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_PUBLISHED JANUARY 4, 1897. _

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[Illustration: Frontispiece. ]

 * * * * *

FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA

FROM

Subaltern to Commander-in-Chief

BY

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHARV. C. , K. P. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. , G. C. I. E. 

[Illustration: Seal]

_FIRST EDITION IN ONE VOLUME_

WITH FORTY ILLUSTRATIONS

LONDONRICHARD BENTLEY AND SONPublishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen1898[_All rights reserved_]

_A NEW EDITION, BEING THE TWENTY-NINTH_

_TO THE COUNTRY TO WHICH I AM SO PROUD OF BELONGING, TO THE ARMY TO WHICH I AM SO DEEPLY INDEBTED, AND TO MY WIFE, WITHOUT WHOSE LOVING HELP

MY 'FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA'

COULD NOT BE THE HAPPY RETROSPECT IT IS, I DEDICATE THIS BOOK. _

 * * * * *

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

 * * * * *

I would never have ventured to intrude upon the public with mypersonal reminiscences had I not been urged to do so by friends who, being interested themselves in what I was able to tell them of Indiaas my father knew it, and as I found it and left it, persuaded me thatmy experiences of the many and various aspects under which I haveknown the wonderful land of my adoption and its interesting peopleswould be useful to my countrymen. It was thought that I might thuscontribute towards a more intimate knowledge of the glorious heritageour forefathers have bequeathed to us, than the greater number of thempossess, and towards helping them to understand the characteristicsand requirements of the numerous and widely different races by whomIndia is inhabited. 

It is difficult for people who know nothing of Natives to understandand appreciate the value they set on cherished customs, peculiaridiosyncrasies, and fixed prejudices, all of which must be carefullystudied by those who are placed in the position of their Rulers, ifthe suzerain Power is to keep their respect and gain their gratitudeand affection. 

The Natives of India are particularly observant of character, andintelligent in gauging the capabilities of those who govern them; andit is because the English Government is trusted that a mere handfulof Englishmen are able to direct the administration of a country withnearly three hundred millions of inhabitants, differing in race, religion, and manners of life. Throughout all the changes which Indiahas undergone, political and social, during the present century, thisfeeling has been maintained, and it will last so long as the servicesare filled by honourable men who sympathize with the Natives, respecttheir prejudices, and do not interfere unnecessarily with their habitsand customs. 

My father and I spent between us nearly ninety years in India. Themost wonderful of the many changes that took place during that timemay be said to date from the Mutiny. I have endeavoured in thefollowing pages to explain the causes which, I believe, broughtabout that terrible event--an event which for a while produced amuch-to-be-regretted feeling of racial antagonism. Happily, thisfeeling did not last long; even when things looked blackest for us, itwas softened by acts of kindness shown to Europeans in distress, andby the knowledge that, but for the assistance afforded by the Nativesthemselves, the restoration of order, and the suppression of a fiercemilitary insurrection, would have been a far more arduous task. Delhicould not have been taken without Sikhs and Gurkhas; Lucknow couldnot have been defended without the Hindustani soldiers who so noblyresponded to Sir Henry Lawrence's call; and nothing that Sir JohnLawrence might have done could have prevented our losing, for a time, the whole of the country north of Calcutta, had not the men of thePunjab and the Derajat[*] remained true to our cause. 

[Note *: Tracts beyond the Indus. ]

It has been suggested that all outward signs of the Mutiny shouldbe obliterated, that the monument on the Ridge at Delhi should belevelled, and the picturesque Residency at Lucknow allowed to fallinto decay. This view does not commend itself to me. These relics ofthat tremendous struggle are memorials of heroic services performedby Her Majesty's soldiers, Native as well as British; and by thecivilians who shared the duties and dangers of the army. They arevaluable as reminders that we must never again allow ourselves to belulled into fancied security; and above all, they stand as warningsthat we should never do anything that can possibly be interpreted bythe Natives into disregard for their various forms of religion. 

The Mutiny was not an unmitigated evil, for to it we owe theconsolidation of our power in India, as it hastened on theconstruction of the roads, railways, and telegraphs, so wisely andthoughtfully planned by the Marquis of Dalhousie, and which havedone more than anything to increase the prosperity of the people andpreserve order throughout the country. It was the Mutiny which broughtLord Canning into closer communication with the Princes of India, andpaved the way for Lord Lytton's brilliant conception of the ImperialAssemblage--a great political success which laid the foundation ofthat feeling of confidence which now, happily, exists between theRuling Chiefs and the Queen-Empress. And it was the Mutiny whichcompelled us to reorganize our Indian Army and make it the admirablefighting machine it now is. 

In the account I have given of our relations with Afghanistan andthe border tribes, I have endeavoured to bring before my readersthe change of our position in India that has been the inevitableconsequence of the propinquity upon our North-West Frontier of afirst-class European Power. The change has come about so gradually, and has been so repeatedly pronounced to be chimerical by authoritiesin whom the people of Great Britain had every reason to feelconfidence, that until recently it had attracted little publicattention, and even now a great majority of my countrymen may scarcelyhave realized the probability of England and Russia ever being nearenough to each other in Asia to come into actual conflict. I impute noblame to the Russians for their advance towards India. The force ofcircumstances--the inevitable result of the contact of civilizationwith barbarism--impelled them to cross the Jaxartes and extend theirterritories to the Khanates of Turkestan and the banks of the Oxus, just as the same uncontrollable force carried us across the Sutlej andextended our territories to the valley of the Indus. The object I haveat heart is to make my fellow-subjects recognize that, under thesealtered conditions, Great Britain now occupies in Asia the position ofa Continental Power, and that her interests in that part of the globemust be protected by Continental means of defence. 

The few who have carefully and steadily watched the course of events, entertained no doubt from the first as to the soundness of theseviews; and their aim has always been, as mine is now, not to sound analarm, but to give a warning, and to show the danger of shutting oureyes to plain facts and their probable consequences. 

Whatever may be the future course of events, I have no fear of theresult if we are only true to ourselves and to India. Thinking Nativesthoroughly understand the situation; they believe that the time mustcome when the territories of Great Britain and Russia in their part ofAsia will be separated only by a common boundary line, and they wouldconsider that we were wanting in the most essential attributes ofRulers if we did not take all possible precautions, and make everypossible preparation to meet such an eventuality. 

I send out this book in the earnest hope that the friendlyanticipations of those who advised me to write it may not be seriouslydisappointed; and that those who care to read a plain, unvarnishedtale of Indian life and adventure, will bear in mind that the writeris a soldier, not a man of letters, and will therefore forgive allfaults of style or language. 

ROBERTS. 

_30th September_, 1896. 

 * * * * *

[Illustration: KASHMIR GATE AT DELHI. ]

CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

Voyage to India--Life in Calcutta--A destructive cyclone--Home-sickness

CHAPTER II. 

Bengal Horse Artillery--Incidents of the journey--New Friends

CHAPTER III. 

With my father at Peshawar--Peshawar in 1852--Excitements of a frontier station--A flogging parade--Mackeson's assassination--The Jowaki expedition--A strange dream--A typical frontier fight

CHAPTER IV. 

A trip to Khagan--The Vale of Kashmir--With the Horse Artillery--My first visit to Simla--Life at Peshawar--A staff appointment--The bump of locality

CHAPTER V. 

Lord Dalhousie's Afghan policy --Treaty with Dost Mahomed--War with Persia --The advantage of the Amir's friendship --John Nicholson --'A pillar of strength on the frontier'

CHAPTER VI. 

First tidings of the mutiny --Prompt action at Peshawar--A bold policy --The Movable Column--An annoying occurrence --I leave Peshawar

CHAPTER VII. 

First symptoms of disaffection --Outbreak at Berhampur--Mangal Pandy --Court-Martial at Meerut--Mutiny at Meerut --The work of destruction--Want of energy --Hugh Gough's experiences --Nothing could arrest the mutiny

CHAPTER VIII. 

General Anson--The news reaches Simla --Anson loses no time--A long list of troubles --John Lawrence--The Phulkian family --Death of General Anson

CHAPTER IX. 

John Lawrence's wise measures --Disarmament at Peshawar --Salutary effect in the valley

CHAPTER X. 

Neville Chamberlain's presence of mind --The command of the Column--Robert Montgomery --Disarmament at Mian Mir --A Drum-Head Court-Martial--Swift retribution

CHAPTER XI. 

Ferozepore--Crawford Chamberlain at Multan --Chamberlain's masterly conduct --Nicholson succeeds Neville Chamberlain --Irresolution at Jullundur--General Mehtab Sing --Nicholson's soldierly instincts --More disarmaments

CHAPTER XII. 

George Ricketts at Ludhiana--Pushing on to Delhi --In the camp before Delhi

CHAPTER XIII. 

The first victory--Enthusiasm amongst the troops --Barnard's success at Badli-ki-Serai --The Flagstaff Tower--Position on the Ridge --Quintin Battye--The gallant little Gurkhas --Proposed assault--The besiegers besieged --Hard fighting--The centenary of Plassy

CHAPTER XIV. 

A new appointment

CHAPTER XV. 

Reinforcements begin to arrive --An assault again proposed--The attack on Alipur --Death of General Barnard --General Reed assumes command --Two V. C. 's--Treachery in camp --Fighting close up to the city walls --Sufferings of the sick and wounded --General Reed's health fails

CHAPTER XVI. 

Archdale Wilson assumes command --Enemy baffled in the Sabzi Mandi --Efforts to exterminate the Feringhis --A letter from General Havelock --News of Henry Lawrence's death --Arrival of the Movable Column --The 61st Foot at Najafgarh

CHAPTER XVII. 

Wilson's difficulties--Nicholson's resolve --Arrangements for the assault --Construction of breaching batteries --Nicholson expresses his satisfaction --Orders for the assault issued --Composition of the attacking columns

CHAPTER XVIII. 

Delhi stormed--The scene at the Kashmir Gate --Bold front by Artillery and Cavalry --Nicholson wounded--The last I saw of Nicholson --Wilson wavers--Holding on to the walls of Delhi

CHAPTER XIX. 

Capture of the Burn bastion --The 60th Rifles storm the palace --Hodson captures the King of Delhi --Nicholson's death--Gallantry of the troops --Praise from Lord Canning

CHAPTER XX. 

Necessity for further action--Departure from Delhi --Action at Bulandshahr--Lieutenant Home's death --Knights-errant--Fight at Aligarh --Appeals from Agra--Collapse of the administration --Taken by surprise--The fight at Agra --An exciting chase--The Taj Mahal

CHAPTER XXI. 

Infatuation of the authorities at Agra --A series of Mishaps --Result of indecision and incapacity

CHAPTER XXII. 

Advantage of being a good horseman--News from Lucknow --Cawnpore--Heart-rending scenes--Start for Lucknow --An exciting Adventure --Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell --Plans for the advance

CHAPTER XXIII. 

Sir Colin's preparations--The Alambagh --The Dilkusha and Martinière--Mayne's death --A tall-talk story--Ammunition required --A night march--The advance on Lucknow --Sir Colin wounded--The attack on the Sikandarbagh --Heroic deeds--The 4th Punjab Infantry

CHAPTER XXIV. 

Henry Norman--The Shah Najaf--The mess-house --Planting the flag--A memorable meeting --The Residency

CHAPTER XXV. 

Sir Colin's wise decision--Robert Napier --Impressions on visiting the Residency --Henry Lawrence--Lawrence as Statesman and Ruler --Lawrence's friendliness for Natives --A hazardous duty

CHAPTER XXVI. 

Death of General Havelock--Appeals from Cawnpore --General Windham--The passage of the Ganges

CHAPTER XXVII. 

The fight at Cawnpore--Unexpected visitors --A long chase--Unjur Tiwari--Bithur --Windham at Cawnpore

CHAPTER XXVIII. 

The Fight at Khudaganj--A mêlée--Oudh or Rohilkand?

CHAPTER XXIX. 

Mianganj--Curious effect of a mirage --The Dilkusha revisited--Passage of the Gumti --Capture of the Chakar Kothi --Capture of the iron bridge--Hodson mortally wounded --Outram's soldierly instinct--A lost opportunity --Sam Browne--Start for England --Death of Sir William Peel

CHAPTER XXX. 

What brought about the Mutiny? --Religious fears of the people--The land question --The annexation of Oudh --Fulfilment of Malcolm's prophecy --The Delhi royal family--The Nana Sahib --The Native army--Greased cartridges --Limited number of British troops --Objection to foreign service --Excessive age of the British officers

CHAPTER XXXI. 

Discontent of the Natives--Successful administrators --Paternal despotism--Money-lenders and the Press --Faddists--Cardinal points

CHAPTER XXXII. 

Home again--Back in India--Allahabad and Cawnpore --The Viceroy's camp--State entry into Lucknow --The Talukdars of Oudh--Loyalty of the Talukdars --Cawnpore and Fatehgarh--The Agra Durbar

CHAPTER XXXIII. 

Delhi under a different aspect--Lord Clyde --Umritsar and Lahore--The Lahore Durbar --Simla--Life at Simla

CHAPTER XXXIV. 

The Staff Corps--With the Viceroy's camp again --The marble rocks--Lady Canning's death --Pig-sticking at Jamu--Lord Canning --Another cold-weather march--Gwalior and Jhansi --Departmental promotion

CHAPTER XXXV. 

The Umbeyla expedition--The Akhund of Swat --The 'Eagle's Nest' and 'Crag piquet' --The death of Lord Elgin --Loyalty of our Pathan soldiers --Bunerwals show signs of submission --The conical hill--Umbeyla in flames --Bunerwals agree to our terms--Malka destroyed

CHAPTER XXXVI. 

A voyage round the Cape--Cholera camps --The Abyssinian expedition--Landed at Zula

CHAPTER XXXVII. 

Sir Robert Napier to command--Defective transport --King Theodore commits suicide--First A. Q. M. G. 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

Afzal Khan ousts Sher Ali --Sher Ali regains the Amirship --Foresight of Sir Henry Rawlinson --The Umballa Durbar

CHAPTER XXXIX. 

The Lushais--The Lushai expedition --Defective transport again --Practice _versus_ theory--A severe march --Lushais foiled by Gurkhas --A successful turning movement--Murder of Lord Mayo

CHAPTER XL. 

Lord Napier's care for the soldier --Negotiations with Sher Ali renewed --Sher Ali's demands

CHAPTER XLI. 

A trip in the Himalayas--The famine in Behar --The Prince of Wales in India --Farewell to Lord Napier

CHAPTER XLII. 

Lord Lytton becomes Viceroy --Difficulties with Sher Ali --Imperial assemblage at Delhi --Reception of the Ruling Chiefs --Queen proclaimed Empress of India --Political importance of the assemblage --Sher Ali proclaims a 'Jahad' --A journey under difficulties

CHAPTER XLIII. 

Object of the first Afghan war --Excitement caused by Russia's advances

CHAPTER XLIV. 

Effect of the Berlin Treaty at Kabul --Sher Ali decides against England --A meeting of portentous moment --Preparations for war--Letter from Sher Ali

CHAPTER XLV. 

Shortcomings of my column --Attitude of the Border tribes

CHAPTER XLVI. 

The Kuram valley--Conflicting news of the enemy --An apparently impregnable position --Spingawi route decided on--Disposition of the force --A night attack--Advantages of a night attack --Devotion of my orderlies --Threatening the enemy's rear--The Peiwar Kotal

CHAPTER XLVII. 

Alikhel--Treachery of the tribesmen --Transport difficulties --Sher Ali looks to Russia for aid --Khost--An attack on our camp --An unsuccessful experiment --An unpleasant incident--Punjab Chiefs' Contingent

CHAPTER XLVIII. 

Sher Ali's death--Premature negotiations --The treaty of Gandamak --Making friends with the tribesmen --Gloomy forebodings--Good-bye to Cavagnari

CHAPTER XLIX. 

Massacre of the Embassy--The Kabul Field Force --Lord Lytton's foresightedness--Start for Kabul --Letter to the Amir --Proclamation to the people of Kabul --Yakub Khan's agents --Reasons for remaining at Alikhel

CHAPTER L. 

Hector Macdonald and Sher Mahomed--Yakub Khan --A Proclamation and an Order --The _maliks_ of Logar--Attack on the Shutargardan --Reconnoitring roads leading to Kabul

CHAPTER LI. 

The Afghan position--The fight at Charasia --Highlanders, Gurkhas, and Punjabis --Defeat of the Afghans--Kabul in sight --Deh-i-Mazang gorge--The enemy give us the slip

CHAPTER LII. 

Guiding instructions--Visit to the Bala Hissar --Yakub Khan abdicates--The Proclamation --Administrative measures --Explosions in the Bala Hissar

CHAPTER LIII. 

Afghans afraid to befriend us--Kabul Russianized --Yakub Khan's abdication accepted --State treasury taken over

CHAPTER LIV. 

The amnesty Proclamation --Strength of the Kabul Field Force --Yakub Khan despatched to India

CHAPTER LV. 

Political situation at Kabul --Serious trouble ahead --Macpherson attacks the Kohistanis --Combined movements--The uncertainty of war --The fight in the Chardeh valley--Forced to retire --Padre Adams earns the V. C. --Macpherson's column arrives --The captured guns recovered--Melancholy reflections

CHAPTER LVI. 

Attack on the Takht-i-Shah --City people join the tribesmen --Increasing numbers of the enemy --Loss of the conical hill --Captain Vousden's gallantry --The retirement to Sherpur

CHAPTER LVII. 

Sherpur--Defence of Sherpur--Arrest of Daud Shah --Rumours of an assault--Attack and counter-attack --Communication with India re-opened --Sherpur made safe

CHAPTER LVIII. 

Two important questions--A Ruler required --News of Abdur Rahman Khan --Abdur Rahman in Afghan-Turkestan --Overtures made to Abdur Rahman

CHAPTER LIX. 

Jenkins attacked near Charasia --Sir Donald Stewart reaches Kabul --Difficulties with Abdur Rahman --Abdur Rahman proclaimed Amir

CHAPTER LX. 

Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster --Relief from Kabul suggested --A force ordered from Kabul --Preparations for the march --The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force --Commissariat and Transport

CHAPTER LXI. 

The order of marching--Ghazni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai --Food required daily for the force --A letter from General Phayre--Kandahar --Reconnoitring the enemy's position --A turning movement

CHAPTER LXII. 

Commencement of the fight --72nd Highlanders and 2nd Sikhs --92nd Highlanders and 2nd Gurkhas --Ayub Khan's camp--Difficulties about supplies --Parting with the troops--A pleasing memory

CHAPTER LXIII. 

Reception in England--A fruitless journey --Andaman Isles and Burma--The Madras Army --Measures for improving the Madras Army --Memories of Madras--An allegory

CHAPTER LXIV. 

Disturbing action of Russia--Abdur Rahman Khan --The Rawal Pindi Durbar --Unmistakable loyalty of the Natives

CHAPTER LXV. 

The Burma expedition--The Camp of Exercise at Delhi --Defence of the North-West Frontier --Quetta and Peshawar --Communications _versus_ fortifications --Sir George Chesney

CHAPTER LXVI. 

Nursing for the soldier --Pacification of Burma considered --Measures recommended --The Buddhist priesthood --The Regimental Institute --The Army Temperance Association

CHAPTER LXVII. 

Defence and Mobilization Committees --The Transport Department --Utilization of Native States' armies --Marquis of Lansdowne becomes Viceroy --Rajputana and Kashmir --Musketry instruction --Artillery and Cavalry training

CHAPTER LXVIII. 

Extension of command --Efficiency of the Native Army --Concessions to the Native Army --Officering of the Native Army --The Hunza-Naga campaign --Visit to Nepal--A Nepalese entertainment --Proposed mission to the Amir --A last tour--Farewell entertainments --Last days in India

APPENDIX

INDEX

[Illustration: PEIWAR KOTAL. ]

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

I. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS. (_From a Photograph by Bourne and Shepherd, Simla, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_) _Frontispiece_

II. THE KASHMIR GATE AT DELHI _Over List of Contents_

III. THE PEIWAR KOTAL _Over List of Illustrations_

IV. PORTRAIT OF GENERAL SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS, G. C. B. (_From a Photograph, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

V. PORTRAIT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NICHOLSON, C. B. (_From a Painting by J. R. Dicksee in possession of the Rev. Canon Seymour, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

VI. PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARRY TOMBS, V. C. , G. C. B. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Grillet and Co. , engraved upon wood by Swain_)

VII. PORTRAIT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JAMES HILLS-JOHNES, V. C. , G. C. B. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Bourne and Shepherd, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

VIII. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART, BART. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. , C. I. E. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

IX. PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH. (_From a Plan made by Lieutenant Geneste, by permission of Messrs. Wm. Blackwood and Sons_)

X. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE AND ATTACK OF DELHI, IN 1857

XI. PORTRAITS OF GENERAL SIR COLIN CAMPBELL (LORD CLYDE) AND MAJOR-GENERAL SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD (LORD SANDHURST). (_From a Photograph taken in India, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XII. PORTRAIT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G. C. B. (_From a Painting by Thomas Brigstocke, R. A. , engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XIII. PORTRAIT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, K. C. B. (_From a Photograph taken at Lucknow, engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XIV. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, IN 1857

XV. PLAN OF CAWNPORE

XVI. PLAN OF THE ENGAGEMENT AT KHUDAGANJ

XVII. PORTRAIT OF GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V. C. , G. C. B. , K. C. S. I. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XVIII. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW, IN 1858

XIX. PORTRAIT OF LADY ROBERTS (WIFE OF SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS). (_From a Sketch by Carpenter, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XX. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY EARL CANNING, K. G. , G. C. B. , G. M. S. I. , VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Mayall, engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XXI. THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE 101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS). (_From a Sketch by General Sir John Adye, G. C. B. , R. A. , engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXII. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXIII. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE EARL OF LYTTON, G. C. B. , G. M. S. I. , G. M. I. E. , VICEROY OF INDIA. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XXIV. THE ATTACK ON THE PEIWAR KOTAL. (_From a Painting by Vereker Hamilton, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XXV. GENERAL ROBERTS'S GURKHA ORDERLIES. (_From a Water-colour Sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. , engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXVI. GENERAL ROBERTS'S SIKH ORDERLIES. (_From a Water-colour Sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. , engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXVII. ONE OF GENERAL ROBERTS'S PATHAN ORDERLIES. (_From a Water-colour Sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. , engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXVIII. ONE OF GENERAL ROBERTS'S PATHAN ORDERLIES. (_From a Water-colour Sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. , engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXIX. THE ENTRANCE TO THE BALA HISSAR--THE LAHORE GATE AT KABUL. (_From a Photograph, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXX. SKETCH SHOWING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CHARDEH VALLEY ON DECEMBER 10TH AND 11TH, 1879

XXXI. PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEFENCES OF SHERPUR AND THE OPERATIONS ROUND KABUL IN DECEMBER, 1879

XXXII. CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL. (_From a Painting by the Chevalier Desanges, engraved upon wood by W. Cheshire_)

XXXIII. PLAN OF THE ROUTE TAKEN FROM KABUL TO KANDAHAR

XXXIV. SKETCH OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF KANDAHAR

XXXV. PORTRAITS OF THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA (SIR DONALD STEWART, SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, AND SIR ARTHUR HARDINGE). (_From a Photograph, engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XXXVI. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE MARQUIS OF DUFFERIN AND AVA, K. P. , G. C. B. , G. C. M. G. , G. M. S. I. , G. M. I. E. , F. R. S. , VICEROY OF INDIA. (_From an engraving by the Fine Art Society of a portrait by the late Frank Holl, R. A. , re-engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XXXVII. PORTRAIT OF HIS HIGHNESS ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN. (_From a Photograph, engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XXXVIII. MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA

XXXIX. PORTRAIT OF LADY ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Johnson and Hoffmann, engraved upon wood by George Pearson_)

XL. PORTRAIT OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, K. G. , G. C. M. G. , G. M. S. I. , G. M. I. E. , VICEROY OF INDIA. (_From a Photograph by Messrs. Cowell, Simla, engraved upon wood by Swain_)

XLI. PORTRAIT OF FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS ARAB CHARGER 'VONOLEL. ' (_From an Oil-painting by Charles Furse, made from an Instantaneous Photograph, and engraved upon wood by E. Whymper_)

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FORTY-ONE YEARS IN INDIA. 

CHAPTER I. 1852

 Voyage to India--Life in Calcutta--A destructive cyclone --Home-sickness

Forty years ago the departure of a cadet for India was a much moreserious affair than it is at present. Under the regulations then inforce, leave, except on medical certificate, could only be obtainedonce during the whole of an officer's service, and ten years had to bespent in India before that leave could be taken. Small wonder, then, that I felt as if I were bidding England farewell for ever when, onthe 20th February, 1852, I set sail from Southampton with Calcutta formy destination. Steamers in those days ran to and from India but oncea month, and the fleet employed was only capable of transporting some2, 400 passengers in the course of a year. This does not include theCape route; but even taking that into consideration, I should doubtwhether there were then as many travellers to India in a year as thereare now in a fortnight at the busy season. 

My ship was the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer _Ripon_, commanded by Captain Moresby, an ex-officer of the Indian Navy, inwhich he had earned distinction by his survey of the Red Sea. A fewAddiscombe friends were on board, leaving England under the samedepressing circumstances as myself, and what with wind and weather, and the thought that at the best we were bidding farewell to home andrelations for ten long years, we were anything but a cheerful partyfor the first few days of the voyage. Youth and high spirits had, however, re-asserted themselves long before Alexandria, which placewe reached without incident beyond the customary halts for coaling atGibraltar and Malta. At Alexandria we bade adieu to Captain Moresby, who had been most kind and attentive, and whose graphic accountsof the difficulties he had had to overcome whilst mastering thenavigation of the Red Sea served to while away many a tedious hour. 

On landing at Alexandria, we were hurried on board a large mast-lesscanal boat, shaped like a Nile dahabeah. In this we were towed up theMahmoudieh canal for ten hours, until we arrived at Atfieh, on theNile; thence we proceeded by steamer, reaching Cairo in about sixteenhours. Here we put up at Shepherd's Hotel for a couple of days, whichwere most enjoyable, especially to those of the party who, likemyself, saw an eastern city and its picturesque and curious bazaarsfor the first time. From Cairo the route lay across the desert forninety miles, the road being merely a cutting in the sand, quiteundistinguishable at night. The journey was performed in a conveyanceclosely resembling a bathing-machine, which accommodated six people, and was drawn by four mules. My five fellow-travellers were allcadets, only one of whom (Colonel John Stewart, of Ardvorlich, Perthshire) is now alive. The transit took some eighteen hours, withan occasional halt for refreshments. Our baggage was carried oncamels, as were the mails, cargo, and even the coal for the Red Seasteamers. 

On arrival at Suez we found awaiting us the _Oriental_, commanded byCaptain Powell. A number of people met us there who had left Englanda month before we did; but their steamer having broken down, they hadnow to be accommodated on board ours. We were thus very inconvenientlycrowded until we arrived at Aden, where several of the passengers leftus for Bombay. We were not, however, much inclined to complain, assome of our new associates proved themselves decided acquisitions. Amongst them was Mr. (afterwards Sir Barnes) Peacock, an immensefavourite with all on board, and more particularly with us lads. Hewas full of fun, and although then forty-seven years old, and on hisway to Calcutta to join the Governor-General's Council, he took partin our amusements as if he were of the same age as ourselves. Hiscareer in India was brilliant, and on the expiration of his term ofoffice as member of Council he was made Chief Justice of Bengal. Another of the passengers was Colonel (afterwards Sir John Bloomfield)Gough, who died not long ago in Ireland, and was then on his way totake up his appointment as Quartermaster-General of Queen's troops. Hehad served in the 3rd Light Dragoons and on the staff of his cousin, Lord Gough, during the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns, and was naturallyan object of the deepest veneration to all the youngsters on board. 

At Madras we stopped to land passengers, and I took this opportunityof going on shore to see some old Addiscombe friends, most of whomwere greatly excited at the prospect of a war in Burma. The transportswere then actually lying in the Madras roads, and a few days laterthis portion of the expedition started for Rangoon. 

At last, on the 1st April, we reached Calcutta, and I had to saygood-bye to the friends I had made during the six weeks' voyage, mostof whom I was never to meet again. 

On landing, I received a letter from my father, who commanded theLahore division, informing me that the proprietor of Spence's Hotelhad been instructed to receive me, and that I had better put up thereuntil I reported myself at the Head-Quarters of the Bengal Artilleryat Dum-Dum. This was chilling news, for I was the only one of ourparty who had to go to a hotel on landing. The Infantry cadets hadeither been taken charge of by the Town Major, who provided them withquarters in Fort William, or had gone to stay with friends, and theonly other Artilleryman (Stewart) went direct to Dum-Dum, where hehad a brother, also a gunner, who, poor follow, was murdered with hisyoung wife five years later by the mutineers at Gwalior. I was stillmore depressed later on by finding myself at dinner _tête-à-tête_with a first-class specimen of the results of an Indian climate. He belonged to my own regiment, and was going home on medicalcertificate, but did not look as if he could ever reach England. Hegave me the not too pleasing news that by staying in that drearyhotel, instead of proceeding direct to Dum-Dum, I had lost a day'sservice and pay, so I took care to join early the following morning. 

A few years before, Dum-Dum had been a large military station, butthe annexation of the Punjab, and the necessity for maintaininga considerable force in northern India, had greatly reduced thegarrison. Even the small force that remained had embarked for Burmabefore my arrival, so that, instead of a large, cheery mess party, towhich I had been looking forward, I sat down to dinner with only oneother subaltern. 

No time was lost in appointing me to a Native Field Battery, and Iwas put through the usual laboratory course as a commencement to myduties. The life was dull in the extreme, the only variety being anoccasional week in Fort William, where my sole duty was to superintendthe firing of salutes. Nor was there much in my surroundings tocompensate for the prosaic nature of my work. Fort William was notthen what it has since become--one of the healthiest stationsin India. Quite the contrary. The men were crowded into smallbadly-ventilated buildings, and the sanitary arrangements were asdeplorable as the state of the water supply. The only efficientscavengers were the huge birds of prey called adjutants, and sogreat was the dependence placed upon the exertions of these uncleancreatures, that the young cadets were warned that any injury done tothem would be treated as gross misconduct. The inevitable result ofthis state of affairs was endemic sickness, and a death-rate of overten per cent. Per annum. [1]

Calcutta outside the Fort was but a dreary place to fall back upon. Itwas wretchedly lighted by smoky oil-lamps set at very rare intervals. The slow and cumbrous palankin was the ordinary means of conveyance, and, as far as I was concerned, the vaunted hospitality of theAnglo-Indian was conspicuous by its absence. 

I must confess I was disappointed at being left so completely tomyself, especially by the senior military officers, many of whom werepersonally known to my father, who had, I was aware, written to someof them on my behalf. Under these circumstances, I think it is hardlyto be wondered at that I became terribly home-sick, and convincedthat I could never be happy in India. Worst of all, the prospects ofpromotion seemed absolutely hopeless; I was a supernumerary SecondLieutenant, and nearly every officer in the list of the BengalArtillery had served over fifteen years as a subaltern. Thisstagnation extended to every branch of the Indian Army. 

There were singularly few incidents to enliven this unpromising stageof my career. I do, however, remember one rather notable experiencewhich came to me at that time, in the form of a bad cyclone. I wasdining out on the night in question. Gradually the wind grew higherand higher, and it became evident that we were in for a storm of noordinary kind. Consequently, I left my friend's house early. A Nativeservant, carrying a lantern, accompanied me to light me on my way. Atan angle of the road a sudden gust of wind extinguished the light. Theservant, who, like most Natives, was quite at home in the dark, walkedon, believing that I was following in his wake. I shouted to him asloudly as I could, but the uproar was so terrific that he could nothear a word, and there was nothing for it but to try and make my ownway home. The darkness was profound. As I was walking carefully along, I suddenly came in contact with an object, which a timely flash oflightning showed me was a column, standing in exactly the oppositedirection from my own house. I could now locate myself correctly, andthe lightning becoming every moment more vivid, I was enabled to gropemy way by slow degrees to the mess, where I expected to find someoneto show me my way home, but the servants, who knew from experience theprobable effects of a cyclone, had already closed the outside Venetianshutters and barred all the doors. I could just see them through thecracks engaged in making everything fast. In vain I banged at the doorand called at the top of my voice--they heard nothing. Reluctantly Ibecame convinced that there was no alternative but to leave my shelterand face the rapidly increasing storm once more. My bungalow was notmore than half a mile away, but it took me an age to accomplish thisshort distance, as I was only able to move a few steps at a timewhenever the lightning showed me the way. It was necessary to becareful, as the road was raised, with a deep ditch on either side;several trees had already been blown down, and lay across it, and hugebranches were being driven through the air like thistle-down. I foundextreme difficulty in keeping my feet, especially at the cross-roads, where I was more than once all but blown over. At last I reached myhouse, but even then my struggles were not quite at an end. It was avery long time before I could gain admittance. The servant who hadbeen carrying the lantern had arrived, and, missing me, imagined thatI must have returned to the house at which I had dined. The men withwhom I chummed, thinking it unlikely that I should make a secondattempt to return home, had carefully fastened all the doors, momentarily expecting the roof of the house to be blown off. I had tocontinue hammering and shouting for a long time before they heard andadmitted me, thankful to be comparatively safe inside a house. 

By morning the worst of the storm was over, but not before greatdamage had been done. The Native bazaar was completely wrecked, looking as if it had suffered a furious bombardment, and great havochad been made amongst the European houses, not a single verandah oroutside shutter being left in the station. As I walked to the mess, Ifound the road almost impassable from fallen trees; and dead birds, chiefly crows and kites, were so numerous that they had to be carriedoff in cartloads. How I had made my way to my bungalow withoutaccident the night before was difficult to imagine. Even the columnagainst which I had stumbled was levelled by the fury of the blast. This column had been raised a few years before to the memory ofthe officers and men of the 1st Troop, 1st Brigade, Bengal HorseArtillery, who were killed in the disastrous retreat from Kabul in1841. It was afterwards rebuilt. 

Dum-Dum in ruins was even more dreary than before the cyclone, and Ifelt as if I could not possibly continue to live there much longer. Accordingly I wrote to my father, begging him to try and get me sentto Burma; but he replied that he hoped soon to get command of thePeshawar division, and that he would then like me to join him. Thus, though my desire to quit Dum-Dum was not to be immediately gratified, I was buoyed up by the hope that a definite limit had now been placedto my service in that, to me, uninteresting part of India, and myrestlessness and discontent disappeared as if by magic. 

In time of peace, as in war, or during a cholera epidemic, a soldier'smoral condition is infinitely more important than his physicalsurroundings, and it is in this respect, I think, that the subalternof the present day has an advantage over the youngster of forty yearsago. The life of a young officer during his first few months of exile, before he has fallen into the ways of his new life and made friendsfor himself, can never be very happy; but in these days he isencouraged by the feeling that, however distasteful, it need notnecessarily last very long; and he can look forward to a rapid andeasy return to England and friends at no very distant period. At thetime I am writing of he could not but feel completely cut off from allthat had hitherto formed his chief interests in life--his familyand his friends--for ten years is an eternity to the young, and thefeeling of loneliness and home-sickness was apt to become almostinsupportable. 

The climate added its depressing influence; there was no going to thehills then, and as the weary months dragged on, the young strangerbecame more and more dispirited and hopeless. Such was my case. I hadonly been four months in India, but it seemed like four years. My joy, therefore, was unbounded when at last my marching orders arrived. Indeed, the idea that I was about to proceed to that grand field ofsoldierly activity, the North-West Frontier, and there join my father, almost reconciled me to the disappointment of losing my chance offield service in Burma. My arrangements were soon made, and early inAugust I bade a glad good-bye to Dum-Dum. 

[Footnote 1: In the fifty-seven years preceding the Mutiny the annualrate of mortality amongst the European troops in India was sixty-nineper thousand, and in some stations it was even more appalling. TheRoyal Commission appointed in 1864 to inquire into the sanitarycondition of the army in India expressed the hope that, by takingproper precautions, the mortality might be reduced to the rate oftwenty per thousand per annum. I am glad to say that this hope hasbeen more than realized, the annual death-rate since 1882 having neverrisen to seventeen per thousand. ]

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CHAPTER II. 1852

Bengal Horse Artillery--Incidents of the journey--New Friends

When I went to India the mode of travelling was almost as primitiveas it had been a hundred, and probably five hundred, years before. Private individuals for the most part used palankins, while officers, regiments, and drafts were usually sent up country by the river routeas far as Cawnpore. It was necessarily a slow mode of progression--howslow may be imagined from the fact that it took me nearly three monthsto get from Dum-Dum to Peshawar, a distance now traversed with thegreatest ease and comfort in as many days. As far as Benares Itravelled in a barge towed by a steamer--a performance which took thebest part of a month to accomplish. From Benares to Allahabad it was apleasant change to get upon wheels, a horse-dâk having been recentlyestablished between these two places. At Allahabad I was most kindlyreceived by Mr. Lowther, the Commissioner, an old friend of myfather's, in whose house I experienced for the first time that profusehospitality for which Anglo-Indians are proverbial. I was muchsurprised and amused by the circumstance of my host smoking a _hookah_even at meals, for he was one of the few Englishmen who still indulgedin that luxury, as it was then considered. The sole duty of oneservant, called the _hookah-bardar_, was to prepare the pipe for hismaster, and to have it ready at all times. 

My next resting-place was Cawnpore, my birthplace, where I remaineda few days. The Cawnpore division was at that time commanded by anofficer of the name of Palmer, who had only recently attained therank of Brigadier-General, though he could not have been less thansixty-eight years of age, being of the same standing as my father. 

From Cawnpore I went to Meerut, and there came across, for the firsttime, the far-famed Bengal Horse Artillery, and made the acquaintanceof a set of officers who more than realized my expectations regardingthe wearers of the much-coveted jacket, association with whom createdin me a fixed resolve to leave no stone unturned in the endeavour tobecome a horse gunner. Like the Cavalry and Infantry of the East IndiaCompany's service, the Artillery suffered somewhat from the employmentof many of its best officers on the staff and in civil appointments;the officers selected were not seconded or replaced in theirregiments. This was the case in a less degree, no doubt, in the HorseArtillery than in the other branches, for its _esprit_ was great, andofficers were proud to belong to this _corps d'élite_. It certainlywas a splendid service; the men were the pick of those recruited bythe East India Company, they were of magnificent physique, and theiruniform was singularly handsome. The jacket was much the same as thatnow worn by the Royal Horse Artillery, but instead of the busby theyhad a brass helmet covered in front with leopard skin, surmounted bya long red plume which drooped over the back like that of a FrenchCuirassier. This, with white buckskin breeches and long boots, completed a uniform which was one of the most picturesque andeffective I have ever seen on a parade-ground. 

The metalled highway ended at Meerut, and I had to perform theremainder of my journey to Peshawar, a distance of 600 miles, in apalankin, or doolie. 

This manner of travelling was tedious in the extreme. Starting afterdinner, the victim was carried throughout the night by eight men, divided into reliefs of four. The whole of the eight were changed atstages averaging from ten to twelve miles apart. The baggage wasalso conveyed by coolies, who kept up an incessant chatter, and theprocession was lighted on its way by a torch-bearer, whose torchconsisted of bits of rag tied round the end of a stick, upon whichhe continually poured the most malodorous of oils. If thepalankin-bearers were very good, they shuffled along at the rate ofabout three miles an hour, and if there were no delays, forty orforty-five miles could be accomplished before it became necessary toseek shelter from the sun in one of the dâk-bungalows, or rest-houses, erected by Government at convenient intervals along all the principalroutes. In these bungalows a bath could be obtained, and sorely it wasneeded after a journey of thirteen or fourteen hours at a level ofonly a few inches above an exceedingly dusty road. As to food, the_khansamah_, like 'mine host' in the old country, declared himselfat the outset prepared to provide everything the heart of man coulddesire; when, however, the traveller was safely cornered for the restof the day, the _menu_ invariably dwindled down to the elementaryand universal 'sudden death, ' which meant a wretchedly thin chicken, caught, decapitated, grilled, and served up within twenty minutes ofthe meal being ordered. At dinner a variety was made by the chickenbeing curried, accompanied by an unlimited supply of rice and chutney. 

I was glad to be able to break the monotony of this long journey bya visit to a half-sister of mine, who was then living at thehill-station of Mussoorie. The change to the delightful freshness of aHimalayan climate after the Turkish-bath-like atmosphere of the plainsin September was most grateful, and I thoroughly enjoyed the few daysI spent in the midst of the lovely mountain scenery. 

My next station was Umballa. There I fell in with two other troops ofHorse Artillery, and became more than ever enamoured with the idea ofbelonging to so splendid a service. From Umballa it was a two nights'journey to Ludhiana, where I rested for the day, and there met acousin in the Survey Department, who had been suddenly ordered toLahore, so we agreed to travel together. 

The next halting-place was Jullundur. To make a change, we hired abuggy at this place, in which to drive the first stage, sending ourpalankins on ahead; when we overtook them, we found, to our surprise, that their number had increased to six. We were preparing for a start, when it struck us that we ought to make some inquiries about theadditional four, which, from the luggage lying about, we assumed tobe occupied, but which appeared to be stranded for want of bearers tocarry them on. The doors were carefully closed, and it was some timebefore we could get an answer to our offers of assistance. Eventuallya lady looked out, and told us that she and a friend, each accompaniedby two children and an _ayah_, [1] were on their way to Lahore; thatthe bearers who had brought them so far had run away, and that theywere absolutely in despair as to how they were to proceed. It turnedout that the bearers, who had been engaged to carry the ladies onthe second stage towards Lahore, found it more amusing to attend theceremony of the installation of the Raja of Kaparthala, then going on, than to fulfil their engagement. After discussing the situation, theladies were persuaded to get out of their palankins and into ourbuggy. We divided the baggage and six doolies between our sixteenbearers, and started off, my cousin, the _ayahs_, and I on foot. Itwas then 10 p. M. We hoped relays of bearers for the whole partywould be forthcoming at the next stage, but we were doomed todisappointment. Our reliefs were present, but none for the ladies. We succeeded, however, in inducing our original bearers to come on afurther stage, thus arranging for the carriage of the _ayahs_, whilewe two men trudged on beside the buggy for another ten or twelvemiles. It was a heavy, sandy road, and three stages were about as muchas the horse could manage. 

Soon after daybreak next morning we reached the Bias river. Crossingby a bridge of boats, we found on the other side a small one-roomedhouse with a verandah running round it, built for the use of theEuropean overseer in charge of the road. On matters being explained, this man agreed to turn out. The ladies and children were put inside, and my cousin and I spent the day in the verandah; in the evening, with the assistance of the overseer, we were able to get a sufficientnumber of bearers to carry us all on to Mian Mir without furtheradventure. In the course of conversation we found that one of theladies was the wife of Lieutenant Donald Stewart, [2] of the 9th BengalInfantry, and that she and her friend were returning to join theirrespective husbands after spending the summer months at Simla. Thismeeting was the beginning of a close friendship with Sir Donald andLady Stewart, which has lasted to the present day. 

At Mian Mir (the military cantonment of Lahore) I stayed a few dayswith another half-sister, and from there, as the weather was beginningto get cooler, I travelled day and night. One evening about eighto'clock I was disappointed at not having come across the usualrest-house; lights could be seen, however, at no great distance, andI proceeded towards them; they turned out to be the camp fires of aCavalry regiment which was halting there for the night. Being halffamished, and fearing that my craving for food was not likely to begratified unless someone in the camp would take pity upon my forlorncondition, I boldly presented myself at the first tent I came across. The occupant came out, and, on hearing the strait I was in, he withkindly courtesy invited me to enter the tent, saying, 'You are justin time to share our dinner. ' My host turned out to be Major CrawfordChamberlain, [3] commanding the 1st Irregular Cavalry, the famousSkinner's Horse, then on its way to Peshawar. A lady was sitting atthe table--Mrs. Chamberlain--to whom I was introduced; I spent a verypleasant evening, and in this way commenced another equally agreeableand lasting friendship. 

[Footnote 1: A Native woman-servant. ]

[Footnote 2: Now Field Marshal Sir Donald Stewart, Bart. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 3: Now General Crawford Chamberlain, C. S. I. , a brother ofGeneral Sir Neville Chamberlain. ]

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CHAPTER III. 1852-1853

 With my father at Peshawar--Peshawar in 1852--Excitements of a frontier station--A flogging parade--Mackeson's assassination --The Jowaki expedition--A strange dream--A typical frontier fight

Even the longest journey must come to an end at last, and earlyin November I reached Peshawar. My father, who was then in hissixty-ninth year, had just been appointed to command the divisionwith the temporary rank of Major-General. Old as this may appear ata period when Colonels are superannuated at fifty-seven, andMajor-Generals must retire at sixty-two, my father did not considerhimself particularly unlucky. As for the authorities, they evidentlythought they were to be congratulated on having so young and active anofficer to place in a position of responsibility upon the North-WestFrontier, for amongst my father's papers I found letters fromthe Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General expressing highsatisfaction at his appointment to this difficult command. 

It was a great advantage as well as a great pleasure to me to be withmy father at this time. I had left India an infant, and I had norecollection of him until I was twelve years old, at which time hecame home on leave. Even then I saw very little of him, as I was atschool during the greater part of his sojourn in England, thus we metat Peshawar almost as strangers. We did not, however, long remain so;his affectionate greeting soon put an end to any feeling of shyness onmy part, and the genial and kindly spirit which enabled him to enterinto and sympathize with the feelings and aspirations of men youngerthan himself, rendered the year I spent with him at Peshawar oneof the brightest and happiest of my early life. In one respectparticularly I benefited by the intercourse and confidence of theyear in question. My father spoke to me freely of his experiences inAfghanistan, where he commanded during the Afghan war first a brigade, and then Shah Shuja's contingent. The information I in this waygathered regarding the characteristics of that peculiar country, andthe best means of dealing with its still more peculiar people, wasinvaluable to me when I, in my turn, twenty-five years later, foundmyself in command of an army in Afghanistan. 

Eleven years only had elapsed since the first Afghan war, when myfather went to Peshawar and found himself again associated withseveral Afghan friends; some had altogether settled in the Peshawardistrict, for nearly all of those who had assisted us, or shown anyfriendly feeling towards us, had been forced by Dost Mahomed Khan, onhis return as Amir to Kabul, to seek refuge in India. One of the chiefof these unfortunate refugees was Mahomed Usman Khan, Shah Shuja'sWazir, or Prime Minister. He had been very intimate with my father, soit was pleasant for them to meet again and talk over events in whichthey had both played such prominent parts. Usman Khan died some yearsago; but visitors to India who travel as far as Peshawar may stillmeet his sons, one of whom is the Commandant of the Khyber Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel Aslam Khan, C. I. E. , a fine specimen of a Nativesoldier and gentleman, who has proved his loyalty and done excellentservice to the State on many trying occasions. 

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS, G. C. B. 

_From a photograph_. ]

My father had also been on terms of intimacy with Dost Mahomedhimself and many other men of influence in Kabul, from whom, while atPeshawar, he received most interesting letters, in which anxiety wasoften expressed as to whether the English were amicably disposedtowards the Amir. To these communications my father was always carefulto send courteous and conciliatory replies. The correspondence whichtook place confirmed him in his frequently expressed opinion that itwould be greatly to the advantage of the Government, and obviatethe necessity for keeping such large garrisons on the frontier, iffriendly relations could be established with the Amir, and with theneighbouring tribes, who more or less looked to the Ruler of Kabulas their Chief. My father accordingly addressed the Secretary to theGovernment of India, and pointed out how successfully some of the mostexperienced Anglo-Indian officials had managed barbarous tribes bykindness and conciliation. 

My father was prevented by ill-health from remaining long enough atPeshawar to see the result of his proposals, but it was a source ofgreat satisfaction to him to learn before he left India[1] that theywere approved by Lord Dalhousie (the Governor-General), and that theywere already bearing fruit. That the Amir was himself ready to respondto any overtures made to him was evident from a letter written by abrother of the Dost's, which was discovered amongst the papers ofColonel Mackeson (the Commissioner of Peshawar) after his death. Itwas still more gratifying to my father to find that the views ofMackeson's successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes, on thissubject entirely coincided with his own. This distinguished officerand brilliant administrator zealously maintained this policy, andsucceeded in establishing such a good understanding with the Rulerof Kabul that, when the Mutiny broke out, Afghanistan stood aloof, instead of, as might have been the case, turning the scale against us. 

The Peshawar division in 1852 was not only the most important, butthe largest, in India. It included besides Attock, Rawal Pindi, andJhelum, the hill-station of Murree, which had only been recentlyoccupied. The cantonment of Peshawar had been laid out by Sir ColinCampbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), who commanded there when we firstoccupied that place in 1849. He crowded the troops, European andNative, into as small a space as possible in order that the stationmight be the more easily protected from the raids of the Afridisand other robber tribes, who had their homes in the neighbouringmountains, and constantly descended into the valley for the sake ofplunder. To resist these marauders it was necessary to place guardsall round the cantonment. The smaller the enclosure, the fewer guardswould be required. From this point of view alone was Sir Colin'saction excusable; but the result of this overcrowding was what italways is, especially in a tropical climate like that of India, andfor long years Peshawar was a name of terror to the English soldierfrom its proverbial unhealthiness. The water-supply for the firstfive-and-twenty years of our occupation was extremely bad, andsanitary arrangements, particularly as regards Natives, wereapparently considered unnecessary. 

In addition to the cordon of sentries round the cantonment, strongpiquets were posted on all the principal roads leading towards thehills; and every house had to be guarded by a _chokidar_, or watchman, belonging to one of the robber tribes. The maintaining this watchmanwas a sort of blackmail, without consenting to which no one's horsesor other property were safe. The watchmen were armed with all sorts ofquaint old firearms, which, on an alarm being given, they dischargedin the most reckless manner, making it quite a work of danger to passalong a Peshawar road after dark. No one was allowed to venture beyondthe line of sentries when the sun had set, and even in broad daylightit was not safe to go any distance from the station. 

In the autumn of 1851 an officer--Captain Frank Grantham, of the 98thFoot--was riding with a young lady on the Michni road, not far fromthe Artillery quarter-guard, when he was attacked by five hill-men. Grantham was wounded so severely that he died in a few days, thehorses were carried off, but the girl was allowed to escape. She ranas fast as she could to the nearest guard, and told her story; thealarm was given, and the wounded man was brought in. The young ladywas called upon shortly afterwards to identify one of the supposedmurderers, but she could not recognize the man as being of the partywho made the attack; nevertheless, the murderer's friends were afraidof what she might remember, and made an attempt one night to carry heroff. Fortunately, it was frustrated, but from that time, until sheleft Peshawar, it was considered necessary to keep a guard over thehouse in which she lived. 

From all this my readers may probably think that Peshawar, as I firstknew it, was not a desirable place of residence; but I was very happythere. There was a good deal of excitement and adventure; I made manyfriends; and, above all, I had, to me, the novel pleasure of beingwith my father. 

It was the custom in those days for the General commanding one of thelarger divisions to have under him, and in charge of the Head-Quarterstation, a senior officer styled Brigadier. Soon after I went toPeshawar, Sydney Cotton[2] held this appointment, and remained init for many years, making a great reputation for himself during theMutiny, and being eventually appointed to the command of the division. The two senior officers on my father's staff were Lieutenant Norman[3]and Lieutenant Lumsden, [4] the former Deputy Assistant-Adjutant-Generaland the latter Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General. The high opinionof them which my father had formed was subsequently justified by theirdistinguished careers. Norman, with sixteen years' service, and at theage of thirty-four, became Adjutant-General of the Army in India, anda year or two later Secretary to Government in the Military Department. He finished his Indian service as Military Member of Council. Lumsdenbecame Quartermaster-General, and afterwards Adjutant-General, the twohighest positions on the Indian staff. 

There was a separate mess for all the staff officers, and I remembera curious circumstance in connexion with that mess which, unless theexception proves the rule, is strong evidence against the superstitionthat thirteen is an unlucky number to sit down to dinner. On the 1stJanuary, 1853, thirteen of us dined together; eleven years after wewere all alive, nearly the whole of the party having taken part in thesuppression of the Mutiny, and five or six having been wounded. 

From the time of my arrival until the autumn of 1853, nothing ofmuch importance occurred. I lived with my father, and acted as hisAide-de-camp, while, at the same time, I did duty with the Artillery. The 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, to which I belonged, was composed of afine body of men, who had a grand reputation in the field, but, beingsomewhat troublesome in quarters, had acquired the nickname of 'TheDevil's Own. ' Because of the unusually good physique of the men, thiscompany was selected for conversion into a Mountain Battery, which itwas thought advisable to raise at that time. I was the only subalternwith this battery for several months, and though my commanding officerhad no objection to my acting as A. D. C. To my father, he took goodcare that I did my regimental duty strictly and regularly. 

One very painful circumstance stamped itself on my memory. I wasobliged to be present at a flogging parade--the only one, I am glad tosay, I have ever had to attend, although the barbarous and degradingcustom of flogging in the army was not done away with until nearlythirty years later. [5] A few years before I joined the service, thenumber of lashes which might be given was limited to fifty, but evenunder this restriction the sight was a horrible one to witness. Theparade to which I refer was ordered for the punishment of two men whohad been sentenced to fifty lashes each for selling their kits, and toa certain term of imprisonment in addition. They were fine, handsomeyoung Horse Artillerymen, and it was hateful to see them thus treated. Besides, one felt it was productive of harm rather than good, for ittended to destroy the men's self-respect, and to make them completelyreckless. In this instance, no sooner had the two men been releasedfrom prison than they committed the same offence again. They were asecond time tried by Court-Martial, and sentenced as before. How Ilonged to have the power to remit the fifty lashes, for I felt thatselling their kits on this occasion was their way of showing theirresentment at the ignominious treatment they had been subjected to, and of proving that flogging was powerless to prevent their repeatingthe offence. A parade was ordered, as on the previous occasion. Oneman was stripped to the waist, and tied to the wheel of a gun. Thefinding and sentence of the Court-Martial were read out--a trumpeterstanding ready the while to inflict the punishment--when thecommanding officer, Major Robert Waller, instead of ordering him tobegin, to the intense relief of, I believe, every officer present, addressed the prisoners, telling them of his distress at finding twosoldiers belonging to his troop brought up for corporal punishmenttwice in a little more than six weeks, and adding that, however littlethey deserved such leniency, if they would promise not to commit thesame offence again, and to behave better for the future, he wouldremit the flogging part of the sentence. If the prisoners were nothappy, I was; but the clemency was evidently appreciated by them, forthey promised, and kept their words. I did not lose sight of thesetwo men for some years, and was always gratified to learn that theirconduct was uniformly satisfactory, and that they had become good, steady soldiers. 

The Commissioner, or chief civil authority, when I arrived atPeshawar, was Colonel Mackeson, a well-known frontier officer who hadgreatly distinguished himself during the first Afghan war by his workamong the Afridis and other border tribes, by whom he was liked andrespected as much as he was feared. During Shah Shuja's brief reignat Kabul, Mackeson was continually employed on political duty in theKhyber Pass and at Peshawar. On the breaking out of the insurrectionat Kabul, he was indefatigable in forwarding supplies and money toSir Robert Sale at Jalalabad, hastening up the reinforcements, andmaintaining British influence in the Khyber, a task of no smallmagnitude when we remember that a religious war had been proclaimed, and all true believers had been called upon to exterminate theFeringhis. While at Peshawar, as Commissioner, his duties were arduousand his responsibilities heavy--the more so as at that time the Afghaninhabitants of the city were in a dangerous and excited state. 

On the 10th September, 1853, we were horrified to learn that Mackesonhad been murdered by a religious fanatic. He was sitting in theverandah of his house listening to appeals from the decisions of hissubordinates, when, towards evening, a man--who had been remarkedby many during the day earnestly engaged in his devotions, hisprayer-carpet being spread within sight of the house--came up and, making a low salaam to Mackeson, presented him with a paper. TheCommissioner, supposing it to be a petition, stretched out his hand totake it, when the man instantly plunged a dagger into his breast. Thenoise consequent on the struggle attracted the attention of some ofthe domestic servants and one of the Native officials. The latterthrew himself between Mackeson and the fanatic, and was himselfslightly wounded in his efforts to rescue his Chief. 

Mackeson lingered until the 14th September. His death causedconsiderable excitement in the city and along the border, increasingto an alarming extent when it became known that the murderer had beenhanged and his body burnt. This mode of disposing of one of their deadis considered by Mahomedans as the greatest insult that can be offeredto their religion, for in thus treating the corpse, as if it were thatof (by them) a hated and despised Hindu, the dead man is supposed tobe deprived of every chance of paradise. It was not without carefuland deliberate consideration that this course was decided upon, and itwas only adopted on account of the deterrent effect it would have uponfanatical Mahomedans, who count it all gain to sacrifice their livesby the murder of a heretic, and thereby secure, as they firmlybelieve, eternal happiness, but loathe the idea of being burned, whicheffectually prevents the murderer being raised to the dignity of amartyr, and revered as a saint ever after. 

It being rumoured that the Pathans intended to retaliate bydesecrating the late Commissioner's grave, it was arranged that heshould be buried within cantonment limits. A monument was raised tohis memory by public subscription, and his epitaph[6] was written bythe Governor-General himself. 

Shortly before Mackeson's murder my father had found it necessary togo to the hill-station of Murree; the hot weather had tried him verymuch, and he required a change. He had scarcely arrived there, whenhe was startled by the news of the tragedy which had occurred, and atonce determined to return, notwithstanding its being the most sicklyseason of the year at Peshawar, for he felt that at a time of suchdangerous excitement it was his duty to be present. As a precautionarymeasure, he ordered the 22nd Foot from Rawal Pindi to Peshawar. Thisand other steps which he deemed prudent to take soon put an end to thedisturbances. 

No sooner had matters quieted down at Peshawar than the JowakiAfridis, who inhabit the country immediately to the east of the KohatPass, began to give trouble, and we went out into camp to select asite for a post which would serve to cover the northern entrance tothe pass and keep the tribesmen under surveillance. The great changeof temperature, from the intense heat he had undergone in the summerto the bitter cold of November nights in tents, was too severe a trialfor my father. He was then close on seventy, and though apparentlyactive as ever, he was far from well, consequently the doctorsstrongly urged him not to risk another hot weather in India. It wasaccordingly settled that he should return to England without delay. 

Shortly before his departure, an incident occurred which I will relatefor the benefit of psychological students; they may, perhaps, be ableto explain it, I never could. My father had some time before issuedinvitations for a dance which was to take place in two days' time--onMonday, the 17th October, 1853. On the Saturday morning he appeareddisturbed and unhappy, and during breakfast he was silent anddespondent--very different from his usual bright and cheery self. On my questioning him as to the cause, he told me he had had anunpleasant dream--one which he had dreamt several times before, andwhich had always been followed by the death of a near relation. As theday advanced, in spite of my efforts to cheer him, he became more andmore depressed, and even said he should like to put off the dance. Idissuaded him from taking this step for the time being; but that nighthe had the same dream again, and the next morning he insisted onthe dance being postponed. It seemed to me rather absurd to have todisappoint our friends because of a dream; there was, however, nothingfor it but to carry out my father's wishes, and intimation wasaccordingly sent to the invited guests. The following morning the postbrought news of the sudden death of the half-sister at Lahore withwhom I had stayed on my way to Peshawar. 

As my father was really very unwell, it was not thought advisable forhim to travel alone, so it was arranged that I should accompany him toRawal Pindi. We started from Peshawar on the 27th November, and droveas far as Nowshera. The next day we went on to Attock. I found theinvalid had benefited so much by the change that it was quite safe forhim to continue the journey alone, and I consented the more readily toleave him, as I was anxious to get back to my battery, which had beenordered on service, and was then with the force assembled at Bazidkhelfor an expedition against the Bori villages of the Jowaki Afridis. 

Having said farewell to my father, I started for Bazidkhel early onthe 29th November. At that time there was no direct road to that placefrom Nowshera, nor was it considered safe to travel alone along theslopes of the lower Afridi hills. I had, therefore, to go all the wayback to Peshawar to get to my destination. I rode as fast as relays ofhorses could carry me, in the hope that I should reach Bazidkhel intime for the fun; but soon after passing Nowshera I heard guns in thedirection of the Kohat Pass, and realized that I should be too late. I was very disappointed at missing this, my first chance of activeservice, and not accompanying the newly raised Mountain Train (as itwas then called) on the first occasion of its being employed in thefield. 

The object of this expedition was to punish the Jowaki section of theAfridis for their many delinquencies during the three previous years. Numerous murders and raids on the Kohat and Peshawar districts, the plunder of boats on the Indus, and the murder of a Europeanapothecary, were all traced to this tribe. They had been blockaded, and their resort to the salt-mines near Bahadurkhel and to the marketsof Kohat and Peshawar had been interdicted, but these measuresproduced no effect on the recalcitrant tribesmen. John (afterwardsLord) Lawrence, who had come to Peshawar for the purpose of taking (sic)over frontier affairs with Edwardes, the new Commissioner, held aconference with the _maliks_[7] of the villages connected with theJowaki Pass, and being anxious to avoid hostilities, offered tocondone all past offences if the tribes would agree to certainconditions, which, briefly, were that no further crimes should becommitted in British territory; that such criminals as had takenrefuge in their villages should be given up; and that for the futurecriminals and outlaws flying from justice should not be affordedan asylum in Jowaki lands. To the second condition the whole tribeabsolutely refused to agree. They stated, with truth, that from timeimmemorial it was their custom to afford an asylum to anyone demandingit, and that to surrender a man who had sought and found shelter withthem would be a disgrace which they could not endure. 

Afridis have curious ideas as to the laws of hospitality; it is nouncommon thing for them to murder their guests in cold blood, but itis contrary to their code of honour to surrender a fugitive who hasclaimed an asylum with them. 

The sections of the tribe living nearest our territory agreed to thefirst and third of our conditions, no doubt because they felt theywere in our power, and had suffered considerably from the blockade. But the Bori Afridis would make no atonement for the past and giveno security for the future, although they admitted having robbed andmurdered our subjects. There was nothing for it, therefore, but tosend a force against them. This force consisted of rather more than1, 500 men, British and Native. The Afridis made no stand until wereached their main position, when they offered a stout resistance, which, however, proved of no avail against the gallantry of the Guidesand 66th (now 1st) Gurkhas. The Bori villages were then destroyed, with a loss to us of eight men killed and thirty-one wounded. 

Sufficient punishment having been inflicted, our force retired. Therear-guard was hotly pressed, and it was late in the evening beforethe troops got clear of the hills. 

The tribesmen with whom we had just made friends sat in hundreds onthe ridges watching the progress of the fight. It was no doubt a greattemptation to them to attack the 'infidels' while they were at theirmercy, and considerable anxiety was felt by Lawrence and Edwardesas to the part which our new allies would play; their relief wasproportionate when it was found they intended to maintain a neutralattitude. 

I shall not further describe the events of that day, more especiallyas I was not fortunate enough to be in time to take part in theproceedings. I have only referred to this expedition as being typicalof many little frontier fights, and because I remember being muchimpressed at the time with the danger of trusting our communicationsin a difficult mountainous country to people closely allied to thoseagainst whom we were fighting. This over-confidence in the good faithof our frontier neighbours caused us serious embarrassments a fewyears later during the Umbeyla campaign. 

The force remained in camp for some time for the protection of the menemployed in building the post, which was called Fort Mackeson, afterthe murdered Commissioner. When it was completed we returned toPeshawar. 

[Footnote 1: Shortly before my father left Peshawar he receivedthe following letter from Colonel Outram, dated Calcutta, the 23rdOctober, 1853: 'As I know that your views as to the policy that shouldbe pursued towards Dost Mahomed must be in accordance with those ofthe Governor-General, I accordingly showed your letter to Grant, Courtney, and Colonel Low, all of whom were glad to learn that youentertained such sound views, opposed though they be with the generalclamour for war with the Kabulese which appears to be the cry of thearmy. This, together with the wise forethought you displayed beforethe Kabul insurrection (which, though at the time it found no favourat Head-Quarters, was subsequently so mournfully established by theKabul massacre, which would have been prevented had your warningsbeen attended to), shows how well you would combine the military andpolitical control of the country beyond the Indus. ']

[Footnote 2: The late General Sir Sydney Cotton, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 3: Now General Sir Henry Norman, G. C. B. , G. C. M. G. , latelyGovernor of Queensland. ]

[Footnote 4: Now General Sir Peter Lumsden, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: 1881. ]

[Footnote 6:

 'HERE LIES THE BODY OF FREDERICK MACKESON, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL IN THE BENGAL ARMY, COMPANION OF THE BATH, AND

 COMMISSIONER OF PESHAWAR, WHO WAS BORN SEPTEMBER 2ND, 1807, AND DIED

 SEPTEMBER 14TH, 1853, OF A WOUND INFLICTED BY A RELIGIOUS FANATIC. 

He was the beau-ideal of a soldier--cool to conceive, brave to dare, and strong to do. The Indian Army was proud of his noble presence inits ranks--not without cause. On the dark page of the Afghan war thename of "Mackeson" shines brightly out; the frontier was his post, andthe future his field. The defiles of the Khyber and the peaks of theBlack Mountain alike witness his exploits. Death still found him infront. Unconquered enemies felt safer when he fell. His own Governmentthus mourn the fall. 

'The reputation of Lieutenant-Colonel Mackeson as a soldier is knownto and honoured by all. His value as a political servant of the Stateis known to none better than to the Governor-General himself, who in adifficult and eventful time had cause to mark his great ability, andthe admirable prudence, discretion, and temper, which added tenfoldvalue to the high soldierly qualities of his public character. 

'The loss of Colonel Mackeson's life would have dimmed a victory; tolose him thus, by the hand of a foul assassin, is a misfortune ofthe heaviest gloom for the Government, which counted him amongst itsbravest and best. 

'General orders of the Marquis Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, 3rd October, 1853. 

'This monument was erected by his friends. ']

[Footnote 7: Head men. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER IV. 1854-1856

 A trip to Khagan--The Vale of Kashmir--With the Horse Artillery --My first visit to Simla--Life at Peshawar--A staff appointment --The bump of locality

I had had a great deal of fever during my eighteen months' residenceat Peshawar, and in April, 1854, I obtained six months' leave toKashmir. I travelled _viâ_ Murree to Abbottabad, along the route nowwell known as the 'Gullies. ' Here I was joined by Lieutenant GeorgeRodney Brown, [1] a subaltern of Horse Artillery, with whom I chummedat Peshawar. 

Abbottabad was a very small place in those days. It was named afterits first Deputy-Commissioner, James Abbott, [2] famous for his journey_viâ_ Bokhara and Khiva to Russia in 1839, undertaken for the releaseof Russian prisoners who were kept as slaves by the Turkomans. He hadjust left, and had been succeeded as Deputy-Commissioner by a CaptainBecher, who, fortunately for us, was away in the district. I sayfortunately, because we were bent on visiting Khagan, and had obtainedpermission from the Commissioner of Peshawar to do so. He had toldus to apply to Becher for assistance, but from what we heard of thatofficer, it did not seem likely he would help us. Khagan was beyondour border, and the inhabitants were said to be even more fanaticalthan the rest of the frontier tribes. The Commissioner, however, hadgiven us leave, and as his Deputy appeared to be the kind of manto create obstacles, we made up our minds to slip away before hereturned. 

We started on the 21st May, and marched to Habibula-Ki-Ghari. Here theroad bifurcates, one branch leading to Kashmir, the other to Khagan. We took the latter, and proceeded to Balakot, twelve miles furtheron, which was then our frontier post. There we found a small guard ofFrontier Police, two of whom we induced to accompany us on our onwardjourney for the purpose of assisting to look after the baggage andcollecting coolies. Three days' more marching brought us to Khagan. The road almost the whole way from Balakot ran along a precipiceoverhanging the Nainsukh river, at that time of year a rushingtorrent, owing to the melting of the snows on the higher ranges. Thetrack was rough, steep, and in some places very narrow. We crossed andrecrossed the river several times by means of snow-bridges, which, spanning the limpid, jade-coloured water, had a very pretty effect. Atone point our _shikarris_[3] stopped, and proudly told us that on thatvery spot their tribe had destroyed a Sikh army sent against them inthe time of Runjit Sing. It certainly was a place well chosen for astand, not more than fifty yards wide, with a perpendicular cliff onone side and a roaring torrent on the other. 

The people apparently did not object to our being in their country, and treated us with much civility throughout our journey. We wereenjoying ourselves immensely, so when an official cover reached uswith the signature of the dreaded Deputy-Commissioner in the corner, we agreed that it would be unwise to open it just then. 

Khagan was almost buried in snow. The scenery was magnificent, andbecame every moment more wonderful as we slowly climbed the steepascent in front of us; range after range of snow-capped mountainsdisclosed themselves to our view, rising higher and higher into theair, until at last, towering above all, Nanga Parbat[4] in all herspotless beauty was revealed to our astonished and delighted gaze. 

We could not get beyond Khagan. Our coolies refused to go further, alleging as their reason the danger to be dreaded from avalanchesin that month; but I suspect that fear of hostility from the tribesfurther north had more to do with their reluctance to proceed thandread of falling avalanches. We remained at Khagan for two orthree days in the hope of being able to shoot an ibex, but we weredisappointed; we never even saw one. 

We retraced our steps with considerable regret, and reachedHabibula-Ki-Ghari on the 31st May. Here we received a second officialdocument from Abbottabad. It contained, like the previous letter, which we now looked at for the first time, orders for our immediatereturn, and warnings that we were on no account to go to Khagan. Sincethen Khagan has been more than once visited by British officers, andnow a road is in course of construction along the route we travelled, as being a more direct line of communication with Gilghit than that_viâ_ Kashmir. 

We made no delay at Habibula-Ki-Ghari, but started at once for thelovely Vale of Kashmir, where we spent the summer, amusing ourselvesby making excursions to all the places of interest and beauty we hadso often heard of, and occasionally shooting a bear. The place whichimpressed me most was Martund, [5] where stand the picturesque ruins ofa once renowned Hindu temple. These noble ruins are the most strikingin size and position of all the existing remains of the past gloriesof Kashmir. 

From Martund we made our way to Vernag, the celebrated spring whichis supposed to be the source of the Jhelum river. The Moghul EmperorAkbar built there a summer palace, and the arches, on which it issaid rested the private apartments of the lovely Nur Jehan, are stillvisible. 

We wandered over the beautiful and fertile Lolab valley, and pitchedour little camp in the midst of groves of chunar, walnut, apple, cherry, and peach trees; and we marched up the Sind valley, andcrossed the Zojji La Pass leading into Thibet. The scenery all alongthis route is extremely grand. On either side are lofty mountains, their peaks wrapped in snow, their sides clothed with pine, and theirfeet covered with forests, in which is to be found almost every kindof deciduous tree. From time to time we returned for a few days toSrinagar, the capital of Kashmir, to enjoy the pleasures of morecivilized society. Srinagar is so well known nowadays, and has beenso often described in poetry and prose, that it is needless for me todwell at length upon its delights, which, I am inclined to think, aregreater in imagination than in reality. It has been called the Veniceof the East, and in some respects it certainly does remind one of the'Bride of the Sea, ' both in its picturesqueness and (when one getsinto the small and tortuous canals) its unsavouriness. Even at thetime of which I am writing it was dilapidated, and the houses lookedexactly like those made by children out of a pack of cards, which apuff of wind might be expected to destroy. Of late years the greaterpart of the city has been injured by earthquakes, and Srinagar looksmore than ever like a card city. The great beauty of the place inthose days was the wooden bridges covered with creepers, and gay withbooths and shops of all descriptions, which spanned the Jhelum atintervals for the three miles the river runs through the town--now, alas! for the artistic traveller, no more. Booths and shops have beenswept away, and the creepers have disappeared--decidedly an advantagefrom a sanitary point of view, but destructive of the quaintpicturesqueness of the town. 

The floating gardens are a unique and very pretty characteristic ofSrinagar. The lake is nowhere deeper than ten or twelve feet, and insome places much less. These gardens are made by driving stakes intothe bed of the lake, long enough to project three or four feet abovethe surface of the water. These stakes are placed at intervals in anoblong form, and are bound together by reeds and rushes twined in andout and across, until a kind of stationary raft is made, on whichearth and turf are piled. In this soil seeds are sown, and the cropsof melons and other fruits raised in these fertile beds are extremelyfine and abundant. 

The magnificent chunar-trees are another very beautiful feature of thecountry. They grow to a great height and girth, and so luxuriant anddense is their foliage that I have sat reading and writing for hoursduring heavy rain under one of these trees and kept perfectly dry. 

The immediate vicinity of Srinagar is very pretty, and the wholevalley of Kashmir is lovely beyond description: surrounded bybeautifully-wooded mountains, intersected with streams and lakes, andgay with flowers of every description, for in Kashmir many of thegorgeous eastern plants and the more simple but sweeter ones ofEngland meet on common ground. To it may appropriately be applied thePersian couplet:

 'Agar fardos baru-i zamin ast, hamin ast, hamin ast' (If there be an Elysium on earth, it is this, it is this). 

The soil is extremely productive; anything will grow in it. Put astick into the ground, and in an extraordinary short space of time itbecomes a tree and bears fruit. What were we about, to sell such acountry for three quarters of a million sterling? It would have madethe most perfect sanatorium for our troops, and furnished an admirablefield for British enterprise and colonization, its climate being asnear perfection as anything can be. 

How sad it is that, in a country 'where every prospect pleases, only man' should be 'vile'! And man, as he existed in Kashmir, wasvile--vile, because so miserable. The Mahomedan inhabitants were beingground down by Hindu rulers, who seized all their earnings, leavingthem barely sufficient to keep body and soul together. What interestcould such people have in cultivating their land, or doing any workbeyond what was necessary to mere existence? However hard they mightlabour, their efforts would benefit neither themselves nor theirchildren, and so their only thought was to get through life withas little exertion as possible--in the summer sitting in the sunabsolutely idle the greater part of the day, and in the winter wrappedup in their blankets, under which were concealed curious littlevessels called _kangris_, holding two or three bits of live charcoal. Every Kashmiri still carries one of these _kangris_, as the mosteconomical way of keeping himself warm. 

Early in September we said good-bye to the happy valley and returnedto Peshawar, where I rejoined the Mountain Battery. 

In November, to my great delight, I was given my jacket. At first myhappiness was somewhat damped by the fact that the troop to which Iwas posted was stationed at Umballa. I did not want to leave Peshawar, and in the end I had not to do so, as a vacancy most opportunelyoccurred in one of the troops of Horse Artillery at that station, which was given to me. 

Life on the frontier in those days had a great charm for most youngmen; there was always something of interest going on; militaryexpeditions were constantly taking place, or being speculated upon, and one lived in hope of being amongst those chosen for activeservice. Peshawar, too, notwithstanding its unhealthiness, was afavourite station with officers. To me it was particularly pleasant, for it had the largest force of Artillery of any station in Indiaexcept Meerut; the mess was a good one, and was composed of as nicea set of fellows as were to be found in the army. In addition to theofficers of the regiment, there were a certain number of honorarymembers; all the staff and civilians belonged to the Artillery mess, and on guest-nights we sat down as many as sixty to dinner. Anotherattraction was the 'coffee shop, ' an institution which has now almostceased to exist, at which we all congregated after morning parade andfreely discussed the home and local news. 

The troop to which I was posted was composed of a magnificent body ofmen, nearly all Irishmen, most of whom could have lifted me upwith one hand. They were fine riders, and needed to be so, for thestud-horses used for Artillery purposes at that time were not thequiet, well-broken animals of the present day. I used to try myhand at riding them all in turn, and thus learnt to understand andappreciate the amount of nerve, patience, and skill necessary tothe making of a good Horse Artillery 'driver, ' with the additionaladvantage that I was brought into constant contact with the men. Italso qualified me to ride in the officers' team for the regimentalbrake. The brake, it must be understood, was drawn by six horses, eachridden postilion fashion by an officer. 

My troop was commanded by Captain Barr, a dear old fellow who had seena good deal of service and was much liked by officers and men, buthardly the figure for a Horse Artilleryman, as he weighed aboutseventeen stone. On a troop parade Barr took up his position wellin advance and made his own pace, but on brigade parades he had toconform to the movements of the other arms, and on these occasions heused to tell one of the subalterns as he galloped past him to come'left about' at the right time without waiting for his order. This, ofcourse, we were always careful to do, and by the time we had come intoaction Barr had caught us up and was at his post. 

During the winter of 1854-55 I had several returns of Peshawar fever, and by the beginning of the spring I was so reduced that I was giveneight months' leave on medical certificate, with orders to reportmyself at Mian Mir at its expiration, in view to my going through theriding course, there being no Riding-Master at Peshawar. 

I decided to return to Kashmir in the first instance, and thence tomarch across the Himalayas to Simla. 

On my way into Kashmir I was fortunate enough to fall in with a veryagreeable travelling companion--Lieutenant John Watson. [6] He was thenAdjutant of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and was looked upon as one ofthe most promising officers of the Frontier Force. We spent a veryenjoyable time in Kashmir, and early in August I started for Simlawith two brother officers named Light and Mercer, whose acquaintanceI had only recently made, but who turned out to be very pleasantfellow-travellers. 

We marched _viâ_ Kishtwar, Chamba, and Dharmsala, a distance of about400 miles, through most beautiful scenery. At the last-named place Iparted from my companions, who travelled onwards to Simla by the Kuluvalley, while I took the shorter route _viâ_ Bilaspur. 

The Simla of those days was not the busy and important place ithas since become. The Governor-General seldom visited it, and theCommander-in-Chief only spent a summer there occasionally. When Iarrived, Sir William Gomm, the Commander-in-Chief of that day, who hadbeen spending the hot weather months there, was about to give up hiscommand, and Colonel Grant, [7] who had been his Adjutant-General, hadleft not long before. 

The only thing of interest to myself which occurred during the month Iremained at Simla was that I lunched with Colonel Arthur Becher, theQuartermaster-General. I think I hear my reader say, 'Not a veryremarkable event to chronicle. ' But that lunch was a memorable one tome; indeed, it was the turning-point in my career, for my host wasgood enough to say he should like to have me in his department someday, and this meant a great deal to me. Joining a department at thattime generally resulted in remaining in it for the greater partof one's service. There was then no limit to the tenure of staffappointments, and the object of every ambitious young officer was toget into one department or another--political, civil, or the armystaff. My father had always impressed upon me that the politicaldepartment was _the_ one to aspire to, and failing that, theQuartermaster-General's, as in the latter there was the best chance ofseeing service. I had cherished a sort of vague hope that I might someday be lucky enough to become a Deputy Assistant-Quartermaster-General, for although I fully recognized the advantages of a political career, I preferred being more closely associated with the army, and I had seenenough of staff work to satisfy myself that it would suit me; so thefew words spoken to me by Colonel Becher made me supremely happy. 

It never entered into my head that I should get an early appointment;the fact of the Quartermaster-General thinking of me as a possiblerecruit was quite enough for me. I was in no hurry to leave the HorseArtillery, to which I was proud of belonging, and in which I hoped tosee service while still on the frontier. I left Simla very pleasedwith the result of my visit, and very grateful to Colonel Becher, whoproved a good friend to me ever after, and I made my way to Mian Mir, where I went through the riding-school course, and then returned toPeshawar. 

(1856) The winter of 1855-56 passed much as the cold weather generallydoes in the north of India. Our amusements consisted of an occasionalrace-meeting or cricket match. Polo was unknown in those days, andhunting the jackal, a sport which has been a source of so muchrecreation to the Peshawar garrison for thirty odd years, had not thenbeen thought of. It was a pleasant change to visit the outposts, andwhenever I got the chance I rode over to Mardan, where the Corpsof Guides were stationed, commanded by that gallant soldier, HarryLumsden, [8] who had raised the corps in 1846 under the auspices ofHenry Lawrence. Many were the good gallops I enjoyed with his hawks, hunting the _aubara_. [9] Of work there was plenty at Peshawar, for theBrigadier, Sydney Cotton, [10] kept us alive with field days, carefullyinstilling into us his idea that parade-grounds were simply useful fordrill and preliminary instruction, and that as soon as the rudimentsof a soldier's education had been learnt, the troops should leavetheir nursery, and try as far as possible to practise in peace whatthey would have to do in war. Sydney Cotton was never tired ofexplaining that the machinery of war, like all other machinery, shouldbe kept, so to speak, oiled and ready for use. 

My dream of a staff appointment was realized more quickly than I hadexpected. In the early part of 1856 the Surveyor-General applied forthe services of two or three experienced officers to assist in thesurvey of Kashmir. Lumsden, the D. A. Q. M. G. , was one of those selectedfor the duty, and I was appointed to officiate for him. So delightedwas I to get my foot on the lowest rung of the staff ladder, that Icheerfully agreed to the condition my Captain insisted upon, that Ishould perform my regimental duties in addition to the staff work. Things went merrily with me for a short time, when most unexpectedlymy hopes of some day becoming Quartermaster-General of the Army inIndia were dashed to the ground by the Governor-General refusingto confirm my appointment, because I had not passed the prescribedexamination in Hindustani. A rule existed requiring a language test, but it had seldom been enforced, certainly not in the case of 'actingappointments, ' so that this refusal came as a great blow to me. Ithad, however, excellent results, for it made me determined to pass inHindustani. It was then May, and in July the half-yearly examinationwas to be held. I forthwith engaged the best _munshi_[11] at Peshawar, shut myself up, and studied Indian literature from morning till night, until I felt pretty confident of success. 

Just before the examination took place, the officer who had steppedinto my shoes when I was turned out (Lieutenant Mordaunt Fitz-Gerald, of my own regiment) was offered an appointment in the Punjab FrontierForce. He consulted me as to the advisability of accepting it, andI told him I thought he ought not to do so. I considered this mostdisinterested advice, for I had good reason to believe that I shouldbe re-appointed to the staff, should the appointment again becomevacant. Fortunately for me, Fitz-Gerald followed the usual procedureof those who delight in consulting their friends. He listened to myadvice, and then decided not to follow it. Accordingly, he joined thePunjab Frontier Force, whilst I, having passed the examination, wentback to the coveted appointment, and continued in the department, withthe exception of one or two short intervals, until 1878, when I leftit as Quartermaster-General. 

The autumn of 1856 was a very sickly one at Peshawar; fever was rifeamongst the troops, and in the hope of shaking it off Brigadier Cottongot permission to take a certain number into camp. It was September, and the sun was still very hot, so that it was necessary to begin thedaily march long before dawn in order to reach the new camping groundwhile it was still tolerably cool. We crossed the Kabul river atNowshera, which place was then being made into a station for troops, and marched about the Yusafzai plain for three weeks. The chiefdifficulty was the absence of water, and I had to prospect the countryevery afternoon for a sufficient supply, and to determine, with regardto this _sine quâ non_, where the camp should be pitched the next day. On one occasion the best place I could discover was between two andthree miles off the main road. There was no difficulty in reaching itby day, but I was afraid of some mistake being made when we had toleave it in the small hours of the morning, few things being morebewildering than to find one's way in the dark from a camp pitched inthe open country when once the tents have been struck. It was my dutyto lead the column and see that it marched off in the right direction;knowing how anxious the Brigadier was that the new ground should bereached while it was cool, and the men be thus saved from exposure tothe sun, I was careful to note my position with regard to the stars, and to explain to the officer who was in orders to command the advanceguard the direction he must take. When the time came to start, and theBrigadier was about to order the bugler to sound the march, I saw thatthe advance guard was drawn up at right angles to the way in which wehad to proceed. The officer commanding it was positive he was right, and in this he was supported by Brigadier Cotton and some of the otherofficers; I was equally positive that he was wrong, and that if wemarched as he proposed, we should find ourselves several miles outof our course. The Brigadier settled the question by saying I wasresponsible for the troops going in the right direction, and orderingme to show the way. The country was perfectly bare, there was nota tree or object of any kind to guide me, and the distance seemedinterminable. I heard opinions freely expressed that I was on thewrong road, and at last, when the Brigadier himself came up to me andsaid he thought I must have lost the way, I really began to waver inmy conviction that I was right. At that moment my horse stumbled intoa ditch, which proved to be the boundary of the main road. I wasimmensely relieved, the Brigadier was delighted, and from that momentI think he was satisfied that I had, what is so essential to aQuartermaster-General in the field, the bump of locality. 

In October the Artillery moved into the practice camp at Chamkanie, about five miles from Peshawar. It was intended that we should remainthere for a couple of months, but before the end of that time I hadto join the General at Rawal Pindi, where he had gone on a tour ofinspection. Being anxious not to shirk my regimental duty, I did notleave Chamkanie until the last moment, and had but one day in whichto reach Rawal Pindi, a distance of one hundred miles, which Iaccomplished on horseback between 7 a. M. And 6 p. M. , only stopping atAttock a short time for refreshment. 

This tour with General Reed ended my staff duties for a time, asthe survey in Kashmir had come to an end and Lumsden rejoined hisappointment before Christmas. 

[Footnote 1: Now a retired Major-General. ]

[Footnote 2: Now General Sir James Abbott, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 3: Men who carry the guns, and point out the most likelyplaces for game, etc. ]

[Footnote 4: 26, 000 feet above the sea-level. ]

[Footnote 5: Three miles east of Islamabad. ]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir John Watson, V. C. , K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 7: The late Field-Marshal Sir Patrick Grant, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 8: The late General Sir Harry Lumsden, K. C. S. I. , C. B. ]

[Footnote 9: Bastard florican. ]

[Footnote 10: This officer arrived in India as a Cornet in the 24thLight Dragoons in the year 1810, and although, when he reachedPeshawar with his regiment--the 22nd Foot--in 1853, he had beenforty-three years in the army, and was sixty-one years of age, he hadnot even succeeded to the command of a battalion. He was an officerof unusual energy and activity, a fine rider, a pattern drill, and athorough soldier all round. He was not fortunate enough to see muchactive service, but it must have been a source of consolation to himto feel, when ending his days as Governor of the Royal Hospital atChelsea, that it was in a great measure owing to his foresight anddecision that there was no serious disturbance at Peshawar during theeventful summer of 1857. ]

[Footnote 11: Instructor in Oriental languages. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER V. 1856-1857

 Lord Dalhousie's Afghan policy--Treaty with Dost Mahomed --War with Persia--The advantage of the Amir's friendship --John Nicholson--'A pillar of strength on the frontier'

Towards the close of the year 1856, a rumour reached us that the Amir, Dost Mahomed Khan, was shortly expected to arrive at Peshawar to meetthe Chief Commissioner, Sir John Lawrence, who had recently been madea K. C. B. 

Before describing the Amir's visit and its results, it seems desirablethat I should briefly explain how and why the visit was brought about, and then endeavour to show what an important bearing its results hadon the great crisis which occurred so unexpectedly a few months later. 

It will be remembered that the murdered Mackeson was succeededas Commissioner of Peshawar by Herbert Edwardes, one of the mostremarkable men that the Indian army has ever produced, and who, as Ihave already mentioned, entirely concurred in my father's expressedopinion as to the great advantage it would be for the Government ofIndia to enter into more friendly relations with the Ruler of Kabul. They both held that the constant troubles all along our frontier werein a great measure due to the Amir's hostility, and that such troubleswould increase rather than diminish unless we could succeed inestablishing an _entente cordiale_ with Dost Mahomed. 

In 1854 Edwardes had a correspondence with the Governor-General on thesubject, and on one occasion expressed himself as follows: 'My ownfeeling is, that we have much injured Dost Mahomed, and may very wellafford to let by-gones be by-gones. It would contribute much tothe security of this frontier if open relations of goodwill wereestablished at Kabul. There is a sullenness in our present relations, as if both parties were brooding over the past, and expecting anopportunity in the future. This keeps up excitement and unrest, andprevents our influence and institutions taking root. I should be veryglad to see a new account opened on the basis of an open treaty offriendship and alliance. '

Lord Dalhousie was quite in accord with Edwardes. He thought it verydesirable to be on better terms with Kabul, but believed this to bea result difficult to attain. 'I give you, ' he said in a letter toEdwardes, _carte blanche_, and if you can only bring about such aresult as you propose, it will be a new feather in your cap. '

Lord Dalhousie was supported by the British Government in his opinionas to the desirability of coming to a better understanding with theAmir. War with Russia was then imminent, and the strained condition ofEuropean politics made it expedient that we should be on more amicableterms with Afghanistan. 

The Governor-General thus wrote to Edwardes:

'Prospects of a war between Russia and Turkey are watched withinterest by all.... In England they are fidgety regarding this borderbeyond all reason, and most anxious for that declared amity and thatformal renewal of friendly relations which you advocate in yourletter. '

The balance of Indian opinion, however, was against our makingovertures to Dost Mahomed. John Lawrence, at that time the great powerin the Punjab, was altogether opposed to Edwardes's policy in thismatter. He admitted that it might be wise to renew intercoursewith the Kabul ruler if he first expressed his regret for previousmisunderstandings; but later he wrote to Edwardes:

 'I dare say you are right; still, I cannot divest myself of the idea that it is _a mistake_, and will end in mixing us up in Afghan politics and affairs more than is desirable. The strength which a treaty can give us seems to be a delusion. It will be like the reed on which, if a man lean, it will break and pierce his hand. '

John Nicholson, Outram, and James Abbott agreed with Lawrence. They urged that any advance on our part would be looked upon as anindication of conscious weakness; and the probability was that anarrogant, irritated Mussulman ruler would regard an overture as aproof of our necessity, and would make our necessity his opportunity. But Lord Dalhousie, while anxious to avoid any communication beingmade which could be liable to misconstruction, saw neither objectionnor risk in opening the door to reconciliation, provided no undueanxiety was displayed on our part. The Governor-General practicallyleft the matter in the hands of Edwardes, who lost no time in tryingto attain the desired object. The greatest forbearance and diplomaticskill were necessary to bring the negotiations to a satisfactorytermination, but they were concluded at last, most successfully, andto Edwardes alone is due the credit. It is instructive to read thefull record[1] of this tedious and difficult piece of diplomacy, for it serves as an interesting example of Oriental subtlety andcircumlocution, contrasted with the straightforward dealing of ahigh-minded Englishman. 

The Amir wrote a letter to the Governor-General couched in mostsatisfactory terms, which he forwarded to Peshawar by the hand of hisconfidential secretary, and which received, as it deserved, a veryfriendly reply. This resulted in Dost Mahomed sending his son andheir-apparent, Sardar Ghulam Haidar Khan, to Peshawar, and deputinghim to act as his Plenipotentiary in the negotiations. Ghulam HaidarKhan reached Peshawar in March, 1855, where he was met by the ChiefCommissioner, and on the 30th of that month the treaty was concluded. 'It guaranteed that we should respect the Amir's possessions inAfghanistan, and never interfere with them; while the Amir engagedsimilarly to respect British territory, and to be the friend of ourfriends and the enemy of our enemies. '

The Governor-General had at first resolved to entrust to Edwardes theduty of meeting the expected Envoy from Kabul, and orders to thateffect were issued. But Edwardes, more anxious for the success ofthe negotiations than for his own honour and glory, wrote toLord Dalhousie suggesting that the Government of India should berepresented by the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and promising toafford Sir John Lawrence all the assistance in his power. Edwardesbelieved that the importance of the treaty would be enhanced in theeyes of the Afghans by the presence of the higher official; and inthis opinion the Governor-General concurred. On the conclusion of thetreaty, Lord Dalhousie wrote to Edwardes: 'I congratulate you andmyself and all else concerned on this successful issue of thenegotiations, which have now lasted just a year. '

This treaty of March, 1855, was only preliminary to that for theratification of which the Amir came in person to Peshawar thefollowing year. 

Towards the end of 1855 Dost Mahomed found himaelf in considerabledifficulties, and appealed to us for assistance. A revolt had occurredat Herat, and a Persian army was preparing to besiege that fortress;the chiefs and people of Kandahar were disaffected; and the provinceof Balkh was threatened with invasion both by the King of Bokhara andby Turkoman hordes. The Amir looked upon Herat as an integral part ofthe Afghan dominions, and was very desirous of re-establishing hisauthority over that place and preventing its falling into the hands ofthe Persians; but he felt himself too weak to have any hope of successwithout help from us in men and money. It was, therefore, DostMahomed's interest to convince the British Government that the Shahhad infringed the conditions of an engagement entered into with us in1853, under which Persia abandoned all claim to Herat. The Amir thushoped to establish a quarrel between England and Persia for his ownbenefit, and to secure our assistance against the latter power. Tofurther this design, Dost Mahomed offered to come to Peshawar andconsult with the British authorities. Edwardes was in favour of theproposed visit. John Lawrence was opposed to it, saying he did notthink much good would result from such a meeting, because it couldhardly be anticipated that the views of the Amir and the BritishGovernment would coincide, and if Dost Mahomed should fail to obtainwhat he wanted, his dissatisfaction would be a positive evil. TheGovernor-General admitted the force of these objections, but in theend considered that they should be set aside if the Amir was inearnest in desiring a consultation. 'A refusal or an evasion to complywith his wish, ' Lord Dalhousie thought, 'might be misunderstood, andalthough a meeting might lead to disappointment and disagreement, itwould, at any rate, put the relations of the British Government withthe Amir, as regards Herat, upon a clear footing. '

While this discussion was going on, the advance of a Persian army forthe purpose of besieging Herat, coupled with the insults offered tothe British flag at Teheran, led to the declaration of war betweenEngland and Persia. The Chief Commissioner was therefore directed totell the Amir that he would be paid a periodical subsidy to aid himin carrying on hostile operations against Persia, subject to certainconditions. On receiving these instructions, the Chief Commissionerdirected Edwardes to invite the Amir to an interview. Dost Mahomedaccepted the invitation, but before the auspicious meeting could takeplace Lord Dalhousie had left India, and Lord Canning reigned in hisstead. Lord Dalhousie resigned on the 29th February, 1856, afterhaving filled the arduous and responsible position of Governor-Generalfor no less than eight years, adding year by year fresh lustre to hissplendid reputation. 

The first day of 1857 witnessed the meeting between the Amir of Kabuland the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. The Amir's camp was pitchedat the mouth of the Khyber Pass, and that of the Chief Commissioner onthe plain near Jamrud. Barr's troop of Horse Artillery formed part ofthe escort, so I was in the midst of it all. On the occasion of theAmir's first visit to the English camp, there was a force presentof upwards of 7, 000 soldiers, including three regiments of BritishInfantry; the troops lined the road for more than a mile, and it wasevident that their strength and soldierly appearance inspired theAmir and his followers with a very salutary feeling of awe andadmiration. [2]

The result of the conferences between these two great personages wasan agreement confirming the treaty of the year before. In addition, the Amir bound himself to keep up a certain number of regular troopsfor the defence of Afghanistan, so long as the war with Persiacontinued, in consideration of a monthly subsidy of Rs. 100, 000 anda gift of 4, 000 muskets. He also engaged to communicate to theGovernment of India any overtures he might receive from Persia, andhe consented to allow British officers to visit certain parts of hisdominions, either for the purpose of assisting his subjects againstPersia, or to ascertain that the subsidy was properly applied. 

I have dwelt at some length on this treaty with Afghanistan, first, because the policy of which this was the outcome was, as I havealready shown, initiated by my father; and, secondly, because I do notthink it is generally understood how important to us were its results. Not only did it heal the wounds left open from the first Afghan war, but it relieved England of a great anxiety at a time when throughoutthe length and breadth of India there was distress, revolt, bloodshed, and bitter distrust of our Native troops. Dost Mahomed loyally heldto his engagements during the troublous days of the Mutiny which soquickly followed this alliance, when, had he turned against us, weshould assuredly have lost the Punjab; Delhi could never have beentaken; in fact, I do not see how any part of the country north ofBengal could have been saved. Dost Mahomed's own people could notunderstand his attitude. They frequently came to him during theMutiny, throwing their turbans at his feet, and praying him as aMahomedan to seize that opportunity for destroying the 'infidels. ''Hear the news from Delhi, ' they urged; 'see the difficulties theFeringhis are in. Why don't you lead us on to take advantage of theirweakness, and win back Peshawar?'[3]

But I am anticipating, and must return to my narrative. 

The clause of the treaty which interested me personally was thatrelating to British officers being allowed to visit Afghanistan, to give effect to which a Mission was despatched to Kandahar. Itconsisted of three officers, the brothers Harry and Peter Lumsden, andDr. Bellew, together with two of Edwardes's trusted Native Chiefs. Theselection of Peter Lumsden as a member of this Mission again left theDeputy Assistant-Quartermaster-Generalship vacant, and I was a secondtime appointed to officiate in his absence. 

Shortly afterwards the General of the division (General Reed) startedon his tour of inspection, taking me with him as his staff officer. Jhelum was the first place we visited. Whether the sepoys had thenany knowledge of what was so soon to happen is doubtful. If they had, there was no evidence that such was the case. Nothing could havebeen more proper or respectful than their behaviour; no crimes werereported, no complaints were made. The British officers, certainly, had not the slightest idea of the storm that was brewing, for theyspoke in the warmest terms of their men. 

From Jhelum we went to Rawal Pindi. John Lawrence happened to be incamp there at the time, and looked on at the General's inspection. At the conclusion of the parade he sent his secretary to ask me ifI would like to be appointed to the Public Works Department. Irespectfully declined the offer, though very grateful for its havingbeen made. Some of my friends doubted the wisdom of my refusinga permanent civil appointment; but it meant having to give upsoldiering, which I could not make up my mind to do, and though onlyofficiating, I was already in the department to which of all others Iwished to belong. 

Nowshera was the last station we visited. It was the beginning ofApril, and getting rather hot for parading troops. I there met for thefirst time the present Commander-in-Chief in India, General Sir GeorgeWhite, who was then a subaltern in the 27th (Inniskilling) Regiment. 

I recollect the commanding officer of the 55th, the Native Infantrycorps at this station, who had served all his life with clean-looking, closely-shaven Hindustanis, pointing with a look of contempt, not tosay disgust, to some Sikhs (a certain proportion of whom had beenunder recent orders enlisted in regiments of Native Infantry), andexpressing his regret that he could not get them to shave their beardsand cut their hair. 'They quite spoil the look of my regiment, ' hesaid. In less than two months' time the Hindustanis, of whom theColonel was so proud, had broken into open mutiny; the despised Sikhswere the only men of the regiment who remained faithful; and thecommanding officer, a devoted soldier who lived for his regiment, andwho implored that his men might not have their arms taken away, as hehad 'implicit confidence' in them, and would 'stake his life on theirfidelity, ' had blown his brains out because he found that confidencemisplaced. 

Towards the end of April I was ordered to report on the capabilitiesof Cherat (now well known to all who have been stationed at Peshawar)as a sanatorium for European soldiers. I spent two or three dayssurveying the hill and searching for water in the neighbourhood. Itwas not safe to remain on the top at night, so I used to return eachevening to the plain below, where my tent was pitched. On one occasionI was surprised to find a camp had risen up during my absence quiteclose to my tent. I discovered that it belonged to Lieutenant-ColonelJohn Nicholson, the Deputy-Commissioner, who was on his tour ofinspection, and very soon I received an invitation to dine with him, at which I was greatly pleased. John Nicholson was a name to conjurewith in the Punjab. I had heard it mentioned with an amount ofrespect--indeed, awe--which no other name could excite, and I was allcuriosity to see the man whose influence on the frontier was so greatthat his word was law to the refractory tribes amongst whom he lived. He had only lately arrived in Peshawar, having been transferred fromBannu, a difficult and troublesome district ruled by him as it hadnever been ruled before, and where he made such a reputation forhimself that, while he was styled 'a pillar of strength on thefrontier' by Lord Dalhousie, he was looked up to as a god by theNatives, who loved as much as they feared him. By some of them he wasactually worshipped as a saint; they formed themselves into a sect, and called themselves 'Nicholseyns. ' Nicholson impressed me moreprofoundly than any man I had ever met before, or have ever met since. I have never seen anyone like him. He was the beau-ideal of a soldierand a gentleman. His appearance was distinguished and commanding, witha sense of power about him which to my mind was the result of hishaving passed so much of his life amongst the wild and lawlesstribesmen, with whom his authority was supreme. Intercourse withthis man amongst men made me more eager than ever to remain on thefrontier, and I was seized with ambition to follow in his footsteps. Had I never seen Nicholson again, I might have thought that thefeelings with which he inspired me were to some extent the result ofmy imagination, excited by the astonishing stories I had heard of hispower and influence; my admiration, however, for him was immeasurablystrengthened when, a few weeks later, I served as his staff officer, and had opportunities of observing more closely his splendid soldierlyqualities and the workings of his grand, simple mind. 

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN NICHOLSON, C. B. 

_From a painting by J. R. Dicksee, in the possession of the ReverendCanon Seymour. _]

It was the end of April when I returned to Peshawar from Cherat, andrapidly getting hot. On the strength of being a D. A. Q. M. G. , I hadmoved into a better house than I had hitherto been able to afford, which I shared with Lieutenant Hovenden of the Engineers. We werejust settling down and making ourselves comfortable for the long hotweather, when all our plans were upset by the breaking out of theMutiny. 

[Footnote 1: See 'Memorials of the Life and Letters of Major-GeneralSir Herbert Edwardes. ']

[Footnote 2: 'Memorials of Major-General Sir Herbert Edwardes. ']

[Footnote 3: _Ibid. _]

CHAPTER VI. 1857

 First tidings of the mutiny--Prompt action at Peshawar --A bold policy--The Movable Column--An annoying occurrence --I leave Peshawar

The first threatenings of coming trouble were heard in the early partof 1857. During the months of February, March, and April, rumoursreached us at Peshawar of mysterious _chupattis_ (unleavened cakes)being sent about the country with the object, it was alleged, ofpreparing the Natives for some forthcoming event. There was also anevident feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction in the minds of thesepoys. We heard that the 19th Native Infantry at Berhampur, amilitary station about 100 miles from Calcutta, had broken open thebells-of-arms, [1] and forcibly taken possession of their muskets andammunition; that a sepoy named Mangal Pandy, [2] belonging to the 34thNative Infantry at Barrackpore, had attacked and severely woundedthe Adjutant and Sergeant-Major of his regiment; that it was foundnecessary to disband the 19th on the 30th March, and the 34th on the6th May; that bungalows had been burnt in several stations; andthat the sepoys at the Schools of Musketry had objected to use thecartridges served out with the new rifles, because, it was asserted, they were greased with a mixture of cow's fat and lard, the one beingas obnoxious to the prejudices of the Hindu as the other is to thoseof the Mussulman. 

It seems strange on looking back that these many warnings should havepassed almost unheeded, and that there should have been no suspicionamongst the officers serving with Native regiments that discontent wasuniversal amongst the sepoys, and that a mutiny of the whole BengalArmy was imminent. But at that time the reliance on the fidelity ofthe Native troops was unbounded, and officers believed implicitly inthe contentment and loyalty of their men. Their faith in them wasextraordinary. Even after half the Native army had mutinied and manyofficers had been murdered, those belonging to the remaining regimentscould not believe that their own particular men could be guilty oftreachery. 

At Peshawar there was not the slightest suspicion of the extent towhich the evil had spread, and we were quite thunderstruck when, onthe evening of the 11th May, as we were sitting at mess, the telegraphsignaller rushed in breathless with excitement, a telegram in hishand, which proved to be a message from Delhi 'to all stations in thePunjab, ' conveying the startling intelligence that a very seriousoutbreak had occurred at Meerut the previous evening, that some ofthe troopers from there had already reached Delhi, that the Nativesoldiers at the latter place had joined the mutineers, and that manyofficers and residents at both stations had been killed. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Davidson, commanding the 16th Irregular Cavalry, who happened to be dining at mess that evening, was the first torecover from the state of consternation into which we were thrownby the reading of this telegram. He told us it was of the utmostimportance that the Commissioner and the General should at once be putin possession of this astounding news, and at the same time impressedupon us the imperative necessity for keeping it secret. 

Davidson then hurried off to the Commissioner, who with his deputy, Nicholson, lived within a stone's-throw of the mess. Edwardes drove atonce to the General's house, while Nicholson came to our mess. He toopointed out to us the importance of preventing the news from gettingabout and of keeping it as long as possible from the Native soldiers. 

We had at Peshawar three regiments of Native Cavalry and five ofNative Infantry, not less than 5, 000 men, while the strength of thetwo British regiments and the Artillery did not exceed 2, 000. ThisEuropean force was more than sufficient to cope with the eight Nativecorps, but in the event of any general disturbance amongst the Nativetroops, we had to calculate on the probability of their being joinedby the 50, 000 inhabitants of the city, and, indeed, by the entirepopulation of the Peshawar valley; not to speak of the tribes allalong the border, who were sure to rise. 

It was an occasion for the gravest anxiety, and the delay of even afew hours in the sepoys becoming aware of the disastrous occurrencesat Meerut and Delhi meant a great deal to us. 

Fortunately for India, there were good men and true at Peshawar inthose days, when hesitation and irresolution would have beenfatal, and it is worthy of note that they were comparatively youngmen--Edwardes was thirty-seven, Nicholson thirty-five; NevilleChamberlain, the distinguished Commandant of the Punjab Frontier Force(who was hastily summoned from Kohat, where he happened to be on histour of inspection), was thirty-seven; and the Brigadier, SydneyCotton, though much older, being sixty-five, was not onlyexceptionally young for his years and full of energy and intelligence, but actually much younger than the average of General officerscommanding stations in India. 

At once, on hearing of the Mutiny, Edwardes, acting in unison withNicholson, sent to the post-office and laid hands on all Nativecorrespondence; the letters they thus secured showed but too plainlyhow necessary was this precaution. The number of seditious papersseized was alarmingly great; they were for the most part couched infigurative and enigmatical language, but it was quite sufficientlyclear from them that every Native regiment in the garrison was more orless implicated and prepared to join the rebel movement. 

A strong interest attaches to these letters, for they brought to lightthe true feeling of the Natives towards us at the time, and it wasevident from them that the sepoys had really been made to believe thatwe intended to destroy their caste by various unholy devices, ofwhich the issue of contaminating cartridges was one. The seeds ofdisaffection had been sown by agitators, who thought they saw anopportunity for realizing their hope of overthrowing our rule, maintained as it was by a mere handful of Europeans in the midst of avast population of Asiatics. This feeling of antagonism, only guessedat before, was plainly revealed in these letters, never intended tomeet the European eye. Some corps did not appear to be quite so guiltyas others, but there could now be no doubt that all were tainted withdisloyalty, and that none of the Hindustani troops could any longer betrusted. 

In the afternoon of Tuesday, the 12th May, I received a note from theGeneral commanding the division directing me to present myself at hishouse the following morning, which I accordingly did. Besides GeneralReed I found there the Brigadier, Sydney Cotton; the Commissioner, Herbert Edwardes; the Deputy Commissioner, John Nicholson;Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, and Captain Wright, DeputyAssistant-Adjutant-General, who, like myself, had been summoned torecord the decisions that might be arrived at. 

This meeting was a most momentous one, and I remember being greatlyimpressed with the calm and comprehensive view of the situation takenby Edwardes and Nicholson. They had already been in communication withthe Chief Commissioner, and had, previous to the meeting, received atelegram from him approving generally of the several proposals theycontemplated. John Lawrence also informed them that the authoritiesat Lahore had decided on disarming the Native troops at Mian Mir thatvery morning. 

The problem to be solved was how the Punjab could best be made securewith the small force of British troops available--all told not morethan 15, 000, with 84 guns--against upwards of 65, 000 Natives (of whom42, 000 were Hindustanis), with 62 guns. [3] In all stations Nativetroops preponderated, and in some there were no European soldiers atall. 

Edwardes and Nicholson gave it as their opinion that the only chanceof keeping the Punjab and the frontier quiet lay in trusting theChiefs and people, and in endeavouring to induce them to side with usagainst the Hindustanis. They undertook to communicate, regardingthe raising of levies and fresh troops, with their friends andacquaintances along the border, who had proved such staunch allies in1848-49, when we were fighting with the Sikhs. How nobly these loyalmen responded to the demand made upon them, and how splendidly thefrontier and Punjab soldiers whom they brought to our assistancebehaved, will be seen hereafter. 

Amongst other matters of importance, it was proposed by those two ablesoldier-civilians, Edwardes and Nicholson, that General Reed, as thesenior officer in the Punjab, should join the Chief Commissioner atRawal Pindi, leaving Brigadier Cotton in command at Peshawar; that aMovable Column, composed of reliable troops, should be organizedat some convenient place in the Punjab, [4] prepared to move in anydirection where its services might be required; that the Hindustaniregiments should be scattered as much as possible, in order to preventdangerous combinations; that a detachment of Punjab Infantry fromKohat should replace the Hindustani sepoys in the fort of Attock, which was a very important position, as it contained a magazine, andcovered the passage of the Indus; and that a small guard of Pathanlevies, under a tried and trusty frontier Native officer, should beplaced in charge of the Attock ferry. 

All these proposals were cordially and unanimously agreed to by themilitary authorities present. 

The question of the command of the Movable Column was then discussed. It was considered essential that the officer selected should, inaddition to other necessary qualifications, have considerableexperience of the country, and an intimate knowledge of Nativesoldiers. It was no ordinary command. On the action of the MovableColumn would depend, to a great extent, the maintenance of peace andorder throughout the Punjab, and it was felt that, at such a crisis, the best man must be selected, irrespective of seniority. It was aposition for which Cotton and Nicholson would have given much, and forwhich they were well qualified, but there was important work for themto do at Peshawar. Neville Chamberlain was available, and there wasa general consensus of opinion that he should be appointed. It wasnecessary, however, to refer the matter to the Chief Commissioner, with a request that he would submit it for the orders of theCommander-in-Chief. This course was adopted, and in a few hours areply was received from General Anson nominating Chamberlain to thecommand. My anxiety as to the Commander-in-Chief's decision was veryconsiderable; for Brigadier Chamberlain, to my infinite delight andastonishment, had offered, in the event of his being appointed, totake me with him as his staff officer--the most wonderful piece ofgood fortune that could have come to me; my readers must imaginemy feelings, for it is impossible for me to describe them. My mostsanguine hopes seemed about to be more than realized; for though theserious aspect of affairs seemed to promise the chance of activeservice, I little thought that I should be lucky enough to be employedas the staff officer of such a distinguished soldier as NevilleChamberlain. 

When the meeting was over I was ordered to take the several messages, which Wright and I had written out, to the telegraph office, and seethem despatched myself; as they disclosed more or less the measuresthat had been decided upon, it was necessary to avoid any chance oftheir falling into the hands of Native clerks. One of the messages[5]contained a summary of the proceedings of the council, and wasaddressed to the commanding officers of all stations in the Punjab, with the view of imparting confidence, and letting them know whatsteps were being taken for the protection of the British residentsthroughout the province. This duty having been carried out, I returnedhome in a not unpleasant frame of mind, for though the crisis was agrave one, the outlook gloomy, and the end doubtful, the excitementwas great. There were stirring times in store for us, when every man'spowers would be tested, and the hopefulness of youth inclined me tolook only on the bright side of the situation. 

My equanimity was somewhat disturbed later in the day by an occurrencewhich caused me a good deal of annoyance at the time, though itsoon passed away. Nicholson came to my house and told me that theproceedings at the meeting that morning had in some unaccountablemanner become known; and he added, much to my disgust, that it wasthought I might perhaps have been guilty of the indiscretion ofdivulging them. I was very angry, for I had appreciated as much asanyone the immense importance of keeping the decisions arrived atperfectly secret; and I could not help showing something of theindignation I felt at its having been thought possible that I couldbetray the confidence reposed in me. I denied most positively havingdone so; upon which Nicholson suggested that we should proceedtogether to the telegraph office and see whether the informationcould have leaked out from there. The signaller was a mere boy, andNicholson's imposing presence and austere manner were quite too muchfor him; he was completely cowed, and, after a few hesitating denials, he admitted having satisfied the curiosity of a friend who hadinquired of him how the authorities intended to deal with thecrisis. This was enough, and I was cleared. The result to me of thisunpleasant incident was a delightful increase of intimacy with theman for whom above all others I had the greatest admiration and mostprofound respect. As if to make up for his momentary injustice, Nicholson was kinder to me than ever, and I felt I had gained in him afirm and constant friend. So ended that eventful day. 

At that time it was the custom for a staff officer, who had charge ofany Government property, to have a guard of Native soldiers in chargeof his house. That night it happened that my guard was furnishedby the 64th Native Infantry, a regiment with a particularly badreputation, and which had, in order to give effect to the measuresproposed at the morning's meeting, been ordered to leave Peshawar andproceed to the outposts. The intercepted letters showed that thisregiment was on the point of mutinying, and I could not help feeling, as I lay down on my bed, which, as usual in the hot weather, wasplaced in the verandah for the sake of coolness, how completely I wasat the mercy of the sentry who walked up and down within a few feet ofme. Fortunately, he was not aware that his regiment was suspected, andcould not know the reason for the sudden order to march, or my careermight have been ended then and there. 

Within a week from that time I had started for Rawal Pindi to be readyto join the Movable Column, which was to be formed at Wazirabad assoon as the troops could be got together. I took with me only justenough kit for a hot-weather march, and left everything standing in myhouse just as it was, little thinking that I should never return to itor be quartered in Peshawar again. 

[Footnote 1: Place where the arms and accoutrements of Nativeregiments were kept. ]

[Footnote 2: This name was the origin of the sepoys generally beingcalled Pandies. ]

[Footnote 3: At Meerut, Delhi, and Rurki, and in the Punjab therewere:

 _British Troops. _

 MEN. GUNS. 2 Regiments of Cavalry 1, 41012 Regiments of Infantry 12, 624 9 Troops of Horse Artillery 1, 017 54 5 Light Field Batteries 415 3010 Companies of Foot Artillerymen 837 ------ -- Total 16, 303 84

 _Native Troops. _

 MEN. GUNS. 7 Regiments of Light Cavalry 3, 51414 Regiments of Irregular Cavalry and Guides Cavalry 8, 51931 Regiments of Regular Infantry }15 Regiments of Irregular Infantry and } 50, 188 Guides Infantry } 3 Troops of Horse Artillery 411 18 6 Light Field Batteries 930 30 (3 batteries had only 4 guns each) 2 Mountain Batteries 192 14 (1 battery had 8, the other 6 guns) 3 Companies of Foot Artillery 330Head-Quarters and 12 Companies of Sappers and Miners 1, 394 ------ -- Total 65, 478 62

The above figures show the troops at full strength. There wereprobably not more than 15, 000 British soldiers in the Punjab availablefor duty in May, 1857. ]

[Footnote 4: The original proposal was that the Movable Column shouldbe formed at Jhelum, and composed of the 24th Foot from Rawal Pindi, the 27th Foot from Nowshera, a troop of Horse Artillery from Peshawar, a Native Field Battery from Jhelum, the Guides from Murdan, the 16thIrregular Cavalry from Rawal Pindi, the Kumaon battalion from Murree, the 1st Punjab Infantry from Bannu, and a wing of the 2nd PunjabCavalry from Kohat. But events developed so rapidly that before thecolumn was formed every one of these troops was otherwise employed. Itwas thought unwise to unduly weaken the Peshawar valley; the troop ofHorse Artillery, therefore, stood fast, the 27th Foot was halted atAttock, and the 24th Foot and Kumaon battalion were kept at theirstations ready to move towards the frontier. The Guides, 2nd PunjabCavalry, and 1st Punjab Infantry were ordered to Delhi, and the 16thIrregular Cavalry and the Native Field Battery were not consideredsufficiently loyal to be employed on such a duty. Eventually, thecolumn was formed of one troop of Horse Artillery, one Field Battery, and one Infantry regiment, all British and all from Sialkot. ]

[Footnote 5: The full text of the message was as follows:

 'To Sir John Lawrence, Rawal Pindi, the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, and officers commanding all stations in the Punjab respectively; to be forwarded by the assistant in charge of the telegraph office, or post, as the case may be. 

 'The senior military officer in the Punjab, Major-General Reed, having this morning received news of the disarming of the troops at Mian Mir, a council of war was held, consisting of General Reed, Brigadier Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson, and the following measures were decided on, subject to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief. General Reed assumes the chief military command in the Punjab; his Head-Quarters will be the Head-Quarters of the Punjab Civil Government, and a Movable Column will be formed at Jhelum at once, consisting of [the troops were here detailed]. The necessary orders for this column have been issued. The column will move on every point in the Punjab where open mutiny requires to be put down by force, and officers commanding at all stations in the Punjab will co-operate with the column. ']

 * * * * *

CHAPTER VII. 1857

 First symptoms of disaffection--Outbreak at Berhampur --Mangal Pandy--Court-Martial at Meerut--Mutiny at Meerut --The work of destruction--Want of energy --Hugh Gough's experiences--Nothing could arrest the mutiny

Before proceeding with the account of my experiences with the MovableColumn, and the subsequent operations for the suppression of therebellion, in which I was fortunate enough to take part, it will, I think, be advisable, for the better understanding of the wholesituation, to devote a little time to the consideration of theprogress of events from the first appearance of symptoms ofdisaffection in Lower Bengal, to the crisis I have just beendescribing, when Peshawar became involved in the general disturbance. 

The substitution of a new rifle for the old musket with which thesepoys had hitherto been armed entailed a different kind of drill;and in order that this drill should be speedily learned by thewhole Native army, depots were formed at convenient places for theinstruction of selected men from every corps, who, on becomingproficient, were to return and instruct their own regiments. One ofthese depots was at Dum-Dum, and as early as the 24th January GeneralHearsay, commanding the Presidency division, reported to Head-Quartersthat he perceived an 'unpleasant feeling' amongst the Native soldierslearning the new drill, caused by a belief instilled into them 'bydesigning persons, most likely Brahmins, ' that they were to be forcedto embrace Christianity, and that for the furtherance of this objectthe new ball-cartridges received from the arsenal at Fort William weregreased with the fat of pigs and cows, with the intention of violatingthe religious prejudices and destroying the caste of those who wouldhave to bite them. 

A little later various acts of incendiarism took place at otherstations in the command, and Hearsay became more than ever convincedthat there was grave dissatisfaction amongst the troops. He thereforeordered a Court of Inquiry to be held to enable him to ascertain thereal cause of the ill-feeling which so evidently existed. 

In the General's opinion, the statements recorded in the proceedingsof this Court clearly established the fact, that the Native officersand sepoys were undoubtedly imbued with the belief that an unholymixture of cow's fat and lard had been used in the manufacture of thenew cartridge, and he recommended that the rifle ammunition should infuture be made up with the same description of paper that had alwaysbeen used for the musket-cartridge, which, he conceived, would put anend to their suspicions and uneasiness. 

The General, however, was told in reply that it was impossible to usethe old paper for the new cartridge, as the bore of the rifle beingmuch smaller than that of the musket, thinner paper was indispensable;and he was directed to inform the sepoys that the new paper, thoughtougher and less bulky, was made of exactly the same material as theold. With respect to the lubricating mixture, he was to announce thatthe Government had authorized the preparation of a grease, composed ofwax and oil, which was to be made up and applied to the cartridgesby the men themselves. These orders were carefully explained to theNative troops, but without any good result. Their religious objectionto the new cartridge was not removed, and they frankly acknowledgedtheir fears. 

On the 6th February an officer of the 34th Native Infantry atBarrackpore was informed by a sepoy of his company that the fourNative regiments at that station, fearing that they would be forcedto destroy their caste and become Christians, had determined to riseagainst their officers, and when they had plundered and burned theirbungalows, to proceed to Calcutta and try to seize Fort William, or, if that proved beyond their powers, to take possession of thetreasury. 

This circumstance was reported to Government by General Hearsay on the11th February. In the same letter he said, 'We have at Barrackporebeen living upon a mine ready for explosion, ' and he reported a storywhich had reached him from Dum-Dum of a sepoy, on his way to cookhis food with his _lota_[1] full of water, meeting a low-caste manbelonging to the arsenal where the Enfield cartridges were beingmanufactured. This man, it was said, asked the sepoy to allow him todrink from his _lota_. The sepoy, a Brahmin, refused, saying: 'I havescoured my _lota_; you will defile it by your touch. ' The low-casteman replied: 'You think much of your caste, but wait a little: the_Sahib-logue_[2] will make you bite cartridges soaked in cow's fat, and then where will your caste be?' The sepoy no doubt believed theman, and told his comrades what was about to happen, and the reportrapidly spread to other stations. 

Early in March several of the Hindu sepoys belonging to the Dum-DumSchool of Musketry expressed their unwillingness to bite the newcartridge, and the Commandant proposed that the drill should bealtered so as to admit of the cartridge being torn instead of bitten. Hearsay supported the proposal, remarking that the new mode of loadingneed not be made to appear as a concession to agitation, but as partof the drill for the new weapon. Events, however, moved so quicklythat, before sanction could be received to this suggestion, the troopsat Berhampur had broken into open mutiny. They refused to receivetheir ammunition, on the ground of its being polluted, even afterit was explained to them that they were not being given the newcartridges, but those which had been made up in the regiment a yearbefore. That night they broke open the bells-of-arms, and carried offtheir muskets. 

The Government then became aware that prompt action was necessary. They decided that such open mutiny could not be excused on the groundsof religious scruples, and ordered the regiment to be disbanded. AsBerhampur was somewhat isolated, and some distance from Europeantroops, it was arranged that the disbandment should take place at theHead-Quarters of the Presidency division, and the 19th Native Infantrywas accordingly ordered to march to Barrackpore. 

The revolt of this regiment brought forcibly before Lord Canning andhis advisers the perilous position of Lower Bengal, owing to thepaucity of European troops. Well may the authorities have beenstartled, for between Calcutta and Meerut, a distance of 900 miles, there were only four regiments of British infantry and a few scatteredArtillerymen, numbering in all less than 5, 000, while the Nativetroops amounted to upwards of 55, 000. One of the four Infantryregiments was at Fort William; but as only a portion of it couldbe spared for the disbandment of the 19th, a special steamer wasdespatched to Rangoon to bring over the 84th Foot. This regimentreached Calcutta on the 20th March, and on the 31st the disbandment ofthe mutinous Native Infantry regiment was carried out. The men werepaid up and escorted across the river Hughly, whence they were allowedto proceed to their homes. They behaved in the most orderly manner onthe march from Berhampur and throughout the proceedings, and as theyleft the parade-ground they cheered General Hearsay, and wished him along life, apparently well pleased at being let off so easily. 

