnature of the proposal[764], but that there was even now no thoroughlyworked out agreement on the sequence of steps necessary is shown byPalmerston's letter to Gladstone of the twenty-fourth, in which isoutlined a preliminary proposal of an armistice, cessation of blockade, and negotiation on the basis of separation[765]. 

Other members of the Cabinet were likewise informed of the proposedoverture to France and Russia and soon it was clear that there would beopposition. Granville had replaced Russell in attendance upon the Queenat Gotha. He now addressed a long and careful argument to Russellopposing the adventure, as he thought it, summing up his opinion inthis wise:

 ". . . I doubt, if the war continues long after our recognition of the South, whether it will be possible for us to avoid drifting into it. "

 ". . . I have come to the conclusion that it is premature to depart from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord Palmerston, and which, notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the North, the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parliament, the press, and the public[766]. "

But Granville had little hope his views would prevail. A few days laterhe wrote to Lord Stanley of Alderley:

 "I have written to Johnny my reasons for thinking it decidedly premature. I, however, suspect you will settle to do so! Pam, Johnny, and Gladstone would be in favour of it; and probably Newcastle. I do not know about the others. It appears to me a great mistake[767]. "

Opportunely giving added effect to Granville's letter there now arrivedconfused accounts from America of the battles about Washington and of acheck to the Southern advance. On September 17 there had been fought thebattle of Antietam and two days later Lee, giving up his Marylandcampaign, began a retreat through the Shenandoah valley toward the olddefensive Southern lines before Richmond. There was no pursuit, forMcClellan, again briefly in command, thought his army too shattered foran advance. Palmerston had been counting on a great Southern victory andwas now doubtful whether the time had come after all for Europeanovertures to the contestants. October 2 he wrote Russell:

 "MY DEAR RUSSELL, "I return you Granville's letter which contains much deserving of serious consideration. There is no doubt that the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be accepted by the South. Why should it not be accepted? It would give the South in principle the points for which they are fighting. The refusal, if refusal there was, would come from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the principle for which they have been fighting so long as they had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they could carry their point. The condition of things therefore which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be great success of the South against the North. That state of things seemed ten days ago to be approaching. Its advance has been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about to follow. Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future prospects. 

 "As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the South, it is quite true that we should have less to care about that resentment in the spring when communication with Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe. 

 "But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like one against a European Confederation. Such a quarrel would render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the acknowledgment of which would have caused it. 

 "The first communication to be made by England and France to the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not come when it might be well for the two parties to consider whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any other result than separation; and whether it might not therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of the contest, however long it may last. 

 "The best thing would be that the two parties should settle details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this might be difficult. But their quarrels in negotiation would do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war. An armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades, would be all in favour of the North, especially if New Orleans remained in the hands of the North. 

 "The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be cleared up by some more decided events between the contending armies. . . . "

 PALMERSTON[768]. "

Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favourof cautious delay. American military events more than Granville'sarguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a muchmore vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet. CornewallLewis was prompt to express objections. October 2, Russell transmittedto Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis. Russell also, momentarily, was hesitating. He wrote:

 "This American question must be well sifted. I send you a letter of G. Lewis who is against moving . . . "

 "My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia holds back. Her separation from our move would ensure the rejection of our proposals. But we shall know more by the 16th. I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day, but the summons will not go out till Saturday. So if you wish to stop it, write to Hammond[769]. "

From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but thatRussell's chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposedprivate communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he waswaiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth. If sohis expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the FrenchMinistry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of anyother matter. On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formalretirement from office did not take place until October 24. SeveralMinisters abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him intoretirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. TheEmperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that thelast time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "assoon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into aserious consideration of the whole question[772]. . . . " Cowley himself wasmore concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite ofprevious protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773]. 

Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, whilewholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever thatEngland might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official orprivate, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took forgranted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused bythe doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution ofPalmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand forMinisterial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him toreturn to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:

 "I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest, proposing to North and South to come to terms. 

 "Two things however must be made clear:

 (i) That we propose separation, (ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked ourselves[775]. "

How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not madeclear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing amemorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on linesof separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind becameevident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart, written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for asuggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russellnow thought:

 "If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over on the 25th[777]. "

British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the ForeignSecretary, having started out on a course portending positive andvigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side, if not turning completely about. But the day after Russell seemed to beconsidering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be contentwith a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the alreadytroubled waters further and violently disturbing them. This wasGladstone's speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which wasdevoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davishad made an army, was making a navy, and had created something stillgreater--a nation[778]. The chronology of shifts in opinion would, atfirst glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with theintention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the lineearlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground. His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, wascertain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmentalaction. If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then earlyrecognition must be given it. But this surmise of intentional pressureis not borne out by any discovered evidence. On the contrary, the truthis, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was incomplete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters fromPalmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even anyhesitation. Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British interventionin some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to makethe good news known. His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that didnot pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had notyet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against thetraditions of British Cabinet organization. He had spoken withoutauthorization and "off his own bat. "

The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy, immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a generalbelief that Gladstone's speech meant action in the war. The price of rawcotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause themto give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would beno immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779]. On the otherhand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, _hoped_ that Gladstone wasmerely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston andRussell to move. He was sore at heart over the "vile speech" of "yourold acquaintance and friend[780]. " The leading newspapers while at firstaccepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement andgenerally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there wasstill uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be madeclear just what was in the wind[781]. Within the Cabinet it is to besupposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of hisunusual procedure and by his sentiments. On Russell, however muchdisliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect wasreinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of theplan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice. Sixdays after Gladstone's speech Russell circulated, October 13, amemorandum on America[782]. 

This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, itspower to resist--had maintained a successful defensive; that the notionof a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to bewholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeingof the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, wasno humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in theloyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servilewar--a most "terrible" plan. For these reasons Russell urged that theGreat Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their dutyto propose a "suspension of arms" for the purpose of "weighing calmlythe advantages of peace[783]. " This was a far cry from mediation andrecognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of anarmistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it aboutand making it of value. But the memorandum of October 13 does clearlynegative what has been the accepted British political tradition which isto the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone's presumption andnow determined against action, had "put up" Cornewall Lewis to reply ina public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinetdecision had as yet been reached. Lewis' speech was made at Hereford onOctober 14. Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell thatit is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifyingRussell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Officememorandum of the thirteenth[784]. Lewis was, in fact, vigorouslymaintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to _any_ planof departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and hisspeech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition. 

Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North. Rather hetreated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in theCabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole groundof British interests. This was the line best suited to sustain hisarguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinetacknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, washis private conviction[785]. At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone mustacknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it "to beundecided. Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived whenit could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines ofinternational law that the independence of the Southern States had beenestablished[786]. " In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinetdecision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinettraditions with Gladstone's speech, since equally unauthorized, butexcusable in the view that the first offence against tradition hadforced a rejoinder[787]. For the public Lewis accomplished his purposeand the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788]. MeanwhilePalmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining inuncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult, indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament. This wasdone through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derbywas averse to action. 

 "He said that he had been constantly urged to _go in for_ recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the ground that recognition would merely irritate the North without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present temper of the Belligerents _must_ be rejected even if the mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having that which the other declared was vitally essential to its existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out the stipulations of a treaty of peace. . . . The recognition of the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of hostility towards the North[789]. "

More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess, fairly accurately, what was in the Premier's mind for Lewis wasClarendon's brother-in-law, and "the most intimate and esteemed of hismale friends[790]. " They were in constant communication as the Cabinetcrisis developed, and Lewis' next step was taken immediately afterPalmerston's consultation of Derby through Clarendon. October 17, Lewiscirculated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell's of October 13. Heagreed with Russell's statement of the facts of the situation inAmerica, but added with sarcasm:

 "A dispassionate bystander might be expected to concur in the historical view of Lord Russell, and to desire that the war should be speedily terminated by a pacific agreement between the contending parties. But, unhappily, the decision upon any proposal of the English Government will be made, not by dispassionate bystanders, but by heated and violent partisans; and we have to consider, not how the proposal indicated in the Memorandum ought to be received, or how it would be received by a conclave of philosophers, but how it is likely to be received by the persons to whom it would be addressed. "

Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, Lewis admitted, presumably wasintended to incite servile war, but that very fact was an argumentagainst, not for, British action, since it revealed an intensity ofbitterness prohibitory of any "calm consideration" of issues by thebelligerents. And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice theonly peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South forthe establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediaryand sponsor. Any policy except that of the continuance of strictneutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible asyet. Statesmanship required great caution; ". . . Looking to the probableconsequences, " Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, wemay doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over thechances of good, and whether it is not--

 'Better to endure the ills we have Than fly to others which we know not of[791]. '"

At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them onthe lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were receivedat the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a Britishspecial agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States. Anderson's reports emphasized three points:

(1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought ofameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed;

(2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securingcotton for a long time to come;

(3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour ofvigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being metwith enthusiasm[792]. 

This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or forNorthern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting onClarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, stillargued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harmand might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition"would certainly be premature at present[793]. " Russell himself nowheard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urgedto press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on theground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government wasthe right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet withan insolent rejection of our offer[794]. " A long conference with Lyonsgave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to theextent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ withoutRussia[795]. . . . " Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision forthe immediate present, writing to Russell:

 "Your description of the state of things between the two parties is most comprehensive and just. I am, however, much inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition with any advantage. "

 * * * * *

 "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree to an armistice but whether they might not turn their thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves. But the answer of each might be written by us beforehand. The Northerners would say that the only condition of arrangement would be the restoration of the Union; the South would say their only condition would be an acknowledgment by the North of Southern Independence--we should not be more advanced and should only have pledged each party more strongly to the object for which they are fighting. I am therefore inclined to change the opinion on which I wrote to you when the Confederates seemed to be carrying all before them, and I am very much come back to our original view of the matter, that we must continue merely to be lookers-on till the war shall have taken a more decided turn[796]. "

By previous arrangement the date October 23 had been set for a Cabinetto consider the American question but Russell now postponed it, though afew members appeared and held an informal discussion in which Russellstill justified his "armistice" policy and was opposed by Lewis and themajority of those present. Palmerston did not attend, no action waspossible and technically no Cabinet was held[797]. It soon appeared thatRussell, vexed at the turn matters had taken, was reluctant in yieldingand did not regard the question as finally settled. Yet on the afternoonof this same day Adams, much disturbed by the rumours attendant upon thespeeches of Gladstone and Lewis, sought an explanation from Russell andwas informed that the Government was not inclined at present to changeits policy but could make no promises for the future[798]. This appearedto Adams to be an assurance against _any_ effort by Great Britain andhas been interpreted as disingenuous on Russell's part. Certainly Adams'confidence was restored by the interview. But Russell was apparentlyunconvinced as yet that a suggestion of armistice would necessarily leadto the evil consequences prophesied by Lewis, or would, indeed, requireany departure from a policy of strict neutrality. On the one sideRussell was being berated by pro-Southerners as weakly continuing anoutworn policy and as having "made himself the laughing-stock of Europeand of America[799];" on the other he was regarded, for the moment, asinsisting, through pique, on a line of action highly dangerous to thepreservation of peace with the North. October 23 Palmerston wrote hisapproval of the Cabinet postponement, but declared Lewis' doctrine of"no recognition of Southern independence until the North had admittedit" was unsound[800]. The next day he again wrote: ". . . To talk to thebelligerents about peace at present would be as useless as asking thewinds during the last week to let the waters remain calm[801]. "

This expression by Palmerston on the day after the question apparentlyhad come to a conclusion was the result of the unexpected persistence ofRussell and Gladstone. Replying to Palmerston's letter of thetwenty-third, Russell wrote: "As no good could come of a Cabinet, I putit off. But tho' I am quite ready to agree to your conclusions for thepresent, I cannot do so for G. Lewis' reasons. . . . "

 "G. Lewis besides has made a proposition for me which I never thought of making. He says I propose that England and France and perhaps some one Continental power should ask America to suspend the war. I never thought of making such a proposal. 

 "I think if Russia agreed Prussia would. And if France and England agreed Austria would. Less than the whole five would not do. I thought it right towards the Cabinet to reserve any specific proposition. I am not at all inclined to adopt G. Lewis' invention. 

 "I have sent off Lyons without instructions, at which he is much pleased[802]. "

Russell was shifting ground; first the proposal was to have been made byEngland and France; then Russia was necessary; now "less than fivepowers would not do. " But whatever the number required he still desireda proposal of armistice. On October 23, presumably subsequent to theinformal meeting of Cabinet members, he drew up a brief memorandum inanswer to that of Lewis on October 17, denying that Lewis had correctlyinterpreted his plan, and declaring that he had always had "incontemplation" a step by the five great powers of Europe. Theadvisability of trying to secure such joint action, Russell asserted, was all he had had in mind. _If_ the Cabinet had approved thisadvisability, and the powers were acquiescent, _then_ (in answer toLewis' accusation of "no look ahead") he would be ready with definiteplans for the negotiation of peace between North and South[803]. Thus byletter to Palmerston and by circulation of a new memorandum Russell gavenotice that all was not yet decided. On October 24, Gladstone alsocirculated a memorandum in reply to Lewis, urging action by England, France and Russia[804]. 

Russell's second memorandum was not at first taken seriously by hisCabinet opponents. They believed the issue closed and Russell merelyputting out a denial of alleged purposes. Clarendon, though not a memberof the Cabinet, was keeping close touch with the situation and onOctober 24 wrote to Lewis:

 "Thanks for sending me your memorandum on the American question, which I have read with great satisfaction. Johnny [Russell] always loves to do something when to do nothing is prudent, and I have no doubt that he hoped to get support in his meddling proclivities when he called a Cabinet for yesterday; but its postponement _sine die_ is probably due to your memorandum. You have made so clear the idiotic position we should occupy, either in having presented our face gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in being asked what practical solution we had to propose after an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805]. "

On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell'snewly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again:

 "The Foreign Secretary's _blatt_ exhibits considerable soreness, for which you are specially bound to make allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him. He had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did. He is therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a deal more training before he can appear in public again. "

 * * * * *

 "I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention, and that you did so without in the smallest degree committing either the Government or yourself with respect to the future[806]. "

In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell'scomplaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, butthere was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which, if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question. This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirectovertures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of anopinion by Palmerston that Napoleon's words could not be depended uponas an indication of what he intended to do[807]. On the day this waswritten the French ministerial crisis--the real cause of Napoleon'ssilence--came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and thesuccession of Drouyn de Lhuys. Russell's reply to Palmerston's assertionof the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that "recognition"was certainly out of the question for the present and that "it shouldnot take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may showpretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808]. " But this yielding tothe Premier's decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon andhis new Minister could turn their attention to the American question. 

On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in whichAmerican affairs were discussed. Napoleon hoped that England, France andRussia would join in an offer of mediation. Cowley replied that he hadno instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting aproposal of armistice for six months "in order to give time for thepresent excitement to calm down[809]. . . . " The next day Cowley reportedthat Drouyn de Lhuys stated the Emperor to be very anxious to "put anend to the War, " but that he was himself doubtful whether it would notbe better to "wait a little longer, " and in any case if overtures toAmerica were rejected Russia probably would not join Great Britain andFrance in going on to a recognition of the South[810]. All this wasexactly in line with that plan to which Russell had finally come and ifofficially notified to the British Government would require a renewedconsideration by the Cabinet. Presumably Napoleon knew what had beengoing on in London and he now hastened to give the needed French push. October 28, Slidell was summoned to an audience and told of theEmperor's purpose, acting with England, to bring about anarmistice[811]. Three days later, October 31, Cowley wrote that he hadnow been officially informed by Drouyn de Lhuys, "by the Emperor'sorders" that a despatch was about to be sent to the French Ministers inEngland and Russia instructing them to request joint action by the threepowers in suggesting an armistice of six months _including a suspensionof the blockade_, thus throwing open Southern ports to Europeancommerce[812]. 

Napoleon's proposal evidently took Palmerston by surprise and was notregarded with favour. He wrote to Russell:

 "As to the French scheme of proposals to the United States, we had better keep that question till the Cabinet meets, which would be either on Monday 11th, or Wednesday 12th, as would be most convenient to you and our colleagues. But is it likely that the Federals would consent to an armistice to be accompanied by a cessation of Blockades, and which would give the Confederates means of getting all the supplies they may want?"

 * * * * *

 "Then comes the difficulty about slavery and the giving up of runaway slaves, about which we could hardly frame a proposal which the Southerns would agree to, and people of England would approve of. The French Government are more free from the shackles of principle and of right and wrong on these matters, as on all others than we are. At all events it would be wiser to wait till the elections in North America are over before any proposal is made. As the Emperor is so anxious to put a stop to bloodshed he might try his hand as a beginning by putting down the stream of ruffians which rolls out from that never-failing fountain at Rome[813]. "

But Russell was more optimistic, or at least in favour of some sort ofproposal to America. He replied to Palmerston:

 "My notion is that as there is little chance of our good offices being accepted in America we should make them such as would be creditable to us in Europe. I should propose to answer the French proposal therefore by saying, "That in offering our good offices we ought to require both parties to consent to examine, first, whether there are any terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there are any terms upon which both would consent to separate. 

 "We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it would be essential in our view, that after what has taken place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain emancipated her slaves in 1833. 

 "If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil. 

 "This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the Cabinet. 

 "It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and probably the South will refuse it[814]. "

Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North andSouth in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed themcertain to be refused by the North in any case. But he was eager topresent the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of theprevious decision. Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdomof a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance ofthe French plan, with modifications. The news of Napoleon's offer and ofRussell's attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated anothermemorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words. This was in the main an historical résumé of past British policy inrelation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of suchcases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized arevolted people so long as a _bona fide_ struggle was still going on. Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired. "If England could, bylegitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her owninterests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earnthe just gratitude of the civilized world. " But the question, as he hadpreviously asserted, was full of grave dangers. The very suggestion of aconcert of Powers was itself one to be avoided. "A conference of thefive great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body toset in motion. A single intervening Power may possibly contrive tosatisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have firstto satisfy one another. " Who could tell what divergence might arise onthe question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England mightfind her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?

Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for itsappeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in internationallaw. On the same day that Lewis' memorandum was circulated, thereappeared a communication in the _Times_ by "Historicus, " on "TheInternational Doctrine of Recognition, " outlining in briefer formexactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, andadvocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality. "Historicus" was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis' stepdaughterwho was also the niece of Clarendon. Evidently the family guns were alltrained on Russell[816]. "Historicus" drove home the fact that prematureaction by a neutral was a "hostile act" and ought to be resented by the"Sovereign State" as a "breach of neutrality and friendship[817]. "

Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon's proposal the Cabinet crisiswas renewed and even more sharply than on October 23. The French offerwas not actually presented until November 10[818]. On the next two daysthe answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet. Lewisdescribed this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating thatRussell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to theeffect that Russia would not join but would support English-Frenchproposals through her Minister at Washington, "provided it would notcause irritation[819]. "

 "Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain his views on the question. These were, briefly, that the recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of separating France and England. He therefore advised that the proposal of France should be accepted. Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal. His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of mitigating it [_sic_]. 

 "The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion. The principal objection was that the proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly unequal--so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against being a party to the representation, and he capitulated. I do not think his support was very sincere: it certainly was not hearty . . . I ought to add that, after the Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation, and gave a strong support to Lord John. His support came rather late . . . I proposed that we should _tater le terrain_ at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of the proposal being accepted. Lord John refused this. He admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from Washington. I think his principal motive was a fear of displeasing France, and that Palmerston's principal motive was a wish to seem to support him. There is a useful article in to-day's _Times_ throwing cold water on the invitation. I take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet[820]. "

Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more briefaccount:

 "Nov. 11. We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again to-morrow. I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the business of America. But I will send you definite intelligence. Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are _right. _ Nov. 12. The United States affair has ended and not well. Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way without resolutely fighting out his battle. However, though we decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in terms which leave the matter very open for the future. Nov. 13. I think the French will make our answer about America public; at least it is very possible. But I hope they may not take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may themselves act in the matter. It will be clear that we concur with them, that the war should cease. Palmerston gave to Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821]. "

The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in Franceand in England. It was complimentary to the Emperor's "benevolent viewsand humane intentions, " agreed that "if the steps proposed were to betaken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable" butremarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russiawished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground tohope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone anyoverture until there was a "greater prospect than now exists of itsbeing accepted by the two contending parties[822]. " The argument ofRussell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia thoughearlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential. This was due tothe knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823]. But in the answerto France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reasonfor British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decisionwithin the British Cabinet. This is not to say that had Russia accededEngland also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion, adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the resultreached was that which the Premier wished. More important in his viewthan any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and atthe conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write: "As tothe state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen itsmoother[824]. "

Public opinion in England in the main heartily supported the Cabinetdecision. Hammond described it as "almost universal in this countryagainst interference[825], " an estimate justified if the more importantjournals are taken into account but not true of all. The _Times_ ofNovember 13 declared:

 "We are convinced that the present is not the moment for these strong measures. There is now great reason to hope that by means of their own internal action the Americans may themselves settle their own affairs even sooner than Europe could settle them for them. We have waited so long that it would be unpardonable in us to lose the merit of our self-denial at such a moment as this. . . . We quite agree with Mr. Cobden that it would be cheaper to keep all Lancashire on turtle and venison than to plunge into a desperate war with the Northern States of America, even with all Europe at our back. In a good cause, and as a necessity forced upon us in defence of our honour, or of our rightful interests, we are as ready to fight as we ever were; but we do not see our duty or our interest in going blindfold into an adventure such as this. We very much doubt, more over, whether, if Virginia belonged to France as Canada belongs to England, the Emperor of the French would be so active in beating up for recruits in this American mediation league. "

This was followed up two days later by an assertion that no Englishstatesman had at any time contemplated an offer of mediation made insuch a way as to lead to actual conflict with the United States[826]. Onthe other hand the _Herald_, always intense in its pro-Southernutterances, and strongly anti-Palmerston in politics, professed itselfunable to credit the rumoured Cabinet decision. "Until we are positivelyinformed that our Ministers are guilty of the great crime attributed tothem, " the _Herald_ declared, "we must hope against hope that they areinnocent. " If guilty they were responsible for the misery of Lancashire(depicted in lurid colours):

 "A clear, a sacred, an all-important duty was imposed upon them; to perform that duty would have been the pride and delight of almost any other Englishmen; and they, with the task before them and the power to perform it in their hands--can it be that they have shrunk back in craven cowardice, deserted their ally, betrayed their country, dishonoured their own names to all eternity, that they might do the bidding of John Bright, and sustain for a while the infamous tyranny of a Butler, a Seward, and a Lincoln[827]?"

In the non-political _Army and Navy Gazette_ the returned editor, W. H. Russell, but lately the _Times_ correspondent in America, jeered at theAmerican uproar that might now be expected against France instead ofEngland: "Let the Emperor beware. The scarred veteran of the New YorkScarrons of Plum Gut has set his sinister or dexter eye upon him, andthreatens him with the loss of his throne, " but the British public mustexpect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must beready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. _Blackwood's_ forNovember, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act. The _Edinburgh_ for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministryand expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out ofthe war. _The Index_ naturally frothed in angry disappointment, continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerialdecision, even into the next year. "Has it come to this? Is England, orthe English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States? Lord Russell mightcontrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both hiscountry and her ally[829]. " An editorial from the _Richmond_ (Virginia)_Whig_ was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as"two old painted mummies, " who secretly were rejoiced at the war inAmerica as "threatening the complete annihilation" of both sides, andexpressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both Northand South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830]. The explanation, said _The Index_, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimousfear of war--and of a war that would not take place in spite of thebluster of Lincoln's "hangers-on[831]. " Even as late as May of the yearfollowing, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell "astatesman" who belonged "rather to the past than to the present" wasprimarily responsible for British inaction. "The nominal conduct ofForeign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has nevershown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display ofthese qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse thanuseless[832]. "

_The Index_ never wavered from its assumption that in the CabinetRussell was the chief enemy of the South. Slidell, better informed, wrote: "Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been theonly member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting theEmperor's proposition[833]?" He had information that Napoleon had beenled to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated--somuch so that France would now probably act alone[834]. Gladstone'sattitude was a sorrow to many of his friends. Bright believed he was atlast weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answerto France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone onAmerican affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman's mind wasof offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]--aplan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone's reputation for good judgment, save to his correspondent. 

In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with thepublic and in the Government that England had made no adventure of newpolicy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced whenthe first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America. Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives"were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought itwould only do harm until there was a change of Government inWashington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediationuseless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South andthat such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of theblockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837]. Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment ofconditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture incomparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southernarguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find asingle Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838]. In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act andEngland had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-Britishfeeling[839]. 

The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection ofEuropean offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. Itexpressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather toanimadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personallyresponsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was nocause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specificinstructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason topresent these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Sewardbelieved all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. Hewrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secessionintrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forgetthem[840]. " This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared byAdams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude tothe answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept thatanswer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, thatGreat Britain intended no change of policy[841]. 

So far removed was Seward's attitude toward England from that ascribedto him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up forimmediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after hisreturn to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threateningthe retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought onby the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, anddirected at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by thetact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in hisresignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refusedboth and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential controlwhich Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy"I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are muchmore likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a manmore disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two yearsago[842]. " After the event of Seward's retention of office Russellwrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]. " This is aremarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Sewardhad come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action inthe _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone"being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both beliefin Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities. 

Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to apolite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion ofarmistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. Theprojects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeeddestined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in theBritish Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the Southwas even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must sometime come when European recognition would have to be given theConfederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result ofthe war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging theattitude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Theirsympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much inevidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon theexpediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations_now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose resultin separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promisedgood results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even thoughpersonally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, inthe end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time whichdetermined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdrawhis support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreoverboth statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and asthe possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers werebrought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's truepolicy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844]. 

For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerouscrisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan beenadopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question thatLewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensuedbetween England and the North. But also whatever its results in otherrespects the independence of the South would have been established. Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease oflife--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreedthat Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was but an incitement toservile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon thatproclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion againstany future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was thereserious governmental consideration of meddling in the American CivilWar[845]. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 735: _Ibid. _, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862. ]

[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally apurely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of theConfederacy. ]

[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862. ]

[Footnote 738: e. G. , the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long reportof a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In hisspeech Roebuck asserted: "A divided America will be a benefit toEngland. " He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had notcome to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends. (Cheers. ) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; theyare not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don'tsay that; don't say that. ') (Cheers and disapprobation. ) I know what Iam saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends. "]

[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at muchlength. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C. F. Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his_Life of C. F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp. 400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisisin Downing Street_, Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp. 372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motionof midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy. ]

[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388. ]

[Footnote 741: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp. 165-168. ]

[Footnote 742: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 389. Firstprinted in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899. ]

[Footnote 743: _Ibid. _, p. 390. ]

[Footnote 744: See _ante_, p. 32. ]

[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862. ]

[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that thenewspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, onconsultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would onlymake matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the nextspring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F. O. , Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offerof mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to openthe Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; beforeleaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture onmediation unless we are ready to go to war. " Mercier, however, was eagerfor action and believed that if France came forward, supported by theother Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled toyield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right(_Ibid. _, Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776). ]

[Footnote 748: _Ibid. _, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant. ]

[Footnote 749: _Ibid. _, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirelypolitical. "]

[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862. ]

[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by aletter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if anaccepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that thewar should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers). ]

[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixesthe date of Russell's letter. ]

[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 754: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 360. ]

[Footnote 755: _Ibid. _, p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862. ]

[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. Thisis the first reference by Cowley in over three months tomediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise. ]

[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers. ]

[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862. ]

[Footnote 759: Russell Papers. ]

[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862. ]

[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers. ]

[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862. ]

[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76. ]

[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40. ]

[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving theexact text paraphrased by Morley. ]

[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entireletter. Sept. 27, 1862. ]

[Footnote 767: _Ibid. _, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributesmuch influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that theQueen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show thatshe otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion toRussell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would havecounted for little. ]

[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter isprinted in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. ]

[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offeringgood services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Muchimportance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance ofsuccess. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, inwhich case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemedlikely that this could be done without giving the United States a justground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" theaction of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delayit. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the politicalnecessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (RussianArchives, Brunow to F. O. , London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N. S. ). No. 1698. )Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letterfrom Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N. S. ), in which Brunowexpressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was tointroduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate thedifferences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (Thisseems very far-fetched. ) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this toStoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy ofextreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid. _, F. O. To Stoeckl, Oct. 3, 1862 (O. S. ). )]

[Footnote 771: Thouvenel, _Le Secret de l'Empereur_, II, pp. 438-9. ]

[Footnote 772: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862. ]

[Footnote 773: _Ibid. _, Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862. ]

[Footnote 774: Even the _Edinburgh Review_ for October, 1862, discussedrecognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole againstsuch action. ]

[Footnote 775: Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible forthe original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing topostpone. This study reverses the roles. ]

[Footnote 776: Russell Papers. Also see _ante_ p. 41. Stuart to Lyons. The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor. ]

[Footnote 777: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862. Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25. ]

[Footnote 778: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 79. Morley calls thisutterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, whohimself later so characterized it. ]

[Footnote 779: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 402. ]

[Footnote 780: Bright to Sumner, October 10, 1862. Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 108. Bright was wholly in the dark as to aMinisterial project. Much of this letter is devoted to the emancipationproclamation which did not at first greatly appeal to Bright as awise measure. ]

[Footnote 781: The _Times_, October 9 and 10, while surprised thatGladstone and not Palmerston, was the spokesman, accepted the speech asequivalent to a governmental pronouncement. Then the _Times_ makes nofurther comment of moment until November 13. The _Morning Post_(regarded as Palmerston's organ) reported the speech in full on October9, but did not comment editorially until October 13, and then with muchlaudation of Gladstone's northern tour but _with no mention whatever_ ofhis utterances on America. ]

[Footnote 782: Gladstone wrote to Russell, October 17, explaining thathe had intended no "official utterance, " and pleaded that Spence, whomhe had seen in Liverpool, did not put that construction on his words(Gladstone Papers). Russell replied, October 20. ". . . Still you mustallow me to say that I think you went beyond the latitude which allspeakers must be allowed when you said that Jeff Davis had made anation. Negotiations would seem to follow, and for that step I think theCabinet is not prepared. However we shall soon meet to discuss this verytopic" _(Ibid. )_]

[Footnote 783: Palmerston MS. Appended to the Memorandum were the textsof the emancipation proclamation, Seward's circular letter of September22, and an extract from the _National Intelligencer_ of September 26, giving Lincoln's answer to Chicago abolitionists. ]

[Footnote 784: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 80, narrates the "tradition. "Walpole, _Twenty-five Years_, II, 57, states it as a fact. Also_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 136, 140. Over forty years later ananonymous writer in the _Daily Telegraph_, Oct. 24, 1908, gave exactdetails of the "instruction" to Lewis, and of those present. (Cited inAdams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, pp. 404-5. ) C. F. Adams, _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, Ch. III, repeats the tradition, but in _A Crisis in Downing Street_ he completely refutes his earlieropinion and the entire tradition. The further narrative in this chapter, especially the letters of Clarendon to Lewis, show that Lewis actedsolely on his own initiative. ]

[Footnote 785: Anonymously, in the _Edinburgh_, for April, 1861, Lewishad written of the Civil War in a pro-Northern sense, and appears neverto have accepted fully the theory that it was impossible to reconquerthe South. ]

[Footnote 786: Cited in Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 407. ]

[Footnote 787: Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterizedGladstone's speech as an offence against tradition and best practice. Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made toLewis' speech. Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 267. Palmerston to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1862. Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not thinkthis called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof ofthe falsity of Palmerston's initiative. _Ibid. _, p. 267. ]

[Footnote 788: _The Index_, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance ofGladstone's Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy, asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantlyinterpreted Cabinet hesitation to the "favour of the North and bitterenmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of LordRussell. . . . " Throughout the war, Russell, to _The Index_, was the evilgenius of the Government. ]

[Footnote 789: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 790: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 279. ]

[Footnote 791: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 792: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863. _Commons_, Vol. I XII. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of NorthAmerica. " Nos. 33 and 37. Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862. Anderson's mission was to report on the alleged drafting of Britishsubjects into the Northern Army. ]

[Footnote 793: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862. ]

[Footnote 794: Russell Papers. Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 795: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862. ]

[Footnote 796: Russell Papers. It is significant that Palmerston'sorgan, the _Morning Post_, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 witha sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption. Lewis was alsoreflected upon, but less severely. ]

[Footnote 797: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265. ]

[Footnote 798: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 223. Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862. C. F. Adams in _A Crisis in DowningStreet_, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government's intention was"to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality"--seemingly a more positiveassurance, and so understood by the American Minister. ]

[Footnote 799: _The Index_, Oct. 23, 1862. ". . . While our people arestarving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministryhave no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, andwait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up. "]

[Footnote 800: Russell Papers. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 801: _Ibid. _, To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862. ]

[Footnote 802: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862. ]

[Footnote 803: Palmerston MS. Marked: "Printed Oct. 24, 1862. "]

[Footnote 804: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 84. Morley was the first to makeclear that no final decision was reached on October 23, a date hithertoaccepted as the end of the Cabinet crisis. Rhodes, IV, 337-348, gives arésumé of talk and correspondence on mediation, etc. , and places October23 as the date when "the policy of non-intervention was informallyagreed upon" (p. 343), Russell's "change of opinion" being also"complete" (p. 342). Curiously the dictum of Rhodes and others dependsin some degree on a mistake in copying a date. Slidell had an importantinterview with Napoleon on October 28 bearing on an armistice, but thiswas copied as October 22 in Bigelow's _France and the Confederate Navy_, p. 126, and so came to be written into narratives of mediationproposals. Richardson, II, 345, gives the correct date. Rhodes'supposition that Seward's instructions of August 2 became known toRussell and were the determining factor in altering his intentions isevidently erroneous. ]

[Footnote 805: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 265. ]

[Footnote 806: _Ibid. _, p. 266. ]

[Footnote 807: Russell Papers. Palmerston to Russell, Oct. 24, 1862. Palmerston was here writing of Italian and American affairs. ]

[Footnote 808: Palmerston MS. Oct. 25, 1862. ]

[Footnote 809: Russell Papers. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 810: F. O. , France, Vol. 1446. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 28, 1862. Cowley, like Lyons, was against action. He approved Drouyn deLhuys' "hesitation. " It appears from the Russian archives that Franceapproached Russia. On October 31, D'Oubril, at Paris, was instructedthat while Russia had always been anxious to forward peace in America, she stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United States, andwas against any appearance of pressure. It would have the contraryeffect from that hoped for. If England and France should offer mediationRussia, "being too far away, " would not join, but might give her moralsupport. (Russian Archives, F. O. To D'Oubril, Oct. 27, 1862 (O. S. ). No. 320. ) On the same date Stoeckl was informed of the French overtures, andwas instructed not to take a stand with France and Great Britain, but tolimit his efforts to approval of any _agreement_ by the North and Southto end the war. Yet Stoeckl was given liberty of action if (asGortchakoff did not believe) the time had assuredly come when both Northand South were ready for peace, and it needed but the influence of somefriendly hand to soothe raging passions and to lead the contendingparties themselves to begin direct negotiations (_Ibid. _, F. O. ToStoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (O. S. ). )]

[Footnote 811: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, Oct. 29, 1862. Slidell'sfull report to Benjamin is in Richardson, II, 345. ]

[Footnote 812: F. O. , France, Vol. 1446, No. 1236. Cowley thought neitherparty would consent unless it saw some military advantage. (RussellPapers. Cowley to Russell, Oct. 31, 1862. ) Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 84-5, speaks of the French offer as "renewed proposals of mediation. "There was no renewal for this was the _first_ proposal, and it was notone of mediation though that was an implied result. ]

[Footnote 813: Russell Papers, Nov. 2, 1862. Monday, November 1862, wasthe 10th not the 11th as Palmerston wrote. ]

[Footnote 814: Palmerston MS. Nov. 3, 1862. ]

[Footnote 815: Gladstone Papers. The memorandum here preserved has theadditional interest of frequent marginal comments by Gladstone. ]

[Footnote 816: The letters of "Historicus" early attracted, in the caseof the _Trent_, favourable attention and respect. As early as 1863 theywere put out in book form to satisfy a public demand: _Letters byHistoricus on some questions of International Law_, London, 1863. ]

[Footnote 817: The _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862. The letter was dated Nov. 4. ]

[Footnote 818: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, Lords, Vol. XXIX. "Despatchrespecting the Civil War in North America. " Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 819: For substance of the Russian answer to France see _ante_, p. 59, _note_ 4. D'Oubril reported Drouyn de Lhuys as unconvinced thatthe time was inopportune but as stating he had not expected Russia tojoin. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs was irritated at an articleon his overtures that had appeared in the _Journal de Petersbourg_, andthought himself unfairly treated by the Russian Government. (RussianArchives. D'Oubril to F. O. , Nov. 15, 1862 (N. S. ), Nos. 1908 and 1912. )]

[Footnote 820: Maxwell, _Clarendon_, II, 268. The letter, as printed, isdated Nov. 11, and speaks of the Cabinet of "yesterday. " This appears tobe an error. Gladstone's account is of a two-days' discussion on Nov. 11and 12, with the decision reached and draft of reply to France outlinedon the latter date. The article in the _Times_, referred to by Lewis, appeared on Nov. 13. ]

[Footnote 821: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 85. ]

[Footnote 822: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Despatch respecting the Civil War in North America. " Russell to Cowley, Nov. 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 823: F. O. , Russia, Vol. 609, No. 407. Napier to Russell. Thesame day Napier wrote giving an account of an interview between theFrench Minister and Prince Gortchakoff in which the latter stated Russiawould take no chances of offending the North. _Ibid. _, No. 408. ]

[Footnote 824: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, 85. To his wife, Nov. 13, 1862. Even after the answer to France there was some agitation in the Ministrydue to the receipt from Stuart of a letter dated Oct. 31, in which itwas urged that this was the most opportune moment for mediation becauseof Democratic successes in the elections. He enclosed also an account ofa "horrible military reprisal" by the Federals in Missouri alleging that_ten_ Southerners had been executed because of _one_ Northerner seizedby Southern guerillas. (Russell Papers. ) The Russell Papers contain aseries of signed or initialled notes in comment, all dated Nov. 14. "W. "(Westbury?) refers to the "horrible atrocities, " and urges that, ifRussia will join, the French offer should be accepted. Gladstone wrote, "I had supposed the question to be closed. " "C. W. " (Charles Wood), "Thisis horrible; but does not change my opinion of the course to bepursued. " "C. P. V. " (C. P. Villiers) wrote against accepting the Frenchproposal, and commented that Stuart had always been a strong partisan ofthe South. ]

[Footnote 825: Lyons Papers. Hammond to Lyons, Nov. 15, 1862. ]

[Footnote 826: The _Times_, Nov. 15, 1862. ]

[Footnote 827: The _Herald_, Nov. 14, 1862. This paper was listed byHotze of _The Index_, as on his "pay roll. " Someone evidently was tryingto earn his salary. ]

[Footnote 828: Nov. 15, 1862. It is difficult to reconcile Russell'seditorials either with his later protestations of early conviction thatthe North would win or with the belief expressed by Americans that hewas _constantly_ pro-Northern in sentiment, e. G. , Henry Adams, in _ACycle of Adams' Letters_, I, 14l. ]

[Footnote 829: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 56. ]

[Footnote 830: _Ibid. _, Jan. 15, 1863, p. 191. ]

[Footnote 831: _Ibid. _, Jan. 22, 1863, p. 201. ]

[Footnote 832: _Ibid. _, May 28, 1863, p. 72. ]

[Footnote 833: Mason Papers. To Mason, Nov. 28, 1862. ]

[Footnote 834: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 29, 1862. Thisdespatch is not in Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, and illustrates the gaps in that publication. ]

[Footnote 835: Rhodes, IV, 347. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862. ]

[Footnote 836: Goldwin Smith told of this plan in 1904, in a speech at abanquet in Ottawa. He had destroyed Gladstone's letter outlining it. _The Ottawa Sun_, Nov. 16, 1904. ]

[Footnote 837: Almost immediately after Lyons' return to Washington, Stoeckl learned from him, and from Mercier, also, that England andFrance planned to offer mediation and that if this were refused theSouth would be recognized. Stoeckl commented to the Foreign Office:"What good will this do?" It would not procure cotton unless the portswere forced open and a clear rupture made with the North. He thoughtEngland understood this, and still hesitated. Stoeckl went on to urgethat if all European Powers joined England and France they would bemerely tails to the kite and that Russia would be one of the tails. Thiswould weaken the Russian position in Europe as well as forfeit herspecial relationship with the United States. He was against any _joint_European action. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F. O. , Nov. 5-17, 1862, No. 2002. ) Gortchakoff wrote on the margin of this despatch: "Je trouveson opinion trčs sage. " If Stoeckl understood Lyons correctly then thelatter had left England still believing that his arguments with Russellhad been of no effect. When the news reached Washington of England'srefusal of the French offer, Stoeckl reported Lyons as much surprised(_Ibid. _, to F. O. , Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2170). ]

[Footnote 838: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1832, _Commons_, Vol. LXXII, "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of NorthAmerica. " Nos. 47 and 50. Received Nov. 30 and Dec. 11. Mercier, who hadbeen Stuart's informant about political conditions in New York, feltthat he had been deceived by the Democrats. F. O. , Am. , Vol. 784, No. 38. Confidential, Lyons to Russell, Jan. 13, 1863. ]

[Footnote 839: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 840, No. 518. Moore (Richmond) to Lyons, Dec. 4, 1862. Also F. O. , Am. , Vol. 844, No. 135. Bunch (Charleston) toRussell, Dec. 13, 1862. Bunch wrote of the "Constitutional hatred andjealousy of England, which are as strongly developed here as at theNorth. Indeed, our known antipathy to Slavery adds another element toSouthern dislike. "]

[Footnote 840: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelowwas Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northernconfidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contactswith the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported theContinental press as largely dependent for its American news andjudgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, sothat Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. _Ibid. _, p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 841: Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. Hewrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of theAmerican Ministers abroad. " (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec. 12, 1862. )]

[Footnote 842: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862. ]

[Footnote 843: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863. ]

[Footnote 844: December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russellexpressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreementthat the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the UnitedStates. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressedher proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding andunderstanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reasonfor changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F. O. , Dec. 1, 1862 (N. S. ), No. 1998. ) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunowknew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France. ]

[Footnote 845: Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 asthe "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this willbe shown. ]

CHAPTER XII

THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

The finality of the British Cabinet decision in November, 1862, relativeto proposals of mediation or intervention was not accepted at the momentthough time was to prove its permanence. The British press was full ofsuggestions that the first trial might more gracefully come from Francesince that country was presumed to be on more friendly terms with theUnited States[846]. Others, notably Slidell at Paris, held the sameview, and on January 8, 1863, Slidell addressed a memorandum to NapoleonIII, asking separate recognition of the South. The next day, Napoleondictated an instruction to Mercier offering friendly mediation incourteous terms but with no hint of an armistice or of an intendedrecognition of the South[847]. Meanwhile, Mercier had again approachedLyons alleging that he had been urged by Greeley, editor of the _NewYork Tribune_, to make an isolated French offer, but that he felt thiswould be contrary to the close harmony hitherto maintained inFrench-British relations. But Mercier added that if Lyons wasdisinclined to a proposal of mediation, he intended to advise hisGovernment to give him authority to act alone[848]. Lyons made nocomment to Mercier but wrote to Russell, "I certainly desire that theSettlement of the Contest should be made without the interventionof England. "

A week later the Russian Minister, Stoeckl, also came to Lyons desiringto discover what would be England's attitude if Russia should act alone, or perhaps with France, leaving England out of a proposal to theNorth[849]. This was based on the supposition that the North, weary ofwar, might ask the good offices of Russia. Lyons replied that he did notthink that contingency near and otherwise evaded Stoeckl's questions;but he was somewhat suspicious, concluding his report, "I cannot quiteforget that Monsieur Mercier and Monsieur de Stoeckl had agreed to go toRichmond together last Spring[850]. " The day after this despatch waswritten Mercier presented, February 3, the isolated French offer and onFebruary 6 received Seward's reply couched in argumentative, yet politelanguage, but positively declining the proposal[851]. Evidently Lyonswas a bit disquieted by the incident; but in London, Napoleon's overtureto America was officially stated to be unobjectionable, as indeed wasrequired by the implications of the reply of November 13, to France. Russell, on February 14, answered Lyons' communications in a lettermarked "Seen by Lord Palmerston and the Queen":

 "Her Majesty's Government have no wish to interfere at present in any way in the Civil War. If France were to offer good offices or mediation, Her Majesty's Government would feel no jealousy or repugnance to such a course on the part of France alone[852]. "

The writing of this despatch antedated the knowledge that France hadalready acted at Washington, and does not necessarily indicate anygovernmental feeling of a break in previous close relations with Franceon the American question. Yet this was indubitably the case and becameincreasingly evident as time passed. Russell's despatch to Lyons ofFebruary 14 appears rather to be evidence of the effect of the debatesin Parliament when its sessions were resumed on February 5, for in bothLords and Commons there was given a hearty and nearly unanimous supportof the Government's decision to make no overture for a cessation of theconflict in America. Derby clearly outlined the two possible conditionsof mediation; first, when efforts by the North to subdue the South hadpractically ceased; and second, if humane interests required action byneutral states, in which case the intervening parties must be fullyprepared to use force. Neither condition had arrived and strictneutrality was the wise course. Disraeli also approved strict neutralitybut caustically referred to Gladstone's Newcastle speech and sharplyattacked the Cabinet's uncertain and changeable policy--merely a partyspeech. Russell upheld the Government's decision but went out of his wayto assert that the entire subjugation of the South would be a calamityto the United States itself, since it would require an unending use offorce to hold the South in submission[853]. Later, when news of theFrench offer at Washington had been received, the Government wasattacked in the Lords by an undaunted friend of the South, LordCampbell, on the ground of a British divergence from close relationswith France. Russell, in a brief reply, reasserted old arguments thatthe time had "not yet" come, but now declared that events seemed to showthe possibility of a complete Northern victory and added with emphasisthat recognition of the South could justly be regarded by the North asan "unfriendly act[854]. "

Thus Parliament and Cabinet were united against meddling in America, basing this attitude on neutral duty and national interests, and withbarely a reference to the new policy of the North toward slavery, declared in the emancipation proclamations of September 22, 1862, andJanuary 1, 1863, Had these great documents then no favourable influenceon British opinion and action? Was the Northern determination to rootout the institution of slavery, now clearly announced, of no effect inwinning the favour of a people and Government long committed to a worldpolicy against that institution? It is here necessary to review earlyBritish opinion, the facts preceding the first emancipationproclamation, and to examine its purpose in the mind of Lincoln. 

Before the opening of actual military operations, while there was stillhope of some peaceful solution, British opinion had been with the Northon the alleged ground of sympathy with a free as against a slave-owningsociety. But war once begun the disturbance to British trade interestsand Lincoln's repeated declarations that the North had no intention ofdestroying slavery combined to offer an excuse and a reason for analmost complete shift of British opinion. The abolitionists of the Northand the extreme anti-slavery friends in England, relatively few innumber in both countries, still sounded the note of "slavery the causeof the war, " but got little hearing. Nevertheless it was seen bythoughtful minds that slavery was certain to have a distinct bearing onthe position of Great Britain when the war was concluded. In May, 1861, Palmerston declared that it would be a happy day when "we could succeedin putting an end to this unnatural war between the two sections of ourNorth American cousins, " but added that the difficulty for England wasthat "_We_ could not well mix ourselves up with the acknowledgment ofslavery[855]. . . . "

Great Britain's long-asserted abhorrence of slavery caused, indeed, aperplexity in governmental attitude. But this looked to the finaloutcome of an independent South--an outcome long taken for granted. Debate on the existing moralities of the war very soon largelydisappeared from British discussion and in its place there cropped out, here and there, expressions indicative of anxiety as to whether the warcould long continue without a "servile insurrection, " with all itsattendant horrors. 

On July 6, 1861, the _Economist_, reviewing the progress of the warpreparations to date, asserted that it was universally agreed norestoration of the Union was possible and answered British fears bydeclaring it was impossible to believe that even the American madnesscould contemplate a servile insurrection. The friendly _Spectator_ alsodiscussed the matter and repeatedly. It was a mistaken idea, said thisjournal, that there could be no enfranchisement without a slave rising, but should this occur, "the right of the slave to regain his freedom, even if the effort involve slaughter, is as clear as any otherapplication of the right of self-defence[856]. " Yet Englishabolitionists should not urge the slave to act for himself, since "aswar goes on and all compromise fails the American mind will harden underthe white heat and determine that the _cause_ of all conflict mustcease. " That slavery, in spite of any declaration by Lincoln or Northerndenial of a purpose to attack it--denials which disgusted HarrietMartineau--was in real fact the basic cause of the war, seemed to her asclear as anything in reason[857]. She had no patience with Englishanti-slavery people who believed Northern protestations, and she didnot express concern over the horrors of a possible servile insurrection. Nevertheless this spectre was constantly appearing. Again the_Spectator_ sought to allay such fears; but yet again also proclaimedthat even such a contingency was less fearful than the consolidation ofthe slave-power in the South[858]. 

Thus a servile insurrection was early and frequently an argument whichpro-Northern friends were compelled to meet. In truth the bulk of theBritish press was constant in holding up this bogie to its readers, evengoing to the point of weakening its argument of the impossibility of aNorthern conquest of the South by appealing to history to show thatEngland in her two wars with America had had a comparatively easy timein the South, thus postulating the real danger of some "negro Garibaldicalling his countrymen to arms[859]. " Nor was this fear merely apretended one. It affected all classes and partisans of both sides. Evenofficial England shared in it; January 20, 1862, Lyons wrote, "Thequestion is rapidly tending towards the issue either of peace and arecognition of the separation, or a Proclamation of Emancipation and theraising of a servile insurrection[860]. " At nearly the same timeRussell, returning to Gladstone a letter from Sumner to Cobden, expressed his sorrow "that the President intends a war of emancipation, meaning thereby, I fear, a war of greater desolation than has been sincethe revival of letters[861]. " John Stuart Mill, with that clear logicwhich appealed to the more intelligent reader, in an able examination ofthe underlying causes and probable results of the American conflict, excused the Northern leaders for early denial of a purpose to attackslavery, but expressed complete confidence that even these leaders bynow understood the "almost certain results of success in the presentconflict" (the extinction of slavery) and prophesied that "if thewriters who so severely criticize the present moderation of theFree-soilers are desirous to see the war become an abolition war, it isprobable that if the war lasts long enough they will be gratified[862]. "John Bright, reaching a wider public, in speech after speech, expressedfaith that the people of the North were "marching on, as I believe, toits [slavery's] entire abolition[863]. "

Pro-Southern Englishmen pictured the horrors of an "abolition war, " andbelieved the picture true; strict neutrals, like Lyons, feared the samedevelopment; friends of the North pushed aside the thought of a "negroterror, " yet even while hoping and declaring that the war would destroyslavery, could not escape from apprehensions of an event that appearedinevitable. Everywhere, to the British mind, it seemed that emancipationwas necessarily a provocative to servile insurrection, and this belieflargely affected the reception of the emancipation proclamation--a factalmost wholly lost sight of in historical writing. 

Nor did the steps taken in America leading up to emancipation weakenthis belief--rather they appeared to justify it. The great advocate ofabolition as a weapon in the war and for its own sake was CharlesSumner, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He earlytook the ground that a proclamation everywhere emancipating the slaveswould give to the Northern cause a moral support hitherto denied it inEurope and would at the same time strike a blow at Southern resistance. This idea was presented in a public speech at Worcester, Massachusetts, in October, 1861, but even Sumner's free-soil friends thought himmistaken and his expressions "unfortunate. " By December, however, hefound at Washington a change in governmental temper and from that dateSumner was constant, through frequent private conversations withLincoln, in pressing for action. These ideas and his personal activitiesfor their realization were well known to English friends, as in hisletters to Cobden and Bright, and to the English public in generalthrough Sumner's speeches, for Sumner had long been a well-known figurein the British press[864]. 

Lincoln, never an "Abolitionist, " in spite of his famous utterance inthe 'fifties that the United States could not indefinitely continue toexist "half-slave and half-free, " had, in 1861, disapproved and recalledthe orders of some of the military leaders, like Fremont, who withoutauthority had sought to extend emancipation to slaves within the linesof their command. But as early as anyone he had foreseen the gradualemergence of emancipation as a war problem, at first dangerous to thatwise "border state policy" which had prevented the more northern of theslave states from seceding. His first duty was to restore the Union andto that he gave all his energy, yet that emancipation, when the time wasripe, was also in Lincoln's mind is evident from the gradual approachthrough legislation and administrative act. In February, 1862, a Billwas under discussion in Congress, called the "Confiscation Bill, " which, among other clauses, provided that all slaves of persons engaged inrebellion against the United States, who should by escape, or capture, come into the possession of the military forces of the United States, should be for ever free; but that this provision should not be operativeuntil the expiration of sixty days, thus giving slave-owners opportunityto cease their rebellion and retain their slaves[865]. This measure didnot at first have Lincoln's approval for he feared its effect on theloyalists of the border states. Nevertheless he realized the growingstrength of anti-slavery sentiment in the war and fully sympathized withit where actual realization did not conflict with the one great objectof his administration. Hence in March, 1862, he heartily concurred in ameasure passed rapidly to Presidential approval, April 16, freeing theslaves in the District of Columbia, a territory where there was noquestion of the constitutional power of the national Government. 

From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipationproclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflictbetween Congress and President as to methods and extent of emancipation. Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, looking steadilytoward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength of anti-slavery inthe North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and compensated emancipation. Neither party spoke the word "servile insurrection, " yet both realizedits possibility, and Seward, in foreign affairs, was quick to see anduse it as a threat. A brief summary of measures will indicate thecontest. March 6, Lincoln sent a message to Congress recommending that ajoint resolution be passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the nationalGovernment to any state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowedpurpose being to secure early action by the loyal border states in thehope that this might influence the Southern states[866]. Neither theHouse of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to thisresolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in debate, but itpassed by substantial majorities in both branches and was approved byLincoln on April 10. In effect the extreme radical element in Congresshad yielded, momentarily, to the President's insistence on anolive-branch offering of compensated emancipation. Both as regards theborder states and looking to the restoration of the Union, Lincoln wasdetermined to give this line of policy a trial. The prevailingsentiment of Congress, however, preferred the punitive ConfiscationBill. 

At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the "Department of theSouth, " which theoretically included also the States of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the slaves in thesestates free. This was May 9, 1862. Lincoln immediately countermandedHunter's order, stating that such action "under my responsibility, Ireserve to myself[867]. " He renewed, in this same proclamation, earnestappeals to the border states, to embrace the opportunity offered by theCongressional resolution of April 10. In truth, border state attitudewas the test of the feasibility of Lincoln's hoped-for voluntaryemancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan. Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the ConfiscationBill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for hissignature or veto. He signed it on July 12, _but did not notify thatfact to Congress until July 17. _ On this same day of signature, July 12, Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid involuntary state emancipation and held a conference with thecongressional representatives of the border states seeking theirdefinite approval of his policy. A minority agreed but the majority wereemphatically against him. The Confiscation Bill would not affect theborder states; they were not in rebellion. And they did not desire tofree the slaves even if compensated[868]. 

Thus Lincoln, by the stubbornness of the border states, was forcedtoward the Congressional point of view as expressed in the ConfiscationBill. On the day following his failure to win the border staterepresentatives he told Seward and Welles who were driving with him, that he had come to the conclusion that the time was near for the issueof a proclamation of emancipation as a military measure fully within thecompetence of the President. This was on July 13[869]. Seward offered afew objections but apparently neither Cabinet official did more thanlisten to Lincoln's argument of military necessity. Congress adjournedon July 17. On July 22, the President read to the Cabinet a draft of anemancipation proclamation the text of the first paragraph of whichreferred to the Confiscation Act and declared that this would berigorously executed unless rebellious subjects returned to theirallegiance. But the remainder of the draft reasserted the ideal of agradual and compensated emancipation and concluded with the warning thatfor states still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, a general emancipationof slaves would be proclaimed[870]. All of the Cabinet approved exceptBlair who expressed fears of the effect on the approaching Novemberelections, and Seward who, while professing sympathy with the indicatedpurpose, argued that the time was badly chosen in view of recentmilitary disasters and the approach of Lee's army toward Washington. Themeasure, Seward said, might "be viewed as the last measure of anexhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forthits hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands tothe government. It will be considered our last _shriek_ on the retreat. "He therefore urged postponement until after a Northern victory. Thisappealed to Lincoln and he "put the draft of the proclamation aside, waiting for victory[871]. "

Victory came in September, with McClellan's defeat of Lee at Antietam, and the retreat of the Southern army toward Richmond. Five days later, September 22, Lincoln issued the proclamation, expanded and altered intext from the draft of July 22, but in substance the same[872]. Theloyal border states were not to be affected, but the proclamationrenewed the promise of steps to be taken to persuade them to voluntaryaction. On January 1, 1863, a second proclamation, referring to that ofSeptember 22, was issued by Lincoln "by virtue of the power in me vestedas commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in timeof actual armed rebellion against the authority and Government of theUnited States. . . . " The states affected were designated by name and allpersons held as slaves within them "are, and henceforward shall be, free. . . . " "I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free toabstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence. . . . " "Andupon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted bythe Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the consideratejudgment of mankind, and the gracious favour of Almighty God[873]. "

Such were the steps, from December, 1861, when the radical Sumner beganhis pressure for action, to September, 1862, when Lincoln's pledge ofemancipation was made. Did these steps indicate, as British opinionunquestionably held, an intention to rouse a servile insurrection? Wasthe Confiscation Bill passed with that purpose in view and had Lincolndecided to carry it into effect? The failure of the slaves to rise is, indeed, the great marvel of the Civil War and was so regarded not inEngland only, but in America also. It was the expectation of the Northand the constant fear of the South. But was this, in truth, the_purpose_ of the emancipation proclamation?

This purpose has been somewhat summarily treated by Americanhistorians, largely because of lack of specific evidence as to motivesat the time of issue. Two words "military necessity" are made to covernearly the entire argument for emancipation in September, 1862, but injust what manner the military prowess of the North was to be increasedwas not at first indicated. In 1864, Lincoln declared that after thefailure of successive efforts to persuade the border states to acceptcompensated emancipation he had believed there had arrived the"indispensable necessity for military emancipation and arming theblacks[874]. " Repeatedly in later defence of the proclamation he urgedthe benefits that had come from his act and asserted that commanders inthe field "believe the emancipation policy and the use of colouredtroops constitute the heaviest blow yet dealt to the rebellion[875]. " Headded: "negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they doanything for us, if we will do nothing for them? If they stake theirlives for us, they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even thepromise of freedom. "

There is no note here of stirring a servile insurrection; nor didLincoln ever acknowledge that such a purpose had been in his mind, though the thought of such possible result must have been present--was, indeed, present to most minds even without a proclamation ofemancipation. Lincoln's alleged purpose was simply to draw away slaves, wherever possible, from their rebellious masters, thus reducing theeconomic powers of resistance of the South, and then to make theseex-slaves directly useful in winning the war. But after the war, evenhere and there during it, a theory was advanced that an impelling motivewith the President had been the hope of influencing favourably foreigngovernments and peoples by stamping the Northern cause with a high moralpurpose. In popular opinion, Lincoln came to be regarded as afar-visioned statesman in anticipating that which ultimately came topass. This has important bearing on the relations of the United Statesand Great Britain. 

There is no doubt that nearly every Northern American had believed in1860, that anti-slavery England would sympathize strongly with theNorth. The event did not prove this to be the case, nor could the Northjustly complain in the face of administration denials of an anti-slaverypurpose. The English Government therefore was widely upheld by Britishopinion in regarding the struggle from the point of view of Britishinterests. Yet any Northern step antagonistic to the institution ofslavery compelled British governmental consideration. As early asDecember, 1860, before the war began, Bunch, at Charleston, had reporteda conversation with Rhett, in which the latter frankly declared that theSouth would expect to revive the African Slave Trade[876]. This waslimited in the constitution later adopted by the Confederacy which insubstance left the matter to the individual states--a condition thatSouthern agents in England found it hard to explain[877]. As alreadynoted, the ardent friends of the North continued to insist, even afterLincoln's denial, that slavery was the real cause of the Americanrupture[878]. By September, 1861, John Bright was writing to his friendSumner that, all indications to the contrary, England would warmlysupport the North if only it could be shown that emancipation was anobject[879]. Again and again he urged, it is interesting to note, justthose ideals of gradual and compensated emancipation which were sostrongly held by Lincoln. In this same month the _Spectator_ thought itwas "idle to strive to ignore the very centre and spring of alldisunion, " and advised a "prudent audacity in striking at the causerather than at the effect[880]. " Three weeks later the _Spectator_, reviewing general British press comments, summed them up as follows:

 "If you make it a war of emancipation we shall think you madmen, and tell you so, though the ignorant instincts of Englishmen will support you. And if you follow our counsel in holding a tight rein on the Abolitionists, we shall applaud your worldly wisdom so far; but shall deem it our duty to set forth continually that you have forfeited all claim to the _popular_ sympathy of England. "

This, said the _Spectator_, had been stated in the most objectionablestyle by the _Times_ in particular, which, editorially, had alleged that"the North has now lost the chance of establishing a high moralsuperiority by a declaration against slavery. " To all this the_Spectator_ declared that the North must adopt the bold course and makeclear that restoration of the Union was not intended with the old cankerat its roots[881]. 

Official England held a different view. Russell believed that theseparation of North and South would conduce to the extinction of slaverysince the South, left to itself and fronted by a great and prosperousfree North, with a population united in ideals, would be forced, ultimately, to abandon its "special system. " He professed that he couldnot understand Mrs. Stowe's support of the war and thought she andSumner "animated by a spirit of vengeance[882]. " If the South did yieldand the Union were restored _with_ slavery, Russell thought that"Slavery would prevail all over the New World. For that reason I wishfor separation[883]. " These views were repeated frequently by Russell. He long had a fixed idea on the moral value of separation, but wascareful to state, "I give you these views merely as speculations, " andit is worthy of note that after midsummer of 1862 he rarely indulged inthem. Against such speculations, whether by Russell or by others, Millprotested in his famous article in _Fraser's_, February, 1862[884]. 

On one aspect of slavery the North was free to act and early did so. Seward proposed to Lyons a treaty giving mutual right of search off theAfrican Coast and on the coasts of Cuba for the suppression of theAfrican Slave Trade. Such a treaty had long been urged by Great Britainbut persistently refused by the United States. It could not well bedeclined now by the British Government and was signed by Seward, April8, 1862[885], but if he expected any change in British attitude as aresult he was disappointed. The renewal by the South of that trade mightbe a barrier to British goodwill, but the action of the North was viewedas but a weak attempt to secure British sympathy, and to mark the limitsof Northern anti-slavery efforts. Indeed, the Government was not eagerfor the treaty on other grounds, since the Admiralty had never "felt anyinterest in the suppression of the slave trade . . . Whatever they havedone . . . They have done grudgingly and imperfectly[886]. "

This was written at the exact period when Palmerston and Russell wereinitiating those steps which were to result in the Cabinet crisis onmediation in October-November, 1862. Certainly the Slave Trade treatywith America had not influenced governmental attitude. At this juncturethere was founded, November, 1862, the London Emancipation Society, withthe avowed object of stirring anti-slavery Englishmen in protest against"favouring the South. " But George Thompson, its organizer, had beenengaged in the preliminary work of organization for some months and theSociety is therefore to be regarded as an expression of that small groupwho were persistent and determined in assertion of slavery as the causeand object of the Civil War, before the issue of Lincoln'sproclamation[887]. Thus for England as a whole and for official Englandthe declarations of these few voices were regarded as expressive of awish rather than as consistent with the facts. The moral uplift of ananti-slavery object was denied to the North. 

This being so did Lincoln seek to correct the foreign view by theemancipation proclamation? There is some, but scant ground for sobelieving. It is true that this aspect had at various times, thoughrarely, been presented to the President. Carl Schurz, American Ministerat Madrid, wrote to Seward as early as September 14, 1861, stronglyurging the declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war andasserting that public opinion in Europe would then be such in favour ofthe North that no government would "dare to place itself, by declarationor act, upon the side of a universally condemned institution[888]. "There is no evidence that Seward showed this despatch to Lincoln, but inJanuary, 1862, Schurz returned to America and in conversation with thePresident urged the "moral issue" to prevent foreign intervention. ThePresident replied: "You may be right. Probably you are. I have beenthinking so myself. I cannot imagine that any European power would dareto recognize and aid the Southern Confederacy if it became clear thatthe Confederacy stands for slavery and the Union for freedom[889]. " Nodoubt others urged upon him the same view. Indeed, one sincere foreignfriend, Count Gasparin, who had early written in favour of theNorth[890], and whose opinions were widely read, produced a second workin the spring of 1862, in which the main theme was "slavery the issue. "The author believed emancipation inevitable and urged an instantproclamation of Northern _intention_ to free the slaves[891]. Presumably, Lincoln was familiar with this work. Meanwhile Sumnerpressed the same idea though adding the prevalent abolition argumentswhich did not, necessarily, involve thought of foreign effect. On thegeneral question of emancipation Lincoln listened, even telling Sumnerthat he "was ahead of himself only a month or six weeks[892]. "

Yet after the enactment of the "confiscation bill" in July, 1862, whenstrong abolitionist pressure was brought on the President to issue ageneral proclamation of emancipation, he reasserted in the famous replyto Greeley, August 22, 1862, his one single purpose to restore the Union"with or without slavery. "

 "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. 

 "If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. 

 "_My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery_[893]. "

Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknownto the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussedin Cabinet the emancipation proclamation. Greeley had presentedabolitionist demands essential to cement the North. A month later, September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, hadan audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laidstress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe. This was butnine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln repliedmuch as to Greeley, though he stated, "I will also concede thatEmancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we areincited by something more than ambition[894]. " Immediately after theevent, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party, Lincoln said, "I can only trust in God I have made no mistake. . . . It isnow for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, takeaction upon it[895]. " Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annualmessage to Congress, he noted a "much improved" tone in foreigncountries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dweltmainly on the beneficial effects at home[896]. 

Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have beenconvinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation. On the contrary, if he trusted Seward's judgment he may have _feared_the effect on Europe, for such was Seward's prophecy. Here may have lainthe true meaning of Lincoln's speech of September 24--that it was nowfor "the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it. " Afterall foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to thePresident's control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout thisentire period of six months since the introduction of the ConfiscationBill up to Lincoln's presentation of his draft proclamation to theCabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servileinsurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention. Attimes Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation--attimes not. 

Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal toEurope on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he could notstate explicitly, the "noble" cause of the North. He had been met withwhat he considered a "cold" and premature as well as unjustifiabledeclaration of neutrality. From the first day of the conflict Lyons andMercier had been constant in representing the hardships inflicted by theAmerican war upon the economic interests of their respective countries. Both men bore down upon the interruption of the cotton trade and Sewardkept repeating that Northern victories would soon release the rawcotton. He expected and promised much from the capture of New Orleans, but the results were disappointing. As time went on Seward becameconvinced that material interests alone would determine the attitude andaction of Great Britain and France. But the stored supplies were on handin the South, locked in by the blockade and would be available when thewar was over _provided_ the war did not take on an uncivilized andsanguinary character through a rising of the slaves. If that occurredcotton would be burned and destroyed and cotton supply to Europe wouldbe not merely a matter of temporary interruption, but one oflong-continued dearth with no certainty of early resumption. Fearing thegrowth in England, especially, of an intention to intervene, Sewardthreatened a Northern appeal to the slaves, thinking of the threat notso much in terms of an uncivilized and horrible war as in terms of thematerial interests of Great Britain. In brief, considering foreignattitude and action in its relation to Northern advantage--to thewinning of the war--he would use emancipation as a threat of servileinsurrection, but did not desire emancipation itself for fear it wouldcause that very intervention which it was his object to prevent. 

His instructions are wholly in line with this policy. In February, 1862, the Confiscation Bill had been introduced in Congress. In April, Mercier's trip to Richmond[897] had caused much speculation and startedmany rumours in London of plans of mediation[898]. On May 28, Sewardwrote to Adams at great length and especially emphasized two points:first that while diplomats abroad had hitherto been interdicted fromdiscussing slavery as an issue in the war, they were now authorized tostate that the war was, in part at least, intended for the suppressionof slavery, and secondly, that the North if interfered with by foreignnations would be forced to have recourse to a servile war. Such a war, Seward argued, would be "completely destructive of all Europeaninterests[899]. . . . " A copy of this instruction Adams gave to Russell onJune 20. Eight days later Adams told Cobden in reply to a query aboutmediation that it would result in a servile war[900]. Evidently Adamsperfectly understood Seward's policy. 

On July 13, Lincoln told Seward and Welles of the planned emancipationproclamation and that this was his first mention of it to anyone. Sewardcommented favourably but wished to consider the proposal in all itsbearings before committing himself[901]. The day following hetransmitted to agents abroad a copy of the Bill that day introduced intoCongress embodying Lincoln's plan for gradual and compensatedemancipation. This was prompt transmittal--and was unusual. Seward sentthe Bill without material comment[902], but it is apparent that thismethod and measure of emancipation would much better fit in with histheory of the slavery question in relation to foreign powers, than wouldan outright proclamation of emancipation. 

Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in Britishneutral policy was increasing. July 11, Adams reported that he hadlearned "from a credible source" that the British Cabinet might soon"take new ground[903]. " This despatch if it reached Seward previous tothe Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction ofthe inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation. In that Cabinet, Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement thathe advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of aNorthern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton'snotes of the meeting, "That foreign nations will intervene to preventthe abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton. . . . We break up ourrelations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixtyyears[904]. " These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponedaction. Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adamscovering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which, fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905]. In it therewas renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid theSouth, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized. Sewardwas clinging to his theory of correct policy. 

Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in governmentalcircles abroad--at least in England. On July 21, the day beforeLincoln's proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, Stuart in reviewingmilitary prospects wrote: "Amongst the means relied upon for weakeningthe South is included a servile war[906]. " To this Russell replied: ". . . I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only makeother nations more desirous to see an end of this desolating anddestructive conflict[907]. " This was but brief reiteration of a moreexact statement by Russell made in comment on Seward's first hint ofservile war in his despatch to Adams of May 28, a copy of which had beengiven to Russell on June 20. On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward'sarguments, commented on the fast increasing bitterness of the Americanconflict, disturbing and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote:

 "The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr. Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a country so lately prosperous and tranquil[908]. "

In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on theConfiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses. Stuartpresented a copy of the despatch to Seward on August 16[909]. On August22, Stuart learned of Lincoln's plan and reported it as purely amanoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreigngovernments[910]. Where did Stuart get the news if not from Seward, since he also reported the latter's success in postponing theproclamation?

In brief both Seward and Russell were regarding emancipation in thelight of an incitement to servile insurrection, and both believed suchan event would add to the argument for foreign intervention. The_threat_ Seward had regarded as useful; the _event_ would be highlydangerous to the North. Not so, however, did emancipation appear inprospect to American diplomats abroad. Adams was a faithful servant inattempting to carry out the ideas and plans of his chief, but as earlyas February, 1862, he had urged a Northern declaration in regard toslavery in order to meet in England Southern private representationsthat, independence won, the South would enter upon a plan of gradualemancipation to be applied "to all persons born after some specificdate[911]. " Motley, at Vienna, frequently after February, 1862, inprivate letters to his friends in America, urged some forward step onslavery[912], but no such advice in despatches found its way into theselected correspondence annually sent to print by Seward. Far moreimportant was the determination taken by Adams, less than a month afterhe had presented to Russell the "servile war" threat policy of Seward, to give advice to his chief that the chances of foreign interventionwould be best met by the distinct avowal of an anti-slavery object inthe war and that the North should be prepared to meet an European offerof mediation by declaring that if made to extinguish slavery suchmediation would be welcome. This Adams thought would probably put an endto the mediation itself, but it would also greatly strengthen theNorthern position abroad[913]. 

This was no prevision of an emancipation proclamation; but it wasassertion of the value of a higher "moral issue. " Meanwhile, on July 24, Seward still fearful of the effects abroad of emancipation, wrote toMotley, asking whether he was "sure" that European powers would not beencouraged in interference, because of material interests, by a Northernattempt to free the slaves[914]. Motley's answer began, "A thousandtimes No, " and Adams repeated his plea for a moral issue[915]. September25, Adams met Seward's "material interests" argument by declaring thatfor Great Britain the chief difficulty in the cotton situation was notscarcity, but uncertainty, and that if English manufacturers could butknow what to expect there would be little "cotton pressure" on theGovernment[916]. Thus leading diplomats abroad did not agree withSeward, but the later advices of Adams were not yet received when theday, September 22, arrived on which Lincoln issued the proclamation. Onthat day in sending the text to Adams the comment of Seward was brief. The proclamation, he said, put into effect a policy the approach ofwhich he had "heretofore indicated to our representatives abroad, " andhe laid emphasis on the idea that the main purpose of the proclamationwas to convince the South that its true interests were in thepreservation of the Union--which is to say that the hoped-for result wasthe return of the South _with its slaves_[917]. Certainly this was farfrom a truthful representation, but its purpose is evident. Seward'sfirst thought was that having held up the threat of servile insurrectionhe must now remove that bogie. Four days later his judgment wasimproved, for he began, and thereafter maintained with vigour, the "highmoral purpose" argument as evinced in the emancipation proclamation. "The interests of humanity, " he wrote to Adams, "have now becomeidentified with the cause of our country[918]. . . . "

That the material interests of Great Britain were still in Seward'sthought is shown by the celerity with which under Lincoln's orders hegrasped at an unexpected opening in relation to liberated slaves. Stuartwrote in mid-September that Mr. Walker, secretary of the colony ofBritish Guiana, was coming from Demerara to Washington to secureadditional labour for the British colony by offering to carry awayex-slaves[919]. This scheme was no secret and five days after the issueof the proclamation Seward proposed to Stuart a convention by which theBritish Government would be permitted to transport to the West Indies, or to any of its colonies, the negroes about to be emancipated. OnSeptember 30, Adams was instructed to take up the matter at London[920]. Russell was at first disinclined to consider such a convention anddiscussion dragged until the spring of 1864, when it was again proposed, this time by Russell, but now declined by Seward. In its immediateinfluence in the fall of 1862, Seward's offer had no effect on theattitude of the British Government[921]. 

To Englishmen and Americans alike it has been in later years a matterfor astonishment that the emancipation proclamation did not at onceconvince Great Britain of the high purposes of the North. But if it beremembered that in the North itself the proclamation was greeted, saveby a small abolitionist faction, with doubt extending even to bitteropposition and that British governmental and public opinion had longdreaded a servile insurrection--even of late taking its cue fromSeward's own prophecies--the cool reception given by the Government, thevehement and vituperative explosions of the press do not seem sosurprising. "This Emancipation Proclamation, " wrote Stuart on September23, "seems a brutum fulmen[922]. " One of the President's motives, hethought, was to affect public opinion in England. "But there is nopretext of humanity about the Proclamation. . . . It is merely aConfiscation Act, or perhaps worse, for it offers direct encouragementto servile insurrections[923]. " Received in England during the Cabinetstruggle over mediation the proclamation appears not to have affectedthat controversy, though Russell sought to use it as an argument forBritish action. In his memorandum, circulated October 13, Russell stroveto show that the purpose and result would be servile war. He dwelt bothon the horrors of such a war, and on its destruction of industry:

 "What will be the practical effect of declaring emancipation, not as an act of justice and beneficence, dispensed by the Supreme Power of the State, but as an act of punishment and retaliation inflicted by a belligerent upon a hostile community, it is not difficult to foresee. Wherever the arms of the United States penetrate, a premium will be given to acts of plunder, of incendiarism, and of revenge. The military and naval authorities of the United States will be bound by their orders to maintain and protect the perpetrators of such acts. Wherever the invasion of the Southern States is crowned by victory, society will be disorganized, industry suspended, large and small proprietors of land alike reduced to beggary[924]. "

The London newspaper press was very nearly a unit in treating theproclamation with derision and contempt and no other one situation inthe Civil War came in for such vigorous denunciation. Citations settingforth such comment have frequently been gathered together illustrativeof the extent of press condemnation and of its unity in viciouseditorials[925]. There is no need to repeat many of them here, but a fewwill indicate their tone. The _Times_ greeted the news with an assertionthat this was a final desperate play by Lincoln, as hope of victorywaned. It was his "last card[926], " a phrase that caught the fancy oflesser papers and was repeated by them. October 21, appeared the"strongest" of the _Times_ editorials:

[Illustration: ABE LINCOLN'S LAST CARD; OR, ROUGE-ET-NOIR. _Reproducedby permission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

 ". . . We have here the history of the beginning of the end, but who can tell how the pages will be written which are yet to be filled before the inevitable separation is accomplished? Are scenes like those which we a short time since described from Dahomey yet to interpose, and is the reign of the last PRESIDENT to go out amid horrible massacres of white women and children, to be followed by the extermination of the black race in the South? Is LINCOLN yet a name not known to us as it will be known to posterity, and is it ultimately to be classed among that catalogue of monsters, the wholesale assassins and butchers of their kind?

 ". . . We will attempt at present to predict nothing as to what the consequence of Mr. Lincoln's new policy may be, except that it certainly will not have the effect of restoring the Union. It will not deprive Mr. Lincoln of the distinctive affix which he will share with many, for the most part foolish and incompetent, Kings and Emperors, Caliphs and Doges, that of being LINCOLN--'the Last. '"

The _Times_ led the way; other papers followed on. The _Liverpool Post_thought a slave rising inevitable[927], as did also nearly every paperacknowledging anti-Northern sentiments, or professedly neutral, whileeven pro-Northern journals at first feared the same results[928]. Another striking phrase, "Brutum Fulmen, " ran through many editorials. The _Edinburgh Review_ talked of Lincoln's "cry of despair[929], " whichwas little different from Seward's feared "last shriek. " _Blackwood's_thought the proclamation "monstrous, reckless, devilish. " It "justifiesthe South in raising the black flag, and proclaiming a war withoutquarter[930]. " But there is no need to expand the citation of thewell-nigh universal British press pouring out of the wrath of heavenupon Lincoln, and his emancipation proclamation[931]. 

Even though there can be no doubt that the bulk of England at firstexpected servile war to follow the proclamation it is apparent that hereand there a part of this British wrath was due to a fear that, in spiteof denials of such influence, the proclamation was intended to arousepublic opinion against projects of intervention and _might so arouseit_. The New York correspondent of the _Times_ wrote that it was"promulgated evidently as a sop to keep England and France quiet[932], "and on October 9, an editorial asserted that Lincoln had "a veryimportant object. There is a presentiment in the North that recognitioncannot be delayed, and this proclamation is aimed, not at the negro orthe South, but at Europe. " _Bell's Weekly Messenger_ believed that itwas now "the imperative duty of England and France to do what they canin order to prevent the possible occurrence of a crime which, if carriedout, would surpass in atrocity any similar horror the world has everseen[933]. " "Historicus, " on the other hand, asked: "What is thatsolution of the negro question to which an English Government isprepared to affix the seal of English approbation[934]?" Mason, theConfederate Agent in London, wrote home that it was generally believedthe proclamation was issued "as the means of warding off recognition. . . . It was seen through at once and condemned accordingly[935]. "

This interpretation of Northern purpose in no sense negatives the dictumthat the proclamation exercised little influence on immediate Britishgovernmental policy, but does offer some ground for the belief thatstrong pro-Southern sympathizers at once saw the need of combating anargument dangerous to the carrying out of projects of mediation. Yet thenew "moral purpose" of Lincoln did not immediately appeal even to hisfriends. The _Spectator_ deplored the lack of a clean-cut declaration infavour of the principle of human freedom: "The principle asserted isnot that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot ownhim unless he is loyal to the United States. " . . . "There is no moralitywhatever in such a decree, and if approved at all it must be upon itsmerits as a political measure[936]. " Two weeks later, reporting a publicspeech at Liverpool by ex-governor Morehead of Kentucky, in whichLincoln was accused of treachery to the border states, the _Spectator_, while taking issue with the speaker's statements, commented that it wasnot to be understood as fully defending a system of government whichchose its executive "from the ranks of half-educated mechanics[937]. "

Similarly in America the emancipation proclamation, though loudlyapplauded by the abolitionists, was received with misgivings. Lincolnwas disappointed at the public reaction and became very despondent, though this was due, in part, to the failure of McClellan to follow upthe victory of Antietam. The elections of October and November wentheavily against the administration and largely on the alleged ground ofthe President's surrender to the radicals[938]. The army as a whole wasnot favourably stirred by the proclamation; it was considered at best asbut a useless bit of "waste paper[939]. " In England, John Bright, themost ardent public advocate of the Northern cause, was slow to applaudheartily; not until December did he give distinct approval, and eventhen in but half-hearted fashion, though he thought public interest wasmuch aroused and that attention was now fixed on January 1, the date setby Lincoln for actual enforcement of emancipation[940]. In a speech atBirmingham, December 18, Bright had little to say of emancipation;rather he continued to use previous arguments against the South foradmitting, as Vice-President Stephens had declared, that slavery was thevery "corner-stone" of Southern institutions and society[941]. A fewpublic meetings at points where favour to the North had been shown weretried in October and November with some success but with no great showof enthusiasm. It was not until late December that the wind of publicopinion, finding that no faintest slave-rising had been created by theproclamation began to veer in favour of the emancipation edict[942]. Bythe end of the year it appeared that the Press, in holding up horrifiedhands and prophesying a servile war had "overshot the mark[943]. "

Soon the changing wind became a gale of public favour for the cause ofemancipation, nor was this lessened--rather increased--by JeffersonDavis' proclamation of December 23, 1862, in which he declared thatLincoln had approved "of the effort to excite a servile insurrection, "and that therefore it was now ordered "all negro slaves captured in armsbe at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respectiveStates to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws ofsaid State. " This by state laws meant death to the slave fighting forhis freedom, even as a regular soldier in the Northern armies, and gavea good handle for accusations of Southern ferocity[944]. 

Official opinion was not readily altered, Lyons writing in December thatthe promised January proclamation might still mean servile war. He hopedthat neither Lincoln's proclamation nor Davis' threat of retaliationwould be carried into effect[945]. Russell regarded the January 1proclamation as "a measure of war of a very questionable kind[946]. "

But the British anti-slavery public, now recovered from its fears of an"abolition war" was of another temper. Beginning with the last week ofDecember, 1862, and increasing in volume in each succeeding month, theretook place meeting after meeting at which strong resolutions were passedenthusiastically endorsing the issue of the emancipation proclamationand pledging sympathy to the cause of the North. The _Liberator_ fromweek to week, listed and commented on these public meetings, notingfifty-six held between December 30, 1862, and March 20, 1863. TheAmerican Minister reported even more, many of which sent to him engravedresolutions or presented them in person through selected delegations. The resolutions were much of the type of that adopted at Sheffield, January 10:

 "_Resolved_: that this meeting being convinced that slavery is the cause of the tremendous struggle now going on in the American States, and that the object of the leaders of the rebellion is the perpetuation of the unchristian and inhuman system of chattel slavery, earnestly prays that the rebellion may be crushed, and its wicked object defeated, and that the Federal Government may be strengthened to pursue its emancipation policy till not a slave be left on the American soil[947]. "

Adams quoted the _Times_ as referring to these meetings as made up of"nobodies. " Adams commented:

 "They do not indeed belong to the high and noble class, but they are just those nobodies who formerly forced their most exalted countrymen to denounce the prosecution of the Slave Trade by the commercial adventurers at Liverpool and Bristol, and who at a later period overcame all their resistance to the complete emancipation of the negro slaves in the British dependencies. If they become once fully aroused to a sense of the importance of this struggle as a purely moral question, I feel safe in saying there will be an end of all effective sympathy in Great Britain with the rebellion[948]. "

Adams had no doubt "that these manifestations are the genuine expressionof the feelings of the religious dissenting and of the working classes, "and was confident the Government would be much influenced by them[949]. The newspapers, though still editorially unfavourable to theemancipation proclamation, accepted and printed communications withincreasing frequency in which were expressed the same ideas as in thepublic meetings. This was even more noticeable in the provincial press. Samuel A. Goddard, a merchant of Birmingham, was a prolific letterwriter to the _Birmingham Post_, consistently upholding the Northerncause and he now reiterated the phrase, "Mr. Lincoln's cause is just andholy[950]. " In answer to Southern sneers at the failure of theproclamation to touch slavery in the border states, Goddard made clearthe fact that Lincoln had no constitutional "right" to apply his edictto states not in rebellion[951]. On the public platform no one equalledthe old anti-slavery orator, George Thompson, in the number of meetingsattended and addresses made. In less than a month he had spokentwenty-one times and often in places where opposition was in evidence. Everywhere Thompson found an aroused and encouraged anti-slaveryfeeling, now strongly for the North[952]. 

Eight years earlier five hundred thousand English women had united in anaddress to America on behalf of the slaves. Harriet Beecher Stowe nowreplied to this and asked the renewed sympathy of her English sisters. Alargely signed "round robin" letter assured her that English women werestill the foes of slavery and were indignantly united againstsuggestions of British recognition of the South[953]. Working classBritain was making its voice heard in support of the North. To those ofManchester, Lincoln, on January 19, 1863, addressed a special letter ofthanks for their earnest support while undergoing personal hardshipsresulting from the disruption of industry caused by the war. "I cannot"he wrote, "but regard your decisive utterances upon the question [ofhuman slavery] as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has notbeen surpassed in any age or in any country[954]. " Nonconformist Englandnow came vigorously to the support of the North. Spurgeon, in London, made his great congregation pray with him: "God bless and strengthenthe North; give victory to their arms[955]. " Further and more generalexpression of Nonconformist church sympathy came as a result of a letterreceived February 12, 1863, from a number of French pastors and laymen, urging all the Evangelical churches to unite in an address to Lincoln. The London and Manchester Emancipation Societies combined in drawing upa document for signature by pastors and this was presented for adoptionat a meeting in Manchester on June 3, 1863. In final form it was "AnAddress to Ministers and Pastors of All Christian Denominationsthroughout the States of America. " There was a "noisy opposition" butthe address was carried by a large majority and two representatives, Massie and Roylance, were selected to bear the message in person to thebrethren across the ocean[956]. Discussion arose over the Biblicalsanction of slavery. In the _Times_ appeared an editorial pleading thissanction and arguing the _duty_ of slaves to refuse liberty[957]. Goldwin Smith, Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, replied ina pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery[958]?" Hisposition and his skill in presentation made him a valuable ally tothe North. 

Thus British anti-slavery circles, previously on the defensive, becamearoused and enthusiastic when Lincoln's January 1, 1863, proclamationmade good his pledge of the previous September: other elements ofopinion, and in all classes, were strengthened in like measure, andeverywhere the first expression of fear of a servile insurrectionlargely disappeared. In truth, pro-Northern England went to suchlengths in its support of emancipation as to astound and alarm the_Saturday Review_, which called these demonstrations a "carnival ofcant[959]. " More neutral minds were perplexed over the practicaldifficulties and might well agree with Schleiden who wrote in January, 1863, quoting Machiavelli: "What is more difficult, to make free menslaves, or slaves free[960]?" But by the end of January the popularapproval of emancipation was in full swing. On the evening of thetwenty-ninth there took place in London at Exeter Hall, a great massmeeting unprecedented in attendance and enthusiasm. The meeting had beenadvertised for seven o'clock, but long before the hour arrived the hallwas jammed and the corridors filled. A second meeting was promptlyorganized for the lower hall, but even so the people seeking admissioncrowded Exeter Street and seriously impeded traffic in the Strand. Outdoor meetings listened to reports of what was going on in the Halland cheered the speakers. The main address was made by the Rev. NewmanHall, of Surrey Chapel. A few Southern sympathizers who attempted toheckle the speakers were quickly shouted down[961]. 

The "carnival of cant, " as the _Saturday Review_ termed it, was truly apopular demonstration, stirred by anti-slavery leaders, but supported bythe working and non-enfranchised classes. Its first effect was torestore courage and confidence to Northern supporters in the upperclasses. Bright had welcomed emancipation, yet with some misgivings. Henow joined in the movement and in a speech at Rochdale, February 3, on"Slavery and Secession, " gave full approval of Lincoln's efforts. 

In 1862, shortly after the appearance of Spence's _American Union_, which had been greeted with great interest in England and had influencedlargely upper-class attitude in favour of the South, Cairnes hadpublished his pamphlet, "Slave Power. " This was a reasoned analysis ofthe basis of slavery and a direct challenge to the thesis ofSpence[962]. England's "unnatural infatuation" for a slave power, Cairnes prophesied, would be short-lived. His pamphlet began to be readwith more conviction by that class which until now had been coldlyneutral and which wished a more reassured faith in the Northern causethan that stirred by the emotional reception given the emancipationproclamation. Yet at bottom it was emancipation that brought thisreasoning public to seek in such works as that of Cairnes a logicalbasis for a change of heart. Even in official circles, utterancespreviously made in private correspondence, or in governmentalconversations only, were now ventured in public by friends of the North. On April 1, 1863, at a banquet given to Palmerston in Edinburgh, theDuke of Argyll ventured to answer a reference made by Palmerston in aspeech of the evening previous in which had been depicted the horrors ofCivil War, by asking if Scotland were historically in a position toobject to civil wars having high moral purpose. "I, for one, " Argyllsaid, "have not learned to be ashamed of that ancient combination of theBible and the sword. Let it be enough for us to pray and hope that thecontest, whenever it may be brought to an end, shall bring with it thatgreat blessing to the white race which shall consist in the finalfreedom of the black[963]. "

The public meetings in England raised high the hope in America thatgovernmental England would show some evidence of a more friendlyattitude. Lincoln himself drafted a resolution embodying the ideas hethought it would be wise for the public meetings to adopt. It read:

 "Whereas, while _heretofore_ States, and Nations, have tolerated slavery, _recently_, for the first time in the world, an attempt has been made to construct a new Nation, upon the basis of, and with the primary, and fundamental object to maintain, enlarge, and perpetuate human slavery, therefore, _Resolved_: that no such embryo State should ever be recognized by, or admitted into, the family of Christian and civilized nations; and that all Christian and civilized men everywhere should, by all lawful means, resist to the utmost, such recognition or admission[964]. "

This American hope much disturbed Lyons. On his return to Washington, inNovember, 1862, he had regarded the emancipation proclamation as apolitical manoeuvre purely and an unsuccessful one. The administrationhe thought was losing ground and the people tired of the war. This wasthe burden of his private letters to Russell up to March, 1863, but doesnot appear in his official despatches in which there was nothing to giveoffence to Northern statesmen. But in March, Lyons began to doubt thecorrectness of these judgments. He notes a renewed Northern enthusiasmleading to the conferring of extreme powers--the so-called "dictatorshipmeasures"--upon Lincoln. Wise as Lyons ordinarily was he was bound bythe social and educational traditions of his class, and had at first notthe slightest conception of the force or effect of emancipation upon thepublic in middle-class England. He feared an American reaction againstEngland when it was understood that popular meetings would have noinfluence on the British Government. 

 "Mr. Seward and the whole Party calculate immensely on the effects of the anti-slavery meetings in England, and seem to fancy that public feeling in England is coming so completely round to the North that the Government will be obliged to favour the North in all ways, even if it be disinclined to do so. This notion is unlucky, as it makes those who hold it, unreasonable and presumptuous in dealing with us[965]. "

 * * * * *

Lincoln's plan of emancipation and his first proclamation had littlerelation to American foreign policy. Seward's attitude towardemancipation was that the _threat_ of it and of a possible servile warmight be useful in deterring foreign nations, especially Great Britain, from intervening. But he objected to the carrying of emancipation intoeffect because he feared it would _induce_ intervention. Servile war, inpart by Seward's own efforts, in part because of earlier Britishnewspaper speculations, was strongly associated with emancipation, inthe English view. Hence the Government received the September, 1862, proclamation with disfavour, the press with contempt, and the publicwith apprehension--even the friends of the North. But no servile warensued. In January, 1863, Lincoln kept his promise of wide emancipationand the North stood committed to a high moral object. A great wave ofrelief and exultation swept over anti-slavery England, but did not soquickly extend to governmental circles. It was largely that Englandwhich was as yet without direct influence on Parliament which so exultedand now upheld the North. Could this England of the people affectgovernmental policy and influence its action toward America? Lyonscorrectly interpreted the North and Seward as now more inclined to pressthe British Government on points previously glossed over, and in thesame month in which Lyons wrote this opinion there was coming to a heada controversy over Britain's duty as a neutral, which both during thewar and afterwards long seemed to Americans a serious and distinctlyunfriendly breach of British neutrality. This was the building inBritish ports of Confederate naval vessels of war. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 846: _Punch_, Nov. 22, 1862, has a cartoon picturingPalmerston as presenting this view to Napoleon III. ]

[Footnote 847: Rhodes, IV, p. 348. ]

[Footnote 848: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 875. No. 80. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, Jan. 27, 1863. This date would have permitted Mercier to bealready in receipt of Napoleon's instructions, though he gave no hint ofit in the interview with Lyons. ]

[Footnote 849: Mercier had in fact approached Stoeckl on a joint offerof mediation without England. Evidently Stoeckl had asked instructionsand those received made clear that Russia did not wish to be compelledto face such a question. She did not wish to offend France, and an offerwithout England had no chance of acceptance (Russian Archives, F. O. ToStoeckl, Feb. 16, 1863 (O. S. )). ]

[Footnote 850: F. O. Am. , Vol. 876. No. 108. Confidential. Lyons toRussell, Feb. 2, 1863. ]

[Footnote 851: Rhodes, IV, p. 348. ]

[Footnote 852: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 868, No. 86. ]

[Footnote 853: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXIX, pp. 5-53, and 69-152. ]

[Footnote 854: _Ibid. _, pp. 1714-41. March 23, 1863. ]

[Footnote 855: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, 208-9. To Ellice, May 5, 1861. ]

[Footnote 856: July 13, 1861. ]

[Footnote 857: Harriet Martineau, _Autobiography_, p. 508, To Mrs. Chapman, Aug. 8, 1861. ]

[Footnote 858: Sept. 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 859: _Saturday Review_, Nov. 17, 1860. ]

[Footnote 860: Russell Papers. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 861: Gladstone Papers. Russell to Gladstone, Jan. 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 862: Article in _Fraser's Magazine_, Feb. 1862, "The Contestin America. "]

[Footnote 863: Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CXLV, p. 387, Feb. 17, 1862. ]

[Footnote 864: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 41-48, and 63-69. ]

[Footnote 865: Raymond, _Life, Public Services and State Papers ofAbraham Lincoln_, p. 243. ]

[Footnote 866: _Ibid. _, pp. 229-32. ]

[Footnote 867: _Ibid. _, p. 233, May 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 868: A Bill was in fact introduced July 16, 1862, on the linesof Lincoln's "pecuniary aid" proposal of July 12, but no action wastaken on it. ]

[Footnote 869: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 70-71. ]

[Footnote 870: Abraham Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 213. ]

[Footnote 871: Rhodes, IV, pp. 71-2. ]

[Footnote 872: As issued September 22, the first paragraph refers to hisplan of securing legislation to aid compensated voluntary emancipation, the next sets the date January 1, 1863, for completed emancipation ofslaves in states still in rebellion and the remaining paragraphs concernthe carrying out of the confiscation law. Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, pp. 237-8. ]

[Footnote 873: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, 260-61. ]

[Footnote 874: Rhodes, IV, p. 214. ]

[Footnote 875: _Ibid. _, p. 410. In letter, August 26, 1863, addressed toa Springfield mass meeting of "unconditional Union men. "]

[Footnote 876: American Hist. Rev. , XVIII, pp. 784-7. Bunch to Russell, Dec. 5, 1860. ]

[Footnote 877: Southern Commissioners abroad early reported thatrecognition of independence and commercial treaties could not be securedunless the South would agree to "mutual right of search" treaties forthe suppression of the African Slave Trade. Davis' answer was that theConfederate constitution gave him no authority to negotiate such atreaty; indeed, denied him that authority since the constitution itselfprohibited the importation of negroes from Africa. For Benjamin'sinstructions see Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 591-96. ]

[Footnote 878: _Spectator_, May 4, 1861. ]

[Footnote 879: Sept. 6, 1861. In Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLVI, p. 95. ]

[Footnote 880: Sept. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 881: October 5, 1861. ]

[Footnote 882: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Oct. 26, 1861. ]

[Footnote 883: _Ibid. _, To Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861. The same ideas areofficially expressed by Russell to Lyons, March 7, 1861, and May 1, 1862. (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 818, No. 104, Draft; and _Ibid. _, Vol. 819, No. 197, Draft. ). ]

[Footnote 884: See ante, p. 81. ]

[Footnote 885: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1862-3, Pt. I, p. 65. ]

[Footnote 886: Ashley, _Palmerston_, II, p. 227. Palmerston to Russell, Aug. 13, 1862. ]

[Footnote 887: Garrison, _Garrison_, IV, p. 66. Many distinguished nameswere on the roster of the Society--Mill, Bright, Cobden, Lord Houghton, Samuel Lucas, Forster, Goldwin Smith, Justin McCarthy, Thomas Hughes, Cairns, Herbert Spencer, Francis Newman, the Rev. Newman Hall, andothers. Frederick W. Chesson was secretary, and very active inthe work. ]

[Footnote 888: Schurz, _Speeches and Correspondence_, I, 190. ]

[Footnote 889: Schurz, _Reminiscences_, II, 309. ]

[Footnote 890: Gasparin, _The Uprising of a Great People_, 1861. ]

[Footnote 891: Gasparin, _America before Europe_, Pt. V, Ch. III. Thepreface is dated March 4, 1862, and the work went through three Americaneditions in 1862. ]

[Footnote 892: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, p. 63. No exact date, but Spring of1862. ]

[Footnote 893: Raymond, _State Papers of Lincoln_, p. 253. ]

[Footnote 894: _Ibid. _, p. 256. ]

[Footnote 895: Rhodes, IV, p. 162. ]

[Footnote 896: Lincoln's _Complete Works_, II, p. 454. But the_after-comment_ by Lincoln as to purpose was nearly always in line withan unfinished draft of a letter to Charles D. Robinson, Aug. 17, 1864, when the specific object was said to be "inducing the coloured people tocome bodily over from the rebel side to ours. " _Ibid. _, p. 564. ]

[Footnote 897: See _ante_, Ch. IX. ]

[Footnote 898: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 83. Adams to Seward, May 8, 1862. ]

[Footnote 899: _Ibid. _, pp. 101-105. ]

[Footnote 900: _Ibid. _, p. 122. Adams to Seward, July 3, 1862. In hisdespatch Adams states the conversation to have occurred "last Saturday, "and with an "unofficial person, " who was sounding him on mediation. Thiswas Cobden. ]

[Footnote 901: Welles, _Diary_, I, p. 70. ]

[Footnote 902: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 135. ]

[Footnote 903: _Ibid. _, p. 133. To Seward. His informant was Baring. ]

[Footnote 904: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 333. ]

[Footnote 905: See _ante_, p. 35. ]

[Footnote 906: _Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of NorthAmerica. " No. 8. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 907: _Ibid. _, No. 10. Russell to Stuart, Aug. 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 908: _Ibid. _, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXV. "Further correspondencerelating to the Civil War in the United States of North America. " No. 2. To Stuart. ]

[Footnote 909: _Ibid. _, 1863, _Lords_, Vol. XXIX. "Correspondencerelating to the Civil War in the United States of North America, " No. 20. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 16, 1862. ]

[Footnote 910: See _ante_, p. 37. ]

[Footnote 911: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 78, No. 119. Adams toSeward, Feb. 21, 1862. This supplemented a similar representation madeon Jan. 17, 1862. (_U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 16. )]

[Footnote 912: e. G. , Motley, _Correspondence_, II, pp. 64-5. To O. W. Holmes, Feb. 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 913: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 140. Adams to Seward, July 17, 1862. ]

[Footnote 914: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 336. ]

[Footnote 915: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 191. Adams to Seward, Sept. 12, 1862. ]

[Footnote 916: _Ibid. _, p. 199. ]

[Footnote 917: _Ibid. _, p. 195. ]

[Footnote 918: _Ibid. _, p. 202. Seward to Adams, Sept. 26, 1862. Lyons, on his return to Washington, wrote that he found Seward's influence muchlessened, and that he had fallen in public estimation by his "signingthe Abolition Proclamation, which was imposed upon him, in opposition toall his own views, by the Radical Party in the Cabinet. " (RussellPapers. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 14, 1862. )]

[Footnote 919: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 19, 1862. ]

[Footnote 920: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3_, Pt. I, p. 202. Theinstruction went into great detail as to conditions and means. A similarinstruction was sent to Paris, The Hague, and Copenhagen. ]

[Footnote 921: There was much talk and correspondence on this projectfrom Sept. , 1862, to March, 1864. Stuart was suspicious of some "trap. "Russell at one time thought the United States was secretly planning tocolonize ex-slaves in Central America. Some of the Colonies were infavour of the plan. (Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 29, 1862. F. O. , Am. , Vol. 878, No. 177. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 24, 1863. )]

[Footnote 922: Lyons Papers. To Lyons. ]

[Footnote 923: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Sept. 26, 1862. ]

[Footnote 924: Gladstone Papers. British agents still residing in theSouth believed the proclamation would have little practical effect, butadded that if actually carried out the cultivation of cotton "would beas completely arrested as if an edict were pronounced against its futuregrowth, " and pictured the unfortunate results for the world at large. (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 846, No. 34. Cridland to Russell, Oct. 29, 1862. )]

[Footnote 925: See Rhodes, IV, 344, _notes_. ]

[Footnote 926: October 6, 1862. The _Times_ had used the "last card"phrase as early as Dec. 14, 1861, in speculations on the effect ofSumner's agitation for emancipation. ]

[Footnote 927: Oct. 6, 1862. ]

[Footnote 928: e. G. , _Dublin Nation_, Oct. 11, 1862. _ManchesterGuardian_, Oct. 7. _London Morning Advertiser_, Oct. 9. _North BritishReview_, Oct. , 1862. _London Press_, Oct. 11. _London Globe_, Oct. 6. _London Examiner_, Oct. 11, editorial: "The Black Flag, " and Oct. 18:"The Instigation to Servile War. " _Bell's Weekly Messenger_, Oct. 11. ]

[Footnote 929: October, 1862. ]

[Footnote 930: November, 1862. ]

[Footnote 931: It is worthy of note that the French offer of jointmediation made to Britain in October specified the danger of servile warresulting from the proclamation as a reason for European action. (France, _Documents Diplomatiques, 1862_, p. 142. )]

[Footnote 932: The _Times_, Oct. 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 933: Oct. 18, 1862. ]

[Footnote 934: Communication in the _Times_, Nov. 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 935: Richardson, II, 360. Mason to Benjamin, Nov. 6, 1862. ]

[Footnote 936: _Spectator_, Oct. 11, 1862. ]

[Footnote 937: _Ibid. _, Oct. 25, 1862. ]

[Footnote 938: Rhodes, IV, 162-64. ]

[Footnote 939: Perry, _Henry Lee Higginson_, p. 175. ]

[Footnote 940: Rhodes, IV, p. 349, _note_. Bright to Sumner, Dec. 6, 1862. ]

[Footnote 941: Rogers, _Speeches by John Bright_, I, pp. 216 ff. ]

[Footnote 942: _Liberator_, Nov. 28, 1862, reports a meeting at Leigh, Oct. 27, expressing sympathy with the North. At Sheffield, Dec. 31, 1862, an amended resolution calling for recognition of the South wasvoted down and the original pro-Northern resolutions passed. There werespeakers on both sides. _Liberator_, Jan. 23, 1863. ]

[Footnote 943: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 113. J. S. Mill toMotley, Jan. 26, 1863. ]

[Footnote 944: Richardson, I, p. 273. Davis' order applied also to allNorthern white officers commanding negro troops. It proved anidle threat. ]

[Footnote 945: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 30, 1862. Andagain, Jan. 2, 1863. "If it do not succeed in raising a servileinsurrection, it will be a very unsuccessful political move for itsauthors. " Stoeckl in conference with Seward, expressed regret that theemancipation proclamation had been issued, since it set up a furtherbarrier to the reconciliation of North and South--always the hope ofRussia. Seward replied that in executing the proclamation, there wouldbe, no doubt, many modifications. Stoeckl answered that then theproclamation must be regarded as but a futile menace. (Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F. O. , Nov. 19-Dec. 1, 1862, No. 2171. )]

[Footnote 946: Rhodes, IV, p. 357. ]

[Footnote 947: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 55. Adams to Seward, Jan. 16, 1863, transmitting this and other resolutionspresented to him. Adams by March 20 had reported meetings which sentresolutions to him, from Sheffield, Chesterfield, Derbyshire, Crophills, Salford, Cobham, Ersham, Weybridge, Bradford, Stroud, Bristol, Glasgow, Liverpool, South London, Bath, Leeds, Bromley, Middleton, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Aberdare, Oldham, Merthyr Tydfil, Paisley, Carlisle, Bury, Manchester, Pendleton, Bolton, Newcastle-on-Tyne, Huddersfield, Ashford, Ashton-under-Lyme, Mossley, Southampton, Newark, and York. See alsoRhodes, IV, 348-58, for résumé of meetings and opinions expressed. ]

[Footnote 948: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 81, No. 300. Adams toSeward, Jan. 22, 1863. ]

[Footnote 949: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Pt. I, p. 100. Adams to Seward, Feb. 5, 1863. ]

[Footnote 950: Goddard, _Letters on the American Rebellion_, p. 287. Goddard contributed seventy letters before 1863. ]

[Footnote 951: _Ibid. _, p. 307. Letter to _Daily Gazette_, May 2, 1863. ]

[Footnote 952: _The Liberator_, Feb. 27, 1863. At Bristol the oppositionelement introduced a resolution expressing abhorrence of slavery and thehope that the war in America might end in total emancipation, but addingthat "at the same time [this meeting] cannot but regard the policy ofPresident Lincoln in relation to slavery, as partial, insincere, inhuman, revengeful and altogether opposed to those high and nobleprinciples of State policy which alone should guide the counsels of agreat people. " The resolution was voted down, and one passed applaudingLincoln. The proposer of the resolution was also compelled to apologizefor slurring remarks on Thompson. ]

[Footnote 953: _Atlantic Monthly_, XI, p. 525. ]

[Footnote 954: Lincoln, _Complete Works_, II, p. 302. ]

[Footnote 955: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, p. 306. Also Rhodes, IV, p. 351. ]

[Footnote 956: Massie, _America: the Origin of Her Present Conflict_, London, 1864. This action and the tour of the two delegates in Americadid much to soothe wounded feelings which had been excited by acorrespondence in 1862-3 between English, French and American branchesof similar church organizations. See _New Englander_, April, 1863, p. 288. ]

[Footnote 957: Jan. 6, 1863. ]

[Footnote 958: Published Oxford and London, 1863. ]

[Footnote 959: Rhodes, IV, p. 355. ]

[Footnote 960: Lutz, _Notes_. Schleiden's despatch, No. 1, 1863. Germanopinion on the Civil War was divided; Liberal Germany sympathizedstrongly with the North; while the aristocratic and the landowning classstood for the South. The historian Karl Friedrich Neumann wrote athree-volume history of the United States wholly lacking in historicalimpartiality and strongly condemnatory of the South. (Geschichte derVereinigten Staaten, Berlin, 1863-66. ) This work had much influence onGerman public opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_. )]

[Footnote 961: _Liberator_, Feb. 20, 1863. Letter of J. P. Jewett to W. L. Garrison, Jan. 30, 1863. "The few oligarchs in England who may stillsympathize with slavery and the Southern rebels, will be renderedabsolutely powerless by these grand and powerful uprisings ofTHE PEOPLE. "]

[Footnote 962: Duffus, _English Opinion_, p. 51. ]

[Footnote 963: Argyll, _Autobiography_, II, pp. 196-7. ]

[Footnote 964: Trevelyan, _John Bright_. Facsimile, opp. P. 303. Copysent by Sunmer to Bright, April, 1863. ]

[Footnote 965: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863. Lyonswas slow to favour the emancipation proclamation. The first favourablemention I have found was on July 26, 1864. (Russell Papers. To Russell. )In this view his diplomatic colleagues coincided. Stoeckl, in December, 1863, wrote that slavery was dead in the Central and Border States, andthat even in the South its form must be altered if it survived. (RussianArchives, Stoeckl to F. O. , Nov. 22-Dec. 4, 1863, No. 3358. ) Butimmediately after the second proclamation of January, 1863, Stoecklcould see no possible good in such measures. If they had been made ofuniversal application it would have been a "great triumph for theprinciple of individual liberty, " but as issued they could only mean"the hope of stirring a servile war in the South. " _(Ibid. _, Dec. 24, 1863-Jan. 5, 1864, No. 70. )]

CHAPTER XIII

THE LAIRD RAMS

The building in British ports of Confederate war vessels like the_Alabama_ and the subsequent controversy and arbitration in relationthereto have been exhaustively studied and discussed from every aspectof legal responsibility, diplomatic relations, and principles ofinternational law. There is no need and no purpose here to review indetail these matters. The purpose is, rather, to consider thedevelopment and effect at the time of their occurrence of the principalincidents related to Southern ship-building in British yards. The_intention_ of the British Government is of greater importance in thisstudy than the correctness of its action. 

Yet it must first be understood that the whole question of abelligerent's right to procure ships of war or to build them in theports of neutral nations was, in 1860, still lacking definiteapplication in international law. There were general principles alreadyestablished that the neutral must not do, nor permit its subjects to do, anything directly in aid of belligerents. The British Foreign EnlistmentAct, notification of which had been given in May, 1861, forbade subjectsto "be concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming, of any ship or vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vesselshall be employed in the service . . . " of a belligerent, and provided forpunishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if this prohibitionwere disobeyed. But the Act also declared that such punishment, orseizure, would follow on due proof of the offence. Here was the weakpoint of the Act, for in effect if secrecy were maintained by offendersthe proof was available only after the offence had been committed andone of the belligerents injured by the violation of the law. Over twentyyears earlier the American Government, seeking to prevent its subjectsfrom committing unneutral acts in connection with the Canadian rebellionof 1837, had realized the weakness of its neutrality laws as they thenstood, and by a new law of March 10, 1838, hastily passed and thereforelimited to two years' duration, in the expectation of a more perfectlaw, but intended as a clearer exposition of neutral duty, had givenfederal officials power to act and seize _on suspicion_, leaving theproof of guilt or innocence to be determined later. But the Britishinterpretation of her own neutrality laws was that proof was required inadvance of seizure--an interpretation wholly in line with the basicprinciple that a man was innocent until proved guilty, but fatal to thatpreservation of strict neutrality which Great Britain had so promptlyasserted at the beginning of the Civil War[966]. 

The South wholly lacking a navy or the means to create one, earlyconceived the idea of using neutral ports for the construction of warvessels. Advice secured from able British lawyers was to the effect thatif care were taken to observe the strict letter of the ForeignEnlistment Act, by avoiding warlike equipment, a ship, even though herconstruction were such as to indicate that she was destined to become aship of war, might be built by private parties in British yards. Thethree main points requiring careful observance by the South wereconcealment of government ownership and destination, no war equipmentand no enlistment of crew in British waters. 

The principal agent selected by the South to operate on these lines wasCaptain J. D. Bullock, who asserts in his book descriptive of his workthat he never violated British neutrality law and that prevailing legalopinion in England supported him in this view[967]. In March, 1862, thesteamer _Oreto_ cleared from Liverpool with a declared destination of"Palermo, the Mediterranean, and Jamaica. " She was not heard of untilthree months later when she was reported to be at Nassau completing herequipment as a Southern war vessel. In June, Adams notified Russell"that a new and still more powerful war-steamer was nearly ready fordeparture from the port of Liverpool on the same errand[968]. " Heprotested that such ships violated the neutrality of Great Britain anddemanded their stoppage and seizure. From June 23 to July 28, when thissecond ship, "No. 290" (later christened the _Alabama_) left Liverpool, Adams and the United States consul at Liverpool, Dudley, were busy insecuring evidence and in renewing protests to the Government. To eachprotest Russell replied in but a few lines that the matter had beenreferred to the proper departments, and it was not until July 26, whenthere was received from Adams an opinion by an eminent Queen's Counsel, Collier, that the affidavits submitted were conclusive against the"290, " that Russell appears to have been seriously concerned. On July28, the law officers of the Crown were asked for an immediate opinion, and on the thirty-first telegrams were sent to Liverpool and to otherports to stop and further examine the vessel. But the "290" was wellaway and outside of British waters[969]. 

The _Alabama_, having received guns and munitions by a ship, the_Bahama_, sent out from England to that end, and having enlisted in theConfederate Navy most of the British crews of the two vessels, nowentered upon a career of destruction of Northern commerce. She was not aprivateer, as she was commonly called at the time, but a Governmentvessel of war specially intended to capture and destroy merchant ships. In short her true character, in terms of modern naval usage, was that ofa "commerce destroyer. " Under an able commander, Captain Semmes, shetraversed all oceans, captured merchant ships and after taking coal andstores from them, sank or burnt the captures; for two years she evadedbattle with Northern war vessels and spread so wide a fear that analmost wholesale transfer of the flag from American to British or otherforeign register took place, in the mercantile marine. The career of the_Alabama_ was followed with increasing anger and chagrin by the North;this, said the public, was a British ship, manned by a British crew, using British guns and ammunition, whose escape from Liverpool had beenwinked at by the British Government. What further evidence was necessaryof bad faith in a professed strict neutrality?

Nor were American officials far behind the public in suspicion andanger. At the last moment it had appeared as if the Government wereinclined to stop the "290. " Was the hurried departure of the vessel dueto a warning received from official sources? On November 21, Adamsreported that Russell complained in an interview of remarks madeprivately by Bright, to the effect that warning had come from Russellhimself, and "seemed to me a little as if he suspected that Mr. Brighthad heard this from me[970]. " Adams disavowed, and sincerely, any suchimputation, but at the same time expressed to Russell his convictionthat there must have been from some source a "leak" of the Government'sintention[971]. The question of advance warning to Bullock, or to theLairds who built the _Alabama_, was not one which was likely to beofficially put forward in any case; the real issue was whether anoffence to British neutrality law had been committed, whether it wouldbe acknowledged as such, and still more important, whether repetitionsof the offence would be permitted. The _Alabama_, even though she might, as the American assistant-secretary of the Navy wrote, be "giving us asick turn[972], " could not by herself greatly affect the issue of thewar; but many _Alabamas_ would be a serious matter. The belatedgovernmental order to stop the vessel was no assurance for the futuresince in reply to Adams' protests after her escape, and to a prospectiveclaim for damages, Russell replied that in fact the orders to stop hadbeen given merely for the purpose of further investigation, and that instrict law there had been no neglect of governmental duty[973]. If thiswere so similar precautions and secrecy would prohibit officialinterference in the issue from British ports of a whole fleet ofSouthern war-vessels. Russell might himself feel that a real offence tothe North had taken place. He might write, "I confess the proceedings ofthat vessel [the _Alabama_] are enough to _rile_ a more temperatenation, and I owe a grudge to the Liverpool people on thataccount[974], " but this was of no value to the North if the governmentaldecision was against interference without complete and absolute proof. 

It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of bringinghome to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence in Americaneyes and the serious danger to good relations if such offences were tobe continued. An immediate downright threat of war would have beenimpolitic and would have stirred British pride to the point ofresentment. Yet American pride was aroused also and it was required ofSeward that he gain the Northern object and yet make no such threat aswould involve the two nations in war--a result that would have markedthe success of Southern secession. That Seward was able to find the wayin which to do this is evidence of that fertility of imagination andgift in expedient which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of theCivil War[975]. 

In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the "290, "June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the contractsmade with the Laird Brothers at Liverpool, for the building of twovessels far more dangerous than the _Alabama_ to the Northern cause. These were the so-called Laird Rams. They were to be two hundred andthirty feet long, have a beam of forty feet, be armoured with four andone-half inch iron plate and be provided with a "piercer" at the prow, about seven feet long and of great strength. This "piercer" caused theships to be spoken of as rams, and when the vessels were fully equippedit was expected the "piercer" would be three feet under the surface ofthe water. This was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it wasunusual construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle atsea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close blockadeat some Southern port. While there was much newspaper comment in Englandthat the vessels were "new _Alabamas_, " and in America that they were"floating fortresses, " suitable for attack upon defenceless Northerncities, their primary purpose was to break up the blockadingsquadrons[976]. 

Shortly before the escape of the _Alabama_ and at a time when there wasbut little hope the British Government would seize her and shortly afterthe news was received in Washington that still other vessels wereplanned for building in the Lairds' yards, a Bill was introduced inCongress authorizing the President to issue letters of marque andprivateering. This was in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward wroteto Adams of the proposed measure specifying that the purpose was topermit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the _Alabama_ orother vessels of a like type. He characterized this as a plan "toorganize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of marque andreprisal[977]. " Neither here nor at any time did Seward or Adams allegein diplomatic correspondence any other purpose than the pursuit of_Alabamas_, nor is it presumable that in July, 1862, the constructionplans of the Rams were sufficiently well known to the North to warrant aconclusion that the later purpose of the proposed privateering fleet was_at first_ quite other than the alleged purpose. Probably the Billintroduced in July, 1862, was but a hasty reaction to the sailing of the_Oreto_ (or _Florida_) and to the failure of early protests in the caseof the _Alabama_. Moreover there had been an earlier newspaper agitationfor an increase of naval power by the creation of a "militia of theseas, " though with no clear conception of definite objects to beattained. This agitation was now renewed and reinforced and many publicspeeches made by a General Hiram Wallbridge, who had long advocated anorganization of the mercantile marine as an asset in times of war[978]. But though introduced in the summer of 1862, the "privateering bill" wasnot seriously taken up until February, 1863. 

In the Senate discussion of the Bill at the time of introduction, Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to encourageprivateers to pursue British ships when, as was expected, they should"turn Confederate. " Sumner objected that the true business of privateerswas to destroy enemy commerce and that the South had no such _bona fide_commerce. Grimes agreed that this was his opinion also, but explainedthat the administration wanted the measure passed so that it might havein its hands a power to be used if the need arose. The general opinionof the Senate was opposed and the matter was permitted to lapse, butwithout definite action, so that it could at any time be called upagain[979]. Six months later the progress of construction and thepurpose of the rams at Liverpool were common knowledge. On January 7, 1863, the privateering bill again came before the Senate, was referredto the committee on naval affairs, reported out, and on February 17 waspassed and sent to the House of Representatives, where on March 2 it wasgiven a third reading and passed without debate[980]. In the Senate, Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because theConfederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed tobreak our blockade of their coast, " and that the privateers were to"assist in maintaining blockades. " There was no thorough debate but afew perfunctory objections were raised to placing so great a power inthe hands of the President, while Sumner alone appears as a consistentopponent arguing that the issue of privateers would be dangerous to theNorth since it might lead to an unwarranted interference with neutralcommerce. No speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers wereto be used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an"administration measure. "

Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of Russellat the escape of the _Alabama_ had somewhat lost its edge. At first hehad been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign EnlistmentAct so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of thelaw officers of the Crown. Russell had even offered to take up withAmerica an agreement by which both countries were to amend theirneutrality laws at the same moment. This was in December, 1862, but nowon February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendmenthad been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981]. While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter fromSeward was _en route_, explaining to Adams the meaning of theprivateering bill. 

"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President of theUnited States the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in anywar in which the country may at any time be engaged, and it is expectedthat the Bill will become a law. Lord Lyons suggests that thetransaction may possibly be misapprehended abroad, if it come uponforeign powers suddenly and without any explanations. You will be atliberty to say that, as the Bill stands, the executive Government willbe set at liberty to put the law in force in its discretion, and thatthus far the proper policy in regard to the exercise of that discretionhas not engaged the President's attention. I have had little hesitationin saying to Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, therewill be entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicatingto him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part offriendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be feared wouldbe incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall be found expedientto put the Act in force against the insurgents of the UnitedStates[982]. "

Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object mightbe asserted "to put the act in force against the insurgents, " the hintwas given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be "incidentallyand indirectly affected. " And so both Lyons and Seward understood thematter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a long conversation withSeward in which after pointing out the probable "bad effect" on Europe, Lyons received the reply that some remedy must be found for the factthat "the law did not appear to enable the British Government toprevent" the issue of Confederate "privateers[983]. " On March 8, Sewardfollowed this up by sending to Lyons an autograph letter:

 "I am receiving daily such representations from our sea-ports concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by the vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I do most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into the unhappy condition of affairs, which, with all the best dispositions of your Government and my own, cannot long be controlled to the preservation of peace. 

 "If you think well of it, I should like that you should confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more armed vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English ports is a thing to be deprecated above all things. "

On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and itappears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it. Seward statedthat the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about the _Alabama_, declaring:

 "That no American merchant vessels would get freights--that even war with England was preferable to this--that in that case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least find a profitable employment in cruising against British trade. "

Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and Lyonsprotested vigorously and implied that war must result. 