At Barrackpore itself an outbreak had occurred two days before in the34th Native Infantry. As I have already related, the sepoy, MangalPandy, shot at the sergeant-major. [3] The Adjutant, on hearingwhat had happened, galloped to the parade-ground. As he neared thequarter-guard he was fired at, and his horse shot by the mutineer, whothen badly wounded him with a sword as he was trying to disentanglehimself from the fallen animal. The General now appeared on the scene, and, instantly grasping the position of affairs, rode straight atMangal Pandy, who stood at bay with his musket loaded, ready toreceive him. There was a shot, the whistle of a bullet, and a man fellto the ground--but not the General; it was the fanatic sepoy himself, who at the last moment had discharged the contents of his musket intohis own breast! The wretched man had been worked up to a pitch ofmadness by the sepoys of his regiment, who stood by while he attackedthe Adjutant, and would have allowed him to kill their Commander, butthey were too great cowards to back him up openly. Mangal Pandy wasnot dead. He was taken to the hospital, and eventually was tried bya Court-Martial composed of Native officers, sentenced to death, andhanged in the presence of all the troops at Barrackpore. The Nativeofficer in command of the quarter-guard met the same fate, and theregiment was then disbanded. 

The orders for the disbandment of the 19th and 34th Native Infantrywere directed to be read to every Native corps in the service, andit was hoped that the quick retribution which had overtaken theseregiments would check the spirit of mutiny throughout the army. Fora time this hope appeared to be justified. Satisfactory reports werereceived from different parts of Bengal, and anything like a seriousor general outbreak was certainly not contemplated by the authorities. General Hearsay reported to Government that he had directed theEuropean troops, temporarily located at Barrackpore, to return totheir respective cantonments, as he did not think it probable thathe would require their presence again. About the same time Sir JohnLawrence, after visiting the Musketry School at Sialkot, wrotehopefully to the Governor-General of the aspect of affairs in thePunjab. Lord Canning and his advisers, owing to these favourablereports, were on the point of sending the 84th Foot back to Burma, when news reached them from Upper India of the calamitous occurrencesat Meerut and Delhi. 

The Meerut division was commanded by Major-General Hewitt, an officerof fifty years' service, and the station of Meerut by BrigadierArchdale Wilson, Commandant of the Bengal Artillery. The garrisonconsisted of the 6th Dragoon Guards, a troop of Horse Artillery, abattery of Field Artillery, a company of Foot Artillery, the 1stBattalion 60th Rifles, and three Native corps--the 3rd Light Cavalry, and the 11th and 20th Native Infantry. 

Towards the end of April incendiary fires began to take place, andthe Native soldiers evinced more or less disrespect in their mannertowards their officers. These signs of disaffection were followedby the refusal of some of the troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry toreceive their cartridges, although the commanding officer carefullyexplained to them that they were not the new cartridges, but the verysame they had always used, and that according to the new drill theywere not required to bite them when loading their carbines. 

A Court of Inquiry was held to investigate the matter, composedentirely of Native officers, three of whom belonged to the offendingregiment. The verdict of the Court was that no adequate cause could beassigned for the disobedience of orders in refusing to receive and usethe cartridges that were served out. 'The only conclusion the Courtcan arrive at in regard to this point is that a report seems to havegot abroad which in some vague form attaches suspicion of impurityto the materials used for making these cartridges, but the Court areunanimously of opinion that there is nothing whatever objectionable inthe cartridges of the 3rd Regiment Light Cavalry, and that they may befreely received and used as heretofore without in the slightest degreeaffecting any religious scruple of either a Hindu or Mussulman, and ifany pretence contrary to that is urged, that it must be false. ' Thisopinion, it must be remembered, was the opinion of Natives, notEuropeans, and was given only sixteen days before the outbreakoccurred at Meerut. 

After carefully reviewing the evidence brought before the Court, andconsidering the opinion expressed by the Native officers who composedit, the Commander-in-Chief decided to try the eighty-five men who hadrefused to receive the cartridges by a General Court-Martial composedentirely of their own countrymen. The Court was formed of sixMahomedans and nine Hindus, six Native officers being brought overfrom Delhi for the purpose. 

The prisoners were tried on the 8th May, found guilty, and sentencedto imprisonment with hard labour for ten years. 

The following morning there was a parade of the whole of the Meerutgarrison, and the finding and sentence of the Court were read to themen. The eighty-five troopers were then stripped of their uniform andfetters were fastened on their ankles. As each culprit was marchedforward, he called on his comrades to rescue him, but no response camefrom the ranks; and when the ceremony was finished the prisoners weremarched down the line and escorted to the gaol. In his report of theparade to Army Head-Quarters, General Hewitt stated that 'the majorityof the prisoners seemed to feel acutely the degradation to which theirfolly and insubordination had brought them. The remainder of thetroops are behaving steady and soldier-like. '

The action of the Meerut authorities in putting the prisoners in ironson the parade-ground, in the presence of their regiment, beforebeing made over to the civil power, met with the disapproval of theCommander-in-Chief and the Governor-General. The former expressed hisregret at the unusual procedure. The latter was more pronounced, andthus expressed himself: 'The riveting of the men's fetters on parade, occupying, as it did, several hours, in the presence of many who werealready ill-disposed and many who believed in the cartridge fable, must have stung the brigade to the quick. The consigning theeighty-five prisoners after such a ceremony to gaol with no other thana Native guard over them was folly that is inconceivable. '

The procedure was no doubt unusual, and it certainly was mostimprudent, under the circumstances, to trust the gaol to a Nativeguard. I think also, considering the number of the prisoners, and thelength of time necessary for riveting the fetters, that it was notjudicious to subject the troops to such a severe and protractedtrial of their nerves and patience; but, before acquiescing in LordCanning's sweeping condemnation, it should be considered that theobject of the punishment was to produce a deterrent effect on thosewho were likely to follow the bad example that had been set them, and as the offence of the troopers had been public and ostentatious, General Hewitt no doubt thought it right to make the punishment asmarked and public as possible. 

The next day was Sunday, and outwardly the cantonment of Meeruthad assumed its usual appearance of Sabbath calm; but there was anundercurrent of unrest--there was considerable commotion in the Nativebazaars, which were unusually crowded, and had not the Europeanofficers been blinded by over-confidence in their men, signs mighthave been perceived amongst the Native soldiers of preparation forsome untoward event. 

It was late in the day before the storm burst. The Chaplain of Meeruttells us that he was about to start with his wife for evening service, when the Native nurse warned them of coming danger, beseeching hermistress to remain indoors, and, on being asked to explain, sayingthere would be a fight with the sepoys. The idea seemed incredible, and the Chaplain would have paid no attention to the warning had nothis wife been greatly alarmed. At her earnest request he took his twochildren with them in the carriage, instead of leaving them in thehouse with the _ayah_, as had been intended. It was soon apparent thatthe _ayah_ had not spoken without reason, for before the church wasreached sounds of musketry were heard and columns of smoke wereseen rising above the quarter occupied by the Native troops. As theChaplain arrived at the church enclosure, the buglers of the 60thRifles, who were drawn up ready to enter the church, sounded the'alarm' and the 'assembly. ' The parade was dismissed, and as theBritish soldiers rushed to the barracks for their arms and ammunition, the congregation rapidly dispersed, some to their homes, others toseek safety in the nearest quarter-guard. 

It was the custom before the Mutiny for our soldiers to attend DivineService unarmed, save with their side-arms. The Native soldiers wereaware of this, and they no doubt calculated on the 60th Rifles beingsafe and almost defenceless inside the church as soon as the bellsceased tolling. What they were not aware of was the fact that, owingto the lengthening days and the increasing heat, the evening churchparade had been ordered half an hour later than on the previousSunday. The mutineers therefore showed their hand half an hour toosoon, and as they galloped down the 60th Rifles lines they came uponthe men fully armed and rapidly falling in. Being thus disappointed intheir hope of surprising the white soldiers, the 3rd Cavalry proceededwithout a moment's delay to the gaol, broke into the cells, andreleased their eighty-five comrades and all the other prisoners, about1, 200 in number. 

While this was going on, the two Native Infantry regiments assembledon their respective parade-grounds in wild excitement, dischargingtheir muskets at random, and setting fire to their own huts. TheBritish officers, hearing the tumult, hastened to their lines and didtheir best to restore order, but in vain. The sepoys had gone toofar, and were absolutely deaf to threats and entreaties. They did notattack their own officers, but warned them to get away, telling themthe Company's '_raj_'[4] was at an end. Their clemency, however, didnot extend to officers of other regiments. 

Colonel Finnis, who had served forty years with the sepoys, and firmlybelieved in their loyalty, was the first victim; he fell riddled withbullets from a volley fired by the 20th, while exhorting the men ofhis own regiment (the 11th) to be true to their salt. The work ofdestruction then began in earnest, in which the population from thebazaars and the neighbouring villages eagerly joined, for (as theCommissioner reported) they were armed and ready for the onslaughtbefore the sepoys commenced the attack, plainly showing how perfectlythey were aware of what was about to happen. They poured forth inthousands from every direction, and in a surprisingly short timealmost every bungalow belonging to a British officer serving withNative troops was gutted and burnt. Besides Colonel Finnis, sevenofficers, three officers' wives, two children, and every strayEuropean man, woman and child in the outskirts of the cantonments weremassacred. 

It was now time for the sepoys to think of themselves. They had thrownoff all allegiance to the _Sarkar_;[5] they had been guilty of murder, robbery, and incendiarism, and they knew that retribution mustspeedily overtake them if they remained at Meerut; they thereforelost no time in making their escape towards Delhi. They had had ampleopportunity for consultation with the Native officers from thatstation, who had come to Meerut as members of the Court-Martial on themen of the 3rd Light Cavalry, and they knew perfectly well that thetroops at Delhi were prepared to help them to seize the magazine andresuscitate the old Moghul dynasty. 'To Delhi! To Delhi!' was theircry, and off they went, leaving naught behind them in their linesbut the smouldering fires of their officers' houses and the lifelessbodies of their English victims. 

But it will be asked, Where were the British troops? Where indeed?On the alarm being given, the British troops got under arms 'in anincredibly short time, ' but there was unaccountable delay in marchingthem to the spot where their help was so greatly needed. TheCarabineers occupied barracks within a few hundred yards of the NativeInfantry lines, the 60th Rifles were only about a mile and a halfaway, and the Artillery lay just beyond the 60th. The Brigadier(Wilson) despatched one company of the Rifles to guard the treasury, another he left to protect the barracks, and with the remainder, accompanied by the Carabineers and Artillery, he leisurely proceededtowards the Native Infantry lines. It was almost dark when he arrived, but there was light enough to discern, from the ruined houses and thedead bodies of the murdered officers lying about, in what a mercilessspirit the revolt had been perpetrated. A few shots were fired frombehind the burning huts, but not a single living being was visible, except two or three Native troopers who were dimly perceptible in thedistance coming from the direction of the gaol, and it was evidentthat the sepoys as a body had vanished. But whither? A lengtheneddiscussion took place as to what was the best course to pursue, whichonly resulted in the troops being marched back to their own end of thecantonment and bivouacking on the mall for the night. The Generaland Brigadier, misled by the tumult in the city, which they coulddistinctly hear, came to the conclusion that the sepoys hadcongregated within its walls and might shortly be expected to attackthat part of the station where the European residents chiefly lived. It was not discovered till the next morning that all three Nativeregiments had made for Delhi. 

It is easy to be wise after the event, but one cannot but feel thatthere was unaccountable, if not culpable, want of energy displayed bythe Meerut authorities on this disastrous occasion. The officerin command was afterwards severely censured for not acting withsufficient promptitude on first hearing of the outbreak; for nottrying to find out where the mutineers had gone; and for notendeavouring to overtake them before they reached Delhi. TheGovernment of India finally signified their disapproval by removingGeneral Hewitt from his command. 

Wilson, the Brigadier, like everyone else at Meerut, appears to havebeen completely taken by surprise. But why this should have been thecase, after the warning that had been given by the mutinous conductof the 3rd Cavalry, and why no steps should have been taken after theexasperating parade on the 9th to guard against a possible, if notprobable, outbreak, is difficult to understand; and can only beaccounted for by that blind faith in the Native soldier, and disbeliefin his intention or ability to revolt, which led to such unfortunateresults all over India. 

The following story will exemplify how completely the authorities atMeerut were blinded by this misplaced confidence. On the afternoon ofthe 9th the British officers of the 3rd Light Cavalry went to the gaolto pay up the prisoners belonging to their regiment. When LieutenantHugh Gough, [6] who was one of these officers, returned to his house, a Hindu Native officer, belonging to the troop Gough was temporarilycommanding, told him that the men had determined to rescue theircomrades, and that the Native guard over the gaol had promised to helpthem. Gough went at once to his commanding officer, Lieutenant-ColonelCarmichael Smyth, and reported what he had heard, but the Colonelpooh-poohed the idea as ridiculous, and told Gough he must not givecredence to anything so monstrous. 

Later in the day Gough met Brigadier Wilson and told him of thewarning which had been given to him, without, however, producing anyimpression; the information was received with the same contemptuousdisbelief displayed by Colonel Carmichael Smyth. 

The following day (Sunday), late in the afternoon, the same Nativeofficer, attended by two troopers, galloped to Gough's house, shoutingto him that the _hala_[7] had begun, and that the Native Infantry werefiring on their officers. Gough mounted his horse, and, accompanied bythe three Cavalry soldiers, proceeded as quickly as possible to theInfantry parade-ground, where he arrived just as the wild scene ofexcitement and confusion I have before described was at its height. The sepoys, some in uniform, some in their own Native clothes, wererushing about in the maddest disorder, yelling, shouting, and dancingas if possessed, while the flames from the burning huts shed a luridlight on the demoniacal proceedings. 

When Gough's party appeared in sight, the sepoys called to the threetroopers to get out of the way, as they wanted to shoot the _sahib_. No notice being taken of this warning, they fired straight at thewhole party, but without hitting anyone. Gough, seeing things had gonetoo far for him to do any good, rode off with his little escort tohis own lines, where he found the men busy saddling their horses, andhelping themselves to ammunition from the regimental magazine, whichthey had broken open. He endeavoured in vain to allay the excitement;one or two shots were fired at him by recruits, but no determinedattempt was made to take his life, and at last the Native officerscombined to force him away, saying they could no longer answer for hissafety. 

It was then all but dark. Gough rode off towards the European lines, still accompanied by his trusty Native escort, and on his way cameupon an enormous crowd of people from the bazaar, armed with swords, sticks, and anything they could get hold of, who tried to stop him. Through these he charged, closely followed by the Native officer andtwo troopers, who did not leave him until he was within sight ofthe Artillery mess. Then they pulled up, and said they could go nofurther. Gough did all he could to persuade them to remain withhim, but to no purpose. They told him it was impossible for them toseparate themselves from their friends and relations, and making theofficer they had so carefully protected a respectful salaam, they rodeoff to join their mutinous comrades. Gough never heard of them again, though he tried hard to trace what had become of the men who provedthemselves such 'friends in need. '

However much the authorities at Meerut deserved to be censured fortheir dilatoriness in dealing with the revolt in the first instance, and their lack of energy in not trying to discover in what directionthe mutineers had gone, I doubt whether anything would have beengained by following them up, or whether it would have been possibleto overtake them before they reached Delhi. Only a very few EuropeanCavalry were available for pursuit, for the Carabineers, having latelyarrived in India, were composed mainly of recruits still in theriding-school, and their horses for the most part were quite unbroken. These few, with the six Horse Artillery guns, might have beendespatched; but the mutineers had a considerable start, the Cavalrycould not have been overtaken, and as soon as the Infantry becameaware that they were being followed, they would have scatteredthemselves over the country, the features of which were familiar tothem, and, favoured by the darkness, could have defied pursuit. Delhiis forty miles from Meerut, and it would not have been possible forthe 60th Rifles, marching in the terrible heat of the month of May, tohave reached that place before the next evening (the 11th), and, aswas afterwards ascertained, the work of murder and devastation therebegan on the morning of that day. The three Native Infantry regimentsand the battery of Artillery stationed at Delhi were prepared tojoin the insurgent troopers from Meerut directly they arrived. Themagazine, with its vast stores of war material, was in the hands ofthe King, and the 150, 000 inhabitants of the city were ready to assistin the massacre of the white men and women, and the destruction oftheir property. 

After careful consideration of all the circumstances of the revolt atMeerut, I have come to the conclusion that it would have been futileto have sent the small body of mounted troops available in pursuit ofthe mutineers on the night of the 10th May, and that, consideringthe state of feeling throughout the Native Army, no action, howeverprompt, on the part of the Meerut authorities could have arrested theMutiny. The sepoys had determined to throw off their allegiance to theBritish Government, and the when and the how were merely questions oftime and opportunity. 

[Footnote 1: A metal drinking vessel, which the Hindu religiouslyguards against defilement, and to which he clings as a cherishedpossession when he has nothing else belonging to him in the world. ]

[Footnote 2: European officers. ]

[Footnote 3: Each Hindustani regiment had a European sergeant-majorand quartermaster-sergeant. ]

[Footnote 4: Rule. ]

[Footnote 5: British Government. ]

[Footnote 6: Now Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Gough, V. C. , G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 7: Tumult. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER VIII1857

 General Anson--The news reaches Simla--Anson loses no time --A long list of troubles--John Lawrence--The Phulkian family --Death of General Anson

While the events I have recounted were taking place, theCommander-in-Chief and the Head-Quarters staff were on their way upcountry inspecting the troops at the various stations _en route_ toSimla, at which place it had been arranged that the summer of 1857 wasto be spent. The Commander-in-Chief in India at that time was Generalthe Hon. George Anson, an officer of forty-three years' service, butwithout much Indian experience, having been only four years in thecountry. He was an able, intelligent man, an excellent judge ofcharacter, a great authority on whist and on horses, and he was wellknown in London society, which was somewhat surprised when he acceptedan appointment in India--the command of the Meerut division. He didnot, however, remain long in that position, for he was soon giventhe command of the Madras Army, and a year and a half later becameCommander-in-Chief in India. General Anson was present at Waterloo asan Ensign, but had seen no service afterwards, and until he arrived inIndia had held no high appointment. 

When the Commander-in-Chief left Calcutta the previous autumn, all wasapparently quiet in the Native army. He visited the principal militarystations, amongst others Meerut and Delhi, and although reports of anuneasy feeling amongst the Native troops in the Presidency divisionhad reached him from time to time, it was not until he arrived atUmballa, about the middle of March, that these reports were confirmedby personal communication with the sepoys attending the School ofMusketry which had been formed at that station. 

On the occasion of the Commander-in-Chief's inspection of the School, he learnt from the men of the various regiments under instruction howstrongly opposed they were to using a cartridge which they believedto be injurious to their caste. Anson listened attentively to all thesepoys had to say, and then explained to them in a manly, sensiblespeech, that the old cartridge was not suited to the rifle about to beintroduced. A new cartridge had, therefore, to be made; but they mustnot listen to any foolish rumour as to its being designed to destroytheir caste. He assured them, 'on the honour of a soldier likethemselves, ' that it had never been, and never could be, the policy ofthe British Government to coerce the religious feeling of either themilitary or the civil population of India, or to interfere in any waywith their caste or customs. He told the Native officers to do all intheir power to allay the men's unfounded fears, and called upon themto prove themselves worthy of the high character they had hithertomaintained; he concluded by warning all ranks that the Government weredetermined not to yield to insubordination, which would be visitedwith the severest punishment. 

The demeanour of the sepoys was most respectful, and when the paradewas over they expressed their high sense of the Commander-in-Chief'sgoodness. They declared that he had removed their own objections, but that the story was universally believed by their countrymen andrelations, and if they were to use the cartridge they must becomesocial outcasts. 

General Anson, feeling that the doubts and anxieties of the men withregard to the use of the new cartridges were by no means imaginary, suspended their issue until a special report had been prepared as tothe composition of the paper in which they were wrapped. [1]

Having thus done all that he could at the time to allay any feeling ofuneasiness, and hoping that the news of the disbandment of the 19thNative Infantry would check the spirit of insubordination, GeneralAnson continued his journey to Simla, that beautiful place in theHimalayas, 7, 000 feet above the sea, which has since become the seatof the Government of India and Army Head-Quarters during the hotweather months. 

The Commander-in-Chief had been at Simla rather more than a month, when, on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 12th May, an Aide-de-campgalloped in from Umballa (the Head-Quarters station of the Sirhinddivision), distant eighty miles, bringing with him a copy of thetelegraphic message which had been despatched from Delhi the previousday to 'all stations in the Punjab, ' and which had caused suchconsternation at Peshawar on the evening of the 11th May. 

Sir Henry Barnard, commanding the Sirhind division, desired theAide-de-camp (his own son) to inform the Commander-in-Chief thatthe temper of the three Native regiments at Umballa was more thandoubtful, and that it seemed advisable that the three regiments ofBritish Infantry stationed in the hills near Simla should be orderedat once to Umballa. So urgent did this seem to Barnard, that, inanticipation of sanction from the Commander-in-Chief, he told his sonto warn the 75th Foot as he passed through Kasauli to be prepared foran immediate move. 

General Anson at once saw the necessity for taking prompt action. Thatsame afternoon he despatched an Aide-de-camp to Kasauli to order the75th to proceed without delay to Umballa, and the 1st Bengal Fusiliersat Dagshai to follow the 75th as soon as carriage could be collected;also to warn the 2nd Bengal Fusiliers at Subathu to be ready to move. Expresses were sent at the same [time] to Ferozepore and Jullundurdirecting that a European guard should be placed in charge of themagazine at the former place, and a detachment of European Infantrythrown into the fort of Philour from the latter. The confidencereposed in the Native army before the Mutiny was so great that thesetwo important magazines, like almost all the arsenals and magazines inIndia, were guarded by Native soldiers, and subsequent events provedthat, but for General Anson's timely precautions, the mutineersmust have obtained possession of the magazines at Ferozepore andPhilour. [2]

Anson had not long to wait before he received confirmation of thealarming news brought by General Barnard's son. The very nextafternoon a letter arrived from Meerut giving an account of theoutbreak on the 10th, and a few particulars of what had occurred atDelhi. The Commander-in-Chief immediately decided on proceeding toUmballa, to superintend personally the organization of the forcewhich, as he rightly judged, would have to be sent to Delhi. Therewas no hesitation on General Anson's part, or delay in issuing thenecessary orders. [3] The 2nd Bengal Fusiliers were directed to marchto Umballa, and an Artillery officer was sent express to Philour withinstructions for a third-class siege-train to be got ready, and forreserve Artillery and Infantry ammunition to be despatched to Umballa. Orders were also issued for the Nasiri battalion, stationed at Jutog, near Simla, and for the company of Native Artillery at Kangra andNurpur[4] to march with all expedition to Philour, for the purpose ofaccompanying the siege-train; and for the Sirmur battalion of Gurkhasat Dehra Dun, and the Sappers and Miners at Rurki, to proceed toMeerut. 

Having thus pressed forward the measures for the suppression of therevolt which to him seemed most urgent, General Anson left Simla earlyon the 14th May, within forty-eight hours of the receipt of the firstnews of the outbreak, and reached Umballa the following morning. Hislast act at Simla was to draft a circular which he hoped would havethe effect of allaying excitement in the Native army. 

The report which Sir Henry Barnard had to make to the Chief on hisarrival at Umballa was not reassuring. The troops at that stationconsisted of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, two troops of Horse Artillery, the 4th Bengal Light Cavalry, and two regiments of Native Infantry. The 75th Foot and 1st Bengal Fusiliers had just marched in with onlythirty and seventy rounds of ammunition per man, respectively, and(from want of carriage) without tents or baggage. The Commissariat andMedical Departments were totally unprepared to meet the requirementsof a force suddenly ordered to take the field; there were no dooliesfor the sick; supplies were difficult to collect, for the bazaarswere partially deserted; there was a scarcity of contractors, and noammunition was available nearer than Philour, eighty miles off. 

At Delhi all the Europeans who had not escaped had been massacred, andthe city had been taken possession of by the Native garrison and themutinous troops from Meerut in the name of the old King. 

At Meerut the European troops were entrenching themselves; thesurrounding district was in the most complete disorder, and the civilcourts powerless. 

At Umballa and Jullundur, although the presence of European troops hadhitherto kept the Native regiments from open mutiny, it was evidentthat they were not in the least to be depended upon. 

At Ferozepore an aggravated revolt had occurred, and at Lahore it hadbeen found necessary to disarm all the Native troops. 

From below Meerut there was no intelligence whatever, but it seemedmore than probable that the spirit of rebellion had broken out in manystations, and later this was known to be the case. 

To add to the Commander-in-Chief's anxieties, it was reported that theNasiri battalion at Jutog had got out of hand for a time and refusedto march to Philour, while a detachment of the same corps at Kasauliplundered the treasury, rendering it necessary to send back 100 menof the 75th Foot to reinforce the depot at that place, where a largenumber of European soldiers' families were collected. 

The behaviour of the Gurkhas gave rise to a panic at Simla, which, however, did not last long. Lord William Hay, [5] who wasDeputy-Commissioner at the time, induced most of the ladies, with their children, to seek a temporary asylum with the Raja ofKiunthal. [6] Hay himself managed to keep Simla quiet, and the menof the Nasiri battalion coming to their senses, order was restoredthroughout the hills. The money taken from the Kasauli treasury wasnearly all voluntarily given up, and before the year was out thebattalion did us good service. 

It was a long list of troubles that was placed before theCommander-in-Chief. Disturbing as they all were, each requiring promptand special action, there was one amongst them which stood out in boldrelief--the situation at Delhi; and to wrest that stronghold from thehands of the mutineers was, General Anson conceived, his most pressingobligation. But could it be done with the means at his disposal?He thought not; and in this opinion he was supported by the seniorofficers at Umballa, with whom the question was anxiously discussed ata conference held at Sir Henry Barnard's house on the 16th May. [7] Itwas nevertheless determined to push on to Delhi, and General Hewittwas asked what force he could spare from Meerut to co-operate with theUmballa column. He was warned that time was an object, and that the23rd May was the date on which his troops would probably be requiredto start. All details were carefully considered. The first difficultyto be overcome was the want of carriage. No organized system oftransport--one of the most essential requirements of an efficientarmy--existed, and, owing to the restlessness and uncertainty whichprevailed throughout the country, the civil authorities were unable tocollect carts and camels with the usual rapidity. [8]

That afternoon General Anson received a letter from Sir John Lawrenceurging the importance of an immediate advance on Delhi, and giving anoutline of the measures he proposed to adopt in the Punjab. He askedthe Commander-in-Chief to give a general sanction to the arrangements, and concluded with these words: "I consider this to be the greatestcrisis which has ever occurred in India. Our European force is sosmall that, unless effectively handled in the outset, and brought tobear, it will prove unequal to the emergency. But with vigour andpromptitude, under the blessing of God, it will prove irresistible. "

Anson naturally hesitated to advance with an inefficient and onlypartially equipped force against a strongly-fortified city withan immense armed population, defended by many thousand desperatemutineers, and in his reply (dated the 17th May) he put the caseplainly before Sir John Lawrence. He pointed out that the Europeanswere without tents; that there were no guns at Umballa or Meerutheavier than six or nine pounders with which to batter down the wallsof Delhi; that the required amount of carriage could not be providedin less than sixteen or twenty days; and that the three Native corpsat Umballa could not be depended upon. He asked Sir John whether heconsidered 'it would be prudent to risk the small European force wehave here in an enterprise against Delhi, ' and he wrote: 'My own viewof the state of things now is, by carefully collecting our resources, having got rid of the bad materials which we cannot trust, and havingsupplied their places with others of a better sort, it would not bevery long before we could proceed, without a chance of failure, inwhatever direction we might please. ' Adding, 'this is now the opinionof all here whom I have consulted--the Major-General and Brigadier, the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General. 'Anson concluded his letter with the following words: 'It would give megreat satisfaction to have your views upon the present crisis, for Iwould trust to them more than to my experience. '

John Lawrence, who was straining every nerve to check the Mutiny andprevent a general rising of the population, was impatient at the ideaof delay, and lost no time in giving Anson his opinion. He telegraphedit briefly on the 20th, and the following day he wrote to the effectthat he knew Delhi well, having been stationed there for nearlythirteen years, and it seemed incredible to him that mutineers couldhold and defend it; his belief was 'that, with good management on thepart of the civil officers, it would open its gates on the approach ofour troops. ' He admitted that 'on military principles, in the presentstate of affairs, it may not be expedient to advance on Delhi untilthe Meerut force is prepared to act. ' But he protested againstEuropean soldiers being 'cooped up in their cantonments, tamelyawaiting the progress of events. ' He went on to say: 'Pray onlyreflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed whenwe acted vigorously? Where have we succeeded when guided by timidcounsels? Clive with 1, 200 men fought at Plassy, in opposition tothe advice of his leading officers, beat 40, 000 men, and conqueredBengal. '

That Sir John Lawrence greatly under-estimated the difficulties whichAnson had to overcome we now know. Delhi did not open its gates on ourapproach, but for more than three months defied all our efforts tocapture it. And in his eagerness to get the Commander-in-Chiefto think as he did, the resolute Chief Commissioner forgot thatClive--not with 1, 200 men, but with 3, 000 disciplined troops--had todeal in the open field with an enemy little better than a rabble;whereas Anson had to attack a strong fortress, amply supplied withstores and ammunition, possessing a powerful armament, and heldby soldiers who were not only well trained and equipped, but werefighting for their lives, and animated by religious fanaticism. 

Still, there can be no doubt that John Lawrence's views as to thenecessity for Delhi being taken at all hazards were correct. TheGovernor-General held the same opinion, and strongly urged it uponAnson, who loyally responded, and during the short time he remained atUmballa strenuously exerted himself to equip the troops destined forthe arduous task. 

While preparing for his advance on the Moghul capital, Anson did notneglect to provide, as far as lay in his power, for the safety ofUmballa. The soldiers' wives and children were sent to Kasauli; aplace of refuge was made for the non-combatants at the church, roundwhich an entrenchment was thrown; a garrison, about 500 strong, wasformed of the sick and weakly men of the several European regiments, assisted by some of the Patiala troops; and as an additional securityhalf the Native corps were sent into the district, and the other halfwith the column to Delhi. 

John Lawrence had strongly advocated the policy of trusting theMaharaja of Patiala and the Rajas of Jhind and Nabha. The attitude ofthese Chiefs was of extreme importance, for if they had not been welldisposed towards us, our communication with the Punjab would have beenimperilled. There was therefore much anxiety at Umballa as to thecourse Patiala, Jhind, and Nabha (the three principal members ofthe great Phulkian family) would elect to take. Douglas Forsyth, [9]Deputy-Commissioner of Umballa, who was a personal friend of theMaharaja of Patiala, at once sought an interview with him. Hewas beginning to explain to the Maharaja the difficulties of thesituation, when he was interrupted by His Highness, who said he wasaware of all that had happened; on which Forsyth asked if it wastrue that emissaries from the King of Delhi had come to Patiala. TheMaharaja pointed to some men seated at a little distance, saying, 'There they are. ' Forsyth then asked for a word in private. As soon asthey were alone, he addressed the Maharaja thus: 'Maharaja _sahib_, answer me one question: Are you for us, or against us?' The Maharaja'sreply was very hearty: 'As long as I live I am yours, but you knowI have enemies in my own country; some of my relations are againstme--my brother for one. What do you want done?' Forsyth then asked theMaharaja to send some of his troops towards Kurnal to keep open theGrand Trunk Road. The Maharaja agreed on the understanding thatEuropeans should soon be sent to support them--a very necessarycondition, for he knew that his men could only be trusted so long asthere was no doubt of our ultimate success. 

Patiala was true to his word, and throughout the Mutiny the PhulkianChiefs remained perfectly loyal, and performed the important serviceof keeping open communication between Delhi and the Punjab. [10]

On the 19th May General Anson was cheered by hearing from JohnLawrence that the Corps of Guides and four trusty Punjab regimentswere proceeding by forced marches to join him. On the 21st he receiveda message from the Governor-General informing him that European troopswere coming from Madras, Bombay, and Ceylon. He also heard of thearrival of the siege-train at Umballa, and he had the satisfaction oftelegraphing to the Chief Commissioner that the first detachment ofthe column destined for Delhi had started. 

On the 23rd the Commander-in-Chief communicated his plan of operationsto General Hewitt. It was as follows: Two brigades were to advancefrom Umballa, commanded by Brigadier Hallifax of the 75th Foot, andColonel Jones of the 60th Rifles; and one brigade from Meerut, underthe command of Brigadier Archdale Wilson. The two former were to beconcentrated at Kurnal by the 30th May, and were then to advance, under General Anson, so as to arrive opposite Baghput on the 5th June, at which place they were to be joined by the Meerut brigade, and theunited force was then to proceed to Delhi. 

All his arrangements being now completed, Anson left Umballa on the24th May, and reached Kurnal the following morning. On the 26th he wasstruck down by cholera, and in a few hours succumbed to that fataldisease. His last words expressed a hope that his country would do himjustice, and it is grievous to feel that, in estimating his work andthe difficulties he had to encounter, full justice has not been donehim. Anson has been undeservedly blamed for vacillation and want ofpromptitude. He was told to 'make short work of Delhi, ' but beforeDelhi could be taken more men had perished than his whole force atthat time amounted to. The advice to march upon Delhi was sound, buthad it been rashly followed disaster would have been the inevitableresult. Had the Commander-in-Chief been goaded into advancing withoutspare ammunition and siege Artillery, or with an insufficient force, he must have been annihilated by the overwhelming masses of themutineers--those mutineers, who, we shall see later, stoutly opposedBarnard's greatly augmented force at Badli-ki-Serai, would almostcertainly have repulsed, if not destroyed, a smaller body of troops. 

On the death of General Anson the command of the Field Force devolvedon Major-General Sir Henry Barnard. 

[Footnote 1: 'I am not so much surprised, ' wrote General Anson to LordCanning on the 23rd March, 'at their objections to the cartridges, having seen them. I had no idea they contained, or, rather, aresmeared with, such a quantity of grease, which looks exactly like fat. After ramming down the ball, the muzzle of the musket is coveredwith it. This, however, will, I imagine, not be the case with thoseprepared according to the late instructions. But there are nowmisgivings about the paper, and I think it so desirable that theyshould be assured that no animal grease is used in its manufacture, that I have ordered a special report to be made to me on that headfrom Meerut, and until I receive an answer, and am satisfied that noobjectionable material is used, no firing at the depots by the sepoyswill take place. It would be easy to dismiss the detachments to theirregiments without any practice, on the ground that the hot weather isso advanced, and that very little progress could be made, but I do notthink that would be admissible. The question, having been raised, mustbe settled. It would only be deferred till another year, and I trustthat the measures taken by the Government when the objection was firstmade, and the example of the punishment of the 19th Native Infantryand of the other delinquents of the 70th, now being tried by a GeneralCourt-Martial, will have the effect we desire. '--KAYE, vol. I. , p. 558. ]

[Footnote 2: Surely those whom God has a mind to destroy, He firstdeprives of their senses; for not only were the magazines at Delhi andCawnpore allowed to fall into the enemy's hands, but the great arsenalat Allahabad narrowly escaped the same fate. Up till May, 1857, thisfort was garrisoned only by Native soldiers. Early in that month sixtyworn-out European pensioners were brought to Allahabad from Chunar, with whose assistance, and that of a few hastily raised Volunteers, Lieutenants Russell and Tod Brown, of the Bengal Artillery, were ableto overawe and disarm the Native guard on the very night on which theregiments to which they belonged mutinied in the adjoining cantonment. These two gallant officers had taken the precaution to fill thecellars below the armoury (which contained some 50, 000 or 60, 000stands of arms) with barrels of powder, their intention being to blowup the whole place in the event of the sepoys getting the upper hand. This determination was known to all in the fort, and no doubt hadsomething to say to the guard submitting to be disarmed. ]

[Footnote 3: He has been accused of dilatoriness and want of decisionafter hearing the news. ]

[Footnote 4: Places at the foot of the Himalayas. ]

[Footnote 5: Now the Marquis of Tweeddale. ]

[Footnote 6: A small hill state near Simla. ]

[Footnote 7: It is a remarkable fact that the five senior officers atthis conference were all dead in less than seven weeks. General Anson, Brigadier Hallifax, commanding the Umballa station, and ColonelMowatt, commanding the Artillery, died within ten days; ColonelChester, Adjutant-General of the Army, was killed at Badli-ki-Serai onthe 8th June, and Sir Henry Barnard died at Delhi on the 5th July. ]

[Footnote 8: See Kaye's 'History of the Indian Mutiny, ' vol. Ii. , p. 120. ]

[Footnote 9: The late Sir Douglas Forsyth, K. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 10: See 'The Life of Sir Douglas Forsyth. ']

 * * * * *

CHAPTER IX. 1857

 John Lawrence's wise measures--Disarmament at Peshawar --Salutary effect in the valley

I will now continue my story from the time I left Peshawar to join theMovable Column. 

On the 18th May Brigadier Chamberlain and I arrived at Rawal Pindi, where we joined the Chief Commissioner, who had got thus far on hisway to his summer residence in the Murree Hills when tidings of thedisaster reached him. One of Sir John Lawrence's first acts aftertalking over matters with Chamberlain was to summon Edwardes fromPeshawar, for he wished to consult with him personally about thequestion of raising levies and enlisting more frontier men, the onlyone of Edwardes's and Nicholson's proposals regarding which the ChiefCommissioner had any doubt; it appeared to him a somewhat risky stepto take, and he desired to give the matter very careful considerationbefore coming to any decision. I remember being greatly struck withthe weight given by Lawrence to Edwardes's opinion. He called him hisCouncillor, he eagerly sought his advice, and he evidently placed theutmost reliance on his judgment. 

During the six days that we remained at Rawal Pindi waiting for theMovable Column to be assembled, I spent the greater part of my timein the Chief Commissioner's office, drafting or copying confidentialletters and telegrams. I thus learned everything that was happening inthe Punjab, and became aware of the magnitude of the crisis throughwhich we were passing. This enabled me to appreciate the tremendousefforts required to cope with the danger, and to understand that thefate of Delhi and the lives of our countrymen and countrywomen inUpper India depended upon the action taken by the authorities in thePunjab. I realized that Sir John Lawrence thought of every detail, andhow correct was his judgment as to which of his subordinates could, orcould not, be trusted. The many European women and children scatteredover the province caused him the greatest anxiety, and he wiselydetermined to collect them as much as possible at hill stations andthe larger centres, where they would be under the protection ofBritish troops; for this reason he ordered the families of theEuropean soldiers at Sialkot (who were being withdrawn to join theMovable Column) to be sent to Lahore. But, notwithstanding all thathad occurred, and was daily occurring, to demonstrate how universalwas the spirit of disaffection throughout the Native Army, BrigadierFrederick Brind, who commanded at Sialkot, could not be brought tobelieve that the regiments serving under his command would ever provedisloyal, and he strongly objected to carry out an order which hedenounced as 'showing a want of confidence in the sepoys. ' JohnLawrence, however, stood firm. Brind was ordered to despatch thesoldiers' families without delay, and advised to urge the civiliansand military officers to send away their families at the same time. Afew of the ladies and children were sent off, but some were allowed toremain until the troops mutinied, when the Brigadier was one of thefirst to pay the penalty of his misplaced confidence, being shot downby one of his own orderlies. 

We had not been long at Rawal Pindi before we heard that theuneasiness at Peshawar was hourly increasing, and that the detachmentof the 55th Native Infantry[1] at Nowshera had mutinied and brokenopen the magazine. The military force in the Peshawar valley had beenconsiderably weakened by the withdrawal of the 27th Foot and Corps ofGuides; it was evident that disaffection was rapidly spreading, andwhat was still more alarming was the ominously restless feelingsamongst the principal tribes on the frontier. Nicholson encounteredconsiderable difficulty in raising local levies, and there was ageneral unwillingness to enlist. Our disasters in Kabul in 1841-42had not been forgotten; our cause was considered desperate, and evenNicholson could not persuade men to join it. It was clear that thisstate of affairs must not be allowed to continue, and that somedecisive measures must quickly be taken, or there would be a generalrising along the frontier. 

Matters seemed to be drawing to a head, when it was wisely determinedto disarm the Native regiments at Peshawar without delay. Thisconclusion was come to at midnight on the 21st May, when the news ofthe unfortunate occurrences at Nowshera reached Edwardes, who hadreturned that morning from Rawal Pindi. He and Nicholson felt thatno time was to be lost, for if the sepoys heard that the regiment atNowshera had mutinied, it would be too late to attempt to disarm them. Going forthwith to the Brigadier's house, they communicated theirviews to Sydney Cotton, who thoroughly appreciated the urgency of thecase, and, acting with the most praiseworthy decision, summoned thecommanding officers of all the Native regiments to be at his house atdaybreak. 

When they were assembled, the Brigadier carefully explained tothe officers how matters stood. He pointed out to them that theirregiments were known to be on the verge of mutiny, and that they mustbe disarmed forthwith, ending by expressing his great regret at havingto take so serious a step. 

The officers were quite aghast. They were persistent and almostinsubordinate in expressing their conviction that the measure waswholly uncalled-for, that the sepoys were thoroughly loyal, and that, notwithstanding what had occurred in other places, they had perfectconfidence in their men. 

The Brigadier, who knew the officers well, felt that every allowanceshould be made for them, called upon as they were to disarm the menwith whom they had been so long associated, and in whom theystill implicitly believed. But although he regarded the officers'remonstrances as natural and excusable, Cotton never wavered in hisdecision, for he was experienced enough to see that the evil waswidespread and deep-seated, and that any display of confidence orattempt at conciliation in dealing with the disaffected regimentswould be worse than useless. 

The parade, which was ordered for 7 a. M. , was conducted with greatjudgment. The European troops were skilfully disposed so as to renderresistance useless, and four out of the five regular Native regimentswere called upon to lay down their arms. The fifth regiment--the 21stNative Infantry[2]--was exempted from this indignity, partly becauseit had shown no active symptoms of disaffection, was well commandedand had good officers, and partly because it would have been extremelydifficult to carry on the military duties of the station without someNative Infantry. 

The two regiments of Irregular Cavalry were also spared the disgraceof being disarmed. It was hoped that the stake the Native officersand men had in the service (their horses and arms being their ownproperty) would prevent them from taking an active part in the Mutiny, and it was believed that the British officers who served with them, and who for the most part were carefully selected, had sufficientinfluence over their men to keep them straight. This hope proved to benot altogether without foundation, for of the eighteen regiments ofIrregular Cavalry which existed in May, 1857, eight are still borne onthe strength of the Bengal Army; while of the ten regiments of RegularCavalry and seventy-four of Infantry, none of the former, and onlyeleven of the latter, now remain. 

How immediate and salutary were the effects of the disarmament onthe inhabitants of the Peshawar valley will be seen by the followingaccount which Edwardes gave of it. 'As we rode down to the disarming avery few Chiefs and yeomen of the country attended us; and I rememberjudging from their faces that they came to see which way the tidewould turn. As we rode back friends were as thick as summer flies, andlevies began from that moment to come in. '

The Subadar-Major of the 51st--one of the four regiments disarmed--hada few days before written to the men of the 64th, who were dividedamongst the outposts, calling upon them to return to Peshawar in timeto join in the revolt fixed for the 22nd May. The letter ran; 'Inwhatever way you can manage it, come into Peshawar on the 21stinstant. Thoroughly understand that point! In fact, eat there anddrink here. ' The rapidity with which the disarmament had been carriedthrough spoilt the Subadar-Major's little game; he had, however, gonetoo far to draw back, and on the night of the 22nd he deserted, takingwith him 250 men of the regiment. His hopes were a second time doomedto disappointment. However welcome 250 muskets might have been to theAfridis, 250 unarmed sepoys were no prize; and as our neighbours inthe hills had evidently come to the conclusion that our _raj_ was notin such a desperate state as they had imagined, and that their bestpolicy was to side with us, they caught the deserters, with theassistance of the district police, and made them over to theauthorities. The men were all tried by Court-Martial, and theSubadar-Major was hanged in the presence of the whole garrison. 

On the 23rd May, the day after the disarmament, news was received atPeshawar that the 55th Native Infantry had mutinied at Mardan, andthat the 10th Irregular Cavalry, which was divided between Nowsheraand Mardan, had turned against us. A force was at once despatched torestore order, and Nicholson accompanied it as political officer. Nosooner did the mutineers, on the morning of the 25th, catch sightof the approaching column than they broke out of the fort and fledtowards the Swat hills. Nicholson pursued with his levies and mountedpolice, and before night 120 fugitives were killed and as many moremade prisoners. The remainder found no welcome among the hill tribes, and eventually became wanderers over the country until they died orwere killed. Poor Spottiswoode, the Colonel, committed suicide shortlybefore the Peshawar troops reached Mardan. 

[Footnote 1: The Head-Quarters of this regiment had been sent toMardan in place of the Guides. ]

[Footnote 2: Now the 1st Bengal Infantry. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER X. 1857

 Neville Chamberlain's presence of mind --The command of the Column--Robert Montgomery --Disarmament at Mian Mir --A Drum-Head Court-Martial--Swift retribution

While I was employed in the Chief Commissioner's office at Rawal Pindiit became known that the Mutineers intended to make their stand atDelhi, and immediately urgent demands came from the Head-Quarters ofthe army for troops to be sent from the Punjab. Sir John Lawrenceexerted himself to the uttermost, even to the extent of denuding hisown province to a somewhat dangerous degree, and the Guides and 1stPunjab Infantry, which had been told off for the Movable Column, wereordered instead to proceed to Delhi. 

The Guides, a corps second to none in Her Majesty's Indian Army, wascommanded by Captain Daly, [1] and consisted of three troops of Cavalryand six companies of Infantry. The regiment had got as far as Attock, when it received the order to proceed to Delhi, and pushed on at onceby double marches. The 4th Sikhs, under Captain Rothney, and the 1stPunjab Infantry, under Major Coke, [2] followed in quick succession, and later on the following troops belonging to the Punjab FrontierForce were despatched towards Delhi: a squadron of the 1st PunjabCavalry, under Lieutenant John Watson (my companion in Kashmir);a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, under Lieutenant CharlesNicholson[3] (John Nicholson's brother); a squadron of the 5th PunjabCavalry, under Lieutenant Younghusband; and the 2nd and 4th PunjabInfantry, commanded respectively by Captains G. Green[4] and A. Wilde. [5]

We (Brigadier Chamberlain and I) remained at Rawal Pindi until the24th May to give our servants and horses time to reach Wazirabad, andthen started on a mail-cart for the latter place, which we reachedon the 27th. Lieutenant James Walker, [6] of the Bombay Engineers, accompanied us as the Brigadier's orderly officer. 

The Grand Trunk Road, which runs in a direct line from Calcutta toPeshawar, was then in course of construction through the Punjab, andin places was in rather an elementary condition. The drivers of themail-carts sent along their half-wild and entirely unbroken ponies atracing speed, regardless alike of obstacles and consequences. With anenterprising coachman the usual pace was about twelve miles anhour, including stoppages. As we were recklessly flying along, theBrigadier, who was sitting in front, perceived that one of the reinshad become unbuckled, and warned Walker and me to look out for anupset. Had the coachman not discovered the state of his tackle allmight have been well, for the ponies needed no guiding along thewell-known road. Unfortunately, however, he became aware of what hadhappened, lost his head, and pulled the reins; the animals dashed offthe road, there was a crash, and we found ourselves on the ground, scattered in different directions. No great damage was done, and in afew minutes we had righted the cart, re-harnessed the ponies, and wererushing along as before. 

In order that the authorities at Rawal Pindi might be able tocommunicate with the Movable Column while on the march and awayfrom telegraph stations, which were few and far between in 1857, asignaller accompanied us, and travelled with his instruments on asecond mail-cart, and wherever we halted for the day he attached hiswire to the main line. He had just completed the attachment on ourarrival at Wazirabad, when I observed that the instrument was working, and on drawing the signaller's attention to it, he read off a messagewhich was at that moment being transmitted to the Chief Commissioner, informing him of the death of the Commander-in-Chief at Kurnal theprevious day. This sad news did not directly affect the MovableColumn, as it had been organized by, and was under the orders of, thePunjab Government, which for the time being had become responsible forthe military, as well as the civil, administration in the north ofIndia. 

The column had marched into Wazirabad the day before we arrived. It consisted of Major Dawes' troop of European Horse Artillery, a European battery of Field Artillery, commanded by CaptainBourchier, [7] and Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry, commanded byColonel George Campbell. In addition, and with a view to reducing theNative garrison of Sialkot, a wing of the 9th Bengal Light Cavalry andthe 35th Native Infantry were attached to the column. 

My first duty at Wazirabad was to call upon the senior officer, Colonel Campbell, and inform him that Brigadier Chamberlain had cometo take over command of the Movable Column. I found the Colonel lyingon his bed trying to make himself as comfortable as it was possiblewith the thermometer at 117° Fahrenheit. We had not met before, and hecertainly received me in a very off-hand manner. He never moved fromhis recumbent position, and on my delivering my message, he told me hewas not aware that the title of Brigadier carried military rankwith it; that he understood Brigadier Chamberlain was only aLieutenant-Colonel, whereas he held the rank of Colonel in HerMajesty's army; and that, under these circumstances, he must declineto acknowledge Brigadier Chamberlain as his senior officer. I repliedthat I would give his message to the Brigadier, and took my leave. 

When Chamberlain heard what had occurred, he desired me to return toCampbell and explain that he had no wish to dispute the question ofrelative seniority, and that in assuming command of the column hewas only carrying out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in India. Campbell, who technically speaking had the right on his side, wasnot to be appeased, and requested me to inform the Brigadier of hisdetermination not to serve under an officer whom he considered to behis junior. 

This was not a pleasant beginning to our duties with the column, andChamberlain thought that we had better take our departure and leaveCampbell in command until the question could be settled by superiorauthority. Campbell was accordingly asked to march the troops toLahore, to which place we continued our journey by mail-cart. 

At the same time a reference was made to Sir John Lawrence andGeneral Reed, which resulted in the decision that, under the peculiarcircumstances of the case, it was essential that an officer of Indianexperience should be in command of the column, and that Campbell, having only been a very short time in the country, did not fulfil thiscondition; but Campbell was told that, if he objected to serve underChamberlain, he could remain at Lahore with the Head-Quarters of hisregiment. Campbell, who at heart was really a very nice fellow and anexcellent officer, would not be separated from the 52nd, and agreedto serve under the Brigadier, reserving to himself the right ofprotesting when the new Commander-in-Chief should arrive in India. 

There was probably another reason for Campbell not wishing to serveunder Chamberlain besides that of being senior to him in the army, inthe fact that the Brigadier was a servant of 'John Company, ' whileCampbell belonged to the 'Queen's Service. ' From the time of theestablishment of a local army there had existed an absurd andunfortunate jealousy between the officers of the Queen's and Company'sservices, and one of the best results of the Mutiny was its gradualdisappearance. This ill-feeling influenced not only fellow-countrymen, but relations, even brothers, if they belonged to the differentservices, and was distinctly prejudicial to the interests of theGovernment. It is difficult to understand how so puerile a sentimentcould have been so long indulged in by officers who no doubtconsidered themselves sensible Englishmen. [8]

On the 31st May we arrived at Lahore, where we found everyone in astate of considerable excitement. Lahore was and is the great centreof the Punjab, and to it non-combatants and English ladies with theirchildren were hurrying from all the outlying districts. In the cityitself there was a mixed population of nearly 100, 000, chiefly Sikhsand Mahomedans, many of the former old soldiers who had served in theKhalsa Army. The fort, which was within the walls of the city, wasgarrisoned by half a regiment of sepoys, one company of EuropeanInfantry, and a few European Artillerymen. Mian Mir, five milesoff, was the Head-Quarters of the Lahore division; it was a long, straggling cantonment, laid out for a much larger force than it hasever been found necessary to place there, with the European Infantryat one end and the European Artillery at the other, separated byNative troops. This arrangement (which existed in almost every stationin India) is another proof of the implicit confidence placed in theNative army--a confidence in mercenary soldiers of alien races whichseems all the more surprising when we call to mind the warningsthat for nearly a hundred years had been repeatedly given of thepossibility of disaffection existing amongst Native troops. 

There were four Native regiments at Mian Mir, one of Cavalry and threeof Infantry, while the European portion of the garrison consisted ofone weak Infantry regiment, two troops of Horse Artillery, and fourcompanies of Foot Artillery. This force was commanded by BrigadierCorbett, of the Bengal Army; he had been nearly forty years in theservice, was mentally and physically vigorous, and had no fear ofresponsibility. Robert Montgomery[9] was then chief civil officer atLahore. He was of a most gentle and benevolent nature, with a rubicundcountenance and a short, somewhat portly figure, which characteristicsled to his being irreverently called 'Pickwick, ' and probably if hehad lived in less momentous times he would never have been creditedwith the great qualities which the crisis in the Punjab proved him topossess. 

On receipt of the telegraphic news of the outbreaks at Meerut andDelhi, Montgomery felt that immediate action was necessary. He at onceset to work to discover the temper of the Native troops at Mian Mir, and soon ascertained that they were disaffected to the core, and wereonly waiting to hear from their friends in the south to break intoopen mutiny. He thoroughly understood the Native character, andrealized the danger to the whole province of there being anything inthe shape of a serious disturbance at its capital; so after consultinghis various officials, Montgomery decided to suggest to the Brigadierthe advisability of disarming the sepoys, or, if that were consideredtoo strong a measure, of taking their ammunition from them. Corbettmet him quite half-way; he also saw that the danger was imminent, andthat prompt action was necessary, but he not unnaturally shrank fromtaking the extreme step of disarming men whose loyalty had never untilthen been doubted--a step, moreover, which he knew would be keenlyresented by all the regimental officers--he therefore at first onlyagreed to deprive the sepoys of their ammunition; later in the day, however, after thinking the matter over, he came to the conclusionthat it would be better to adopt Montgomery's bolder proposal, and heinformed him accordingly that he would 'go the whole hog. '

I do not think that Corbett's action on this occasion has beensufficiently appreciated. That he decided rightly there can be nodoubt, but very few officers holding commands in India at that timewould have accepted such responsibility. His knowledge as to what hadhappened at Meerut and Delhi was based on one or two meagre telegrams, and the information Montgomery gave him as to the treacherousintentions of the sepoys at Mian Mir had been obtained by means ofa spy, who, it was quite possible, might have been actuated byinterested motives. 

Having made up his mind what should be done, Corbett had the goodsense to understand that success depended on its being done quickly, and on the Native troops being kept absolutely in the dark as to whatwas about to take place. A general parade was ordered for the nextmorning, the 13th May, and it was wisely determined not to put off aball which was being given that evening to the officers of the 81stFoot. The secret was confided to very few, and the great majority ofthose who were taking part in the entertainment were ignorant of thereason for a parade having been ordered the following morning--anunusual proceeding which caused a certain amount of grumbling. 

When the sepoys were drawn up, it was explained to them in their ownlanguage that they were about to be deprived of their arms, in orderto put temptation out of their reach, and save them from the disgraceof being led away by the evil example of other corps. Whilst they werebeing thus addressed, the Horse Artillery and 81st Foot took up asecond line immediately in rear of the Native regiments, the gunsbeing quietly loaded with grape during the manoeuvre. The regimentswere then directed to change front to the rear, when they foundthemselves face to face with the British troops. The order was givento the sepoys to 'pile arms'; one of the regiments hesitated, but onlyfor a moment; resistance was hopeless, and the word of command wassullenly obeyed. 

The same morning the fort of Lahore was secured. Three companies ofthe 81st marched into it at daylight, relieved the sepoys of theirguards, and ordered them to lay down their arms. Another companyof the same regiment travelled through the night in carriages toUmritsar, the holy city of the Sikhs, and occupied the fortressof Govindgarh. Montgomery had been very anxious about these twostrongholds, and it was a great satisfaction to him to know that theywere at length safely guarded by British bayonets. 

Although, as I have said, we found Lahore in a state of considerableexcitement, it was satisfactory to see how fully the situation hadbeen grasped, and how everything that was possible had been doneto maintain order, and show the people of the Punjab that we wereprepared to hold our own. Montgomery's foresight and decision, andCorbett's hearty and willing co-operation, checked, if not altogetherstopped, what, under less energetic management, would assuredly haveresulted in very grievous trouble. Excitement was inevitable. Therewas a general stir throughout the province. Lahore was crowded withthe families of European soldiers, and with ladies who had come therefrom various parts of the Punjab, all in terrible anxiety as to whatmight be the ultimate fate of their husbands and relatives; some ofwhom were with Native regiments, whose loyalty was more than doubtful;some with the Movable Column, the destination of which was uncertain;while others were already on their way to join the army hurrying toDelhi. 

The difficulty with Campbell having been settled, Chamberlain assumedthe command of the Movable Column, the advent of which on the 2nd Junewas hailed with delight by all the Europeans at Lahore. A regiment ofBritish Infantry and two batteries of Artillery afforded a much neededsupport to the handful of British soldiers keeping guard over thegreat capital of the Punjab, and gave confidence to the Sikhs andothers disposed to be loyal, but who were doubtful as to the wisdom ofsiding with us. 

The disturbing element was the Native troops which accompanied thecolumn. They had not shown openly that they contemplated mutiny, butwe knew that they were not to be trusted, and were only watching foran opportunity to break out and escape to Delhi with their arms. 

I was living with the Brigadier in a house only a few minutes' walkfrom the garden where the Native regiments were encamped, and thespies we were employing to watch them had orders to come to mewhenever anything suspicious should occur. During the night of the8th June one of these men awoke me with the news that the 35th NativeInfantry intended to revolt at daybreak, and that some of them hadalready loaded their muskets. I awoke the Brigadier, who directed meto go at once to the British officers of the regiment, tell them whatwe had heard, and that he would be with them shortly. As soon as theBrigadier arrived the men were ordered to fall in, and on their armsbeing examined two of them were found to have been loaded. The sepoysto whom the muskets belonged were made prisoners, and I was ordered tosee them lodged in the police-station. 

Chamberlain determined to lose no time in dealing with the case, andalthough Drum-Head Courts-Martial were then supposed to be obsolete, he decided to revive, for this occasion, that very useful means ofdisposing, in time of war, of grave cases of crime. 

The Brigadier thought it desirable that the Court-Martial should becomposed of Native, rather than British, officers, as being likely tobe looked upon by the prisoners as a more impartial tribunal, underthe peculiar circumstances in which we were placed. This was madepossible by the arrival of the 1st Punjab Infantry--Coke's Rifles--agrand regiment under a grand Commander. Raised in 1849, composedchiefly of Sikhs and Pathans, and possessing Native officers ofundoubted loyalty, the 1st Punjab Infantry had taken part in almostevery frontier expedition during the previous eight years. Its historywas a glorious record of faithful and devoted service, such as canonly be rendered by brave men led by officers in whom they believe andtrust. [10] The Subadar-Major of the corps was a man called Mir Jaffir, a most gallant Afghan soldier, who entered the British service duringthe first Afghan war, and distinguished himself greatly in all thesubsequent frontier fights. This Native officer was made presidentof the Court-Martial. The prisoners were found guilty of mutiny, andsentenced to death. Chamberlain decided that they should be blown awayfrom guns, in the presence of their own comrades, as being the mostawe-inspiring means of carrying the sentence into effect. [11] A paradewas at once ordered. The troops were drawn up so as to form threesides of a square; on the fourth side were two guns. As the prisonerswere being brought to the parade, one of them asked me if they weregoing to be blown from guns. I said, 'Yes. ' He made no further remark, and they both walked steadily on until they reached the guns, to whichthey were bound, when one of them requested that some rupees he had onhis person might be saved for his relations. The Brigadier answered:'It is too late!' The word of command was given; the guns went offsimultaneously, and the two mutineers were launched into eternity. 

It was a terrible sight, and one likely to haunt the beholder for manya long day; but that was what was intended. I carefully watchedthe sepoys' faces to see how it affected them. They were evidentlystartled at the swift retribution which had overtaken their guiltycomrades, but looked more crest-fallen than shocked or horrified, andwe soon learnt that their determination to mutiny, and make the bestof their way to Delhi, was in nowise changed by the scene they hadwitnessed. 

[Footnote 1: The late General Sir Henry Daly, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: Now General Sir John Coke, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 3: Afterwards commanded by Lieutenant, now General, SirDighton Probyn, V. C. , G. C. V. O. , K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 4: The late Major-General Sir George Green, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Wilde, K. C. B. , K. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 6: The late General James Walker, C. B. , sometimeSurveyor-General in India. ]

[Footnote 7: Now General Sir George Bourchier, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 8: Now, except for one short interval, every officer who hasjoined the Indian Army since 1861 must, in the first instance, havebelonged or been attached to one of Her Majesty's British regiments:the great majority have been educated at Sandhurst or Woolwich, andall feel that they are members of the same army. ]

[Footnote 9: The late Sir Robert Montgomery, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 10: During the operations in the Kohat Pass in February, 1850, within twelve months of the corps being raised, several of themen were killed and wounded. Among the latter was a Pathan namedMahomed Gul. He was shot through the body in two places, and as Cokesat by him while he was dying, he said, with a smile on his face:'_Sahib_, I am happy; but promise me one thing--don't let my oldmother want. I leave her to your care. ']

[Footnote 11: Awe-inspiring certainly, but probably the most humane, as being a sure and instantaneous mode of execution. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XI. 1857

 Ferozepore--Crawford Chamberlain at Multan --Chamberlain's masterly conduct --Nicholson succeeds Neville Chamberlain--Irresolution at Jullundur --General Mehtab Sing--Nicholson's soldierly instincts --More disarmaments

For a few days after our arrival at Lahore nothing could be settled asto the further movements of the column. It was wanted in all parts ofthe Punjab: Ferozeporo, Multan, Jhelum, Sialkot, Umritsar, Jullundur, Philour, Ludhiana--all these places were more or less disturbed, andall were clamorous for help. 

At Ferozepore the Native regiments[1] broke out on the 13th May, whenthey made a daring, but unsuccessful effort to seize the arsenal, situated inside the fort and the largest in Upper India. Had thatfallen into the hands of the rebels, Delhi could not have beencaptured without very considerable delay, for the besieging forcedepended mainly upon Ferozepore for the supply of munitions of war. The fort had been allowed to fall into bad repair, and the mutineershad no difficulty in forcing their way inside; there, fortunately, they were checked by the wall which surrounded the arsenal, and thisobstacle, insignificant as it was, enabled the guard to hold its own. Originally this guard consisted entirely of Native soldiers, but, asI have already recorded, after the outbreak at Meerut, Europeanshad been told off for the charge of this important post; so strong, however, here as elsewhere, was the belief in the loyalty of thesepoys, and so great was the reluctance to do anything which mighthurt their feelings, that the Native guard was not withdrawn. Thissame guard, when the attack took place, did its best to assist theassailants, and even prepared scaling-ladders to enable the latter togain access to the magazine enclosure. The Europeans, however, were equal to the emergency; they overpowered and disarmed theirtreacherous companions, and then succeeded in beating off anddispersing the attacking party. 

Being foiled in this attempt, the mutineers returned to thecantonment, set fire to the church and other buildings, and thenstarted for Delhi. Ferozepore had a large European garrison, aregiment of Infantry, a battery of Field Artillery, and a company ofFoot Artillery, and was supposed to be able to look after itself, although affairs had been greatly mismanaged. 

Multan had next to be considered. Matters at that station were veryunsettled, and indeed were causing the authorities grave anxiety, butMultan was more fortunate than many places, in being in the hands ofan unusually able, experienced officer, Major Crawford Chamberlain. Consequently, the Commander-in-Chief and Chief Commissioner agreed, while fully appreciating the great value of Multan, that the presenceof British troops was less urgently needed there than elsewhere, and it was decided they could not be spared from the Punjab for itsprotection. 

The garrison at Multan consisted of a troop of Native Horse Artillery, two regiments of Native Infantry, and the 1st Irregular Cavalry, composed entirely of Hindustanis from the neighbourhood of Delhi;while in the old Sikh fort there were about fifty EuropeanArtillerymen, in charge of a small magazine. The station was nominallycommanded by an officer who had been thirty-four years in the army, and had great experience amongst Natives; but he had fallen into sucha bad state of health, that he was quite unfit to deal with thecrisis which had now arrived. The command, therefore, was practicallyexercised by Chamberlain. Next to Delhi and Lahore, Multan was themost important place in Upper India, as our communication with the seaand southern India depended on its preservation. 

To Chamberlain's own personality and extraordinary influence over themen of the 1st Irregular Cavalry must be attributed his success. Hisrelations with them were of a patriarchal nature, and perfect mutualconfidence existed. He knew his hold over them was strong, andhe determined to trust them. But in doing so he had really noalternative--had they not remained faithful, Multan must have beenlost to us. One of his first acts was to call a meeting at his houseof the Native officers of the Artillery, Infantry, and his ownregiment, to discuss the situation. Taking for granted the absoluteloyalty of these officers, he suggested that a written bond shouldbe given, in which the seniors of each corps should guarantee thefidelity of their men. The officers of his regiment rose _enmasse_, and placing their signet-rings on the table, said: '_Kabúlsir-o-chasm'_ ('Agreed to on our lives'). The Artillery Subadardeclared that his men had no scruples, and would fire in whicheverdirection they were required; while the Infantry Native officerspleaded that they had no power over their men, and could give noguarantee. Thus, Chamberlain ascertained that the Cavalry were loyal, the Artillery doubtful, and the Infantry were only biding their timeto mutiny. 

Night after night sepoys, disguised beyond all recognition, attemptedto tamper with the Irregular Cavalry. The Wurdi-Major, [2] aparticularly fine, handsome _Ranagar_, [3] begged Chamberlain tohide himself in his house, that he might hear for himself the openproposals to mutiny, massacre, and rebellion that were made to him;and the promises that, if they succeeded in their designs, he (theWurdi-Major) should be placed upon the _gaddi_[4] of Multan for hisreward. Chamberlain declined to put himself in such a position, fearing he might not be able to restrain himself. 

Matters now came to a climax. A Mahomedan Subadar of one of the NativeInfantry regiments laid a plot to murder Chamberlain and his family. The plot was discovered and frustrated by Chamberlain's own men, butit became apparent that the only remedy for the fast increasing evilwas to disarm the two Native Infantry regiments. How was this to beaccomplished with no Europeans save a few gunners anywhere near? SirJohn Lawrence was most pressing that the step should be taken atonce; he knew the danger of delay; at the same time, he thoroughlyappreciated the difficulty of the task which he was urging Chamberlainto undertake, and he readily responded to the latter's request for aregiment of Punjab Infantry to be sent to him. The 2nd Punjab Infantrywas, therefore, despatched from Dera Ghazi Khan, and at the same timethe 1st Punjab Cavalry arrived from Asni, [5] under Major Hughes, [6]who, hearing of Chamberlain's troubles, had marched to Multan withoutwaiting for orders from superior authority. The evening of the day onwhich these troops reached Multan, the British officers of the severalregiments were directed to assemble at the Deputy-Commissioner'shouse, when Chamberlain told them of the communication he had receivedfrom Sir John Lawrence, adding that, having reliable information thatthe Native Infantry were about to mutiny, he had settled to disarmthem the next morning. 

It was midnight before the meeting broke up. At 4 a. M. The HorseArtillery troop and the two Native Infantry regiments were ordered tomarch as if to an ordinary parade. When they had gone about a quarterof a mile they were halted, and the Punjab troops moved quietlybetween them and their lines, thus cutting them off from their spareammunition; at the same time the European Artillerymen took theirplaces with the guns of the Horse Artillery troop, and a carefullyselected body of Sikhs belonging to the 1st Punjab Cavalry, underLieutenant John Watson, was told off to advance on the troop and cutdown the gunners if they refused to assist the Europeans to work theguns. 

Chamberlain then rode up to the Native Infantry regiments, and afterexplaining to them the reason for their being disarmed, he gave theword of command, 'Pile arms!' Thereupon a sepoy of the 62nd shouted:'Don't give up your arms; fight for them!' Lieutenant Thomson, theAdjutant of the regiment, instantly seized him by the throat and threwhim to the ground. The order was repeated, and, wonderful to relate, obeyed. The Native Infantry regiments were then marched back to theirlines, while the Punjab troops and Chamberlain's Irregulars remainedon the ground until the arms had been carted off to the fort. 

It was a most critical time, and enough credit has never been given toChamberlain. Considering the honours which were bestowed on otherswho took more or less conspicuous parts in the Mutiny, he was veryinsufficiently rewarded for this timely act of heroism. Had he notshown such undaunted courage and coolness, or had there been thesmallest hesitation, Multan would certainly have gone. Chamberlainmanaged an extremely difficult business in a most masterly manner. His personal influence insured his own regiment continuing loyalthroughout the Mutiny, and it has now the honour of being the 1stRegiment of Bengal Cavalry, and the distinction of wearing a differentuniform from every other regiment in the service, being allowed toretain the bright yellow which the troopers wore when they were firstraised by Colonel James Skinner, and in which they performed suchloyal service. [7]

At Jhelum and Sialkot it was decided that, as the Native troops hadbeen considerably reduced in numbers, the danger was not so great asto require the presence of the Movable Column. 

Umritsar had been made safe for the time, but it was a place theimportance of which could not be over-estimated, and it was thoughtthat keeping a strong column in its vicinity for a few days wouldmaterially strengthen our position there. Moreover, Umritsar lay inthe direct route to Jullundur, where the military authorities hadproved themselves quite unfitted to deal with the emergency. It wasdecided, therefore, that Umritsar should be our objective in thefirst instance. We marched from Lahore on the 10th June, and reachedUmritsar the following morning. 

News of a severe fight at Badli-ki-Serai had been received, whichincreased our anxiety to push on to Delhi, for we feared the placemight be taken before we could get there. But to our mortification itwas decided that the column could not be spared just then even forDelhi, as there was still work for it in the Punjab. To add to ourdisappointment, we had to give up our trusted Commander; for a fewhours after our arrival at Umritsar a telegram came to NevilleChamberlain offering him the Adjutant-Generalship of the Army insuccession to Colonel Chester, who had been killed at Badli-ki-Serai. He accepted the offer, and I made certain I should go with him. Mychagrin, therefore, can easily be understood when he told me that Imust remain with the column, as it would be unfair to his successor totake away the staff officer. We were now all anxiety to learn whothat successor should be, and it was a satisfaction to hear that JohnNicholson was the man. 

Chamberlain left for Delhi on the 13th; but Nicholson could not joinfor a few days, and as troops were much needed at Jullundur, it wasarranged that the column should move on to that place, under thetemporary command of Campbell, and there await the arrival of the newBrigadier. 

On my going to Campbell for orders, he informed me that he was nolonger the senior officer with the column, as a Colonel Denniss, junior to him regimentally, but his senior in army rank, had justrejoined the 52nd. Accordingly I reported myself to Denniss, who, though an officer of many years' service, had never before held acommand, not even that of a regiment; and, poor man! was considerablytaken aback when he heard that he must be in charge of the column forsome days. He practically left everything to me--a somewhat tryingposition for almost the youngest officer in the force. It was underthese circumstances I found what an able man Colonel Campbell reallywas. He correctly gauged Denniss's fitness, or rather unfitness, forthe command, and appreciating the awkwardness of my position, advisedme so wisely that I had no difficulty in carrying on the work. 

We reached Jullundur on the 20th, Nicholson taking over command thesame day. He had been given the rank of Brigadier-General, whichremoved all grounds for objection on the part of Campbell, and the twosoon learnt to appreciate each other, and became fast friends. 

Jullundur was in a state of the greatest confusion. The Native troops, consisting of a regiment of Light Cavalry and two regiments of NativeInfantry, began to show signs of disaffection soon after the outbreakat Meerut, and from that time until the 7th June, when they broke intoopen mutiny, incendiary fires were almost of daily occurrence. Thewant of resolution displayed in dealing with the crisis at Jullundurwas one of the regrettable episodes of the Mutiny. The Europeangarrison consisted of Her Majesty's 8th Foot and a troop of HorseArtillery. The military authorities had almost a whole month's warningof the mutinous intentions of the Native troops, but though they hadbefore them the example of the prompt and successful measures adoptedat Lahore and Peshawar, they failed to take any steps to prevent theoutbreak. 

The Brigadier (Johnstone) was on leave at the commencement of theMutiny, and during his absence the treasure was placed in charge ofa European guard, in accordance with instructions from Sir JohnLawrence. This measure was reversed as soon as the Brigadier rejoined, for fear of showing distrust of the sepoys, and another wise orderof the watchful Chief Commissioner--to disarm the Native troops--wasnever carried out. The Commissioner, Major Edward Lake, one of HenryLawrence's most capable assistants, had also repeatedly urged uponJohnstone the advisability of depriving the sepoys of their arms, buthis advice remained unheeded. When the inevitable revolt took placeEuropean soldiers were allowed to be passive spectators while propertywas being destroyed, and sepoys to disappear in the darkness of thenight carrying with them their muskets and all the treasure andplunder they could lay their hands on. 

A futile attempt at pursuit was made the following morning, but, aswill be seen, this was carried out in so half-hearted a manner, thatthe mutineers were able to get safely across the Sutlej with theirloot, notwithstanding that the passage of this broad river had to bemade by means of a ferry, where only very few boats were available. Having reached Philour, the British troops were ordered to push on toDelhi, and as Jullundur was thus left without protection, Lake gladlyaccepted the offer of the Raja of Kapurthala to garrison it with hisown troops. 

There was no doubt as to the loyalty of the Raja himself, and hissincere desire to help us; but the mismanagement of affairs atJullundur had done much to lower our prestige in the eyes of hispeople, and there was no mistaking the offensive demeanour of histroops. They evidently thought that British soldiers had gone neverto return, and they swaggered about in swash-buckler fashion, as onlyNatives who think they have the upper hand can swagger. 

It was clearly Lake's policy to keep on good terms with the Kapurthalapeople. His position was much strengthened by the arrival of ourcolumn; but we were birds of passage, and might be off at any moment, so in order to pay a compliment to the officers and principal men withthe Kapurthala troops, Lake asked Nicholson to meet them at his house. Nicholson consented, and a durbar was arranged. I was present on theoccasion, and was witness of rather a curious scene, illustrativealike of Nicholson and Native character. 

At the close of the ceremony Mehtab Sing, a general officer in theKapurthala Army, took his leave, and, as the senior in rank at thedurbar, was walking out of the room first, when I observed Nicholsonstalk to the door, put himself in front of Mehtab Sing and, waving himback with an authoritative air, prevent him from leaving the room. Therest of the company then passed out, and when they had gone, Nicholsonsaid to Lake: 'Do you see that General Mehtab Sing has his shoeson?'[8] Lake replied that he had noticed the fact, but tried to excuseit. Nicholson, however, speaking in Hindustani, said: 'There is nopossible excuse for such an act of gross impertinence. Mehtab Singknows perfectly well that he would not venture to step on his ownfather's carpet save barefooted, and he has only committed this breachof etiquette to-day because he thinks we are not in a position toresent the insult, and that he can treat us as he would not havedared to do a month ago. ' Mehtab Sing looked extremely foolish, andstammered some kind of apology; but Nicholson was not to be appeased, and continued: 'If I were the last Englishman left in Jullundur, you'(addressing Mehtab Sing) 'should not come into my room with yourshoes on;' then, politely turning to Lake, he added, 'I hope theCommissioner will now allow me to order you to take your shoes off andcarry them out in your own hands, so that your followers may witnessyour discomfiture. ' Mehtab Sing, completely cowed, meekly did as hewas told. 

Although in the kindness of his heart Lake had at first endeavoured tosmooth matters over, he knew Natives well, and he readily admittedthe wisdom of Nicholson's action. Indeed, Nicholson's uncompromisingbearing on this occasion proved a great help to Lake, for it had thebest possible effect upon the Kapurthala people; their manner at oncechanged, all disrespect vanished, and there was no more swaggeringabout as if they considered themselves masters of the situation. 

Five or six years after this occurrence I was one of a pig-stickingparty at Kapurthala, given by the Raja in honour of theCommander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose. [9] When riding home in the eveningI found myself close to the elephant on which our host and the Chiefwere sitting. The conversation happening to turn on the events of theMutiny, I asked what had become of General Mehtab Sing. The Raja, pointing to an elephant a little distance off on which two Nativegentlemen were riding, said, 'There he is. ' I recognized the General, and making him a salaam, which he politely returned, I said to him, 'Ihave not had the pleasure of meeting you since those hot days in June, 1857, when I was at Jullundur. ' The Raja then asked me if I knewNicholson. On my telling him I had been his staff officer, and withhim at the durbar at Lake _Sahib's_ house, the Raja laughed heartily, and said, 'Oh! then you saw Mehtab Sing made to walk out of the roomwith his shoes in his hand? We often chaff him about that littleaffair, and tell him that he richly deserved the treatment he receivedfrom the great Nicholson _Sahib_. '

Sir Hugh Rose was greatly interested in the story, which he made merepeat to him as soon as we got back to camp, and he was as muchstruck as I was with this spontaneous testimony of a leading Native tothe wisdom of Nicholson's procedure. 

On taking over command, Nicholson's first care was to establish aneffective system of intelligence, by means of which he was keptinformed of what was going on in the neighbouring districts; and, fully recognizing the necessity for rapid movement in the event of anysudden emergency, he organized a part of his force into a smallflying column, the infantry portion of which was to be carried in_ekkas_. [10] I was greatly impressed by Nicholson's knowledge ofmilitary affairs. He seemed always to know exactly what to do and thebest way to do it. This was the more remarkable because, thougha soldier by profession, his training had been chiefly that of acivilian--a civilian of the frontier, however, where his soldierlyinstincts had been fostered in his dealing with a lawless and unrulypeople, and where he had received a training which was now to standhim in good stead. Nicholson was a born Commander, and this was feltby every officer and man with the column before he had been amongstthem many days. 

The Native troops with the column had given no trouble since we leftLahore. We were travelling in the direction they desired to go, whichaccounted for their remaining quiet; but Nicholson, realizing thedanger of having them in our midst, and the probability of theirrefusing to turn away from Delhi in the event of our having to retraceour steps, resolved to disarm the 35th. The civil authorities in thedistrict urged that the same course should be adopted with the 33rd, aNative Infantry regiment at Hoshiarpur, about twenty-seven miles fromJullundur, which it had been decided should join the column. TheNative soldiers with the column already exceeded the Europeans innumber, and as the addition of another regiment would make the oddsagainst us very serious, it was arranged to disarm the 35th before the33rd joined us. 

We left Jullundur on the 24th June, and that afternoon, accompanied bythe Deputy-Commissioner of the district, I rode to Philour to choose aplace for the disarming parade. The next morning we started early, theEuropeans heading the column, and when they reached the ground we hadselected they took up a position on the right of the road, the twobatteries in the centre and the 52nd in wings on either flank. Theguns were unlimbered and prepared for action. On the left of the roadwas a serai, [11] behind which the officer commanding the 35th was toldto take his regiment, and, as he cleared it, to wheel to the right, thus bringing his men in column of companies facing the line ofEuropeans. This manoeuvre being accomplished, I was ordered to tellthe commanding officer that the regiment was to be disarmed, and thatthe men were to pile arms and take off their belts. The sepoys andtheir British officers were equally taken aback; the latter hadreceived no information of what was going to happen, while the formerhad cherished the hope that they would be able to cross the Sutlej, and thence slip off with their arms to Delhi. 

I thought I could discover relief in the British officers' faces, certainly in that of Major Younghusband, the Commandant, and when Igave him the General's order, he murmured, 'Thank God!' He had beenwith the 35th for thirty-three years; he had served with it at thesiege of Bhurtpore, throughout the first Afghan war, and in Sale'sdefence of Jalalabad; he had been proud of his old corps, but knowingprobably that his men could no longer be trusted, he rejoiced to feelthat they were not to be given the opportunity for further disgracingthemselves. [12] The sepoys obeyed the command without a word, and in afew minutes their muskets and belts were all packed in carts and takenoff to the fort. 

As the ceremony was completed, the 33rd arrived and was dealt with ina similar manner; but the British officers of this regiment did nottake things so quietly--they still believed in their men, and theColonel, Sandeman, trusted them to any extent. He had been with theregiment for more than two-and-thirty years, and had commanded itthroughout the Sutlej campaign. On hearing the General's order, heexclaimed: 'What! disarm my regiment? I will answer with my life forthe loyalty of every man!' On my repeating the order the poor oldfellow burst into tears. His son, the late Sir Robert Sandeman, whowas an Ensign in the regiment at the time, told me afterwards howterribly his father felt the disgrace inflicted upon the regiment ofwhich he was so proud. 

It was known that the wing of the 9th Light Cavalry was incommunication with the mutineers at Delhi, and that the men were onlywaiting their opportunity; so they would also certainly have beendisarmed at this time, but for the idea that such a measure might havea bad effect on the other wing, which still remained at Sialkot. Theturn of this regiment, however, came a few days later. 

Up till this time we all hoped that Delhi was our destination, but, greatly to our surprise and disappointment, orders came that morningdirecting the column to return to Umritsar; the state of the Punjabwas causing considerable anxiety, as there were several stations atwhich Native corps still remained in possession of their arms. 

The same afternoon I was in the Philour fort with Nicholson, whenthe telegraph-signaller gave him a copy of a message from Sir HenryBarnard to the authorities in the Punjab, begging that all Artilleryofficers not doing regimental duty might be sent to Delhi, where theirservices were urgently required. I at once felt that this messageapplied to me. I had been longing to find myself at Delhi, and livedin perpetual dread of its being captured before I could get there; nowat last my hopes seemed about to be realized in a legitimatemanner, but, on the other hand, I did not like the idea of leavingNicholson--the more closely I was associated with him the more I wasattracted by him--and I am always proud to remember that he did notwish to part with me. He agreed, however, that my first duty was to myregiment, and only stipulated that before leaving him I should findsomeone to take my place, as he did not know a single officer with thecolumn. This I was able to arrange, and that evening Nicholson and Idined _tête-à-tête_. At dawn the next morning I left by mail-cart forDelhi, my only kit being a small bundle of bedding, saddle and bridle, my servants having orders to follow with my horses, tents, and otherbelongings. 

[Footnote 1: One Cavalry and two Infantry. ]

[Footnote 2: Native Adjutant. ]

[Footnote 3: A name applied by the Hindus to any Rajput who has, orwhose ancestors have, been converted to Islam. There were several_Rangars_ in the 1st Irregulars. One day in June, Shaidad Khan, aResaidar of this class, came to Chamberlain, and said: 'There was arumour that he (Chamberlain) had not as much confidence in _Rangars_as in other classes of the regiment, and he came to be comforted'!Chamberlain asked him to sit down, and sent to the banker of theregiment for a very valuable sword which he had given him for safecustody. It had belonged to one of the Amirs of Sindh, was taken inbattle, and given to Chamberlain by Major Fitzgerald, of the SindhHorse. On the sword being brought, Chamberlain handed it over toShaidad Khan and his sect for safety, to be returned when the Mutinywas over. The tears rose to the Native officer's eyes, he touchedChamberlain's knees, and swore that death alone would sever the bondof fidelity of which the sword was the token. He took his leave, thoroughly satisfied. ]

[Footnote 4: Throne. ]

[Footnote 5: A station since abandoned for Rajanpur. ]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir W. T. Hughes, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 7: The two disarmed regiments remained quietly at Multan formore than a year, when, with unaccountable inconsistency, a suddenspirit of revolt seized them, and in August, 1858, they broke out, tried to get possession of the guns, murdered the Adjutant of theBombay Fusiliers, and then fled from the station. But order by thattime had been quite restored, our position in the Punjab was secure, and nearly all the sepoys were killed or captured by the countrypeople. ]

[Footnote 8: No Native, in Native dress, keeps his shoes on when heenters a room, unless he intends disrespect. ]

[Footnote 9: The late Field Marshal Lord Strathnairn, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 10: A kind of light cart. ]

[Footnote 11: A four-walled enclosure for the accommodation oftravellers. ]

[Footnote 12: It will be remembered that this was the regiment inwhich two men had been found with loaded muskets, and blown away fromguns at Lahore. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XII. 1857

 George Ricketts at Ludhiana--Pushing on to Delhi --In the camp before Delhi

The mail-cart rattled across the bridge of boats, and in less than anhour I found myself at Ludhiana, at the house of George Ricketts, [1]the Deputy Commissioner. Ricketts's bungalow was a resting-place foreveryone passing through _en route_ to Delhi. In one room I foundLieutenant Williams of the 4th Sikhs, who had been dangerously woundedthree weeks before, while assisting Ricketts to prevent the Jullundurmutineers from crossing the Sutlej. 

While I was eating my breakfast, Ricketts sat down by my side andrecounted a stirring tale of all that had happened at Philourand Ludhiana consequent on the rising of the Native regiments atJullundur. The mutineers had made, in the first instance, for Philour, a small cantonment, but important from the fact of its containing afair-sized magazine, and from its situation, commanding the passageof the Sutlej. It was garrisoned by the 3rd Native Infantry, whichfurnished the sole guard over the magazine--a danger which, as I havementioned, had fortunately been recognized by the Commander-in-Chiefwhen he first heard of the outbreak at Meerut. The men of the 3rdremained quiet, and even did good service in helping to drag the gunsof the siege-train across the river, and in guarding the treasury, until the mutineers from Jullundur arrived on the 8th June. They thengave their British officers warning to leave them, saying they did notmean to injure them or their property, but they had determined theywould no longer serve the _Sirkar_. Twelve British officers (therecould not have been more), confronted by 3, 000 sepoys, felt themselvespowerless, and retired to the fort. 

Ricketts had with him at that time an assistant named Thornton, [2] whohad gone to Philour to lodge some money in the treasury. This officerhad started to ride back to Ludhiana, when he suddenly became aware ofwhat had happened, and how perilous was the position. Had he consultedhis own safety, he would have returned and taken refuge in thefort, instead of which he galloped on, having to pass close by themutineers, until he reached the bridge of boats, which, with admirablecoolness and presence of mind, he cut behind him, then, hurrying on, he informed Ricketts of what had taken place; and that the rebelsmight shortly be expected to attempt the passage of the river. Fortunately the 4th Sikhs from Abbottabad had that very morningmarched into Ludhiana, and Ricketts hoped, with their assistance, tohold the sepoys in check until the arrival of the British troops, which he believed must have been despatched from Jullundur in pursuitof the mutineers. 

The garrison of Ludhiana consisted of a detachment of the 3rd NativeInfantry, guarding the fort, in which was stored a large amount ofpowder. The detachment was commanded by Lieutenant Yorke, who, onhearing Thornton's story, went at once to the fort. He was much likedby his men, who received him quite civilly, but told him they knewthat their regiment had joined the rebels from Jullundur, and thatthey themselves could no longer obey his orders. Ricketts thenunderstood that he had but the 4th Sikhs and a small party of troopsbelonging to the Raja of Nabha to depend upon. There were onlytwo officers with the 4th Sikhs--Captain Rothney, in command, andLieutenant Williams, the Adjutant. Taking three companies of theregiment under Williams, and two guns of the Nabha Artillery, onedragged by camels, the other by horses, Ricketts started off towardsthe bridge of boats. Galloping on alone, he found that the gap in thebridge made by Thornton had not been repaired, which proved that therebels had not crossed by that passage, at all events. He widened thegap by cutting adrift some more boats, and then had himself ferriedacross the river, in order to ascertain the exact state of affairs atPhilour. He learnt that no tidings had been received of any Britishtroops having been sent from Jullundur in pursuit of the mutineers, who, having failed to get across the bridge, owing to Thornton'stimely action, had gone to a ferry reported to be three miles up theriver. 

Ricketts recrossed the river as quickly as he could, and joinedWilliams. It was then getting dark, but, hoping they might still bein time to check the rebels, they pushed on in the direction of theferry, which proved to be nearer six than three miles away. The groundwas rough and broken, as is always the case on the banks of Indianrivers, swollen as they often are by torrents from the hills, whichleave behind boulders and debris of all kinds. They made but littleway; one of the gun-camels fell lame, the guides disappeared, and theybegan to despair of reaching the ferry in time, when suddenly therewas a challenge and they know they were too late. The sepoys hadsucceeded in crossing the river and were bivouacking immediately infront of them. 

It was not a pleasant position, but it had to be made the best of; andboth the civilian and the soldier agreed that their only chance wasto fight. Williams opened fire with his Infantry, and Ricketts tookcommand of the guns. At the first discharge the horses bolted with thelimber, and never appeared again; almost at the same moment Williamsfell, shot through the body. Ricketts continued the fight until hisammunition was completely expended, when he was reluctantly obliged toretire to a village in the neighbourhood, but not until he had killed, as he afterwards discovered, about fifty of the enemy. 

Ricketts returned to Ludhiana early the next morning, and later inthe day the mutineers passed through the city. They released some 500prisoners who were in the gaol, and helped themselves to what foodthey wanted, but they did not enter the cantonment or the fort. Thegallant little attempt to close the passage of the Sutlej was entirelyfrustrated, owing to the inconceivable want of energy displayed by theso-called 'pursuing force'; had it pushed on, the rebels must havebeen caught in the act of crossing the river, when Ricketts's smallparty might have afforded considerable help. The Europeans fromJullundur reached Philour before dark on the 8th; they heard thefiring of Ricketts's guns, but no attempt was made by the officer incommand to ascertain the cause, and they came leisurely on to Ludhianathe following day. 

Having listened with the greatest interest to Ricketts's story, andrefreshed the inner man, I resumed my journey, and reached Umballalate in the afternoon of the 27th, not sorry to get under shelter, forthe monsoon, which had been threatening for some days past, burst withgreat fury as I was leaving Ludhiana. 

On driving to the dâk-bungalow I found it crowded with officers, someof whom had been waiting there for days for an opportunity to go on toDelhi; they laughed at me when I expressed my intention of proceedingat once, and told me that the seats on the mail-carts had to beengaged several days in advance, and that I might make up my mind tostay where I was for some time to come. I was not at all prepared forthis, and I determined to get on by hook or by crook; as a preliminarymeasure, I made friends with the postmaster, from whose office themail-carts started. From him I learnt that my only chance was tocall upon the Deputy-Commissioner, by whose orders the seats weredistributed. I took the postmaster's advice, and thus becameacquainted with Douglas Forsyth, who in later years made a name forhimself by his energetic attempts to establish commercial relationswith Yarkand and Kashgar. Forsyth confirmed what I had already heard, but told me that an extra cart was to be despatched that night, ladenwith small-arm ammunition, on which I could, if I liked, get a seat, adding: 'Your kit must be of the smallest, as there will be no roomfor anything inside the cart. '

I returned to the dâk-bungalow, overjoyed at my success, to findmyself quite an important personage, with everyone my friend, like theboy at school who is the lucky recipient of a hamper from home. 'Takeme with you!' was the cry on all sides. Only two others besides thedriver and myself could possibly go, and then only by carrying ourkits in our laps. It was finally arranged that Captain Law andLieutenant Packe should be my companions. Packe was lamed for lifeby a shot through his ankle before we had been forty-eight hoursat Delhi, and Law was killed on the 23rd July, having greatlydistinguished himself by his gallantry and coolness under fire duringthe short time he served with the force. 

We got to Kurnal soon after daybreak on the 28th. It was occupied by afew of the Raja of Jhind's troops, a Commissariat officer, and one ortwo civilians, who were trying to keep the country quiet and collectsupplies. Before noon we passed through Panipat, where there was astrong force of Patiala and Jhind troops, and early in the afternoonwe reached Alipur. Here our driver pulled up, declaring he would go nofurther. A few days before there had been a sharp fight on the roadbetween Alipur and Delhi, not far from Badli-ki-Serai, where thebattle of the 8th June had taken place, and as the enemy wereconstantly on the road threatening the rear of the besieging force, the driver did not consider it safe to go on. We could not, however, stop at Alipur, so after some consultation we settled to take themail-cart ponies and ride on to camp. We could hear the boom of gunsat intervals, and as we neared Delhi we came across several deadbodies of the enemy. It is a curious fact that most of these bodieswere exactly like mummies; there was nothing disagreeable about them. 

Why this should have been the case I cannot say, but I often wishedduring the remainder of the campaign that the atmospheric influences, which, I presume, had produced this effect, could assert themselvesmore frequently. 

We stopped for a short time to look at the position occupied by theenemy at Badli-ki-Serai; but none of us were in the mood to enjoysight-seeing. We had never been to Delhi before, and had but thevaguest notion where the Ridge (the position our force was holding)was, or how the city was situated with regard to our camp. The soundof heavy firing became louder and louder, and we knew that fightingmust be going on. The driver had solemnly warned us of the risk wewere running in continuing our journey, and when we came to the pointwhere the Grand Trunk Road bifurcates, one branch going direct to thecity and the other through the cantonment, we halted for a few minutesto discuss which we should take. Fortunately for us, we settled tofollow that which led to the cantonment, and, as it was then gettingdark, we pushed on as fast as our tired ponies could go. The reliefto us when we found ourselves safe inside our own piquets may beimagined. My father's old staff-officer, Henry Norman, who was thenAssistant-Adjutant-General at Head-Quarters, kindly asked me to sharehis tent until I could make other arrangements. He had no bed to offerme, but I required none, as I was thoroughly tired out, and all Iwanted was a spot on which to throw myself down. A good night's restquite set me up. I awoke early, scarcely able to believe in my goodfortune. I was actually at Delhi, and the city was still in thepossession of the mutineers. 

[Footnote 1: George Ricketts, Esq. , C. B. , afterwards a member of theBoard of Revenue of the North-West Provinces. ]

[Footnote 2: Thomas Thornton, Esq. , C. S. I. , afterwards Secretary tothe Government of India in the Foreign Department. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XIII. 1857

 The first victory--Enthusiasm amongst the troops --Barnard's success at Badli-ki-Serai--The Flagstaff Tower --Position on the Ridge--Quintin Battye--The gallant little Gurkhas --Proposed assault--The besiegers besieged--Hard fighting --The centenary of Plassy

Before entering on the narrative of what came under my own observationduring the three months I was at Delhi, I will relate what took placeafter Sir Henry Barnard succeeded General Anson in command on the 26thMay, and how the little British force maintained itself against almostoverwhelming odds during the first three weeks of that memorablesiege. 

Barnard had served as Chief of the Staff in the Crimea, and had heldvarious staff appointments in England; but he was an utter stranger toIndia, having only arrived in the country a few weeks before. Hefully realized the difficulties of the position to which he had sounexpectedly succeeded, for he was aware how unjustly Anson was beingjudged by those who, knowing nothing of war, imagined he could havestarted to attack Delhi with scarcely more preparation than would havebeen necessary for a morning's parade. The officers of the column werecomplete strangers to him, and he to them, and he was ignorant of thecharacteristics and capabilities of the Native portion of his troops. It must, therefore, have been with an anxious heart that he took overthe command. 

One of Barnard's first acts was to get rid of the unreliable elementwhich Anson had brought away from Umballa. The Infantry he sent toRohtuk, where it shortly afterwards mutinied, and the Cavalry toMeerut. That these troops should have been allowed to retain theirweapons is one of the mysteries of the Mutiny. For more than twomonths their insubordination had been apparent, incendiarism hadoccurred which had been clearly traced to them, and they had even goneso far as to fire at their officers; both John Lawrence and RobertMontgomery had pressed upon the Commander-in-Chief the advisabilityof disarming them; but General Anson, influenced by the regimentalofficers, who could not believe in the disaffection of their men, hadnot grasped the necessity for this precautionary measure. The Europeansoldiers with the column, however, did not conceal their mistrust ofthese sepoys, and Barnard acted wisely in sending them away; but itwas extraordinary that they should have been allowed to keep theirarms. 

On the 5th June Barnard reached Alipur, within ten miles of Delhi, where he decided to await the arrival of the siege-train and thetroops from Meerut. 

The Meerut brigade, under Brigadier Wilson, had started on the 27thMay. It consisted of two squadrons of the Carabineers, Tombs's[1]troop of Horse Artillery, Scott's Field Battery and two 18-pounderguns, a wing of the 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, a few Native Sappersand Miners, and a detachment of Irregular Horse. 

Early on the 30th the village of Ghazi-u-din-nagar (now known asGhaziabad) close to the Hindun river, and about eleven miles fromDelhi, was reached. Thence it was intended to make a reconnaissancetowards Delhi, but about four o'clock in the afternoon a vedettereported that the enemy were approaching in strength. A very carelesslook-out had been kept, for almost simultaneously with the report around shot came tumbling into camp. The troops fell in as quickly aspossible, and the Artillery came into action. The Rifles crossed theHindun suspension bridge, and, under cover of our guns, attacked theenemy, who were strongly posted in a village. From this position theywere speedily dislodged, and the victory was complete. Seven hundredBritish soldiers defeated seven times their number, capturing fiveguns and a large quantity of ammunition and stores. Our loss was oneofficer and ten men killed, and one officer and eighteen men wounded. 

The following day (Sunday) the enemy reappeared about noon, butafter two hours' fighting they were again routed, and on our troopsoccupying their position, they could be seen in full retreat towardsDelhi. The rebels succeeded in taking their guns with them, for ourmen, prostrated by the intense heat and parched with thirst, werequite unable to pursue. We had one officer and eleven men killed, andtwo officers and ten men wounded. Among the latter was an ensign ofthe 60th Rifles, a boy named Napier, a most gallant young fellow, fullof life and spirit, who had won the love as well as the admiration ofhis men. He was hit in the leg, and the moment he was brought intocamp it had to be amputated. When the operation was over, Napier washeard to murmur, 'I shall never lead the Rifles again! I shall neverlead the Rifles again!' His wound he thought little of. What grievedhim was the idea of having to give up his career as a soldier, and toleave the regiment he was so proud of. Napier was taken to Meerut, where he died a few days afterwards. [2]

On the 1st June Wilson's force was strengthened by the Sirmurbattalion of Gurkhas, [3] a regiment which later covered itself withglory, and gained an undying name by its gallantry during the siege ofDelhi. 

On the 7th June Wilson's brigade crossed the Jumna at Baghput, andat Alipur it joined Barnard's force, the men of which loudly cheeredtheir Meerut comrades as they marched into camp with the capturedguns. The siege-train had arrived the previous day, and Barnard wasnow ready for an advance. His force consisted of about 600 Cavalry and2, 400 Infantry, with 22 field-guns. There were besides 150 EuropeanArtillerymen, chiefly recruits, with the siege-train, which comprisedeight 18-pounders, four 8-inch and twelve 5-1/2-inch mortars. Theguns, if not exactly obsolete, were quite unsuited for the work thathad to be done, but they were the best procurable. George Campbell, inhis 'Memoirs of my Indian Career, ' thus describes the siege-train ashe saw it passing through Kurnal: 'I could not help thinking that itlooked a very trumpery affair with which to bombard and take a greatfortified city;' and he expressed his 'strong belief that Delhi wouldnever be taken by that battery. '

Barnard heard that the enemy intended to oppose his march to Delhi, and in order to ascertain their exact position he sent LieutenantHodson (who had previously done good service for the Commander-in-Chiefby opening communication with Meerut) to reconnoitre the road. Hodsonreported that the rebels were in force at Badli-ki-Serai a little morethan halfway between Alipur and Delhi. Orders were accordingly issuedfor an advance at midnight on the 7th June. 

When it became known that a battle was imminent, there was greatenthusiasm amongst the troops, who were burning to avenge themassacres of Meerut and Delhi. The sick in hospital declared theywould remain there no longer, and many, quite unfit to walk, insistedon accompanying the attacking column, imploring their comrades not tomention that they were ill, for fear they should not be allowed totake part in the fight. [4]

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR HARRY TOMBS, V. C. , G. C. B. 

_From a photograph by Messrs. Grillet and Co. _]

The mutineers had selected an admirable position on both sides of themain road. To their right was a serai and a walled village capableof holding large numbers of Infantry, and protected by an impassableswamp. To their left, on some rising ground, a sand-bag battery forfour heavy guns and an 8-inch mortar had been constructed. On bothsides the ground was swampy and intersected by water-cuts, and abouta mile to the enemy's left, and nearly parallel to the road, ran theWestern Jumna Canal. 

At the hour named, Brigadier Hope Grant, [5] commanding the Cavalry, started with ten Horse Artillery guns, three squadrons of the 9thLancers, and fifty Jhind horsemen under Lieutenant Hodson, with theobject of turning the enemy's left flank. Shortly afterwards the mainbody marched along the road until the lights in the enemy's campbecame visible. Colonel Showers, who had succeeded Hallifax in thecommand of the 1st Brigade, [6] moved off to the right of the road, andColonel Graves, who had taken Jones's place with the 2nd Brigade, [7]to the left. The heavy guns remained on the road with a battery ofField Artillery on either flank. Just as day broke our guns advanced, but before they were in position the fight began by a cannonade fromthe rebel Artillery, which caused us severe loss. To this destructivefire no adequate reply could be made; our guns were too few and of toosmall calibre. To add to our difficulties, the Native bullock-driversof our heavy guns went off with their cattle, and one of the waggonsblew up. At this critical moment Barnard ordered Showers to charge theenemy's guns, a service which was performed with heroic gallantry byHer Majesty's 75th Foot, who carried the position at the point of thebayonet, with a loss of 19 officers and men killed and 43 wounded. Then, supported by the 1st Fusiliers, the same regiment dashed acrossthe road and burst open the gates of the serai. A desperate fightensued, but the sepoys were no match for British bayonets, andthey now learnt that their misdeeds were not to be allowed to gounpunished. Graves's brigade, having passed round the _jhil_, [8]appeared on the enemy's right rear, while Grant with his Cavalry andHorse Artillery threatened their left. The defeat was complete, andthe rebels retreated hastily towards Delhi, leaving their guns on theground. 

Although the men were much exhausted, Barnard determined to push on, for he feared that if he delayed the rebels might rally, and occupyanother strong position. 

From the cross-roads just beyond Badli-ki-Serai could be seen theRidge on which the British force was to hold its own for more thanthree months during the heat of an Indian summer, and under the rainof an Indian monsoon. At this point two columns were formed, Barnardtaking command of the one, which proceeded to the left towards thecantonment, and Wilson of the other, which moved along the city road. Wilson's column fought its way through gardens and enclosures until itreached the western extremity of the Ridge. Barnard, as he came underthe fire of the enemy's guns, made a flank movement to the left, andthen, wheeling to his right, swept along the Ridge from the FlagstaffTower to Hindu Rao's house, where the two columns united, the rebelsflying before them. 

Barnard had achieved a great success and with comparatively smallloss, considering the formidable position occupied by the enemy, theirgreat strength in Artillery, and their superiority in numbers. 

Our casualties were 51 killed and 131 wounded. Among the former wasColonel Chester, the Adjutant-General of the Army. Of the troopsopposed to us it was reckoned that 1, 000 never returned to Delhi;thirteen guns were captured, two of them being 24-pounders. 

I have frequently wandered over the Ridge since 1857, and thought howwonderfully we were aided by finding a ready-made position--not only acoign of vantage for attack, but a rampart of defence, as Forrest[9]describes it. This Ridge, rising sixty feet above the city, coveredthe main line of communication to the Punjab, upon the retention ofwhich our very existence as a force depended. Its left rested on theJumna, unfordable from the time the snow on the higher ranges beginsto melt until the rainy season is over, and of sufficient width toprevent our being enfiladed by field-guns; although, on the immediateright, bazaars, buildings, and garden-walls afforded cover to theenemy, the enclosed nature of the ground was so far advantageous thatit embarrassed and impeded them in their attempts to organize anattack in force upon our flank or rear; and a further protection wasafforded by the Najafgarh _jhil_, which during the rains submerges avast area of land. 

The distance of the Ridge from the city walls varied considerably. Onour right, where the memorial monument now stands, it was about 1, 200yards, at the Flagstaff Tower about a mile and a half, and at the endnear the river nearly two miles and a half. This rendered our leftcomparatively safe, and it was behind the Ridge in this direction thatthe main part of our camp was pitched. The Flagstaff Tower in thecentre was the general rendezvous for the non-combatants, and forthose of the sick and wounded who were able to move about, as theycould assemble there and hear the news from the front without muchrisk of injury from the enemy's fire. 

The Flagstaff Tower is interesting from the fact that it was here theresidents from the cantonment of Delhi assembled to make a stand, on hearing that the rebels from Meerut were murdering the Britishofficers on duty within the city, that the three Native regiments andbattery of Field Artillery had joined the mutineers, and that at anymoment they themselves might expect to be attacked. The tower was 150feet high, with a low parapet running round the top, approached by anarrow winding staircase. Here the men of the party proposed to awaitthe attack. The ladies, who behaved with the utmost coolness andpresence of mind, were, with the wives and children of the fewEuropean non-commissioned officers, placed for their greater safety onthe stairs, where they were all but suffocated by the stifling heat insuch a confined space. The little party on the roof consisted of sometwenty British officers, the same number of half-caste buglers anddrummers, and half a dozen European soldiers. Not a drop of water, nota particle of food, was to be had. No help appeared to be coming fromMeerut, in the direction of which place many a longing and expectantglance had been cast during the anxious hours of that miserable 11thMay. Constant and heavy firing was heard from the city and suburbs, and the Cavalry were reported to be advancing on the cantonment. 

Before evening the weary watchers realized that their position wasuntenable, and that their only possible chance of escaping the fatewhich had befallen the officers within the city (whose dead bodies hadbeen inhumanly sent in a cart to the Tower) lay in flight. Shortlybefore dark the move was made, the women and children were crowdedinto the few vehicles available, and accompanied by the men, some onfoot and some on horseback, they got away by the road leading towardsUmballa. They were only just in time, for before the last of the partywere out of sight of the cantonment, crowds of Natives poured into it, burning, plundering, and destroying everything they could find. 

Amongst the fugitives from Delhi was Captain Tytler, of the 38thNative Infantry, who, after a variety of vicissitudes, reached Umballasafely with his wife and children. When Anson's force was being formedfor the advance on Delhi, Tytler was placed in charge of the militarytreasure chest, and through some unaccountable negligence Mrs. Tytlerwas allowed to accompany him. I believe that, when Mrs. Tytler'spresence became known to the authorities, she would have been sentout of camp to some safe place, but at that time she was not in a fitstate to travel, and on the 21st June, a few days after the force tookup its position under a heavy cannonade, she gave birth to a sonin the waggon in which she was accommodated. The infant, who waschristened Stanley Delhi Force, seems to have been looked upon by thesoldiery with quite a superstitious feeling, for the father tells usthat soon after its birth he overheard a soldier say; 'Now we shallget our reinforcements; this camp was formed to avenge the bloodof innocents, and the first reinforcement sent to us is a new-borninfant. ' Reinforcements did actually arrive the next day. 

It was on the afternoon of the 8th June that the British force wasplaced in position on the Ridge. The main piquet was established atHindu Rao's house, a large stone building, in former days the countryresidence of some Mahratta Chief. About one hundred and eighty yardsfurther to the left was the observatory, near which our heavy gunbattery was erected. Beyond the observatory was an old Pathan mosque, in which was placed an Infantry piquet with two field-guns. Stillfurther to the left came the Flagstaff Tower, held by a party ofInfantry with two more field-guns. At the extreme right of the Ridge, overlooking the trunk road, there was a strong piquet with a heavybattery. 

This was the weak point of our defence. To the right, and somewhatto the rear, was the suburb of Sabzi Mandi (vegetable market), asuccession of houses and walled gardens, from which the rebelsconstantly threatened our flank. To protect this part of the positionas much as possible, a battery of three 18-pounders and an Infantrypiquet was placed on what was known as the General's Mound, with aCavalry piquet and two Horse Artillery guns immediately below. In front of the Ridge the ground was covered with old buildings, enclosures, and clumps of trees, which afforded only too perfectshelter to the enemy when making their sorties. 

As described by the Commanding Engineer, 'the eastern face of Delhirests on the Jumna, and at the season of the year during which ouroperations were carried on, the stream may be described as washing theface of the walls. The river front was therefore inaccessible tothe besieging force, while at the same time the mutineers and theinhabitants of the city could communicate freely across the river bymeans of the bridge of boats and ferries. This rendered it impossiblefor us to invest Delhi, even if there had been a sufficient numberof troops for the purpose. We were only able, indeed, to direct ourattack against a small portion of the city wall, while throughout thesiege the enemy could freely communicate with, and procure suppliesfrom, the surrounding country. 

'On the river front the defences consisted of an irregular wall withoccasional bastions and towers, and about one half of the length ofthis face was occupied by the palace of the King of Delhi and itsoutwork, the old Moghul fort of Selimgarh. 

'The remaining defences consisted of a succession of bastioned fronts, the connecting curtains being very long, and the outworks limitedto one crown-work at the Ajmir gate, and Martello towers mounting asingle gun, at the points where additional flanking fire to that givenby the bastions themselves was required. '[10]

The above description will give some idea of the strength of the greatcity which the British force had come to capture. For more than twomonths, however, our energies were devoted not to capturing the city, but to defending ourselves, having to be ever on the watch to guardour communication with the Punjab, and to repel the enemy's almostdaily sorties. 

The defences of Delhi, which remain almost unaltered up to the presentday, were modernized forms of the ancient works that existed whenthe city fell before Lord Lake's army in 1803. These works had beenstrengthened and improved some years before the Mutiny by LieutenantRobert Napier. [11] How thoroughly and effectually that talented anddistinguished Engineer performed the duty entrusted to him, we who hadto attack Delhi could testify to our cost. 

Barnard was not left long in doubt as to the intentions of the rebels, who, the very afternoon on which he occupied the Ridge, attacked HinduRao's house, where the Sirmur battalion, two companies of the 60thRifles, and two of Scott's guns had been placed. The enemy were drivenoff before dark. The following day they began to cannonade from thecity walls, and in the afternoon repeated their attack. 

That same morning a welcome reinforcement reached camp, the famousCorps of Guides having arrived as fresh as if they had returned froman ordinary field day, instead of having come off a march of nearly600 miles, accomplished in the incredibly short time of twenty-twodays, at the most trying season of the year. The General, havinginspected them, said a few words of encouragement to the men, whobegged their gallant Commandant to say how proud they were to belongto the Delhi Force. Their usefulness was proved that same afternoon, when, in support of the piquets, they engaged the enemy in ahand-to-hand contest, and drove them back to the city. 

It was close up to the walls that Quintin Battye, the dashingCommander of the Guides Cavalry, received his mortal wound. He was thebrightest and cheeriest of companions, and although only a subalternof eight years' service, he was a great loss. I spent a few hours withhim on my way to Delhi, and I remember how his handsome face glowedwhen he talked of the opportunities for distinguishing themselves instore for the Guides. Proud of his regiment, and beloved by his men, who, grand fellows themselves, were captivated by his many soldierlyqualities, he had every prospect before him of a splendid career, buthe was destined to fall in his first fight. He was curiously fond ofquotations, and the last words he uttered were '_Dulce et decorum estpro patriâ mori_. '

While our Infantry and Field Artillery were busily engaged with theenemy, the few heavy guns we had were put in position on the Ridge. Great things were hoped from them, but it was soon found that theywere not powerful enough to silence the enemy's fire, and that oursmall supply of ammunition was being rapidly expended. [12] The rebels'guns were superior in number and some in calibre to ours, and werewell served by the Native Artillerymen whom we had been at such painsto teach. Barnard discovered, too, that his deficiencies in men and_matériel_ prevented regular approaches being made. There were only150 Native Sappers and Miners with our force, and Infantry could notbe spared for working parties. 

On the 10th June another determined attack was made on Hindu Rao'shouse, which was repulsed by the Sirmur battalion of Gurkhas under itsdistinguished Commandant, Major Reid. [13] The mutineers quite hopedthat the Gurkhas would join them, and as they were advancing theycalled out: 'We are not firing; we want to speak to you; we want youto join us. ' The little Gurkhas replied, 'Oh yes; we are coming, ' onwhich they advanced to within twenty paces of the rebels, and, firinga well-directed volley, killed nearly thirty of them. 

The next day the insurgents made a third attack, and were againrepulsed with considerable loss. They knew that Hindu Rao's house wasthe key of our position, and throughout the siege they made the mostdesperate attempts to capture it. But Barnard had entrusted thispost of danger to the Gurkhas, and all efforts to dislodge them wereunavailing. At first Reid had at his command only his own battalionand two companies of the 60th Rifles; but on the arrival of the Guidestheir Infantry were also placed at his disposal, and whenever hesounded the alarm he was reinforced by two more companies of the 60th. Hindu Rao's house was within easy range of nearly all the enemy'sheavy guns, and was riddled through and through with shot and shell. Reid never quitted the Ridge save to attack the enemy, and never oncevisited the camp until carried into it severely wounded on the day ofthe final assault. Hindu Rao's house was the little Gurkhas' hospitalas well as their barrack, for their sick and wounded begged to be leftwith their comrades instead of being taken to camp. [14]

Failing in their attempts on the centre of the position, the mutineerssoon after daylight on the 12th, having concealed themselves in theravines adjoining Metcalfe House, attacked the Flagstaff Tower, thepiquet of which was composed of two Horse Artillery guns and twocompanies of the 75th Foot, under the command of Captains Dunbar andKnox. A heavy fog and thick mist rolling up from the low ground nearthe Jumna completely enveloped the Ridge and the left front of ourposition, hiding everything in the immediate vicinity. The piquetwas on the point of being relieved by a detachment of the 2ndBengal Fusiliers, when a large body of the enemy, who had crept upunobserved, made a rush at the Flagstaff Tower, and as nearly aspossible captured the guns. The piquet was hardly pressed, Knoxand several men were killed, and but for the timely arrival of twocompanies of the 60th, the rebels would have gained the day. 

This engagement was scarcely over, when masses of insurgents advancedfrom the Sabzi Mandi upon Hindu Rao's house, and into the gardens onthe right flank of the camp, threatening the Mound piquet. Reserveswere called up, these attacks, in their turn, were repulsed and therebels were pursued for some distance. It was most fortunate thatboth attacks did not take place simultaneously, as was the obviousintention of the enemy, for our strength would not have beensufficient to repel them both at the same moment. 

In order to prevent the mutineers from coming to such close quartersagain, a piquet was placed in Metcalfe's House, and the Mound to therear of the ridge facing the Sabzi Mandi was strengthened. Theseprecautions ought to, and would, have been taken before, but for thewant of men. Our soldiers were scarcely ever off duty, and this freshdemand made it impossible at times to provide a daily relief for theseveral piquets. 

Our resources in siege guns and ammunition were so limited, dailysorties, disease, and heat were making such ravages amongst oursmall force, there was so little hope of receiving any considerablereinforcements, and it appeared to be of such paramount importance tocapture Delhi without further delay, that Barnard agreed to a proposalfor taking it by a _coup de main_. 

The particular details of the project and disposition of the troopswere worked out by three young officers of Engineers, under the directorders of the General, and were kept a profound secret; even theCommanding Engineer was not made acquainted with them. Secrecy was, ofcourse, of vital importance, but that the officers who ought to havebeen chiefly concerned were kept in ignorance of the scheme, showsthere was little of that confidence so essential to success existingbetween the Commander and those who were in the position of hisprincipal advisers. Practically the whole force was to be engaged, divided into three columns--one to enter by the Kashmir gate, thesecond by the Lahore gate, and the third was to attempt an escalade. The three columns, if they succeeded in effecting an entrance, were towork their way to the centre of the city, and there unite. 

It was intended that these columns should move off from camp so as toarrive at the walls just before daybreak; accordingly, at one o'clockon the morning of the 13th June the troops were suddenly paraded andammunition served out, and then for the first time the Commandersof the three columns and the staff were made acquainted with theGeneral's intentions. It so happened that the 75th Foot, which hadfollowed the enemy into the grounds of Metcalfe House after therepulse on the Flagstaff Tower the previous morning, had through someoversight never been recalled; their absence was only discovered whenthe order was given for the regiment to turn out, and a considerabletime was wasted in sending for it and bringing it back to camp. Daywas breaking when this regiment received its ammunition, and all hopeof an unperceived advance to the walls had to be given up. Thetroops were therefore dismissed, and allowed to turn in, having beenuselessly disturbed from their much-needed rest. 

The failure to give effect to the young Engineer officers' plan may belooked upon as a merciful dispensation of Providence, which saved usfrom what would almost certainly have been an irreparable disaster. When we think of the hard fighting encountered when the assault didtake place under much more favourable circumstances, and how thecolumns at the end of that day were only just able to get inside thecity, those who had practical knowledge of the siege can judge whatchance there would have been of these smaller columns accomplishingtheir object, even if they had been able to take the enemy bysurprise. 

The 13th and 14th passed in comparative quiet; but early on the 15tha strong force advanced from Delhi against the Metcalfe House piquet, with the object of turning our left flank, but it was driven back withconsiderable loss. 

On the 17th we were attacked from almost every direction--a manoeuvreintended to prevent our observing a battery which was beingconstructed close to an Idgah, [15] situated on a hill to our right, from which to enfilade our position on the Ridge. As it was veryimportant to prevent the completion of this battery, Barnard orderedit to be attacked by two small columns, one commanded by Tombs, of theBengal Horse Artillery, the other by Reid. Tombs, with 400 of the 60thRifles and 1st Bengal Fusiliers, 30 of the Guides Cavalry, 20 Sappersand Miners, and his own troop of Horse Artillery, moved towards theenemy's left, while Reid, with four companies of the 60th and someof his own Gurkhas, advanced through Kishenganj against their right. Tombs drove the rebels through a succession of gardens till theyreached the Idgah, where they made an obstinate but unavailingresistance. The gates of the mosque were blown open, and thirty-nineof its defenders were killed. Tombs himself was slightly wounded, andhad two horses killed, making five which had been shot under thisgallant soldier since the commencement of the campaign. Reid's attackwas equally successful. He completely destroyed the battery, andinflicted heavy loss on the enemy. 

The next day but one the rebels issued from the city in great force, and threatened nearly every part of our position. The fighting wassevere throughout the afternoon, the piquets having again and againto be reinforced. Towards evening, while nearly all the Infantry werethus engaged, a large party of the insurgents, passing unperceivedthrough the suburbs and gardens on our right, reappeared about a mileand a half to our rear. Very few troops were left in camp, and allHope Grant, who was in command at the time, could collect was four orfive squadrons of Cavalry and twelve guns. He found the enemy in astrong position, against which his light guns could make but littleimpression, while their Artillery and well-placed Infantry did usconsiderable damage. Tombs's troop especially suffered, and at onetime his guns were in imminent danger of being captured. Just atthis moment some of the Guides Cavalry rode up. 'Daly, if you do notcharge, ' called out Tombs, 'my guns are taken. ' Daly spurred into thebushes, followed by about a dozen of his gallant Guides. He returnedwith a bullet through his shoulder, but the momentary diversion savedthe guns. [16]

As long as it was light the steady fire of the Artillery and thedashing charges of the Cavalry kept the rebels in check; but in thedusk of the evening their superior numbers told: they very nearlysucceeded in turning our flank, and for some time the guns were againin great jeopardy; the 9th Lancers and Guides, bent on saving them atall hazards, charged the enemy; but, with a ditch and houses on eachside, their action was paralyzed, and their loss severe. All was nowin confusion, the disorder increasing as night advanced, when a smallbody of Infantry (about 300 of the 60th Rifles) came up, dashedforward, and, cutting a lane through the rebels, rescued the guns. [17]

Our loss in this affair amounted to 3 officers and 17 men killed, and7 officers and 70 men wounded. Among the latter was Hope Grant, who had his horse shot under him in a charge, and was saved by thedevotion of two men of his own regiment (the 9th Lancers) and aMahomedan sowar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry. 

It was nearly midnight before the troops returned to camp. The enemyhad been frustrated in their attempt to force our rear, but they hadnot been driven back; we had, indeed, been only just able to hold ourown. The result of the day added considerably to the anxiety of theCommander. He saw that the rebels had discovered our weak point, and that if they managed to establish themselves in our rear, ourcommunication with the Punjab would be cut off, our small force wouldbe invested, and without supplies and reinforcements it would beimpossible to maintain our position against the daily increasingstrength of the insurgents. Great was the despondency in camp whenthe result of the day's fighting was known; but the fine spirit whichanimated the force throughout the siege soon asserted itself, and ourmen cheerfully looked forward to the next encounter with the enemy. 

At daybreak Grant was again upon the ground, but found it abandoned. Many dead men and horses were lying about, and a 9-pounder gun, leftby the enemy, was brought into camp. 

The troops had scarcely got back, hoping for a little rest, when theenemy again resumed their attack on the rear, and opened fire at soshort a distance that their shot came right through the camp. But onthis occasion they made no stand, and retreated as soon as our troopsshowed themselves. 

In order to strengthen our position in rear a battery of two18-pounders was constructed, supported by Cavalry and Infantrypiquets, and most of the bridges over the drain from the Najafgarh_jhil_ were destroyed. 

For two days after the events I have just described the hard-workedlittle body of troops had comparative rest, but our spies informed usthat the enemy were being largely reinforced, and that we might expectto be hotly attacked on the 23rd. 

For some time an idea had been prevalent amongst the Natives that theEnglish _raj_ was not destined to survive its hundredth year, and thatthe centenary of Clive's victory on the field of Plassy on the 23rdJune, 1757, would see its downfall. This idea was strengthened inthe Native mind by the fact that the 23rd June, 1857, was a datepropitious alike for Hindus and Mahomedans; the Jattsa, a Hindureligious festival, was to take place on that day, and there was alsoto be a new moon, which the Mahomedans looked upon as a lucky omen;the astrologers, therefore, declared that the stars in their courseswould fight for the mutineers. If, however, prophecies and omens alikeappeared to favour the rebels, fortune was not altogether unkind tous, for on the 22nd a reinforcement reached Rhai, twenty-two milesfrom Delhi, consisting of six Horse Artillery guns, a small partyof British Infantry, a squadron of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and theHead-Quarters of the 4th Sikhs, numbering in all about 850 men. 

A staff officer was sent at once to Rhai to hurry on the force andtell them how urgently their assistance was required in camp; thisappeal was responded to with the utmost alacrity, and early the nextevening the welcome reinforcement made its appearance. 