 "Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the inconvenience not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque: that he should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the necessity altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure would be unavoidable[984]. "

Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North must notbe underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers were dwelling onthe notion that under British interpretation of her duty as a neutralMexico, if she had money, could build ships in British ports to cruisein destruction of French commerce, adding that "one might almostsuppose" some rich American would give the funds to Mexico for thepurpose and so seek to involve England in trouble with France[985]. Lyons had also been told by Seward in their conversation of March 9, that on that day an instruction had been sent to Adams to present toRussell the delicacy of the situation and to ask for some assurance thatno further Southern vessels of war should escape from British ports. This instruction presented the situation in more diplomatic language butin no uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateeringbill as required to prevent the "destruction of our national navigatinginterest, unless that calamity can be prevented by . . . The enforcementof the neutrality law of Great Britain[986]. . . . "

Lyons' reports reached Russell before Seward's instruction was read tohim. Russell had already commented to Adams that American privateerswould find no Confederate merchant ships and that if they interferedwith neutral commerce the United States Government would be put in anawkward position. To this Adams replied that the privateers would seekand capture, if possible, vessels like the _Alabama_, but Russell askedLyons to find out "whether in any case they [privateers] will beauthorized to interfere with neutral commerce, and if in any case inwhat case, and to what extent[987]. " Three days later, on March 26, Adams presented his instructions and these Russell regarded as "notunfriendly in tone, " but in the long conversation that ensued the oldresult was reached that Adams declared Great Britain negligent inperformance of neutral duty, while Russell professed eagerness to stopSouthern shipbuilding if full evidence was "forthcoming. " Adamsconcluded that "he had worked to the best of his power for peace, but ithad become a most difficult task. " Upon this Russell commented to Lyons, "Mr. Adams fully deserves the character of having always laboured forpeace between our two Nations. Nor I trust will his efforts, and thoseof the two Governments fail of success[988]. "

In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing to ahead both in America and England. At Washington, from March seventh tothe thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of marque and reprisalhad been prominently before the Cabinet and even Welles who had opposedthem was affected by unfavourable reports received from Adams as to theintentions of Great Britain. The final decision was to wait later newsfrom England[989]. This was Seward's idea as he had not as yet receivedreports of the British reaction to his communications through Lyons andAdams. March 27 was the critical day of decision in London, as it wasalso the day upon which public and parliamentary opinion was mostvigorously debated in regard to Great Britain's neutral duty. Precedingthis other factors of influence were coming to the front. In the firstdays of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official assurancesthat if the South wished to build ships in French yards "we should bepermitted to arm and equip them and proceed to sea[990]. " Thissuggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the intention, nodoubt, of strengthening Bullock's position there. In the winter of1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic fleet to cruise inwestern waters and there was first a suspicion in America, later aconviction, that the purpose of this cruise was distinctly friendly tothe North--that the orders might even extend to actual naval aid in casewar should arise with England and France. In March, 1863, thiswas but vague rumour, by midsummer it was a confident hope, bySeptember-October, when Russian fleets had entered the harbours of NewYork and San Francisco, the rumour had become a conviction and thesilence of Russian naval officers when banqueted and toasted wasregarded as discreet confirmation. There was no truth in the rumour, butalready in March curious surmises were being made even in England, as toRussian intentions, though there is no evidence that the Government wasat all concerned. The truth was that the Russian fleet had been orderedto sea as a precaution against easy destruction in Baltic waters, incase the difficulties developing in relation to Poland should lead towar with France and England[991]. 

In England, among the people rather than in governmental England, afeeling was beginning to manifest itself that the Ministry had been laxin regard to the _Alabama_, and as news of her successes was receivedthis feeling was given voice. Liverpool, at first almost wholly on theside of the Lairds and of Southern ship-building, became doubtful bythe very ease with which the _Alabama_ destroyed Northern ships. Liverpool merchants looked ahead and saw that their interests might, after all, be directly opposed to those of the ship-builders. Meetingswere held and the matter discussed. In February, 1863, such a meeting atPlaistow, attended by the gentry of the neighbourhood, but chiefly byworking men, especially by dock labourers and by men from theship-building yards at Blackwall, resolved that "the Chairman berequested to write to the Prime Minister of our Queen, earnestlyentreating him to put in force, with utmost vigilance, the law ofEngland against such ships as the _Alabama_[992]. " Such expressions werenot as yet widespread, nor did the leading papers, up to April, indulgein much discussion, but British _doubt_ was developing[993]. 

Unquestionably, Russell himself was experiencing a renewed doubt as toBritain's neutral duty. On March 23, he made a speech in Parliamentwhich Adams reported as "the most satisfactory of all the speeches hehas made since I have been at this post[994]. " On March 26, came thepresentation by Adams of Seward's instruction of which Russell wrote toLyons as made in no unfriendly tone and as a result of which Adamswrote: "The conclusion which I draw . . . Is, that the Government isreally better disposed to exertion, and feels itself better sustainedfor action by the popular sentiment than ever before[995]. " Russell toldAdams that he had received a note from Palmerston "expressing hisapprobation of every word" of his speech three days before. In a portionof the despatch to Seward, not printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence, Adams advised against the issue of privateers, writing, "In the presentfavourable state of popular mind, it scarcely seems advisable to run therisk of changing the current in Great Britain by the presentation of anew issue which might rally all national pride against us as was done inthe _Trent_ case[996]. " That Russell was indeed thinking of definiteaction is foreshadowed by the advice he gave to Palmerston on March 27, as to the latter's language in the debate scheduled for that day on theForeign Enlistment Act. Russell wrote, referring to the interviewwith Adams:

 "The only thing which Adams could think of when I asked him what he had to propose in reference to the _Alabama_ was that the Government should declare their disapproval of the fitting out of such ships of war to prey on American commerce. 

 "Now, as the fitting out and escape of the _Alabama_ and _Oreto_ was clearly an evasion of our law, I think you can have no difficulty in declaring this evening that the Government disapprove of all such attempts to elude our law with a view to assist one of the belligerents[997]. "

But the tone of parliamentary debate did not bear out the hopeful viewof the American Minister. It was, as Bright wrote to Sumner, "badlymanaged and told against us[998], " and Bright himself participated inthis "bad management. " For over a year he had been advocating the causeof the North in public speeches and everywhere pointing out tounenfranchised England that the victory of the North was essential todemocracy in all Europe. Always an orator of power he used freelyvigorous language and nowhere more so than in a great public meeting ofthe Trades Unions of London in St. James' Hall, on March 26, the eveningbefore the parliamentary debate. The purpose of this meeting was tobring public pressure on the Government in favour of the North, and thepith of Bright's speech was to contrast the democratic instincts ofworking men with the aristocratic inclinations of the Government[999]. Reviewing "aristocratic" attitude toward the Civil War, Bright said:

 "Privilege thinks it has a great interest in this contest, and every morning, with blatant voice, it comes into your streets and curses the American Republic. Privilege has beheld an afflicting spectacle for many years past. It has beheld thirty millions of men, happy and prosperous, without emperor, without king, without the surroundings of a court, without nobles, except such as are made by eminence in intellect and virtue, without State bishops and State priests. 

 "'Sole venders of the lore which works salvation, ' without great armies and great navies, without great debt and without great taxes. 

 * * * * *

 "You wish the freedom of your country. You wish it for yourselves. . . . Do not then give the hand of fellowship to the worst foes of freedom that the world has ever seen. . . . You will not do this. I have faith in you. Impartial history will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile or coldly neutral, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your press--which ought to have instructed and defended--was mainly written to betray, the fate of a Continent and of its vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an unfailing trust that God in his infinite mercy will yet make it the heritage of all His children[1000]. "

The public meeting of March 26 was the most notable one in support ofthe North held throughout the whole course of the war, and it was alsothe most notable one as indicating the rising tide of popular demand formore democratic institutions. That it irritated the Government and gavea handle to Southern sympathizers in the parliamentary debate of March27 is unquestioned. In addition, if that debate was intended to securefrom the Government an intimation of future policy against Southernshipbuilding it was conducted on wrong lines for _immediate_effect--though friends of the North may have thought the method used waswise for _future_ effect. This method was vigorous attack. Forster, leading in the debate[1001], called on Ministers to explain the"flagrant" violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and to offer somepledge for the future; he asserted that the Government should have beenactive on its own initiative in seeking evidence instead of waiting tobe urged to enforce the law, and he even hinted at a certain degree ofcomplicity in the escape of the _Alabama_. The Solicitor-Generalanswered in a legal defence of the Government, complained of the offenceof America in arousing its citizens against Great Britain uponunjustifiable grounds, but did not make so vigorous a reply as might, perhaps, have been expected. Still he stood firmly on the ground thatthe Government could not act without evidence to convict--in itself astatement that might well preclude interference with the Rams. Brightaccused the Government of a "cold and unfriendly neutrality, " andreferred at length to the public meeting of the previous evening:

 "If you had last night looked in the faces of three thousand of the most intelligent of the artisan classes in London, as I did, and heard their cheers, and seen their sympathy for that country for which you appear to care so little, you would imagine that the more forbearing, the more generous, and the more just the conduct of the Government to the United States, the more it would recommend itself to the magnanimous feelings of the people of this country. "

This assumption of direct opposition between Parliament and the peoplewas not likely to win or to convince men, whether pro-Southern or not, who were opponents of the speaker's long-avowed advocacy of moredemocratic institutions in England. It is no wonder then that Laird, whohad been castigated in the speeches of the evening, rising in defence ofthe conduct of his firm, should seek applause by declaring, "I wouldrather be handed down to posterity as the builder of a dozen _Alabamas_than as a man who applies himself deliberately to set class againstclass, and to cry up the institutions of another country which, whenthey come to be tested, are of no value whatever, and which reduce thevery name of liberty to an utter absurdity. " This utterance was greetedwith great cheering--shouted not so much in approval of the _Alabama_ asin approval of the speaker's defiance of Bright. 

[Illustration: WILLIAM EDWARD FORSTER (1851)]

In short, the friends of the North, if they sought some immediate pledgeby the Government, had gone the wrong way about to secure it. Vigour inattack was no way to secure a favourable response from Palmerston. Always a fighting politician in public it was inevitable that he shouldnow fight back. Far from making the statement recommended to him byRussell, he concluded the debate by reasserting the correctness ofgovernmental procedure in the case of the _Alabama_, and himself withvigour accused Forster and Bright of speaking in such a way as toincrease rather than allay American irritation. Yet a careful reading ofthe speeches of both the Solicitor-General and of Palmerston, shows thatwhile vindicating the Government's conduct in the past, they wereavoiding _any_ pledge of whatever nature, for the future. 

Adams was clearly disappointed and thought that the result of the debatewas "rather to undo in the popular mind the effect of Lord Russell'sspeech than to confirm it[1002]. " He and his English advisers were veryuneasy, not knowing whether to trust to Russell's intimations of moreactive governmental efforts, or to accept the conclusion that his advicehad been rejected by Palmerston[1003]. Possibly if less anxious andalarmed they would have read more clearly between the lines ofparliamentary utterances and have understood that their failure to hurrythe Government into public announcement of a new policy was no proofthat old policy would be continued. Disappointed at the result inParliament, they forgot that the real pressure on Government was comingfrom an American declaration of an intention to issue privateers unlesssomething were done to satisfy that country. Certainly Russell wasunmoved by the debate for on April 3 he wrote to Palmerston:

 "The conduct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the ironclads at Birkenhead is so very suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct that they should be detained. The Attorney-General has been consulted and concurs in the measure, as one of policy, though not of strict law. 

 "We shall thus test the law, and if we have to pay damages we have satisfied the opinion which prevails here as well as in America that this kind of neutral hostility should not be allowed to go on without some attempt to stop it[1004]. "

Two days later, on April 5, the _Alexandra_, a vessel being equipped tojoin the _Alabama_ as a commerce destroyer, was seized on the groundthat she was about to violate the Enlistment Act and a new policy, atleast to make a test case in law, was thereby made public. In fact, onMarch 30, but three days after the debate of March 27, the case of the_Alexandra_ had been taken up by Russell, referred to the law officerson March 31, and approved by them for seizure on April 4[1005]. Publicmeetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's action, as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people applauded theseizure of the _Alexandra_, demanded vigorous prosecution of the Lairdsand others, and urged governmental activity to prevent any furthership-building for the South[1006]. 

On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons:

 "The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can be procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings which have been raised in Northern America by the escape from justice of the _Oreto_ and _Alabama_[1007]. "

It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on _evidence_ to besure, but on evidence of the vessels being "_apparently_ intended" forthe South. This was far from being the same thing as the previousassertion that conclusive evidence was required. What, then, was thebasic consideration in Russell's mind leading to such a face-about ondeclared policy? Chagrin at the very evident failure of existingneutrality law to operate, recognition that there was just cause for therising ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerfulthan these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and intent inapplication of the American "privateering" Bill. How did Russell, andLyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did they foreseeand fear?

As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had beenintroduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason passedwithout serious debate. In the Cabinet it was opposed by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the feeling that"something must be done" because vessels were building in Englandintended to destroy the blockade. The Rams under construction wereclearly understood to have that purpose. If privateers were to offsetthe action of the Rams there must be some definite plan for their use. Seward and Adams repeatedly complained of British inaction yet in thesame breath asserted that the privateers were intended to chase anddestroy _Alabamas_--a plan so foolish, so it seemed to Britishdiplomats, as to be impossible of acceptance as the full purpose ofSeward. How, in short, _could_ privateers make good an injury toblockade about to be done by the Rams? If added to the blockadingsquadrons on station off the Southern ports they would but become somuch more fodder for the dreaded Rams. If sent to sea in pursuit of_Alabamas_ the chances were that they would be the vanquished ratherthan the victors in battle. There was no Southern mercantile marine forthem to attack and privateering against "enemy's commerce" was thus outof the question since there was no such commerce. 

There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended use ofprivateers. If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the close blockadethe only recourse of the North would be to establish a "cruisingsquadron" blockade remote from the shores of the enemy. If conducted bygovernment war-ships such a blockade was not in contravention to Britishinterpretation of international law[1008]. But the Northern navy, conducting a cruising squadron blockade was far too small to interfereseriously with neutral vessels bringing supplies to the Confederacy orcarrying cotton from Southern ports. A "flood of privateers, " scouringthe ocean from pole to pole might, conceivably, still render effectivethat closing in of the South which was so important a weapon in theNorthern war programme. 

This was Russell's interpretation of the American plan and he saw in ita very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable ultimate clashleading to war. Such, no doubt, it was Seward's desire should beRussell's reaction, though never specifically explaining the exactpurpose of the privateers. Moreover, nine-tenths of the actualblockade-running still going on was by British ships, and this being soit was to be presumed that "privateers" searching for possible blockaderunners would commit all sorts of indignities and interferences withBritish merchant ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged inordinary trade between non-belligerent ports. 

Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering bill, Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to raiseobjections though not formally making official protest, and had askedfor explanation of the exact nature of the proposed activities of suchvessels. Also he had prepared instructions to be issued by theAdmiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty of preventingunwarranted interference with legitimate British commerce byprivateers[1009]. The alteration of governmental policy as indicated inthe arrest of the _Alexandra_, it might be hoped, would at least cause asuspension of the American plan, but assurances were strongly desired. Presumably Russell knew that Adams as a result of their conversations, had recommended such suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yetuninformed of the _Alexandra_ action, was still much alarmed. On April13 he reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relativeto the ships building in England, indicating that this was "a lasteffort to avert the evils which the present state of things had madeimminent[1010]. " Lyons had argued with Seward the inadvisability ofsending such a despatch, since it was now known that Russell had "spokenin a satisfactory manner" about Confederate vessels, but Seward wasinsistent. Lyons believed there was real cause for anxiety, writing:

 "A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident design of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate England, but still there can be little doubt that the exasperation has reached such a point as to constitute a serious danger. It is fully shared by many important members of the Cabinet--nor are the men in high office exempt from the overweening idea of the naval power of the United States, which reconciles the people to the notion of a war with England. Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned the flame in order to recover his lost popularity. He is now, I believe, seriously anxious to avoid going farther. But if strong measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance to them. If no military success be obtained within a short time, it may become a Party necessity to resort to some means of producing an excitement in the country sufficient to enable the Government to enforce the Conscription Act, and to exercise the extra-legal powers conferred by the late Congress, To produce such an excitement the more ardent of the party would not hesitate to go, to the verge of a war with England. Nay there are not a few who already declare that if the South must be lost, the best mode to conceal the discomfiture of the party and of the nation, would be to go to war with England and attribute the loss of the South to English interference[1011]. "

On the same day Lyons wrote, privately:

 "I would rather the quarrel came, if come it must, upon some better ground for us than this question of the ships fitted out for the Confederates. The great point to be gained in my opinion, would be to prevent the ships sailing, without leading the people here to think that they had gained their point by threats[1012]. "

So great was Lyons' alarm that the next day, April 14, hecipher-telegraphed Monck in Canada that trouble was brewing[1013], butsoon his fears were somewhat allayed. On the seventeenth he could reportthat Seward's "strong" despatch to Adams was not intended forcommunication to Russell[1014], and on the twenty-fourth whenpresenting, under instructions, Russell's protest against theprivateering plan he was pleased, if not surprised, to find that the"latest advices" from England and the news of the seizure of the_Alexandra_, had caused Seward to become very conciliatory. Lyons wasassured that the plan "was for the present at rest[1015]. " ApparentlySeward now felt more security than did Lyons as to future British actionfor three days later the British Minister wrote to Vice-Admiral Milnethat an American issue of letters of marque would surely come ifEngland did not stop Southern ship-building, and he wrote in such a wayas to indicate his own opinion that effective steps _must_ be taken toprevent their escape[1016]. 

The whole tone and matter of Lyons' despatches to Russell show that heregarded the crisis of relations in regard to Southern ship-building inBritish yards as occurring in March-April, 1863. Seward became unusuallyfriendly, even embarrassingly so, for in August he virtually forcedLyons to go on tour with him through the State of New York, thus makingpublic demonstration of the good relations of the two Governments. Thissweet harmony and mutual confidence is wholly contrary to the usualhistorical treatment of the Laird Rams incident, which neglects thethreat of the privateering bill, regards American protests as steadilyincreasing in vigour, and concludes with the "threat of war" note byAdams to Russell just previous to the seizure of the Rams, in September. Previously, however, American historians have been able to use onlyAmerican sources and have been at a loss to understand the privateeringplan, since Seward never went beyond a vague generalization of itsobject in official utterances. It is the British reaction to that planwhich reveals the real "threat" made and the actual crisis ofthe incident. 

It follows therefore that the later story of the Rams requires lessextended treatment than is customarily given to it. The correctunderstanding of this later story is the recognition that Great Britainhad in April given, a pledge and performed an act which satisfied Sewardand Adams that the Rams would not be permitted to escape. It was theirduty nevertheless to be on guard against a British relaxation of thepromise made, and the delay, up to the very last moment, in seizing theRams, caused American anxiety and ultimately created a doubt of thesincerity of British actions. 

Public opinion in England was steadily increasing against Southernship-building. On June 9, a memorial was sent to the Foreign Office by agroup of ship-owners in Liverpool, suggesting an alteration in theForeign Enlistment Act if this were needed to prevent the issue ofSouthern ships, and pointing out that the "present policy" of theGovernment would entail a serious danger to British commerce in thefuture if, when England herself became a belligerent, neutral portscould be used by the enemy to build commerce destroyers[1017]. Thememorial concluded that in any case it was a disgrace that British lawshould be so publicly infringed. To this, Hammond, under-secretary, gavethe old answer that the law was adequate "provided proof can be obtainedof any act done with the intent to violate it[1018]. " Evidentlyship-owners, as distinguished from ship-builders, were now acutelyalarmed. Meanwhile attention was fixed on the trial of the _Alexandra_, and on June 22, a decision was rendered against the Government, but waspromptly appealed. 

This decision made both Northern and Southern agents anxious and thelatter took steps further to becloud the status of the Rams. Rumourswere spread that the vessels were in fact intended for France, and whenthis was disproved that they were being built for the Viceroy of Egypt. This also proved to be untrue. Finally it was declared that the realowners were certain French merchants whose purpose in contracting forsuch clearly warlike vessels was left in mystery, but with theintimation that Egypt was to be the ultimate purchaser. Captain Bullockhad indeed made such a contract of sale to French merchants but with theproviso of resale to him, after delivery. On his part, Russell wasseeking _proof_ fully adequate to seizure, but this was difficult toobtain and such as was submitted was regarded by the law officers asinadequate. They reported that there was "no evidence capable of beingpresented to a court of justice. " He informed Adams of this legalopinion at the moment when the latter, knowing the Rams to be nearingcompletion, and fearing that Russell was weakening in his earlierdetermination, began that series of diplomatic protests which verynearly approached a threat of war. 

At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court's decision inthe _Alexandra_ case, and shortly after the great Northern victories atVicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a despatch to Adams, July 11, which has been interpreted as a definite threat of war. In substanceSeward wrote that he still felt confident the Government of GreatBritain would find a way to nullify the _Alexandra_ decision, butrenewed, in case this did not prove true, his assertion of Northernintention to issue letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to"pursue" Southern vessels even into neutral ports[1019]. But there aretwo considerations in respect to this despatch that largely negative thebelligerent intent attributed to it: Seward did not read or communicateit to Lyons, as was his wont when anything serious was in mind; and hedid not instruct Adams to communicate it to Russell. The latter neverheard of it until the publication, in 1864, of the United Statesdiplomatic correspondence[1020]. 

In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell evidencesecured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the Rams and to urgetheir immediate seizure. Adams here but performed his duty and was infact acting in accordance with Russell's own request[1021]. On July 16he reported to Seward that the Roebuck motion for recognition of theSouth[1022] had died ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxietybecause of the slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape, Adams wrote to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become aparticipant in the war[1023]. Further affidavits were sent to Russell onAugust 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell that theGovernment was legally advised "they cannot interfere in any way withthese vessels, " Adams sent still more affidavits and expressed hisregret that his previous notes had not sufficiently emphasized the gravenature of the crisis pending between the United States and GreatBritain. To this Russell replied that the matter was "under serious andanxious consideration, " to which, on September 5, in a longcommunication, Adams wrote that if the Rams escaped: "It would besuperfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war. "

The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat of war onthe explanation that Great Britain would herself be participating in thewar. There is no question that at the moment Adams thought Russell's"change of policy" of April was now thrown overboard, but the fact wasthat on September 1, Russell had already given directions to take stepsfor the detention of the Rams and that on September 3, positiveinstructions were given to that effect[1024], though not carried outuntil some days later. There had been no alteration in the "new policy"of April; the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety tosecure evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack foracting in contradiction to those principles which had been declared tobe the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the_Alabama_. But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain Bullock thatcomplete evidence was not procurable and Russell was forced, finally, toact without it[1025]. 

It would appear from a letter written by Russell to Palmerston, onSeptember 3, the day on which he gave the order to stop, that no Cabinetapproval for this step had yet formally been given, since Russellnotified Palmerston of his purpose and asked the latter, if hedisapproved, to call a Cabinet at once[1026]. The _plan_ to stop theRams must have long been understood for Palmerston called no Cabinet. Moreover it is to be presumed that he was preparing the public for theseizure, for on this same September 3, the _Times_, in a long editorial, argued that the law as it stood (or was interpreted), was not in harmonywith true neutrality, and pointed out future dangers to Britishcommerce, as had the Liverpool ship-owners. Delane of the _Times_ was atthis period especially close to Palmerston, and it is at leastinferential that the editorial was an advance notice of governmentalintention to apply a policy known in intimate circles to have been forsome time matured. Four days later, while governmental action was stillunknown to the public another editorial advocated seizure of theRams[1027]. Russell had acted under the fear that one of the Rams mightslip away as had the _Alabama_; he had sent orders to stop andinvestigate, but he delayed final seizure in the hope that betterevidence might yet be secured, conducting a rapid exchange of letterswith Lairds (the builders), seeking to get admissions from them. It wasonly on September 9 that Lairds was officially ordered not to send thevessels on a "trial trip, " and it was not until September 16 that publicannouncement was made of the Government's action[1028]. 

Russell has been regarded as careless and thoughtless in that it was notuntil September 8 he relieved Adams' mind by assuring him the Rams wouldbe seized, even though three days before, on September 5, thisinformation had been sent to Washington. The explanation is Russell'seager search for evidence to _convict_, and his correspondence withLairds which did not come to a head until the eighth, when the buildersrefused to give information. To the builders Russell was writing as if agovernmental decision had not yet been reached. He could take no chanceof a "leak" through the American Minister. Once informed, Adams was wellsatisfied though his immediate reaction was to criticize, not Russell, but the general "timidity and vacillation" of the law officers of theCrown[1029]. Two days later, having learned from Russell himself justwhat was taking place, Adams described the "firm stand" taken by theForeign Secretary, noted the general approval by the public press andexpressed the opinion that there was now a better prospect of being ableto preserve friendly relations with England than at any time since hisarrival in London[1030]. Across the water British officials weredelighted with the seizure of the Rams. Monck in Canada expressed hisapproval[1031]. Lyons reported a "great improvement" in the feelingtoward England and that Seward especially was highly pleased withRussell's expressions, conveyed privately, of esteem for Seward togetherwith the hope that he would remain in office[1032]. 

The actual governmental seizure of the Rams did not occur untilmid-October, though they had been placed under official surveillance onSeptember 9. Both sides were jockeying for position in the expectedlegal battle when the case should be taken up by the courts[1033]. Atfirst Russell even thought of making official protest to Mason in Londonand a draft of such protest was prepared, approved by the Law Officersand subsequently revised by Palmerston, but finally was not sent[1034]. Possibly it was thought that such a communication to Mason approachedtoo nearly a recognition of him in his desired official capacity, for inDecember the protest ultimately directed to be made throughConsul-General Crawford at Havana, instructed him to go to Richmond andafter stating very plainly that he was in no way recognizing theConfederacy to present the following:

 "It appears from various correspondence the authenticity of which cannot be doubted, that the Confederate Government having no good ports free from the blockade of the Federals have conceived the design of using the ports of the United Kingdom for the purpose of constructing ships of war to be equipped and armed to serve as cruisers against the commerce of the United States of America, a State with which Her Majesty is at peace. . . . "

 "These acts are inconsistent with the respect and comity which ought to be shewn by a belligerent towards a Neutral Power. 

 "Her Majesty has declared her Neutrality and means strictly to observe it. 

 "You will therefore call upon Mr. Benjamin to induce his Government to forbear from all acts tending to affect injuriously Her Majesty's position[1035]. "

To carry out this instruction there was required permission for Crawfordto pass through the blockade but Seward refused this when Lyons made therequest[1036]. 

Not everyone in Britain, however, approved the Government's course inseizing the Rams. Legal opinion especially was very generally againstthe act. Adams now pressed either for an alteration of the British lawor for a convention with America establishing mutual similarinterpretation of neutral duty. Russell replied that "until the trialsof the _Alexandra_ and the steam rams had taken place, we could hardlybe said to know what our law was, and therefore not tell whether itrequired alteration. I said, however, that he might assure Mr. Sewardthat the wish and intention of Government were to make our neutrality anhonest and bona-fide one[1037]. " But save from extreme and avowedSouthern sympathizers criticism of the Government was directed less tothe stoppage of the Rams than to attacks of a political character, attempting to depict the weakness of the Foreign Minister and hishumiliation of Great Britain in having "yielded to American threats. "Thus, February II, 1864, after the reassembling of Parliament, a partyattack was made on Russell and the Government by Derby in the House ofLords. Derby approved the stopping of the Rams but sought to prove thatthe Government had dishonoured England by failing to act of its ownvolition until threatened by America. He cited Seward's despatch of JulyII with much unction, that despatch now having appeared in the printedAmerican diplomatic correspondence with no indication that it was not aninstruction at once communicated to Russell. The attack fell flat forRussell simply replied that Adams had never presented such aninstruction. This forced Derby to seek other ground and on February 15he returned to the matter, now seeking to show by the dates of variousdocuments that "at the last moment" Adams made a threat of war andRussell had yielded. Again Russell's reply was brief and to the effectthat orders to stop the Rams had been given before the communicationsfrom Adams were received. Finally, on February 23, a motion in theCommons called for all correspondence with Adams and with Lairds, TheGovernment consented to the first but refused that with Lairds and wassupported by a vote of 187 to 153. [1038]

Beginning with an incautious personal and petty criticism of Russell theTories had been driven to an attempt to pass what was virtually a voteof censure on the Ministry yet they were as loud as was the Governmentin praise of Adams and in approval of the seizure of the Rams. Naturallytheir cause was weakened, and the Ministry, referring to expressionsmade and intentions indicated as far back as March, 1863, thus hintingwithout directly so stating that the real decision had then been made, was easily the victor in the vote[1038]. Derby had committed an error asa party leader and the fault rankled for again in April, 1864, heattempted to draw Russell into still further discussion on dates ofdocuments. Russell's reply ignored that point altogether[1039]. It didnot suit his purpose to declare, flatly, the fact that in Aprilassurances had been given both to Adams and through Lyons to Seward, that measures would be taken to prevent the departure of Southernvessels from British ports. To have made this disclosure would haverequired an explanation _why_ such assurance had been given and thiswould have revealed the effect on both Russell and Lyons of the Northernplan to create a _cruising squadron blockade by privateers_. _There_ wasthe real threat. The later delays and seeming uncertainties of Britishaction made Adams anxious but there is no evidence that Russell everchanged his purpose. He sought stronger evidence before acting and hehoped for stronger support from legal advisers, but he kept an eye onthe Rams and when they had reached the stage where there was danger ofescape, he seized them even though the desired evidence was stilllacking[1040]. Seward's "privateering bill" plan possibly entered uponin a moment of desperation and with no clear statement from him of itsexact application had, as the anxiety of British diplomats becamepronounced, been used with skill to permit, if not to state, theinterpretation they placed upon it, and the result had been thecessation of that inadequate neutrality of which America complained. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 966: In other respects, also, this question of belligerentship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in practice, vaguelydefined. As late as 1843 in the then existing Texan war of independenceagainst Mexico, the British Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all atsea. Mexico made a contract for two ships of war with the English firmof Lizardi & Company. The crews were to be recruited in England, theships were to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and theguns were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the BritishNavy. Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary authority topurchase guns. When Texas protested he at first seemed to think strictneutrality was secured if the same privileges were offered that country. Later he prohibited naval officers to go in command. One Mexican vessel, the _Guadaloupe_, left England with full equipment as originallyplanned; the other, the _Montezuma_, was forced to strip her equipment. But both vessels sailed under British naval officers for these werepermitted to resign their commissions. They were later reinstated. Inall this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid Mexico, butit is also clear that British governmental opinion was much in confusionas to neutral duty in the case of such ships. See my book, _BritishInterests and Activities in Texas_, Ch. IV. ]

[Footnote 967: Bullock, _Secret Service under the Confederacy_. ]

[Footnote 968: Bernard, _Neutrality of Great Britain during the AmericanCivil War_, p. 338-9. ]

[Footnote 969: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII. "Correspondence respecting the 'Alabama. '" Also _ibid. _, "Correspondencebetween Commissioner of Customs and Custom House Authorities atLiverpool relating to the 'Alabama. '" The last-minute delay was due tothe illness of a Crown adviser. ]

[Footnote 970: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 81, No. 264. Adams toSeward, Nov. 21, 1862. ]

[Footnote 971: Selborne, in his _Memorials: Family and Personal_, II, p. 430, declared that in frequent official communication with all membersof the Cabinet at the time, "I never heard a word fall from any one ofthem expressive of anything but regret that the orders for the detentionof the _Alabama_ were sent too late. " Of quite different opinion isBrooks Adams, in his "The Seizure of the Laird Rams" (_Proceedings_, Mass. Hist. Soc. , Vol. XLV, pp. 243-333). In 1865 his father, theAmerican Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown whatpurported to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse, Southern agent in England, warning him of danger to his "protegé. " "ThisVictor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office. " (_Ibid. _, p. 260, _note_. )]

[Footnote 972: Fox, _Confidential Correspondence_, I, p. 165. Fox toDupont, Nov. 7, 1862. ]

[Footnote 973: It is interesting that the opinion of many Continentalwriters on international law was immediately expressed in favour of theAmerican and against the British contention. This was especially true ofGerman opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_. )]

[Footnote 974: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20, 1862. ]

[Footnote 975: I am aware that Seward's use of the "Privateering Bill, "now to be recounted is largely a new interpretation of the play ofdiplomacy in regard to the question of Southern ship-building inEngland. Its significance became evident only when Britishcorrespondence was available; but that correspondence and a carefulcomparison of dates permits, and, as I think, requires a revisedstatement of the incident of the Laird Rams. ]

[Footnote 976: Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers and layingNorthern cities under contribution. According to a statement made in1898 by Captain Page, assigned to command the rams, no instructions asto their use had been given him by the Confederate Government, but hisplans were solely to break the blockade with no thought of attackingNorthern cities. (Rhodes, IV. 385, _note_. )]

[Footnote 977: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, p. 134. ]

[Footnote 978: Wallbridge, _Addresses and Resolutions_. Pamphlet. NewYork, n. D. He began his agitation in 1856, and now received much popularapplause. His pamphlet quotes in support many newspapers from June, 1862, to September, 1863. Wallbridge apparently thought himself betterqualified than Welles to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded hisagitation as instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet. Welles professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congressunknown to him and "surreptitiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a statementdifficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon it. ]

[Footnote 979: Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. IV, pp. 3271, 3325 and 3336. ]

[Footnote 980: _Ibid. _, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220, 393, and Part II, pp. 960, 1028, 1489. ]

[Footnote 981: Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams. " (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, pp. 265-6. )]

[Footnote 982: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 116, Feb. 19, 1863. ]

[Footnote 983: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to Russell. ]

[Footnote 984: _Ibid. _, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863. ]

[Footnote 985: _Ibid. _, No. 235. Lyons to Russell, March 13, 1863. Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger. (Russell Papers. ToRussell, March 24, 1863. )]

[Footnote 986: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 141. Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863. ]

[Footnote 987: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to Lyons, March 24, 1863. ]

[Footnote 988: _Ibid. _, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell to Lyons, March 27, 1863. ]

[Footnote 989: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 245-50. ]

[Footnote 990: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 634, Slidell to Benjamin, March 4, 1863. ]

[Footnote 991: For example of American contemporary belief and later"historical tradition, " see Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, pp. 24-38. Also for a curious story that a large part of the price paid for Alaskawas in reality a repayment of expenses incurred by Russia in sending herfleet to America, see _Letters of Franklin K. Lane_, p. 260. The factsas stated above are given by F. A. Golder, _The Russian Fleet and theCivil War_ (_Am. Hist. Rev_. , July, 1915, pp. 801 _seq_. ). The plan wasto have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of aid to the Northwas "born on American soil, " and Russian officers naturally did nothingto contradict its spread. In one case, however, a Russian commander wasready to help the North. Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in theharbour of San Francisco was appealed to by excited citizens on rumoursof the approach of the _Alabama_ and gave orders to protect the city. Heacted without instructions and was later reproved for the order by hissuperiors at home. ]

[Footnote 992: _The Liberator_, March 6, 1863. ]

[Footnote 993: American opinion knew little of this change. Aninteresting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan to thwartSouthern ship-building operations, had been taken up by the UnitedStates Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams outright by the offerof such a price as, it was thought, would be so tempting to the Lairdsas to make refusal unlikely. Two men, Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent toEngland with funds and much embarrassed Adams to whom they discreetlyrefrained from stating details, but yet permitted him to guess theirobject. The plan of buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomaticprotests on England's duty in international law and the agentsthemselves soon saw the folly of it. Fox, Assistant Secretary of theNavy, wrote to Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads inEngland, I think, will be taken care of. " (Correspondence, I, 196. )Thurlow Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit ofForbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 632. ) Forbesreported as early as April 18 virtually against going on with the plan. "We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we have put new fire intoMr. Dudley by furnishing _fuel_, and he is hard at it gettingevidence. . . . My opinion _to-day_ is that we can and shall stop by legalprocess and by the British Government the sailing of ironclads and otherwar-ships. " (Forbes MS. To Fox. ) That this was wholly a Navy Departmentplan and was disliked by State Department representatives is shown byDudley's complaints (Forbes MS. ). The whole incident has been adequatelydiscussed by C. F. Adams, though without reference to the precedingcitations, in his _Studies Military and Diplomatic_, Ch. IX. "AnHistorical Residuum, " in effect a refutation of an article by Chittendenwritten in 1890, in which bad memory and misunderstanding played sadhavoc with historical truth. ]

[Footnote 994: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157. ToSeward, March 24, 1863. ]

[Footnote 995: _Ibid. _, p. 160. To Seward, March 27, 1863. ]

[Footnote 996: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 82, No. 356. Adams toSeward, March 27, 1863. ]

[Footnote 997: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 27, 1863. ]

[Footnote 998: Rhodes, IV, p. 369, _notes_, April 4, 1863. Bright wasmade very anxious as to Government intentions by this debate. ]

[Footnote 999: This topic will be treated at length in Chapter XVIII. Itis here cited merely in relation to its effect on the Government atthe moment. ]

[Footnote 1000: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, 307-8. ]

[Footnote 1001: Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for entire debate. ]

[Footnote 1002: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 164. Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1003: Rhodes, IV, 369-72. ]

[Footnote 1004: Palmerston MS. ]

[Footnote 1005: Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in June, and theseizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government this decision wasupheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It was again appealed, andthe Government defeated in the House of Lords in April, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1006: _Manchester Examiner and Times_, April 7, 1863. GoldwinSmith was one of the principal speakers. Letters were read from Bright, Forster, R. A. Taylor, and others. ]

[Footnote 1007: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 869, No. 183. ]

[Footnote 1008: "Historicus, " in articles in the _Times_, was at thisvery moment, from December, 1862, on, discussing international lawproblems, and in one such article specifically defended the belligerentright to conduct a cruising squadron blockade. See _Historicus onInternational Law_, pp. 99-118. He stated the established principle tobe that search and seizure could be used "not only" for "vesselsactually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, butthose also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to havebeen destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of theblockade. " (_Ibid. _, p. 108. )]

[Footnote 1009: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to Lyons, March28, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1010: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 881, No. 309. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 1011: _Ibid. _, No. 310. To Russell, April 13, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1012: Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1013: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy enclosed in Lyons toRussell, April 17, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1014: Russell Papers. To Russell. ]

[Footnote 1015: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to Russell, April24, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1016: Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons wrote: "The storiesin the newspapers about an ultimatum having been sent to England areuntrue. But it is true that it had been determined (or very nearlydetermined) to issue letters of marque, if the answers to the despatchessent were not satisfactory. It is very easy to see that if U. S. Privateers were allowed to capture British merchant vessels on chargesof breach of blockade or carrying contraband of war, the vexations wouldhave soon become intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel musthave ensued. "]

[Footnote 1017: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII. "Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on Foreign Enlistment Act. "]

[Footnote 1018: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1019: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, pp. 308-10. ]

[Footnote 1020: The despatch taken in its entirety save for a fewvigorous sentences quite typical of Seward's phrase-making, is not atall warlike. Bancroft, II, 385 _seq_. , makes Seward increasingly anxiousfrom March to September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch toAdams, September 5. This last was the result of Adams' misgivingsreported in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in myinterpretation) that Seward really began to fear the "pledge" made inApril would not be carried out. Adams himself, in 1864, read to Russella communication from Seward denying that his July 11 despatch wasintended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to Great Britain. (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 939, No. 159. Russell to Lyons, April 3, 1864. )]

[Footnote 1021: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels building at Birkenhead. "]

[Footnote 1022: See next chapter. ]

[Footnote 1023: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 83, No. 452, and No. 453with enclosure. Adams to Seward, July 16, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1024: Rhodes, IV, 381. ]

[Footnote 1025: Many of these details were unknown at the time so thaton the face of the documents then available, and for long afterwards, there appeared ground for believing that Adams' final protests ofSeptember 3 and 5 had forced Russell to yield. Dudley, as late as 1893, thought that "at the crisis" in September, Palmerston, in the absence ofRussell, had given the orders to stop the rams. (In _Penn. Magazine ofHistory_, Vol. 17, pp. 34-54. "Diplomatic Relations with England duringthe Late War. ")]

[Footnote 1026: Rhodes, IV, p. 382. ]

[Footnote 1027: The _Times_, Sept. 7, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1028: _Ibid. _, Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863. The Governmentalcorrespondence with Lairds was demanded by a motion in Parliament, Feb. 23, 1864, but the Government was supported in refusing it. A printedcopy of this correspondence, issued privately, was placed in Adams'hands by persons unnamed and sent to Seward on March 29, 1864. Sewardthereupon had this printed in the _Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1864-5, Pt. I, No. 633. ]

[Footnote 1029: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 84, No. 492. Adams toSeward, Sept. 8, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1030: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 370. To Seward, Sept. 10, 1863. Adams, looking at the whole matter of theRams and the alleged "threat of war" of Sept. 5, from the point of viewof his own anxiety at the time, was naturally inclined to magnify theeffects of his own efforts and to regard the _crisis_ as occurring inSeptember. His notes to Russell and his diary records were early themain basis of historical treatment. Rhodes, IV, 381-84, has disprovedthe accusation of Russell's yielding to a threat. Brooks Adams (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, p. 293, _seq. _) ignores Rhodes, harks back to the old argument and amplifies it with much new andinteresting citation, but not to conviction. My interpretation is thatthe real crisis of Governmental decision to act came in April, and thatevents in September were but final applications of that decision. ]

[Footnote 1031: Russell Papers. Monck to Stuart, Sept. 26, 1863. Copy inStuart to Russell, Oct. 6, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1032: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 16, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1033: Hammond wrote to Lyons, Oct. 17: "You will learn by thepapers that we have at last seized the Iron Clads. Whether we shall beable to bring home to them legally that they were Confederate propertyis another matter. I think we can, but at all events no moral doubt canbe entertained of the fact, and, therefore, we are under no anxietywhether as to the public or Parliamentary view of our proceeding. Theywould have played the devil with the American ships, for they are mostformidable ships. I suppose the Yankees will sleep more comfortably inconsequence. " (Lyons Papers. ) The Foreign Office thought that it hadthwarted plans to seize violently the vessels and get them to sea. (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 930. Inglefield to Grey, Oct. 25, and Romaine toHammond, Oct. 26, 1863. ). ]

[Footnote 1034: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 929. Marked "September, 1863. " The draftsummarized the activities of Confederate ship-building and threatenedSouthern agents in England with "the penalities of the law. . . . "]

[Footnote 1035: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 932, No. 1. F. O. To Consul-GeneralCrawford, Dec. 16, 1863. The South, on October 7, 1863, had already"expelled" the British consuls. Crawford was to protest against thisalso. (_Ibid. _, No. 4. )]

[Footnote 1036: Bonham. _British Consuls in the South_, p. 254. (Columbia Univ. Studies, Vol. 43. )]

[Footnote 1037: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Dec. 5, 1863. Bullock, _Secret Service_, declares the British Government to have been neutralbut with strong leaning toward the North. ]

[Footnote 1038: Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXXIII, pp. 430-41, 544-50, 955-1021. The Tory point of view is argued at length by Brooks Adams, _The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, pp. 312-324. ]

[Footnote 1039: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXIV, pp. 1862-1913. _The Index_, naturally vicious in comment on the question of the Rams, summed up itsapproval of Derby's contentions: "Europe and America alike willinevitably believe that it was the threat of Mr. Adams, and nothingelse, which induced the Foreign Secretary to retract his letter of the1st September, and they will draw the necessary conclusion that the wayto extort concessions from England is by bluster and menace. " (Feb. 18, 1864, p. 106. )]

[Footnote 1040: Lairds brought suit for damages, but the case neverreached a decision, for the vessels were purchased by the Government. This has been regarded as acknowledgment by the Government that it hadno case. In my view the failure to push the case to a conclusion was dueto the desire not to commit Great Britain on legal questions, in view ofthe claim for damages certain to be set up by the United States onaccount of the depredations of the _Alabama_. ]

CHAPTER XIV

ROEBUCK'S MOTION

In the mid-period during which the British Government was seeking tofulfil its promise of an altered policy as regards ship-building andwhile the public was unaware that such a promise had been given, certainextreme friends of the South thought the time had come for renewedpressure upon the Government, looking toward recognition of theConfederacy. The _Alexandra_ had been seized in April, but the firsttrial, though appealed, had gone against the Government in June, andthere was no knowledge that the Ministry was determined in its stand. From January to the end of March, 1863, the public demonstrations inapproval of the emancipation proclamation had somewhat checkedexpressions of Southern sympathy, but by the month of June old friendshad recovered their courage and a new champion of the South came forwardin the person of Roebuck. 

Meanwhile the activities of Southern agents and Southern friends had notceased even if they had, for a time, adopted a less vigorous tone. Forfour months after the British refusal of Napoleon's overtures onmediation, in November, 1862, the friends of the South were against"acting now, " but this did not imply that they thought the cause lost orin any sense hopeless. Publicists either neutral in attitude or evenprofessedly sympathetic with the North could see no outcome of the CivilWar save separation of North and South. Thus the historian Freeman inthe preface to the first volume of his uncompleted _History of FederalGovernment_, published in 1863, carefully explained that his book didnot have its origin in the struggle in America, and argued that thebreaking up of the Union in no way proved any inherent weakness in afederal system, but took it for granted that American reunion wasimpossible. The novelist, Anthony Trollope, after a long tour of theNorth, beginning in September, 1861, published late in 1862 a two-volumework, _North America_, descriptive of a nation engaged in the businessof war and wholly sympathetic with the Northern cause. Yet he, also, could see no hope of forcing the South back into the Union. "The Northand South are virtually separated, and the day will come in which theWest also will secede[1041]. "

Such interpretations of conditions in America were not unusual; theywere, rather, generally accepted. The Cabinet decision in November, 1862, was not regarded as final, though events were to prove it to be sofor never again was there so near an approach to British intervention. Mason's friend, Spence, early began to think that true Southern policywas now to make an appeal to the Tories against the Government. InJanuary, 1863, he was planning a new move:

 "I have written to urge Mr. Gregory to be here in time for a thorough organization so as to push the matter this time to a vote. I think the Conservatives may be got to move as a body and if so the result of a vote seems to me very certain. I have seen Mr. Horsfall and Mr. Laird here and will put myself in communication with Mr. Disraeli as the time approaches for action for this seems to me now our best card[1042]. "

That some such effort was being thought of is evidenced by the attitudeof the _Index_ which all through the months from November, 1862, to themiddle of January, 1863, had continued to harp on the subject ofmediation as if still believing that something yet might be done by theexisting Ministry, but which then apparently gave up hope of thePalmerstonian administration:

 "But what the Government means is evident enough. It does not mean to intervene or to interfere. It will not mediate, if it can help it; it will not recognize the Confederate States, unless there should occur some of those 'circumstances over which they have no control, ' which leave weak men and weak ministers no choice. They will not, if they are not forced to it, quarrel with Mr. Seward, or with Mr. Bright. They will let Lancashire starve; they will let British merchantmen be plundered off Nassau and burnt off Cuba; they will submit to a blockade of Bermuda or of Liverpool; but they will do nothing which may tend to bring a supply of cotton from the South, or to cut off the supply of eggs and bacon from the North[1043]. "

But this plan of 'turning to the Tories' received scant encouragementand was of no immediate promise, as soon appeared by the debate inParliament on reassembling, February 5, 1863. Derby gave explicitapproval of the Government's refusal to listen to Napoleon[1044]. ByFebruary, Russell, having recovered from the smart of defeat within theCabinet, declared himself weary of the perpetual talk about mediationand wrote to Lyons, ". . . Till both parties are heartily tired and sickof the business, I see no use in talking of good offices. When that timecomes Mercier will probably have a hint; let him have all the honour andglory of being the first[1045]. " For the time being Spence's idea waslaid aside, Gregory writing in response to an inquiry from Mason:

 "The House of Commons is opposed to taking any step at present, feeling rightly or wrongly that to do so would be useless to the South, and possibly embroil us with the North. Any motion on the subject will be received with disfavour, consequently the way in which it will be treated will only make the North more elated, and will irritate the South against us. If I saw the slightest chance of a motion being received with any favour I would not let it go into other hands, but I find the most influential men of all Parties opposed to it[1046]. "

Of like opinion was Slidell who, writing of the situation in France, reported that he had been informed by his "friend at the Foreign Office"that "It is believed that every possible thing has been done here inyour behalf--we must now await the action of England, and it is throughthat you must aim all your efforts in that direction[1047]. "

With the failure, at least temporary, of Southern efforts to move theBritish Government or to stir Parliament, energies were now directedtoward using financial methods of winning support for the Southerncause. The "Confederate Cotton Loan" was undertaken with the doubleobject of providing funds for Southern agents in Europe and of creatingan interested support of the South, which might, it was hoped, ultimately influence the British Government. 

By 1863 it had become exceedingly difficult, owing to the blockade, forthe Government at Richmond to transmit funds to its agents abroad. Bullock, especially, required large amounts in furtherance of hisship-building contracts and was embarrassed by the lack of businessmethods and the delays of the Government at home. The incompetence ofthe Confederacy in finance was a weakness that characterized all of itsmany operations whether at home or abroad[1048] and was made evident inEngland by the confusion in its efforts to establish credits there. Atfirst the Confederate Government supplied its agents abroad with draftsupon the house of Fraser, Trenholm & Company, of Liverpool, a branch ofthe firm long established at Charleston, South Carolina, purchasing itsbills of exchange with its own "home made" money. But as Confederatecurrency rapidly depreciated this method of transmitting funds becameincreasingly difficult and costly. The next step was to send to Spence, nominated by Mason as financial adviser in England, Confederate moneybonds for sale on the British market, with authority to dispose of themas low as fifty cents on the dollar, but these found no takers[1049]. BySeptember, 1862, Bullock's funds for ship-building were exhausted andsome new method of supply was required. Temporary relief was found inadopting a suggestion from Lindsay whereby cotton was made the basis foran advance of Ł60, 000, a form of cotton bond being devised which fixedthe price of cotton at eightpence the pound. These bonds were not put onthe market but were privately placed by Lindsay & Company with a fewbuyers for the entire sum, the transaction remaining secret[1050]. 

In the meantime this same recourse to cotton had occurred to theauthorities at Richmond and a plan formulated by which cotton should bepurchased by the Government, stored, and certificates issued to be soldabroad, the purchaser being assured of "all facilities of shipment. "Spence was to be the authorized agent for the sale of these "cottoncertificates, " but before any reached him various special agents of theConfederacy had arrived in England by December, 1862, with suchcertificates in their possession and had disposed of some of them, calling them "cotton warrants. " The difficulties which might arise fromseparate action in the market were at once perceived and following aconference with Mason all cotton obligations were turned to Fraser, Trenholm & Company. Spence now had in his hands the "money bonds" but nofurther attempt was made to dispose of these since the "cotton warrants"were considered a better means of raising funds. 

It is no doubt true that since all of these efforts involved agovernmental guarantee the various "certificates" or "warrants" partookof the nature of a government bond. Yet up to this point the Richmondauthorities, after the first failure to sell "money bonds" abroad werenot keen to attempt anything that could be stamped as a foreign"government loan. " Their idea was rather that a certain part of theproduce of the South was being set aside as the property of those who inEngland should extend credit to the South. The sole purpose of theseearlier operations was to provide funds for Southern agents. By July, 1862, Bullock had exhausted his earlier credit of a million dollars. TheŁ60, 000 loan secured through Lindsay then tided over an emergency demandand this had been followed by a development on similar lines of the"cotton certificates" and "warrants" which by December, 1862, hadsecured, through Spence's agency, an additional million dollars orthereabouts. Mason was strongly recommending further expansion of thismethod and had the utmost confidence in Spence. Now, however, there wasbroached to the authorities in Richmond a proposal for the definitefloating in Europe of a specified "cotton loan. "

This proposal came through Slidell at Paris and was made by thewell-established firm of Erlanger & Company. First approached by thiscompany in September, 1862, Slidell consulted Mason but found the latterstrongly committed to his own plans with Spence[1051]. But Slidellpersisted and Mason gave way[1052]. Representatives of Erlangerproceeded to Richmond and proposed a loan of twenty-five milliondollars; they were surprised to find the Confederate Governmentdisinclined to the idea of a foreign loan, and the final agreement, cutto fifteen millions, was largely made because of the argument advancedthat as a result powerful influences would thus be brought to thesupport of the South[1053]. The contract was signed at Richmond, January28, 1863, and legalized by a secret act of Congress on the dayfollowing[1054]. But there was no Southern enthusiasm for the project. Benjamin wrote to Mason that the Confederacy disclaimed the "desire orintention on our part to effect a loan in Europe . . . During the war wewant only such very moderate sums as are required abroad for thepurchase of warlike supplies and for vessels, and even that is notrequired because of our want of funds, but because of the difficultiesof remittance"; as for the Erlanger contract the Confederacy "would havedeclined it altogether but for the political considerations indicated byMr. Slidell[1055]. . . . "

From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; fromSlidell's (at least so asserted) it was to place a loan with the purposeof establishing strong friends. It had been agreed to suspend theoperations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's offer was learned, but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing agent of the Confederacy, caused a further sale of "cotton warrants[1056]. " Spence, fearing he wasabout to be shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, whileSlidell regarded Spence[1057] as a weak and meddlesome agent[1058]. Buton February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris anduncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, andagreed to co-operate in floating the loan[1059]. Then followed aremarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so much as regardsthe financial returns to the South, for these were negligible, as inrelation to the declared object of Slidell and the RichmondGovernment--namely, the "strong influences" that would accompany thesuccessful flotation of a loan. 

Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to receivepromptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress authorizing theloan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this contract Erlanger &Company, sole managers of the loan, had guaranteed flotation of theentire $15, 000, 000 at not less than 77, the profit of the Company to befive per cent. , plus the difference between 77 and the actual pricereceived, but the first $300, 000 taken was to be placed at once at thedisposal of the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19, in London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practicallyall operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan wasentitled "_Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States ofAmerica for_ 3 _Millions Sterling at_ 90 _per Cent_. " The bonds were tobear interest at seven per cent. And were to be exchangeable for cottonat the option of the holder at the price of sixpence "for each pound ofcotton, at any time not later than six months after the ratification ofa treaty of peace between the present belligerents. " There wereprovisions for the gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those whodid not desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. Onapplication. 10 per cent. On allotment, 10 per cent. On each of thedays, the first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. On thefirst of August, September and October. 

Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound it wasthought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at least a goodchance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds. True "the loan waslooked upon as a wild cotton speculation[1060], " but odds were so largeas to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed hardly conceivablethat cotton could for some years go below sevenpence per pound, and eventhat figure would have meant profit, _if_ the Confederacy wereestablished. Moreover, even though the loan was not given officialrecognition by the London stock exchange, the financial columns of the_Times_ and the _Economist_ favoured it and the subscriptions were soprompt and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported asover-subscribed three times in London alone[1061]. With the closing ofthe subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2. Slidell wrote: "It is afinancial recognition of our independence, emanating from a classproverbially cautious, and little given to be influenced by sentiment orsympathy[1062]. " On Friday, March 27, the allotment took place and threedays later Mason wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, onthe triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows, _malgré_ alldetraction and calumny, that cotton is king at last[1063]. "

"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble and ittook all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep him instate[1064]. " On April 1, the flurry of speculation had begun to falterand the loan was below par; on the second it dropped to 3-1/2 discount, and by the third the promoters and the Southern diplomats were veryanxious. They agreed that someone must be "bearing" the bonds andsuspected Adams of supplying Northern funds for that purpose[1065]. Spence wrote from Liverpool in great alarm and coincidently Erlanger &Company urged that Mason should authorize the use of the receiptsalready secured to hold up the price of the bonds. Mason was veryreluctant to do this[1066], but finally yielded when informed of theresult of an interview between Spence, Erlanger, and the latter's chiefLondon agent, Schroeder. Spence had proposed a withdrawal of a part ofthe loan from the market as likely to have a stabilizing effect, andopposed the Erlanger plan of using the funds already in hand. ButSchroeder coolly informed him that if the Confederate representativerefused to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market, then Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed theircontract . . . Which was simply to issue the Loan. " "Having issued it, they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up theirinstalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent sacrificedis, in point of fact, not the property of the Government at all, but theprofits of Messrs. Erlanger & Co. , actually in their hands, and theycannot be expected to take a worse position. At any rate they will notdo so, and unless the compact can be made on the basis we name, mattersmust take their course[1067]. "

In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he "could nothesitate . . . Seeing that nothing could be so disastrous politically, aswell as financially, as the public break-down of the Loan[1068]. " Masongave the required authorization and this was later approved fromRichmond. For a time the "bulling" of the loan was successful, but againand again required the use of funds received from actual sales of bondsand in the end the loan netted very little to the Confederacy. Some$6, 000, 000 was squandered in supporting the market and from the entireoperation it is estimated that less than $7, 000, 000 was realized by theConfederacy, although, as stated by the _Economist_, over $12, 000, 000 ofthe bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands of British investorsat the end of the war[1069]. 

The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by Slidell, a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere barometer ofSouthern fortunes[1070]. From first to last the Confederate Cotton Loanbore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture and lacked theregard attached to sound investment. This fact in itself denied to theloan any such favourable influence, or "financial recognition of theConfederacy, " as Mason and Slidell, in the first flush of success, attributed to it. The rapid fluctuations in price further discredited itand tended to emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus"confidence in the South" was, if anything, lessened instead ofincreased by this turning from political to financial methods ofbringing pressure upon the Government[1071]. 

Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been reservedfrom January to June, 1863. Public attention was distracted from the warin America by the Polish question, which for a time, particularly duringthe months of March and April, 1863, disturbed the good relationsexisting between England and France since the Emperor seemed bent ongoing beyond British "meddling, " even to pursuing a policy that easilymight lead to war with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America, and Napoleon himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polishquestion than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture wasstill a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary "push"and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in Lancashirelittle attention was given it, though ordinarily it would have beenseized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern demonstration. This wasa bitter attack by one Ferrand in the Commons, on April 27, directedagainst the cotton manufacturers as lukewarm over employees' sufferings. Potter, a leading cotton manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter andhis brother were already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yetno effort was made to use the debate to the advantage of theSouth[1072]. 

In late May both necessity and fortuitous circumstance seemed to makeadvisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton loan, thoughfairly strong again because of Confederate governmental aid, was in facta failure in its expected result of public support for the South;something must be done to offset that failure. In Polish affairs Francehad drawn back; presumably Napoleon was again eager for some activeeffort. Best of all, the military situation in America was thought toindicate Southern success; Grant's western campaign had come to a haltwith the stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold atVicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelminglydefeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, adefinite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance northdid not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in a selectcircle in England and much was expected of it. The time seemed ripe, therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck of a motion forthe recognition of the Confederacy--first step the real purpose of whichwas to attempt that 'turning to the Tories' which had been advocated bySpence in January, but postponed on the advice of Gregory[1073]. _TheIndex_ clearly indicated where lay the wind: "No one, " it declared "nowasks what will be the policy of Great Britain towards America; buteverybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will do. "

 ". . . England to-day pays one of the inevitable penalties of free government and of material prosperity, that of having at times at the head of national affairs statesmen who belong rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details, acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies. . . . 

 "The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless. . . . From Great Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet at Washington has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States nothing to expect[1074]. "

Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The _Times_minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as required forpolitical effect to hold the north-western states loyal to the Union, and while indulging in no prophecies as to the fate of Vicksburg, expressing the opinion that, if forced to surrender it, the South couldeasily establish "a new Vicksburg" at some other point[1075]. Naturally_The Index_ was pleased with and supported this view[1076]. Suchignorance of the geographic importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilfulmisleading of the public; but professed British military experts wereequally ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History atSandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American campaigns, centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and Virginia andreaching the conclusion that the South could resist, indefinitely, anyNorthern attack[1077]. He dismissed the western campaigns as of no realsignificance. W. H. Russell, now editor of the _Army and Navy Gazette_, better understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believedNorthern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of theUnion to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the successof Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to Roebuck's motionfor recognition, W. H. Russell was against it. 

 "If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking the North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered Union again, is the delusion of some people in England who imagine that by recognition we would give life to the South, divide the nations on each side of the black and white line for ever, and bring this war to the end. There is probably not one of these clamourers for recognition who could define the limits of the State to be recognized. . . . And, over and above all, recognition, unless it meant 'war, ' would be an aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid the South one whit, and it would add immensely to the unity and the fury of the North[1078]. "

The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at Roebuck'smotion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has given notice ofa motion to recognize the South. But I think it certain that neitherLord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think no greatnumber of the Liberal party. Offshoots from all parties will compose theminority[1079]. " Russell was correct in this view but not so did itappear to Southern agents who now became active at the request ofRoebuck and Lindsay in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions ofwillingness to act, and promptly, if England would but give the word. There was no real hope that Russell would change his policy, but thereseemed at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one. The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30. OnJune 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from Roebuckasking for an interview with Napoleon[1080], and on June 16, Mason wrotethat if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the greatest importance thathe, Mason, should be at once informed of the results and how far hemight communicate them to "our friends in the House[1081]. " Slidell sawthe Emperor on June 18, talked of the possibility of "forcing theEnglish Cabinet to act or to give way to a new ministry, " asked that aninterview be given Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury, a warm friend of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary ina Tory cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aidin upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requestedinterview and declared he would go to the length of officially informingthe British Ministry that France was very ready to discuss theadvisability of recognizing the South[1082]. 