It had scarcely arrived before the Artillery on the city walls openedfire, while guns, which had been brought into the suburbs, enfiladedour right and concentrated a heavy fire on Hindu Rao's house which thefew guns we had in position were quite unable to silence. The rebelInfantry occupied Kishenganj and Sabzi Mandi in force, and threatenedto advance on the Mound battery, while a constant musketry fire wasmaintained upon the Ridge. Reid reported that the mutineers made adesperate attack at about twelve o'clock, and that no men could havefought better; they charged the Rifles, the Guides, and the Gurkhasagain and again. The cannonade raged fast and furious, and at onetime it seemed as though the day must be lost. Thousands were broughtagainst a mere handful of men; but Reid knew the importance ofhis position, and was determined at all hazards to hold it untilreinforcements arrived. [18]

The mutineers were checked, but not driven off. The first attempt fromthe Mound battery failed to repulse them, and Colonel Welchman, whowas in command, was dangerously wounded. Every available man in camphad been engaged, and as a last resource the 2nd Fusiliers and the 4thSikhs, who had just arrived from Rhai, were sent to the front. Showerswas placed in command, and shortly before the day closed he succeededin forcing the enemy to retire. So the anniversary of Plassy saw us, though hardly pressed, undefeated, and the enemy's hopes unfulfilled. They lost over 1, 000 men. Our casualties were 1 officer and 38 menkilled, and 3 officers and 118 men wounded. The heat all the while wasterrific, and several of our men were knocked over by the sun. 

The lesson taught us by this severe fighting was the importanceof occupying the Sabzi Mandi, and thus preventing the enemy fromapproaching too close to the camp and enfilading the Ridge. Thisentailed more constant duty upon our already overworked soldiers, butBarnard felt that it would not do to run the risk of another suchstruggle. 

A piquet of 180 Europeans was accordingly placed in the Sabzi Mandi, part in a serai on one side of the Grand Trunk Road, and the rest ina Hindu temple on the opposite side. These posts were connected by aline of breastworks with the Hindu Rao piquets, and added considerablyto the strength of our position. 

After the 23rd there were real or threatened attacks daily; but wewere left fairly undisturbed until the 27th June, when the Metcalfeand Sabzi Mandi piquets were assaulted, and also the batteries on theRidge. These attempts were defeated without any very great loss, only13 of our men being killed, and 1 officer and 48 men wounded. 

[Footnote 1: The late Major-General Sir Harry Tombs, V. C. , K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: The Chaplain's Narrative of the siege of Delhi. ]

[Footnote 3: Now the 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas. ]

[Footnote 4: 'Siege of Delhi; by an Officer who served there. ']

[Footnote 5: The late General Sir Hope Grant, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 6: 75th and 1st Bengal Fusiliers. ]

[Footnote 7: 1st Battalion 60th Rifles, 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, andSirmur battalion. ]

[Footnote 8: Swampy ground. ]

[Footnote 9: 'The Indian Mutiny, ' by George W. Forrest. ]

[Footnote 10: The bastions were small, each mounting from ten tofourteen pieces of Artillery; they were provided with masonry parapetsabout 12 feet in thickness, and were about 16 feet high. The curtainconsisted of a simple masonry wall or rampart 16 feet in height, 11feet thick at top, and 14 or 15 feet at bottom. This main wall carrieda parapet loopholed for musketry 8 feet in height and 3 feet inthickness. The whole of the land front was covered by a faussebraye ofvarying thickness, ranging from 16 to 30 feet, and having a verticalscarp wall 8 feet high; exterior to this was a dry ditch about 25feet in width. The counterscarp was simply an earthen slope, easy todescend. The glacis was very narrow, extending only 50 or 60 yardsfrom the counterscarp, and covering barely one-half of the wallsfrom the besiegers' view. These walls were about seven miles incircumference, and included an area of about three square miles (seeColonel Baird-Smith's report, dated September 17, 1857). ]

[Footnote 11: The late Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 12: So badly off were we for ammunition for the heavy gunsat this time, that it was found necessary to use the shot fired atus by the enemy, and a reward was offered for every 24-pounder shotbrought into the Artillery Park. ]

[Footnote 13: Now General Sir Charles Reid, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 14: Forrest's 'Indian Mutiny' and Norman's 'Narrative of theSiege of Delhi, ' two interesting accounts from which I shall oftenquote. ]

[Footnote 15: A Mahomedan place of worship and sacrifice. ]

[Footnote 16: 'Siege of Delhi; by an Officer who served there. ']

[Footnote 17: Forrest's 'The Indian Mutiny. ']

[Footnote 18: Reid's own report. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XIV. 1857

 A new appointment

I will now continue my story from the 29th June, the morning after myarrival in camp, when I awoke full of excitement, and so eager to hearall my old friend Norman could tell me, that I am afraid he must havebeen considerably bored with my questions. 

It is impossible for me to describe my pleasure at finding myself amember of a force which had already gained imperishable fame. I longedto meet and know the men whose names were in everyone's mouth. Thehero of the day was Harry Tombs, of the Bengal Horse Artillery, anunusually handsome man and a thorough soldier. His gallantry in theattack on the Idgah, and wherever he had been engaged, was the generaltalk of the camp. I had always heard of Tombs as one of the bestofficers in the regiment, and it was with feelings of respectfuladmiration that I made his acquaintance a few days later. 

Jemmy Hills, [1] one of the subalterns in Tombs's troop, was an oldAddiscombe friend of mine; he delighted in talking of his Commander, in dilating on his merits as a soldier and his skill in handlingeach arm of the service. As a cool, bold leader of men Tombs wasunsurpassed: no fire, however hot, and no crisis, however unexpected, could take him by surprise; he grasped the situation in a moment, and issued his orders without hesitation, inspiring all ranks withconfidence in his power and capacity. He was somewhat of a martinet, and was more feared than liked by his men until they realized what agrand leader he was, when they gave him their entire confidence, andwere ready to follow him anywhere and everywhere. 

Another very distinguished officer of my regiment, whom I now met forthe first time, and for whom I ever afterwards entertained the warmestregard, was Edwin Johnson, [2] Assistant-Adjutant-General of the BengalArtillery, in which capacity he had accompanied Brigadier Wilson fromMeerut. He had a peculiarly bright intellect--somewhat caustic, but always clever and amusing. He was a delightful companion, andinvariably gained the confidence of those with whom he worked. 

[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR JAMES HILLS-JOHNES, V. C. , G. C. B. _from a photograph by Messrs. Bourne and Shepherd. _]

Johnson was the first person on whom I called to report my arrival andto find out with which troop or battery I was to do duty. He told methat the Quartermaster-General wished to keep me in his department. So, after visiting General Chamberlain, [3] who I knew would be anxiousto hear all that had been going on in the Movable Column since hisdeparture, I made my way to Colonel Becher, whom I found sufferingfrom the severe wound he had received a few days before, and asked himwhat was to be my fate. He replied that the question had been raisedof appointing an officer to help the Assistant-Adjutant-General ofthe Delhi Field Force, who found it impossible to carry on the dailyincreasing work single-handed, and that Chamberlain had thought of mefor this post. Had Chamberlain's wish been carried out my career mighthave been quite changed, but while he was discussing the question withSir Henry Barnard, Donald Stewart unexpectedly arrived in camp. 

I was waiting outside Sir Henry Barnard's tent, anxious to hear whatdecision had been come to, when two men rode up, both looking greatlyfatigued and half starved; one of them being Stewart. He told methey had had a most adventurous ride; but before waiting to hear hisstory, [4] I asked Norman to suggest Stewart for the new appointment--acase of one word for Stewart and two for myself, I am afraid, forI had set my heart on returning to the Quartermaster-General'sdepartment. And so it was settled, to our mutual satisfaction, Stewartbecoming the D. A. A. G. Of the Delhi Field Force, and I the D. A. Q. M. G. With the Artillery. 

[Footnote 1: Now Lieutenant-General Sir James Hills-Johnes, V. C. , G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: The late General Sir Edwin Johnson, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 3: Chamberlain had been given the rank of Brigadier-Generalon his arrival at Delhi. ]

[Footnote 4: The account of this adventurous ride is given in theAppendix. (Appendix I. )]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XV. 1857

 Reinforcements begin to arrive--An assault again proposed --The attack on Alipur--Death of General Barnard --General Reed assumes command--Two V. C. 's--Treachery in camp --Fighting close up to the city walls --Sufferings of the sick and wounded--General Reed's health fails

That my readers may better understand our position at the time Ijoined the Delhi Field Force, I might, I think, quote with advantagefrom a letter[1] written the very day of my arrival by General Barnardto Sir John Lawrence, in which he describes the difficulties of thesituation, hitherto met by the troops with the most determined courageand endurance, but to which no end could be seen. When he took overthe command, he wrote, he was expected to be able to silence at oncethe fire from the Mori and Kashmir bastions, and then to bring hisheavy guns into play on the walls and open a way into the city, after which, it was supposed, all would be plain sailing. But thisprogramme, so plausible in theory, was absolutely impossible to putinto practice. In spite of every effort on our part, not a single oneof the enemy's guns was silenced; they had four to our one, while thedistance from the Ridge to the city walls was too great to allow ofour comparatively light guns making any impression on them. Underthese circumstances the only thing to be done was to constructbatteries nearer to the city, but before these could be begun, entrenching tools, sandbags, and other necessary materials, of whichthe Engineers were almost entirely destitute, had to be collected. Thetroops were being worn out by constant sanguinary combats, and theattacks to which they were exposed required every soul in camp torepel them. It was never certain where the enemy intended to strike, and it was only by the most constant vigilance that their intentionscould be ascertained, and the men were being incessantly withdrawnduring the scorching heat of the day from one place to another. General Barnard concluded as follows: 'You may ask why we engage inthese constant combats. The reason simply is that when attacked wemust defend ourselves, and that to secure our camp, our hospitals, ourstores, etc. , every living being has to be employed. The whole thingis too gigantic for the force brought against it. '

Soon after Barnard wrote these lines reinforcements began to arrive, and our position was gradually improved. By the 3rd July the followingtroops had reached Delhi: four Horse Artillery guns (two Britishand two Native), a detachment of European Foot Artillery, theHead-Quarters of Her Majesty's 8th and 61st Foot, one squadron of the5th Punjab Cavalry, the 1st Punjab Infantry, and some newly-raisedSikh Sappers and Artillery. The strength of the force was thusincreased to nearly 6, 600 men of all arms. The enemy's reinforcements, however, were out of all proportion to ours--mutineers from Jullundur, Nasirabad, Nimach, Kotah, Gwalior, Jhansi, and Rohilkand arrived aboutthis time. Those from Rohilkand crossed by the bridge of boats andentered the city by the Calcutta gate; we could distinctly see themfrom the Ridge, marching in perfect formation, with their bandsplaying and colours flying. Indeed, throughout the siege the enemy'snumbers were constantly being increased, while they had a practicallyunlimited number of guns, and the well-stocked magazine furnished themwith an inexhaustible supply of ammunition. 

I found myself under fire for the first time on the 30th June, when anattack was made on the Sabzi Mandi piquet and Hindu Rao's house. Eightof our men were killed and thirty wounded; amongst the latter wereYorke and Packe, both attached to the 4th Sikhs. It appeared certainthat these two officers were wounded by the Hindustanis of their ownregiment; Packe, who was shot through the ankle, being so close up tothe breastwork that it was scarcely possible for the bullet which hithim to have come from the front. Consequently all the Hindustanisin the 4th Sikhs were disarmed and turned out of camp, as it wasmanifestly undesirable to have any but the most loyal soldiers in ourranks. 

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART, BART. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. , C. I. E. _From a photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry. _]

In the afternoon of the same day I was ordered to accompany a columnunder Brigadier Showers, sent on reconnoitring duty towards the Idgah, where we heard that the enemy were again constructing a battery. Ithad not been commenced, but the intention to build one was evident, for we found a number of entrenching tools, and a quantity ofsandbags. 

The question of attempting to take the city by a _coup de main_ wasnow again discussed. It was urged that our numbers, already small, were being daily reduced by casualties and sickness; that the want ofproper equipment rendered it impossible to undertake regular siegeoperations; and that a rising in the Punjab was imminent. The chancesof success were certainly more favourable than they were on the 13thJune. The force to be employed was stronger; all concerned--the staff, commanders, and troops--were fully apprised of what was intended, andof the part they would have to play; above all, the details of thescheme, which was drawn up on much the same lines as the former one, were carefully worked out by Lieutenant Alex. Taylor, [2] who hadrecently come into camp, and was acting temporarily as CommandingEngineer. 

Of the supreme importance of regaining possession of Delhi there canbe no doubt whatever. But nevertheless the undertaking would, at thattime, have been a most desperate one, and only to be justified bythe critical position in which we were placed. In spite of the latereinforcements, we were a mere handful compared with the thousandswithin the walls. Success, therefore, depended on the completenessof the surprise; and, as we could make no movement without its beingperceived by the enemy, surprise was impossible. Another strong reasonagainst assaulting at that time was the doubtful attitude of someof the Hindustani Cavalry still with us; the whole of the effectivetroops, too, would have to be employed, and the sick and wounded--alarge number--left to the mercy of the Native followers. 

General Barnard carefully weighed all the arguments for and againstthe proposal, and at last reluctantly consented to the attack beingmade, but the discovery of a conspiracy amongst the Natives in campcaused it to be countermanded--a great disappointment to many, andthere was much cavilling and discontent on the part of some, who couldnot have sufficiently appreciated the difficulties and risks of theundertaking, or the disastrous consequences of a repulse. 

On the morning of the day on which it had been arranged that theassault should be made, the staff at Delhi received a most valuableaddition in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel Baird-Smith, of theBengal Engineers. Summoned from Rurki to take the place of the ChiefEngineer, whose health had broken down, Baird-Smith was within sixtymiles of Delhi on the 2nd July, when news of the intended movementreached him. He started at once, and arrived in camp early on the 3rd, but only to find that the assault had been postponed. 

On the afternoon of the 3rd July the enemy came out in force (5, 000or 6, 000 strong with several guns), and occupied the suburbs to ourright. The troops were turned out, but instead of attacking us andreturning to the city as usual when it became dark, the rebels movedoff in the direction of Alipur, where we had an outpost, which washeld by Younghusband's squadron of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. Theyreached Alipur about midnight, and had they attacked the serai at oncewith Infantry, Younghusband and his men could hardly have escaped, butfortunately they opened upon it with Artillery. This gave the sowarstime to mount and fall back on Rhai, the next post, ten miles to therear, which was garrisoned by the friendly troops of the Jhind Raja. The sound of the guns being heard in camp, a column under the commandof Major Coke was got ready to pursue should the insurgents push upthe Trunk Road, or to cut them off should they try to make their wayback to the city. Besides his own corps (the 1st Punjab Infantry), Coke was given a wing of the 61st Foot, six Horse and six FieldArtillery guns, one squadron of the Carabineers, one squadron of the9th Lancers, and the Guides Cavalry; in all about 800 Infantry, 300Cavalry, and 12 guns, and I was sent with him as staff officer. 

It was generally believed that the enemy were on the look-out fortreasure coming from the Punjab, which was known to be under thecharge of a Native guard, and we quite expected to have a long chaseafter them; we were, therefore, surprised to see them, as day broke, crossing our front on their way back to Delhi. 

The rebels were moving on fairly high ground, but between us andthem was a swamp rendered almost impassable by recent heavy rain. Itextended a considerable distance on either side, and as there wasno other way of getting at the rapidly retreating foe, it had to becrossed. Our Artillery opened fire, and Coke advanced with the Cavalryand Infantry. The swamp proved to be very difficult; in it men andhorses floundered hopelessly, and before we were clear the enemy hadgot away with their guns; they were obliged, however, to leave behindall the plunder taken from Alipur, and a considerable quantityof ammunition. My share of the loot was a nice-looking, white, country-bred pony, which I found tied to a tree. I promptly annexedit, glad to save my own horse, and I congratulated myself on havingmade a most useful addition to my small stud. It did not, however, remain long in my possession, for a few days afterwards it was claimedby its rightful owner, Lieutenant Younghusband. 

The heat was great, and as the soldiers were much distressed, havingbeen under arms for ten hours, Coke halted the Infantry portion on thebanks of the Western Jumna Canal instead of returning direct tocamp. While we were enjoying a much-needed rest we were unexpectedlyattacked by some fresh troops (including about 800 Cavalry) which hadhurried out from the city. I was startled from a sound sleep by heavyfiring, and saw the enemy advancing within a few hundred yards of ourhalting-place. Coke formed his Infantry along the bank of the canal, and sent a mounted officer to recall the Cavalry and Artillery. The enemy came on very boldly at first, but the steady fire of ourInfantry kept them at bay, and when the guns arrived we had nodifficulty in driving them off. They left 80 dead on the field; we hadon our side 3 killed and 23 wounded, besides losing several Britishsoldiers from sunstroke. 

Major Coke was much grieved by the loss in this engagement of a Nativefriend of his, a Chief of the Kohat border, by name Mir Mubarak Shah. He was a grand specimen of a frontier Khan, [3] and on hearing that the1st Punjab Infantry was ordered to Delhi expressed his determinationto accompany it. He got together a troop of eighty of his ownfollowers, and leaving Kohat on the 1st June, overtook Coke at Kurnalon the 27th, a distance of nearly 600 miles. A day or two afterwardsCoke's men were approached by the Hindustanis of the 2nd PunjabCavalry, and some Native officers of the 9th Irregulars, who tried toinduce them to join in the rebellion. Advances were made in the firstinstance to Mir Mubarak Shah and Mir Jaffir, the Subadar-Major of the1st Punjab Infantry, who at once informed Coke of what was going on. As soon as the regiment reached Delhi the matter was investigated, andthe Native officers who had endeavoured to tamper with the men wereidentified, tried, and executed. 

About noon on the 5th July we heard the woeful tidings that GeneralBarnard was seized with cholera. The army had never been free fromthat terrible scourge since the Commander-in-Chief fell a victim toit on the 26th May, and now it had attacked his successor, who wascarried off after a few hours' illness. The feeling of sadness amongstthe troops at the loss of their General was universal. Throughout thesix trying weeks he had been in command of the force he had neverspared himself. At work from morning till night in and about thetrenches, he personally attended to every detail, and had won therespect and regard of all in camp. 

Few Commanders were ever placed in a more difficult position thanBarnard. He arrived at Umballa when the Native troops, to whosecharacteristics and peculiarities (as I have already remarked) he wasa complete stranger, were thoroughly disaffected, and within a week ofhis taking over the command of the Sirhind division the Mutiny brokeout. Without any previous knowledge of Indian warfare, he foundhimself in front of Delhi with a force altogether too weak to effectthe object for which it was intended and without any of the appliancesto ensure success; while those who did not realize the extreme riskinvolved never ceased clamouring at a delay which was unavoidable, andurging the General to undertake a task which was impossible. 

Barnard has been blamed, and not unjustly, for mistrusting his ownjudgment and for depending upon others for advice about matters onwhich an experienced Commander ought to have been the best able todecide. But every allowance must be made for the position he wasso unexpectedly called upon to fill and the peculiar nature of hissurroundings. Failing health, too, probably weakened the self-reliancewhich a man who had satisfactorily performed the duties of Chief ofthe Staff in the Crimea must at one time have possessed. 

On the death of Sir Henry Barnard, General Reed assumed command. Hehad joined the force on the morning of the action of Badli-ki-Serai, but though senior to Barnard, he was too much knocked up by theintense heat of the long journey from Peshawar to take part in theaction, and he had allowed Barnard to continue in command. 

For the next few days we had a comparatively quiet time, of whichadvantage was taken to render our position more secure towards therear. The secrecy and rapidity with which the enemy had made their wayto Alipur warned the authorities how easily our communication with thePunjab might be cut off. Baird-Smith saw the necessity for remedyingthis, and, acting on his advice, Reed had all the bridges over theWestern Jumna Canal destroyed for several miles, except one requiredfor our own use. The Phulchudder aqueduct, which carried the canalwater into the city, and along which horsemen could pass to the rearof our camp, was blown up, as was also the Bussye bridge over thedrain from the Najafgarh _jhil_, about eight miles from camp. 

We were not left long in peace, for on the morning of the 9th July theenemy moved out of the city in great force, and for several hours keptup an incessant cannonade on our front and right flank. 

The piquet below the General's Mound happened to be held this day bytwo guns of Tombs's troop, commanded by Second Lieutenant James Hills, and by thirty men of the Carabineers under Lieutenant Stillman. Alittle beyond, and to the right of this piquet, a Native officer'sparty of the 9th Irregular Cavalry had been placed to watch the TrunkRoad. These men were still supposed to be loyal; the regiment to whichthey belonged had a good reputation, and as Christie's Horse haddone excellent service in Afghanistan, where Neville and CrawfordChamberlain had served with it as subalterns. It was, therefore, believed at the Mound piquet that ample warning would be given ofany enemy coming from the direction of the Trunk Road, so that theapproach of some horsemen dressed like the men of the 9th Irregularsattracted little notice. 

Stillman and Hills were breakfasting together, when a sowar from theNative officers' party rode up and reported that a body of the enemy'sCavalry were in sight. Hills told the man to gallop to Head-Quarterswith the report, and to warn Tombs as he passed his tent. Hills andStillman then mounted their men, neither of them having the remotestidea that the news of the enemy's advance had been purposely delayeduntil there was not time to turn out the troops. They imagined thatthe sowar was acting in good faith and had given them sufficientnotice, and while Hills moved his guns towards the position from whichhe could command the Trunk Road, Stillman proceeded to the top of theMound in order to get a better view of the ground over which the enemywere said to be advancing. The troop of the Carabineers was thus leftby itself to receive the first rush of the rebel Cavalry; it wascomposed of young soldiers, some of them quite untrained, who turnedand broke. 

The moment Hills saw the enemy he shouted, 'Action front!' and, inthe hope of giving his men time to load and fire a round of grape, hegallantly charged the head of the column single-handed, cut down theleading man, struck the second, and then was then ridden down himself. It had been raining heavily, so Hills wore his cloak; which probablysaved his life, for it was cut through in many places, as were hisjacket and even his shirt. 

As soon as the body of the enemy had passed on, Hills, extricatinghimself from his horse, got up and searched for his sword, which hehad lost in the mêlée. He had just found it when he was attacked bythree men, two of whom were mounted; he fired at and wounded the firstman; then caught the lance of the second in his left hand, and ran himthrough the body with his sword. The first assailant coming on again, Hills cut him down, upon which he was attacked by the third man onfoot, who succeeded in wrenching his sword from him. Hills fell inthe struggle, and must have been killed, if Tombs, who had been dulywarned by the sowar, and had hurried out to the piquet, had not cometo the rescue and saved his plucky subaltern's life. [4]

Notwithstanding Hills's gallant attempt to stop the sowars, his menhad not time to fire a single round before they were upon them. Theirobject, however, was not to capture these two guns, but to induce theNative Horse Artillery to join them, and galloping past the piquet, they made straight for the troop, and called upon the men to bringaway their guns. The Native Artillerymen behaved admirably: they notonly refused to respond to the call, but they begged the men of theEuropean troop, which was unlimbered close by, to fire through them onthe mutineers. 

Knowing nothing of what was happening, I was standing by my tent, watching my horses, which had just arrived from Philour, as theycrossed the bridge over the canal cut which ran at the rear of ourcamp, when the enemy's Cavalry galloped over the bridge, and for a fewmoments my animals seemed in considerable danger; the sowars, however, having lost more than one-third of their number, and having failed intheir attempt to get hold of the Native Horse Artillery guns, werebent upon securing their retreat rather than upon plunder. Myservants gave a wonderful account of the many perils they hadencountered--somewhat exaggerated, I dare say--but they had done me areal good service, having marched 200 miles through a very disturbedcountry, and arriving with animals and baggage in good order. Indeed, throughout the Mutiny my servants behaved admirably. The _khidmatgar_(table attendant) never failed to bring me my food under the hottestfire, and the _saices_ (grooms) were always present with the horseswhenever they were required, apparently quite indifferent to the risksthey often ran. Moreover, they became imbued with such a warlikespirit that, when I was invalided in April, 1858, four of themenlisted in a regiment of Bengal Cavalry. The _khidmatgar_ died soonafter the Mutiny, but two of his brothers were afterwards in myservice; one, who was with me during the Lushai expedition and thewhole of the Afghan war, never left me for more than twenty years, andwe parted with mutual regret at Bombay on board the P. And O. Steamerin which I took my final departure from India in April, 1893. 

Mine was not a solitary instance; not only the officers' servants, but the followers belonging to European regiments, such as cook-boys, _saices_ and _bhisties_ (water-carriers), as a rule, behaved in themost praiseworthy manner, faithful and brave to a degree. So much wasthis the case, that when the troopers of the 9th Lancers were calledupon to name the man they considered most worthy of the VictoriaCross, an honour which Sir Colin Campbell purposed to confer upon theregiment to mark his appreciation of the gallantry displayed by allranks during the campaign, they unanimously chose the head _bhistie_!Considering the peculiar position we were in at the time, it issomewhat remarkable that the conduct of the Native servants shouldhave been so generally satisfactory. It speaks as well, I think, forthe masters as the servants, and proves (what I have sometimes hearddenied) that Native servants are, as a rule, kindly and consideratelytreated by their European masters. 

To return to my story. The cannonade from within and without the citycontinued unceasing, and the enemy had again to be driven out of thenear suburbs. This duty was entrusted to General Chamberlain, whomI accompanied as one of his staff officers. His column consisted ofabout 800 Infantry and six guns, a few more men joining us as wepassed the Ridge. This was the first occasion on which I had witnessedfighting in gardens and walled enclosures, and I realized howdifficult it was to dislodge men who knew how to take advantage of thecover thus afforded. Our soldiers, as usual, fought well against veryheavy odds, and before we were able to force the enemy back into thecity we had lost 1 officer and 40 men killed, and 8 officers and 163men wounded, besides 11 poor fellows missing: every one of whommust have been murdered. The enemy had nearly 500 men killed, andconsiderably more than that number wounded. 

The result of the day's experience was so far satisfactory that itdetermined General Reed to get rid of all the Hindustani soldiersstill remaining in camp. It was clear that the Native officers' partynear the Mound piquet had been treacherous; none of them were everseen again, and it was generally believed that they had joined theenemy in their dash through the camp. The other Native soldiers didnot hesitate to denounce their Hindustani comrades as traitors; thelatter were consequently all sent away, except a few men of the 4thIrregular Cavalry who were deprived of their horses and employedsolely as orderlies. It was also thought advisable to take the gunsfrom the Native troop of Horse Artillery. A few of the younger menbelonging to it deserted, but the older soldiers continued faithful, and did good work in the breaching batteries. 

There was a short lull after our fight on the 9th--a sure sign thatthe enemy's loss was heavier than they had calculated upon. When themutineers received reinforcements we were certain to be attackedwithin a few hours, but if no fresh troops arrived on the scene wecould generally depend upon a day or two's respite. 

Our next fight was on the 14th July. The rebels came out on thatmorning in great numbers, attacking Hindu Rao's house and the SabziMandi piquets, and supported by a continuous fire of Artillery fromthe walls. For some hours we remained on the defensive, but as theenemy's numbers increased, and we were greatly harassed by theirfire, a column was formed to dislodge them. It was of about the usualstrength, viz. , 800 Infantry and six Horse Artillery guns, with theaddition of a few of the Guides Cavalry and of Hodson's newly-raisedHorse. The command was given to Brigadier Showers, and I was sent ashis staff officer; Reid joined in at the foot of the Ridge with allthe men that could be spared, and Brigadier-General Chamberlain alsoaccompanied the column. 

We moved on under a very heavy fire until we reached an enclosure thewall of which was lined with the enemy. The troops stopped short, whenChamberlain, seeing that they hesitated, called upon them to followhim, and gave them a splendid example by jumping his horse over thewall. The men did follow him, and Chamberlain got a ball in hisshoulder. 

We had great difficulty in driving the enemy back; they contestedevery inch of the ground, the many serais and walled gardens affordingthem admirable cover; but our troops were not to be withstood;position after position was carried until we found ourselves in sightof the Lahore gate and close up to the walls of the city. In oureagerness to drive the enemy back we had, however, come too far. Itwas impossible to remain where we were. Musketry from the walls andgrape from the heavy guns mounted on the Mori and other bastionscommitted terrible havoc. Men were falling on all sides, but thegetting back was hazardous to the last degree. Numerous as the enemywere, they had not the courage to stand against us as long as weadvanced, but the first sign of retreat was the signal for them toleave their shelter and press us the whole way to camp. 

When the retirement commenced I was with the two advanced guns inaction on the Grand Trunk Road. The subaltern in charge was severelywounded, and almost at the same moment one of his sergeants, a smart, handsome fellow, fell, shot through the leg. Seeing some men carryinghim into a hut at the side of the road, I shouted: 'Don't put himthere; he will be left behind; get a doolie for him, or put him on thelimber. ' But what with the incessant fire from the enemy's guns, thebursting of shells, the crashing of shot through the branches of thetrees, and all the din and hubbub of battle, I could not have beenheard, for the poor fellow with another wounded man was left in thehut, and both were murdered by the mutineers. So many of the men withthe two guns were _hors de combat_, and the horses were so unsteady(several of them being wounded), that there was great difficulty inlimbering up, and I was helping the drivers to keep the horses quiet, when I suddenly felt a tremendous blow on my back which made me faintand sick, and I was afraid I should not be able to remain on my horse. The powerless feeling, however, passed off, and I managed to stickon until I got back to camp. I had been hit close to the spine by abullet, and the wound would probably have been fatal but for the factthat a leather pouch for caps, which I usually wore in front nearmy pistol, had somehow slipped round to the back; the bullet passedthrough this before entering my body, and was thus prevented frompenetrating very deep. 

The enemy followed us closely right up to our piquets, and but for thesteadiness of the retirement our casualties must have been even morenumerous than they were. As it was, they amounted to 15 men killed, 16officers and 177 men wounded, and 2 men missing. 

The enemy's loss was estimated at 1, 000. For hours they were seencarrying the dead in carts back to the city. 

My wound, though comparatively slight, kept me on the sick-list for afortnight, and for more than a month I could not mount a horse or puton a sword-belt. I was lucky in that my tent was pitched close to thatof John Campbell Brown, one of the medical officers attached to theArtillery. He had served during the first Afghan war, with Sale'sforce, at Jalalabad, and throughout both the campaigns in the Punjab, and had made a great reputation for himself as an army surgeon. Helooked after me while I was laid up, and I could not have been inbetter hands. 

The Delhi Force was fortunate in its medical officers. Some of thebest in the army were attached to it, and all that was possible to bedone for the sick and wounded under the circumstances was done. Butthe poor fellows had a bad time of it. A few of the worst cases wereaccommodated in the two or three houses in the cantonment that hadescaped destruction, but the great majority had to put up with suchshelter from the burning heat and drenching rain as an ordinarysoldiers' tent could provide. Those who could bear the journey andwere not likely to be fit for duty for some time were sent away toMeerut and Umballa; but even with the relief thus afforded, thehospitals throughout the siege were terribly overcrowded. Anæstheticswere freely used, but antiseptics were practically unknown, consequently many of the severely wounded died, and few amputationcases survived. 

A great aggravation to the misery and discomfort in hospital was theplague of flies. Delhi is at all times noted for having more than itsshare of these drawbacks to life in the East, but during the siegethey were a perfect pest, and for the short time I was laid up I fullyrealized the suffering which our sick and wounded soldiers had toendure. At night the inside of my tent was black with flies. At thefirst ray of light or the smallest shake to the ropes, they were allastir, and for the rest of the day there was no peace; it was evendifficult to eat without swallowing one or more of the loathsomeinsects. I had to brush them away with one hand while I put the foodinto my mouth with the other, and more than once I had to rush fromthe table, a fly having eluded all my efforts to prevent his goingdown my throat. 

As soon as I could get about a little, but before I was able toperform my legitimate work, I was employed in helping to look afterthe conservancy of the camp and its surroundings--an extremelydisagreeable but most important duty, for an Indian army must alwayshave a large following, for which sanitary arrangements are adifficulty. Then, large convoys of camels and bullock-carts arriveddaily with supplies and stores, and a considerable number of transportanimals had to be kept in readiness to follow up the enemy with asuitably sized force, whenever we could drive them out of the city. Without any shelter, and often with insufficient food, deaths amongstthe animals were of constant occurrence, and, unless their carcasescould at once be removed, the stench became intolerable. Everyexpedient was resorted to to get rid of this nuisance. Some of thecarcases were dragged to a distance from camp, some were buried, andsome were burnt, but, notwithstanding all our efforts, many remainedto be gradually devoured by the jackals which prowled about the camp, and by the innumerable birds of prey which instinct had brought toDelhi from the remotest parts of India. [5]

At a time when the powers of each individual were taxed to theuttermost, the strain on the Commander of the force was terriblysevere. Mind and body were incessantly at work. Twice in the shortspace of six weeks had the officer holding this responsible positionsuccumbed, and now a third was on the point of breaking down. Major-General Reed's health, never very strong, completely failed, andon the 17th July, only twelve days after succeeding Sir Henry Barnard, he had to give up the command and leave the camp on sick certificate. 

[Footnote 1: See Kaye's 'History of the Indian Mutiny. ']

[Footnote 2: Now General Sir Alexander Taylor, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 3: Mahomedans of good family are so styled in northernIndia. ]

[Footnote 4: Tombs and Hills both received the Victoria Cross fortheir gallantry. ]

[Footnote 5: 'Adjutants, ' never seen in ordinary times further norththan Bengal, appeared in hundreds, and were really useful scavengers. ]

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CHAPTER XVI. 1857

 Archdale Wilson assumes command--Enemy baffled in the Sabzi Mandi --Efforts to exterminate the Feringhis --A letter from General Havelock--News of Henry Lawrence's death --Arrival of the Movable Column--The 61st Foot at Najafgarh

General Reed was succeeded by Brigadier Archdale Wilson, the officerwho commanded the Meerut column at the beginning of the campaign, andwho was so successful in the fights on the Hindun. Though a soldier ofmoderate capacity, Wilson was quite the best of the senior officerspresent, three of whom were superseded by his selection. Two of these, Congreve, Acting-Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, and Graves, whohad been Brigadier at Delhi when the Mutiny broke out, left the campon being passed over; the third, Longfield, took Wilson's place asBrigadier. 

Wilson's succession to the command gave great relief to the troops onaccount of the systematic manner in which he arranged for the variousduties, and the order and method he introduced. The comparative restto the troops, as well as the sanitary improvements he effected, did agood deal for the health of the force. Wilson also took advantage ofthe reinforcements we had received to strengthen our position. As faras possible he put a stop to the practice of following up the enemyclose to the city walls when they were driven off after an attack (apractice which had cost us many valuable lives), contenting himselfwith preventing the rebels from remaining in the immediate vicinity ofour advanced posts. 

The day after Reed's departure another sharp and prolonged attack wasmade upon the Ridge batteries and Sabzi Mandi piquets, and in theafternoon a column was sent to drive the enemy away. It consistedof four Horse Artillery guns, 750 Infantry, and the Guides Cavalry. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 60th Rifles, commanded the column, and, having gained experience from the lesson we had received on the14th, he took care not to approach too near to the city walls, butcleared the Sabzi Mandi, and took up a good position, where heremained for some little time. This unusual procedure seemed todisconcert the enemy, most of whom returned to the city, while thosewho remained to fight did not come to such close quarters as onprevious occasions. Nevertheless, we had 1 officer and 12 men killed, 3 officers and 66 men wounded, and 2 men were missing. 

The four following days passed without any serious attack being made, but an unfortunate accident occurred about this time to a cousin ofmine, Captain Greensill, of the 24th Foot. He was attached to theEngineer department, and was ordered to undertake some reconnoitringduty after dark. On nearing the enemy's position he halted his escort, in order not to attract attention, and proceeded alone to examine theground. The signal which he had arranged to give on his return wasapparently misunderstood, for as he approached the escort fired; hewas mortally wounded, and died in great agony the next morning. 

The last severe contest took place in the Sabzi Mandi on the 18th, for by this time the Engineers' incessant labour had resulted in theclearing away of the old serais and walled gardens for some distanceround the posts held by our piquets in that suburb. The 'SammyHouse' piquet, to the right front of Hindu Rao's house, was greatlystrengthened, and cover was provided for the men occupying it--a verynecessary measure, exposed as the piquet was to the guns on the Burnand Mori bastions, and within grape range of the latter, while theenemy's Infantry were enabled to creep close up to it unperceived. 

The improvements we had made in this part of our position were, nodoubt, carefully watched and noted by the rebels, who, findingthat all attempts to dislodge us on the right ended in their owndiscomfiture, determined to try whether our left was not morevulnerable than they had found it in the earlier days of the siege. Accordingly early on the 23rd they sallied forth from the Kashmirgate, and, occupying Ludlow Castle and its neighbourhood, shelledMetcalfe House, the stable piquet, and the mosque piquet on the Ridge. As all attempts to silence the enemy's guns with our Artillery provedunavailing, and it was feared that if not dislodged they wouldestablish a battery at Ludlow Castle, a small column under BrigadierShowers moved out by a cutting through the Ridge on our left, itsobject being (in conjunction with the Metcalfe House piquets) to turnthe enemy's right and capture their guns. 

The troops detailed for this duty consisted of six Horse Artilleryguns, 400 British Infantry, 360 of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and aparty of the Guides Cavalry, in addition to 250 men detached from theMetcalfe House piquets. The advance of the column up the road leadingtowards the Kashmir gate appeared to be unnoticed until it arrivedclose to the enemy, who then opened with grape. Our troops pressedon, and in their eagerness to capture the guns, which were beingwithdrawn, got too near the city walls. Here Showers was wounded, andthe command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 60th, whoskilfully conducted the retirement. Our loss was 1 officer and 11 menkilled, 5 officers and 34 men wounded. Captain Law, one of my twocompanions on the mail-cart from Umballa, was the officer killed. 

The enemy were fairly quiet between the 23rd and 31st July, on whichdate they moved out of the city in considerable strength, with theintention of making a temporary bridge across the cut in the swampyground I have before described, and so threatening our rear. A columnunder Coke was sent to the other side of the cut to intercept theenemy should they succeed in getting across; this column was joinedat Alipur by the Kumaon battalion (composed of Gurkhas and hill-men), about 400 strong, which had just arrived from the Punjab as escortto a large store of ammunition. The services of these troops were, however, not required, for the rain, which had been coming down intorrents for some hours, had caused such a rush of water that thebridge was carried away before it was completed. The enemy thenretired towards the city. On reaching the suburbs they were reinforcedby a large body of Infantry, and a most determined attack was made onthe right of our position. This occurred about sunset, and all nightthe roar of musketry and artillery was kept up without a moment'scessation. 

The next day was the anniversary of a great Mahomedan festival, whenit was the custom for the King to pray and make sacrifice at theIdgah, in commemoration of Abraham's intended offering up ofIshmail. [1] On this particular occasion, however, the sacrifices wereto be dispensed with in deference to Hindu prejudices, [2] and intheir stead a tremendous united effort was to be made by Hindus andMussulmans to exterminate the Feringhis. All the morning of the1st August mosques and Hindu temples were crowded with worshippersoffering up prayers for the success of the great attempt, and in theafternoon the rebels, mad with excitement and fanaticism, issuedin countless numbers from the city gates, and, shouting the Moslembattle-cry, advanced and threw themselves on our defences. They weredriven back by our deadly volleys, but only for a moment; they quicklyreformed and made a fresh attack, to be stopped again by our steady, uncompromising fire. Time after time they rallied and hurledthemselves against our breastworks. All that night and well on intothe next day the fight continued, and it was past noon before thedevoted fanatics became convinced that their gods had deserted them, that victory was not for them, and that no effort, however heroic ontheir part, could drive us from the Ridge. The enemy's loss was heavy, ours trifling, for our men were admirably steady, well protected bybreastworks, and never allowed to show themselves except when theassailants came close up. We had only 1 officer and 9 men killed and36 men wounded. 

The officer was Lieutenant Eaton Travers, of the 1st Punjab Infantry. He had been seven years with the regiment, and had been presentwith it in nearly all the many frontier fights in which it had beenengaged. He was a bright, happy fellow, and a great friend of mine. AsMajor Coke, his commanding officer, published in regimental orders:'This gallant soldier and true-hearted gentleman was beloved andrespected by the officers and men of the regiment. His loss is anirreparable one. '

The enemy were much depressed by the failure of the Bakhra Id attack, from which they had expected great things. They began to despair ofbeing able to drive us from our position on the Ridge, which for sevenweeks had been so hotly contested. They heard that Nicholson with hisMovable Column was hastening to our assistance, and they felt that, unless they could gain some signal victory before reinforcementsreached us, we should take our place as the besiegers, instead ofbeing, as hitherto, the besieged. Disaffection within the city wallswas on the increase; only the semblance of authority remained to theold and well-nigh impotent King, while some of his sons, recognizingtheir perilous position, endeavoured to open negotiations with us. Many of the sepoys were reported to be going off to their homes, sickand weary of a struggle the hopelessness of which they had begun torealize. 

Our work, however, was far from being finished. Notwithstanding lossesfrom death and desertion, the enemy still outnumbered us by abouteight or nine to one. 

All this time our communication with the Punjab was maintained, and weregularly received letters and newspapers from England by the northernroute; but for several weeks we had had no news from the south. Rumours of disasters occasionally reached us, but it was not until thesecond week in July that we heard of the fight at Agra, the retirementof our troops, and the flight of all the residents into the fort. 

These scraps of intelligence, for they were mere scraps, written oftenin Greek character, some screwed into a quill, some sewn between thedouble soles of a man's shoe, and some twisted up in the messenger'shair, were eagerly looked for, and as eagerly deciphered when theycame. It was cheering to learn that Allahabad was safe, that Lucknowwas still holding out, that troops from Madras, Ceylon, and theMauritius had reached Calcutta, and that Lord Elgin, taking astatesmanlike view of the situation, had diverted to India[3] theforce intended for the China expedition, and we fondly hoped that someof the six British regiments reported by one messenger to have arrivedat Cawnpore would be sent to the assistance of the Delhi Force. 

Strangely enough, we knew nothing of the death of Sir Henry Lawrenceor General Wheeler, and had not even heard for certain that Cawnporehad fallen and that Lucknow was besieged, while there were constantreports that Wheeler was marching up the Trunk Road. Being mostanxious to get some authentic intelligence, Norman[4] on the 15th Julywrote a letter in French addressed to General Wheeler at Cawnpore, orwhoever might be in command between that place and Delhi, giving anaccount of our position at Delhi, and expressing a hope that troopswould soon march to our assistance. The letter was entrusted to twosepoys of the Guides, who carried out their difficult task mostfaithfully, and on the 3rd August returned with the following replyfrom General Havelock, addressed to Major-General Reed:

 'Cawnpore, left bank of the Ganges, '_25th July, 1857. _

 'MY DEAR GENERAL, 'Yesterday I saw Captain Norman's letter of the 15th instant from Delhi, addressed to Sir Hugh Wheeler. That gallant officer and the whole of his force were destroyed on the 27th June by a base act of treachery. Sir Henry Somerset is Commander-in-Chief in India and Sir Patrick Grant in Bengal. Under the orders of the supreme Government I have been sent to retrieve affairs here. I have specific instructions from which I cannot depart. I have sent a duplicate of your letter to Sir P. Grant. In truth, though most anxious to march on Delhi, I have peremptory orders to relieve Lucknow. I have, thank God, been very successful. I defeated the enemy at Futtehpore on the 12th, and Pandu Naddi on the 15th, and this place, which I recaptured on the 16th. On each occasion I took all the guns. Immense reinforcements are coming from England and China. Sir Patrick Grant will soon be in the field himself. Lucknow holds out. Agra is free for the present. I am sorry to hear you are not quite well. I beg that you will let me hear from you continually. '

Two days afterwards another letter was received; this time fromLieutenant-Colonel Fraser-Tytler, A. Q. M. G. , with Havelock's force. Itwas addressed to Captain Earle, A. Q. M. G. , Meerut, and ran as follows:

 'Cawnpore, _July 27th_. 

 'General Havelock has crossed the river to relieve Lucknow, which will be effected four days hence. He has a strong force with him, and he has already thrashed the Nana and completely dispersed his force. We shall probably march to Delhi with four or five thousand Europeans and a heavy Artillery, in number, not in weight. The China force is in Calcutta, 5, 000 men. More troops expected immediately. We shall soon be with you. '

These sanguine expectations were never fulfilled! Instead of Lucknowbeing relieved in four days, it was nearly four months before thatresult was achieved, and instead of troops from Cawnpore coming tohelp us at Delhi, the troops from Delhi formed the chief part of theforce which relieved Lucknow. 

While we were rejoicing at the prospect of being reinforced by a largenumber of British soldiers, a gloom was cast over the whole camp bythe rumour that Sir Henry Lawrence was dead. As the first BritishRuler of the Punjab, Henry Lawrence was known by reputation to, andrespected by, every man belonging to the Delhi Force, and all realizedwhat a serious loss his death would be to the beleaguered garrison ofLucknow. Much time, however, was not given us for lamentation, for atthe end of the first week in August another attempt was made to driveus from the Metcalfe House piquets. Guns were again brought outthrough the Kashmir gate, and posted at Ludlow Castle and theKudsiabagh; at the same time a number of Infantry skirmishers kept upan almost constant fire from the jungle in front of our position. Thelosses at the piquets themselves were not heavy, good cover havingbeen provided; but the communications between the piquets and our mainposition were much exposed and extremely hazardous for the reliefs. Itwas felt that the enemy could not be allowed to remain in such closeproximity to our outposts, and Showers (who had recovered from hisslight wound) was again ordered to drive them off, for which purposehe was given a strong body of Infantry, composed of Europeans, Sikhs, and Gurkhas, a troop of Horse Artillery, a squadron of the 9thLancers, and the Guides Cavalry. The result was a very brilliantlittle affair. The orders on this occasion were to 'move up silentlyand take the guns at Ludlow Castle. ' The small column proceeded in thedeepest silence, and the first sound heard at dawn on the 12th Augustwas the challenge of the enemy's sentry, '_Ho come dar?_' (Who comesthere?). A bullet in his body was the reply. A volley of musketryfollowed, and effectually awoke the sleeping foe, who succeeded inletting off two of their guns as our men rushed on the battery. An Irish soldier, named Reegan, springing forward, prevented thedischarge of the third gun. He bayoneted the gunner in the act ofapplying the port-fire, and was himself severely wounded. The rebelArtillerymen stood to their guns splendidly, and fought till they wereall killed. The enemy's loss was severe; some 250 men were killed, andfour guns were captured. On our side 1 officer and 19 men were killed, 7 officers and 85 men wounded, and 5 men missing. Amongst the woundedwas the gallant Commander of the column, and that fine soldier, MajorJohn Coke, the Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry. The return tocamp was a stirring sight: the captured guns were brought home intriumph, pushed along by the soldiers, all madly cheering, and thehorses ridden by men carrying their muskets with bayonets fixed. 

The following morning the Punjab Movable Column arrived. Nicholson hadpreceded it by a few days, and from him I heard all about his fightwith the Sialkot mutineers at Trimmu Ghat and the various marches andcounter-marches which he had made since I left him at Philour. 

The column was a most welcome addition to our force. It now consistedof the 52nd Light Infantry, a wing of the 61st Foot, a Field Battery, a wing of the 1st Baluch Regiment, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, beside200 newly-raised Multani Cavalry and 400 military police. This broughtup our effective force to about 8, 000 rank and file of all arms. [5] Amore powerful siege-train than we had hitherto possessed was on itsway from Ferozepore, and three companies of the 8th Foot, detachmentsof Artillery and the 60th Rifles, the 4th Punjab Infantry, and about100 recruits for the 4th Sikhs were also marching towards Delhi. Inaddition, a small contingent from Kashmir and a few of the JhindRaja's troops were shortly expected, after the arrival of whichnothing in the shape of reinforcements could be looked for from thenorth. 

Nor could we hope for any help from the south, for no definite newshad been received from Havelock since his letter of the 25th of July, and rumours had reached us that, finding it impossible to force hisway to Lucknow, he had been obliged to retire upon Cawnpore. It wasfelt, therefore, that if Delhi were to be taken at all, it must betaken quickly, before our augmented numbers should be again diminishedby sickness and casualties. 

The enemy knew our position as well as we did, and appreciating thegreat value the siege-train would be to us, they decided on making asupreme effort to intercept it. A few days before they had been foiledby Hodson in an attempt to cut off our communication with the Punjab, and were determined to ensure success on this occasion by employing areally formidable force. This force left Delhi on the 24th August, andproceeded in the direction of the Najafgarh _jhil_. 

At daybreak the following morning Nicholson started with sixteen HorseArtillery guns, 1, 600 Infantry and 450 Cavalry, his orders being toovertake the enemy and bring them to action. I hoped to have been ofthe party, but Nicholson's request to have me as his staff officerwas refused, as I had not been taken off the sick-list, though Iconsidered my wound was practically healed. 

It proved a most difficult march. The rain fell in torrents, and theroads were mere quagmires. In the first nine miles two swamps had tobe got through, on crossing which Nicholson heard that the insurgentswere at Najafgarh, twelve miles further off. He determined to push on, and at 4 p. M. He found them occupying a strong position about a mileand three-quarters in length. In front was an old serai which was heldin force with four guns, and on either side and in rear of the seraiwas a village equally strongly held; while running round the enemy'sright and rear was a huge drainage cut, swollen by the heavy rain. This cut, or nulla, was crossed by a bridge immediately behind therebels' position. Nicholson advanced from a side-road, which broughthim on their right with the nulla flowing between him and them. Evenat the ford the water was breast-high, and it was with much difficultyand not without a good deal of delay that our troops crossed under aheavy fire from the serai. It was getting late, and Nicholson had onlytime to make a hasty reconnaissance. He decided to attack the serai, drive out the mutineers, and then, changing front to the left, tosweep down their line and get possession of the bridge. 

As the Infantry were about to advance, Nicholson thus addressedthem: 'Men of the 61st, remember what Sir Colin Campbell said atChilianwala, and you have heard that he said the same to his gallantHighland Brigade at the Alma. I have the same request to make of youand the men of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers. Hold your fire until withintwenty or thirty yards, then fire and charge, and the serai is yours. 'Our brave soldiers followed these directions to the letter, and, undercover of Artillery fire, carried the serai. Front was then changed tothe left as had been arranged, and the line swept along the enemy'sdefences, the rebels flying before them over the bridge. Theyconfessed to a loss of more than 800 men, and they left in our handsthirteen field-pieces and a large quantity of ammunition, besides alltheir camp equipage, stores, camels, and horses. Our casualties were 2officers and 23 men killed, and 3 officers and 68 men wounded--two ofthe officers mortally, the third dangerously. 

The enemy in the city, imagining from the size of the force sent withNicholson that we could not have many troops left in camp, attacked usin great strength on the following morning (26th), but were beaten offwith a loss on our side of only 8 killed and 13 wounded. 

[Footnote 1: According to the religion of Islam, Ishmail, not Isaac, was to have been offered up by Abraham. ]

[Footnote 2: Forrest's 'The Indian Mutiny. ']

[Footnote 3: Since writing the above it has been brought to my noticethat the promptitude with which the troops were diverted to Indiawas due in a great measure to the foresight of Sir George Grey, theGovernor of the Cape, who, on hearing of the serious state of affairsin India, immediately ordered all transports which touched at the Capeon their way to take part in the China Expeditionary Force, to proceeddirectly to Calcutta instead of to Singapore. He also despatched asmany of the Cape garrison as he could spare, with stores, etc. , toIndia. It is right, therefore, that he should share with Lord Elginthe credit of having so quickly grasped the magnitude of the crisisthrough which India was passing. ]

[Footnote 4: Owing to Brigadier-General Chamberlain having been placed_hors de combat_ by the severe wound he received the previous day, Norman was carrying on the duties of Adjutant-General. ]

[Footnote 5: There were besides in camp at this time 1, 535 sick andwounded, notwithstanding that several hundred men had been sent away. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XVII. 1857

 Wilson's difficulties--Nicholson's resolve --Arrangements for the assault--Construction of breaching batteries --Nicholson expresses his satisfaction--Orders for the assault issued --Composition of the attacking columns

By the 6th September all the reinforcements that could be expected, including the siege train (consisting of thirty-two pieces of ordnancewith ample ammunition) had arrived in camp, and the time had now comewhen it was necessary for Wilson to determine whether Delhi was to beassaulted, or whether the attempt must be given up. Long exposure tosun and rain began to tell terribly on the troops; sickness increasedto an alarming extent, and on the 31st August there were 2, 368 men inhospital--a number which, six days later, had risen to 2, 977. 

Norman, on whose figures implicit reliance can be placed, states thaton this date the total number of effective rank and file of all arms, Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, and Infantry, including gun-Lascars, Native drivers, newly-raised Sikh Pioneers, and recruits for thePunjab regiments, was 8, 748. 

The strength of the British troops was 3, 217, composed of 580Artillery, 443 Cavalry, and 2, 294 Infantry. The Infantry corps weremere skeletons, the strongest being only 409 effective rank and file. The 52nd, which had arrived three weeks before with 600 healthy men, had already dwindled to 242 fit for duty. 

The above numbers are exclusive of the Kashmir Contingent of 2, 200men and four guns, which had by this time reached Delhi; and severalhundred men of the Jhind troops (previously most usefully employedin keeping open our communication with Kurnal) were, at the Raja'sparticular request, brought in to share in the glory of the capture ofDelhi, the Raja himself accompanying them. 

No one was more alive than the Commander of the Delhi Field Force tothe fact that no further aid could be expected, and no one realizedmore keenly than he did that the strength of the little army athis disposal was diminishing day by day. But Wilson had never beensanguine as to the possibility of capturing Delhi without aid from thesouth. In a letter to Baird-Smith dated the 20th August, he discussedat length his reasons for not being in a position to 'hold out anyhope of being able to take the place until supported by the force frombelow. ' He now was aware that no troops could be expected from thesouth, and Sir John Lawrence plainly told him that he had sent him thelast man he could spare from the Punjab. On the 29th August Lawrencewrote to Wilson: 'There seem to be very strong reasons for assaultingas soon as practicable. Every day's delay is fraught with danger. Every day disaffection and mutiny spread. Every day adds to the dangerof the Native Princes taking part against us. ' But Wilson did not findit easy to make up his mind to assault. He was ill. Responsibility andanxiety had told upon him. He had grown nervous and hesitating, andthe longer it was delayed the more difficult the task appeared to him. 

[Illustration: SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATE THE ENGAGEMENT AT NAJAFGARH INAUGUST, 1857. ]

Fortunately for the continuance of our rule in India, Wilson had abouthim men who understood, as he was unable to do, the impossibility ofour remaining any longer as we were. They knew that Delhi musteither be taken or the army before it withdrawn. The man to whomthe Commander first looked for counsel under these conditions--Baird-Smith, of the Bengal Engineers--proved himself worthy of thehigh and responsible position in which he was placed. He too was ill. Naturally of a delicate constitution, the climate and exposure hadtold upon him severely, and the diseases from which he was sufferingwere aggravated by a wound he had received soon after his arrival incamp. He fully appreciated the tremendous risks which an assaultinvolved, but, in his opinion, they were less than were those ofdelay. Whether convinced or not by his Chief Engineer's arguments, Wilson accepted his advice and directed him to prepare a plan ofattack. 

Baird-Smith was strongly supported by Nicholson, Chamberlain, Daly, Norman, and Alex. Taylor. They were one and all in communication withthe authorities in the Punjab, and they knew that if 'Delhi were nottaken, and that speedily, there would be a struggle not only forEuropean dominion, but even for European existence within the Punjabitself. '[1]

Our position in that province was, indeed, most critical. Anattempted conspiracy of Mahomedan tribes in the Murree Hills, and aninsurrection in the Gogaira district, had occurred. Both these affairswere simply attempts to throw off the British yoke, made in the beliefthat our last hour was come. The feeling that prompted them was notconfined to the Mahomedans; amongst all classes and races in thePunjab a spirit of restlessness was on the increase; even the mostloyally disposed were speculating on the chances of our being able tohold our own, and doubting the advisability of adhering to our cause. On the part of the Sikhs of the Manjha[2] there was an unwillingnessto enlist, and no good recruits of this class could be obtained untilafter Delhi had fallen. 

It was under these critical circumstances that a council of war wasconvened to decide definitely whether the assault should take place ornot. 

Nicholson was not a man of many intimacies, but as his staff officerI had been fortunate enough to gain his friendship. I was constantlywith him, and on this occasion I was sitting in his tent before he setout to attend the council. He had been talking to me in confidentialterms of personal matters, and ended by telling me of his intentionto take a very unusual step should the council fail to arrive at anyfixed determination regarding the assault. 'Delhi must be taken, ' hesaid, 'and it is absolutely essential that this should be done atonce; and if Wilson hesitates longer, I intend to propose at to-day'smeeting that he should be superseded. ' I was greatly startled, andventured to remark that, as Chamberlain was _hors de combat_ from hiswound, Wilson's removal would leave him, Nicholson, senior officerwith the force. He smiled as he answered: 'I have not overlooked thatfact. I shall make it perfectly clear that, under the circumstances, Icould not possibly accept the command myself, and I shall propose thatit be given to Campbell, of the 52nd; I am prepared to serve under himfor the time being, so no one can ever accuse me of being influencedby personal motives. '

Happily, Nicholson was not called upon to take so unusual a step. Iwalked with him to the Head-Quarters camp, waited in great excitementuntil the council of war was over, and, when Nicholson issued from theGeneral's tent, learnt, to my intense relief, that Wilson had agreedto the assault. 

That Nicholson would have carried out his intention if the council hadcome to a different conclusion I have not the slightest doubt, andI quite believe that his masterful spirit would have effected itspurpose and borne down all opposition. Whether his action would havebeen right or wrong is another question, and one on which there isalways sure to be great difference of opinion. At the time it seemedto me that he was right. The circumstances were so exceptional--Wilsonwould have proved himself so manifestly unfit to cope with them hadhe decided on further delay--and the consequences of such delay wouldhave been so calamitous and far-reaching, that even now, after manyyears have passed, and after having often thought over Nicholson'sintended action and discussed the subject with other men, I have notchanged my opinion. 

In anticipation of an attack on Delhi, preparations had been commencedearly in September, one of the first of these being to form a trenchto the left of the 'Sammy House, ' at the end of which a battery wasconstructed for four 9-pounders and two 24-pounder howitzers. Theobject of this battery was to prevent sorties from the Lahore or Kabulgates passing round the city wall to annoy our breaching batteries, and also to assist in keeping down the fire from the Mori bastion. [3]This battery, moreover, led the enemy to believe that we should attackthem from our right, whereas it had been resolved to push the mainattack from our left, where we could approach nearer to the wallsunder cover, and where our flank was completely protected by theriver. The Engineers had also employed themselves in getting ready10, 000 fascines, as many gabions, and 100, 000 sand-bags, besidesfield-magazines, scaling-ladders, and spare platforms. 

On the 7th September Wilson issued an order informing the force thatarrangements for the assault would be commenced at once. He dwelt uponthe hardships and fatigue which had been cheerfully borne by officersand men, and expressed his hope that they would be rewarded for theirpast labours, 'and for a cheerful endurance of still greater fatigueand exposure. ' He reminded the troops of the reasons for the deadlystruggle in which they were engaged, and he called upon all ranks toco-operate heart and soul in the arduous work now before them. 

Ground was broken that evening. Unfortunately Baird-Smith was not ableto personally superintend the construction of the breaching batteries, but he had in his second-in-command, Alex. Taylor, a thoroughlypractical Engineer, who not only knew how to work himself, but how toget work out of others. Ever alert and cheerful, he was trusted andlooked up to by all his subordinates, and was of all others the veryman to be placed in charge of such a difficult and dangerous duty. 

The first battery, known as No. 1, was traced out in two parts, about700 yards from the Mori bastion, which the right half, with its five18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer, was intended to silence; whilethe left half, with its four 24-pounders, was to hold the Kashmirbastion in check. 

All night the Engineers worked at the battery, but although before daybroke it was nearly finished and armed, it was not ready to open fireuntil close on sunrise. The enemy did not fail to take advantage ofthis chance. They poured in round after round of shot and grape, causing many casualties. Their fire slackened as our guns weregradually able to make themselves felt, and by the afternoon it wassilenced. Nothing remained of the Mori bastion but a heap of ruins. No. 1 battery was commanded by Major James Brind, [4] the bravest ofthe brave. It was said of him that he 'never slept'; and Reid (of'Hindu Rao' fame) wrote of him: 'On all occasions the exertions ofthis noble officer were indefatigable. He was always to be found wherehis presence was most required; and the example he set to officers andmen was beyond all praise. '

No. 2 battery was next taken in hand. This was erected in front ofLudlow Castle, and about 500 yards from the Kashmir gate. Like No. 1, it was formed in two parts, the right half being intended forseven heavy howitzers and two 18-pounders, and the left for nine24-pounders, commanded respectively by Majors Kaye and Campbell. Allthese guns were intended to breach the Kashmir bastion, where the mainassault was to be made. 

Up till this time the enemy had imagined that the attack would bedelivered from our right, and they were quite taken by surprise when, on the evening of the 8th September, we occupied Ludlow Castle. 

Baird-Smith showed his grasp of the situation in attacking fromour left, notwithstanding the greater distance of this part of ourposition from the city wall. No counter-attack could be made on thatflank, and the comparatively open ground between the Kashmir and Moribastions would assist us in protecting the assaulting columns. 

As soon as the enemy discovered their mistake, they did their utmostto prevent our batteries being constructed; but the Engineers werenot to be deterred. By the morning of the 11th No. 2 battery wascompleted, armed, and unmasked, and No. 3 and No. 4 batteries weremarked out in the Kudsiabagh. No. 3, commanded by Major Scott, wasconstructed for six 18-pounders, and twelve 5-1/2-inch mortars underCaptain Blunt. Norman in his narrative says: 'The establishment ofMajor Scott's battery within 180 yards of the wall, to arm whichheavy guns had to be dragged from the rear under a constant fire ofmusketry, was an operation that could rarely have been equalled inwar. ' During the first night of its construction 89 men were killedand wounded; but with rare courage the workmen continued their task. They were merely unarmed pioneers; and with that passive bravery socharacteristic of Natives, as man after man was knocked over, theywould stop a moment, weep a little over a fallen friend, place hisbody in a row along with the rest, and then work on as before. [5]

No. 4 battery, armed with ten heavy mortars, and commanded by MajorTombs, was placed under the shelter of an old building, about half-waybetween No. 2 and No. 3 batteries. [6]

I was posted to the left half of No. 2 battery, and had charge of thetwo right guns. At eight o'clock on the morning of the 11th Septemberwe opened fire on the Kashmir bastion and the adjoining curtain, andas the shots told and the stones flew into the air and rattled down, a loud cheer burst from the Artillerymen and some of the men ofthe Carabineers and 9th Lancers who had volunteered to work in thebatteries. The enemy had got our range with wonderful accuracy, andimmediately on the screen in front of the right gun being removed, around shot came through the embrasure, knocking two or three of usover. On regaining my feet, I found that the young Horse Artillerymanwho was serving the vent while I was laying the gun had had his rightarm taken off. 

In the evening of the same day, when, wearied with hard work andexhausted by the great heat, we were taking a short rest, trusting tothe shelter of the battery for protection, a shower of grape came intous, severely wounding our commander, Campbell, whose place was takenby Edwin Johnson. We never left the battery until the day of theassault--the 14th--except to go by turns into Ludlow Castle for ourmeals. Night and day the overwhelming fire was continued, and theincessant boom and roar of guns and mortars, with the ceaselessrain of shot and shell on the city, warned the mutineers that theirpunishment was at hand. We were not, however, allowed to have it allour own way. Unable to fire a gun from any of the three bastions wewere breaching, the enemy brought guns into the open and enfiladedour batteries. They sent rockets from their martello towers, and theymaintained a perfect storm of musketry from their advanced trench andfrom the city walls. No part of the attack was left unsearched bytheir fire, and though three months' incessant practice had made ourmen skilful in using any cover they had, our losses were numerous, 327officers and men being killed and wounded between the 7th and 14thSeptember. 

On the evening of the 13th September Nicholson came to see whether wegunners had done our work thoroughly enough to warrant the assaultbeing made the next morning. He was evidently satisfied, for when heentered our battery he said: 'I must shake hands with you fellows; youhave done your best to make my work easy to-morrow. '

Nicholson was accompanied by Taylor, who had to make certain thatthe breaches were practicable, and for this purpose he detailed foursubaltern officers of Engineers to go to the walls as soon as it wasdark, and report upon the condition they were in. Greathed and Homewere told off for the Water bastion breach, and Medley and Lang[7] forthat of the Kashmir bastion. Lang asked to be allowed to go while itwas yet daylight; Taylor agreed, and with an escort of four men of the60th Rifles he crept to the edge of the cover in the Kudsiabagh, andthen, running up the glacis, sat on top of the counterscarp for a fewseconds studying the ditch and the two breaches. On his return Langreported the breaches to be practicable; as, however, it was desirableto ascertain whether ladders would be necessary, he was sent againafter dark, in company with Medley. They took a ladder and ameasuring-rod with them, and were escorted by an officer andtwenty-four riflemen, of whom all but six were left under cover in theKudsiabagh. Lang slipped into the ditch, which he found to be sixteenfeet deep. Medley handed him the ladder and rod, and followed him withtwo riflemen, the other four remaining on the crest of the glacis tocover their retreat. With the help of the ladder they ascended theberm and measured the height of the wall. Two minutes more, and theywould have reached the top of the breach, but, quiet as they had been, their movements had attracted attention, and several of the enemywere heard running towards the breach. The whole party reascended asrapidly as possible, and, throwing themselves on the grass, waited inbreathless silence, hoping the sepoys would go away, and that theymight be able to make another attempt to reach the top of the breach. The rebels, however, gave no signs of retiring, and as all needfulinformation had been obtained, they determined to run for it. A volleywas fired at the party as they dashed across the open, but no one washit. 

Greathed and Home had been equally successful, and by midnightBaird-Smith was able to report to General Wilson that both breacheswere practicable. 

Baird-Smith urged the importance of attacking without delay. Hepointed out the impossibility of continuing the high pressure at whichnearly every man[8] in the force had been working during the past fewdays; that the tension was becoming too severe to last; and that everyhour that passed without assaulting was a loss to us and a gain to theenemy. 

Before Wilson and Baird-Smith separated, orders had been issued forthe attack to be made at daybreak the next morning, the 14th. 

It was arranged that there were to be four assaulting columns and onereserve column. 

The first, second and third columns, which were to operate on ourleft, were under the command of Brigadier-General Nicholson, whopersonally led No. 1 column. It consisted of:

 MEN. Her Majesty's 75th Foot 300 1st Bengal Fusiliers 250 2nd Punjab Infantry 450 ----- Total 1, 000

and was meant to storm the breach near the Kashmir bastion. 

[Note: I am indebted to the kindness of Mrs. Barter, the widow of mygallant friend and comrade. General Richard Barter, C. B. , who servedthroughout the Mutiny with the 75th Foot, first as Adjutant andafterwards as Captain, for the above 'Daily State' and for thefollowing extract from that officer's diary:

'In the evening the order was published for the storming of Delhi alittle before daybreak the next morning, September 14, and we eachof us looked carefully to the reloading of our pistols, filling offlasks, and getting as good protection as possible for our heads, which would be exposed so much going up the ladders. I wound twopuggris or turbans round my old forage cap, with the last letter fromthe hills [Mrs. Barter was then at Kasauli, in the Himalayas] in thetop, and committed myself to the care of Providence. There was notmuch sleep that night in our camp. I dropped off now and then, butnever for long, and whenever I woke I could see that there was a lightin more than one of the officers' tents, and talking was going on ina low tone amongst the men, the snapping of a lock or springing of aramrod sounding far in the still air, telling of preparation forthe coming strife. A little after midnight we fell in as quietly aspossible, and by the light of a lantern the orders for the assaultwere then read to the men. They were to the following purport: Anyofficer or man who might be wounded was to be left where he fell; noone was to step from the ranks to help him, as there were no men tospare. If the assault were successful he would be taken away in thedoolies, or litters, and carried to the rear, or wherever he couldbest receive medical assistance. If we failed, wounded and soundshould be prepared to bear the worst. There was to be no plundering, but all prize taken was to be put into a common stock for fairdivision after all was over. No prisoners were to be made, as wehad no one to guard them, and care was to be taken that no women orchildren were injured. To this the men answered at once, by "No fear, sir. " The officers now pledged their honours on their swords to abideby these orders, and the men then promised to follow their example. At this moment, just as the regiment was about to march off, FatherBertrand came up in his vestments, and, addressing the Colonel, beggedfor permission to bless the regiment, saying: "We may differ someof us in matters of religion, but the blessing of an old man and aclergyman can do nothing but good. " The Colonel at once assented, andFather Bertrand, lifting his hands to Heaven, blessed the regiment ina most impressive manner, offering up at the same time a prayer forour success and for mercy on the souls of those soon to die. ']

No. 2 column, under Brigadier Jones, of Her Majesty's 61st Foot, consisted of:

 MEN. Her Majesty's 8th Foot 250 2nd Bengal Fusiliers 250 4th Sikhs 350 --- Total 850

and was intended for the storming of the breach near the Waterbastion. 

No. 3 column, under Colonel Campbell, of Her Majesty's 52nd LightInfantry, consisted of:

 MEN. Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry 200 Kumaon Battalion 250 1st Punjab Infantry 500 --- Total 950

and was told off to enter the Kashmir gate after it had been blown in. 

No. 4 column was to operate on our right. It was commanded by MajorReid, of the Sirmur battalion, and was composed of that regiment, theGuides Infantry, and such men from the piquets (European and Native)as could be spared. Its strength was 860 men, besides 1, 200 of theKashmir Contingent, and its orders were to attack the suburbs ofKisenganj and Paharipur, and support the main attack by effecting anentrance at the Kabul gate. 

The Reserve column, under Brigadier Longfield, Her Majesty's 8th Foot, was told to await the result of the attack, and afford assistancewherever required. It consisted of:

 MEN. Her Majesty's 61st Foot 250 4th Punjab Infantry 450 Wing Baluch battalion 300 ----- Total 1, 000

with 300 of the Jhind Contingent. 

There were besides 200 of the 60th Rifles, who were to cover theadvance of Nicholson's columns, and join the reserve as soon as theassaults had been carried out. 

In order to provide these five columns, in all hardly 5, 000 strong, the services of every man who could bear arms had to be put intorequisition. Piquets were weakened to a dangerous extent, and many ofthe sick and wounded who ought to have been in hospital were utilizedfor the protection of the camp. 

[Footnote 1: Punjab Administration Report, 1857-58. ]

[Footnote 2: The tract of country between the Sutlej and Ravi rivers. ]

[Footnote 3: Norman's narrative. ]

[Footnote 4: The late General Sir James Brind, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: 'The Indian Mutiny, ' by Forrest. ]

[Footnote 6: When his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales was coming toIndia in 1875, I obtained permission from Lord Napier of Magdala, whowas then Commander-in-Chief, to erect miniature embrasures to markthe gun of direction of each of the breaching batteries; and on theseembrasures are recorded the number, armament, and object of thebatteries. ]

[Footnote 7: Colonel Arthur Lang is the only one of the four nowalive. ]

[Footnote 8: Nearly every man was on duty. The daily state of theseveral corps must have been very similar to the following one of the75th Foot. 

 DAILY STATE OF H. M. 'S 75TH REGIMENT

 Camp Delhi, 13th September, 1857. 

+--------------------+--------------+------------+----------------+| | Sergeants. | Drummers. | Rank and File. |+--------------------+--------------+------------+----------------+| Fit to turn out | 1 | 5 | 37 || On duty | 29 | 6 | 361 |+--------------------+--------------+------------+----------------+

 (Sd. ) E. COURTENAY, Sergt. -Major, 75th Regt. 

 True copy, (Sd. ) R. BARTER, Lieut. -Adj. , 75th Regiment. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XVIII. 1857

 Delhi stormed--The scene at the Kashmir Gate --Bold front by Artillery and Cavalry--Nicholson wounded --The last I saw of Nicholson--Wilson wavers-- Holding on to the walls of Delhi

It was intended, as I have before said, that the assault should bedelivered at break of day, but many of the men belonging to theregiments of the storming force had been on piquet all night, and ittook some time for them to rejoin their respective corps. A furtherdelay was caused by our having to destroy the partial repairs to thebreaches which the enemy had succeeded in effecting during the night, notwithstanding the steady fire we had kept up. 

While we were thus engaged, the Infantry were ordered to lie downunder cover. Standing on the crenellated wall which separated LudlowCastle from the road, I saw Nicholson at the head of his column, andwondered what was passing through his mind. Was he thinking of thefuture, or of the wonderful part he had played during the past fourmonths? At Peshawar he had been Edwardes's right hand. At the headof the Movable Column he had been mainly instrumental in keeping thePunjab quiet, and at Delhi everyone felt that during the short timehe had been with us he was our guiding star, and that but for hispresence in the camp the assault which he was about to lead wouldprobably never have come off. He was truly 'a tower of strength. ' Anyfeeling of reluctance to serve under a Captain of the Company's army, which had at first been felt by some, had been completely overcome byhis wonderful personality. Each man in the force, from the General incommand to the last-joined private soldier, recognized that the manwhom the wild people on the frontier had deified--the man of whom alittle time before Edwardes had said to Lord Canning, 'You may relyupon this, that if ever there is a desperate deed to be done in India, John Nicholson is the man to do it'--was one who had proved himselfbeyond all doubt capable of grappling with the crisis through which wewere passing--one to follow to the death. Faith in the Commander whohad claimed and been given the post of honour was unbounded, and everyman was prepared 'to do or die' for him. 

The sun had risen high in the heavens, when the breaching gunssuddenly ceased, and each soldier felt he had but a brief moment inwhich to brace himself for the coming conflict. Nicholson gave thesignal. The 60th Rifles with a loud cheer dashed to the front inskirmishing order, while at the same moment the heads of the first andsecond columns appeared from the Kudsiabagh and moved steadily towardsthe breaches. 

No sooner were the front ranks seen by the rebels than a storm ofbullets met them from every side, and officers and men fell thick onthe crest of the glacis. Then, for a few seconds, amidst a blaze ofmusketry, the soldiers stood at the edge of the ditch, for only one ortwo of the ladders had come up, the rest having been dropped by theirkilled or wounded carriers. Dark figures crowded on the breach, hurling stones upon our men and daring them to come on. More ladderswere brought up, they were thrown into the ditch, and our men, leapinginto it, raised them against the escarp on the other side. Nicholson, at the head of a part of his column, was the first to ascend thebreach in the curtain. The remainder of his troops diverged a littleto the right to escalade the breach in the Kashmir bastion. HereLieutenants Barter and Fitzgerald, of the 75th Foot, were the first tomount, and here the latter fell mortally wounded. The breaches werequickly filled with dead and dying, but the rebels were hurled back, and the ramparts which had so long resisted us were our own. 

The breach at the Water bastion was carried by No. 2 column. No soonerwas its head seen emerging from the cover of the old Custom-house thanit was met by a terrible discharge of musketry. Both the Engineerofficers (Greathed and Hovenden) who were leading it fell severelywounded, and of the thirty-nine men who carried the ladderstwenty-nine were killed or wounded in as many seconds. The ladderswere immediately seized by their comrades, who, after one or two vainattempts, succeeded in placing them against the escarp. Then, amidsta shower of stones and bullets, the soldiers ascended, rushed thebreach, and, slaying all before them, drove the rebels from the walls. 

No. 3 column had in the meanwhile advanced towards the Kashmir gateand halted. Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, with eight Sappers andMiners and a bugler of the 52nd Foot, went forward to blow the gateopen. The enemy were apparently so astounded at the audacity ofthis proceeding that for a minute or two they offered but slightresistance. They soon, however, discovered how small the party was andthe object for which it had come, and forthwith opened a deadly fireupon the gallant little band from the top of the gateway, from thecity wall, and through the open wicket. 

The bridge over the ditch in front of the gateway had been destroyed, and it was with some difficulty that the single beam which remainedcould be crossed. Home with the men carrying the powder-bags gotover first. As the bags were being attached to the gate, SergeantCarmichael was killed and Havildar Madhoo wounded; the rest thenslipped into the ditch to allow the firing party which had come upunder Salkeld to carry out its share of the duty. 

While endeavouring to fire the charge, Salkeld, being shot throughthe leg and arm, handed the slow-match to Corporal Burgess, who fellmortally wounded, but not until he had successfully performed histask. 

As soon as the explosion had taken place, Bugler Hawthorne soundedthe regimental call of the 52nd. Meeting with no response, he soundedtwice again. The noise of firing and shouting was so great thatneither the sound of the bugle nor that of the explosion reached thecolumn, but Campbell, after allowing the firing party what he thoughtwas sufficient time, gave the order to advance. Captain Crosse, of the52nd, was the first to reach the gate, followed closely by CorporalTaylor of his own company, and Captain Synge of the same regiment, whowas Campbell's Brigade-Major. In single file along the narrow plankthey crossed the ditch in which lay the shattered remnant of thegallant little band; they crept through the wicket, which was the onlypart blown in, and found the interior of the gateway blocked by an18-pounder gun, under which were lying the scorched bodies of two orthree sepoys, who had evidently been killed by the explosion. The restof the column followed as rapidly as the precarious crossing wouldadmit, and when Campbell got inside he found himself face to face withboth Nicholson's and Jones's columns, which, after mounting the threebreaches, poured in a mingled crowd into the open space between theKashmir gate and the church. 

No. 4 column advanced from the Sabzi Mandi towards Kisenganj andPaharipur. Reid, the commander, was unfortunately wounded early in theday. Several other officers were either killed or wounded, and fora little time a certain amount of confusion existed owing to somemisconception as to whether the command of the column should beexercised by the senior officer with the regular troops, or by thepolitical officer with the Kashmir Contingent. The fighting was verysevere. The enemy were in great numbers, and strongly posted onthe banks of the canal--indeed, at one time there appeared to be alikelihood of their breaking into our weakly-guarded camp or turningthe flank of our storming parties. The guns at Hindu Rao's house, however, prevented such a catastrophe by pouring shrapnel into theranks of the rebels; and just at the critical moment Hope Grantbrought up the Cavalry brigade, which had been covering the assaultingcolumns. The Horse Artillery dashed to the front and opened fire uponthe enemy. From the gardens and houses of Kisenganj, only two or threehundred yards off, the mutineers poured a deadly fire of musketry onour men, and from the bastion near the Lahore gate showers of grapecaused serious losses amongst them. Owing to the nature of the groundthe Cavalry could not charge. Had they retired the guns would havebeen captured, and had the guns been withdrawn the position would havebeen lost. For two hours the troopers drawn up in battle array satmotionless, while their ranks were being cruelly raked. Not a manwavered. Hope Grant and four of his staff had their horses killedunder them; two of them were wounded, and Hope Grant himself was hitby a spent shot. In Tombs's troop of Horse Artillery alone, 25 men outof 50 were wounded, and 17 horses either killed or wounded. The9th Lancers had 38 casualties amongst the men, and lost 71 horses. 'Nothing daunted, ' wrote Hope Grant, 'those gallant soldiers heldtheir trying position with patient endurance; and on my praising themfor their good behaviour, they declared their readiness to stand thefire as long as I chose. The behaviour of the Native Cavalry, ' headded, 'was also admirable. Nothing could be steadier; nothing couldbe more soldierlike than their bearing. '

The bold front shown by the Horse Artillery and Cavalry enabled No. 4column to retire in an orderly manner behind Hindu Rao's house, andalso assisted the Kashmir Contingent in its retreat from the Idgah, where it was defeated with the loss of four guns. The repulse of thiscolumn added considerably to our difficulties by freeing many hundredsto take part in the fight which was being fiercely carried on withinthe city. 

Meanwhile the three assaulting columns had made good their lodgment onthe walls. The guns in the Kashmir and Water bastions had been turnedso as to allow of their being used against the foe, and preparationswere made for the next move. 

Nicholson's orders were to push his way to the Ajmir gate, by the roadrunning inside the city wall, and to clear the ramparts and bastionsas he went. Jones was to make for the Kabul gate, and Campbell for theJama Masjid. 

These three columns reformed inside the Kashmir gate, from whichpoint the first and second practically became one. Nicholson, beingaccidentally separated from his own column for a short time, pushed onwith Campbell's past the church, in the direction of the Jama Masjid, while the amalgamated column under Jones's leadership took the rampartroute past the Kabul gate (on the top of which Jones had planted aBritish flag), capturing as they advanced all the guns they foundon the ramparts, and receiving no check until the Burn bastion wasreached by some of the more adventurous spirits. Here the enemy, taking heart at seeing but a small number of opponents, made a stand. They brought up a gun, and, occupying all the buildings on the southside of the rampart with Infantry, they poured forth such a heavy firethat a retirement to the Kabul gate had to be effected. 

It was at this point that Nicholson rejoined his own column. Hishaughty spirit could not brook the idea of a retirement; howeverslight the check might be, he knew that it would restore to the rebelsthe confidence of which our hitherto successful advance had deprivedthem, and, believing that there was nothing that brave men could notachieve, he determined to make a fresh attempt to seize the Burnbastion. 

The lane which was again to be traversed was about 200 yards long, with the city wall and rampart on the right, and on the leftflat-roofed houses with parapets, affording convenient shelter for theenemy's sharp-shooters. 

As the troops advanced up this lane the mutineers opened upon them aheavy and destructive fire. Again and again they were checked, andagain and again they reformed and advanced. It was in this lane thatMajor Jacob, the gallant Commander of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, fell, mortally wounded. His men wanted to carry him to the rear, but hewould not allow them to remain behind for him, and refused their help, urging them to press forward against the foe. The officers, leadingfar ahead of their men, were shot down one after the other, and themen, seeing them fall, began to waver. Nicholson, on this, sprangforward, and called upon the soldiers to follow him. He was instantlyshot through the chest. 

A second retirement to the Kabul gate was now inevitable, and thereall that was left of the first and second columns remained for thenight. 

Campbell's column, guided by Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, who from hisintimate acquaintance with the city as Magistrate and Collector ofDelhi was able to conduct it by the route least exposed to the enemy'sfire, forced its way to the vicinity of the Jama Masjid, where itremained for half an hour, hoping that the other columns would come toits assistance. They, however, as has been shown, had more than enoughto do elsewhere, and Campbell (who was wounded), seeing no chance ofbeing reinforced, and having no Artillery or powder-bags with which toblow in the gates of the Jama Masjid, fell back leisurely and in orderon the church, where he touched what was left of the Reserve column, which had gradually been broken up to meet the demands of theassaulting force, until the 4th Punjab Infantry alone remained torepresent it. 

While what I have just described was taking place, I myself was withGeneral Wilson. Edwin Johnson and I, being no longer required with thebreaching batteries, had been ordered to return to our staff duties, and we accordingly joined the General at Ludlow Castle, where hearrived shortly before the assaulting columns moved from the cover ofthe Kudsiabagh. 

Wilson watched the assault from the top of the house, and when he wassatisfied that it had proved successful, he rode through the Kashmirgate to the church, where he remained for the rest of the day. 

He was ill and tired out, and as the day wore on and he receiveddiscouraging reports, he became more and more anxious and depressed. He heard of Reid's failure, and of Reid himself having been severelywounded; then came the disastrous news that Nicholson had fallen, anda report (happily false) that Hope Grant and Tombs were both killed. All this greatly agitated and distressed the General, until at last hebegan seriously to consider the advisability of leaving the city andfalling back on the Ridge. 

I was ordered to go and find out the truth of these reports, and toascertain exactly what had happened to No. 4 column and the Cavalry onour right. 

Just after starting on my errand, while riding through the Kashmirgate, I observed by the side of the road a doolie, without bearers, and with evidently a wounded man inside. I dismounted to see if Icould be of any use to the occupant, when I found, to my grief andconsternation, that it was John Nicholson, with death written on hisface. He told me that the bearers had put the doolie down and gone offto plunder; that he was in great pain, and wished to be taken to thehospital. He was lying on his back, no wound was visible, and but forthe pallor of his face, always colourless, there was no sign of theagony he must have been enduring. On my expressing a hope that he wasnot seriously wounded, he said: 'I am dying; there is no chance forme. ' The sight of that great man lying helpless and on the point ofdeath was almost more than I could bear. Other men had daily diedaround me, friends and comrades had been killed beside me, but I neverfelt as I felt then--to lose Nicholson seemed to me at that moment tolose everything. 

I searched about for the doolie-bearers, who, with othercamp-followers, were busy ransacking the houses and shops in theneighbourhood, and carrying off everything of the slightest value theycould lay their hands on. Having with difficulty collected four men, I put them in charge of a sergeant of the 61st Foot. Taking down hisname, I told him who the wounded officer was, and ordered him to godirect to the field hospital. 

That was the last I saw of Nicholson. I found time to ride severaltimes to the hospital to inquire after him, but I was never allowed tosee him again. 

Continuing my ride, I soon came up with Hope Grant's brigade. It hadshortly before been relieved from its perilous and unpleasant positionas a target for the enemy by the timely arrival of the Guides Infantryand a detachment of the Baluch battalion. I was rejoiced to find Tombsalive and unhurt, and from him and other officers of my regiment Ilearnt the tremendous peppering they had undergone. Hodson was alsothere with his newly-raised regiment, some officers of the 9thLancers, and Dighton Probyn, Watson, and Younghusband, of the PunjabCavalry. Probyn was in great spirits, having fallen temporarilyinto the command of his squadron, owing to Charles Nicholson (JohnNicholson's younger brother) having been selected to take Coke's placewith the 1st Punjab Infantry. Probyn retained his command throughoutthe campaign, for Charles Nicholson was wounded that very morningwhile gallantly leading his regiment. His right arm was beingamputated when his heroic brother was carried mortally wounded intothe same hospital, and laid on the bed next to him. 

It seemed so important to acquaint the General without delay that HopeGrant and Tombs were both alive, that the Cavalry had been relievedfrom their exposed position, and that there was no need for furtheranxiety about Reid's column, that I galloped back to the church asquickly as possible. 

The news I was able to give for the moment somewhat cheered theGeneral, but did not altogether dispel his gloomy forebodings; and thefailure of Campbell's column (which just at that juncture returned tothe church), the hopelessness of Nicholson's condition, and, aboveall, the heavy list of casualties he received later, appeared to crushall spirit and energy out of him. His dejection increased, and hebecame more than ever convinced that his wisest course was to withdrawfrom the city. He would, I think, have carried out this fatal measure, notwithstanding that every officer on his staff was utterly opposedto any retrograde movement, had it not been his good fortune to havebeside him a man sufficiently bold and resolute to stimulate hisflagging energies. Baird-Smith's indomitable courage and determinedperseverance were never more conspicuous than at that critical moment, when, though suffering intense pain from his wound, and weakened bya wasting disease, he refused to be put upon the sick-list; and onWilson appealing to him for advice as to whether he should or shouldnot hold on to the position we had gained, the short but decisiveanswer, 'We _must_ hold on, ' was given in such a determined anduncompromising tone that it put an end to all discussion. 

Neville Chamberlain gave similar advice. Although still suffering fromhis wound, and only able to move about with difficulty, he had takenup his position at Hindu Rao's house, from which he exercised, asfar as his physical condition would allow, a general supervision andcontrol over the events that took place on the right of the Ridge. Hewas accompanied by Daly and a very distinguished Native officer of theGuides, named Khan Sing Rosa, both of whom, like Chamberlain, wereincapacitated by wounds from active duty. From the top of Hindu Rao'shouse Chamberlain observed the first successes of the columns, andtheir subsequent checks and retirements, and it was while he was therethat he received two notes from General Wilson. In the first, writtenafter the failure of the attacks on the Jama Masjid and the Lahoregate, the General asked for the return of the Baluch battalion, which, at Chamberlain's request, had been sent to reinforce Reid's column, and in it he expressed the hope that 'we shall be able to hold whatwe have got. ' In the second note, written at four o'clock in theafternoon, the General asked whether Chamberlain 'could do anythingfrom Hindu Rao's house to assist, ' adding, 'our numbers arefrightfully reduced, and we have lost so many senior officers that themen are not under proper control; indeed, I doubt if they could be gotto do anything dashing. I want your advice. If the Hindu Rao's piquetcannot be moved, I do not think we shall be strong enough to take thecity. ' Chamberlain understood General Wilson's second note to implythat he contemplated withdrawing the troops from the city, and heframed his reply accordingly. In it he urged the necessity for holdingon to the last; he pointed out the advantages already gained, and thedemoralization thereby inflicted upon the enemy. The dying Nicholsonadvocated the same course with almost his latest breath. So angry andexcited was he when he was told of the General's suggestion to retire, that he exclaimed, 'Thank God I have strength yet to shoot him, ifnecessary. ' There was no resisting such a consensus of responsible andreliable opinion, and Wilson gave up all idea of retreating. 

During the afternoon of the 14th, Norman, Johnson, and I, at theGeneral's desire and for his information, visited every positionoccupied by our troops within the city walls. In some places therewas great confusion--men without their officers, and officers withouttheir men--all without instructions, and not knowing what was going onin their immediate neighbourhood, the inevitable result of the rapidadvance. We did what we could to remedy matters, and were able toreport to Wilson that our troops were holding the wall from the Waterbastion to the Kabul gate in sufficient strength. But this was all thecomfort we could give him. The fact is, too much had been attemptedon that eventful morning. We should have been satisfied with gainingpossession of the Kashmir and Water bastions, and getting a lodgmentwithin the city walls. This was as much as three such weak columnsshould have tried, or been asked to accomplish. No one who waspresent on that occasion, and experienced the difficulty, indeedimpossibility, of keeping soldiers in hand while engaged in fightingalong narrow streets and tortuous lanes, would ever again attempt whatwas expected of the assaulting columns. 

While engaged in this duty we (Norman, Johnson and I) were attacked bya party of the enemy who had been hiding in considerable numbers in aside-lane watching for a chance. A fight ensued; we had only a smallguard with us, but, fortunately, the firing was heard by the men of anear piquet, some of whom came to our help. With their assistance wedrove off the sepoys, but in the scrimmage my poor mare was shot. Shewas a very useful animal, and her death was a great loss to me at thetime. 

At sunset on the 14th of September only a very small portion of thewalls of Delhi was in our possession. The densely-populated cityremained to be conquered. The magazine, the palace, and the Fort ofSelimgarh, all strongly fortified, were still in the hands of theenemy. The narrow strip of ground we had gained had been won at severeloss. Three out of the four officers who commanded the assaultingcolumns had been disabled, and 66 officers and 1, 104 men had beenkilled and wounded. 

The night of the 14th was spent by the General and staff in 'Skinner'shouse, '[1] close to the church. Rest was badly needed, for almosteveryone in the force, officers and men alike, had been hard at work, night and day, for a week. That night, luckily, we were allowed to beat peace, for whether it was that the rebels were as tired as we were, or that they were busy making preparations for further resistance, they did not disturb us; and when day broke we were all refreshed andready to continue the struggle. At one time, indeed, early in theevening, the enemy appeared from their movements to be preparing toattack us, but just at that moment the band of the 4th Punjab Infantrystruck up 'Cheer, Boys, Cheer!' upon which the men of the regiment didcheer, most lustily, and other regiments caught up and continued theinspiriting hurrahs, which apparently had the effect of disconcertingthe mutineers and keeping them quiet. 

[Footnote 1: The house belonged to the Skinner family, and wasoriginally built by James Skinner, a Eurasian, who served the MoghulEmperor with great distinction towards the end of the last century. When Lord Lake broke up that Mahomedan Prince's power, Skinner enteredthe service of the East India Company and rose to the rank of Major. He was also a C. B. He raised the famous Skinner's Horse, now the 1stBengal Cavalry. His father was an officer in one of His Majesty'sregiments of Foot, and after one of Lord Clive's battles married aRajput lady of good family, who with her father and mother had beentaken prisoners. Skinner himself married a Mahomedan, so that he hadan interest in the three religions, Christian, Hindu, and Mahomedan, and on one occasion, when left on the ground severely wounded, he madea vow that if his life were spared he would build three places ofworship--a church, a temple, and a mosque. He fulfilled his vow, anda few years later he built the church at Delhi, and the temple andmosque which are in close proximity to it. ]

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CHAPTER XIX. 1857

 Capture of the Burn bastion--The 60th Rifles storm the palace --Hodson captures the King of Delhi--Nicholson's death --Gallantry of the troops--Praise from Lord Canning

On the morning of the 15th the situation was reviewed, andpreparations made for the conquest of the city. Order was restoredamongst the troops, who, as I have shown, had become somewhatdemoralized by the street fighting. Regiments and brigades were gottogether; raids were made on all the store shops within reach, andevery bottle of beer and spirits was broken. [1] Some of the liquorwould doubtless have been of great use in the hospitals, but there wasno means of removing it, and the General wisely determined that it wasbest to put temptation out of the men's way. Guns and mortars wereplaced into position for shelling the city and palace, and a fewhouses near, where the enemy's sharpshooters had establishedthemselves, were seized and occupied. We soon, however, gave upattacking such positions, for we found that street fighting could notbe continued without the loss of more men than we had to spare, andthat the wisest plan would be to keep the soldiers under cover as muchas possible while we sapped from house to house. A battery commandingSelimgarh and part of the palace was constructed in the collegegardens, and a breach was made in the wall of the magazine, which wascaptured the next morning with but slight loss. 

On the 16th, and again on the 18th, Chamberlain took command of thetroops inside the city while the General rested for a few hours. Hewas, as he expressed himself in a note to Chamberlain, 'completelydone. '

The enemy now began to draw in their line. The suburbs were evacuated, and riding through the Sabzi Mandi, Kisenganj and Paharipur, we gazedwith wonder at the size and strength of the works raised against us bythe mutineers, in attacking which we had experienced such heavy lossduring the early days of the siege, and from which No. 4 column hadbeen obliged to retire on the day of the assault. 

The smaller the position that had to be defended, the greater becamethe numbers concentrated in our immediate front, and every inch of ourway through the city was stoutly disputed; but the advance, thoughslow, was steady, and considering the numbers of the insurgents, andthe use they made at close quarters of their Field Artillery, ourcasualties were fewer than could have been expected. 

I had been placed under the orders of Taylor, Baird-Smith'sindefatigable Lieutenant, who directed the advance towards the Lahoregate. We worked through houses, courtyards, and lanes, until on theafternoon of the 19th we found ourselves in rear of the Burn bastion, the attempt to take which on the 14th had cost the life of the gallantNicholson and so many other brave men. We had with us fifty Europeanand fifty Native soldiers, the senior officer of the party beingCaptain Gordon, of the 75th Foot. A single door separated us from thelane which led to the Burn bastion. Lang, of the Engineers, burst thisdoor open, and out dashed the party. Rushing across the lane and upthe ramp, the guard was completely surprised, and the bastion wasseized without our losing a man. 

Early the next day we were still sapping our way towards the Lahoregate, when we suddenly found ourselves in a courtyard in which werehuddled together some forty or fifty _banias_, [2] who were evidentlyas much in terror of the sepoys as they were of us. The men of ourparty nearly made an end of these unfortunates before their officerscould interfere, for to the troops (Native and European alike) everyman inside the walls of Delhi was looked upon as a rebel, worthy ofdeath. These people, however, were unarmed, and it did not requirea very practised eye to see that they were inoffensive. We thought, however, that a good fright would do them no harm, and might possiblyhelp us, so for a time we allowed them to believe that they werelooked upon as traitors, but eventually told them their lives wouldbe spared if they would take us in safety to some place from whichwe might observe how the Lahore gate was guarded. After considerablehesitation and consultation amongst themselves they agreed to two oftheir party guiding Lang and me, while the rest remained as hostages, with the understanding that, if we did not return within a given time, they would be shot. 

Our trembling guides conducted us through houses, across courtyards, and along secluded alleys, without our meeting a living creature, until we found ourselves in an upper room of a house looking out onthe Chandni Chauk, [3] and within fifty yards of the Lahore gate. 

From the window of this room we could see beneath us the sepoyslounging about, engaged in cleaning their muskets and otheroccupations, while some, in a lazy sort of fashion, were acting assentries over the gateway and two guns, one of which pointed in thedirection of the Sabzi Mandi, the other down the lane behind theramparts leading to the Burn bastion and Kabul gate. I could see fromthe number on their caps that these sepoys belonged to the 5th NativeInfantry. 

Having satisfied ourselves of the feasibility of taking the Lahoregate in rear, we retraced our steps. 

The two _banias_ behaved well throughout, but were in such a terriblefright of anything happening to us that they would not allow us toleave the shelter of one house until they had carefully reconnoitredthe way to the next, and made sure that it was clear of the enemy. This occasioned so much delay that our friends had almost given us up, and were on the point of requiring the hostages to pay the penalty forthe supposed treachery of our guides, when we reappeared on the scene. 

We then discussed our next move, and it was decided to repeat themanoeuvre which had been so successful at the Burn bastion. The troopswere brought by the route we had just traversed, and drawn up behind agateway next to the house in which we had been concealed. The gate wasburst open, and rushing into the street, we captured the guns, andkilled or put to flight the sepoys whom we had watched from our upperchamber a short time before, without losing a man ourselves. 

This was a great achievement, for we were now in possession of themain entrance to Delhi, and the street of the city leading direct fromthe Lahore gate to the palace and Jama Masjid. We proceeded up thisstreet, at first cautiously, but on finding it absolutely empty, andthe houses on either side abandoned, we pushed on until we reachedthe Delhi Bank. Here there was firing going on, and round shot flyingabout from a couple of guns placed just outside the palace. But thiswas evidently an expiring effort. The great Mahomedan mosque had justbeen occupied by a column under the command of Major James Brind;while Ensign McQueen, [4] of the 4th Punjab Infantry, with one of hisown men had pluckily reconnoitred up to the chief gateway of thepalace, and reported that there were but few men left in the Moghulfort. 

The honour of storming this last stronghold was appropriately reservedfor the 60th Rifles, the regiment which had been the first to engagethe enemy on the banks of the Hindun, nearly four months before, andwhich throughout the siege had so greatly distinguished itself. 

Home, of the Engineers, the hero of the Kashmir gate exploit, firstadvanced with some Sappers and blew in the outer gate. At this, thelast struggle for the capture of Delhi, I wished to be present, soattached myself for the occasion to a party of the 60th Rifles, underthe command of Ensign Alfred Heathcote. As soon as the smoke ofthe explosion cleared away, the 60th, supported by the 4th PunjabInfantry, sprang through the gateway; but we did not get far, forthere was a second door beyond, chained and barred, which was withdifficulty forced open, when the whole party rushed in. The recessesin the long passage which led to the palace buildings were crowdedwith wounded men, but there was very little opposition, for only afew fanatics still held out. One of these--a Mahomedan sepoy in theuniform of a Grenadier of the 37th Native Infantry--stood quietlyabout thirty yards up the passage with his musket on his hip. As weapproached he slowly raised his weapon and fired, sending the bulletthrough McQueen's helmet. The brave fellow then advanced at thecharge, and was, of course, shot down. So ended the 20th September, aday I am never likely to forget. 

At sunrise on the 21st a royal salute proclaimed that we were againmasters in Delhi, and that for the second time in the century thegreat city had been captured by a British force. 

Later in the day General Wilson established his Head-Quarters in theDewan-i-khas (the King's private hall of audience), and, as was inaccordance with the fitness of things, the 60th Rifles and the Sirmurbattalion of Gurkhas[5] were the first troops of Her Majesty's armyto garrison the palace of the Moghuls, in which the traitorous andtreacherous massacre of English men, women and children had beenperpetrated. 

The importance of securing the principal members of the Royal Familywas pressed upon the General by Chamberlain and Hodson, who bothurged that the victory would be incomplete if the King and his malerelatives were allowed to remain at large. Wilson would not consentto any force being sent after them, and it was with considerablereluctance that he agreed to Hodson going on this hazardous duty withsome of his own men only. The last of the Moghul Emperors had takenrefuge in Humayun's tomb, about seven miles from Delhi, where, on theafternoon of the 21st, he surrendered to Hodson on receiving a promisefrom that officer that his own life and the lives of his favouritewife and her son should be spared. Hodson brought them all into Delhiand placed them under a European guard in a house in the ChandniChauk, thus adding one more to the many valuable services he hadrendered throughout the siege. 

I went with many others the next day to see the King; the old manlooked most wretched, and as he evidently disliked intensely beingstared at by Europeans, I quickly took my departure. On my way back Iwas rather startled to see the three lifeless bodies of the King's twosons and grandson lying exposed on the stone platform in front of the_Kotwali_. On enquiry I learnt that Hodson had gone a second timeto Humayun's tomb that morning with the object of capturing thesePrinces, and on the way back to Delhi had shot them with his ownhand--an act which, whether necessary or not, has undoubtedly cast ablot on his reputation. His own explanation of the circumstance wasthat he feared they would be rescued by the mob, who could easily haveoverpowered his small escort of 100 sowars, and it certainly wouldhave been a misfortune had these men escaped. At the time a thirst forrevenge on account of the atrocities committed within the walls ofDelhi was so great that the shooting of the Princes seemed to theexcited feelings of the army but an act of justice; and there weresome men, whose opinions were entitled to the greatest respect, whoconsidered the safety of the British force would have been endangeredby the escape of the representatives of the house of Taimur, and thatfor this reason Hodson's act was justified. 

My own feeling on the subject is one of sorrow that such a brilliantsoldier should have laid himself open to so much adverse criticism. Moreover, I do not think that, under any circumstances, he shouldhave done the deed himself, or ordered it to be done in that summarymanner, unless there had been evident signs of an attempt at a rescue. 

But it must be understood that there was no breach of faith onHodson's part, for he steadily refused to give any promise tothe Princes that their lives should be spared; he did, however, undoubtedly by this act give colour to the accusations ofblood-thirstiness which his detractors were not slow to make. 

The news that we had occupied the palace, and were in completepossession of the city of Delhi, consoled Nicholson on his deathbed. From the first there was little hope that this valuable life couldbe saved. He was taken into hospital in a fainting condition frominternal hemorrhage, and he endured excruciating agony; but, wroteGeneral Chamberlain, 'throughout those nine days of suffering he borehimself nobly; not a lament or sigh ever passed his lips. ' His everythought was given to his country, and to the last he materially aidedthe military authorities by his clear-sighted, sound, and reliableadvice. His intellect remained unclouded to the end. With his latestbreath he sent messages of tender farewell to his mother, hoping shewould be patient under his loss, and to his oldest and dearest friend, Herbert Edwardes. After his death some frontier Chiefs and Nativeofficers of the Multani Horse were permitted to see him, and I wastold that it was touching beyond expression to see these strong menshed tears as they looked on all that was left of the leader they soloved and honoured. 

 * * * * *

Thus ended the great siege of Delhi, and to no one could the tidingsof its fall have brought more intense relief and satisfaction than tothe Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. Although in the first instanceSir John Lawrence certainly under-estimated the strength of the Delhidefences and the difficulties with which General Anson had to contend, he fully realized them later, and even at the risk of imperilling thesafety of his own province by denuding it of troops, he provided themeans for the capture of the rebel stronghold, and consequently thearmy of Delhi felt they owed him a deep debt of gratitude. 

Like Norman when writing his narrative of the siege, I feel I cannotconclude my brief account of it without paying my small tribute ofpraise and admiration to the troops who bore themselves so nobly fromthe beginning to the end. Their behaviour throughout was beyondall praise, their constancy was unwearied, their gallantry mostconspicuous; in thirty-two different fights they were victorious overlong odds, being often exposed to an enemy ten times their number, who, moreover, had the advantage of ground and superior Artillery;they fought and worked as if each one felt that on his individualexertions alone depended the issue of the day; they willingly, nay, cheerfully, endured such trials as few armies have ever been exposedto for so long a time. For three months, day after day, and for thegreater part of the day, every man had to be constantly under arms, exposed to a scorching Indian sun, which was almost as destructive as, and much harder to bear than, the enemy's never-ceasing fire. They sawtheir comrades struck down by cholera, sunstroke, and dysentery, moredispiriting a thousand times than the daily casualties in action. They beheld their enemies reinforced while their own numbers rapidlydecreased. Yet they never lost heart, and at last, when it becameevident that no hope of further reinforcements could be entertained, and that if Delhi were to be taken at all it must be taken at once, they advanced to the assault with as high a courage and as complete aconfidence in the result, as if they were attacking in the first flushand exultation of troops at the commencement of a campaign, insteadof being the remnant of a force worn out, by twelve long weeks ofprivation and suffering, by hope deferred (which truly 'maketh theheart sick'), and by weary waiting for the help which never came. Batteries were thrown up within easy range of the walls, than whicha more heroic piece of work was never performed; and finally, thesegallant few, of whom England should in very truth be everlastinglyproud, stormed in the face of day a strong fortress defended by 30, 000desperate men, provided with everything necessary to defy assault. 

The list of killed and wounded bears witness to the gallantry of allarms of the service. The effective force at Delhi never amountedto 10, 000 men. Of these 992 were killed and 2, 845 wounded, besideshundreds who died of disease and exposure. Where all behaved nobly, itis difficult to particularize; but it will not, I hope, be consideredinvidious if I specially draw my readers' attention to the four corpsmost constantly engaged: the 60th Rifles, the Sirmur battalion ofGurkhas, the Guides, and the 1st Punjab Infantry. Placed in the veryfront of the position, they were incessantly under fire, and theirlosses in action testify to the nature of the service they performed. The 60th Rifles left Meerut with 440 of all ranks; a few days beforethe assault they received a reinforcement of nearly 200, making atotal of 640; their casualties were 389. The Sirmur battalion beganwith 450 men, and were joined by a draft of 90, making a total of 540;their loss in killed and wounded amounted to 319. The strength ofthe Guides when they joined was 550 Cavalry and Infantry, and theircasualties were 303. The 1st Punjab Infantry arrived in Delhi with3 British officers and 664 Natives of all ranks. Two of the Britishofficers were killed, and the third severely wounded, and of theNatives, 8 officers[6] and 200 men were killed and wounded; while outof the British officers attached to the regiment during the siege 1was killed and 4 wounded. Further, it is a great pleasure to me todwell on the splendid service done by the Artillery and Engineers. Theformer, out of their small number, had 365 killed or disabled, and thelatter two-thirds of their officers and 293 of their men. I cannotmore appropriately conclude this chapter than by quoting the words ofLord Canning, who, as Governor-General of India, wrote as follows ingiving publication to the Delhi despatches: 'In the name of outragedhumanity, in memory of innocent blood ruthlessly shed, and inacknowledgment of the first signal vengeance inflicted on the foulesttreason, the Governor-General in Council records his gratitude toMajor-General Wilson and the brave army of Delhi. He does so in thesure conviction that a like tribute awaits them, not in England only, but wherever within the limits of civilization the news of theirwell-earned triumph shall reach. '

[Footnote 1: A report was circulated that a large number of our menhad fallen into the trap laid for them by the Native shopkeepers, andwere disgracefully drunk. I heard that a few men, overcome by heat andhard work, had given way to temptation, but I did not see a singledrunken man throughout the day of the assault, although, as I haverelated, I visited every position held by our troops within the wallsof the city. ]

[Footnote 2: Sellers of grain and lenders of money. ]

[Footnote 3: 'Silver Bazaar, ' the main street of Delhi, in whichwere, and still are, situated all the principal jewellers' andcloth-Merchants' shops. ]

[Footnote 4: Now Lieutenant-General Sir John McQueen, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: The Gurkhas became such friends with the men of the 1stBattalion 60th Rifles during the siege--the admiration of brave menfor brave men--that they made a special request to be allowed to wearthe same uniform as their 'brothers' in the Rifles. This was accededto, and the 2nd Gurkhas are very proud of the little red line on theirfacings. ]

[Footnote 6: Amongst the Native officers killed was Subadar RuttunSing, who fell mortally wounded in the glacis. He was a Patiala Sikh, and had been invalided from the service. As the 1st Punjab Infantryneared Delhi, Major Coke saw the old man standing in the road with twoswords on. He begged to be taken back into the service, and when Cokedemurred he said: 'What! my old corps going to fight at Delhi withoutme! I hope you will let me lead my old Sikh company into action again. I will break these two swords in your cause. ' Coke acceded to the oldman's wish, and throughout the siege of Delhi he displayed the mostsplendid courage. At the great attack on the 'Sammy House' on the 1stand 2nd August, when Lieutenant Travers of his regiment was killed, Ruttun Sing, amidst a shower of bullets, jumped on to the parapet andshouted to the enemy, who were storming the piquet: 'If any man wantsto fight, let him come here, and not stand firing like a coward! Iam Ruttun Sing, of Patiala. ' He then sprang down among the enemy, followed by the men of his company, and drove them off with heavyloss. 

On the morning of the assault the regiment had marched down to therendezvous at Ludlow Castle, 'left in front. ' While waiting for theArtillery to fire a few final rounds at the breaches, the men satdown, and, falling in again, were doing so 'right in front. ' RuttunSing came up to Lieutenant Charles Nicholson, who was commanding theregiment, and said: 'We ought to fall in "left in front, " therebymaking his own company the leading one in the assault. In a fewminutes more Ruttun Sing was mortally wounded, and Dal Sing, theJemadar of his company, a man of as great courage as Ruttun Sing, butnot of the same excitable nature, was killed outright. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XX. 1857

 Necessity for further action--Departure from Delhi --Action at Bulandshahr--Lieutenant Home's death--Knights-errant --Fight at Aligarh--Appeals from Agra --Collapse of the administration--Taken by surprise --The fight at Agra--An exciting chase--The Taj Mahal

The fall of Delhi was loudly proclaimed, and the glad tidings spreadlike wildfire throughout the length and breadth of India, bringingintense relief to Europeans everywhere, but more especially to thosein the Punjab, who felt that far too great a strain was being put uponthe loyalty of the people, and that failure at Delhi would probablymean a rising of the Sikhs and Punjabis. Salutes were fired inhonour of the victory at all the principal stations, but the Nativepopulation of the Punjab could not at first be made to believe thatthe Moghul capital, with its hordes of defenders, could have beencaptured by the small English army they saw marching through theirprovince a few months before. Even at that time it seemed all toosmall for the task before it, and since then they knew it had dwindleddown to less than half its numbers. It was not, indeed, until they hadocular demonstration of our success, in the shape of the loot whichsome of the Native followers belonging to the besieging force tookback to their homes, that they became convinced of the reality of ourvictory. 

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE OF DELHI, 1857]

Sir John Lawrence being painfully alive to the weakness of ourposition in the Punjab, as compared to the great strength of theSikhs, on hearing the news of the capture of Delhi, begged GeneralWilson to send back at once a British regiment as a practical proofthat our triumph was complete, and that he no longer needed so manytroops. But though the city was in our possession, a great dealremained to be done before a single soldier could be spared. Above allthings, it was necessary to open up communication with Cawnpore andLucknow, in order to ascertain exactly the state of affairs in thatpart of the country. We had heard of the failure of Havelock'sattempts to reach Lucknow, and of his having been obliged in the endto retire to Cawnpore and wait for reinforcements, but we had not beenable to learn whether such reinforcements had reached him, or how longthe beleaguered garrison of Lucknow was likely to hold out. 

No time was wasted at Delhi. On the 21st September, the very dayafter the palace was occupied, it was decided to despatch a columnto Cawnpore; but, on account of the weakened condition of the wholeforce, there was considerable difficulty in detailing the troopsfor its composition. The total strength of the corps[1] eventuallyselected amounted to 750 British and 1, 900 Native soldiers, withsixteen field-guns. 

No officer of note or high rank being available, the command of thecolumn should have been given to the senior regimental officer servingwith it, viz. , Colonel Hope Grant, of the 9th Lancers; but for someunexplained motive Lieutenant-Colonel Greathed, of the 8th Foot, waschosen by General Wilson. Captain Bannatyne, of the same regiment, wasappointed his Brigade-Major, and I was sent with the column as DeputyAssistant-Quartermaster-General. On the fall of Delhi the whole ofthe Head-Quarters staff returned to Simla, except Henry Norman, whosesoldierly instincts made him prefer accompanying the column, in orderthat he might be ready to join Sir Colin Campbell, the newly-appointedCommander-in-Chief, who had shortly before arrived in India. 

Nicholson's funeral was taking place as we marched out of Delhi, atdaybreak on the morning of the 24th September. It was a matter ofregret to me that I was unable to pay a last tribute of respect to myloved and honoured friend and Commander by following his body to thegrave, but I could not leave the column. That march through Delhi inthe early morning light was a gruesome proceeding. Our way from theLahore gate by the Chandni Chauk led through a veritable city ofthe dead; not a sound was to be heard but the falling of our ownfootsteps; not a living creature was to be seen. Dead bodieswere strewn about in all directions, in every attitude that thedeath-struggle had caused them to assume, and in every stage ofdecomposition. We marched in silence, or involuntarily spoke inwhispers, as though fearing to disturb those ghastly remains ofhumanity. The sights we encountered were horrible and sickening to thelast degree. Here a dog gnawed at an uncovered limb; there a vulture, disturbed by our approach from its loathsome meal, but too completelygorged to fly, fluttered away to a safer distance. In many instancesthe positions of the bodies were appallingly life-like. Some lay withtheir arms uplifted as if beckoning, and, indeed, the whole scene wasweird and terrible beyond description. Our horses seemed to feel thehorror of it as much as we did, for they shook and snorted in evidentterror. The atmosphere was unimaginably disgusting, laden as it waswith the most noxious and sickening odours. 

It is impossible to describe the joy of breathing the pure air of theopen country after such a horrible experience; but we had not escapeduntainted. That night we had several cases of cholera, one of thevictims being Captain Wilde, the Commandant of the 4th PunjabInfantry. He was sent back to Delhi in a hopeless condition, it wasthought, but he recovered, and did excellent work at the head of hisfine regiment during the latter part of the campaign. 

After a march of eleven miles we reached Ghazi-uddin nagar, to findthe place deserted. We halted the next day. The baggage animals wereout of condition after their long rest at Delhi; and it was necessaryto overhaul their loads and get rid of the superfluous kit and plunderwhich the followers had brought away with them. We were accompaniedon our march by a few enterprising civilians, who had found their wayinto Delhi the day after we took possession of the palace. Amongstthem was Alfred Lyall, [2] a schoolfellow of mine at Eton. He wason his way to take up the appointment of Assistant-Magistrate atBulandshahr, where he was located when the Mutiny broke out. Aswe rode along he gave me a most interesting little history of hispersonal experiences during the early days of May, from the time whenthe first symptoms of the coming storm were felt, until that when thesurrounding country rose _en masse_, and he and those with him hadto seek shelter at Meerut. I should like to repeat his story for thebenefit of my readers, but I refrain, as it would lose so much by mytelling; and I hope that some day Sir Alfred Lyall may be induced totell his own story in the picturesque and attractive language which isso well known and so much appreciated by the reading public. 

Early on the morning of the 28th, Norman, Lyall, and I, marching withWatson's Cavalry, two or three miles in advance of the column, arrivedat cross-roads, one leading to Bulandshahr, the other to Malagarh, afort belonging to a Mahomedan of the name of Walidad Khan, who, whenthe British rule was in abeyance, assumed authority over the districtin the name of the Emperor of Delhi. We halted, and, having put outour piquets, lay down and waited for the dawn. From informationobtained by the civil officers with the column, we suspected thatlarge numbers of mutineers were collected in the neighbourhood. 

We were not left long in doubt as to the correctness of oursurmisings, for we were soon rudely awakened by the rattle of shotsexchanged between our vedettes and those of the enemy. Information wassent back at once to the advance guard and to our Commander, while weset to work to ascertain the enemy's exact position; this proved to beat Bulandshahr, and we were within a couple of miles of the main body. 

As we advanced the rebel Cavalry fell back, and when we got under fireof their guns, our Horse Artillery came into action; our Infantrycoming up, found the enemy occupying an extremely strong position, inthe gaol and a walled serai at the entrance to the town, their leftbeing covered by the enclosed gardens and ruined houses of thedeserted civil station, within which they were collected inconsiderable force. From these points they were driven by the 75thFoot, who, in a most dashing manner, captured two 9-pounder guns, while a third was taken by the Cavalry. The rebels then began toretreat, and were followed up by a small body of Cavalry, underDrysdale, [3] of the 9th Lancers, with whom were Sarel, of the sameregiment, Augustus Anson of the 84th Foot, and myself. We soon becameentangled in narrow streets, but at last found ourselves in a gatewayleading out of the town, which was crowded with bullock-carts, flyingtownspeople, and a number of the enemy, some on horseback, some onfoot. There we had hard fighting; Sarel was wounded in the act ofrunning a sepoy through the body, the forefinger of his right handbeing taken off by a bullet, which then passed through his left arm;Anson was surrounded by mutineers, and performed prodigies of valour, for which he was rewarded with the Victoria Cross. I was riding aWaziri horse, which had belonged to John Nicholson, and as it had beena great favourite of his, I had commissioned a friend to buy him forme at the sale of Nicholson's effects. He was naturally impetuous, and, being now greatly excited by the firing and confusion, plungedabout a good deal. He certainly was not a comfortable mount on thatday, but all the same he saved my life. In the midst of the mêlée Iobserved a sepoy taking deliberate aim at me, and tried to get at him, but the crowd between him and me prevented my reaching him. He fired;my frightened animal reared, and received in his head the bullet whichwas intended for me. [4]

The work fell chiefly on the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. Major Ouvry, who commanded them, must have been a proud man that day, for theybehaved splendidly. Two of Blunt's guns also, under an old Addiscombefriend of mine named Cracklow, did excellent service. The 9th Lancers, under Drysdale, performed wonders; and the three squadrons of PunjabCavalry, under their gallant young leaders, Probyn, Watson, andYounghusband, and the squadron of Hodson's Horse, under Hugh Gough, showed of what good stuff they were made. Our casualties were 6 menkilled, 6 officers and 35 men wounded. The enemy's loss was 300. A large quantity of ammunition and baggage fell into our hands, including many articles plundered from European men and women. 

After the fight was over, the column passed through the town, and ourcamp was pitched about a mile beyond, on the banks of the Kali Naddi. The same afternoon Malagarh was reconnoitred, but was found to bedeserted, a satisfactory result of the morning's action, for the fort, if defended, would have given us some trouble to take. Walidad Khanevidently hoped to become a power in the district, for he had begun tomake gun-carriages, and we found roughly-cast guns on the lathes readyfor boring out. It was decided that Malagarh Fort, which was full ofarticles of every description taken from the English residents, shouldbe destroyed. Its demolition, however, took some time to effect, andas we could not move till transport came from Meerut to convey ourwounded officers and men back to that place, the column halted atBulandshahr for four days. 

On the afternoon of the 1st October the fort was blown up, and mostunfortunately, while superintending the operation, Lieutenant Home waskilled. [5] The mine had been laid and the slow-match lighted, but theexplosion not following as quickly as was expected, Home thought thematch must have gone out, and went forward again to relight it. Atthat moment the mine blew up. His death was greatly felt in camp, happening as it did when all the excitement of battle was over. 

We left Bulandshahr, and said good-bye to Lyall on the 3rd October, feeling that he was being placed in a position of considerable risk, thrown as he was on his own resources, with general instructions tore-establish the authority of the British Government. He was not, however, molested, and after two or three days he was joined by asmall body of troops from Meerut. During the months that followedhe and his escort had several alarms and some smart skirmishes; forRohilkand, a large tract of country to the east of Bulandshahr, washeld by the rebels until the following spring, and Lyall's districtwas constantly traversed by bodies of mutinous sepoys. 

On the afternoon of the same day we reached Khurja, a fair-sizedMahomedan town, from which some of our Cavalry soldiers wererecruited. The first thing that met our eyes on arrival at this placewas a skeleton, ostentatiously placed against the side of a bridgeleading to the encamping-ground; it was headless, and the bones werehacked and broken. It was pronounced by more than one doctor to be theskeleton of a European woman. This sight maddened the soldiery, whodemanded vengeance, and at one time it seemed that the town of Khurjawould have to pay the penalty for the supposed crime. The whole forcewas greatly excited. At length calmer counsels prevailed. The peopleof the town protested their innocence, and expressed their anxiety tobe our humble servants; they were, as a whole, given the benefit ofthe doubt, but some soldiers found in the town, belonging to regimentswhich had mutinied, were tried, and hanged or acquitted according tothe evidence given. 

Some excitement was caused on reaching camp by the appearance of afakir seated under a tree close to where our tents were pitched. Theman was evidently under a vow of silence, which Hindu devotees oftenmake as a penance for sin, or to earn a title to more than a fairshare of happiness in a future life. On our addressing him, the fakirpointed to a small wooden platter, making signs for us to examine it. The platter had been quite recently used for mixing food in, andat first there seemed to be nothing unusual about it. On closerinspection, however, we discovered that a detachable square of woodhad been let in at the bottom, on removing which a hollow becamevisible, and in it lay a small folded paper, that proved to be a notefrom General Havelock, written in the Greek character, containingthe information that he was on his way to the relief of the Lucknowgarrison, and begging any Commander into whose hands the communicationmight fall to push on as fast as possible to his assistance, as hesorely needed reinforcements, having few men and no carriage to speakof. This decided Greathed to proceed with as little delay as might beto Cawnpore. 

Just before we left Bulandshahr, a spy reported to me that an Englishlady was a prisoner in a village some twenty miles off, and that shewas anxious to be rescued. As on cross-examination, however, the storydid not appear to me to be very reliable, I told the man he must bringme some proof of the presence of the lady in the village. Accordingly, on the arrival of the column at Khurja, he appeared with a piece ofpaper on which was written 'Miss Martindale. ' This necessitated thematter being inquired into, and I obtained the Brigadier's permissionto make a detour to the village in question. I started off, accompanied by Watson and Probyn, with their two squadrons of Cavalry. We timed our march so as to reach our destination just before dawn;the Cavalry surrounded the village, and with a small escort we threeproceeded up the little street to the house where the guide told usthe lady was confined. Not only was the house empty, but, with theexception of a few sick and bedridden old people, there was not asoul in the village. There had evidently been a hasty retreat, whichpuzzled me greatly, as I had taken every precaution to ensure secrecy, for I feared that if our intention to rescue the lady became known shewould be carried off. As day broke we searched the surrounding crops, and found the villagers and some soldiers hidden amongst them. Theyone and all denied that there was the slightest truth in the story, and as it appeared a waste of time to further prosecute the fruitlesssearch, we were on the point of starting to rejoin our camp, whenthere was a cry from our troopers of '_Mem sahib hai!_' (Here is thelady), and presently an excessively dusky girl about sixteen years ofage appeared, clad in Native dress. We had some difficulty in gettingthe young woman to tell us what had happened; but on assuring her thatno harm should be done to those with whom she was living, she told usthat she was the daughter of a clerk in the Commissioner's office atSitapur; that all her family had been killed when the rising tookplace at that station, and that she had been carried off by a sowar tohis home. We asked her if she wished to come away with us. After somehesitation she declined, saying the sowar had married her (after theMahomedan fashion), and was kind to her, and she had no friends andrelations to go to. On asking her why she had sent to let us know shewas there, she replied that she thought she would like to join theBritish force, which she heard was in the neighbourhood, but onfurther reflection she had come to the conclusion it was best forher to remain where she was. After talking to her for some time, andmaking quite sure she was not likely to change her mind, we rodeaway, leaving her to her sowar, with whom she was apparently quitecontent. [6] I need hardly say we got unmercifully chaffed on ourreturn to camp, when the result of our expedition leaked out. 

At Somna, where we halted for the night, we heard that the Mahomedaninsurgents, the prisoners released from gaol, and the rebel Rajputs ofthe neighbourhood, were prepared to resist our advance on Aligarh, andthat they expected to be aided by a large number of mutineers fromDelhi. We came in sight of Aligarh shortly before daybreak on the 5thOctober. Our advance was stopped by a motley crowd drawn up beforethe walls, shouting, blowing horns, beating drums, and abusing theFeringhis in the choicest Hindustani; but, so far as we could see, there were no sepoys amongst them. The Horse Artillery coming up, these valiant defenders quickly fled inside the city and closed thegates, leaving two guns in our possession. Thinking we should be sureto attack and take the place, they rushed through it to the otherside, and made for the open country. But we had had enough of streetfighting at Delhi. Our Cavalry and Artillery were divided into twoparties, which moved round the walls, one to the right and the otherto the left, and united in pursuit of the fugitives at the furtherside. We followed them for several miles. Some had concealedthemselves in the high crops, and were discovered by the Cavalry ontheir return march to camp. Ouvry formed a long line, and one by onethe rebels, starting up as the troopers rode through the fields, werekilled, while our loss was trifling. 

The inhabitants of Aligarh had apparently had a bad time of it underthe rebel rule, for they expressed much joy at the result of themorning's work, and were eager in their proffers to bring in suppliesfor our troops and to otherwise help us. 

Ill as we could afford to weaken our column, it was so necessaryto keep the main line of communication open, and put a stop to thedisorder into which the country had fallen, that it was decided toleave two companies of Punjabis at Aligarh, as a guard to the youngcivilian who was placed in charge of the district. 

Fourteen miles from Aligarh on the road to Cawnpore there lived twoRajputs, twin brothers, who had taken such a prominent part in therebellion that a price had been put on their heads, and for the futurepeace of the district it was considered necessary to capture them. Inorder to surprise them the more completely, it was given out that thecolumn was to march towards Agra, from which place disquieting newshad been received, while secret orders were issued to proceed towardsCawnpore. The Cavalry went on in advance, and while it was still dark, succeeded in surrounding the village of Akrabad, where dwelt thebrothers. In attempting to escape they were both killed, and threesmall guns were found in their house loaded and primed, but we hadarrived too suddenly to admit of their being used against us. Wediscovered besides a quantity of articles which must have belongedto European ladies--dresses, books, photographs, and knick-knacksof every description--which made us feel that the twins had richlydeserved their fate. 

We halted on the 7th, and on the 8th marched across country toBryjgarh (a prettily situated village under a fortified hill), ourobject being to get nearer to Agra, the reports from which place hadbeen causing us anxiety, and likewise to put ourselves in a positionto intercept the Rohilkand mutineers, who we were told were on theirway to Lucknow. 

No sooner had we got to Bryjgarh than we received information that thedetachment we had left behind at Aligarh was not likely to be leftundisturbed, and at the same time an urgent call for assistance camefrom Agra, where a combined attack by insurgents from Gwalior, Mhow, and Delhi was imminent. Fifty of Hodson's Horse, under a Europeanofficer, and a sufficient number of Infantry to make the detachment wehad left there up to 200, were at once despatched to Aligarh. It wasclear, too, that the appeal from Agra must be responded to, for itwas an important place, the capital of the North-West Provinces; thetroops and residents had been shut up in the fort for more thanthree months, and the letters, which followed each other in quicksuccession, showed that the authorities were considerably alarmed. Itwas felt, therefore, that it was imperative upon us to turn our stepstowards Agra, but it entailed our marching forty-eight miles outof our way, and having to give up for the time any idea of aidingHavelock in the relief of Lucknow. 

The column marched at midnight on the 8th October, the Horse Artilleryand Cavalry, which I accompanied, pushing on as fast as possible. Wehad done thirty-six miles, when we were advised from Agra that therewas no need for so much haste, as the enemy, having heard of ourapproach, were retiring; we accordingly halted, nothing loath, tillthe Infantry came up. 

Early the next morning, the 10th October, we reached Agra. Crossingthe Jumna by a bridge of boats, we passed under the walls of thepicturesque old fort built by the Emperor Akbar nearly 300 yearsbefore. 

The European residents who had been prisoners within the walls of thefort for so long streamed out to meet and welcome us, overjoyed atbeing free at last. We presented, I am afraid, but a sorry appearance, as compared to the neatly-dressed ladies and the spick-and-span troopswho greeted us, for one of the fair sex was overheard to remark, 'Wasever such a dirty-looking lot seen?' Our clothes were, indeed, wornand soiled, and our faces so bronzed that the white soldiers werehardly to be distinguished from their Native comrades. 

Our questions as to what had become of the enemy, who we had beeninformed had disappeared with such unaccountable celerity on hearingof the advance of the column, were answered by assurances that therewas no need to concern ourselves about them, as they had fled acrossthe Kari Naddi, a river thirteen miles away, and were in full retreattowards Gwalior. It was a little difficult to believe in the completedispersion of the formidable rebel army, the mere rumoured approachof which had created such consternation in the minds of the Agraauthorities, and had caused the many urgent messages imploring us topush on. 

Our doubts, however, were met with the smile of superior knowledge. We were informed that the rebels had found it impossible to gettheir guns across to the Agra side of the stream, and that, feelingthemselves powerless without them to resist our column, they had takenthemselves off with the least possible delay. We were asked withsome indignation, 'Had not the whole country round been scouredby thoroughly trustworthy men without a trace of the enemy beingdiscovered?' And we were assured that we might take our much-neededrest in perfect confidence that we were not likely to be disturbed. We were further told by those who were responsible for the localIntelligence Department, and who were repeatedly questioned, that theyhad no doubt whatever their information was correct, and that therewas no need to follow up the enemy until our troops were rested andrefreshed. 

We were then not aware of what soon became painfully apparent, thatneither the information nor the opinions of the heads of the civiland military administration at Agra were to be relied upon. Thatadministration had, indeed, completely collapsed; there was nocontrolling authority; the crisis had produced no one in anyresponsible position who understood the nature of the convulsionthrough which we were passing; and endless discussion had resulted (asmust always be the case) in fatal indecision and timidity. 

We could hardly have been expected to know that the government of sogreat a province was in the hands of men who were utterly unfit tocope with the difficulties of an emergency such as had now arisen, although in quieter times they had filled their positions with creditto themselves and advantage to the State. 

That this was the case can be proved beyond a doubt, but I do not giveit as an excuse for our being caught napping by the enemy, whichwe certainly were. We ought, of course, to have reconnoitred thesurrounding country for ourselves, and posted our piquets as usual;and we ought not to have been induced to neglect these essentialmilitary precautions by the confident assertion of the Agraauthorities that the enemy were nowhere in our neighbourhood. 

The Brigadier gave orders for our camp to be pitched as soon as thetents should arrive, but he saw no necessity for posting piquetsuntil the evening. Accordingly, I marked out the camp on the brigadeparade-ground, which had been selected as best suited for thepurpose--a grassy, level, open spot, a mile and a half from the fort. On the left and rear were the ruined lines of the two Native Infantryregiments which had been disarmed and sent to their homes, and thecharred remains of the British officers' houses. To the right andfront there was cultivation, and the high crops, almost ready to bereaped, shut out the view of the country beyond. 

As the tents and baggage could not arrive for some time, I got leaveto go with Norman, Watson, and a few others to breakfast in the fort. We had scarcely sat down, bent on enjoying such an unusual event as ameal in ladies' society, when we were startled by the report of a gun, then another and another. Springing to our feet, there was a generalexclamation of, 'What can it mean? Not the enemy, surely!' But theenemy it was, as we were soon convinced by our host, who, having goneto a point from which he could get a view of the surrounding country, came back in hot haste, to tell us that an action was taking place. 

We who belonged to the column hurried down the stairs, jumped onour horses, and galloped out of the fort and along the road in thedirection of the firing. We had got but half-way to camp, when we weremet and almost borne down by an enormous crowd, consisting of men, women, and children of every shade of colour, animals and baggage allmixed up in inextricable confusion. On they rushed, struggling andyelling as if pursued by demons. 

The refugees from the fort, tired of their long imprisonment, hadtaken advantage of the security which they thought was assured by thearrival of the column to visit their deserted homes. Two-thirds of the150, 000 inhabitants of the city had also flocked out to see the troopswho had taken part in the capture of Delhi (the report of whichachievement was still universally disbelieved), to watch our campbeing pitched, and to see what was going on generally. All this variedcrowd, in terror at the first sound of firing, made for the fort andcity, and were met in their flight by the heavy baggage of thecolumn on its way to camp. Instantly, elephants, camels, led horses, doolie-bearers carrying the sick and wounded, bullocks yoked toheavily-laden carts, all becoming panic-stricken, turned round andjoined in the stampede. Elephants, as terrified as their _mahouts_[7], shuffled along, screaming and trumpeting; drivers twisted the tailsof their long-suffering bullocks with more than usual energy andheartlessness, in the vain hope of goading them into a gallop; andcamels had their nostrils rent asunder by the men in charge of them, in their unsuccessful endeavours to urge their phlegmatic animals intosomething faster than their ordinary stately pace. 

Into this surging multitude we rushed, but for a time our progress wascompletely checked. Eventually, however, by dint of blows, threats, and shouts, we managed to force our way through the motley crowd andreach the scene of action. What a sight was that we came upon! I seemto see it now as distinctly as I did then. Independent fights weregoing on all over the parade-ground. Here, a couple of Cavalrysoldiers were charging each other. There, the game of bayonet _versus_sword was being carried on in real earnest. Further on, a party ofthe enemy's Cavalry were attacking one of Blunt's guns (which theysucceeded in carrying off a short distance). Just in front, the 75thFoot (many of the men in their shirt-sleeves) were forming square toreceive a body of the rebel horse. A little to the left of the 75th, Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery and Bourchier's batteryhad opened fire from the park without waiting to put on theiraccoutrements, while the horses were being hastily harnessed by theNative drivers and _saices_. Still further to the left, the 9thLancers and Gough's squadron of Hodson's Horse were rapidly saddlingand falling in. On the right the 8th Foot and the 2nd and 4th PunjabInfantry were busy getting under arms, while beyond, the threesquadrons of Punjab Cavalry, under Probyn and Younghusband, werehurrying to get on the enemy's flank. 

Watson galloped off to take command of the Punjab Cavalry, and Normanand I rode in different directions to search for the Brigadier. Whilethus employed, I was stopped by a dismounted _sowar_, who danced aboutin front of me, waving his _pagri_[8] before the eyes of my horse withone hand, and brandishing his sword with the other. I could not getthe frightened animal near enough to use my sword, and my pistol (aDeane and Adams revolver), with which I tried to shoot my opponent, refused to go off, so I felt myself pretty well at his mercy, when, tomy relief, I saw him fall, having been run through the body by a manof the 9th Lancers who had come to my rescue. 

Being unable to find the Brigadier, I attached myself to the nextsenior officer, Major Frank Turner, who commanded the Artillery. Gradually the enemy were beaten off, and the troops formed themselvesup ready for pursuit, or whatever they might be called upon to do. Atthis juncture Greathed appeared on the ground. 

With less experienced troops the surprise--and a thorough surprise itwas--would in all probability have had serious results. Most of themen were asleep under the few tents which had already arrived, or suchshelter as could be obtained near at hand, when first one round shot, then another, came right into their midst from a battery concealedin the high crops to our right front. At the same time half a dozenrebels, one of them playing the _nagàra_, [9] rode quietly up to theQuarter-Guard of the 9th Lancers and cut down the sentry. Beingdressed, like Probyn's men, in red, they were mistaken for them, andwere thus enabled to get close to the guard. This act was quicklyfollowed by a general rush of the enemy's Cavalry, which brought aboutthe series of fights that were going on when we appeared on the scene. The Commander was not to be found; no one knew who was the seniorofficer present; consequently each regiment and battery had to actaccording to its own discretion. The troops got ready with incrediblerapidity, and set to work to drive the enemy off the ground. TheArtillery replied to the insurgents' guns; the Infantry did what theycould, but were hampered by the fear of doing more injury to theirfriends than their foes, and thus the brunt of the work fell upon theCavalry. The 9th Lancers made a succession of brilliant charges. Onetroop especially distinguished itself by recovering Blunt's capturedgun; the Captain (French) was killed, and the subaltern (Jones), covered with wounds, was left on the ground for dead. Watson, Probyn, and Younghusband, with their three squadrons, cleared our right flank, capturing two guns and some standards; and Hugh Gough, with hissquadron, performed a similar duty on the left. 

Probyn greatly distinguished himself on this occasion. In one of thecharges he got separated from his men, and was for a time surroundedby the enemy, two of whom he slew. In another charge he captured astandard. For these and numerous acts of gallantry during the Mutiny, he was, to the great delight of his many friends in the column, awarded the Victoria Cross. 

When Greathed arrived, the order for a general advance was given, and we were just moving off in pursuit of the rebels, when the3rd European Regiment and a battery of Field Artillery underLieutenant-Colonel Cotton arrived from the fort. This officer, beingsenior to our Brigadier, took command of the force, and untimelydelay was caused while he learnt the details of our position. Havingsatisfied himself that the enemy must be followed up, he endorsedGreathed's order, and off we again started. 

We soon overtook the retreating foe, who every now and then turned andmade an ineffectual stand. At the end of about four miles we came upontheir camp; it covered a considerable space, and must have takena long time to transport and pitch--a circumstance which made theignorance on the part of the Agra authorities as to the closeproximity of the enemy appear even more unaccountable than before. 

Our Infantry were now pretty well done up; they had been on the move, with one or two short intervals, for nearly sixty hours, and the 3rdEuropeans were not in trim for a long and hot day's work after such alengthened period of inactivity in the fort, and clad, as they were, in thick scarlet uniform. The enemy, however, could not be allowed tocarry off their guns; so, leaving the Infantry to amuse themselves bymaking hay in the rebels' camp, we pushed forward with the Cavalry andArtillery. It was a most exciting chase. Property of all sorts anddescriptions fell into our hands, and before we reached the Kari Naddiwe had captured thirteen guns, some of them of large calibre, and agreat quantity of ammunition. The enemy's loss on this occasion wasnot very great, owing to the extraordinary facility with which Nativetroops can break up and disappear, particularly when crops are on theground. 

While watching a few of the rebel Cavalry making their escape alongthe opposite bank of the Kari Naddi, I noticed about a dozen menbelonging to the 2nd and 4th Punjab Infantry quenching their thirst inthe stream. Carried away by excitement, they had managed to keep upwith the pursuit, never thinking of the inevitable trudge back toAgra, which meant that, by the time they arrived there, they wouldhave accomplished a march of not less than 70 miles without a halt, besides having had a severe fight with an enemy greatly superior innumbers. 

Our casualties were slight: 12 officers and men were killed, 54wounded, and 2 missing, besides some 20 camp-followers killed andwounded. 

There is no doubt that the enemy were almost as much taken by surpriseas we were. They knew that we were on our way from Aligarh, and hadarranged (as we afterwards heard) with the people of the city todestroy the bridge of boats in time to prevent our crossing. But ourmovements were sufficiently rapid to prevent their carrying theirintention into effect; and although the insurgents were informed thatwe had actually crossed the river they refused to believe the report, and, it was said, hanged the man who brought it. Their incredulity wasstrengthened by the small dimensions of the ground taken up for ourcamp, and the few tents which were pitched, and they made up theirminds that these were only being prepared for the troops belongingto the Agra garrison, and so anticipated an easy victory. Theirastonishment first became known when they were repulsed by the 75thFoot, and were heard to say to one another, '_Arrah bhai! ye Diliwhalehain!_' (I say, brother! these are the fellows from Delhi!). 

We halted at Agra on the 11th, 12th, and 13th October, partly torest the men and transport animals, but chiefly on account of thedifficulty we had in getting out of the clutches of the North-WestProvinces Government, the local authorities not caring to be left totheir own resources. Our wounded were taken to the fort, and lodged inthe Moti Masjid, [10] which exquisite little building had been turnedinto a hospital. The men were well taken care of by the ladies, whoseemed to think they could never do enough for the Delhi column. 

I now for the first time saw the lovely Taj Mahal--that beautiful, world-famed memorial of a man's devotion to a woman, a husband'sundying love for a dead wife. I will not attempt to describe theindescribable. Neither words nor pencil could give to the mostimaginative reader the slightest idea of the all-satisfying beauty andpurity of this glorious conception. To those who have not alreadyseen it, I would say: 'Go to India. The Taj alone is well worth thejourney. '

[Footnote 1: Two troops of Horse Artillery, with four guns and onehowitzer each, commanded respectively by Captains Remmington andBlunt. One Field Battery, with six guns, commanded by CaptainBourchier. One British Cavalry regiment, the 9th Lancers, reduced to300 men, commanded by Major Ouvry. Two British Infantry regiments (the8th and 75th Foot), commanded respectively by Major Hinde and CaptainGordon, which could only number between them 450 men. Detachments ofthree Punjab Cavalry regiments, the 1st, 2nd and 5th, commanded byLieutenants John Watson, Dighton Probyn and George Younghusband, numbering in all 320 men. A detachment of Hodson's Horse, commanded byLieutenant Hugh Gough, and consisting of 180 men. Two Punjab Infantryregiments, commanded by Captains Green and Wilde, each about 600 men;and 200 Sappers and Miners, with whom were Lieutenants Home and Lang. ]

[Footnote 2: Afterwards Sir Alfred Lyall, G. C. I. E. , K. C. B. , Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, and now a member ofthe Indian Council. ]

[Footnote 3: Now General Sir William Drysdale, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 4: The horse, although badly hurt, was not killed, andeventually did me good service. ]

[Footnote 5: This was the Engineer officer who had such a miraculousescape when he blew in the Kashmir gate at Delhi, for which act ofgallantry he had been promised the Victoria Cross. ]

[Footnote 6: A few years afterwards she communicated with the civilauthorities of the district, and made out such a pitiful story ofill-treatment by her Mahomedan husband, that she was sent to Calcutta, where some ladies were good enough to look after her. ]

[Footnote 7: Men in charge of the elephants. ]

[Footnote 8: Turban. ]

[Footnote 9: Native kettle-drum. ]

[Footnote 10: Pearl Mosque. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXI. 1857

 Infatuation of the authorities at Agra--A series of Mishaps --Result of indecision and incapacity

During our three days' halt at Agra we were told the story of all thathad happened before we came, and a sad story it was of incapacity andneglected opportunity. The Lieutenant-Governor, an able, intelligentman under ordinary circumstances, had, unfortunately, no firmness ofcharacter, no self-reliance. Instead of acting on his own convictions, he allowed himself to be entirely led by men about him, who had notsufficient knowledge of Natives to enable them to grasp how completelythe latter's attitude towards us had been changed by the loss of ourmilitary hold over the country. [1]

Deaf to warnings from those who did understand the magnitude of thedanger, the Lieutenant-Governor refused to listen to the MaharajaScindia, who, influenced by the wise counsels of his astute andenlightened minister, Dinkar Rao, told him that the whole Native armywas disloyal, and that the men of his own (the Gwalior) Contingent[2]were as bad as the rest. The authorities refused to allow the ladiesand children at Gwalior to be sent into Agra for safety; they objectedto arrangements being made for accommodating the non-combatants insidethe walls of the fort, because, forsooth, such precautions would showa want of confidence in the Natives! and the sanction for suppliesbeing stored in the fort was tardily and hesitatingly accorded. It wasnot, indeed, until the mutinous sepoys from Nimach and Nasirabad werewithin sixty miles of Agra that orders were given to put the fort ina state of defence and provision it, and it was not until they hadreached Futtehpore Sikri, twenty-three miles from Agra, that the womenand children were permitted to seek safety within the stronghold. [3]

Fortunately, however, notwithstanding the intermittent manner in whichinstructions were issued, there was no scarcity of supplies, for, owing to the foresight and energy of Lieutenant Henry Chalmers, the executive Commissariat officer, assisted by that prince ofcontractors, Lalla Joti Persâd, and ably supported by Mr. Reade, thecivilian next in rank to the Lieutenant-Governor, food was stored insufficient quantities, not only for the garrison, but for all therefugees from the surrounding districts. [4]

Mr. Drummond, the magistrate of the district, who had from the firstbeen the chief opponent of precautionary measures for the security ofthe residents, had the audacity to set the Lieutenant-Governor's orderfor victualling the fort at defiance. He forbad grain or provisionsbeing sold to the Commissariat contractor, whose duty it was tocollect supplies, and positively imprisoned one man for responding tothe contractor's demands. It was at this official's instigation thatthe Native police force was largely increased, instead of being doneaway with altogether, as would have been the sensible course; andas there was an insufficiency of weapons wherewith to arm theaugmentation, a volunteer corps of Christians, lately raised, wasdisbanded, and their arms distributed amongst the Mahomedan police. Sofar was this infatuated belief in the loyalty of the Natives carriedthat it was proposed to disarm the entire Christian population, on thepretext that their carrying weapons gave offence to the Mahomedans! Itwas only on the urgent remonstrance of some of the military officersthat this preposterous scheme was abandoned. [5] The two Nativeregiments stationed at Agra were not disarmed until one of the Britishofficers with them had been killed and another wounded. The gaol, containing 5, 000 prisoners, was left in charge of a Native guard, although the superintendent, having reliable information that thesepoys intended to mutiny, begged that it might be replaced byEuropean soldiers. The Lieutenant-Governor gave his consent to thiswise precaution, but afterwards not only allowed himself to bepersuaded to let the Native guard remain, but authorized theremoval of the European superintendent, on the plea of his being analarmist. [6]

On the 4th July Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor, whose health hadbeen very indifferent for some time, was induced, much against hiswill, to retire to the fort, and for the time being the management ofaffairs passed into the hands of Brigadier Polwhele. There was littleimprovement--indecision reigned supreme. Notwithstanding that thegradual approach of the mutineers from Gwalior and Nasirabad was wellknown, no preparations were made, no plan of action decided upon. Polwhele, who was a brave old soldier, and had seen a great deal ofservice, had, indeed, wisely come to the conclusion that the rebelswould never venture to attack a fort like Agra, and that, if leftalone, they would in all probability continue their march towardsDelhi. The available troops numbered less than 1, 000 effective men, and Polwhele felt that, by going out to attack the enemy, there wouldbe a grave risk of the seat of government falling into the hands ofthe disaffected police and city people. 

Unfortunately, however, the Brigadier allowed himself to be overruled, and when the mutineers were reported to have arrived at Shahganj, fourmiles from Agra, he gave way to the cry to 'Go out and do something!'and issued orders for the troops to fall in. 

A series of mishaps then occurred. It was one o'clock in the afternoonof the 5th July before the column[7] was ready to start; the men intheir thick red uniform suffered greatly from the heat and thirst; theenemy, 9, 000 strong, with twelve guns, instead of being at Shahganj, were found to be strongly entrenched at Sarsia, some distance fartheroff. A protracted engagement then took place, and our troops, havingexpended all their ammunition, were obliged to retreat, leaving manydead and a gun on the field. 

Meanwhile the city and cantonment were in a state of uproar. The firstgun was the signal for the guard at the gaol to release the 5, 000prisoners, who, as they appeared in the streets, still wearing theirfetters, caused a perfect panic amongst the respectable inhabitants;while the evil-disposed made for the cantonment, to plunder, burn, andmurder. Some of the residents who had not sought shelter in the fort, confident that our troops would gain an easy victory, on hearing oftheir defeat hurried with all speed to that place of refuge, and forthe most part succeeded in reaching it; but a few were overtaken andkilled by the mob, aided by the trusted police, who had early in theday broken into open mutiny. [8]

With one or two exceptions the officials, military and civil alike, were utterly demoralized by all these disastrous occurrences, theresult of their own imbecility. For two days no one was allowedto leave the fort or approach from the outside. Within was direconfusion; without, the mob had it all their own way. 

Early in August a despatch was received from the Governor-Generalacknowledging the receipt of the report on the fight of the 5th July, and directing that Brigadier Polwhele should be removed from thecommand of his brigade. On the 9th September Mr. Colvin died; henever recovered the shock of the Mutiny. As a Lieutenant-Governorin peace-time he was considered to have shown great ability in themanagement of his province, and he was highly respected for hisuprightness of character. One cannot but feel that it was in a greatmeasure due to his failing health that, when the time of trial came, he was unable to accept the responsibility of directing affairshimself, or to act with the promptitude and decision which weredemanded from all those occupying prominent positions in 1857. 

Mr. Reade, the next senior civilian, assumed charge of the governmenton Mr. Colvin's death, until orders were received from the Governmentof India vesting the supreme authority in a military officer, andappointing Colonel Hugh Fraser, of the Bengal Engineers, to be Mr. Colvin's successor with the rank and position of a Chief Commissioner. Lord Canning was doubtless induced to make this selection inconsequence of the courage and ability Colonel Fraser had displayedduring the Burmese War, and also on account of the sound advice hehad given to the Lieutenant-Governor in the early days of theoutbreak--advice which unfortunately was ignored. Mr. Reade, who hadproved himself worthy of his high position, gave Colonel Fraserhis cordial and unqualified support, but that officer, like hispredecessor, was in bad health, and found it difficult to exercise themuch-needed control. A constant state of panic continued to exist, andno reliable information could be obtained of what was going on even inthe immediate neighbourhood. The relief afforded by the news of thefall of Delhi was great, but short-lived, for it was quickly followedby a report that the whole rebel army had fled from Delhi and washastening towards Agra, and that the mutineers from Gwalior andCentral India were advancing to attack the fort. Again all wasconfusion. Reports as to the movements of the enemy were never thesame for two days together; at last what appeared to be authenticintelligence was received: the Gwalior troops were said to be closeat hand, and those urgent appeals for assistance which were sent toGreathed caused us to turn our steps towards Agra. 

Our object having been attained, we were all anxious to depart. TheChief Commissioner, however, was quite as anxious that we shouldremain; firmly believing that the Gwalior troops would reappear, hesuggested that we should follow them up at least as far as Dholpur;but this proposal Greathed firmly refused to accede to. The orders hehad received were to open up the country[9] between the Jumna andthe Ganges, and he had not forgotten the little note from Havelockdiscovered in the fakir's platter. 

At last the column was allowed to leave. The evening before ourdeparture Norman and I called on the Chief Commissioner to saygood-bye. We found Colonel Fraser greatly depressed, and inclinedto take a most gloomy view of the situation, evidently thinking therestoration of our rule extremely doubtful. His last words to us were, 'We shall never meet again. '[10] He looked extremely ill, and hisstate of health probably accounted for his gloomy forebodings. We, onthe contrary, were full of health and hope. Having assisted at thecapture of Delhi, the dispersion of the enemy who had attempted tooppose us on our way through the Doab, and the troops we were servingwith having recently achieved a decisive victory at Agra over a foefour times their number, we never doubted that success would attendus in the future as in the past, and we were now only anxious tojoin hands with Havelock, and assist in the relief of the sufferersbesieged in Lucknow. 

[Footnote 1: 'They regarded the Mutiny as a military revolt; the ruraldisturbances as the work of the mobs. The mass of the people theyconsidered as thoroughly loyal, attached to our rule as well fromgratitude as from self-interest, being thoroughly conscious of thebenefits it had conferred upon them. Holding these opinions, they didnot comprehend either the nature or the magnitude of the crisis. Totheir inability to do so, many lives and much treasure were needlesslysacrificed. '--'The Indian Mutiny, ' Thornhill. ]

[Footnote 2: The Gwalior Contingent was raised in 1844, after thebattles of Punniar and Maharajpore, to replace the troops of MaharajaScindia ordered to be reduced. It consisted of five batteries ofArtillery, two regiments of Cavalry, and seven regiments of Infantry, officered by British officers belonging to the Indian Army, andpaid for out of the revenues of districts transferred to Britishmanagement. ]

[Footnote 3: 'The Indian Mutiny, ' Thornhill. ]

[Footnote 4: Throughout the campaign the Commissariat Department neverfailed: the troops were invariably well supplied, and, even during thelongest marches, fresh bread was issued almost daily. ]

[Footnote 5: 'The Indian Mutiny, ' Thornhill. ]

[Footnote 6: 'The Indian Mutiny, ' Thornhill. ]

[Footnote 7: It consisted of the 3rd European Regiment, 568 strong, a battery of Field Artillery, with Native drivers and a few EuropeanArtillerymen, and about 100 mounted Militia and Volunteers, composedof officers, civilians and others who had taken refuge in Agra. ]

[Footnote 8: The police were suspected of having invited theinsurgents who defeated Polwhele to Agra. ]

[Footnote 9: Known as the Doab. ]

[Footnote 10: Colonel Fraser died within nine months of our leavingAgra. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXII. 1857

 Advantage of being a good horseman--News from Lucknow --Cawnpore--Heart-rending scenes--Start for Lucknow --An exciting Adventure--Arrival of Sir Colin Campbell --Plans for the advance

On the 14th October we moved camp to the left bank of the Jumna, wherewe were joined by a small party of Artillerymen with two 18-pounderguns, and some convalescents belonging to the regiments with us, whohad been left behind at Delhi--300 in all. Our camp was pitched in apretty garden called the Rambagh, only a short distance from Agra, where we gave a picnic to the ladies who had been so kind to ourwounded men--a rough sort of entertainment, as may be imagined, butmuch enjoyed by the easily-pleased people who had been prisoners forso long, to whom the mere getting away from the fort for a few hourswas a relief. 

On the morning of the 15th we commenced our march towards Mainpuri, asmall station seventy miles from Agra, which we reached on the 18th. While on our way there, Hope Grant, Colonel of the 9th Lancers, arrived in camp to take over the command of the column. He hadremained at Delhi when superseded by Greathed, and being naturallyindignant at the treatment he had received, he protested against it, and succeeded in getting the order appointing Greathed to the commandcancelled. 

Had an officer been specially selected on account of his possessinga more intimate acquaintance with Native soldiers and a longerexperience of India, Hope Grant would no doubt have accepted theinevitable. But Greathed did not know as much of the country andNative troops as Hope Grant did; he had seen no service before hecame to Delhi, and while there had no opportunity of showing that hepossessed any particular qualification for command; he certainly didnot exhibit any while in charge of the column, and everyone in theforce was pleased to welcome Hope Grant as its leader. 

The Raja of Mainpuri, who had openly joined the rebels, fled the daybefore we marched in, leaving behind him several guns and a quantityof powder. We halted on the 20th, blew up his fort and destroyed thepowder. The European part of the station was in ruins, but a relationof the Raja had been able to prevent the Government treasury frombeing plundered, and he made over to us two and a half lakhs ofrupees. 

The civilians of the Mainpuri district were amongst the refugees atAgra, and took advantage of our escort to return to their station. We had also been joined by some officers whom the mutiny of theirregiments had left without employment; they were a welcome additionto our Punjab regiments, as the limited number of British officersattached to these corps had been considerably reduced by theconstantly recurring casualties. One of these officers was a CaptainCarey, whose story, as he told it to me, of his escape from themassacre at Cawnpore and his subsequent experiences is, I think, worthrepeating. 

In the month of May Carey went into Wheeler's entrenchment with therest of the garrison; a few days before the investment, however, SirHenry Lawrence sent his Military Secretary, Captain Fletcher Hayes, toCawnpore, to report on what course events were taking at that place, and, if possible, to communicate with Delhi. His escort was the 2ndOudh Irregular Cavalry. Hayes had already made Carey's acquaintance, and, on finding him at Cawnpore, asked him to accompany him to Delhi, which invitation Carey gladly accepted. When they got close to Bewar, where the road to Mainpuri branched off, Hayes, wishing to gaininformation from the civil authorities as to the state of the countrythrough which their route to Delhi lay, rode off to the latter placewith Carey, having first ordered the escort to proceed towards Delhi, and having arranged with the British officers to catch them up at theend of the next day's march. The following day, as the two friendsapproached the encamping ground where they were to overtake theescort, they beheld the regiment marching steadily along the roadin regular formation; there was nothing to warn them that it hadrevolted, for as there were only three British officers with thecorps, whose dress was almost the same as the men's, their absence wasnot noticed. 

Suddenly, when they had got within two or three hundred yards of theregiment, the troopers with one accord broke into shouts and yells, and, brandishing their swords, galloped towards Hayes and Carey, who, turning their horses, made with all possible speed back towardsMainpuri. Hayes, who was an indifferent rider, was soon overtaken andcut to pieces, while Carey, one of the best horsemen in the army, and beautifully mounted, escaped; the _sowars_ followed him for somedistance, but a wide irrigation cut, which he alone was able to clear, put an end to the pursuit. Carey reached his destination in safety, and, with the other Europeans from Mainpuri, sought refuge in the Agrafort, where he spent the following five months. It was afterwardsascertained that the three British officers with the escort had beenmurdered by the _sowars_ shortly before Hayes and Carey came in sight. 

On the 21st October we reached Bewar, the junction of the roads fromMeerut, Agra, Fatehgarh, and Cawnpore, at which point the Brigadierreceived a communication from Sir James Outram, written in Greekcharacter, from the Lucknow Residency, begging that aid might be sentas soon as possible, as provisions were running short. [1] The note wasrolled up inside a quill, which the Native messenger had cunninglyconcealed in the heart of his thick walking-stick. Outram's urgentsummons determined the Brigadier to push on. So the next day we madea march of twenty-eight miles to Goorsahaigunj, and on the 23rd wereached Miran-ki-Serai, close to the ruined Hindu city of Kanoj. 

The same day I went on as usual with a small escort to reconnoitre, and had passed through the town, when I was fired upon by a party ofthe rebels, consisting of some 300 Cavalry, 500 Infantry, and fourguns, who, having heard of the approach of the column, were trying toget away before it arrived. Their Cavalry and Infantry were on theopposite bank of a fairly wide stream, called the Kali Naddi, throughwhich were being dragged some heavy pieces of cannon. I retireda short distance, and sent back word to the advance guard, whichhastened to my assistance. A few rounds from our Artillery caused theenemy to abandon their guns, the Infantry dispersed and disappeared, the Cavalry fled, and we, crossing the stream, had a smart gallopafter them for about four miles over a fine grassy plain. On we flew, Probyn's and Watson's squadrons leading the way in parallel lines, about a mile apart. I was with the latter, and we had a running fighttill we reached the Ganges, into which plunged those of the _sowars_whom we had not been able to overtake; we reined up, and saw theunlucky fugitives struggling in the water, men and horses rolling overeach other; they were gradually carried down by the swiftly runningstream, and but a very few reached the opposite bank. 

Our casualties were trifling, only some half-dozen men wounded, whilemy horse got a gash on his quarter from a sabre. Watson had theforefinger of his right hand badly cut in an encounter with a young_sowar_; I chaffed him at allowing himself to be nearly cut down by amere boy, upon which he laughingly retorted: 'Well, boy or not, he wasbigger than you. '

It was on this occasion that I first recognized the advantage ofhaving the carbine slung on the trooper's back while in action, instead of being carried in the bucket, as is the custom with ourBritish Cavalry. Several of the enemy's loose horses were going aboutwith carbines on their saddles, while their dismounted riders were atan enormous disadvantage in trying to defend themselves from theirmounted adversaries with only their swords. I saw, too, one ofWatson's men saved from a fierce cut across the spine by having hiscarbine on his back. More recent experience has quite satisfied methat this is the only way this weapon should be carried when actualfighting is going on. 

Three more marches brought us to Cawnpore, where we arrived on the26th October. 

We now for the first time heard the miserable 'story of Cawnpore. ' Wewere told how, owing to Sir Hugh Wheeler's misplaced belief in theloyalty of the sepoys, with whom he had served for upwards of half acentury, and to the confiding old soldier's trust in the friendship ofthe miscreant Nana, and in the latter's ability to defend him untilsuccour should arrive, he had neglected to take precautionary measuresfor laying in supplies or for fortifying the two exposed barrackswhich, for some unaccountable reason, had been chosen as a place ofrefuge, instead of the easily defensible and well-stored magazine. Ourvisit to this scene of suffering and disaster was more harrowing thanit is in the power of words to express; the sights which met our eyes, and the reflections they gave rise to, were quite maddening, and couldnot but increase tenfold the feelings of animosity and desire forvengeance which the disloyalty and barbarity of the mutineers in otherplaces had aroused in the hearts of our British soldiers. Tresses ofhair, pieces of ladies' dresses, books crumpled and torn, bits of workand scraps of music, just as they had been left by the wretched ownerson the fatal morning of the 27th June, when they started for thatterrible walk to the boats provided by the Nana as the bait to inducethem to capitulate. [2] One could not but picture to one's self theawful suffering those thousand Christian souls of both sexes andof all ages must have endured during twenty-one days of misery andanxiety, their numbers hourly diminished by disease, privation, theterrific rays of a June sun, and the storm of shot, shell, and bulletswhich never ceased to be poured into them. When one looked on theruined, roofless barracks, with their hastily constructed parapet andditch (a mere apology for a defence), one marvelled how 465 men, notmore than half of them soldiers by profession, could have held outfor three long weeks against the thousands of disciplined troops andhordes of armed retainers whom the Nana was able to bring to theattack. 

It is impossible to describe the feelings with which we looked on theSati-Choura Ghat, where was perpetrated the basest of all the Nana'sbase acts of perfidy;[3] or the intense sadness and indignation whichoverpowered us as we followed the road along which 121 women andchildren (many of them well born and delicately nurtured) wendedtheir weary way, amidst jeers and insults, to meet the terrible fateawaiting them. After their husbands and protectors had been slain, thewretched company of widows and orphans were first taken to the Savadahouse, and then to the little Native hut, where they were doomed tolive through two more weeks of intensest misery, until at length theend came, and the last scene in that long drama of foulest treacheryand unequalled brutality was enacted. Our unfortunate countrywomen, with their little children, as my readers will remember, were murderedas the sound of Havelock's avenging guns was heard. 

We found at Cawnpore some men who had fought their way from Allahabadwith Havelock's force, from whom we heard of the difficulties they hadencountered on their way, and the subsequent hardships the gallantlittle force had to endure in its attempts to reach Lucknow. They alsotold us that Havelock and Outram, with only 3, 179 men of all arms, and14 guns, had succeeded in forcing their way through that great citywith a loss of 700, but only to be themselves immediately surroundedby the vast multitude of the enemy, who for three whole months hadvainly endeavoured to overpower the heroic defenders of the Residency. 

At Cawnpore there were very few troops. The Head-Quarters of the 64thFoot, under Colonel Wilson, and some recovered invalids belongingto regiments which had gone to Lucknow, had held it for more than amonth, within an entrenchment thrown up on the river bank to protectthe bridge of boats. Just before we arrived four companies of the93rd Highlanders had marched in. It was the first time I had seen aHighland regiment, and I was duly impressed by their fine physique, and not a little also by their fine dress. They certainly lookedsplendid in their bonnets and kilts--a striking contrast to mywar-worn, travel-stained comrades of the Movable Column. An _avantcourier_ of the Naval Brigade had also come in, sent on by CaptainWilliam Peel, of H. M. S. _Shannon_, to arrange for the rest of theblue-jackets who were about to arrive--the first naval officer, Iimagine, who had ever been sent on duty so far up the country asCawnpore. 

Other troops were rapidly being pushed up, and officers who had beenon leave to England were daily arriving, having hurried out to jointheir different regiments in various parts of India. Amongst these wasan old friend and brother subaltern of mine, Augustus Otway Mayne, whom, greatly to my satisfaction, Hope Grant appointed D. A. Q. M. G. Tohelp me, for there was now more work to be done than I could well getthrough. 

The day after our arrival at Cawnpore we heard that the newCommander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, was to leave Calcutta thatevening to take command of the force with which he hoped to effect therelief of the Lucknow garrison, and with this news came an order toHope Grant from Sir Colin to get into communication with the Alambagh, a small garden-house not quite two miles from the city of Lucknow, built by one of the Begums of the ex-King of Oudh, in which the sickand wounded, tents and spare stores, had been left in charge of asmall detachment, when Outram and Havelock advanced towards theResidency on the 25th September. 

On the 30th October we left Cawnpore, and crossed the Ganges intoOudh, taking with us the four companies of the 93rd Highlanders, andthe men belonging to Havelock's force, whom I have mentioned as havingbeen left behind on account of sickness. 

On the 31st we were at Bani bridge, more than half-way to theAlambagh, when a telegram reached the Brigadier directing him to haltuntil Sir Colin Campbell (who had got as far as Cawnpore) shouldarrive. 

Hope Grant did not think the ground we were on well adapted for aprolonged halt; that afternoon, therefore, I went off with Mayne toreconnoitre the country for a more suitable place. We fixed uponan open plain at the village of Bhantira, about three miles nearerLucknow. We met with no opposition that day, but the country peoplein the neighbourhood had shown marked hostility by killing one or twosoldiers and every camp-follower who had strayed from the main road;so we were careful to examine Bhantira and all the neighbouringvillages, but were unable to discover the slightest sign of an enemy. 

As the next day's march was such a very short one, we did not startuntil 7 a. M. , instead of before daybreak as usual. Mayne and I rode onahead with a couple of _sowars_, and reached the site we had chosenfor the camp without meeting a single suspicious-looking individual. We then sent back the escort to bring up the camp colour-men, andwhile waiting for them, we entered into conversation with some passingpilgrims, who told us they were on their way to Benares to procureholy water from the Ganges. Suddenly a bullet whizzed over our heads, fired from the direction from which we had just come. Looking back, to our amazement we saw a crowd of armed men at a distance of betweenthree and four hundred yards, completely cutting us off from thecolumn. The whole plain was alive with them. When they saw they wereobserved, they advanced towards us, shouting and firing. Fortunatelyfor us, we had made ourselves perfectly acquainted with the countrythe previous day, and instantly realized that escape by our right (aswe faced Lucknow) was impossible, because of a huge impassable _jhil_. There was another _jhil_ to our left front, but at some littledistance off, and our only chance seemed to be in riding hard enoughto get round the enemy's flank before they could get close enough tothis _jhil_ to stop us. 

Accordingly, we put spurs to our horses and galloped as fast as theycould carry us to our left; the enemy turned in the same direction, and made for a village we must pass, and which we could see wasalready occupied. The firing got hotter and more uncomfortable aswe neared this village, the walls of which we skirted at our bestpossible pace. We cleared the village, and hoped we had distanced therebels, when suddenly we came upon a deep _nulla_. Mayne got safely tothe other side, but my horse stumbled and rolled over with me into thewater at the bottom. In the fall my hand was slightly cut by my sword, which I had drawn, thinking we might have to fight for our lives; theblood flowed freely, and made the reins so slippery when I tried toremount, that it was with considerable difficulty I got into thesaddle. The enemy were already at the edge of the _nulla_, andpreparing to fire, so there was no time to be lost. I struggledthrough the water and up the opposite bank, and ducking my head toavoid the shots, now coming thick and fast, galloped straight intosome high cultivation in which Mayne had already sought shelter. Finally we succeeded in making our way to the main body of the force, where we found Hope Grant in great anxiety about us, as he had heardthe firing and knew we were ahead. The dear old fellow evinced hissatisfaction at our safe return by shaking each of us heartily by thehand, repeating over and over again in his quick, quaint way, 'Well, my boys, well, my boys, very glad to have you back! never thoughtto see you again. ' The column now moved on, and we found ourselvesopposed to a vast body of men, not soldiers, but country people, who in those days were all armed warriors, and who spent their timechiefly in fighting with each other. As we approached the crowdturned, opened out, and fled in every direction, spreading over theplain and concealing themselves in the long grass. We gave chase andkilled many, but a large proportion escaped. Favoured by the highcrops, they disappeared with that marvellous celerity with whichNatives can almost instantly become invisible, leaving in ourpossession a 9-pounder brass gun. On this occasion we had thirtykilled and wounded. 

We could not at the time understand where the men had sprung fromwho so suddenly attacked us; but it afterwards transpired that somepowerful _zemindars_[4] in the neighbourhood had collected all theforces they could get together, and established them after dark in thevery villages we had so carefully examined the previous afternoon andhad found completely deserted, with the intention of falling upon thecolumn as it passed in the early morning. The unusually late hour atwhich the march was made, however, disconcerted their little plan, and giving up all hope of the force coming that day, they consoledthemselves by trying to get hold of Mayne and myself. 

We halted on the 3rd and 4th November. On the 5th, Hope Grant senta force to the Alambagh for the purpose of escorting a long line ofcarts and camels laden with provisions and ammunition, which theCommander-in-Chief was desirous of having near at hand, in case therelief of the Lucknow garrison should prove a more prolonged operationthan he hoped or anticipated it was likely to be. 

As we neared the Alambagh the enemy's guns opened on us from ourright, while their Cavalry threatened us on both flanks. They wereeasily disposed of, and we deposited the stores, receiving in exchangea number of sick and wounded who were to be sent back to Cawnpore. 

A curious incident happened at the Alambagh. I was employed inside theenclosure, when all at once I heard a noise and commotion some littledistance off. Getting on to the roof, I looked over the plain, and sawour troops flying in every direction; there was no firing, no enemy insight, but evidently something was wrong; so I mounted my horse androde to the scene of confusion, where I found that the ignominiousflight of our troops was caused by infuriated bees which had beendisturbed by an officer of the 9th Lancers thoughtlessly thrusting alance into their nest. There were no serious consequences, but theHighlanders were heard to remark on the unsuitability of their dressfor an encounter with an enemy of that description. 

On the 9th November Sir Colin Campbell joined the column, accompaniedby his Chief of the Staff, Brigadier-General Mansfield. [5]

[Illustration: LORDS CLYDE AND SANDHURST. (SIR COLIN CAMPBELL AND SIR WILLIAM MANSFIELD. )_From a photograph taken in India. _]

The following morning we were surprised to hear that a European fromthe Lucknow garrison had arrived in camp. All were keen to see him, and to hear how it was faring with those who had been shut up inthe Residency for so long; but the new-comer was the bearer of veryimportant information from Sir James Outram, and to prevent any chanceof its getting about, the Commander-in-Chief kept the messenger, Mr. Kavanagh, a close prisoner in his own tent. 

Outram, being anxious that the officer in command of the relievingforce should not follow the same route taken by himself and Havelock, and wishing to communicate his ideas more at length than was possiblein a note conveyed as usual by a spy, Kavanagh, a clerk in an officein Lucknow, pluckily volunteered to carry a letter. It was an offerwhich appealed to the heart of the 'Bayard of the East, ' as Outram hasbeen appropriately called, and just such an errand as he himself, had he been in a less responsible position, would have delighted toundertake. Outram thoroughly understood the risk of the enterprise, and placed it clearly before the brave volunteer, who, nothingdaunted, expressed his readiness to start at once, and his confidencein being able to reach the British camp. 

Disguised as a Native, and accompanied by a man of Oudh, on whosecourage and loyalty he was convinced he could rely, Kavanagh left theResidency after dark on the 9th and got safely across the Gumti. Heand his guide remained in the suburbs mixing with the people untilthe streets might be expected to be pretty well empty, when theyre-crossed the river and got safely through the city. They wereaccosted more than once on their way, but were saved by the readinessof the Native, who it had been arranged should answer all inquiries, though Kavanagh, having been born and bred in the country, couldhimself speak the language fluently. On the morning of the 10th theymade themselves known to a piquet of Punjab Cavalry on duty near theAlambagh. 

Outram, profiting by his own experience, wished the relieving columnto be spared having to fight its way through the streets of Lucknow. This was all the more necessary because the enemy, calculating on ourfollowing the same route as before, had destroyed the bridge over thecanal and made extensive preparations to oppose our advance in thatdirection. Outram explained his views most clearly, and sent with hisletter a plan on which the line he proposed we should take was plainlymarked. He recommended that the advance should be made, by theDilkusha[6] and Martinière, [7] and that the canal should be crossedby the bridge nearest the Gumti. Outram showed his military acumenin suggesting this route, as our right flank would be covered by theriver, and therefore could only be molested by a comparatively distantfire. Sir Colin, appreciating all the advantages pointed out, readilyaccepted and strictly adhered to this plan of advance, except that, instead of crossing the canal by the bridge, we forded it a littlenearer the river, a wise divergence from Outram's recommendation, andone which he would assuredly have advised had he been aware that thecanal was fordable at this spot, as it kept us altogether clear of thestreets. 

Outram did not touch in his despatch upon any question but theall-important one of how the junction between his own and therelieving forces could best be effected. Many other matters, however, claimed the earnest consideration of the Commander-in-Chief before hecould proceed. He had to determine what was to be done to secure thesafety of the women and children in the Residency, after the firstmost pressing duty of relieving the garrison had been accomplished. Cawnpore was again in great danger from the Gwalior mutineers, who, foiled at Agra, and finding that the Maharaja Sindhia would notespouse their cause, had placed themselves under the orders of theRani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi, the vile Mahratta whom the Nana madeuse of to carry out the massacre of the Sati-Choura Ghat; led bythis man the rebels were seriously threatening Cawnpore, and it wasnecessary to take steps for its security. Then again the city ofLucknow had to be thought of; its capture and the restoration ofBritish authority were alike essential, but our Chief knew that hehad neither the time nor the means at his disposal to undertake thisimportant operation at once. He therefore made up his mind that sosoon as the Residency had been relieved he would withdraw altogetherfrom Lucknow, and place a force at the Cawnpore side of the city, toform the nucleus of the army with which he hoped later on to take theplace, and to keep open communication with his Head-Quarters, whilehe himself should hurry back to Cawnpore, taking with him all thenon-combatants and the sick and wounded. 

[Footnote 1: No account of the quantity and description of suppliesstored in the Residency had been kept, or, if kept, it was destroyedwhen the Mutiny broke out. Captain James, the energetic Commissariatofficer, on receiving Sir Henry Lawrence's order to provision theResidency, spent his time riding about the country buying supplies ofall descriptions, which were stored wherever room could be found forthem. James was very severely wounded at the fight at Chinhut, and wasincapacitated the greater part of the siege. It was only by degreesthat some of the supplies were discovered; no one knew how much hadbeen collected, and no record of the quantities issued from day today could be kept. When Outram joined hands with Inglis, his firstquestion was, 'How much food is there?' Thanks to Sir Henry Lawrence'sforesight, there was an ample supply, not only for the originalgarrison, but for the numbers by which it was augmented on the arrivalof the relieving force. Of this, however, Outram must have beenignorant when he despatched the little note to which I have alluded inthe text. ]

[Footnote 2: On the 25th June, after twenty-one days of intensesuffering--with his numbers so reduced as to render further defencescarcely possible, with starvation staring him in the face, and withno hope of succour--Sir Hugh Wheeler most reluctantly consented tocapitulate. The first overtures were made by the Nana, who, despairingof being able to capture the position, and with disaffection in hisown camp, sent the following message to the General: 'All those whoare in no way connected with the acts of Lord Dalhousie, and arewilling to lay down their arms, shall receive a safe passage toAllahabad. ' This missive, which was without signature, was in thehandwriting of Azimula Khan, a Mahomedan who had been employed by theNana as his Agent in England, and was addressed, 'To the subjects ofHer Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria. ' General Wheeler agreedto give up the fortification, the treasure, and the Artillery, oncondition that each man should be allowed to carry his arms and sixtyrounds of ammunition, that carriages should be provided for theconveyance of the wounded, the women, and the children, andthat boats, with a sufficiency of flour, should be ready at theneighbouring _ghat_ (landing-place). The Nana accepted theseconditions, and three officers of the garrison were deputed to go tothe river and see that the boats were properly prepared. They foundabout forty boats moored, and apparently ready for departure, and intheir presence a show of putting supplies on board was made. ]

[Footnote 3: The Nana never intended that one of the garrison shouldleave Cawnpore alive, and during the night of the 26th June hearranged with Tantia Topi to have soldiers and guns concealed at theSati-Choura Ghat to open fire upon the Europeans he had been unable toconquer as soon as the embarkation had been effected and they could nolonger defend themselves and their helpless companions in misery. Theriver was low and the boats were aground, having been purposely drawnclose to the shore. When the last man had stepped on board, at a givensignal the boatmen jumped into the water and waded to the bank. Theyhad contrived to secrete burning charcoal in the thatch of most of theboats; this soon blazed up, and as the flames rose and the dry woodcrackled, the troops in ambush on the shore opened fire. Officers andmen tried in vain to push off the boats; three only floated, and ofthese two drifted to the opposite side, where sepoys were waiting tomurder the passengers. The third boat floated down the stream, and ofthe number on board four eventually escaped--Lieutenants Thomson andDelafosse, both of the 53rd Native Infantry, Private Murphy of the84th Foot, and Gunner Sullivan, of the Bengal Artillery. The restof the officers and men were killed or drowned, and the women andchildren who escaped were carried off as prisoners. ]

[Footnote 4: Permanent occupiers of the land, either of the landlordclass, as in Bengal, Oudh, and the North-West Provinces, or of theyeoman class, as in the Punjab. ]

[Footnote 5: Afterwards General Lord Sandhurst, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 6: The Dilkusha house was built at the beginning of thecentury by a king of Oudh as a hunting-box and country residence, andclose to it he cleared away the jungle and laid out a large park, which he stocked with herds of deer and other game. ]

[Footnote 7: The Martinière was built by Claude Martin, a Frenchsoldier of fortune, who came out to India, under Count de Lally, in the stirring days of 1757. In 1761 he was taken prisoner by theEnglish at Pondicherry and sent to Bengal. After the conclusion ofthe war he enlisted in the English Army, and on attaining the rank ofCaptain he got permission to attach himself to the Court of the Kingof Oudh, where he soon obtained supreme influence, and became to allpractical purposes Prime Minister. He remained an officer of the EastIndia Company's Service, and at the time of his death held the rankof Major-General. He amassed a large fortune, and by his will foundedcolleges at Lucknow, Calcutta, and Lyons, the place of his birth. Hisdirections that his house at the former place should never be sold, but should 'serve as a college for educating children and men inthe English language and religion, ' were carried out by the BritishGovernment, and Martin lies buried in its vault. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXIII. 1857

 Sir Colin's preparations--The Alambagh --The Dilkusha and Martinière--Mayne's death--A tall-talk story --Ammunition required--A night march--The advance on Lucknow --Sir Colin wounded--The attack on the Sikandarbagh --Heroic deeds--The 4th Punjab Infantry

The next morning, the 11th, I had the honour of making theCommander-in-Chief's acquaintance. The manner of my introduction waspeculiarly unceremonious. I had left my own tent to be repaired atCawnpore, and was sharing one with Norman, who was well known to, andgreatly believed in by, His Excellency, whose Brigade-Major he hadbeen at Peshawar. Before we were out of bed we heard Sir Colin'svoice outside. He had come to speak to Norman about his plans forthe future, and as the conversation seemed likely to be of a veryconfidential nature, and it was too dark for him to see me, I askedNorman to make my presence known. Sir Colin said to Norman somewhatroughly, 'Who is he?' and on my name being mentioned, he asked if Iwere to be trusted. Norman having vouched for my discretion, theold Chief was apparently satisfied, and then ensued an intenselyinteresting discussion on Outram's letter, Kavanagh's description ofthe state of affairs in the Residency, and the manner in which it wasbest to carry out Outram's recommendations. 

That same afternoon the Commander-in-Chief reviewed the column, whichnow amounted to about 600 Cavalry and 3, 500 Infantry, with 42 guns. [1]The parade was under the command of Hope Grant, who had been given therank of Brigadier-General, and put in executive command of the wholeforce. 

Sir Colin spoke a few inspiriting words to each regiment and battery, being particularly appreciative and complimentary in his remarks tothe Delhi troops, who certainly looked the picture of workmanlikesoldiers; and, considering what they had accomplished, there wasnothing invidious in the Chief's singling them out. The BengalArtillery came in for a large share of praise; he had a strong likingfor them, having been with them on service, [2] and seen of what goodstuff they were made. He recognized several old acquaintances amongstthe officers, and freely expressed his satisfaction at having suchreliable batteries to help him in the hazardous operation he was aboutto undertake. He was careful also to say a few words of commendationto the four squadrons of Punjab Cavalry, and the two regiments ofPunjab Infantry, the only Native troops, except the Sappers, with thecolumn. 

That evening orders were issued for a march to the Alambagh thefollowing morning. It may perhaps seem as if Sir Colin was ratherleisurely in his movements, but he had ascertained that the Lucknowgarrison was in no immediate want of food, as had been reported, andhe was determined to leave nothing undone to ensure the success of theundertaking. He personally attended to the smallest detail, and he hadto arrange for the transport of the sick and wounded, and the womenand children, shut up in the Residency, numbering in all not less thanfifteen hundred souls. 

Everything being ready, we began our march towards Lucknow, one andall eager to have a share in the rescue of our suffering countrywomenand their children from a most perilous position, and in relievingsoldiers who had so long and so nobly performed the most harassingduty, while they cheerfully endured the greatest privations. 

We had proceeded but a short distance, when the advance guard wasfired upon by some guns in position on our right, near the old fort ofJalalabad. An extensive swamp protected the enemy's right flank, whileon their left were a number of water-cuts and broken ground. TheInfantry and Artillery wheeled round and attacked the battery infront, while Hugh Gough pushed on with his squadron of Cavalry to seeif he could find a way through the apparently impassable swamp to theenemy's right and rear. Bourchier's battery coming up in the nick oftime, the hostile guns were soon silenced, and Gough, having succeededin getting through the _jhil_, made a most plucky charge, in which hecaptured two guns and killed a number of the enemy. For his gallantconduct on this occasion Gough was awarded the Victoria Cross, thesecond of two brothers to win this much-coveted distinction. 

The next morning Adrian Hope, who commanded a brigade, was ordered toseize the Jalalabad fort, but finding it evacuated, he blew up one ofthe walls, and so rendered it indefensible. 

On the afternoon of the 13th I accompanied the Commander-in-Chief in areconnaissance towards the Charbagh bridge and the left front of theAlambagh, a ruse to deceive the enemy as to the real line of ouradvance. When riding along he told me, to my infinite pride anddelight, that I was to have the honour of conducting the force to theDilkusha. The first thing I did on returning to camp was to find agood guide. We had only about five miles to go; but it was necessaryto make sure that the direction taken avoided obstacles which mightimpede the passage of the Artillery. I was fortunate in finding afairly intelligent Native, who, after a great deal of persuasion, agreed, for a reward, to take me by a track over which guns couldtravel. I never let this man out of my sight, and made him show meenough of the road to convince me he knew the way and meant fairdealing. 

The Alambagh now proved most useful; all our camp equipage was packedinside the enclosure, for we took no tents with us, and all our sparestores were left there. A rough description of semaphore, too, wasconstructed on the highest point of the building, by means of which wewere able to communicate with the Residency. It was put in Orders thatthe troops were to breakfast early the next morning, and that theywere to take three days' rations in their haversacks; while sufficientfor fourteen days was to be carried by the Commissariat. 

Just before we started on the 14th November we were strengthened bythe arrival of 200 of the Military Train equipped as Cavalry, twoMadras Horse Artillery guns, and another company of Madras Sappers. 

Captain Moir, of the Bengal Artillery, was placed in charge of theAlambagh, with a garrison consisting of the 75th Foot, 50 of theregiment of Ferozepore, [3] and a few Artillerymen. The 75th was thefirst regiment to move down from the hills when the news of theoutbreak at Meerut reached Head-Quarters; it had done grand service, had suffered heavily during the siege of Delhi, and had well earned, and badly needed, a rest. It was now only 300 strong, and had lost insix months 9 officers, in action and from disease, besides 12 wounded. The officers were all friends of mine, and I was very sorry to leavethem behind, particularly Barter, the Adjutant, a jolly, good-heartedIrishman, and an excellent officer. 

We marched at 9 a. M. , keeping to the south of the Alambagh and theJalalabad fort. We then struck across the fields to the ground nowoccupied by the Native Cavalry lines, and on to the open space uponwhich the present race-course is marked out. On reaching this pointthe Dilkusha came in sight about a mile in front. As we approached, afew shots were fired at us; but the enemy rapidly disappeared as theCavalry and Horse Artillery, followed by the Infantry of the advanceguard, in skirmishing order, passed through an opening which had beenhastily made in the wall of the enclosure. 

The gallop across the Dilkusha park was quite a pretty sight: deer, which had been quietly browsing, bounded away on all sides, frightenedby our approach and the rattle of the guns; while the routed sepoysflew down the grassy slope leading to the Martinière. We reined up fora few seconds to look at the view which opened out before us. In frontrose the fluted masonry column of the Martinière, 123 feet high;directly behind, the picturesque building itself, and in the distancethe domes and minarets of the mosques and palaces within the city ofLucknow; all looked bright and fair in the morning sun. 

We could see that the Martinière was occupied; a crowd of sepoys werecollected round the building; and as we showed ourselves on the browof the hill, a number of round shot came tumbling in amongst us. 

Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery, Bourchier's battery, and aheavy howitzer brought up by Captain Hardy, now came into action, and under cover of their fire the 8th Foot and 1st battalion ofDetachments attacked and drove the enemy out of the Martinière, whilethe Cavalry pursued them as far as the canal. 

On this occasion my friend Watson greatly distinguished himself. Entirely alone he attacked the enemy's Cavalry, and was at onceengaged with its leader and six of the front men; he fought gallantly, but the unequal contest could not have lasted much longer had notProbyn, who, with his own and Watson's squadrons, was only about 300yards off, become aware of his comrade's critical position, and dashedto his assistance. For this 'and gallantry on many other occasions, 'Hope Grant recommended Watson for the Victoria Cross, which he dulyreceived. [4]

By noon on the 14th we had occupied the Dilkusha and Martinière, andplaced our outposts along the right bank of the canal from the riverto the point immediately opposite Banks's house. The left bank washeld in force by the rebels. Early in the afternoon I went with HopeGrant, accompanied by a small force of Cavalry, to ascertain whetherit would be possible to ford the canal somewhere close to the river, and we succeeded in finding a place by which the whole force crossedtwo days later. Our movements were fortunately not noticed by theenemy, whose attention was concentrated on the roads leading direct tothe city from the Dilkusha and Martinière, by which they expected ouradvance to be made. 

Sir Colin, meanwhile, had fixed his Head-Quarters in the Martinière, on the topmost pinnacle of which he caused a semaphore to be erectedfor communication with Outram. From this post of vantage Kavanagh wasable to point out to the Commander-in-Chief the different objects ofmost interest to him--the positions taken up by the enemy; the groupof buildings, of which the Chatta Manzil[5] was the most conspicuous, then occupied by the gallant troops led by Outram and Havelock, who, by overwhelming numbers alone, had been prevented from carrying theirglorious enterprise to a successful issue; the Residency, where, thanks to Sir Henry Lawrence's foresight and admirable arrangements, a handful of heroic Britons had been able to defy the hordes ofdisciplined soldiers and armed men who, for nearly three months, day and night, had never ceased to attack the position; and theKaisarbagh, that pretentious, garish palace of the Kings of Oudh, thecentre of every kind of evil and debauchery. 

Later in the day the enemy made a determined attack on our centre, which was checked by Brigadier Little advancing with the 9th Lancersand some guns. On a few rounds being fired, they retired from theimmediate neighbourhood of the canal, and in the belief that therewould be no further trouble that day, the Cavalry and Artilleryreturned to the Martinière; but the guns were hardly unlimbered beforeheavy firing was heard from the direction of Banks's house. 

I galloped off with Mayne to ascertain the cause. Some little distancefrom the canal we separated, Mayne going to the left, I to the right. I found the piquets hotly engaged, and the officer in command beggedme to get him some assistance. I returned to Hope Grant to reportwhat was going on, but on the way I met the supports coming up, andpresently they were followed by the remainder of Hope's and Russell'sbrigades. Russell had, early in the day, with soldierly instinct, seized two villages a little above the bridge to the north of Banks'shouse; this enabled him to bring a fire to bear upon the enemy asthey advanced, and effectually prevented their turning our left. Hopeopened fire with Remmington's troop, Bourchier's battery, and some ofPeel's 24-pounders, and as soon as he found it had taken effect andthe rebels were shaken, he proceeded to push them across the canal andfinally drove them off with considerable loss. 

Hope's and Russell's united action, by which our left flank wassecured, was most timely, for had it been turned, our long lineof camels, laden with ammunition, and the immense string of cartscarrying supplies, would in all probability have been captured. As itwas, the rear guard, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, [6] of the 93rdHighlanders, had a hot time of it; it was frequently attacked, and itsprogress was so slow that it was more than twenty-four hours betweenthe Alambagh and the Dilkusha. 

At the conclusion of the fight I heard, with great grief, that my poorfriend Mayne had been killed, shot through the breast a few secondsafter he had left me. He was seen to turn his horse, and, after goinga short distance, fall to the ground; when picked up he was quitedead. This was all I could learn. No one was able to tell me where hisbody had been taken, and I looked for it myself all that evening invain. 

At daybreak the next morning, accompanied by Arthur Bunny, the cheeryAdjutant of Horse Artillery, I began my search afresh, and atlength we discovered the body inside a doolie under the wall of theMartinière. As there was no knowing how soon our services might berequired, we decided to bury the poor fellow at once. I chose a spotclose by for his grave, which was dug with the help of some gunners, and then Bunny and I, aided by two or three brother officers, laid ourfriend in it just as he was, in his blue frock-coat and long boots, his eyeglass in his eye, as he always carried it. The only thing Itook away was his sword, which I eventually made over to his family. It was a sad little ceremony. Overhanging the grave was a young tree, upon which I cut the initials 'A. O. M. '--not very deep, for there waslittle time: they were quite distinct, however, and remained so longenough for the grave to be traced by Mayne's friends, who erected thestone now to be seen. 

The whole of that day (the 15th) was spent in preparing for theadvance. The Dilkusha was turned into a general depot, where the sickand wounded were placed, also the Ordnance park and stores of everydescription. A rough defence was thrown up round the building, and agarrison was left to protect it, consisting of five Field guns, halfthe 9th Lancers, the Military Train, a squadron of Punjab Cavalry, andthe 8th Foot, the whole under the command of Little, the Brigadier ofCavalry. 

In the afternoon Sir Colin made a feint to the left of our positionfor the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy from thereal line of advance. He massed the Artillery in this direction, andordered a constant mortar fire to be kept up during the night on theBegum palace and the barracks. To further strengthen the belief thatoperations would be carried on from our left, some of the piquetson our right were drawn in; this induced the enemy to make a slightdemonstration in that direction. They crossed the canal, but werespeedily driven back by the Madras Horse Artillery guns. They thenopened fire with a 12-pounder howitzer from the west side of theGumti, when a really most extraordinary incident happened, which I amnot sure I should have the courage to relate, were it not that SirDighton Probyn and Sir John Watson, who were close by and saw whattook place, are able to vouch for the accuracy of my story. 

A shell, fortunately a blind one, from the enemy's howitzer came intoWatson's squadron, which was drawn up under the bank of the Martinièretank; it struck a trooper's saddle in front, and must have lifted theman partly out of it, for it passed between his thigh and the horse, tearing the saddle[7] to shreds, and sending one piece of it high intothe air. The horse was knocked down, but not hurt; the man's thigh wasonly badly bruised, and he was able to ride again in a few days. Oneof Watson's officers, Captain Cosserat, having examined the man andhorse, came up and reported their condition to Watson, who, of course, was expecting to be told they were both dead, and added: 'I think wehad better not tell this story in England, for no one would believeit. ' I myself was close to the squadron, and distinctly saw whathappened, [8]

All that day (the 15th) I had been very hard at work, and was greatlylooking forward to what I hoped would be a quiet night, when anAide-de-camp appeared, who informed me that the Commander-in-Chiefdesired my presence at the Martinière. 

On reporting myself to His Excellency, he told me that he was notsatisfied that a sufficient reserve of small-arm ammunition had beenbrought with the force, and that the only chance of getting more intime was to send back to the Alambagh for it that night, adding thathe could neither afford the time nor spare the troops which would berequired, were the business of fetching the additional supply tobe postponed until the following day. Sir Colin then asked me ifI thought I could find my way back to the Alambagh in the dark. Ianswered, 'I am sure I can. ' I might have hesitated to speak soconfidently had I not taken the precaution of placing the man whohad acted as my guide on the 14th in charge of some Afghan_chuprassies_[9] attached to the Quartermaster-General's department, with strict orders not to lose sight of him. I thought, therefore, I would have him to depend upon if my own memory failed me. TheCommander-in-Chief impressed very strongly upon me the great necessityfor caution, and told me I could take what escort I thought necessary, but that, whatever happened, I must be back by daybreak, as he hadsignalled to Outram that the force would advance on the morrow. SirColin desired that the Ordnance officer, whose fault it was thatsufficient ammunition had not been brought, should go back with me andbe left at the Alambagh. 

It was then dusk, and there was no time to be lost. In the firstinstance I went to my General, and reporting the orders I had receivedfrom the Commander-in-Chief, consulted him about my escort. Hope Grantstrongly urged my taking with me a troop of the 9th Lancers, as wellas some Native Cavalry, but for a night trip I thought it would bebetter to employ Natives only. I knew that my one chance of successdepended on neither being seen nor heard, and Native Cavalry move morequietly than British, chiefly because their scabbards are of wood, instead of steel. I felt, too, that if we came across the enemy, whichwas not improbable, and got scattered, Natives would run less risk, and be better able to look after themselves. All this I explained tothe General, but in the kindness of his heart he pressed me to takethe Lancers, telling me he would feel happier about me if I had my owncountrymen with me; but I stuck to my own opinion, and it was arrangedthat I was to be accompanied by Younghusband and Hugh Gough, withtheir respective squadrons of Native Cavalry. I took leave of my kindand considerate General, and hurried off first to warn the two Cavalryofficers, then to the Dilkusha to tell Lieutenant Tod Brown, in chargeof the Ordnance depot, that his assistant was to go with me, andlastly to arrange with the Commissariat officer for camels upon whichto bring back the ammunition. 

It was quite dark before I got to the place where my servants hadcollected, and where I expected to find my guide. What was my horrorto hear that he had disappeared! He had made his escape in theconfusion consequent on the enemy's attacks the previous afternoon. What was to be done now? I was in despair--and became more and moredoubtful of my ability to find the Alambagh in the dark. By daylight, and with the aid of a compass, which I always carried about me, Ishould have had little difficulty, even though the country we had toget over was intersected by ravines and water-courses, not to speak ofthe uncompromising _jhil_ near the Jalalabad fort. However, go I must. I could not possibly tell the Commander-in-Chief that I was unable tocarry out a duty for which he had selected me--there was nothing forit but to trust to my own recollection of the route and hope for thebest. 

Everything having been put in train, I returned to the Artillerybivouac, managed a hasty dinner, mounted a fresh horse, and, about9 p. M. , started off, accompanied by Younghusband, Hugh Gough, theunlucky Ordnance officer, two squadrons of Cavalry, and 150 camels. 

We got on well enough until we reached the broken ground near thepresent Native Cavalry lines, when we lost the road, or rather track, for road there was none. We could see nothing but the lights of theenemy's piquets at an uncomfortably short distance to our right. Istruck a match, and made out from the compass the right direction; butthat did not help us to clear the ravines, which, in our efforts toturn or get through them, made our way appear interminable. At lengthwe found ourselves upon open ground; but, alas! having edged off toomuch to our right we were in close proximity to the enemy's piquets, and could distinctly hear their voices. We halted to collect the longstring of camels, and as soon as they were got in order started offagain. I led the way, every few minutes striking a light to see howthe compass was pointing, and to take an anxious look at my watch, forI was beginning to fear I should not be able to accomplish my task bythe given time. Our pace was necessarily slow, and our halts frequent, for the little party had to be carefully kept together. 

At last the Jalalabad fort was reached and passed. I then told HughGough, whose squadron was in front, that we had better halt, forwe could not be far from the Alambagh, and I was afraid that if weapproached in a body we should be fired upon, in which case thecamel-drivers would assuredly run away, there would be a stampedeamongst the camels, and we might find it difficult to make ourselvesknown. I decided it would be best for me to go on alone, and arrangedwith Gough that he should remain where he was until I returned. 

The Alambagh proved to be farther off than I calculated, and I wasbeginning to fear I had lost my way, when all at once a great wallloomed in front of me, and I could just make out the figure of thesentry pacing up and down. I hailed him, and ordered him to ask thesergeant of the guard to summon the officer on duty. When the latterappeared, I explained to him my object in coming, and begged him tohave the ammunition boxes ready for lading by the time I returned withthe camels. I then rode back to where I had left Gough, and the wholeprocession proceeded to the Alambagh. 

Already half the night was gone; but beyond the time required forloading the camels there was no delay; the utmost assistance wasafforded us, and ere long we started on our return journey. 

Day had dawned before we came in sight of the Dilkusha, and by thetime I had made the ammunition over to the Ordnance officer it wasbroad daylight. As I rode up to the Martinière I could see old SirColin, only partially dressed, standing on the steps in evidentanxiety at my non-arrival. 

He was delighted when at last I appeared, expressed himself verypleased to see me, and, having made many kind and complimentaryremarks as to the success of the little expedition, he told me to gooff and get something to eat as quickly as possible, for we were tostart directly the men had breakfasted. That was a very happy momentfor me, feeling that I had earned my Chief's approbation and justifiedhis selection of me. I went off to the Artillery camp, and refreshedthe inner man with a steak cut off a gun bullock which had been killedby a round shot on the 14th. 

At 8 a. M. The troops moved off. I was ordered to go with the advanceguard. [10] Hope's and Russell's brigades came next, with Travers'sHeavy battery, Peel's Naval Brigade, and Middleton's Field battery. 

Greathed's brigade (except the 8th Foot left at the Dilkusha), withBourchier's battery, remained to guard our left flank until mid-day, when it was ordered to follow the column and form its rear guard. 

The offer of a Native who volunteered to guide us was accepted, andSir Colin, who rode just behind the advance guard, had Kavanagh withhim, whose local knowledge proved very valuable. 

The enemy had been so completely taken in by the previous day'sreconnaissance that they had not the slightest suspicion we shouldadvance from our right, the result being that we were allowed to crossthe canal without opposition. [11] We kept close along the river bank, our left being partially concealed by the high grass. About a milebeyond the canal we turned sharp to the left, and passed through thenarrow street of a small village, coming immediately under fire fromsome houses on our right, and from the top of a high wall above andbeyond them, which turned out to be the north-east corner of theSikandarbagh. 

The greatest confusion ensued, and for a time there was a completeblock. The Cavalry in advance were checked by a fierce fire poureddirectly on them from the front: they were powerless, and the onlything for them to do was to force their way back, down the confinedlane we had just passed up, which by this time was crammed withInfantry and Artillery, making 'confusion worse confounded. ' As soonas the Cavalry had cleared out, the 53rd lined the bank which ranalong the side of the lane nearest the Sikandarbagh, and by their firecaused all those of the rebels who had collected outside the wallsto retire within the enclosure. This opened a road for Blunt, who, leading his guns up the bank with a splendid courage, unlimbered andopened fire within sixty yards of the building. 

Blunt found himself under a heavy fire from three differentdirections--on the right from the Sikandarbagh; on the left and leftfront from the barracks, some huts (not twenty yards off), and aserai; and in front from the mess-house, Kaisarbagh, and otherbuildings. In these three directions he pointed his guns, regardlessof deadly fire, especially from the huts on the left. 

It would, however, have been impossible for the advance guard to haveheld its ground much longer, so it was with a feeling of the utmostrelief that I beheld Hope's brigade coming up the lane to ourassistance. A company of the 53rd, in the most brilliant manner, forced the enemy from the position they held on our left front, andthe Highlanders, without a moment's hesitation, climbed on to thehuts--the point, as I have already said, from which the heaviest fireproceeded; they tore off the roofs, and, leaping into the houses, drove the enemy before them right through the serai and up to thebarracks, which they seized, and for the remainder of the operationsthese barracks were held by the 93rd. 

This action on the part of the Highlanders was as serviceable as itwas heroic, for it silenced the fire most destructive to the attackingforce; but for all that, our position was extremely critical, and SirColin, perceiving the danger, at once decided that no further movecould be attempted until we had gained possession of the Sikandarbagh. It was, indeed, a formidable-looking place to attack, about 130 yardssquare, surrounded by a thick brick wall twenty feet high, carefullyloopholed, and flanked at the corners by circular bastions. Therewas only one entrance, a gateway on the south side, protected bya traverse of earth and masonry, over which was a double-storiedguard-room. Close to the north side of the enclosure was a pavilionwith a flat roof prepared for musketry, and from the whole place anincessant fire was being kept up. 

Sir Colin, in order to get a better view of the position, and thus beable to decide in what direction the attack could most advantageouslybe made, rode up the bank and placed himself close to one of Blunt'sguns. Mansfield and Hope Grant were on either side, and AugustusAnson and I were directly behind, when I heard the Commander-in-Chiefexclaim, 'I am hit. ' Luckily it was only by a spent bullet, which hadpassed through a gunner (killing him on the spot) before it struck SirColin on the thigh, causing a severe contusion, but nothing more. Itwas a moment of acute anxiety until it was ascertained that no greatdamage had been done. 

By this time one of Travers's guns and a howitzer, which withconsiderable difficulty had been dragged up the bank, opened fire onthe point selected by Sir Colin for the breach--the south-east cornerof the wall surrounding the Sikandarbagh. [12] Instantly Hardy (Captainof the battery) was killed and the senior Subaltern wounded: Blunt'scharger was shot, and of the few men under his command 14 Europeansand 6 Gun Lascars were killed or wounded; 20 of the troop-horses werealso knocked over. [13]

While the heavy guns were at work on the breach, Adrian Hope, with the53rd, cleared off a body of the enemy who had collected on our leftfront, and connected the barracks with the main attack by a line ofskirmishers. 

In less than half an hour an opening three feet square and three feetfrom the ground had been made in the wall. It would have been betterhad it been larger, but time was precious; Sir Colin would not wait, and ordered the assault to begin. The Infantry had been lying down, under such slight cover as was available, impatiently awaiting forthis order. The moment it reached them, up they sprang withone accord, and with one voice uttered a shout which must haveforeshadowed defeat to the defenders of the Sikandarbagh. The 93rdunder Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, and the 4th Punjab Infantry underLieutenant Paul, led the way, closely followed by the 53rd underLieutenant-Colonel Gordon[14] of the 93rd Highlanders, and one of thebattalions of Detachments under Major Roger Barnston. 

It was a magnificent sight, a sight never to be forgotten--thatglorious struggle to be the first to enter the deadly breach, theprize to the winner of the race being certain death! Highlanders andSikhs, Punjabi Mahomedans, Dogras[15] and Pathans, all vied with eachother in the generous competition. [16]

A Highlander was the first to reach the goal, and was shot dead as hejumped into the enclosure; a man of the 4th Punjab Infantry came next, and met the same fate. Then followed Captain Burroughs and LieutenantCooper, of the 93rd, and immediately behind them their Colonel(Ewart), Captain Lumsden, of the 30th Bengal Infantry, [17] and anumber of Sikhs and Highlanders as fast as they could scramble throughthe opening. A drummer-boy of the 93rd must have been one of the firstto pass that grim boundary between life and death, for when I got inI found him just inside the breach, lying on his back quite dead--apretty, innocent-looking, fair-haired lad, not more than fourteenyears of age. 

The crush now became so great in the men's eagerness to get throughthe opening and join the conflict within, that a regular block was theconsequence, which every minute became more hopeless. One partymade for the gateway and another for a barred window[18] close by, determined to force an entrance by them. The traverse havingbeen rushed by the 4th Punjab Infantry gallantly led by a DograSubadar, [19] a Punjabi Mahomedan of this distinguished corps behavedwith the most conspicuous bravery. The enemy, having been driven outof the earthwork, made for the gateway, the heavy doors of which werein the act of being closed, when the Mahomedan (Mukarrab Khan by name)pushed his left arm, on which he carried a shield, between them, thuspreventing their being shut; on his hand being badly wounded by asword-cut, he drew it out, instantly thrusting in the other arm, whenthe right hand was all but severed from the wrist. [20] But he gainedhis object--the doors could not be closed, and were soon forced openaltogether, upon which the 4th Punjab Infantry, the 53rd, 93rd, andsome of the Detachments, swarmed in. 

This devoted action of Mukarrab Khan I myself witnessed, for, withAugustus Anson, I got in immediately behind the storming party. Aswe reached the gateway, Anson was knocked off his horse by a bullet, which grazed the base of the skull just behind the right ear, andstunned him for a moment--the next, he was up and mounted again, butwas hardly in the saddle when his horse was shot dead. 

The scene that ensued requires the pen of a Zola to depict. Therebels, never dreaming that we should stop to attack such a formidableposition, had collected in the Sikandarbagh to the number of upwardsof 2, 000, with the intention of falling upon our right flank so soonas we should become entangled amongst the streets and houses of theHazratganj. [21] They were now completely caught in a trap, the onlyoutlets being by the gateway and the breach, through which our troopscontinued to pour. There could therefore be no thought of escape, andthey fought with the desperation of men without hope of mercy, anddetermined to sell their lives as dearly as they could. Inch by inchthey were forced back to the pavilion, and into the space between itand the north wall, where they were all shot or bayoneted. There theylay in a heap as high as my head, a heaving, surging mass of dead anddying inextricably entangled. It was a sickening sight, one of thosewhich even in the excitement of battle and the flush of victory makeone feel strongly what a horrible side there is to war. The wretchedwounded men could not get clear of their dead comrades, however greattheir struggles, and those near the top of this ghastly pile ofwrithing humanity vented their rage and disappointment on everyBritish officer who approached by showering upon him abuse of thegrossest description. 

The firing and fighting did not cease altogether for some time afterthe main body of the rebels were destroyed. A few got up into theguard-room above the gateway, and tried to barricade themselves in;others sought shelter in the bastions, but none escaped the vengeanceof the soldiers. There were some deadly combats between the mutinoussepoys and the Sikhs. Eventually all the rebels were killed, savethree or four who dropped over the wall on the city side. It is tobe hoped they lived to tell the tale of the dauntless courage whichcarried everything before it. 

Considering the tremendous odds which those who first entered throughthe breach were exposed to, and the desperate nature of the fighting, our losses were astonishingly small. The 93rd had 2 officers and 23men (including the Sergeant-Major) killed, and 7 officers and 61 menwounded. 

The 4th Punjab Infantry went into action with four British officers, of whom two were killed and one was severely wounded. Sixty-nine ofthe Native officers and men were also killed or wounded. [22]

[Footnote 1: Besides the troops from Delhi, the force consisted ofPeel's Naval Brigade, with eight heavy guns and howitzers; Middleton'sField Battery of Royal Artillery (the first that had ever served inIndia), and two companies of garrison Royal Artillery, under Traversand Longden, equipped with heavy guns and mortars; a company of RoyalEngineers under Lieutenant Lennox, V. C. ;[*] a few Bengal, and twonewly-raised companies of Punjab Sappers; the 93rd Highlanders, Head-Quarters and wing of the 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and ofthe 53rd Foot; part of the 82nd Foot, and detachments of the 5thFusiliers, 64th, 78th, 84th, and 90th Foot, and Madras Fusiliers, regiments which had gone into the Residency with Outram and Havelock. The Infantry was brigaded as follows:

 Wing 53rd Foot \ 93rd Highlanders | Commanded by Brigadier the Hon. Battalion of detachments | Adrian Hope, 93rd Highlanders. 4th Punjab Infantry /

 8th Foot \ Battalion of detachments | Commanded by Brigadier Greathed, 2nd Punjab Infantry / 8th Foot. 

 Wing 23rd Fusiliers \ Commanded by Brigadier D. Two companies 82nd Foot / Russell, 84th Foot. ]

 [*Note: Afterwards General Sir Wilbraham Lennox, V. C. , K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: Sir Colin Campbell had served throughout the PunjabCampaign and on the Peshawar frontier. ]

[Footnote 3: Now the 14th (Sikhs) Bengal Infantry. ]

[Footnote 4: During one of Watson's many reconnaissances he received acut on the face from a sabre. One of the 2nd Punjab Cavalrymen, seeingwhat had happened, rushed to Probyn, and said: 'Watson _sahib_ has gota wound which is worth a lakh of rupees!']

[Footnote 5: Built by a king of Oudh for the ladies of his harem. It takes its name from the gilt umbrella (Chatta) with which it isadorned. Now the Lucknow Club. ]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir John Ewart, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 7: It was a Native saddle, such as Irregular Cavalry used inthose days, made of felt without a tree. ]

[Footnote 8: On one occasion, when I was telling this story to GeneralSir Samuel Browne, V. C. , he said that something similar happened atthe battle of Sadulapur on December 2, 1848. He (Browne) was Adjutantof his regiment (the 46th Native Infantry), which was drawn up inline, with a troop of Horse Artillery, commanded by Major Kinleside, on its right flank. Seeing that something unusual had occurred, Brownerode up to the troop, and found that one of the men had had his saddlecarried away from under him by a small round shot. The man, whohappened at the moment to be standing up in his stirrups, escaped witha bruise, as did the horse. ]

[Footnote 9: A kind of more or less responsible servant or messenger, so called from wearing a chuprass, or badge of office. ]

[Footnote 10: It consisted of Blunt's troop of Horse Artillery, thewing of the 53rd Foot, and Gough's squadron of Hodson's Horse. ]

[Footnote 11: We had not, however, gone far, when a body of rebelInfantry, about 2, 000 strong, managing to elude Greathed's brigade, crossed the canal, and, creeping quietly up, rushed the Martinière. Sir Colin had left Lieutenant Patrick Stewart, an unusually promisingofficer of the Bengal Engineers, on the top of the Martinière to keepOutram informed of our movements by means of the semaphore, andwhile Stewart was sending a message he and Watson (who was with him)observed the enemy close up to the building. They flew down thestaircase, jumped on their horses, and, joining Watson's squadron andthe two Madras Native Horse Artillery guns, rode to the city sideof the Martinière to try and cut off the enemy, who, finding no oneinside the building, and seeing their line of retreat threatened, madethe best of their way back to the city. Several were killed by theHorse Artillery, which opened upon them with grape, and by Watson's_sowars_. ]

[Footnote 12: This wall has long since been built up, and the wholeplace is so overgrown with jungle that it was with difficulty I couldtrace the actual site of the breach when I last visited Lucknow in1893. ]

[Footnote 13: Blunt's troop, when it left Umballa in May, 1857, consisted of 93 Europeans and 20 Native Gun Lascars. It suffered soseverely at Delhi that only five guns could be manned when it marchedfrom there in September, and after the fight at Agra its total lossamounted to 12 killed and 25 wounded. Four guns could then withdifficulty be manned. When Blunt left the troop in January, 1858, totake command of Bourchier's Field Battery, 69 out of the 113 men withwhom he had commenced the campaign had been killed or wounded! Thetroop would have been unserviceable, had men not volunteered forit from other corps, and drivers been posted to it from the RoyalArtillery. At the commencement of the Mutiny Blunt was a subaltern, and in ten months he found himself a Lieutenant-Colonel and a C. B. Quick promotion and great rewards indeed, but nothing more than herichly deserved; for seldom, if ever, has a battery and its commanderhad a grander record to show. ]

[Footnote 14: Captain Walton was the senior officer of the regimentpresent, and took a conspicuous part in leading it, but as inSir Colin Campbell's opinion he was too junior to be in command, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon was appointed as a temporary measure. ]

[Footnote 15: The word 'Dogra' was originally applied to the Rajputclans in the hills and sub-montane tracts to the north of the Ravi. In later years it included hill Rajputs south of the Ravi, and inmilitary parlance all these Rajputs who enlisted in our ranks came tobe called Dogras. ]

[Footnote 16: In consequence of the behaviour of the 4th PunjabInfantry on this occasion, and in other engagements in which theyserved with the 93rd Highlanders, the officers and men of the lattercorps took a great liking to the former regiment, and some years afterthe Mutiny two officers of the 93rd, who were candidates for the StaffCorps, specially applied to be posted to the 4th Punjab Infantry. ]

[Footnote 17: Attached as Interpreter to the 93rd Highlanders. ]

[Footnote 18: It was here Captain Walton, of the 53rd, was severelywounded. ]

[Footnote 19: Subadar Gokal Sing was mentioned by theCommander-in-Chief in despatches for his conduct on this occasion. ]

[Footnote 20: For this act of heroism Mukarrab Khan was given theOrder of Merit, the Indian equivalent to the Victoria Cross, butcarrying with it an increase of pay. At the end of the campaignMukarrab Khan left the service, but when his old Commanding officer, Colonel Wilde, went to the Umbeyla expedition in 1863, Mukarrab Khanturned up and insisted on serving with him as an orderly. ]

[Footnote 21: One of the principal thoroughfares of Lucknow. ]

[Footnote 22: Lieutenant Paul, the Commandant, was killed. LieutenantOldfield mortally, and Lieutenant McQueen severely, wounded. Lieutenant Willoughby, who brought the regiment out of action, wasquite a lad, and was killed at Ruhiya the following April. Both heand McQueen were recommended for the V. C. For their gallantry onthis occasion. After the fight was over, one of the Native officers, bemoaning the loss of the British officers, asked me who would be sentto replace them. He added: '_Sahib, ham log larai men bahut tez hain, magar jang ka bandobast nahin jante_' ('Sir, we can fight well, butwe do not understand military arrangements'). What the old soldierintended to convey to me was his sense of the inability of himself andhis comrades to do without the leadership and general management ofthe British officers. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXIV. 1857

 Henry Norman--The Shah Najaf--The mess-house--Planting the flag --A memorable meeting--The Residency

The operation which I have tried to describe in the last chapterwas not completed until well on in the afternoon, when the movementtowards the Residency was at once proceeded with. To the left as weadvanced the ground was fairly open (with the exception of quite asmall village) for about 1, 100 yards in the direction of the BritishInfantry mess-house. To the right also, for about 300 yards, there wasa clear space, then a belt of jungle intersected by huts and smallgardens extending for about 400 yards farther, as far as the ShahNajaf, [1] a handsome white-domed tomb, surrounded by a court-yard, andenclosed by high masonry loopholed walls; and beyond the Shah Najafrose the Kadam Rasul, [2] another tomb standing on a slight eminence. 

But little opposition was experienced from the village, which wascarried by the Infantry, while the Artillery were brought up to openfire on the Shah Najaf and Kadam Rasul. The latter was soon occupiedby the 2nd Punjab Infantry, belonging to Greathed's brigade, which hadby this time joined the main body; but the Shah Najaf proved a hardernut to crack. This building was almost concealed by dense jungle, andits great strength therefore remained unsuspected until we got quiteclose up to it. 

Barnston's battalion of Detachments advanced in skirmishing order, under cover of our guns. One of the shells most unfortunately burstprematurely, wounding Major Barnston so severely that he died soonafterwards. Whether it was that the men were depressed by the loss oftheir leader, or that they were not prepared for the very damagingfire which suddenly poured upon them, I know not, but certain it isthat they wavered, and for a few minutes there was a slight panic. TheCommander-in-Chief, with Hope Grant, Mansfield, Adrian Hope, and theirrespective staffs, were sitting on their horses anxiously awaiting theresult of the attack, when all at once it became apparent that therewas a retrograde movement on the part of some of the men, who wereemerging from the belt of jungle and hastening towards us. Normanwas the first to grasp the situation. Putting spurs to his horse, he galloped into their midst, and called on them to pull themselvestogether; the men rallied at once, and advanced into the cover fromwhich they had for the moment retreated. I had many opportunities fornoting Norman's coolness and presence of mind under fire. On thisparticular occasion these qualities were most marked, and his actionwas most timely. 

More Infantry were brought up, but without avail. The enemy evidentlywere determined to prevent the capture of the Shah Najaf. Fire was nowopened upon us from a heavy gun on the other side of the Gumti (thefirst shot from which blew up one of the ammunition waggons belongingto the Naval Brigade), and all the cannon that were collected at theKaisarbagh and mess-house were brought to bear upon us. The musketryfire was incessant, and Peel's men suffered so severely that one ofhis guns could not be worked. 

Sir Colin was beginning to get extremely anxious, and no wonder--theposition was most uncomfortable, and the prospect very gloomy. Threehours since the attack began! The day was rapidly drawing to a close, and we were no nearer our object; on the contrary, the oppositionbecame every moment stronger, and the fire more deadly. A retreat wasnot to be thought of; indeed, our remaining so long stationary hadbeen an encouragement to the enemy, and every one felt that the onlychance for the little British army fighting against 30, 000 desperatemutineers, with every advantage of position and intimate knowledge oflocality in their favour, was to continue to advance at all hazards;and this our gallant old Chief decided to do. Placing himself at thehead of the 93rd, he explained to the only too eager Highlanders thedangerous nature of the service, and called on them to follow him. There was no mistaking the response; cheer after cheer rent the airas they listened to the words of the Chief they knew so well, andbelieved in so thoroughly, assuring him of their readiness to followwhithersoever he should lead, do whatever he should direct. They movedoff, followed by Peel's guns dragged by sailors and some of the MadrasFusiliers, the advance of the party being covered by Middleton's Fieldbattery, which dashed to the front and opened with grape. 

Almost instantaneously the narrow path along which we were proceedingwas choked with wounded officers and dead and struggling horses. Itwas here that Sir Archibald Alison, Sir Colin's Aide-de-camp, lost hisarm, and his brother (another Aide-de-camp) was wounded. Adrian Hope'shorse was shot dead--indeed, very few escaped injury, either tothemselves or their horses. I was one of the lucky few. On reachingthe wall of the Shah Najaf enclosure, it was found to be twenty feethigh, no entrance could be seen, and there were no scaling-laddersavailable, so there was nothing for it but to endeavour to breach themassive wall. [3] The 24-pounders hammered away at it for some time, but proved quite unequal to the task; though only a few yards off, they made no impression whatever, and it seemed as if the attempt totake the position must be abandoned. Peel was, therefore, ordered towithdraw his guns under cover of some rockets, which were dischargedinto the enclosure, and Hope was directed to retire as soon as hecould collect the killed and wounded. 

Captain Allgood, Sir Colin's trusted Assistant Quartermaster-General, was the bearer of the order. He and Hope, after consulting together, determined that before the latter obeyed they would try to discoverif there did not exist an opening in some other part of the walls. Assisted by a sergeant of the 93rd, they set about their search, andactually did find a narrow gap, through which they could see that theenemy, terrified and thrown into confusion by the exploding rocketsfalling amongst them, were fast abandoning the building. The twofriends helped each other through the gap, and, followed by someHighlanders, they proceeded across the now deserted enclosure tosecure the only gateway, which was on the opposite side to that whichwe had attacked; and Allgood had the great pleasure of announcingto the Commander-in-Chief that there was no need to retire, for theformidable position was in our possession. 

It was getting dark when at length we occupied the Shah Najaf; some ofus got on to the top of the building to take a look round. There wasjust light enough to show us a sepoy sauntering unconcernedly up tothe gate, evidently in happy ignorance of what had happened. He soondiscovered that his comrades were no longer masters of the situation, and, letting his musket fall, he made all haste to the river, intowhich he dropped, and swam to the other side. 

Sir Colin and my General took up their quarters in the Shah Najaf, butonly nominally, for after a scratch dinner we all joined the troops, who bivouacked where they stood. 

The force was disposed in a semicircle, extending from the ShahNajaf to the barracks. The wounded were placed in the huts near theSikandarbagh, where they passed a most comfortless night, for whenthe sun set it rapidly got cold, and the hospital arrangements werenecessarily on a very limited scale. 

By this time I was dead beat, having been for sixty hours continuallyin the saddle, except when I lay down for a short nap on the night ofthe 14th. 

We were not allowed, however, to have a very long night's rest. Hoursbefore dawn on the 17th we were roused by the beating of drums andringing of bells (an impotent attempt on the part of the rebel leadersto excite the enthusiasm of their followers), which caused the troopsto prepare for an attack and stand to their arms. But the enemy werenot in a mood to encounter us in the open, small as our numbers were;they had suffered heavily the day before, and they must have begun torealize that their strongest positions were inadequate against Britishpluck and determination. 

The mess-house was the next point to be carried, but theCommander-in-Chief thought it would be prudent to make our left quitesecure in the first instance. The duty of occupying the houses andgardens situated between the barracks and Banks's house was entrustedto Brigadier Russell. Four bungalows, [4] in which the officers of the32nd Foot had lived, were first seized. Russell then pushed on towardsBanks's house, which it was necessary to occupy, as it commanded thecrossing over the canal, by which we communicated with the Dilkusha, and by which it was thought that the people rescued from the Residencywould have to be brought away. Russell, avoiding the main road, advanced under cover of his Artillery, and forced the rebels tovacate this important position, and Banks's house was held during theremainder of the operations by 50 men of the 2nd Punjab Infantry, under Lieutenant F. Keen. [5]

In the meantime a heavy fire from Peel's guns had been opened on themess-house--a double-storied building, situated on slightly risingground, surrounded by a ditch 12 feet broad, and beyond that at somelittle distance by a loop-holed wall. 

Our losses on the previous day had been very severe, and Sir Colin, anxious to spare his men as much as possible, decided to batter theplace freely with Artillery before permitting it to be attacked. Peel's guns and Longden's mortars were therefore brought to bear uponit, and kept up a continual fire until 3 p. M. , when the enemy seemedto think they had had enough, their musketry fire slackened off, andthe Commander-in-Chief, considering the assault might safely be made, gave the order to advance. The attacking party was commanded byBrevet-Major Wolseley, [6] of the 90th Light Infantry, and consisted ofa company of his own regiment, a piquet of the 53rd Foot under CaptainHopkins, and a few men of the 2nd Punjab Infantry under CaptainPowlett, supported by Barnston's Detachments, under Captain Guise, ofthe 90th. 

The building and its many outhouses were carried with a rush, andthe enemy, who hastily retreated to the Moti Mahal, [7] were followedacross the road, where our troops were stopped by the high wall whichenclosed that building. Wolseley then sent for some Sappers, whoquickly opened out a space through which they all passed. The MotiMahal was hotly defended, but without avail, and ere the sun set thelast position which separated the relieved from the relieving forceswas in our possession. 

As the party moved off to attack the mess-house, Sir Colin, who, onhis white horse, was interestedly watching the proceedings, ordered meto procure a regimental colour and place it on one of the turretsof the building, that Outram might be able to judge how far we hadadvanced. I rode off accordingly to the 2nd Punjab Infantry, standingclose by, and requested the Commandant, Captain Green, to let me haveone of his colours. He at once complied, and I galloped with it to themess-house. As I entered, I was met by Sir David Baird (one of SirColin's Aides-de-camp), and Captain Hopkins, of the 53rd Foot, by bothof whom I was assisted in getting the flag with its long staff up theinconveniently narrow staircase, and in planting it on the turretnearest the Kaisarbagh, which was about 850 yards off. No sooner didthe enemy perceive what we were about, than shot after shot was aimedat the colour, and in a very few minutes it was knocked over, fallinginto the ditch below. I ran down, picked it up, and again placed it inposition, only for it to be once more shot down and hurled into theditch, just as Norman and Lennox (who had been sent by Sir Colin toreport what was going on in the interior of the Kaisarbagh) appearedon the roof. Once more I picked up the colour, and found that thistime the staff had been broken in two. Notwithstanding, I managedto prop it up a third time on the turret, and it was not again hit, though the enemy continued to fire at it for some time. 

Outram, unwilling to risk unnecessary loss of men, did not greatlyextend his position until he was sure we were close at hand, but hewas not idle. While Sir Colin was slowly working his way towards himon the 16th, he had gradually occupied such buildings as lay in thedirection of our advance. From the mess-house we could see the Britishflag flying on the top of the engine-house, only a short distancebeyond the Moti Mahal, which satisfactory piece of intelligence Normanwent down to report to Sir Colin, who, with his Chief of the Staff, had just arrived. I followed Norman, and we two made our way to thewestern wall of the Pearl Palace enclosure, outside which Outram andHavelock were standing together. They had run the gauntlet of theenemy's fire in coming from the engine house; Colonel Robert Napierand two other officers who accompanied them, having been wounded, hadto be carried back. Some of Lennox's Sappers set to work, and soonmade a hole in the wall[8] large enough for these two distinguishedmen to pass through. 

I had never before met either of them. In Afghanistan Outram had beena friend of my father, who had often spoken to me about him in termsof the warmest admiration, and his courage and chivalry were known andappreciated throughout India. It was therefore with feelings of themost lively interest that I beheld this man, whose character I sogreatly admired. He was then fifty-four years of age, strong andbroad-shouldered, in no way broken down by the heavy load ofresponsibility and anxiety he had had to bear, or the hardships he hadgone through. Havelock, the hero of a hundred fights, on the contrary, looked ill, worn and depressed, but brightened up a little when Normantold him he had been made a K. C. B. 

Sir Colin waited to receive these two heroes on the ground slopingdown from the mess-house, and it was there that the meeting betweenthe three veterans took place. A most impressive and memorable scenewas that meeting, which has been well depicted in the historicalpicture by Barker. 

As if to show the rage and disappointment of the enemy at thisevidence of the success of our operations, every gun in the Kaisarbaghwas turned upon us, and it was under a shower of shot and shell thatthe interview was held; it did not last long, for it was neither thetime nor the place to discuss plans for the future. All Sir Colincould then say was that the troops should be removed outside Lucknowas soon as the women and children had been brought away, and heexpressed his 'thankfulness that the relief of the garrison had beenaccomplished. '

[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JAMES OUTRAM, G. C. B. _From a painting by Thomas Brigstocke, R. A. _]

Norman and I obtained permission to accompany Outram and Havelock backto the Residency. It was intensely but painfully interesting to visitthis scene of so many acts of heroism, and of so much sufferingendured with unexampled fortitude. We first went to the posts occupiedby Havelock's force in the Chatta Manzil, and in other buildings whichhave long since disappeared. At one of these we stopped to watch theArtillery trying to silence the enemy's guns on the opposite side ofthe river. We talked to the men, who were keen to hear news from theouter world and the story of our advance. It was some little timebefore we discovered in one of them the Commander of the battery, Captain William Olpherts, [9] for in his soiled and torn summerclothing, his face thin, worn, and begrimed with smoke, it wasdifficult to distinguish the officer from his men, and it was underthese levelling circumstances that I had the honour of making theacquaintance of my distinguished brother officer, whose audaciouscourage on the occasion of Havelock's advance over the Charbagh bridgehad won the admiration of everyone in the force, and gained for himthe Victoria Cross. 

We next came to the Bailey-guard; and as we looked at the batteredwalls and gateway, not an inch without a mark from a round shot orbullet, we marvelled that Aitken and Loughman could have managed todefend it for nearly five months. There was plenty of evidence on allthe surrounding buildings of the dangerous nature of the service whichthey and their gallant Native comrades had so admirably performed. Although we were pressed for time, we could not resist stopping tospeak to some of the Native officers and sepoys, whose magnificentloyalty throughout the siege was one of the most gratifying featuresof the Mutiny. 

At length we came to the Residency itself, where we met a few oldfriends and acquaintances, who welcomed us with the most touchingenthusiasm. Mrs. (afterwards Lady) Inglis and the Rev. J. P. Harris andhis wife I had known at Peshawar; there were also Mrs. Fletcher Hayes, the widow of the poor fellow whose murder by the men of his own escortnear Mainpuri I have related, and Mrs. Case, the widow of the braveMajor of the 32nd, who lost his life at the affair of Chinhut. Mrs. Inglis showed us the tiny room which she and her children had sharedwith Mrs. Case all through the siege; but it was difficult to get anyof them to speak of their miserable experiences, which were too sadand terrible, and too recent to be talked about, and they naturallypreferred to dwell on their thankfulness for the relief that had comeat last, and to listen to our account of what had happened in otherplaces. 

It was too late then to go round the position; that had to be leftfor another day; indeed, it was quite dark when we returned toHead-Quarters, established by our Chief in the open, his soldierlyinstincts prompting him to remain with his troops. 

[Footnote 1: Shah Najaf is the tomb of Ghazi-ud-din Haidar, first Kingof Oudh, built by himself. It derives its name from Najaf, the hillon which is built the tomb of Ali, the son-in-law of Mahomed, and ofwhich tomb this is said to be a copy. ]

[Footnote 2: The Kadam Rasul, or Prophet's footprint, a Mahomedanplace of worship, which contained a stone bearing the impress of thefoot of the Prophet, brought from Arabia by a pilgrim. During theMutiny the holy stone was carried off. ]

[Footnote 3: Lieutenant Salmon, R. N. (now Admiral Sir Nowell Salmon, K. C. B. ), climbed up a tree overhanging this wall, in order to see whatwas going on behind it; he succeeded in obtaining useful information, but on being perceived, was fired at and badly wounded. He receivedthe V. C. ]

[Footnote 4: Marked D on the map. ]

[Footnote 5: Now Major-General Keen, C. B. It was an extremelyresponsible charge for so young an officer with such a small party, asit was very isolated and exposed to attack. ]

[Footnote 6: Now Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley, K. P. , Commander-in-Chief. ]

[Footnote 7: Called the Pearl Palace from the fancied resemblance ofone of its domes (since destroyed) to the curve of a pearl. ]

[Footnote 8: A slab let into the south-west corner of the wall marksthe spot. ]

[Footnote 9: Now General Sir William Olpherts, V. C. , K. C. B. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXV. 1857

 Sir Colin's wise decision--Robert Napier --Impressions on visiting the Residency--Henry Lawrence --Lawrence as Statesman and Ruler --Lawrence's friendliness for Natives--A hazardous duty

The night of the 17th passed off quietly. Before daybreak the nextmorning the troops were under arms. Thousands of the enemy hadcollected in the Kaisarbagh, and for the protection of the mess-house, the Tara Koti, about 200 yards to the south-west, was seized and held, as from this position a flanking fire could be brought to bear uponany enemy advancing from the Kaisarbagh. 

The most difficult part of Sir Colin's task had yet to beaccomplished--the bringing away of the women and children, and thesick and wounded, from the Residency--and the question of how thiscould best be done was one which caused the Commander-in-Chief muchanxious thought. Many, amongst whom were Outram and Hope Grant, pressed him to attack the Kaisarbagh and capture the city in the firstinstance; but 45 officers and 496 men out of our small force had beenkilled or wounded; Sir Colin, therefore, decided that it would be tothe last degree imprudent to attempt such an undertaking with hisreduced numbers, and became more than ever determined to confine hisoperations to the relief of the garrison. 

That the Chief was right there can be no room for doubt. This forcewas barely strong enough for the service it had to perform. Every manwas on duty day and night; there was no reserve to fall back upon; andhad he listened to these proposals, and allowed himself to be drawninto complications in the city, it is more than probable that thosehe had come to succour would have been sacrificed. The wisdom of hisdecision was fully proved by subsequent events, and unreservedlyacknowledged by Hope Grant and others who at the time differed fromhim in their ideas of the course which should be adopted. 

From the Dilkusha to the Residency was not less than five miles; everyyard of the way had to be guarded, and the garrison at the formerplace was so attenuated that it had to be reinforced by the withdrawalof part of the 75th Foot from the Alambagh. Fortunately this could bedone without dangerously weakening that post, as it had been latelystrengthened by the arrival of a small body of troops from Cawnpore. 

It had now to be settled whether the evacuation should be effectedby the route we had ourselves followed, which was circuitous and inplaces difficult for the wheeled vehicles necessary for the conveyanceof the sick and wounded, and the women and children; or by the waypast the barracks and Banks's house, which was shorter and had theadvantage of a metalled road throughout. But unless Russell, whosebrigade was in position at the barracks, could make the latter linesecure, it would be too hazardous to adopt, and up to the present thereports from Russell had not been very promising. He had beenhardly pressed on the 17th, and had sent word that he could make noimpression on the enemy without heavy guns. Colonel Biddulph, theDeputy-Quartermaster-General, was therefore ordered to proceed tothe barracks to ascertain how guns could best be sent to Russell'sassistance, and report to the Commander-in-Chief on the wholesituation. I was told to go with him and bring back the requiredinformation. 

We found Russell in a very uncomfortable position, exposed to a hotfire and closely surrounded by the enemy, who were holding the BritishInfantry hospital and other buildings within a few yards of him. 

I remained with Russell while Biddulph reconnoitred the ground betweenthe barracks, the canal, and the Sikandarbagh. It was found coveredwith villages and walled enclosures, but he discovered a path securefrom the enemy's fire, along which he was able to bring to Russell'sassistance a 9-pounder gun, a 24-pounder howitzer, and four 5-1/2-inchmortars. As the 9-pounder was fired, a round shot from one of theenemy's 18-pounders struck the mud wall immediately in front of it, scattering great clods of earth, which knocked over Bourchier andanother officer; the round shot then hit Brigadier Russell, justgrazing the back of his neck, actually cutting his watch-chain in two, and causing partial paralysis of the lower limbs for some days. 

Russell being for the time _hors de combat_, Biddulph assumed command, and ordered me to return to Head-Quarters, report what had happened, and inform Sir Colin that he intended to attack the hospital andendeavour to drive the enemy out of his immediate neighbourhood. 

I never saw Biddulph again. I had scarcely delivered my message to theChief when heavy firing was heard from the direction of the barracks, and shortly afterwards a determined attack was made by the rebels onthe piquets placed between the Sikandarbagh and the barracks, whichwas repulsed by Remmington's troop of Horse Artillery, with twocompanies of Infantry belonging to the 23rd and 53rd Foot, brought upby the Commander-in-Chief himself, who expressed to Remmington hiswarm approval of the brilliant manner in which his troop had come intoaction. 

Sir Colin now received information that Biddulph was killed, and thatHale, who succeeded to the command of the brigade, had attacked andtaken the hospital, but had been forced to abandon it, as the thatchedroof had been set on fire by the shells showered upon it by the enemy, who were keeping our troops constantly on the alert. This decided SirColin to give up the idea of withdrawing the relieved garrison byBanks's house. 

Early on the following morning, the 19th, I was sent by theCommander-in-Chief to the Residency with a note for Sir James Outram, containing the information that arrangements for the withdrawal werenow complete, and that conveyances for the women, children, sick, andwounded would be sent as soon as they arrived from the Dilkusha. 

When he had read the note Sir James questioned me as to the road, andasked me particularly if I had noticed the openings made in the wallsof houses and enclosures, and whether I thought they were large enoughfor the guns, carts, and carriages to get through. I replied that Ihad not observed them very particularly, but I was inclined tothink some of them were certainly rather small. My answer, to myastonishment, roused the ire of a wounded officer lying on a couch atthe end of the room, for he wrathfully asked me whether I had measuredthe openings, and on my saying I had not, he added: 'You had betterwait to give your opinion until you know what you are talking about;those openings were made by my orders, and I am quite sure they arethe necessary size. ' The officer was no other than Colonel RobertNapier, who, as I have already stated, was badly wounded on the 17th. I felt myself considerably snubbed, but Sir James kindly came to therescue, and explained that I had merely answered his question and hadnot offered any opinion of my own: Colonel Napier, however, was notto be appeased, and I could plainly see that I had incurred hisdispleasure, and that he thought me a very bumptious youngster. I donot know whether the Chief of the Staff[1] ever heard of it, but itwas some satisfaction to me to find afterwards that I was right in myestimation of the size of those apertures, some of which had to beenlarged before the guns and carriages could pass through. 

By sunset that day the women and children had been brought away andcollected in the Sikandarbagh. Not a very agreeable resting-place, forthough the 2, 000 dead mutineers had been got out of sight, they weremerely slightly covered over in a ditch which they themselves hadrecently dug outside the north wall to strengthen the defences. Thesurvivors of the siege, however, had become too inured to horrors ofall kinds, and were too thankful for their deliverance from the fatewhich for months had constantly threatened them, to be over-sensitive. 

It was a sad little assemblage; all were more or less broken down andout of health, while many were widows or orphans, having left theirnearest and dearest in the Residency burial-ground. Officers and menaccorded them a respectful welcome, and by their efforts to help themshowed how deeply they felt for their forlorn condition, while our oldChief had a comfortable tea prepared for them. When night set in, theroad having been carefully reconnoitred beforehand, the melancholyconvoy with its guard of soldiers started for the Dilkusha, where itarrived in safety, and was warmly received by the officers of the 9thLancers and the rest of the garrison, who did all that circumstanceswould allow to make the ladies and children comfortable. 

During the 20th, 21st, and 22nd, everything that was worth removingand for which carriage could be provided was brought away. Such amiscellaneous collection it was--jewels and other valuables belongingto the ex-royal family, twenty-five lakhs of treasure, stores of allkinds, including grain, and as many of the 200 guns discovered in thepalace as were considered likely to be of use. 

The troops were not moved away from the Residency till midnight on the22nd, and I had several opportunities before then of going over theposition, to every point of which some thrilling story was attached, and of renewing acquaintance with many of the garrison whom I hadknown before. Amongst them was Sam Lawrence, of the 32nd Foot, afriend of Peshawar days, who, for his gallant defence of the Redan, was awarded the Victoria Cross. I was shown Innes's advanced post, named after McLeod Innes, [2] a talented Engineer officer, who alsosubsequently gained that coveted reward; the Cawnpore battery, whereso many valuable lives had been sacrificed, and the room where SirHenry Lawrence received his mortal wound; then I climbed up to thetower, from which a good view of the city and the posts held by theenemy could be obtained. 

The more I saw, the more I wondered at what had been achieved by sucha mere handful of men against such vast numbers. It was speciallypleasant to me to listen to the praises bestowed on the officers of myown regiment, of whom nine were present when the siege commenced, andonly one escaped to the end unwounded, while five were killed or diedof their injuries. Of the other three, one was wounded three differenttimes, and both the others once. 

All were loud, too, in their praises of the Engineer officers. Duringthe latter part of the siege the rebels, finding they could not carrythe position by assault, tried hard to undermine the defences; but ourEngineers were ever on the watch, and countermined so successfullythat they were able to frustrate the enemy's designs on almost everyoccasion. 

The wonderful manner in which the Hindustani soldiers held theirground, notwithstanding that they were incessantly taunted by theirmutinous comrades for aiding the Feringhis against their own people, was also much dilated upon. 

The casualties during the siege were extremely heavy. When itcommenced on the 1st of July, the strength of the garrison was 927Europeans and 765 Natives. Of the former, 163 were civilians--braveand useful, but untrained to arms; of the latter, 118 were pensioners, many of whom were old and decrepit. Up to the arrival of Outram andHavelock (a period of eighty-seven days), 350 Europeans and 133natives were either killed or died of wounds and disease. Of the nobleand unselfish conduct of the ladies and soldiers' wives, everyonespoke in the highest terms and with the warmest appreciation. Theysuffered, without a murmur, the most terrible hardships; they devotedthemselves to the sick and wounded in the hospital, and were everready to help in any way that was useful. Two ladies were killed, andnine died, during the siege. 

The contemplation of the defence of Lucknow, and the realization ofthe noble qualities it called forth in the defenders, cannot butexcite in the breast of every British man and woman, as it did inmine, feelings of pride and admiration. But what impressed me morethan even the glorious defence was the foresight and ability of theman who made that defence possible. 

Henry Lawrence was, apparently, the only European in India who, fromthe very first, formed an accurate estimate of the extent of thedanger which threatened our rule in the early part of 1857, and who, notwithstanding his thorough appreciation of the many good qualitiesof Native soldiers, was not misled into a mistaken belief in theabsolute loyalty of the Native army. Fourteen years before Lawrencehad predicted the Mutiny[3] and the course it would take, and whenevents shaped themselves as he had foreseen, he gave it as his opinionthat the disaffection would be general and widespread. But while hisintimate knowledge of Native character led him to this conviction, so great was his influence with Natives--perhaps by reason of thatknowledge--that he was able to delay the actual outbreak at Lucknowuntil his measures for the defence of the Residency were completed, and he persuaded a considerable number of sepoys, not only to continuein their allegiance, but to share with their European comrades thedangers and privations of the siege--a priceless service, for withouttheir aid the defence could not have been made. 

[Illustration: BRIGADIER-GENERAL SIR HENRY LAWRENCE, K. C. B. _From a photograph taken at Lucknow. _]

In no part of India was there greater need for the services of astrong, enlightened, and sympathetic Ruler and Statesman. Difficult aswere the positions in which many men in authority were placed in1857, none was more difficult than that in which Henry Lawrence foundhimself when he took over the Chief Commissionership of Oudh in thespring of that year. His colleagues in the administration were atfeud with each other, and by their ignorance of the proper methods ofdealing with the people they had succeeded in alienating all classes. 

While Lawrence was engaged in pouring oil on these troubled waters, and in earning the gratitude of the people by modifying the previousyear's undue assessment, signs appeared of the disaffection, whichhad begun amongst the troops at Barrackpore, having spread to thecantonments in Oudh. Sir Henry met this new trouble in the sameintelligent and conciliatory spirit as that in which he had dealt withhis civil difficulties. He summoned to a durbar some Native officerswho had displayed a very proper feeling of loyalty by arrestingseveral fanatics who had tried to tamper with the soldiery, and heliberally rewarded them, pointing out at the same time in forciblelanguage the disgrace to a soldier of being faithless to his salt. Butwhile doing everything in his power to keep the Natives loyal, andwith a certain amount of success, he did not neglect to take everypossible precaution. 

When first he heard of the outbreak at Meerut, he telegraphed to theGovernor-General advising him to send for British troops to China andCeylon, and to call on the Nepalese to assist; at the same timehe applied to Lord Canning for, and obtained, the rank ofBrigadier-General, which gave him military as well as civil control--avery necessary measure, for none of the senior military officers inOudh were men to be relied upon; indeed, as in so many other places, they had to be effaced when the troubles began. 

Very early in the day Henry Lawrence commenced his preparations forthe defence of the Residency; he cleared the ground of all coverin its immediate vicinity, as far as it was possible to do so; hefortified it, mounted guns, stored ammunition, powder, and firewood;arranged for a proper supply of water; collected food, which provedsufficient, not only for the original number of refugees, but for the3, 000 additional mouths belonging to Outram and Havelock's force; infact, he did everything which forethought and ingenuity could suggestto enable the garrison to hold out in what he foresaw would be a longand deadly struggle against fearful odds. There was no fort, as therewas at Agra, capable of sheltering every European in Oudh, and strongenough to defy any number of mutineers, nor was there, as at Cawnpore, a well-stocked and strongly-fortified magazine to depend upon. ButHenry Lawrence was not cast down by the difficulties which surroundedhim; he was fully alive to the danger, but he recognized that hisbest, indeed, his only, chance of delaying the inevitable rebellionuntil (as he hoped) assistance might arrive, was to show a bold front. 

On the 27th May Lawrence wrote to Lord Canning as follows: 'Hithertothe country has been kept quiet, and we have played the Irregularsagainst the line regiments; but being constituted of exactly the samematerial, the taint is fast pervading them, and in a few weeks, if notdays--unless Delhi be in the interim captured--there will be but onefeeling throughout the army, a feeling that our prestige is gone, andthat feeling will be more dangerous than any other. Religion, fear, hatred, one and all have their influence; but there is still areverence for the Company's _ikbâl_[4]--when it is gone we shall havefew friends indeed. The tone and talk of many have greatly alteredduring the last few days, and we are now asked, almost in terms ofinsolence, whether Delhi is captured, or when it will be. It wasonly just after the Kabul massacre, and when we hesitated to advancethrough the Khyber, that, in my memory, such a tone ever beforeprevailed. [5]

Feeling all this so strongly, it is the more remarkable that HenryLawrence never lost heart, but struggled bravely on 'to preserve thesoldiery to their duty and the people to their allegiance, ' whileat the same time he was, as I have shown, making every conceivablepreparation to meet the outbreak whenever it should come. 

There is no doubt that Henry Lawrence was a very remarkable man; hisfriendly feeling for Natives, and his extraordinary insight intotheir character, together with his military training and his variedpolitical experience, peculiarly fitted him to be at the head of aGovernment at such a crisis. [6]

All this, however, is a digression from my narrative, to which I mustnow return. 

While the withdrawal was being effected, Peel's guns distracted theenemy's attention from the proceedings by keeping up a perpetual anddestructive fire on the Kaisarbagh, thus leading the rebels to believethat our whole efforts were directed to taking that place. By theevening of the 22nd three large breaches had been made, and the enemynaturally expected an assault to take place the next morning. But theobject of that heavy fire had already been accomplished; the women andchildren, the sick and wounded, were all safe in the Dilkusha; no onewas left in the Residency but the garrison, on duty for the last timeat the posts they had so long and so bravely defended, and they wereto leave at midnight. 

As the clock struck twelve, in the deepest silence and with the utmostcaution, the gallant little band evacuated the place, and passed downthe long line of posts, first those held by Outram's and Havelock'smen, and then those occupied by the relieving force, until theyreached the Martinière Park. As they moved on, Outram's and Havelock'stroops fell in behind, and were followed by the relieving force, whichbrought up the rear. The scheme for this very delicate movement hadbeen most carefully considered beforehand by General Mansfield, theclever Chief of the Staff, who clearly explained to all concerned theparts they had to play, and emphatically impressed upon them thatsuccess depended on his directions being followed to the letter, andon their being carried out without the slightest noise or confusion. 

Sir Colin Campbell and Hope Grant, surrounded by their respectivestaffs, watched the movement from a position in front of theSikandarbagh, where a body of Artillery and Infantry were held inreadiness for any emergency. When the time arrived for the advancedpiquets to be drawn in, the enemy seemed to have become suspicious, for they suddenly opened fire with guns and musketry from theKaisarbagh, and for a moment we feared our plans had been discovered. Fortunately, one of Peel's rocket-carts was still in position beyondthe Moti Mahal, and the celerity with which the officer in chargereplied to this burst of fire apparently convinced the enemy we wereholding our ground, for the firing soon ceased, and we breathed again. 