This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from Mocquardstating that Baron Gros, the French Ambassador at London, had beeninstructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and Lindsay had hurriedto Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the twenty-fifth, Slidellreported that they were authorized to state in the House of Commons thatFrance was "not only willing but anxious to recognize the ConfederateStates with the co-operation of England[1083]. " Slidell added, however, that Napoleon had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formalproposal to Great Britain. This rested on the assurances received bySlidell from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the assurance beknown to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, onJune 26, had denied any official communication from France, and askedfor authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being permittedto give Roebuck a copy of the supposed instruction[1084], he received areply indicating confusion somewhere:

 "I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires Etrangeres on the subject of your note of Saturday: he has just left me. M. D. De Lh. Will not give a copy of his instructions to Baron Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading Members of Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the subject of American affairs were unchanged. That he was disposed with the co-operation of England immediately to recognize the Confederate States; this was in the form of a draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he officially instructed the Baron to sound _Palmerston_ on the subject and to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This was done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait bien d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis décidé ŕ reconnaître le Sud. ' This is by far the most significant thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England may do or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press his motion and make his statement of the Emperor's declaration. Lord Palmerston will not dare to dispute it and the responsibility of the continuance of the war will rest entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not heard from Baron Gros the result of his interview with Palmerston. I see that the latter has been unwell and it is probable that the former had not been able to see him. There can be no impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will doubtless give him information which he will use to advantage. I write in great haste; will you do me the favour to let Lord Campbell know the substance of this note, omitting that portion of it which relates to the Emperor's inclination to act alone. Pray excuse me to Lord Campbell for not writing to him, time not permitting me to do so[1085]. "

This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth, "Can Iput in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought byCorcoran[1086]. " To which Slidell replied by letter:

 "For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write to say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be _used in any way_. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay when they were here and have no objection that they should again see it confidentially[1087]. "

On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the information thatno formal communication had been made to Russell. The next day in aneffort in some way to secure an admission of what Mason and his friendsbelieved to be the truth, Lord Campbell asked Russell in the House ofLords if he had received either a document or a verbal communicationoutlining Napoleon's desires. Russell replied that Baron Gros had toldhim "an hour ago" that he had not even received any instruction todeliver such a communication[1088]. This was in the hours preceding thedebate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had been anerror in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck and Lindsay, or else there was a question of veracity between Russell, Baron Grosand Napoleon. 

Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the Queen toenter into negotiations with foreign powers for co-operation inrecognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that the South had infact established its independence and that this was greatly to England'sadvantage since it put an end to the "threatening great power" in theWest. He repeated old arguments based on suffering in Lancashire--apoint his opponents brushed aside as no longer of dangerousconcern--attacked British anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy andminimized the dangers of a war with the North, prophesying an easyvictory for Great Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on theGovernment Roebuck related at length his interview with Napoleon, claiming to have been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England toaction and asserting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to applyagain to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry wasconcealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, headded that Napoleon had told him no formal French application could berenewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to Seward, throughLyons, the contents of a former application. 

Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhatperfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot withall of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance[1089]. Here was directattack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the debate. Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of the South, wassarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into the field ofdiplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming involved in thewar, and moved an amendment in favour of continued British neutrality. Palmerston was absent, being ill, but Gladstone, for the Government, while carefully avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North orSouth, yet going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disasterto political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, waspositive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck'smotion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not _commit_ herselfto any line of policy, especially as military events were "nowoccurring" which might greatly alter the whole situation, though "themain result of the contest was not doubtful. " Here spoke that element ofthe Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success. 

If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friendsmight well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial changeof front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himselfthan for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and inmeeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive andemphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, HomeSecretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himselfto be made the channel of a French complaint against England. It earlybecame evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics hadbeen committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a newFrench offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof ofit; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt tounseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to asupport of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck"feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party stronglysupporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mereparty one that it served to increase the strength of ministerialresistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation andin strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government. Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of Britishemancipation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the mostpowerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. Inparticular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy ofRoebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his"friend" Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded byrecalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fondof talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright dilated uponthe egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperorof France on the floor of the House of Commons. The Emperor, heasserted, was in great danger of being too much represented inParliament[1091]. 

The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was disconcerting toSouthern friends. It had been adjourned without a vote, for which theywere duly thankful. Especially disconcerting was Slidell's refusal topermit the citation of Mocquard's note in proof of Roebuck's assertions. Mason wrote:

 "I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the papers of to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was present, and will have seen what in the H. L. Lord Russell said in reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair remains in a 'muss, ' unless the Emperor will show his hand _on paper_, we shall never know what he really means, or derive any benefit from his private and individual revelations. As things now stand before the public, there can be but one opinion, i. E. , that he holds one language in private communications, though 'with liberty to divulge, ' and another to his ambassador here. The debate is adjourned to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no confidence in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from him so far can invite only distrust[1092]. "

As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition of theConfederacy received little support. The _Times_, while sympathetic withthe purpose was against Roebuck's motion, considering it of no valueunless backed up by force; to this the _Times_ was decidedlyopposed[1093]. Of like opinion was the _Economist_, declaring thatpremature recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of warby the North[1094]. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate was to berenewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's recovery and returnto the House. Bright pressed for an immediate decision. Layardreaffirmed very positively that no communication had been received fromFrance and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged complaint of a Britishrevelation to Seward of French overtures was a myth, since the documentin question had been printed in the _Moniteur_, thus attracting Seward'sattention[1095]. Thus Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spencewrote strongly urging the withdrawal of the motion:

 "I have a letter from an eminent member of the House and great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr. Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated by a great majority and the effect of this will encourage the North and distress our friends. It will also strengthen the minority of the Cabinet in favour of the North. . . . 

 "The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on the part of France, has failed us--and taken shape which tells injuriously instead of being the great support. . . . 

 "If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to support the motion it would alter the question entirely. In the absence of this I fear the vote would be humiliating and would convey an impression wholly delusive, for the members are 10 to 1 in favour of the South and yet on this point the vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern interests[1096]. "

On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured anagreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next[1097]. "Meantime many powerful organs of the French press had taken up thematter and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policyand actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create afeeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out apro-Southern policy[1098]. Palmerston, wishing to avoid furtherdiscussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, wrotein a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July 9:

 "Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon you, and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further mention or discussion of what passed between you and Mr. Lindsay on the one hand, and the Emperor of the French on the other. In truth the whole proceeding on this subject the other day seems to me to have been very irregular. The British Parliament receives messages and communications from their own sovereign, but not from the sovereigns of other countries. . . . "

 "No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr. Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow traveller[1099]. "

The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck towithdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of theuncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressedto a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if thedebate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention ofthe personal questions that had been raised, since these were not propermatters for discussion in the House and were embarrassing to the FrenchEmperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in thiscase and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsayentered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed theaccusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck notto withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday. " The _Scotia_, he said was due and any moment news from America might change thegovernmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharplydisavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck'sactions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed forcontinuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's"diplomacy, " and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant andthose of the South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that themotion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South, " but LordRobert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and thiswas finally done[1100]. 

All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee'sadvance was known to have passed by Washington, but no reports were yetat hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensivecampaign by the South. July 9, the _Times_ predicted, editorially, thatLee was about to capture Washington and that this event would be met bya great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war andeager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101]. Nevertheless the _Times_, while still confident of Lee's victoriousadvance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, cameout strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion, arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make nohurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuckmoved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave theimpression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay, his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own"amateur diplomacy, " spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleonand tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact, "employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic inreply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that thiswould be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it hisduty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may havepassed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]. "

The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause ofthe South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding ofthe position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its moverinto tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personalveracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubtthe very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, uponwhich Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, adeterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain mightnow keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway. " There is noevidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by anyconsideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even tothe extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of theGovernment in relation to Southern ship-building. 

Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southernvictory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would beoverwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance onthe topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check atGettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the _Times_two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern armyhad been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue itwas stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hopethere can be of reducing the city[1105]. " But on July 20, full news ofthe events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat fromGettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, thoughefforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neitherside could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previousassertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to opposeNorthern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that thecapture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a greatdisaster to the South. _The Index_, forgetful that it was supposedly aBritish publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached _us_since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender ofVicksburg. The _very day_ on which the capitulation took place rendersthe blow heavier[1107]. "

"The fall of Vicksburg, " wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week, never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]. " Adams reported thatthe news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bondsand that the press and upper classes were exceedingly glad they hadrefused support of Roebuck's motion[1109]. 

If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southerneffort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure fromthe outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortuneof Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmentalattitude had long since passed. Naturally this was not acknowledged bythe staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it wasacknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of theConfederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British interventionhad come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, theConfederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writingthat the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determinednot to receive him:

 "Under these circumstances, your continued residence in London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent with the dignity of this Government, and the President therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end, and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from London[1110]. "

A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remainif there were any "marked change" in governmental attitude, but sincethe decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been madepublic at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received, September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, thevery fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit thoughthere was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stoppingof Confederate ship-building in England. The real connection was withthe failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse ofRoebuck's motion. Even the _Times_ was now expanding upon the "seriousreverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England"has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to interventionor mediation, or to take any position except that of strictneutrality[1111]. "

Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instructionand secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposedmaking to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents tookplace and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was theregard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. _The Index_ hastened tojoin in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France inher conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial fromthe _Richmond Enquirer_ in which it was declared, "France is the onlyPower in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards theConfederacy in its terrible struggle for independence. " Evidently allhope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubtdistasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final. 

On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearlyin the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once madepublic, calling out from the _Times_ a hectoring editorial on the follyof the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. Ingeneral, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "letMason down easily, " acknowledging that his act indicated a universalunderstanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strictneutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence ofthe South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesybut also with seeming finality:

 "I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the accredited Minister of an established State. 

 "These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to repeat them. 

 "I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and satisfaction[1116]. "

Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England werestill to be his, but the chief rôle there was now assigned to others andthe principal scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fullyconcur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, isevident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. Heregarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly anEnglish political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow ofPalmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of thePrime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerstonwere frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course ofaction and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing hisacquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events. 

If the South was indignant at British inaction the North wascorrespondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams wasofficially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this sameprivate letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against anotion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action byEngland, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_, unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status ofa Belligerent for all _international_ purposes. " Why or how this ideacame to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the resultof irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that thewar was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theoryclearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the AmericanSecretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causingdifficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons wasquick to see the danger. He wrote:

 "Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the United States Government and people would become more difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only an excuse for doing so[1118]. "

Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America'sreadiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such acontingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caughtnapping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting generalspeculation and was accompanied by the assurance, "I don't think theGovernment here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with anyEuropean Power--but the better prepared it is, the less manageable itwill be[1120]. " Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion ofwithdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and hisrepresentations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of thematter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:

 "I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship which might turn sour like beer if there should be a thunder-storm. 

 "But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United States[1121]. "

If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial, " therewas, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of theSouth. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and Ihope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during thepast two years[1122]. " George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding HenryWard Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded openpublic meetings in favour of the North as compared with the twopro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123]. Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, wasbitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams, by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in theultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125]. 

Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended thecessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal ofactivity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the militarysituation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largelynegative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced byorganized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the Westhad been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recoverChattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelledto release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallenback to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnablefront to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had beenexpected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Smallwonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should nowdeclare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and countmuch upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently publishedbook[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry theorganization of the "Southern Independence Association. " Seeking aspecific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they firstfixed their attention on the new trial of the _Alexandra_, on appealfrom the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. OnDecember 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying totown" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government wouldagain be defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for theseizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution toMason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy oron any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128]. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1041: Trollope, _North America_, I, p. 124. ]

[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool. ]

[Footnote 1043: The _Index_, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent incontrol of the _Index_ was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managingthis journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure thesupport of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with allthe Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears neverto have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I madenotes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then inthe possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) aletter and cash book marked "C. S. A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) acopy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copyletter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16, 1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J. F. Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams'death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. Myreferences, then, to "Hotze Papers, " must rest on my notes, andtranscripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activitiesto Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the _Index_, he furnished news items and _editorials_ to various London papers, hadseven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constantdistributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana . . . Americanwhiskey and other articles. " He added: "It is, of course, out of thequestion to give vouchers. " (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze toBenjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863. ) In Hotze's cash book one of hisregular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of theConfederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" onthe _Times_. ]

[Footnote 1044: See _ante_, Ch. XI. ]

[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3, 1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson. ]

[Footnote 1048: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_ gives thebest analysis and history of Southern financing. ]

[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of tocontractors in payment for materials. ]

[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1051: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married toErlanger's son. ]

[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far inrecommending these propositions . . . Had I not the best reason to believethat even in anticipation of its acceptance the very strongest influencewill be enlisted in our favour. " (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin, Oct. 28, 1862. )]

[Footnote 1054: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, pp. 30-31. Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond, since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contactwith Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond. ]

[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1056: _Ibid_, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1058: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1059: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason toSlidell, Feb. 24, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33. ]

[Footnote 1061: _Ibid. _, p. 33. In France permission to advertise theloan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention ofthe Emperor. ]

[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1063: Mason's _Mason_, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M. A. Degree atStanford University: _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_ (1915). I ammuch indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance. "]

[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not thereal reason for the change to be found in British Governmentalintentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentarydebate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the otherhand, the _Alexandra_ case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to bepresumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government hadnot failed to reach the bond market. ]

[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1067: _Ibid. _, Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter waswritten a month after the event at Mason's request for an exactstatement of what had occurred. ]

[Footnote 1068: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger &Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselvesbeen large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of thepresumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietlyunloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the marketshowed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access toSpence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion. ]

[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern ships had run byVicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused arecovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty percent. Discount. ]

[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of andpublished an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in whichappeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation--a seriousone if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member--in his_Retrospections_ (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in manywritings (e. G. , G. P. Putnam, _Memoirs_, p. 213). Gladstone's emphaticdenial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery, " appears in Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 83. ]

[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXX, pp. 776-838. ]

[Footnote 1073: See _ante_, p. 155. ]

[Footnote 1074: The _Index_, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3. ]

[Footnote 1075: The _Times_, June 1, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1076: The _Index_, June 4, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1077: Chesney, _Military View of Recent Campaigns in Marylandand Virginia_, London, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1078: _Army and Navy Gazette_, June 6, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1079: Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1080: Callahan, _Diplomatic History of the SouthernConfederacy_, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The Crisis in England"is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole plan of "bringing in theTories" never had a chance of succeeding, as, indeed, Callahan himselfnotes. His detailed examination of the incident has unfortunately misledsome historians who have derived from his work the idea that thecritical period of British policy towards America was Midsummer, 1863, whereas it occurred, in fact, in October-November, 1862 (e. G. , Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War, " pp. 413 _seq_. Schmidt's thesisis largely dependent on placing the critical period in 1863). ]

[Footnote 1081: Mason Papers. To Slidell. ]

[Footnote 1082: Callahan, pp. 184-5. ]

[Footnote 1083: _Ibid. _, p. 186. To Benjamin. ]

[Footnote 1084: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, 1863. Masonwrote: "The question of veracity is raised. "]

[Footnote 1085: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, June 29, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1086: _Ibid. _, To Slidell. ]

[Footnote 1087: _Ibid. _, To Mason. "Monday eve. " (June 29, 1863. )]

[Footnote 1088: Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXXI, p. 1719. ]

[Footnote 1089: Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was of a terrierlabelled "Tear 'em, " worrying and snarling at his enemies. ]

[Footnote 1090: Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long been warm friends. They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did not destroy theirfriendship. ]

[Footnote 1091: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXI, pp. 1771-1842, for debate ofJune 30. Roebuck's egotism was later related by Lamar, then in London onhis way to Russia as representative of the South. A few days before thedebate Lamar met Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether heexpected Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir, " said Roebucksententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old story--thestory of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. Bright will not crossswords with me again. " Lamar attended the debate and saw Roebuck givenby Bright the "most deliberate and tremendous pounding I everwitnessed. " (_Education of Henry Adams_, pp. 161-2. )]

[Footnote 1092: Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1093: July 1, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1094: July 4, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1095: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXII, pp. 67-73. ]

[Footnote 1096: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In fact Disraeli, throughout the Civil War, favoured strict neutrality, not agreeing withmany of his Tory colleagues. He at times expressed himself privately asbelieving the Union would not be restored but was wise enough to refrainfrom such comment publicly. (Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, p. 328. )]

[Footnote 1097: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXII, p. 252. ]

[Footnote 1098: _The Index_ felt it necessary to combat this, and onJuly 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating such criticisms to benegligible as emanating wholly from minority and opposition papers. "Allthe sympathies of the French Government have, from the outset, been withthe South, and this, quite independently of other reasons, dictated theline which the opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist_Debats_, Republican _Sičcle_, The Palais Royal _Opinion_, all join inthe halloo against the South. "]

[Footnote 1099: Palmerston MS. July 9, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1100: Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXXII, 554 _seq_. , July 10, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1101: In the same issue appeared a letter from the New Yorkcorrespondent of the _Times_, containing a similar prediction but inmuch stronger terms. For the last half of the war the _Times_ was badlyserved by this correspondent who invariably reported the situation froman extreme anti-Northern point of view. This was Charles Mackay whoserved the _Times_ in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865. (Mackay, _Forty Years' Recollections_, II, p. 412. ) Possibly he hadstrict instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately toRussell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported thatMercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if Washington shouldfall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for himself inadvisable, sinceit would irritate Seward and in case the unexpected happened he could nodoubt get passage on Mercier's ship. When news came of the Southerndefeat at Gettysburg and of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thoughtthe complete collapse of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. LeslieStephen is a witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at thistime. He visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and metSeward, being received with much cordiality as a _verbal_ champion inEngland of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles on thewar. ) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke of thefriendly services of "Monkton Mill, " as a publicist on politicaleconomy. (Maitland, _Leslie Stephen_, p. 120. )]

[Footnote 1102: In this issue a letter from the New York correspondent, dated July 1, declared that all of the North except New England, wouldwelcome Lee's triumph: ". . . He and Mr. Jefferson Davis might ride intriumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a more enthusiasticmultitude than ever assembled on the Continent of America. " The New Yorkcity which soon after indulged in the "draft riots" might give someground for such writing, but it was far fetched, nevertheless--and NewYork was not the North. ]

[Footnote 1103: Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXXII, 661 _seq_. Ever afterwardsRoebuck was insistent in expressions of dislike and fear of America. Ata banquet to him in Sheffield in 1869 he delivered his "politicaltestament": "Beware of Trades Unions; beware of Ireland; beware ofAmerica. " (Leader, _Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck_, p. 330. )]

[Footnote 1104: May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to introduce anotherrecognition motion, but on July 25 complained he had had no chance tomake it, and asked Palmerston if the Government was not going to act. The reply was a brief negative. ]

[Footnote 1105: The _Times_, July 18, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1106: The power of the _Times_ in influencing public opinionthrough its news columns was very great. At the time it stood far in thelead in its foreign correspondence and the information printednecessarily was that absorbed by the great majority of the Britishpublic. Writing on January 23, 1863, of the mis-information spread aboutAmerica by the _Times_, Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt somuch as in this matter the enormous power which the _Times_ has, notfrom the quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, butfrom its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to avast number of minds. The _ignorance_ in which it has been able to keepa great part of the public is astounding. " (To E. S. Beesly. Haultain, _Correspondence of Goldwin Smith_, p. 11. )]

[Footnote 1107: _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 200. The italics aremine. The implication is that a day customarily celebrated as one ofrejoicing has now become one for gloom. No _Englishman_ would be likelyto regard July 4 as a day of rejoicing. ]

[Footnote 1108: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1109: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 329. Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1110: Mason, _Mason_, p. 449. ]

[Footnote 1111: Sept. 4, 1863. The _Times_ was now printing Americancorrespondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburgwhen the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilatedupon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to thewriter's astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war hadfostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863. ). ]

[Footnote 1112: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863. Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1113: McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in hisopinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of valuediplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He thought all otherswould soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason, had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and hisfamily's intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress. ]

[Footnote 1114: Sept. 23, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1115: e. G. , _Manchester Guardian_, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in_The Index_, Sept. 24, p. 343. ]

[Footnote 1116: Mason's _Mason_, p. 456. ]

[Footnote 1117: Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1118: _Ibid. _, Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of adespatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1119: F. O. , Am. , 896. No. 788. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencementof a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United Statesand its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they wouldhave been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago. Of thetwo Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for thestruggle--the coasts of the United States would present few points opento attack--while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in theneighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas, would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great Britain might atthe commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troopsinto the British Provinces on the continent than could have beenimmediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces. Itseems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now withoutdifficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any forcewhich Great Britain would be likely to place there. "]

[Footnote 1120: _Ibid. _, Private. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1121: Lyons Papers. To Lyons. ]

[Footnote 1122: Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1123: _The Liberator_, Nov. 27, 1863. I have not dwelt uponBeecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, because its influence in"winning England" seems to me absurdly over-estimated. He was a giftedpublic orator and knew how to "handle" his audiences, but the majorityin each audience was friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis ofopinion" in 1863 as has frequently been stated in order to exaltBeecher's services. ]

[Footnote 1124: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 319. The words are Dodd's. ]

[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams toSeward, Dec. 17, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1127: McHenry, _The Cotton Trade_, London, 1863. The prefacein the form of a long letter to W. H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863. For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C. F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 _seq_. ]

[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers. ]

CHAPTER XV

THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION

Northern friends in England were early active in organizing publicmeetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends, confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equallyconfident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinionin England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in publicexpressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up toNovember, 1862, _The Index_ records no Southern public meeting. But bythe summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusionthat something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northernsympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on hisinitiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and thatothers were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. InManchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionistmeeting in the Free Trade Hall":

 "These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and you will see there are here the germs of important work--but they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good deal of money individually but I see room for the use of Ł30 or Ł40 a month or more[1129]. "

The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance therequired amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederatesecret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributionswillingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a tastefor agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhatdubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list ofpatrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spencesucceeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24, 1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in courseof execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and forman association for the promotion of Southern independence "under theauspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M. P. , Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay, Peacocke, Van Stittart, M. P. , Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, andothers[1130]. . . . " A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts andpostulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay theprincipal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence--a view never_publicly_ acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:

 "The news is gloomy--very, and I really do not see how the war is to be worked out to success without the action of Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of 4, 000 I think they were fully 1, 000 strong, but we beat them completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings, Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury, Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc. , as we come upon the assembling of Parliament. . . . By dint of perseverance I think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side to move the Cabinet--divided as it is, if we can only arouse that power. At any rate the object is worth the effort[1131]. "

In the month of November, _The Index_ began to report these meetings. Innearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle thespeakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which werevoted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called"indefatigable":

 "The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout the North. A loud protest will arise against the _faineant_ policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined. . . . It remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]. "

By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanationwas made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it wasreally a "congeries of cities, " with no such solidarity of interests ascharacterized "the North[1133]. " Without London, however, the movementlacked driving force and it was determined to create there anassociation which should become the main-spring of further activities. Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee todraft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming fromthe big blockade-running firms

 "Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was near saying, but I mean Briton--by offering at once to devote a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once Ł500 on account of this--which I got to-day in a cheque and have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]. "

Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was toolate:

 "Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings make uphill work of it--very. Public opinion has quite veered round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The _Times_ correspondent's letters do great harm--more especially Gallenga's--who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York. I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat, so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our side[1135]. "

Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention:

 "I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to move--or some improbable convulsion occur in the North--the end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: 'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead--the efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or death what effort should be spared[1136]?"

The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized bySpence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts. On December 15, a great gathering (as described by _The Index_) tookplace there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forsterreferred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive effortsbeing made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in Americanaffairs[1138], " but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned andplans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston, Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members ofParliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signedin every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout thedistrict[1139]. " It was high time for London, if it was desired that sheshould lead and _control_ these activities, to perfect her own Club. "Next week, " wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would beformally launched under the name of "The Southern IndependenceAssociation[1140], " and would be in working order before thereassembling of Parliament. 

The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the SouthernIndependence Association were attempts to do for the South what Brightand others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardilythe realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightlyrepresented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which toinfluence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received fromSouthern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it bythose gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk oftheir own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early inthe war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on sodiffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the _LondonConfederate States Aid Association_ which came to the attention of Adamsand his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an earlymeeting of one, W. A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), whoreported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty personsand was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcomeguest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman andgot revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who waspresent), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showinga negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated insuch a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South. Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to holdregular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being ashilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership fornon-attendance[1142]. 

Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possiblyits puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appealto the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern IndependenceAssociation betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London tomatch and guide that already started in the provinces. A long andcarefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic strugglesof the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for theircause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places, ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animositytoward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests ofAmerica and of the world would be best served by the independence of theSouth. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln'semancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framersof this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handlingand was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section ofthe constitution read:

 "The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true civilization of the negro race[1144]. "

The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns ofheavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (oneguinea annually) was large enough to attract the élite, but it remainedto be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yetthe vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there acurious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaringthat the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30, 000at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But onJanuary 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free TradeHall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come toa halt. "The Southerners, " he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hallin the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rentof the room, though they did not use it. They knew that theirresolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass againstthem[1145]. " There must have been truth in the taunt for while _TheIndex_ in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports greatactivity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. Thereports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters, from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respectivecounties[1146]. "

Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Associationprogramme. It _did_ appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen ofstanding, " but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classesit precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England--alreadylargely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his"Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association, " madethe point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongestpresentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation ofSouthern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smithappealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked thearistocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make theRadicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause. Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the listof signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of titleand family, " with "a good sprinkling of clergymen, " and as having forits object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148]. 

It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the SouthernIndependence Association at Manchester, that _The Index_, from the endof March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern publicmeeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavyorganization, was content with that act and showed no life. The firstmove by the Association was planned to be made in connection with the_Alexandra_ case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court shouldrender a decision against the Government's right to detain her. OnJanuary 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for thepublic launching of the Association "next week, " that he had again seenthe Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that theGovernment is entirely wrong":

 "I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the Government persisted in proceeding further, that our Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed) would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the South might not require them. I think public opinion will go with us on this point, for John Bull--with all his failings--loves fair play[1149]. "

It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he wasthinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the_Alexandra_[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government'spolicy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made tobear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an_Index_ editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into acorner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by aPitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the"acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":

 "Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark. We can trace his influence in the detention of the _Alexandra_ and the protracted judicial proceedings which have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is Earl Russell[1151]. "

But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152], the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive homethe meaning of the _Alexandra_ decision, carefully avoided urging theGovernment to change its policy and contented themselves with aneffort, very much in line with that initiated by _The Index_, tobelittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded bythe Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countriesout of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent. Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietuson the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building. Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going intodetails, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack onthe _policy_ of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result ofthe _Alexandra_ trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "theuncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration ofjustice[1153]. "

As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiffmanner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the otherwere now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager toprotest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language. Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of theNorth. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament forinterposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and Southon a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederatedebts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northernanswer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion byforce of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves werealready free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "Asto the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would neverpay a dollar of it[1154]. " That there was public animosity to GreatBritain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress forending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paidno attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise inpolitical manipulation and depending on his opposition to themeasure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence bySeward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war ofestablishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties onimports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams toexplain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of GreatBritain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to berefused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a Britishwithdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a boldNorthern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss theproject with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of itand in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less amatured plan than a "feeler, " put out to sound British attitude and tolearn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England andFrance in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainlyat this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposedto current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexicanpolicy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, ofhelping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158]. 

For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held afirm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimatelythe North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now hebegan to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered theSouth would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government. As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North couldbe made to see this. 

 ". . . It is a pity, " he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it. If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates Charleston and Savannah[1159]. "

This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon theUnited States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to thewarlike _power_ of the North. Similarly the _Quarterly Review_, longconfident of Southern success and still prophesying it, wasacknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire"must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864, Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness ofthe United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a militaryexpert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by thearrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especiallyby Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote, often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearingof the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons toavoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as heought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]. "

Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority anddisregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter alreadyattracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxietyto Russell--the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for theNorthern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industryin the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created anincreased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, inlarge part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply, easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A fewNorthern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to reviveimmigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by theefforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapidresumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups ofIrishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmentalagents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked intothe army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offeredunder the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit. Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few ofthese hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could tosecure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing tored-tape and also to the resistance of army officers. 

As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt stepswere taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the fewcases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of_bona fide_ labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusationsin Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place ofenlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams, investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorizedNorthern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had beendropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labouremigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the suddenincrease of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic andpublic quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel_Kearsarge_, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on boardfifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once receivedindirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these menhad been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul atQueenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was wellunder way the _Kearsarge_ sailed into Queenstown again and landed themen. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to giveorders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusationagainst the consul but it still remained a question whether thecommander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of Britishneutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleadedguilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question ofthe commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, April 11, of further investigation[1166]. 

The _Kearsarge_ case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not, therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past, named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carryingoff to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subjectof a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharplymade that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British lawand British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusationsthan concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with theGovernment[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July, 1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity ofRussell's policy towards the North--a method then also being employed onmany other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministryfor the great Tory attack now being organized on the question ofDanish policy. 

In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one sidein public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish questionwhich had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominenceuntil March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII ofDenmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of theSalic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations ofDenmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutionalact" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. Thelaw was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two dayslater. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention tohold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate fromDenmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. TheFederal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose ofDenmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but hadgiven no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on variousoccasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favourfor the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the pointof virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. Adistinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head whenPrussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumedcommand of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark. 

This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston'sutterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinetcolleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the Britishpublic as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britaincould not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will onDenmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat theMinistry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy, " at one timethreatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak andunsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Governmentlaboured to bring about through a European council some solution thatshould both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige. Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats whichcould not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once itbecame clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to thedefence of the Danish King. 

From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlierstages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essentialbearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe thatin it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Associationon its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new moveby Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to otherrumours, received privately through Delane of the _Times_, that animportant Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote:

 "Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]. "

Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extremeSouthern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet madeclear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affectthe cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidantand friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary politicalquestions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soondisgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association andthreatened to resign membership if this organization, started with muchtrumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a publicdemand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it beknown that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation andrecognition and was indignant that the Association did not at oncedeclare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties. Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a breakup of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting ofthe Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution wouldbe considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and readyto support him. "The question is quite ripe _for fresh agitation_ andfrom experience I find that that agitation _must_ be started by a debatein Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in theprovinces[1175]. "

Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers begananew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation inAmerica. They met with little favourable response. The _Times_, at thevery end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recitedthe situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question hadthen been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "nomoral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so wouldresult in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism anddefiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]. " Thus support toLindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences withAssociation members had brought a plan of modified action the essentialfeature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a_party_ one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existingGovernment. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearlyunderstood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerialdesire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected tofind Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards Americanpolicy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:

 "I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at present. Some say 'move'--others, 'postpone'--but the news by the _Scotia_ to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the motion must _not_ be a party one, and that the main point will be to get the Government to go with _whoever_ brings forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the American question are so well known. As no competent member however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the result of which was that if I brought forward a motion somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be prepared _to accept it_, though he asked if I would see him again after the _Scotia_ arrived. The motion we talked about was to this _effect_--'That the House of Commons deeply regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the people of the United States and the Confederate States of North America by the continuance of the war which has been so long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of hostilities. '"

Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason toreturn to England and have a conference with the Premier. To thisPalmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsaystrongly urged Mason to come over:

 _I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston. It will lead to other meetings_; and besides in other matters I think if you came here, you might _at present_ prove of much service to the South[1177]. "

Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Associationpermitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called _TheSociety for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America_. A letterwas addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time hadcome for action:

 "215 _Regent Street, London, W. May 28th_, 1864. 

 "SIR, "The Society which has the honour to present to you the accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken by the Government of this country in concert with other Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the belligerents in North America. 

 "I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you will, before the Session closes, support a motion in Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before you[1178]. "

Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirredthe Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter, following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive. The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful. Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall, that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell andthat the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsayhad now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed toshake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authorityto return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declinedto hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, or at least suggestion:

 "Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it. 

 "Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]. "

The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the lastparagraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsayrenewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seemingsuccess of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerstonand had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtureswhen the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion ofrecognition of the Confederacy:

 "I reasoned on the _moral_ effect of recognition, considering that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc. , etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South could not be effected by the North, and he added that he thought the people of the North were becoming more and more alive to the fact every day. "

Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russelland if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would beplain sailing:

 "Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern facts we can get Lord R. To my views, I think I may say that all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, _is at an end_. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow. He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I ventured to express to him, and I am _not_ without hope. I may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day, that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed much gratified with what I said. The fact is, _sub rosa_, it is clear to me that _no_ motion will be carried unless it is supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive, and therefore, _in the present state of matters_, it would seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any motion which would not be carried. "

Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London. 

 "Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can do no harm, and _may, at the present moment, be of great service to your country_[1180]. "

Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would haveamounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his"gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentarymotion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebukedfor a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy, " can be interpreted in no otherlight than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends fromjoining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on theGovernment's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is notclear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have beenhoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that muchwas hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters. The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. Inaddition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy overSouthern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and inthis the _Times_ was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting theCessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circularletter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call onPalmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture. Such a deputation would represent "more than 5, 000 members and thefeeling of probably more than twenty millions of people. " It should notbe a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups inParliament:

 "The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation would strengthen his hands[1182]. "

This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's laterobjective--namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to beunfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary ofthe Society, to Mason. He wrote that the _Southern IndependenceAssociation_, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed tojoin the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured somespecific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that hefavoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, andas a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on themild lines of Lindsay's original motion:

 "Although this quite expresses the object of our Society, still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to bring before Parliament--that of the Independence of the Confederacy--and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc. '

 "This is just leaving the Government where they have been all along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"

Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among theleaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where laythe wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying hismotion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it. Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless itshould depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northernforces[1184]. The day following the _Times_ reported Grant to be meetingfearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easyadvance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in theWest[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage inEngland was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Masonunderstood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence andhad come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of theinterview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:

 "Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and that neither could union be restored nor the South brought under the yoke. . . . In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell said, that he could not _accept_ it, but if brought up for discussion his side would _speak_ favourably of it. That is to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it. "

This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliestopportunity of mediation, " and the pleasant reception given by Russellscarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. Itmust now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was toMason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was butpolitical manipulation to retain or to secure support in the comingcontest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentarymanagement, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing withLindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured tosuggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him unexpectedly in agreement:

 "I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, editor of the _Herald_, had written to Hotze about his connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the _pas_. Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon our success in Virginia--and agreeing entirely with Lindsay that the movement could not be in better hands and as there were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I thought the better policy would be for the present that he should be silent and to await events[1186]. "

Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might bestadvantage the South to be rid of Russell:

 "If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful, Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action--if he can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified assent[1187]. "

But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in Britishpolicy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on achange of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Toryattack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "ofcourse postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]. " On June 25, theDanish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark wasrenewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's blusterfollowed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote ofcensure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmentalpolicy as one of "meddle and muddle. " The censure was carried in theLords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerialmajority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis ofPalmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote wasneeded[1189]. 

Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview withPalmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred inview of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, itresolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that theSouth could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready toacknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the comingPresidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to havesaid little. 

 "At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the obligation would be increased if I could take with me any expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]. "

Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Masonwrote:

 "My own impressions derived from the whole interview are, that [while] P. Is as well satisfied as I am, that the separation of the States is final and the independence of the South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under the menaces of the North[1191]. "

Slidell's comment was bitter:

 "I am very much obliged for your account of your interview with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has now arrived when it is comparatively of very little importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]. "

Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South hadnothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledgethe independence of the Confederacy. July 21, _The Index_ expressed muchthe same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the _MorningHerald_ of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interviewwith Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":

 "The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated, and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition. "

In the same issue _The Index_ described a deputation of clergymen, noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influentialgentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward acessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project ofthe Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promotingthe Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution_after_ the political storm had passed and not before--when thedeputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that nodeputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected beforethe conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had noparty complexion, " and the smiling readiness with which it receivedPalmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy wasto keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputationitself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making thisdemonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so _TheIndex_ which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston:

 ". . . He proved incontestably to his visitors that, though he has been charged with forgetting the vigour of his prime, he can in old age remember the lessons of his childhood, by telling them that

 They who in quarrels interpose Will often wipe a bloody nose (laughter)--

 a quotation which, in the mouth of the Prime Minister of the British Empire, and on such an occasion, must be admitted as not altogether unworthy of Abraham Lincoln himself[1193]. "

Spence took consolation in the fact that Mason had at last come intopersonal contact with Palmerston, "even now at his great age a charmingcontrast to that piece of small human pipe-clay, Lord Russell[1194]. "But the whole incident of Lindsay's excited efforts, Mason's journey toLondon and interview with Palmerston, and the deputation, left a badtaste in the mouth of the more determined friends of the South--of thosewho were Confederates rather than Englishmen. They felt that they hadbeen deceived and toyed with by the Government. Mason's return to Londonwas formally approved at Richmond but Benjamin wrote that the argumentfor recognition advanced to Palmerston had laid too much stress on thebreak-down of the North. All that was wanted was recognition which wasdue the South from the mere facts of the existing situation, andrecognition, if accorded, would have at once ended the war withoutintervention in any form[1195]. Similarly _The Index_ stated thatmediation was an English notion, not a Southern one. The South merelydesired justice, that is, recognition[1196]. This was a bold front yetone not unwarranted by the military situation in midsummer of 1864, asreported in the press. Sherman's western campaign toward Atlanta had butjust started and little was known of the strength of his army or of thepowers of Southern resistance. This campaign was therefore regarded asof minor importance. It was on Grant's advance toward Richmond thatBritish attention was fixed; Lee's stiff resistance, the great losses ofthe North in battle after battle and finally the settling down by Grantto besiege the Southern lines at Petersburg, in late June, 1864, seemedto indicate that once again an offensive in Virginia to "end the war"was doomed to that failure which had marked the similar efforts of eachof the three preceding years. 

Southern efforts in England to alter British neutrality practicallyended with Lindsay's proposed but undebated motion of June, 1864, butBritish confidence in Southern ability to defend herself indefinitely, aconfidence somewhat shattered at the beginning of 1864--had renewed itsstrength by July. For the next six months this was to be the note harpedupon in society, by organizations, and in the friendly press. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1129: Mason Papers. ]

[Footnote 1130: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1131: _Ibid. _, Spence to Mason, Dec. 7, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1132: _The Index_, Dec. 10, 1863, p. 518. ]

[Footnote 1133: The success of pro-Northern meetings in London wasignored. Lord Bryce once wrote to C. F. Adams, "My recollection is thatwhile many public meetings were held all over Great Britain by those whofavoured the cause which promised the extinction of Slavery, no open(i. E. , non-ticket) meeting ever expressed itself on behalf of the South, much as its splendid courage was admired. " (Letter, Dec. 1, 1913, inMass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLVII, p. 55. ) No doubt many ofthese pro-Southern meetings were by ticket, but that many were not isclear from the reports in _The Index_. ]

[Footnote 1134: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Dec. 17, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1135: _Ibid. _, The _weight_ of the _Times_ is here evidenteven though Goldwin Smith's statement, made in a speech at Providence, R. I. , in 1864, be true that the London _Daily Telegraph_, a paper notcommitted to either side in America, had three times the circulation ofthe _Times_. (_The Liberator_, Sept. 30, 1864. ) Smith's speech was madeon the occasion of receiving the degree of LL. D. From Brown University. ]

[Footnote 1136: _Ibid. _, That Mason did contribute Confederate funds toSpence's meetings comes out in later correspondence, but the amount isuncertain. ]

[Footnote 1137: _The Index_, Dec. 17, 1863, p. 532. "The attendance ofrepresentatives was numerous, and the greatest interest was manifestedthroughout the proceedings. Manchester was represented by Mr. W. R. Callender (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee), and by Messrs. Pooley, J. H. Clarke, T. Briggs, Rev. Geo. Huntington, Rev. W. Whitelegge, Messrs. Armstrong, Stutter, Neild, Crowther, Stenhouse, Parker, Hough, W. Potter, Bromley, etc. Mr. Mortimer Collins, theSecretary of the Association, was also present. The districts wereseverally represented by the following gentlemen: Stockport--Messrs. Constantine and Leigh; Rochdale--Mr. Thos. Staley; Bradford--Mr. J. Leach; Hyde--Messrs. Wild and Fletcher; Glossop--Mr. C. Schofield;Oldham--Messrs. Whittaker, Steeple, and Councillor Harrop; Delf andSaddleworth--Mr. Lees, J. P. ; Macclesfield--Messrs. Cheetham and Bridge;Heywood--Mr. Fairbrother; Middleton--Mr. Woolstencroft; Alderley(Chorley)---Mr. J. Beesley, etc. , etc. "]

[Footnote 1138: So reported by _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 20, incomment on speeches being made by Forster and Massie throughoutLancashire. ]

[Footnote 1139: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 22. ]

[Footnote 1140: Mason Papers. To Mason. ]

[Footnote 1141: _The Liberator_, Dec. 26, 1862, giving an extract fromthe London _Morning Star_ of Dec. 4, and a letter from George Thompson. ]

[Footnote 1142: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. 1, p. 18. Adams to Seward, Dec. 18, 1862, enclosing a pamphlet issued by theAssociation. ]

[Footnote 1143: Its appeal for funds was addressed in part to women. "Fairest and best of earth! for the sake of violated innocence, insultedvirtue, and the honour of your sex, come in woman's majesty andomnipotence and give strength to a cause that has for its object thehighest human aims--the amelioration and exaltation of humanity. "]

[Footnote 1144: _The Index_, Jan. 14, 1864, p. 23. The committee oforganization was as follows:--

 The Most Noble the Marquis of Lothian, The Most Noble the Marquis of Bath, The Lord Robert Cecil, M. P. , The Lord Eustace Cecil, The Right Honourable Lord Wharncliffe. The Right Honourable Lord Campbell, The Hon. C. Fitzwilliam, M. P. , The Honourable Robt. Bourke, Edward Akroyd, Esq. , Halifax, Colonel Greville, M. P. , W. H. Gregory, Esq. , M. P. , T. C. Haliburton, Esq. , M. P. , A. J. B. Beresford Hope, Esq. , W. S. Lindsay, Esq. , M. P. , G. M. W. Peacocke, Esq. , M. P. , Wm. Scholefield, Esq. , M. P. , James Spence, Esq. , Liverpool, William Vansittart, Esq. , M. P. 

 * * * * *

 Chairman: A. J. B. Beresford Hope, Esq. Treasurer: The Lord Eustace Cecil. ]

[Footnote 1145: _The Liberator_, Feb. 26, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1146: _The Index_, March 17, 1864, p. 174. An amusing replyfrom an "historian" inclined to dodge is printed as of importance. Onewould like to know his identity, and what his "judicial situation" was. "An eminent Conservative historian writes as follows: 'I hesitate tobecome a member of your Association from a doubt whether I should takethat open step to which my inclinations strongly prompt me, or adhere tothe neutrality in public life to which, as holding a high andresponsible judicial situation in this country, I have hithertoinvariably confined myself. And after mature consideration I am ofopinion that it will be more decorous to abide in this instance by myformer rule. I am the more inclined to follow this course from thereflection that by not appearing in public as an advocate of theSouthern States, I shall be able to serve their cause more effectuallyin my literary character. And the printing of a new edition of my'History' (which is now going on) will afford me several opportunitiesof doing so, of which I shall not fail gladly to avail myself. '"]

[Footnote 1147: Printed, London, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1148: At the time a recently-printed work by a clergyman hadmuch vogue: "The South As It Is, or Twenty-one Years' Experience in theSouthern States of America. " By Rev. T. D. Ozanne. London, 1863. Ozannewrote: "Southern society has most of the virtues of an aristocracy, increased in zest by the democratic form of government, and the freedomof discussion on all topics fostered by it. It is picturesque, patriarchal, genial. It makes a landed gentry, it founds families, itfavours leisure and field sports; it develops a special class ofthoughtful, responsible, guiding, and protecting minds; it tends toelevation of sentiment and refinement of manners" (p. 61). Especially heinsisted the South was intensely religious and he finally dismissedslavery with the phrase: "The Gospel of the Son of God has higherobjects to attain than the mere removal of one social evil" (p. 175). ]

[Footnote 1149: Mason Papers. ]

[Footnote 1150: The _Alexandra_, as a result of the Court's decision, was again appealed, but on an adverse decision was released, proceededto Nassau, where she was again libelled in the Vice-Admiralty Court ofthe Bahamas, and again released. She remained at Nassau until the closeof the war, thus rendering no service to the South. (Bernard, pp. 354-5. )]

[Footnote 1151: Feb. 4, 1864, p. 73. ]

[Footnote 1152: See Ch. XIII. ]

[Footnote 1153: State Department, Eng. Adams to Seward, April 7, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1154: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 944, No. 81. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 1, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1155: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 9, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1156: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 944, No. 98. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 12, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1157: _Ibid. _, Vol. 946, No. 201. Lyons to Russell, March 22, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1158: _Ibid. _, Vol. 945, No. 121. Lyons to Russell, Feb. 23, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1159: Lyons Papers, April 23, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1160: April, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1161: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 19, 1864, andF. O. , Am. , Vol. 948, No. 284. Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1864. ACaptain Goodenough was sent to America and fully confirmedLyons' reports. ]

[Footnote 1162: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, May 9, 1864. The toneof the _New York Herald_ might well have given cause for anxiety. "Insix months at the furthest, this unhappy rebellion will be brought to aclose. We shall then have an account to settle with the Governments thathave either outraged us by a recognition of what they call 'thebelligerent rights' of the rebels, or by the active sympathy and aidwhich they have afforded them. Let France and England beware how theyswell up this catalogue of wrongs. By the time specified we shall haveunemployed a veteran army of close upon a million of the finest troopsin the world, with whom we shall be in a position not only to drive theFrench out of Mexico and to annex Canada, but, by the aid of ourpowerful navy, even to return the compliment of intervention in Europeanaffairs. " (Quoted by _The Index_, July 23, 1863, p. 203. )]

[Footnote 1163: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 563, states that greatefforts were made by the Government to stimulate immigration both tosecure a labour supply and to fill up the armies. Throughout and evensince the war the charge has been made by the South that the foreignelement, after 1862, preponderated in Northern armies. There is no wayof determining the exact facts in regard to this for no statistics werekept. A Memorandum prepared by the U. S. War Department, dated July 15, 1898, states that of the men examined for physical fitness by theseveral boards of enrolment, subsequent to September 1, 1864 (at whichtime, if ever, the foreign element should have shown preponderance), thefigures of nativity stood: United States, 341, 569; Germany, 54, 944;Ireland, 50, 537; British-America, 21, 645; England, 16, 196; and variousother countries no one of which reached the 3, 500 mark. These statisticsreally mean little as regards war-time immigration since they do notshow _when_ the foreign-born came to America; further, from the veryfirst days of the war there had been a large element of Americancitizens of German and Irish birth in the Northern armies. Moreover, theBritish statistics of emigration, examined in relation to the figuresgiven above, negative the Southern accusation. In 1861, but 38, 000subjects of Great Britain emigrated to the United States; in 1862, 48, 000; while in 1863 the number suddenly swelled to 130, 000, and thisfigure was repeated in 1864. In each year almost exactly two-thirds werefrom Ireland. Now of the 94, 000 from Ireland in 1863, considering thenumber of Irish-American citizens already in the army, it is evidentthat the bulk must have gone into labour supply. ]

[Footnote 1164: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII. "Correspondence with Mr. Adams respecting enlistment of Britishsubjects. "]

[Footnote 1165: The _Times_, Nov. 21, 1863. Also March 31, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1166: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondence respecting the Enlistment of British seamen atQueenstown. " Also "Further Correspondence, " etc. ]

[Footnote 1167: For facts and much correspondence on the Phinney casesee _Parliamentary Papers_, 1864, _Commons_, LXII. "Correspondencerespecting the Enlistment of British subjects in the United StatesArmy. " Also "Further Correspondence, " etc. ]

[Footnote 1168: Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXXIV, p. 628, and CLXXV, p. 353, and CLXXVI, p. 2161. In the last of these debates, July 28, 1864, paperswere asked for on "Emigration to America, " and readily granted by theGovernment. ]

[Footnote 1169: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch. VI. ]

[Footnote 1170: In the Cabinet, Palmerston (and to some extent Russell)was opposed by Granville and Clarendon (the latter of whom just at thistime entered the Cabinet) and by the strong pro-German influence of theQueen. (Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, Ch. XVI. )]

[Footnote 1171: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, March 13, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1172: This came through a letter from Donoughmore to Mason, April 4, 1864, stating that it was private information received byDelane from Mackay, the _Times_ New York correspondent. The expectedSouthern victory was to come "in about fourteen days. " (Mason Papers. )]

[Footnote 1173: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1174: Mason Papers. Lindsay to Beresford Hope, April 8, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1175: _Ibid. _, Lindsay to Mason, May 10, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1176: July 18, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1177: Mason Papers. ]

[Footnote 1178: Sample letter in Mason Papers. ]

[Footnote 1179: Mason Papers. Mason to Lindsay, May 29, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1180: _Ibid. _, Lindsay to Mason, May 30, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1181: Editorials of May 28 and 30, 1864, painted a darkpicture for Northern armies. ]

[Footnote 1182: Mason Papers. Sample letter, June I, 1864. Signed byF. W. Tremlett, Hon. Sec. ]

[Footnote 1183: _Ibid. _, Tremlett to Mason, June 2, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1184: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 86, No. 705. Adams toSeward, June 2, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1185: June 3, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1186: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 8, 1864. Masonwrote to Benjamin that Disraeli had said "to one of his friends andfollowers" that he would be prepared to bring forward some such motionas that prepared by Lindsay. (Mason's _Mason_, p. 500. To Benjamin, June9, 1864. ) Evidently the friend was Hunter. ]

[Footnote 1187: Mason Papers. Slidell to Mason, June 9, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1188: _Ibid. _, Mason to Slidell, June 29, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1189: Walpole, _History of Twenty-five Years_, Vol. I, Ch. VI. ]

[Footnote 1190: Mason's _Mason_, p. 507. Mason to Benjamin, July 14, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1191: Mason Papers, July 16, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1192: _Ibid. _, To Mason, July 17, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1193: _The Index_, July 21, 1864, p. 457. ]

[Footnote 1194: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, July 18, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1195: Richardson, II, pp. 672-74. Benjamin to Mason, Sept. 20, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1196: July 21, 1864. ]

CHAPTER XVI

BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH

After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South and ofSouthern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, but laterinvolving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European eyes, hadreached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the other. To theEuropean neutral the situation was much as in the Great War it appearedto the American neutral in December, 1916, at the end of two years offighting. In both wars the neutral had expected and had prophesied ashort conflict. In both, this had proved to be false prophecy and witheach additional month of the Civil War there was witnessed an increaseof the forces employed and a psychological change in the people wherebywar seemed to have become a normal state of society. The American CivilWar, as regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resourcesemployed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War, " todate, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all foreignobservers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after an apparentcheck to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that all America hadbecome engaged in a struggle from which there was scant hope ofemergence by a decisive military victory. There was little knowledge ofthe steady decline of the resources of the South even though JeffersonDavis in a message to the Confederate Congress in February, 1864, hadspoken bitterly of Southern disorganization[1197]. Yet this belief instalemate in essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, forthe function of the Confederacy was, after all, to _resist_ until itsindependence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in England bothfelt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the general attitudeof neutral England leaned rather to faith in the powers of indefiniteSouthern resistance, so loudly voiced by Southern champions. 

There was now one element in the situation, however, that hampered theseSouthern champions. The North was at last fully identified with thecause of emancipation; the South with the perpetuation of slavery. By1864, it was felt to be impossible to remain silent on this subject andeven in the original constitution and address of the SouthernIndependence Association a clause was adopted expressing a hope for thegradual extinction of slavery[1198]. This brought Mason someheartburnings and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's replybeing that he also agreed that the South ought not to be offeredgratuitous advice on what was purely "an internal question, " but thatthe topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand, at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, therearose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar expressions. "InManchester, " Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J. P. , and the strongest man on theboard, brought forward a motion for an address on this subject. I wentup to Manchester purposely to quash it and I did so effectually[1199]. "

Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in Southernarmour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot, " and by mereiteration gave such currency to it that even in Southern meetings it wasrepeated. _The Index_, as early as February, 1864, felt compelled tomeet the phrase and in an editorial, headed "The Foul Blot, " argued theerror of Southern friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" incharacterization of Southern slavery, _The Index_ felt that there couldbe no effective British push for Southern independence and it assertedthat slavery, in the sense in which England understood it, did not existin the Confederacy. 

 ". . . It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and otherwise dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending such practices to say that the South does none of these things, but that on the contrary, both in theory and in practice, she treats the negro as a fellow-creature, with a soul to be saved, with feelings to be respected, though in the social order in a subordinate place, and of an intellectual organization which requires guardianship with mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery, because it developed itself out of an older and very different one of that name, but for this the South is not to blame. 

 * * * * *

 "But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so long as they make no determined effort to relieve the Southern character from this false drapery, they will never gain for it that respect, that confidence in the rectitude of Southern motives, that active sympathy, which can alone evoke effective assistance. . . . The best assurance you can give that the destinies of the negro race are safe in Southern hands is, not that the South will repent and reform, but that she has consistently and conscientiously been the friend and benefactor of that race. 

 * * * * *

 "It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such expressions as 'the foul blot, ' and similar ones, fall from the lips of earnest promoters of Confederate Independence. As a concession they are useless; as a confession they are untrue. . . . Thus the Southerner may retort as we have seen that an Englishman would retort for his country. He might say the South is proud, and of nothing more proud than this--not that she has slaves, but that she has treated them as slaves never were treated before, that she has used power as no nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem which has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he might use the unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at hearing much said of 'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark and damnable blot that England left us with, and it required all the efforts of Southern Christianity to pale it as it now is[1200]. '"

In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, _The Index_ had declared that slaverywas not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domesticinstitution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, wasevidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipationedicts. _The Index_ could not keep away from the subject. In March, quotations were given from the _Reader_, with adverse comments, upon areport of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper readbefore the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the authorand the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature, " aroused thecontempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific andplaced upon it the "stigma of public condemnation. " The result was afine controversy among the scientists which could only serve toemphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the AmericanWar and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duelwith Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North isjustified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicatea system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the politicalfreedom, or the economical progress of the American people[1201]. . . . "

Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to manysincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of _The Index_, acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented thecarrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence andintended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By theend of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southernmeetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a briefperiod in the fall just before the Presidential election inAmerica[1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the wholeperiod of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They werealmost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies andreligious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. Ananalysis of those recorded in the files of _The Liberator_, andin the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the followingclassification[1203]:

 YEAR. NUMBER. CHARACTER. ANTI-SLAVERY AND RELIGIOUS WORKING-MEN. 1860 3 3 - 1861 7 7 - 1862 16 11 5 1863 82 26 56 1864 21 10 11 1865 5 4 1

Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or asspeakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing withfrequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, JohnBright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M. P. , Rev. Francis Bishop, P. A. Taylor, M. P. , William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F. W. Chesson andMason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the greatmajority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturingdistricts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the oldanti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the mostactive speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to themoribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain[1204]. Thompsonasserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active andenergetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town orcity[1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question themost popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others, not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206]. Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of theNorth in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament, rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire andbecame to American eyes their great English champion, a view attestedby the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on theappeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named AlfredRubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port ofSan Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northerncommerce[1207]. 

This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, therelative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thusindicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessationof public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk ofEnglish opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers ofresistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and wasexceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, themore so as there was now being voiced by the public in America asentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" inopposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain andFrance[1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out ofthe blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to theseRussell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. Hewrote to Lyons:

 "I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to distract their attention from the arduous task they have so wantonly undertaken[1209]. "

Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thoughtthat the current of political opinion was running against there-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full ofexpressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the"peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of anysolution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons stronglyadvised that "the quieter England and France were just at this momentthe better[1210]. " Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, hestated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of militaryprobabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughoutall his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note ofwarning as to the great power and high determination of the North. 

But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theoryof an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the onlyhope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leadingBritish newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence inthe South while at the same time putting much faith in the expecteddefeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for thefew newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important dailyprofessing strict neutrality--the _Telegraph_--the bulk of themetropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, fromthe columns of the _Times_. This journal, while early assuming aposition of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in thewar fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent, Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the_Times_; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving itsreaders, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was colouredto create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance. Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situationthroughout the war, the _Times_ gave accurate reports for the earlieryears but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last yearof the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meetingreverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in theWest was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta[1211]. Thesame ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun tobe printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmondwho wrote in contempt of Grant's army. 

 "I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines. . . . The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are contemplating an army which is at once republican and undisciplined[1212]. "

At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leadingpaper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable toprevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiersto recover and punish the deserters. But on this the _Times_ was eitherignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentimentduring the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power anddetermination in the war[1213], even though it was unquestioned that theearlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away[1214]. Oneelement in the influence of the _Times_ was its _seeming_ impartialityaccompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information andwisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized asmaking this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a_Times_ editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated fora speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, _The Index_ declared:

 "Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and contending crowds. It is everybody's _Times_[1215]. "

Yet _The Index_ knew, and frequently so stated, that the _Times_ was atbottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the _Morning Star_, said:"There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacityof the war news supplied by the _Times_. Of course, its prophecies werein a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of yourdouble-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhusin[1216]. " In short, the _Times_ became for the last year of the war theBible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in itspreachments[1217]. 

There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if notgreater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly_Army and Navy Gazette_, and its editor, W. H. Russell, in 1861 warcorrespondent in America of the _Times_, but recalled shortly after hisfamous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained afterthe war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory ofthe North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this wasthe real cause of his recall[1218]. He even claimed to have believed inNorthern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations afterthe event are not borne out by the columns of the _Gazette_, for thatjournal was not far behind the _Times_ in its delineation of incidentsunfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northerndisaster. The _Gazette_ had no wide circulation except among those inthe service, but its _dicta_, owing to the established reputation ofRussell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quitereadily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correctappreciation of man power and resources the _Gazette_ did from time totime proclaim its faith in Northern victory[1219], but always in suchterms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always withthe assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's mostdefinite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:

 "The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by itself, without even a conference or an armistice to aid it; and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that its component parts can never again be welded into a Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the action of force for that of free will, we think it will reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]. . . . "

Such occasional "professions of faith, " accompanied by sneers at the"Confederate partisanship" of the _Times_[1221] served to differentiatethe _Gazette_ from other journals, but when it came to description andestimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between themand consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus afortnight before his "profession of faith, " Russell could commenteditorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta:

 "The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North have so long been fixed promises to become a source of fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has eaten up all the supplies of the district. . . . All the enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]. "

Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on thePresidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln'sdefeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but thecitations made in British papers emphasized especially Northernweariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printedin _The Index_, an extract from a New York paper, _The New Nation_, gotfrequent quotation:

 "We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals override the laws, and the _echo of the armed heel rings forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory, and we must have both_[1223]. "

It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have animportant bearing on the election. The _Times_ while expressingadmiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confidentof his defeat:

 ". . . It is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal general having ventured far from water communications. That Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]. "

And W. H. Russell, in the _Gazette_, included Grant in the approachingdisaster:

 "The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman. Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful artillery as their own out of a position. . . . The Northerners have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]. "

On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the _Gazette_ the city ofAtlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the_Times_ having declared this impossible, now asserted that it wasunimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and, two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the politicalstruggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted, would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win[1226]. Russell, in the _Gazette_, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeksearlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta:

 "General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which carried him from Chattanooga . . . Into the heart of Georgia[1227]. "

But neither of these political-military "expert" journals wouldacknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. Notso, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed than hewould have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, who for sometime had been increasingly in bad health, had sought escape from thesummer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. He now wrote correctlyinterpreting a great change in Northern attitude and a reneweddetermination to persevere in the war until reunion was secured. Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be re-elected:

 "The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be publicly made[1228]. "

The _Times_, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have influence in theelection, and as always clever above its contemporaries in the delicateprocess of face-about to save its prestige, arrived in October at thepoint where it could join in prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It didso by throwing the blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the partyconvention in Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away anexcellent chance of success by declaring for union first and peaceafterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was lateanalysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had called fora "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a convention to restorepeace--in substance, for an armistice. But the _Times_[1229] now assumedtemporarily a highly moral and disinterested pose and washed its handsof further responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:

 For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that we are aware of against the present Government of America. Allowance being made for the difficulties of their position, they are conducting the war with a fair regard to the rights of neutral nations. The war has swept American commerce from the sea, and placed it, in great measure, in our hands; we have supplied the loss of the cotton which was suddenly withdrawn from us; the returns of our revenue and our trade are thoroughly satisfactory, and we have received an equivalent for the markets closed to us in America in the vast impulse that has been given towards the development of the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not been in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of our ruin, apparently resolved to execute, without pause and without remorse, the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon itself. We see the frantic patient tearing the bandages from his wounds and thrusting aside the hand that would assuage his miseries, and every day that the war goes on we see less and less probability that the great fabric of the Union will ever be reconstructed in its original form, and more and more likelihood that the process of disintegration will extend far beyond the present division between North and South. . . . Were we really animated by the spirit of hostility which is always assumed to prevail among us towards America, we should view the terrible spectacle with exultation and delight, we should rejoice that the American people, untaught by past misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end, and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady continuance in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that the people of this country view the prospect of another four years of war in America with very different feelings. They are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the path that leadeth to destruction[1230]. 

Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln wouldagain be chosen President, but the _Times_ was more slow to acknowledgeits military importance, first hinting and then positively assertingthat Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficultyin escaping[1231]. The _Gazette_ called this "blind partisanship[1232], "but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character andresults of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain thatelection day would see the use of "force, fraud and every mechanismknown to the most unscrupulous political agitation. " "We confess, " itcontinued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as itdishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation forjustice and honour throughout the world[1233]. " Again official Englandwas striking a note far different from that of the press[1234]. Adamspaid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chiefinformed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active indetermining, governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" byMembers of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evidentunanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it wasinexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential electionin America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events. Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends inAmerica to vote for Lincoln[1235]. Writing from Washington, Lyons, asalways anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote toRussell, "We must be prepared for demonstrations of a '_spirited foreignpolicy_' by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneeringpurposes[1236]. " Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for fourdays later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much aspossible all business with him until after the election[1237]. " ByNovember 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and inreplying, "You will come away at once, " Russell added that he wasentirely convinced the United States wished to make no seriousdifficulties with Great Britain. 

 ". . . I do not think the U. S. Government have any ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and buncome may be at times, I think they will subside when the popular clamour is over[1238]. "

In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving 212electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such as the_Gazette_ had gloomily foretold attended the event, and the tremendousmajority gained by the President somewhat stunned the press. Havingprophesied disorders, the _Gazette_ now patted America on the back forher behaviour, but took occasion to renew old "professions of faith"against reunion:

 "Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham Lincoln I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and so far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the measure of the man is taken and known. . . . It is most creditable to the law-abiding habits of the people that the elections . . . Passed off as they have done. . . . Mr. Lincoln has four long years of strife before him; and as he seems little inclined to change his advisers, his course of action, or his generals, we do not believe that the termination of his second period of government will find him President of the United States[1239]. "

The _Times_ was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was cautious incomment:

 "Ever since he found himself firmly established in his office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had begun to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of the conduct of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been less exacting, his language has been less offensive and, due allowance being made for the immense difficulties of his situation, we could have parted with Mr. Lincoln, had such been the pleasure of the American people, without any vestige of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done as regards this country what the necessities of his situation demanded from him, and he has done no more[1240]. "

This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the realreaction of the press was indicated by _Punch's_ cartoon of a phoenix, bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising from the asheswhere lay the embers of all that of old time had gone to make up the_liberties_ of America[1241]. 

During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election Englishfriends of the South had largely remained inactive. Constantly twittedthat at the chief stronghold of the _Southern Independence Association_, Manchester, they did not dare to hold a meeting in the great Free TradeHall[1242], they tried ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even theremet with opposition from those who attended. At three other places, Oldham, Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on themanufacturing districts met with little success[1243], and even, asreported in the _Index_, were attended mainly by "magistrates, clergy, leading local gentry, manufacturers, tradesmen, and cotton operatives, "the last named being also, evidently, the last considered, andpresumably the least represented[1244]. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted"follow up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured anappearance[1245]. At one town only, Oldham, described by _The Index_ as"the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire, " was a meeting held at allcomparable with the great demonstrations easily staged by pro-Northernfriends. Set for October 31, great efforts were made to picture thismeeting as an outburst of indignation from the unemployed. Summoned byhandbills headed "_The Crisis! The Crisis! The Crisis!_" theregathered, according to _The Index_ correspondent, a meeting "of between5, 000 and 6, 000 wretched paupers, many of whom were women with childrenin their arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment, had met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was tobe done. " Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost threateningviolence, " but finally adopting a resolution now become so hackneyed asto seem ridiculous after a description intended to portray the miseryand the revolutionary character of the meeting:

 "That in consequence of the widespread distress that now prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the war in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's Government should use their influence, together with France and other European powers, to bring both belligerents together in order to put a stop to the vast destruction of life and property that is now going on in that unhappy country[1246]. "

No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but in truthit must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the distress inLancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew it, whileelsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative feeling was withthe North. Even in Ireland petitions were being circulated for signatureamong the working men, appealing to Irishmen in America to stand by theadministration of Lincoln and to enlist in the Northern armies on theground of emancipation[1247]. Here, indeed, was the insuperable barrier, in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny as he mightthe presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, Hotze, of _TheIndex_, could not counteract that phrase. When the Confederate Congressat Richmond began, in the autumn of 1864, seriously to discuss a planof transforming slaves into soldiers, putting guns in their hands, andthus replenishing the waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze washard put to it to explain to his English readers that this was in factno evidence of lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on thepart of the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing armsin defence of his country[1248]. 

This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon theabsolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, however, permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of November 10, andindeed of the project of arming the slaves, though this, early in thespring of 1865, was actually provided for by law. On November 11, Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the Powers of Europe acommunication accompanying a Confederate "Manifesto, " of which theblockade had long delayed transmissal. This "Manifesto" set forth theobjects of the Southern States and flatly demanded recognition:

 "'All they ask is immunity from interference with their internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness which their common ancestry declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to the Social compact[1249]. '"

Russell replied, November 25:

 "Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the exception of a short period, connected by friendly relations with both the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's Government have continued to entertain sentiments of friendship equally for the North and for the South; of the causes of the rupture Her Majesty's Government have never presumed to judge; they deplored the commencement of this sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period of its termination. In the meantime they are convinced that they best consult the interests of peace, and respect the rights of all parties by observing a strict and impartial Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has faithfully maintained and will continue to maintain[1250]. "

If _The Index_ did indeed hope for results from the "Manifesto, " and hadsought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a Southern plan to "let theslaves win their freedom, " the answer of Russell was disappointing. Yetat the moment, in spite of the effect of Lincoln's re-election, thecurrent of alleged expert military opinion was again swinging in favourof the South. The _Times_ scored Russell's answer, portraying him asattempting to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":

 "The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the representatives of the Confederate States without appearing rude to the United States; and, on the other hand, to acknowledge the authority of the United States without affronting the dignity of the Confederates. Between these two pitfalls Lord Russell oscillates in his letter, and now puts his foot a little bit in the hole on one side, and then, in recovering himself gets a little way into the hole on the other side. In this way he sways to and fro for a minute or two, but rights himself at last, and declares he has hitherto stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will continue to do so. . . . Lord Russell seems to be in danger of forgetting that _neuter_ does not mean _both_, but _neither_, and that if, therefore, he would maintain even in words a strict neutrality it is necessary to avoid any demonstrations of friendship to either belligerent[1251]. "

This was harsh criticism, evincing a _Times_ partisanship justifyingthe allegations of the _Gazette_, but wholly in line with the opinion towhich the _Times_ was now desperately clinging that Grant had failed andthat Sherman, adventuring on his spectacular "march to the sea" fromAtlanta, was courting annihilation. Yet even Northern friends wereappalled at Sherman's boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. Theson of the American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the ironwall in Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only astep after all[1252]. "

The _Times_ was at least consistent in prophecies until the eventfalsified them; the _Gazette_ less so. Some six weeks after havingacclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of Atlanta[1253], the_Gazette's_ summary of the military situation was that:

 ". . . If the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, and Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the South may be nearer its dawning day of independence than could have been expected a few weeks ago, even though Wilmington be captured and Charleston be ground away piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The position of the Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, and the wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body which now represents the Federal States of North America[1254]. "

But on December 17, W. H. Russell again changed his view and foretoldwith accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so the _Times_, privately very anxious as to what Sherman's campaign portended, whilepublicly belittling it. December 2, it was noted that Sherman had notbeen heard from for weeks, having left Atlanta with 50, 000 men. December5, his objective was stated to be Savannah, and while the difficultiesto be encountered were enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But onDecember 22, Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by hisinability to retreat _northward_ from Atlanta:

 "If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that the great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into Georgia. We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will succeed in escaping the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that his apparent rashness is excused by the fact that Sherman was unable to return on the way by which he came; so that the most remarkable feature of the war, according to the President, is the wild and desperate effort of an out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position which, whatever effect it may have had on the election, should never, on mere military grounds, have been occupied at all[1255]. "

This was followed up four days later by a long and careful review ofSherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the dictum that hissole object now was to escape to some undefended point on the coastwhere he could be rescued by the Northern navy. The war had taken adefinite turn in favour of the South; it was impossible to conceive thatSherman would venture to attack Savannah:

 "For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring point on the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be equivalent to ruin, and he will do nothing to create it[1256]. "

Rarely, if ever, did the _Times_, in its now eager and avowedchampionship so definitely commit itself in an effort to preserveBritish confidence in the Southern cause[1257]. Even friends of theNorth were made doubtful by the positiveness of prediction indulged inby that journal whose opinions were supposed to be based on superiorinformation. Their recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling onthe American Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northerncause[1258], and their relief was great when the news was received thatSavannah had fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The _Times_recorded the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southernprospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a longsilence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorialwiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to acomplacent resumption of authoritative utterance. 

For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the fall ofSavannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of prestige to the_Times_[1259]. Courage failed and confidence in the Southwaned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed before the_Times_ ventured to lift again the banner of hope, and even then buthalf-heartedly. 

 "The capture of the city completes the history of Sherman's march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of the most singular military achievements of the war. 

 ". . . The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the possession of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his army 'the change of base' is indisputably a change for the better. Assuming that his position at Atlanta was as desperate as shortness of supplies and an interrupted line of retreat could make it, the command of a point near the sea-coast and free communication with the fleet is obviously an improvement. At the least the army secures full means of subsistence, and a point from which further operations may be commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as the Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the capture of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage of the war. 

 ". . . But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would be absurd to deny that it has produced an impression unfavourable to the _prestige_ of the Confederacy[1260]. "

Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picturepresented, though in sarcasm, by the _Times_ New York correspondent, printed in this same issue:

 "No disappointments, however fast they may follow on the heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of conceit and self-worship that glows in the heart of the Yankee. His country is the first in the world, and he is the first man in it. Knock him down, and he will get up again, and brush the dirt from his knees, not a bit the worse for the fall. If he do not win this time, he is bound to win the next. His motto is 'Never say die. ' His manifest destiny is to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to conquer. "

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1197: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 233. ]

[Footnote 1198: See _ante_, p. 192. ]

[Footnote 1199: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1200: _The Index_, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105. ]

[Footnote 1201: _The Index_, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the_Reader_ for March 19. ]

[Footnote 1202: The first Southern meeting in England I have foundrecord of was one reported in the _Spectator_, Nov. 16, 1861, to honourYancey on his arrival. It was held by the _Fishmongers of London_. Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground thatthe South was the best buyer of English goods. ]

[Footnote 1203: The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means allheld, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of1862. (_The Civil War in America_, London, 1866. ) The list may beregarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attentionof _The Liberator_ and of Adams. ]

[Footnote 1204: At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declaredby Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the Englishcolonies, " and by P. A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquyand personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake, " havingrendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America. "]

[Footnote 1205: _The Liberator_, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum, of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1206: Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: AnAddress read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union andEmancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tributeto Thomas Bayley Potter, M. P. , stating "you boldly allied yourself withthe working-men in forming this association. " Smith gives a five-pagelist of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northernfriends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren, John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors, " among themCairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of thissociety during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of fourhundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts. " Here, as previously, theactivities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George FrancisTrain, correspondent of the _New York Herald_, made twenty-threespeeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches inEngland. ")]

[Footnote 1207: For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteemheld by the United States of America for the high character and steadyfriendship of the said John Bright. . . . " The names of leading friends ofthe South have been given in Chapter XV. ]

[Footnote 1208: This was a commonplace of American writing at the timeand long after. A Rev. C. B. Boynton published a book devoted to thethesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressingthe development of America and Russia (_English and French Neutralityand the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United Statesand Russia_, Cincinnati, C. F. Vest & Co. , 1864). Boynton wrote: "Youhave not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until youhave touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too largeand strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historicalimportance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864. ]

[Footnote 1209: Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy. ]

[Footnote 1210: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1211: June 3, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1212: The _Times_, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 andJuly 5, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1213: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 126. Henry Adams tohis brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and theatmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of oursuccess is not admitted. "]

[Footnote 1214: _Ibid. _, p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1215: _The Index_, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265. ]

[Footnote 1216: This was written immediately after the battles ofVicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much moremarked in 1864. ]

[Footnote 1217: The _Times_ average of editorials on the Civil War rantwo in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in everythree days. ]

[Footnote 1218: Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know, perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I wastabooed from dealing with American questions in the _Times_ even aftermy return to England, but _en revanche_ I have had my say in the _Armyand Navy Gazette_, which I have bought, every week, and if one could beweak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid suchruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which Imaintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment"(Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865, Russell wrote in his diary: ". . . Had the _Times_ followed my advice, howdifferent our position would be--not only that of the leading journal, but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters fromAmerica. " (Atkins, _Life of W. H. Russell_, Vol. II, p. 115. ) See alsoBigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the_Gazette_ on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but leftit to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial taskin November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the _Gazette_ maybe regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America tothe _Times_ constitute a most valuable picture of the months precedingthe outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army forits defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. Thisdislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("ALetter to William Howard Russell, LL. D. , on passages in his 'Diary Northand South'"), published in London in 1863. ]

[Footnote 1219: June 25, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1220: The _Army and Navy Gazette_, July 30, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1221: _Ibid. _, June 25, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1222: _Ibid. _, July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorialsmight be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the _Times_and the _Gazette_ will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have notexamined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyonddetermining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasionalspecial references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, towarrant the conclusion that the _weight_ of the _Times_ in influencingopinion was very great. Collating statistics given in:

 (1) Grant's _The Newspaper Press_; (2) in a speech in Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser. , CLXXV, p. 295); and (3) in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Commons_, Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the United Kingdom . . . From 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861, " the following facts of circulation are derived:

(A) _Daily Papers_:

 (1) _The Telegraph_ (evening), 150, 000 (neutral). 

 (2) _The Standard_ (morning and evening), 130, 000 (Southern). Under the same management was also _The Herald_ (morning), but withsmall circulation (Southern). 

 (3) The _Times_ (morning), 70, 000 (Southern). Grant says: "Theprestige of the _Times_ was remarkable. The same articles appearingin other papers would not produce the same effect as in the _Times_. "Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just aswell-known . . . Throughout the civilized world as that of any of ourEuropean kings. . . . The _Times_ may, indeed, be called the Monarchof the Press. " (Grant, II, p. 53. )

 (4) _The Morning Advertiser_ (circulation uncertain, probably 50, 000), but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in theClubs (neutral). 

 (5) _The Daily News_ (morning), 6, 000 (Northern). 

 (6) _The Morning Star_, 5, 500 (but with evening edition 10, 000)(Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Brightwas never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits. _The Star_ was regarded as an _anti-British paper_ and was very unpopular. 

 (7) _The Morning Post_, 4, 500 (Southern). It was regarded asPalmerston's organ. 

 (8) _The Morning Chronicle_. Very small circulation in the 'sixties(neutral). 

(B) _Weekly Papers. _--No approximate circulation figures are available, but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers. 

 (1) _Reynolds' Weekly_. Circulation upwards of 350, 000. A pennypaper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturingdistricts (Northern). 

 (2) _John Bull_ (Southern). "The country squire's paper. "

 (3) _The Spectator_ (Northern). 

 (4) _The Saturday Review_ (Southern). 

 (5) _The Economist_ (Neutral). 

 (6) _The Press and St. James' Chronicle_. Small circulation (Southern). 

In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment_The Liberator_ names for Great Britain as a whole _WestminsterReview, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, ManchesterExaminer, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig_, and somefew others of lesser importance. (_Liberator_, June 30, 1863. )The attitude of the _Manchester Guardian_ seemed to _The Liberator_ tobe like that of the _Times_. ]

[Footnote 1223: _The Index_, April 14, 1864, p. 231. ]

[Footnote 1224: August 8, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1225: Sept. 3, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1226: Sept. 20 and 22, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1227: Sept. 24, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1228: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1229: General McClellan, the nominee of the convention, modified this in his letter of acceptance. ]

[Footnote 1230: Oct. 10, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1231: Nov. 10, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1232: Nov. 12, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1233: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1234: According to _The Index_, the French press was moredivided than was the London press in portrayal of military events inAmerica. The _Sičcle_ and the _Opinion Nationale_ pictured Sherman asabout to capture Atlanta. Readers of the _Constitutionel, Patrie, Moniteur_, and _La France_ "know quite well that Sherman has neitheroccupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of thedefences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hoodon July 22. " (_Index_, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522. ) The Paris correspondentwrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign inthe Shenandoah Valley:

"The _Sičcle_ is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal, whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part ofwhich it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, theAmerican contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates arerunning in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is atlast to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due tothe Northern generals, _who have carried military glory to so high apitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!_

"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above linesundertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but whatwill they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresseshimself relative to the issues of the coming election?

'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The Southwill lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced tobarrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by thelabour of the freeman; the Confederates, _who know only how to fight, and who are supported by the sweat of others_, will purify andregenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of theirown hands. . . . '

"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to therobust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers forthe welfare of the American brethren. 

"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece ofdelirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminentwriters of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France. (_Index_, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667. )

A week later _The Index_ was vicious in comment upon the "men and money"pouring out of _Germany_ in aid of the North. German financiers, underthe guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous businessof "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for thebenefit, as they say, of the poor blacks. " (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685. ) Thisbitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State. Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfullydeceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, hestated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of theFrench, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed inthe defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatlysuperior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting hisown purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and dutytoward us. " (Richardson, II, p. 577. )]

[Footnote 1235: e. G. , Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society, Oct. 11, 1864. (_The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864. )]

[Footnote 1236: Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1237: _Ibid. _, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1238: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyonsreached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America. Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and GreatBritain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gaveoffence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wiseand generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government. No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success, even though at first sharing in the view that there was smallpossibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known toSeward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in therelations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to theGovernment at home. ]

[Footnote 1239: Nov. 26, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1240: Nov. 22, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1241: The gradual change in _Punch's_ representation of asilly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity isan interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 thosewho watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and powerthough as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities. ]

[Footnote 1242: _The Liberator_, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T. H. Barkerto Garrison, August 27, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1243: _Ibid. _, Nov. 4, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1244: _The Index_, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing themeeting at Ashton. ]

[Footnote 1245: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1246: _The Index_, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699. ]

[Footnote 1247: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1248: _The Index_, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713. ]

[Footnote 1249: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell, Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Swedenand the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865). ]

[Footnote 1250: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the"Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States, " Nov. 25, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1251: Dec. 1, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1252: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 207. Henry Adams tohis brother, Oct. 21, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1253: See _ante_, p. 233. ]

[Footnote 1254: Nov. 12, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1255: Dec. 22, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1256: Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keepingup courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300. ]

[Footnote 1257: That this was very effective championship is shown byHenry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (_A Cycle of Adams'Letters_, II, p. 232. ) "Popular opinion here declares louder than everthat Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption inattempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march isenormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at thesea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration onEurope will be greater than that of any other event of the war. "]

[Footnote 1258: State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864. Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receivingsuch deputations and making replies to them. _The Index_ (Dec. 22, 1864, p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector andthreaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receivedeputations. ]

[Footnote 1259: Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons forthe importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described inCh. XVIII. ]

[Footnote 1260: Jan. 9, 1865. ]

CHAPTER XVII

THE END OF THE WAR

 "I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this moment opinion seems to have undergone a complete change, and our people and indeed our Government is more moderately disposed than I have ever before known it to be. I hear from a member of the Government that it is believed that the feeling between our Cabinet and the Washington Government has been steadily improving[1261]. "

Thus wrote Bright to Sumner in the last week of January, 1865. Threeweeks later he again wrote in reassurance against American rumours thatEurope was still planning some form of intervention to save the South:"_All parties and classes_ here are resolved on a strictneutrality[1262]. . . . " This was a correct estimate. In spite of atemporary pause in the operations of Northern armies and of renewedassertions from the South that she "would never submit, " British opinionwas now very nearly unanimous that the end was near. This verdict wassoon justified by events. In January, 1865, Wilmington, North Carolina, was at last captured by a combined sea and land attack. Grant, thoughsince midsummer, 1864, held in check by Lee before Petersburg, was yetknown to be constantly increasing the strength of his army, while hisability to strike when the time came was made evident by the freedomwith which his cavalry scoured the country about the Confederatecapital, Richmond--in one raid even completely encircling that city. Steadily Lee's army lost strength by the attrition of the siege, byillness and, what was worse, by desertion since no forces could bespared from the fighting front to recover and punish the deserters. Grant waited for the approach of spring, when, with the advancenorthwards of the army at Savannah, the pincers could be applied to Lee, to end, it was hoped, in writing _finis_ to the war. 

From December 20, 1864, to February 1, 1865, Sherman remained inSavannah, renewing by sea the strength of his army. On the latter datehe moved north along the coast, meeting at first no resistance andeasily overrunning the country. Columbia, capital of South Carolina, wasburned. Charleston was evacuated, and it was not until March, in NorthCarolina, that any real opposition to the northward progress wasencountered. Here on the sixteenth and the nineteenth, Johnston, incommand of the weak Southern forces in North Carolina, made a desperateeffort to stop Sherman, but without avail, and on March 23, Sherman wasat Goldsboro, one hundred and sixty miles south of Richmond, prepared tocut off the retreat of Lee when Grant should at last take up anenergetic offensive. 

In the last week of March, Grant began cutting off supplies to Richmond, thus forcing Lee, if he wished still to protect the Southern capital, tocome out of his lines at Petersburg and present an unfortified front. The result was the evacuation of Petersburg and the abandonment ofRichmond, Jefferson Davis and his Government fleeing from the city onthe night of April 2. Attempting to retreat southwards with the plan ofjoining Johnston's army, Lee, on April 9, found his forces surrounded atAppomattox and surrendered. Nine days later, on April 18, Johnstonsurrendered to Sherman at Durham, North Carolina. It was the end of thewar and of the Confederacy. 

[Illustration: THE AMERICAN GLADIATORS-HABET! _Reproduced by permissionof the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

The rapidity with which Southern resistance in arms crumbled in 1865when once Sherman and Grant were under way no doubt startled foreignobservers, but in British opinion, at least, the end had been foreseenfrom the moment Sherman reached the sea at Savannah. The desperatecourage of the South was admired, but regarded as futile. Equallydesperate and futile was the last diplomatic effort of the Confederateagents in Europe, taking the form of an offer to abolish slavery inreturn for recognition. The plan originated with Benjamin, SouthernSecretary of State, was hesitatingly approved by Davis[1263], and wascommitted to Mason for negotiation with Great Britain. Mason, after hiswithdrawal from London, had been given duplicate powers in blank for anypoint to which emergencies might send him, thus becoming a sort ofConfederate Commissioner at Large to Europe. Less than any otherrepresentative abroad inclined to admit that slavery was other than abeneficent and humane institution, it was felt advisable at Richmond notonly to instruct Mason by written despatch, but by personal messengeralso of the urgency of presenting the offer of abolition promptly andwith full assurance of carrying it into effect. The instruction wastherefore entrusted to Duncan F. Kenner, of Louisiana, and he arrived inParis early in March, 1865, overcame Mason's unwillingness to carry suchan offer to England, and accompanied the latter to London. 

The time was certainly not propitious, for on the day Mason reachedLondon there came the news of the burning of Columbia and the evacuationof Charleston. Mason hesitated to approach Palmerston, but was pressedby Kenner who urged action on the theory that Great Britain did not wishto see a reconstruction of the Union[1264]. Slidell, in Paris, onreceiving Mason's doubts, advised waiting until the Emperor had beenconsulted, was granted an interview and reported Napoleon III as readyas ever to act if England would act also, but as advising delay untilmore favourable news was received from America[1265]. But Mason'sinstructions did not permit delay; he must either carry them out orresign--and Kenner was at his elbow pressing for action. On March 13, therefore, Mason wrote to Palmerston asking for a private interview andwas promptly granted one for the day following. 

Both personal disinclination to the proposal of abolition and judgmentthat nothing would come of it made Mason cautious in expressing himselfto Palmerston. Mason felt that he was stultifying his country incondemning slavery. Hence in roundabout language, "with such form ofallusion to the _concession_ we held in reserve, as would make himnecessarily comprehend it[1266], " and turning again and again to asupposed "latent, undisclosed obstacle[1267]" to British recognition, Mason yet made clear the object of his visit. The word slavery was notmentioned by him, but Palmerston promptly denied that slavery in theSouth had ever been, or was now, a barrier to recognition; Britishobjections to recognition were those which had long since been stated, and there was nothing "underlying" them. On March 26, Mason called onthe Earl of Donoughmore, a Tory friend of the South with whom he hadlong been in close touch, and asked whether he thought Palmerston'sGovernment could be induced by a Southern abolition of slavery torecognize the Confederacy. The reply was "that the time had gone bynow. . . . " This time the words "slavery" and "abolition" were spokenboldly[1268], and Donoughmore was positive that if, in the midsummer of1863, when Lee was invading Pennsylvania, the South had made its presentoverture, nothing could have prevented British recognition. The opinionclashed with Mason's own conviction, but in any case no more was to behoped, now, from his overture. Only a favourable turn in the war couldhelp the South. 

There was no public knowledge in London of this "last card" Southerneffort in diplomacy, though there were newspaper rumours that some suchmove was on foot, but with a primary motive of restoring Southernfighting power by putting the negroes in arms. British public attentionwas fixed rather upon a possible last-moment reconciliation of North andSouth and a restored Union which should forget its domestic troubles ina foreign war. Momentarily somewhat of a panic overcame London societyand gloomy were the forebodings that Great Britain would be the chosenenemy of America. Like rumours were afloat at Washington also. TheRussian Minister, Stoeckl, reported to his Government that he hadlearned from "a sure source" of representations made to Jefferson Davisby Blair, a prominent Unionist and politician of the border state ofMaryland, looking to reconstruction and to the sending by Lincoln ofarmies into Canada and Mexico. Stoeckl believed such a war would bepopular, but commented that "Lincoln might change his mind[1269]to-morrow. " In London the _Army and Navy Gazette_ declared that Daviscould not consent to reunion and that Lincoln could not offer any otherterms of peace, but that a truce might be patched up on the basis of acommon aggression against supposed foreign enemies[1270]. Adams picturedall British society as now convinced that the end of the war was near, and bitter against the previous tone and policy of such leaders ofpublic opinion as the _Times_, adding that it was being "whispered aboutthat if the feud is reconciled and the Union restored, and a great armyleft on our hands, the next manifestation will be one of hostility tothis country[1271]. "

The basis of all this rumour was Blair's attempt to play the mediator. He so far succeeded that on January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Sewardto go to Fortress Monroe to meet "commissioners" appointed by Davis. ButLincoln made positive in his instructions three points:

 (1) Complete restoration of the Union. 

 (2) No receding on emancipation. 

 (3) No cessation of hostilities "short of an end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the Government. "

A few days later the President decided that his own presence wasdesirable and joined his Secretary of State in the "Hampton RoadsConference" of February 3. It quickly appeared that the Confederates didindeed hope to draw the North into a foreign war for a "traditionalAmerican object, " using the argument that _after_ such a war restorationof the Union would be easily accomplished. The enemy proposed was notGreat Britain but France, and the place of operations Mexico. There wasmuch discussion of this plan between Seward and Stephens, the leadingSouthern Commissioner, but Lincoln merely listened, and when pressed forcomment stuck fast to his decision that no agreement whatever would beentered into until the South had laid down its arms. The Southernersurged that there was precedent for an agreement in advance of cessationof hostilities in the negotiations between Charles I and the Roundheads. Lincoln's reply was pithy: "I do not profess to be posted in history. Onall such matters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollectabout the case of Charles I is that he lost his head in the end[1272]. "

When news of the holding of this conference reached England thereoccurred a panic on the Stock Exchange due to the uncertainty created bythe prospect of an immediate end of the American War. "Theconsternation, " wrote Adams, "was extraordinary[1273]. " What did theUnited States intend to do? "The impression is now very general thatpeace and restoration at home are synonymous with war with thiscountry. " There existed an "extraordinary uneasiness and indefiniteapprehension as to the future. " So reported Adams to Seward; and headvised that it might be well for the United States "to consider thequestion how far its policy may be adapted to quiet this disturbance";due allowance should be made for the mortification of those leaders whohad been so confident of Southern victory and for expressions that mightnow fall from their lips; it was possible that reassurances given by theUnited States might aid in the coming elections in retaining theGovernment in power--evidently, in Adams' opinion, a result to bedesired[1274]. 

Adams' advice as to the forthcoming elections was but repetition of thatgiven earlier and with more emphasis[1275]. Apparently Seward was thenin no mood to act on it, for his reply was distinctly belligerent intone, recapitulating British and Canadian offences in permitting theenemy to use their shores, and asserting that the measures now proposedof abrogating the reciprocity treaty of 1854 with Canada and theagreement of 1817 prohibiting armaments on the Great Lakes, were butdefensive measures required to protect American soil[1276]. Thesematters Adams had been instructed to take up with Russell, but withdiscretion as to time and he had ventured to postpone them asinopportune. Professing entire agreement with the justice of Seward'scomplaints he nevertheless wrote that to press them "at this momentwould be only playing into the hands of the mischief-makers, anddisarming our own friends[1277]. " The day before this was written homeSeward, at Washington, on March 8, recalled his instruction as to theagreement of 1817, stating that Russell might be informed the UnitedStates had no intention of increasing its armaments on the GreatLakes[1278]. 

Thus there were incidents offering ground for a British excitement overa prospective war with America, even though no such intention wasseriously entertained by the North. The British Government did not sharethis fear, but Delane, of the _Times_, kept it alive in the public mind, and indeed was sincere in efforts to arouse his readers to the danger. "I do not know what grounds Delane has for it, " wrote W. H. Russell tohis American friend Bigelow, "but he is quite sure Uncle Samuel is aboutto finish off the dreadful Civil War with another war with us scarcelyless horrible[1279]. " Governmental circles, however, belittled theagitation. Burnley, temporarily representing England at Washington, wasassured by Seward, and so reported, that all these rumours of a foreignwar were of Southern origin, had in fact been actually elaborated at theHampton Roads Conference, but were perfectly understood by the North asbut part of the Southern game, and that the Southern offer had beenflatly refused[1280]. In a parliamentary debate in the Commons on March13, arising out of governmental estimates for military expenditures inCanada, opportunity was given for a discussion of relations withAmerica. A few Members gave voice to the fear of war, but the generaltone of the debate was one of confidence in the continuance of peacefulrelations. Bright, in a vigorous and witty speech, threw right and leftcriticisms of Parliament, the Press, and individuals, not sparingmembers of the Government, but expressed the utmost confidence in thepacific policy of Lincoln. As one known to be in close touch withAmerica his words carried weight[1281]. Palmerston gave assurances thatthe present relations between the two Governments were perfectlyfriendly and satisfactory. The effect of the debate, reported Adams, wasto quiet the panic[1282], yet at the same time England was now awake toand somewhat alarmed by, America's "prodigious development of physicalpower during the war. " To quiet this, Adams recommended "prudence andmoderation in tone[1283]. "

Thus the actual cessation of hostilities in America and the possibleeffect of this event on foreign relations had been for some timeanticipated and estimated in Great Britain[1284]. The news of Lee'ssurrender, therefore, caused no great surprise since the _Times_ andother papers had been preparing the public for it[1285]. Newspapercomment on the event followed closely that of the _Times_, renderinghonour to the militant qualities of the South and to Lee, but writing_finis_ to the war:

 "Such is the end of the great army which, organized by the extraordinary genius of one man, aided by several other commanders of eminent ability, has done such wonders in this war. Not even the Grand Army of Napoleon himself could count a series of more brilliant victories than the force which, raised chiefly from the high-spirited population of Virginia, has defeated so many invasions of the State, and crushed the hopes of so many Northern generals. Chief and soldiers have now failed for the first and last time. They were victorious until victory was no longer to be achieved by human valour, and then they fell with honour[1286]. "

The people of the North, also, were complimented for their slowlydeveloped but ultimate ability in war, and especially for "a patience, afortitude, and an energy which entitle them to rank among the very firstof military nations[1287]. " No one remained to uphold the Southernbanner in Europe save the Confederate agents, and, privately, even theywere hopeless. Mason, it is true, asserted, as if bolstering his owncourage, that "this morning's" news did not mean an overwhelmingdisaster; it could not be wholly true; even if true it must mean peaceon the basis of separation; finally, "5th. _I know_ that no terms ofpeace would be accepted that did not embrace independence. " But at theconclusion of this letter he acknowledged:

 "I confess that all this speculation rests on, what I assume, that Lee surrendered only in expectation of a peace derived from his interview with Grant--and that no terms of peace would be entertained that did not rest on _independence_[1288]. "

But Slidell saw more clearly. He replied:

 "I cannot share your hopefulness. We have seen the beginning of the end. I, for my part, am prepared for the worst. With Lee's surrender there will soon be an end to our regular organized armies and I can see no possible good to result from a protracted guerilla warfare. We are crushed and must submit to the yoke. Our children must bide their time for vengeance, but you and I will never revisit our homes under our glorious flag. For myself I shall never put my foot on a soil from which flaunts the hated Stars and Stripes. . . . I am sick, sick at heart[1289]. "

The news of Lee's surrender arrived at the same moment with that of aserious injury to Seward in a runaway accident, and in its editorial onthe end of the war the _Times_ took occasion to pay a tribute to thestatesman whom it had been accustomed to berate. 

 "There seems to be on the part of President Lincoln a desire to conciliate vanquished fellow-citizens. Under the guidance of Mr. Seward, who has creditably distinguished himself in the Cabinet by his moderate counsels, and whose life will, we trust, be spared at this crisis to the Union, he may by gentle measures restore tranquillity, and perhaps, before his term of office expires, calm in some degree the animosities which have been raised by these years of war[1290]. "

Nor was this insincere, for Seward had, first in the estimate of Britishstatesmen, more slowly in the press and with the public, come to beregarded in an aspect far different from that with which he wasgenerally viewed in 1861. There was real anxiety at the reports ofSeward's accident, but when, in less than a week, there was receivedalso the news of the assassination of Lincoln and of the brutal attackon Seward, all England united in expressions of sympathy and horror. "Few events of the present century, " wrote Adams, "have created suchgeneral consternation and indignation[1291]. "

In Ford's Theatre on the evening of April 14, Lincoln was shot by Booth, a fanatical Southerner, who had gained entrance to the box where thePresident was sitting. Lincoln died early the next morning. On the sameevening, at about ten o'clock, an unknown man was admitted to Seward'shouse on the plea that he had a message from the physician, passedupstairs, but was stopped by Seward's son at the door of the sick room. Beating the son into semi-unconsciousness with a revolver which hadmissed fire, the stranger burst open the door, attacked the Secretary ashe lay in bed with a bowie-knife, slashing at his throat, until Sewardrolled off the bed to the floor. Seward's throat was "cut on both sides, his right cheek nearly severed from his face"; his life was saved, probably, because of an iron frame worn to support the jaw fractured inthe runaway accident nine days before[1292]. The assailant fought hisway out of the house and escaped. For some days Seward's life wasdespaired of, whether from his injuries or from shock. 

These tragic occurrences were the outcome of a revengeful spirit in thehearts of a few extreme Southerners, and in no sense represented thefeeling of the South. It was inevitable, however, that abroad sohorrible a crime should react both to the detriment of the Confederacyand to the advantage of the North. Sympathy with the North took the formof a sudden exaltation of the personality of Lincoln, bringing outcharacterizations of the man far different from those which had been hisearlier in the war. The presence of a "rural attorney" in thePresidential office had seemed like the irony of fate in the greatcrisis of 1861. Even so acute an observer as Lyons could then write, "Mr. Lincoln has not hitherto given proof of his possessing any naturaltalents to compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinoisvillage politics. He seems to be well meaning and conscientious, in themeasure of his understanding, but not much more[1293]. " But Lyons was nomore blind than his contemporaries, for nearly all characterizations, whether American or foreign, were of like nature. 

But the slow progress of the years of war had brought a differentestimate of Lincoln--a curious blending of admiration for the growth ofhis personal authority and for his steadiness of purpose, with criticismof his alleged despotism. Now, with his death, following so closely thecollapse of the Confederacy, there poured out from British press andpublic a great stream of laudation for Lincoln almost amounting to anational recantation. In this process of "whitening Abraham's tomb, " asa few dyed-in-the-wool Southern sympathizers called it, _Punch_ led theway in a poem by Tom Taylor:

 "_You_ lay a wreath on murdered Lincoln's bier, _You_, who with mocking pencil wont to trace, Broad for the self-complacent British sneer, His length of shambling limb, his furrowed face. "

 * * * * *

 "Yes, he had lived to shame me from my sneer, To lame my pencil and confute my pen-- To make me own this hind of princes peer, This rail-splitter a true-born king of men[1294]. "

Less emotional than most papers, but with a truer estimate of Lincoln, stood the _Times_. Severely reprobating the act of Booth and prophesyinga disastrous effect in the treatment of the conquered South, itproceeded:

 "Starting from a humble position to one of the greatest eminence, and adopted by the Republican party as a make-shift, simply because Mr. Seward and their other prominent leaders were obnoxious to different sections of the party, it was natural that his career should be watched with jealous suspicion. The office cast upon him was great, its duties most onerous, and the obscurity of his past career afforded no guarantee of his ability to discharge them. His shortcomings moreover were on the surface. The education of a man whose early years had been spent in earning bread by manual labour had necessarily been defective, and faults of manner and errors of taste repelled the observer at the outset. In spite of these drawbacks, Mr. Lincoln slowly won for himself the respect and confidence of all. His perfect honesty speedily became apparent, and, what is, perhaps, more to his credit, amid the many unstudied speeches which he was called upon from time to time to deliver, imbued though they were with the rough humour of his early associates, he was in none of them betrayed into any intemperance of language towards his opponents or towards neutrals. His utterances were apparently careless, but his tongue was always under command. The quality of Mr. Lincoln's administration which served, however, more than any other to enlist the sympathy of bystanders was its conservative progress. He felt his way gradually to his conclusions, and those who will compare the different stages of his career one with another will find that his mind was growing throughout the course of it. "

 * * * * *

 "The gradual change of his language and of his policy was most remarkable. Englishmen learnt to respect a man who showed the best characteristics of their race in his respect for what is good in the past, acting in unison with a recognition of what was made necessary by the events of passing history[1295]. "

This was first reaction. Two days later, commenting on the far warmerexpressions of horror and sympathy emanating from all England, thereappeared another and longer editorial:

 "If anything could mitigate the distress of the American people in their present affliction, it might surely be the sympathy which is expressed by the people of this country. We are not using the language of hyperbole in describing the manifestation of feeling as unexampled. Nothing like it has been witnessed in our generation. . . . But President Lincoln was only the chief of a foreign State, and of a State with which we were not infrequently in diplomatic or political collision. He might have been regarded as not much more to us than the head of any friendly Government, and yet his end has already stirred the feelings of the public to their uttermost depths. "

 * * * * *

 ". . . A space of twenty-four hours has sufficed not only to fill the country with grief and indignation, but to evoke almost unprecedented expressions of feeling from constituted bodies. It was but on Wednesday that the intelligence of the murder reached us, and on Thursday the Houses of Lords and Commons, the Corporation of the City of London, and the people of our chief manufacturing towns in public meeting assembled had recorded their sentiments or expressed their views. In the House of Lords the absence of precedent for such a manifestation was actually made the subject of remark. 

 "That much of this extraordinary feeling is due to the tragical character of the event and the horror with which the crime is regarded is doubtless true, nor need we dissemble the the fact that the loss which the Americans have sustained is also thought our own loss in so far as one valuable guarantee for the amity of the two nations may have been thus removed. But, upon the whole, it is neither the possible embarrassment of international relations nor the infamous wickedness of the act itself which has determined public feeling. The preponderating sentiment is sincere and genuine sympathy--- sorrow for the chief of a great people struck down by an assassin, and sympathy for that people in the trouble which at a crisis of their destinies such a catastrophe must bring. Abraham Lincoln was as little of a tyrant as any man who ever lived. He could have been a tyrant had he pleased, but he never uttered so much as an ill-natured speech. . . . In all America there was, perhaps, not one man who less deserved to be the victim of this revolution than he who has just fallen[1296]. "

The Ministry did not wait for public pressure. Immediately on receiptof the news, motions were made, April 27, in both Lords and Commons foran address to the Queen, to be debated "Monday next, " expressing "sorrowand indignation" at the assassination of Lincoln[1297]. April 28, Russell instructed Bruce to express at Washington that "the Government, the Parliament, and the Nation are affected by a unanimous feeling ofabhorrence of the criminals guilty of these cowardly and atrociouscrimes, and sympathy for the Government and People of the UnitedStates[1298]. . . . " Russell wrote here of both Lincoln and Seward. TheQueen wrote a personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln. Already Brucehad written from Washington that Lincoln "was the only friend of theSouth in his party[1299], " and he was extremely anxious that Seward'srecovery might be hastened, fearing the possibility of Sumner'sassumption of the Secretaryship of State. "We miss terribly thecomparative moderation of Lincoln and Seward[1300]. "

[Illustration: BRITANNIA SYMPATHISES WITH COLUMBIA. _Reproduced bypermission of the Proprietors of "Punch"_]

The American Minister naturally became the centre toward which thepublic outpouring of sympathy was directed. "The excitement in thiscountry has been deep and wide, spreading through all classes ofsociety. My table is piled high with cards, letters andresolutions[1301]. . . . " Indeed all the old sources of "addresses" toAdams on emancipation and many organizations having no professedinterest in that subject now sent to him resolutions--the emancipationsocieties, of horror, indignation, and even accusation against theSouth; the others of sympathy, more moderate in tone, yet allevincing an appreciation of the great qualities of Lincoln and of thejustice of the cause of the North, now victorious. Within two weeksAdams reported over four hundred such addresses from EmancipationSocieties, Chambers of Commerce, Trades Unions, municipalities, boroughs, churches, indeed from every known type of Britishorganizations[1302]. 

On May 1 the motion for the address to the Crown came up for debate. Inthe Lords, Russell emphasized the kindly and forgiving qualities ofLincoln as just those needed in America, and now lost by his death. Derby, for the Opposition, expressed the horror of the world at Booth'sact, joined in expressions of sympathy to the United States, butrepeated the old phrase about the "North fighting for empire, the Southfor independence, " and hinted that the unusual step now being taken byParliament had in it a "political object, " meaning that the motion hadbeen introduced in the hope of easing American irritation with GreatBritain[1303]. It was not a tactful speech, but Derby's lieutenant inthe Commons, Disraeli, saved his party from criticism by what wasdistinctly the most thoughtful and best-prepared utterance of the day. Palmerston was ill. The Government speech was made by Grey, whoincautiously began by asserting that the majority of the people of GreatBritain had always been on the side of the North and was met by cries of"No, no" and "Hear, hear. " Disraeli concluded the debate. He said:

 "There are rare instances when the sympathy of a nation approaches those tenderer feelings that generally speaking, are supposed to be peculiar to the individual, and to form the happy privilege of private life; and this is one. Under all circumstances we should have bewailed the catastrophe at Washington; under all circumstances we should have shuddered at the means by which it was accomplished. But in the character of the victim, and even in the accessories of his last moments there is something so homely and so innocent that it takes as it were the subject out of all the pomp of history and the ceremonial of diplomacy; it touches the heart of nations, and appeals to the domestic sentiment of mankind. 

 "Sir, whatever the various and varying opinions in this House, and in the country generally on the policy of the late President of the United States, on this, I think, all must agree, that in one of the severest trials which ever tested the moral qualities of man, he fulfilled his duty with simplicity and strength. Nor is it possible for the people of England, at such a moment, to forget that he sprang from the same fatherland, and spoke the same mother tongue. 

 "When such crimes are perpetrated the public mind is apt to fall into gloom and perplexity; for it is ignorant alike of the causes and the consequences of such deeds. But it is one of our duties to reassure the country under unreasoning panic or despondency. Assassination has never changed the history of the world. . . . 

 "In expressing our unaffected and profound sympathy with the citizens of the United States at the untimely end of their elected Chief, let us not, therefore, sanction any feeling of depression, but rather let us express a fervent hope that from out the awful trials of the last four years, of which not the least is this violent demise, the various populations of North America may issue elevated and chastened; rich in that accumulated wisdom, and strong in that disciplined energy which a young nation can only acquire in a protracted and perilous struggle. Then they will be enabled not merely to renew their career of power and prosperity, but they will renew it to contribute to the general happiness of mankind. It is with these feelings, Sir, that I second the Address to the Crown[1304]. "

Lincoln's assassination served to bring out not only British popularsympathy, but also the certitude that the war was over and the Northvictorious. But officially the Government had not yet recognized this. Even as early as January, 1865, Seward had returned to the old proposalthat the nations of Europe should withdraw their recognition ofSouthern belligerent rights[1305], and in March he had asked Stoeckl, the Russian Minister, whether Russia would not lead in the suggestion ofthis measure to England and France[1306]. Meanwhile Sherman's army wasrapidly advancing northward and reports were arriving of its pillagingsand burnings. March 20, Gregory asked in the Commons whether theGovernment was taking any steps to prevent the destruction of Britishproperty and received from Layard an evasive reply. Merely a "confidenthope" had been expressed to the United States that "every facility willbe given" to British subjects to prove ownership of property[1307]. Evidently the Government was not eager to raise irritating questions ata moment when all eyes were strained to observe the concluding eventsof the war. 

Then came the news of Lee's surrender and of the assassination ofLincoln, with the attack on Seward, already incapacitated from activeduties. Seward's illness delayed American pressure on England--afortunate circumstance in the relations with Great Britain in that itgave time for a clearer appreciation of the rapidity and completeness ofthe collapse of the South. May 15, Lord Houghton asked whether theGovernment did not intend, in view of recent events in America, "towithdraw the admission of belligerent rights conceded to the so-calledConfederate States. " Russell promptly objected to the form of thequestion: England had not "conceded" any rights to the South--she hadmerely issued a proclamation of neutrality after Lincoln had declaredthe existence of a war by proclaiming a blockade. England had had noother recourse, unless she chose to refuse recognition of the blockade, and this would have drawn her into the war. As to a withdrawal of theneutrality proclamation this must wait upon official announcement fromthe United States that the war was at an end. Texas was still in armsand Galveston still blockaded, and for this section the United Stateswould no doubt continue to exercise on neutral vessels a belligerentright of search. It followed that if Great Britain did prematurelywithdraw her proclamation of neutrality and the United States searched aBritish vessel, it would be the exercise of a right of search in time ofpeace--an act against which Great Britain would be bound to makevigorous protest. Hence England must wait on American action proclaimingthe end of the war. Russell concluded by expressing gratification at theprospect of peace[1308]. 

But matters were not to take this orderly and logical course. Seward, though still extremely weak and confined to his home, was eager toresume the duties of office, and on May 9 a Cabinet was held at hishouse. A week later Bruce wrote to Russell in some anxiety that Americawas about to _demand_ the withdrawal by Great Britain of belligerentrights to the South, that if Great Britain would but act before such ademand was made it would serve to continue the existing good feeling inAmerica created by the sympathy over Lincoln's death, and especially, that there was a decided danger to good relations in the fact thatConfederate cruisers were still at large. He urged that orders should besent to stop their presence in British colonial ports securing coal andsupplies[1309]. Three days later Bruce repeated his warning[1310]. Thiswas, apparently, a complication unforeseen at the Foreign Office. In anycase Russell at once made a complete face-about from the policy he hadoutlined in reply to Lord Houghton. On May 30 he instructed Cowley inParis to notify France that England thought the time had arrived forrecognition that the war was ended and laid special stress upon thequestion of Confederate cruisers still at sea and their proper treatmentin British ports[1311]. Thus having given to France notice of hisintention, but without waiting for concurrent action, Russell, on June2, issued instructions to the Admiralty that the war was ended andstated the lines upon which the Confederate cruisers were to betreated[1312]. Here was prompt, even hurried, action though the onlyadditional event of war in America which Russell could at the momentcite to warrant his change of policy was the capture of Jefferson Davis. On the same day Russell wrote to Bruce stating what had been done andrecognizing the "re-establishment of peace within the whole territory ofwhich the United States, before the commencement of the civil war, werein undisturbed possession[1313]. "

This sudden shift by the Government did not escape Derby's causticcriticism. June 12, he referred in Parliament to Houghton's previousinquiry and Russell's answer, asking why the Government had not stuck toits earlier position and calling attention to the fact that the UnitedStates, while now proclaiming certain ports open to trade, yet specifiedothers as still closed and threatened with punishment as pirates, anyvessel attempting to enter them. Derby desired information as to whatthe Government had done about this remarkable American proclamation. Russell, "who was very imperfectly heard, " answered that undoubtedly itwas embarrassing that no "regular communication" had been received fromAmerica giving notice of the end of the war, but that the twoConfederate cruisers still at sea and the entrance of one of them tovarious Australian ports had compelled some British action. He hadconsulted Adams, who had no instructions but felt confident the UnitedStates would soon formally declare the end of the war. The "piracyproclamation" was certainly a strange proceeding. Derby pushed for ananswer as to whether the Government intended to let it go by unnoticed. Russell replied that a despatch from Bruce showed that "notice" had beentaken of it. Derby asked whether the papers would be presented toParliament; Russell "was understood to reply in the affirmative[1314]. "Derby's inquiry was plainly merely a hectoring of Russell for his quickshift from the position taken a month earlier. But the very indifferenceof Russell to this attack, his carelessness and evasion in reply, indicate confidence that Parliament was as eager as the Government tosatisfy the North and to avoid friction. The only actual "notice" takenby Bruce at Washington of the "piracy proclamation" was in fact, toreport it to Russell, commenting that it was "unintelligible" andprobably a mere attempt to frighten foreign ship-owners[1315]. Russellinstructed Bruce not to ask for an explanation since Galveston had beencaptured subsequent to the date of the proclamation and there waspresumably no port left where it could be applied[1316]. 

In truth the actual events of the closing days of the war had outrundiplomatic action by America. Scattered Southern forces still in thefield surrendered with an unexpected rapidity, while at Washington allwas temporarily in confusion upon the death of Lincoln and the illnessof Seward. Bruce's advice had been wise and the prompt action of Russellfortunate. Seward at once accepted Russell's notification of June 2 asending British neutrality. While again insisting upon the essentialinjustice of the original concession of belligerent rights to the South, and objecting to some details in the instructions to the Admiralty, heyet admitted that normal relations were again established andacknowledged that the United States could no longer exercise a right ofsearch[1317]. July 4, Russell presented this paper to Parliament, reading that portion in which Seward expressed his pleasure that theUnited States could now enter again upon normal relations with GreatBritain[1318]. Two days later Russell wrote to Bruce that he had notexpected Seward to acknowledge the rightfulness of England's neutralityposition, pointed out that his Admiralty instructions were misunderstoodand were less objectionable than appeared and concluded by theexpression of a hope for the "establishment of a lasting and intimatefriendship between the two nations[1319]. "

 * * * * *

Great Britain, wrote the Russian Minister in Washington in January, 1860, was about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" whichoccurred but rarely in the history of nations, in the approachingdissolution of the American Union. She alone, of all the nations of theworld, would benefit by it in the expansion of her power, hithertoblocked by the might of the United States. Broken into two or morehostile pieces America would be at the mercy of England, to become herplaything. "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internaldissensions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience whichit has difficulty in disguising. " Great Britain would soon, in returnfor cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armedsupport. For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of theslaves. The break-up of the Union was no less than a disaster for allnations save England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England andthe United States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitiousprojects and political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race[1320]. "

This prophecy, made over a year in advance of events, was repeatedfrequently as the crisis in America approached and during the first twoyears of the war. Stoeckl was not solitary in such opinion. The FrenchMinister of Foreign Affairs held it also--and the French Emperor puzzledhimself in vain to discover why Great Britain, in furtherance of her owninterests, did not eagerly accept his overtures for a vigorous jointaction in support of the South[1321]. 

The preceding chapters of this work will have shown how unfounded wassuch prophecy. Stoeckl was behind the times, knowing nothing, apparently, of that positive change in British policy in the late'fifties which resulted in a determination to cease opposition to theexpansion of American power. Such opposition was then acknowledged tohave been an error and in its place there sprang into being a convictionthat the might of America would tend toward the greatness of Englanditself[1322]. In the months preceding the outbreak of the Civil War allBritish governmental effort was directed toward keeping clear of thequarrel and toward conciliation of the two sections. No doubt there werethose in Great Britain who rejoiced at the rupture between North andSouth, but they were not in office and had no control of British policy. 

The war once begun, the Government, anxious to keep clear of it, wasprompt in proclaiming neutrality and hastened this step for fear ofmaritime complications with that one of the belligerents, the North, which alone possessed a naval force. But the British Ministry, like thatof every other European state, believed that a revolution forindependence when undertaken by a people so numerous and powerful asthat of the South, must ultimately succeed. Hence as the war dragged on, the Ministry, pressed from various angles at home, ventured, with muchuncertainty, upon a movement looking toward mediation. Its desire wasfirst of all for the restoration of world peace, nor can any othermotive be discovered in Russell's manoeuvres. This attempt, fortunatelyfor America and, it may be believed, for the world, was blocked by coolheads within the Ministry itself. There was quick and, as it proved, permanent readjustment of policy to the earlier decision not to meddlein the American crisis. 

This very failure to meddle was cause of great complaint by both Northand South, each expectant, from divergent reasons, of British sympathyand aid. The very anger of the North at British "cold neutrality" isevidence of how little America, feeling the ties of race and sentiment, could have understood the mistaken view-point of diplomats like Stoeckl, who dwelt in realms of "reasons of state, " unaffected by popularemotions. Aside from race, which could be claimed also by the South, theone great argument of the North in appeal to England lay in the cry ofanti-slavery. But the leaders of the North denied its pertinence. Itselfunsympathetic with the emotions of emancipation societies at home, theBritish Government settled down by the end of 1862 to a fixed policy ofstrict neutrality. 

In all this the Government but pursued that line which is the businessof Governments--the preservation of the prosperity and power of thestate. With the unexpected prolongation of the war and the Britishrecognition of the Northern "will to conquer" there came, as is evidentfrom a scrutiny of Russell's diplomatic tone and acts, a growing beliefthat the North might after all succeed in its purpose, at least ofsubjugating the South. This would mean the possibility of continuingthat policy of friendship for a united America which had been determinedupon in the 'fifties. Here was no special sympathy, but merely a coolcalculation of benefits to Great Britain, but there can be no questionthat the general attitude of the Government by midsummer of 1863 wasdistinctly favourable to a restored Union. A "friendly neutrality" beganto replace a "cold neutrality. "

But it is the business of Governments not merely to guard nationalinterests and prosperity; they also must guard their own authority andseek to remain in political power. Here emancipation, never greatlystirring the leaders, whether Whig or Tory, exercised an increasingpressure by the force of public approval. It made impossible any attemptto overthrow the Ministry on the score of non-interference in America, or of favouritism toward the North. It gave to an enthusiastic andvociferous section of the British public just ground for strong supportof Lincoln and his cause, and in some degree it affectedgovernmental attitude. 

There was, however, another question, much more vital than emancipationin its relation to British home politics, that ran like a constantthread through the whole pattern of British public attitude towardAmerica. It had always been so since the days of the American revolutionand now was accentuated by the American war. This was the question ofthe future of democracy. Was its fate bound up with the result of thatwar? And if so where lay British interest? Always present in the mindsof thoughtful Englishmen, appearing again and again through eachchanging phase of the war, this question was so much a constant that tohave attempted discussion of it while other topics were being treated, would have resulted in repetition and confusion. It is therefore madethe subject of a separate and concluding chapter. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1261: Bright to Sumner, Jan. 26, 1865 (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 132). ]

[Footnote 1262: To Sumner, Feb. 17, 1865 (_Ibid. _, p. 133). ]

[Footnote 1263: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 343]

[Footnote 1264: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, March 4, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1265: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, March 5 and 6, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1266: _Ibid. _, Mason to Slidell, March 15, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1267: Mason to Benjamin, March 31, 1865. (Richardson, II, pp. 709-17. )]

[Footnote 1268: _Ibid. _, p. 717. ]

[Footnote 1269: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F. O. , Jan. 24, 1865. No. 187. It is interesting that just at this time Gortchakoff should havesent to Stoeckl the copy of a memorandum by one, C. Catacazy, employé ofthe Foreign Office and long-time resident in the United States, in whichwas outlined a plan of a Russian offer of mediation. The memorandumspecified that such an offer should be based on the idea that the timehad come for a complete restoration of the Union and argued that bothNorth and South regarded Russia as a special friend; it was Russia'sinterest to see the Union restored as a balance to Great Britain. Gortchakoff's comment was favourable, but he left it wholly to Stoeckl'sjudgment and discretion to act upon the plan. (Russian Archives. F. O. ToStoeckl, Feb. 6, 1865. )]

[Footnote 1270: Feb. 4, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1271: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 254. To his son, Feb. 10, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1272: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, pp. 410-14. ]

[Footnote 1273: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 256. To his son, Feb. 17, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1274: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 182. Adams to Seward, Feb. 23, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1275: _Ibid. _, p. 112. Adams to Seward, Feb. 2, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1276: _Ibid. _, p. 180. Seward to Adams, Feb. 21, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1277: _Ibid. _, p. 199. Adams to Seward, March 9, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1278: _Ibid. _, p. 197. Seward to Adams, March 8, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1279: March 8, 1865. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, II, p. 361. )]

[Footnote 1280: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Feb. 23 and March13, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1281: "The speech of Mr. Bright is universally admitted tohave been one of the most brilliant specimens of his peculiar style oforatory. In its reminiscences, equally unwelcome to both sides of theHouse, it was yet received after the fashion of an unpleasant medicine, which has the aid of a strong and savoury medium to overwhelm thenauseous taste. " (_U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 246. Adams to Seward, March 16, 1865. )]

[Footnote 1282: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1283: _Ibid. _, p. 262. Adams to Seward, March 24, 1865. Adamswrote of his own situation that it "seems at last to be getting easy andcomfortable, so far as freedom from anxiety is concerned. " (_A Cycle ofAdams' Letters_, II, p. 258. To his son, March 24, 1865. )]

[Footnote 1284: Bruce, who succeeded Lyons at Washington, reached NewYork on April 7. His first letter to Russell from Washington, datedApril 14, stated that America was certainly preparing to oust Maximilianin Mexico, and that even the Southern prisoners were eager to join theUnited States troops in an expedition for this purpose. (Russell Papers. )]

[Footnote 1285: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Part II, p. 323. Adams to Seward, April 20, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1286: April 24, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1287: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1288: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 23, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1289: _Ibid. _, Slidell to Mason, April 26, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1290: April 24, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1291: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1865-66, Pt. I, p. 331. Adams to Seward, April 28, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1292: Bancroft, _Seward_, II, p. 417. ]

[Footnote 1293: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, April 9, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1294: May 6, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1295: April 27, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1296: April 29, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1297: Hansard, 3d. Ser. , CLXXVIII, pp. 1073 and 1081. ]

[Footnote 1298: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII. "Correspondence respecting the Assassination of the late President ofthe United States. "]

[Footnote 1299: Russell Papers. Bruce to Russell, April 18, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1300: _Ibid. _, April 24, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1301: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, 267. Charles FrancisAdams to his son, April 28, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1302: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1865-66_, Pt. I, pp. 344, 361. Adams to Hunter, May 4 and May 11, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1303: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXVIII, p. 1219. ]

[Footnote 1304: _Ibid. _, pp. 1242-46. ]

[Footnote 1305: Russell Papers. Burnley to Russell, Jan. 16, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1306: Russian Archives. Stoeckl to F. O. , March 1-13, 1865. No. 523. Stoeckl was opposed to this. ]

[Footnote 1307: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXVII, p. 1922. ]

[Footnote 1308: _Ibid. _, CLXXIX, p. 286. ]

[Footnote 1309: F. O. , Am. , Vol. 1018. No. 297. Bruce to Russell, May 16, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1310: _Ibid. _, No. 303. Bruce to Russell, May 19, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1311: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII. "Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in NorthAmerica. " No. 10. ]

[Footnote 1312: _Ibid. _, "Correspondence respecting the Cessation ofCivil War in North America. "]

[Footnote 1313: _Ibid. _, "Further Correspondence respecting theCessation of Civil War in North America. " No. 9. ]

[Footnote 1314: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXX, pp. 1-6. ]

[Footnote 1315: _Parliamentary Papers, 1865, Commons_, Vol. LVII. "Correspondence respecting President's Proclamation of 22nd May, 1865. "Bruce to Russell, May 26, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1316: _Ibid. _, June 16, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1317: _Ibid. _, "Further Correspondence respecting theCessation of Civil War in North America. " No. 9. Seward to Bruce, June19, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1318: Hansard, 3rd. Ser. , CLXXX, p. 1143. ]

[Footnote 1319: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1865, _Commons_, Vol. LVII. "Further Correspondence respecting the Cessation of Civil War in NorthAmerica. " No. 10. ]

[Footnote 1320: Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F. O. , Dec. 23, 1859/Jan. 4, 1860. No. 146. ]

[Footnote 1321: _Ibid. _, Stoeckl to F. O. , Jan. 17-29, 1861. No. 267. Hereports that he has seen a confidential letter from Thouvenel to Mercieroutlining exactly his own ideas as to England being the sole gainer bythe dissolution of the Union. ]

[Footnote 1322: For an analysis of this change see _The CambridgeHistory of British Foreign Policy_, Vol II, p. 277, which also quotes aremarkable speech by Disraeli. ]

CHAPTER XVIII

THE KEY-NOTE OF BRITISH ATTITUDE

On May 8, 1865, the news was received in London of Johnston's surrenderto Sherman. On that same day there occurred in the Commons the firstserious debate in thirty-three years on a proposed expansion of theelectoral franchise. It was a dramatic coincidence and no merefortuitous one in the minds of thoughtful Englishmen who had seen in theCivil War a struggle as fateful in British domestic policy as in that ofAmerica herself. Throughout all British political agitation from thetime of the American revolution in 1776, there had run the thread of theAmerican "example" as argument to some for imitation, to others forwarning. Nearly every British traveller in America, publishing hisimpressions, felt compelled to report on American governmental andpolitical institutions, and did so from his preconceived notions of whatwas desirable in his own country[1323]. In the ten years immediatelypreceding the Civil War most travellers were laudatory of Americandemocracy, and one, the best in acute analysis up to the time of LordBryce's great work, had much influence on that class in England whichwas discontented with existing political institutions at home. This wasMackay's _Western World_ which, first published in 1849, had gonethrough four editions in 1850 and in succeeding years was frequentlyreprinted[1324]. Republicanism, Mackay asserted, was no longer anexperiment; its success and permanence were evident in the mighty powerof the United States; Canada would soon follow the American example; the"injustice" of British aristocrats to the United States was intentional, seeking to discredit democracy:

 ". . . Englishmen are too prone to mingle severity with their judgments whenever the Republic is concerned. It is the interest of aristocracy to exhibit republicanism, where-ever it is found, in the worst possible light, and the mass of the people have too long, by pandering to their prejudice, aided them in their object. They recognize America as the stronghold of republicanism. If they can bring it into disrepute here, they know that they inflict upon it the deadliest blow in Europe[1325]. "

On the opposing side were other writers. Tremenheere argued theinapplicability of American institutions to Great Britain[1326]. Thetheoretical bases of those institutions were in some respects admirablebut in actual practice they had resulted in the rule of the mob and haddebased the nation in the estimation of the world; bribery in elections, the low order of men in politics and in Congress, were proofs of theevils of democracy; those in England who clamoured for a "numerical"rather than a class representation should take warning from the Americanexperiment. Occasionally, though rarely, there appeared the impressionsof some British traveller who had no political axe to grind[1327], butfrom 1850 to 1860, as in every previous decade, British writing onAmerica was coloured by the author's attitude on political institutionsat home. The "example" of America was constantly on the horizon inBritish politics. 