Mansfield had taken the precaution to have with him an officer fromHale's brigade, which was on the left rear of our line of posts, thathe might go back and tell his Brigadier when the proper time came forthe latter to move off in concert with the rest of the force; but thisofficer had not, apparently, understood that he would have to returnin the dark, and when Mansfield directed him to carry out the duty forwhich he had been summoned, he replied that he did not think he couldfind his way. Mansfield was very angry, and with reason, for it wasof supreme importance that the retirement should be simultaneous, andturning to me, he said: 'You have been to Hale's position: do youthink you could find your way there now?' I answered: 'I think I can. 'Upon which he told me to go at once, and ordered the officer belongingto the brigade to accompany me. I then asked the General whether hewished me to retire with Hale's party or return to him. He replied:'Return to me here, that I may be sure the order has been received. '

I rode off with my companion, and soon found I had undertaken toperform a far from easy, and rather hazardous, duty. I had only beenover the ground twice--going to and returning from the position on the18th--and most of the villages then standing had since been burnt. There was no road, but any number of paths, which seemed to lead inevery direction but the right one; at last, however, we arrived at ourdestination, I delivered the order to Colonel Hale, and set out onmy return journey alone. My consternation was great on reaching theSikandarbagh, where I had been ordered to report myself to Mansfield, to find it deserted by the Generals, their staffs, and the troops; nota creature was to be seen. I then began to understand what a long timeit had taken me to carry out the errand upon which I had been sent, much longer, no doubt, than Mansfield thought possible. I could nothelp feeling that I was not in at all a pleasant position, for anymoment the enemy might discover the force had departed, and come outin pursuit. As it turned out, however, happily for me, they remainedfor some hours in blissful ignorance of our successful retirement, and, instead of following in our wake, continued to keep up a heavyfire on the empty Residency and other abandoned posts. Turning myhorse's head in the direction I knew the troops must have taken, Igalloped as fast as he could carry me until I overtook the rear guardjust as it was crossing the canal, along the right bank of which thegreater part of the force had been placed in position. When I reportedmyself to Mansfield, he confessed that he had forgotten all about me, which somewhat surprised me, for I had frequently noticed how exactlyhe remembered the particulars of any order he gave, no matter how longa time it took to execute it. 

[Footnote 1: Colonel Napier was Chief of the Staff to Sir JamesOutram. ]

[Footnote 2: Now Lieutenant-General McLeod Innes, V. C. ]

[Footnote 3: _Calcutta Review_, 1843. After commenting on the habitualcarelessness of Government and its disregard of ordinary militaryprecautions and preparations, Henry Lawrence had shown how possible itwas that a hostile party might seize Delhi, and, if the outbreak werenot speedily suppressed, what grave consequences might ensue. 'Letthis happen, ' he said, 'on June 2, and does any sane man doubt thattwenty-four hours would swell the hundreds of rebels into thousands, and in a week every ploughshare in the Delhi States would be turnedinto a sword? And when a sufficient force had been mustered, whichcould not be effected within a month, should we not then have a moredifficult game to play than Clive at Plassy or Wellington at Assaye?We should then be literally striking for our existence at themost inclement season of the year, with the prestige of our nametarnished. ' Going on to suggest that Meerut, Umballa, and Agra mightsay that they had no troops to spare from their own necessities, orthat they had no carriage, 'Should we not, then, ' he wrote, 'have tostrike anew for our Indian Empire?]

[Footnote 4: Prestige, or, rather, good luck. ]

[Footnote 5: 'Life of Sir Henry Lawrence. ']

[Footnote 6: In Sir Henry Lawrence's 'Life' two memoranda appear, one by Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-General) McLeod Innes, AssistantEngineer at Lucknow in 1857, the other by Sir Henry Lawrence himself. They are worthy of perusal, and will give the reader some insight intoLawrence's character; they will also exemplify how necessary it isfor anyone placed in a position of authority in India to study thepeculiarities of the people and gain their confidence by kindness andsympathy, to which they readily respond, and, above all, to be firmand decided in his dealings with them. Firmness and decision arequalities which are appreciated more than all others by Natives; theyexpect them in their Rulers, and without them no European can have anypower over them, or ever hope to gain their respect and esteem. 

(See Appendix II). ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXVI. 1857

 Death of General Havelock--Appeals from Cawnpore --General Windham--The passage of the Ganges

The Relief of the Lucknow garrison was now accomplished--a grandachievement indeed, of which any Commander might well be proud, carried out as it had been in every particular as originally planned, thus demonstrating with what care each detail had been thought out, and how admirably movement after movement had been executed. 

November the 23rd was spent in arranging for the march to Cawnpore, and in organizing the division which was to be left in position, underOutram, in and about the Alambagh; it was to be strong enough to holdits own, and to keep open communication with Head-Quarters. 

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE RELIEF OF LUCKNOW, IN 1857]

My time was chiefly occupied in assisting in the distribution oftransport, and in carrying out Hope Grant's directions as to the orderin which the troops were to march. Round the Dilkusha the scene ofconfusion was bewildering in the extreme; women, children, sickand wounded men, elephants, camels, bullocks and bullock-carts, grass-cutters' ponies, and doolies with their innumerable bearers, allcrowded together. To marshal these incongruous elements and get themstarted seemed at first to be an almost hopeless task. At last thefamilies were got off in two bodies, each under a married officerwhose wife was of the party, and through whom all possiblearrangements for their comfort were to be made, and their place on theline of march, position in camp, etc. , determined. 

In the afternoon the force was gratified by the issue of a GeneralOrder by the Commander-in-Chief thanking the troops for the manner inwhich the very difficult and harassing service of the Relief had beenperformed. Alluding to the withdrawal, he said it was a model ofdiscipline and exactitude, the result of which was that the rebelswere completely thrown off their guard, and the retirement had beensuccessfully carried out in the face of 50, 000 of the enemy along amost inconveniently narrow and tortuous lane--the only line of retreatopen. 

The following morning Hope Grant's division marched to the Alambagh. On arrival there, our transport was sent back for Outram's division, which joined us the morning after, bringing with it General Havelock'sdead body. He had died the previous day--'a martyr to duty, ' as theCommander-in-Chief expressed it in his General Order. The brave oldsoldier, who had served with distinction in four campaigns before theMutiny--Burma, Afghanistan, Gwalior, and the Sutlej--was buried insidethe Alambagh enclosure, respected and honoured by the whole army, butmore especially by those who had shared in his noble efforts to rescuethe Lucknow garrison. 

A wash and change of clothes, in which we were now able to indulge, were much-appreciated luxuries. From the time we had left the Alambaghevery officer and man had been on duty without cessation, and slept, if they slept at all, on the spot where the close of day found themfighting. 

It was a rough experience, but, notwithstanding the exposure, hardwork, and a minimum of sleep, there was no great sickness amongst thetroops. The personal interest which every man in the force felt inthe rescue of his countrymen and countrywomen, in addition to theexcitement at all times inseparable from war, was a stimulantwhich enabled all ranks to bear up in a marvellous manner againstlong-continued privations and hardships--for body and mind are equallyaffected by will--and there was no doubt about the will in thisinstance to endure anything that was necessary for the speedyachievement of the object in view. Personally, I was in the bestof health, and though I almost lived on horseback, I never feltinconvenience or fatigue. 

The 25th and 26th were busy days, spent in allotting camp equipageand making the necessary arrangements for fitting out Outram'sforce--4, 000 strong, with 25 guns and howitzers and 10 mortars. 

At 11 a. M. On the 27th we started on our return march towardsCawnpore. [1] It was a strange procession. Everything in the shape ofwheeled carriage and laden animals had to keep to the road, which wasnarrow, and for the greater part of the way raised, for the countryat that time of the year was partly under water, and _jhils_ werenumerous. Thus, the column was about twelve miles in length, so thatthe head had almost reached the end of the march before the rear couldstart. Delays were constant and unavoidable, and the time each day'sjourney occupied, as well as the mode of conveyance--country cartsinnocent of springs--must have been most trying to delicate women andwounded men. Fortunately there was no rain; but the sun was still hotin the daytime, causing greater sensitiveness to the bitter cold atnight. 

My place was with the advance guard, as I had to go on ahead to markout the camp and have ramps got ready to enable the carts to be takenoff the raised roads. Soon after leaving the Alambagh we heard thesound of guns from the direction of Cawnpore, and when we reachedBani bridge (about thirteen miles on, where a small post had beenestablished) the officer in command told us that there had been heavyfiring all that day and the day before. 

Camp was pitched about two miles further on late in the afternoon; butmy work was not over till midnight, when the rear guard arrived, forit took all that time to form up the miscellaneous convoy. 

Next morning we made an early start, in order to reach ourdestination, if possible, before dark. Having received no informationfrom Cawnpore for more than ten days, the Commander-in-Chief wasbeginning to feel extremely anxious, and the firing we had heard theprevious day had greatly increased his uneasiness, for there seemedlittle room for doubt that the Gwalior rebels were making an attack onthat place. The probability that this would happen had been foreseenby Sir Colin, and was one of his reasons for determining to limit theoperations at Lucknow to the withdrawal of the garrison. 

We had not proceeded far, when firing was again heard, and by noonall doubt as to its meaning was ended by a Native who brought a notemarked 'Most urgent, ' written in Greek character, and addressed to'General Sir Colin Campbell, or any officer commanding troops on theLucknow road. ' This turned out to be a communication from GeneralWindham, who had been placed in command at Cawnpore when theCommander-in-Chief left for Lucknow on the 9th of November. It wasdated two days earlier, and told of an attack having been made, thatthere had been hard fighting, and that the troops were sorely pressed;in conclusion Windham earnestly besought the Chief to come to hisassistance with the least possible delay. 

Two other letters followed in quick succession, the last containingthe disappointing and disheartening intelligence that Windham, withthe greater part of his troops, had been driven into the entrenchment, plainly showing that the city and cantonment were in the possessionof the enemy, and suggesting the possibility of the bridge of boatshaving been destroyed. 

Sir Colin, becoming impatient to learn the exact state of the case, desired me to ride on as fast as I could to the river; and if Ifound the bridge broken, to return at once, but if it were still inexistence to cross over, try and see the General, and bring back allthe information I could obtain. 

I took a couple of sowars with me, and on reaching the river I found, under cover of a hastily-constructed _tête-de-pont_, a guard ofBritish soldiers, under Lieutenant Budgen, of the 82nd Foot, whosedelight at seeing me was most effusively expressed. He informed methat the bridge was still intact, but that it was unlikely it wouldlong remain so, for Windham was surrounded except on the river side, and the garrison was 'at its last gasp. '

I pushed across and got into the entrenchment, which was situated onthe river immediately below the bridge of boats. The confusion insidewas great, and I could hardly force my way through the mass of men whothronged round my horse, eager to learn when help might be expected;they were evidently demoralized by the ill-success which had attendedthe previous days' operations, and it was not until I reassured themwith the news that the Commander-in-Chief was close at hand thatI managed to get through the crowd and deliver my message to theGeneral. 

The 'hero of the Redan, ' whom I now saw for the first time, though thefame of his achievement had preceded him to India, was a handsome, cheery-looking man of about forty-eight years of age, who appeared, incontrast to the excited multitude I had passed, thoroughly calm andcollected; and notwithstanding the bitter disappointment it must havebeen to him to be obliged to give up the city and retire with hiswholly inadequate force into the entrenchment, he was not dispirited, and had all his wits about him. In a few words he told me what hadhappened, and desired me to explain to the Commander-in-Chief that, although the city and cantonment had to be abandoned, he was stillholding the enemy in check round the assembly-rooms (which weresituated outside and to the west front of the entrenchment), thuspreventing their approaching the bridge of boats near enough to injureit. 

I was about to start back to Head-Quarters, when suddenly loud cheersbroke from the men, caused by the appearance in their midst of theCommander-in-Chief himself. After I had left him, Sir Colin becameevery minute more impatient and fidgety, and ere long started offafter me, accompanied by Mansfield and some other staff officers. Hewas recognized by the soldiers, some of whom had known him inthe Crimea, and they at once surrounded him, giving enthusiasticexpression to their joy at seeing him again. 

The Chief could now judge for himself as to how matters stood, so, asthere was plenty of work in camp for me, I started back to rejoin myown General. On my way I stopped to speak to Budgen, whom I found ina most dejected frame of mind. Unfortunately for him, he had usedexactly the same words in describing the situation at Cawnpore to SirColin as he had to me, which roused the old Chief's indignation, andhe flew at the wretched man as he was sometimes apt to do when greatlyput out, rating him soundly, and asking him how he dared to say of HerMajesty's troops that they were 'at their last gasp. '

I found Hope Grant about four miles from the river bank, where thecamp was being pitched. Sir Colin did not return till after dark, whenwe were told that the rest of Windham's troops had been driven insidethe entrenchment, which only confirmed what we had suspected, forflames were seen mounting high into the air from the direction of theassembly-rooms, which, it now turned out, had been set on fire by theenemy--an unfortunate occurrence, as in them had been stored the campequipage, kits, clothing, etc. , belonging to most of the regimentswhich had crossed the Ganges into Oudh. But what was more seriousstill was the fact that the road was now open for the rebels' heavyguns, which might be brought to bear upon the bridge of boats at anymoment. 

Owing to the length of the march (thirty-two or thirty-three miles), some of the carts and the heavy guns did not arrive till daybreak. Scarcely had the bullocks been unyoked, before the guns were orderedon to the river bank, where they formed up, and so effectually pliedthe enemy with shot and shell that the passage of the river wasrendered comparatively safe for our troops. 

When the men had breakfasted, the order was given to cross over. SirColin accompanied the column as far as the bridge, and then directedHope Grant, with the Horse Artillery and most of the Cavalry, Bourchier's battery and Adrian Hope's brigade, to move to thesouth-east of the city and take up a position on the open ground whichstretched from the river to the Grand Trunk Road, with the canalbetween us and the enemy. By this arrangement communication withAllahabad, which had been temporarily interrupted, was restored, a very necessary measure, for until the road was made safe, reinforcements, which on account of the paucity of transport had tobe sent up in small detachments, could not reach us, nor could thefamilies and sick soldiers be sent down country. 

The passage of the huge convoy over the bridge of boats, under theprotection of Greathed's brigade, was a most tedious business, occupying thirty hours, from 3 p. M. On the 29th till about 9 p. M. Onthe 30th, when Inglis brought over the rear guard. During its transitthe enemy fired occasionally on the bridge, and tried to destroy it byfloating fire-rafts down the river; fortunately they did not succeed, and the convoy arrived without accident on the ground set apart for itin the rear of our camp. 

For the three first days of December I was chiefly employed inreconnoitring with the Native Cavalry the country to our left andrear, to make sure that the rebels had no intention of attempting toget round that flank, and in making arrangements for the despatch ofthe families, the sick, and the wounded, to Allahabad _en route_ toCalcutta. We improvised covers for some of the carts, in which weplaced the women and children and the worst cases amongst the men; butwith all our efforts to render them less unfit for the purpose, thesecarts remained but rough and painful conveyances for delicate womenand suffering men to travel in. 

We were not left altogether unmolested by the enemy during these days. Round shot kept continually falling in our midst, particularly in theneighbourhood of the Commander-in-Chief's tent, the exact position ofwhich must have somehow been made known to the rebels, otherwise theycould not have distinguished it from the rest of the camp, as itwas an unpretentious hill tent, such as was then used by subalternofficers. 

Until the women left camp on the night of the 3rd December, we wereobliged to act on the defensive, and were not able to stop the enemy'sfire completely, though we managed to keep it under control byoccupying the point called Generalganj, and strengthening the piquetson our right and left flank. On the 4th a second unsuccessful attemptwas made to destroy the bridge of boats by means of fire-rafts, and onthe 5th there were several affairs at the outposts, all of which endedin the discomfiture of the rebels without any great loss to ourselves;Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart of the 93rd Highlanders, who lost his arm onthe 1st, and Captain Crutchley of the same regiment, who was severelywounded, being the only casualties amongst the officers. 

[Footnote 1: Our force consisted of the troops which Sir Colin hadreviewed on the Alambagh plain on the 11th instant, with the exceptionof the 75th Foot, which was transferred to Outram's division. We had, however, in their place, the survivors of the 32nd Foot, and of theNative regiments who had behaved so loyally during the siege. Theselatter were formed into one battalion, called the Regiment ofLucknow--the present 16th Bengal Infantry. The 32nd Foot, which wasnot up to full strength (1, 067) when the Mutiny broke out, had in1857-58 no less than 610 men killed and wounded, exclusive of 169who died from disease. We had also with us, and to them was given anhonoured place, 'the remnant of the few faithful pensioners who hadalone, of many thousands in Oudh, responded to the call of Sir HenryLawrence to come in to aid the cause of those whose salt they hadeaten. '--Lecture on the Relief of Lucknow, by Colonel H. W. Norman. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXVII. 1857

 The fight at Cawnpore--Unexpected visitors--A long chase --Unjur Tiwari--Bithur--Windham at Cawnpore

The time had now arrived to give the Gwalior troops a repetition ofthe lesson taught them at Agra on the 10th October. They had hadit all their own way since then; and having proved too strong forWindham, they misunderstood the Commander-in-Chief remaining for solong on the defensive, and attributed his inaction to fear of theirsuperior prowess. 

Sunday, the 6th December, was one of those glorious days in which theEuropean in northern India revels for a great part of the winter, clear and cool, with a cloudless sky. I awoke refreshed after a goodnight's rest, and in high spirits at the prospect before us ofa satisfactory day's work; for we hoped to drive the enemy fromCawnpore, and to convince those who had witnessed, if not taken partin, the horrible brutalities perpetrated there, that England's hourhad come at last. 

The 42nd Highlanders, a battery of Royal Artillery, and detachments ofseveral different corps, had quite lately been added to the force, so that the Commander-in-Chief had now at his disposal about 5, 000Infantry, 600 Cavalry, and 35 guns. The Infantry were divided intofour brigades, commanded respectively by Greathed, Adrian Hope, Inglis, and Walpole. [1] The Cavalry brigade, consisting of thesame regiments which had come with us from Delhi, was commanded byBrigadier Little, the Artillery[2] by Major-General Dupuis, and theEngineers by Colonel Harness, General Windham being placed in chargeof the entrenchments. 

Opposed to this force there were 25, 000 men, with 40 guns, notall disciplined soldiers, but all adepts in the use of arms, andaccustomed to fighting. They were divided into two distinct bodies, one composed of the Gwalior Contingent, the Rani of Jhansi'sfollowers, and the mutinous regiments which had been stationed inBundelkand, Central India, and Rajputana, which occupied the rightof the enemy's position, covering their line of retreat by the Kalpiroad. The other consisted of the troops--regular and irregular--whichhad attached themselves to the Nana, and held the city and the groundwhich lay between it and the Ganges, their line of retreat being alongthe Grand Trunk Road to Bithur. Tantia Topi was in command of thewhole force, while the Nana remained with his own people on the leftflank. 

On the centre and left the enemy were very strongly posted, and couldonly be approached through the city and by way of the difficult brokenground, covered with ruined houses, stretching along the river bank. 

While the men were eating their breakfasts, and the tents were beingstruck, packed, and sent to the rear, Sir Colin carefully explainedhis plan of operations to the Commanding officers and the staff; thisplan was, to make a feint on the enemy's left and centre, but todirect the real attack on their right, hoping thus to be able todispose of this portion of Tantia Topi's force, before assistancecould be obtained from any other part of the line. 

With this view Windham was ordered to open with every gun withinthe entrenchment at 9 a. M. ; while Greathed, supported by Walpole, threatened the enemy's centre. Exactly at the hour named, the roar ofWindham's Artillery was heard, followed a few minutes later by therattle of Greathed's musketry along the bank of the canal. Meanwhile, Adrian Hope's brigade was drawn up in fighting formation behind theCavalry stables on our side of the Trunk Road, and Inglis's brigadebehind the racecourse on the other side. At eleven o'clock the orderwas given to advance. The Cavalry and Horse Artillery moved to theleft with instructions to cross the canal by a bridge about two milesoff, and to be ready to fall upon the enemy as they retreated alongthe Kalpi road. Walpole's brigade, covered by Smith's Field battery, crossed the canal by a bridge immediately to the left of Generalganj, cleared the canal bank, and, by hugging the wall of the city, effectually prevented reinforcements reaching the enemy's right. 

Peel's and Longden's heavy guns, and Bourchier's and Middleton's Fieldbatteries, now opened on some brick-kilns and mounds which the enemywere holding in strength on our side of the canal, and against whichAdrian Hope's and Inglis's brigades advanced in parallel lines, covered by the 4th Punjab Infantry in skirmishing order. 

It was a sight to be remembered, that advance, as we watched it fromour position on horseback, grouped round the Commander-in-Chief. Before us stretched a fine open grassy plain; to the right the darkgreen of the Rifle Brigade battalions revealed where Walpole's brigadewas crossing the canal. Nearer to us, the 53rd Foot, and the 42nd and93rd Highlanders in their bonnets and kilts, marched as on parade, although the enemy's guns played upon them and every now and then around shot plunged through their ranks or ricocheted over their heads;on they went without apparently being in the least disconcerted, andwithout the slightest confusion. 

As the brick-kilns were neared, the 4th Punjab Infantry, supported bythe 53rd Foot, charged the enemy in grand style, and drove them acrossthe canal. Here there occurred a slight check. The rebels, having beenreinforced, made a stand, and bringing guns to bear upon the bridgewithin grape range, they must have done us great damage but for thetimely arrival of Peel and his sailors with a heavy gun. This put newlife into the attacking party; with a loud cheer they dashed acrossthe bridge, while Peel poured round after round from his 24-pounder onthe insurgents with most salutary effect. The enemy faced about andretired with the utmost celerity, leaving a 9-pounder gun in ourpossession. 

The whole of Hope's brigade, followed by Inglis's, now arrived on thescene and proceeded to cross the canal, some by the bridge, whileothers waded through the water. Having got to the other side, bothbrigades re-formed, and moved rapidly along the Kalpi road. We(the Commander-in-Chief, Hope Grant, and their respective staffs)accompanied this body of troops for about a mile and a half, when therebels' camp came in sight. A few rounds were fired into it, and thenit was rushed. 

We were evidently unexpected visitors; wounded men were lying about inall directions, and many sepoys were surprised calmly cooking theirfrugal meal of unleavened bread. The tents were found to be full ofproperty plundered from the city and cantonment of Cawnpore--soldiers'kits, bedding, clothing, and every description of miscellaneousarticles; but to us the most valuable acquisition was a quantity ofgrain and a large number of fine bullocks, of which those best suitedfor Ordnance purposes were kept, and the rest were made over to theCommissariat. 

That portion of the rebel force with which we had been engaged was nowin full retreat, and Sir Colin wished to follow it up at once; butthe Cavalry and Horse Artillery had not arrived, so that considerabledelay occurred; while we were waiting the Chief arranged to sendMansfield with a small force[3] round to the north of Cawnpore, and, by thus threatening the road along which the Nana's troops mustretreat, compel them to evacuate the city. The 23rd Royal WelshFusiliers and a detachment of the 38th Foot were to be left to lookafter the deserted camp, and Inglis's brigade was to move along theKalpi road in support of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. But wherewere the much-needed and anxiously-expected mounted troops? It was notlike them to be out of the way when their services were required; butit was now nearly two o'clock, they had not appeared, and the dayswere very short. What was to be done? The enemy could not be allowedto carry off their guns and escape punishment. Suddenly the old Chiefannounced that he had determined to follow them up himself withBourchier's battery and his own escort. 

What a chase we had! We went at a gallop, only pulling up occasionallyfor the battery to come into action, 'to clear our front and flanks. 'We came up with a goodly number of stragglers, and captured severalguns and carts laden with ammunition. But we were by this timeovertaking large bodies of the rebels, and they were becoming toonumerous for a single battery and a few staff officers to cope with. We had outstripped the Commander-in-Chief, and Hope Grant decided tohalt, hoping that the missing Cavalry and Horse Artillery might soonturn up. We had not to wait long. In about a quarter of an hour theyappeared among some trees to our left, even more put out than we wereat their not having been to the front at such a time. Their guide hadmade too great a détour, but the sound of our guns showed them hismistake, and they at once altered their course and pushed on in thedirection of the firing. Sir Colin had also come up, so off we startedagain, and never drew rein until we reached the Pandu Naddi, fourteenmiles from Cawnpore. The rout was complete. Finding themselvespressed, the sepoys scattered over the country, throwing away theirarms and divesting themselves of their uniform, that they might passfor harmless peasants. Nineteen guns, some of them of large calibre, were left in our hands. Our victory was particularly satisfactory inthat it was achieved with but slight loss to ourselves, the casualtiesbeing 2 officers and 11 men killed, and 9 officers and 76 men wounded. 

Hope Grant now desired me to hurry back to Cawnpore before it got toodark, and select the ground for the night's bivouac. As there was somerisk in going alone, Augustus Anson volunteered to accompany me. We had got about half-way, when we came across the dead body ofLieutenant Salmond, who had been acting Aide-de-camp to my General, and must have got separated from us in the pursuit. His throat wascut, and he had a severe wound on the face. Soon after we met Inglis'sbrigade, which, in accordance with my instructions, I turned back. Onreaching the Gwalior Contingent camp, we heard that an attempt hadbeen made to recapture it, which had been repulsed by the troops leftin charge. 

It was dusk by the time we reached the junction of the Kalpi and GrandTrunk roads, and we agreed that this would be a good place for abivouac, the city being about a mile in front, and Mansfield's columnless than two miles to the left. I marked out the ground, and showedeach corps as it came up the position it was to occupy. When all thiswas over I was pretty well tired out and ravenously hungry; but foodthere was none, so I had made up my mind to lie down, famished as Iwas. Just then I came across some sleeping men, who to my joy turnedout to be Dighton Probyn and the officers of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry, who were magnanimous enough to forgive the abrupt interruption totheir slumbers, and to supply me with some cold mutton, bread, and abottle of beer. Never was man more grateful for a meal, and never wasa meal more thoroughly enjoyed. I lay down beside my friends and wassoon fast asleep, in spite of the bitter cold and being much troubledabout my horse; neither for him nor myself was there a vestige ofcovering to be found. 

The next morning I was astir by cockcrow. Patrols who had been sentforward to ascertain the truth of a rumour which had reached theCommander-in-Chief the previous evening, to the effect that the cityhad been evacuated, returned with confirmation of the report; but thenews in other respects was far from satisfactory. Mansfield's movementhad caused the enemy to retire, but they had got away without loss, and had succeeded in carrying off all their guns; so that only onehalf of Tantia Topi's force had really been dealt with; the otherhalf still remained to be disposed of, and to Hope Grant's greatsatisfaction and my delight, the duty of following them up wasentrusted to him. 

His orders were to go to Bithur, as it was thought likely that theNana's troops would retire on that place. But as the news was notvery reliable, Hope Grant was told to use his own discretion, and actaccording to circumstances. 

For several days I had been trying unsuccessfully to get hold of someNatives upon whom I could rely to bring me trustworthy information asto the enemy's movements. It is always of the utmost importance that aQuartermaster-General on service should have the help of such men, andI was now more than ever in need of reliable intelligence. In thisemergency I applied to Captain Bruce, the officer in charge of theIntelligence Department which had been established at Cawnpore for thepurpose of tracing the whereabouts of those rebels who had takena prominent part in the atrocities. I was at once supplied with afirst-rate man, Unjur Tiwari by name, [4] who from that moment untilI left India for England in April, 1858, rendered me most valuableservice. He was a Brahmin by caste, and belonged to the 1st NativeInfantry. In a few words I explained what I required of him, and hestarted at once for Bithur, promising to meet me the next day on theline of march. 

[Illustration: PLAN OF CAWNPORE. 1857. ]

Early on the afternoon of the 8th we marched out of Cawnpore, and atsunset Unjur Tiwari, true to his promise, made his appearance at thepoint where the road turns off to Bithur. He told me that the Nana hadslept at that place the night before, but hearing of our approach, haddecamped with all his guns and most of his followers, and was now at aferry some miles up the river, trying to get across and make his wayto Oudh. We had come thirteen miles, and had as many more to go beforewe could get to the ferry, and as there was nothing to be gainedby arriving there in the dark, a halt was ordered for rest andrefreshment. At midnight we started again, and reached Sheorajpur(three miles from the ferry) at daybreak. Here we left ourimpedimenta, and proceeded by a cross-country road. Presently a coupleof mounted men belonging to the enemy, not perceiving who we were, galloped straight into the escort. On discovering their mistake, theyturned and tried to escape, but in vain; one was killed, the othercaptured, and from him we learnt that the rebels were only a shortdistance ahead. We pushed on, and soon came in sight of them and ofthe river; crowds were collected on the banks, and boats were beinghurriedly laden, some of the guns having already been placed on board. Our troops were ordered to advance, but the ground along the riverbank was treacherous and very heavy. Notwithstanding, the Artillerymanaged to struggle through, and when the batteries had got to within1, 000 yards of the ferry, the enemy appeared suddenly to discoverour presence, and opened upon us with their Artillery. Our batteriesgalloped on, and got considerably nearer before they returned thefire; after a few rounds the rebels broke and fled. The ground was sounfavourable for pursuit, being full of holes and quicksands, thatnearly all escaped, except a few cut up by the Cavalry. Fifteen gunswere captured, with one single casualty on our side--the Generalhimself--who was hit on the foot by a spent grape-shot, without, happily, being much hurt. 

Hope Grant's successful management of this little expeditionconsiderably enhanced the high opinion the Commander-in-Chief hadalready formed of his ability. He was next ordered to proceed toBithur and complete the destruction of that place, which had beenbegun by Havelock in July. We found the palace in good order--therewas little evidence that it had been visited by an avenging force, andin one of the rooms which had been occupied by the treacherous AzimulaKhan, I came across a number of letters, some unopened, and someextremely interesting, to which I shall have to refer later on. 

We left Adrian Hope's brigade at Bithur to search for treasurereported to have been buried near the palace, and returned toCawnpore, where we remained for about ten days, not at all sorry forthe rest. 

During this time of comparative idleness, I went over the ground wherethe troops under Windham had been engaged for three days, and heardmany comments on the conduct of the operations. All spoke in highterms of Windham's dash and courage, but as a Commander he wasgenerally considered to have failed. 

Windham was without doubt placed in an extremely difficult position. The relief of the garrison at Lucknow was of such paramount importancethat Sir Colin Campbell was obliged to take with him every availableman, [5] and found it necessary to order Windham to send allreinforcements after him as soon as they arrived, although it wasrecognized as probable that Tantia Topi, with the large force thenassembled near Kalpi, would advance on Cawnpore as soon as theCommander-in-Chief was committed to his difficult undertaking. Windham's orders were to improve the defences of the entrenchment; tocarefully watch the movements of the Gwalior army; and to make as muchdisplay as possible of the troops at his command by encamping them ina conspicuous position outside the city; but he was not on any accountto move out to attack, unless compelled to do so in order to preventthe bombardment of the entrenchment. The safety of this entrenchmentwas of great importance, for it contained a number of guns, quantitiesof ammunition and other warlike stores, and it covered, as alreadyshown, the bridge of boats over the Ganges. 

Windham loyally carried out his instructions, but he subsequentlyasked for and obtained leave to detain any troops arriving at Cawnporeafter the 14th of November, as he did not feel himself strong enough, with the force at his disposal, to resist the enemy if attacked. Buteven after having received this sanction he twice despatched strongreinforcements to Lucknow, thus weakening himself considerably inorder to give Sir Colin all possible help. 

Windham eventually had at his disposal about 1, 700 Infantry and eightguns, the greater part of which were encamped as directed, outside thecity, close to the junction of the Delhi and Kalpi roads, while therest were posted in and around the entrenchment. Meanwhile the rebelswere slowly approaching Cawnpore in detachments, with the evidentintention of surrounding the place. On the 17th two bodies of troopswere pushed on to Shuli and Shirajpur, within fifteen miles of thecity, and a little less than that distance from each other. Windhamthought that if he could manage to surprise either of these, he couldprevent the enemy from concentrating, and he drew up a scheme forgiving effect to this plan, which he submitted for the approval of theCommander-in-Chief. No reply came, and after waiting a week he gave upall idea of attempting to surprise the detachments, and determined totry and arrest the rebels' advance by attacking the main body, stillsome distance off. Accordingly he broke up his camp, and marched sixmiles along the Kalpi road, on the same day that the Gwalior forcemoved some distance nearer to Cawnpore. The next morning, the 25th, the enemy advanced to Pandu Naddi, within three miles of Windham'scamp. 

Windham now found himself in a very critical position. With only 1, 200Infantry[6] and eight light guns, he was opposed to Tantia Topi withan army of 25, 000 men and forty guns. He had to choose whether hewould fight these enormous odds or retire: he decided that to fightwas the least of the two evils, and he was so far successful thathe drove back that portion of the opposing force immediately inhis front, and captured three guns; but being unable to press hisadvantage on account of the paucity of men and the total absence ofCavalry, he had perforce to fall back--a grievous necessity. He wasfollowed the whole way, insulted and jeered at, by the rebel horsemen. The result of the day was to give confidence to the wily Mahrattaleader; he pushed on to Cawnpore, and attacked Windham with suchvehemence that by nightfall on the 28th the British troops were driveninside the entrenchment, having had 315 men killed and wounded, andhaving lost all their baggage and camp equipage. 

Windham undoubtedly laid himself open to censure. His defence wasthat, had he received the Commander-in-Chief's authority to carry outhis plan for surprising the rebels, he would certainly have broken uptheir army, and the disaster could not have occurred. But surely whenhe decided that circumstances had so changed since Sir Colin's orderswere given as to justify him in disregarding them, he should haveacted on his own responsibility, and taken such steps as appeared tohim best, instead of applying for sanction to a Commander far fromthe scene of action, and so entirely ignorant of the conditions underwhich the application was made, as to render it impossible for him todecide whether such sanction should be given. The march which Windhammade towards the enemy on the 24th was quite as grave a disobedienceof orders as would have been the surprise movement he contemplatedon the 17th; but while the former placed him in a most dangerousposition, and one from which it was impossible to deal the enemy adecisive blow, the latter, if successful, would have deserved, anddoubtless would have received, the highest praise. 

[Footnote 1: Greathed's brigade consisted of the 8th and 64th Foot and2nd Punjab Infantry. Adrian Hope's brigade consisted of the 53rd Foot, 42nd and 93rd Highlanders, and 4th Punjab Infantry. Inglis's brigadeconsisted of the 23rd Fusiliers, 32nd and 82nd Foot. Walpole's brigadeconsisted of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Rifle Brigade and a detachmentof the 38th Foot. ]

[Footnote 2: The Artillery consisted of Peel's Naval Brigade, Blunt's, Bridge's and Remmington's troops of Horse Artillery, Bourchier's, Middleton's, and Smith's Field batteries, and Longden's Heavybattery. ]

[Footnote 3: Mansfield was given the two Rifle Brigade battalions, the93rd Highlanders, Longden's Heavy, and Middleton's Field battery. ]

[Footnote 4: Unjur Tiwari's career was a very remarkable one. A sepoyin the 1st Bengal Native Infantry, he was at Banda when the Mutinybroke out, and during the disturbances at that place he aideda European clerk and his wife to escape, and showed hisdisinterestedness by refusing to take a gold ring, the only rewardthey had to offer him. He then joined Havelock's force, and renderedexcellent service as a spy; and although taken prisoner more thanonce, and on one occasion tortured, he never wavered in his loyalty tous. Accompanying Outram to Lucknow, he volunteered to carry a letterto Cawnpore, and after falling into the hands of the rebels, andbeing cruelly ill-treated by them, he effected his escape, and safelydelivered Outram's message to Sir Colin Campbell. He then workedfor me most faithfully, procuring information which I could alwaysthoroughly rely upon; and I was much gratified when he was rewarded bya grant of Rs. 3, 000, presented with a sword of honour, and investedwith the Order of British India, with the title of Sirdar Bahadur. Iwas proportionately distressed some years later to find that, owing tomisrepresentations of enemies when he was serving in the Oudh MilitaryPolice, Unjur Tiwari had been deprived of his rewards, and learning hewas paralyzed and in want, I begged Lord Napier to interest himself inthe matter, the result being that the brave old man was given a yearlypension of Rs. 1, 200 for his life. He was alive when I left India, and although he resided some distance from the railway he always hadhimself carried to see me whenever I travelled in his direction. ]

[Footnote 5: The garrison left at Cawnpore consisted of:

 Four companies of the 64th Foot, and small detachments of other regiments 450 men. Sailors 47 men. -------- Total 497

with a hastily organized bullock battery of four field guns, mannedpartly by Europeans and partly by Sikhs. ]

[Footnote 6: The force was composed of the 34th Foot, and portions ofthe 82nd and 88th Foot, and 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; with four9-pounders, manned partly by Royal and Bengal gunners and partly bySikhs; and four 6-pounders, manned by Madras Native gunners. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXVIII. 1857-1858

 The Fight at Khudaganj--A mêlée--Oudh or Rohilkand?

Our stay at Cawnpore was more prolonged than the Commander-in-Chiefintended or wished it to be, but want of transport made it impossiblefor us to move until the carts returned which had gone to Allahabadwith the women and children and the sick soldiers. We were thusdelayed until the 23rd December, on which date we commenced our marchtowards Fatehgarh. 

At Chobipur, two marches from Cawnpore, where we spent Christmas Day, we were joined by the troops who had been left behind at Bithur;they had not succeeded in discovering any considerable quantity oftreasure, some silver vessels of various kinds being the only resultof their labours. 

The Commander-in-Chief's object in moving on Fatehgarh was to restoreorder throughout the Doab and open communication between the Punjaband Bengal. 

A brigade under Brigadier Walpole had been despatched on the 16th, with orders to clear the country along the left bank of the Jumna upto Mainpuri, where he was to be joined by Brigadier Seaton with astrong column from Delhi, and whence the united force was to advanceon Fatehgarh. 

We reached Gursahaiganj, where the road turns off to Fatehgarh, on the31st, and here the main body of the army halted on New Year's Day, 1858; but information having been received that 5, 000 rebels under theNawab of Farakabad had partly destroyed the suspension bridge overthe Kali Naddi, about five miles ahead, and had then gone off towardsFatehgarh, Adrian Hope's brigade was sent forward to repair the damageand watch the bridge. 

Early the following morning Sir Colin, with Mansfield and the rest ofhis staff, went on to inspect progress, leaving orders for the rest ofthe force to follow later in the day. Very soon, however, Hope Grantreceived an urgent message from the Chief of the Staff, telling him topush on the troops with all possible speed, as the enemy had returned, and were now in strength on the other side of the Kali Naddi. 

We (Sir Hope and his staff) started off with the Horse Artillery andCavalry, and found, on reaching the bridge, that the rebels wereoccupying the village of Khudaganj, just across the river, and onlyabout 300 yards off, from which advantageous position they werepouring a heavy fire on Hope's brigade. Our piquets on the furtherside of the stream had been strengthened by a wing of the 53rd Foot, and a wing of the 93rd Highlanders had been placed in reserve behindthe bridge on the nearer side, the rest of the regiment having beendespatched to watch a ford some distance down the river, while abattery of Field Artillery had been brought into action in reply tothe enemy's guns. Immediately on the arrival of the main body, threeof Peel's guns, under Vaughan, his First Lieutenant, were pushedacross the bridge to the further side, and getting under shelter ofa convenient building, opened fire on the village, and on a toll-bardirectly in its front, about which the enemy were collected inconsiderable numbers. Our Infantry now crossed over, followed by theCavalry and Horse Artillery--a tedious operation, as there had notbeen time to fully repair the bridge, and in one place planks had onlybeen laid for half its width, necessitating horses being led, andInfantry passing over in sections. Moreover, the enemy had got theexact range, and several casualties occurred at this spot; one roundshot alone killed and wounded six men of the 8th Foot. Vaughan atlast succeeded in silencing the gun which had troubled us most, andpreparations were made for an attack on the village. While we werewatching the proceedings, the Interpreter to the Naval Brigade, HenryHamilton Maxwell, a brother officer of mine who had been standingclose to me, was very badly wounded in the leg, and both Sir Colin andSir Hope were hit by spent bullets, luckily without being much hurt. 

There was a feeling throughout the army that Sir Colin was inclined tofavour Highlanders unduly; and a rumour got about that the 93rd wereto be allowed the honour of delivering the assault on Khudaganj, whichwas highly resented by the 53rd, and they determined that on thisoccasion, at any rate, the Highlanders should not have it all theirown way. The 53rd was composed of a remarkably fine set of fellows, chiefly Irish, and it was Mansfield's own regiment; wishing, therefore, to do an old comrade a good turn, he had placed MajorPayn, [1] one of the senior officers, in command of the piquets. Paynwas a fine dashing soldier, and a great favourite with the men, whocalculated on his backing them up if they upset Sir Colin's littleplan. Whether what happened was with or without Payn's permission, Icannot say, but we were all waiting near the bridge for the attackingparty to form when suddenly the 'advance' was sounded, then the'double, ' followed by a tremendous cheer, and we saw the 53rd chargethe enemy. Sir Colin was very angry, but the 53rd could not be broughtback, and there was nothing for it but to support them. Hope's andGreathed's troops were instantly pushed on, and the Cavalry and HorseArtillery were ordered to mount. 

The ground gradually sloped upwards towards Khudaganj, and theregiments moving up to the attack made a fine picture. The 93rdfollowed the impulsive 53rd, while Greathed's brigade took a line tothe left, and as they neared the village the rebels hastily limberedup their guns and retired. This was an opportunity for mounted troopssuch as does not often occur; it was instantly seized by Hope Grant, who rode to the Cavalry, drawn up behind some sand hills, and gave theword of command, 'Threes left, trot, march. ' The words had hardly lefthis lips before we had started in pursuit of the enemy, by this timehalf a mile ahead, the 9th Lancers leading the way, followed byYounghusband's, Gough's, and Probyn's squadrons. When within 300 yardsof the fugitives, the 'charge' was sounded, and in a few seconds wewere in their midst. A regular mêlée ensued, a number of the rebelswere killed, and seven guns captured in less than as many minutes. TheGeneral now formed the Cavalry into a long line, and, placing himselfat the head of his own regiment (the 9th Lancers), followed up theflying foe. I rode a little to his left with Younghusband's squadron, and next to him came Tyrrell Ross, the doctor. [2] As we gallopedalong, Younghusband drew my attention with great pride to theadmirable manner in which his men kept their dressing. 

On the line thundered, overtaking groups of the enemy, who every nowand then turned and fired into us before they could be cut down, or knelt to receive us on their bayonets before discharging theirmuskets. The chase continued for nearly five miles, until daylightbegan to fail and we appeared to have got to the end of the fugitives, when the order was given to wheel to the right and form up on theroad. Before, however, this movement could be carried out, we overtooka batch of mutineers, who faced about and fired into the squadron atclose quarters. I saw Younghusband fall, but I could not go to hisassistance, as at that moment one of his _sowars_ was in dire perilfrom a sepoy who was attacking him with his fixed bayonet, and had Inot helped the man and disposed of his opponent, he must have beenkilled. The next moment I descried in the distance two sepoys makingoff with a standard, which I determined must be captured, so I rodeafter the rebels and overtook them, and while wrenching the staff outof the hands of one of them, whom I cut down, the other put his musketclose to my body and fired; fortunately for me it missed fire, and Icarried off the standard. [3]

[Illustration: Plan of the Engagement on the Banks of the KALI NADI atKHUDAGANJ January 2nd. 1858. ]

Tyrrell Ross, attracted by a party of men in the rear of the squadronbending over the fallen Younghusband, now came up, and, to everyone'sgreat grief, pronounced the wound to be mortal. From the day that Ihad annexed Younghusband's pony at the siege of Delhi we had been somuch together, and had become such fast friends, that it was a greatshock to me to be told that never again would my gallant comrade leadthe men in whom he took such soldierly pride. [4]

When the wounded had been attended to, we returned to camp, wherewe found Sir Colin waiting to welcome us, and we received quite anovation from our comrades in the Infantry and Artillery. We musthave presented a curious spectacle as we rode back, almost everyman carrying some trophy of the day, for the enemy had abandonedeverything in their flight, and we found the road strewn with ladencarts and palankins, arms, Native clothing, etc. Our losses weresurprisingly small--only 10 men killed, and 30 men and 2 officerswounded. 

The next day the column marched to Fatehgarh, which we found deserted. The rebels had fled so precipitately that they had left the bridgeover the Ganges intact, and had not attempted to destroy the valuablegun-carriage factory in the fort, which was then placed in the chargeof Captain H. Legeyt Bruce. [5]

We remained a whole month at Fatehgarh, and loud were the complaintsin camp at the unaccountable delay. It was the general opinion thatwe ought to move into Rohilkand, and settle that part of the countrybefore returning to Lucknow; this view was very strongly held bySir Colin Campbell, and those who accused him of "indecision, dilatoriness, and wasting the best of the cold weather" could not haveknown how little he deserved their censure. The truth was, that theGovernor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were not in accord as tothe order in which the several military operations should be taken inhand; the latter urged that Rohilkand should be dealt with first, andsettled before the end of the cold weather; he thought that the troopswould then be the better for a rest, and that Lucknow could very wellwait till the following autumn. Lord Canning opined, on the other hand(and I entirely agree with him), that, while it was most desirablethat order should be restored in Rohilkand, and indeed throughout thewhole of the North-West Provinces, the possession of Lucknow was of'far greater value. ' 'Every eye, ' Lord Canning wrote, 'is upon Oudh asit was upon Delhi: Oudh is not only the rallying-place of the sepoys, the place to which they all look, and by the doings in which their ownhopes and prospects rise or fall; but it represents a dynasty; thereis a king of Oudh "seeking his own. "' He pointed out that there was anuneasy feeling amongst the Chiefs of Native States, who were intentlywatching our attitude with regard to Lucknow, and that even in'far-off Burma' news from Lucknow was anxiously looked for. TheGovernor-General laid great stress also upon the advisability ofemploying as soon and as close to their own country as possible thetroops from Nepal which, at Sir Henry Lawrence's suggestion, had beenapplied for to, and lent us by, the Nepalese Government. 

The visit of Jung Bahadur (the Prime Minister of Nepal) to England afew years before had opened his eyes to our latent power, and he hadbeen able to convince his people that time alone was required for usto recover completely from the blow which had been dealt us by theMutiny, and that it was therefore to their advantage to side with us. Lord Canning wisely judged, however, that it would be highly imprudentto allow the province immediately adjoining Nepal to continue in astate of revolt, and he felt that neither Jung Bahadur nor his Gurkhaswould be satisfied unless they were allowed to take an active part inthe campaign. 

[Footnote 1: The late General Sir William Payn, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: Tyrrell Ross was well known as a skilful surgeon, andmuch esteemed as a staunch friend. He had just returned from England, and had that very morning been placed in medical charge of the CavalryBrigade. When the order to mount was given, Ross asked the Generalwhere he wished him to be, pointing out that he would not be of muchuse in the rear if there were a pursuit across country. Hope Grantreplied: 'Quite so; I have heard that you are a good rider and canuse your sword. Ride on my left, and help to look after my thirdsquadron. ' This Ross did as well as any Cavalry officer could havedone. ]

[Footnote 3: For these two acts I was awarded the Victoria Cross. ]

[Footnote 4: Younghusband met with an extraordinary accident duringthe fight at Agra. While pursuing one of the Gwalior rebels, he fellwith his horse into a disused well, fifty feet deep, and was followedby two of his men, also mounted. Ropes were brought, and the bodieswere hauled up, when, to the astonishment of everyone, Younghusbandwas found to be alive, and, beyond being badly bruised, uninjured. He had fallen to the bottom in a sitting position, his back restingagainst the side of the well, and his legs stretched out in frontof him, while his horse fell standing and across him. He was thusprotected from the weight of the other two horses and their riders, who were all killed. ]

[Footnote 5: Now Major-General H. L. Bruce, C. B. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXIX. 1858

 Mianganj--Curious effect of a mirage--The Dilkusha revisited --Passage of the Gumti--Capture of the Chakar Kothi --Capture of the iron bridge--Hodson mortally wounded --Outram's soldierly instinct--A lost opportunity--Sam Browne --Start for England--Death of Sir William Peel

Our prolonged stay at Fatehgarh was not altogether without advantage. Such a large force being concentrated in the neighbourhood secured thesafety of the Doab for the time being, and as Fatehgarh was equallyconveniently situated for an advance, either into Rohilkand or uponLucknow, the rebels were kept in a state of uncertainty as to thedirection of our next move. 

At length it was decided that Lucknow was to be our first objective, and Sir Colin at once communicated with Outram and Napier as to thebest means of conducting the siege. Then, leaving Hope Grant to takethe division across the Ganges, the Chief went to Allahabad, thetemporary Head-Quarters of the supreme Government, to discuss thesituation with the Governor-General. 

We marched through Cawnpore, and on the 8th February reached Unao, where we found encamped the 7th Hussars, a troop of Royal HorseArtillery, the 38th Foot and the 79th Highlanders. 

Sir Colin on his return from Allahabad on the 10th issued a GeneralOrder detailing the regiments, staff, and Commanders who were to takepart in the 'Siege of Lucknow. '[1] Hope Grant, who had been madea Major-General for the 'Relief of Lucknow, ' was appointed to thecommand of the Cavalry division, and I remained with him as D. A. Q. M. G. 

Rumours had been flying about that the Nana was somewhere in theneighbourhood, but 'Wolf!' had been cried so often with regard to him, that but little notice was taken of the reports, until my faithfulspy, Unjur Tiwari, brought me intelligence that the miscreant reallywas hiding in a small fort about twenty-five miles from our camp. HopeGrant started off at once, taking with him a compact little force, andreached the fort early next morning (17th February), just too lateto catch the Nana, who, we were told, had fled precipitately beforedaybreak. We blew up the fort, and for the next few days moved byshort marches towards Lucknow, clearing the country as we went ofrebels, small parties of whom we frequently encountered. On the 23rdwe reached Mianganj, a small fortified town on the old Cawnpore andLucknow road, where some 2, 000 of the enemy had ensconced themselves. Our advance guard having been fired upon as we approached, thecolumn was halted and the baggage placed in safety, while HopeGrant reconnoitred the position in order to see where it could mostadvantageously be attacked. We found the town enclosed by a highloop-holed wall with circular bastions at the four corners and atregular intervals along the sides, the whole being surrounded by a wetditch, while the gateways had been strengthened by palisades. Largebodies of the enemy's Cavalry hovered about our reconnoitring party, only to retire as we advanced, apparently not liking the look of the7th Hussars and 9th Lancers, who formed the General's escort. 

After a careful inspection, Hope Grant decided to breach thenorth-west angle of the wall, as from a wood near the Infantry couldkeep down the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, and the heavy gunswould be in a measure protected while the walls were being bombarded. A sufficiently good breach was made in about two hours, and the 53rdRegiment, having been selected for the honour of leading the assault, was told to hold itself in readiness. Hope Grant then spoke a fewwords of encouragement to the men, and their Colonel (English) repliedon their behalf that they might be depended upon to do their duty. Thesignal was given; the Horse Artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel FrankTurner, galloped to within grape range of the town, and covered bytheir fire the 53rd marched in steadily until they got within 100yards of the walls, when, with a ringing cheer, they dashed throughthe water in the ditch and entered the breach. Hopkins, the pluckyCaptain of the light company, was the first inside the walls, followedclosely by Augustus Anson and an adventurous Post-Captain of the RoyalNavy, who, being unemployed, came to see what 'a winter's campaign inIndia' was like. [2] There was a good deal of hand-to-hand fighting, and the enemy lost about 500 men, those who tried to escape being cutdown by the Cavalry outside the walls. We took about the same numberof prisoners, but as none of these were soldiers, and vowed they hadbeen forced to take up arms against us, the General, as much to theirastonishment as to their delight, ordered them to be set free. Ourlosses were small. 

Next day we halted while the walls were being destroyed and theplace rendered indefensible. As I was superintending the work ofdestruction, the horrors of war were once more brought very forciblybefore me by the appearance of an infirm old man, who besought me tospare his house, saying: 'Yesterday I was the happy father of fivesons: three of them lie there' (pointing to a group of dead bodies);'where the other two are, God only knows. I am old and a cripple, andif my house is burned there is nothing left for me but to die. ' Ofcourse I took care that his house and property were left untouched. 

On the 25th February we marched to Mohan, a picturesquely situatedvillage on the bank of the Sai Naddi, which stream we crossed the nextday and encamped on a fine grassy plain, there to remain until itshould be time to join the army before Lucknow. 

While we were halting at this place, Watson and I had rather a curiousadventure. During a morning's ride my greyhound put up a _nilghai_[3]so close to us that Watson, aiming a blow at him with his sword, gashed his quarter. Off he started, and we after him at full speed;the chase continued for some miles without our getting much nearer, when, all at once, we beheld moving towards us from our right fronta body of the enemy's Cavalry. We were in an awkward position; ourhorses were very nearly dead beat, and we could hardly hope to getaway if pursued. We pulled up, turned round, and trotted back, veryquietly at first, that our horses might recover their breath beforethe enemy got to closer quarters and we should have to ride for ourlives. Every now and then we looked back to see whether they weregaining upon us, and at last we distinctly saw them open out and makeas if to charge down upon us. We thought our last hour was come. Webade each other good-bye, agreeing that each must do his best toescape, and that neither was to wait for the other, when lo! assuddenly as they had appeared, the horsemen vanished, as though theground had opened and swallowed them; there was nothing to be seenbut the open plain, where a second before there had been a crowd ofmounted men. We could hardly believe our eyes, or comprehend at firstthat what we had seen was simply a mirage, but so like reality thatanyone must have been deceived. Our relief, on becoming convincedthat we had been scared by a phantom enemy, was considerable; butthe apparition had the good effect of making us realize the follyof having allowed ourselves to be tempted so far away from our campwithout escort of any kind in an enemy's country, and we determinednot to risk it again. [4]

While we were occupied in clearing the country to the north ofthe Cawnpore-Lucknow road, the main body of the army, with thesiege-train, Engineer park, Naval Brigade, [5] ammunition, and storesof all kinds, had gradually been collecting at Bhantira, to whichplace we were ordered to proceed on the 1st March. We had atroublesome march across country, and did not reach the Head-Quarterscamp until close on midnight. There was much difficulty in getting theguns through the muddy nullas and up the steep banks, and but forthe assistance of the elephants the task could hardly have beenaccomplished. It was most curious and interesting to see how thesesagacious creatures watched for and seized the moment when their helpwas needed to get the guns up the steep inclines; they waited tillthe horses dragging the gun could do no more and were coming to astand-still, when one of them would place his forehead against themuzzle and shove until the gun was safely landed on the top of thebank. 

We started early on the morning of the 2nd for Lucknow, Hope Granttaking command of the Cavalry division for the first time. 

On nearing the Alambagh, we bore to our right past the Jalalabad fort, where Outram's Engineers were busily engaged in constructing fascinesand gabions for the siege, and preparing spars and empty casks forbridging the Gumti. As we approached the Mahomedbagh we came under thefire of some of the enemy's guns placed in a grove of trees; but nosooner had the Artillery of our advance guard opened fire than therebels retired, leaving a gun in our hands. We moved on to theDilkusha, which we found unoccupied. The park had been greatlydisfigured since our last visit, most of the finest trees having beencut down. 

My General was now placed in charge of the piquets, a position forwhich he was admirably fitted and in which he delighted. He rode well, without fatigue to himself or his horse, so that any duty entailinglong hours in the saddle was particularly congenial to him. Iinvariably accompanied him in his rounds, and in after-years I oftenfelt that I owed Hope Grant a debt of gratitude for the practicallessons he gave me in outpost duty. 

Strong piquets with heavy guns were placed in and around the Dilkusha, as well as in the Mahomedbagh. The main body of the army was encampedto the rear of the Dilkusha, its right almost on the Gumti, while itsleft stretched for two miles in the direction of the Alambagh. HopeGrant, wishing to be in a convenient position in case of an attack, spent the night in the Mahomedbagh piquet, and Anson, the D. A. A. G. , and I kept him company. 

On the 3rd some of the troops left at Bhantira came into camp, andon the 5th General Franks arrived. His division, together withthe Nepalese Contingent, 9, 000 strong, brought the numbers at theCommander-in-Chief's disposal up to nearly 31, 000 men, with 164guns;[6] not a man too many for the capture of a city twenty miles incircumference, defended by 120, 000 armed men, who for three months anda half had worked incessantly at strengthening the defences, whichconsisted of three lines, extending lengthwise from the Charbaghbridge to the Gumti, and in depth from the canal to the Kaisarbagh. 

In Napier's carefully prepared plan, which Sir Colin decided to adopt, it was shown that the attack should be made on the east, as thatside offered the smallest front, it afforded ground for plantingour Artillery, which the west side did not, and it was the shortestapproach to the Kaisarbagh, a place to which the rebels attached thegreatest importance; more than all, we knew the east side, and werelittle acquainted with the west. Napier further recommended that theattack should be accompanied by a flank movement on the north, withthe object of taking in reverse the first and second lines of theenemy's defences. [7] A division was accordingly sent across theGumti for this purpose, and the movement, being entirely successful, materially aided in the capture of the city. The passage of the riverwas effected by means of two pontoon bridges made of empty barrels, and thrown across the stream a little below the Dilkusha. They werecompleted by midnight on the 5th March, and before day broke thetroops detailed for this service had crossed over. 

Outram, who, since the 'Relief of Lucknow, ' had been maintaining hishigh reputation by keeping the enemy in check before the Alambagh, commanded this division, with Hope Grant as his second in command. Assoon as it was light we moved away from the river to be out of reachof the Martinière guns, and after marching for about two miles we camein view of the enemy; the Artillery of the advance guard got to withina thousand yards and opened fire, upon which the rebels broke andfled. The Bays pursued them for a short distance, but with very littleresult, the ground being intersected with nullas, and the enemyopening upon them with heavy guns, they had to retire precipitately, with the loss of their Major, Percy Smith, whose body, unhappily, hadto be abandoned. 

About noon we encamped close to Chinhut, and Hope Grant took specialcare that day to see the piquets were well placed, for the rebelswere in great numbers, and we were surrounded by ravines and woodedenclosures. It was thought by some that he was unnecessarily anxiousand careful, for he rode several times over the ground; but the nextmorning proved how right he was to leave nothing to chance. 

While we were at breakfast, information was brought in that the enemywere advancing in force, and directly afterwards half a dozen roundshot were sent into our camp; the troops fell in, the Infantry movedout, and Hope Grant took the Horse Artillery and Cavalry to our rightflank, where the mutineers were collected in considerable numbers. Inless than an hour we had driven them off, but we were not allowed tofollow them up, as Outram did not wish to get entangled in the suburbsuntil heavy guns had arrived. The piquets were strengthened and pushedforward, affording another opportunity for a useful lesson in outpostduty. 

All that day and the next I accompanied my General in hisreconnaissance of the enemy's position, as well as of the ground nearthe Gumti, in order to determine where the heavy guns could bestbe placed, so as effectually to enfilade the enemy's first line ofdefences along the bank of the canal. On returning to report progressto Outram at mid-day on the 8th, we found Sir Colin Campbell andMansfield with him, arranging for a joint attack the following day;after their consultation was over, they all rode with us to see thesite Hope Grant had selected for the battery. It was a slightlyelevated piece of ground about half a mile north of the Kokrel nulla, fairly concealed by a bend of the river; but before it could be madeuse of it was considered necessary to clear the rebels out of theposition they were occupying between the nulla and the iron bridge, the key to which was the Chakar Kothi, and Outram was directed toattack this point the next morning. 

At 2 a. M. On the 9th the heavy guns, escorted by the 1st BengalFusiliers, were sent forward to within 600 yards of the enemy. The troops then moved off in two parties, that on the right beingcommanded by Hope Grant. We marched along the Fyzabad road, the twoRifle Brigade battalions leading the way in skirmishing order, withthe Cavalry well away to the right. The rebels retired as we advanced, and Walpole, commanding one of our brigades, by wheeling to his lefton reaching the opposite bank of the nulla, was enabled to enfiladetheir position. The column was then halted, and I was sent to informOutram as to our progress. 

When I had delivered my message, and was about to return, Outramdesired me to stay with him until the capture of the Chakar Kothi(which he was just about to attempt) should be accomplished, that Imight then convey to Hope Grant his orders as to what further actionwould be required of him; meanwhile Outram sent a messenger to tellmy General what he was about to do, in view of his co-operating on theright. [8]

The Chakar Kothi was attacked and taken, and the enemy, apparentlyhaving lost heart, fled precipitately. One of the 1st BengalFusiliers' colours was placed on the top of this three-storiedbuilding by Ensign Jervis to show the Commander-in-Chief that it wasin our possession, and that the time had come for him to attack thefirst line of the enemy's defences. We then continued our advance tothe river, where the parties united, and I rejoined Hope Grant. 

It was now only 2 p. M. , and there was plenty of time to place theheavy guns in position before dark. Major Lothian Nicholson, [9]Outram's Commanding Engineer, was superintending this operation, whenhe thought he perceived that the enemy had abandoned their first line, but he could not be quite sure. It was most necessary to ascertain forcertain whether this was the case, as the Infantry of Hope's brigade, which had attacked and driven the rebels out of the Martinière, couldbe seen preparing to assault the works at the other side of the river. A discussion ensued as to how this knowledge could be obtained, and ayoung subaltern of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, named Butler, [10] offeredto swim across the Gumti, and, if he found the enemy had retired, to communicate the fact to Hope's men. This feat was successfullyaccomplished by the plucky young volunteer; he found the enemy hadretired, and, on giving the information to Hope, the brigade advanced, and before nightfall the whole of the enemy's first line was in ourpossession--a success which had been achieved with but slight loss tous, the chief casualty during the day being William Peel, the gallantCommander of the Naval Brigade, who had been seriously wounded whilein command of a battery near the Dilkusha. 

The next day, the 10th, Outram's camp was moved close up to the Gumti, and batteries were constructed from which fire could be poured on themess-house and the Kaisarbagh. For the protection of these works, and to prevent an attack in force being made on the main part of thecolumn, Hope Grant kept moving about with the Horse Artillery andCavalry between the river and the Sitapur road, our reconnaissanceextending beyond the old cantonment. We had several little fights, in one of which a very promising officer named Sandford, who hadsucceeded Younghusband in command of the 5th Punjab Cavalry squadron, was killed. 

At daybreak on the morning of the 11th the batteries opened fire onthe enemy's second line of defence; at the same time Outram himselfled a strong body of Infantry along the river with the object ofsecuring the approaches to the bridges. On reaching the Fyzabad road, about half a mile from the iron bridge, Outram placed the 1st BengalFusiliers in a mosque, with orders to entrench themselves and holdthe post, while he pushed on to the stone bridge about a mile away. Outram's advance was covered by Hope Grant's Horse Artillery andCavalry, but we had to keep at some distance away to the right, inorder to avoid houses and walled enclosures. Soon after crossing theSitapur road we heard guns to our left, and proceeding at a smarttrot, came up with Outram just as he was about to attack a large bodyof the rebels, who, finding themselves in an awkward position, withthe river in their rear and their retreat by the iron bridge cut off, made but a feeble resistance before they broke and fled. Some fewescaped by the stone bridge, but the greater number, including thewhole of the mutinous 15th Irregular Cavalry, made for the oldcantonment. We pursued with our Cavalry, and very few of them gotaway. A couple of guns and a quantity of plunder were left behind bythe enemy, who evidently had not expected us and were quite unpreparedfor our attack. Outram pushed on to the stone bridge, but finding hewas losing men from the fire poured upon us by the rebels from theopposite side of the river, he fell back to the mosque where he hadleft the Fusiliers. 

That afternoon, as there was nothing particular for the Cavalry to do, the General, Anson, and I rode across the river to see how matterswere progressing on the left of the attack. We reached theHead-Quarters camp just as Sir Colin was about to receive a visit ofceremony from the Nepalese General, the famous Jung Bahadur. Our oldChief, in honour of the occasion, had doffed his usual workman-likecostume, and wore General's full-dress uniform, but he was quitethrown into the shade by the splendour of the Gurkha Prince, who wasmost gorgeously attired, with magnificent jewels in his turban, roundhis neck, and on his coat. 

I looked at Jung Bahadur with no small interest, for his deeds ofdaring had made him conspicuous amongst probably the bravest race ofmen in the world, and the fact that a high-born Hindu, such as he was, should, fifty years ago, have so far risen superior to caste prejudiceas to cross the sea and visit England, proved him to be a man ofunusually strong and independent mind. He was about five feet eightinches high--tall for a Gurkha--with a well-knit, wiry figure, akeen, dauntless eye, and a firm, determined mouth--in every respect atypical, well-bred Nepalese. The interview did not last long, for SirColin disliked ceremonial, and, shortly after the Nepalese Prince hadtaken his seat, news was brought in that the assault on the BegumKothi had been successfully completed, upon which Sir Colin made thenecessity for attending to business an excuse for taking leave of hisdistinguished visitor, and the interview came to an end. 

I then obtained leave to go to the scene of the recent fight, and, galloping across the canal by the bridge near Banks's house, soonfound myself at the Begum Kothi. There I was obliged to dismount, foreven on foot it was a difficult matter to scramble over the breach. The place was most formidable, and it was a marvel that it had beentaken with comparatively so little loss on our side. The bodies of anumber of Highlanders and Punjabis were lying about, and a good manywounded men were being attended to, but our casualties were nothing inproportion to those of the enemy, 600 or 700 of whom were buriedthe next day in the ditch they had themselves dug for their ownprotection. A very determined stand had been made by the sepoys whenthey found there was no chance of getting away. There were many talesof hair-breadth escapes and desperate struggles, and on all sides Ihoard laments that Hodson should have been one of those dangerously, if not mortally, wounded in the strife. Hodson had been carried toBanks's house, and to the inquiry I made on my way back to camp, as tohis condition, the answer was, 'Little, if any, hope. '

A great stride in the advance had been made on this day. Outramhad accomplished all that was expected of him, and he was nowbusy constructing additional batteries for the bombardment of theKaisarbagh; while Lugard, [11] from his newly-acquired position at theBegum Kothi, was also able to bring fire to bear upon that doomedpalace. 

Hodson died the following day (the 12th). As a soldier, I had a verygreat admiration, for him, and, in common with the whole army, Imourned his early death. [12]

On the 13th Lugard's division was relieved by Franks's, and to JungBahadur and his Gurkhas, only too eager for the fray, was entrustedthe conduct of operations along the line of the canal between Banks'shouse and the Charbagh bridge. On our side of the river nothing ofimportance occurred. 

The capture of the Imambara (a mosque situated between the Begum Kothiand the Kaisarbagh) was accomplished early next morning. The assaultwas led by Brasyer's Sikhs and a detachment of the 10th Foot, supported by the remainder of that regiment and the 90th LightInfantry. After a short but very severe struggle, the enemy wereforced to retire, and were so closely pursued that the storming partysuddenly found themselves in a building immediately overlooking theKaisarbagh. 

It had not been intended to advance that day beyond the Imambara, but, recognizing the advantage of the position thus gained, and thedemoralized condition of the rebels, Franks wisely determined tofollow up his success. Reinforcements were hurried forward, the troopsholding the Sikandarbagh and the Shah Najaf were ordered to act inconcert, and before nightfall the Kaisarbagh, the mess-house, and thenumerous buildings situated between those places and the Residency, were in our possession. 

By means of the field telegraph, Outram was kept accurately informedas to the movements of Franks's division, and he could have affordedit valuable assistance had he been allowed to cross the Gumti with histhree brigades of Infantry. Outram, with his soldierly instinct, feltthat this was the proper course to pursue; but in reply to his requestto be allowed to push over the river by the iron bridge, he receivedfrom the Commander-in-Chief through Mansfield the unaccountablystrange order that he must not attempt it, if it would entail hislosing 'a single man. ' Thus a grand opportunity was lost. The bridge, no doubt, was strongly held, but with the numerous guns which Outramcould have brought to bear upon its defenders its passage could havebeen forced without serious loss; the enemy's retreat would have beencut off, and Franks's victory would have been rendered complete, which it certainly was not, owing to Outram's hands having been soeffectually tied. 

Lucknow was practically in our hands on the evening of the 14th March, but the rebels escaped with comparatively slight punishment, and thecampaign, which should have then come to an end, was protracted fornearly a year by the fugitives spreading themselves over Oudh, andoccupying forts and other strong positions, from which they were ableto offer resistance to our troops until towards the end of May, 1859, thus causing the needless loss of thousands of British soldiers. [13]Sir Colin saw his mistake when too late. The next day orders wereissued for the Cavalry to follow up the mutineers, who were understoodto have fled in a northerly direction. One brigade under Campbell (theColonel of the Bays) was directed to proceed to Sandila, and another, under Hope Grant, towards Sitapur. But the enemy was not seen byeither. As usual, they had scattered themselves over the country andentirely disappeared, and many of the rebels who still remained in thecity seized the opportunity of the Cavalry being absent to get away. 

Outram's command on the left bank of the Gumti was now broken up, withthe view to his completing the occupation of the city. Accordingly, onthe 16th, he advanced from the Kaisarbagh with Douglas's brigade[14]and Middleton's battery, supported by the 20th Foot and Brasyer'sSikhs, and occupied in quick succession, and with but slightresistance, the Residency, the Machi Bhawan, and the great Imambara, thus taking in reverse the defences which had been thrown up by theenemy for the protection of the two bridges. As Outram pushed on, therebels retreated, some across the stone bridge towards Fyzabad, andsome through the city towards the Musabagh. They made two attacks tocover their retirement, one on Walpole's piquets, which enableda large number (20, 000 it was said) to get away in the Fyzabaddirection, and another on the Alambagh, which was much more serious, for the garrison had been reduced to less than a thousand men, and therebels' force was considerable, consisting of Infantry, Cavalry andArtillery. They attacked with great determination, and fought for fourhours and a half before they were driven off. 

It was not a judicious move on Sir Colin's part to send the Cavalrymiles away from Lucknow just when they could have been so usefullyemployed on the outskirts of the city. This was also appreciated whentoo late, and both brigades were ordered to return, which they did onthe 17th. Even then the Cavalry were not made full use of, for insteadof both brigades being collected on the Lucknow bank of the river, which was now the sole line of retreat left open to the enemy (thebridges being in our possession), one only (Campbell's) was sentthere, Hope Grant being directed to take up his old position on theopposite side of the Gumti, from which we had the mortification ofwatching the rebels streaming into the open country from the Musabagh, without the smallest attempt being made by Campbell to stop or pursuethem. His brigade had been placed on the enemy's line of retreat onpurpose to intercept them, but he completely failed to do what wasexpected of him. We, on our side, could do nothing, for an unfordableriver flowed between us and the escaping mutineers. [15]

There was one more fight in Lucknow. The Moulvie[16] of Fyzabad (whofrom the first was one of the prominent leaders of the rebellion) hadreturned at the head of a considerable force, and had placed himselfin a strongly-fortified position in the very centre of the city. Itwas not without a severe struggle that he was dislodged by the 93rdHighlanders and 4th Punjab Infantry under Lugard. The brunt of thefighting fell upon the last-named regiment, the gallant Commander(Wilde) of which, and his second in command, [17] were severelywounded. The Moulvie made his escape, but his followers were pursued, and many of them were cut up. Thus at last the city was cleared ofrebels, and we were once more masters in Lucknow. 

On the 22nd March Hope Grant was ordered to proceed to Kursi, a smalltown about twenty-five miles off between the Sitapur and Fyzabadroads, reported to be occupied in force by the enemy. 

We started at midnight with a brigade of Infantry, 1, 000 Cavalry, twotroops of Horse Artillery, and eight heavy guns and mortars. We weredelayed some hours by the heavy guns and their escort (the 53rd Foot)taking a wrong turn when leaving the city, which resulted in the enemybeing warned of our approach in time to clear out before we arrived. 

On hearing they had gone, Hope Grant pushed on with the mountedportion of the force, and we soon came in sight of the enemy in fullretreat. The Cavalry, commanded by Captain Browne, [18] was orderedto pursue. It consisted of Browne's own regiment (the 2nd PunjabCavalry), a squadron of the 1st Punjab Cavalry under Captain Cosserat, and three Horse Artillery guns. At the end of two miles, Browne cameupon a body of the mutineers formed up on an open plain. The Cavalrycharged through them three times, each time thinning their ranksconsiderably, but they never wavered, and in the final charge avengedthemselves by killing Macdonnell (the Adjutant of the 2nd PunjabCavalry), and mortally wounding Cosserat. I arrived on the ground withHope Grant just in time to witness the last charge and the fall ofthese two officers, and deplorable as we felt their loss to be, it wasimpossible not to admire the gallantry and steadiness of the sepoys, every one of whom fought to the death. 

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR SAMUEL BROWNE, V. C. , G. C. B. , K. C. S. I. _From a photograph by Messrs. Elliott and Fry. _]

As soon as Browne could got his men together, the pursuit of the enemywas continued; no further opposition was met with, and fourteen gunsfell into our hands. 

On the 24th we retraced our steps, halting for the night at the oldcantonment of Muriao, where we buried poor Macdonnell. On the 25th wecrossed the Gumti, and pitched our camp near the Dilkusha. 

Lucknow was now completely in our possession, and our success had beenachieved with remarkably slight loss, a result which was chieflydue to the scientific manner in which the siege operations had beencarried on under the direction of our talented Chief Engineer, RobertNapier, ably assisted by Colonel Harness; and also to the good usewhich Sir Colin Campbell made of his powerful force of Artillery. Ourcasualties during the siege amounted to only 16 British officers, 3Native officers, and 108 men killed; 51 British officers, 4 Nativeofficers, and 540 men wounded, while 13 men were unaccounted for. 

The capture of Lucknow, though not of such supreme importance in itsconsequences as the taking of Delhi, must have convinced the rebelsthat their cause was now hopeless. It is true that Jhansi had not yetfallen, and that the rest of Oudh, Rohilkand, and the greater partof Central India remained to be conquered, but there was no veryimportant city in the hands of the enemy, and the subjugation of thecountry was felt to be merely a matter of time. Sir Hugh Rose, after abrilliant campaign, had arrived before Jhansi, columns of our troopswere traversing the country in every direction, and the British Armyhad been so largely increased that, on the 1st of April, 1858, therewere 96, 000 British soldiers in India, besides a large body ofreliable Native troops, some of whom, although hurriedly raised, hadalready shown that they were capable of doing good service--a verydifferent state of affairs from that which prevailed six monthsbefore. 

For some time I had been feeling the ill effects of exposure to theclimate and hard work, and the doctor, Campbell Browne, had beenurging me to go on the sick-list; that, of course, was out of thequestion until Lucknow had fallen. Now, however, I placed myself inBrowne's hands, hoping that a change to the Hills was all that wasneeded to set me up; but the doctors insisted on a trip to England. Itwas a heavy blow to me to have to leave while there was still work tobe done, but I had less hesitation than I should have had if mostof my own immediate friends had not already gone. Several had beenkilled, others had left sick or wounded; Watson had gone to Lahore, busily engaged in raising a regiment of Cavalry;[19] Probyn was on hisway home, invalided; Hugh Gough had gone to the Hills to recover fromhis wounds; and Norman and Stewart were about to leave Lucknow withArmy Head-Quarters. 

On the 1st April, the sixth anniversary of my arrival inIndia, I made over my office to Wolseley, who succeeded me asDeputy-Assistant-Quartermaster-General on Hope Grant's staff, andtowards the middle of the month I left Lucknow. 

The Commander-in-Chief was most kind and complimentary when I tookleave of him, and told me that, in consideration of my services, he would bestow upon me the first permanent vacancy in theQuartermaster-General's Department, and that he intended to recommendthat I should be given the rank of Brevet-Major so soon as I shouldbe qualified by becoming a regimental Captain. I was, of course, muchgratified by his appreciative words and kindly manner; but the brevetseemed a long way off, for I had only been a First Lieutenant for lessthan a year, and there were more than a hundred officers in the BengalArtillery senior to me in that rank!

I marched to Cawnpore with Army Head-Quarters. Sir William Peel, whowas slowly recovering from his wound, was of the party. We reachedCawnpore on the 17th, and the next day I said good-bye to my friendson the Chief's staff. Peel and I dined together on the 19th, when toall appearances he was perfectly well, but on going into his roomthe next morning I found he was in a high fever, and had somesuspicious-looking spots about his face. I went off at once in searchof a doctor, and soon returned with one of the surgeons of the 5thFusiliers, who, to my horror--for I had observed that Peel was nervousabout himself--exclaimed with brutal frankness the moment he enteredthe room, 'You have got small-pox. ' It was only too true. On beingconvinced that this was the case, I went to the chaplain, the Rev. Thomas Moore, and told him of Peel's condition. Without an instant'shesitation, he decided the invalid must come to his house to be takencare of. That afternoon I had the poor fellow carried over, and thereI left him in the kind hands of Mrs. Moore, the _padre's_ wife, whohad, as a special case, been allowed to accompany her husband toCawnpore. Peel died on the 27th. On the 4th May I embarked at Calcuttain the P. And O. Steamer _Nubia_, without, alas! the friend whosepleasant companionship I had hoped to have enjoyed on the voyage. 

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW, March, 1858]

[Footnote 1: The Infantry portion of the army was divided into threedivisions, commanded respectively by Outram, Lugard, and Walpole. Thiswas exclusive of Franks's column, which joined at Lucknow and made afourth division. The Artillery was placed under Archdale Wilson, andthe Engineers under Robert Napier. Sir Colin's selection of Commanderscaused considerable heart-burnings, especially amongst the seniorofficers who had been sent out from England for the purpose of beingemployed in the field. But, as the Chief explained to the Duke ofCambridge, the selection had been made with the greatest care, ithaving been found that 'an officer unexperienced in war in Indiacannot act for himself ... It is quite impossible for him to be ableto weigh the value of intelligence ... He cannot judge what are theresources of the country, and he is totally unable to make an estimatefor himself of the resistance the enemy opposed to him is likely tooffer. ' Sir Colin wound up his letter as follows: 'I do not wish toundervalue the merits of General or other officers lately arrivedfrom England, but merely to indicate to your Royal Highness thedifficulties against which they have to contend. What is more, thestate of things at present does not permit of trusting anything tochance, or allowing new-comers to learn, except under the command ofothers. '--Shadwell's 'Life of Lord Clyde. ']

[Footnote 2: The late Captain Oliver Jones, who published hisexperiences under that title. ]

[Footnote 3: Literally 'blue cow, ' one of the bovine antelopes. ]

[Footnote 4: A few days afterwards, when we were some miles from thescene of our adventure, I was awakened one morning by the greyhoundlicking my face; she had cleverly found me out in the midst of a largecrowded camp. ]

[Footnote 5: Peel had changed his 24-pounders for the more powerful64-pounders belonging to H. M. S. _Shannon_. ]

[Footnote 6:

 Naval Brigade 431 Artillery 1, 745 Engineers 865 Cavalry 3, 169 Infantry 12, 498 Franks's Division 2, 880 Nepalese Contingent 9, 000 ------ 30, 588]

[Footnote 7: Kaye, in his 'History of the Indian Mutiny, ' givesthe credit for originating this movement to the Commander-in-Chiefhimself; but the present Lord Napier of Magdala has letters in hispossession which clearly prove that the idea was his father's, and there is a passage in General Porter's 'History of the RoyalEngineers, ' vol. Ii. , p. 476, written after he had read Napier'sletters to Sir Colin Campbell, which leaves no room for doubt as to myversion being the correct one. ]

[Footnote 8: Outram's division consisted of the 23rd Royal WelshFusiliers, 79th Highlanders, 2nd and 3rd battalions of the RifleBrigade, 1st Bengal Fusiliers, 2nd Punjab Infantry, D'Aguilar's, Remmington's and Mackinnon's troops of Horse Artillery, Gibbon's andMiddleton's Field Batteries, and some Heavy guns, 2nd Dragoon Guards, 9th Lancers, 2nd Punjab Cavalry, and Watson's and Sandford's squadronsof the 1st and 5th Punjab Cavalry. ]

[Footnote 9: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Lothian Nicholson, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 10: Now Colonel Thomas Butler, V. C. ]

[Footnote 11: Now General the Right Hon. Sir Edward Lugard, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 12: It was current in camp, and the story has often beenrepeated, that Hodson was killed in the act of looting. This certainlywas not the case. Hodson was sitting with Donald Stewart in theHead-Quarters camp, when the signal-gun announced that the attack onthe Begum Kothi was about to take place. Hodson immediately mountedhis horse, and rode off in the direction of the city. Stewart, who hadbeen ordered by the Commander-in-Chief to accompany the troops, andsend an early report to his Excellency of the result of the assault, had his horse ready, and followed Hodson so closely that he kept himin sight until within a short distance of the fighting, when Stewartstopped to speak to the officer in charge of Peel's guns, which hadbeen covering the advance of the troops. This delayed Stewart for afew minutes only, and as he rode into the court-yard of the palace aHighland soldier handed him a pistol, saying, 'This is your pistol, sir; but I thought you were carried away mortally wounded a short timeago?' Stewart at once conjectured that the man had mistaken him forHodson. In face they were not much alike, but both were tall, wellmade and fair, and Native soldiers had frequently saluted one for theother. It is clear from this account that Hodson could not have beenlooting, as he was wounded almost as soon as he reached the palace. ]

[Footnote 13: In the month of May, 1858, alone, not less than athousand British soldiers died of sunstroke, fatigue and disease, andabout a hundred were killed in action. ]

[Footnote 14: Consisting of the 23rd Fusiliers, 79th Highlanders, and1st Bengal Fusiliers. ]

[Footnote 15: Captain Wale, a gallant officer who commanded a newlyraised corps of Sikh Cavalry, lost his life on this occasion. Hepersuaded Campbell to let him follow up the enemy, and was shot deadin a charge. His men behaved extremely well, and one of them, by nameGanda Sing, saved the life of the late Sir Robert Sandeman, who was asubaltern in the regiment. The same man, two years later, saved thelate Sir Charles Macgregor's life during the China war, and when I wasCommander-in-Chief in India I had the pleasure of appointing him to bemy Native Aide-de-Camp. Granda Sing, who has now the rank of Captainand the title of _Sirdar Bahadur_, retired last year with a handsomepension and a small grant of land. ]

[Footnote 16: A Mahomedan Priest. ]

[Footnote 17: Now General Cockburn Hood, C. B. ]

[Footnote 18: Now General Sir Samuel Browne, V. C. , G. C. B. This popularand gallant officer, well known to every Native in Upper India as'S[=a]m Br[=u]n _Sahib_, ' and to the officers of the whole of HerMajesty's army as the inventor of the sword-belt universally adoptedon service, distinguished himself greatly in the autumn of 1858. With230 sabres of his own regiment and 350 Native Infantry, he attacked aparty of rebels who had taken up a position at Nuria, a village at theedge of the Terai, about ten miles from Pilibhit. Browne managed toget to the rear of the enemy without being discovered; a hand-to-handfight then ensued, in which he got two severe wounds--one on the knee, from which he nearly bled to death, the other on the left shoulder, cutting right through the arm. The enemy were completely routed, andfled, leaving their four guns and 300 dead on the ground. Browne wasdeservedly rewarded with the V. C. ]

[Footnote 19: The present 13th Bengal Lancers. ]

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CHAPTER XXX. 

 What brought about the Mutiny? --Religious fears of the people--The land question --The annexation of Oudh--Fulfilment of Malcolm's prophecy --The Delhi royal family--The Nana Sahib--The Native army --Greased cartridges--Limited number of British troops --Objection to foreign service--Excessive age of the British officers

'What brought about the Mutiny?' and 'Is there any chance of a similarrising occurring again?' are questions which are constantly being putto me; I will now endeavour to answer them, though it is not a veryeasy task--for I feel that my book will be rendered more interestingand complete to many if I endeavour to give them some idea of thecircumstances which, in my opinion, led to that calamitous crisis inthe history of our rule in India, and then try to show how I think arepetition of such a disaster may best be guarded against. 

The causes which brought about the Mutiny were so various, and some ofthem of such long standing, that it is difficult to point them out asconcisely as I could wish; but I will be as brief as possible. 

During the first years of our supremacy in India, Hindus andMahomedans alike were disposed to acquiesce in our rule--the blessingsof rest and peace after a long reign of strife and anarchy were tooreal not to be appreciated; but as time went by, a new generationsprang up by whom past miseries were forgotten, and those who had realgrievances, or those who were causelessly discontented, were all readyto lay the blame for their real or fancied troubles on their foreignrulers. Mahomedans looked back to the days of their Empire in India, but failed to remember how completely, until we broke the Mahrattapower, the Hindus had got the upper hand. Their Moulvies taught themthat it was only lawful for true Mussulmans to submit to the rule ofan infidel if there was no possibility of successful revolt, and theywatched for the chance of again being able to make Islam supreme. TheHindus had not forgotten that they had ousted the Mahomedans, and theyfancied that the fate of the British _raj_ might also be at theirmercy. 

The late Sir George Campbell, in his interesting memoirs, says: 'TheMutiny was a sepoy revolt, not a Hindu rebellion. ' I do not altogetheragree with him; for, although there was no general rising of the ruralpopulation, the revolt, in my judgment, would never have taken placehad there not been a feeling of discontent and disquiet throughoutthat part of the country from which our Hindustani sepoys chieflycame, and had not certain influential people been thoroughlydissatisfied with our system of government. This discontent anddissatisfaction were produced by a policy which, in many instances, the Rulers of India were powerless to avoid or postpone, forced uponthem as it was by the demands of civilization and the necessity for amore enlightened legislation. Intriguers took advantage of this stateof affairs to further their own ends. Their plan of action was toalienate the Native army, and to increase the general feeling ofuneasiness and suspicion, by spreading false reports as to theintentions of the authorities in regard to the various measures whichhad been adopted to promote the welfare and prosperity of the masses. It can hardly be questioned that these measures were right and properin themselves, but they were on that account none the less obnoxiousto the Brahmin priesthood, or distasteful to the Natives generally. In some cases also they were premature, and in others they were notcarried out as judiciously as they might have been, or with sufficientregard to the feelings and prejudices of the people. 

The prohibition of _sati_ (burning widows on the funeral pyres oftheir husbands); the putting a stop to female infanticide; theexecution of Brahmins for capital offences; the efforts ofmissionaries and the protection of their converts; the removal of alllegal obstacles to the remarriage of widows; the spread of western andsecular education generally; and, more particularly, the attempt tointroduce female education, were causes of alarm and disgust to theBrahmins, and to those Hindus of high caste whose social privilegeswere connected with the Brahminical religion. Those arbiters offate, who were until then all-powerful to control every act of theirco-religionists, social, religious or political, were quick toperceive that their influence was menaced, and that their sway wouldin time be wrested from them, unless they could devise some means foroverthrowing our Government. They knew full well that the groundworkof this influence was ignorance and superstition, and they stoodaghast at what they foresaw would be the inevitable result ofenlightenment and progress. Railways and telegraphs were speciallydistasteful to the Brahmins: these evidences of ability and strengthwere too tangible to be pooh-poohed or explained away. Moreover, railways struck a direct blow at the system of caste, for on thempeople of every caste, high and low, were bound to travel together. 

The fears and antagonism of the Brahmins being thus aroused, itwas natural that they should wish to see our rule upset, and theyproceeded to poison the minds of the people with tales of theGovernment's determination to force Christianity upon them, andto make them believe that the continuance of our power meant thedestruction of all they held most sacred. 

Nor was opportunity wanting to confirm, apparently, the truth of theirassertions. In the gaols a system of messing had been establishedwhich interfered with the time-honoured custom of every man beingallowed to provide and cook his own food. This innovation was mostproperly introduced as a matter of gaol discipline, and due care wastaken that the food of the Hindu prisoners should be prepared bycooks of the same or superior caste. Nevertheless, false reports weredisseminated, and the credulous Hindu population was led to believethat the prisoners' food was in future to be prepared by men ofinferior caste, with the object of defiling and degrading those forwhom it was prepared. The news of what was supposed to have happenedin the gaols spread from town to town and from village to village, the belief gradually gaining ground that the people were about to beforced to embrace Christianity. 

As the promiscuous messing story did not greatly concern theMahomedans, other cries were made use of to create suspicion anddistrust amongst the followers of the Prophet. One of these, whichequally affected the Hindu and Mahomedan, was the alleged unfairnessof what was known in India as the land settlement, under which systemthe right and title of each landholder to his property was examined, and the amount of revenue to be paid by him to the paramount Power, asowner of the soil, was regulated. 

The rapid acquisition of territory by the East India Company, andthe establishment of its supremacy as the sovereign Power throughoutIndia, were necessarily effected by military operations; but as peaceand order were established, the system of land revenue, which hadbeen enforced in an extremely oppressive and corrupt manner undersuccessive Native Rulers and dynasties, had to be investigated andrevised. With this object in view, surveys were made, and inquiriesinstituted into the rights of ownership and occupancy, the resultbeing that in many cases it was found that families of position andinfluence had either appropriated the property of their humblerneighbours, or evaded an assessment proportionate to the value oftheir estates. Although these inquiries were carried out with the bestintentions, they were extremely distasteful to the higher classes, while they failed to conciliate the masses. The ruling families deeplyresented our endeavours to introduce an equitable determination ofrights and assessment of land revenue. They saw that it would put anend to the system of pillage and extortion which had been practisedfrom time immemorial; they felt that their authority was beingdiminished, and that they would no longer be permitted to govern theirestates in the same despotic manner as formerly. On the other hand, although the agricultural population generally benefited materiallyby our rule, they could not realize the benevolent intentions of aGovernment which tried to elevate their position and improve theirprospects. Moreover, there were no doubt mistakes made in thevaluation of land, some of it being assessed at too high a rate, whilethe revenue was sometimes collected in too rigid a manner, sufficientallowance not being made for the failure of crops. Then the harshlaw for the sale of proprietary rights in land to realize arrears ofland-tax was often enforced by careless revenue authorities in far toosummary a manner. The peasantry of India were, and still are, ignorantand apathetic. Accustomed from the earliest days to spoliation andoppression, and to a periodical change of masters, they had somereason to doubt whether the rule of the Feringhis would be morepermanent than that of the Moghuls or the Mahrattas. Much as a justand tolerant Government would have been to their advantage, they wereunable to appreciate it, and if they had appreciated it, they were tootimid and too wanting in organization to give it their open support. Under these social and political conditions, the passive attitude ofthe rural population failed to counterbalance the active hostilityof a large section of the upper classes, and of their predatoryfollowers, who for centuries had lived by plunder and civil war. 

Another weighty cause of discontent, chiefly affecting the wealthy andinfluential classes, and giving colour to the Brahmins' accusationthat we intended to upset the religion and violate the most cherishedcustoms of the Hindus, was Lord Dalhousie's strict enforcement ofthe doctrine of the lapse of property in the absence of direct orcollateral heirs, and the consequent appropriation of certain NativeStates, and the resumption of certain political pensions by theGovernment of India. This was condemned by the people of India asgrasping, and as an unjustifiable interference with the institutionsof the country, and undoubtedly made us many enemies. [1]

Later on, the annexation of Oudh, which was one of those measuresforced on the Rulers of India in the interests of humanity and goodgovernment, and which could hardly have been longer delayed, createdsuspicion and apprehension amongst all the Native States. For morethan sixty years Governor-General after Governor-General had pointedout the impossibility of a civilized Government tolerating in themidst of its possessions the misrule, disorder, and debaucherywhich were desolating one of the most fertile and thickly-populateddistricts in India. 

As early as 1801 Lord Wellesley wrote: 'I am satisfied that noeffectual security can be provided against the ruin of the provinceof Oudh until the exclusive management of the civil and militarygovernment of that country shall be transferred to the Company undersuitable provisions for the Nawab and his family. '

In 1831 Lord William Bentinck warned the King of Oudh that, unlesshe would consent to rule his territories in accordance with theprinciples of good government and the interest of the people, the EastIndia Company would assume the entire administration of the province, and would make him a state prisoner. 

In 1847 Lord Hardinge went in person to Lucknow and solemnlyreiterated the warning, giving the King two years to reform hisadministration. 

In 1851 Colonel Sleeman, the Resident at Lucknow, whose sympathy withthe Rulers of Native States was thought to be even too great, andwho was the last person to exaggerate the misrule existing in Oudh, reported to Lord Dalhousie that the state of things had becomeintolerable, and that, if our troops were withdrawn from Oudh, thelandholders would in one month's time overrun the province and pillageLucknow. It is true Sleeman, with his Native proclivities, did notcontemplate annexation; his advice was to 'assume the administration, 'but not to 'grasp the revenues of the country. ' The same mode ofprocedure had been advocated by Henry Lawrence six years before in anarticle which appeared in the _Calcutta Review_. His words were: 'LetOudh be at last governed, not for one man, the King, but for the Kingand his people. Let the administration of the country be Native; letnot one rupee come into the Company's coffers. '

Sleeman was followed in 1854 by Colonel Outram, than whom he couldnot have had a more admirable successor, or one less likely to beunnecessarily hard upon a State which, with all its shortcomings, hadbeen loyal to us for nearly a century. Colonel Outram, nevertheless, fully endorsed the views of his predecessor. General Low, the thenMilitary Member of Council, who twenty years before, when Residentat Lucknow, had deprecated our assuming even temporarily theadministration of Oudh, thinking our action would be misunderstood bythe people, now also stated his conviction that 'it was the paramountduty of the British Government to interfere at once for the protectionof the people of Oudh. '

In summing up the case, Lord Dalhousie laid three possible courses ofaction before the authorities in England. The King of Oudh might beforced to abdicate, his province being incorporated in the Britishdominions; or he might be maintained in his royal state as asubsidized Prince, the actual government being permanently transferredto the East India Company; or the transfer of the government tothe East India Company might be for a limited period only. TheGovernor-General recommended the second course, but the Court ofDirectors and Her Majesty's Ministers decided to adopt the first, and requested Lord Dalhousie to carry out the annexation before heresigned his office. 

This measure, so long deferred and so carefully considered, couldhardly, in my opinion, have been avoided by a civilized and civilizingGovernment. It was at last adopted with the utmost reluctance, andonly after the experiment of administering a province for the benefitof the Natives, without annexing it, had been tried in the Punjaband had signally failed. To use Lord Dalhousie's words, it was amplyjustified on the ground that 'the British Government would be guiltyin the sight of God and man if it were any longer to aid in sustainingby its countenance an administration fraught with suffering tomillions. ' But the Natives generally could not understand thenecessity for the measure, or believe in the reasons which influencedus; many of them, therefore, considered it an unprovoked usurpation, and each Ruler of a Native State imagined that his turn might comenext. 

Thus, the annexation of Oudh in one sense augmented that weakness inour position as an eastern Power which, so to speak, had its sourcein our strength. So long as there was a balance of powerbetween ourselves and Native States--Mahratta, Rajput, Sikh, orMahomedan--they were prevented by their mutual jealousies andreligious differences from combining against us; but when that balancewas destroyed and we became the paramount Power in India, the periodof danger to us began, as was prophesied by the far-seeing Malcolm inthe early days of our first conquests. We had now become objects ofsuspicion and dread to all the lesser Powers, who were ready to sinktheir own disputes in the consideration of the best means to check theextension of our rule and overthrow our supremacy; while we, inflatedby our power and satisfied with our apparent security, became moredogmatic and uncompromising in enforcing principles which, thoughsound and just in themselves, were antipathetic to Native ideas andtraditions. By a great many acts and measures we made them feel howcompletely our ideas differed from theirs. They preferred their own, and strongly resented our increasing efforts to impose ours upon them. Even those amongst the Native Princes who were too enlightened tobelieve that we intended to force our religion upon them and changeall their customs, felt that their power was now merely nominal, andthat every substantial attribute of sovereignty would soon disappearif our notions of progress continued to be enforced. 

At a time when throughout the country there existed these feelings ofdissatisfaction and restless suspicion, it was not to be expected thatthe most discontented and unfriendly of the Native Rulers would notseize the opportunity to work us mischief. The most prominent of theseamongst the Mahomedans were the royal family of Delhi and the ex-Kingof Oudh, and, amongst the Hindus, Dundu Pant, better known by Englishpeople as the 'Nana Sahib. '

All three considered themselves badly treated, and no doubt, fromtheir point of view, their grievances were not altogether groundless. The King of Oudh's I have already indicated, and when his province wasannexed, he was removed to Calcutta. Having refused the yearly pensionof twelve lakhs[2] of rupees offered to him, and declined to sign thetreaty by which his territory was made over to the British Government, he sent his mother, his son, and his brother to England to plead hiscause for him. 

The most influential of the three discontented Rulers, or, at allevents, the one whom the rebellious of all castes and religions weremost inclined to put forward as their nominal leader, was the head ofthe Delhi royal family, by name Bahadur Shah. He was eighty years oldin 1857, and had been on the throne for twenty years. His particulargrievance lay in the fact of our decision that on his death thetitle of King, which we had bestowed on the successors of the MoghulEmperor, should be abolished, and his family removed from Delhi. 

In the early part of the century Lord Wellesley pointed out the dangerof allowing a Mahomedan Prince, with all the surroundings of royalty, to remain at the seat of the old Moghul government, but the questionwas allowed to remain in abeyance until 1849, when Lord Dalhousiereconsidered it, and obtained the sanction of the authorities inEngland to the removal of the Court from Delhi to a place aboutfourteen miles off, where the Kutub tower stands. At the same time theHeir Apparent was to be told that on his father's death the title ofKing of Delhi would cease. 

Lord Dalhousie had been only a short time in India when he tookup this question, and he could not properly have appreciated theestimation in which the Natives held the King of Delhi, for he wrotein support of his proposals 'that the Princes of India and its peoplehad become entirely indifferent to the condition of the King or hisposition. ' But when the decision of the British Government on thesubject reached India, he had been more than two years in the country, and although his views as to the desirability of the measure remainedunchanged, the experience he had gained enabled him to gauge moreaccurately the feelings of the people, and, with the advice of hisCouncil, he came to the conclusion that it would be wiser to letaffairs remain _in statu quo_ during Bahadur Shah's lifetime. Theroyal family were informed accordingly, and an agreement was drawn up, signed, sealed, and witnessed, by which the Heir Apparent accepted theconditions to be imposed upon him on the death of his father, who wasto be allowed to remain in Delhi during his lifetime, with all theparaphernalia of royalty. 

However satisfactory this arrangement might be to the Government ofIndia, to every member of the Delhi royal family it must have seemedoppressive and humiliating to the last degree. Outwardly they appearedto accept the inevitable quietly and submissively, but they were onlybiding their time, and longing for an opportunity to throw off thehated English yoke. The war with Persia in 1856 seemed to offer thechance they wanted. On the pretence that the independence of Heratwas threatened by the Amir of Kabul, the Persians marched an army tobesiege that place. As this act was a violation of our treaty withPersia made three years before, Her Majesty's Government directed thatan army should be sent from India to the Persian Gulf. The troops hadscarcely left Bombay before the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-WestProvinces was warned by a Native correspondent that the King ofDelhi was intriguing with the Shah of Persia. At the same time aproclamation was posted on the walls of the Jama Masjid (Shah Jehan'sfamous mosque at Delhi), to the effect that a Persian army was comingto relieve India from the presence of the English, and calling on alltrue believers to rise and fight against the heretics. Reports werealso diligently circulated of our being defeated on the shores ofthe Persian Gulf, and the people were made to believe that theiropportunity had arrived, and that the time was now favourable for asuccessful rebellion. 

Of the three principal movers in the events which immediately precededthe Mutiny, the Nana Sahib was by far the most intelligent, and hadmixed most with Europeans. He was the adopted son and heir of the lastof the Peshwas, the Chiefs of the Mahratta confederacy. His cause ofdissatisfaction was the discontinuance to him of a pension which, atthe close of the Mahratta war in 1818, was granted to the Peshwa, onthe clear understanding that it was to cease at his death. The Peshwadied in 1851, leaving the Nana an enormous fortune; but he was notcontent. The lapse of the pension, to which he was not entitled, rankled in his breast, and when all his efforts to get it restoredto him proved of no avail, he became thoroughly disgusted anddisaffected. After failing to obtain in India a reconsideration ofthe decision of the Government on the subject, he sent to Englandas confidential agent a Mahomedan of the name of Azimula Khan, whoremained three years in Europe, residing for the most part in London;but he also visited Paris, Constantinople, and the Crimea, arriving atthe latter place when we, in alliance with the French, were besiegingSebastopol. He was a man of no rank or position in his own country, amere agent of the Nana's, but he was received into the best Englishsociety, was everywhere treated as a royal Prince, and became engagedto a young English girl, who agreed to follow him to India to bemarried. All this was revealed by the correspondence to which I havereferred as having been found in the Nana's palace of Bithur. Thegreater number of these letters were from people in England--not a fewfrom ladies of rank and position. One elderly dame called him her deareastern son. There were numerous letters from his English _fiancée_, and two from a Frenchman of the name of Lafont, [3] relating to somebusiness with the French settlement of Chandernagore, with which hehad been entrusted by Azimula Khan, acting for the Nana. Written, asthese letters were, immediately before the Mutiny, in which the Nanawas the leading spirit, it seems probable that '_les principaleschoses_, ' to which Lafont hopes to bring satisfactory answers, wereinvitations to the disaffected and disloyal in Calcutta, and perhapsthe French settlers at Chandernagore, to assist in the effort about tobe made to throw off the British yoke. A portion of the correspondencewas unopened, and there were several letters in Azimula's ownhandwriting which had not been despatched. Two of these were to OmarPasha at Constantinople, and told of the sepoys' discontent and thetroubled state of India generally. That the Nana was intriguing withthe King of Delhi, the Nawab of Oudh, and other great personages, hasbeen proved beyond a doubt, although at the time he was looked upon bythe British residents at Cawnpore as a perfectly harmless individual, in spite of its being known that he considered himself aggrieved onaccount of his having been refused the continuance of the pension, andbecause a salute of guns (such as it is the custom to give to NativePrinces on entering British territory) had not been accorded to him. 

While the spirit of rebellion was thus being fostered and stirred intoactive existence throughout the country, it was hardly to be hopedthat the Native army would be allowed to remain unaffected by amovement which could not easily attain formidable proportions withoutthe assistance of the Native soldiers, who themselves, moreover, hadnot remained unmoved spectators of all that had happened during theprevious thirty or forty years. The great majority of the sepoys weredrawn from the agricultural classes, especially in the provinceof Oudh, and were therefore directly interested in all questionsconnected with rights of property, tenure of land, etc. ; and questionsof religion and caste affected them equally with the rest of thepopulation. 

Quietly, but surely, the instigators of rebellion were preparing theNative army for revolt. The greatest cunning and circumspection were, however, necessary to success. There were so many opposing intereststo be dealt with, Mahomedans and Hindus being as violently hostile toeach other, with regard to religion and customs, as they were to us. Soldiers, too, of all ranks had a great stake in their profession. Some had nearly served their time for their pensions, that greatestof all attractions to the Native to enter the army, for the youngestrecruit feels that, if he serves long enough, he is sure of an incomesufficient to enable him to sit in the sun and do nothing for the restof his days--a Native's idea of supreme happiness. The enemies of ourrule generally, and the fanatic in particular, were, however, equalto the occasion. They took advantage of the widespread discontent toestablish the belief that a systematic attack was to be made on thefaith and habits of the people, whether Hindu or Mahomedan, and, as aproof of the truth of their assertions, they alleged that the Enfieldcartridges which had been recently issued to the army were greasedwith a mixture of cows' fat and lard, the one being as obnoxious tothe Hindu as the other is to the Mahomedan. The news spread throughoutthe Bengal Presidency; the sepoys became alarmed, and determined tosuffer any punishment rather than pollute themselves by biting thecontaminating cartridge, as their doing so would involve loss ofcaste, which to the Hindu sepoy meant the loss of everything to himmost dear and sacred in this world and the next. He and his familywould become outcasts, his friends and relations would look on himwith horror and disgust, while eternal misery, he believed, would behis doom in the world to come. 

It has been made quite clear that a general belief existed amongst theHindustani sepoys that the destruction of their caste and religion hadbeen finally resolved upon by the English, as a means of forcing themto become Christians, and it seems extraordinary that the Englishofficers with Native regiments were so little aware of the strength ofthis impression amongst their men. 

The recent researches of Mr. Forrest in the records of the Governmentof India prove that the lubricating mixture used in preparing thecartridges was actually composed of the objectionable ingredients, cows' fat and lard, and that incredible disregard of the soldiers'religious prejudices was displayed in the manufacture of thesecartridges. When the sepoys complained that to bite them would destroytheir caste, they were solemnly assured by their officers that theyhad been greased with a perfectly unobjectionable mixture. Theseofficers, understanding, as all who have come in contact with Nativesare supposed to understand, their intense abhorrence of touching theflesh or fat of the sacred cow or the unclean pig, did not believe itpossible that the authorities could have been so regardless of thesepoys' feelings as to have allowed it to be used in preparing theirammunition: they therefore made this statement in perfect good faith. But nothing was easier than for the men belonging to the regimentsquartered near Calcutta to ascertain, from the low-caste Nativeworkmen employed in manufacturing the cartridges at the Fort Williamarsenal, that the assurances of their officers were not in accordancewith facts, and they were thus prepared to credit the fables which thesedition-mongers so sedulously spread abroad, to the effect that theGovernment they served and the officers who commanded them had enteredinto a deliberate conspiracy to undermine their religion. 

Notwithstanding all the evil influence brought to bear on the Nativearmy, I do not think that the sepoys would have proved such readyinstruments in the hands of the civilian intriguers, had that armybeen organized, disciplined, and officered in a satisfactory manner, and had there been a sufficient proportion of British troops in Indiaat the time. To the great preponderance of Native, as compared withBritish, troops may be attributed the fact that the sepoys dared tobreak into open mutiny. Moreover, the belief of the Natives in theinvincibility of the British soldier, which formerly enabled smallnumbers of Europeans to gain victories over large Native armies, hadbeen seriously weakened by the lamentable occurrences at Kabul duringthe first Afghan war, terminating in the disastrous retreat in thewinter of 1841-42. 

To add to the exalted idea the sepoys were beginning to entertain oftheir own importance, they were pampered by their officers and thecivil Government to a most absurd extent, being treated under allcircumstances with far greater consideration than the Europeansoldiers. For instance, in the time of Lord William Bentinck floggingwas abolished in the Native army, [4] while still in full swing amongstBritish soldiers, and sepoys were actually allowed to witness thehumiliation of their white comrades when this degrading form ofpunishment was inflicted upon them. 

In the early days of our connexion with India, we had no need foran army. Living, as we were, on sufferance in a foreign land forcommercial purposes, armed men were only required to guard thefactories. As these factories increased in size and importance, thesearmed men were given a semi-military organization, and in time theywere formed into levies as a reserve to the few Europeans entertainedby the merchants, to enable them to hold their own against the French, who were then beginning to dispute with us for supremacy in southernIndia. When employed in the field, the Native troops were associatedwith a varying proportion of British soldiers, but the number of thelatter was limited by the expense of their maintenance, the difficultyof supplying them from England, and the unadvisability of locking up apart of the British army in distant stations, which at that timewere very inaccessible and generally unhealthy. Native troops weretherefore raised in continually increasing numbers, and after thebattle of Plassey the Native army was rapidly augmented, especiallyin the Bengal Presidency; and, trained and led as it was by Britishofficers, it achieved remarkable successes. 

During the thirteen years preceding the Mutiny, the Native army, numbering 217, 000 men and 176 guns, was increased by 40, 000 men and 40guns, but no addition was made to the small British force of 38, 000until 1853, when one regiment was added to each Presidency, or lessthan 3, 000 soldiers in all. This insignificant augmentation wassubsequently more than neutralized by the withdrawal of six Britishregiments from India to meet the requirements of the Crimean andPersian wars. Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General in 1854, saw the dangerof this great preponderance of Native troops. He represented that theannexations and conquests which had taken place during his tenure ofoffice necessitated a proportional increase of British soldiers; heprotested against the withdrawal of a single European regiment, eitheron account of the war with Russia or for operations in the PersianGulf, and he solemnly warned Her Majesty's Government that theessential element of our strength in India was the presence of a largenumber of British troops. 

No attention, however, was paid to Lord Dalhousie's representations bythe authorities in England, who doubtless thought they understood therequirements of India better than the Governor-General, with hismore than six years' experience of the country. In spite of hisremonstrances, two regiments were ordered to England, and four weresent later to the Persian Gulf, with the result which I have alreadystated. 

When the Mutiny broke out, the whole effective British force in Indiaonly amounted to 36, 000 men, against 257, 000 Native soldiers, [5] afact which was not likely to be overlooked by those who hoped andstrived to gain to their own side this preponderance of numericalstrength, and which was calculated to inflate the minds of the sepoyswith a most undesirable sense of independence. An army of Asiatics, such as we maintain in India, is a faithful servant, but a treacherousmaster; powerfully influenced by social and religious prejudices withwhich we are imperfectly acquainted, it requires the most carefulhandling; above all, it must never be allowed to lose faith in theprestige or supremacy of the governing race. When mercenaries feelthat they are indispensable to the maintenance of that authority whichthey have no patriotic interest in upholding, they begin to considerwhether it would not be more to their advantage to aid in overthrowingthat authority, and if they decide that it would be, they have littlescruple in transferring their allegiance from the Government theynever loved, and have ceased to fear, to the power more in accordancewith their own ideas, and from which, they are easily persuaded, theywill obtain unlimited benefits. 

A fruitful cause of dissatisfaction in our Native army, and one whichpressed more heavily upon it year by year, as our acquisitions ofterritory in northern India became more extended, was the sepoy'sliability to service in distant parts of India, entailing upon him alife amongst strangers differing from him in religion and in all theircustoms, and far away from his home, his family, and his congenialsurroundings--a liability which he had never contemplated except inthe event of war, when extra pay, free rations and the possibilityof loot, would go far to counterbalance the disadvantages ofexpatriation. Service in Burma, which entailed crossing the sea, and, to the Hindu, consequent loss of caste, was especially distasteful. Sogreat an objection, indeed, had the sepoys to this so-called 'foreignservice, ' and so difficult did it become to find troops to relieve theregiments, in consequence of the bulk of the Bengal army not beingavailable for service beyond the sea, that the Court of Directorssanctioned Lord Canning's proposal that, after the 1st September, 1856, 'no Native recruit shall be accepted who does not at the time ofhis enlistment undertake to serve beyond the sea whether withinthe territories of the Company or beyond them. ' This order, thoughabsolutely necessary, caused the greatest dissatisfaction amongstthe Hindustani sepoys, who looked upon it as one of the measuresintroduced by the _Sirkar_ for the forcible, or rather fraudulent, conversion of all the Natives to Christianity. [6]

That the long-existing discontent and growing disloyalty in ourNative army might have been discovered sooner, and grappled with in asufficiently prompt and determined manner to put a stop to the Mutiny, had the senior regimental and staff officers been younger, moreenergetic, and intelligent, is an opinion to which I have always beenstrongly inclined. Their excessive age, due to a strict system ofpromotion by seniority which entailed the employment of Brigadiers ofseventy, Colonels of sixty, and Captains of fifty, must necessarilyhave prevented them performing their military duties with the energyand activity which are more the attributes of younger men, and musthave destroyed any enthusiasm about their regiments, in which therewas so little hope of advancement or of individual merit beingrecognized. Officers who displayed any remarkable ability were allowedto be taken away from their own corps for the more attractive andbetter-paid appointments appertaining to civil employ or the Irregularservice. It was, therefore, the object of every ambitious and capableyoung officer to secure one of these appointments, and escape as soonas possible from a service in which ability and professional zealcounted for nothing. [7]

So far as I understand the causes which led to the rebellion of 1857, I have now answered the question, 'What brought about the Mutiny?' Thereply to the second question, 'Is there any chance of a similar risingoccurring again?' must be left to another chapter. 

[Footnote 1: In this matter it seems to me that Lord Dalhousie'spolicy has been unfairly criticized. The doctrine of lapse was nonew-fangled theory of the Governor-General, but had been recognizedand acted upon for many years by the Native dynasties which precededthe East India Company. Under the Company's rule the Court ofDirectors had investigated the subject, and in a series of despatchesfrom 1834 to 1846 had laid down that, in certain cases, the selectionand adoption of an heir by a Native Ruler was an incontestable right, subject only to the formal sanction of the suzerain Power, while inother cases such a procedure was optional, and could only be permittedas a special favour. Lord Dalhousie concurred in the view that eachcase should be considered and decided on its merits. His words were:'The Government is bound in duty, as well as in policy, to act onevery such occasion with the purest integrity, and in the mostscrupulous observance of good faith. Where even a shadow of doubt canbe shown, the claim should at once be abandoned. But where the rightto territory by lapse is clear, the Government is bound to take thatwhich is justly and legally its due, and to extend to that territorythe benefits of our sovereignty, present and prospective. ']

[Footnote 2: In those days £120, 000. ]

[Footnote 3:

 'Benares, '_April 4, 1857. _

 'MON CHER AZIMULA KHAN, 'Je suis parti de Cawnpore le premier du mois et suis arrivé ici ce matin, je partirai ce soir et serai à Chandernagore le 7 au matin, dans la journée je ferai une visite au Gouverneur et le lendemain irai à Calcutta, je verrai notre Consul General. Ecrivez-moi et adressez-moi vos lettres, No. 123, Dhurumtollah. Je voudrais que vous puissiez m'envoyer des fonds au moins 5 ou 600 Rs. Sans retard, car je ne resterai à Calcutta que le temps nécessaire pour tout arranger et _le bien arranger_. Je suppose 48 heures à Calcutta et deux ou trois jours au plus à Chandernagore, ne perdez pas de temps mais répondez de suite. Pour toutes les principales choses les réponses seraient satisfaisantes, soyez-en assuré. 

 'Faites en sorte de me répondre sans délai afin que je ne sois pas retenu à Calcutta. 

 'Présentez mes compliments respectueux. 

 'Rappelez-moi au souvenir de Baba Sahib, et croyez moi, 'Votre bien dévoué 'A. LAFONT. 

 'Mon adresse à Chandernagore, "Care of Mesdames Albert. "

 'N. B. --Mais écrivez-moi à _Calcutta_, car je serai chaque jour là, en chemin de fer, je fais le trajet en 20 minutes. Si vous avez quelque chose de pressé à me communiquer vous le pouvez faire par télégraph en Anglais seulement. 'A. L. '

 'Chandernagore, '_April 9, 1857. _

 'MON CHER AZIMULA KHAN, 'J'ai tout arrangé, _j'apporterai une lettre_, et elle sera satisfaisante _cette lettre_ me sera donnée le 14 et le 15 je partirai pour Cawnpore. Mes respects à son Altesse. 

 'Votre tout dévoué 'A. LAFONT. ']

[Footnote 4: Flogging was re-introduced in 1845. ]

[Footnote 5: This does not include the bodies of armed and trainedpolice, nor the lascars attached to the Artillery as fighting men. These amounted to many thousands. ]

[Footnote 6: In a letter to Lord Canning, which Sir Henry Lawrencewrote on the 9th May, 1857, he gave an interesting account of aconversation he had had with a Brahmin Native officer of the OudhArtillery, who was most persistent in his belief that the Governmentwas determined to make the people of India Christians. He alludedespecially to the new order about enlistment, our object being, hesaid, to make the sepoys go across the sea in order that they might beobliged to eat what we liked; and he argued that, as we had made ourway through India, had won Bhartpur, Lahore, etc. , by fraud, so itmight be possible that we would mix bone-dust with grain sold toHindus. Sir Henry Lawrence was quite unable to convince the Nativeofficer; he would give us credit for nothing, and although he wouldnot say that he himself _did_ or did _not_ believe, he kept repeating, 'I tell you Natives are all like sheep; the leading one tumbles, anddown all the rest roll over him. ']

[Footnote 7: It is curious to note how nearly every military officerwho held a command or high position on the staff in Bengal when theMutiny broke out, disappeared from the scene within the first fewweeks, and was never heard of officially again. Some were killed, somedied of disease, but the great majority failed completely to fulfilthe duties of the positions they held, and were consequentlyconsidered unfit for further employment. Two Generals of divisionswere removed from their commands, seven Brigadiers were found wantingin the hour of need, and out of the seventy-three regiments of RegularCavalry and Infantry which mutinied, only four Commanding officerswere given other commands, younger officers being selected to raiseand command the new regiments. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXI. 

 Discontent of the Natives--Successful administrators --Paternal despotism--Money-lenders and the Press--Faddists --Cardinal points

The India of to-day is altogether a different country from theIndia of 1857. Much has been done since then to improve the civiladministration, and to meet the legitimate demands of the Nativeraces. India is more tranquil, more prosperous, and more civilizedthan it was before the Mutiny, and the discipline, efficiency, andmobility of the Native army have been greatly improved. Much, however, still remains to be done, and a good deal might with advantage beundone, to secure the contentment of the Natives with our rule. 

Our position has been materially strengthened by the provision of mainand subsidiary lines of communication by road and railway; by thegreat network of telegraphs which now intersects the country; and bythe construction of canals. These great public works have largelyincreased the area of land under cultivation, minimized the risk offamine, equalized the prices of agricultural produce, and developed alarge and lucrative export trade. Above all, while our troops can nowbe assembled easily and rapidly at any centre of disturbance, thenumber of British soldiers has been more than doubled and the numberof Native soldiers has been materially reduced. Moreover, as regardsthe Native equally with the British army of India, I believe thata better feeling never existed throughout all ranks than exists atpresent. 

Nevertheless, there are signs that the spirit of unrest and discontentwhich sowed the seeds of the Mutiny is being revived. To some extentthis state of things is the natural result of our position inIndia, and is so far unavoidable, but it is also due to old faultsreappearing--faults which require to be carefully watched and guardedagainst, for it is certain that, however well disposed as soldiers themen in our ranks may be, their attitude will inevitably be influencedby the feelings of the people generally, more especially should theirhostility be aroused by any question connected with religion. 

For a considerable time after the Mutiny we became more cautious andconciliatory in administrative and legislative matters, more intenton doing what would keep the Chiefs and Rulers satisfied, the massescontented, and the country quiet, than on carrying out our own ideas. Gradually this wholesome caution is being disregarded. The Governmenthas become more and more centralized, and the departmental spiritvery strong. Each department, in its laudable wish for progress andadvancement, is apt to push on measures which are obnoxious to theNatives, either from their not being properly understood, or fromtheir being opposed to their traditions and habits of life, thusentailing the sacrifice of many cherished customs and privileges. Eachdepartment admits in theory the necessity for caution, but in practicepresses for liberty of action to further its own particular schemes. 

Of late years, too, the tendency has been to increase the number ofdepartments and of secretariat offices under the supreme Government, and this tendency, while causing more work to devolve on the supremeGovernment than it can efficiently perform, results in lesseningthe responsibility of provincial Governments by interference in themanagement of local concerns. It is obvious that in a country likeIndia, composed as it is of great provinces and various racesdiffering from one another in interests, customs, and religions, eachwith its own peculiar and distinct necessities, administrative detailsought to be left to the people on the spot. The Government of Indiawould then be free to exercise a firm and impartial control over theEmpire and Imperial interests, while guiding into safe channels, without unduly restraining, intelligent progress. 

In times of peace the administration is apt to fall too exclusivelyinto the hands of officials whose ability is of the doctrinaire type;they work hard, and can give logical and statistical reasons for themeasures they propose, and are thus able to make them attractive to, and believed in by, the authorities. But they lack the more perfectknowledge of human nature, and the deeper insight into, and greatersympathy with, the feelings and prejudices of Asiatics, which thosepossessed in a remarkable degree who proved by their success that theyhad mastered the problem of the best form of government for India. I allude to men like Thomas Munro, Mountstuart Elphinstone, JohnMalcolm, Charles Metcalfe, George Clerk, Henry and John Lawrence, William Sleeman, James Outram, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, andmany others. These administrators, while fully recognizing the needfor a gradual reform, understood the peculiarities of our positionin the east, the necessity for extreme caution and toleration, and a'live and let live' policy between us and the Natives. The sound andbroad views of this class of public servant are not always appreciatedeither in India or England, and are too often put aside asunpractical, obstructive, and old-fashioned. 

Amongst the causes which have produced discontent of late years, I would mention our forest laws and sanitary regulations, ourlegislative and fiscal systems--measures so necessary that noone interested in the prosperity of India could cavil at theirintroduction, but which are so absolutely foreign to Native ideas, that it is essential they should be applied with the utmost gentlenessand circumspection. 

I think, also, that the official idea of converting the young Princesand Nobles of India into English gentlemen by means of English tutorsand English studies should be carried out with great care and caution. It has not hitherto invariably succeeded, and the feeling in manyStates is strongly opposed to it. The danger of failure lies in thewholesome restraint of the tutor being suddenly removed, and in theyoung Prince being left at too early an age to select his advisers andcompanions. The former, perhaps not unnaturally, are interestedin proving that the training of their young Ruler by his Europeangovernor or tutor has not resulted in good either to himself or hispeople, while the latter are too often of the lowest class of Europeanadventurers. 

The proceedings and regulations of the Forest Department, desirableas they may be from a financial and agricultural point of view, haveprovoked very great irritation in many parts of India. People who havebeen accustomed from time immemorial to pick up sticks and graze theircattle on forest lands, cannot understand why they should now beforbidden to do so, nor can they realize the necessity for preservingthe trees from the chance of being destroyed by fire, a risk to whichthey were frequently exposed from the Native custom of making use oftheir shelter while cooking, and of burning the undergrowth to enrichthe grazing. 

The action taken by the Government in sanitary matters has alsoaroused much ill-feeling and apprehension. Sanitary precautions areentirely ignored in eastern countries. The great majority of thepeople can see no good in them, and no harm in using the same tankfor drinking purposes and for bathing and washing their clothes. Theimmediate surroundings of their towns and villages are most offensive, being used as the general receptacles for dead animals and all kindsof filth. Cholera, fever, and other diseases, which carry off hundredsof thousands every year, are looked upon as the visitation of God, from which it is impossible, even were it not impious to try, toescape; and the precautionary measures insisted upon by us in ourcantonments, and at the fairs and places of pilgrimage, are viewedwith aversion and indignation. Only those who have witnessed thepersonal discomfort and fatigue to which Natives of all ages and bothsexes willingly submit in their struggle to reach some holy shrine onthe occasion of a religious festival, while dragging their weary limbsfor many hundreds of miles along a hot, dusty road, or being huddledfor hours together in a crammed and stifling railway carriage, canhave any idea of the bitter disappointment to the pilgrims causedby their being ordered to disperse when cholera breaks out at suchgatherings, without being given the opportunity of performing theirvows or bathing in the sacred waters. [1]

Further, our legislative system is based on western ideas, its objectbeing to mete out equal justice to the rich and poor, to the Princeand peasant. But our methods of procedure do not commend themselvesto the Indian peoples. Eastern races are accustomed to a paternaldespotism, and they conceive it to be the proper function of the localrepresentatives of the supreme Power to investigate and determine onthe spot the various criminal and civil cases which come under thecognizance of the district officials. Legal technicalities andreferences to distant tribunals confuse and harass a population which, with comparatively few exceptions, is illiterate, credulous, andsuspicious of underhand influence. An almost unlimited right ofappeal from one court to another, in matters of even the most trivialimportance, not only tends to impair the authority of the localmagistrate, but gives an unfair advantage to the wealthy litigantwhose means enable him to secure the services of the ablest pleader, and to purchase the most conclusive evidence in support of his claims. For it must be remembered than in India evidence on almost any subjectcan be had for the buying, and the difficulty, in the administrationof justice, of discriminating between truth and falsehood is therebygreatly increased. Under our system a horde of unscrupulous pleadershas sprung up, and these men encourage useless litigation, therebyimpoverishing their clients, and creating much ill-feeling against ourlaws and administration. 

Another point worthy of consideration is the extent to which, underthe protection of our legal system, the peasant proprietors ofIndia are being oppressed and ruined by village shop-keepers andmoney-lenders. These men advance money at a most exorbitant rate ofinterest, taking as security the crops and occupancy rights of thecultivators of the soil. The latter are ignorant, improvident, andin some matters, such as the marriage ceremonies of their families, inordinately extravagant. The result is that a small debt soon swellsinto a big one, and eventually the aid of the law courts is invoked tooust the cultivator from a holding which, in many cases, has beenin the possession of his ancestors for hundreds of years. Themoney-lender has his accounts to produce, and these can hardly bedisputed, the debtor as a rule being unable to keep accounts of hisown, or, indeed, to read or write. Before the British dominionwas established in India, the usurer no doubt existed, but hisopportunities were fewer, his position more precarious, and hisoperations more under control than they are at present. Themoney-lender then knew that his life would not be safe if he exactedtoo high interest for the loans with which he accommodated hiscustomers, and that if he became too rich, some charge or other wouldbe trumped up against him, which would force him to surrender a largeshare of his wealth to the officials of the State in which he wasliving. I do not say that the rough-and-ready methods of Nativejustice in dealing with money-lenders were excusable or tolerable, butat the same time I am inclined to think that, in granting these menevery legal facility for enforcing their demands and carrying on theirtraffic, we may have neglected the interests of the agriculturists, and that it might be desirable to establish some agency under thecontrol of Government, which would enable the poorer landholders toobtain, at a moderate rate of interest, advances proportionate to thesecurity they had to offer. [2]

Another danger to our supremacy in India is the license allowed tothe Native press in vilifying the Government and its officials, andpersistently misrepresenting the motives and policy of the rulingPower. In a free country, where the mass of the population is welleducated, independent, and self-reliant, a free press is a mostvaluable institution, representing as it does the requirements andaspirations of important sections of the community, and bringing tolight defects and abuses in the social and political system. In acountry such as Great Britain, which is well advanced in the art ofself-government, intolerant and indiscriminate abuse of public mendefeats its own object, and misstatements of matters of fact can beat once exposed and refuted. Like most of the developments ofcivilization which are worth anything, the English press is a plantof indigenous growth, whereas in India the Native press is an exoticwhich, under existing conditions, supplies no general want, doesnothing to refine, elevate, or instruct the people, and is used by itssupporters and promoters--an infinitesimal part of the population--asa means of gaining its selfish ends, and of fostering sedition, andracial and religious animosities. There are, I am afraid, very fewNative newspapers actuated by a friendly or impartial spirit towardsthe Government of India, and to Asiatics it seems incredible that weshould permit such hostile publications to be scattered broadcast overthe country, unless the assertions were too true to be disputed, orunless we were too weak to suppress them. We gain neither credit norgratitude for our tolerant attitude towards the Native press--ourforbearance is misunderstood; and while the well-disposed areamazed at our inaction, the disaffected rejoice at being allowed topromulgate baseless insinuations and misstatements which undermine ourauthority, and thwart our efforts to gain the goodwill and confidenceof the Native population. 

Yet another danger to the permanence of our rule in India lies in theendeavours of well-intentioned faddists to regulate the customs andinstitutions of eastern races in accordance with their own ideas. The United Kingdom is a highly civilized country, and our habits andconvictions have been gradually developed under the influences of ourreligion and our national surroundings. Fortunately for themselves, the people of Great Britain possess qualities which have made themmasters of a vast and still expanding Empire. But these qualities havetheir defects as well as their merits, and one of the defects is acertain insularity of thought, or narrow-mindedness--a slowness torecognize that institutions which are perfectly suitable and right forus may be quite unsuited, if not injurious, to other races, and thatwhat may not be right for us to do is not necessarily wrong for peopleof a different belief, and with absolutely different traditions andcustoms. 

Gradually the form of Government in the United Kingdom has becomerepresentative and democratic, and it is therefore assumed by somepeople, who have little, if any, experience of the east, thatthe Government of India should be guided by the utterances ofself-appointed agitators who pose as the mouth-pieces of an oppressedpopulation. Some of these men are almost as much aliens[3] asourselves, while others are representatives of a class which, thoughintellectually advanced, has no influence amongst the races in whomlies the real strength of India. Municipal self-government has beenfound to answer well in the United Kingdom, and it is held, therefore, that a similar system must be equally successful in India. We inEngland consume animal food and alcoholic liquors, but have no likingfor opium; an effort has accordingly been made to deprive our Asiaticfellow-subjects, who, as a rule, are vegetarians, and either totalabstainers or singularly abstemious in the matter of drink, of a smalland inexpensive stimulant, which they find necessary to their healthand comfort. British institutions and ideas are the embodiment ofwhat long experience has proved to us to be best for ourselves; butsuddenly to establish these institutions and enforce these ideas ona community which is not prepared for them, does not want them, andcannot understand them, must only lead to suspicion and discontent. The Government of India should, no doubt, be progressive in itspolicy, and in all things be guided by the immutable principles ofright, truth, and justice; but these principles ought to be applied, not necessarily as we should apply them in England, but with dueregard to the social peculiarities and religious prejudices of thepeople whom it ought to be our aim to make better and happier. 

It will be gathered from what I have written that our administration, in my opinion, suffers from two main defects. First, it is internallytoo bureaucratic and centralizing in its tendencies; and, secondly, itis liable to be forced by the external pressure of well-meaning butirresponsible politicians and philanthropists to adopt measures whichmay be disapproved of by the authorities on the spot, and opposed tothe wishes, requirements, and interests of the people. It seems to methat for many years to come the best form of government for India willbe the intelligent and benevolent despotism which at present rules thecountry. On a small scale, and in matters of secondary importance, representative institutions cannot perhaps do much harm, though I amafraid they will effect but little good. On a large scale, however, such a system of government would be quite out of place in view ofthe fact that ninety-nine out of every hundred of the population areabsolutely devoid of any idea of civil responsibility, and that thevarious races and religious sects possess no bond of national union. 

In reply, then, to the question, 'Is there any chance of a Mutinyoccurring again?' I would say that the best way of guarding againstsuch a calamity is--

 By never allowing the present proportion of British to Native soldiers to be diminished or the discipline and efficiency of the Native army to become slack. 

 By taking care that men are selected for the higher civil and military posts whose self-reliance, activity, and resolution are not impaired by age, and who possess a knowledge of the country and the habits of the peoples. 

 By recognizing and guarding against the dogmatism of theorists and the dangers of centralization. 

 By rendering our administration on the one hand firm and strong, on the other hand tolerant and sympathetic; and last, but not least, by doing all in our power to gain the confidence of the various races, and by convincing them that we have not only the determination, but the ability to maintain our supremacy in India against all assailants. 

If these cardinal points are never lost sight of, there is, I believe, little chance of any fresh outbreak disturbing the stability of ourrule in India, or neutralizing our efforts to render that countryprosperous, contented, and thoroughly loyal to the British Crown. 

[Footnote 1: Few acts have been more keenly resented than the closingof the great Hurdwar Fair in the autumn of 1892, on account of aserious outbreak of cholera. It was looked upon by the Natives as adirect blow aimed at their religion, and as a distinct departure fromthe religious tolerance promised in Her Majesty's proclamation of1858. The mysterious mud marks on mango-trees in Behar have beenattributed by some to a self-interested motive on the part of certainpriests to draw the attention of Hindus to the sanctity of some templeoutside the limits of British jurisdiction, where the devotees wouldbe at liberty to assemble in any numbers without being troubled byofficious inspectors, and where they could remain as long as theypleased, irrespective of the victims daily claimed by cholera, thatunfailing avenger of the neglect of sanitary laws in the east. ]

[Footnote 2: The proposal would seem to be quite a practical one, forI read in the _Times_ of the 28th November, 1894, that the Governmentof New Zealand invited applications for Consols in connexion with thescheme for granting loans at a reasonable rate of interest to farmerson the security of their holdings. ]

[Footnote 3: I allude to the Parsis, who came from Persia, and whosereligion and customs are as distinct from those of the Natives ofIndia as are our own. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXII. 1858-1859

 Home again--Back in India--Allahabad and Cawnpore --The Viceroy's camp--State entry into Lucknow --The Talukdars of Oudh--Loyalty of the Talukdars --Cawnpore and Fatehgarh--The Agra Durbar

I travelled home _viâ_ Corfu, Trieste, Venice, and Switzerland, arriving in England towards the end of June. The intense delightof getting 'home' after one's first term of exile can hardly beexaggerated, and certainly cannot be realized, save by those who havegone through the exile, and been separated, as I had been for years, from all that made the happiness of my early life. Every English treeand flower one comes across on first landing is a distinct and livelypleasure, while the greenness and freshness are a delicious rest tothe eye, wearied with the deadly whitey-brown sameness of dried-upsandy plains, or the all-too gorgeous colouring of eastern cities andpageants. 

My people were living in Ireland, in the county of Waterford, so afteronly a short sojourn in London, for the very necessary re-equipmentof the outer man, I hastened over there. I found my father welland strong for a man of seventy-four, and to all appearance quiterecovered from the effects of his fifty years of Indian service, and, to my great joy, my mother was looking almost as young, and quite asbeautiful, as I had left her six years before. My little sister, too, always an invalid, was very much as when I had parted from her--fullof loving-kindness for everyone, and, though unable to move withouthelp, perfectly happy in the many resources she had within herself, and the good she was able to do in devoting those resources to thebenefit of others. 

There, too, I found my fate, in the shape of Nora Bews, a young ladyliving with a married sister not far from my father's place, who afew months later consented to accompany me on my return to India. Thegreater part of my leave was, therefore, spent in Ireland. 

During the winter months I hunted with the Curraghmore hounds, and wasout with them the day before Lord Waterford was killed. We had no run, and at the end of the day, when wishing us good-bye, he said: 'I hope, gentlemen, we shall have better luck next time. ' 'Next time' there was'better luck' as regarded the hunting, but the worst of all possibleluck for Lord Waterford's numerous friends; in returning home after agood run, and having killed two foxes, his horse stumbled over quitea small ditch, throwing his rider on his head; the spinal cord wassnapped and the fine sportsman breathed his last in a few moments. 

I was married on the 17th May, 1859, in the parish church ofWaterford. While on our wedding tour in Scotland, I received a commandto be present on the 8th June at Buckingham Palace, when the Queenproposed to honour the recipients of the Victoria Cross by presentingthe decoration with Her Majesty's own hands. 

Being anxious that my wife should be spared the great heat of ajourney to India in July, the hottest month of the year in the RedSea, and the doctors being very decided in their opinion that I shouldnot return so soon, I had applied for a three months' extension ofleave, and quite calculated on getting it, so our disappointmentwas great when the answer arrived and I found that, if I took theextension, I should lose my appointment in the Quartermaster-General'sDepartment. This, we agreed, was not to be thought of, so there wasnothing for it but to face the disagreeable necessity as cheerfullyas we could. We made a dash over to Ireland, said good-bye to ourrelations, and started for India on the 27th June. 

[Illustration: LADY ROBERTS(WIFE OF SIR ABRAHAM ROBERTS). _From a sketch by Carpenter. _]

The heat in the Red Sea proved even worse than I had anticipated. Ourcaptain pronounced it the hottest trip he had ever made. Twice was theship turned round to steam against the wind for a short time in orderto revive some of the passengers, who were almost suffocated. 

We passed the wreck of the _Alma_, a P. And O. Vessel which had struckon a coral reef not far from Mocha. The wreck had happened in the deadof night, and there had been only time to get the passengers into theboats, in which they were rowed to another reef near at hand; therethey had remained for eighty hours in their scanty night garments, andwithout the smallest shelter, until rescued by a friendly steamer. Theofficers and crew were still on the rock when we passed, endeavouringto get up the mails and the passengers' property. We supplied themwith provisions and water, of which they were badly in need, and thenhad to leave them in their extremely uncomfortable position. 

We could not complain of lack of air after we passed Aden, for weforthwith encountered the south-west monsoon, then at its height, andon entering the Bay of Bengal we experienced something very nearlyakin to a cyclone. We broke our rudder; the lightships, on which acertain number of pilots were always to be found, had all been blownout to sea; and as we had only just sufficient coal to take us up theHugli when the pilot should appear, we did not dare to keep up steam. Thus we had to remain at the mercy of the winds and waves for somedays, until at length a brig with a pilot on board was sent to lookfor us, and eventually we arrived in Calcutta, in rather a dilapidatedcondition, on the 30th July. 

We were not cheered by the orders I found awaiting me, which were toproceed to Morar and join Brigadier-General Sir Robert Napier, then incommand of the Gwalior district. Morar in the month of August is oneof the hottest places in India, and my wife was considerably the worsefor our experiences at sea. However, a Calcutta hotel never has manyattractions, and at that time of year was depressing and uncomfortableto the last degree; in addition, I had rather a severe attack of myold enemy, Peshawar fever, so we started on our journey 'up country'with as little delay as possible. 

The railway at that time was not open further than Raniganj; thence weproceeded for a hundred miles in a 'dâk-ghari, ' when, changing intodoolies, we continued our journey to Hazaribagh, a little cantonmentabout twenty miles off the main road, where some relations of minewere living; but a day or two after our arrival at their hospitablehouse, I was ordered back to Calcutta. 

I left my wife with our kind friends, and retraced my steps inconsiderable elation of spirits, for the China expedition was eventhen being talked about, and I hoped this sudden summons mightpossibly mean that I was to be sent with it in some capacity. Onreaching Calcutta, however, I was told that I had been appointedto organize and take charge of the large camp to be formed for thetriumphal progress which Lord Canning proposed to make through Oudh, the North-West Provinces, and the Punjab, with the view of meetingthe principal feudatory Chiefs, and rewarding those who had beenespecially loyal during the rebellion. I was informed that the tentswere in store in the arsenal at Allahabad, and that the camp must beready at Cawnpore on the 15th October, on which date the Viceroy wouldarrive, and a day or two later commence his stately procession towardsLucknow. 

While I was in England a Royal Proclamation had announced to thepeople of India that the Queen had taken over the government of theircountry, which had hitherto been held in trust for Her Majesty by theHonourable East India Company. This fact had been publicly proclaimed, with befitting ceremony, throughout the length and breadth of theland, on the 1st November, 1858. At the same time it was announcedthat Her Majesty's representative in India was henceforth to be styledViceroy and Governor-General of India, and it was with the object ofemphasizing this Proclamation, and impressing the Native mind with thereality of Queen Victoria's power and authority, that Lord Canningdecided on undertaking this grand tour. 

While in Calcutta on this occasion, I was offered a post in theRevenue Survey Department. I refused it, for, although as a marriedman the higher pay was a tempting bait, the recollection of theexcitement and variety of the year of the Mutiny was still fresh uponme, and I had no wish to leave the Quartermaster-General's Department. I therefore started for Allahabad, picking up my wife _en route_. 

It was then the middle of the rains, and the bridge of boats overthe Jumna had been taken down, so we had to cross in ferry-boats--dâk-gharis, horses, and all--rather a perilous-looking proceeding, for the river was running at a tremendous pace, and there was somedifficulty in keeping the boat's head straight. At Allahabad westayed with a brother officer of mine in the fort, while I wasgetting the camp equipage out of store, and the tents pitched forinspection. There had not been a large camp for many years, andeverything in India deteriorates so rapidly, that I found most of thetents in such a state of mildew and decay as to render it necessaryto renew them almost entirely before they could be used for such asplendid occasion as that of the first Viceroy's first march throughthe re-conquered country. 

From Allahabad we proceeded to Cawnpore, where I had a busy timearranging for the multifarious requirements of such an enormous camp;and sometimes I despaired of its being completed by the appointeddate. However, completed it was; and on the 15th October Lord and LadyCanning arrived, and expressed themselves so pleased with all thearrangements, and were so kindly appreciative of the exertions I hadmade to be ready for them by the appointed time, that I felt myselffully rewarded for all my trouble. 

The next day I took my wife to call upon Lady Canning, whoseunaffected and simple, yet perfectly dignified manner completelycharmed her, and from that day she was devoted, in common witheveryone who was at all intimately associated with Lady Canning, tothe gentle, gracious lady, who was always kindness itself to her. 

On the 18th the Viceroy made his first march towards Lucknow. The campequipage was in duplicate, so that everyone on arriving at the newhalting-place found things exactly the same as in the tents they hadleft. 

The camp occupied a considerable space; for, in addition to theViceroy's large _entourage_, ground had to be provided for theCommander-in-Chief and the officers of Army Head-Quarters, whowere marching with us; then there were the post-office, telegraph, workshops, _toshikhana_, [1] commissariat, and a host of other officesto be accommodated, beside the escort, which consisted of a battery ofHorse Artillery, a squadron of British Cavalry, a regiment of BritishInfantry, a regiment of Native Cavalry, a regiment of Native Infantry, and the Viceroy's Bodyguard. For the Viceroy, his staff, guests, andsecretaries alone, 150 large tents were pitched in the main street, and when we came to a station the duplicate tents were also pitched. For the transport of this portion of the camp equipage 80 elephantsand 500 camels were required. [2]

It is very difficult to give any idea of the extraordinary spectacle abig camp like this presents on the line of march. The followers, as arule, are accompanied by their wives and families, who are piled uponthe summits of laden carts, or perched on the loads borne by thebaggage animals. In the two camps marching together (Lord Canning'sand Lord Clyde's) there could not have been less than 20, 000men, women, and children--a motley crowd streaming along aboutfour-and-twenty miles of road, for the day's march was usually abouttwelve miles, and before every one had cleared out of the campoccupied the night before, the advance guard had begun to arrive onthe ground to be occupied the next day. The strictest discipline hadto be maintained, or this moving colony would have been a seriouscalamity to the peasantry, for the followers would have spreadthemselves over the country like a flight of locusts, and takenanything they could lay their hands on, representing themselvesas _Mulk-i-Lord-Sahib-Ke-Naukar_, [3] whom according to immemorialtradition it was death to resist. The poor, frightened country-people, therefore, hardly ventured to remonstrate at the _mahouts_ walking offwith great loads of their sugar-cane, or to object to the compulsorypurchase of their farm produce for half its value. There was a greatdeal of this kind of raiding at the commencement of the march, andI was constantly having complaints made to me by the villagers; butafter I had inflicted on the offenders a few summary and tolerablysevere punishments, and made the peasants to understand it was not the_Mulk-i-Lord-Sahib's_ wish that they should submit to such treatmentfrom his servants, order was established, and I had very rarely anytrouble. 

Our first halt was at Lucknow. Sir Hope Grant was commanding thedivision, and had established himself very comfortably in theDilkusha. He had written asking me to bring my wife straight there andstay with him during the Viceroy's visit, as it was still very hot intents during the day. An invitation which I gladly accepted, for itwas pleasant to think of being with my old General again, and I wantedto introduce him to my wife. 

The next day, the 22nd October, the state entry was made into Lucknow. It must have been an imposing sight, that long array of troopsand guns, with Lord Canning in the centre, accompanied by theCommander-in-Chief, and surrounded by their respective staffs in fulluniform. Lord Canning, though at that time not given to riding, lookedremarkably well on horseback; for he had a fine head and shoulders, and sat his horse well; on foot, his height, not being quite inproportion, rather detracted from the dignity of his presence. 

I headed the procession, leading it across the Charbagh bridge, thescene of Havelock's fiercest encounter, past the Machi Bhawan, and theResidency, to the Kaisarbagh, in front of which were drawn up in abody the Talukdars of Oudh, who had with difficulty been persuadedto come and make their obeisance, for, guiltily conscious of theirdisloyalty during the rebellion, they did not feel at all sure thatthe rumours that it was intended to blow them all away from guns, orto otherwise summarily dispose of them, were not true. They salaamedrespectfully as the Viceroy passed, and the cavalcade proceeded to theMartinière park, where the camp, which I had pitched the previous day, lay spread before us, in all the spotless purity of new white tentsglistening in a flood of brilliant sunshine. The streets through whichwe passed were crowded with Natives, who--cowed, but not tamed--lookedon in sullen defiance, very few showing any sign of respect for theViceroy. 

Sir William and Lady Mansfield, and several other people from our campwere also staying with Sir Hope Grant, and that evening the wholeDilkusha party went to a state dinner given by Lord and Lady Canning. The latter was a delightful hostess; the shyest person was set at easeby her kindly, sympathetic manner, and she had the happy knack ofmaking her guests feel that her entertainments were a pleasure toherself--the surest way of rendering them enjoyable to those sheentertained. 

I made use of the next week, which was for me a comparatively idletime, to take my wife over the ground by which we had advanced twoyears before, and explain to her the different positions held by theenemy. She was intensely interested in visiting the Sikandarbagh, theShah Najaf, the mess-house, and, above all, that glorious memorialof almost superhuman courage and endurance, the Residency, ruined, roofless, and riddled by round shot and bullets. Very little had thenbeen done towards opening out the city, and the surroundings of theResidency were much as they had been during the defence--a labyrinthof streets and lanes; it was therefore easier for the stranger torealize exactly what had taken place than it is now that the landmarkshave been cleared away, and well-laid-out gardens and broad roads havetaken the place of jungle and narrow alleys. 

On the 26th the Viceroy held a grand durbar for the reception of theTalukdars. It was the first function of the sort I had witnessed, andwas an amusing novelty to my wife, who, with Lady Canning and someof the other ladies in camp, viewed the proceedings from behind asemi-transparent screen, it not being considered at that time thething for ladies to appear at ceremonials when Natives were present. The whole scene was very impressive, though not as brilliant incolouring as it would have been in any other part of India, owingto the Chiefs of Oudh being clad in simple white, as is the customamongst Rajputs. 

The Talukdars, to the number of one hundred and sixty, were ushered totheir places in strict order of seniority, the highest in rank beingthe last to arrive. They were arranged in a half semicircle on theright of the Viceroy's chair of state, while on the left the Europeanswere seated according to their official rank. When all was ready, thewords 'Attention! Royal salute! Present arms!' were heard without, warning those within of the Viceroy's approach, and, as the buglessounded and the guns thundered forth their welcome, Lord Canning, accompanied by the Commander-in-Chief, and preceded by their staffs, entered the tent. 

Everyone rose, and remained standing until the great man took hisseat, when the Foreign Secretary came forward, and, making a low bow, informed His Excellency that all who had been summoned to attend thedurbar were present. The Chiefs were then brought up and introducedto the Viceroy one by one; each made a profound obeisance, and, asa token of allegiance, presented an offering of gold mohurs, which, according to etiquette, the Viceroy just touched by way ofacknowledgment. The presents from the Government to the Chiefs werethen handed in on trays, and placed on the ground in front of each, the value of the present being regulated according to the rank andposition of the recipient. This part of the ceremony being over, theViceroy rose and addressed the Talukdars. 

After expressing his pleasure at meeting them in their own country, hegave them an assurance that, so long as they remained faithful to theGovernment, they should receive every consideration; he told them thata new era had commenced in Oudh, and that henceforth they would beallowed to revert to the conditions under which they had held theirestates prior to the annexation of the province. When Lord Canning hadfinished speaking, a translation of his address in Urdu was readto the Talukdars by Mr. Beadon, the Foreign Secretary; _atar_ and_pan_[4] were then handed round, and the Viceroy took his departurewith the same formalities as those with which the durbar had beenopened. 

There is some excuse to be made for the attitude of the Talukdars, who, from their point of view, had little reason to be grateful to theBritish Government. These powerful Chiefs, whose individual revenuesvaried from £10, 000 to £15, 000 a year, and who, in their junglefastnesses, often defied their sovereign's troops, had suddenly beendeprived of all the authority which in the confusion attending a longperiod of misgovernment they had gradually usurped, as well as of aconsiderable proportion of the landed property which, from time totime, they had forcibly appropriated. The conversion of feudal Chiefsinto ordinary law-abiding subjects is a process which, howeverbeneficial to the many, is certain to be strenuously resisted by thefew. 

In March, 1858, when Lucknow was captured, a Proclamation was issuedby the Government of India confiscating the proprietary rights in thesoil. The object in view was not merely to punish contumacious Chiefs, but also to enable the Government to establish the revenue system ona sounder and firmer footing. Talukdars who submitted were to receivetheir possessions as a free gift direct from the Government; whilethose who had done good service, whether men of Oudh or strangers, might be rewarded by grants of confiscated property. 

The Proclamation was considered in many influential quarters tooarbitrary and sweeping a measure; Outram protested against it, andLord Ellenborough (the President of the Board of Control) condemnedit; but Lord Canning was backed up by the British public, and LordEllenborough resigned to save his Cabinet from being wrecked. ThatOutram and Ellenborough took the right view of the case is, I think, shown by the fact that Lord Canning cancelled the Proclamation on hisfirst visit to Lucknow. By that time he had come to recognize that theTalukdars had reasonable grounds for their discontent, and he wiselydetermined to take a step which not only afforded them the greatestrelief and satisfaction, but enlisted their interest on the sideof Government. From that day to this, although, from time to time, subsequent legislation has been found necessary to save the peasantryfrom oppression, the Chiefs of Oudh have been amongst the most loyalof Her Majesty's Indian subjects. 

We remained a few days longer at Lucknow. Lord and Lady Canningentertained all the residents, while a ball was given by the latter inthe Chatta Manzil to the strangers in camp, and the city and principalbuildings were illuminated in the Viceroy's honour with those curiouslittle oil-lamps which are the most beautiful form of illumination, the delineation of every line, point, and pinnacle with myriads ofminute lights producing a wonderfully pretty effect. 

On the 29th the first march was made on the return journey toCawnpore. My duty was to go on ahead, select the best site for thenext day's camping-ground, and make all necessary arrangements forsupplies, etc. I waited till the Viceroy had given his orders, andthen my wife and I started off, usually in the forenoon; sometimeswe remained till later in the day, lunching with one or other of ourfriends in camp, and on very rare occasions, such as a dinner-party atthe Viceroy's or the Commander-in-Chief's, we drove on after dinner bymoonlight. But that was not until we had been on the march for sometime and I felt that the head Native in charge of the camp was tobe trusted to make no mistake. It was a life of much interest andvariety, and my wife enjoyed the novelty of it all greatly. 

Lord Canning held his second durbar at Cawnpore on the 3rd November, when he received the principal Chiefs of Bundelkand, the Maharaja ofRewa, the Maharaja of Benares, and a host of lesser dignitaries. 

It was on this occasion that, in accordance with the Proclamationwhich had already announced that the Queen had no desire to extend herterritorial possessions, and that the estates of Native Princes wereto be scrupulously respected, the Chiefs were informed that the rightof adoption was conceded to them. This meant that, in default of maleissue, they were to be allowed to adopt sons according to the Indiancustom of adoption, and that the British Government would recognizethe right of the chosen heir to succeed as Ruler of the State as wellas to inherit the personal property of the Chief by whom he had beenadopted. There had been no clear rule on this point previously, eachcase having been considered on its own merits, but the doctrine thatadoption should not be recognized, and that, in default of naturalheirs, the State should lapse and be annexed by the supremeGovernment, had been enforced in a good many instances. Lord Canning'sannouncement therefore caused the liveliest satisfaction to certainclasses throughout India, and did more than any other measure tomake the feudatory Princes believe in the sincerity of the amnestyProclamation. [5]

Our next move was to Fatehgarh, eight marches from Cawnpore, where, on the 15th November, a third durbar was held, at which was received, amongst other leading men of Rohilkand whose services were consideredworthy of acknowledgment, the Nawab of Rampur, who had behavedwith distinguished loyalty in our time of trouble. This MahomedanNobleman's conduct was the more meritorious in that the surroundingcountry swarmed with rebels, and was the home of numbers of themutinous Irregular Cavalry, while the close proximity of Rampur toDelhi, whence threats of vengeance were hurled at the Nawab unless heespoused the King's cause, rendered his position extremely precarious. 

From Fatehgarh we proceeded to Agra, nine marches, only halting onSundays, and consequently everyone appreciated being stationary therefor a few days. The camp was pitched on the parade-ground, the sceneof the fight of the 10th October, 1857. Here the Viceroy received someof the bigger potentates, who were accompanied by large retinues, and, as far as the _spectacle_ went, it was one of the grandest and mostcurious gatherings we had yet witnessed. 

The occasions are rare on which a Viceroy has the opportunity ofreceiving in durbar the great vassals of our Indian Empire, but whenthese assemblies can be arranged they have a very useful effect, and should not be looked upon as mere empty ceremonials. This wasespecially the case at a time when the country had so recently beenconvulsed by intestine war, and when the Native Princes were anxiouslyconsidering how their prospects would be affected by Her Majesty'sassumption of the administration of India. 

The Chief of highest rank on this occasion was the Maharaja ofGwalior, who, as I have already stated, influenced by his courageousMinister, Dinkar Rao, had remained faithful to us. Like most MahrattaPrinces of that time, he was very imperfectly educated. Moreover, hewas possessed of a most wayward disposition, frequently threatening, when thwarted in any way, to throw up the reins of government, andtake refuge in the jungle; manners he had none. 

Next came the enlightened head of the Princely house of Jaipur, thesecond in importance of the great Chiefs of Rajputana. 

He was succeeded by the Karaoli Raja, whose following was the mostquaint of all. Amongst the curious signs of his dignity he had on hisescort four tigers, each chained on a separate car, and guarded bystrange-looking men in brass helmets. 

The Maharao Raja of Ulwar was the next to arrive, seated on asuperb elephant, eleven feet high, magnificently caparisoned withcloth-of-gold coverings, and chains and breastplates of gold. He was apromising-looking lad who had succeeded to his estate only two yearsbefore; but he soon fell into the hands of low intriguers, whoplundered his dominions and so oppressed his people that the BritishGovernment had to take over the management of his State. 

After Ulwar came the Nawab of Tonk, the descendant of an adventurerfrom Swat, on the Peshawar border, who had become possessed ofconsiderable territory in Rajputana. The Nawab stood by us in theMutiny, when his capital was plundered by Tantia Topi. 

The sixth in rank was the Jât Ruler of Dholpur, a bluff, coarse-looking man, and a very rude specimen of his race. 

Last of all arrived the Nawab of Jaora, a handsome, perfectly-dressedman of considerable refinement of manner, and with all the courtesy ofa well-bred Mahomedan. Though a feudatory of the rebellious Holkar ofIndore, he kept aloof from all Mahratta intrigues, and behaved well tous. 

Some of the highest of the Rajput Chiefs declined to attend, allegingas an excuse the distance of their capitals from Agra; but the truthis that these Rulers, the best blood of India, had never bowed theirheads to any Power, not even that of the Moghul, and they consideredit would be derogatory to their dignity to obey the summons of therepresentative of a sovereign, of whom they considered themselves theallies and not the mere feudatories. [6]

Those of the Chieftains attending this durbar who had shownconspicuous loyalty during the rebellion were not allowed to leavewithout receiving substantial rewards. Sindhia had territorybestowed on him to the value of £30, 000 a year. Jaipur was given theconfiscated property of Kôt K[=a]sim, yielding £5, 000 a year, whileothers were recompensed according to the importance of the servicesrendered. 

[Footnote 1: The depository for jewels and other valuables kept forpresentation to Native Chiefs at durbars. ]

[Footnote 2: The following details will give some idea of themagnitude of the arrangements required for the Viceroy's camp alone. Besides those above mentioned there were 500 camels, 500 bullocks and100 bullock carts for transport of camp equipage, 40 _sowari_ (riding)elephants, 527 coolies to carry the glass windows belonging to thelarger tents, 100 _bhisties_, and 40 sweepers for watering and keepingthe centre street clean. These were in addition to the private baggageanimals, servants, and numberless riding and driving horses, for allof which space and shelter had to be provided. ]

[Footnote 3: Servants of the Lord of the Country, orGovernor-General. ]

[Footnote 4: A few drops of attar of roses are given to each person, and a small packet of _pan_, which is composed of slices of betel-nutsmeared with lime and wrapped in a leaf of the betel-tree. ]

[Footnote 5: The question of Native Rulers having the right to adoptheirs was first brought to Lord Canning's notice by the three Phulkianchiefs--Patiala, Jhind and Nabha--who jointly requested in 1858 thatthe right of adoption might be accorded to them as a reward for theservices they had rendered during the Mutiny. The request was refusedat the time on the ground that it had never been the custom of thecountry, though it had occasionally been done. Since then, however, Lord Canning had come to see that the uncertainty which prevailed asto the rights of succession was harassing to the owners of land, andundesirable in many ways, and he urged upon the Secretary of Statethat some distinct rule on the subject might with advantage be laiddown. He wrote as follows: 'The crown of England stands forth theunquestioned Ruler and paramount Power in all India, and is now forthe first time brought face to face with its feudatories. There is areality in the suzerainty of the Sovereign of England which has neverexisted before, which is not only felt, but eagerly acknowledgedby the Chiefs. A great convulsion has been followed by such amanifestation of our strength as India has never seen; and if this inits turn be followed by an act of general and substantial grace, overand above the special rewards which have already been given to thosewhose services deserve them, the measure will be seasonable andappreciated. ' Lord Canning's proposals met with the cordial approvalof Her Majesty's Government, and his announcement at Cawnpore rejoicedthe hearts of the Chiefs, one of whom, the Maharaja of Rewa, was aleper and had no son. He said, on hearing the Viceroy's words, 'Theydispel an evil wind which has long been blowing upon me. ']

[Footnote 6: These Rajput Chiefs, however, accepted Lord Lytton'sinvitation to attend the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi on the 1stJanuary, 1877, and having once given their allegiance to the 'Empressof India, ' they have since been the most devotedly loyal of HerMajesty's feudatory Princes. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIII. 1859-1860

 Delhi under a different aspect--Lord Clyde--Umritsar and Lahore --The Lahore Durbar--Simla--Life at Simla

We remained at Agra until the 9th December. There was so much ofbeauty and interest in and around the place, that Lady Canning founda wealth of subjects for her facile pencil, and was well content toremain there. There were the usual banquets to the residents, andentertainments given by the Agra people to those in camp, one of thembeing a party in the Taj gardens, to give us an opportunity of seeingthe tomb by moonlight, when it certainly looks its loveliest. My wifewas more delighted even than I had anticipated with the perfectbeauty of the Taj and the exquisite little mosque in the fort, theMoti-Masjid. I greatly enjoyed showing her all that was worth seeing, and witnessing her pleasure on first viewing these wonderful works ofart. 

There was no halt again, except the usual one on Sunday, until wereached Meerut on the 21st December. 

Three marches from Agra a fire broke out in Lady Canning's tent soonafter she had retired for the night, caused by the iron pipe ofthe stove, which passed through the side of the tent, becomingover-heated. Lady Canning's tents were on one side of the bigdining-tent, and the Viceroy's on the other. Immediately on perceivingthe fire, Lady Canning ran across to awaken her husband, but theNative sentry, who did not know her or understand a word of what shewas saying, would not let her in, and, in despair of being able tomake anyone hear, she rushed off to the tent of Sir Edward Campbell, the Military Secretary, which was nearest her own. She succeededin awaking him, and then flew back to try and save some of her owntreasures. The first thing she thought of was her portfolio ofdrawings, which she dragged outside; but it had already been partiallyburned, and most of the valuable and characteristic sketches she hadmade at the different durbars were destroyed. She next tried to rescueher jewels, many of which she had worn the night before; her pearlswere lying on the dressing-table, and she was only just in time tosave them; one of the strings had caught fire, and several of thepearls were blackened. She swept them off the table into a towel, andthrew them into a tub of water standing outside. Her wardrobe wascompletely destroyed. More damage would have been done had not thePrivate Secretary, Mr. Lewin Bowring, on the alarm being given, hurried to the dining-tent, and, with great presence of mind, orderedthe Native Cavalry sentry to cut the ropes, causing it to fall atonce, and preventing the fire from spreading. Some office boxes andrecords were destroyed, but nothing more. We were as usual in theadvance camp, and did not hear what had happened until next morning, when Lady Canning arrived dressed in Lady Campbell's clothes; and asLady Canning was tall, and Lady Campbell was short, the effect wasrather funny. 

Christmas was spent at Meerut, where I met several of my brotherofficers, amongst others my particular friend Edwin Johnson, whom Ihad the great pleasure of introducing to my wife. With scarcelyan exception, my friends became hers, and this added much to thehappiness of our Indian life. 

Delhi, our next halting-place, was certainly not the least interestingin our tour. Lord Canning was anxious to understand all about thesiege, and visited the different positions; the Ridge and itssurroundings, the breaches, and the palace, were the chief pointsof interest. There were two 'Delhi men' besides myself to explaineverything to him, Sir Edward Campbell, who was with the 60th Riflesthroughout, and one of the best officers in the regiment, and JemmyHills, who had now become the Viceroy's Aide-de-camp; while in LordClyde's camp there were Norman, Stewart, and Becher. 

I had, of course, taken my wife to the scenes of the fights at Agra, Aligarh, and Bulandshahr, but Delhi had the greatest fascination forher. It is certainly an extraordinarily attractive place, settingaside the peculiar interest of the siege. For hundreds of years it hadbeen the seat of Government under Rulers of various nationalities andreligions; few cities have the remains of so much pomp and glory, andvery few bear the traces of having been besieged so often, or couldtell of so much blood spilt in their defence, or of such quantities oftreasure looted from them. When Tamerlane captured Delhi in 1398 thecity was given over to massacre for five days, 'some streets beingrendered impassable by heaps of dead'; and in 1739 the Persianconqueror, Nadir Shah, after sacking the place for fifty-eight daysand massacring thousands of its inhabitants, carried off thirty-twomillions sterling of booty. 

Although the fierce nature of the struggle that Delhi had gone throughin 1857 was apparent everywhere, the inhabitants seemed now to haveforgotten all about it. The city was as densely populated as it hadever been; the Chandni Chauk was gay as formerly with draperies ofbright-coloured stuffs; jewellers and shawl-merchants carried on theirtrades as briskly as ever, and were just as eager in their endeavoursto tempt the _Sahib log_ to spend their money as if trade had neverbeen interrupted; so quickly do Orientals recover from the effects ofa devastating war. 

We left Delhi on the 3rd January, 1860, marching _viâ_ Karnal. When atthis place my wife went to see Lady Canning, as she often did if weremained at all late in camp. On this particular occasion she foundher busy with the English mail, which had just arrived, so she saidshe would not stay then, but would come next day instead. LadyCanning, however, would not let my wife go until she had read her partof a letter from Lady Waterford, which she thought would amuse her. Itwas in answer to one from Lady Canning, in which she had describedthe camp, and given her sister a list of all the people in it. LadyWaterford wrote: 'Your Quartermaster-General must be the son ofGeneral Roberts, who lives near Waterford; he came home on leave lastyear. I must tell you an amusing little anecdote about his father. Onenight, when the General was dining at Curraghmore, he found himselfsitting next the Primate of Ireland, with whom he entered intoconversation. After some time they discovered they had known eachother in the days of their youth, but had never met since a certainmorning on which they went out to fight a duel on account of somesquabble at a mess; happily the quarrel was stopped without any harmbeing done, each feeling equally relieved at being prevented fromtrying to murder the other, as they had been persuaded they were inhonour bound to do. The two old gentlemen made very merry over theirreminiscences. '

For some time I had been indulging a hope that I might be sent toChina with my old General, Hope Grant, who had been nominated to thecommand of the expedition which, in co-operation with the French, wasbeing prepared to wipe out the disgrace of the repulse experiencedearly in the year, by the combined French and English naval squadronsin their attack on the Taku forts. My hope, however, was doomed todisappointment. Lord Clyde decided to send Lumsden and Allgood asA. Q. M. G. 's with the force, and I was feeling very low in consequence. A day or two afterwards we dined with the Cannings, and Lord Clydetook my wife in to dinner. His first remark to her was: 'I think Ihave earned your gratitude, if I have not managed to satisfy everyoneby these China appointments. ' On my wife asking for what she wasexpected to be grateful, he said: 'Why, for not sending your husbandwith the expedition, of course. I suppose you would rather not beleft in a foreign country alone a few months after your marriage? IfRoberts had not been a newly-married man, I would have sent him. 'This was too much for my wife, who sympathized greatly with mydisappointment, and she could not help retorting: 'I am afraid Icannot be very grateful to you for making my husband feel I am ruininghis career by standing in the way of his being sent on service. Youhave done your best to make him regret his marriage. ' The poor oldChief was greatly astonished, and burst out in his not too refinedway: 'Well, I'll be hanged if I can understand you women! I have donethe very thing I thought you would like, and have only succeeded inmaking you angry. I will never try to help a woman again. ' My wifesaw that he had meant to be kind, and that it was, as he said, onlybecause he did not 'understand women' that he had made the mistake. She was soon appeased, and in the end she and Lord Clyde became greatfriends. 

The middle of January found us at Umballa, where Lord Canning met instate all the Cis-Sutlej Sikh Chiefs. Fine, handsome men they most ofthem were, and magnificently attired. The beautifully delicate tintswhich the Sikhs are so fond of, the warlike costumes of some of theSirdars, the quiet dignity of these high-born men who had renderedus such signal service in our hour of need, made the scene mostpicturesque and impressive. The place of honour was given to theMaharaja of Patiala (the grandfather of the present Maharaja), as themost powerful of the Phulkian Princes; and he was followed by hisneighbours of Nabha and Jhind, all three splendid specimens ofwell-bred Sikhs, of stately presence and courtly manners. They weremuch gratified at having the right of adoption granted to theirfamilies, and at being given substantial rewards in the shape ofextension of territory. 

The Sikh Chiefs were followed by Rajas of minor importance, chieflyfrom the neighbouring hills, whom the Viceroy had summoned in order tothank them for assistance rendered during the Mutiny. Many of them hadgrievances to be redressed; others had favours to ask; and the Viceroywas able to more or less satisfy them by judiciously yielding toreasonable demands, and by bestowing minor powers on those who werelikely to use them well. The wisdom of this policy of concessionon Lord Canning's part was proved in after years by its successfulresults. 

On the 29th January the Raja of Kapurthala came out to meet theViceroy one march from Jullundur. He had supplemented the valuableassistance rendered to Colonel Lake in the early days of the Mutinyby equipping and taking into Oudh a force of 2, 000 men, which hepersonally commanded in six different actions. The Viceroy cordiallythanked him for this timely service, and in recognition of it, and hiscontinued and conspicuous loyalty, bestowed upon him large estates inOudh, where he eventually became one of the chief Talukdars. This Rajawas the grandfather of the enlightened nobleman who came to Englandthree years ago. 

After visiting Umritsar, gay with brilliant illuminations in honourof the Viceroy, and crowded with Sikhs come to welcome the Queen'srepresentative to their sacred city, we arrived at Lahore on the 10thFebruary. 

Early the following morning Lord Canning made his state entry. As weapproached the citadel the long line of mounted Chiefs drawn up toreceive the Viceroy came into view. A brilliant assemblage theyformed, Sikh Sirdars, stately Hill Rajputs, wildly picturesqueMultanis and Baluchis with their flowing locks floating behind them, sturdy Tawanas from the Salt range, all gorgeously arrayed in everycolour of the rainbow, their jewels glittering in the morning sun, while their horses, magnificently caparisoned in cloth-of-gold saddlecloths, and gold and silver trappings, pranced and curvetted underpressure of their severe bits. As the procession appeared in sightthey moved forward in one long dazzling cavalcade, each party ofChiefs being headed by the Commissioner of the district from whichthey came; they saluted as they approached the Viceroy, and thenpassing him fell in behind, between the Body Guard and the Artilleryof the escort. A royal salute was fired from the fort as we passedunder the city walls; we then wound through the civil station ofAnárkáli, and on to camp where the garrison of Mian Mir, under thecommand of Major-General Sir Charles Windham, was drawn up to receivethe Viceroy. 

At nightfall there were illuminations and a procession of elephants;the Viceroy, seated in a superb howdah, led the way through thebrilliantly lighted city. Suddenly a shower of rockets was dischargedwhich resulted in a stampede of the elephants, who rushed through thenarrow streets, and fled in every direction, to the imminent peril andgreat discomfort of the riders. In time they were quieted andbrought back, only to become again unmanageable at a fresh volley offireworks; a second time they were pacified, and as they seemed to begetting accustomed to the noise and lights, the procession proceededto the garden of the old palace. Here the elephants were drawn up, when all at once a fresh discharge of rockets from every side drovethem mad with fright, and off they bolted under the trees, throughgates, and some of them could not be pulled up until they had gone farinto the country. Howdahs were crushed, hats torn off, but, strange tosay, there was only one serious casualty; an officer was swept out ofhis howdah by the branch of a tree, and falling to the ground, had histhigh broken. Lord Clyde declared that a general action was not halfso dangerous, and he would much sooner have been in one!

The Lahore durbar, at which the Punjab Chiefs were received, surpassedany former ceremonials in point of numbers and splendour of effect. Many of Runjit Singh's Sirdars were present, and many who had foughtagainst us in the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns, but had now become ourfast friends. The Chiefs quite spontaneously prepared and presentedLord Canning with an address, and, in reply, his Excellency madean eloquent and telling speech, commenting in terms of the highestappreciation on the courage and loyalty displayed by the Nobles andpeople of the Punjab during the Mutiny. 

While the camp was marching to Sialkot, where the Maharaja of Kashmirand some of the leading men of the Punjab were to be received, theViceroy, accompanied by Lady Canning, Lord Clyde, and a small staff, went on a flying visit to Peshawar, with the object of satisfyinghimself, by personal examination of our position there, as to theadvisability or otherwise of a retirement cis-Indus--a retrogrademovement which John Lawrence was still in favour of. The visit, however, only served to strengthen Lord Canning in his preconceivedopinion that Peshawar must be held on to as our frontier station. 

My wife remained at Mian Mir with our good friends Doctor and Mrs. Tyrrell Ross until it was time for her to go to Simla, and the kindthoughtfulness of Lord Canning, who told me the camp now worked sowell that my presence was not always necessary, enabled me to be withher from time to time. 

Lord Canning's tour was now nearly over, and we marched without anyhalt of importance from Sialkot to Kalka at the foot of the hills, where, on the 9th April, the camp was broken up. It was high time toget into cooler regions, for the heat of the tents in the day hadbecome very oppressive. 

Thus ended a six months' march of over a thousand miles--a march neverlikely to be undertaken again by any other Viceroy of India, now thatrailway trains run from Calcutta to Peshawar, and saloon carriageshave taken the place of big tents. 

This progress through India had excellent results. The advantages ofthe representative of the Sovereign meeting face to face the principalfeudatories and Chiefs of our great dependency were very considerable, and the opportunity afforded to the Viceroy of personallyacknowledging and rewarding the services of those who had helped us, and of showing that he was not afraid to be lenient to those who hadfailed to do so, provided they should remain loyal in the future, hada very good effect over the whole of India. The wise concessions alsoannounced at the different durbars as regards the adoption by NativeRulers of successors to their estates, and the grant to Nativegentlemen of such a share as they were fitted for in the governmentof the country, were undoubtedly more appreciated than any otherdescription of reward given for assistance in the Mutiny. 

My duty with the Viceroy being ended, I returned to Mian Mir to fetchmy wife and the little daughter, who had made her appearance on the10th March, and escort them both to Simla. The journey up the hill wasa tedious one. Carriages were not then used as they are now, and mywife travelled in a _jampan_, a kind of open, half-reclining sedanchair, carried by relays of four men, while I rode or walked by herside. She had been greatly exhausted by the heat of the journey fromMian Mir, but as we ascended higher and higher up the mountain side, and the atmosphere became clearer and fresher, she began to revive. Four hours, however, of this unaccustomed mode of travelling in herweak state had completely tired her out, so on finding a fairlycomfortable bungalow at the end of the first stage, I decided toremain there the next day. After that we went on, stage by stage, until we reached Simla. Our house, 'Mount Pleasant, ' was on the verytop of a hill; up and up we climbed through the rhododendron forest, along a path crimson with the fallen blossom, till we got to the top, when a glorious view opened out before our delighted eyes. The woodedhills of Jakho and Elysium in the foreground, Mahasu and the beautifulShalli peaks in the middle distance, and beyond, towering above all, the everlasting snows glistening in the morning sun, formed a picturethe beauty of which quite entranced us both. I could hardly persuademy wife to leave it and come into the house. Hunger and fatigue, however, at length triumphed. Our servants had arranged everything inour little abode most comfortably; bright fires were burning in thegrates, a cosy breakfast was awaiting us, and the feeling that at lastwe had a home of our own was very pleasant. 

Lord Canning did not remain long at Simla. His Council in Calcutta wasabout to lose its President, Sir James Outram, who was leaving Indiaon account of failing health; and as the suggestion to impose anincome-tax was creating a good deal of agitation, the Viceroy hurriedback to Calcutta, deeming it expedient to be on the spot. 

The measures necessary for the suppression of the Mutiny had emptiedthe Government coffers; and although a large loan had been raised, the local authorities found it impossible to cope with the increasedexpenditure. Lord Canning had, therefore, applied to the Government inEngland for the services of a trained financier; and Mr. Wilson, whohad a great reputation in this respect, was sent out. He declared theonly remedy to be an income-tax, and he was supported in this viewby the merchants of Calcutta. Other Europeans, however, who wereintimately acquainted with India, pointed out that it was notadvisable to ignore the dislike of Natives to such direct taxation;and Sir Charles Trevelyan, Governor of Madras, argued well and wiselyagainst the scheme. Instead, however, of confining his action in thematter to warning and advising the supreme Government, he publiclyproclaimed his opposition, thus giving the signal for agitation to allthe malcontents in India. Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, followed Trevelyan's example, but in a less pronounced manner, and these attacks from the minor Presidencies proved a seriousembarrassment to the action of the Government. In spite of all thisantagonism, the income-tax was passed, and Sir Charles Trevelyan'sunusual procedure led to his recall. 

Lord Canning left Simla for his long and trying journey in May, aboutthe hottest time of the year. On my taking leave of him, he toldme that Sir Hugh Rose, then commanding the Bombay army, had beenappointed to succeed Lord Clyde, who had long been anxious to returnto England, and that Sir Hugh, though he intended to go to Calcuttahimself, wished the Head-Quarters of the Army to remain at Simla; aquestion about which we had been rather anxious, as it would have beenan unpleasant breaking up of all our plans, had I been ordered toCalcutta. 

Life at Simla was somewhat monotonous. The society was not very largein those days; but there were a certain number of people on leavefrom the plains, who then, as at present, had nothing to do but amusethemselves, consequently there was a good deal of gaiety in a smallway; but we entered into it very little. My wife did not care muchabout it, and had been very ill for the greater part of the summer. She had made two or three kind friends, and was very happy in hermountain home, though at times, perhaps, a little lonely, as I had tobe in office the greater part of each day. 

In the autumn we made a trip into the interior of the hills, beyondSimla, which was a new and delightful experience for my wife. Weusually started in the morning, sending our servants on about halfway, when they prepared breakfast for us in some pretty, shady spot;there we remained, reading, writing, or resting, until after lunch, and it was time to move on, that we might get to our halting place forthe night before dinner. 

It was a lovely time of the year, when the autumn tints made theforest gorgeous, and the scarlet festoons of the Himalayan vine stoodout in brilliant contrast to the dark green of the solemn deodar, amongst the branches of which it loves to twine itself. 

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIV. 1860

 The Staff Corps--With the Viceroy's camp again--The marble rocks --Lady Canning's death--Pig-sticking at Jamu--Lord Canning --Another cold-weather march--Gwalior and Jhansi --Departmental promotion

In 1860 an important alteration was made in the organization of thearmy in India, by the passing of a Bill for the amalgamation of thelocal European Forces with the Royal Army. 

On the transfer of the administration of India from the HonourableEast India Company to the Crown, a question arose as to the conditionsunder which the European soldiers had enlisted. The Governmentcontended that the conditions were in no way affected by the abolitionof the Company. The soldiers, on the other hand, claimed to bere-enlisted, and on this being refused they asked for their discharge. This was granted, and 10, 000 out of the 16, 000 men serving in thelocal army had to be sent to England. These men were replaced and thelocal Forces were kept up to strength by fresh drafts from England;but, from the date of the amalgamation, enlistment to serve solely inIndia was to cease. 

There was great difference of opinion as to the advisability of thismeasure; officers of the Queen's service for the most part, andnotably Sir Hugh Rose, were in favour of it, but it was not generallypopular in India. It was feared that the change would result in agreat increase to the military charges which the Indian Governmentwould be called upon to pay; that, notwithstanding such increase, there would be a serious diminution in the control exercised by thatGovernment over the administration and organization of the BritishArmy in India; and that, under the pressure of political emergency inEurope, troops might be withdrawn and Indian requirements disregarded. On the other hand, those in favour of the Bill thought that, after thetransfer of India to the Crown, the maintenance of a separate Forceuncontrolled by the Horse Guards would be an anomaly. There was, nodoubt, much to be said on both sides of the question, but, although ithas been proved that the fears of those opposed to the change were notaltogether without foundation, in my opinion it was unavoidable, andhas greatly benefited both services. 

The amalgamation considerably accelerated my promotion, for, in orderto place the Indian Ordnance Corps on the same footing as those of theRoyal service, the rank of Second Captain had to be introduced intothe former, a rank to which I attained in October, 1860, only, however, to hold it for one day, as the next my name appeared in the_Gazette_ as a Brevet Major. 

The same year saw the introduction of the Staff Corps. This was theoutcome of the disappearance during the Mutiny of nearly the whole ofthe Regular regiments of the Bengal Army, and their replacement byIrregular regiments. But, as under the Irregular system the number ofBritish officers with each corps was too limited to admit of theirpromotion being carried on regimentally, as had been done under theRegular system, [1] some organization had to be devised by which thepay and promotion of all officers joining the Indian Army in futurecould be arranged. Many schemes were put forward; eventually oneformulated by Colonel Norman was, with certain modifications, acceptedby the Secretary of State, the result being that all officers aboutto enter the Indian Army were to be placed on one list, in which theywould be promoted after fixed periods of service;[2] and all thoseofficers who had been thrown out of employment by the disbandmentof their regiments, or by the substitution of the Irregular for theRegular system, were to have the option of joining it. The term StaffCorps, however, was a misnomer, for the constitution of the Corps andthe training of its officers had no special connection with staffrequirements. 

Towards the end of the summer the Viceroy announced his intention ofmaking a march through Central India, and I was again ordered to takecharge of his camp, which was to be formed at Benares. My wife and herbaby remained at Simla with our friends the Donald Stewarts, and Ileft her feeling sure that with them she would be happy and well takencare of. 

Sir Hugh Rose was at Allahabad, and as I passed through that place Iavailed myself of the opportunity to pay my respects to the new Chief, being anxious to meet an officer whom I had held in great admirationfrom the time when, as _Chargé d'affaires_ at Constantinople, hispluck and foresight practically saved Turkey in her time of perilfrom Russia's threatened attack--admiration increased by the masterlymanner in which he had conducted the Central India campaign, in spiteof almost overwhelming difficulties from want of transport andother causes, and a severe attack of sunstroke, which would haveincapacitated many men. Sir Hugh Rose, when I first met him atAllahabad, was fifty-nine years of age, tall, slight, with refinedfeatures, rather delicate-looking, and possessing a distinctlydistinguished appearance. He received me most kindly, and told methat he wished me to return to Head-Quarters when the Viceroy coulddispense with my services. 

The camp this year was by no means on so grand a scale as thepreceding one. The escort was much smaller, and the Commander-in-Chiefwith Army Head-Quarters did not march with us as on the previousoccasion. 

Lord and Lady Canning arrived by steamer at Benares on the 6thNovember, and I went on board to meet them. Lord Canning was cordialand pleasant as usual, but I did not think he looked well. LadyCanning was charming as ever; she reproached me for not having broughtmy wife, but when I told her how ill she had been, she agreed thatcamp was not quite the place for her. 

Benares, to my mind, is a most disappointing city; the streetsare narrow and dirty, there are no fine buildings, and it is onlyinteresting from its being held so sacred by the Hindus. The view ofthe city and burning ghâts from the river is picturesque and pretty, but there is nothing else worth seeing. 

Two days were occupied in getting the camp to Mirzarpur, on theopposite bank of the Ganges. There was no bridge, and everything hadto be taken over in boats; 10, 000 men, 1, 000 horses, 2, 000 camels, 2, 000 bullocks, besides all the tents, carts, and baggage, had to beferried across the great river. The 180 elephants swam over with their_mahouts_ on their backs to keep their heads straight and urge themon; the stream was rapid, and it was a difficult business to land themsafely at the other side, but at last it was accomplished, and ouronly casualty was one camel, which fell overboard. 

The march to Jubbulpur lay through very pretty scenery, low hillsand beautiful jungle, ablaze with the flame-coloured blossom of thedhâk-tree. Game abounded, and an occasional tiger was killed. LordCanning sometimes accompanied the shooting expeditions, but not often, for he was greatly engrossed in, and oppressed by, his work, which heappeared unable to throw off. Even during the morning's drive he wasoccupied with papers, and on reaching camp he went straight to hisoffice tent, where he remained the whole day till dinner-time, returning to it directly the meal was over, unless there werestrangers present with whom he wished to converse. 

At Jubbulpur the Viceroy held a durbar for the Maharaja Tukaji Holkarof Indore, and some minor Chiefs of that part of the country. Holkar'sconduct during the Mutiny was not altogether above suspicion, but, considering that the only troops at his disposal belonged to themutinous Indore Contingent, which consisted mainly of Hindustanisenlisted by English officers, over whom he could not be expected toexercise much control, Lord Canning gave him the benefit of the doubt, and was willing to attribute his equivocal behaviour to want ofability and timidity, rather than to disloyalty, and therefore allowedhim to come to the durbar. 

Another potentate received at this time by the Viceroy was the Begumof Bhopal, who, being a powerful and skilful Ruler, and absolutelyloyal to the British Government, had afforded us most valuableassistance during the rebellion. She was one of those women whom theEast has occasionally produced, endowed with conspicuous talent andgreat strength of character, a quality which, from its rarity amongstIndian women, gives immense influence to those who possess it. LordCanning congratulated the Begum on the success with which she hadgoverned her country, thanked her for her timely help, andbestowed upon her a large tract of country as a reward. She wasa determined-looking little woman, and spoke fluently in her ownlanguage; she personally managed the affairs of her State, and wrote aremarkably interesting account of her travelling experiences during apilgrimage to Mecca. 

Just as the Begum took her departure, news was brought in of thepresence of a tiger two or three miles from the cantonment, and asmany of us as could get away started off in pursuit. Not consideringmyself a first-rate shot, I thought I should be best employed with thebeaters, but, as good luck would have it, the tiger broke from thejungle within a few yards of my elephant: I could not resist having ashot, and was fortunate enough to knock him over. 

While at Jubbulpur, I visited the famous marble rocks on the Nerbudda. We rowed up the river for about a mile, when the stream began tonarrow, and splendid masses of marble came into view. The cliffs riseto about a hundred feet in height, pure white below, gradually shadingoff to gray at the top. The water at their base is of a deep browncolour; perfectly transparent and smooth, in which the white rocks arereflected with the utmost distinctness. In the crevices hang numerousbeehives, whose inmates one has to be careful not to disturb, for onthe bank are the graves of two Englishmen who, having incautiouslyaroused the vicious little creatures, were attacked and drowned indiving under the water to escape from their stings. 

A few days later the Viceroy left camp, and proceeded to Lucknow, where he held another durbar for the Talukdars of Oudh. Lady Canningcontinued to march with us to Mirzapur, where I took her on board herbarge, and bade her farewell--a last farewell, for I never saw thisgood, beautiful, and gifted woman again. 

The camp being broken up, I returned towards the end of February to mywork in the Quartermaster-General's Office at Simla. I found the placedeep in snow; it looked very beautiful, but the change of temperature, from the great heat of Central India to several degrees of frost, wassomewhat trying. My wife had benefited greatly from the fine bracingair, and both she and our baby appeared pictures of health; but a dayor two after my arrival the little one was taken ill, and died withinone week of her birthday--our first great sorrow. 

We passed a very quiet, uneventful summer, and in the beginning ofOctober we left Simla for Allahabad, where I had received instructionsto prepare a camp for the Viceroy, who had arranged to hold aninvestiture of the Star of India, the new Order which was originallydesigned to honour the principal Chiefs of India who had done usgood service, by associating them with some of the highest and mostdistinguished personages in England, and a few carefully selectedEuropeans in India. Lord Canning was the first Grand Master, and SirHugh Rose the first Knight. 

The durbar at which the Maharajas Sindhia and Patiala, the Begum ofBhopal, and the Nawab of Rampur were invested, was a most imposingceremony. The Begum was the cynosure of all eyes--a female Knightwas a novelty to Europeans as well as to Natives--and there was muchcuriosity as to how she would conduct herself; but no one could havebehaved with greater dignity or more perfect decorum, and she made apretty little speech in Urdu in reply to Lord Canning's complimentaryaddress. She was dressed in cloth-of-gold, and wore magnificentjewels; but the effect of her rich costume was somewhat marred by afunny little wreath of artificial flowers, woollen mittens, and blackworsted stockings with white tips. When my wife visited the Begumafter the durbar, she showed her these curious appendages with greatpride, saying she wore them because they were 'English fashion. ' Thiswas the first occasion on which ladies were admitted to a durbar, outof compliment to the Begum. 

That evening my wife was taken in to dinner by a man whose manner andappearance greatly impressed her, but she did not catch his name whenhe was introduced; she much enjoyed his conversation during dinner, which was not to be wondered at, for, before she left the table, hetold her his name was Bartle Frere. [3] She never saw him again, butshe always says he interested her more than almost any of the manydistinguished men she has since met. 

From Allahabad the Viceroy again visited Lucknow, this time with theobject of urging upon the Talukdars the suppression of the horriblecustom of female infanticide, which had its origin in the combinedpride and poverty of the Rajputs. In various parts of India attemptshad been made, with more or less success, to put a stop to thisinhuman practice. But not much impression had been made in Oudh, inconsequence of the inordinately large dowries demanded from the Rajputfathers of marriageable daughters. Two hundred Talukdars attendedLord Canning's last durbar, and, in reply to his feeling and tellingspeech, declared their firm determination to do their best todiscourage the evil. 

The Commander-in-Chief had decided to pass the winter in marchingthrough the Punjab, and inspecting the different stations for troopsin the north of India. The Head-Quarters camp had, therefore, beenformed at Jullundur, and thither we proceeded when the gathering atAllahabad had dispersed. We had but just arrived, when we were shockedand grieved beyond measure to hear of Lady Canning's death. Instead ofaccompanying the Viceroy to Allahabad she had gone to Darjeeling, and on her return, anxious to make sketches of the beautiful junglescenery, she arranged, alas! contrary to the advice of those withher, to spend one night in the _terai_, [4] where she contractedjungle-fever, to which she succumbed ten days after her return toCalcutta. Her death was a real personal sorrow to all who had theprivilege of knowing her; what must it have been to her husband, returning to England without the helpmate who had shared and lightenedthe burden of his anxieties, and gloried in the success which crownedhis eventful career in India. 

The Commander-in-Chief arrived in the middle of November, and all theofficers of the Head-Quarters camp went out to meet him. I was mountedon a spirited nutmeg-gray Arab, a present from Allgood. Sir Hughgreatly fancied Arabian horses, and immediately noticed mine. Hecalled me up to him, and asked me where I got him, and of whatcaste he was. From that moment he never varied in the kindness andconsideration with which he treated me, and I always fancied I owedhis being well disposed towards me from the very first to the factthat I was riding my handsome little Arab that day; he loved a goodhorse, and liked his staff to be well mounted. A few days afterwardshe told me he wished me to accompany him on the flying tours heproposed to make from time to time, in order to see more of thecountry and troops than would be possible if he marched altogetherwith the big camp. 

We went to Umritsar, Mian Mir, and Sialkot; at each place there werethe usual inspections, mess dinners, and entertainments. The Chief'svisit made a break in the ordinary life of a cantonment, and theresidents were glad to take advantage of it to get up variousfestivities; Sir Hugh, too, was most hospitably inclined, so thatthere was always a great deal to do besides actual duty when wearrived at a station. 

Jamu, where the Ruler of Kashmir resides during the winter, is not farfrom Sialkot, so Sir Hugh was tempted to accept an invitation from theMaharaja to pay him a visit and enjoy some good pig-sticking, to mymind the finest sport in the world. His Highness entertained us rightroyally, and gave us excellent sport, but our pleasure was marred bythe Chief having a bad fall: he had got the first spear off a fineboar, who, feeling himself wounded, turned and charged, knocking overSir Hugh's horse. All three lay in a heap together; the pig was dead, the horse was badly ripped up, and the Chief showed no signs of life. We carried him back to Jamu on a _charpoy_[5] and when he regainedconsciousness we found that no great harm was done beyond a severelybruised face and a badly sprained leg, which, though still verypainful two or three days later, did not prevent the plucky old fellowfrom riding over the battle-field of Chilianwalla. 

Very soon after this Norman, who was then Adjutant-General of theArmy, left Head-Quarters to take up the appointment of Secretary tothe Government of India in the Military Department. Before we partedhe expressed a hope that I would soon follow him, as a vacancy in theDepartment was about to take place, which he said he was sure LordCanning would allow him to offer to me. Norman was succeeded asAdjutant-General of the Indian Army by Edwin Johnson, the last officerwho filled that post, as it was done away with when the amalgamationof the services was carried into effect. 

Two marches from Jhelum my wife was suddenly taken alarmingly ill, andhad to remain behind when the camp moved on. Sir Hugh Rose most kindlyinsisted on leaving his doctor (Longhurst) in charge of her, and toldme I must stay with her as long as was necessary. For three wholeweeks we remained on the encamping ground of Sahawar; at the end ofthat time, thanks (humanly speaking) to the skill and care of ourDoctor, she was sufficiently recovered to be put into a doolie andcarried to Lahore, I riding a camel by her side, for my horses hadgone on with the camp. 

While at Lahore I received a most kind letter from Norman, offering methe post in the Secretariat which he had already told me was aboutto become vacant. After some hesitation--for the Secretariat had itsattractions, particularly as regarded pay--I decided to decline theproffered appointment, as my acceptance of it would have taken me awayfrom purely military work and the chance of service in the field. Ileft my wife on the high-road to recovery, and hurried after thecamp, overtaking it at Peshawar just in time to accompany theCommander-in-Chief on his ride along the Derajat frontier, a trip Ishould have been very sorry to have missed. We visited every stationfrom Kohat to Rajanpur, a ride of about 440 miles. Brigadier-GeneralNeville Chamberlain, who was still commanding the Punjab FrontierForce, met us at Kohat, and remained with us to the end. We did fromtwenty-five to forty miles a day, and our baggage and servants, carried on riding-camels, kept up with us. 

This was my first experience of a part of India with which I had laterso much to do, and which always interested me greatly. At the time ofwhich I am writing it was a wild and lawless tract of country. As weleft Kohat we met the bodies of four murdered men being carried in, but were told there was nothing unusual in such a sight. On oneoccasion General Chamberlain introduced to Sir Hugh Rose two youngKhans, fine, handsome fellows, who were apparently on excellent terms. A few days later we were told that one of them had been murdered byhis companion, there having been a blood-feud between their familiesfor generations; although these two had been brought up together, andliked each other, the one whose clan had last lost a member by thefeud felt himself in honour bound to sacrifice his friend. 

When I rejoined my wife at the end of the tour, I found her a greatdeal worse than her letters had led me to expect, but she had beenmuch cheered by the arrival of a sister who had come out to pay usa visit, and who lived with us until she married an old friend andbrother officer of mine named Sladen. We remained at Umballa till theend of March; the only noteworthy circumstance that occurred there wasa parade for announcing to the troops that Earl Canning had departed, and that the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine was now Viceroy of India. 

There are few men whose conduct of affairs has been so severelycriticized as Lord Canning's, but there are still fewer who, asGovernors or Viceroys, have had to deal with such an overwhelmingcrisis as the Mutiny. While the want of appreciation Lord Canning atfirst displayed of the magnitude of that crisis may, with perfectjustice, be attributed to the fact that most of his advisers hadgained their experience only in Lower Bengal, and had therefore a veryimperfect knowledge of popular feeling throughout India, the verylarge measure of success which attended his subsequent action wasundoubtedly due to his own ability and sound judgment. 

That by none of Lord Canning's responsible councillors could theextent of the Mutiny, or the position in Upper India, have beengrasped, was evident from the telegram[6] sent from Calcutta to theCommander-in-Chief on the 31st May, three weeks after the revolt atMeerut had occurred; but from the time Lord Canning left Calcuttain January, 1858, and had the opportunity of seeing and judging forhimself, all that he did was wise and vigorous. 

Outwardly Lord Canning was cold and reserved, the result, I think, ofextreme sensitiveness; for he was without doubt very warm-hearted, and was greatly liked and respected by those about him, and therewas universal regret throughout India when, three months after hisdeparture, the news of his death was received. 

We returned to Simla early in April. The season passed much as otherseasons had passed, except that there was rather more gaiety. The newViceroy remained in Calcutta; but Sir Hugh Rose had had quite enoughof it the year before, so he came up to the Hills, and establishedhimself at 'Barnes Court. ' He was very hospitable, and having mysister-in-law to chaperon, my wife went out rather more than she hadcared to do in previous years. We spent a good deal of our time alsoat Mashobra, a lovely place, in the heart of the Hills, about sixmiles from Simla, where the Chief had a house, which he was goodenough to frequently place at our disposal, when not making use ofit himself. It was an agreeable change, and one which we all greatlyenjoyed. But at the best one gets very tired of the Hills by the closeof the summer, and I was glad to start off towards the end ofOctober with my wife and her sister for Agra, where this year theHead-Quarters camp was to be formed, as the Chief had settled thecold-weather tour was to begin with a march through Bundelkand andCentral India, the theatre of his successful campaign. 

The second march out we were startled by being told, when we awokein the morning, that Colonel Gawler, the Deputy-Adjutant-General ofQueen's troops, had been badly wounded in the night by a thief, whogot into his tent with the object of stealing a large sum of moneyGawler had received from the bank the previous day, and for greatersafety had placed under his pillow when he went to bed. In the middleof the night his wife awoke him, saying there was someone in the tent, and by the dim light of a small oil-lamp he could just see a darkfigure creeping along the floor. He sprang out of bed and seized therobber; but the latter, being perfectly naked and oiled all over, slipped through his hands and wriggled under the wall of the tent. Gawler caught him by the leg just as he was disappearing, and theystruggled outside together. When despairing of being able to make hisescape, the thief stabbed Gawler several times with a knife, which wastied by a string to his wrist. By this time Mrs. Gawler had beenable to arouse two Kaffir servants, one of whom tried to seize themiscreant, but in his turn was stabbed. The second servant, however, was more wary, and succeeded in capturing the thief; Kaffir fashion, he knocked all the breath out of his body by running at him headdown and butting him in the stomach, when it became easy to bind themiscreant hand and foot. It was a bad part of the country for thieves;and when some four weeks later I went off on a flying tour with theCommander-in-Chief, I did not leave my wife quite as happily as usual. But neither she nor her sister was afraid. Each night they senteverything at all valuable to be placed under the care of the guard, and having taken this precaution, were quite easy in their minds. 

[Illustration: THE EARL CANNING, K. G. , G. C. B. , G. M. S. I. , VICEROY ANDGOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, _From a photograph by Messrs. Mayall. _]

When the camp reached Gwalior, the Maharaja Sindhia seemed to thinkhe could not do enough to show his gratitude to Sir Hugh Rose for hisopportune help in June, 1858, [7] when the Gwalior troops mutinied, andjoined the rebel army under the Rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi. Theday after our arrival Sindhia held a grand review of his new army inhonour of our Chief. The next day there was an open-air entertainmentin the Phulbagh (garden of flowers); the third a picnic and elephantfight, which, by the way, was a very tame affair. We had nervedourselves to see something rather terrific, instead of which the greatcreatures twisted their trunks about each other in quite a playfulmanner, and directly the play seemed to be turning into earnest theywere separated by their _mahouts_, being much too valuable to beallowed to injure themselves. Each day there was some kind ofentertainment: pig-sticking or shooting expeditions in the morning, and banquets, fireworks, and illuminations in the evening. 

Gwalior is an interesting place. The fort is picturesquely situatedabove a perpendicular cliff; the road up to it is very steep, and itmust have been almost impregnable in former days. It was made doublyinteresting to us by Sir Hugh Rose explaining how he attacked it, andpointing out the spot where the Rani of Jhansi was killed in a chargeof the 8th Hussars. 

Our next halt was Jhansi. Here also Sir Hugh had a thrilling tale totell of its capture, and of his having to fight the battle of theBetwa against a large force brought to the assistance of the rebels byTantia Topi, while the siege was actually being carried on. 

From Jhansi the big camp marched to Lucknow, _viâ_ Cawnpore; while theChief with a small staff (of which I was one) and light tents, madea detour by Saugor, Jubbulpur, and Allahabad. We travelled throughpretty jungle for the most part, interspersed with low hills, and wehad altogether a very enjoyable trip. Sir Hugh was justly proud of thesplendid service the Central India Field Force had performed underhis command; and, as we rode along, it delighted him to point out thevarious places where he had come in contact with the rebels. 

While at Allahabad, on the 13th January--quite the coolest time of theyear--I had a slight sunstroke, which it took me a very long time toget over completely. The sensible custom introduced by Lord Clyde, of wearing helmets, was not always adhered to, and Sir Hugh Hose wasrather fond of cocked hats. On this occasion I was wearing this--forIndia--most unsuitable head-dress, and, as ill-luck would have it, theChief kept me out rather late, going over the ground where the presentcantonment stands. I did not feel anything at the time, but an hourlater I was suddenly seized with giddiness and sickness, and for ashort time I could neither see nor hear. Plentiful douches of coldwater brought me round, and I was well enough in the afternoon to gowith the Chief to inspect the fort; but for months afterwards I neverlost the pain in my head, and for many years I was very susceptible tothe evil influence of the sun's rays. 

We reached Lucknow towards the middle of January. Here, as elsewhere, we had constant parades and inspections, for Sir Hugh carried out hisduties in the most thorough manner, and spared himself no trouble tosecure the efficiency and the well-being of the soldier. At the sametime, he was careful not to neglect his social duties; he took aprominent part in all amusements, and it was mainly due to his liberalsupport that we were able to keep up a small pack of hounds withHead-Quarters, which afforded us much enjoyment during the wintermonths. 

From Lucknow we marched through Bareilly, Meerut, and Umballa, and the30th March saw us all settled at Simla for the season. 

Early in April Lord Elgin arrived in Simla for the hot weather, and from that time to the present, Simla has continued to be theHead-Quarters of the Government during the summer months. 

About this time the changes necessitated by the amalgamation ofthe services took place in the army staff. Edwin Johnson lost hisappointment in consequence, and Colonel Haythorne, [8] Adjutant-Generalof Queen's troops, became Adjutant-General of the Army in India, with Donald Stewart as his deputy. The order limiting the tenure ofemployment on the staff in the same grade to five years was also nowintroduced, which entailed my good friend Arthur Becher vacating theQuartermaster-Generalship, after having held it for eleven years. He was succeeded by Colonel Paton, with Lumsden as his deputy, andCharles Johnson (brother of Edwin Johnson) and myself as assistants inthe Department. 

[Footnote 1: Under the Regular system, which was modelled on the RoyalArmy organization, each regiment of Native Cavalry had 22, and eachregiment of Native Infantry 25 British officers, who rose to thehigher grades by seniority. From this establishment officers weretaken, without being seconded, for the multifarious extra-regimentalduties on which the Indian Army was, and is still, employed, viz. , Staff, Civil, Political, Commissariat, Pay, Public Works, Stud, and Survey. With the Irregular system this was no longer possible, although the number of British officers with each corps was (afterthe Mutiny) increased from 3 to 9 with a Cavalry, and 3 to 8 with anInfantry regiment. ]

[Footnote 2: Captain after twelve years, [*] Major after twenty years, and Lieutenant-Colonel after twenty-six years. ]

[Footnote * to Footnote 2: Since reduced to eleven years. ]

[Footnote 3: The late Sir Bartle Frere, Bart, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 4: The fever-giving tract of country at the foot of theHimalayas. ]

[Footnote 5: Native string bed. ]

[Footnote 6: 'Your force of Artillery will enable us to disposeof Delhi with certainty. I therefore beg that you will detach oneEuropean Infantry regiment and a small force of European Cavalry tothe south of Delhi, without keeping them for operations there, so thatAligarh may be recovered and Cawnpore relieved immediately. ']

[Footnote 7: After the capture of Kalpi in May, 1858, Sir Hugh Rose, worn out with fatigue and successive sunstrokes, was advised by hismedical officer to return at once to Bombay; his leave had beengranted, and his successor (Brigadier-General Napier) had beenappointed, when intelligence reached him to the effect that the rebelarmy, under Tantia Topi and the Rani of Jhansi, had been joined bythe whole of Sindhia's troops and were in possession of the fortof Gwalior with its well-supplied arsenal. Sir Hugh Rose at oncecancelled his leave, pushed on to Gwalior, and by the 30th of June hadre-captured all Sindhia's guns and placed him again in possession ofhis capital. ]

[Footnote 8: The late General Sir Edmund Haythorne, K. C. B. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXV. 1863

 The Umbeyla expedition--The Akhund of Swat --The 'Eagle's Nest' and 'Crag piquet'--The death of Lord Elgin --Loyalty of our Pathan soldiers--Bunerwals show signs of submission --The conical hill--Umbeyla in flames--Bunerwals agree to our terms --Malka destroyed

In the autumn of 1863, while we were preparing for the usual wintertour, Sir Hugh Rose, who had accompanied Lord Elgin on a trip throughthe hills, telegraphed to the Head-Quarters staff to join him at MianMir without delay. 

The news which greeted us on our arrival was indeed disturbing. LordElgin was at Dharmsala in a dying condition, and the Chief hadbeen obliged to leave him and push on to Lahore, in consequence ofunsatisfactory reports from Brigadier-General Chamberlain, who wasjust then commanding an expedition which had been sent into themountains near Peshawar, and had met with unexpected opposition. Thecivil authorities on the spot reported that there existed a great dealof excitement all along the border, that the tribes were collecting inlarge numbers, that emissaries from Kabul had appeared amongstthem, and that, unless reinforcements could be sent up at once, theGovernment would be involved in a war which must inevitably lead tothe most serious complications, not only on the frontier, but withAfghanistan. In so grave a light did the Lieutenant-Governor, SirRobert Montgomery, view the position, that he contemplated the forcebeing withdrawn and the undertaking abandoned. 

Sir Hugh had had nothing to do with the despatch of this expedition;it had been decided on by the Government of India in consultation withthe Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. When the Commander-in-Chief wascommunicated with, he expressed himself adverse to the proposal, andplaced his views at length before the Government, pointing out theinexpediency of entering a difficult and unknown country, unless thetroops were properly equipped with transport, supplies, and reserveammunition; that time did not permit of their being so equipped beforethe winter set in; and that, to provide a force of 5, 000 men (thestrength considered necessary by the Government), the frontier wouldhave to be dangerously weakened. Moreover, he gave it as his opinionthat it would be better to postpone operations until the spring, wheneverything could be perfectly arranged. Subsequent events proved howsound was this advice. But before proceeding with my narrative it willbe as well to explain the circumstances with led the authorities toundertake this expedition. 

In 1857, when all our resources were required to quell internaltumult, the Hindustani fanatics[1] took the opportunity to stir updisturbances all along the Yusafzai frontier of the Peshawar district, and, aided by the rebel sepoys who had fled to them for protection, they made raids upon our border, and committed all kinds ofatrocities. We were obliged, therefore, to send an expedition againstthem in 1858, which resulted in their being driven from theirstronghold, Sitana, and in the neighbouring tribes being bound down toprevent them reoccupying that place. Three years later the fanaticsreturned to their former haunts and built up a new settlement atMalka; the old troubles recommenced, and for two years they had beenallowed to go on raiding, murdering, and attacking our outposts withimpunity. It was, therefore, quite time that measures should be takento effectually rid the frontier of these disturbers of the peace, provided such measures could have been decided upon early enough inthe year to ensure success. 

The Punjab Government advocated the despatch of a very strong force. Accordingly, two columns were employed, the base of one being in thePeshawar valley, and that of the other in Hazara. The Peshawar columnwas to move by the Umbeyla Pass, the Buner frontier, and the Chamlavalley, thus operating on the enemy's line of retreat. This routewould not have been chosen, had not Chamberlain been assured by thecivil authorities that no hostility need be feared from the Bunerwals, even if their country had to be entered, as they had given no troublefor fifteen years, and their spiritual head, the Akhund of Swat, [2]had no sympathy with the fanatics. It was not, therefore, considerednecessary to warn the Buner people of our approach until preparationswere completed; indeed, it was thought unadvisable to do so, as it wasimportant to keep the proposed line of advance secret. The strength ofthe force was 6, 000 men, with 19 guns, but to make up these numbersthe stations in Upper India had to be considerably weakened, and therewas no reserve nearer than Lahore. 

The Peshawar column[3] being all ready for a start, a Proclamation wasforwarded to the Buner and other neighbouring tribes, informingthem of the object of the expedition, and stating that there was nointention of interfering with them or their possessions. 

On the following morning, the 20th October, the Umbeyla Pass wasentered, and by noon the kotal[4] was reached without any resistanceto speak of; but, from information brought in, it was evident that anyfurther advance would be stoutly opposed. The road turned out to bemuch more difficult than had been anticipated, and the hurriedlycollected transport proved unequal to the strain. Not a single baggageanimal, except the ammunition mules, got up that night; indeed, it wasnot until the morning of the 22nd--more than forty-eight hours afterthey started--that the rear guard reached the kotal, a distance ofonly six miles. As soon as it arrived Colonel Alex. Taylor, R. E. , wassent off with a body of Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Probyn, toreconnoitre the road in front. The delay in reaching the top of thepass had given the tribes time to collect, and when the reconnoitringparty entered the Chamla valley the Bunerwals could be seen about twomiles and a half off, occupying in force the range which separatesBuner and Chamla. Whatever may have been their first intention, theyapparently could not resist the temptation to try and cut off thissmall body of Cavalry, for our horsemen on their return journey founda large number of the trusted Buner tribe attempting to block themouth of the pass. A charge was made, but mounted men could not domuch in such a hilly country; the proceedings of the Bunerwals, however, had been observed from the kotal, and Major Brownlow, [5] withsome of his own regiment (the 20th Punjab Infantry), was sent to theassistance of the party. A hand-to-hand fight ensued, and the enemypressed our troops closely on their way back, coming right in amongstthem with the utmost daring. 

There was now brought in to the Commissioner by a spy the copy ofa letter from the Hindustani fanatics, addressed to the Bunerwals, telling them not to be taken in by our assurances that our only objectwas to punish the fanatics, for our real intentions were to annexChamla, Buner, and Swat. This letter no doubt aroused the suspicionsof the tribes, and, encouraged by the slowness of our movements, theyall joined against us from Buner, Mahaban, and the Black Mountain. 

On the 23rd large bodies of men with numerous standards were to beseen approaching the mouth of the pass, and a day or two later areport was received that our foes were to have the support of theAkhund of Swat, which meant a most formidable accession of moral aswell as material strength, and put a stop, for the time being, toany possibility of a successful advance being made with the force atChamberlain's disposal. 

The position occupied by our troops was enclosed on the left (west)by the Guru Mountain, which separates Umbeyla from Buner, and on theright (east) by a range of hills, not quite so high. The main piqueton the Guru occupied a position upon some precipitous cliffs known asthe Eagle's Nest, while that on the right was designated the 'Cragpiquet. ' The Eagle's Nest was only large enough to accommodate 110men, so 120 more were placed under the shelter of some rocks at itsbase, and the remainder of the troops told off for the defence of theleft piquet were drawn up on and about a rocky knoll, 400 feet west ofthe Eagle's Nest. 

Some 2, 000 of the enemy occupied a breastwork on the crest of a spurof the Guru Mountain; and about noon on the 26th they moved down, andwith loud shouts attacked the Eagle's Nest. Their matchlock men postedthemselves to the greatest advantage in a wood, and opened a gallingfire upon our defences, while their swordsmen made a determinedadvance. The nature of the ground prevented our guns from beingbrought to bear upon the assailants, and they were thus able toget across the open space in front of the piquet, and plant theirstandards close under its parapet. For some considerable time theyremained in this position, all our efforts to dislodge them proving ofno avail. Eventually, however, they were forced to give way, and weredriven up the hill, leaving the ground covered with their dead, and agreat many wounded, who were taken into our hospitals and carefullytreated, while a still greater number were carried off by theirfriends. Our losses were, 2 British officers, 1 Native officer, and26 men killed; and 2 British officers, 7 Native officers, and 86 menwounded. 

The day following the fight the Bunerwals were told they might carryaway their dead, and we took advantage of their acceptance of thispermission to reason with them as to the uselessness of an unnecessarysacrifice of their tribesmen, which would be the certain result offurther opposition to us. Their demeanour was courteous, and theyconversed freely with General Chamberlain and Colonel Reynell Taylor, the Commissioner, but they made it evident that they were determinednot to give in. 

Our position had now become rather awkward; there was a combinationagainst us of all the tribes between the Indus and the Kabul rivers, and their numbers could not be less than 15, 000 armed men. Mutualanimosities were for the time allowed to remain in abeyance, andthe tribes all flocked to fight under the Akhund's standard in theinterests of their common faith. Moreover, there was trouble in therear from the people along the Yusafzai border, who assisted theenemy by worrying our lines of communication. Under these changedconditions, and with such an inadequate force, Chamberlain came tothe conclusion that, for the moment, he could only remain on thedefensive, and trust to time, to the discouragement which repeatedunsuccessful attacks were sure to produce on the enemy, and to thegradual decrease of their numbers, to break up the combination againstus; for, as these tribesmen only bring with them the quantity of foodthey are able to carry, as soon as it is finished they are bound tosuspend operations till more can be procured. 

For three weeks almost daily attacks were made on our position; theenemy fought magnificently, some of them being killed inside ourbatteries, and twice they gained possession of the 'Crag piquet, ' thekey of the position, which it was essential should be retaken at allhazards. On the second occasion General Chamberlain himself led theattacking party, and was so severely wounded that he was obliged torelinquish the command of the force. 

The Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, being convinced thatreinforcements were necessary, in consultation with Colonels Durand[6]and Norman (the Foreign and Military Secretaries, who had come toLahore to meet the Viceroy), and without waiting for the sanction ofthe Commander-in-Chief, ordered to the frontier the three regimentswhich had been detailed for the Viceroy's camp, [7] as well as the 93rdHighlanders, then at Sialkot; and when Sir Hugh Rose on his arrivalat Lahore heard of the heavy losses the expeditionary force hadsustained, and of General Chamberlain being _hors de combat_ from hiswound, further reinforcements from every direction were hurried to thefront. Subsequently, however, it became a question whether the troopsshould not be withdrawn altogether, and the punishment of the fanaticsgiven up, the Government of India and the Punjab Government beingcompletely in accord in favouring this view, while the Commissioner ofPeshawar, Major James (who had succeeded Reynell Taylor), [8] and SirHugh Rose were as strongly opposed to a retrograde movement. TheCommander-in-Chief pointed out to the Government that the loss ofprestige and power we must sustain by retiring from the Umbeyla Passwould be more disastrous, both from a military and political pointof view, than anything that could happen save the destruction of theforce itself, and that General Chamberlain, on whose sound judgment hecould rely, was quite sure that a retirement was unnecessary. 

Unfortunately at this time the Viceroy died at Dharmsala, and thequestion remained in abeyance pending the arrival of Sir WilliamDenison, Governor of Madras, who was coming round to take over thereins of Government until a successor to Lord Elgin should be sentfrom England. 

In the meantime Sir Hugh Rose was most anxious to obtain exactinformation respecting our position at Umbeyla, the means of operatingfrom it, the nature of the ground--in fact, all details which couldonly be satisfactorily obtained by sending someone to report on thesituation, with whom he had had personal communication regardingthe points about which he required to be enlightened. He thereforedetermined to despatch two officers on special service, whose duty itwould be to put the Commander-in-Chief in possession of all the factsof the case; accordingly, Colonel Adye[9] (Deputy-Adjutant-Generalof Royal Artillery) and I were ordered to proceed to Umbeyla withoutdelay. 

Adye proved a most charming travelling companion, clever andentertaining, and I think we both enjoyed our journey. We reached thepass on the 25th November. 

There had been no fighting for some days, and most of the wounded hadbeen removed. Sir Neville Chamberlain was still in camp, and I wassorry to find him suffering greatly from his wound. We were muchinterested in going over the piquets and listening to the story of thedifferent attacks made upon them, which had evidently been conductedby the enemy with as much skill as courage. [10] The loyalty of ourNative soldiers struck me as having been most remarkable. Not a singledesertion had occurred, although all the Native regiments engaged, with the exception of the Gurkhas and Punjab Pioneers, had amongstthem members of the several tribes we were fighting, and many of oursoldiers were even closely related to some of the hostile tribesmen;on one occasion a young Buner sepoy actually recognized his own fatheramongst the enemy's dead when the fight was over. [11]

We listened to many tales of the gallantry of the British officers. The names of Brownlow, Keyes, [12] and Hughes[13] were on everyone'slips, and Brownlow's defence of the Eagle's Nest on the 26th October, and of the 'Crag piquet' on the 12th November, spoke volumes for hiscoolness and pluck, and for the implicit faith reposed in him by themen of the 20th Punjab Infantry, the regiment he had raised in 1857when but a subaltern. In his official report the General remarked that'to Major Brownlow's determination and personal example he attributedthe preservation of the "Crag piquet. "' And Keyes's recapture of thesame piquet was described by Sir Neville as 'a most brilliant exploit, stamping Major Keyes as an officer possessing some of the highestmilitary qualifications. ' Brownlow and Keyes were both recommended forthe Victoria Cross. 

We (Adye and I) had no difficulty in making up our minds as tothe course which ought to be taken. The column was daily beingstrengthened by the arrival of reinforcements, and although thecombination of the tribesmen was still formidable, the enemy wereshowing signs of being disheartened by their many losses, and of awish to come to terms. 

Having consulted the civil and military authorities on the spot, weinformed the Commander-in-Chief that they were of opinion a withdrawalwould be most unwise, and that it was hoped that on the arrival ofGeneral Garvock[14] (Chamberlain's successor) an advance would be madeinto the Chamla valley, for there would then be a sufficient numberof troops to undertake an onward move, as well as to hold the presentposition, which, as we told the Chief, was one of the strongest we hadever seen. 

Sir William Denison reached Calcutta on the 2nd December. A carefulstudy of the correspondence in connexion with the Umbeyla expeditionsatisfied him that the Commander-in-Chief's views were correct, andthat a retirement would be unwise. 

Sir Hugh Rose had previously requested to be allowed to personallyconduct the operations, and in anticipation of the Government accedingto his request, he had sent a light camp to Hasan Abdal, from whichplace he intended to push on to Umbeyla; and with the object ofcollecting troops near the frontier, where they would be availableas a reserve should the expedition not be soon and satisfactorilysettled, he desired me to select an encamping-ground between RawalPindi and Attock suitable for 10, 000 men. 

Leaving Adye in the pass, I started for Attock, where I spent threedays riding about in search of a promising site for the camp. Isettled upon a place near Hasan Abdal, which, however, was not in theend made use of. The people of the country were very helpful to me;indeed, when they heard I had been a friend of John Nicholson, theyseemed to think they could not do enough for me, and delighted intalking of their old leader, whom they declared to be the greatest manthey had ever known. 

On my return I marched up the pass with the Rev. W. G. Cowie[15] andProbyn, who, with 400 Cavalry, had been ordered to the front to be inreadiness for a move into the Chamla valley. James, the Commissioner, had been working to detach the Bunerwals from the combination againstus, and on the afternoon of our arrival a deputation of their headmenarrived in camp, and before their departure the next morning theypromised to accompany a force proceeding to destroy Malka, and toexpel the Hindustani fanatics from the Buner country. 

Later, however, a messenger came in to say they could not fulfil theirpromise, being unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon themby their co-religionists. The man further reported that large numbersof fresh tribesmen had appeared on the scene, and that it was intendedto attack us on the 16th. He advised the Commissioner to take theinitiative, and gave him to understand that if we advanced theBunerwals would stand aloof. 

Sir Hugh Rose had been accorded permission to take command of thetroops in the field, and had sent word to General Garvock not 'toattempt any operations until further orders. ' James, however, thinkingthat the situation demanded immediate action, as disturbances hadbroken out in other parts of the Peshawar valley, deprecated delay, and pressed Garvock to advance, telling him that a successfulfight would put matters straight. Garvock consented to follow theCommissioner's advice, and arranged to move on the following day. 

The force was divided into three columns. The first andsecond--consisting of about 4, 800 men, and commanded respectively byColonel W. Turner, C. B. , [16] and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilde, C. B. --wereto form the attacking party, while the third, about 3, 000 strong, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan, [17] was to be leftfor the protection of the camp. 

At daybreak, on the 15th, the troops for the advance, unencumbered bytents or baggage, and each man carrying two days' rations, assembledat the base of the 'Crag piquet. ' Turner, an excellent officer, whoduring the short time he had been at Umbeyla had inspired greatconfidence by his soldierly qualities, had on the previous afternoonreconnoitred to the right of the camp, and had discovered thatabout 4, 000 men were holding the village of Lalu, from which it wasnecessary to dislodge them before Umbeyla could be attacked. On beingtold to advance, therefore, Turner moved off in the direction of Lalu, and, driving the enemy's piquets before him, occupied the heightsoverlooking the valley, out of which rose, immediately in front about200 yards off, a conical hill which hid Lalu from view. This hill, which was crowded with Hindustani fanatics and their Pathan allies, was a most formidable position; the sides were precipitous, and thesummit was strengthened by _sangars_. [18] No further move could bemade until the enemy were dislodged, so Turner lined the heights allround with his Infantry, and opened fire with his Mountain guns. Meanwhile, Wilde's column had cleared off the enemy from the frontof the camp, and formed up on Turner's left. On the advance beingsounded, Turner's Infantry rushed down the slopes, and in ten minutescould be seen driving the enemy from the heights on his right; at thesame time the 101st Fusiliers, the leading regiment of Wilde's column, made straight for the top of the conical hill, and, under cover ofthe fire from the Mountain guns of both columns, and supported bythe Guides, 4th Gurkhas, and 23rd Pioneers, they climbed the almostperpendicular sides. When near the top a short halt was made to givethe men time to get their breath; the signal being then given, amidsta shower of bullets and huge stones, the position was stormed, andcarried at the point of the bayonet. It was a grand sight as Adye andI watched it from Hughes's battery; but we were considerably relievedwhen we perceived the enemy flying down the sides of the hill, andheard the cheers of the gallant Fusiliers as they stood victorious onthe highest peak. 

[Illustration: THE STORMING OF THE CONICAL HILL AT UMBEYLA BY THE101ST FOOT (BENGAL FUSILIERS). _From a sketch by General Sir John Adye, G. C. B. , R. A. _]

Now that the enemy were on the run it was the time to press them, andthis Turner did so effectually that the leading men of his columnentered Lalu simultaneously with the last of the fugitives. Therapidity of this movement was so unexpected that it threw the enemyinside the walls into confusion; they made no stand, and were soon infull retreat towards Umbeyla and the passes leading into Buner. 

While affairs were thus prospering on our right, the enemy, apparentlyimagining we were too busy to think of our left, came in largenumbers from the village of Umbeyla, threatening the camp and thecommunications of the second column. Wilde, however, was prepared forthem, and held his ground until reinforced by Turner, when he made aforward movement. The Guides, and detachments of the 5th Gurkhas and3rd Sikhs, charged down one spur, and the 101st down another; theenemy were driven off with great slaughter, leaving a standard inthe hands of the Gurkhas, and exposing themselves in their flight toTurner's guns. During the day they returned, and, gathering on theheights, made several unsuccessful attacks upon our camp. At last, about 2 p. M. , Brownlow, who was in command of the right defences, assumed the offensive, and, aided by Keyes, moved out of thebreastworks and, by a succession of well-executed charges, completelycleared the whole front of the position, and drove the tribesmen withgreat loss into the plain below. 

All opposition having now ceased, and the foe being in full retreat, the force bivouacked for the night. We had 16 killed and 67 wounded;while our opponents admitted to 400 killed and wounded. 

The next morning we were joined by Probyn with 200 sabres of the 11thBengal Lancers and the same number of the Guides; and after a hastybreakfast the order was given to march into the Chamla valley. My dutywas to accompany the Mountain batteries and show them the way. As wedebouched into comparatively open country, the enemy appeared on aridge which completely covered our approach to Umbeyla, and we coulddescry many standards flying on the most prominent points. The roadwas so extremely difficult that it was half-past two o'clock beforethe whole force was clear of the hills. 

General Garvock, having made a careful reconnaissance of the enemy'sposition, which was of great strength and peculiarly capable ofdefence, had decided to turn their right, a movement which was to beentrusted to the second column, and I was told to inform Turner thathe must try and cut them off from the Buner Pass as they retreated. I found Turner close to Umbeyla and delivered my message. He movedforward at once with the 23rd Pioneers and a wing of the 32nd Pioneersin line, supported by the second wing, having in reserve a wing of the7th Royal Fusiliers. 

When we had passed the village of Umbeyla, which was in flames, havingbeen set fire to by our Cavalry, the wing of the 32nd was brought upin prolongation of our line to the right. The advance was continuedto within about 800 yards of the Buner Pass, when Turner, observing alarge body of the enemy threatening his left flank, immediately senttwo companies of the Royal Fusiliers in that direction. Just at thatmoment a band of _Ghazis_ furiously attacked the left flank, whichwas at a disadvantage, having got into broken ground covered with lowjungle. In a few seconds five of the Pioneer British officers wereon the ground, one killed and four wounded; numbers of the men wereknocked over, and the rest, staggered by the suddenness of theonslaught, fell back on their reserve, where they found the neededsupport, for the Fusiliers stood as firm as a rock. At thecritical moment when the _Ghazis_ made their charge, Wright, theAssistant-Adjutant-General, and I, being close by, rushed in amongstthe Pioneers and called on them to follow us; as we were personallyknown to the men of both regiments, they quickly pulled themselvestogether and responded to our efforts to rally them. It was lucky theydid so, for had there been any delay or hesitation, the enemy, whothronged the slopes above us, would certainly have come down in greatnumbers, and we should have had a most difficult task. As it was, wewere entirely successful in repulsing the _Ghazis_, not a man ofwhom escaped. We counted 200 of the enemy killed; our losses werecomparatively slight--8 killed and 80 wounded. 

We bivouacked for the night near the village of Umbeyla, and the nextmorning the Bunerwals, who, true to their word, had taken no part inthe fighting on the 15th or 16th, came in and made their submission. 

The question which now had to be decided was, whether a force fullyequipped and strong enough to overcome all opposition should be sentto destroy the fanatic settlement of Malka, or whether the work ofannihilation should be entrusted to the Bunerwals, witnessed byBritish officers. The latter course was eventually adopted, chieflyon account of the delay which provisioning a brigade would entail--adelay which the Commissioner was anxious to avoid--for although forthe present the combination had broken up, and most of the tribesmenwere dispersing to their homes, the Akhund of Swat and his followerswere still hovering about in the neighbourhood, and inaction on ourpart would in all probability have led to a fresh gathering andrenewed hostilities. 

The terms which were drawn up, and to which the Bunerwals agreed, were:

 The breaking-up of the tribal gathering in the Buner Pass. 

 The destruction of Malka; those carrying out the work to be accompanied by British officers and such escort as might be considered necessary by us. 

 The expulsion of the Hindustanis from the Buner, Chamla, and Amazai countries. 

 And, finally, it was stipulated that the headmen of their tribe should be left as hostages until such time as the requirements should have been fulfilled. 

On the afternoon of Saturday, the 19th December, the little partyof British officers who were to witness the destruction of Malkaassembled at Umbeyla. Its members were Reynell Taylor (who was incharge), Alex. Taylor (Commanding Engineer), two Survey officers, Wright, Adye, and myself. Twenty-five Cavalry and 4 companies of theGuides Infantry, under four officers, formed our escort, and it hadbeen arranged that we were to be accompanied by four leading BunerKhans, with 2, 000 followers, who would be responsible for our safety, and destroy the fanatics' stronghold in our presence. Rain was fallingheavily, but as all our arrangements had been made, and delay wasconsidered undesirable, it was settled that we should make a start. Itwas rough travelling, and it was almost dark when we reached Kuria, only eight miles on our way, where we halted for the night, and wherewe had to remain the next day, as the Bunerwals declared they couldnot continue the journey until they had come to an understanding withthe Amazais, in whose territory Malka was situated. 

We had noticed on leaving Umbeyla that, instead of 2, 000 Bunerwals, there were only about sixty or seventy at the most, and in reply toour repeated questions as to what had become of the remainder, we weretold they would join us later on. It soon became evident, however, that no more were coming, and that the Khans thought it wiser to trustto their own influence with the Amazais rather than to intimidation. 

We made a fresh start on the morning of the 21st. Malka was onlytwelve miles off, but the way was so difficult, and our guides stoppedso often to consult with the numerous bands of armed men we cameacross, that it was sunset before we arrived at our destination. 

Malka was perched on a spur of the Mahabun mountain, some distancebelow its highest peak. It was a strong, well-built place, withaccommodation for about 1, 500 people. The Amazais did not attempt todisguise their disgust at our presence in their country, and theygathered in knots, scowling and pointing at us, evidently discussingwhether we should or should not be allowed to return. 

The next morning Malka was set on fire, and the huge column of smokewhich ascended from the burning village, and was visible for milesround, did not tend to allay the ill-feeling so plainly displayed. TheNative officers of the Guides warned us that delay was dangerous, asthe people were becoming momentarily more excited, and were vowing weshould never return. It was no use, however, to attempt to make amove without the consent of the tribesmen, for we were a mere handfulcompared to the thousands who had assembled around Malka, and we wereseparated from our camp by twenty miles of most difficult country. Ourposition was no doubt extremely critical, and it was well for us thatwe had at our head such a cool, determined leader as Reynell Taylor. Igreatly admired the calm, quiet manner in which he went up and spoketo the headmen, telling them that, the object of our visit having beenaccomplished, we were ready to retrace our steps. At this theAmazais became still further excited. They talked in loud tones, andgesticulated in true Pathan fashion, thronging round Taylor, who stoodquite alone and perfectly self-possessed in the midst of the angry anddangerous-looking multitude. At this crisis the Bunerwals came to ourrescue. The most influential of the tribe, a grey-bearded warrior, who had lost an eye and an arm in some tribal contest, forced his waythrough the rapidly increasing crowd to Taylor's side, and, raisinghis one arm to enjoin silence, delivered himself as follows: 'You arehesitating whether you will allow these English to return unmolested. You can, of course, murder them and their escort; but if you do, youmust kill us Bunerwals first, for we have sworn to protect them, andwe will do so with our lives. ' This plucky speech produced a quietingeffect, and taking advantage of the lull in the storm, we set out onour return journey; but evidently the tribesmen did not consider thequestion finally or satisfactorily settled, for they followed us thewhole way to Kuria. The slopes of the hills on both sides were coveredwith men. Several times we were stopped while stormy discussions tookplace, and once, as we were passing through a narrow defile, an armedAmazai, waving a standard above his head, rushed down towards us. Fortunately for us, he was stopped by some of those less inimicallydisposed; for if he had succeeded in inciting anyone to fire a singleshot, the desire for blood would quickly have spread, and in allprobability not one of our party would have escaped. 

On the 23rd December we reached our camp in the Umbeyla Pass, when theforce, which had only been kept there till our return, retired to theplains and was broken up. 

During my absence at Umbeyla my wife remained with friends at Mian Mirfor some time, and then made her way to Peshawar, where I joined heron Christmas Day. She spent one night _en route_ in Sir Hugh Rose'scamp at Hasan Abdal, and found the Chief in great excitement and veryangry at such a small party having been sent to Malka, and placed atthe mercy of the tribes. He did not know that my wife had arrived, andin passing her tent she heard him say: 'It was madness, and not oneof them will ever come back alive. ' She was of course dreadfullyfrightened. As soon as Sir Hugh heard she was in camp, he went to seeher, and tried to soften down what he knew she must have heard; buthe could not conceal his apprehension; and my poor wife's anxiety wasterrible, for she did not hear another word till the morning of theday I returned to her. 

[Footnote 1: In 1825 a religious adventurer from Bareilly made hisappearance on the Yusafzai frontier with about forty Hindustanifollowers, and gave out that he was a man of superior sanctity, andhad a divine command to wage a war of extermination, with the aid ofall true believers, against the infidel. After studying Arabic atDelhi, he proceeded to Mecca by way of Calcutta, and during thisjourney his doctrines had obtained so great an ascendency over theminds of the Mahomedans of Bengal that they have ever since suppliedthe colony which Syad Ahmed Shah founded in Yusafzai with money andrecruits. The Syad was eventually slain fighting against the Sikhs, but his followers established themselves at Sitana, and in theneighbourhood of that place they continue to flourish, notwithstandingthat we have destroyed their settlements more than once during thelast forty years. ]

[Footnote 2: The Akhund of Swat was a man of seventy years of age atthe time of the Umbeyla expedition; he had led a holy life, and hadgained such an influence over the minds of Mahomedans in general, that they believed he was supplied by supernatural means with thenecessaries of life, and that every morning, on rising from hisprayers, a sum of money sufficient for the day's expenditure was foundunder his praying carpet. ]

[Footnote 3: The Peshawar column consisted of half of 19th CompanyRoyal Artillery, No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, the Peshawar andHazara Mountain Batteries, the 71st and 101st Foot, the Guides, onetroop 11th Bengal Lancers, one company Bengal Sappers and Miners, 14thSikhs, 20th Punjab Infantry, 32nd Pioneers, 1st, 3rd, 5th and 6thPunjab Infantry, and 4th and 5th Gurkhas. The Hazara column consistedof a wing of the 51st Foot, 300 Native Cavalry, a regiment of NativeInfantry and eight guns, holding Darband, Torbela, and Topi on theIndus. ]

[Footnote 4: The highest point of a pass crossing a mountain range. ]

[Footnote 5: Now General Sir Charles Brownlow, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 6: The late Sir Henry Marion Durand, K. C. S. I. , C. B. , afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. ]

[Footnote 7: 7th Royal Fusiliers, 23rd Pioneers, and 24th PunjabNative Infantry. ]

[Footnote 8: Reynell Taylor remained with the force as politicalofficer. ]

[Footnote 9: General Sir John Adye, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 10: The expedition was an admirable school for training menin outpost duty. The Pathans and Gurkhas were quite at home at suchwork, and not only able to take care of themselves, but when stalkedby the enemy were equal to a counter-stalk, often most successful. Theenemy used to joke with Brownlow's and Keyes's men on these occasions, and say, 'We don't want you. Where are the _lal pagriwalas?_ [as the14th Sikhs were called from their _lal pagris_ (red turbans)] or the_goralog_ [the Europeans]? They are better _shikar_ [sport]!' Thetribesmen soon discovered that the Sikhs and Europeans, though full offight, were very helpless on the hill-side, and could not keep theirheads under cover. ]

[Footnote 11: Colonel Reynell Taylor, whilst bearing like testimony tothe good conduct of the Pathan soldiery, said the personal influenceof officers will always be found to be the only stand-by for theGovernment interests when the religious cry is raised, and thefidelity of our troops is being tampered with. Pay, pensions, andorders of merit may, and would, be cast to the winds when the honourof the faith was in the scale; but to snap the associations of years, and to turn in his hour of need against the man whom he has provedto be just and worthy, whom he has noted in the hour of danger, andpraised as a hero to his family, is just what a Pathan will not do--tohis honour be it said. The fact was that the officers in camp had beenso long and kindly associated with their soldiers that the latter werewilling to set them before their great religious teacher, the Akhundof Swat ('Records of Expeditions against the North-West FrontierTribes'). ]

[Footnote 12: The late General Sir Charles Keyes, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 13: The late Major-General T. E. Hughes, C. B. , RoyalArtillery. ]

[Footnote 14: The late General Sir John Garvock, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 15: Now Bishop of Auckland and Primate of New Zealand. ]

[Footnote 16: The late Brigadier-General Sir W. W. Turner, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 17: General Sir T. L. Vaughan, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 18: Stone breastworks. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVI. 1864-1868

 A voyage round the Cape--Cholera camps--The Abyssinian expedition --Landed at Zula

Early in the New Year (1864) Sir Hugh Rose, with the Head-Quarterscamp, marched into Peshawar, where we remained until the middle ofFebruary. The time was chiefly spent in inspections, parades, andfield-days, varied by an occasional run with the hounds. The huntingabout Peshawar was very fair, and we all, the Chief included, got agreat deal of fun out of our small pack. 

On the 25th January a full-dress parade was held to announce to thegarrison that Sir John Lawrence had been appointed Viceroy of India, and soon afterwards we left Peshawar and began our return march toSimla. 

We changed our house this year and took one close to the Stewarts, anarrangement for which I was very thankful later, when my wife had agreat sorrow in the death of her sister, Mrs. Sladen, at Peshawar. Itwas everything for her at such a time to have a kind and sympathizingfriend close at hand, when I was engaged with my work and could bevery little with her during the day. At this time, as at all others, Sir Hugh Rose was a most considerate friend to us; he placed his houseat Mashobra at my wife's disposal, thus providing her with a quietresort which she frequently made use of and which she learned to loveso much that, when I returned to Simla as Commander-in-Chief, herfirst thought was to secure this lovely 'Retreat' as a refuge from the(sometimes) slightly trying gaiety of Simla. 

The Commander-in-Chief was good enough to send in my name for a brevetfor the Umbeyla expedition, but the Viceroy refused to forward therecommendation, for the reason that I was 'too junior to be made aLieutenant-Colonel. ' I was then thirty-two!

Throughout the whole of 1864 I was more or less ill; the office work(which never suited me quite as well as more active employment) wasexcessive, for, in addition to the ordinary routine, I had undertakento revise the 'Bengal Route-Book, ' which had become quite obsolete, having been compiled in 1837, when Kurnal was our frontier station. Avoyage round the Cape was still considered the panacea for all Indianailments, and the doctors strongly advised my taking leave to England, and travelling by that route. 

We left Simla towards the end of October, and, after spending the nextthree months in Calcutta, where I was chiefly employed in taking uptransports and superintending the embarkation of troops returning toEngland, I was given the command of a batch of 300 time-expired menon board the _Renown_, one of Green's frigate-built ships which waschartered for their conveyance. Two hundred of the men belonged tothe 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Rifle Brigade, the remainder to theArtillery and various other corps; they had all been twelve years inthe army, and most of them were decorated for service in the Crimeaand Indian Mutiny. 

At the inspection parade before we embarked, a certain number of menwere brought up for punishment for various offences committed onthe way down country; none of the misdemeanours appeared to me veryserious, so I determined to let the culprits off. I told the men thatwe had now met for the first time and I was unwilling to commence ouracquaintance by awarding punishments; we had to spend three or fourmonths together, and I hoped they would show, by their good behaviourwhile under my command, that I had not made a mistake in condoningtheir transgressions. The officers seemed somewhat surprised atmy action in this matter, but I think it was proved by the men'ssubsequent conduct that I had not judged them incorrectly, for theyall behaved in quite an exemplary manner throughout the voyage. 

We had been on board more than six weeks, when one of the crew wasattacked by small pox--an untoward circumstance in a crowded ship. Thesailor was placed in a boat which was hung over the ship's side, and acabin-boy, the marks on whose face plainly showed that he had alreadysuffered badly from the disease, was told off to look after him. Theman recovered, and there was no other case. Shortly before we reachedSt. Helena, scurvy appeared amongst the troops, necessitatinglime-juice being given in larger quantities, but what proved a moreeffectual remedy was water-cress, many sacks of which were laid inbefore we left the island. 

On the 29th May, 1865, we sighted the 'Lizard, ' and took a pilot onboard, who brought with him a few newspapers, which confirmed thetidings signalled to us by an American ship that the war between theFederals and Confederates was at an end. How eagerly we scanned thejournals, after having heard nothing from home for four months, butthe only piece of news we found of personal interest to ourselves wasthat my father had been made a K. C. B. 

On the 30th May we reached Portsmouth, and landed between two showersof snow! I had a final parade of the men before leaving the ship, andI was quite sorry to say good-bye to them; some of the poor fellowswere already beginning to be anxious about their future, and to regretthat their time with the colours was over. 

My father, mother, and sister came up to London to meet us, verylittle changed since I had left them six years before. I remained inEngland till March, 1866, when I returned to India, leaving my wifebehind to follow in the autumn. 

While I was at home, Sir Hugh Rose's term of the chief command inIndia came to an end, and his place had been taken by Sir WilliamMansfield. On my arrival in Calcutta, I received orders to join theAllahabad division, and thither I proceeded. In October I went toCalcutta to meet my wife and take her to Allahabad, where we remainedfor nearly a year, her first experience of a hot season in the plains, and a very bad one it was. Cholera was rife; the troops had to be sentaway into camps, more or less distant from the station, all of whichhad to be visited once, if not twice, daily; this kept me pretty wellon the move from morning till night. It was a sad time for everyone. People we had seen alive and well one day were dead and buried thenext; and in the midst of all this sorrow and tragedy the mostirksome--because such an incongruous--part of our experience was thatwe had constantly to get up entertainments, penny readings, and thelike, to amuse the men and keep their minds occupied, for if oncesoldiers begin to think of the terrors of cholera they are seized withpanic, and many get the disease from pure fright. 

My wife usually accompanied me to the cholera camps, preferring to dothis rather than be left alone at home. On one occasion, I had justgot into our carriage after going round the hospital, when a youngofficer ran after us to tell me a corporal in whom I had been muchinterested was dead. The poor fellow's face was blue; the cholerapanic had evidently seized him, and I said to my wife, 'He will be thenext. ' I had no sooner reached home than I received a report of hishaving been seized. 

We were fortunate in having at Allahabad as Chaplain the presentBishop of Lahore, who, with his wife, had only lately come to India;they never wearied in doing all that was possible for the soldiers. Bishop Matthew is still one of our closest friends; his good, charmingand accomplished wife, alas! died some years ago. 

We remained at Allahabad until August, 1867, when we heard that abrigade from Bengal was likely to be required to take part in anexpedition which would probably be sent from Bombay to Abyssinia forthe relief of some Europeans whom the King, Theodore, had imprisoned, and that the Mountain battery, on the strength of which my name wasstill borne, would in such case be employed. I therefore thought I hadbetter go to Simla, see the authorities, and arrange for rejoiningmy battery, if the rumour turned out to be true. The cholera had nowdisappeared, so I was at liberty to take leave, and we both lookedforward to a cooler climate and a change to brighter scenes after thewretched experience we had been through. On my arrival at Simla Icalled upon the Commander-in-Chief and told him that, if my batterywas sent on service, I wished to join it and was quite ready to resignmy staff appointment. 

Sir William Mansfield was particularly kind in his reception of me, from which I augured well; but I could learn nothing definite, and itwas not until quite the end of September that it was announced thatColonel Donald Stewart was to have command of the Bengal Brigadewith the Abyssinian Force, and that I was to be his Assistant-Quartermaster-General. We at once hastened back to Allahabad, wherewe only remained long enough to pack up what we wanted to take withus, and arrange for the disposal of our property; thence we proceededto Calcutta, where, for the next two months, I had a busy time takingup transports and superintending the equipment of the force. 

I had often read and heard of the difficulties and delays experiencedby troops landing in a foreign country, in consequence of theirrequirements not being all shipped in the same vessels withthemselves--men in one ship, camp equipage in another, transport andfield hospital in a third, or perhaps the mules in one and theirpack-saddles in another; and I determined to try and prevent thesemistakes upon this occasion. With Stewart's approval, I arranged thateach detachment should embark complete in every detail, which resultedin the troops being landed and marched off without the least delay aseach vessel reached its destination. [1]

We were living with the Stewarts in the Commander-in-Chief's quartersin Fort William, which His Excellency had placed at our disposal forthe time being. On the 1st November Calcutta was visited by the secondcyclone within my experience. We had arranged to go to the opera thatevening, but when it was time to start the wind was so high that thereseemed every chance of the carriage being blown over before we couldget there, so we decided not to attempt it. It was well we did, forthe few adventurous spirits who struggled through the storm had thegreatest difficulty in getting back to their homes. The opera-housewas unroofed before the performance was half over, and very littleof the building remained standing the next day. At bedtime we stillthought it was only a bad storm, but towards midnight the windincreased to an alarming extent, and my wife awoke me, and begged meto get up, as the windows were being burst open and deluges of raincoming in. Stewart and I tried to reclose the windows, but the thickiron bars had been bent in two and forced out of their sockets; aheavy oak plate-chest and boxes, which we with much difficulty draggedacross the windows, were blown into the middle of the dining-room, like so much cardboard, and the whole place was gradually flooded. We were driven out of each room in turn, till at length we all tookrefuge in a small box room, about ten feet wide, right in the middleof the house, where we remained the rest of the night and 'hoped forthe day. '

Towards morning the wind abated, but what a scene of desolation wasthat upon which we emerged! The rooms looked as if they could never bemade habitable again, and much of our property was floating about in afoot of water. 

My first thought was for the shipping, and I hurried down to the riverto see how my transports had fared. Things were much better than Iexpected to find them--only two had been damaged. Most fortunately thecyclone, having come from a different direction, was not accompaniedby a storm-wave such as that which worked so much mischief amongst theshipping on a former occasion, but the destruction on land was evengreater: all the finest trees were torn up by the roots, a great partof the Native bazaar was levelled, and lay from two to three feet deepin water, while many houses were wholly or partly demolished. We cameacross most curious sights when driving round Calcutta in the evening;some of the houses were divided clean down the centre, one halfcrumbled into a heap of ruins, the other half still standing anddisplaying, as in a doll's house, the furniture in the differentstories. 

The work of filling up and loading the vessels was greatly retarded, owing to a large number of cargo boats having been sunk, consequentlyit was the 5th December before the first transport got off; from thatdate the others started in quick succession, and on the 9th January, 1868, Stewart and his staff left Calcutta in the P. And O. Steamer_Golconda_. The officers and men of the Mountain battery were also onboard, Captain Bogle in command, my friend Jemmy Hills in my place assecond Captain, and Collen[2] and Disney as subalterns. Mrs. Stewartand my wife accompanied us as far as Aden, where they were left to thekind care of Major-General Russell, [3] commanding there at the time, until the arrival of the mail-steamer in which they were to proceed toEngland. 

On the 3rd February we anchored in Annesley Bay and landed at Zula. 

[Footnote 1: The average strength of the regiments was as follows:10th and 12th Bengal Cavalry, each 9 British officers, 13 Nativeofficers, 450 non-commissioned officers and men, 3 Native doctors, 489horses, 322 mules, 590 followers. 21st and 23rd Punjab Infantry, each9 British officers, 16 Native officers, 736 non-commissioned officersand men, 3 Native doctors, 10 horses, 350 mules, 400 followers. Ifound that six ships were required for the conveyance of a Cavalry andfour for that of an Infantry regiment; for the Mountain battery threeships were necessary, and for the coolie corps (1, 550 strong) four; inall twenty-seven ships, besides nine tugs. In selecting ships, carewas taken to secure those intended for Artillery or Cavalry as high'tween-decks as possible; a sufficient number of these were procurableat Calcutta, either iron clippers from Liverpool or large NorthAmerican built traders, with decks varying from 7 feet 6 inches to 8feet 2 inches high. I gave the preference to wooden ships, as beingcooler and more easily ventilated. The vessels taken up were each from1, 000 to 1, 400 tons, averaging in length from 150 to 200 feet, with abeam varying from 30 to 35 feet, and usually they had a clear upperdeck, where from forty to fifty animals were accommodated. ]

[Footnote 2: Now Major-General Sir Edwin Collen, K. C. I. E. , MilitaryMember of the Governor-General's Council. ]

[Footnote 3: Now General Sir Edward Lechmere Russell, K. C. S. I. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVII. 1868-1869

 Sir Robert Napier to command--Defective transport --King Theodore commits suicide--First A. Q. M. G

It will, perhaps, be as well to recall to the reader's mind that theobject of the expedition in which we were taking part was to rescuesome sixty Europeans, who, from one cause or another, had found theirway to Abyssinia, and been made prisoners by the King of that country. Amongst these were four English officials, Mr. Rassam, and CaptainCameron, who had at different times been the bearers of letters fromQueen Victoria to King Theodore, and Lieutenant Prideaux and Dr. Blanc of the Bombay Army; the rest were chiefly French and Germanmissionaries, and artisans, with their wives and children. Theprisoners were confined in a fort built on the Magd[=a]la plateau, 9, 150 feet above sea-level, and 379 miles inland from Annesley Bay. 

The repeated demands of the British Government for the restoration ofthe prisoners having been treated with contemptuous silence by theKing, Colonel Merewether, the Political Agent at Aden, who in July, 1867, had been directed to proceed to Massowa and endeavour to obtainthe release of the captives, and to make inquiries and collectinformation in case of an expedition having to be sent, reported tothe Secretary of State that he had failed to communicate with theKing, and urged the advisability of immediate measures being taken toprepare a force in India for the punishment of Theodore and the rescueof the prisoners. Colonel Merewether added that in Abyssinia theopinion had become very general that England knew herself to betoo weak to resent insult, and that amongst the peoples of theneighbouring countries, even so far as Aden, there was a feeling ofcontemptuous surprise at the continued long-suffering endurance of theBritish Government. 