In 1860, the Liberal movement in England was at its lowest ebb since thehigh tide of 1832. Palmerston was generally believed to have made aprivate agreement with Derby that both Whig and Tory parties wouldoppose any movement toward an expansion of the franchise[1328]. LordJohn Russell, in his youth an eager supporter of the Reform Bill of1832, had now gained the name of "Finality John" by his assertion thatthat Reform was final in British institutions. Political reaction was infull swing much to the discontent of Radicals like Bright and Cobden andtheir supporters. When the storm broke in America the personalcharacteristics of the two leaders North and South, Lincoln and Davis, took on, to many British eyes, an altogether extreme importance as ifrepresentative of the political philosophies of the two sections. Lincoln's "crudity" was democratic; Davis' "culture" wasaristocratic--nor is it to be denied that Davis had "aristocratic" viewson government[1329]. But that this issue had any vital bearing on thequarrel between the American sections was never generally voiced inEngland. Rather, British comment was directed to the lesson, taught tothe world by the American crisis, of the failure of democraticinstitutions in _national power. _ Bright had long preached to theunenfranchised of England the prosperity and might of America and thesehad long been denied by the aristocratic faction to be a result ofdemocratic institutions. At first the denial was now repeated, the_Saturday Review_, February 23, 1861, protesting that there was noessential connection between the "shipwreck" of American institutionsand the movement in England for an expanded franchise. Even, the articlecontinued, if an attempt were made to show such a connection it wouldconvince nobody since "Mr. Bright has succeeded in persuading a greatnumber of influential persons that the admission of working-men into theconstituencies is chiefly, if not solely, desirable on the ground thatit has succeeded admirably in America and has proved a sovereign panaceaagainst the war, taxation and confusion which are the curses of oldGovernments in Europe. " Yet that the denial was not sincere is shown bythe further assertion that "the shallow demagogues of Birmingham andother kindred platforms must bear the blame of the inference, drawnnearly universally at the present moment, that, if the United Statesbecome involved in hopeless difficulties, it would be madness to lowerthe qualification for the suffrage in England. "

This pretended disclaimer of any essential relation between the Americanstruggle and British institutions was not long persisted in. A monthlater the _Saturday Review_ was strong in contemptuous criticism of the"promiscuous democracy" of the North[1330]. Less political journalsfollowed suit. The _Economist_ thought the people of England would nowbe convinced of the folly of aping America and that those who hadadvocated universal suffrage would be filled with "mingled alarm, gratitude and shame[1331]. " Soon W. H. Russell could write, while stillat Washington ". . . The world will only see in it all, the failure ofrepublican institutions in time of pressure as demonstrated by allhistory--that history which America vainly thought she was going to setright and re-establish on new grounds and principles[1332]. " "TheEnglish worshippers of American institutions, " said the _SaturdayReview_, "are in danger of losing their last pretext for preferring theRepublic to the obsolete and tyrannical Monarchy of England. . . . It nowappears that the peaceable completion of the secession has becomeimpossible, and it will be necessary to discover some new ground ofsuperiority by which Mr. Buchanan or Mr. Lincoln may be advantageouslycontrasted with Queen Victoria[1333]. "

These expressions antedated the news of the actual opening of the warand may be regarded as jeers at Bright and his followers rather than asattempts to read a lesson to the public. No such expressions are to befound in the letters of leading officials though minor ones occasionallyindulged in them[1334]. As late as June, 1861, Adams declared that whilesome in England welcomed American disunion as a warning to theircountrymen it was evident that but a small number as yet saw the causeof the North as identical with the world progress of freeinstitutions[1335]. Evidently he was disappointed that the followers ofBright were not exhibiting more courage and demanding public support ofthe North as fighting their battle at home. They were indeed strangelysilent, depressed no doubt by American events, and discouraged. Itrequired time also to arouse intensity of feeling on the Americanquestion and to see clearly the issues involved. Aristocratic Britainwas first to declare a definite lesson to be learned, thereby bringingout the fighting qualities of British democracy. Throughout 1861, thecomment was relatively mild. In July, _Blackwood's_ declared:

 "It is precisely because we do not share the admiration of America for her own institutions and political tendencies that we do not now see in the impending change an event altogether to be deplored. In those institutions and tendencies we saw what our own might be if the most dangerous elements of our Constitution should become dominant. We saw democracy rampant, with no restriction upon its caprices. We saw a policy which received its impulses always from below . . . Nor need we affect particularly to lament the exhibition of the weak point of a Constitution . . . The disruption of which leaves entirely untouched the laws and usages which America owes to England, and which have contributed so powerfully to her prosperity. . . . "

 "With a rival Government on the frontier . . . With great principles to be not vapoured about but put to the proof we should probably see the natural aristocracy rise from the dead level of the Republic, raising the national character with its own elevation[1336]. "

In the same month the _Quarterly_, always more calm, logical andconvincing than _Blackwood's_, published "Democracy on its Trial[1337]. ""The example of America kept alive, as it had created, the party ofprogress"; now "it has sunk from the decrepitude of premature old age. "If England, after such an example, permits herself to be led intodemocracy she "will have perished by that wilful infatuation which nowarning can dispel. "

Adams had complained that few British friends of progress identified thecause of the North with their own, but this was true of Americans also. The _Atlantic Monthly_ for July 1861, discussed British attitude whollyin terms of cotton supply. But soon there appeared in the British pressso many preachments on the "lesson" of America that the aristocraticeffort to gain an advantage at home became apparent to all[1338]. The_Economist_ moralized on the "untried" character of Americaninstitutions and statesmen, the latter usually as ignorant as the"masses" whom they represented and if more intellectual still moreworthy of contempt because of their "voluntary moral degradation" to thelevel of their constituents[1339]. "The upper and ruling class" wroteBright to Sumner, were observing with satisfaction, "that democracy mayget into trouble, and war, and debt, and taxes, as aristocracy has donefor this country[1340]. " Thus Bright could not deny the blow todemocracy; nor could the _Spectator_, upbraiding its countrymen for lackof sympathy with the North: "New England will be justified in sayingthat Old England's anti-slavery sympathies are mere hollow sentimentalpretences, since she can rest satisfied to stuff her ears with cottonagainst the cries of the slaves, and to compensate her gentle regretover the new impulse given to slavery by her lively gratification overthe paralyzing shock suffered by Democracy[1341]. " This was no taking upof cudgels for the North and "Progress" such as Adams had hoped for. Vigour rested with the opposing side and increased when hopes of a shortwar vanished. The _Saturday Review_ asserted:

 "In that reconstruction of political philosophy which the American calamities are likely to inaugurate, the value of the popular element will be reduced to its due proportions. . . . The true guarantee of freedom will be looked for more in the equilibrium of classes than in the equality of individuals. . . . We may hope, at last, that the delusive confusion between freedom and democracy is finally banished from the minds of Englishmen[1342]. "

"The real secret, " wrote Motley, "of the exultation which manifestsitself in the _Times_ and other organs over our troubles and disasters, is their hatred, not to America, so much as to democracy inEngland[1343]. " It was scarcely a secret in the columns of the journalsalready quoted. But no similar interpretation had as yet appeared in the_Times_ and Motley's implication was justified for it and other leadingdaily newspapers. The Reviews and Weeklies were for the moment leadingthe attack--possibly one reason for the slowness in reply of Bright andhis followers. Not all Reviews joined in the usual analysis. The_Edinburgh_ at first saw in slavery the sole cause of the Americandispute[1344], then attributed it to the inevitable failure in power ofa federal system of government, not mentioning democracy as inquestion[1345]. _Blackwood's_ repeatedly pushed home its argument:

 "Independent of motives of humanity, we are glad that the end of the Union seems more likely to be ridiculous than terrible. . . . But for our own benefit and the instruction of the world we wish to see the faults, so specious and so fatal, of their political system exposed, in the most effective way. . . . And the venerable Lincoln, the respectable Seward, the raving editors, the gibbering mob, and the swift-footed warriors of Bull's Run, are no malicious tricks of fortune played off on an unwary nation, but are all of them the legitimate offspring of the great Republic . . . Dandled and nursed--one might say coddled--by Fortune, the spoiled child Democracy, after playing strange pranks before high heaven, and figuring in odd and unexpected disguises, dies as sheerly from lack of vitality as the oldest of worn-out despotisms. . . . In the hope that this contest may end in the extinction of mob rule, we become reconciled to the much slighter amount of suffering that war inflicts on America[1346]. "

Equally outspoken were a few public men who early espoused the cause ofthe South. Beresford Hope, before a "distinguished audience" usedlanguage insulting to the North, fawning upon the South and picturingthe latter as wholly admirable for its aristocratic tendencies. For thishe was sharply taken to task by the _Spectator_[1347]. More sedately theEarl of Shrewsbury proclaimed, "I see in America the trial of Democracyand its failure. I believe that the dissolution of the Union isinevitable, and that men now before me will live to see an aristocracyestablished in America[1348]. " In all countries and at all times thereare men over-eager in early prophecy on current events, but in suchutterances as these there is manifest not merely the customary desire tostand in the limelight of assured knowledge and wisdom, but also thehappy conviction that events in America were working to the undoing ofthe Radicals of Great Britain. If they would not be supine the Radicalsmust strike back. On December 4, at Rochdale where, as the _Times_asserted, he was sure of an audience sympathetic on purely personalgrounds, Bright renewed his profession of faith in the American Republicand sang his accustomed praises of its great accomplishments[1349]. Thebattle, for England, on American democracy, was joined; the challengeissued by aristocratic England, accepted. 

But apart from extreme factions at either end of the scale there stood agroup holding a middle ground opinion, not yet sure of the historicalsignificance of the American collapse. To this group belonged Gladstone, as yet uncertain of his political philosophy, and regretful, thoughvainly, it would appear, of the blow to democracy. He wrote his thoughtto Brougham, no doubt hoping to influence the view-point of the_Edinburgh_. 

 "This has without doubt been a deplorable year for poor 'Democracy' and never has the old woman been at a heavier discount since 1793. I see no discredit to the founders of the American constitution in the main fact of the rupture. On the contrary it was a great achievement to strike off by the will and wit of man a constitution for two millions of men scattered along a seaboard, which has lasted until they have become more than thirty millions and have covered a whole continent. But the freaks, pranks, and follies, not to say worse, with which the rupture has been met in the Northern States, down to Mr. Chase's financial (not exposition but) exposure have really given as I have said the old lady in question such a heavy blow and great discouragement that I hope you will in the first vigour of your action be a little merciful and human lest you murder her outright[1350]. "

On this middle group of Englishmen and their moral conceptions theAmerican Minister, Adams, at first pinned his faith, not believing in1861 that the issues of democracy or of trade advantage would lead GreatBritain from just rules of conduct. Even in the crisis of the _Trent_affair he was firm in this opinion:

 "Much as the commercial and manufacturing interests may be disposed to view the tariff as the source of all our evils, and much as the aristocratic classes may endeavour to make democracy responsible for them, the inexorable logic of events is contradicting each and every assertion based on these notions, and proving that the American struggle is, after all, the ever-recurring one in human affairs between right and wrong, between labour and capital, between liberty and absolutism. When such an issue comes to be presented to the people of Great Britain, stripped of all the disguises which have been thrown over it, it is not difficult to predict at least which side it will _not_ consent to take[1351]. 

April, 1861, saw the beginning of the aristocratic challenge on Americandemocracy and December its acceptance by Bright. Throughout 1862 hepractically deserted his seat in Parliament and devoted himself tostirring up labour and radical sentiment in favour of the North. InJanuary, 1862, a mass meeting at New Hall, Edgware Road, denounced thedaily press and was thought of sufficient moment to be reported byAdams. A motion was carried:

 "That in the opinion of this meeting, considering the ill-disguised efforts of the _Times_ and other misleading journals to misrepresent public opinion here on all American questions . . . To decry democratic institutions under the trials to which the Republic is exposed, it is the duty of the working-men especially as unrepresented in the National Senate to express their sympathy with the United States in their gigantic struggle for the preservation of the Union[1352]. . . . "

The daily press was, in fact, now joining more openly in thecontroversy. The _Morning Post_, stating with conviction its belief thatthere could be no re-union in America, added:

 ". . . If the Government of the United States should succeed in reannexing them [the Southern States] to its still extensive dominions, Democracy will have achieved its grandest triumph since the world began. It will have demonstrated to the ample satisfaction of its present and future proselytes that it is even more puissant in war than in peace; that it can navigate not only the smooth seas of unendangered prosperity, but can ride safely through the fiercest tempests that would engulf every other craft laden with human destinies; that it can descend to the darkest depths of adversity, and rise from them all the stronger for the descent. . . . And who can doubt that Democracy will be more arrogant, more aggressive, more levelling and vulgarizing, if that be possible, than it ever had been before[1353]. "

By midsummer, 1862, Adams was more convinced than in 1861 that thepolitical controversy in England had an important bearing on theattitude toward America. Even the alleged neutrality of _Fraser'sMagazine_ seemed turning to one-sided presentation of the "lesson" ofAmerica. Mill's defence of the North, appearing in the February number, was soon followed in July by the first of a series of articles, "Universal Suffrage in the United States and Its Consequences, "depicting the war as the result of mob rule and predicting a militarydespotism as its inevitable consequence. The Liberals were losingstrength, wrote Adams:

 "That the American difficulties have materially contributed to this result cannot be doubted. The fact that many of the leading Liberals are the declared friends of the United States is a decided disadvantage in the contest now going on. The predominating passion here is the desire for the ultimate subdivision of America into many separate States which will neutralize each other. This is most visible among the conservative class of the Aristocracy who dread the growth of liberal opinions and who habitually regard America as the nursery of them[1354]. "

From all this controversy Government leaders kept carefully aloof atleast in public expression of opinion. Privately, Russell commented toPalmerston, "I have been reading a book on Jefferson by De Witt, whichis both interesting and instructive. It shows how the Great Republic ofWashington degenerated into the Democracy of Jefferson. They are nowreaping the fruit[1355]. " Was it mere coincidence or was theresignificance in an editorial in Palmerston's alleged "organ, " the_Morning Post_:

 "That any Englishman has looked forward with pleasure to the calamities of America is notoriously and demonstrably false. But we have no hesitation in admitting that many thoughtful Englishmen who have watched, in the policy of the United States during the last twenty years, the foreshadowing of a democratic tyranny compared with which the most corrupt despotisms of the Old World appear realms of idyllic happiness and peace, have gratefully recognized the finger of Providence in the strife by which they have been so frightfully rent asunder[1356]. . . . "

In October the heavy artillery of the Conservatives was again broughtinto action and this time with more explicit diagnosis than heretofore. "For a great number of years, " said the _Quarterly_, "a certain partyamong us, great admirers of America . . . Have chosen to fight theirEnglish battles upon American soil. " Now the American Government "hasdisgracefully and ignominiously failed" at all points. It is evidentthat "political equality is not merely a folly, it is a chimera[1357]. "At last, in November, the _Times_ openly took the position which itsaccusers declared to have been the basis of its editorial utterancesalmost from the beginning of the Civil War. 

 "These are the consequences of a cheap and simple form of government, having a rural attorney for Sovereign and a city attorney for Prime Minister. We have already said that if such a terrible exposure of incapacity had happened in England we should at the earliest moment possible have sent the incapables about their business, and put ourselves in the hands of better men. . . . "

 "This Republic has been so often proposed to us as a model for imitation that we should be unpardonable not to mark how it works now, when for the first time it has some work to do. We believe that if the English system of Parliamentary action had existed in America, the war could not have occurred, but we are quite sure that such Ministers would have long since been changed[1358]. "

In addition to a Conservative ringing the changes upon the failure ofdemocracy, the open friends of the South dilated also upon the"gentlemanly" characteristics of Southern leaders and society. This wasthe frequent burden of articles in _The Index_ in the early weeks of itspublication. To this was soon added a picture of Northern democracy ascomposed of and controlled by the "immigrant element" which was thesource of "the enormous increase of population in the last thirty years"from revolutionary areas in Europe. "Germans, Hungarians, Irish carriedwith them more than their strong arms, they imported also their theoriesof equality. . . . The revolutionary party which represents them is at thismoment master in the States of the North, where it is indulging in allits customary licence[1359]. " This fact, complained _The Index_, was notsufficiently brought out in the English press. Very different was thepicture painted by Anthony Trollope after a tour of the Western states:

 ". . . This man has his romance, his high poetic feeling, and above all his manly dignity. Visit him, and you will find him without coat or waistcoat, unshorn, in ragged blue trousers and old flannel shirt, too often bearing on his lantern jaws the signs of ague and sickness; but he will stand upright before you and speak to you with all the ease of a lettered gentleman in his own library. All the odious incivility of the republican servant has been banished. He is his own master, standing on his own threshold, and finds no need to assert his equality by rudeness. He is delighted to see you, and bids you sit down on his battered bench, without dreaming of any such apology as an English cotter offers to a Lady Bountiful when she calls. He has worked out his independence, and shows it in every easy movement of his body. He tells you of it unconsciously in every tone of his voice. You will always find in his cabin some newspaper, some book, some token of advance in education. When he questions you about the old country he astonishes you by the extent of his knowledge. I defy you not to feel that he is superior to the race from whence he has sprung in England or in Ireland. "

 * * * * *

 "It is always the same story. With us there is no level of society. Men stand on a long staircase, but the crowd congregates near the bottom, and the lower steps are very broad. In America men stand upon a common platform, but the platform is raised above the ground, though it does not approach in height the top of our staircase. If we take the average altitude in the two countries, we shall find that the American heads are the more elevated of the two[1360]. "

A comparison of dates shows that the unanimity of conservative andaristocratic expression on the failure of American democracy and itslesson to England was most marked and most open at the moment when theGovernment was seriously considering an offer of mediation in the war. Meanwhile the emancipation proclamation of September, 1862, hadappeared. It did not immediately affect governmental attitude, saveadversely to the North, and it gave a handle for pro-Southern outcry onthe score of a "servile war. " Indeed, the radicals were at firstdepressed by it; but when months passed with no appearance of a servilewar and when the second emancipation proclamation of January, 1863, further certified the moral purpose of the North, a great element ofstrength was added to the English advocates of democracy. The numerous"addresses" to Lincoln exhibited both a revived moral enthusiasm for thecause of anti-slavery and were frequently combined with a laudation ofAmerican political institutions. The great mass-meeting at Exeter Hall, January 29, 1863, was described by the correspondent of an Americanpaper as largely deriving its strength from the universaldissatisfaction of the lower orders of the English people with theirexisting conditions under the Crown:

 "The descendants of the Roundhead commoners, chafing under the limitations of the franchise, burdensome taxation, the contempt with which they are regarded by the lords of the soil, the grievous effects of the laws of entail and primogeniture, whereby they are kept poor and rendered liable to starvation and pauperism--these have looked to America as the model democracy which proves the poor man's capacity for self-government. " The meeting was called for seven o'clock but at half after five the hall was filled, and at six crowded. A second hall was filled and outdoor meetings of two thousand people organized in Exeter Street. "All working-class England was up in arms, not so much against slavery as against British oligarchy[1361]. "

The correspondent further reported rumours that this meeting had causedanxious consideration to the managers of the _Times_, and the decisionto step more warily. No doubt this was exaggeration of the politicalcharacter and effect of the meeting, but certain it is that thepolitical element was present joining hands with anti-slaveryenthusiasm. Also it is noteworthy that the last confident and vigorousexpression of the "failure" of democracy, from sources professedlyneutral, appeared immediately after the St. James' Hall meeting, but wasnecessarily written before that meeting took place. _Blackwood's_, inits issue of February, 1863, declared, as before: "Every sensible man inthis country now acknowledges . . . That we have already gone as fartoward democracy as is safe to go. . . . This is the great moral benefitwhich we have derived from the events in America. " John Blackwood was anintimate friend of Delane, editor of the _Times_, holding similar viewson political questions; but the _Times_ was suddenly grown cautious inreading English political lessons from America. In truth, attack nowrested with the Radicals and Bright's oratory was in great demand[1362]. He now advanced from the defensive position of laudation of the North tothe offensive one of attacking the Southern aristocracy, not merelybecause it wished to perpetuate African slavery, but because it desiredto make all the working-classes as subservient to it as was thenegro[1363]. It was now Radical purpose to keep the battle raging andthey were succeeding. Bigelow believed that the United States might wellrecognize its opportunity in this controversy and give aid toits friends:

 "After all, this struggle of ours both at home and abroad is but a struggle between the principle of popular government and government by a privileged class. The people therefore all the world over are in a species of solidarity which it is our duty and interest to cultivate to the utmost[1364]. "

But Adams gave contrary advice. Wholly sympathetic with the democraticmovement in England as now, somewhat to his surprise, developed, he yetfeared that the extremes to which Bright and others were going insupport of the North might create unfortunate reactions in theGovernment. Especially he was anxious that the United States should notoffer opportunity for accusation of interference in a British politicalquarrel. It is noteworthy that while many addresses to Lincoln wereforwarded by him and many were printed in the annual publication ofdiplomatic correspondence, those that thus appeared dealt almostexclusively with emancipation. Yet Adams was also forwarding addressesand speeches harping on American democracy. A meeting at Edinburgh, February 19, found place, in its emancipation aspect in the UnitedStates documents[1365], but the burden of that meeting, democracy, didnot. It was there proclaimed that the British press misrepresentedconditions in America, "because the future of free politicalinstitutions, as sketched in the American Declaration of Independenceand in the State Constitutions of the Northern States, would be astanding argument against the expansion of the franchise and theenjoyment of just political rights among us, as well as a convenientargument in favour of the continued domination of our aristocraticparties[1366]. " The tide of democratic feeling was rising rapidly inEngland. On March 26, Adams wrote to Seward of a recent debate inParliament that that body was much more judicious in expressions onAmerica than it had been before 1862. "It will not escape yourobservation that the question is now felt to be taking a shape which wasscarcely anticipated by the managers [of the _Times_] when they firstundertook to guide the British mind to the overthrow of freeinstitutions in America[1367]. "

On the evening of the day on which this was written there occurred thegreatest, most outspoken, and most denunciatory to the aristocracy, ofthe meetings held to support the cause of the North. This was thespectacular gathering of the Trades Unions of London at St. James' Hall, on March 26, usually regarded as the culminating effort in Bright's tourof England for the cause of democracy, but whose origin is somewhatshrouded in mystery. Socialist tradition claims that Karl Marx conceivedthe idea of the meeting and was responsible for its organization[1368]. The press generally reported it as a "Bright Meeting. " Adams wrote toSeward of the pressure put on him by Professor Beesly, of the Universityof London, to send a representative from the American Ministry, Beeslyexpanding upon the importance and high standing of the Trades Unions. Tothis Adams demurred but finally sent his son to sit in the audience andreport the proceedings. 

Whatever its origin there can be no doubt that this was the mostimportant of all pro-Northern meetings held in England during the CivilWar, nor that its keynote was "America fighting the battle ofdemocracy. " Save for some distinguished speakers those in attendanceconsisted almost wholly of three thousand picked representatives of theTrades Unions of London. Adams transmitted to Seward his son's report ofthe meeting, its character, composition, names of speakers and theiremphatic expressions of friendship for the North[1369], but it is againnoteworthy that Henry Adams' clear analysis of the real significance ofthe meeting was not printed in the published diplomatic correspondence. Giving due praise to the speeches of Bright and Beesly, and commentingon press assertions that "the extraordinary numbers there were onlybrought together by their curiosity to hear Mr. Bright, " Henry Adamscontinued: "That this was not the case must have been evident to everyperson present. In fact, it was only after he closed that the realbusiness of the evening began. " Then followed speeches and theintroduction of resolutions by "Mr. Howell, a bricklayer . . . Mr. Odgers, a shoemaker . . . Mr. Mantz, a compositor . . . Mr. Cremer, a joiner, whowas bitter against Lord Palmerston . . . Mr. Conolly, a mason. . . . " andother labouring men, all asserting "that the success of freeinstitutions in America was a political question of deep consequence inEngland and that they would not tolerate any interference unfavourableto the North. " No one, the report emphasized, "could doubt what wasintended. "

 "The meeting was a demonstration of democratic strength and no concealment of this fact was made. If it did not have a direct political bearing on internal politics in England it needed little of doing so. There was not even a profession of faith in the government of England as at present constituted. Every hostile allusion to the Aristocracy, the Church, the opinions of the 'privileged classes, ' was received with warm cheers. Every allusion to the republican institutions of America, the right of suffrage, the right of self-taxation, the 'sunlight' of republican influence, was caught up by the audience with vehement applause. It may therefore be considered as fairly and authoritatively announced that the class of skilled workmen in London--that is the leaders of the pure popular movement in England--have announced by an act almost without precedent in their history, the principle that they make common cause with the Americans who are struggling for the restoration of the Union and that all their power and influence shall be used on behalf of the North[1370]. "

Bright's words of most scarifying indictment of "Privilege, " and hisappeal to workers to join hands with their fellows in America have beengiven in a previous chapter[1371]. Evidently that appeal, thoughenthusiastically received for its oratorical brilliance, was unneeded. His was but an eloquent expression of that which was in the minds of hisaudience. Upon the American Minister the effect was to cause him torenew warnings against showing too keen an appreciation of the supportof political radicalism in England. The meeting, he wrote, had at oncestirred anxiety in Parliament and verged:

 ". . . Much too closely upon the minatory in the domestic politics of this Kingdom to make it easy to recognize or sympathize with by Foreign Governments. . . . Hence it seems to me of the greatest consequence that the treatment of all present questions between the two nations should be regulated by a provident forecast of what may follow it [the political struggle in England] hereafter. I am not sure that some parties here would not now be willing even to take the risk of a war in order the more effectually to turn the scale against us, and thus, as they think, to crush the rising spirit of their own population. That this is only a feeling at present and has not yet risen to the dignity of a policy may be true enough; but that does not the less impose upon the Government at home a duty so to shape its actions as, if possible, to defeat all such calculations and dissipate such hopes. . . . We owe this duty not less to the great body of those who in this kingdom are friends to us and our institutions, than to ourselves[1372]. "

[Illustration: JOHN BRIGHT (_From a photograph taken of him in theattitude in which he usually spoke_) (_From Trevelyan's "Life of JohnBright_")]

Thus Adams advised his Government to tread lightly in respect todemocratic agitation in England. Over a month later he received adeputation headed by Bright, come to present to him the resolutionspassed at the Trades Unions' meeting. The deputation expressed fearsthat a rupture was imminent in the relations of Great Britain andAmerica, and that this would have a disastrous influence on theaspirations of working-class Europe. Adams replied in general terms ofappreciation for the sympathies expressed by the meeting butcarefully avoided specific comment on its democratic purpose. "He wastoo prudent, " said the _Times_ in reporting the deputation, "to appraisethe importance of the particular demonstration to which his notice wasinvited . . . " and his reply was given favourable comment[1373]. Thisreply, wrote Adams, "appears to have had a sedative effect[1374]. "Meanwhile, Bright continued his preachment to the English people thoughmodifying his tone of fierce accusation against "privilege, " andconfining himself to declaring the interest of the unenfranchised in theAmerican conflict. In a speech before the Union and Emancipation Societyof London, on June 16, he asserted for the "twenty millions of people inthis country" as yet without representation in Parliament, "I say thatthese have an interest, almost as great and direct as though they wereliving in Massachusetts or New York, in the tremendous struggle forfreedom which is now shaking the whole North American Continent[1375]. "Like utterances were repeated at further public meetings and soinsistent were they as to require reply by the conservative faction, even if, as was supposed, the effect of the Trades' Union attitude hadbeen to give a halt to the vehemence of those who had been sounding the"lesson" of American failure in democracy. Bright became the centre ofattack. The _Times_ led. 

 "His is a political fanaticism. He used to idolize the Constitution of the United States as the one great dominant Democracy of the world. He believes in it still, and, if it must go, he is ready to idolize its memory. For this he gives up all his most cherished notions and all his less absorbing principles. . . . "

 "Yet Mr. Bright is consistent. He has one master passion and his breast, capacious as it is, can hold no more. That master passion is the love of that great dominant Democracy. He worshipped it while rising to its culminating point, and he is obliged to turn right round to worship it while setting. He did not himself know, until tested by this great trial, how entirely his opinions as to war and peace, and slavery and freedom, and lust of conquest and hatred of oppression, were all the mere accidents which hung loosely upon him, and were capable of being detached at once in the interest of the ruling passion of his soul for that great dominant Democracy. Nor need we wonder; for if that great Democracy has been a failure, then men will say that the life of Mr. John Bright up to this time has been but a foolish dream[1376]. "

Evidently Bright's speeches were causing anxiety and bitterness; but an"if" had crept into the estimate of the future of American democracy, caused less by the progress of the war than by the rising excitement ofdemocratic England. The _Times_ editorial just quoted appeared when thefaith was generally professed that Lee was about to end the war throughthe invasion of Pennsylvania. In the reaction created by the arrival ofthe news of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Adams still again warned hisGovernment against either a belligerent or interfering attitude towardGreat Britain, but stated plainly that Northern victory was of supremeimportance in Europe itself. "We have a mission to fulfill. It is toshow, by our example to the people of England in particular, and to allnations in general, the value of republican institutions. " There wasstill a general belief in the incompetency of those institutions. "Thegreatest triumph of all would be to prove these calculations vain. Incomparison with this, what would be the gain to be derived from anycollision with the powers of Europe[1377]?"

It is strange that with so clearly-expressed a division of Englishopinion on American democracy few in America itself appreciated thesignificance of the British controversy. J. M. Forbes, who had been on aspecial mission to England, wrote to Lincoln, on his return[1378]:

 "Our friends abroad see it! John Bright and his glorious band of English Republicans see that we are fighting for Democracy or (to get rid of the technical name) for liberal institutions; the Democrats and the liberals of the old world are as much and as heartily with us as any supporters we have on this side. 

 Our enemies too see it in the same light; the Aristocrats and the Despots of the old world see that our quarrel is that of the People against an Aristocracy[1379]. "

But there are few similar expressions and these few nearly always camefrom men who had been abroad and had thus come into direct contact withBritish political movements. Meanwhile, Lee's retreat from Pennsylvaniahad produced a like retreat in the opinions on the failure of democracyearlier confidently held by the professedly neutral press. In September, having arrived at the point by the usual process of gradually facingabout, the _Times_ was bold enough to deny that England had any personalfeeling or concern about democracy in America or that this had anythingto do with English attitude on the war[1380]. Thenceforth neither the_Times_ nor any of the leading papers saw fit to revive with vigour thecry of "democracy's failure, " no matter how persistent in proclaimingultimate victory for the South. Aristocratic exultation had given placeto alarm and it seemed wiser, if possible, to quiet the issue[1381]. Notso the Radicals, who made every effort to keep the issue alive in theminds of the British public, and whose leaders with less violence butincreased firmness debated the question in every public meetingfavourable to the North[1382]. Many Conservatives, Adams reported, werenow anxiously sitting on the fence yet finding the posture a difficultone because of their irritation at Bright's taunts[1383]. Bright's starwas rising. "The very moment the war comes to an end, " wrote Adams, "anda restoration of the Union follows, it will be the signal for a reactionthat will make Mr. Bright perhaps the most formidable public man inEngland[1384]. "

The continuation of the controversy was not, however, wholly one-sided. In the silence of the daily press it seemed incumbent upon the moreeager and professed friends of the South to take up the cudgels. Hence, in part, came the organization of the Southern Independence Associationand the attempt to hold public meetings favourable to the South, in theearly months of 1864. Much talk had been spent on the "British issue"involved in the war; there was now to be vigorous work to secureit[1385]. _The Index _plunged into vigorous denunciation of "TheManchester School, which, for convenience and truth, we had better forthe future call the American School. " Even the Government was attackedfor its complacence under the "American danger" and for retaining as amember Milner-Gibson, who, in a recent speech, had shown that he sharedBright's views on democracy:

 "That gentleman [Bright] could not be asked to enter the Cabinet in person. The country abhorred him; Parliament despised him; his inveterate habits of slander and vituperation, his vulgarity, and his incurable want of veracity, had made him so hateful to the educated classes that it would have required no common courage to give him office; his insolent sneers at royalty would have made his appointment little less than a personal insult to the Queen; and his bad temper would have made him an intolerable colleague in the Council. But Mr. Bright had another self; a faithful shadow, which had no ideas, no soul, no other existence but what it borrowed from him, while its previous life and education had accustomed it to the society of statesmen and of gentlemen[1386]. "

Such expressions gained nothing for the Conservative cause; they weretoo evidently the result of alarm at the progress of Radical andpro-Northern sentiment. Goldwin Smith in a "Letter" to the SouthernIndependence Association, analysed with clarity the situation. Answeringcriticisms of the passionate mob spirit of Northern press and people, heaccused the _Times_ of having

 ". . . Pandered to the hatred of America among the upper classes of this country during the present war. Some of us at least had been taught by what we have lately seen not to shrink from an extension of the suffrage, if the only bad consequence of that measure of justice would be a change in government from the passions of the privileged class to the passions of the people. . . . History will not mistake the meaning of the loud cry of triumph which burst from the hearts of all who openly or secretly hated liberty and progress, at the fall, as they fondly supposed, of the Great Republic. " British working men "are for the most part as well aware that the cause of those who are fighting for the right of labour is theirs, as any nobleman in your Association can be that the other cause in his[1387]. "

The question of democracy as a political philosophy and as aninstitution for Great Britain was, by 1864, rapidly coming to the frontin politics. This was very largely a result of the American Civil War. Roebuck, after the failure of his effort for mediation in 1863, wasobsessed with a fear of the tendency in England. "I have great faith inmy countrymen, " he wrote, "but the experience of America frightens me. Iam not ashamed to use the word _frightened_. During my whole life I havelooked to that country as about to solve the great problem ofself-government, and now, in my old age, the hopes of my youth andmanhood are destroyed, and I am left to reconstruct my politicalphilosophy, and doubt and hesitation beset me on every point[1388]. "More philosophically Matthew Arnold, in 1864, characterized the rule ofaristocracy as inevitably passing, but bent his thought to the discoveryof some middle ground or method--some "influence [which] may help us toprevent the English people from becoming, with the growth of democracy, _Americanized_[1389]. " "There is no longer any sort of disguisemaintained, " wrote Adams, "as to the wishes of the privileged classes. Very little genuine sympathy is entertained for the rebels. The truemotive is apparent enough. It is the fear of the spread of democraticfeeling at home in the event of our success[1390]. "

The year 1864 had witnessed a rapid retreat by wiser Conservativeelements in proclaming the "lesson" of American democracy--a retreatcaused by alarm at the vigour with which Radicals had taken up thechallenge. Conservative hopes were still fixed upon Southern success andConservative confidence loudly voiced. Even the pride of the _Times_ inthe accuracy of its news and in its military forecasts was subordinatedto the purpose of keeping up the courage of the faction itrepresented[1391]. Small wonder, then, that Delane, on receiving thenews of Sherman's arrival before Savannah, should be made physically illand write to Dasent: "The American news is a heavy blow to us as wellas to the South. " The next day he added: "I am still sore vexed aboutSherman, but Chenery did his best to attenuate the mischief[1392]. ""Attenuation" of Northern progress in arms was, indeed, attempted, butthe facts of the military situation were too strong for continuedconcealment. From January, 1865, only the most stubborn of Southernfriends could remain blind to the approaching Northern victory. LordActon, a hero-worshipper of the great Confederate military leader, "broke his heart over the surrender of Lee, " but was moved also by keeninsight as to the political meaning of that surrender[1393]. 

So assured were all parties in England that the great Civil War inAmerica was closing in Northern victory that the final event wasdiscounted in advance and the lines were rapidly being formed for anEnglish political struggle on the great issue heralded as involved inthe American conflict. Again, on the introduction of a motion inParliament for expansion of the franchise the ultra-Conservativesattempted to read a "lesson" from America. The _Quarterly_ for April, 1865, asserted that even yet "the mass of educated men in England retainthe sympathy for the South which they have nourished ever since theconflict assumed a decided shape. " America was plainly headed in thedirection of a military despotism. Her example should warn England froma move in the same direction. "The classes which govern this country arein a minority, " and should beware of majority rule. But eventsdiscredited the prophecy of a military despotism. The assassination ofLincoln gave opportunity not merely for a general outpouring ofexpressions of sympathy but also to the Radicals a chance to exaltLincoln's leadership in democracy[1394]. 

In July Great Britain was holding elections for a new Parliament. Not asingle member who had supported the cause of the North failed ofre-election, several additional Northern "friends" were chosen, and someoutspoken members for the South were defeated. Adams thought this amatter deserving special notice in America, and prophesied a new eraapproaching in England:

 "As it is, I cannot resist the belief that this period marks an era in the political movement of Great Britain. Pure old-fashioned conservatism has so far lost its hold on the confidence of the country that it will not appear in that guise any more. Unless some new and foreign element should interpose, I look for decided progress in enlarging the popular features of the constitution, and diminishing the influence of the aristocracy. . . . It is impossible not to perceive traces of the influence of our institutions upon all these changes. . . . The progress of the liberal cause, not in England alone, but all over the world, is, in a measure, in our hands[1395]. "

The "Liberal progress" was more rapid, even, than Adams anticipated. Palmerston, ill for some months past, died on October 18, 1865. Russellsucceeded him as head of the Ministry, and almost immediately declaredhimself in favour of Parliamentary reform even though a majority in bothHouses was still opposed to such a measure. Russell's desertion of hisearlier attitude of "finality" on franchise expansion correctlyrepresented the acceptance, though unwillingly, by both politicalparties of the necessity of reform. The battle, long waged, but reachingits decisive moment during the American Civil War, had finally goneagainst Conservatism when Lee surrendered at Appomatox. Russell'sReform Bill of 1866 was defeated by Tory opposition in combination witha small Whig faction which refused to desert the "principle" ofaristocratic government--the "government by the wise, " but the Torieswho came into power under Derby were forced by the popular demand voicedeven to the point of rioting, themselves to present a Reform Bill. Disraeli's measure, introduced with a number of "fancy franchises, "which, in effect, sought to counteract the giving of the vote to Britishworking-men, was quickly subjected to such caustic criticism that allthe planned advantages to Conservatism were soon thrown overboard, and aBill presented so Radical as to permit a transfer of political power tothe working classes[1396]. The Reform Bill of 1867 changed Great Britainfrom a government by aristocracy to one by democracy. A new nation cameinto being. The friends of the North had triumphed. 

Thus in addition to the play of diplomatic incidents, the incidentalfrictions, the effect on trade relations, the applications of Britishneutrality, and the general policy of the Government, there existed forGreat Britain a great issue in the outcome of the Civil War--the issueof the adoption of democratic institutions. It affected at every turnBritish public attitude, creating an intensity and bitterness of tone, on both sides, unexampled in the expressions of a neutral people. InAmerica this was little understood, and American writers both during thewar and long afterwards, gave little attention to it[1397]. Immediatelyupon the conclusion of the war, Goldwin Smith, whose words during theconflict were bitter toward the aristocracy, declared that "theterritorial aristocracy of this country and the clergy of theEstablished Church" would have been excusable "if they could only havesaid frankly that they desired the downfall of institutions opposed totheir own, instead of talking about their sympathy for the weak, andtheir respect for national independence, and their anxiety for thetriumph of Free Trade[1398]. " This was stated before the democratic hopein England had been realized. Three years later the same staunch friendof the North, now removed to America and occupying a chair of history atCornell University, wrote of the British aristocracy in excuse of theirattitude: "I fought these men hard; I believed, and believe now, thattheir defeat was essential to the progress of civilization. But Idaresay we should have done pretty much as they did, if we had been bornmembers of a privileged order, instead of being brought up under theblessed influence of equality and justice[1399]. "

Such judgment and such excuses will appear to the historian aswell-founded. But to Americans who conceived the Civil War as one foughtfirst of all for the preservation of the nation, the issue of democracyin England seemed of little moment and little to excuse either the "coldneutrality" of the Government or the tone of the press. To AmericansGreat Britain appeared friendly to the dissolution of the Union and thedestruction of a rival power. Nationality was the issue for the North;that democracy was an issue in America was denied, nor could it, in theintensity of the conflict, be conceived as the vital questiondetermining British attitude. The Reform Bill of 1867 brought a newBritish nation into existence, the nation decrying American institutionswas dead and a "sister democracy" holding out hands to the UnitedStates had replaced it, but to this the men who had won the war for theNorth long remained blind. Not during the generation when Americans, immersed in a life and death struggle for national existence, felt that"he who is not for me is against me, " could the generally correctneutrality of the British Government and the whole-hearted support ofRadical England be accepted at their true value to the North. For nearlyhalf a century after the American Civil War the natural sentiments offriendship, based upon ties of blood and a common heritage of literatureand history and law, were distorted by bitter and exaggeratedmemories. 

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1323: See my article, "The Point of View of the BritishTraveller in America, " _Pol. Sci. Quarterly_, June, 1914. ]

[Footnote 1324: Alexander Mackay, _The Western World; or Travels in theUnited States in_ 1846-47. ]

[Footnote 1325: _Ibid. _, Fourth Edition, London, 1850, Vol. III, p. 24. ]

[Footnote 1326: Hugh Seymour Tremenheere, _The Constitution of theUnited States compared with Our Own_, London, 1854. ]

[Footnote 1327: e. G. , William Kelly, _Across the Rocky Mountains fromNew York to California_, London, 1852. He made one acute observation onAmerican democracy. "The division of parties is just the reverse inAmerica to what it is in England. In England the stronghold of democracyis in the large towns, and aristocracy has its strongest supporters inthe country. In America the ultra-democrat and leveller is the westernfarmer, and the aristocratic tendency is most visible amongst themanufacturers and merchants of the eastern cities. " (p. 181. )]

[Footnote 1328: Monypenny, _Disraeli_, IV, pp. 293-4, states a Toryoffer to support Palmerston on these lines. ]

[Footnote 1329: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 217. ]

[Footnote 1330: March, 30, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1331: March 16, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1332: To John Bigelow, April 14, 1861. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 347. )]

[Footnote 1333: April 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1334: Bunch wrote to Russell, May 15, 1861, that the war inAmerica was the "natural result of the much vaunted system of governmentof the United States"; it had "crumbled to pieces, " and this result hadlong been evident to the public mind of Europe. (F. O. , Am. , Vol. 780, No. 58. )]

[Footnote 1335: State Department, Eng. , Vol. 77, No. 9. Adams to Seward, June 21, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1336: I have made an effort to identify writers in_Blackwood's_, but am informed by the editors that it is impossible todo this for the period before 1870, old correspondence having beendestroyed. ]

[Footnote 1337: July, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1338: The _Atlantic Monthly_ for November, 1861, takes up thequestion, denying that democracy is in any sense "on trial" in America, so far as the permanence of American institutions is concerned. It stilldoes not see clearly the real nature of the controversy in England. ]

[Footnote 1339: Aug. 17, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1340: Sept. 6, 1861. (Mass. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, XLVI, p. 94. )]

[Footnote 1341: Sept. 7, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1342: Sept. 14, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1343: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, p. 35. To his mother, Sept. 22, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1344: April, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1345: Oct. , 1861. ]

[Footnote 1346: Oct. , 1861. Article, "Democracy teaching by Example. "]

[Footnote 1347: Nov. 23, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1348: Cited by Harris, _The Trent Affair_, p. 28. ]

[Footnote 1349: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, pp. 177 _seq. _]

[Footnote 1350: Gladstone Papers, Dec. 27, 1861. ]

[Footnote 1351: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 78, No. 95. Adams to Seward, Dec. 27, 1861. As printed in _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63_, Pt. I, p. 14. Adams' emphasis on the word "_not_" is unindicated, by thefailure to use italics. ]

[Footnote 1352: _Ibid. _, No. 110. Enclosure. Adams to Seward, Jan. 31, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1353: Feb. 22, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1354: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 80, No. 206. Adams to Seward, Aug. 8, 1862. Of this period in 1862, Rhodes (IV, 78) writes that "themost significant and touching feature of the situation was that thecotton operative population was frankly on the side of the North. " Lutz, _Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staatenwährend des Sezessionskrieges_, pp. 49-53, makes an interesting analysisof the German press, showing it also determined in its attitude byfactional political idealisms in Germany. ]

[Footnote 1355: Palmerston MS. , Aug. 24, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1356: Aug. 30, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1357: October, 1862. "The Confederate Struggle andRecognition. "]

[Footnote 1358: Nov. 4, 1862. ]

[Footnote 1359: _The Index_, Nov. 20, 1862, p. 63. (Communication. )]

[Footnote 1360: Anthony Trollope, _North America_, London, 1862, Vol. I, p. 198. The work appeared in London in 1862, and was in its thirdedition by the end of the year. It was also published in New York in1862 and in Philadelphia in 1863. ]

[Footnote 1361: _The Liberator_, March 13, 1863, quoting a report in the_New York Sunday Mercury_. ]

[Footnote 1362: Lord Salisbury is quoted in Vince, _John Bright_, p. 204, as stating that Bright "was the greatest master of English oratorythat this generation--I may say several generations--has seen. I havemet men who have heard Pitt and Fox, and in whose judgment theireloquence at its best was inferior to the finest efforts of John Bright. At a time when much speaking has depressed, has almost exterminated, eloquence, he maintained that robust, powerful and vigorous style inwhich he gave fitting expression to the burning and noble thoughts hedesired to utter. "]

[Footnote 1363: Speech at Rochdale, Feb. 3, 1863. (Robertson, _Speechesof John Bright_, I, pp. 234 _seq. _)]

[Footnote 1364: Bigelow to Seward, Feb. 6, 1863. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 600. )]

[Footnote 1365: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 123. ]

[Footnote 1366: State Dept. , Eng. , Adams to Seward. No. 334. Feb. 26, 1863. Enclosing report of the Edinburgh meeting as printed in _TheWeekly Herald, Mercury and News_, Feb. 21, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1367: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157. ]

[Footnote 1368: Spargo, _Karl Marx, _pp. 224-5. Spargo claims that Marxbent every effort to stir working men to a sense of class interest inthe cause of the North and even went so far as to secure the presence ofBright at the meeting, as the most stirring orator of the day, thoughpersonally he regarded Bright "with an almost unspeakable loathing. " Onreading this statement I wrote to Mr. Spargo asking for evidence andreceived the reply that he believed the tradition unquestionably wellfounded, though "almost the only testimony available consists of areference or two in one of his [Marx's] letters and the amplecorroborative testimony of such friends as Lessner, Jung and others. "This is scant historical proof; but some years later in a personal talkwith Henry Adams, who was in 1863 his father's private secretary, andwho attended and reported the meeting, the information was given thatHenry Adams himself had then understood and always since believed Marx'sto have been the guiding hand in organizing the meeting. ]

[Footnote 1369: _U. S. Messages and Documents_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 162. (Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863. )]

[Footnote 1370: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 82, No. 358. Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863, enclosing report by Henry Adams. There was also enclosedthe printed report, giving speeches at length, as printed by _The BeeHive_, the organ of the London Trades Unions. ]

[Footnote 1371: See _ante_, p. 132. ]

[Footnote 1372: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 82, No. 360. Adams to Seward, April 2, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1373: May 5, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1374: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 243. Adams to Seward, May 7, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1375: Robertson, _Speeches of John Bright_, I, p. 264. In aletter to Bigelow, March 16, 1863, Bright estimated that there wereseven millions of men of twenty-one years of age and upward in theUnited Kingdom, of whom slightly over one million had the vote. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, p. 610. )]

[Footnote 1376: July 2, 1863. The editorial was written in connectionwith Roebuck's motion for mediation and is otherwise interesting for anattempt to characterize each of the speakers in the Commons. ]

[Footnote 1377: _U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863_, Part I, p. 319. To Seward, July 23, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1378: See _ante_, p. 130, _note_ 2. ]

[Footnote 1379: MS. Letter, Sept. 8, 1863, in possession of C. F. Adams, Jr. ]

[Footnote 1380: Sept. 24, 1863. ]

[Footnote 1381: Even the friendly Russian Minister in Washington was atthis time writing of the "rule of the mob" in America and trusting thatthe war, "the result of democracy, " would serve as a warning to Europe. (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F. O. , Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1864, No. 1900. )]

[Footnote 1382: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 84, Nos. 557 and 559. Adams toSeward, Dec. 17, 1863. Adams repeated his advice to "keep out of it. "]

[Footnote 1383: _Ibid. _, Vol. 85, No. 587. Adams to Seward, Jan. 29, 1864. Adams here expressed the opinion that it was partly thearistocratic antipathy to Bright that had _produced_ the ill-will to theUnited States. ]

[Footnote 1384: _Ibid. _]

[Footnote 1385: See Ch. XV. ]

[Footnote 1386: _The Index_, Jan. 28, 1864, p. 58. ]

[Footnote 1387: Goldwin Smith, _A Letter to a Whig Member of theSouthern Independence Association_, London, 1864, pp. 14, 68, and 71. ]

[Footnote 1388: Leader, _Roebuck_, p. 299. To William Ibbitt, April 26, 1864. ]

[Footnote 1389: Arnold, _Mixed Essays_, p. 17. N. Y. , Macmillan, 1883. ]

[Footnote 1390: State Dept. , Eng. , Vol. 86, No. 709. Adams to Seward, June 9, 1864]

[Footnote 1391: See _ante_, Ch. XVI. ]

[Footnote 1392: Dasent, _Delane_, II, pp. 135-6. Delane to Dasent, Dec. 25 and 26, 1864. The _Times_ on December 26 pictured Sherman as having_escaped_ to the sea, but on the 29th acknowledged his achievements. ]

[Footnote 1393: _Lord Acton's Letters to Mary Gladstone_, p. 183. ]

[Footnote 1394: These were not confined to Great Britain. The AmericanLegation in Berlin received addresses of sympathy from manyorganizations, especially labour unions. One such, drawn by W. Liebknecht, A. Vogt, and C. Schilling read in part: "Members of theworking-class, we need not affirm to you the sincerity of these oursympathies; for with pride we can point to the fact, that, while thearistocracy of the Old World took openly the part of the southernslaveholder, and while the middle class was divided in its opinions, theworking-men in all countries of Europe have unanimously and firmly stoodon the side of the Union. " (_U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1865_, Pt. IV, p. 500. )]

[Footnote 1395: _U. S. Messages and Documents, 1865_, Pt. I, p. 417. Adams to Hunter, July 13, 1865. ]

[Footnote 1396: Disraeli was less disturbed by this than were other Toryleaders. He had long before, in his historical novels, advocated anaristocratic leadership of democracy, as against the middle class. Derbycalled the Bill "a leap in the dark, " but assented to it. ]

[Footnote 1397: Pierce, _Sumner_, IV, pp. 151-153, summarizes thefactors determining British attitude and places first the fear of theprivileged classes of the example of America, but his treatment reallyminimizes this element. ]

[Footnote 1398: Goldwin Smith, "The Civil War in America: An Addressread at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and EmancipationSociety. " (Jan. 26, 1866. ) London, 1866, pp. 71-75. ]

[Footnote 1399: Goldwin Smith, _America and England in their presentrelations_, London, 1869, p. 30. ]

INDEX

Aberdeen, Lord, i. 10, 13, 14, 15; ii. 117 _note_[1]Acton, Lord, ii. 301Adams, Brooks, _The Seizure of the Laird Rams_, cited, ii. 120 _note_[2], 125 _note_[1], 147 _note_[1], 150 _note_[1]Adams, Charles Francis, i. 49, 62-3, 80-1; attitude in the early days of the American crisis, 49 _and note_, 55, 63; appointed American Minister in London, 62, 80-1, 96; impressions of English opinion on the crisis, 96, 97, 98, 107; alarm at Seward's Despatch No. 10, i. 127; attitude of, to the Palmerston-Russell ministry, 170; controversy on General Butler's order, 302-5; reports to Seward on British public meetings on Emancipation Proclamation, ii. 107 _and note_[3], 223; view of the popular manifestations on Emancipation, 108; view as to decline of British confidence in the South, 184; and the London Confederate States Aid Association, 191, 192; receives deputations of allegiance during rumours before the fall of Savannah, 245 _and note_[1]; quoted on rumours in Britain of possible reunion and foreign war, ii. 251-2, 253; on effect in England of the Hampton Roads Conference, 253; advice of, to Seward on attitude to be observed to Britain, 253-255; attitude to Seward's complaints of British and Canadian offences, 253-4; comments of, on parliamentary debate and Bright's speech of confidence in Lincoln, 255 _and note_[1]; on feeling in Britain over Lincoln's assassination and the attempt on Seward, 257, 262-3; receives addresses of sympathy from British organizations, 262-3; and formal declaration of the end of the war, 268; faith of, in ultimate British opinion on the issues in the Civil War, ii. 283; views of, on the political controversy in England as influencing attitude to America 284, 285; advice to Seward on the political position in relation to democracy, 290, 294, 296, 298 _note_[1]; quoted on the rising of democratic feeling in Britain, 291; disappointed in attitude of British friends of progress, 278, 279, 280; report of, on London mass meeting in favour of the North, 284; and the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292, 294-5; quoted on John Bright, 298; on the attitude of the privileged classes to democracy, 298 _note_[2], 300; on the influence of American institutions on the political movement in Great Britain, 302