On receipt of this communication, Her Majesty's Government, havingexhausted all their resources for the preservation of peace, decided to send an expedition from India under the command ofLieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier, the Commander-in-Chief of theBombay Army. After carefully considering the distance along whichoperations would have to be prosecuted, and the necessity for holdinga number of detached posts, Napier gave it as his opinion that theforce should consist of not less than 12, 000 men. [1]

Profiting by the experience of the Crimean War, the Government wasdetermined that the mobility of the force should not be hampered bywant of food and clothing. Stores of all descriptions were despatchedin unstinted quantities from England, and three of the steamers inwhich they were conveyed were fitted up as hospital ships. But food, clothing, and stores, however liberally supplied, would not take thearmy to Magd[=a]la without transport. 

The question as to the most suitable organization for the LandTransport Corps occupied a good deal of Sir Robert Napier's attentionwhile the expedition was being fitted out, and caused a considerableamount of correspondence between him and the Bombay Government. TheCommissary-General wished to keep the corps under his own orders, andobjected to its being given an entirely military organization. SirRobert Napier preferred to establish the corps on an independentbasis, but was at first overruled by the Bombay Government. Whileacting in accordance with their orders, the Commander-in-Chief wrote:'I believe that the success of systems depends more on the men whowork them than on the systems themselves; but I cannot accept withoutprotest a decision to throw such a body of men as the drivers of ourtransport animals will be (if we get them) on an expedition in aforeign country without a very complete organization to secure orderand discipline. ' Eventually Sir Robert got his own way, but muchvaluable time had been lost, and the corps was organized on too smalla scale;[2] the officers and non-commissioned officers were not sentto Zula in sufficient time or in sufficient numbers to take charge ofthe transport animals as they arrived. 

A compact, properly-supervised train of 2, 600 mules, with serviceable, well-fitting pack-saddles, was sent from the Punjab; and from Bombaycame 1, 400 mules and ponies and 5, 600 bullocks, but these numbersproving altogether inadequate to the needs of the expedition, theywere supplemented by animals purchased in Persia, Egypt, and on theshores of the Mediterranean. The men to look after them were suppliedfrom the same sources, but their number, even if they had beenefficient, was insufficient, and they were a most unruly andunmanageable lot. They demanded double the pay for which they hadenlisted, and struck work in a body because their demand was not atonce complied with. They refused to take charge of the five muleseach man was hired to look after, and when that number was reducedto three, they insisted that one should be used as a mount for thedriver. But the worst part of the whole organization, or, rather, wantof organization, was that there had been no attempt to fit the animalswith pack-saddles, some of which were sent from England, some fromIndia, and had to be adjusted to the mules after they had been landedin Abyssinia, where there was not an establishment to make thenecessary alterations. The consequence was that the wretched animalsbecame cruelly galled, and in a few weeks a large percentage wereunfit for work, and had to be sent to the sick depot. 

Other results of having no properly arranged transport train, andno supervision or discipline, were that mules were lost or stolen, starved for want of food, or famished from want of water. Thecondition of the unfortunate animals was such that, though they hadbeen but a few weeks in the country, when they were required toproceed to Senafe, only sixty-seven miles distant, a very smallproportion were able to accomplish the march; hundreds died on theway, and their carcases, quickly decomposing in the hot sun, became afruitful source of dangerous disease to the force. 

On arrival at Zula, we were told that Sir Robert Napier was at Senafe, the first station in the Hills, and the advanced depot for supplies. We of the Bengal brigade were somewhat disconcerted at the orderswhich awaited us, from which we learned that our brigade was to bebroken up; the troops were to proceed to the front; while Stewart wasto take command at Senafe, and I myself was to remain at Zula, assenior staff officer. The disappointment was great, but, being thelast-comer, I had no unfairness to complain of, and I had plentyto do. I spent the greater part of each day amongst the shipping, superintending the embarkation and disembarkation of men, animals, andstores. 

Zula was not an attractive place of residence. The heat wasintense--117° in the daytime in my tent. The allowance of fresh waterwas extremely limited, [3] while the number of scorpions was quitethe reverse, and the food, at the best, was not appetizing. Few whoremained there as long as I did escaped scurvy and horrible boils orsores. I was fortunate, however, in finding in charge of the transportarrangements afloat, my old friend and Eton schoolfellow, GeorgeTryon, [4] to whom I owed many a good dinner, and, what I appreciatedeven more, many a refreshing bath on board the _Euphrates_, atransport belonging to the British India Steam Navigation Companywhich had been fitted up for Captain Tryon and his staff. Indeed, allthe officers of the Royal Navy were most helpful and kind, and Ihave a very pleasant recollection of the hospitality I received fromCommodore Heath[5] and those serving under him. 

During the four months I remained at Zula, Tryon and I were constantlytogether, and I had plenty of opportunity for observing the masterlymanner in which he could grasp a situation, his intimate knowledge ofdetail, and the strong hold he had over all those working with him, not only the officers of the Royal Navy, but also the commanders ofthe merchant vessels taken up as transports, and lying in AnnesleyBay. 

On the 17th April news reached us that four days before Sir RobertNapier had successfully attacked Magd[=a]la and released theprisoners, having experienced but very slight opposition; and thatKing Theodore, deserted by his army, which had apparently becometired of his brutalities, had committed suicide. [6] A few days laterMajor-General Russell, who had come from Aden to take over the commandat Zula, received orders to prepare for the embarkation of the force. Arrangements were accordingly made to enable regiments and batteriesto be embarked on board the transports told off for them directly theyarrived from the front--a matter of the utmost importance, both onaccount of the fearful heat at Zula, and the absence of a sufficientwater-supply. 

On the 2nd June the Commander-in-Chief returned to Zula, and on the10th he embarked on board the old Indian marine steamer _Feroze_ forSuez. Sir Robert was good enough to ask me to accompany him, as hewished to make me the bearer of his final despatches. My work wasended, the troops had all left, and as I was pretty well knocked up, I felt extremely grateful for the offer, and very proud of the greathonour the Chief proposed to confer upon me. 

We reached Alexandria on the 20th June, and the next day I started inthe mail-steamer for Brindisi, arriving in London on the evening ofSunday, the 28th. I received a note at my club from Edwin Johnson (whowas at that time Assistant Military Secretary to H. R. H. The Duke ofCambridge), directing me to take the despatches without delay to theSecretary of State for India. I found Sir Stafford and Lady Northcoteat dinner; Sir Stafford looked through the despatches, and when he hadfinished reading them, he asked me to take them without delay to theCommander-in-Chief, as he knew the Duke was most anxious to see them. There was a dinner-party, however, that night at Gloucester House, and the servant told me it was quite impossible to disturb His RoyalHighness; so, placing my card on the top of the despatches, I told theman to deliver them at once, and went back to my club. I had scarcelyreached it when the Duke's Aide-de-camp made his appearance and toldme that he had been ordered to find me and take me back with him. TheCommander-in-Chief received me very kindly, expressing regret that Ihad been sent away in the first instance; and Their Royal Highnessesthe Prince and Princess of Wales, who were present, were mostgracious, and asked many questions about the Abyssinian Expedition. 

The next day I joined my wife, who was staying with my people atClifton, and on the 14th August, when the rewards for theAbyssinian Expedition were published, my name appeared for a brevetLieutenant-Colonelcy. 

I was now anxious to ascertain in what manner I was to be employed. Myfive years as A. Q. M. G. Were about to expire, and I thought I shouldlike to go back to my regiment for a time. I therefore applied for thecommand of a battery of Horse Artillery. I was told, in answer to myapplication, that it was not the custom to appoint an officer who hadbeen in staff employment for some time to the mounted branch, butthat, in consideration of my services, the Duke of Cambridge waspleased to make an exception in my favour. I was posted to a batteryat Meerut, and warned to be ready to start in an early troopship. Before the time for our departure arrived, however, I received aletter from Lumsden, who had now become Quartermaster-General, informing me that the Commander-in-Chief had recommended, and theGovernment had approved of, the formation of a fresh grade--that ofFirst A. Q. M. G. --and that he was directed by Sir William Mansfield tooffer the new appointment to me--an offer which I gratefully accepted;for though the command of a Horse Artillery battery would have beenmost congenial, this unexpected chance of five years' further staffemploy was too good to be refused. 

On the 4th January, 1869, having said good-bye to those dear to us, two of whom I was never to see again, my wife and I, with a baby girlwho was born the previous July, embarked at Portsmouth on board thes. S. _Helvetia_, which had been taken up for the conveyance of troopsto Bombay, the vessel of the Royal Navy in which we were to havesailed having suddenly broken down. The _Helvetia_ proved mostunsuitable as a transport, and uncomfortable to the last degree forpassengers, besides which it blew a gale the whole way to Alexandria. We were all horribly ill, and our child caught a fatal cold. Wethoroughly appreciated a change at Suez to the Indian trooper, the_Malabar_, where everything possible was done for our comfort by ourkind captain (Rich, R. N. ), and, indeed, by everyone on board; but, alas! our beautiful little girl never recovered the cruel experienceof the _Helvetia_, and we had the terrible grief of losing her soonafter we passed Aden. She was buried at sea. 

It was a very sad journey after that. There were several nice, kindpeople amongst our fellow-passengers; but life on board ship at sucha time, surrounded by absolute strangers, was a terrible trial to usboth, and, what with the effects of the voyage and the anxiety andsorrow she had gone through, my wife was thoroughly ill when wearrived at Simla towards the end of February. 

[Footnote 1: The numbers actually despatched from India were 13, 548, of whom 3, 786 were Europeans. In addition, a company of RoyalEngineers was sent from England. ]

[Footnote 2: At first it was thought that 10, 000 mules, with a cooliecorps 3, 000 strong, would suffice, but before the expedition was over, it was found necessary to purchase 18, 000 mules, 1, 500 ponies, 1, 800donkeys, 12, 000 camels, and 8, 400 bullocks. ]

[Footnote 3: Fresh water was obtained by condensing the sea-water;there were few condensors, and no means of aerating the water. ]

[Footnote 4: The late Admiral Sir George Tryon, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: Now Admiral Sir Leonid Heath, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 6: He is said to have killed in one month, or burnt alive, more than 3, 000 people. He pillaged and burnt the churches at Gondur, and had many priests and young girls cast alive into the flames. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 1869

 Afzal Khan ousts Sher Ali--Sher Ali regains the Amirship --Foresight of Sir Henry Rawlinson--The Umballa Durbar

In January, 1869, Sir John Lawrence, after a career which wasaltogether unique, he having risen from the junior grades ofthe Bengal Civil Service to the almost regal position ofGovernor-General, [1] left India for good. He was succeeded as Viceroyby Lord Mayo, one of whose first official acts was to hold a durbar atUmballa for the reception of the Amir Sher Ali, who, after five yearsof civil war, had succeeded in establishing himself on the throneof Afghanistan, to which he had been nominated by his father, DostMahomed Khan. [2]

Sher Ali had passed through a stormy time between the death of theDost, in June, 1863, and September, 1868. He had been acknowledged asthe rightful heir by the Government of India, and for the first threeyears he held the Amirship in a precarious sort of way. His two elderbrothers, Afzal and Azim, and his nephew, Abdur Rahman (the presentRuler of Afghanistan), were in rebellion against him. The death ofhis favourite son and heir-apparent, Ali Khan, in action nearKhelat-i-Ghilzai, in 1865, grieved him so sorely that for a time hisreason was affected. In May, 1866, he was defeated near Ghazni (mainlyowing to the treachery of his own troops) by Abdur Rahman, who, releasing his father, Afzal, from the prison into which he had beencast by Sher Ali, led him in triumph to Kabul, and proclaimed him Amirof Afghanistan. 

The new Amir, Afzal, at once wrote to the Government of Indiadetailing what had occurred, and expressing a hope that the friendshipof the British, which he so greatly valued, would be extended to him. He was told, in reply, that the Government recognized him as Ruler ofKabul, but that, as Sher Ali still held Kandahar and Herat, existingengagements with the latter could not be broken off. The evidentpreference thus displayed for Sher Ali caused the greatest vexation tothe brothers Afzal and Azim, who showed their resentment by directingan Envoy who had come from Swat to pay his respects to the new Amirto return to his own country and set on foot a holy war against theEnglish; the Waziri _maliks_[3] in attendance at the court weredismissed with presents and directions to harass the British frontier, while an emissary was despatched on a secret mission to the Russians. 

After his defeat near Ghazni, Sher Ali fled to Kandahar, and in theJanuary of the following year (again owing to treachery in his army)he met with a second defeat near Khelat-i-Ghilzai, and lost Kandahar. 

On this fact being communicated to the Government of India, Afzal Khanwas in his turn recognized as Amir of Kabul and Kandahar. But he wasat the same time informed that the British Government intended tomaintain a strict neutrality between the contending parties inAfghanistan. John Lawrence, in his letter of the 20th of February, said that 'neither men, nor arms, nor money, nor assistance of anykind, have ever been supplied by my Government to Amir Sher Ali. YourHighness and he, both equally unaided by me, have fought out thebattle, each upon your own resources. I purpose to continue the samepolicy for the future. If, unhappily, the struggle for supremacy inAfghanistan has not yet been brought to a close, and hostilities areagain renewed, I shall still side with neither party. '

This reply altogether failed to satisfy Afzal and Azim. They answeredit civilly, but at the same time they sent a copy of it to GeneralRomanofski, the Russian Governor of Tashkent, who was informed bythe new Amir that he had no confidence in the 'Lord _sahib's_ fineprofessions of friendship, and that he was disgusted with the BritishGovernment for the ingratitude and ill-treatment shown towards hisbrother Azim. [4] He looked upon the Russians as his real and onlyfriends, hoped soon to send a regular Ambassador to the Russian camp, and would at all times do his utmost to protect and encourage Russiantrade. '

In October of this year (1867) Afzal Khan died, and his brother Azim, hastening to Kabul, took upon himself the Amirship. Abdur Rahman hadhoped to have succeeded his father, but his uncle having forestalledhim, he thought it politic to give in his allegiance to him, which hedid by presenting his dead father's sword, in durbar, to the new Amir, who, like his predecessor, was now acknowledged by the Government ofIndia as Ruler of Kabul and Kandahar. 

The tide, however, was beginning to turn in favour of Sher Ali. Azimand Abdur Rahman quarrelled, and the former, by his extortions andcruelties, made himself detested by the people generally. 

In March, 1868, Sher Ali's eldest son, Yakub Khan, regained possessionof Kandahar for his father. In July father and son found themselvesstrong enough to move towards Ghazni, where Azim Khan's army wasassembled. The latter, gradually deserted by his soldiers, took toflight, upon which Sher Ali, after an absence of forty months, enteredKabul on the 8th of September, and re-possessed himself of all hisdominions, with the exception of Balkh, where Azim and Abdur Rahman(now reconciled to each other) still flew the flag of rebellion. 

One of the newly-installed Amir's first acts was to inform the Viceroyof his return to Kabul, and of the recovery of his kingdom. Heannounced his desire to send some trusted representatives, or elseproceed himself in person, to Calcutta, 'for the purpose of showinghis sincerity and firm attachment to the British Government, andmaking known his real wants. '

Sir John Lawrence, in his congratulatory reply, showed that a changehad come over his policy of non-interference in the internal affairsof Afghanistan, for he stated that he was 'prepared, not only tomaintain the bonds of amity and goodwill which were establishedbetween Dost Mahomed and the British Government, but, so far as may bepracticable, to strengthen those bonds'; and, as a substantial proofof his goodwill, the Viceroy sent Sher Ali £60, 000, aid which arrivedat a most opportune moment, and gave the Amir that advantage over hisopponents which is of incalculable value in Afghan civil war, namely, funds wherewith to pay the army and bribe the opposite side. 

The energetic and capable Abdur Rahman Khan had in the meantimecollected a sufficient number of troops in Turkestan to enable him tomove towards Kabul with his uncle Azim. On nearing Ghazni, he foundhimself confronted by Sher Ali; the opposing forces were about equalin strength, and on both sides there was the same scarcity of readymoney. Suddenly the report was received that money was being sent fromIndia to Sher Ali, and this turned the scale in his favour. AbdurRahman's men deserted in considerable numbers, and a battle foughton the 3rd January, 1869, resulted in the total defeat of uncle andnephew, and in the firmer consolidation of Sher Ali's supremacy. 

The change in policy which induced the Government of India to assista struggling Amir with money, after its repeated and emphaticdeclarations that interference was impossible, was undoubtedly broughtabout by an able and elaborate memorandum written by the late SirHenry Rawlinson on the 28th July, 1868. In this paper Rawlinsonpointed out that, notwithstanding promises to the contrary, Russia wassteadily advancing towards Afghanistan. He referred to the increasedfacilities of communication which would be the result of the recentproposal to bring Turkestan into direct communication, _viâ_ theCaspian, with the Caucasus and St. Petersburg. He dwelt at length uponthe effect which the advanced position of Russia in Central Asia wouldhave upon Afghanistan and India. He explained that by the occupationof Bokhara Russia would gain a pretext for interfering in Afghanpolitics, and 'that if Russia once assumes a position which, in virtueeither of an imposing military force on the Oxus, or of a dominantpolitical influence in Afghanistan, entitles her, in Nativeestimation, to challenge our Asiatic supremacy, the disquieting effectwill be prodigious. '

'With this prospect before us, ' Sir Henry asked, 'are we justifiedin maintaining what has been sarcastically, though perhaps unfairly, called Sir John Lawrence's policy of "masterly inaction"? Are wejustified in allowing Russia to work her way to Kabul unopposed, andthere to establish herself as a friendly power prepared to protect theAfghans against the English?' He argued that it was contrary toour interests to permit anarchy to reign in Afghanistan; that LordAuckland's famous doctrine of 'establishing a strong and friendlyPower on our North-West Frontier' was the right policy for India, 'that Dost Mahomed's successful management of his country was in agreat measure due to our aid, and that, if we had helped the son as wehad helped the father, Sher Ali would have summarily suppressedthe opposition of his brothers and nephews. ' Rawlinson then added:'Another opportunity now presents itself. The fortunes of Sher Ali areagain in the ascendant; he should be secured in our interests withoutdelay. '

Rawlinson's suggestions were not at the time supposed to commendthemselves to the Government of India. In the despatch in which theywere answered, [5] the Viceroy and his Councillors stated thatthey still objected to any active interference in the affairs ofAfghanistan; they foresaw no limits to the expenditure which such amove would entail, and they believed that the objects that they had atheart might be attained by an attitude of readiness and firmness onthe frontier. It is worthy of note, however, that, after Sir HenryRawlinson's memorandum had been received by the Indian Government, andnotwithstanding these protests, the sum of £60, 000 was sent to SherAli, that Sir John Lawrence invited him 'to come to some place inBritish territory for a personal meeting in order to discuss the bestmanner in which a limited support might be accorded, ' and that fivedays from the time of writing the above-mentioned despatch, JohnLawrence sent a farewell letter to Sher Ali, expressing the earnesthope of the British Government that His Highness's authority would beestablished on a solid and permanent basis, and informing him that afurther sum of £60, 000 would be supplied to him during the next fewmonths, and that future Viceroys would consider, from time to time, what amount of practical assistance in the shape of money or warmaterials should periodically be made over to him as a testimony oftheir friendly feeling, and to the furtherance of his legitimateauthority and influence. 

Sher Ali expressed himself as most grateful, and came to Umballa fullof hope and apparently thoroughly well disposed towards the BritishGovernment. He was received with great state and ceremony, and LordMayo was most careful to demonstrate that he was treating with anindependent, and not a feudatory, Prince. 

At this conference Sher Ali began by unburdening himself of hisgrievances, complaining to Lord Mayo of the manner in which his twoelder brothers had each in his turn been recognized as Amir, anddwelling on the one-sided nature of the treaty made with his father, by which the British Government only bound itself to abstain frominterfering with Afghanistan, while the Amir was to be 'the friend ofthe friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honourable East IndiaCompany. ' His Highness then proceeded to make known his wants, whichwere that he and his lineal descendants on the throne that he hadwon 'by his own good sword' should be acknowledged as the _de jure_sovereigns of Afghanistan; that a treaty offensive and defensiveshould be made with him; and that he should be given a fixed subsidyin the form of an annual payment. 

It was in regard to the first of these three demands that Sher Ali wasmost persistent. He explained repeatedly and at some length that toacknowledge the Ruler _pro tempore_ and _de facto_ was to invitecompetition for a throne, and excite the hopes of all sorts ofcandidates; but that if the British Government would recognize him andhis dynasty, there was nothing he would not do in order to evince hisgratitude. 

These requests, the Amir was informed, were inadmissible. There couldbe no treaty, no fixed subsidy, no dynastic pledges. He was furthertold that we were prepared to discourage his rivals, to give him warmcountenance and support, and such material assistance as we consideredabsolutely necessary for his immediate wants, if he, on his part, would undertake to do all he could to maintain peace on our frontierand to comply with our wishes in matters connected with trade. 

As an earnest of our goodwill, the Amir was given the second £60, 000promised him by Sir John Lawrence, besides a considerable supply ofarms and ammunition, [6] and was made happy by a promise that Europeanofficers should not be required to reside in any of his cities. Beforethe conference took place, Lord Mayo had contemplated British agentsbeing sent to Kabul in order to obtain accurate information regardingevents in Central Asia, but on discovering how vehemently opposed SherAli was to such an arrangement, he gave him this promise. Saiyad NurMahomed, the Minister who accompanied the Amir, though equally averseto European agents, admitted that 'the day might come when theRussians would arrive, and the Amir would be glad, not only of Britishofficers as agents, but of arms and troops to back them. '

One request which the Amir made towards the close of the meeting theViceroy agreed to, which was that we should call Persia to account forher alleged encroachments on the debatable ground of Sistan. This, which seemed but an unimportant matter at the time, was one of thechief causes of Sher Ali's subsequent estrangement; for the committeeof arbitration which inquired into it decided against the Amir, who never forgave what he considered our unfriendly action indiscountenancing his claims. 

The Umballa conference was, on the whole, successful, in that Sher Alireturned to his own country much gratified at the splendour of hisreception, and a firm personal friend of Lord Mayo, whose finepresence and genial manner had quite won the Amir's heart, although hehad not succeeded in getting from him everything he had demanded. 

[Footnote 1: I should have mentioned that Sir John Lawrence was notthe only instance of a Bengal civilian rising to the position ofGovernor-General, as a predecessor of his, Sir John Shore, afterwardsLord Teignmouth, was appointed Governor-General in 1792, and held thatoffice until 1798. ]

[Footnote 2: Dost Mahomed had several sons. Mahomed Akbar and GhulamHaidar, the two heirs-designate in succession, died before theirfather. Sixteen other sons were alive in 1863, of whom the followingwere the eldest:

 1. Mahomed Afzal Khan, aged 52 years } By a wife not of Royal blood. 2. Mahomed Azim Khan " 45 " } " " " " " " " 3. Sher Ali Khan " 40 " } By a favourite Popalzai wife. 4. Mahomed Amir Khan " 34 " } " " " " " 5. Mahomed Sharif Khan " 30 " } " " " " " 6. Wali Mahomed Khan " 33 " } By a third wife. 7. Faiz Mahomed Khan " 25 " } " " " "

Afzal Khan had a son Abdur Rahman Khan, the present Amir ofAfghanistan, and Sher Ali had five sons--Ali Khan, Yakub Khan, IbrahimKhan, Ayub Khan, and Abdulla Jan. ]

[Footnote 3: The headmen of villages in Afghanistan are styled_maliks_. ]

[Footnote 4: Azim Khan behaved well towards the Lumsden Mission, andit was reported that he encouraged his father, Dost Mahomed Khan, notto disturb the Peshawar frontier during the Mutiny. ]

[Footnote 5: Dated 4th January, 1869. ]

[Footnote 6: Besides the remainder of the aggregate sum of twelvelakhs, 6, 500 more rifles were forwarded to the frontier fortransmission to the Amir, and in addition four 18-pounder smooth-boreguns, two 8-inch howitzers, and a Mountain battery of six 3-pounderscomplete, with due proportion of ammunition and stores, together withdraught bullocks and nine elephants. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XXXIX. 1869-1871

 The Lushais--The Lushai expedition--Defective transport again --Practice _versus_ theory--A severe march --Lushais foiled by Gurkhas--A successful turning movement --Murder of Lord Mayo

We spent a very quiet year at Simla. My wife was far from strong, andwe had another great sorrow in the death of a baby boy three weeksafter his birth. 

That winter I was left in charge of the Quartermaster-General'soffice, and we moved into 'Ellerslie, ' a larger and warmer house thanthat in which we had lived during the summer. 

Simla in the winter, after a fresh fall of snow, is particularlybeautiful. Range after range of hills clothed in their spotlessgarments stretch away as far as the eye can reach, relieved in theforeground by masses of reddish-brown perpendicular cliffs anddark-green ilex and deodar trees, each bearing its pure white burden, and decked with glistening fringes of icicles. Towards evening thescene changes, and the snow takes the most gorgeous colouring fromthe descending rays of the brilliant eastern sun--brilliant even inmid-winter--turning opal, pink, scarlet, and crimson; gradually, asthe light wanes, fading into delicate lilacs and grays, which slowlymount upwards, till at last even the highest pinnacle loses thelife-giving tints, and the whole snowy range itself turns cold andwhite and dead against a background of deepest sapphire blue. Thespectator shivers, folds himself more closely in his wraps, andretreats indoors, glad to be greeted by a blazing log-fire and a hotcup of tea. 

In the spring of the next year (1870) Sir William Mansfield's termof command came to an end, and he was succeeded by Lord Napier ofMagd[=a]la. The selection of this distinguished officer for thehighest military position in India was greatly appreciated by theIndian army, as no officer of that army had held it since the days ofLord Clive. 

In September a daughter was born, and that winter we again remainedat Simla. I amused myself by going through a course of electrictelegraphy, which may seem rather like a work of supererogation; butduring the Umbeyla campaign, when the telegraph office had to beclosed in consequence of all the clerks being laid up with fever, andwe could neither read nor send messages, I determined that I would onthe first opportunity learn electric signalling, in order that I mightbe able to decipher and send telegrams should I ever again find myselfin a similar position. 

In May my wife and I went for a march across the hills to Chakrata, and thence to Mussoorie and back by way of Dehra Dun and the plains. The object of this trip was to settle the boundary of Chakrata, and mywife took the opportunity of my being ordered on this duty to get awayfrom Simla, as we had now been there for more than two years, and wereconsequently rather longing for a change. Our route lay through mostbeautiful scenery, and notwithstanding that the trip was a littlehurried, and that some of the marches were therefore rather long, weenjoyed it immensely. When passing along the ridge of a very highhill one afternoon, we witnessed rather a curious sight--a violentthunderstorm was going on in the valley below us, while we ourselvesremained in the mildest, most serene atmosphere, enjoying brightsunshine and a blue sky. Dense black clouds filled up the valley athousand feet beneath us, the thunder roared, the lightning flashed, and soon we could hear the rush of waters in the streams below fromthe torrents of rain which the clouds were discharging; but it was notuntil we had crossed over the mountain, and descended to a low levelon the other side, that we fully realized the effects of the heavystorm. 

On our return to Simla we had the pleasure of a visit fromMajor-General Donald Stewart, who had come up to receive Lord Mayo'sinstructions before taking over his appointment as Superintendentof the Andaman Islands. In September he and I travelled together toCalcutta, to which place I was directed to proceed in order to makearrangements for a military expedition into the country of theLushais, having been appointed senior staff officer to the force. 

Lushai, situated between south-eastern Bengal and Burma, was a _terraincognita_ to me, and I had only heard of it in connexion with theraids made by its inhabitants upon the tea-gardens in its vicinity, which had now spread too far away from Cachar for the garrison of thatsmall military station to afford them protection. From time to timethe Lushais had done the planters much damage, and carried off severalprisoners, and various attempts had been made in the shape of smallmilitary expeditions to punish the tribesmen and rescue the captives;but from want of proper organization, and from not choosing the righttime of the year, these attempts had hitherto been unsuccessful, andour failures had the inevitable result of making the Lushais bolder. Raids became more frequent and more destructive; until at last alittle European girl, named Mary Winchester, was carried off, andkept by them as a prisoner; on this the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengaldeclared that a punitive expedition was 'absolutely necessary for thefuture security of the British subjects residing on the Cachar andChittagong frontiers. '

The despatch of a force was therefore decided upon; it was to consistof two small columns[1]--one having its base at Cachar, the other atChittagong--commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Bourchier, C. B. , and C. Brownlow, C. B. , supreme political power being also vestedin these two officers. Long experience had taught Lord Napier thewisdom of having only one head in time of war, and he impressed uponthe Government his opinion that the civil officers, while acting asadvisers and as the channels of communication with the tribes, shouldbe subordinate to the control of the two Commanders, who, after havingbeen put in possession of the views and wishes of the Government, should be held responsible for carrying them out loyally so far ascircumstances and the safety of the force would permit. 

As the existence of the tea industry was at stake, the Lushais havingestablished a perfect terror on all the estates within their reach, it was essential that they should be given a severe lesson, and thiscould only be done by their principal villages, which lay at someconsiderable distance from the base of operations, being visited inforce. The difficult country and the paucity of transport necessitatedthe columns being lightly equipped; no tents were to be allowed, andbaggage and followers were to be reduced to a minimum. My instructionswere to fit out and despatch the two columns, and then joinBrigadier-General Bourchier at Cachar. 

I was kept in Calcutta all October--not a pleasant month, the climatethen being very muggy and unhealthy. Everyone who could get away hadgone to the Hills or out to sea; and the offices being closed for theHindu holidays of the _Durga Puja, _ it was extremely difficult to getwork done. Everything for the Chittagong column had to be sent bysea. The shipping of the elephants was rather interesting: they clungdesperately to the ground, trying hard to prevent themselves beinglifted from it; and when at last, in spite of all their struggles, they were hoisted into the air, the helpless appearance of the hugeanimals and their despairing little cries and whines were quitepathetic. I found it trying work being on the river all day; my eyessuffered from the glare, and I became so reduced that before I leftCalcutta I weighed scarcely over eight stone--rather too fine acondition in which to enter on a campaign in a mountainous country, sothickly covered with jungle as to make riding out of the question. 

By the 3rd November the equipment and stores for both columns had beendespatched, and on the 16th I joined General Bourchier at the house ofthat most hospitable of hosts, Mr. Edgar, [2] Deputy-Commissioner ofCachar, who accompanied the left column as civil officer. 

We left Cachar on the 23rd, and from the outset we had to make our ownroads, a labour which never ceased until the end of January, by whichdate 110 miles had been completed. There was not the vestige of atrack to direct us; but I got hold of some people of the country, withwhom I made friends, and induced them to act as guides. Many a longand weary reconnaissance had to be executed, however, before the lineof advance could be decided upon. The troops worked with a will, and, notwithstanding the vapour-bath-like atmosphere of the valleys and thedifficult nature of the country, which was a succession of hill-rangescovered with jungle forests, made almost impenetrable from the hugecreepers, and intersected by rivers and watercourses, a good road, from six to eight feet wide, was constructed, with a sufficiently easygradient for laden elephants to travel over. Cutting one's way dayafter day through these dense, gloomy forests, through which hardly aray of light penetrates, was most stifling and depressing. One couldhardly breathe, and was quite unable to enjoy the beauty of themagnificent trees, the graceful bamboos and canes, and the wonderfulcreepers, which abounded, and under other circumstances would havebeen a source of pleasure; the difficulties we encountered, and theconsequent delay in our progress, quite prevented me from being in aframe of mind to appreciate my picturesque surroundings. 

It became evident from the first that our onward movements would begreatly impeded by want of transport. Notwithstanding the experiencewhich ought to have been gained in many small mountain wars, theGovernment had not been taught that a properly organized transportcorps was an absolute necessity, and that it was a mere waste of moneyto collect a number of men and animals without providing trainedsupervision. Fourteen hundred of our coolies were attached tothe Commissariat Department without anyone to look after them, consequently officers and non-commissioned officers, who could ill bespared from their regimental duties, had to be told off to organizeand work them. 

To add to our troubles, cholera broke out amongst some Nepalesecoolies on their way to join us; out of 840, 251 died in a few days, and a number deserted panic-stricken, while the rest were so weakenedand shaken that, notwithstanding the care bestowed upon them by theirable and energetic Commandant, Major H. Moore, only 387 joined thecolumn. We were not much better off in the matter of elephants, whichhad been so carelessly selected that only 33 out of the 157 sent withour column were of any use. All this resulted in our being obliged tostill further reduce our already small kits. Officers were allowedonly forty pounds of baggage, and soldiers twenty-four pounds, limitswithin which it was rather difficult to keep. A couple of blanketswere essential, as we should have to operate over mountains five andsix thousand feet high; so was a waterproof sheet, for even if weshould be lucky enough to escape rain, the dew is so heavy in thoseparts that it wets one just as thoroughly as a shower of rain. Thesethree items with my cloak and cork mattress--which is also a verynecessary adjunct in such a damp climate--amounted to thirty-onepounds, leaving only nine pounds for a change of clothes, plate, knife, fork, etc. --not too much for a four months' campaign. However, 'needs must, ' and it is surprising how many things one considersabsolute necessities under ordinary circumstances turn out to havebeen luxuries when we are obliged to dispense with them. 

The advance portion of the column did not arrive at Tipai Mukh, onlyeighty-four miles from Cachar, until the 9th December, which will givean idea of the enforced slowness of our progress. Tipai Mukh proved avery suitable place for our depot: it was situated at the junctionof two rivers, the Tipai and the Barak; thickly-wooded hills roseprecipitously on all sides, but on the right bank of the Barak therewas sufficient level space for all our requirements. With the helpof local coolies, the little Gurkhas were not long in running uphospitals and storesheds; bamboo, the one material used in Lushailandfor every conceivable purpose, whether it be a house, a drinkingvessel, a bridge, a woman's ear-ring, or a musical instrument, grewin profusion on the hillside. A trestle bridge was thrown across theTipai in a few hours, and about that bridge I have rather an amusingstory to relate. On my telling the young Engineer officer in charge ofthe Sapper company that a bridge was required to be constructed withthe least possible delay, he replied that it should be done, but thatit was necessary to calculate the force of the current, the weight tobe borne, and the consequent strength of the timber required. Off hewent, urged by me to be as quick as he could. Some hours elapsed, andnothing was seen of the Engineer, so I sent for him and asked him whenthe bridge was to be begun. He answered that his plans were nearlycompleted, and that he would soon be able to commence work. In themeantime, however, and while these scientific calculations were beingmade, the headman of the local coolies had come to me and said, if theorder were given, he would throw a good bridge over the river in notime. I agreed, knowing how clever Natives often are at this kindof work, and thinking I might just as well have two strings to thisparticular bow. Immediately, numbers of men were to be seen fellingthe bamboos on the hillside a short distance above the stream: thesewere thrown into the river, and as they came floating down they werecaught by men standing up to their necks in water, who cut them to therequired length, stuck the uprights into the river-bed, and attachedthem to each other by pieces laid laterally and longitudinally; theflooring was then formed also of bamboo, the whole structure wasfirmly bound together by strips of cane, and the bridge was pronouncedready. Having tested its strength by marching a large number of menacross it, I sent for my Engineer friend. His astonishment on seeing abridge finished ready for use was great, and became still greater whenhe found how admirably the practical woodmen had done their work; fromthat time, being assured of their ability to assist him, he wiselyavailed himself when difficulties arose of their useful, ifunscientific, method of engineering. 

By the 14th December matters had so far progressed as to warrant anadvance. As our route now lay away from the river, scarcity of waterentailed greater care being taken in the selection of encampinggrounds, so on arriving at our halting-place each day I had toreconnoitre ahead for a suitable site for our next resting-ground, aconsiderable addition to the day's work. Road-making for the passageof the elephants became more difficult, and transport was so deficientthat the troops could only be brought up very gradually. Thus, it wasthe 22nd of the month before we reached the Tuibum river, only twentymiles from Tipai Mukh. On our way we were met by some scouts fromthe villages ahead of us, who implored of us to advance no further, saying, if we would only halt, their headmen would come in and submitto whatever terms we chose to make. The villagers were informed inreply that our quarrel was not with them, and so long as we remainedunmolested, not the slightest injury should be done to them, theirvillages, or their crops; but that we were determined to reach thecountry of Lalbura, the Chief who had been the ringleader in the raidsupon the tea-gardens. 

We pushed on as fast as the dense undergrowth would permit untilwithin about a mile of the river, where we found the road blocked bya curious erection in the form of a gallows, from which hung twogrotesque figures, made of bamboo. A little further on it was a felledtree which stopped us; this tree was studded all over with knife-likepieces of bamboo, and from the incisions into which these were stuckexuded a red juice, exactly the colour of blood. This was the Lushaimode of warning us what would be our fate if we ventured further. We, however, proceeded on our way, bivouacked for the night, and early thenext morning started off in the direction of some villages which weunderstood lay in the road to our destination. 

For the first thousand feet the ascent was very steep, and the path sonarrow that we could only march in single file. Suddenly we enteredupon a piece of ground cleared for cultivation, and as we emerged fromthe forest we were received by a volley from a position about sixtyyards off. A young police orderly, who was acting as our guide, wasknocked over by my side, and a second volley wounded one of thesepoys, on which we charged and the enemy retired up the hill. We cameacross a large number of these _jooms_ (clearings), and at each therewas a like effort to oppose us, always with the same result. Afteradvancing in this way for the greater part of the day, alternatelythrough dense jungle and open spaces, and occasionally passing byscattered cottages, we sighted a good-sized village, where it wasdecided we should remain for the night. The day's march had been verysevere, the village being 4, 000 feet above the river; and the troopswere so worn out with their exertions that it was with difficulty thepiquets could be got to construct proper shelter for themselves out ofthe plentiful supply of trees and underwood ready at hand. Throughoutthe night the enemy's sharpshooters kept up an annoying fire undercover of the forest which surrounded the village, and so as soon asday dawned a party moved out to clear the ground all round. 

It was most aggravating to find from the view we got of the countryfrom this elevated position that the previous day's harassing marchhad been an absolutely useless performance and an unnecessary waste oftime and strength. We could now distinctly see that this village didnot lead to Lalbura's country, as we had been led to believe it would, and that there was no alternative but to retrace our steps as far asthe river. The men and animals were too tired to march that day, andthe next being Christmas, we made another halt, and commenced ourretirement on the 26th. This was an extremely nasty business, andhad to be carried out with very great caution. The ground, as I saidbefore, necessitated our proceeding in single file, and with only250 fighting men (all that our deficient transport admitted of beingbrought on to this point) it was difficult to guard the long lineof sick, wounded, and coolies. As soon as we began to draw in ourpiquets, the Lushais, who had never ceased their fire, perceiving wewere about to retire, came down in force, and entered one end of thevillage, yelling and screaming like demons, before we had got outat the other. The whole way down the hill they pressed us hard, endeavouring to get amongst the baggage, but were invariably baffledby the Gurkhas, who, extending rapidly whenever the ground wasfavourable, retired through their supports in admirable order, anddid not once give the enemy the chance of passing them. We had 3 menkilled and 8 wounded during the march, but the Lushais confessedafterwards to a loss of between 50 and 60. 

As we were given to understand that our short retrograde movement hadbeen interpreted into a defeat by the Lushais, the General wiselydetermined to pay the village of Kholel another visit. Our doing sohad the best possible effect. A slight resistance was offered at thefirst clearance, but by the time the ridge was reached the Chief, having become convinced of the uselessness of further opposition, submitted, and engaged to give hostages and keep open communicationwith our depot at Tipai Mukh, a promise which he most faithfullyperformed. 

1872 opened auspiciously for me. On New Year's Day I was agreeablysurprised by a communication from the Quartermaster-General informingme that, a vacancy having unexpectedly occurred, Lord Napier hadappointed me Deputy-Quartermaster-General. This was an important stepin my department, and I was proportionately elated. 

A few days later I received the good news of the birth of a son atUmballa on the 8th. 

Paucity of transport and difficulty about supplies kept us stationaryon the Tuibum for some time, after which we moved on as before, theLushais retiring in front of us until the 25th, when they attackedus while we were moving along a narrow ravine, with a stream at thebottom and steep hills on either side. The first volley wounded theGeneral in the arm and hand, and killed his orderly. The enemy'sintention was evidently to push past the weak column along thehillside and get amongst the coolies; but this attempt was againfoiled by the Gurkhas, who, flinging off their great-coats, rushedinto the stream and engaged the Lushais before they could get at thebaggage, pressing them up the mountain, rising 2, 500 feet above us, asfast as the precipitous nature of the ascent would allow. On the crestwe found the enemy occupying a good-sized village, out of which wecleared them and took possession of it ourselves. On this occasionwe had only 4 killed and 8 wounded, including the General, while theenemy lost about 60. In one place we found a heap of headless bodies. The Lushais, if unable to remove their dead, invariably decapitatethem to prevent their adversaries from carrying off the heads, theirown mode of dealing with a slain enemy, as they believe that whoeveris in possession of the head will have the man to whom it belonged asa slave in the next world. 

To complete the success we had gained, the General sent me the nextday with a small party to burn the village of Taikum, belonging to thepeople who had attacked us. It was past noon before we could make astart, owing to the non-arrival of the elephants with the guns. Whenthey did come in, the poor huge creatures were so fatigued by theirclimb that it was considered advisable to transfer their loads tocoolies, particularly as the route we had to traverse was reported tobe even more difficult than anything we had yet encountered. When wehad proceeded a short distance, we perceived that our way was blockeda mile ahead by a most formidable-looking stockade, on one side ofwhich rose perpendicular cliffs, while on the other was a rockyravine. As the nature of the ground did not admit of my approachingnear enough to discover whether the Artillery could be placed so as tocover the Infantry advance, and being anxious to avoid losing manyof my small party, I settled to turn the stockade by a detour up thehillside. This manoeuvre took some time, owing to the uncompromisingnature of the country; but it was successful, for when we struckthe track, we found ourselves about a mile on the other side of thestockade. The Lushais, on realizing what we were about, retired toTaikum, which place came into view at 5 p. M. It was situated on thesummit of a hill 1, 200 yards in front, and was crowded with men. Theguns were brought at once into action, and while Captain Blackwood[3]was preparing his fuses, I advanced towards the village with theInfantry. The first shell burst a little beyond the village, thesecond was lodged in its very centre, for a time completely paralyzingthe Lushais. On recovering from the shock, they took to their heelsand scampered off in every direction, the last man leaving the villagejust as we entered it. The houses, as usual, were made of bamboo, andafter it had been ascertained that there was no living creature insideany of them, the place was set on fire, and we began our returnjourney. There was a bright moon, but even aided by its light we didnot reach our bivouac until midnight. This ended the campaign so faras opposition was concerned, for not another shot was fired either byus or against us during the remaining six weeks we continued in thecountry. 

Soon after this we heard that some of the captives we had come torelieve had been given up to the Chittagong column, and that MaryWinchester was safe in General Brownlow's hands--very satisfactoryintelligence, showing as it did that the Lushais were beginning tounderstand the advisability of acceding to our demands. The work ofour column, however, was not over, for although, from the informationwe received of his whereabouts, we had given up hope of joining handswith Brownlow, Bourchier determined that Lalbura's country must bereached; he (Lalbura) being the chief offender, it would never havedone to let him think his stronghold lay beyond our power. 

In order that we might be well out of Lushailand before the rains, which usually begin in that part of the world about the middle ofMarch, and are extremely heavy, it was decided not to wait until aroad could be made for elephants, but to trust to coolie-carriagealone, and to push on rapidly as soon as supplies sufficient fortwelve days could be collected. Kits were still further reduced, officers and soldiers alike being only allowed a couple of blanketsand one or two cooking utensils. 

We resumed our march on the 12th February; the route in many placeswas strongly and skilfully stockaded, but the tidings of our successeshad preceded us, and our advance was unopposed. In five days wereached the Chamfai valley, at the end of which, on a high hill, Lalbura's village was situated. [4] Although Lalbura's father, Vonolel, had been dead some years, the people still called the place Vonolel'scountry. Vonolel had been a famous warrior, and they were evidentlyvery proud of his reputation. We were shown his tomb, which, like thatof all great Lushai braves, was decorated with the heads of humanbeings (his slaves in paradise) and those of animals, besidesdrinking-vessels and various kinds of utensils for his use in anotherlife. 

Lalbura had taken himself off; but his headmen submitted to us andaccepted our terms. We remained at this place till the 21st, inaccordance with an agreement we had made with Brownlow to send upsignals on the night of the 20th in case his column should be anywherein the neighbourhood. During the three days we stayed amongst themwe mixed freely with the Lushais, who were greatly delighted andastonished with all we had to show them. The telescope and theburning-glass amused them greatly; our revolvers excited theirenvy; and for the little Mountain guns they displayed the highestveneration. But what seemed to astonish them more than anything wasthe whiteness of our skins, particularly when on closer inspectionthey discovered that our arms and bodies were even fairer than ourfaces and hands, which to our eyes had become from long exposure sobronzed as to make us almost unrecognizable as Europeans. 

We were all glad that the duty entrusted to us had been satisfactorilyended, and we were hoping that the Viceroy, who had taken a keenpersonal interest in our proceedings, would be satisfied with theresult, when we were shocked and startled beyond measure by hearingthat Lord Mayo had been murdered by a convict while visiting theAndaman Islands. The disastrous news arrived as we were in the midstof firing signal-rockets, burning blue-lights, and lighting bonfiresto attract the attention of the Chittagong column. I could not helpthinking of the heavy loss India had sustained, for the manly, open-hearted Governor-General had impressed the Native Chiefs in quitean exceptional manner, and he was liked as well as respected by allclasses of Europeans and Natives. I felt also much for Donald Stewart, to whom, I knew, such a terrible tragedy, happening while he wasSuperintendent at Port Blair, would be a heavy blow. 

On the 6th March we reached Tipai Mukh, where we bade farewell to ourLushai friends, numbers of whom accompanied us to get possession ofthe empty tins, bags, and casks which were got rid of at every stage. The hostages and those who had assisted us were liberally rewarded, and we parted on the best of terms, with promises on their part offuture good behaviour--promises which were kept for nearly twentyyears. 

No one was sorry that the marching was at an end, and that the rest ofthe journey back was to be performed in boats. Constant hard work andexposure in a peculiarly malarious and relaxing climate had told uponthe whole force; while our having to depend for so long on tinnedmeats, which were not always good, and consisted chiefly of pork, withan occasional ration of mutton and salt beef, had been very trying tothe officers. One and all were 'completely worn out, ' as the principalmedical officer reported; two out of our small number died, and theGeneral's condition gave cause for grave anxiety. For myself, having aperfect horror of pork, I think I should have starved outright butfor the extraordinary culinary talent of Mr. Edgar, who disguisedthe presence of the unclean animal in such a wonderful way in soups, stews, etc. , that I frequently partook of it without knowing what Iwas eating. My wife and some anonymous kind friend sent by post smalltins of Liebig's extract, which were highly appreciated. 

Cholera pursued us up to and beyond Cachar; the wretched cooliessuffered most, and it is a disease to which Gurkhas are peculiarlysusceptible, while a feast on a village pig from time to time probablyhelped to make matters worse for them. Many of these grand littlesoldiers and some of the Sikhs also fell victims to the scourge. Myorderly, a very smart young Gurkha, to my great regret, was seizedwith it the day after I reached Cachar, and died next morning. 

On my way to Simla, I spent a few days with Norman at Calcutta. Thewhole place was in mourning on account of the terrible catastrophewhich had happened at Port Blair. 

[Footnote 1: The Cachar column consisted of half of the PeshawarMountain battery, one company of Bengal Sappers and Miners, the 22ndPunjab Infantry, 42nd and 44th Assam Light Infantry. The Chittagongcolumn consisted of the other half of the Mountain battery, the 27thPunjab Infantry, and the 2nd and 4th Gurkhas. Each regiment was 500strong, and each column was accompanied by 100 armed police. ]

[Footnote 2: Now Sir John Edgar, K. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 3: Major Blackwood, who was killed at Maiwand, in command ofE Battery, R. H. A. ]

[Footnote 4: Latitude 23° 26' 32", longitude (approximately) 93° 25';within a short distance of Fort White, lately built in the Chin Hills. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XL. 1872-1873

 Lord Napier's care for the soldier --Negotiations with Sher Ali renewed--Sher Ali's demands

Lord Napier of Murchiston, the Governor of Madras, had been summonedto Calcutta to act as Viceroy until Lord Northbrook, Lord Mayo'ssuccessor, should arrive. He seemed interested in what I had to tellhim about Lushai, and Lord Napier of Magd[=a]la spoke in laudatoryterms of the manner in which the expedition had been carried out. 

I reached Simla on the 1st of April, the twentieth anniversary of myarrival in India. I found my wife, with the two children, settled inSnowdon, [1] a house I had recently purchased. She had had much troublein my absence, having been at death's door herself, and having verynearly lost our little son at Umballa three weeks after his birthfrom a Native wet-nurse having tried to kill him. The English nurse'ssuspicions had been aroused by one day finding a live coal in thecradle, but she did not mention this discovery at the time for fear offrightening my wife; but she determined to watch. A few days later, while with our little girl in the next room, she heard the baby boychoking, and rushed in to find, to her horror, blood on his lips, andthat he was struggling violently, as if to get rid of something in histhroat! She pushed down her finger and pulled out a sharp piece ofcane about two inches long; but other pieces had evidently gone down, for the poor little fellow was in terrible agony for many days. Itturned out that the wretched woman hated the unwonted confinement ofher new life, and was determined to get away, but was too much afraidof her husband to say so. He wanted her to remain for the sake of thehigh pay this class of servant receives, so it appeared to the womanthat her only chance of freedom was to get rid of the child, and tocarry out her purpose she first attempted to set fire to the cradle, and finding this did not succeed, she pulled some pieces of cane offthe chair upon which she was sitting, and shoved them down the child'sthroat. She was, as my wife described her, a pretty, innocent, timid-looking creature, to whom no one would ever have dreamt ofattributing such an atrocity. The boy was made extremely delicate forseveral months by this misadventure, as his digestion had been ruinedfor the time being, but eventually he completely recovered from itseffects. 

In September the C. B. Was conferred upon me for the Lushai Expedition. Lord Napier informed me of the fact in a particularly kind littlenote. I was very proud of being a member of the Bath, although at thetime a brevet would have been a more useful reward, as want of rankwas the reason Lord Napier had given for not allowing me to act asQuartermaster-General, on Lumsden being temporarily appointed Residentat Hyderabad. 

We began our usual winter tour in the middle of October. At Mian Mir Imade the acquaintance of the Adjutant of the 37th Foot, the late SirHerbert Stewart, who was then a smart, good-looking subaltern, and Irecollect his bemoaning bitterly his bad luck in never having had achance of seeing service. How little at that time could it have beenanticipated that within twelve years he would see hard fighting inAfrica, and be killed as a Major-General in command of a column!

We visited several of the stations in the Punjab, and spent a few daysat Jamu as guest of the Maharaja of Kashmir, who treated us royally, and gave us some excellent pig-sticking; and on the 21st December wejoined Head-Quarters at Lawrencepur for a large Camp of Exercise, tobe held on the identical ground which I had selected for the campwhich Sir Hugh Rose proposed to have eleven years before. 

Lord Napier of Magd[=a]la did much to improve the efficiency of thearmy by means of Camps of Exercise. He held one at Delhi in the winterof 1871-72, and the Camp of which I am writing was most successful andinstructive. No Commander-in-Chief ever carried out inspections withmore thoroughness than did Lord Napier of Magd[=a]la. He sparedhimself no trouble. On the hottest day he would toil through barrackafter barrack to satisfy himself that the soldiers were properly caredfor; Europeans and Natives were equally attended to, and many measuresconducive to the men's comfort date from the time he was in command inIndia. 

At the close of this camp Lumsden, who had returned to his appointmentfrom Hyderabad, gave up the Quartermaster-Generalship for good. We hadbeen greatly thrown together during the twenty-one years I had been inIndia, and my wife and I were very sorry to bid farewell to him andMrs. Lumsden. He was succeeded by Edwin Johnson, pending whose arrivalI was now allowed to officiate. 

From Lawrencepur I went with the Commander-in-Chief to Calcutta. Soonafter we arrived there I was asked by Sir Douglas Forsyth to accompanyhim on his Mission to Yarkand and Kashgar. I should have much liked tohave done so, for the idea of a trip to these, at that time unknown, regions possessed great fascinations for me. I was therefore wellpleased when Lord Napier told me he would not stand in the way ofmy going, and proportionately disappointed when, the next day, HisExcellency said that on consideration he did not think I could bespared just then, for the Quartermaster-General would be new to thework at first, and he thought he would need my assistance. 

The end of April saw us back in Simla, and in July Edwin Johnsonarrived. 

During the summer of 1873 important events occurred which had much todo with our subsequent relations with Afghanistan. The inquiries whichSher Ali had begged Lord Mayo to make about Persian encroachments inSistan, had resulted in General Goldsmid[2] and Colonel Pollock[3]being deputed in 1871 to proceed to Sistan to decide the question. Thesettlement arrived at by these officers, which assigned to Afghanistanthe country up to the right bank of the Helmand, but nothing beyond, satisfied neither the Shah nor the Amir, and the latter sent hisconfidential Minister, Saiyad Nur Mahomed, the Afghan Commissionerin the Sistan arbitration, to meet Lord Northbrook on his arrival inBombay for the purpose of appealing to him against the decision. Itcould not, however, be reversed; but in a subsequent interview whichthe new Viceroy accorded the Envoy, the latter was told that as soonas Persia and Afghanistan had signified their acceptance of thesettlement, the Government of India would present the Amir with fivelakhs of rupees as compensation for the ceded territory which had fora time belonged to Afghanistan. 

The action of Her Majesty's Ministers in communication with Russiaregarding the northern boundary of Afghanistan was another matterabout which the Amir was greatly exercised; and Lord Northbrook, thinking that all such vexed questions could be more satisfactorilyexplained by personal communication than by letter, proposed to theAmir that His Highness should consent to receive at Kabul a Britishofficer 'of high rank and dignity, in whom I have full confidence'(Mr. Macnabb), [4] 'who will also explain to Your Highness, ' wrotethe Viceroy, 'the negotiations which have now been satisfactorilyconcluded with the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, whereby the Russian Government have agreed to recognize and respectthe integrity and independence of the territories now in YourHighness's possession. '

To this request Sher Ali replied that he considered it advisable thatone of his agents should first wait on the Viceroy to ascertain thereal views of the British Government on these important matters. Thiswas agreed to, and Saiyad Nur Mahomed was again selected to representthe Amir. He reached Simla towards the end of June. On being informedthat Persia had unreservedly accepted the decision as to the Sistanquestion, the Envoy declared that, whatever opinion the Amir mighthold as to his rights, His Highness would also scrupulously respectthat decision. With regard to the northern frontier, the Envoy beggedit to be clearly understood that the Afghan Government wished to beallowed to make their own laws and follow their own customs withintheir territories; that the internal affairs of the country should befree from interference; and that the acknowledgment by Russia of theAmir's claim to land south of the Oxus should be confirmed by Bokhara. He further requested 'that the British Government would distinctlypromise that, in the event of any aggression on the Amir'sterritories, they would consider the perpetrator of such aggressionas their own enemy. ' It was explained to the Saiyad that the BritishGovernment did not share the Amir's apprehension of Russia; that undersuch circumstances as he contemplated, it would be the duty of theAmir to refer to the British Government, who would decide whether itwas an occasion for assistance to be rendered by them, and what thenature and extent of the assistance should be; moreover, that theirhelp must be conditional upon the Amir himself abstaining fromaggression, and on his unreserved acceptance of the advice of theBritish Government in regard to his external relations. 

Two other questions were discussed:

 (1) The location in certain towns in Afghanistan of British officers as representatives of the British Government. 

 (2) The present assistance to be rendered to the Amir for the purpose of strengthening his country against foreign aggression. 

On the first point the Envoy said he had no instructions, but that, inhis opinion, to ask Sher Ali to allow British officers to be locatedin Afghanistan would give rise to mistrust and apprehension. Herecommended that a letter should be addressed to the Amir, pointingout the desirability of a British officer being sent to inspect thewestern and northern boundaries of Afghanistan, proceeding _viâ_Kandahar and returning _viâ_ Kabul, where he might confer personallywith His Highness. This suggestion was carried out. 

With regard to the second point under discussion, the Envoy statedthat 20, 000 stand-of-arms were desired, laying very particular stresson 5, 000 Sniders being included in this number, and that hopes wereentertained by the Amir that he would be largely assisted with money. In answer to this, the Saiyad was told that there was not then asufficient reserve supply of Sniders for the English troops in India, and that it was impossible to spare more than 5, 000 Enfields; thatthis number should at once be placed at the Amir's disposal, and thatthe remainder should be forwarded as soon as they were received fromEngland. He was further informed that five lakhs of rupees (exclusiveof the five lakhs promised the year before, as indemnification for theloss of territory) would be given to Sher Ali. 

A final letter from the Viceroy was sent to the Amir through SaiyadNur Mahomed, dated 6th September, 1873, summing up the result of theconference. His Highness was told, with reference to a fear expressedby the Envoy lest Russia should press for the establishment of aRussian Mission and agents in Afghanistan, that Prince Gortschakoffhad officially intimated that, while he saw no objection to Britishofficers going to Kabul, he engaged that Russian agents should abstainfrom doing so, and that, far from apprehending a Russian invasion ofAfghanistan, the British Government believed that the effect of therecent arrangements had been to render the occurrence of such acontingency more remote than ever. At the same time, being desirous ofseeing the Amir strong and his rule firmly established, the Governmentwere prepared to give him any reasonable assistance. 

Sher Ali was greatly annoyed and disappointed at the result of hisEnvoy's visit to Simla. He was of a very impulsive, passionatedisposition; his reply to the Viceroy's letter was discourteous andsarcastic; he declined to receive a British officer at Kabul, andalthough he condescended to accept the arms presented to him, he leftthe ten lakhs of rupees untouched in the Peshawar treasury. ColonelValentine Baker, who was at that time travelling through Central Asia, was forbidden by the Amir to pass through Afghanistan on his wayto India; and a few months later he refused to allow Sir DouglasForsyth's Mission to return to India by way of Afghanistan. 

[Footnote 1: We lived in this house whenever we were in Simla, tillwe left it in 1892. It has since been bought by Government for theCommander-in-Chief's residence. ]

[Footnote 2: General Sir Frederick Goldsmid, K. C. M. G. ]

[Footnote 3: Major-General Sir Frederick Pollock, K. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 4: Sir Donald Macnabb, K. C. S. I. , then Commissioner ofPeshawar. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLI. 1873-1877

 A trip in the Himalayas--The famine in Behar --The Prince of Wales in India--Farewell to Lord Napier

In the beginning of October my wife and I started for a fortnight'strip to the top of the Chor, a fine mountain sixty-two miles fromSimla, and close on 12, 000 feet high. We were accompanied by a verydear friend of ours--now no more--Colonel Baigrie, who was soonafterwards made Quartermaster-General in Bombay. He was a talentedartist and delightful companion, and notwithstanding the old adagethat two are company and three none, we three enjoyed our holidayimmensely. 

After crossing a stream called the Ghiri, below Fagu, the road passesthrough beautiful forest and cliff scenery, and for the most part wasfairly easy, until the foot of the mountain was reached about sixmiles from the top, when it became very precipitous and difficult. Wewere the whole day doing this march, breakfasting in one place andlunching in another higher up. There was a good deal of snow in theshady spots. A few days before we had noticed that the top of themountain was white, but the sun was still too strong in the daytimefor the snow to lie long in exposed parts. The way being too steepfor my wife to ride or go in a dandy, we all three walked, or ratherclimbed, up to the shoulder where our tents were pitched, about a milefrom the summit. 

The forest through which we passed was very beautiful, commencing withdark-green ilex, glistening holly, and sombre brown oak, interspersedwith groups of the dainty, graceful, white-stemmed birch, and wreathedwith festoons of the scarlet Himalayan vine. As we mounted higher, trees became fewer and the foliage less luxuriant, till at length onlyoaks were to be seen, their branches twisted into all sorts of weird, fantastic shapes from the strength of the south-west monsoon. Hugerocks became more frequent, covered with lichens and mosses of everyshade, from dark-green to brilliant crimson. At length trees andshrubs were left behind, except the red-berried juniper, which growsat a higher elevation here than any other bush, and flourishes in theclefts of the rocks, where nothing else will exist. We got up in timeto see the most glorious sunset; the colours were more wonderful thananything I had ever seen before, even in India. My wife urged Baigrieto make a rough sketch, and note the tints, that he might paint apicture of it later. He made the sketch, saying: 'If I attempted torepresent truly what we see before us, the painting would be rejectedby the good people at home as absurdly unreal, or as the work of ahopeless lunatic. ' There was such a high wind that our small tents hada narrow escape of being blown away. That night the water was frozenin our jugs, and it was quite impossible to keep warm. 

We were up betimes the next morning, and climbed to the highest peak, where we found breakfast awaiting us and a magnificent view of theHimalayan ranges, right down to the plains on one side and up to theperpetual snows on the other. We descended to the foot of the mountainin the afternoon, and then returned, march by march, to Simla. 

Towards the end of the month Lord Napier began his winter tour, visiting the hill stations first. At Chakrata I made the acquaintanceof the 92nd Highlanders, that distinguished corps which stood mein such good stead a few years later in Afghanistan. At the end ofNovember we found ourselves at Lucknow, in time to take part in LordNorthbrook's state entry, and be present at a fête given to theViceroy in the Wingfield Park by Sir George Cooper, the ChiefCommissioner. 

From Lucknow we went for a brief visit to a small Camp of Exercisenear Rurki, where Lord Napier left the Adjutant-General, Thesiger, [1]in command, while he himself proceeded to visit some of the stationsin the Madras Presidency, and I returned for a short time to Simla. 

While riding up the hill from Kalka, I had a novel experience. Oneof those tremendous thunder-storms which are not uncommon in theHimalayas came on; the rain was blinding and incessant, and the pealsof thunder were simultaneous with the lightning. At last there was atremendous crash; a flash, more vivid than the rest, passed rightin front of my horse's head, accompanied by a whizzing noise and asulphurous smell, completely blinding me for a second. Two Nativestravelling a few yards ahead of me fell flat on their faces, and Ithought they were killed, but it turned out they were only knockedover and very much frightened. 

Early in January, 1874, we received by telegram the infinitely sadnews of my father's death. We ought, I suppose, to have been preparedfor such an event, seeing that he was within a few months of hisninetieth birthday; but he was so well and active, and took such akeen interest in all that was going on, especially anything connectedwith India, that we hardly realized his great age, and always hoped wemight see him once more. He had received the G. C. B. From Her Majesty'shands at Windsor on the 8th December, and two days afterwards he wroteme an account of the ceremony, and expressed himself much pleased andgratified at the Queen's gracious manner to him. He said nothing abouthis health, but we heard later that he had taken cold in the train onhis way home, and never recovered from the effects; he died on the30th of December. His love for India had not been weakened by histwenty years' absence from the country, and he never wearied ofbeing told of the wonderful changes which had taken place since hisday--changes which, for the most part, dated from the Mutiny, for uptill 1857 life in India was much the same as when my father firstlanded in the beginning of the century. 

A continued drought in Behar was at this time causing grave fears ofa famine, such as from time to time had desolated various parts ofIndia. Nine years before such a drought, and the absence of meansof communication, which prevented grain being thrown into thefamine-stricken districts in sufficient quantities, resultedin one-fourth of the population of Orissa being carried off bystarvation, or disease consequent on starvation. So on this occasionLord Northbrook was determined, at all costs, to ward off such acalamity. He sent Sir Richard Temple to Behar in the confident hopethat his unbounded resource and energy would enable him to cope withthe difficulties of the situation, a hope that was fully realized. Relief works were at once commenced; a transport train was quicklyimprovised, worked chiefly by military and police officers; and onemillion tons of rice were distributed amongst the people. Not a lifewas lost, but the cost to the State was enormous--six millions and ahalf sterling. 

In the beginning of February I was ordered by Government to proceed tothe famine districts to help Temple. I started at once; but I hadnot been long in Behar before I was required to join theCommander-in-Chief in Calcutta, His Excellency having determined tonominate me Quartermaster-General, in succession to Johnson, who wasabout to become Adjutant-General. Being only a Lieutenant-Colonelin the army, I could not, according to the rules, be put at oncepermanently into the appointment, which carried with it the rank ofMajor-General. The difficulty was overcome, however, by my beingallowed to officiate till the following January, when, in the ordinarycourse of promotion, I should become a Colonel. 

Lord Northbrook spent the summer of 1874 in Calcutta, inconsequence of the famine necessities having to be met; and as theCommander-in-Chief determined to follow his example, I took a house inCalcutta, and my wife joined me in the middle of March--rather a badtime of year to come down to the plains after spending the winteramongst the snows of Simla. But she did not fancy Simla in the seasonas a grass-widow, and had had quite enough of being alone. 

We continued in Calcutta until August, when the Head-Quarters returnedto Simla, where we remained till November. 

We had a standing camp at Umballa during the winter of 1874-75, doingour inspections from there, and returning to the camp at intervals. There was the usual visit to Calcutta in March, towards the end ofwhich month another daughter was born. 

In October, 1875, I spent some time at Delhi, arranging for the Campof Exercise to be held there in January for His Royal Highness thePrince of Wales. The camp was formed in the beginning of December, and consisted of 17, 000 men, in four divisions, commanded byMajor-Generals Sir Charles Reid, Macdonnell, the Hon. Arthur Hardinge, and Donald Stewart. 

The country round Delhi is particularly well suited for extendedmanoeuvres, and full advantage was taken of the facilities it affordedduring the two months the Camp of Exercise lasted. The Prince of Waleslanded at Calcutta on the 23rd December; and Lord Napier with hisstaff went down to meet His Royal Highness, whose reception was loyaland hearty to a degree. As the _Serapis_, with the Prince on board, steamed slowly up the Hughli, salutes were fired from Fort William andthree ships of the Royal Navy. All the vessels in the river were gaywith flags, their yards were manned, and good hearty English cheersresounded from stem to stern of each ship as the Indian troopship, carrying the heir to England's throne, came in sight. As soon as the_Serapis_ was moored, the Viceroy went on board to greet the Princeand conduct His Royal Highness to the gaily-decorated landing-stage, where the principal officials, Native Princes, and chief inhabitantsof Calcutta were assembled. Troops lined the road from the river toGovernment House, and the _maidan_ (the great open space in front) wasthronged with a dense crowd of Natives in their most brilliant galaattire, eager to catch a glimpse of the son of the great Queen ofEngland. 

That evening Lord Northbrook gave a State banquet. The next day therewas a reception of the Princes and Chiefs, followed by a levée, andafter dark the whole place was most beautifully illuminated. Theweek that followed was taken up with entertainments of variouskinds--balls, races, and garden-parties, interspersed with officialvisits--which I am afraid the Prince could not have found amusing--andon New Year's Day, 1876, His Royal Highness held a Chapter of theOrder of the Star of India, after which the Commander-in-Chiefreturned to Delhi to arrange to receive the Prince in that historicalcity on the 11th January. 

His Royal Highness's camp, and that of the Commander-in-Chief, werepitched on the ground occupied by the British army during the siege. The road, five miles in length, from the station to the camp was linedwith troops, and on the Ridge itself were placed six Rifle corps, three of which had taken part in the siege. [2] The 2nd Gurkhas werevery appropriately drawn up immediately under Hindu Rao's house, and when this point was reached, the Prince stopped and warmlycomplimented the men on the distinguished service the regiment hadperformed. 

The next day there was a parade of all the troops in review order forthe inspection of the Prince, who was pleased to express his completesatisfaction and approval of 'the steadiness under arms, soldier-likebearing, and precision of movement, which distinguish the corps of thethree armies assembled at the camp at Delhi. '

That evening the Prince was present at a ball in the _diwan-i-khas_(private audience hall) in the palace, given in His Royal Highness'shonour by the officers of the army. 

The next few days were taken up with manoeuvres, which the Princeattended, accompanied by Lumsden[3] and myself. The defence wascommanded by Reid, the attack by Hardinge, the latter's object beingto gain possession of the Ridge, with a view to future operationsagainst the city on the arrival of the main army from the Punjab. Butthe attack did not meet with the success which attended Barnard in1857, while the Commander of the defence proved himself as skilful inprotecting the Ridge against an enemy advancing from the north ashe had been, twenty years before, in repulsing one coming from theopposite direction. 

The Prince of Wales held another investiture of the Star of Indiaon the 7th of March at Allahabad, which Lord Napier and the staffattended. At its close we took our leave of His Royal Highness, whostarted that night for England. 

In less than a fortnight our dear old Chief followed, and I saw himoff from Bombay on the 10th April. I was very low at parting with him, for though in the earlier days of our acquaintance I used to thinkhe was not very favourably disposed towards me, when I became moreintimately associated with him nothing could exceed his kindness. Hewas universally regretted by Europeans and Natives alike. The soldiersrecognized that he had carefully guarded their interests and workedfor their welfare, and the Native Princes and people felt that hewas in sympathy with them, and to this day they speak of _Lat NapierSahib_ with the deepest respect and affection. 

Lord Napier was succeeded in the command by Sir Frederick Haines. 

[Footnote 1: Now General Lord Chelmsford, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: 60th Rifles, 2nd Gurkhas, and 1st Punjab Infantry. ]

[Footnote 3: Lumsden returned to Head-Quarters as Adjutant-Generalon Edwin Johnson being appointed a member of the Indian Council inLondon. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLII. 1876-1878

 Lord Lytton becomes Viceroy--Difficulties with Sher Ali --Imperial assemblage at Delhi--Reception of the Ruling Chiefs --Queen proclaimed Empress of India --Political importance of the assemblage --Sher Ali proclaims a 'Jahad'--A journey under difficulties

With a new Commander-in-Chief came a new Viceroy, and it was whilewe were in Bombay seeing the last of Lord Napier that the _Orontes_steamed into the harbour with Lord Lytton on board. Little did Iimagine when making Lord Lytton's acquaintance how much he would haveto say to my future career. 

His Excellency received me very kindly, telling me he felt that I wasnot altogether a stranger, as he had been reading during the voyagea paper I had written for Lord Napier, a year or two before, onour military position in India, and the arrangements that would benecessary in the event of Russia attempting to continue her advancesouth of the Oxus. Lord Napier had sent a copy of this memorandum toLord Beaconsfield, by whom it had been given to Lord Lytton. 

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. _From a photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox. _]

During the summer of 1876 our frontier policy was frequently underdiscussion. Sir Bartle Frere wrote two very strong letters after theConservative Government came into power in 1874, drawing attentionto the danger of our being satisfied with a policy of aloofness, andpointing out the necessity for coming into closer relations withthe Amir of Afghanistan and the Khan of Khelat. Soon afterwards theSecretary of State communicated with the Government of India as to theadvisability of establishing British agents in Afghanistan, and ofpersuading the Amir to receive a temporary Embassy at Kabul, as hadoriginally been proposed by Lord Northbrook. 

The members of Lord Northbrook's Council were unanimously opposed toboth these proposals, but they did not succeed in convincing LordSalisbury that the measures were undesirable; and on the resignationof Lord Northbrook, the new Viceroy was furnished with specialinstructions as to the action which Her Majesty's Governmentconsidered necessary in consequence of the activity of Russia inCentral Asia, and the impossibility of obtaining accurate informationof what was going on in and beyond Afghanistan. 

The question of the Embassy was dealt with at once; Lord Lyttondirected a letter to be sent to the Amir announcing his assumptionof the Viceroyalty, and his intention to depute Sir Lewis Pelly toproceed to Kabul for the purpose of discussing certain matters withHis Highness. 

To this communication a most unsatisfactory reply was received, anda second letter was addressed to the Amir, in which he was informedthat, should he still decline to receive the Viceroy's Envoy afterdeliberately weighing all the considerations commended to his seriousattention, the responsibility of the result would rest entirely on theGovernment of Afghanistan, which would thus alienate itself fromthe alliance of that Power which was most disposed and best able tobefriend it. 

This letter was the cause of considerable excitement in Kabul, excitement which ran so high that the necessity for proclaiming areligious war was mooted; and, to complicate matters, the Amir atthis time received overtures from General Kauffmann, the RussianGovernor-General in Turkestan. 

A delay of six weeks occurred before Sher Ali replied to Lord Lytton'sletter, and then he altogether ignored the Viceroy's proposal to senda Mission to Kabul, merely suggesting that the British Governmentshould receive an Envoy from him, or that representatives from bothcountries should meet and hold a conference on the border, or, asanother alternative, that the British Native Agent at Kabul shouldreturn and discuss affairs with the Viceroy. 

The last suggestion was accepted by the Government of India, and theagent (Nawab Ata Mahomed Khan) arrived in Simla early in October. TheNawab gave it as his opinion that the Amir's attitude of estrangementwas due to an accumulation of grievances, the chief of which were--theunfavourable arbitration in the Sistan dispute; the want of success ofSaiyad Nur Mahomed's mission to India in 1873, when it was the desireof the Amir's heart to enter into an offensive and defensive alliancewith the British Government; the interposition of Lord Northbrook'sGovernment on behalf of Yakub Khan;[1] the recent proceedings inKhelat, [2] which the Amir thought were bringing us objectionably nearKandahar; the transmission of presents through Afghanistan, to hisvassal, the Mir of Wakhan, without the Amir's permission;[3] and, above all, the conviction that our policy was exclusively directed tothe furtherance of British interests without any thought for those ofAfghanistan. 

As regarded the proposed Mission to Kabul, the Envoy said that HisHighness objected to it for many reasons. Owing to local fanaticism, he could not insure its safety, and it seemed probable that, though ofa temporary nature to begin with, it might only be the thin end of thewedge, ending in the establishment of a permanent Resident, as at thecourts of the Native Rulers in India. Furthermore, the Amir conceivedthat, if he consented to this Mission, the Russians would insist upontheir right to send a similar one, and finally, he feared a BritishEnvoy might bring his influence to bear in favour of the release ofhis son, Yakub Khan, with whom his relations were as strained as ever. 

In answer, the Viceroy enumerated the concessions he was prepared tomake, and the conditions upon which alone he would consent to them;and this answer the agent was directed to communicate to the Amir. 

The concessions were as follows:

 (1) That the friends and enemies of either State should be those of the other. 

 (2) That, in the event of unprovoked aggression upon Afghanistan from without, assistance should be afforded in men, money, and arms; and also that to strengthen the Amir against such aggression, the British Government was willing to fortify Herat and other points on the frontier, and, if desired, to lend officers to discipline the army. 

 (3) That Abdulla Jan should be recognized as the Amir's successor to the exclusion of any other aspirant; and that the question of material aid in support of such recognition should be discussed by the Plenipotentiaries. 

 (4) That a yearly subsidy should be paid to the Amir on the following conditions:

 That he should refrain from external aggression or provocation of his neighbours, and from entering into external relations without our knowledge. 

 That he should decline all communication with Russia, and refer her agents to us. 

 That British agents should reside at Herat and elsewhere on the frontier. 

 That a mixed commission of British and Afghan officers should determine and demarcate the Amir's frontier. 

 That arrangements should be made, by allowances or otherwise, for free circulation of trade on the principal trade routes. 

 That similar arrangements should be made for a line of telegraph, the direction of which was to be subsequently determined. 

 That Afghanistan should be freely opened to Englishmen, official and non-official, and arrangements made by the Amir, as far as practicable, for their safety, though His Highness would not be absolutely held responsible for isolated accidents. 

The Viceroy concluded by suggesting that, if the Amir agreed to theseproposals, a treaty might be arranged between the agents of therespective Governments, and ratified either at Peshawar, by the Amirmeeting Lord Lytton there, or at Delhi if the Amir accepted HisExcellency's invitation to be present at the Imperial Assemblage. 

The Amir at the time vouchsafed no reply whatever to these proposalsor to the invitation to come to Delhi. 

In the autumn of 1876 preparations were commenced for the 'ImperialAssemblage, ' which it was announced by the Viceroy would be heldat Delhi on the first day of January, 1877, for the purpose ofproclaiming to the Queen's subjects throughout India the assumptionby Her Majesty of the title of 'Empress of India. ' To this AssemblageLord Lytton further announced that he proposed 'to invite theGovernors, Lieutenant-Governors, and Heads of Administration from allparts of the Queen's Indian dominions, as well as the Princes, Chiefs, and Nobles in whose persons the antiquity of the past is associatedwith the prosperity of the present, and who so worthily contribute tothe splendour and stability of this great Empire. '

Delhi was selected as the place where the meeting between the Queen'srepresentative and the great nobles of India could most appropriatelybe held, and a committee was appointed to make the necessaryarrangements. As a member of the committee I was deputed to proceed toDelhi, settle about the sites for the camps, and carry out all detailsin communication with the local authorities. The Viceroy impressedupon me that the Assemblage was intended to emphasize the ProclamationLord Canning issued eighteen years before, by which the Queen assumedthe direct sovereignty of her eastern possessions, and that he wishedno trouble or expense to be spared in making the ceremony altogetherworthy of such a great historical event. 

I returned to Simla in October, when my wife and I accompanied theCommander-in-Chief on a very delightful march over the Jalauri Passthrough the Kulu valley, then over the Bubbu Pass and through theKangra valley to Chamba and Dalhousie. Our party consisted of theChief, his Doctor (Bradshaw), Persian interpreter (Moore), General andMrs. Lumsden, and ourselves. The first slight shower of snow had justfallen on the Jalauri Pass, and as we crossed over we disturbed anumber of beautiful snow-pheasants and minals busily engaged inscratching it away to get at their food. The scenery on this march isvery fine and varied; for the most part the timber and foliage aresuperb, and the valleys are very fertile and pretty, lying close underthe snow-capped mountains. 

Having inspected the 'Hill stations, ' we proceeded to Peshawar, where the Viceroy had arranged to hold a conference with theLieutenant-Governor of the Punjab and the Commissioner of Peshawarabout frontier affairs. 

Early in December I was back again at Delhi, where I found thearrangements for the several camps progressing most satisfactorily, and canvas cities rising up in every direction, I had previouslychosen the site of the old cantonment for the camps of the Viceroy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the principal officials, while for theAssemblage itself I had selected ground about three miles off. 

The Chiefs and Princes were all settled in their several camps readyto meet the Viceroy, who, on his arrival, in a few graceful wordswelcomed them to Delhi, and thanked them for responding to hisinvitation. He then mounted, with Lady Lytton, on a state elephant, and a procession was formed, which, I fancy, was about the mostgorgeous and picturesque which has ever been seen even in the East. The magnificence of the Native Princes' retinues can hardly bedescribed; their elephant-housings were of cloth of gold, orscarlet-and-blue cloths embroidered in gold and silver. The howdahswere veritable thrones of the precious metals, shaded by the mostbrilliant canopies, and the war-elephants belonging to some ofthe Central India and Rajputana Chiefs formed a very curious andinteresting feature. Their tusks were tipped with steel; they woreshields on their fore-heads, and breastplates of flashing steel;chain-mail armour hung down over their trunks and covered their backsand sides; and they were mounted by warriors clad in chain-mail, andarmed to the teeth. Delhi must have witnessed many splendid pageants, when the Rajput, the Moghul, and the Mahratta dynasties, each in itsturn, was at the height of its glory; but never before had Princes andChiefs of every race and creed come from all parts of Hindustan, vyingwith each other as to the magnificence of their _entourage_, and mettogether with the same object--that of acknowledging and doing homageto one supreme Ruler. 

The next few days were spent by Lord Lytton in receiving thesixty-three[4] Ruling Princes of India according to the strictestetiquette. Each Prince, with his suite, was met at the entrance tothe camp, and conducted up the street to the durbar tent by mountedofficers, the salute to which he was entitled being fired while theprocession moved on. He was then presented by the Foreign Secretary tothe Viceroy, who placed him on a chair on his right, immediatelybelow a full-length portrait of Her Majesty. A satin banner, richlyembroidered with the Chief's armorial bearings, surmounted by theImperial crown, was next brought in by Highland soldiers and plantedin front of the throne, when the Viceroy, leading the particular Chieftowards it, thus addressed him: 'I present Your Highness with thisbanner as a personal gift from Her Majesty the Queen, in commemorationof her assumption of the title of Empress of India. Her Majesty truststhat it may never be unfurled without reminding you not only of theclose union between the throne of England and your loyal and princelyhouse, but also of the earnest desire of the paramount power to seeyour dynasty strong, prosperous, and permanent. '

His Excellency then placed round the Chief's neck a crimson ribbon, towhich was attached a very handsome gold medal[5] with the Queen's headengraved on it, adding: 'I further decorate you, by command of HerMajesty. May this medal be long worn by yourself, and long kept asan heirloom in your family in remembrance of the auspicious date itbears. '

The 1st January, 1877, saw the Queen proclaimed Empress of India, Theceremony was most imposing, and in every way successful. Three tentedpavilions had been constructed on an open plain. The throne-pavilionin the centre was a very graceful erection, brilliant in hangings andbanners of red, blue, and white satin magnificently embroidered ingold, with appropriate emblems. It was hexagonal in shape, and rathermore than 200 feet in circumference. In front of this was the pavilionfor the Ruling Chiefs and high European officials, in the form ofa semicircle 800 feet long. The canopy was of Star of Indiablue-and-white satin embroidered in gold, each pillar being surmountedby an Imperial crown. Behind the throne was the stand for thespectators, also in the form of a semicircle divided in the middle, and likewise canopied in brilliant colours. Between these two blockswas the entrance to the area. 

Each Chief and high official sat beneath his own banner, which wasplanted immediately behind his chair, and they were all mixed up asmuch as possible to avoid questions of precedence, the result beingthe most wonderful mass of colour, produced from the intermingling ofBritish uniforms and plumes with gorgeous eastern costumes, set off bya blaze of diamonds and other precious stones. 

All the British troops brought to Delhi for the occasion were paradedto the north, and the troops and retainers belonging to the NativeChiefs to the south, of the pavilion. Guards of Honour were drawn upon either side of the throne and at each opening by which the RulingChiefs were to enter the pavilion. 

The guests being all seated, a flourish of trumpets by the heraldsexactly at noon announced the arrival of the Viceroy. The militarybands played a march, and Lord Lytton, accompanied by Lady Lytton, their daughters, and his staff, proceeded to the pavilion. HisExcellency took his seat upon the throne, arrayed in his robes asGrand Master of the Star of India, the National Anthem was played, the Guards of Honour presented arms, while the whole of the vastassemblage rose as one man. The Chief Herald was then commanded toread the Proclamation. A flourish of trumpets was again sounded, andHer Majesty was proclaimed Empress of India. 

When the Chief Herald had ceased reading, the Royal Standard washoisted, and a salute of 101 salvoes of artillery was fired, with a_feu de joie_ from the long line of troops. This was too much for theelephants. As the _feu de joie_ approached nearer and nearer tothem they became more and more alarmed, and at last scampered off, dispersing the crowd in every direction. When it ceased they werequieted and brought back by their _mahouts_, only to start off againwhen the firing recommenced; but, as it was a perfectly bare plain, without anything for the great creatures to come in contact with, there was no harm done beyond a severe shaking to their riders. Asthe sound of the last salvo died away the Viceroy addressed theassemblage. When he had ceased speaking, the assembly again rose _enmasse_ and joined the troops in giving several ringing cheers. 

His Highness the Maharaja Sindhia then spoke as follows: '_Shah inShah Padishah_. May God bless you. The Princes of India bless you, andpray that your sovereignty and power may remain steadfast for ever. '

Sir Salar Jung rose on behalf of the boy Nizam, and said: 'I amdesired by His Highness the Nizam to request your Excellency to conveyto Her Majesty, on the part of himself and the Chiefs of India, theexpression of their hearty congratulations on the assumption of thetitle of Empress of India, and to assure the Queen that they pray forher, and for the enduring prosperity of her Empire, both in India andEngland. '

The Maharajas of Udaipur and Jaipur, in the name of the united Chiefsof Rajputana, begged that a telegram might be sent to the Queen, conveying their dutiful and loyal congratulations; and the Maharajaof Kashmir expressed his gratification at the tenor of the Viceroy'sspeech, and declared that he should henceforth consider himself secureunder the shadow of Her Majesty's protecting care. [6]

[Illustration: THE EARL OF LYTTON, G. C. B. , G. M. S. I. , G. M. I. E. , VICEROYor INDIA. _From a photograph by Messrs. Maull and Fox. _]

It is difficult to overrate the political importance of this greatgathering. It was looked upon by most of the Ruling Chiefs as theresult of the Prince of Wales's visit, and rejoiced in as an evidenceof Her Majesty's increased interest in, and appreciation of, the vastEmpire of India with its many different races and peoples. 

I visited all the camps, and conversed with every one of the Princesand Nobles, and each in turn expressed the same intense gratificationat the Viceroy's reception of him, the same fervent loyalty to theEmpress, and the same satisfaction that the new title should have beenannounced with such appropriate splendour and publicity. 

General rejoicings in honour of the occasion took place all overIndia, in Native States as well as British cantonments. School-houses, town halls, hospitals, and dispensaries were founded, large numbers ofprisoners were released, substantial additions were made to the pay ofall ranks in the Native Army, as well as a considerable increase innumbers to the Order of British India; and the amnesty granted in 1859was extended to all but murderers and leaders in the Mutiny. 

When the Assemblage broke up, I started with Sir Frederick Hainesfor a tour along the Derajat frontier. We visited Kohat, Bannu, DeraIsmail Khan, and Multan; proceeded by steamer down the Indus toSukkur, and thence rode to Jacobabad. Then on to Kotri, from whichplace we went to see the battle-field of Miani, where Sir CharlesNapier defeated the Amirs of Sind in 1843. From Kotri we travelledto Simla _viâ_ Karachi and Bombay, where we were most hospitablyentertained by the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay (Sir Charles Stavely)and his wife. 

Afghan affairs were this year again giving the Viceroy a great dealof anxiety. The Amir had eventually agreed to a discussion of LordLytton's proposals being held, and for this purpose Saiyad Nur Mahomedand Sir Lewis Pelly had met at Peshawar in January, 1877. Themeeting, unfortunately, ended in a rupture, owing to Sher Ali'sagent pronouncing the location of European officers in any part ofAfghanistan an impossibility; and what at this crisis complicatedmatters to a most regrettable extent was the death of Saiyad NurMahomed, who had been in failing health for some time. 

On learning the death of his most trusted Minister, and the failure ofthe negotiations, Sher Ali broke into a violent fit of passion, givingvent to his fury in threatenings and invectives against the BritishGovernment. He declared it was not possible to come to terms, and thatthere was nothing left for him but to fight; that he had seven croresof rupees, every one of which he would hurl at the heads of theEnglish, and he ended by giving orders for a _jahad_ (a religious war)to be proclaimed. 

For the time being nothing more could be done with Afghanistan, andthe Viceroy was able to turn his attention to the following importantquestions: the transfer of Sind from Bombay to the Punjab, a measurewhich had been unanimously agreed to by Lord Northbrook's Government;the removal from the Punjab government of the trans-Indus tract ofcountry, and the formation of the latter into a separate districtunder the control of a Chief Commissioner, who would be responsibleto the Government of India alone for frontier administration andtrans-frontier relations. This post Lord Lytton told me, as much to mysurprise as to my gratification, that he meant to offer to me, if hisviews were accepted by the Secretary of State. It was above all othersthe appointment I should have liked. I delighted in frontier life andfrontier men, who, with all their faults, are men, and grand men, too. I had felt for years what an important factor the trans-Indus tribesare in the defence of India, and how desirable it was that we shouldbe on better terms with them than was possible so long as our policyconsisted in keeping them at arm's length, and our only intercoursewith them was confined to punitive expeditions or the visits of theirhead-men to our hard-worked officials, whose whole time was occupiedin writing long reports, or in settling troublesome disputes to thesatisfaction of no one. 

I now hoped to be able to put a stop to the futile blockades andinconclusive reprisals which had been carried on for nearly thirtyyears with such unsatisfactory results, and I looked forward toturning the wild tribesmen from enemies into friends, a strengthinstead of a weakness, to our Government, and to bringing them bydegrees within the pale of civilization. My wife quite shared myfeelings, and we were both eager to begin our frontier life. 

As a preliminary to my engaging in this congenial employment, LordLytton proposed that I should take up the command of the PunjabFrontier Force. I gladly acquiesced; for I had been a long time on thestaff, and had had three years of the Quartermaster-Generalship. My friends expressed surprise at my accepting the position ofBrigadier-General, after having filled an appointment carrying with itthe rank of Major-General; but this was not my view. I longed fora command, and the Frontier Force offered opportunities for activeservice afforded by no other post. 

We were in Calcutta when the question was decided, and started verysoon afterwards to make our arrangements for the breaking up of ourhome at Simla. I took over the command of the Force on the 15th March, 1878. My wife accompanied me to Abbottabad--the pretty, quiet littleplace in Hazara, about 4, 000 feet above the sea, which was to behenceforth our winter head-quarters. For the summer months we were tobe located in the higher hills, and my wife was anxious to see thehouse which I had purchased from my predecessor, General Keyes, atNatiagali. So off we set, nothing daunted by being told that we werelikely to find snow still deep in places. 

For the first part of the way we got on well enough, my wife in adandy, I riding, and thirteen miles were accomplished without muchdifficulty. Suddenly the road took a bend, and we found ourselves indeep snow. Riding soon proved to be impossible, and the dandy-bearerscould not carry my wife further; so there was nothing for it but towalk. We were seven miles from our destination, and at each step wesank into the snow, which became deeper and deeper the higher weascended. On we trudged, till my wife declared she could go nofurther, and sat down to rest, feeling so drowsy that she entreated meto let her stay where she was. Fortunately I had a small flask withme filled with brandy. I poured a little into the cup, mixed it withsnow, and administered it as a stimulant. This restored her somewhat, and roused her from the state of lethargy into which she had fallen. Again we struggled on. Soon it became dark, except for such light asthe stars, aided by the snow, afforded. More than once I despairedof reaching the end of our journey; but, just as I had become quitehopeless, we saw lights on the hill above us, and heard our servants, who had preceded us, shouting to attract our attention. I answered, and presently they came to our assistance. Half carrying, halfdragging her, we got my wife up the steep mountain-side; and atlength, about 9 p. M. , we arrived at the little house buried in snow, into which we crept through a hole dug in the snow wall, whichencircled it. We were welcomed by a blazing wood-fire and a mostcheering odour of dinner, to which we did full justice, after havinggot rid of our saturated garments. Next morning we started on ourreturn journey at daybreak, for it was necessary to get over the worstpart of the road before the sun had had time to soften the snow, whichthe night's frost had so thoroughly hardened that we slipped over itwithout the least difficulty. 

This was our only visit to our new possession, for very soonafterwards I was informed that Lord Lytton wished me to spend thesummer at Simla, as the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab would bethere, and His Excellency was anxious to discuss the details of theproposed Chief Commissionership. My wife, therefore, returned to Simlaat once, and I joined her at the end of May, having in the meanwhileinspected every regiment and visited every post held by the FrontierForce between Sind and Hazara--a most interesting experience, which Ithoroughly enjoyed. 

[Footnote 1: The Amir's eldest son, who had rebelled on his youngerbrother, Abdulla Jan, being nominated heir to the throne. ]

[Footnote 2: Before Lord Northbrook left India he sent Major Sandemanon a Mission to Khelat to re-open the Bolan Pass, and endeavour tosettle the differences between the Khan and the Baluchistan tribes, and between the tribes themselves, who were all at loggerheads. ]

[Footnote 3: Presents given by the British Government to the Mir ofWakhan in recognition of his hospitable reception of the members ofthe Forsyth Mission on their return from Yarkund. ]

[Footnote 4: 'Besides the sixty-three Ruling Chiefs, there were nearlythree hundred titular Chiefs and persons of distinction collectedat the Imperial Assemblage, besides those included in the suitesof Ruling Chiefs. --J. Talboys Wheeler, 'History of the DelhiAssemblage. ']

[Footnote 5: These gold medals were also presented to the Governors, Lieutenant-Governors, and other high officials, and to the members ofthe Imperial Assemblage Committee. ]

[Footnote 6: In endeavouring to describe this historical event, I havefreely refreshed my memory from Talboys Wheeler's 'History of theImperial Assemblage, ' in which is given a detailed account of theproceedings. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLIII. 1878

 Object of the first Afghan war --Excitement caused by Russia's advances

Before continuing my story, it will, I think, be as well to recall tothe minds of my readers the train of events which led to Englandand Russia becoming at the same moment solicitous for the Amir'sfriendship, for it was this rivalry which was the immediate cause ofthe second Afghan war. 

Less than two hundred years ago the British Empire in the East andRussia were separated from each other by a distance of 4, 000 miles. Russia's most advanced posts were at Orenburg and Petropaulovsk, whileEngland had obtained but an uncertain footing on the seaboard ofsouthern India. The French were our only European rivals in India, andthe advance of Russia towards the Oxus was as little anticipated aswas England's advance towards the Indus. 

Thirty years later Russia began to absorb the hordes of the Kirghizsteppes, which gave her occupation for more than a hundred years, during which time England was far from idle. Bengal was conquered, orceded to us, the Madras Presidency established, and Bombay had becomean important settlement, with the result that, in the early part ofthis century, the distance between the Russian and English possessionshad been diminished to less than 2, 000 miles. 

Our progress was now more rapid. While Russia was laboriouslycrossing a barren desert, the North-West Provinces, the Carnatic, theterritories of the Peshwa, Sind, and the Punjab, successively cameunder our rule, and by 1850 we had extended our dominions to the footof the mountains beyond the Indus. 

Russia by this time, having overcome the difficulties of the desert, had established herself at Aralsk, near the junction of the Syr Dariawith the waters of Lake Aral; so that in fifty years the distancebetween the outposts of the two advancing Powers in Asia had beenreduced to about 1, 000 miles. 

Repeated successful wars with Persia, and our desertion of that Powerowing to the conviction that we could no longer defend her againstthe Russians, had practically placed her at their mercy, and they hadinduced Persia, in 1837, to undertake the siege of Herat. At thesame time, the Russian Ambassador at Teheran had despatched CaptainVitkievitch to Kabul with letters from himself and from the Czarto the Amir, in the hope of getting Dost Mahomed Khan to join theRussians and Persians in their alliance against the English. 

Vitkievitch's arrival at Kabul towards the end of 1837 had beenanticipated by Captain (afterwards Sir Alexander) Burnes, who had beensent three months before by Lord Auckland on a Mission to the Amir, ostensibly to improve our commercial relations with the Afghans, butin reality to prevent them from joining the Russo-Persian alliance. 

Burnes had been most cordially received by Dost Mahomed, who hoped, with the help of the Indian Government, to recover the district ofPeshawar, which had been wrested from him by the Sikhs. Vitkievitch'sreception was proportionately discouraging, and for some weeks hecould not obtain an interview with the Amir. 

The Dost's hopes, however, were not fulfilled. We declined to give himany assistance towards regaining possession of Peshawar or defendinghis dominions, should his refusal to join with Persia and Russia drawdown upon him the enmity of those Powers. 

Vitkievitch, who had been patiently biding his time, was now takeninto favour by the Amir, who accorded him a reception which fullycompensated for the neglect with which he had previously been treated. 

Burnes remained at Kabul until the spring of 1838, and then returnedto India to report that Dost Mahomed had thrown himself heart and soulinto the Russo-Persian alliance. 

Under pressure from the English Ministry the Governor-General of Indiadetermined to take the extreme measure of deposing an Amir who hadshown himself so hostilely inclined, and of placing on the throneof Kabul a Ruler who, it was hoped, would feel that it was to hisinterest to keep on good terms with us. It was for this object thatthe first Afghan war[1] was undertaken, which ended in the murder ofour nominee, Shah Shuja, and the triumphant return of Dost Mahomed. The disastrous failure of our action in this matter taught the BritishGovernment that our frontier on the Sutlej was too far removed for usto think of exercising any real influence in Afghanistan, and that thetime had not arrived to warrant our interfering in Afghan affairs. 

After this came our war with the Sikhs, resulting in our conquestof the Punjab, and our frontier becoming conterminous with that ofAfghanistan on the banks of the Indus. 

There was a lull in the movements of Russia in Central Asia untilafter the Crimean War of 1854-56, which, while temporarily checkingthe designs of Russia in Europe, seems to have stimulated her progressin the East. After the passage of the great desert, Russia foundherself in the midst of fertile and settled countries, whose provincesfell under her control as rapidly as those of India had fallen underours, until in 1864 Chimkent was occupied, the point beyond whichPrince Gortchakoff stated that there was no intention on the part ofRussia to make further advances. 

Notwithstanding these assurances, Tashkent was captured on the29th June of the following year. In 1866 Khojent was successfullyassaulted. Tisakh fell on the 30th October; and in the spring of1867 the fort of Yani-Kargan in the Nurata mountains was seized andoccupied. 

Bokhara alone remained unconquered, but the Ruler of that State, aftervainly endeavouring to gain assistance from Afghanistan and to enlistthe sympathies of the Indian Government, was compelled to sue forpeace. 

Important as these acquisitions were, they attracted but littleattention in England, owing partly to the policy of non-interferencewhich had been adopted as regards Central Asian affairs, and partly tothe British public being absorbed in European politics, until 1868, when the occupation of Samarkand by Russia caused considerableexcitement, not to say consternation, amongst the authorities inEngland. 

Conferences took place in the spring of 1870 between Lord Clarendon, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Baron Brunow, theRussian Ambassador, with the object of determining a neutral zone, which should be the limit of the possessions of England and Russia inCentral Asia. For nearly three years, Russia was persistent in herendeavours to have Afghanistan placed outside the pale of Britishinfluence; but the Indian Government were equally persistent inpointing out the danger of agreeing to such an arrangement, and it wasnot until the 31st January, 1873, that the boundary, which neitherEngland nor Russia might cross, was finally agreed upon. 

Six months later the conquest of Khiva by Russia was effected. Itwas at first given out that the expedition was to punish acts ofbrigandage, and to rescue fifty Russian prisoners, but was on noaccount to lead to a prolonged occupancy of the Khanate. CountSchouvaloff, the Russian Statesman who was deputed to communicate theobject of the expedition to the British Government, declared that apositive promise to this effect might be given to the British public, as a proof of the friendly and pacific intentions of his master theCzar; but, notwithstanding these assurances, the Russians never leftKhiva, and it has been a Russian possession from that time. 

Thus, in a little more than twenty years, Russia had made a stride of600 miles towards India, leaving but 400 miles between her outpostsand those of Great Britain. Russia's southern boundary was now, infact, almost conterminous with the northern boundary of Afghanistan, near enough to cause the Ruler of that country considerable anxiety, and make him feel that Russia had become a dreaded neighbour, and thatthe integrity of his kingdom could not be maintained save by theaid of one of the two great Powers between whose fire he now foundhimself. 

I have endeavoured to show how it was that Sher Ali, notwithstandinghis soreness and disappointment at the many rebuffs he had receivedfrom us in the earlier part of his career, gratefully rememberedthe timely aid afforded him by Sir John Lawrence, and the princelyreception accorded to him by Lord Mayo, and was still quite preparedin 1873 to enter into friendly relations with us, provided we wouldrecognize his favourite son as his heir, and give a direct promise ofaid in the event of Russian aggression. Our refusal to accede to theseterms, added to our adverse decision in regard to the Sistan boundary, turned Sher Ali from a friend into an enemy, and he decided, as hisfather had done forty years before, to throw in his lot with Russia. 

[Footnote 1: It is instructive to note how remarkably similar were thecircumstances which brought about the first and second Afghan wars, viz. , the presence of Russian officers at Kabul. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLIV. 1878

 Effect of the Berlin Treaty at Kabul --Sher Ali decides against England--A meeting of portentous moment --Preparations for war--Letter from Sher Ali

In 1877 Russia declared war with Turkey; for more than a year fightinghad been going on between the two countries, and as it seemed possibleto the British Government that England might in the end be drawn intothe contest, it was deemed expedient to obtain help from India, anda force of about 5, 000 Native soldiers was despatched from Bombay toMalta in response to the demand from home. 

Russia answered this move on our part by increased activity inCentral Asia; and in June, 1878, it was reported by Major Cavagnari, Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawar, that a Russian Envoy of the same rankas the Governor-General of Tashkent was about to visit Kabul, andthat General Kauffmann had written to the Amir that the Envoy mustbe received as an Ambassador deputed by the Czar himself. A few dayslater further reports were received of Russian troops being mobilized, and of the intention of Russia to establish cantonments on the ferriesof Kilif and Kerki on the Oxus. 

The Amir, it was said, summoned a council of the leading Chiefs, to discuss the question whether it would be most advantageous forAfghanistan at this juncture to side with Russia or with England; itwas decided apparently in favour of the former, for from the momentGeneral Stolietoff's Mission set foot on Afghan territory it met withan enthusiastic reception. Five miles from the capital Stolietoff andhis companions were welcomed by the Foreign Secretary. They were thenmounted on richly-caparisoned elephants, and escorted by a large bodyof troops to the Bala Hissar, where the following morning they werereceived in state by Sher Ali, and the nobles of highest degree in hiskingdom. [1]

On the eve of the day that the Mission entered Kabul, Stolietoffreceived a despatch from General Kauffmann giving him the heads of theBerlin Treaty, with the following commentary in the handwriting ofthe Governor-General himself: 'If the news be true, it is indeedmelancholy;' adding, however, that the Congress had finished itssittings, and that, therefore, the Envoy in his negotiations withthe Amir had better refrain from arranging any distinct measures, ormaking any positive promises, and '_not go generally as far as wouldhave been advisable if war with England had been threatened_. 'Evidently these instructions greatly modified the basis ofStolietoff's negotiations with Sher Ali; for, although the Russiansdeny that an offensive and defensive alliance with the Afghan Rulerwas contemplated, it seems probable, from the tone of Kauffmann'sdespatch, that the Envoy's instructions were elastic enough to admitof such an arrangement had the circumstances of the case made itdesirable--_e. G. _, had the Berlin Congress failed to establish peacein Europe. 

In telegraphing to the Secretary of State an account of theseproceedings at Kabul, the Viceroy requested explicit instructions fromHer Majesty's Government as to whether this conduct on the part ofRussia and Afghanistan was to be left to the Government of India todeal with as a matter between it and the Amir, or whether, havingregard to Russia's formal promises, it would be treated as an Imperialquestion. 'In the former case, ' he concluded, 'I shall propose, withyour approval, to insist on an immediate suitable reception of aBritish Mission. '

Lord Lytton's proposition was approved of by Her Majesty's Ministers, and a letter[2] was at once written by the Viceroy to the Amir, announcing that a Mission would shortly be despatched to Kabul withGeneral Sir Neville Chamberlain, at that time Commander-in-Chief inMadras, as its responsible head. 

Major Cavagnari was at the same time directed to inform theauthorities at Kabul that the object of the Mission was altogetherfriendly, and that a refusal to grant it a free passage and safeconduct, such as had been accorded to the Russian Envoy, would beconsidered as an act of open hostility. Intimation of the Viceroy'sintentions reached Kabul on the 17th August, the day on which theAmir's favourite son, Abdulla Jan, died. This untoward event was takenadvantage of to delay answering the Viceroy's letter, but it was notallowed in any way to interfere with the progress of the negotiationswith Russia. When these were completed, Stolietoff inquired from SherAli whether he meant to receive the English Mission, whereupon theAmir asked for the General's advice in the matter. Stolietoff, whilereplying somewhat evasively, gave Sher Ali to understand that thesimultaneous presence of Embassies from two countries in almosthostile relations with each other would not be quite convenient, uponwhich His Highness decided not to allow the British Mission to enterAfghanistan. This decision, however, was not communicated to theViceroy, and on the 21st September the Mission[3] marched out ofPeshawar and encamped at Jamrud, three miles short of the Kyber Pass. 

In consequence of the extremely hostile attitude of the Amir, and thevery unsatisfactory reply received from General Faiz Mahomed Khan, commanding the Afghan troops in the Kyber Pass, to a letter[4] he hadwritten a few days before, Sir Neville Chamberlain suspected that theadvance of the Mission would be opposed, and, in order 'to reduce toa minimum any indignity that might be offered to our Government, ' hedeputed Major Cavagnari to ride on with a few sowars to Ali Masjid, afort ten miles beyond the mouth of the Pass, and demand leave for theMission to proceed. 

When within a mile of the fort, Cavagnari was met by a body ofAfridis, who warned him that the road ahead was blocked by Afghans, and that if he ventured further he would be fired upon. On thisCavagnari halted, and while in the act of writing a letter to FaizMahomed, complaining of the treatment he had met with, and informinghim that he and his companions intended to proceed until fired upon, an act the responsibility for which would rest with the Amir'srepresentatives, a message was brought him from Faiz Mahomed to theeffect that he was coming to meet him, and would hear anything he hadto communicate. 

The interview took place near a water-mill on the right bank of thestream which flows under Ali Masjid. I have several times since riddenpast the spot and pictured to myself the meeting between the Britishpolitical officer and the Afghan General. It was a meeting of mostportentous moment, for its result would mean peace or war. 

Faiz Mahomed's bearing was perfectly courteous, but he made it clearthat he did not intend to permit the Mission to pass, explaining thathe was only acting as a sentry under instructions from Kabul, andthat he was bound to resist the entrance of the Mission intoAfghan territory with all the force at his disposal. He spoke withconsiderable warmth, and told Cavagnari that but for their personalfriendship he would, in obedience to the Amir's orders, have shot downhim and his escort. 

Faiz Mahomed's followers were not so respectful in their bearing astheir Chief, and their manner warned Cavagnari that it was unadvisableto prolong the conversation; he, therefore, took leave of the AfghanGeneral, and returned to Jamrud. The Mission was dissolved, [5] ourAgent at Kabul was ordered to return to India, and Cavagnari wasinstructed to remain at Peshawar and arrange for alienating theAfridis in the Khyber from the Amir's interests. 

In reporting these circumstances to the Secretary of State, theGovernment of India expressed their regret that this final endeavouron their part to arrive at some definite understanding with the Amirof Kabul should have been thus met with repudiation and affront, andconcluded their despatch in the following words: 'The repulse of SirNeville Chamberlain by Sher Ali at his frontier while the Russianemissaries are still at his capital has proved the inutility ofdiplomatic expedients, and has deprived the Amir of all claim upon ourfurther forbearance. '

It had been arranged that, if it were unfortunately found to benecessary to support political efforts by military measures, twocolumns should be mobilized, one at Sukkur on the Indus, for anadvance in the direction of Kandahar, the other at Kohat foroperations in the Kuram valley, and that I was to have command of thelatter. As soon, therefore, as the tidings of Sir Neville's repulsewas received, I started from Simla to be on the spot in case theproposal to employ force should be sanctioned by the authorities inEngland. 

Between the time of my leaving Simla and my arrival at Kohat onthe 9th October, it was decided to employ a third column to makea demonstration in the direction of the Khyber for the purpose ofclearing the Amir's troops out of the pass. [6]

The formation of this column was no doubt a wise move, as the Afghanswere holding Ali Masjid, the spot on which the insult had been offeredto our Envoy, and the presence of a force on this line would tend torelieve the pressure against my column; but looked at from my point ofview, this third column was not quite so desirable, as it involved thewithdrawal of three of my most efficient regiments, and the transferof a large number of my transport animals to the Khyber for its use. There was some consolation, however, in the fact that my old friendMajor-General Sir Samuel Browne, who had been named for the command inthe Khyber, was to be the gainer by my loss. 

Major-General Donald Stewart, who was in England, was telegraphed forto command the Kandahar column, the advanced portion of which, it wasintended, should push on under Major-General Biddulph to strengthenQuetta. 

The long-expected reply[7] from the Amir to the Viceroy's letter ofthe 14th August was received at Simla on the 19th October. Its tonewas considered extremely discourteous; it contained no apology for thepublic affront offered to the British Government, and indicated nodesire for improved relations. 

The reply was at once communicated to the Secretary of State, who wasfurther informed that the Government of India proposed the followingmeasures:--

 The immediate issue of a manifesto which should define the cause of offence, declare a friendly disposition towards the Afghan people and reluctance to interfere in their internal affairs, and should fix the whole responsibility of what might happen upon the Amir. 

 An advance into the Kuram valley as soon as the force at Kohat was ready to move. 

 The expulsion of the Afghan troops holding the Khyber Pass. 

 An advance from Quetta into Pishin, or, if necessary, to Kandahar. 

Lord Cranbrook (who had succeeded the Marquis of Salisbury asSecretary of State for India) replied[8] that he did not considermatters to be at present ripe for taking the extreme measuresrecommended by the Government of India, and that, before crossing thefrontiers of Afghanistan, a letter should be addressed to the Amirdemanding, in temperate language, an apology, and the acceptance of apermanent Mission within Afghan limits; that sufficient time should begiven for the receipt of a reply to this letter (the text of which wasto be telegraphed to Lord Cranbrook for approval before despatch), andthat meanwhile the massing of troops should be continued, and adequateforces assembled at the various points where the frontier would becrossed if war were declared. The Secretary of State went on to say:'There must be no mistake as to our show of power to enforce what werequire; this _locus penitentiæ _should be allowed before hostile actsare committed against the Amir. '

These instructions were carried out, and on the 30th October theultimatum was despatched to Sher Ali, informing him that, unless hisacceptance of the conditions were received by the Viceroy not laterthan the 20th November, he would be treated by the British Governmentas a declared enemy. 

[Footnote 1: On the 13th June, the day on which the Berlin Congressheld its first sitting, the news of the approach of GeneralStolietoff's Mission reached Kabul. The Russians hoped that theMission might influence the decision of the Berlin Congress, andalthough its despatch was repudiated by the Imperial Government at St. Petersburg, it was subsequently ascertained on excellent authoritythat the project of sending a Mission to Kabul was discussed threetimes at the Council of Ministers, and, according to a statement inthe _Journal de St. Petersbourg_, orders were sent in April, 1878, toGeneral Kauffmann regarding its despatch. About the same time, theRussian Minister of War proposed that the Army of the Caucasus shouldbe transferred bodily across the Caspian to Astrabad, whence thetroops would march in two columns on Herat; while three columns, amounting in the aggregate to 14, 000 men, were to move direct upon theOxus from Turkestan. The main part of this scheme was never carriedinto effect, probably from its being found too great an undertaking ata time when Russia had scarcely obtained a footing beyond the Caspian, but the minor movement was partially carried out. The largest of thethree columns, under Kauffmann's own command, moved from Tashkent, through Samarkand, to Jam, the most southern point of the Russianpossessions at that time, and within ten marches of Kilif, the mainferry over the Oxus. There it remained for some weeks, when itreturned to Tashkent, the Afghan expedition being abandoned inconsequence of the Treaty of Berlin having been signed. ]

[Footnote 2:

 'SIMLA, '14_th August, _ 1878. 

 'The authentic intelligence which I have lately received of the course of recent events at Kabul and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan has rendered it necessary that I should communicate fully and without reserve with your Highness upon matters of importance which concern the interests of India and of Afghanistan. For this reason, I have considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential British Envoy of high rank, who is known to your Highness--his Excellency General Sir Neville Bowles Chamberlain, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of the Most Exalted Order of the Star of India, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army--to visit your Highness immediately at Kabul, in order that he may converse personally with your Highness regarding these urgent affairs. It appears certain that they can best be arranged for the welfare and tranquillity of both States, and for the preservation of friendship between the two Governments, by a full and frank statement of the present position. This letter is therefore sent in advance to your Highness by the hand of Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, C. S. I. , a faithful and honoured Sirdar of my Government, who will explain all necessary details as to the time and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that your Highness may be pleased to issue commands to your Sirdars, and to all other authorities in Afghanistan, upon the route between Peshawar and Kabul, that they shall make, without any delay, whatever arrangements are necessary and proper for effectively securing to my Envoy, the representative of a friendly Power, due safe conduct and suitable accommodation according to his dignity, while passing with his retinue through the dominions of your Highness. 

 'I beg to express the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and to subscribe myself. ']

[Footnote 3: The Mission was composed of General Sir NevilleChamberlain, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. ; Major Cavagnari, C. S. I. ; Surgeon-MajorBellew, C. S. I. ; Major O. St. John, R. E. ; Captain St. V. Hammick, 43rd Foot; Captain F. Onslow, Madras Cavalry; Lieutenant NevilleChamberlain, Central India Horse; Maharaj Pertap Sing of Jodhpur; andSirdar Obed Ulla Khan, of Tonk. Lieutenant-Colonel F. Jenkins andCaptain W. Battye were with the escort. ]

[Footnote 4:

 'PESHAWAR, '15_th September_, 1878. 

 (After compliments. ) 'I write to inform you that, by command of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, a friendly Mission of British officers, with a suitable escort, is about to proceed to Kabul through the Khyber Pass, and intimation of the despatch of this Mission has been duly communicated to His Highness the Amir by the hand of the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan. 

 'I hear that an official from Kabul has recently visited you at Ali Masjid, and he has doubtless instructed you in accordance with His Highness the Amir's commands. As, however, information has now been received that you have summoned from Peshawar the Khyber headmen with whom we were making arrangements for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, I therefore write to inquire from you whether, in accordance with the instructions you have received, you are prepared to guarantee the safety of the British Mission to Daka or not; and I request that a clear reply to this inquiry may be speedily communicated by the hand of the bearer of this letter, as I cannot delay my departure from Peshawar. It is well known that the Khyber tribes are in receipt of allowances from the Kabul Government, and also, like other independent tribes on this frontier, have relations with the British Government. It may be well to let you know that when the present negotiations were opened with the Khyber tribes, it was solely with the object of arranging with them for the safe conduct of the British Mission through the Khyber Pass, in the same manner as was done in regard to the despatch of our Agent, the Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan; and the tribes were given clearly to understand that these negotiations were in no way intended to prejudice their relations with His Highness the Amir, as it was well known that the object of the British Mission was altogether of a friendly character to His Highness the Amir and the people of Afghanistan. 

 'I trust that, in accordance with the instructions you have received from His Highness the Amir, your reply to this letter will be satisfactory, and that it will contain the required assurances that the Mission will be safely conducted to Daka. I shall expect to receive your reply to this letter not later than the 18th instant, so please understand that the matter is most urgent. 

 'But at the same time, it is my duty to inform you, in a frank and friendly manner, that if your answer is not what I trust it will be, or if you delay to send an early reply, I shall have no alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to me best for carrying out the instructions I have received from my own Government. ']

[Footnote 5: In a letter to Lord Lytton reporting the rebuff theMission had encountered, General Chamberlain wrote: 'No man was evermore anxious than I to preserve peace and secure friendly solution, and it was only when I plainly saw the Amir's fixed intention to driveus into a corner that I told you we must either sink into a positionof merely obeying his behests on all points or stand on our rightsand risk rupture. Nothing could have been more distinct, nothing morehumiliating to the dignity of the British Crown and nation; and Ibelieve that but for the decision and tact of Cavagnari at one periodof the interview, the lives of the British officers and the Nativefollowing were in considerable danger. ']

[Footnote 6: The approximate strength of the three columns was asfollows:

 _Officers. _ _Men. _ _Guns. _

 I. The Kandahar Field Force 265 12, 599 78

 II. The Kuram Field Force 116 6, 549 18

 III. The Peshawar Valley Field Force 325 15, 854 48 ----- ------ --- 706 35, 002 144]

[Footnote 7:

 'KABUL, '_6th October, 1878. _

 (After compliments. ) 'Your Excellency's despatch regarding the sending of a friendly Mission has been received through Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan; I understand its purport, but the Nawab had not yet an audience, nor had your Excellency's letters been seen by me when a communication was received to the address of my servant, Mirza Habibulla Khan, from the Commissioner of Peshawar, and was read. I am astonished and dismayed by this letter, written threateningly to a well-intentioned friend, replete with contentions, and yet nominally regarding a friendly Mission. Coming thus by force, what result, or profit, or fruit, could come of it? Following this, three other letters from above-mentioned source, in the very same strain, addressed to my officials, have been perused by me. Thus, during a period of a few days several letters from that quarter have all been before me, and none of them have been free from harsh expressions and hard words, repugnant to courtesy and politeness, and in tone contrary to the ways of friendship and intercourse. Looking to the fact that I am at this time assaulted by affliction and grief at the hand of fate, and that great trouble has possessed my soul, in the officials of the British Government patience and silence would have been specially becoming. Let your Excellency take into consideration this harsh and breathless haste with which the desired object and place of conference have been seized upon, and how the officials of the Government have been led into discussion and subjection to reproach. There is some difference between this and the pure road of friendship and goodwill. In alluding to those writings of the officials of the opposite Government which have emanated from them, and are at this time in the possession of my own officials, the latter have in no respect desired to show enmity or opposition towards the British Government, nor, indeed, do they with any other Power desire enmity or strife; but when any other Power, without cause or reason, shows animosity towards this Government, the matter is left in the hands of God, and to His will. The esteemed Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan, the bearer of this despatch, has, in accordance with written instructions received from the British Government, asked for permission to retire, and it has been granted. ']

[Footnote 8: 25th October. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLV. 1878

 Shortcomings of my column--Attitude of the Border tribes

It was a proud, albeit a most anxious, moment for me when I assumedcommand of the Kuram Field Force; though a local Major-General, I wasonly a Major in my regiment, and save for a short experience on oneoccasion in Lushai, I had never had an opportunity of commandingtroops in the field. Earnestly longing for success, I was intenselyinterested in ascertaining the qualities of those who were to aid mein achieving it. To this end I lost no time in taking stock of theseveral officers and corps who were to be associated with me, some ofwhom were personally known to me, while others I had never met before;and in endeavouring to satisfy myself as to their qualifications andfitness for their several posts, I could not help feeling that theymust be equally anxious as to my capability for command, and that theinspection must be of nearly as great moment to them as to me. 

The results of a very close investigation were tolerably satisfactory, but there were weak points in my armour which gave me grave cause foranxiety. 

I came to the conclusion that the force was not numerically strongenough for the very difficult task before it--in the first instance, the occupation of the Kuram valley and the expulsion of all Afghangarrisons south of the Shutargardan Pass, and in the second, asopportunity might offer, the pushing my reconnaissances into the Khostvalley, and, if military considerations would admit, the dislodgingthe Amir's administration from that tract of country, so as to preventthe Kabul Government drawing supplies from it. Finally, I was directedto explore the roads leading to the unknown region beyond Khost. 

The Shutargardan was not less than 180 miles from Kohat, the garrisonof which station would, on my departure, be reduced to a minimum, andRawal Pindi, the nearest place from which aid could be procured, was130 miles still further off, separated from Kohat by an execrable roadand the swiftly-flowing river Indus, crossed by a precarious bridge ofboats. It had to be taken into account also that the various Afriditribes were watching their opportunity, and at the first favourablemoment, in common with the tribesmen nearer Kuram, they might beexpected to take advantage of our weakness and attack our convoys andthe small posts which had necessarily to be established along our lineof communication. 

The attitude of the Mahomedan sepoys, of whom there were large numbersin four out of my six Native Infantry regiments, was also a cause ofconsiderable anxiety; for I was aware that they were not altogetherhappy at the prospect of taking part in a war against theirco-religionist, the Ruler of Afghanistan, and that the mullas werealready urging them to desert our cause. 

Furthermore, I discovered that my only British Infantry Regiment, the2nd Battalion of the 8th Foot, was sickly to a degree, and thereforein an unserviceable condition. It was largely composed of quiteyoung, unacclimatized soldiers, peculiarly susceptible to fever--thatterrible scourge which fills the hospitals of our Punjab stations inthe autumn of each year. I rode out to meet the battalion on its wayinto Kohat, and was horrified to see the long line of doolies andambulance-carts by which it was accompanied. 

The inefficient state of the transport added to my anxieties. Notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in former campaigns fromthe same cause, the Government had neglected to take any steps for theorganization of a proper transport service while we were at peace;consequently, when everything should have been ready for a start, confusion reigned supreme in this all-important department. Largenumbers of camels, mules, and bullocks arrived daily, picked up atexorbitant prices from anyone who would supply them; but most of theseanimals were quite unfit to enter upon the hard work of a campaign, and with a totally inexperienced and quite insufficient staff ofofficers to supervise them, it was evident that the majority mustsuccumb at an early date. 

Hardly had I realized these shortcomings in the constitution andequipment of my column than I received intelligence which led me tobelieve that the Afghans would hold the Peiwar Kotal (the pass leadinginto Afghanistan over the range of mountains bounding the Kuramvalley) in great strength, and were determined to oppose our advanceat this point. Under these circumstances I felt myself justified inrepresenting to the powers at Simla that I considered the number oftroops at my disposal inadequate for the task they were expected toperform, which representation resulted in the 23rd Pioneers, whosetransfer to the Khyber column had been under consideration, being leftwith me, and the 72nd Highlanders, a battery of Field Artillery, andthe 28th Punjab Infantry, being sent to Kohat. Of these, however, Iwas allowed to take on with me only one wing of the 72nd, half thebattery, and the 28th Punjab Infantry; and the last-named regiment Icould hardly consider as part of my force, for when we should arriveat Thal, our furthest frontier post, it would have to be dropped, with a wing of the 5th Punjab Cavalry and No. 2 Mountain Battery, togarrison that place. 

This small reinforcement was not given to me without considerabledemur on the part of the military authorities, who had made uptheir minds that the Kuram column would meet with slight, if any, opposition, and that the chief stand would be made in the Khyber. LordLytton, however, supported my appeal, as did Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was then acting as Military Member of Council, and who hadpersonal knowledge of the great natural strength of the Peiwar Kotalposition. 

I next turned my attention to the transport, and endeavoured by allthe means I could think of to render it more efficient. A certainportion of it I placed in regimental charge; I had the men instructedin loading and unloading, and I took great care that the animals werenot overladen. 

Happily, I had a very able staff. Major Galbraith, theAssistant-Adjutant-General, though new to the work, provedexceptionally good, and Captain Badcock, the chief Commissariatofficer, and Major Collett and Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, officers ofthe Quartermaster-General's department, whom I had myself selected, Icould thoroughly depend upon. 

As regards my own personal staff I was equally lucky, Captain Pretymanof the R. A. Being my A. D. C. , and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, ofthe Central India Horse, and Lieutenant-Colonel George Villiers, ofthe Grenadier Guards, my Orderly officers. 