 _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to:_ _Alabama case_: ii. 35, 120 _and note_[2], 121, 131 British Foreign Enlistment Act, i. 135, 148-9; ii. 201-2 Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190, 193, 195 Confederate Commissioners: representations on intercourse with, i. 105-6, 107 Confederate Cotton Loan: reported connection with, ii. 161 _and note_[4]; views on, 179 Confederate Shipbuilding in England: protests against, ii. 118, 128, 131, 137, 143, 145 _note_[2]; and U. S. Navy Department plan to stop, 130 _note_[2]; Laird Rams incident, 144, 146, 147 _note_[1], 150 Cotton: report on British position, ii. 99 Declaration of Paris negotiation: action on proposed convention, i. 141-69 _passim_; view of American intention, 144, 169; failure of his negotiation, 137, 145-6, 169-71 Gladstone and Lewis speeches, ii. 55 Irish emigrants, enlistment of, ii. 201-2 Lindsay's efforts for mediation, ii. 34-5. 212 Mediation: presents the "servile war" threat against, ii. 18-19, 95; view of England's reply to French proposals on, 71; advantages of an anti-slavery avowal, 98-9 Neutrality Law, _See_ British Foreign Enlistment Act _supra_ Privateering Bill, ii. 122-3, 125, 127; advises against issue of privateers, 131 Proclamation of Neutrality, The: representations on, i. 98-100, 101, 105, 107 _and note_[2], 300-1; despatch on settlement of peaceful policy, 134; protests against British recognition of belligerency, 159; advice to Seward on, 275 Roebuck's motion: report on, ii. 144 "Servile War" threat, ii. 18-19, 95 _and note_[4] Slavery: urges Northern declaration on, ii. 98-9; comments on _Times_ criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108 Southern Ports: plan of collecting duties at, ii. 198 _Trent_ Affair, the: interviewed by Palmerston, i. 208-9; statement on the _James Adger_, 209-10; suspicion of British policy in, 218; views on public opinion in, 222-3; officially states Wilkes acted without authorization, 226; report on English hope of peaceful settlement, 228, 229; on British opinion after settlement of, 238, 240; on effect of, in Great Britain, 243; view of popular attitude in Britain in the crisis of, ii. 283 Appreciation and criticisms on: Characterized in _The Index_, ii. 196 Lord Lyons', report on, i. 62-3; opinion on, ii. 71 _note_[4] Lord Russell's view of his diplomacy, ii. 128 Tory approval of, ii. 197 Otherwise mentioned, i. 1, 2, 129, 198, 263, 274, 276; ii. 31, 100Adams, C. F. , Jun. , view of British attitude and the Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 109, 110; view of the delay in his father's journey to England, 112 _note_; view on Seward's attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 138, 153-6; examination of British action in the negotiation, 154-5; review of the _Trent_ affair, cited, 203 _note, et seq. Passim_; on American feeling over seizure of Mason and Slidell, 218; and the Hotze materials, ii. 154 _note_Adams, E. D. : _British Interests and Activities in Mexico_, cited ii. 117 _note_[1] "The Point of View of the British Traveller in America, " cited, i. 23 _note_; ii. 274 _note_[1]Adams, Henry, i. 138; ii. 292 _note_[1]; view of, on W. E. Forster, i. 58 _note_[2]; on British Proclamation of Neutrality, 110; on American exultation in _Trent_ affair, 223; on British attitude in _Trent_ affair, 230; view of Gregory's speech on the blockade, 270; on British view of prospects in the War, 297; on possibility of intervention, ii. 23; on advantage of a Northern declaration on slavery, 23; on the Trades Unions of London meeting, 292 _and note_[1] 293 "Declaration, The, of Paris, " 1861 . . . Reviewed, 146 _et seq. _, 153; view of Russell's policy in, 146-150, 159; view of Lyons, 147, 150 _Education of Henry Adams_ quoted, i. 149 _note_[3]; ii. 172 _note_[2]; cited, ii. 50 _note_[1]Adams, John (Second President of the U. S. ), i. 62, 81Adams, John Quincy, i. 11, 20, 62, 81African Slave Trade, attitude of the South to, i. 85-6; ii. 88; suppression of, international efforts for, i. 8-10; punishment to slave traders in American law, 9; American attitude to right of search, 9, 10, 219; British anti-slavery policy, 31-2; wane of British interest in, 10, 32; ii. 90; Slave Trade Treaty signed, i. 10, 275, 276; ii. 90, 91Agassiz, L. , i. 37 _note_. Akroyd, Edward, ii. 193 _note_. _Alabama_, The, ii. 35, 116, 119-120; departure of, from Liverpool, 118; British order to stop departure, 119, 120 _and note_[2], 133; Russell's private feelings as to, 121, 124; public opinion in Great Britain on, 129-130; Palmerston's defence of Government action on, 134-5; American anger over, 119, 127; measures against, 121-3, 127; New York Chamber of Commerce protest on, 126; claim for damages on account of, 151 _note_[1]; mentioned, i. 138; ii. 129 _note_[1], 131, 134, 136, 145, 146_Alexandra_, case, The: Seizure of the vessel, ii. 136, 139, 140, 152, 161 _note_[4]; public approval, 136; law actions on, 136 _note_[2], 142, 149, 152, 185, 195; American anxiety at Court decision, 143; final result, 196 _note_[2]America, Central: British-American disputes in, i. 16, 17American: Civil War: i. 86, 87 _and note_[2], 99; British public and official views at the commencement of, 40-60; origins of; American and British views, i. 47-8; efforts at compromise, 49; British official attitude on outbreak of, 73; European opinion of, after duration of three years, ii. 219; compared with the Great War in Europe, 219; British attitude to democracy as determining attitude to the War, i. 77; ii. 303-5; bearing of, on democracy in Great Britain, 299 Union, The: British views of, i. 15; prognostications of its dissolution, 36, 37 War of Independence, i. 2-3, 17; adjustments after the Treaty of Peace, 3; as fostering militant patriotism, 7, 8 _note_; commercial relations after, 17-18 "War of 1812" i. 4, 7, 18; causes leading to, 5-7; New England opposition to, 7, 18; effect of, on American National unity, 7 _See also under_ United StatesAnderson, Major, Northern Commander at Fort Sumter, i. 117Anderson's Mission, ii. 53 _note_[3]; reports, ii. 53 _and note_[2]Andrews, Governor of Massachusetts, i. 219-20Anthropological Society of London, ii. 222Antietam, defeat of Lee by McClellan at, ii. 43, 85, 105; effect of, on Lord Palmerston, 43Archibald, British Consul at New York, i. 63, 64Argyll, Duke of, i. 179, 212; anti-slavery attitude of, i. 179, 238; ii. 112; views of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 212, 215, 229, 238; on calamity of war with America, 215, 238; on Northern determination, ii. 30Arkansas joins Confederate States, i. 172_Army and Navy Gazette_, The, ii. 228, 229; attitude in the conflict, 229-30, 236; on the Presidential election, 235-6, 238; summary of military situation after Atlanta, 243; on "foreign war" rumours, 251; cited or quoted, 68, 166, 232-3, 243. (_See also under_ Russell, W. H. )Arnold, Matthew, views on the secession, i. 47; on British "superiority, " 258; on the rule of aristocracy and growth of democracy, ii. 300Arnold, _The History of the Cotton Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2], 10, 11; quoted: first effects of the war on the cotton trade, 9-10; cotton operatives' song, 17 _note_[6]; on the members for Lancashire, 26-7Ashburton, Lord, i. 13; Ashburton Mission, i. 13Aspinwall and Forbes, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2]Atlanta, captured by Sherman, ii. 233-5; effect of, on Northern attitude, 233-4; effect of, on Lincoln's re-election, 235_Atlantic Monthly_, The, ii. 109 _note_[3]; 279 _and note_[3]

Bagley, Mr. , ii. 224Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, cited, ii. 129 _note_[1]Baligny. _See_ BellignyBancroft, Frederic, cited, i. 117 _note_; analysis of Seward's object in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 150-3; view on Russell's aims in, 152 _and note_[2] _Life of Seward_, cited or quoted, i. 106 _note_[1], 118 _note_, 130 _note_[3]; 132 _note_[3], 138, 150-3, 186 _notes_, 191 _note_[4], 196 _note_[1], 200 _note_[2], 213 _note_[4], 231 _note_[3], 280 _and note_[1], 281; ii. 1-2, 96, 99 _note_[2], 143 _note_[3], 253 _note_[1], 258 _note_[1]Banks, Governor, i. 37 _note_Baring, ii. 96 _note_[3]Bath, Marquis of, ii. 193 _note_Beals, Mr. , ii. 191Bedford, Duke of, i. 96 _and note_[3]_Bee Hive, The, _cited, ii. 293 _note_Beecher, Henry Ward, ii. 184 _and note_[3]Beesly, Professor, speech of, at Trades Unions of London Meeting, ii. 292_Belfast Whig_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; 231 _note_Belligny, French Consul at Charleston, i. 185 _note_[1], 186, 188, 189, 191 _and note_[4]_Bell's Weekly Messenger_, quoted, ii. 104Benjamin, Confederate Secretary of State, ii. 5; Mercier's interview with, i. 284, 285; report of, to Slidell on Mercier's visit, 284 _note_[2]; instructions of, to Slidell offering commercial advantages for French intervention, ii. 24 _and note_[2]; on idea of Confederate loan, 158-9; recalls Mason, 179; and recognition of the Confederacy, 217; on the attitude of France to the Confederacy, 236 _note_[2]; plan of offering abolition of slavery in return for recognition, 249; otherwise mentioned, i. 292; ii. 88 _note_[2], 148, 154 _note_[1], 213 _note_[1]Bentinck, i. 268, 269Bernard, Montague: _Neutrality, The, of Great Britain during the American Civil War_, quoted, i. , 100 _and note_[1], 137-8; ii. 118; cited, i. 171 _note_[1], 245 _note_[3], 246 _note_[2], 263 _notes_; ii. 136 _note_[2]; on the American representations on the British Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 100; on Declaration of Paris negotiations, 137-8; on the Blockade, 263 _and notes_ "Two Lectures on the Present American War": on recognition, cited, i. 183Bigelow, John, ii. 71 _note_[3]: _France and the Confederate Navy_, cited, ii. 57 _note_[2] _Retrospections of an Active Life_, cited, i. 56 _note_, 217 _note_[2]; ii. 71 _note_[3], 88 _note_[2], 128 _note_[3], 130 _note_[2]; Gladstone and the Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2]; U. S. Stimulation of immigration, 200 _note_[1]; cited, 229 _note_[1]; Quoted, ii. 254; advice of, on the political position in Britain; quoted, 290; cited, 295 _note_[3]Billault, M. , i. 288, 289 _and note_[1]Birkbeck, Morris, _Letters from Illinois_, quoted, i. 25_Birmingham Post_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_; letters of S. A. Goddard in support of emancipation in, ii. 108-9Bishop, Rev. Francis, ii. 224Bismarck, ii. 203Black, Judge, American Secretary of State, i. 52, 244Blackwood, John, political views of, ii. 289_Blackwood's Magazine_, ii. 279 _note_[1]; on cotton and the blockade, 10; on French mediation proposals, 68; on the Emancipation Proclamation, 103; on democracy as cause of the war, 278-9, 281, 289Blair, member of the United States Cabinet, i, 130 _note_[1], 231; ii. 85, 251, 252Blockade of Southern Ports, the: Lincoln's declaration on, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, 121, 122, 244, 245; commencement of, i. 245; method of warning at the port, 245, 246; as involving hardship to British merchants, 245-6; effectiveness of, 252-71 _passim_; effect on British Trade, 252, 254, 263; effect on Cotton Trade, 262; ii. 8, 9; statistics as to effectiveness, i. 268 _note_[3] Southern Ports Bill, i. 246 _et seq. _ Stone Boat Fleet Blockade, i. 253 _et seq. _, 269, 302 British attitude to, i. 95, 244, 245, 246, 263 _and note_[2], 267, 270; ii. 5, 265; Parliamentary debate on, i. 267 _et seq. _; Gregory's motion 268 _et seq. _; press attitude, 246; Bright's view, ii. 14, 15 Confederate representations on, i. 265 Napoleon's view of, i. 290Booth, assassinator of Lincoln, ii. 258, 259, 263Border States, The: efforts at compromise, i. 49; sympathies in, 173; the "Border State policy" of Lincoln, 173, 176, 272 _note_[1]; ii. 82; and Confiscation Bill, Lincoln's fears, 82; attitude of, to emancipation, ii. 83, 84, 87; not affected in Proclamation of Emancipation, 86Bourke, Hon. Robert, ii. 187, 193Boynton, Rev. C. B. , _English and French Neutrality, etc. _, cited and quoted, ii. 225 _note_[1]Bright, John, i. 58 _note_[2], 77; quoted on _Times_ attitude towards the United States, 55 _note_[3]; view of the Northern attempt at reconquest, 72; views of, on the Proclamation of Neutrality, 108, 110; speech on _Trent_ affair, 221-2; letter to Sumner on _Trent_ affair, influence on Lincoln, 232; speech on Britain's attitude on conclusion of _Trent_ affair, 241-2; view on the war as for abolition, 241; on distress in Lancashire, ii. 13, 14; view of the blockade, 14, 15; on the cotton shortage, 15; and Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 48; view of Emancipation Proclamation, 48 _note_[2], 105-6, 111-12; on England's support if emancipation an object in the war, 88-9; the escape of the _Alabama_, 120; at Trades Unions of London meeting, 132-3, 134, 291-3; support of the North, 132, 283-4, 290, 291-295; on the interests of the unenfranchised in the American conflict, 132, 295; on the unfriendly neutrality of the Government, 134; rebuked by Palmerston, 135; trouncing of Roebuck, 172 _and note_[2]; on Britain's neutrality (Nov. , 1863), 184; championship of democratic institutions, i. 221-2; ii. 132-3, 276-7, 282, 283; popularity of, as advocate of Northern cause, 224, 225; influence of, for the North, i. 58 _note_[2]; ii. 224; Lincoln's pardon of Alfred Rubery in honour of, 225 _and note_[1]; quoted on feeling of the British Government and people towards United States in Jan. , 1865, etc. , 247; confidence of, in pacific policy of Lincoln, 255 _and note_[1]; quoted on the ruling class and democracy, 280; attack on Southern aristocracy by, 290; heads deputation to Adams, 294; eulogy of George Thompson by, 224 _note_[1] Adams' opinion on, ii. 298; view of, in _The Index_, ii. 298-9; Laird's view of, ii. 134; Karl Marx's view of, 292 _note_[1]; Lord Salisbury, quoted on the oratory of, 290 _note_[1], the _Times_ attack on, 295-6 Otherwise mentioned, i. 69, 179, 289; ii. 68, 69, 132 _note_[1], 172 _note_[1], 186, 187, 191, 278, 281. (See also under _Morning Star_)British, _See also under _Great BritainBritish emigration to America, i. 23 _et seq_, 35; effect of American political ideals on, 23, 24, 25, 26British Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. 116-7, 118; application of, in American crisis, question in Commons, i. 94; Russell's idea of amending, ii. 124, 196; Russell's advice to Palmerston on, 131; debate in Parliament on, 132, 133-4, 135; Forster and the violation of, 133; Government reply to Liverpool shipowners on, 142; _Kearsarge_ incident, 202British Press. _See under names of Papers and under subject headings__British Standard_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]British travellers' views on America, i. 23 _and note_, 24, 28, 30; ii. 274-5Brooks, i. 80Brougham, i. 94 _note_[2]; ii. 282Brougham, Lord, i. 19Brown, John, raid of, i. 33 _note_[2]Browning, Robert, pro-Northern sentiment of, i. 70; on stone-boat blockade, 256; on Slavery a factor in the struggle, 238-9; on British dismay at prospect of war in _Trent_ crisis, 240; mentioned, 228 _note_[4]Bruce, --, British Ambassador in Washington, ii. 255 _note_[4]; report of American intentions against France in Mexico, 255 _note_[4]; comment of, on Lincoln, Seward and Sumner, 262; warns Russell of probable American demands at end of war, 266, 268; attitude to "piracy" proclamation, 268. Otherwise mentioned, ii. 262, 269. Brunow, Baron de, Russian Ambassador: on British policy, i. 50-1, 74; interpretation of Russell's "three months" statement, 272 _note_[1]; report of, on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45 _note_[3]; interview of, with Russell on joint mediation offer, 73 _note_[1]Bryce, Lord, i. 30; ii. 188 _note_[3], 274Buchanan, President, i. 16, 49, 52, 117, 259; ii. 278Buckingham, James Silk, _America, Historical, Statistic and Descriptive_, cited, i. 29Buckley, Victor, ii. 120 _note_[2]Bull Run, Northern defeat at, i. 135, 154, 176, 201; as affecting Seward's policy, considered, 154, 155-6; effect of, in Great Britain: press views, 176, 177-8, 179; official views, 178, 179 _and note_[1]; public opinion, 201Bullock, Captain J. D. , Confederate Agent in Britain, ii. 118, 129, 145; on the proposed use of the Laird rams, 122 _note_[1], 143; shipbuilding contracts of, ii. 156, 157; _Secret Service under the Confederacy_, cited, ii. 118, 149 _note_Bunch, --, British Consul at Charleston, description of Jockey Club dinner, i. 43; on Southern anti-British sentiment, 44 _note_[2], ii. 71 _note_[2]; instructions to, on the secession, i. 53 _note_[1]; appeal of, to Judge Black on seizure of Federal customs house, 52; characterizations of Southern leaders, 59; view of President Davis, 59; views on the South and secession, 59, 93; characterizations of Southern Commissioners, 63; negotiations of, with the Confederates on Declaration of Paris, 168 _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 193; attitude of, to the South, 185 _and note_[4], 103, 195 _note_[2]; American complaints of, 187, 189, 193-4; recall of exequatur of, 184, 187 _et seq_. , 193, 194-5, 201; defence of his action in the Mure case, 187, 188, 192, 199; subsequent history of, 195 _note_[2]; view of, as scapegoat, 195 _note_[2]; on attitude to the Blockade, 252 _note_[2], 253 _note_[2], 268; on Southern intentions, 252 _note_[2]; view of Southern determination, 252 _note_[2]; on Southern views of England's necessity for cotton, 63, 252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5; on effect of the blockade on Southern cotton industry, 9 _note_[2]; on burning of Mississippi cotton, 16 _note_[1], 17 _note_[4]; on the American system of government as the cause of the Civil War, 278 _note_[2] British attitude to the controversy over, i. 188-9, 190, 191, 194; French attitude, i. 189, 191 _and_ _note_[4], 192, 201 _note_ Lyons' views on Bunch controversy, i. 187, 193, 194 _and note_[1] Russell's views, i. 187, 190, 193, 194 _and note_[4] Otherwise mentioned, i. 66; ii. 88Burnley, British Ambassador, report of, on prospective war with America, ii. 254Butler, General, order to Federal soldiers in New Orleans, i. 302-4, 305; ii. 68; Palmerston and Adams controversy on, i. 302-5; Lord Russell's advice to Palmerston, 303, 304

Cairnes, Professor, ii. 224 _note_[3]; pamphlet by, on "Slave Power, " 112_Caledonian Mercury_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_California, acquisition of, by U. S. , i. 15, 16Callahan, --, _Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_, cited, i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 167 _notes_, 169 _note_[4]Campbell, Lord, i. 271, 292; ii, 28, 77, 169, 172, 193Canada: Rebellion of 1837 in, i. 4, 109; ii. 117; British fear of American attack on, i. 4; sentiment in, as affected by the American Wars against England, 8 _note_; suggestions of annexation to Northern States of the U. S. , 54-5; "compensation" in, idea in British press, 54-5; and in views of American political leaders, 55; Gladstone's idea regarding, ii. 69-70; military defence of, in _Trent_ crisis, i. 213, 241-2; views in, on _Trent_ affair, 222 _note_; on British policy and defence, 222 _note_; view of the _Times_ in, 222 _note_ Free Trade policy and, a Southern premonition as to, i. 22 Reciprocity Treaty of, with U. S. , ii. 198, 253-4 Otherwise mentioned, ii. 251, 254, 275Canning, i. II, 12, 20Cardwell, ii. 64Carolina, North, joins Confederate States, i. 172Carolina, South, secession of, i. 41, 43-44, 55; ii. 3-4; seizes Federal customs at Charleston, i. 52; requests Federal relinquishment of Fort Sumter, 117"Caroline" affair, The, i. 109Case, Walter M. , _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_, cited and quoted, i. 261 _note_; ii. 161 _and note_[3]Catacazy, C. , and mediation by Russia, ii. 251 _note_[1]Cecil, Lord Eustace, ii. 187, 189, 193Cecil, Lord Robert, supports Gregory's motion on blockade, i. 268; supports Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 175-6; on Committee of Southern Independence Association, 187, 193Charleston, S. C. : Sentiment to Great Britain in, i. 43, 44 _note_; seizure of customs house at, 52; British appeal on question of port dues at, 52, 244; "Stone Boat" blockade of harbour at, 253; evacuation of, ii. 248, 249Charleston _Mercury_, "King Cotton" theory of, ii. 5Chase, Secretary of Treasury, i. 115, 121; ii. 72, 283; quarrel with Seward, 72Chase, W. H. (of Florida), quoted, ii. 4Chattanooga, ii. 185Cheever, Rev. Dr. , ii. 224Chenery, ii. 301Chesney, Captain, cited, ii. 165Chesson, F. W. , ii. 224Chicago Convention, the, i. 175Chicago abolitionists, Lincoln and, ii. 49 _note_[3]Chicamauga, Rosencrans defeated at, ii. 184Chittenden, cited, ii. 130 _note_[2]Christian IX, of Denmark, ii. 203Clanricarde, Lord, ii. 168Clarendon, Earl of, i. 199 _note_[3], 215; ii. 3, 51-8 _passim_, 63, 203 _note_[2]; on Russell's mediation project and Lewis' Hereford speech, quoted, 57-8Clayton-Bulwer Treaty: Seward's attack on British interpretation of, i. 113Cobden, i. 77; quoted, on the _Times_, 222 _note_; opinion of Seward, 222 _note_; and Sumner, 222 _note_; on Palmerston's action in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[3]; letter to Sumner read at American Cabinet meeting, 232 Otherwise mentioned, i. 289; ii. 26, 67, 80, 95 _and note_[4], 166, 276Collie, ii. 189Collier, legal advice of, on _Alabama_, ii. 118-9Columbia District, freeing of slaves in, ii. 83Columbia, S. C. , burning of, ii. 248, 249Combe, George, _Notes on the United States, etc. _, cited, i. 29Confederate Commissioners to Europe, the: Bunch's characterization of, i. 63; unofficial interview with Russell, 85-6, 106, 158; protest against closing of British ports, 170 _note_[2]; replaced by "Special Commissioners, " 203; attempt to make use of the _Trent_ affair, 214; British attitude to, not modified by _Trent_ affair, 235; policy of, with regard to recognition and the blockade, i. 264-5, 267, 273, 300; acquire a "confidential" document, 265 _and note_[2]; hopes of, from Parliament, 265, 266, 272; instructions of the first Commissioners, ii. 4 _and note_[3]; failure of the first Commission, 4-5; suggest a treaty on African Slave Trade, 88 _note_[2]; slavery abolition offer, 249 Confederate Agents' correspondence, collections of, i. 261 _note_[1] _See also under personal names_Confederates, _See under_ Southern StatesConfiscation Bill, The, ii. 82, 84, 85, 86, 92, 95; Lincoln's attitude to, 82, 84; Lord Russell's comment on, 97_Constitutionel_, The, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2]Continental Press and American News, ii. 71 _note_[2]Corcoran, ii. 169Cotton supplies and slavery, i. 13; in British-American commercial relations, 21, 22; British manufacturers' dependence on, 22; effect of the Civil War on, 55, 246; ii. 53; the crop of 1860 . . . Ii. 7 Blockade, The, and, i. 252 _and note_[2], 253; ii. 9; effect of, on price, i. 262, 270; Napoleon's views on, 290 England, need of, for, i. 196-7, 200 _note_[1], 294, 296; ii. 17, 99; cotton famine in, 294; ii. 6, II _et seq. _, 16 _note_[1]; cotton manufacturing industry of, in 1860-1, ii. 6-7, 8; first effects of the war on, 8, 9, 10. _See also under_ Lancashire. France, necessity of, for cotton, i. 279, 290, 293, 294, 296, 300; ii. 17; Mercier's plan to relieve, i. 196-201 Gladstone's Newcastle speech, effect of, on price of, ii. 48; "King Cotton" theory, i. 63; ii. I _et seq. _; belief of the South in cotton as a weapon of diplomacy, 2-3, 4, 5 Southern orders for destruction of, ii. 16, 17 _note_[4]; effect of, on British officials, 17Cowley, Lord, British Ambassador in Paris, i. 88; reports French agreement with British policy on Southern belligerent rights, 88; in the Declaration of Paris negotiations, 88, 143, 156, 157, 158, 162, 167; conversations with Thouvenel in Bunch affair, 189; disturbed at French evasion of direct support, 189, 192, 201 _note_[1]; in _Trent_ affair fears war with America, 214; communications on Southern Ports Bill, 247 _and note_[2]; view of French attitude on Southern Ports Bill, 247; on French policy in Mexico, 260, 261 _note_; ii. 46; quoted, on Thouvenel's view on mediation in Feb. , 1862 . . . I. 266 _note_[1]; on Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 288; statement of, to Lindsay, after interview with Napoleon, 290; on the possibility of reunion, 290; on the blockade, 290-1; denial of Napoleon's "offer" to England, 290, 291; reports of, on Lindsay's mission, 291-2, 293, 295 _note_[1]; conversations with Thouvenel on Lindsay, 291, 293-4; Napoleon's letter to, on Lindsay, quoted, 295 _note_[2]; interview with Thouvenel on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 38, 39 _and note_, 46; on Napoleon's suggestion of joint mediation, 59; instructed to notify France of England's view of the war as ended and of attitude to Confederate cruisers, 266-7 Otherwise mentioned, i. 218 _note_Crawford, Consul-General at Havana, ii. 148Crimean War: Anglo-French agreement regarding neutral commerce, i. 139Crittenden, i. 49

_Daily Gazette_, The, cited, ii. 109 _note__Daily News_, attitude of, during the American Civil War, i. 69-70 _and note_ 1, 176, 181-2; ii. 230 _note_[3], on Lincoln's message to Congress, i. 176; letters of W. W. Story in, 228_Daily Telegraph_, cited, ii. 50 _note_[1], attitude and circulation of, 189 _note_[2], 226, 230 _note_[3]Dallas, American Minister to Great Britain, i. 62; lack of instructions on American intentions, 62, 108, 112; communications with Lord Russell, 62, 66, 74; despatches to Seward on Russell's intentions, 66-7; Russell's pledge of delay to, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108; report on proposed British joint action with France, 84-5, 86 Otherwise mentioned, i. 74, 96, 156 _note_[1]Dana, R. H. , cited, i. 218; _The Trent Affair_, cited, 203 _note_, 205 _note_[2], 237 _note_Danish question, The, ii. 203-5, 214Darwin, Charles, quoted, i. 180 _and note_[4]Davis, Bancroft, _Times_ correspondent in New York, i. 56Davis, Jefferson, personal characteristics of, i. 59, 81, 82: ii. 276; attitude of, in the opening of the crisis, i. 49; elected President of the Southern Government, 59, 81; foreign policy of, 81-2; aristocratic views of, on government, ii. 276; proclamation of, on marque and privateering, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, 121, 122, 141, 160; defensive measures of, in the South, 172; on Bunch's negotiations on Declaration of Paris, 186; replaces Confederate agents to Europe, 203; and the African Slave Trade, ii. 88 _note_[2]; proclamation of retaliation against Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, 106 _and note_[4]; on England's conduct towards the South, 184; on Southern disorganization, 219; flight of, from Richmond, 248; approves plan of offering abolition of slavery in return for recognition, 249; capture of, 267 British views on, ii. 276 Bunch's characterization of, i. 59, 185 _note_[4] Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, ii. 47 Otherwise mentioned, i. 163 _note_[1], 185 _note_[4], 254, 265 _note_[2], 283; ii. 5, 6, 176 _note_[3], 251, 252, 285Dayton, American Minister at Paris, i. 129, 142, 143, 145, 150, 151, 163, 165, 167 _note_[3], 168, 200, 231, 300de Brunow, Russian Ambassador. _See under_ Brunowde Flahault, French Ambassador. _See under _Flahault_Debats_: French press views on military situation, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3]_De Bow's Review_, eulogies of the South in, quoted, ii. 2, 3, 4; on cotton and slavery, 3; view of England's action on blockade, 4Declaration of Paris, The, i. 102, 139-40; attitude of United States to, 140-1, 156; American offer of adherence during the Civil War, 104, 137, 141-2, 150, 151Declaration of Paris Negotiation, The, i. 137 _et seq. _, 184, 201; British suggestion to France in, i. 88, 91, 142, 146-7, 156, 157 _and note_[3]; American offer of adherence, 104, 137, 141-2, 150, 151; convention agreed between Britain, France, and America, 142-3; addition of a declaration in support of British neutrality proposed by Lord Russell, 143-6, 149, 151, 154, 68, 170, 201; American rejection of convention, 145, 168, 201 American argument at Geneva on effect of British diplomacy in, i. 146 _note_[2] Confederates: approach of, in the negotiation, i. 161, 164, 165, 166, 168 _note_[4], 184-6, 188, 192, 193; Confederate Congress resolution of approval in, 186 Convention, the, proposed by U. S. Cowley's opinion on, i. 167 _and note_[3]; Thouvenel's opinion on, 167; Palmerston's suggestion on, 167 _and note_[4] Seward's motives in, _See under_ SewardDelane, editor of the _Times:_ Palmerston's letters to, on American rights in interception of Confederate Commissioners, i. 207-8, 209; close relations of, with Palmerston, 229 _note_[2]; ii. 145; anticipations of Southern victory, ii. 204 _and note_[2]; on prospective war with America, 254; effect of Sherman's arrival at Savannah on, 245 _and note_[2], 300-1 Otherwise mentioned, i. 177, 178, 180; ii. 65, 289de Lhuys, M. Drouyn, French Premier, ii. 59 _and note_[4], 60, 63 _note_[5], 168Democratic element in British Society: lack of press representation, i. 24, 41Democracy: British views on American institutions, i. 24, 28, 30, 31; ii. 274-5; view of the American struggle as a failure of, 276 _et seq. Passim;_ Press comments on the lesson from failure of American democratic institutions, 279, 280, 281, 285, 286, 297; bearing of the Civil War on, 299; aristocratic and conservative attitude to, 286, 287, 297, 298, 300, 301; rise of democratic feeling in Great Britain, 291; effect of the Reform Bill of 1867, 304Derby, Lord (Leader of the Opposition), i. 76, 77, 79, 94 _and note_[2], 240, 241; attitude to recognition and mediation, i. 240; ii. 51, 52, 53, 54, 77; attacks governmental policy in relation to Laird Rams and Southern shipbuilding, 149-50, 197; approves attitude to Napoleon's mediation proposals, 154-5; speech in motion for address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, 263; attacks Government on American "piracy proclamation" at end of the war, 267-8; attitude to expansion of the franchise, i. 77; ii. 276, 303 _and note_[1] Otherwise mentioned, i. 292, 295; ii. 51 _note_[2], 166, 210, 214_Dial_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]Disraeli, Benjamin (Tory leader in the Commons), i. 79; on _Trent_ affair, 241; connection with Lindsay's motion, 292, 295, 296, 306; ii. 213 _and note_[1]; approval of neutrality, ii. 77, 174 _note_[1]; in Roebuck's motion, 153, 171, 174; attitude to stoppage of Southern shipbuilding, 197; speech, of, on the motion for the Address to the Crown on Lincoln's assassination, 263-4; Reform Bill of (1867) . . . 3 03 _and note_[1] Mentioned, ii. 270 _note_[3]Donoughmore, Earl of, ii. 204 _and note_[2]; reply to Mason, 250-1D'Oubril, ii. 59 _note_[4], 62 _note_[5]Doyle, Percy, i. 218 _note_[1]_Dublin News_, quoted, i. 45, 46 _note_[1]_Dubuque Sun_, The, ii. 22 _note_Dudley, U. S. Consul at Liverpool, ii. 118, 130 _note_[2], 144, 145 _note_[2]Dufferin, Lord, i. 240Duffus, R. L. , "Contemporary English Popular Opinion on the American Civil War, " i. 41 _note_[1]; quoted, 41, 48; cited, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 112 _note_[1]Dumfermline, Lady, i. 224 _note_[3]Dumping of British goods: effect on American feeling, i. 19, 21

_Economist_, The: attitude in the struggle, i. 41, 54, 57, 173-4; ii. 15, 173, 231 _note_; cited or quoted: on Lincoln's election, i. 39 _and note_[1]; on impossibility of Northern reconquest, 57; on secession an accomplished fact, 174; ii. 79; on Bull Run, i. 179; on cotton shortage, i. 55; ii. 14, 15; on servile insurrection, 79; on Cotton Loan, 160, 162; on Roebuck's motion, 173; on extension of the franchise, 277; on American institutions and statesmen, 279-80_Edinburgh Review_, The: attitude to slavery, i. 33, 45; ii. 281; attitude in the conflict, i. 42; ii. 50 _note_[2], 68; on recognition, 46 _note_[3]; on the Emancipation Proclamation, 103; on the causes of the war, 281Elliot, chargé, i. 14Elliott, E. N. , editor of _Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments_, ii. 3 _note_[2]Emancipation, Proclamation of: ii. 74, 78, 80, 86 _and note_[1], 91; idea of military necessity for, 81, 82, 85, 87; Lincoln's alleged purpose in, 87; purpose of, according to Seward, 99-100; viewed as an incitement to servile insurrection, 49, 74, 98, 101, 103 _note_[6] American reception of, ii. 101, 105 British attitude to, ii. 101 _et seq. _; Press denunciation of, 102-5, 106; public meetings in favour of, 106 _and note_[2], 107, 108; English women's support of, 109; Nonconformist support, 109, 110; Emancipation societies support of, 110 Confiscation Bill, _See that heading_ _See also_ Border States _and sub-heading under_ LincolnEmigration, British, to America, i. 23-4; ii. 200-1; _Kearsarge_ incident, 200-1England: cotton famine. _See under_ Cotton. _See_ Great BritainErlanger & Co. And Confederate Cotton Loan, ii. 158-60, 161, 162 _and note_[3]European opinion of the Civil War after duration of three years, ii. 219Eustis, i. 204, 234 _note_[2]Evans, William, ii. 224Everett, Edward, Russell's letter to, on Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 166 _note_[3]Ewart, question by, in the House of Commons, on Privateers, i. 90Expatriation, American and British views on, i. 16

Fairfax, Lieut. , of the _San Jacinto_, i. 205Farnall's "Reports on Distress in the Manufacturing Districts, " ii. 12 _note_, 20Fawcett, Prof. , ii. 224 _note_[3]Featherstonaugh, G. W. , _Excursion through the Slave States_, cited, i. 29Federals. _See under _NorthernFerguson, Sir James, i. 268; ii. 175Ferrand, attack by, on cotton manufacturers in the Commons, ii. 164_Fishmongers of London_: Meeting in honour of Yancey, ii. 223 _note_[1]Fitzgerald, Seymour, i. 306; ii. 25Fitzwilliam, Hon. C. , ii. 193Flahault, M. De, French Ambassador, i. 88, 197, 260 _note_[1], 288, 291, 293; ii. 19 _note_[3], 45Forbes, J. M. , and Aspinwall, Mission of, in England, ii. 130 _note_[2], 297Forbes, J. M. , quoted on the Civil War viewed as a fight for Democracy, ii. 297Forster, William E. , i. 58 _and note_[2]; a friend of the North, 58 _note_[2]; ii. 224; quoted, on Harriet Martineau, i. 70 _note_[3]; question in Commons on privateering, 94, 157; speech against Gregory's motion on blockade, 268, 270; speech on mediation and intervention in debate on Lindsay's motion, ii. 22; close touch with Adams, 22, 36; attacks Government in debate on Southern shipbuilding, 133; rebuked by Palmerston, 135; in Roebuck's motion, 171-2, 175; comment on Southern meetings, 190 _and note_[2]Fort Donelson, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note_[1], 274Fort Henry, Confederate reverse at, i. 272, 273 _note[1]_, 274Fox, G. V. : _Confidential Correspondence_, cited, i. 257 _note_[3], 268 _note_[2]; ii. 120 _note_[3]; quoted, on Confederate ironclads in England, 130 _note_[2]France: Naval right of search exercised by, i. 6; and American contentions on neutral rights, 18; Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2] Cotton: lack of, i. 279, 290, 293-4, 296, 300; ii. 17 Mediation and armistice, attitude to British unofficial overture on, ii. 38-9, 45-6, 59-60 Ministerial crisis, ii. 39, 45, 59 Neutrality of, i. 299; Northern sentiment on, ii. 225 _and note_[2] Policy in the Civil War: joint action of, with Great Britain, i. 84, 88, 156, 166 _note_[1], 196, 249-50, 252, 259, 260, 284, 294; ii. 28, 75, 198; break in, 77 Press of, and the events in U. S. , ii. 174 _note_[3], 236 _note_[2] _See also under _Mercier, Napoleon, Thouvenel, _and under subject-headings__Fraser's Magazine_, ii. 284; J. S. Mill's articles in, i. 240, 242; ii. 81, 90, 285Fraser, Trenholm & Company: Confederate financial agents in Liverpool, ii. 156, 157Frederick VII of Denmark: and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203Free Trade, i. 21; ii. 304Freeman, E. A. , _History of Federal Government_, cited, ii. 152-3Fremont, ii. 82

Gallenga, ----, _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 189Gait, Sir J. T. , i. 221 _note_[1]; 222 _note_Galveston, Tex. I. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 266, 268Garrison, W. L. , American abolitionist, editor of the _Liberator_, i. 31, 33, 46 _and note_[1]Garrison, _Garrison_, cited, ii. 91 _note_[1], 111 _note_[3]Gasparin, Count, cited, ii. 92 _notes_Geneva Arbitration Court: American complaint of British Neutrality, in, i. 138; American argument before, on Declaration of Paris, 146 _note_[2]German opinion on the Civil War, i. 178 _note_[3]; ii. 111 _note_[2]; press attitude, 285 _note_[1]Germany: the _Index_ quoted on "aid given by, to the North, " ii. 236 _note_[2]Gettysburg, Battle of, ii. 143, 176 _note_[2], 185, 296Gladstone, Thomas, letters of, to the _Times_, i. 32, 33 _The Englishman in Kansas_, i. 32 _note_Gladstone, W. E. , i. 76, 78; fear of war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215; influence of the commercial situation on, ii. 26; attitude to intervention, 26, 27, 30-1, 48, 57; Newcastle speech, 47 _and note_[3], 48, 49, 50 _and note_[1], 51 _and notes_, 55, 58; memorandum in reply to Lewis, 57; supports Napoleon's suggestion on armistice and blockade, ii. 64, 69; account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's suggestion, 65 _and note_[1]; idea of offering Canada to the North, 69, 70 _and note_[1]; and the Confederate Cotton Loan, 163 _note_[2]; reply of, in Roebuck's motion, 170-1; quoted, on the American dispute as a blow to democracy, 282-3 Otherwise mentioned, i. 179, 200 _note_[1], 224, 266; ii. 59, 66, 77, 80Goddard, S. A. , ii. 108 _Letters on the American Rebellion_, cited, ii. 108 _note_[3], 109 _note_[1]Godkin, E. L. , _Daily News_ correspondent, i. 70 _and note_[2]Golder, Dr. F. A. , cited, i. 53 _note_[3]. "The Russian Fleet and the Civil War, " cited, i. 227 _note_[1]; ii. 129 _note_[1]Goodenough, Captain, report of, on American readiness for foreign war, ii. 199 _note_[3]Gorgas, Col. , ii. 5 _note_[1]Gortchakoff, comment of, on Russell's mediation plan, ii. 45 _note_[2]; and idea of Russian mediation, 251 _note_[1]; mentioned, i. 164 _note_[1]; ii. 59 _note_[4], 66 _note_[2], 70 _note_[2]Grant, General, capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by, i. 273 _note_[1], 274; victory at Shiloh, 278; captures New Orleans, 279; Western campaign of, ii. 164, 166, 184-5; capture of Vicksburg by, 176 _note_[2], 185; advance to Richmond, 217, 219; siege of Southern lines at Petersburg, 217; capture of Petersburg and Richmond by, 247-8; _Times_ report of reverses to, 212, 227, 243; condition of his army, Southern account in _Times_, 227; W. H. Russell's comment on Grant's campaign, 232-3; Henry Adams, quoted, on, 243 Otherwise mentioned, ii. 215, 249, 256Grant's _The Newspaper Press_, cited and quoted, ii. 231 _note_Granville, Lord, i. 76, quoted, 199 _note_[3]; on difficulties in Washington and attitude of neutrality, 241; opposition of, to Russell's mediation plan, ii. 42 _and note_[2], 43, 44, 46; mentioned, i. 94 _note_[3]; ii. 203 _note_[2]Grattan, Thomas Colley, quoted, i. 36; _Civilized America_, i. 36 _note_[1]Great Britain: Citizenship, theory of, i. 5-6 Colonial system: trade basis of, i. 17, 20, 21 Commercial relations with America after independence, i. 17 _et seq_. , 22 Franchise, expansion of the, in, i. 26, 28; ii. 274, 276-7, 301, 302, 303, 304; effect of the American example on political agitation in, 274; connection of the American struggle with the franchise movement in, 276, 277, 278, 286; Radical acceptance of the challenge on democracy, 282, 283, 290, 298, 300; aristocratic and conservative attitude to democracy, 286, 287, 298, 300, 301 Policy toward America: conditions affecting, i. 2 _et seq_. 35; ii. 270; the right of search controversy, i. 6-10; territorial expansion 13-15, 16; extension of slavery, 13, 15; Mexican War, 15-16; commercial interests, 19-22; in the Civil War, 50-4, 58, 59, 79, 84, 136, 178, 199; ii. 270-2; influence of democracy in determining, ii. 303-5; policy of joint action with France. _see under_ France. _See also under_ Lyons, Russell, _and subject-headings. _ Public opinion and governmental policy of, in relation to America, i. 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30 Public opinion and official views in, at the opening of the Civil War, i. 40-60; doubts of Northern cause, 48, 50; attitude to recognition of the South, 53 _note_[1], on secession, 54, 55, 57 Trade: exclusive basis in, i. 17, 20, 21; effect of American retaliatory system on, 20; free trade theory, 21; ii. 304; hopes from cotton interests, i. 22 Working classes in: Northern sympathies of, ii. 284, 285 _note_[1] _See also subject-headings_Great Lakes: Armaments agreement, i. 4; ii. 253, 254Greeley, Horace, editor of _New York Times_, attack on Seward by, i. 280 _note_[1]; and Mercier's proposal of mediation, ii. 75; Lincoln's reply to, on emancipation, 92-3Gregg, Percy, ii. 154 _note_[1]Gregory (Liberal-Conservative, friend of the South), i. 90, 91 _note_[1], 267; motion of, for recognition of the South, 85, 91, 108; advice to Mason on blockade question, 267; motion to urge the blockade ineffective, 268-72; speech in Parliament on distress in Lancashire, ii. 21, 22 _and note_; quoted on attitude of Parliament to intervention and recognition, 155; view of Roebuck's motion, 175; question of, on the destruction of British property in America, 265; mentioned, i. 292; ii. 153, 164Greville, Charles, quoted, ii. 3Greville. Colonel, ii. 193 _note_Grey, Sir George, i. 163, 207; ii. 171, 263Grimes, Senator, on the purpose of the Privateering Bill, ii. 123-4Gros, Baron, ii. 167, 168-9, 170Grote, George, quoted, i. 1

Haliburton, T. C. , ii. 187, 193 _note_Hall, Capt. Basil, _Travels in North America_, cited, i. 26-7Hall, Rev. Newman, ii. 111, 224Hamilton, R. C. , "The English Press and the Civil War, " i. 38 _note_[2]Hamilton, Capt. Thomas, _Men and Manners in America_, quoted, i. 27Hammond, E. , Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, i. 189; enquiry as to possible action of American Navy to intercept Southern Commissioners, 206-7, 210, 211 _and note_[1]; on Foreign Enlistment Act, ii. 142; letter of, to Lyons, on seizure of Laird Rams, 147 _note_[4]; quoted, on public opinion and Napoleon's proposal of mediation, 66; mentioned, i. 256; ii. 45Hammond, Senator, of S. Carolina, quoted, ii. 2-3"Hampton Roads Conference, " The, ii. 252-3Harcourt, Sir William, quoted, on Lord Russell's statesmanship during the American Civil War, i. 1; letters of, in the _Times_ on questions of International Law, i. 222 _note_; ii. 63 _and note_[2]; _and see under_ "Historicus"Hardwicke, Earl, i. 94 _note_[2]Harris, T. L. , _The Trent Affair_, cited, i. 203 _note_, 205 _note_[1], 217 _note_[1], 227 _note_[1], 231 _note_[2]; ii. 282 _note_[2]; citations of anti-Americanism in _Times_, i. 217 _note_[1]Hawthorne, Julian, cited, i. 47Head, Sir Edmund, Governor of Canada, i. 129, 197 _note_[2]Hertslet, _Map of Europe by Treaty_, cited, i. 94 _note_[3]"Historicus, " Letters of, to the _Times_, cited and quoted, i. 222 _note_; ii. 63, 104, 138 _note_[1]Holmes, O. W. , i. 37 _note_Hood, General, ii. 236 _note_[2]Hope, A. J. Beresford, ii. 187, 189, 193 _note_, 281-2Hopwood, i. 305; ii. 11, 18, 21Horsfall, Mr. , ii. 153Horton, Wilmot, i. 23; Committee on Emigration to America, 23, 24Hotze, H. , Confederate agent, quoted on effect of _Trent_ affair, i. 243; descriptive account of his activities, ii. 154 _note_[1]; and the "foul blot" phrase, 240; and the Southern arming of negroes, 241; mentioned, ii. 68 _note_[1], 180 _note_[3], 213 Hotze Papers, The, ii. 154 _note_[1], 180 _note_[2], 185 _note_[1]Houghton, Lord, ii. 265-6, 267Hughes, Thomas, i. 181; ii. 224 _note_[3]Hunt, James, _The Negro's Place in Nature_, cited, ii. 222Hunt's Merchants Magazine, cited ii. 8 _note_[2], 14 _note_[1]Hunter, Confederate Secretary of State, i. 264Hunter, General, issues order freeing slaves, ii. 84Hunter, Mr. , editor of the _Herald, _ ii. 213 _and note_[1]Huse, Caleb, ii. 120 _note_[2], 159Huskisson, cited, i. 20Huxley's criticism of Hunt's _The Negro's Place in Nature_, ii. 222

Impressment by Britain: a cause of irritation to America, i. 6, 7, 8, 16_Index, The_, ii. , 33 _and note_[3]; agitation of, for recognition of the South and mediation, 33-4, 153-4; on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 51 _note_[3]; views of, on Lord Russell and his policy, 51 _note_[3], 55 _and note_[4], 68, 69, 165, 196, 197; on reply to French joint mediation offer, 68-9; on Laird Rams, 150 _note_[2]; quoted on Government attitude to the belligerents, 154, 164-5; connection with Hotze, 154 _note_[1]; and the fall of Vicksburg, 165, 178 _and note_[1]; on French press and policy of France, 174 _note_[3], 180; reports of, on Southern meetings and associations, 188, 190 _and notes_, 194 _and note_[2], 195, 239 _and note_[4], 240; comments on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 215-6; criticism of Palmerston's reply to deputation on mediation, 216; view of mediation, 217; defence of slavery in the South, 220-2, 240-1; criticism of the _Times_, 228; quotations from the French press on the war, 236 _note_[2]; and the Presidential election, 236 _note_[2]; on Germany's aid to the North, 236 _note_[2]; on reception of Northern deputations by Adams, 245 _note_[1]; on characteristics of Southern leaders and society, 287; view of Northern democracy, 287; denunciation of the Manchester School 298-9; cited, ii. 181 _note_[2], 186, 190 _note_[3], 199 _note_[4], 232, 241 _note_[1], 242; quoted, 192, 193 _note_[1]Ionian Islands, control of, i. 79Ireland: Irish emigration to America, i. 29; ii. 200, 201; enlistments in, for Northern forces, 200, 201; the _Kearsarge_ incident, 201-2; petitions circulated in, in support of the North, 240Italy, disturbances in, ii. 29

Jackson, Stonewall, exploits of, in Virginia: effect of, on Russell and Palmerston, ii. 38Jackson, W. A. , ii. 191James, _William Wetmore Story and his Friends_, quoted, i. 228 _and note_[4]; cited, 256 _note_[4]_James Adger_, The, American war-ship, i. 208, 209, 210, 211 _note_[1]Jameson, Professor J. F. , ii. 154 _note_[1]Japan: Seward's suggestion of a naval demonstration against, i. 126 _note_[1]Jefferson, President, i. 7, 11, 18Jewett, J. P. , quoted, ii. 111 _note_[3]_John Bull_, ii. 231 _note_; quoted, on slavery not an issue, i. 179; Bull Run, a blow to democracy, i. 179-80Johnston, General: campaign against Sherman, ii. 248, 274Jones, Mason, pro-Northern speaker, ii. 193-4. 195. 224Juarez (Mexican leader), ii. 198"Justicia, " letters of, in the _Times_, i. 217

Kansas border struggles, i. 32_Kearsarge_ incident, The, ii. 201-2Kelly, William, _Across the Rocky Mountains, etc. _, cited and quoted, ii. 275 _note_[3]Kennedy, William, _Texas, etc. _, cited, i. 29Kenner, Duncan F. , Confederate Commissioner, ii. 249-50Kentucky, effect of "border state policy" on, i. 173Kinglake, views of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. 175

_La France_, cited, ii. 236 _note_[2]Laird Brothers: builders of the _Alabama_ and _Laird Rams_, ii. 120, 121-2, 129; prosecution of, demanded, 136; officially ordered not to send Rams on trial trip, 146, 149; Government's correspondence with, 146 _and note_[2], 149-50Laird, speech of, in reply to Bright's attack on the Government, ii. 134Laird Rams, the, ii. 121-2, 123, 124, 137, 140 _et seq. _, 196; description and purpose of, 122 _and_ _note_[1]; British Government position, 133, 134; rumours regarding, 142-3; seizure of, 145-50, 179-80, 182; suit for damages, 151 _note_[1]; British Government purchase of, 151 _note_[1]; U. S. Navy plan to purchase, 130 _note_[2]; usual historical treatment of the incident, 141, 147 _and note_[1]Lamar, Confederate representative: account of Roebuck and Bright, ii. 172 _note_[2]Lancashire: Cotton trade, distress in, ii. 6, 11 _et seq. _, 21, 26, 29, 31, 240; attitude in, to Government policy, 10, 11, 13-15; attitude of the "Cotton Lords" to, 10, 16; Farnall report on, 12, 20; Northern sympathies of cotton operatives, 13, 285 _note_[1] Cotton factories, statistics, ii 6 Cotton manufacturers, attack on in Commons, ii. 163-4_Lane, Franklin K. , Letters of_, cited ii. 129 _note_[1]Layard, reply of, on Roebuck's motion, ii. 171, 173; on destruction of British property in America, 265_Le Sičcle_, cited, ii. 174 _note_[3], 236 _note_[2]Lee, General, turns back McClellan's advance on Richmond, ii. 1; defeated at Antietam, 43, 85; retreat of, through Shenandoah valley, 43; advance in Pennsylvania, 163 _note_[1], 164, 176; defeats Hooker at Chancellorsville, 164; retreat from Gettysburg, 163 _note_[1], 178, 179, 297; defence of Richmond, 185, 217, 247, 248; surrender, 248, 255, 256-7, 265, 301, 303 _Times_, quoted or cited, on his campaign, ii. 227, 256, 296Lees, Mr. , ii, 220Lempriere, Dr. , i. 180; ii. 191Lewis, Sir George Cornewall, i. 76, 78 _and note_, 94; ii. 52; views of, on the Civil War, ii. 50 _and note_[2], 51; article on "The Election of President Lincoln and its Consequences, " i. 78 _note_; fears war with America in _Trent_ affair, 215, 226; objections of, to mediation, ii. 44-6; Hereford speech of, in reply to Gladstone, 50 _and note_[1], 51, 55, 58; view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 52; action of, on Russell's proposed intervention, 52 _et seq_. , 73-4; memorandum of, on British policy in opposition to Russell, 62-3; account of Cabinet discussion on Napoleon's armistice suggestion, 63-5; Hereford speech, effect on Adams, ii. 55; Palmerston's views on Lewis' attitude to recognition, 56; Russell's reply to Lewis, 56, 57_Liberator, The_, Garrison's abolition organ, i. 31, 33 _and note_[3]; 46 _and note_[1], 47; cited or quoted, 70 _note_[1]; ii. 106 _note_[2], 107, 109 _note_[2]; III _note_[3], 130, 184 _note_[3], 189 _note_[2], 191 _note_[2], 194, 223 _and note_[2], 224 _note_[2], 237 _note_[1], 239 _notes_, 240 _note_[2], 289Liebknecht, W. , ii. 301 _note_[3]Lincoln, President, i. 115 Characteristics of, i. 115, 119, 120, 127-8; influence of, in Britain, ii. 276 Election and inauguration, i. 36, 38, 39, 48, 51, 64, 82, 110, 115; inaugural address, 38, 50, 71, 175; personal view of terms of election, 49; popular views on 79, 114, 115 Decision to reinforce Fort Sumter, i. 117, 118, 119, 120; and defend Federal forts, 118; attitude to Seward's foreign war policy, 119-20, 136; reply to Seward's "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, " 119-20, 124; modifies Despatch No. 10, 126-7; attitude to Schleiden's Richmond visit, 121 122; emergency measures of, 172, 173 _Policy and views of, on:_-- Blockade proclamation, i. 83, 110, 111, 244. _See heading_ Blockade Border State policy of, i. 173, 176, 272 _note_[1]; ii. 82 Confiscation Bill, attitude to, ii. 82, 84 Emancipation Proclamation of, _See that heading_ Hampton Roads, Conference at, ii. 252-3 Intervention, on, ii. 36 Piracy proclamation, i. 83, 111, 160 Servile insurrection, ii. 83 Slavery: inaugural address on, i. 38. 50, 71, 175; view of the terms of his election regarding, 49; denial of emancipation as an issue, 239; ii. 88; reply to Chicago abolitionists on, ii. 49 _note_[3]; declarations on, 78; conversations with Sumner on, 82; attitude to emancipation, 82, 83-4, 96; and anti-slavery sentiment, 83; denial of, as a cause of the war, 88; reply to Schurz on emancipation, 72; reply to Greeley, 93, 94; orders of, as to liberated slaves, 100 _Trent_ affair; attitude to release of envoys, i. 231 _and note_[2], British view of, in, i. 225, 226, 230 Union, the: efforts to preserve, i. 49, 121; efforts to restore, ii. 82, 83, 93-5; reply to Greeley on, 92-3 Attitude of, to England, i. 301; curtails authority of General Butler, 305; settles quarrel between Seward and Chase; ii. 72; letter to Manchester supporters of the North, 109; drafts resolution for use in British public meetings on slavery, 113; British addresses to, 288, 290-1 Re-election, ii. 226, 234, 235, 238; expectations of his defeat, 226, 231; British Press views on, 234-5, 238; _Punch_ cartoon, 239 _and note_[1]; complaints of his despotism and inefficiency in press, ii. 176, 232; his terms to the South, 251, 252 Assassination of, ii. 257-8, 265; political effect of, in Britain, 301, and in Germany, 301 _note_[3]; British sympathy, 259-64 Appreciations of, ii. 258-61 British opinion of, during the War, ii. 239 _note_[1] Bright's confidence in, ii. 255 _and note_[1] Lyons' view on, i. 51; ii. 258-9 Press views, i. 38-9; ii. 102-5 _passim_ Schleiden's view of, i. 116 Influence of Bright's letters on, i. 232; pardons Rubery in honour of Bright, ii. 225 _and note_[1] Otherwise mentioned, i. 59, 81, 149, 223; ii. 39, 68, 91, 109 _note_[2], 126, 225, 251, 278, 281, 297Lindsay, William Schaw: descriptive account of, i. 267, 289; on the blockade and French attitude to intervention, 267; project of mediation of, 279; account of interview with Napoleon III, 289-90; interview with Cowley, 290-1; second interview with Napoleon, 291; effect of interviews on Confederate Commissioners, 292; refused an interview by Russell and Palmerston, 294-5, 296; third interview with Napoleon, 295; interview with Disraeli, 295, 296; proposed motion in Parliament, 301-2, 305-6, 307; account of a letter to Russell in explanation of his proposed motion, 305 _and note_[5]; introduces motion in Parliament on mediation, ii. 18, 20, 21-23; withdrawal of, 23, 34; with Roebuck interviews Napoleon on recognition, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 173, 174-5, 177; suggestion by, on Confederate finance, 156; proposes a further recognition motion, 178 _note_[1]; connection with Southern Independence Association, 193, 195, 204, 205, 206, 211; hopes of, from attack on Government policy in detaining Southern vessels, 185, 195, 196; hopes from Napoleon and from Southern victory, 204; fresh agitation for mediation and recognition, 205-6, 209, 210; interviews Palmerston, 206-7, 209; urges Mason to interview Palmerston, 207, 208, 209; interview with Lord Russell 209-10, 212-13; use of the Danish question, 206, 210; hopes from Disraeli, 213; postponement of his motion, 214, 215, 218 Friendship with John Bright, ii. 172 _note_[1]; otherwise mentioned, i. 197, 268; ii. 25, 181Lindsay & Co. , ii. 157Liverpool: change of feeling in, over the _Alabama_, ii. 129-30_Liverpool Post_, The, cited on the Emancipation Proclamation, ii. 103Liverpool Shipowners' Association, urges remonstrance on closing of Charleston Harbour by "Stone Boats, " i. 256_London Chronicle_, The, quoted, i. 46London Confederate States Aid Association, ii. 191, 192 _and note_[2], 195London Emancipation Society, ii. 91, 110; distinguished members of, 91 _note_[1]_London Gazette_, The, i. 94_London Press_, The, quoted i. 54-5, 68_London Review_, The, cited, i. 46 _and note_[4]Longfellow, H. W. , i. 37 _note_, 55 _note_[2]Lothian, Marquis of, ii. 187, 193 _note_Lousada, letter to Lyons on _Trent_ affair, quoted, i. 220 _note_[2]Lowell, J. R. , i. 37 _note_, 236Lushington, Dr. , i. 207Lutz, Dr. Ralph H. , cited, i. 117 _note_; ii. 111 _note_[2]; 121 _note_[1] _Die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland_, etc. , cited, i. 117 _note_; ii. 285 _note_[1]Lyons, Lord, British Minister in Washington, i. 42, 51, 114; attitude in the American dispute, 51, 53, 88 _note_[2], 93 _and note_[3], 254; ii. 237 _note_[4]; on Southern clamour at Lincoln's election, i. 51; views on the personnel of the Northern Government, i. 59-60; view of Seward, 59, 60, 65, 114, 129; ii. 72; fears from Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-36 _passim_; efforts to prevent interruption of commerce with the South, i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244; views on the American controversy, 72, 73; advises joint action with France, 84; receives instructions on British policy, 87; and course of action if disavowed by America, i. 190; suspicion of French policy, 201 _and note_; survey of the situation after Shiloh, 278; farewell interview with Lincoln, 301; opinion of Adams, ii. 71 _note_[4]; views on Lincoln and Davis' proclamations, 106; friendliness of Seward to, 72, 141, 176 _note_[2]; report of improved relations on seizure of Laird Rams, 147, 182; report on "scare" at Lee's advance, 176 _note_[2]; view after Gettysburg, 176 _note_[2]; protests against Russell's motion to withdraw belligerent rights to the North, 182, 183; attitude to American public animosity towards Great Britain, 197, 198; on Seward's plan to collect import duties at Southern ports, 198; description of American readiness for foreign war, 183 _and note_[2], 199; on arrogance of American ministers, 199; advises quiet attitude towards the North, 226; view of Northern determination 226, 233; view of Lincoln's chances of re-election, 226, 233; on effect of the fall of Atlanta, 234; advice on Seward's demonstrations for electioneering purposes, 237; illness of, 233, 237; return to London, 237 _note_[4]; appreciation of diplomatic service of, 237 _note_[4] _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_: Belligerent rights to the South, i. 87; attitude to request for withdrawal, i. 274-5; ii. 198 Blockade, i. 64, 65, 66, 72, 73, 244-5; ii. 226; and legislative closing of Southern ports, i. 244, 246; communications with Seward on, 244, 245, 246, 250, 257; opinion on, 254 Southern Ports Bill, i. 246-50 _passim_ Bunch controversy, i. 184 _et seq. _; view on Bunch's conduct, 187; conferences with Seward in, 191-2, 193, 194 _and note_[1]; comment on Bunch's explanation, 192-3; attitude to American decision in, 193, 194 Cotton, i. 54 _note_[1], 64, 196-7; ii. 20 _and note_[3] Declaration of Paris negotiations: alarmed by Seward's attitude, i. 151, 163 _notes_; view of Seward's refusal to see the despatch, 153 _and note_[2]; communications with Confederates in, 161, 163 _notes_, 164, 165, 166, 168 _note_[4], 185, 188; view on the American proposal, 154, 162, 164 Emancipation, as an issue, i. 223 Emancipation proclamation, ii. 106, 113, 114 _and note_ Intervention, i. 197; ii. 26, 36; fears commercial influence on policy, 26; _See also_ Mediation _infra_ Irish emigrants: enlistment of, ii. 201 Mediation, i. 284, 286, 297, 298-9; ii. 23, 37 _note_[1], 70; summary of Mercier's plan of, i. 298-9; report on French isolated offer of, ii. 75-6; on Russian suggestion of, 76 Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 281 _et seq. Passim_; ii. 24 _note_[2]; comment on the result of, i. 286; effect of, on, 287; comment on newspaper report of, 287 Privateering Bill, ii. 125, 126, 127 Proclamation of Neutrality, presentation of, to Seward, i. 102, 103, 132, 133, 163 _note_[3], 164, 184 Recognition of the South, i. 65, 66, 73, 197, 198; ii. 70 Seward's foreign war policy, i. 60, 128-9, 130, 132, 133, 136; advice to Russell on, 128-9, 131; anxiety as to Canada, 128, 129, 131 Slave Trade Treaty, i. 276 Slavery, i. 52, 73, 93 _and note_[3]; account of changes in Northern feeling on, 223 Southern Commissioners, i. 65, 72 Southern shipbuilding, ii. 127, 139-141; on American War feeling over, 139-40 _Trent_ affair, i. 210, 211, 221; instructions in, 212-4; anxiety for Canada in, 221

 Otherwise mentioned, i. 43, 57, 59, 74, 242, 243; ii. 147 _note_[4], 170Lytton, Bulwer, on dissolution of the Union, cited, i. 182

McClellan, General: advance of, on Richmond, i. 276, 279, 297, 298, 301; ii. I, 33; defeat of, by Lee, 1, 18, 33; rumoured capture of, 20, 21 _note_; Adams' opinion on rumours, 20, 21 _note_; British newspaper reports of capture of, 20, 21 _note_; removal of, 30; defeats Lee at Antietam, 43, 85; fails to follow up his victory, 43, 105; as candidate in Presidential election, 234 _note_[2], 238McFarland, i. 204, 234 _note_[2]McHenry, George, _The Cotton Trade_, cited, ii. 6 _note_[2], 13 _note_[2], 185 _note_[2]Mackay, Alexander, _The Western World, _ cited and quoted, i. 30; ii. 274-5Mackay, Charles, i. 37 _and note_, 46 _note_[4]; as _Times_ correspondent in New York, ii. 176 _notes_; 189, 226 _Forty Years' Recollections_, cited, ii. 176 _note_[2] "John and Jonathan" poem, quoted, i. 37 _note_ _Life and Liberty in America_, quoted, i. 37 _note_Mackay, Dr. , editor of the _London Review_, i. 46 _note_[4]McKenzie, (Canadian Rebellion, 1837), i. 4McLaren, Duncan, ii. 224 _note_[3]McRea, opinion of, on Hotze and Slidell, ii. 180 _note_[3]Madison, President, i. 11"Madison's War, " i. 4Maine, State of: boundary controversy, i. 4, 9Malmesbury, Lord, i. 79, 84, 149; ii. 25, 167Manchester Emancipation Society, The, ii. No, 224 _note_[3]_Manchester Examiner and Times_, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_; cited, ii. 136 _note_[2]_Manchester Guardian_, The, ii. 231 _note_; cited, 181 _note_[2]Manchester Southern Club, The: meeting of, and list of delegates, ii. 190 _and note_[2]"Manchester Union and Emancipation Society, " The, ii. 110; leading members and activities of, ii. 224 _note_[3]Mann, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85 _notes_; 264, 265, ii. 24 _note_[2], 241 _See also under heading_ Confederate CommissionersMarchand, Captain, of the American ship, _James Adger_, i. 208; instructions of, to intercept the _Nashville_, 209, 210, 211 _note_[1]Marcy, Secretary of State, and the Declaration of Paris, i. 140-1Marryat, Captain Frederick: _A Diary in America_, etc. , cited and quoted, i. 27Martin, M. Henri, ii. 236 _note_[2]Martin, T. P. , theses of, on Anglo-American trade relations, ii. 8 _note_[2]Martineau, Harriet: faith of, in democracy, i. 27; ardent advocate of the North, 70 _and note_[3]; view of slavery as cause of the Civil War, ii. 79-80Marx, Karl, and the Trades Unions of London meeting, ii. 291, 292 _and note_[1]Maryland, and the Union: effect of "border state" policy, i. 173Mason, James M. , Special Commissioner of the Confederates to Britain, i. 183 _note_[2], 203; relations with Spence, 183 _note_[2], 266 _note_[3]; captured in the _Trent_, 204 _et seq. _, 234 _and note_[2]; reception of, in England, 264; interview with Russell, 265-6, 267, 268; statistics of, on the blockade, 268 _and note_[2]; effect of the failure of Gregory's motion on, 272, 273; hope in a change of Government, 273; views of, on capture of New Orleans, 296; comment of, on mediation after the Northern successes, 300, and Lindsay's motion, 305, 306-7; on the state of the cotton trade in England, ii. 10; request to Lord Russell for recognition of the South, 25, 28; and Slidell's offer to France, 24 _and note_[2]; refused an interview: appeals to Russell for recognition, 27; view of the Emancipation Proclamation, 104; nominates Spence as financial adviser in England, 156; and Confederate cotton obligations, 157, 158, 159; and Confederate Cotton Loan, 161, 162; in Roebuck's motion, 167, 168-9, 172-3; opinion of Napoleon, 172-3; recall of, 179, 181-2; determines to remain in Europe, 182; hope from a change of Government, 185, 213-4; demonstration against, after a Southern meeting, 191; representations on _Kearsarge_ enlistment of Irishmen, 201; interview with Palmerston suggested to, 207, 208-9, 214-5; returns to London, 212; opinion of Palmerston and Russell's attitude in interview with Lindsay, 213; suggests Disraeli to handle Lindsay's motion, 213; protests against clause in Southern Independence Association address, 220; attitude of, to slavery, 249, 250; interview of, with Palmerston, on Confederate offer to abolish slavery, 250; interview with Earl of Donoughmore, 250-1; quoted on Lee's surrender, 256 Correspondence of, i. 261 _note_ Otherwise mentioned, i. 255, 263 _note_[3], 267, 292; ii. 19, 31, 147, 154 _note_[1], 185, 186, 195, 206, 241Mason Papers, cited, i. 261 _note_[1]: ii. 24, _et passim_Massie, Rev. , ii. No, 190 _note_[3], 239Maximilian, Archduke, i. 260; ii. 255 _note_[1]Melish, John, _Travels_, quoted, i. 25Mercier, French Minister in Washington: with Lyons attempts official presentation to Seward of Proclamations of Neutrality, i. 96 _note_[1], 102, 103, 132, 164; in Declaration of Paris negotiations 157, 158, 162, 163 _note_[3], 165; negotiations with Confederates, 163 _notes_, 164, 165, 184, 185, 191 _note_[4]; plan for recognition of Southern independence, 192; plan to relieve French need for cotton, 196-201; supports British demands in _Trent_ affair, 230; on withdrawal of belligerent rights to South, 275; efforts for mediation, 279, 298, 300; ii, 36, 37 _note_[1], 41, 70 _note_[2], 71 _note_[1] 75, 76 _note_[1]; idea of an armistice, 41, 47 Richmond visit, i. 280 _ct seq. _, ii. 24 _note_[2], 95; Seward's acquiescence in, i. 280, 281, 282; consultation with Lyons on, 281-2, 283; result of, 284-5; report to Thouvenel on, 285; effect of, on Lyons and Russell, 287; _New York Times _report of, 287; effect of, in Paris and London, 287-8; ii. 95; effect of, on Confederate agents, i. 288 Southern Ports Bill, attitude to, i. 247 _note_[2], 248 _note_[3], 249; views of, on recognition, 285-6; belief of, in ultimate Southern success, 298; and isolated French offer of mediation, ii. 75; proposes Russo-French mediation, 76 _note_[1]; precautions of, during Lee's northern advance, 176 _note_[2] Bancroft quoted on, i. 280

 Otherwise mentioned, i. 166 _note_[1] 191; ii. 23, 40, 155, 270 _note_[2]_Merrimac_, The, i. 276, 277Mexican War of 1846, i. 7, 15, 206Mexico, British influence in, i. 13; revolt of Texas from, 12-15; ii. 117 _note_[1]; contract of, for ships and equipment in Britain, 117 _note_[1]; British policy towards, after revolt of Texas, i. 13-14; war with United States, 1846 . . . 7, 15, 206; expectation in, of British aid, 15; loss of California by, 15; joint action of France, Great Britain and Spain against, for recovery of debts, 259-60; designs of France in, 260; ii. 46; American idea to oust France from, 198, 251, 252, 255 _note_[4]Mill, J. S. , ii. 224 _note_[3]; article in defence of the North contributed to _Fraser's Magazine_, cited or quoted, i. 240, 242; ii. 80-1, 90, 285; on _Trent_ affair, i. 240, 242; on slavery, i. 240; ii. 80-1Milne, Admiral, i. 211; Lyons' letter to, on Southern shipbuilding in Britain and American letters of marque, ii. 140, 141 _and note_Milner-Gibson, i. 226; ii. 36; attack on, by _The Index_, 298Milnes, Monckton, i. 268Missouri, State of, and the Union: effect of the "border state" policy, i. 173Mobile, Ala. , i. 253 _note_[1]Mocquard: note of, on Napoleon's proposal on recognition in Roebuck's motion, ii. 167, 168, 169, 172Monck, Viscount, ii. 140; approves seizure of Laird Rams, 147_Monitor_, The: duel of with the _Merrimac_, i. 276; effect of, in Great Britain, 276, 277Monroe Doctrine, The, i. 11, 12, 259; as a medium for American territorial expansion, 12Monroe, President, i. 11Monson, cited, i. 93Montagu, Lord Robert, ii. 170; amendment of, on Roebuck's motion, 170, 171Montgomery, Ala. , i. 81, 82Moore, _Digest of International Law_, cited, i. 137, 145, 195 _note_[2], 212 _note_[3]Morehead, ex-Governor of Kentucky: speech of, at Liverpool, accusing Lincoln of treachery, ii. 105_Morning Herald_, The, ii. 67, 68 _note_[1], 231 _note_; quoted, 67-8; cited, 215_Morning Post_, The, i. 229; ii. 231 _note_; in _Trent_ crisis, i. 226 _note_[3], 229; views on the conflict and democratic tyranny, 229; ii. 284, 285-6; on the war and the cotton industry, ii. 10; on Gladstone's Newcastle speech, 49 _note_[1], 55 _note_[1]_Morning Star_, The, i. 69, 70 _note_[1], 179; ii. 191 _note_[2], 231 _note_; criticism of _Times_ war news in, 228Motley, J. L. , United States Minister at Vienna: letter of, analysing nature of the American constitution, i. 174-6; urges forward step on slavery, ii. 98; reply to Seward on effect of Northern attempt to free slaves, 99; quoted on the hatred of democracy as shown in the British Press, 280-1; otherwise mentioned, i. 190 _note_[2], 191 _Causes, The, of the American Civil War_, i. 174, 175 _Correspondence_, i. 179 _note_[2], 184; ii. 33, 98 _note_[4], 106 _note_[3], 280-1Motley, Mrs. , i. 179Mure, Robert: arrest of, i. 186-8, 192, 193 _note_[1], 201; Lyons' views on, 187-8

Napier, Lord, ii. 63, 66Napoleon I. , Emperor, i. 4, 8; and American contentions on neutral rights, i. 18 Napoleonic Wars, i. 4-7, 23Napoleon III. , Emperor: American policy of, ii. 39; differences with Thouvenel on, ii. 19 _and note_[2], 39 Blockade, view of, on the, i. 290 British policy: vexation at, i. 295 Confederate Cotton Loan, attitude to, ii. 160 _note_[2] Mediation: hopes for, ii. 23, 59; suggests an armistice for six months, 59, 60 _et seq. _, 69; request for joint action by Russia and Britain with France on, 60; British views on, 60-65; British reply, 65 _and_ _note_[1], 66, 152, 155; Russian attitude to, 59 _note_[4], 63 _and _[3], 64, 66; offers friendly mediation, 75-6 Interview with Lindsay on, i. 289 _et seq. _; reported offer on, to England, 290, 291 Interviews with Slidell on, ii. 24, 57 _note_[2], 60 Mercier's Richmond visit, connection of with, i. 287, 288; displeasure at, 288 Mexican policy of, i. 259-61; ii. 163, 198 Polish question, ii. 163, 164 Recognition: private desires for, ii. 20; endeavours to secure British concurrence, 19-20, 38; reported action and proposals in Roebuck's motion, 166-77 _passim_; interview with Slidell on abolition in return for recognition, 249-50 Otherwise mentioned, i. 114, 191; ii. 32, 54, 71, 180, 204, 270 Benjamin's view of, ii. 236 _note_[1] Mason's opinion of, ii. 172-3 Palmerston's views of, ii. 59_National Intelligencer_, The, i. 297; ii. 49 _note_[2]Neumann, Karl Friedrich: History of the United States by, cited, ii. 111 _note_[2]Neutrality, Proclamations of: British i. 93, 94-6, 100, 110, 111, 134, 157, 168, 174; statements on British position, 99, 111, 163 _note_[3]; ii. 265; British Press views on, i. 136 _note_ French, i. 96 _note_[1], 102 American attitude to, i. 96-110 _passim_, 132, 135, 136, 142, 174; British-French joint action, 102, 132 _and_ _note_[2]; Seward's refusal to receive officially, 102, 103, 132 _and note_[2]; 133, 164, 169; view of, as hasty and premature, 107-8, 109, 110, 112; Seward's view of, 134-5; modern American judgment on, 110New England States, The, i. 17, 18; opposition of, to war of 1812 . . . I. 7_New Nation_, The (New York), quoted on Lincoln's despotism, ii. 232New Orleans, i. 253 _note_[1]; capture of, 279, 296; ii. 16; effect of, on Confederates, i. 296; Seward's promises based on, ii. 16, 26New York, rumour of Russian fleet in harbour of, ii. 129New York Chamber of Commerce, The, protest by, on the _Alabama_, ii. 126New York City: anti-British attitude of, i. 29; idea of separate secession, 83_New York Herald, _The, i. 56, 255; ii. 199 _note_[4]_New York Times, _The, attack on W. H. Russell in, i. 178 _note_[2]; quoted on _Trent_ affair, 220 _note_[1]; report of Mercier's Richmond visit, 287Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's statement to, i. 80, 114, 216, 227_Newcastle Chronicle_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_Newfoundland fisheries controversy, i. 4Newman, Professor, ii. 224Newton, Dr. , in _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, cited, i. 35 _note_Nicaragua, i. 16Nicolay and Hay, _Lincoln_, cited, i. 126 _note_[2], 138, 146 _note_[2]_Nonconformist_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_Nonconformist sympathy with emancipation proclamations, ii. 109-10Norfolk, Va. , i. 253 _note_[1] "No 290, " Confederate War Vessel. See _Alabama_Northern States: Army, foreign element in, ii. 200 _note_[1] Emancipation: identified with, ii. 220 Immigration and recruiting in, ii. 200 "Insurgent" Theory, of the Civil War, i. 96, 102, 103 _and note_[1], 111, 246 Intervention: determination to resist, ii. 35-6, 71 "Piracy" declaration, ii. 267-8 Public and Press views in, at the outbreak of the struggle, i. 42 Union, the: determination to preserve, i. 54, 55, 173, 236; ii. 226 Western and Eastern States attitude to the War, compared, ii. 53

_Opinion Nationale_, The, cited, ii. 174 _note_[2], 236 _note_[2]Oregon territory controversy, i. 15_Oreto_, The, Confederate steamer, ii. 118, 123, 131, 136_Ottawa Sun_, The, cited, ii, 70 _note_[1]Ozanne Rev. T. D. , _The South as_ _it is, etc. _, quoted, ii. 195 _note_[1]

Page, Captain, instructions to, on the use of the Laird Rams, ii. 122 _note_[1]Pakenham, British Minister to Mexico, i. 13-14Palmer, Roundell, Solicitor-General, i. 268, 271Palmerston, Lord: Coalition Government of, in 1859 . . . I. 76, 77, 78; on Seward's attitude, 130; on reinforcement of Canada, 130-1; statement of reasons for participation in Declaration of Paris, 139; suggests method of approach in Declaration of Paris negotiations, 156 _note_[1]; on the object of the belligerents, 178; on British policy and the cotton shortage, 199-200; on possible interception of Mason and Slidell, 207-8, 209; action of, in _Trent_ affair, 226 _note_[2], 229, 241; statement of, on British neutrality, 241; interview with Spence, 266; refusal to interview Lindsay, 295-6; letters to Adams on General Butler's order, 302-5; reply to Hopwood on mediation, ii. 18; definition of British policy in debate on Lindsay's motion, 22-3; sneers at the silent cotton manufacturers, 26; views of, on mediation, 31; participates in Russell's mediation plan, 34, 36, 40-44, 46, 51, 54, 56, 73; traditional connection with Lewis' Hereford speech, 50 _and note_[1]; 51 _note_[2]; on the folly of appealing to the belligerents, 56, 59, 73; opinion of Napoleon, 59; views on French proposals for armistice, 60-1; on British position in regard to slavery, 61, 78-9; approves Russell's speech on Confederate shipbuilding, 131; defends Government procedure in _Alabama_ case, 134-5; accusation of, against Forster and Bright, 135; attitude to seizure of Laird Rams, 145; on the use of Napoleon's name in Roebuck's motion, 174-5, 177; the crisis over Danish policy of, 203-4, 210, 214, 216; interviews with Lindsay, 206-8, 209, 210, 213; consents to interview Mason, 207; opinion of, on the ultimate result of the Civil War, 209, 215; attitude to resolution of Southern Societies, 211; interview with Mason, 214-5; reply to joint deputation of Southern Societies, 216; reply to Mason's offer on abolition, 250; assurances on relations with America after Hampton Roads Conference, 255; attitude to expansion of the franchise, 276 _and note_[1]; death of, 302 Characteristics of, as politician, ii. 134 Cobden quoted on, i. 226 _note_[2] Delane, close relations with, i. 229 _note_[2] _Index_: criticism of, in the, ii. 216 Press organ of, i, 229 Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 168, 194, 262; ii. 19, 68, 90, 112, 168, 170, 173, 185, 188, 190, 249, 263, 285, 293Papineau, Canadian rebellion, 1837 . . . I. 4Papov, Rear-Admiral, ii. 129 _note_[1]Paris, Congress of (1856), i. 139Peabody, George, quoted, i. 227Peacocke, G. M. W. Ii. 187, 193 _note_Persigny, i. 303; conversation with Slidell on intervention, ii. 19Petersburg, evacuation of, ii. 248Phinney, Patrick, and the enlistment of Irishmen in the Northern army, ii. 202 _and note_[2]Pickens, Governor of S. Carolina, i. 120, 185, 186 _and note_[1]Pickett Papers quoted, i. 243; ii. 155; cited, i. 261 _note_; ii. 69 _note_[5]Poland: France, Russia, Great Britain and the Polish question, ii. 129, 163, 164Pollard, _The Lost Cause_, quoted on attitude of England on the cotton question, ii. 5-6Potter, Thomas Bayley, ii. 164, 224, _and note_[3]Prescott, i. 37 _note_Press, British, the attitude of, in the American Civil War. _See under Names of Newspapers, Reviews, etc. _Prim, Spanish General, commanding expedition to Mexico, i. 259Prince Consort, The, i. 76, 213, 224-5; influence of, on Palmerston's foreign policy, 224; policy of conciliation to United States, 228; Adams, C. F. , quoted on, 225, 228Privateering, i. 83 _et seq_. , 153 _et seq. Passim_ Russian convention with U. S. On, i. 171 _note_[1] Southern Privateering, i. 86, 89, 153, 156, 164, 165, 167, 171 _note_[1], 186. Proclamation on, _see under_ Davis. British attitude to, i. 86, 89-92, 95, 158, 160, 161, 163, 166; Parliamentary discussion on, 94, 95, 157; closing of British ports to, 170 _and note_[2] French attitude to, i. 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165 Northern attitude to, i. 83, 89, 90, 92, 111, 163; Seward's motive against in Declaration of Paris negotiation, 162, 164, 169; Northern accusations against Britain on, 91 United States policy on, i. 141, 156. _See_ Privateering Bill, _infra_ _See also under_ Declaration of Paris negotiationPrivateering Bill, The, ii. 122 _et seq_. ; purpose of, 122-3, 125, 137; discussion in Senate on, 123-4; passed as an administrative measure, 124, 137; influence of, on Russell's policy, 137; British view of American intentions, 137-8; historical view, 141; Seward's use of, 121 _note_[2]Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein, ii. 203-4_Punch_, cartoons of, cited: on _Trent_ affair, i. 217-8, 237; on Stone Boat Blockade, 255; suggesting intervention by France, ii. 75 _note_[1]; on Roebuck, 170 _note_[1]; on Lincoln's re-election, 239 _and note_[1] Poem in, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259Putnam, G. H. , _Memories of My Youth_, cited, i. 178 _note_[3]Putnam, G. P. , _Memoirs_, cited, ii. 163 _note_[2]

_Quarterly Review_, The, i. 47; views on the Southern secession, 47; on the lesson from the failure of Democracy in America, 47; ii. 279, 286, 301; attitude in the conflict, 199, 301; on British sympathy for the South, 301

_Reader_, The, cited, ii. 222, _and note_[2]Reform Bill of 1832 . . . I. 26, 28; ii. 276; of 1867 . . . 303, 304Republican Party, The, i. 114, 115Rhett, cited, ii. 4 _and note_[3], 88Rhodes, _United States_, cited or quoted, i. 110 _note_[4], 138, 217 _note_[2], 231 _note_[2]; ii. 16 _note_[2], 57 _note_[2], 147 _note_[1], 285 _note_[1] _et passim_. Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, cited or quoted, i. 261 _note_, 266 _note_[1]; ii. 57 _note_[2], 69 _note_[5], 155 _note_[6], _et passim_. Richmond, Va. , Southern Government head-quarters at, i. 81; capture of, by Grant, ii. 248_Richmond Enquirer_, The, quoted on attitude of France to the Confederacy, ii. 180_Richmond Whig_, The, cited, ii. 68Right of Search controversy, i. 6-10 _passim_, 16; recrudescence of, in _Trent_ affair, 218, 219, 233, 235Robinson, Chas. D. , Lincoln's draft letter to, ii. 93 _note_[4]Roebuck, speech of, on recognition, ii. 34 _note_[1]; motion of, for recognition of the Confederacy, 74 _note_[1], 144, 152, 164 _et seq. _; 296 _note_[1]; W. H. Russell's views on, 166; Lord Russell's opinion on, 166; interview of, with Napoleon, 167; Parliamentary debate on, 170-2, 176-8; withdrawal of motion, 175, 176-7; subsequent attitude of, to America, 177 _note_[1], 299-300; opinion on the failure of democracy in America, 299-300; _Punch_ cartoon on, 170 _note_[1]; otherwise mentioned, i. 306Rogers, Prof. Thorold, ii. 224 _note_[3]Rosencrans, defeat of, at Chicamauga, ii. 184Rost, Southern Commissioner to London, i. 63, 82, 85, 86, 264Rouher, M. , French Minister of Commerce, i. 293, 294Roylance, ii. 110Rubery, Alfred: Lincoln's pardon of, ii. 225 _and note_[1]Russell, Lord John, i. 42, 76, 77, 78-9, 81; attitude of, in the early days of the American struggle, 42, 51, 53, 57, 60, 73-4, 79, 84; views on the secession, 52-3; views and action in anticipation of war, 57-8; instruction on possible jingo policy toward England, 60-1; recommends conciliation, i. 67, 74; refusal to make a pledge as to British policy, 67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 125; promise of delay to Dallas, 67, 84, 85, 107, 108; plan of joint action with France, 84, 85; advises Parliament to keep out of the Civil War, 90 _and note_[3]; uncertainty as to American intention, 201-2; ii. 237; interview with Spence, i. 266; "three months" statement, 272 _and note_[1]; ii. 22; effect of Stonewall Jackson's exploits on, ii. 38; effect of Gladstone's Newcastle speech on, 49; idea of withdrawal of belligerent rights to the North, 182, 183; on relations with United States and Seward, 183-4; attitude to Seward's plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports, 198; views on the conflict: belief in ultimate Southern independence, 198-9, 212, 271; and the Danish question, 203; action in withdrawing neutrality proclamation, and belligerent rights, 266-7, 268, 269; attitude to piracy proclamation, 267-8, and the Reform Bill, 276, 302, 303; quoted on the degeneration of the American Republic, 285; succeeds to Premiership, 302

 _Diplomatic action and views of, in regard to_: _Alabama_, the, ii. 120, 121, 124; interview with Adams on, 128, 131; private feelings on 121, 124, 130 Belligerent rights to the South, i. 86, 87, _and note_[3]; reply to Houghton on, ii. 265-6, 267 Blockade, the: views on, i. 58, 91, 246, 252-3; instructions to Lyons on, 58, 244, 248, 263, 267, 271, 272; instructions to Bunch, 253 _note_[2]; view on notification at the port method, 246; on British Trade under, 252, 253; aim in presenting Parliamentary Papers on, 252, 267; on irritation caused by, ii. 225-6 Southern Ports Bill, protests against, i. 247-51; instructions to Lyons on, 248, 249 Stone Boat Fleet, i. 254-5, 256 Bunch controversy, i. 186, 187, 190-5; letter of caution to Lyons on possible rupture, 190; anxiety in, 190, 191 Butler's, General, order to troops: advice to Palmerston on, i. 303-4; reply to Adams, 304

 Confederate Commissioners: attitude to, i. 67, 68; interviews with, i. 85-6, 158; declines official communication with, 214 _and note_[4], 265-6; reception of Mason, 235, 265-6, 267, 268; suggestion to Thouvenel on reception of Slidell, 235; reply to Mason's notification of his recall, ii. 181; reply to Confederate "Manifesto, " 241-2 Confederate Shipbuilding: reply to Adams' protests, ii. 118, 120-1, 127; advice to Palmerston on, 131; orders detention of contractors, 135; seizure of _Alexandra_, 136; stoppage of, 197; result of _Alexandra_ trial, 197. _See also sub-headings_ Alabama, Laird Rams Confederates: negotiations with, i. 161, 163, 166, 168 _note_[4], 170, 184; attitude to Thouvenel's initiation of negotiations with, 189; explanation to Adams of British attitude to, 190 Cotton supply: attitude to French proposals on, i. 197, 199, 294

 Declaration of Paris negotiation: request to France in, i. 142, 146-7, 156, 157 _and note_[3]; instructions to Lyons on, 146-62 _passim_, 184; interviews with Adams, 141-8, 158; proposals to the United States, 153 _and note_[2], 170; instructions to Cowley, 156-9 _passim_; suggested declaration in proposed convention, 143-6, 146 _note_[1], 149, 151, 154, 168, 170, 201 Emancipation Proclamation: views on, ii. 101-2, 107 _and note_[1]

 Foreign Enlistment Act: idea of amending, ii. 124; offer to United States on, 124-5; reply to Adams' pressure for alteration of, 149

 Gregory's motion, i. 108

 Irishmen: recruiting of, ii. 201-2

 Laird Rams: conversations with Adams on, ii. 144; orders detention of, 144-5, 146, 150, 151; correspondence with the Lairds, 146; drafts protest to Mason, 147, 148 _and note_[1]; reply to attack on Government policy on, 149-50 Lindsay: approval of Cowley's statement to, i. 293, 294; reply to request of, for an interview, 294-5; interview with, on motion for mediation and recognition, ii. 212-13

 Mediation: advice to Palmerston on reported French offer, i. 305; reply to Seward's protest, ii. 19, 25-6, 27; project of, with Palmerston, ii. 31-2, 34, 36 _et seq. _, 91, 271; instructs Cowley to sound Thouvenel, 38; letters to Gladstone on, 40, 41; points of, 46; responsibility for, 46 _note_[4]; Russia approached, 45; memorandum on America, 49 _and note_[3]; proposal of an armistice, 31-2, 49, 53-5, 56-7; comments on Napoleon's Armistice suggestion, 61-2, 64; wish for acceptance, 62, 64; declaration of no change in British policy, 71; end of the project, 72, 155; motive in, 73; viewed as a crisis, 73; comments of, to Brunow on joint mediation offer 73 _note_[1] Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 287, 288

 Privateering, i. 89, 91, 159-63 _passim_; possible interference of, with neutrals, ii. 127, 138-150; opinion of, on intended use of privateers, 138 Proclamation of Neutrality. British position in, i. 166 _note_[2]; ii. 265-6

 Recognition of the Confederacy: attitude to, i. 67, 74, 86, 87, 101, 108, 242, 243; ii. 54, 59, 77-8; influence of _Trent_ affair on, i. 243; reply to Mason's requests for, ii. 25, 27; opinion of Roebuck's motion on, 166, 177; denies receipt of proposal from France on 168-9, 172

 Servile War, ii. 80, 97, 98 Slavery, ii. 89, 90; view of Seward's proposal for transport of emancipated slaves, 100

 _Trent_ affair, view of, i. 212; letter to Lord Palmerston on War with America over, 215; on possible ways of settlement of, 224; instructions to Lyons on learning officially that Wilkes acted without authorization, 226 Policy of, in the American Civil War: i. 145, 202, 243, 299; ii. 271-2; declaration to Adams on, 55, 71 Attitude to Adams, i. 81; view of, i. 131; ii. 128 View of Lincoln, i. 189; ii. 263 View of Seward, i. 67, 68, 131, 235-6; improved relations with, ii. 72, 197 Criticism and view of, in _The Index_, ii. 51 _note_[2], 68, 69, 196 Otherwise mentioned, i. 96, 101 _note_[1], 198, 274, 277; ii. 190, 208, 254Russell, Lady, quoted on _Trent_ affair, i. 224 _note_[3]Russell, W. H. , _Times_ correspondent, i. 44, 56, 66, 177; letters of, to the _Times_, 71, 177; ii. 229 _note_[1]; on the secession, i. 56, 177; impression of Lincoln, 61 _note_[2]; description of Bull Run, 177-8; ii. 229 _note_[1]; abhorrence of slavery, i. 71, 177; American newspaper attacks on 178 _and note_[2]; recall of, 178 _and note_[2]; ii. 228, 229 _note_[1]; on Napoleon's mediation offer, 68; on recognition, 166; editor of _Army and Navy Gazette_, ii. 68, 228, 229 _and note_[1]; belief of, in ultimate Northern victory, i. 178 _note_[2], 180; ii. 68 _note_[2], 228, 229 _and note_[1]; view of the ending of the War, 229-30; on campaigns of Grant and Sherman, 230, 232-3, 243; quoted on Delane, 254; on prospective war with America, 254; on failure of republican institutions, 277 _My Diary North and South_, i. 177 _notes_; quoted 44 _note_[1], 61, 71; cited, 124, 178, ii. 229 _note_[1]Russia: attitude in Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 164 _note_[1]; convention with United States on privateering, 171 _note_[1]; attitude to recognition of the South, 196 _note_[2]; ii. 59; and mediation, i. 283 _note_[1]; ii. 37 _note_[1], 39, 45 _note_[2]; British approach to, on mediation, 40, 45, _and note_[2]; attitude to joint mediation, 59 _note_[2], 63 _and note_[5], 66 _and note_[2], 70 _note_[2]; on joint mediation without Britain, 76 _and note_[1]; plan of separate mediation, 251 _note_[1]; Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights, 265 _and note_[2]; policy of friendship to United States, 45 _note_[2], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2]; United States friendship for, 225 Polish question, ii. 129, 163 Fleets of, in Western waters: story of, in _Trent_ affair, i. 227 _note_[1]; ii. 129 _and note_ _See also under_ Brunow, Gortchakoff, Stoeckl

St. Andre, French Acting-Consul at Charleston, i. 185, 186, 191 _note_[4]Salisbury, Lord, quoted on John Bright's oratory, ii. 290 _note_[1]Salt, price of, in Charleston: effect of the blockade, i. 270San Domingo, Seward's overture to Great Britain for a convention to guarantee independence of, i. 126 _note_[1]San Francisco, Russian vessels in harbour of, ii. 129 _and note_[1]_San Jacinto_, the, i. 204, 205, 216_Saturday Review_, The: views of, on Lincoln's election, i. 39; judgment of Seward, 39; views at outbreak of war, 41, 46; on Southern right of secession, 42; on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100-1; on reported American adhesion to Declaration of Paris, 146 _note_[1]; on slavery as an issue: attack on Mrs. H. B. Stowe, 180-1; on blockade and recognition, 183; on duration of war and cotton supply, 246 _note_[3]; on servile insurrection, ii. 80; and the relation between the American struggle and British institutions, 276, 277-8, 280; on the promiscuous democracy of the North, 277; on the Republic and the British Monarchy, 277-8; cited, 111, 231 _note_Savannah, Ga. , i. 253 _note_[1]; captured by Sherman, ii. 245, 249, 300-1Scherer, _Cotton as a World Power_, cited, ii. 6Schilling, C. , ii. 301 _note_[3]Schleiden, Rudolph, Minister of Republic of Bremen, i. 115, 116 _note_, 130; views of, on Seward and Lincoln, 115-6; offers services as mediator: plan of an armistice, 121, 122; visit of, to Richmond, 121-3; failure of his mediation, 122-3; report of Russian attitude to privateers, 171 _note_[1]; on _Trent_ affair, 231 _note_[2], 242; on Lincoln and Seward's attitude to release of envoys, 231 _note_[2]; on attitude of Seward and Sumner to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _note_[3]; quoted, on slavery, ii. 111 _and note_[2]Schleswig-Holstein question, i. 79; ii. 203-4Schmidt, _Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War_, cited, ii. 7 _notes_; 167 _note_[1]; arguments in, examined, 13 _note_[2]Scholefield, Wm. , ii. 193 _note_Schouler, ----, on diplomatic controversies between England and America, cited, i. 35Schroeder, quoted on Erlanger's contract to issue Confederate Cotton Loan, ii. 161-2Schurz, Carl, papers of, in library of Congress, cited, i. 117 _note_; advocates declaration of an anti-slavery purpose in the war, ii. 91, 92; cited i. 83 _note_[2]Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, cited, ii. 156 _note_[1], 158 _note_[4], 160 _notes_, 162 _note_[3]Scott, Winfield, American General, on Wilkes' action in _Trent_ affair, i. 218Sears, _A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III_, cited, i. 261 _note_, 289 _note_[2]; ii. 24 _note_[1]Secession States, ports of, i. 253 _note_[1]Semmes, captain of the _Alabama_, ii. 119Senior, Nassau W. , article on "American Slavery, " i. 33; quoted, 33 _note_[1], 34Servile insurrection, i. 271; ii. 83, 87; British apprehension of, i. 93; ii. 49, 79, 80, 81, 101, 110; emancipation viewed as provocative of, 49, 81, 86, 98, 101, 114; as an argument for intervention, 98, 101, 103 _note_[6]; use of as a threat, 18-19, 83, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 114Seward, W. H. , American Secretary of State, i. 39, 49, 59, 60, 64, 79, 80, 115; British view of, 60, 80, view of, as unfriendly to Great Britain, 39, 67, 68, 113-4, 125 _et seq. _ 242; reputation as a politician, 80, 114, 115; efforts of, to secure European support for the North, 67, 137, 152; view of his relation to Lincoln, 114, 115-6, 118, 120, 127-8, 130; document "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, " 118-9, 123, 124; advice on Fort Sumter, 118, 120; his "Despatch No. 10", 125-30, 154, 155; reversal of his policy, 130, 132; action on Britain's necessity of intercourse with the South, 164; instructions to American diplomats on slavery as issue, i. 176; ii. 95; offers facilities for transport of British troops, i. 213 _note_[4]; change of attitude to England, ii. 72; quarrel with Chase, 72; influence of, lessened by signing Abolition Proclamation, 100 _note_[2]; friendliness to Lyons, 72, 141; appreciation of Russell's expression of esteem, 147; attitude to Russell, 197; policy in regard to reunion, 197; plan of collecting import duties at Southern ports, 198; tests British-French harmony, 198; anxiety to avoid irritating incidents, 199; considers abrogation of treaties with Canada, 253-4; denies rumours of prospective foreign war, 254; accepts notification of ending of British neutrality, 268-9; meets with an accident, 257; attempted murder of, 257-8, 265 _Diplomatic action and views of, with regard to:_ Belligerent rights to South denial of, i. 87, 102, 169, 233, ii. 182; remonstrance on concession of, i. 247, 274, proposes withdrawal of, ii. 264-5, 266; _See also under_ Declaration of Paris _and_ Neutrality _infra_. Blockade, i. 54 _note_[1], 65, 246, 295; interviews with Lyons on, 244, 245, 246, 251, 256, 257; suggested alleviation of, i. 274 Southern Ports Bill: reassures Lord Lyons' on American intentions in, i. 249; attitude to issue of, 248 _note_[3], 250, 251, 252; on closing of ports by proclamation, 250, 252 Stone Boat Fleet blockade: statement on, i. 256-7 Bunch affair, i. 184, 189, 191 _and note_[4], 192, 193, 194 _and note_[1] Confederate debts: statement on, ii. 197 Confederate envoys: British intercourse with, i. 105 Confederate shipbuilding in Britain: ii. 121, 139, 140; effect of seizure of the _Alexandra_ on, 140; despatch on _Alexandra_ case decision, 143 _and note_[2]; refuses to allow British Consul through the blockade, 148 Cotton: on proposed French intervention to secure, i. 198, 200; promises of, based on capture of New Orleans, ii. 16 Declaration of Paris negotiation, i. 137, 141, 145, 147, 150 _et seq. _; statement in refusing convention as modified by Russell, 145; motives in, 150-2, 153, 169; hope to influence foreign attitude to Southern belligerent rights, 150-1, 162, 164, 165, 169; as part of foreign war policy: considered, 153-4, 155-6 Emancipation Proclamation: urges postponement of, ii. 37. 85, 95, 96, 98, 114; informed as to effect of, on intervention, 98, 99 comments on purpose of, 99-100 the "high moral purpose" argument, ii. 100; proposes convention for transport of emancipated slaves, 100 Hampton Roads Conference, ii. 252; attitude to Britain after, 253-4 Intervention: attitude to, i. 145, 178, 200; threat of servile war and, ii. 18-19, 22, 95; instructions to Adams on, 35-6, 96-7; view of the effect of emancipation, on, 98, 114. _See also_ Mediation _infra_. Irish Emigrants: enlistment of, ii. 201 Mediation: attitude to, i. 283 _note_[1], 297; ii. 18, 57 _note_[2]; by France, i. 283 _note_[1]; by Russia, 283 _note_[1]; view of England's refusal to act with France in, ii. 71, 72; declines French offer of, 76 _See also_ Intervention _supra_. Mercier's Richmond visit, i. 280-4, 286; statement to Lyons: view of Confederate position, 286; newspaper statement on, 287 Napoleon's Mexican policy: attitude to, ii. 198 Neutrality Proclamations: representations on, i. 100, 101; despatch on American view of, 101, 103 _note_[1], 134; refusal to receive officially, 102-3, 132, 133, 153 _and note_[2], 164; efforts to secure recall of, 152-3, 169, 198, 234, 274-5, 300, 301 Privateering, i. 160; convention with Russia, 171 _note_. _See also_ Southern Privateering _infra_. "Privateering Bill:" use of, ii. 121 _note_[3], 141, 151; on the purpose and use of the privateers, 122-3, 125, 137, 143; conversations with Lyons on, 125, 126; on necessity for issuing letters of marque, 126, 143; advised by Adams against issue of privateers, 131, 139 Recognition of Southern Independence, i. 65, 74, 198 Servile War threat, ii. 18-19, 22, 83, 95, 98 Slave Trade Treaty with Great Britain, i. 10, 275, 276; ii. 90 Southern privateering: view of, i. 104, 105; efforts to influence European attitude to, i. 104, 150-1, 154, 162, 164, 169; attitude on issue of privateers from British ports, ii. 126, 127 _Trent_ affair: reception of British demands in, i. 230, 232, 233; on Wilkes' action, 231; attitude to release of envoys, 231 _and note_[2], 232, 233, 234, 236; British opinion on Seward in, 239 Foreign Policy: high tone, i. 236, 252 _and note_[1], 301; restoration of the Union as basis of, 236; influences affecting, ii. 95, 100 Foreign war panacea, i. 60, 113, 120, 123-4, 125, 126 _note_[1], 127, 130, 132, 134-5, 137, 154, 155, 214; appreciation of, 136. Southern conciliation policy of, i. 49, 83, 117, 118, 120-1, 123, 125; expectations from Union sentiment in the South, 60, 117; aids Schieiden's Richmond visit, 121-3; communications with Confederate Commissioners, 117-8, 120 Appreciation and criticism of: by British statesmen and press in 1865. . . . Ii. 257; _Times_ tribute to, 257; Horace Greeley's attack on, i. 280 _note_[1]; Gregory's attack on, i. 269; Lyons' view of, i. 59, 60; Adams' admiration for i. 80, 127 British suspicion of, i. 113, 114, 128, 133, 136, 227, 235-6; ii. 101 _note_[1]; the Newcastle story, 80, 114, 216, 227; Thurlow Weeds' efforts to remove, 227; Adams' view, 227 Otherwise mentioned, i. 66, 163 _notes_, 177, 186, 188, 209, 212, 213, 217; ii. 39, 84, 123 _note_[2], 170, 173, 175, 223, 225, 245 _note_[1], 259, 281Shelburne, Earl of, i. 240Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah, views in French press on, ii. 236 _note_[2]Sherman, General: Atlanta campaign of, ii. 217; captures Atlanta, 233; march to the sea, 243-5; captures Savannah, 245, 249, 300-1; campaign against Johnston, 248; reports of pillaging and burning by his army, 265; mentioned, 215 Russell, W. H. , views of, on Sherman's campaigns, ii. 230, 232-3, 243 _Times_ view of his campaigns, ii. 212, 227, 232, 243-6Shiloh, General Grant's victory at, i. 278Shipbuilding by Confederates in neutral ports, ii. 116, 117 _note_[1], 128; Continental opinion of international law on, 121 _note_[1]_Shipping Gazette_, quoted, ii. 14Shrewsbury, Earl of, cited on democracy in America and its failure, ii. 282Slavery: cotton supplies and, i. 13; controversy in America on, 32, 36; English opinion on, 31-5, 37-8, 40; as an issue in the Civil War, 45, 46, 173, 175, 176, 179, 181, 241, 242; ii. 78, 88-93, 222; Confederates identified with, i. 71; ii. 220; Southern arguments for, 3 _and note_[2]; attitude of the North to, 78; growth of anti-slavery sentiment, 83, 84; failure of the slaves to rise, 86; Northern declaration on, urged, 98-9, 107; British public meetings on, 109 _note_[2]; Southern declaration on, 106. _See also_ African Slave Trade, Emancipation, Servile Insurrection, etc. Slidell, John, "Special Commissioner of the Confederates" to France, i. 203; captured on the _Trent_, 204-5, 234 _and note_[2]; connection of with Napoleon's Mexican policy, 261 _note_[1]; plan of action of, 264-5; received by Thouvenel, 266 _note_[1]; view on Continental and British interests in the blockade, 267 _note_[3], 273; view of Mercier's Richmond visit, 228; on Lindsay's interviews with Napoleon, 292; views of, on the capture of New Orleans, 296; idea to demand recognition from France, 306, 307; ii. 25, 28; hopes of mediation by France, ii. 19, 25; interview of, with Napoleon, 23, 24; makes offers to Napoleon and to Thouvenel, 24, 25; letter to Benjamin on failure to secure intervention, 29; interview with Napoleon on Armistice, 59 _and note_[2], 60; memorandum of, to the Emperor, asking for separate recognition, 75; on shipbuilding for Confederates in France, 128; quoted on position of France in relation to mediation, 155; and Confederate Cotton Loan, 158 _and note_[3], 159, 161, 163; interview of, with Napoleon, on recognition, 167; and Napoleon's instruction on recognition in Roebuck's motion, 168-9, 172; and Mason's recall, 180, 181, 182; opinion of Russell, 213; suggestion on Lindsay's motion, 213; disappointment at result of Mason's interview with Palmerston, 215; opinion on European attitude to the South, 215; interview with Napoleon on the abolition of slavery in return for recognition, 249-50; quoted on Lee's surrender 256-7; appreciation of as diplomatic agent, ii. 25, 180 _note_[3]; correspondence of, i. 261 _note_; otherwise mentioned, ii. 154 _note_[1]. _See also under heading_ Confederate CommissionersSmith, Goldwin, ii. 136 _note_[2], 189 _note_[2]; on Gladstone and Canada, 69, 70 _note_[1]; quoted on the influence of the _Times_, 178 _note_[3], 189 _note_[2]; on the _Daily Telegraph_, 189 _note_[2]; tribute of, to T. B. Potter, 224 _note_[3]; view of the _Times_ attitude to democracy, 299; criticism of the privileged classes of Great Britain, 303-4 _America and England in their present relations_, quoted, ii. 304, _and note_[2] _Civil War, The, in America_, cited, ii. 223 _note_[2], 224 _note_[3]; quoted, 304 _note_[1] Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?" ii. 110 _Letter, A, to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association_, ii. 194-5; quoted, 299Smith, T. C. , _Parties and Slavery_, cited, ii. 3 _note_[2]Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America, ii. 207; letters of, to Members of Parliament, 207-8, 210-11; deputation of, to Palmerston, 216Somerset, Duke of, i. 207South Carolina, secession of, i. 41, 44; _Times_ view on, 55; and restoration of Colonial relations: some British misconceptions on, 43, 44 _and note_Southern Independence Association, The, ii. 185, 189, 191-5, 204, 220, 298; cessation of meetings of, 193-4, 222-3; apathy and dissension in, 205, 207, 208; resolution and deputation to Palmerston, 210-2, 216; ticket meetings, 239; Oldham meeting, 239, 240Southern Ports Bill. _See_ BlockadeSouthern States: attitude of, to protection policy, i. 21, 47; and reciprocity treaty with British-American provinces, 21-2; influences directing British trade to, 22; British press attitude to, 40-48 _passim_; characterization of, 41; right of secession, 42, 82, 175, 176, 269; tariff as a cause for secession, 47; question of recognition considered, 58; secession, 172-3; preparations for war, 172; recognized as belligerents, 190, 191, 172; expulsion of British Consuls, by, ii. 148 _note_[2]; activities of British friends of, 152, 187-8, 190, 193-4, 239, 298; Conservative hopes for success of, 300; views on French attitude, ii. 236 _note_[2]; effect of the fall of Savannah on, 246; end of the Confederacy, 248, 259, 268; hope of, from "foreign war, " 252; effect on, of Lincoln's assassination 258; withdrawal of belligerent rights to, 264-6; end of the war; naval policy towards, 266-7 Belligerent rights, recognition of, i. 87, 88, 95, 108, 109, 150, 151, 155, 166 _note_[3]. _See_ Neutrality Proclamations. Commissioners of, _See under_ Confederate Commissioners Cotton, obsession as to, i. 252 _note_[2]; ii. 4, 5 Cotton Loan, ii. 155 _et seq. _ 179; reception of, in England, 160-1; amounts realized by, 162 Declaration of Paris negotiation: attitude to, i. 186 Finance, ii. 156 _et seq. _ Hampton Roads Conference: suggestions in, ii. 252-3 Leaders of: British information on, i. 58-9 Manifesto to Europe, ii. 241 _and note_[2], 242 Mediation: feeling in, on England's refusal of, ii. 71 _and note_[2]; hope of change in British policy on, 213-4 Military resources: decline of, ii. 219; desertions from the Army, 222 Negroes, arming of, ii. 240-1, 251 Privateering. _See that heading. _ Recognition of independence: anger at failure to secure, i. 252 _note_[2]; desire for, without mediation, ii. 217 Secret service funds, ii. 154 _note_[1] Shipbuilding in British ports for, ii. 115 _et seq. _; British protest to, on, 148. _See also under_ Alabama, Laird Rams, Oreto, etc. Slavery attitude, ii. 88 _and note_[3]; intention of gradual emancipation, 98; British views on, 220; offer of abolition in return for recognition, 249-51Spain, and Mexican debts, i. 259, 260Spargo, _Karl Marx_, cited, ii. 292 _note_[1]_Spectator_, The, i. 70 _note_[1]; ii. 231 _note_; constant advocacy of Northern cause, i. 39; on Lincoln's election, 39; views on the Civil War, 41, 69, 100, 181; on secession, 57; on Proclamation of Neutrality, 100, 136 _note_[1]; attacks Bulwer Lytton's speech on dissolution of the Union, 182; on servile insurrection and emancipation, ii. 79, 80; on British Press attitude to emancipation, 89; on declaration of anti-slavery purpose in the war, 89; on the Emancipation Proclamation, 104-5; on British lack of sympathy with the North, 280; on anti-slavery sympathies and view of democracy in England, 280; otherwise mentioned, i. 180; ii. 105, 223 _note_[1], 282Spence, James, i. 183 _note_[2], 266 _and note_[2]; conferences of, in London, 266, 267, 272 _and note_[1], 273; prevents demonstration by cotton operatives, 300; plan to appeal to the Tories, ii. 153, 155, 164; as Confederate financial adviser, 156, 157, 158; and Confederate Cotton Loan, 159, 161-2; urges withdrawal of Roebuck's motion, 173-4; effect of the fall of Vicksburg on, 179; organization of Southern Clubs by, 186-7, 188, 189, 190; hopes for intervention, 187-8, 189-90; organization of Southern Independence Association by, 191; organization of meetings by, 191, 222-3; organizes petitions to Parliament, 193; comments of, on the Palmerston-Mason interview, 216-7; on slavery clause in Southern Independence Association's address, 220 Slidell's opinion of, i. 266 _note_[3]; ii. 159; Otherwise mentioned, i. 302; ii. 49 _note_[2], 181, 193 _The American Union_, i. 183 _and note_[2], 266 _note_[3]; ii. 112Spencer, Herbert, quoted, i. 38Spurgeon, C. H. , prayer of, for victory of the North, ii. 109-110Stanley of Alderley, Lord, ii. 42Stephen, Leslie, meeting of, with Seward, ii. 176 _note_[2]Stephens, Alexander H. , Vice-President of Southern Government, i. 59, 81, 121; interview of, with Schleiden, 122, 123; discussion of, with Seward on Confederate foreign war plan, ii. 252Stevenson, American Minister to London, letter of, to Palmerston, quoted, i. 109-10Stoeckl, Russian Minister at Washington: view of the secession, i. 53 _note_[3]; on Russian policy in Declaration of Paris negotiations, 164 _note_[1]; on privateers in Northern Pacific, 171 _note_[1]; and recognition of the South, 196 _note_[3], and Mercier's Richmond visit, 283 _and note_[1]; on mediation, 283 _note_[1]; ii. 37 _and note_[1], 59 _note_[4], 70 _note_[2], 76; comments of, on Emancipation Proclamation, 107 _note_[1]; on the reconciliation of North and South followed by a foreign war, 251; Seward's request to, on withdrawal of Southern belligerent rights, 265; views on probable policy of Britain at the beginning of the Civil War, 269-70, 271; on the Civil War as a warning against democracy, 297 _note_[4]; Otherwise mentioned, i. 54 _note_[1]; ii. 45 _note_[2]Stone Boat Fleet. _See_ Blockade. Story, William Wetmore, i. 228, 256; letters of, in _Daily News_, 228 _and note_[4]Stowe, Mrs. Harriet Beecher, and the _Saturday Review_, i. 181; mentioned, ii. 89-90, 109 _Uncle Tom's Cabin_, i. 33 _and note_[1]Stowell, Lord, i. 208Stuart--, British Minister at Washington: report of new Northern levies of men, ii. 30; on recognition, 30 _and note_[3]; views on British policy, 30 _note_[3]; attitude to intervention and recognition, 36, 37, 66 _note_[3]; report of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, 37, 98; suggestion of armistice, 47; account of Federal "reprisals, " 66 _note_[3]; on servile insurrection, 97; describes Emancipation proclamation as a _brutum fulmen_, 101 Otherwise mentioned, ii. 25, 26, 66 _note_[3], 70, 100, 101 _note_[1]Sturge, Joseph, _A Visit to the United States in_ 1841, cited, i. 29Sumner, Charles, i. 79, 80; Brooks' attack on, 33, 80; hope of, for appointment as Minister to England, 55 _and note_[2]; views on annexation of Canada, 55; in _Trent_ affair, 231, 232, 234 _note_[3]; attitude to Southern Ports Bill, 248 _and note_[3]; advocacy of abolition, ii. 81, 90; conversations with Lincoln on abolition, 82, 86; attitude to Privateering Bill, 123, 124; otherwise mentioned, i. 49 _note_, 83, 130 _note_[1], 220; ii. 80, 132, 184, 247, 262, 280Sumter, Fort, fall of, i. 63, 73, 74, 83, 120, 172, 173; Seward's policy on reinforcement of, 118Sutherland, Rev. Dr. , prayer of in American Senate, i. 233 _note_

Tariff Bill (U. S. ) of 1816, i. 19; of 1828, 21Taylor, P. A. , abolitionist, ii. 224; eulogy of George Thompson, 224 _note_[1]Taylor, Tom, poem by, in _Punch_, on the death of Lincoln, ii. 259Tennessee joins Confederate States, i. 173Texas, State of: revolts from Mexico, i. 12; Great Britain sends diplomatic and consular agents to, 12; independence of, as affecting British policy, 13-16; enters the American Union, 14, 15, 16; in War of Independence against Mexico protests against shipbuilding for Mexico in Britain, ii. 117 _note_[1]; mentioned, 266Thompson and Wainwright, _Confidential Correspondence of G. V. Fox, etc. _, cited, i. 257 _note_[3]Thompson, George, organizer of the London Emancipation Society, ii. 91; work of, for emancipation, 109, 224 _and note_[1]; mentioned, 109 _note_[2], 184, 191Thouvenel, M. , French Foreign Minister, i. 88, 143; in the Declaration of Paris negotiations, 151, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163; initiates negotiations with Confederates, 157, 189; policy of, for relief of French need for cotton, 196, 197, 198; attitude of, in Charleston consuls case, 189; and Southern Ports Bill, 247, 248 _and notes_, 249 _and note_[4]; interview with Slidell, 266 _note_[1]; attitude of, to mediation, 266 _note_[1], 279; ii. 19-20, 28; on difficulties due to lack of cotton, i. 279, 293-4; conversations on Lindsay's interview with Napoleon, 291, 293; and Mercier's Richmond visit, 280, 281, 282, 285, 288, 299; conversation with Napoleon on the blockade and recognition of the South, 294; on French neutrality, 299; opposition to Napoleon on American policy, ii. 19 _and note_[3], 20, 39; Slidell's offer to, on mediation, 24, 25; reply of, to Russell's unofficial suggestion of mediation, 38-9, 46; retirement of, 45, 59; view of England's advantage from dissolution of the Union, 270 _note_[2]; otherwise mentioned, i. 275, 289_Times_, The: characteristics of, as newspaper, i. 42, 229 _note_[2]; ii. 178 _note_[2], 228, 230 _note_[2], 234; influence on public opinion, 178 _note_[3], 189 _and note_[2], 228; influence on public press, 226, 230 _note_[3]; accuracy of reports in, 226; pro-Southern attitude in last year of the conflict, 226-8, 242, 244 _and note_[3]; attitude to Hotze, 154 _note_[1]; relations of, with W. H. Russell, i. 177, 178, ii. 228, 229 _and note_[1] Criticisms of: John Bright's view of, i. 55 _note_[3]; citations of anti-Americanism in, 217 _note_[1]; Cobden, on, 222 _note_; Canadian opinion on, 222 _note_; in _Index_, ii. 228; in _Morning Star_, 228; Goldwin Smith's attack on, 299 "Historicus, " articles by, in. _See under_ "Historicus. " _Views expressed in, on:_ Civil War: non-idealistic, i. 89, 97; prints Motley's letter on causes of, 174-5 Confederate Manifesto, ii. 242 Cotton, i. 55; ii. 7 _and note_[1], 14 15 Democracy: attitude to, i. 8; ii. 280-1, 284, 289, 297, 300; change of view on, 289-90, 291, 297; comparison of British and United States Governments, 286; attack on John Bright, 295-6 Foreign war plans of America on, ii. 252, 254 Gladstone's speech, ii. 49 _note_[1] Laird Rams, ii. 146 Lincoln: on Slavery speech of, i. 38; on re-election of, ii. 234-5, 238; appreciations of, after his death, ii. 259-61 Lindsay's proposed motion: ii. 205-6 Mediation, i. 303, 305; ii. 67 Military situation, ii. 165, 176 _and note_[2], 178, 297; after Gettysburg, ii. 180 _and note_[1], 228 _note_[3]; Lee's Northern advance, 176; on Grant's reverses and Sherman's march on Atlanta, 212, 227, 232, 243; capture of Atlanta, 233, 234, 235; fall of Savannah, 245-6, 300-1; Lee's surrender, 255-6; appreciation of Lee's campaign, 256; Northern ability in war, 256; Sherman's campaign, 301 _note_[1] Neutrality in non-idealistic war i. 89, 97 Northern ability in war, ii. 256 Privateers, i. 158 Proclamation of Neutrality, i. 103-4, 158 Roebuck's motion, ii. 173, 176, 296 _note_[2] Secession, i. 45, 68 Seward, i. 216; ii. 257 Slavery: attitude to controversy on, i. 32, 55; condemnation of, 38-9, 40, 71; on Northern attitude to, ii. 89; Emancipation Proclamation, 102-3, 104; criticism of anti-slavery meetings, 108; on Biblical sanction of, 110 South, The: condemnation of, i. 38-9, 40; lawless element in, 40, 41; changing views on, at opening of the war, 55 _and note_[3], 56-7, 68-9; demand of, for recognition, ii. 181; renewed confidence in, ii. 210 _and note_[2] Southern shipbuilding, ii. 145, 146 _Trent_ affair, i. 216-7, 225-6, 237 War of 1812 . . . I. 8 "Yankee, " The, ii. 246 Otherwise mentioned, i. 174; ii. 65 _and note_[1], 160, 201 _and note_[2], 204 _and note_[2], 295Toombs (Confederate Secretary of State), i. 129; ii. 4 _note_[3]Toronto _Globe_, the, cited, i. 222 _note_Trades Unions of London, meeting of, ii. 132-3, 134, 291-3Train, George Francis, of the _New York Herald_, speeches of, in England, ii. 224 _note_[2]Treaty of Washington (1842) i. 4, 9Tremenheere, H. S. , _The Constitution of the United States_, etc. , cited, ii. 275 _note_[2]Tremlett, F. W. , quoted, ii. 211-12_Trent_ affair. The, i. 195, 203 _and note_, 204 _et seq. _ British demands in, i. 212-3, 226, 230, points of the complaint, 214 _note_[1]; American reply, 232, 234 British views on, i. 203, 216, 216-8, 221-4, 225, 226-7; American exultation in, 205-6, 218, 219; effect of in Canada, 222 _note_; Cabinet members' sentiments on, 223; change in American views, 226, 230-1; British speculation on probable war, 228, 229; European support of Britain in, 229, 235; French views on, 230, 234-5; release of envoys, 235; American feeling after settlement of, 236 _and note_[3], 237; Parliamentary debate on conclusion of, 240-1, 262, 265, 274; influence of, on British policy in relation to the Civil War, 242; ii. 15-16; Southerners' action in, i. 211 _note_[1]; effect of, on British cotton trade, ii. 9

 Otherwise mentioned, i. 171 _note_[1], 201, 202, 244, 253, 254; ii. 72, 131Trescott, William Henry, i. 186, 188_Tribune_, The New York, cited, i. 280 _note_[1]Trimble, W. , "Surplus Food Production of the United States, " cited, ii. 13 _note_[2]Trollope, Anthony, i. 239 _and note_[5], 240; ii. 153; description of the United States citizen by, ii. 287-8 _North America_, i. 239; ii. 153, 287, 288 _and note_[1]Trollope, Mrs. , i. 27, 48Tyler, President, i. 10

Union and Emancipation Society of London, The: Bright's speech to, ii. 295United Empire Loyalists, i. 8 _note_United States: Citizenship: theory of, i. 5-6 _and note_ Commercial relations with Great Britain, i. 17 _et seq. _ Democracy in, _See under_ Democracy. International law, influence of U. S. On, belligerent and neutral rights in, i. 5-10, 140 Naval power: agitation for increase of, i. 123 Policy in the Civil War, ii. 197 _See under_ Adams, Lincoln, Seward, _and subject-headings_ Political principles of: British sympathy for, i. 3, 26 Political institutions in: views of travellers and writers, i. 30; ii. 274 _et seq. _ Population, growth of, i. 12 Protection policy: beginnings of, i. 18-19, 20-1; reaction against in the South, 21 Territorial expansion, i. 12 _et seq. _

 _See also under subject-headings. _

United States Supreme Court: decision on Lincoln's blockade proclamations, i. 110 _note_[3]

Van Buren, President, i. 109Vansittart, William, ii. 187, 193 _note_Vicksburg, capture of, ii. 143, 165, 176 _note_[2], 178, 228 _note_[3], 296; Southern defence of, 164, 165, 178; importance of, in the military situation, 165Victoria, Queen, i. 76, 96, 168, 190 _note_[2]; ii. 40, 190, 262; pro-German influence of, 203 _note_[3]; writes personal letter of sympathy to Mrs. Lincoln, 262Vignaud, Henry, ii. 154 _note_[1]Virginia, State of, i. 121, 122, 172, 245Vogt, A. , ii. 301 _note_[3]

Wales, Prince of, visit to United States in 1860, . . . I. 80Walker, Mr. , and employment of ex-slaves in British Guiana, ii. 100Wallbridge, General Hiram, ii. 123 _and note_[2]Warburton, George _Hochelaga_: i. 29Washington, President, i. 11Watts, _Cotton, Famine_, ii. 6 _note_[2]Weed, Thurlow, i. 114 _and notes_, 129, 227, 231; ii. 130 _note_[2]Welles, United States Secretary of the Navy, ii. 199; in _Trent_ affair, congratulates Wilkes, i. 220; attitude to the "Privateering Bill, " ii. 123 _note_[2], 128, 137; mentioned, 84, 96West Indian Colonies, i. 3; American trade with, 17, 19, 20, 21; slavery in, 31Westbury, Lord, i. 262-3; ii. 64_Westminster Review_, The, i. 48, 70 _and note_[1], 71Wharncliffe, Lord, ii. 187, 193 _note_Wheat and cotton in the Civil War, ii. 13 _note_[2]Whig sympathy for American political principles, i. 26, 28White, Andrew D. , "A Letter to W. H. Russell, " etc. Cited, ii. 229 _note_[1]Whittier, J. G. , i. 29, 47Wilberforce, Samuel, i. 31Williams, Commander, R. N. , i. 204Wilkes, Captain, of the _San Jacinto_, intercepts the _Trent_, i. 204, 216, 219-20; American national approbation of, 219-20; Seward on, 233; his action officially stated to be unauthorized, 226, 254Wilmington, N. C. , i. 253 _note_[1]; ii. 247Wilson, President, i. 90 _note_Wodehouse, Lord, i. 84

Yancey, Southern Commissioner, i. 63, 82 _and note_, 85, 86, 264; ii. 4 _note_[3], 223 _note_[1]Yeomans, cited, i. 38