As political adviser I had with me an old friend and schoolfellow, Colonel Garrow Waterfield, Commissioner of Peshawar, who brought withhim a large following of Native gentlemen connected with the frontier, by whom he thought our intercourse with the tribesmen would beassisted. With scarcely an exception they proved loyal, and throughoutthe campaign helped me materially. 

Knowing how important it was to secure the interest of the Chiefs andKhans of the border on our side, especially those who had influence inthe Kuram valley, we lost no opportunity of becoming acquainted withthem while we were at Kohat. They were friendly and full of promises, but it was clear that the amount of assistance to be given bythem depended on whether or not our occupation of Kuram was tobe permanent, and on this important point I solicited definiteinstructions. I reported to the Commander-in-Chief that, from all Ihad learnt, the advent of a British force would be welcomed by thepeople, provided they understood that it was the forerunner ofannexation; that in this case we should be regarded as deliverers, andall the resources of the country would be placed at our disposal; butif the people were led to believe that the force would be withdrawnwhen our work was finished, and that they would be again handed overto the tender mercies of the Kabul Government, we must expect no aidfrom them, as they would naturally dread the resentment of theirAfghan rulers. 

In reply, I was informed that I could assure the people of Kuram thatour occupation would be permanent; and my being enabled to make thispromise was undoubtedly the explanation of the friendly reception wemet with on entering the valley, and the cause of my receiving at thesame time a letter from the Chief of the Turis (the inhabitants ofthe Kuram valley), inquiring when we might be expected, as they weresuffering greatly from the tyranny of the Afghan Government, and wereanxiously waiting the arrival of the British. 

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLVI. 1878

 The Kuram valley--Conflicting news of the enemy --An apparently impregnable position--Spingawi route decided on --Disposition of the force--A night attack --Advantages of a night attack--Devotion of my orderlies --Threatening the enemy's rear--The Peiwar Kotal

By the 15th November my column[1] (consisting of 1, 345 British and3, 990 Native soldiers, with 13 guns) was concentrated at Thal, and onthe 20th--the limit of time given to the Amir--no reply having beenvouchsafed to the Viceroy's ultimatum, orders were issued to the threecolumns to advance the next day. [2]

The Kuram valley, from which my force received its designation, isabout 60 miles long, and from 3 to 10 miles wide. On every side risehigh and magnificently-wooded mountains, those on the north and eastbeing the most lofty and precipitous, while on the north-west projectsthe spur which runs down from Sika Bam, the highest peak of the SufedKoh range, upwards of 14, 000 feet high. This spur forms the boundarybetween Kuram and Afghanistan, and is crossed by the Peiwar Kotal. Ariver, which varies from 100 to 500 yards in width, flows through thevalley, and the road, or, rather, track, which existed in 1878, ranfor the most part along its rocky bed. In the winter months the depthof the water nowhere exceeded three feet, except after heavy rain, andalthough the stream was rather swift, it could usually be fordedwith very little risk. The valley itself had a bleak and desertedappearance, save in the immediate vicinity of the few andwidely-scattered villages, around which were clustered fruit trees andpatches of cultivation. 

For six weeks the thoughts of every one in the force had been turnedtowards Kuram, consequently there was considerable excitement when at3 a. M. On the 21st November the leading troops crossed the river intoAfghan territory and encamped eight miles from Thal. The next morningwe marched fifteen miles farther up the valley to Hazir Pir, where wehalted for one day to improve the road (in some places impracticablefor guns and transport) and to allow of the rear part of the columnclosing up. As we proceeded on our way, the headmen from the differentvillages came out to welcome us, and on arriving at Hazir Pir we founda plentiful repast awaiting us spread under the shade of some trees. Knives and forks were evidently considered unnecessary adjuncts by ourentertainers, so I unhesitatingly took my first lesson in eating roastkid and pillaued chicken without their aid. 

On the 24th we marched to the Darwazai defile, and the next dayproceeded through it to Kuram, forty-eight miles from Thal. We foundthe fort evacuated by the Afghans, who had left behind one 6-poundergun. 

Notwithstanding the proffers of assistance I had received, I could getno reliable information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; from oneaccount I was led to believe that they were in full retreat, fromanother that they were being strongly reinforced. So, to find out thetruth, I reconnoitred as far as the cantonment of Habib Kila, fifteenmiles ahead, and there ascertained that the Afghan army, consisting(it was said) of 18, 000 men and eleven guns, had left the place onlya short time before, and was then moving into position on the PeiwarKotal. 

Depot hospitals were formed at Kuram, and all our surplus stores andbaggage were left there with the following garrison: Two guns of F/A, Royal Horse Artillery, half of G/3, R. A. , the squadron 10th Hussars, one squadron 12th Bengal Cavalry, and the company of Bengal Sappersand Miners, besides all the sick and weakly men of the column. 

At 5 a. M. On the 28th the remainder of the force, with the exceptionof the troops who had been dropped at the several halting-places tokeep open our line of communication, marched towards the Peiwar. 

The stars were still shining when we started, but it was very dark, and we were chilled to the bone by a breeze blowing straight off thesnows of the Sufed Koh; towards sunrise it died away, and was followedby oppressive heat and clouds of dust. Our progress was slow, for thebanks of the numerous nullas which intersect the valleys had to beramped before the guns and baggage could pass over them. 

On reaching Habib Kila, intelligence was again brought that the Amir'stroops were in disorderly retreat, and had abandoned their guns at thefoot of the pass. I at once pushed a reconnaissance in force up thesouth-eastern slopes of the mountain under the command of ColonelGordon, [3] of the 29th Punjab Infantry, who discovered that, so farfrom the enemy having abandoned their guns, they had taken up anextremely strong position on the pass, from which they fired on thereconnaissance party as it advanced, wounding one British, one Nativeofficer[4] and nine men. 

As the Afghans seemed inclined to press Gordon, two guns were broughtinto action, and, to cover his retirement, I sent out the 5th Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh, who skilfully effected this objectwith the loss of only one Gurkha wounded. 

Gordon brought me back the valuable piece of information that nofurther advance in that direction was possible, save in singlefile--valuable because, had I attempted a front attack, the sacrificeof life must have been enormous, even if the attack had provedsuccessful, the possibility of which I still greatly doubt. 

Our tents not having arrived, the force prepared to bivouac; but ourposition proving untenable, from being within range of the Afghanshells, we moved a mile to the rear. Strong piquets were posted onthe neighbouring heights, and the night passed without furtherinterruption. 

We halted the two following days. Men and cattle were exhausted fromtheir fatiguing marches, and supplies had to be brought up beforewe could advance further; besides, I required time to look aboutme before making up my mind how the Peiwar Kotal could mostadvantageously be attacked. 

It was, indeed, a formidable position--a great deal more formidablethan I had expected--on the summit of a mountain rising abruptly 2, 000feet above us, and only approachable by a narrow, steep, and ruggedpath, flanked on either side by precipitous spurs jutting out likehuge bastions, from which an overwhelming fire could be brought tobear on the assailants. The mountain on the enemy's right did not lookmuch more promising for moving troops, and I could only hope that away might be found on their left by which their flank could be turned. The country, however, in that direction was screened from view byspurs covered with dense forests of deodar. 

I confess to a feeling very nearly akin to despair when I gazed atthe apparently impregnable position towering above us, occupied, as Icould discern through my telescope, by crowds of soldiers and a largenumber of guns. 

My Chief Engineer, Colonel Perkins, [5] made a reconnaissance, whichonly too surely confirmed Gordon's opinion; and he further ascertainedthat a deep ravine lay between the ground occupied by our piquets onthe north and the kotal, so that an attack on the enemy's immediateleft seemed as hopeless as on his right, or to his front. 

On the afternoon of the 29th I sent my Quartermaster-General, MajorCollett, with his assistant, Captain Carr, and a small escort, to thetop of a hill, which lay to the right rear of our camp, from whichthey were able to get a fairly good view of the surrounding country. Collett reported that, so far as he could judge, it seemed likelythat, as I had hoped, the enemy's left might be turned by a route overwhat was known as the Spingawi Kotal, where it had been ascertainedthat some Afghan troops were posted. This was encouraging, but beforeI could finally decide on adopting this line of attack, it wasexpedient to find out whether it was practicable for troops, andwhether the kotal itself was held in great strength. Accordingly, early next morning, Collett was again despatched to make a closerreconnaissance of the Spingawi approaches. 

While all this was going on, I did everything I could think of toprevent what was in my mind being suspected by the enemy or, indeed, by my own troops. Each day more than once, accompanied by an imposingnumber of officers and a considerable escort, I climbed the lofty spurby which a direct attack would have to be covered, and everyone incamp was made to believe that an attack in this direction was beingprepared for. I was particularly careful to have this idea impressedon the Turis and the Afghan camel-drivers, by whom the enemy werepretty sure to be informed of what was going on; and also on theMahomedan sepoys, whom I suspected of being half-hearted. I confidedmy real plan to only three people, my two senior staff-officers, Galbraith and Collett, and my A. D. C. , Pretyman, for I knew, from thenature of the country, that, under the most favourable circumstances, the way must be difficult and circuitous, and its passage must occupyseveral hours; and that if the Afghans got wind of the contemplatedmovement, and should attack my small force while on the march anddivided, defeat if not annihilation would be inevitable, for thesurrounding tribes would be certain to join against us if once theybelieved us to be in difficulties. 

I had heard that the smallness of the column was being freelycommented on and discussed; indeed, people in Kuram did not care todisguise their belief that we were hastening to our destruction. Eventhe women taunted us. When they saw the little Gurkhas for the firsttime, they exclaimed: 'Is it possible that these beardless boys thinkthey can fight Afghan warriors?' They little suspected that the bravespirits which animated those small forms made them more than a matchfor the most stalwart Afghan. There was no hiding from ourselves, however, that the force was terribly inadequate for the work to bedone. But done it must be. A retirement was not to be thought of, anddelay would only add to our difficulties, as the Afghans were dailybeing reinforced from Kabul, and we heard of still further additionsof both Artillery and Infantry being on their way. 

Collett returned soon after noon on the 30th; he had done admirablyand brought me most useful information, the result of which was thatI determined to adopt the Spingawi route. The nights were long, and Icalculated that by starting at 10 p. M. , and allowing for unforeseendelays, we should reach the foot of the pass while it was still dark. 

Fresh efforts were now made to distract the enemy's attention from thereal point of attack. In addition to the reconnoitring parties whichwere ostentatiously moved towards the Peiwar, batteries were markedout at points commanding the kotal, and a great display was made ofthe arrival of the two Horse and three Field Artillery guns, whichI had left at Kuram till the last moment on account of scarcity offorage at the front, and of the two squadrons of Bengal Cavalry, whichfor the same reason I had sent back to Habib Kila. Even with theseadditions the total strength of the force in camp, including Britishofficers, amounted to only 889 Europeans and 2, 415 Natives, with 13guns. 

[Illustration: THE ATTACK ON THE PEIWAR KOTAL. _From a painting by Vereker Hamilton. _]

These attempts to mislead the enemy were entirely successful, forthe Afghans shelled the working parties in the batteries, and placedadditional guns in position on the south side of the pass, showingdistinctly that they were preparing for a front attack, while in ourcamp also it was generally believed that this was the movement whichwould be carried out the next morning. 

When it became sufficiently dark to conceal our proceedings, all thecommanding and staff officers assembled in my tent, and I disclosedto them my scheme for the attack, impressing upon them that successdepended upon our being able to surprise the enemy, and begging ofthem not even to whisper the word 'Spingawi' to each other. 

I had had sufficient time since I took over the command to test thecapabilities of the officers and regiments upon whom I had to depend, so that I had now no difficulty in disposing the troops in the mannermost likely to ensure success. 

For the turning movement I selected:

 4 guns F/A, R. H. A. , The wing 72nd Highlanders, No 1 Mountain Battery (4 guns), 2nd and 29th Punjab Infantry, 5th Gurkhas, 23rd Pioneers-- Total strength 2, 263 men with 8 guns;

and I determined to command the attack myself, with Brigadier-GeneralThelwall as second in command. 

For the feint and for the defence of our camp I left under the commandof Brigadier-General Cobbe:

 2 guns F/A, R. H. A. , 3 guns G/3, R. A. , 2nd Battalion 8th Foot, [6] 12th Bengal Cavalry, 5th Punjab Infantry. 

In all, a little more than 1, 000 men with 5 guns. 

At 10 p. M. On Sunday, the 1st December, the little column fell in, in absolute silence, and began its hazardous march. Tents were leftstanding and camp-fires burning; and so noiselessly were orderscarried out that our departure remained unsuspected even by those ofour own people who were left in camp. 

The track (for there was no road) led for two miles due east, andthen, turning sharp to the north, entered a wide gorge and ran alongthe bed of a mountain stream. The moonlight lit up the cliffs on theeastern side of the ravine, but made the darkness only the more densein the shadow of the steep hills on the west, underneath which ourpath lay, over piles of stones and heaps of glacier débris. A bitterlycold wind rushed down the gorge, extremely trying to all, lightly cladas we were in anticipation of the climb before us. Onward and upwardswe slowly toiled, stumbling over great boulders of rock, droppinginto old water-channels, splashing through icy streams, and haltingfrequently to allow the troops in the rear to close up. 

In spite of the danger incurred, I was obliged every now and then tostrike a match and look at my watch to see how the time was going. Ihad calculated that, by starting as early as ten o'clock, there wouldbe an hour or two to spare for rest. The distance, however, provedrather greater than was expected and the road much rougher, but thesefacts were, to my mind, not sufficient to account for the slowness ofour progress, and I proceeded to the head of the column, anxious todiscover the true cause of the delay. 

I had chosen the 29th Punjab Infantry to lead the way, on account ofthe high reputation of Colonel John Gordon, who commanded it, andbecause of the excellent character the regiment had always borne;but on overtaking it my suspicions were excited by the unnecessarilystraggling manner in which the men were marching, and to which Icalled Gordon's attention. No sooner had I done so than a shot wasfired from one of the Pathan companies, followed in a few seconds byanother. The Sikh companies of the regiment immediately closed up, andGordon's Sikh orderly whispered in his ear that there was treacheryamongst the Pathans. 

It was a moment of intense anxiety, for it was impossible to tell howfar we were from the Spingawi Kotal, or whether the shots could beheard by the enemy; it was equally impossible to discover by whom theshots had been fired without delaying the advance, and this I wasloath to risk. So, grieved though I was to take any steps likely todiscredit a regiment with such admirable traditions, I decided tochange the order of the march by bringing one company of the72nd Highlanders and the 5th Gurkhas to the front, and I warnedLieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, in command of the 72nd, to keep a watchover the Pathans with his three remaining companies, for I feltthat our enterprise had already been sufficiently imperilled by thePathans, and that hesitation would be culpable; for, unless wecould reach the kotal while our approach was still concealed bythe darkness, the turning movement would in all probability end indisaster. 

On the Gurkhas coming up, I told Major Fitz-Hugh, who commanded them, that the moment he reached the foot of the kotal, he must front formcompany, fix bayonets, and charge up the slope without waiting forfurther orders. 

Soon afterwards, and just as the first streak of dawn proclaimed theapproach of day, the enemy became aware of our presence, and firedinto us, when instantly I heard Fitz-Hugh give the word to charge. Brownlow, at the head of his Highlanders, dashed forward in support, and two guns of the Mountain battery coming up at the moment, Iordered its Commandant, Captain Kelso, to come into action as soon ashe could find a position. 

I was struck by the smile of satisfied pride and pleasure withwhich he received the order. He was delighted, no doubt, that theopportunity had arrived to prove what the battery--to perfect which hehad spared neither time nor labour--could do; but it was the last timethat gallant soldier smiled, for a few seconds later he was shot dead. 

The Gurkhas, forgetting their fatigue, rapidly climbed the steep sideof the mountain, and, swarming into the first entrenchment, quicklycleared it of the enemy; then, guided by the flashes of the Afghanrifles, they pressed on, and, being joined by the leading company ofthe 72nd, took possession of a second and larger entrenchment 200yards higher up. Without a perceptible pause, the Highlanders andGurkhas together rushed a third position, the most important of all, as it commanded the head of the pass. 

The Spingawi Kotal was won; but we were surrounded by woods, whichwere crowded with Afghans, some 400 of whom made a dashing butineffectual attempt to carry off their guns, left behind in the firstscare of our sudden attack. These men were dressed so exactly likesome of our own Native soldiers that they were not recognized untilthey got within 100 yards of the entrenchment, and they woulddoubtless have succeeded in accomplishing their purpose--as theHighlanders and Gurkhas were busy pursuing the fugitives--had notGalbraith, whom I had sent with an order to the front, hurriedlycollected a certain number of stragglers and met the Afghans with sucha murderous fire that they broke and fled, leaving seventy dead in aspace of about fifty yards square. 

As the rising sun lighted up the scene of the conflict, the advantagesof a night attack became more apparent. The pass lay across theshoulder of a mountain (9, 400 feet above the sea), and through amagnificent pine forest. Its approaches were commanded by precipitousheights, defended by breastworks of felled trees, which completelyscreened the defenders, who were quite comfortably placed in wideditches, from which they could fire deadly volleys without being inthe least exposed themselves. Had we not been able to surprise theenemy before the day dawned, I doubt whether, any of us could havereached the first entrenchment. As it was, the regiment holding itfled in such a hurry that a sheepskin coat and from sixty to a hundredrounds of ammunition were left behind on the spot where each man hadlain. 

We had gained our object so far, but we were still a considerabledistance from the body of the Afghan army on the Peiwar Kotal. 

Immediately in rear of the last of the three positions on the SpingawiKotal was a _murg_, or open grassy plateau, upon which I re-formed thetroops who had carried the assault. The 2nd Punjab Infantry, the 23rdPioneers, and the battery of Royal Horse Artillery were still behind;but as the guns were being transported on elephants, I knew theprogress of this part of the force must be slow, and thinking itunwise to allow the Afghans time to recover from their defeat, Idetermined to push on with the troops at hand. 

A field hospital was formed on the _murg_, and placed under a guard, ammunition-pouches were re-filled, and off we started again, choosingas our route the left of two hog-backed, thickly-wooded heightsrunning almost longitudinally in the direction of the Peiwar Kotal, inthe hope that from this route communication might be established withour camp below. I was not disappointed, for very soon Captain Wynne, in charge of the signalling, was able to inform Brigadier-GeneralCobbe of our progress, and convey to him the order to co-operate withme so far as his very limited numbers would permit. 

Our advance was at first unopposed, but very slow, owing to thedensity of the forest, which prevented our seeing any distance, andmade it difficult to keep the troops together. 

At the end of two hours we arrived at the edge of a deep hollow, onthe further side of which, 150 yards off, the enemy were stronglyposted, and they at once opened fire upon us. 

Fancy my dismay at this critical moment on discovering that theHighlanders, Gurkhas, and the Mountain battery, had not come up! Theyhad evidently taken a wrong turn in the almost impenetrable forest, and I found myself alone with the 29th Punjab Infantry. Knowing thatthe missing troops could not be far off, I hoped that they would hearthe firing, which was each moment becoming heavier; but some timepassed, and there were no signs of their approach. I sent staffofficer after staff officer to search for them, until one onlyremained, the Rev. J. W. Adams, who had begged to be allowed toaccompany me as Aide-de-camp for this occasion, and him I alsodespatched in quest of the missing troops. After some time, whichseemed to me an age, he returned to report that no trace could he findof them; so again I started him off in another direction. Feelingthe situation was becoming serious, and expecting that the Afghans, encouraged by our inaction, would certainly attack us, I thought itadvisable to make a forward movement; but the attitude of the 29thwas not encouraging. I addressed them, and expressed a hope that theywould now by their behaviour wipe out the slur of disloyalty whichthe firing of the signal shots had cast upon the regiment, upon whichCaptain Channer, [7] who was just then in command, stepped forward, andsaid he would answer for the Sikhs; but amongst the Pathans therewas an ominous silence, and Channer agreed with me that they did notintend to fight. I therefore ordered Channer and his subaltern, Picot, to advance cautiously down the slope with the Sikhs of the regiment, following myself near enough to keep the party in sight. I had notgone far, however, before I found that the enemy were much toostrongly placed to be attacked successfully by so few men; accordinglyI recalled Channer, and we returned to the position at the top of thehill. 

[Illustration: MY GURKHA ORDERLIES. _From a water colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. _]

My orderlies[8] during this little episode displayed such touchingdevotion that it is with feelings of the most profound admiration andgratitude I call to mind their self-sacrificing courage. On this (ason many other occasions) they kept close round me, determined that noshot should reach me if they could prevent it; and on my being hit inthe hand by a spent bullet, and turning to look round in the directionit came from, I beheld one of the Sikhs standing with his armsstretched out trying to screen me from the enemy, which he couldeasily do, for he was a grand specimen of a man, a head and shoulderstaller than myself. 

To my great relief, on my return to the edge of the hollow, Adams metme with the good tidings that he had found not only the lost troops, but the Native Infantry of the rear portion of the column, and hadascertained that the elephants with the guns were close at hand. 

Their arrival was most opportune, for the enemy had been reinforced, and, having discovered our numerical weakness, were becoming bolder;they charged down the hill, and were now trying to force their wayup to our position, but our Mountain guns were quickly brought intoaction, and under their cover another attempt was made to drive theAfghans from their position. The 23rd Pioneers, under the command ofColonel Currie, the two front companies led by Captain Anderson, moveddown the slope, and were soon lost to view in the thick wood atthe bottom of the dell; when they reappeared it was, to my greatdisappointment, on the wrong side of the hollow: they had failed inthe attack, and Anderson and some men had been killed. The enemy'sposition, it was found, could only be reached by a narrow causeway, which was swept by direct and cross fires, and obstructed by trunks oftrees and a series of barricades. 

It was evident to me that under these circumstances the enemy couldnot be cleared out of their entrenchment by direct attack withoutentailing heavy loss, which I could ill afford and was most anxious toavoid. I therefore reconnoitred both flanks to find, if possible, away round the hill. On our left front was a sheer precipice; on theright, however, I discovered, to my infinite satisfaction, that wecould not only avoid the hill which had defeated us, but could getalmost in rear of the Peiwar Kotal itself, and threaten the enemy'sretreat from that position. 

At this juncture I was further cheered by the arrival ofLieutenant-Colonel Perkins and Major McQueen, who, with the 5th PunjabInfantry, had worked their way up the steep mountain-side, in the hopeof getting near to the Peiwar Kotal and co-operating with me. Theywere, however, checked by the deep ravine I have before described, and, guided by the sound of firing, pushed higher up the hill. Theybrought me word that the Artillery left in camp had opened fire on thekotal soon after daybreak, and had succeeded in silencing two of theenemy's guns; that our Infantry had crept up within 1, 400 yards of thekotal, but were met by such a destructive fire that they could notadvance further; that Brigadier-General Cobbe had been severelywounded, and that Colonel Barry Drew had assumed the command. Perkinsalso gave me the useful information that he had observed on his way upa spur from which the kotal position could be fired upon at a distanceof 1, 100 yards. To this spot I ordered Lieutenant Sherries, who hadsucceeded poor Kelso in command of the Mountain battery, to take hisguns, and I asked Perkins to return and tell Drew to press on to thekotal, in the hope that Sherries's fire and the turning movement I wasabout, to make would cause the enemy to retreat. 

I sent the 29th Punjab Infantry back to the Spingawi to protect thewounded. I left the 2nd Punjab Infantry in the position we had up tillnow been occupying, and I took McQueen's regiment with me. 

A few rounds from the Mountain battery, and the fact that their rearwas threatened and their retreat about to be cut off, soon producedsigns of wavering amongst the Afghans. Their Artillery fire slackened, their Infantry broke, and about 2 p. M. Drew and Hugh Gough found itpossible to make a move towards the Peiwar Kotal. Gough was the firstto reach the crest, closely followed by Lieutenant Brabazon, hisorderly officer, and a fine plucky Dogra named Birbul. They were soonjoined by some hundreds of Turi levies collected by Waterfield and bythe 8th Foot. Another body of levies under Major Palmer, [9] whohad done good service by making a feint on the right of the Afghanposition, arrived about the same time. Plunder was of course the soleobject of the Turis, but their co-operation at the moment was useful, and helped to swell our small numbers. The enemy having evacuatedtheir stronghold and retreated by the Alikhel road, abandoning intheir headlong flight guns, waggons, and baggage, were pursued by HughGough, whose Cavalry had by this time come up. 

[Illustration: MY SIKH ORDERLIES. _From a water colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. _]

The Peiwar Kotal was not visible from the route we had taken, but justbefore daylight had quite gone I could make out with the aid of mytelescope a large body of Afghans moving towards the Shutargardan, which made me feel quite satisfied that the enemy's position was inour possession. 

Night overtook us before we could reach the kotal, and as everyone wasthoroughly tired out, having been hard at work since 10 p. M. The nightbefore, with but little food, I thought it better to bivouac where wewere, on the southern slope of the Sika Ram mountain. It was hardlya pleasant experience lying on the ground without even cloaks at anelevation of 9, 000 feet, and with the thermometer marking twentydegrees of frost; but spite of cold and hunger, thoroughly contentwith the day's work, and with my mind at rest, I slept as soundly as Ihad ever done in the most luxurious quarters, and I think others didthe same. At any rate, no one that I could hear of suffered from thatnight's exposure. 

We continued our march at daybreak, and reached the kotal in an hour. 

The examination of the enemy's position was very interesting. It wasof enormous natural strength, the dispositions made for its defencewere most complete and judicious, and the impossibility of takingit by other than a turning movement was proved beyond a doubt; itextended from the Spingawi to some commanding heights nearly a milesouth of the Peiwar Kotal; thus having a front of about four milesfacing due east. From right to left the position ran along a lofty andrugged range of mountains, clothed with dense pine-forests. Towardsthe eastern side the range was precipitous, but descended on the westby a succession of upland meadows to the valley of the Hariab; it wascrossed by only two roads, viz. , the Peiwar and Spingawi Kotals; at afew other points there were paths, but too narrow and precipitous forthe passage of troops. 

The Peiwar Kotal is a narrow depression in the ridge, commanded oneach side by high pine-clad mountains. The approach to it from theKuram valley was up a steep, narrow, zigzag path, commanded throughoutits entire length from the adjacent heights, and difficult to ascendon account of the extreme roughness of the road, which was coveredwith large fragments of rocks and boulders. Every point of the ascentwas exposed to fire from both guns and rifles, securely placed behindbreastworks constructed of pine-logs and stones. At the top ofthe path was a narrow plateau, which was again commanded from thethickly-wooded heights on each side, rising to an elevation of 500feet. 

The Afghan Commander had been quite confident of success, and wasonly waiting for reinforcements to attack our camp; but thesereinforcements did not arrive until the afternoon of the 1st December, just too late for him to carry out his intention. He had under hiscommand eight Regular regiments of the Afghan army, and eighteenguns; while these numbers were augmented by hordes of neighbouringtribesmen, who were only too glad to respond to the cry of a _jahad_against the infidel, firmly believing that as true believers theircause would be victorious. 

Our loss at the Peiwar was not great--2 officers and 18 men killed, and 3 officers and 75 men wounded. The Afghans suffered much moreseverely, besides leaving in our possession all their guns, withquantities of ammunition and other warlike stores. 

[Footnote 1: The details of the column are given in the Appendix. (Appendix III. )]

[Footnote 2: On the 30th November a subordinate officer of the KabulGovernment reached Sir Samuel Browne's camp at Daka, and delivered thefollowing letter from the Amir to the address of the Viceroy:

 'FROM HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL TO THE VICEROY OF INDIA. 'KABUL, _19th November, 1878_. 

 'Be it known to your Excellency that I have received, and read from beginning to end, the friendly letter which your Excellency has sent, in reply to the letter I despatched by Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan. With regard to the expressions used by your Excellency in the beginning of your letter, referring to the friendly character of the Mission and the goodwill of the British Government, I leave it to your Excellency, whose wisdom and justice are universally admitted, to decide whether any reliance can be placed upon goodwill, if it be evidenced by words only. But if, on the other hand, goodwill really consists of deeds and actions, then it has not been manifested by the various wishes that have been expressed, and the proposals that have been made by British officials during the last few years to officials of this God-granted Government--proposals which, from their nature, it was impossible for them to comply with. 

 'One of these proposals referred to my dutiful son, the ill-starred wretch, Mahomed Yakub Khan, and was contained in a letter addressed by the officials of the British Government to the British Agent then residing in Kabul. It was written in that letter that, "if the said Yakub Khan be released and set at liberty, our friendship with the Afghan Government will be firmly cemented, but that otherwise it will not. "

 'There are several other grounds of complaint of similar nature, which contain no evidence of goodwill, but which, on the contrary, were effective in increasing the aversion and apprehension already entertained by the subjects of this God-granted Government. 

 'With regard to my refusal to receive the British Mission, your Excellency has stated that it would appear from my conduct that I was actuated by feelings of direct hostility towards the British Government. 

 'I assure your Excellency that, on the contrary, the officials of this God-granted Government, in repulsing the Mission, were not influenced by any hostile or inimical feelings towards the British Government, nor did they intend that any insult or affront should be offered. But they were afraid that the independence of this Government might be affected by the arrival of the Mission, and that the friendship which has now existed between the two Governments for several years might be annihilated. 

 'A paragraph in your Excellency's letter corroborates the statement which they have made to this Government. The feelings of apprehension which were aroused in the minds of the people of Afghanistan by the mere announcement of the intention of the British Government to send a Mission to Kabul, before the Mission itself had actually started or arrived at Peshawar, have subsequently been fully justified by the statement in your Excellency's letter, that I should be held responsible for any injury that might befall the tribes who acted as guides to the Mission, and that I should be called upon to pay compensation to them for any loss they might have suffered; and that if, at any time, these tribes should meet with ill-treatment at my hands, the British Government would at once take steps to protect them. 

 'Had these apprehensions proved groundless, and had the object of the Mission been really friendly, and no force or threats of violence used, the Mission would, as a matter of course, have been allowed a free passage, as such Missions are customary and of frequent occurrence between allied States. I am now sincerely stating my own feelings when I say that this Government has maintained, and always will maintain, the former friendship which existed between the two Governments, and cherishes no feelings of hostility and opposition towards the British Government. 

 'It is also incumbent upon the officials of the British Government that, out of respect and consideration for the greatness and eminence of their own Government, they should not consent to inflict any injury upon their well-disposed neighbours, and to impose the burden of grievous troubles upon the shoulders of their sincere friends. But, on the contrary, they should exert themselves to maintain the friendly feelings which have hitherto existed towards this God-granted Government, in order that the relations between the two Governments may remain on the same footing as before; and if, in accordance with the custom of allied States, the British Government should desire to send a purely friendly and temporary Mission to this country, with a small escort, not exceeding twenty or thirty men, similar to that which attended the Russian Mission, this servant of God will not oppose its progress. '

It was ascertained that this messenger had come to Basawal on the22nd November, when, hearing of the capture of Ali Masjid by Britishtroops, he immediately returned to Kabul. The Amir's letter, thoughdated the 19th November, was believed to have been re-written at Kabulafter the news of the fall of Ali Masjid. The text of this letter wastelegraphed to the Secretary of State on the 7th December; in replyLord Cranbrook pointed out that the letter evaded all the requirementsspecified in the Viceroy's ultimatum, and could not have been acceptedeven if it had reached him before the 20th November. ]

[Footnote 3: Now General J. Gordon, C. B. , Assistant MilitarySecretary, Horse Guards. ]

[Footnote 4: The Native officer was Subadar-Major Aziz Khan, a fineold soldier who had seen hard work with his regiment during theMutiny, and in many a frontier expedition. He twice obtained the Orderof Merit for bravery in the field, and for his marked gallantry on oneoccasion he had received a sword of honour and a _khilat_ (a dress ofhonour or other present bestowed as a mark of distinction). Aziz Khanwas shot through the knee, and after a few days the wound became sobad the Doctors told him that, unless he submitted to amputation, orconsented to take some stimulants in the shape of wine, he would dieof mortification. Aziz Khan, who was a strict and orthodox Mahomedan, replied that, as both remedies were contrary to the precepts of thereligion by which he had guided his life, he would accept death ratherthan disobey them. He died accordingly. ]

[Footnote 5: Now General Sir Æneas Perkins, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 6: The strength of this battalion had now dwindled down to348 men. ]

[Footnote 7: Now Major-General Channer, V. C. , C. B. ]

[Footnote 8: I had six orderlies attached to me--two Sikhs, twoGurkhas, and two Pathans. The Sikhs and Gurkhas never left me for aday during the two years I was in Afghanistan. The Pathans behavedequally well, but they fell sick, and had to be changed more thanonce. Whenever I emerged from my tent, two or more of the orderliesappeared and kept close by me. They had always good information as towhat was going on, and I could generally tell whether there was likelyto be trouble or not by the number in attendance; they put themselveson duty, and decided how many were required. One of the Gurkhas issince dead, but the other and the two Sikhs served with me afterwardsin Burma, and all three now hold the high position of Subadar in theirrespective regiments. ]

[Footnote 9: Now Major-General Sir Arthur Palmer, K. C. B. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLVII. 1878-1879

 Alikhel--Treachery of the tribesmen--Transport difficulties --Sher Ali looks to Russia for aid--Khost--An attack on our camp --An unsuccessful experiment--An unpleasant incident --Punjab Chiefs' Contingent

Perceiving that further pursuit of the enemy would be useless, Idecided to halt a few days to admit of our overtaxed transportbringing up supplies and tents, and to arrange for the occupation ofthe Peiwar position during the winter months. But I considered that mywork would be incomplete if we stopped short of the Shutargardan Pass. Moreover, it was very desirable that we should investigate this route, and, if possible, get into friendly communication with some of thesections of the Ghilzai tribe. The Jajis, through whose territorythe first part of the road ran, now showed themselves to be aswell disposed as the Turis; they readily brought in supplies, andvolunteered to labour for us, and from the information obtained bythe political officers, the inhabitants of the Hariab valley seemedequally anxious to be friendly. The dislodgment of the Afghan army bya much smaller force, from a position they had themselves chosen, hadevidently had a salutary effect. 

As soon as I had leisure, I inquired from Colonel Gordon whether hehad been able to discover the men who had fired the signal shots onthe night of the 2nd, and whether he did not think that the PathanNative officers ought to be able to point out the offenders. Gordonreplied that he suspected the Jemadar of the Pathan company knew whothe culprits were, and that one soldier had confessed to firing thesecond shot; moreover, he told me that eighteen Pathans had left theregiment during the fight. On receiving this unpleasant information, I assembled a Court of Inquiry, with orders to have the proceedingsready for my consideration by the time I returned from theShutargardan. 

[Illustration: ONE OF MY PATHAN ORDERLIES. _From a water-colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. _]

Having despatched the sick and wounded to Kuram and made all necessaryarrangements, I marched on the 6th December to Alikhel, twelve mileson the road to the Shutargardan. Before starting, I issued an orderthanking the troops for the efforts they had made to ensure success, and I had the honour of communicating to them at the same time acongratulatory message from the Queen. [1]

We reached the foot of the Shutargardan on the 8th, and reconnoitredto the top of the pass the next morning. This point was 11, 000 feetabove the sea, commanded a fine view of the Logar valley, and Idiscovered from it that there was nothing between us and the immediatevicinity of Kabul to prevent a force moving rapidly on that place. 

We returned to Alikhel on the 10th, and, as it was important to retaincontrol of this advanced post, I decided to leave Captain Rennick inpolitical charge, a duty for which his nerve and determination ofcharacter eminently fitted him. Colonel Waterfield, as a temporaryarrangement, remained there also with a battery of Artillery and tworegiments of Punjab Infantry, for the purpose of establishing friendlyrelations with the neighbouring tribesmen. 

From Alikhel there were said to be two roads leading to Kuram, besidesthe difficult path over the Peiwar Kotal; and as it was ofgreat importance to gain a knowledge of an alternative line ofcommunication, in view of further trouble, I determined to explore oneof them, choosing that which appeared to be the shortest, and which Iheard had been used some time before by an Afghan Mountain battery. This route was described as practicable for camels, and ran throughlands belonging to tribes whose headmen were with me, a fact whichshould, I thought, ensure our being free from attack. 

I left Alikhel on the 12th December, taking with me No. 1 MountainBattery, a wing 72nd Highlanders, the 5th Gurkhas, and the 23rdPioneers. The route lay for four miles along the banks of the Hariabstream, a tributary of the Kuram river, through a valley whichgradually narrowed into a thickly-wooded ravine, three miles long: atthe end of this ravine the road, turning sharply to the left, ascendedtill it reached an open grassy plateau, on which stood the hamlet ofSapari. The inhabitants turned out to welcome us, bringing supplies, and appearing so friendly that I settled to halt there for the night. I had been warned, however, by the _maliks_ of some of the villages wehad passed through in the morning, that we should probably be attackedon the march the next day, and that a defile which lay at the otherside of a mountain over which we had to cross would be particularlydangerous to us. I determined, therefore, to send on troops thatevening to occupy the pass over this mountain, and to start thebaggage off long before daybreak, so that it should be out of the wayof the main body, which would also have to march at an early hour inorder to reach the kotal before the tribesmen had time to collect. 

This could have been accomplished without difficulty, but for themachinations of our false friends in the village, who directed on tothe precipitous path we had to ascend a stream of water which soonturned into a sheet of ice, and when I arrived on the spot I foundthe road blocked by fallen animals vainly struggling to regain theirfooting. This caused so much delay that it was nearly noon before thelast camel had got over the pass. 

The descent on the other side was scarcely less difficult, though freefrom ice. We dropped 3, 000 feet in the first two miles, down a waywhich can only be described as a ruined staircase, with the stepsmissing at intervals, ending in the defile against the dangers ofwhich we had been warned. This defile was certainly a nasty place tobe caught in, being five miles long, and so narrow that the camels'loads struck against the rocks on either side; and it was impossibleto move flanking parties along the cliffs above, as they wereintersected by wide chasms running back for long distances. 

It was important to secure the exit from this gorge without delay, andfor this purpose I pushed on four companies of the 23rd Pioneers, andin support, when the ravine began to widen out a little, I hurriedon the Highlanders and the Mountain battery, leaving the Gurkhas toprotect the baggage and bring up the rear. 

We only got possession of the exit just in time. The Pioneers, by occupying commanding positions on either side of the opening, effectually checkmated several large bodies of armed men who wereapproaching from different directions, and whose leaders now declaredthey had only come to help us! Later on we discovered still moreformidable gatherings, which doubtless would have all combined toattack us, had they been in time to catch us in the ravine. 

The tail of the column was followed and much harassed by the enemy;but they were kept at bay by the steadiness of the gallant Gurkhas, and so successful were they in safe-guarding the baggage, that, although many of the drivers ran away at the first shot, leaving thesoldiers to lead the animals as well as defend them, not a singlearticle fell into the hands of the tribesmen. The regiment lost threemen killed, and Captain Powell and eleven men wounded. Captain Goad, of the Transport Department, was also badly hurt. [2]

[Illustration: ONE OF MY PATHAN ORDERLIES. _From a water-colour sketch by Colonel Woodthorpe, C. B. , R. E. _]

On Goad being knocked over, Sergeant Greer, of the 72nd Highlanders, assisted by three privates, picked him up, and having placed him undercover of a rock, they turned their attention to the enemy. They wereonly four against large numbers, but by their cool and steady use ofthe Martini-Henry rifle, which had shortly before been issued to theBritish soldiers in India, they were enabled to hold their grounduntil help arrived, when they succeeded in carrying the woundedofficer away. 

I had observed in the advance on the Peiwar Kotal the skill andgallantry displayed by Sergeant Greer, and noted him as a man fittedfor promotion. His distinguished conduct in rescuing and defendingGoad confirmed me in my opinion, and I accordingly recommended himfor a commission, which, to my great gratification, Her Majesty wasgraciously pleased to bestow upon him. 

That night we halted at the village of Keria; thence the route waseasy enough, so, leaving the troops to rest and recover from the lasthard march, I rode on to Kuram, where there was much to be done. 

The ejectment of the Afghan ruler of Khost and the exploration of thatvalley formed, it will be remembered, part of the programme givento me to carry through, and it was very desirable that this serviceshould be completed before the winter rains set in. Peace and ordernow reigned in Upper Kuram and in the neighbourhood of the Peiwar; butthere was a good deal of excitement in the lower part of the valleyand in Khost, our line of communication was constantly harassed byraiders, convoys were continually threatened, outposts fired into, andtelegraph-wires cut. The smallness of my force made it difficult forme to deal with these troubles, so I applied to the Commander-in-Chieffor the wing of the 72nd Highlanders left at Kohat, and the 5th PunjabCavalry at Thal to be ordered to join me at Kuram. At the same time Imoved up No. 2 Mountain Battery and the 28th Punjab Infantry, sendingthe 29th Punjab Infantry to take the place of the 28th at Thal. 

I was greatly hampered by want of transport. Arrangements had to bemade for sending the sick and wounded, as well as the captured guns, to Kohat (the sight of the latter, I fancied, would have a good effecton the tribes in our rear); but hard work, scarcity of forage, andabsence of supervision, had told, as was to be expected, on animals inbad condition at the outset. Mules and camels died daily, reducing ourall too small numbers to such an extent that it was with considerabledifficulty the convoy was at last despatched. 

From the first I foresaw that want of transport would be our greatestdifficulty, and so it proved; very few supplies could be obtained inthe vicinity of Kuram; the troops at Kohat had been drawing on theadjacent districts ever since October, so that the purchasingagents had every day to go further away to procure necessaries, andconsequently an increased number of animals were required for theirconveyance. My Commissary-General reported to me that only a few days'provisions for the troops remained in hand, and that it was impossibleto lay in any reserve unless more transport could be provided. Aboutthis reserve I was very anxious, for the roads might soon becometemporarily impassable from the rising of the rivers after the heavyrain to be expected about Christmas. Contractors were despatchedto all parts of the country to procure camels, and I suggested toGovernment that pack-bullocks should be bought at Mirzapur, and railedup country, which suggestion being acted upon, the danger of thetroops having to go hungry was warded off. 

The treacherous soldiers of the 29th Punjab Infantry had now to bedealt with--a necessary, but most unpleasant, duty. A perusal of theproceedings of the Court of Inquiry satisfied me that the two men whodischarged their rifles during the night-march, the Jemadar of theircompany who failed to report their criminal action, and the eighteenwho deserted their colours during the engagement, should all be triedby Court-Martial. 

The prisoners were found guilty. The sepoy who fired the first shotwas sentenced to death, and the one who discharged the second totwo years' imprisonment with hard labour; the court, recognizing apossibility that the latter, being a young soldier, might have loadedand fired without intending treachery, gave him the benefit of thedoubt. The Jemadar was awarded seven years' transportation, and theeighteen deserters terms varying from ten years to one year. 

It was with deep regret that I confirmed these several sentences, butit was necessary that a deterrent example should be made. Treacherywas altogether too grave a crime to be lightly dealt with, anddesertions amongst the Pathans were becoming of much too frequentoccurrence, particularly as the deserters invariably carried away withthem their rifles and ammunition. 

The effect of these sentences was most salutary; there was not asingle desertion subsequent to the Court-Martial for more than a year, although during that time the Mahomedan portion of my force wereseverely tried by appeals from their co-religionists. 

On Christmas Eve authentic intelligence was brought to me that, onhearing of the defeat of the Afghan army, Sher Ali, with the membersof the Russian Mission then at Kabul, had fled to Turkestan, and thathis son, Yakub Khan, had been released from prison, and had assumedthe reins of Government. 

About this time, also, Sir Samuel Browne, who was at Jalalabad, received a letter[3] from the Amir, in which he announced hisintention of proceeding to St. Petersburg to lay his case before theCzar and obtain the aid of Russia. 

Sher Ali's disappearance and Yakub Khan's assumption of authoritysuggested new possibilities to the Viceroy, who at once instructedMajor Cavagnari, the political officer with the Khyber column, tocommunicate, if possible, with Yakub Khan, and explain to him that ourquarrel was with Sher Ali alone, that he might rest assured of thefriendly disposition of the British Government towards him personally, and that, unless he took the initiative, hostilities would not beresumed. 

Before proceeding to Kuram, I invited all the Turis and Jajis whohad afforded us assistance to meet me in durbar that they might besuitably rewarded. A goodly number responded to the invitation, andwere told, in accordance with the instructions I had received fromthe Government of India, that they would henceforth be under Britishprotection; that no Amir of Afghanistan should ever again be permittedto tyrannize over them; that while they would be expected to livepeaceably, neither their religion nor their customs would beinterfered with; that roads would be made and markets established, andthat whatever supplies they could provide for the use of the troopswould be liberally paid for. 

After this I started for Khost, accompanied by Colonel Waterfield, thepolitical officer. 

The column I took with me consisted of the squadron of the 10thHussars, 200 of the 72nd Highlanders, a wing of the 5th PunjabCavalry, the 21st and 28th Punjab Infantry, and Nos. 1 and 2 MountainBatteries. The corps were so weak that their total strength onlyamounted to 2, 000 men. 

We reached Matun, the name given to some three villages grouped rounda small fort in the centre of the valley, on the 6th January, 1879. The Afghan Governor, with whom I had been in communication, met me andarranged to surrender the fort, on condition that his personal safetyshould be guaranteed, and that he should be allowed to go either toKabul or India, as he might desire. 

About half a mile from the fort I halted the column, and taking asmall escort of the 10th Hussars, I rode on with the Governor, whoinvited me with my staff into his house. While tea was being handedround, the Governor (Akram Khan by name) warned me that we should beattacked, and that he could do nothing to prevent it, having only some200 local militia and no regular troops. He further said that theinhabitants of the valley were not directly opposed to the BritishGovernment, and, if left to themselves, would give no trouble; but hedoubted their being able to resist the pressure put upon them bya large number of tribesmen who had collected from the adjacentdistricts, attracted by the smallness of the force, which theybelieved 'had been delivered into their hands. '

This intelligence showed me I must be prepared for a scrimmage, so Iordered the camp to be pitched in the form of a square as compactly aspossible, with the transport animals and impedimenta in the centre, and strong piquets at the four angles. Cavalry patrols were sent outas far as the broken and hilly nature of the ground would permit, andevery endeavour was made to ascertain the strength and whereaboutsof the enemy, but to no purpose: the enemy were invisible, andthe patrols reported that they had come across numbers ofpeaceable-looking husbandmen, but no one else. 

The night passed off quietly, but when advancing day made themvisible, multitudes of tribesmen were descried collecting on theslopes of the neighbouring hills. Some friendly Natives were sent toascertain their intentions, followed by a Cavalry reconnoitring party, when suddenly a number of camel-drivers and mule-men, who had gone tothe nearest village to procure fodder for their animals, came rushingback to camp in the wildest terror and excitement, declaring thatthe enemy seemed to rise as if by magic out of the ground, and thatseveral thousands were already in the village. No doubt some of thesewere 'the peaceable-looking husbandmen' the patrols had encounteredthe previous day. I now became somewhat anxious, not only for thesafety of the reconnoitring party, which appeared to be in danger ofbeing cut off, but for that of the whole force; such a mere handful aswe were compared to the numbers arrayed against us. 

Vigorous action was evidently necessary. Accordingly, I ordered allthe available Cavalry (only 70 men of the 10th Hussars, and 155 ofthe 5th Punjab Cavalry), under Colonel Hugh Gough, to follow thereconnoitring party in case of their being so hard pressed as to haveto retire, and Captain Swinley's Mountain battery, with six companiesof the 28th Punjab Infantry, under Colonel Hudson, [4] to move outin support. Colonel Drew I left in charge of the camp, with 200Highlanders, the 21st Punjab Infantry, and a Mountain battery. Imyself joined Gough, who, by dismounted fire and several bold charges, notwithstanding the difficult nature of the ground, succeeded indriving the enemy to the highest ridges, over which Swinley'swell-directed fire eventually forced them to retreat. 

Heavy firing was now heard in the direction of our camp, and I hurriedback, taking with me a troop of the 5th Punjab Cavalry. I found thatduring my absence Drew had been attacked on two sides; he had beenable to prevent the enemy from coming to close quarters, but they werestill hovering about at no great distance, and I thought it advisableto clear them away by moving out against them with all the troopsat my disposal. As we approached, they disappeared with their usualrapidity; the 5th Punjab Cavalry, however, got in amongst some ofthem, and we returned to camp with 100 prisoners, 500 head of cattle, some sheep, and a large quantity of grain. 

The tribesmen, however, had not been sufficiently punished to preventa repetition of the attack, probably with largely increased numbers;so I ordered the destruction of the hamlets nearest us, in which theyhad been sheltered and some of our camp followers had been murdered. 

The next night a most unfortunate occurrence took place, resulting inthe death of six of our prisoners; but it was just one of those thingswhich could hardly have been foreseen or guarded against, and forwhich, however lamentable, no one was to blame. The headmen of theparticular Waziri tribe to which the captives belonged had beensummoned during the day, and told that the men would be released onpayment of a sum of fifty rupees each. The money was paid down at oncefor a certain number, who were immediately set free; but there was notquite enough for all, and the headmen went off to procure what wasrequired for the ransom of the remainder. Soon after dark, however, some of the enemy[5] were discovered creeping up the banks of a nullaat the back of the camp, where the unransomed men were detained undera guard; the nearest sentry instantly fired, and the piquets all roundtook up the firing, thinking that another attack on the camp hadcommenced. At the sound of the first shot the prisoners all jumped totheir feet, and calling to each other to escape, attempted to seizethe rifles belonging to the guard, upon which the Native officer incommand (a Pathan like themselves) told them that if they persisted intrying to escape, they would be shot. His words had no effect, and toprevent his men being overpowered, he gave the order to fire. Sixof the prisoners were killed and thirteen wounded. It was a mostregrettable affair, but a Court of Inquiry decided that the Nativeofficer had no option, and completely exonerated the guard fromacting with undue severity. The wounded were, of course, taken to ourhospital, and well cared for by our Doctors. [6]

The remainder of our sojourn in Khost was not marked by any incidentof particular interest. We marched to the end of the valley, and madea careful survey of it and of the surrounding hills. 

The instructions I received with regard to Khost were, to occupy thevalley and dislodge the Afghan administration therefrom. To my greatchagrin, the smallness of my force made it impossible for me to giveeffect to these instructions as I could have wished. To have remainedin Khost under the circumstances would have been to court disaster;the numbers of the enemy were daily increasing, and it would have beenimpossible to hold our own. It was, however, of great importance, ifpracticable, to retain some control over the valley, a peculiarlyproductive district, which, if left alone by us, I feared would becomea centre of dangerous intrigue against any settled government inKuram. Accordingly I determined to try how placing Khost in charge ofone of our own Native officials would answer, and I selected for theposition Shahzada Sultan Jan, a Saddozai gentleman of good birth, anda Sunni Mahomedan in religion, who, I thought, would be a _personagrata_ to the Khostwals, and, if supported by some Native levies, andassociated in his administrative duties with the chief _maliks_ ofKhost, would be more likely to hold his own than anyone else I couldplace there. This was, however, a mere experiment, and I did notdisguise from myself that its success was very doubtful; but it wasthe only way in which I could attempt to carry out the orders ofGovernment, my hands being so completely tied by paucity of troops. Ihad no fear for the Shahzada's personal safety, and I felt that, ifin the end I should be obliged to abandon Khost altogether for thepresent, it could later, if necessary, be easily re-occupied with asomewhat larger force. 

Having decided on the course to be adopted, I held a durbar, which wasnumerously attended, and addressed the people of Khost in much thesame way I had spoken to the Turis in Kuram, expressing a hope thatthey would support the Shahzada's authority until a more permanentform of government could be established. 

On the 27th January we left Khost and made one march; the next dayI halted, so as to be near the Shahzada in case of need. Theintelligence brought to me that evening satisfied me that myexperiment would not answer, and that without troops (which I couldnot spare) to support the newly-established authority at firststarting off, we could not hope to maintain any hold over the country;for though the Khostwals themselves were perfectly content with thearrangements I had made, they could not resist the tribesmen, whodirectly our backs were turned began to show their teeth. Accordingly, I decided to bring the Shahzada away while I could do so withouttrouble. I marched back to Matun the next morning with 1, 000 men(Cavalry and Infantry) and four Mountain guns. We found Sultan Jan inanything but a happy frame of mind, and quite ready to come away. Sohaving formally made the place over to the _maliks_, we started on ourreturn journey. As we departed, a collection of our tribal enemies(about 3, 000) who had been watching the proceedings took theopportunity to attack us; but two weak squadrons of Cavalry, skilfullyhandled by Hugh Gough, kept them in check, and we reached camp withoutfurther molestation. 

The next day, the last of January, we returned to Hazir Pir in Kuram. There I received a visit from Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, brother ofSher Ali, who was accompanied by several leading men of the Logarvalley, some of whom were of great assistance to me a few monthslater. Wali Mahomed was a man of about fifty years of age; he had apleasing countenance, of the same Jewish type as the majority of theAfghan nation, but he had a weak face and was evidently wanting incharacter. He told me that he had fled from Kabul to escape thevengeance of his nephew, Yakub Khan, who attributed his longimprisonment by his father to the Sirdar's influence. Sir SamuelBrowne and Major Cavagnari, on the Khyber line, were conducting allpolitical negotiations with the Afghans, so I passed Wali Mahomed Khanon to them. 

During the month of February my time was chiefly employed ininspecting the roads and the defensive posts which my talentedand indefatigable Chief Engineer was constructing, examining thearrangements for housing the troops, and looking after the transportanimals and Commissariat depots. No more military demonstrations werenecessary, for the people were quietly settling down under Britishrule. Convoys were no longer molested nor telegraph wires cut; but Ihad one rather unpleasant incident with regard to a war Correspondent, which, until the true facts of the case were understood, broughtme into disrepute with one of the leading London newspapers, therepresentative of which I felt myself compelled to dismiss from theKuram Field Force. 

Judging from his telegrams, which he brought to me to sign, the nervesof the Correspondent in question must have been somewhat shaken by thefew and very distant shots fired at us on the 28th November. Thesetelegrams being in many instances absolutely incorrect and of the mostalarming nature, were of course not allowed to be despatched untilthey had been revised in accordance with truth; but one, evidentlyaltered and added to after I had countersigned it, was brought to meby the telegraph master. I sent for the Correspondent, who confessedto having made the alterations, not apparently realizing that he haddone anything at all reprehensible, but he promised that he wouldnever do such a thing again. This promise was not kept; telegramsappeared in his paper which I had not seen before despatch, and whichwere most misleading to the British public. Moreover, his letters, over which I could have no control, and which I heard of for thefirst time when the copies of his paper arrived in Kuram, were mostsubversive of the truth. It was on the receipt of these letters that Ifelt it to be my duty to send the too imaginative author to the rear. 

No one could be more anxious than I was to have all details of thecampaign made public. I considered it due to the people of GreatBritain that the press Correspondents should have every opportunityfor giving the fullest and most faithful accounts of what might happenwhile the army was in the field, and I took special pains from thefirst to treat the Correspondents with confidence, and give them suchinformation as it was in my power to afford. All I required from themin return was that the operations should be truthfully reported, andthat any Correspondent who did not confine himself to the recordingof facts, and felt himself competent to criticize the conduct of thecampaign, should be careful to acquaint himself with the many andvaried reasons which a Commander must always have to consider beforedeciding on any line of action. 

What to my mind was so reprehensible in this Correspondent's conductwas the publication, in time of war, and consequent excitement andanxiety at home, of incorrect and sensational statements, founded oninformation derived from irresponsible and uninformed sources, andthe alteration of telegrams after they had been countersigned by therecognized authority, the result of which could only be to keep thepublic in a state of apprehension regarding the force in the field, and, what is even more to be deprecated, to weaken the confidenceof the troops in their Commander. It was satisfactory to me that myaction in the matter met with the fullest approval of the Viceroy. 

About this time my column was strengthened by the arrival of theContingent provided by the Punjab Chiefs, under the command ofBrigadier General John Watson, my comrade of the Mutiny days. TheContingent consisted of 868 Cavalry, and 2, 685 Infantry with 13 guns, which were placed in position along the line of communication, andproved of great use in relieving the Regular army of escort duty. The senior Native officer with the Punjabis was Bakshi Ganda Sing, Commander-in-Chief of the Patiala army, a particularly handsome, gentlemanly Sikh, with whom I have ever since been on terms offriendly intercourse. 

Towards the end of February I paid a visit to Kohat, where my wife metme; we spent a week together, and I had the pleasure of welcoming tothe frontier that grand regiment, the 92nd Highlanders, which hadbeen sent up to be in readiness to join my column in the event of anadvance on Kabul becoming necessary. 

[Footnote 1:

 'FROM THE VICEROY, LAHORE, TO GENERAL ROBERTS. '_6th December, 1878. _

 'I have much pleasure in communicating to you and the force under your command the following telegram just received Her Majesty, and desire at the same time to add my warm congratulations on the success achieved. Message begins: "I have received the news of the decisive victory of General Roberts, and the splendid behaviour of my brave soldiers, with pride and satisfaction, though I must ever deplore the unavoidable loss of life. Pray inquire after the wounded in my name. May we continue to receive good news. "']

[Footnote 2: Both officers died of their wounds soon afterwards. ]

[Footnote 3:

 'FROM AMIR SHER ALI KHAN TO THE OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. 

 'Be it known to the officers of the British Government that this suppliant before God never supposed, nor wished, that the matters [in dispute] between you and myself should come to this issue [literally, "should come out from the curtain"], or that the veil of friendship and amity, which has for many years been upheld between two neighbours and adjoining States, should, without any cause, be thus drawn aside. 

 'And since you have begun the quarrel and hostilities, and have advanced on Afghan territory, this suppliant before God, with the unanimous consent and advice of all the nobles, grandees, and of the army in Afghanistan, having abandoned his troops, his realm, and all the possessions of his crown, has departed with expedition, accompanied by a few attendants, to St. Petersburg, the capital of the Czar of Russia, where, before a congress, the whole history of the transactions between myself and yourselves will be submitted to all the Powers [of Europe]. If you have anything in dispute with me regarding State affairs in Afghanistan, you should institute and establish your case at St. Petersburg, and state and explain what you desire, so that the questions in dispute between us may be made known and clear to all the Powers. And surely the side of right will not be overlooked. If your intentions are otherwise, and you entertain hostile and vindictive feelings towards the people of Afghanistan, God alone is their Protector and real Preserver. Upon the course of action here above stated this suppliant before God has resolved and decided. ']

[Footnote 4: The late Lieutenant-General Sir John Hudson, K. C. B. , whodied as Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army. ]

[Footnote 5: No doubt friends of the prisoners, who had come to helpthem to escape. ]

[Footnote 6: This occurrence was made great capital of by the anti-warparty at home. A member of the House of Commons, in commenting uponit, said that 'some ninety prisoners, who had been taken, had beentied together with ropes'; that 'on their making some attempt toescape they were set upon, and many of them slaughtered in theirbonds'; and that 'the dead, the living, the dying, and the woundedwere left tied together, and lying in one confused mass of bodies. ']

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLVIII. 1879

 Sher Ali's death--Premature negotiations--The treaty of Gandamak --Making friends with the tribesmen--Gloomy forebodings --Good-bye to Cavagnari

I was informed by the Viceroy's Private Secretary in the beginning ofMarch that, unless satisfactory arrangements could soon be come towith Yakub Khan, an onward move would have to be made. Accordingly Inow set about preparing for such a contingency. 

Sher Ali had died in Afghan Turkestan on the 21st February, and, incommunicating the event to the Viceroy, Yakub Khan wrote that he wasanxious matters might be so arranged that 'the friendship of thisGod-granted State with the illustrious British Government may remainconstant and firm. '

The new Amir was told in reply that Lord Lytton was prepared to enterinto negotiations for the conclusion of peace, and for the restorationof a friendly alliance between the two Governments, provided that HisHighness renounced all claim to authority over the Khyber and MichniPasses, and the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directlyconnected with the main routes leading to India; that the districtof Kuram from Thal to the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, and thedistricts of Pishin and Sibi, should remain under the control of theBritish Government; that the foreign relations of Afghanistan shouldbe conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the BritishGovernment; and that British officers should be accredited to theKabul Government, and permitted to reside at such places as mighthereafter be decided upon. 

Yakub Khan's reply was not altogether satisfactory. He agreed toBritish officers being deputed to Afghanistan on the understandingthat they should reside in Kabul, and abstain from interference inState affairs; but he declined to renounce his authority over theKhyber and Michni Passes and the tribes in their vicinity, and refusedto consent to Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi being placed under Britishprotection. 

The Viceroy now determined to try what a personal conference betweenthe Amir and Cavagnari could effect towards a settlement of thesevexed questions, so in answering the Amir Cavagnari was directedto convey a hint that an invitation to him to visit Kabul might beproductive of good results, and to point out that the places wedesired to occupy were looked upon as essential to the permanentsecurity of the Indian frontier. The Amir replied, expressing hisreadiness to receive Cavagnari in his capital, and laying stress onhis determination to regulate his future conduct in strict conformitywith his professions of loyalty, but begged that he might not becalled upon to cede any portion of his territory. 

Hardly had this letter, dated the 29th March, been received, than aproclamation addressed by Yakub to the Khagianis, a tribe which hadbeen giving much trouble, was intercepted and brought to Cavagnari; init the Amir praised and complimented the Khagianis for their religiouszeal and fidelity to himself. He exhorted them to have no fear of theinfidels, against whom he was about to launch an irresistible force oftroops and _Ghazis_, and wound up as follows: 'By the favour ofGod, and in accordance with the verse "Verily God has destroyed thepowerful ones, " the whole of them will go to the fire of hell forevermore. Therefore kill them to the extent of your ability. ' Acurious commentary this on the Amir's protestation of loyalty. 

Notwithstanding this piece of treachery, it was decided not to breakoff negotiations, and Yakub Khan was informed by Cavagnari that aMission would proceed to Kabul so soon as the necessary arrangementscould be made for its reception. At the same time Lord Lytton himselfwrote to the Amir, telling him that, as he was willing to receive anEnvoy, Cavagnari would be deputed to visit Kabul, and communicateunreservedly with him upon the questions at issue between the twoStates. 

I, personally, was not at all satisfied that the time had come fornegotiation, for I felt that the Afghans had not had the sense ofdefeat sufficiently driven into them to convince them of our strengthand ability to punish breach of treaty, and, therefore, that a peacemade now, before they had been thoroughly beaten, would not be alasting one, and would only end in worse trouble in the near future. The Afghans are an essentially arrogant and conceited people; they hadnot forgotten our disastrous retreat from Kabul, nor the annihilationof our array in the Khurd Kabul and Jagdalak Passes in 1842, andbelieved themselves to be quite capable of resisting our advance onKabul. No great battle had as yet been fought; though Ali Masjid andthe Peiwar Kotal had been taken, a small force of the enemy had beenbeaten by Charles Gough's brigade, near Jalalabad, and a successfulCavalry skirmish had occurred near Kandahar, the Afghans had nowheresuffered serious loss, and it was not to be wondered at if thefighting men in distant villages, and in and around Kabul, Ghazni, Herat, Balkh, and other places, still considered themselves undefeatedand capable of defying us. They and their leaders had to depend forinformation as to recent events upon the garbled accounts of those whohad fought against us, and it was unlikely they would be shaken intheir belief in their superiority by such one-sided versions of whathad occurred. On many occasions I had been amused, in listening toAfghan conversation, to find that, while they appeared thoroughlyconversant with and frequently alluded to their triumphs over us, theyseemed to know nothing, or had no recollection, of Sale's successfuldefence of Jalalabad, or of Pollock's victorious march through theKhyber Pass and the destruction by him of the chief bazaar in Kabul. 

My ideas about the negotiations being premature were freely expressedto Colonel Colley, [1] Lord Lytton's Private Secretary, who paid me avisit in Kuram at this time, and had been a constant correspondent ofmine from the commencement of the war. Colley, however, explained tome that, right or wrong, the Viceroy had no option in the matter; thatthere was the strongest feeling in England against the continuance ofthe war; and that, unless the new Amir proved actively hostile, peacemust be signed. He expressed himself sanguine that the terms of thetreaty which Cavagnari hoped to conclude with Yakub Khan would give usan improved frontier, and a permanent paramount influence at Kabul, the two points about which he said the Viceroy was most anxious, andto which he assigned the first place in his political programme. LordLytton foresaw that, whatever might be the future policy of the twoEuropean Powers concerned, the contact of the frontiers of GreatBritain and Russia in Asia was only a matter of time, and his aim wasto make sure that the conterminous line, whenever it might be reached, should be of our choosing, and not one depending on the exigencies ofthe moment, or on the demands of Russia. 

The Native agent (Bukhtiar Khan), who was the bearer of the Viceroy'sand Cavagnari's letters to the Amir, reached Kabul at the momentwhen the Afghan officials who had accompanied Sher Ali in his flightreturned to that place from Turkestan. Counsel was held with these menas to the manner of receiving the British Mission; but there was aninfluential military party averse to peace, and the Amir was stronglyadvised to abandon the English alliance and trust to Russia. Uponhearing this, our agent became alarmed for the safety of the Mission, and being apprehensive that Yakub Khan would not have the power toprotect its members from insult, he suggested to the Amir that heshould visit our camp instead of the British Mission coming to Kabul, a suggestion which was ultimately adopted, the Viceroy consideringthat it was infinitely the best arrangement that could be made. 

On the 8th May the Amir arrived in Sir Samuel Browne's camp atGandamak, thirty miles on the Kabul side of Jalalabad, and on the26th, owing to the tact and diplomatic skill of Louis Cavagnari, theTreaty of Gandamak was signed, and so ended the first phase of thesecond Afghan war. 

Under the terms of the treaty, Yakub Khan agreed to the cession ofterritory considered necessary by us, and bound himself to conducthis foreign policy in accordance with the advice of the BritishGovernment; while, on our side, we promised to support him againstexternal aggression. It was further arranged that a Britishrepresentative, with a suitable escort, should reside at Kabul;[2]that the Amir should in like manner (if he desired it) depute an agentto the Viceregal Court; that British agents with sufficient escortsshould be at liberty to visit the Afghan frontiers whenever, in theinterests of both countries, it was considered necessary by theBritish Government; that there should be no hindrance to Britishsubjects trading peaceably within the Amir's dominions; that tradersshould be protected, the transit of merchandise facilitated, and roadskept in good order; that a line of telegraph should be constructedfrom India to Kabul, at the expense of the British, but under theprotection of the Afghan Government; and that an annual subsidy of sixlakhs of rupees should be paid to the Amir and his successors. 

The Khyber column was now withdrawn, with the exception of twobrigades, and orders were sent to the Kandahar column to prepare towithdraw on the 1st September, the earliest date at which the troopscould safely march through the Bolan Pass. I was told to stay whereI was, as Kuram, by the treaty conditions, was to remain under ourcontrol and be administered by the British Government. 

On the 24th May I held a parade in honour of the Queen's birthday, atwhich 6, 450 officers and men were present. [3] They were thoroughly fitand workmanlike, and being anxious that the tribesmen should see whatgrand soldiers I had at hand should an advance be necessary, I invitedall the neighbouring clans to witness the display. The Afghans wereseated in picturesque groups round the flag-staff, when suddenly, asthe first round of the _feu-de-joie_ was fired, they started to theirfeet, thinking that treachery was intended, and that they werecaught in a trap: they took to their heels, and we had considerabledifficulty in bringing them back, and in making them understand thatthe firing which had so upset their equanimity was only a sign ofrejoicing on that auspicious anniversary. By degrees they becameassured that there was no thought of taking an unfair advantage ofthem, and at the conclusion of the ceremony they were made happy by apresent of sheep. In the afternoon an impromptu rifle meeting was gotup. The matchlock men could not hold their own against our good shotsarmed with Martini-Henry rifles, a fact which evidently greatlyimpressed the tribesmen, some of whom then and there came forward andpromised that if I should be required to advance on Kabul they wouldnot oppose me. 

I took advantage of our improved relations with the Afghans, consequent on the ratification of the treaty, to enlarge ourgeographical knowledge of the passes which lead from Kuram towardsKabul, and the independent territories in the neighbourhood. Thepresence of the troops, no doubt, had something to say to the cheerfulacquiescence of the tribesmen in these explorations, which theyappeared to look upon as the result of a wish to make ourselvesacquainted with the country assigned to us by the treaty, and having, to use their own expression, lifted for us the _purdah_ (curtain) oftheir country, they became most friendly, and took a curious pleasurein pointing out to us the points of defence at which they would haveopposed us, had we been advancing as enemies. 

Towards the end of June I heard from Lord Lytton that he wished me tobe one of the military members of a Commission of Inquiry into armyexpenditure and organization which was about to be convened at Simla, if I thought I could be spared from my post at Kuram. The people ofthe valley had by this time settled down so contentedly, and thetribesmen showed themselves so peacefully disposed, that I thought Icould safely leave my post for a time, before returning to take up myabode in the neighbourhood for some years, as I hoped to do, when myappointment as Frontier Commissioner should have received the sanctionof the authorities in England. 

Meanwhile, however, some temporary arrangement was necessary for theadministration of Kuram, and I wrote to the Foreign Secretary (AlfredLyall), pointing out my views upon the subject. 

Seeing how much could be done with these wild people by personalinfluence, and how ready they were to submit to my decisions whendisputes arose amongst them--decisions at times literally given fromthe saddle--I was very adverse to their being handed over to someofficial who, from his training, would not be able to understanddealing out the rough-and-ready justice which alone was suited tothese lawless beings, and who could not imagine any question beingproperly settled without its having undergone the tedious process ofpassing through the law courts. Such a rule would, I knew, disgusta people accustomed to decide their quarrels at the point of thesword--a people to whom law and order had been hitherto unknown, and must be distasteful, until they had had time to realize theirbeneficial effects. Profitable employment and judicious managementwould in time, no doubt, turn them into peaceful subjects. Friendlyintercourse had already done much towards this end, and tribes who forgenerations had been at feud with each other now met, when visitingour camp, on common ground, without (much I think to their ownastonishment) wanting to cut each other's throats. What was furtherrequired, I conceived, was the opening up of the country by means ofroads, which would facilitate intercommunication and give remunerativeemployment to thousands who had hitherto lived by plunder andbloodshed. 

In answering my letter, the Foreign Secretary informed me that thefuture of Kuram would be settled when I reached Simla, whither Iwas to proceed so soon as I had seen the British Mission across thefrontier. 

On the 15th July Major Cavagnari, who had been selected as 'the Envoyand Plenipotentiary to His Highness the Amir of Kabul, ' arrived inKuram, accompanied by Mr. William Jenkins, C. I. E. , of the CivilService, and Lieutenant Hamilton, V. C. , Surgeon-Major Kelly, 25Cavalry and 50 Infantry of the Guides Corps. I, with some fiftyofficers who were anxious to do honour to the Envoy and see thecountry beyond Kuram, marched with Cavagnari to within five miles ofthe crest of the Shutargardan Pass, where we encamped, and my staffand I dined that evening with the Mission. After dinner I was asked topropose the health of Cavagnari and those with him, but somehow I didnot feel equal to the task; I was so thoroughly depressed, and my mindwas filled with such gloomy forebodings as to the fate of these finefellows, that I could not utter a word. Like many others, I thoughtthat peace had been signed too quickly, before, in fact, we hadinstilled that awe of us into the Afghan nation which would have beenthe only reliable guarantee for the safety of the Mission. Had weshown our strength by marching to Kabul in the first instance, whetheropposed or not, and there dictated the terms of the treaty, therewould have been some assurance for its being adhered to; as it was, I could not help feeling there was none, and that the chances wereagainst the Mission ever coming back. 

Cavagnari, however, showed no sign of sharing my forebodings; he andhis companions were in the best of spirits; he spoke most hopefully ofthe future, and talked of a tour he hoped to make with me in the coldweather along the northern and western frontiers of Afghanistan. Othermatters of intense interest to us both were discussed, and beforeseparating for the night it was arranged that Mrs. Cavagnari shouldeither join him in Kabul the following spring, or come and stay withmy wife and me in Kuram, where I had already laid the foundations of ahouse near the beautifully situated village of Shalufzan. 

Early next morning the Sirdar, who had been deputed by the Amir toreceive the Mission, came into camp, and soon we all started for thetop of the pass. We had gone about a mile, when we were joined by anescort of Afghan Cavalry, dressed something like British Dragoons, with the exception of their head-gear, which consisted of thediscarded helmets of the old Bengal Horse Artillery. They were mountedon small, useful-looking horses, and were armed with smooth-borecarbines and _tulwars_ (Native swords). 

As we ascended, curiously enough, we came across a solitary magpie, which I should not have noticed had not Cavagnari pointed it out andbegged me not to mention the fact of his having seen it to his wife, as she would be sure to consider it an unlucky omen. 

On reaching the Afghan camp, we were received in a large, tastefullydecorated tent, where tea was served, and we were afterwards conductedto the top of the mountain, where carpets were spread and more teapassed round, while we gazed on the fine view of the Logar valleywhich stretched out beneath us. 

On descending to the camp, we were invited to partake of dinner, served in Oriental fashion on a carpet spread on the ground. Everything was done most lavishly and gracefully, and nothing wasomitted that was calculated to do us honour. Nevertheless, I could notfeel happy as to the prospects of the Mission, and my heart sank as Iwished Cavagnari good-bye. When we had proceeded a few yards in ourdifferent directions, we both turned round, retraced our steps, shookhands once more, and parted for ever. 

I did not delay at Kuram; there was nothing to keep me there, and theprospect of getting back to my belongings and to civilization, nowthat all active work was at an end, was too alluring to be withstood. My wife met me at the foot of the Hills, and we drove up to Simlatogether. I was greeted by Lord Lytton and many kind friends mostwarmly, and had the gratification of hearing that I had been made aK. C. B. , and that I had been accorded the thanks of both Houses ofParliament. 

I was soon deep in the work of the Army Commission, which met forthe first time under the presidency of the Hon. Sir Ashley Eden, [4]K. C. S. I. , on the 1st August. The heavy loss to the revenues of India, consequent on the unfavourable rate of exchange, rendered extensivereductions in public expenditure imperative, and the object of thisCommission was to find out how the cost of the army could be reducedwithout impairing its efficiency. 

Very little was done at the first meeting, and at its close Edenconfessed to me that he did not at all see his way, and that he wassomewhat aghast at the difficulties of the task before the Commission. To me it seemed clear that the maintenance of a separate army for eachpresidency, Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, was at the root of the evilsit was our duty to consider and try to reform; and I promised thePresident that, before the Commission again assembled, I would preparea scheme which might form a basis for them to work upon. 

I considered it an anachronism, since railways and telegraphs hadannihilated distance, to keep up three Commanders-in-Chief, andseparate departments, each having an independent head, in the threedifferent presidencies. I put my ideas on paper, and Eden announcedhimself in favour of my scheme, which substituted for the threepresidential armies four army corps, all subordinate to theCommander-in-Chief in India. Portions of my recommendation began tobe carried into effect directly they had received the sanction of theauthorities in England--such as the amalgamation of the Commissariat, Pay, Ordnance, and Stud departments--but it was not until April, 1895, sixteen years after the proposal had been recommended by theGovernment of India, and although, during that period, four successiveViceroys, each backed up by a unanimous Council, had declaredthemselves strongly in favour of the change, that the finishing touchwas given to the new organization, by the abolition of the offices ofCommanders-in-Chief of Madras and Bombay, and the creation of fourArmy Corps, namely, the Punjab, the Bengal, the Madras, and theBombay, each commanded by a Lieutenant-General. 

[Footnote 1: The late Major-General Sir George Colley, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: Kabul was expressly selected by Yakub Khan as the placewhere he wished the Embassy to reside. ]

[Footnote 3: At this parade I had the great pleasure of decoratingCaptain Cook with the Victoria Cross, and Subadar Ragobir Nagarkoti, Jemadar Pursoo Khatri, Native Doctor Sankar Dass, and five riflemen ofthe 5th Gurkhas, with the Order of Merit, for their gallant conductin the attack on the Spingawi Kotal, and during the passage of theMangior defile. It was a happy circumstance that Major Galbraith, whoowed his life to Captain Cook's intrepidity, and Major Fitz-Hugh, whose life was saved by Jemadar (then Havildar) Pursoo Khatri, shouldboth have been present on the parade. ]

[Footnote 4: Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER XLIX. 1879

 Massacre of the Embassy--The Kabul Field Force --Lord Lytton's foresightedness--Start for Kabul--Letter to the Amir --Proclamation to the people of Kabul--Yakub Khan's agents --Reasons for remaining at Alikhel

My wife and I thought and talked much over our new life on thefrontier, to which we both looked forward with great interest andpleasure, but, before entering upon it, we settled to go home fora time to place our boy at school and see our friends, and we werearranging our plans accordingly, when suddenly our 'castles in theair' were dashed to the ground by a ruthless blow from the hand ofFate, and the whole of India, the whole of the civilized world, wasstruck with grief, horror, and indignation at the awful news of themassacre at Kabul of Cavagnari and his gallant companions. 

Throughout the month of August telegrams and letters constantly camefrom Cavagnari (now a Lieutenant-Colonel and a K. C. B. ) to the Viceroy, the Foreign Secretary, and myself, in which he always expressedhimself in such a manner as to lead to the belief that he wasperfectly content with his position, and felt himself quite secure;and in his very last letter, dated the 30th August, received after hisdeath, he wrote: 'I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn outto be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him tohis engagements. ' His last telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2ndSeptember, concluded with the words, 'All well. ' Cavagnari mentionedin one of his letters that the Afghan soldiers were inclined to bemutinous, and in another that a dispute had arisen in the bazaarbetween them and the men of the British escort, but at the same timehe expressed his confidence in the Amir's ability and determinationto maintain order; I could not, however, help being anxious aboutCavagnari, or divest myself of the feeling that he might beover-estimating Yakub Khan's power, even if His Highness had the will, to protect the Mission. 

Between one and two o'clock on the morning of the 5th September, I wasawakened by my wife telling me that a telegraph man had been wanderinground the house and calling for some time, but that no one hadanswered him. [1] I got up, went downstairs, and, taking the telegramfrom the man, brought it up to my dressing-room, and opened it; itproved to be from Captain Conolly, Political Officer at Alikhel, datedthe 4th September. The contents told me that my worst fears--fears Ihad hardly acknowledged to myself--had been only too fully realized. The telegram ran:

 'One Jelaladin Ghilzai, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari's secret service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns, and being joined by a portion of six other regiments. The Embassy and escort were defending themselves when he left about noon yesterday. I hope to receive further news. '

I was paralyzed for the moment, but was roused by my wife calling out, 'What is it? Is it bad news from Kabul?' She had divined my fearsabout Cavagnari, and had been as anxious about him as I had beenmyself. I replied, 'Yes, very bad, if true. I hope it is not. ' But Ifelt it was. I woke my A. D. C. , and sent him off at once to the Viceroywith the telegram. The evil tidings spread rapidly. I was no soonerdressed than Mr. Alfred Lyall arrived. We talked matters over, Idespatched a telegram[2] to Captain Conolly, and we then went off toLord Lytton. 

Early as it was, I found the Council assembled. The gravity of thesituation was thoroughly appreciated, and it was unanimously decidedthat, should the disastrous report prove to be true, troops mustproceed to Kabul with the least possible delay to avenge or, ifhappily incorrect or exaggerated, to support the Mission. 

Sir Samuel Browne's force had been broken up, Sir Donald Stewart wasin far off Kandahar, and his troops had, all but a small number, lefton their return march to India; the Kuram force was, therefore, theonly one in a position to reach Kabul quickly, and I was ordered toproceed at once to Kuram and resume my command. 

As a preliminary measure, Brigadier-General Massy, who had been placedin temporary command during my absence, was directed to move troopsto the Shutargardan, where they were to entrench themselves and awaitorders, while Stewart was directed to stop all regiments on their wayback to India, and himself hold fast at Kandahar. 

During the day further telegrams were received confirming the truth ofthe first report, and telling of the Mission having been overwhelmedand every member of it cruelly massacred; and later Captain Conollytelegraphed that messengers had arrived from the Amir bringing twoletters addressed to me giving his version of what had occurred. 

During the few hours I remained at Simla I was busily engaged indiscussing with Sir Frederick Haines the formation of the Kabul FieldForce, [3] as my new command was designated, and the many importantmatters which had to be considered. More troops had to be hurried up, for it would be necessary to hold Kuram in strength while I movedon to Kabul, and, as communication by the Shutargardan could not bedepended upon after December, on account of snow, the Khyber routewould have to be opened out. 

At the commencement of the last year's campaign my anxiety had been solargely increased by having been given officers totally inexperiencedin war to fill the higher posts in the Kuram column, that I did nothesitate to press upon the Commander-in-Chief, now that I had a farmore difficult operation to carry through, the importance of my seniorofficers being tried men on whom I could implicitly rely; and Isucceeded in getting for the command of my two Infantry brigadesHerbert Macpherson[4] and T. D. Baker, [5] the Viceroy's MilitarySecretary, both of whom had seen a good deal of service, while theformer had already commanded a brigade in the field. 

To the command of the Artillery and Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Gordon and Brigadier-General Massy were appointed, neither of whom hadmuch experience of war. Gordon had served in Central India duringthe Mutiny, and Massy by his pluck as a subaltern of Infantry in theCrimea had gained for himself the _sobriquet_ of 'Redan' Massy. Buthe had not served with Cavalry in the field, and from my slightacquaintance with him I could not say whether he possessed the veryexceptional qualities required in a Cavalry Commander. 

My staff had proved themselves so capable and reliable that I had nowish to make any change; it was, however, materially strengthened bythe addition of Colonel MacGregor, [6] as 'Chief of the Staff, ' withCaptain Combe, [7] 10th Hussars, and Lieutenant Manners Smith[8] asDeputy-Assistant Quartermaster-Generals. 

Mr. H. M. Durand[9] was attached to me as Political Secretary, andMajor Hastings as Political Officer, in place of Colonel Waterfield, who was _hors de combat_ from a broken leg. Hugh Gough, with the rankof Brigadier-General, and Major Mark Heathcote as his assistant, wereplaced in charge of the lines of communication. 

Before leaving Simla I paid a farewell visit to Lord Lytton. I foundhim in a state of deep distress and depression. To a man of hisaffectionate disposition, the fate of Cavagnari, for whom he had agreat personal regard, was a real grief. But on public grounds he feltstill more strongly the collapse of the Mission and the consequentheavy blow to the policy he had so much at heart, viz. , therectification of our defective frontier, and the rendering Indiasecure against foreign aggression--a policy which, though scouted atthe time by a party which later became all-powerful, has since beenjustified by the action of successive Governments, Liberal andConservative alike, until at the present moment our frontier isgradually becoming what Lord Lytton, with his clear foresightednessand intelligent appreciation of our responsibilities and India'srequirements, would then have made it. 

In answer to my request for instructions as to the line I should takeabout our future relations with the Afghans, Lord Lytton said:'You can tell them we shall never again altogether withdraw fromAfghanistan, and that those who help you will be befriended andprotected by the British Government. '

While I was with Lord Lytton, a telegram[10] was brought in fromCaptain Conolly, reporting the details of the attack upon the Embassy, as given to him by the messenger who had been entrusted by the Amirto deliver the two letters addressed to me. In this telegram Conollysolicited instructions as to what he was to communicate to the Amir inreply to His Highness's request for aid, and inquired whether he wasat liberty to make terms with one Badshah Khan, an influential GhilzaiChief, who had come to Alikhel to offer his services. 

The following telegram was sent in reply by the Foreign Secretary:

 'Your telegram 6th. Reply to the Amir at once from the Viceroy that a strong British force under General Roberts will march speedily on Kabul to his relief, from the Shutargardan, and that he should use all his resources to co-operate with, and facilitate, the advance of the troops through his country. Your proposal to subsidize Badshah Khan and accept his services is approved. Roberts will send detailed instructions. '

Late in the afternoon of the same day (September 6th) I left Simla, accompanied by my wife as far as Umballa, where I found my staffwaiting for me. She saw us off in the train, bidding us a cheerygood-bye and good luck, but I am afraid the return journey must havebeen a sad one for her. 

Thought for the immediate future filled my mind as we sped on our wayto the front, and not a few difficulties connected with the proposedadvance on Kabul presented themselves to me. My chief causes foranxiety were the insufficiency of transport, and the great extent ofthe lines of communication which would have to be guarded. It wouldbe necessary to hold the country in strength from Thal to theShutargardan, a distance of 115 miles, until such time as the Khyberroute could be opened, and I felt that the force at my disposal(7, 500 men and 22 guns) was none too large for the work beforeit, considering that I should have to provide a garrison for theShutargardan, if not for other posts between that place and Kabul. 

My Commissariat arrangements, too, caused me many misgivings, increased by the fact that Major Badcock, my chief CommissariatOfficer, and Major Collett, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, whohad afforded such valuable aid in Kuram, thinking the war was at anend, had taken leave to England. My doubts vanished, however, and myspirits rose at the sight of my brave troops, and the enthusiasticwelcome they gave me as I rode through Kuram on the 12th September onmy way to Alikhel. A splendid spirit pervaded the whole force; themen's hearts were on fire with eager desire to press on to Kabul, andbe led against the miscreants who had foully massacred our countrymen, and I felt assured that whatever it was possible for dauntlesscourage, unselfish devotion, and firm determination to achieve, wouldbe achieved by my gallant soldiers. 

On reaching Alikhel, Captain Conolly handed to me the Amir'sletters, [11] to which I replied at once, and the next day, underinstructions from the Government of India, I wrote to His Highnessthat, in conformity with his own special request that an Englishofficer should be deputed as Envoy to his Court, and on condition thathe would himself be responsible for the protection and honourabletreatment of such an Envoy, Major Cavagnari and three British officershad been allowed to go to Kabul, all of whom within six weeks had beenruthlessly murdered by his troops and subjects; that his inability tocarry out the treaty engagements, and his powerlessness to establishhis authority, even in his own capital, having thus become apparent, an English army would now advance on Kabul with the double object ofconsolidating his Government, should he himself loyally do his best tofulfil the terms of the treaty, and of exacting retribution from themurderers of the British Mission. But that, although His Highness laidgreat stress in his letter of the 4th September on the sincerity ofhis friendship, my Government had been informed that emissaries hadbeen despatched from Kabul to rouse the country people and tribesagainst us, and as this action appeared inconsistent with friendlyintentions, I considered it necessary for His Highness to send aconfidential representative to confer with me and explain his object. 

I had little doubt as to the truth of the report that the Amir wasusing every effort to incite the Ghilzais and other tribes to opposeus, and I was confirmed in my conviction by a Native gentleman, NawabGhulam Hussein Khan, [12] at one time our agent at Kabul, who told methat, although he did not believe that Yakub Khan had actually plannedthe massacre of the Embassy, he had certainly taken no steps toprevent it, and that he, Ghulam Hussein Khan, was convinced that theAmir was now playing us false. It was, therefore, a relief tofind awaiting me at Alikhel several of the leading men from theneighbouring districts, to whom I had telegraphed, before leavingSimla, asking them to meet me. 

These men were profuse in their proffers of assistance, and, althoughI did not place a great deal of faith in their promises, I came to theconclusion that, notwithstanding Yakub Khan's treacherous efforts tostir up the tribes, if I could only push on rapidly with a fairlystrong force, I need not anticipate any opposition that I could notovercome. Everything depended on speed, but rapidity of movementdepended on the condition of the transport service, and my inspectionof the animals, as I passed through Kuram, was not calculated toraise hopes of being able to make a very quick advance; for, owingto continuous hard work and the want of a staff of trained transportattendants, the numbers of animals had steadily diminished, and thosethat remained were for the most part sickly and out of condition. 

On the 16th of September I issued a Proclamation, [13] copies of whichI caused to be sent to the people of Kabul, Ghazni, and all theneighbouring tribes; this, I hoped, would facilitate our advance, andreassure those who had taken no part in the attack on the Residency. I also wrote a letter[14] to the _maliks_ of the Logar valley, whoseterritory we must enter directly we had crossed the Shutargardan, andwhose co-operation I was most anxious to obtain. On the 18th I againwrote[15] to the Amir, enclosing copies of these two documents, andinforming him that I was still awaiting a reply to my first letterand the arrival of His Highness's confidential representative; that Ihoped he would soon issue the necessary orders for the furtherance ofour plans and that he might rest assured of the support of the BritishGovernment. 

On the 19th September matters had so far progressed that I was able totell the Viceroy that Brigadier-General Baker was entrenched with hisbrigade on the Shutargardan, and engaged in improving the road toKushi, the first halting-place in the Logar valley; that supplies werebeing collected by means of local transport; that I was bringing upreserve ammunition and treasure from the rear on Artillery waggons;and that every possible effort was being made to render the forcemobile. 

On the 20th I received the Amir's reply. He expressed regret thathe was unable to come to Alikhel himself, but intimated that he wassending two confidential agents, his Mustaufi (Finance Minister), Habibulla Khan, and his Wazir (Prime Minister), Shah Mahomed Khan, whoaccordingly arrived the next day. 

At each interview I had with these gentlemen during the three daysthey remained in my camp, they impressed upon me that the Amir wasinclined to be most friendly, and that his only wish was to be guidedby the advice of the British Government. But, notwithstanding theseplausible assurances, I soon discovered that Yakub Khan's real objectin sending these two high officials was to stop the advance of theforce, and induce me to leave the punishment of the troops who hadcommitted the massacre in the hands of the Afghan authorities, or elseto delay us long enough to give time for the whole country to riseagainst us. 

As the conversations which were carried on at the meetings with theAfghan agents are interesting, and have an important bearing on thesubsequent proceedings, I give in the Appendix* the notes taken at thetime by my Political Secretary. 

(*Appendix V. )

I was anxious to keep one of the Amir's representatives with me, butneither of them was willing to remain, so I felt bound to let themboth depart, taking with them the following letter to the Amir:

 TO HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL. 

 _Camp, Alikhel, 25th September, 1879. _

 (After compliments. ) I have received Your Highness's two letters of the 19th and 20th September (1st and 2nd Shawal), delivered to me by the hands of Your Highness's two confidential representatives, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed. 

 I am much obliged to Your Highness for sending me two such well-known men, and of such character as the Mustaufi and the Wazir. They have informed me of Your Highness's wishes, and I quite understand all they have told me. It is unfortunate that the season is so late, and that winter will soon be here; but there is yet time for a British army to reach Kabul before the great cold sets in. 

 The Viceroy of India is much concerned that there should have been any delay in promptly acceding to Your Highness's request for advice and assistance, as conveyed in Your Highness's letters of the 3rd and 4th instant. It was His Excellency's earnest wish that troops should march on Kabul at once, so as to ensure Your Highness's personal safety and aid Your Highness in restoring peace and order at your capital. 

 Unfortunately, the want of transport, and the necessity for collecting a certain amount of supplies, have caused a few weeks' delay; it is, however, a source of gratification and happiness to the Viceroy to learn that Your Highness's safety is not at present endangered, and His Excellency trusts Your Highness will be able to keep everything quiet in your kingdom, until such time as British troops may reach Kabul. 

 I am glad to be able to inform Your Highness that news reached me yesterday of the departure of a considerable force from Kandahar under the command of a brave and distinguished officer, and that a large body of troops, under command of General Bright, were advancing rapidly from Peshawar to Jalalabad and onwards _viâ_ Gandamak to Kabul. My own force will, I hope, be in a state to march before long. As Your Highness is aware, the Shutargardan has been occupied for some days. Meanwhile regiments of Cavalry and Infantry and batteries of Artillery have reached Kuram to replace those I am taking on with me, and to reinforce my own column should a necessity for more troops arise--a contingency I do not in the least expect. 

 The Viceroy of India, in His Excellency's anxiety for Your Highness's welfare and safety, issued orders that each of the three armies, now advancing from Kandahar, Kuram, and the Khyber, should be strong enough to overcome any opposition Your Highness's enemies could possibly offer. That each is strong enough there can be no doubt. 

 I understand that there is no one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai or Ghazni to stop the progress of the troops _en route_ from Kandahar. There is no reason, therefore, why they should not reach Kabul in a very short time. 

 The Khyber tribes, having understood and appreciated the Treaty of peace made by Your Highness with the British Government in May last, have unanimously agreed to assist the troops from Peshawar in every way, and are now eager to keep the road through the Khyber safe, and to place all their transport animals at the disposal of the British Commander, who will thus be enabled to concentrate his force rapidly at Kabul. Through the kindness of Your Highness I have experienced much less difficulty than I could have expected, and I may now reasonably hope to be with Your Highness at least as soon as either the Kandahar or Khyber column. I look forward with great pleasure to the meeting with Your Highness, and trust that you will continue your kind assistance to obtain for me supplies and transport. 

 I have carefully considered Your Highness's proposal that you yourself should be permitted to administer just punishment to the mutinous troops and others who shared in the treacherous and cruel attack on the British Envoy and his small escort, and thus save Her Majesty's troops the trouble, hardship, and privation which must necessarily be encountered by an advance on Kabul at this season of the year. I thank Your Highness most cordially, on the part of the Viceroy and Government of India, for this further proof of Your Highness's friendly feelings. Under ordinary circumstances such an offer would be gratefully and willingly accepted, but after what has recently occurred, I feel sure that the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British army marched to Kabul and there assisted Your Highness to inflict such punishments as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves. 

 I have forwarded Your Highness's letters in original to the Viceroy; a copy of this, my reply, will be submitted by to-day's post for His Excellency's consideration. Meanwhile I have permitted Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed to take their leave and rejoin Your Highness. 

I delayed my own departure from Alikhel until a sufficiency ofsupplies had been collected at Kushi, and everything was ready for asrapid an advance on Kabul as my limited transport would admit of; for, so long as I remained behind, the people of Afghanistan could notbe sure of my intentions, and no doubt hoped that the Amir'sremonstrances would have the desired effect, and prevent our doingmore than occupying the Shutargardan, or making a demonstration towardKushi. My crossing the pass would, I knew, be the signal for all thosedetermined on opposition to assemble; it was politic, therefore, toremain behind until the last moment. 

When all arrangements were complete, so far as was possible with themeans at my disposal, I issued the following Field Force Order:

 'The Government of India having decided that a force shall proceed with all possible despatch to Kabul, in response to His Highness the Amir's appeal for aid, and with the object of avenging the dastardly murder of the British representative and his escort, Sir Frederick Roberts feels sure that the troops under his command will respond to the call with a determination to prove themselves worthy of the high reputation they have maintained during the recent campaign. 

 'The Major-General need address no words of exhortation to soldiers whose courage and fortitude have been so well proved. The Afghan tribes are numerous, but without organization; the regular army is undisciplined, and whatever may be the disparity in numbers, such foes can never be formidable to British troops. The dictates of humanity require that a distinction should be made between the peaceable inhabitants of Afghanistan and the treacherous murderers for whom a just retribution is in store, and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to impress upon all ranks the necessity for treating the unoffending population with justice, forbearance, and clemency. 

 'The future comfort and well-being of the force depend largely on the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which supplies must be drawn; prompt payment is enjoined for all articles purchased by departments and individuals, and all disputes must be at once referred to a political officer for decision. 

 'The Major-General confidently looks forward to the successful accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and the establishment of order and a settled Government in Afghanistan. '

[Footnote 1: There are no such things as bells or knockers in India. ]

[Footnote 2: 'Lose no time and spare no money to obtain reliableinformation of what is going on in Kabul, and keep me constantlyinformed by urgent telegrams. I am in hopes that Jelaladin's reportwill turn out to be greatly exaggerated, if not untrue. As, however, his intelligence is sure to spread and cause a certain amount ofexcitement, warn General Massy and Mr. Christie (the Political Officerin Kuram) to be on the alert. ']

[Footnote 3: The Kabul Field Force was composed as follows:

 ARTILLERY. 

 Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, commanding. Captain J. W. Inge, Adjutant. F/A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major J. C. Smyth-Windham. G/3, Royal Artillery, Major Sydney Parry. No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (four guns), Captain Morgan. No. 2 (Derajât) Mountain Battery (four guns), Captain Swinley. Two Gatling guns, Captain Broadfoot. 

 ENGINEERS. 

 Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, C. B. , commanding. Lieutenant F. Spratt, Adjutant. Captain Woodthorpe, R. E. , in charge of surveying. Captain Stratton, 22nd Regiment, in charge of signalling. Lieutenant F. Burn-Murdoch, R. E. , Royal Engineer Park. 

 CAVALRY. 

 Brigadier-General W. D. Massy, commanding. Lieutenant J. P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major. 9th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Cleland. 5th Punjab Cavalry, Major B. Williams. 12th Bengal Cavalry, Major Green. 14th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross. 

 1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE. 

 Brigadier-General H. Macpherson, C. B. , V. C. , commanding. Captain G. De C. Morton, 6th Foot, Brigade-Major. 67th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Knowles. 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Parker. 28th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson. 

 2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE. 

 Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C. B. , 18th Foot, commanding. Captain W. C. Farwell, 26th Punjab Infantry, Brigade-Major. 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow. 5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh. 5th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Macqueen. 3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G. N. Money. 23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie. ]

[Footnote 4: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, V. C. , K. C. B. , who died as Commander-in-Chief of Madras. ]

[Footnote 5: The late Sir Thomas Baker, K. C. B. , who died asQuartermaster-General at the Horse Guards. ]

[Footnote 6: The late Sir Charles MacGregor, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 7: Now Major-General Combe, C. B. ]

[Footnote 8: This promising young officer greatly distinguishedhimself at Kabul, and died a few years afterwards of cholera. ]

[Footnote 9: Now Sir Mortimer Durand, K. C. S. I. , K. C. I. E. , BritishMinister at Teheran. ]

[Footnote 10: TELEGRAM DATED 6TH SEPTEMBER, 1879. 

 _From_ CAPTAIN CONOLLY, ALIKHEL. 

 _To_ FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIMLA. 

 '_Clear the Line. _--Sirkai Khan, bearer of the Amir's first letter, confirms previous reports of disaster, and describes how Badshah Khan visited the spot, and saw the dead bodies of the Envoy, staff, and escort. Of the latter, some nine sowars are said to have been out getting grass that day, and were not killed with the rest; defence was very stubborn, and the loss of the Kabulis heavy, put down at one hundred, or more. Finding they could not storm the place, the mutineers set fire to the doorway below, and, when that gave way, swarmed in and up to the upper story, overwhelmed the defenders, and sacked the place. 

 'The second letter was brought by another messenger, servant of the Embassy _Mehmandar_, whose story in all but a few unimportant details is the same as that first received. 

 'If an advance on Kabul is decided on to revenge massacre of Embassy, and also to quiet surrounding tribes, whom any (?) action would tempt to break out, it appears to me all-important to secure safe passage of the Shutargardan, and with this object to subsidize Badshah Khan handsomely. 

 'I have detained the Kabul messengers pending receipt of instructions as to the line of policy to follow, and what to communicate to the Amir or Badshah Khan. The former invokes our aid; the latter expresses himself, through his messenger, anxious to serve us. Once in Logar valley, where they have had a bumper harvest, we could live on the country. ']

[Footnote 11: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM THE AMIR OF KABUL TOGENERAL ROBERTS, DATED KABUL, 8 A. M. , THE 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1879. 

 (After compliments. ) The troops who had assembled for pay at the Bala Hissar suddenly broke out and stoned their officers, and then all rushed to the Residency and stoned it, receiving in return a hail of bullets. Confusion and disturbance reached such a height that it was impossible to quiet it. People from Sherpur and country around the Bala Hissar, and city people of all classes, poured into the Bala Hissar and began destroying workshops, Artillery park, and magazine; and all the troops and people attacked the Residency. Meanwhile, I sent Daud Shah[*] to help the Envoy. On reaching the Residency, he was unhorsed by stones and spears, and is now dying. I then sent Sirdar Yahia Khan and my own son, the heir-apparent, with the Koran to the troops; but no use. I then sent well-known Syads and Mullahs of each class, but of no avail; up till now, evening, the disturbance continues. It will be seen how it ends. I am grieved with this confusing state of things. It is almost beyond conception. (Here follow the date and the Amir's seal. )

 (Note *: The Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army. )

SECOND LETTER FROM THE AMIR, DATED KABUL, THE 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1879. 

 Yesterday, from 8 a. M. Till evening, thousands assembled to destroy the Embassy. There has been much loss of life on both sides. At evening they set fire to the Residency. All yesterday and up till now, I with five attendants have been besieged. I have no certain news of the Envoy, whether he and his people have been killed in their quarters, or been seized and brought out. Afghanistan is ruined; the troops, city, and surrounding country have thrown off their yoke of allegiance. Daud Shah is not expected to recover; all his attendants were killed. The workshops and magazine are totally gutted--in fact, my kingdom is ruined. After God, I look to the Government for aid and advice. My true friendship and honesty of purpose will be proved as clear as daylight. By this misfortune I have lost my friend, the Envoy, and also my kingdom. I am terribly grieved and perplexed. (Here follow the date and the Amir's seal. )]

[Footnote 12: The Nawab was on his way from Kandahar to Kabul, but onhearing of the massacre he came to Alikhel. ]

[Footnote 13: TRANSLATION OF A PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY MAJOR-GENERALSIR FREDERICK ROBERTS. 

 _Alikhel, 16th September_, 1879. 

 Be it known to all the Chiefs and the people of the country of Kabul and its dependencies that, in accordance with the Treaty concluded in May, 1879, corresponding to Jamdi-ul-Akhir 1296 Hijri, between the two great Governments, and to the terms of which His Highness the Amir expressed his assent, and agreed to the location of an Envoy of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress, a British Envoy was, at the special request of His Highness the Amir, located at the Kabul Court, and the Amir guaranteed that he should be treated honourably and protected. 

 Within six weeks after the said Envoy was received at and entered Kabul the whole Embassy was besieged and massacred in the very citadel of His Highness the Amir, who could not save or protect them from the hands of the soldiers and the people. From this, the lack of power of the Amir and the weakness of his authority in his capital itself are quite apparent and manifest. For this reason the British troops are advancing for the purpose of taking a public vengeance on behalf of the deceased as well as of obtaining satisfaction (_lit. _, consolidation) of the terms entered into in the Treaty concluded. The British troops are entering Afghanistan for the purpose of strengthening the royal authority of His Highness the Amir on condition that His Highness loyally uses those powers for the maintenance of friendship and of amicable relations with the British Government. This is the only course by which the Amir's kingdom can remain intact, and (by which) also the friendly sentiments and sincerity expressed in his letter of the 4th September, 1879, after the occurrence of the (said) event can be proved. 

 For the purpose of removing any doubt about the concord of the two Governments, the Amir has been addressed to depute a confidential agent to my camp. The British force will not punish or injure anyone except the persons who have taken part or joined in the massacre of the Embassy unless they offer opposition. All the rest, the small and great, who are unconcerned (therein) may rest assured of this. Carriage and supplies of every description should be brought into the British camp. Full price and hire shall be paid for everything that may be taken. Whereas mercy and humanity are the characteristics of this great Government, this proclamation is issued beforehand for the information of the people at large. ]

[Footnote 14: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICKROBERTS TO CERTAIN _maliks_ OF THE LOGAR VALLEY. 

 From the Proclamation already issued by me, you will have learnt the reasons for the march of the British troops to Kabul. Her Majesty's Government, by the movement of troops, intends to exact retribution for the massacre of the Embassy and to aid His Highness the Amir in restoring order. 

 Let all those not concerned in the massacre rest assured, provided no opposition is shown, His Highness the Amir, in communications received by me, expresses his friendship, and wishes to continue amicable relations. As the British troops under my command will shortly enter the Logar valley I write to reassure you, and expect that you will inform all the residents of the valley not concerned in the late hateful massacre the purport of the Proclamation, and give every assistance in providing carriage and supplies required for the troops for which adequate hire and payment will be made. I hope that after the above assurance all the headmen will come to meet me in my camp where I shall be glad to see them. ]

[Footnote 15: This letter is given in full in the Appendix. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER L. 1879

 Hector Macdonald and Sher Mahomed--Yakub Khan --A Proclamation and an Order--The _maliks_ of Logar --Attack on the Shutargardan--Reconnoitring roads leading to Kabul

On the 27th September I made over the Kuram command toBrigadier-General T. Gordon, and set out for Kushi, where Baker wasnow encamped. 

Just before I started I had the pleasure of welcoming my old friendand brother officer, Major-General J. Hills, V. C. , C. B. , who hadbeen with Sir Donald Stewart as Assistant Adjutant-General from thebeginning of the campaign, and who had, the moment he heard there wasto be an advance on Kabul, come with all speed to place his servicesat my disposal. Although I had no employment for Hills at the time, there would be plenty for all to do at Kabul, and I was delighted tohave so good a soldier with me. 

My escort consisted of the Head-Quarters of the Cavalry brigade, onesquadron 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and detachments of the 5thand 28th Punjab Infantry. We had only gone about halfway through thepass when I pushed on with the Cavalry, in the hope of reaching thecamp on the top before dark, and was very soon met by twenty-five menof the 92nd Highlanders, who brought me a note from Colonel Perkins, R. E. , in command on the Shutargardan, warning me that we were sure tobe attacked. We had not proceeded far, when at the narrowest part ofthe defile we found the passage blocked by some 2, 000 Afghans, and aswe approached a volley was fired from a party concealed by some rockson our left. I was told afterwards that it was intended for me, but Iremained unscathed, and the principal medical officer, Dr. Townsend, who was riding on my right, and to whom I was talking at the moment, was severely wounded. The Highlanders, supported by some dismountedCavalry, cleared away the enemy to the north, but as they clung to theprecipitous hills on the south, we had to wait till the main body ofthe escort came up, when they were speedily dispersed. 

Meanwhile, a sharp little engagement had taken place further up thegorge, and as we advanced we could see the enemy retiring before adetachment of the 92nd Highlanders, under Colour-Sergeant HectorMacdonald, and of the 3rd Sikhs, under Jemadar Sher Mahomed, a Nativeof Kabul. The manner in which the Colour-Sergeant and the Nativeofficer handled their men gave me a high opinion of them both. [1]

On the top of the Shutargardan Pass that evening I received the Amir'sreply[2] to my last letter, in which he expressed his gratitude forthe sympathy and support afforded him by the British Government, andinformed me that he had given orders to the Governor of Jalalabad thatthe Khyber column should not meet with any opposition. I was alsogiven a letter from Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, and several otherSirdars, professing loyalty to the British Government, and expressingpleasure at my approach. And at the same time the rather embarrassinginformation reached me that the Amir, desiring personal communicationwith me, had already arrived in Baker's camp at Kushi, attended by hisson Musa Khan, a lad about seven years old, his father-in-law, and theCommander-in-Chief of the Afghan army (Daud Shah), with a suite of 45members and an escort of 200 men. 

Although I had met with but slight opposition hitherto, it was evidentfrom the secret information I received that the Ghilzais were inclinedto be hostile, and intended to oppose us, and as it was important tokeep open communication with Alikhel through their country, I arrangedfor the Shutargardan to be held by a Mountain battery, the 3rd Sikhs, and the 21st Punjab Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-ColonelG. N. Money, an officer on whose judgment and coolness I knew I couldrely. 

The next morning I rode to Kushi, where my first interview with theAmir of Afghanistan took place. 

I cannot say that I was favourably impressed by his appearance. He wasan insignificant-looking man, about thirty-two years of age, with areceding forehead, a conical-shaped head, and no chin to speak of, and he gave me the idea of being entirely wanting in that force ofcharacter without which no one could hope to govern or hold in checkthe warlike and turbulent people of Afghanistan. He was possessed, moreover, of a very shifty eye, he could not look one straight in theface, and from the first I felt that his appearance tallied exactlywith the double-dealing that had been imputed to him. His presence inmy camp was a source of the gravest anxiety to me. He was constantlyreceiving and sending messages, and was no doubt giving his friendsat Kabul all the information he could collect as to our resources andintentions. He had, however, come ostensibly as our ally, seekingrefuge from his mutinous soldiers, and whatever suspicions I mightsecretly entertain, I could only treat him as an honoured guest, solong as there was nothing proved against him. 

My first visit to Yakub Khan was of a formal character. Nevertheless, he seized the opportunity to urge strongly upon me the advisabilityof delaying my advance, that he might have time, he said, to restoreorder amongst his troops, and to punish those who had participated inthe attack on the Embassy. I replied that my orders were peremptory, and that it was my duty, as it was my determination, to press on toKabul with all possible speed. Finding that his arguments had noeffect, he changed his tactics, and declared that he was much alarmedfor the safety of his family, whom he had left in the Bala Hissar;that he had only one regiment on which he could depend; that he fearedwhen the others should hear of our approach they would break outand attack the citadel; and that the innocent people in Kabul, notconsidering it possible that a British force could get there soquickly, had made no arrangements to convey their families away. 

Feeling that anxiety for the safety of the families was not the truecause for the Amir's efforts to delay us, and that his sole objectwas to gain time for the development of plans for opposing ouradvance--which subsequent events proved had been made with greatcare--I told him it was impossible to accede to his wishes, but thattime would be given for all women and children to clear out of thecity if it should prove necessary to attack it. This necessity, however, I was most anxious to avoid, and earnestly hoped thatour fighting would be over before we entered Kabul, for I had notforgotten Delhi, and I dreaded the idea of the troops having to forcetheir way through narrow streets and crowded bazaars. 

Yakub Khan was evidently much chagrined at my decision. He had leftKabul hurriedly, his movements probably being hastened by hearing thathis uncle, Wali Mahomed Khan, and several other Sirdars with whom hewas at enmity, were on their way to join me. He had not even broughta tent with him, and, had he succeeded in inducing me to delay ouradvance, he would without doubt have returned to Kabul at once. As itwas, he was accommodated with a tent in the centre of the camp, andthe best arrangements possible, under the circumstances, made for hisentertainment. 

When his own tents arrived, he asked leave to have them pitchedoutside camp limits. To this I consented, at the same time orderingthat a guard of the same strength as my own should be detailed as hisescort, ostensibly to do him honour, but in reality that I mightbe kept informed as to his movements. Unwelcome guest as he was, Ithought the least of two evils was to keep him now that we had gothim, as his presence in Kabul would be sure to increase the oppositionI felt certain we should encounter. 

In response to the fears expressed by the Amir as to the safety of thenon-combatants, I issued the following Proclamation to the people ofKabul:

 'Be it known to all that the British Army is advancing on Kabul to take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully, well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force. Therefore, all well-disposed persons, who have taken no part in the dastardly murder of the British Envoy, or in the plunder of the Residency, are warned that, if they are unable to prevent resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army, and the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate arrangements for their own safety, either by coming to the British camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as the British Government does not make war on women and children, warning is given that all women and children should be removed from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution from offenders. Every effort will, therefore, be made to prevent the innocent suffering with the guilty, but it is necessary that the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition. 

 'After receipt of this Proclamation, therefore, all persons found armed in or about Kabul will be treated as enemies of the British Government; and, further, it must be distinctly understood that, if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold myself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to the persons or property of even well-disposed people, who may have neglected this warning. '

At the same time, the matter having been brought to my notice by LordLytton, and bearing in my mind that my father had told me one ofthe chief causes of the outbreak in Kabul in 1841 was the Afghans'jealousy of their women, and resentment at the European soldiers'intimacy with them, I thought it well to impress upon all thenecessity for caution in this respect by publishing the followingOrder:

 'Sir Frederick Roberts desires General officers, and officers commanding corps, to impress upon all officers under their command the necessity for constant vigilance in preventing irregularities likely to arouse the personal jealousies of the people of Kabul, who are, of all races, most susceptible as regards their women. 

 'The deep-seated animosity of the Afghans towards the English has been mainly ascribed to indiscretions committed during the first occupation of Kabul, and the Major-General trusts that the same excellent discipline so long exhibited by the troops under his command will remove the prejudices of past years, and cause the British name to be as highly respected in Afghanistan as it is throughout the civilized world. [3]

On the 30th September (my forty-seventh birthday), all arrangementswhich it was possible for me to make having been completed, theCavalry brigade marched eight miles to Zargunshahr, the firsthalting-place on the way to Kabul. I accompanied it, for I wasinformed that Wali Mahomed Khan and the Sirdars had arrived so far, and I could not let them come on to my camp so long as the Amir wasstill in it. I wished, also, to interview the Logar _maliks_ andascertain whether I could procure supplies from their valley. Therewas bread-stuff with the force sufficient for fourteen days, but forthe transport of so much grain a large number of animals was required, which could ill be spared, for carriage was so short that I could onlymove a little more than half the troops at one time, and instead ofbeing able to march direct on Kabul with 6, 000 men, a halt would haveto be made every other day to admit of the animals going back to bringup the rear brigade, which practically meant my only having at mydisposal rather more than half that number at any one time. Howfervently I wished that those in authority, who never can see thenecessity for maintaining transport in time of peace, could be made torealize the result of their short-sightedness--the danger of having todivide a none too large force in an enemy's country, the consequentrisk of failure, the enormous increase of anxiety to the Commander, the delay in achieving the object of the campaign, and the additionallabour to all concerned in an undertaking, arduous enough under themost favourable circumstances, in a difficult country, and undera burning eastern sun, even if possessed of good and sufficienttransport. 

Stores had been collected at Kushi partly by means of local carriage, and partly by our own animals doing the journey twice over fromAlikhel, a distance of thirty-six miles. So hard pressed was I fortransport that I had to make the Cavalry soldiers march on foot andlead their horses laden with grain--an unusual piece of duty, whichwas, however, performed with the cheerful alacrity which the troops ofthe Kabul Field Force always displayed. 

But all this is a digression. To return to my story. The _maliks_of Logar, greatly to my relief, agreed to bring a certain amount ofsupplies; while Wali Mahomed Khan and the other Sirdars were full ofprotestations of loyalty and devotion. Most of them remained with meall the time I was in Kabul, and some of them afforded me considerableassistance. The Sirdars warned me to place no trust in the Amir, andenlarged on the treachery of his conduct, but as I knew they lookedupon Yakub Khan as their own deadly enemy, I accepted their counselwith some reservation. I was not, however, able to feel quite at easeabout the proceedings of my Royal guest, so I returned to Kushi thatsame evening. 

On the 1st October the whole of the Kabul Field Force was assembled inthe Logar valley. [4]

I waited at Kushi with the last of the Infantry until the morning ofthe 2nd. Just as I was leaving camp, I became aware that firing wasgoing on in the direction of the Shutargardan, and later in the day Ireceived a report from Colonel Money as to what had happened there. 

The enemy, emboldened by the diminished numbers of the garrison, andundervaluing what might be accomplished by a small number of goodsoldiers, had assembled in force, and occupied the crest of themountain, the only place from which heliographic communication with mecould be kept up. Money very properly decided that this could not bepermitted, and considered it best to take the initiative before theenemy should become still stronger, so ordered an advance. Under coverof the Mountain battery's fire, Major Griffiths, of the 3rd Sikhs, with 200 of his own men and 50 of the 21st Punjab Infantry, supportedby 150 rifles of the latter corps, stormed the Afghans' position. The assault, delivered in a most spirited manner, was perfectlysuccessful. 

Major Griffiths, however, was wounded, also a signalling sergeant ofthe 67th Foot and five men of the 3rd Sikhs, while the enemy leftthirty dead on the ground, and were pursued down the slope of the hillwithout making any attempt to rally. 

On the 3rd we marched fifteen miles to Zahidabad, where we first camein sight of the fortified hill above Kabul. The rear guard was firedinto on the way, and we had considerable difficulty in crossingthe Logar river, as the water from a large irrigation cut had beendirected back into the stream just above the ford. Our only casualtyon this day was Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, who was wounded in the hand. 

It was plain from these occurrences, and from the attack on theShutargardan, that the people generally were not disposed to befriendly. From the Amir I could extract no information on this head, although he must have been fully aware of the feelings and intentionsof his subjects. He was in constant communication with Kabul, and wasfrequently being met by mounted messengers, who, from the haste withwhich they travelled, as evidenced by the exhausted state of theirhorses and the eagerness with which the Amir read the letters theybrought, appeared to be the bearers of important tidings. 

It may be imagined how irritating and embarrassing was Yakub Khan'spresence, since his position in my camp enabled him to give theleaders at Kabul accurate information as to our numbers and movements. That he felt pretty sure of our discomfiture was apparent from hischange of manner, which, from being at first a mixture of extremecordiality and cringing servility, became as we neared Kabul distant, and even haughty. 

On the 5th October, one month from the receipt at Simla of the eviltidings of the fate of the British Embassy, we reached the prettylittle village of Charasia, nestling in orchards and gardens, with arugged range of hills towering above it about a mile away. This rangedescended abruptly on the right to permit the exit of the Logar river, and rose again on its other side in precipitous cliffs, forming a finegorge[5] about halfway between our camp and Kabul city, now only fromten to twelve miles distant. 

An uncle of the Amir (Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan), and a General in theAfghan army, came out to meet Yakub Khan at this place; he remainedsome time in earnest conversation with his nephew, and, as he wasabout to remount his horse, called out in so loud a tone that it wasevidently meant for us all to hear, that he was 'now going to dispersethe troops. '[6] Very different, however, was the story brought to meby an escaped Native servant of Cavagnari's, who came into our camplater in the day. This man declared that preparations for fightingwere steadily being carried on; that the soldiers and townspeople werestreaming into the arsenal and supplying themselves with cartridges;that large bodies of troops were moving out in our direction; andthat, when we advanced next day, we should certainly be opposed by aformidable force. The Amir, on having this intelligence communicatedto him, pretended to disbelieve it utterly, and assured me that allwas at peace in the city, that Nek Mahomed would keep the troopsquiet, and that I should have no trouble; but I was not taken in byhis specious assurances. 

Now more than ever I felt the want of sufficient transport! Had itbeen possible to have the whole of my force with me, I should haveadvanced at once, and have occupied that evening the range of hills Ihave described; but Macpherson's brigade was still a march behind, and all I could do was, immediately on arrival, to send back everyavailable transport animal to bring it up. I pushed forward Cavalrypatrols along the three roads leading to Kabul, and rode out myself toreconnoitre the position in front. It was sufficiently strong to makeme wish I had a larger force. Towards evening groups of men appearedon the skyline all round, giving unmistakable warning that the tribeswere gathering in large numbers. 

From the information brought me by the Cavalry, and from my ownexamination of the ground, I decided to advance along the left bank ofthe river: and to facilitate this movement I determined to seize theheights on either side of the gorge at daybreak, whether Macpherson'sbrigade had arrived or not. That night strong piquets were thrown outround the camp, and Cavalry patrols were ordered to proceed at dawn tofeel for the enemy. _L'homme propose, mais Dieu dispose_. 

[Footnote 1: Macdonald, having subsequently further distinguishedhimself, was given a commission, and is now commanding a regiment inthe Egyptian Army. Sher Mahomed was rewarded with the Order of Merit. ]

[Footnote 2:

 FROM THE AMIR OF KABUL, DATED KUSHI, 27TH SEPTEMBER, 1879. 

 (After compliments. ) Your friendly letter has reached me just at this moment, 8 p. M. , the 10th Shawal (27th September), and opened the doors of joy and happiness on the face of my heart marked with affection. I feel perfectly certain and confident that the movements of Her Imperial Majesty's victorious troops are merely for the purpose of consolidating the foundation of my kingdom and strengthening the basis of my government. 

 In truth, the sympathy of friends with friends is fitting and proper, and the indulgence and kindness of a great Government to a sincere and faithful friend are agreeable and pleasing. I am exceedingly gratified with, and thankful to, the representatives of the illustrious British Government for their expression of sympathy and their support of my cause. Your friendly and wise suggestion that none of the ignorant tribes of Afghanistan should oppose the British troops, so that the officers of the British Government should be the better able to support and protect me, is very acceptable and reasonable. Before I received your letter, I had sent orders repeatedly to the Governors of Jalalabad and Lalpura not to let anyone oppose or resist the British troops, and stringent orders have again been issued to the Governor of Jalalabad to use his utmost endeavours and efforts in this respect. The order in question to the address of the Governor of Jalalabad will be shown you to-morrow, and sent by an express courier. ]

[Footnote 3: It was a matter of intense gratification to me that thewhole time we remained in Afghanistan, nearly two years, not a singlecomplaint was made by an Afghan of any soldier in my force havinginterfered with the women of the country. ]

[Footnote 4: The force was made up as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------| |British | Other Ranks. || |Officers. |----------------|| | |British. |Native. |-------------------------------------------------------||Divisional, Brigade, | | | ||and Departmental Staff | 60 | | ||F/A, R. H. A. | 7 | 118 | ||G/3, R. A. | 7 | 137 | ||No. 2 Mountain Battery | 3 | | 223 ||Two Gatling guns | 1 | 34 | ||9th Lancers (one squadron) | 4 | 118 | ||5th Punjab Cavalry | 7 | | 325 ||12th Bengal Cavalry | 6 | | 328 ||14th Bengal Lancers | 7 | | 407 ||67th Foot | 18 | 686 | ||72nd Highlanders | 23 | 746 | ||92nd Highlanders | 17 | 717 | ||5th Punjab Infantry | 8 | | 610 ||5th Gurkhas | 7 | | 574 ||23rd Pioneers | 6 | | 671 ||28th Punjab Infantry | 8 | | 636 ||7th Company Bengal Sappers | 3 | | 93 || and Miners ---------------------------|| | 192 | 2, 558 |3, 867 |--------------------------------------------------------]

[Footnote 5: Known as the _sang-i-nawishta_ (inscribed stone). ]

[Footnote 6: Shortly after I was settled at Kabul, the followingletter, written by Nek Mahomed on the evening of the day he had beenwith the Amir, to some person whom he wished to acquaint with thestate of affairs, was brought to me:

 'MY KIND FRIEND, --The truth is that to-day, at sunrise, I went to the camp, the Amir having summoned me. When I arrived, Mulla Shah Mahomed [the Wazir] first said to me, "Go back and tell the people to raise a holy war. " I did not feel certain about what he said [or was not satisfied with this], [but] the Amir afterwards told me to go back that very hour and rouse the people to a _ghaza_. I got back to Kabul about 7 o'clock, and am collecting the people. Salaam. '

The letter was not addressed, but it was sealed with Nek Mahomed'sseal, and there was no reason to doubt its authenticity. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LI. 1879

 The Afghan position--The fight at Charasia --Highlanders, Gurkhas, and Punjabis--Defeat of the Afghans --Kabul in sight--Deh-i-Mazang gorge--The enemy give us the slip

The Cavalry having reported that the road through the_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge was impassable, I started off a party[1]before it was fully light on the 6th, to work at it and make itpracticable for guns. I was preparing to follow with an escort ofCavalry to examine the pass and the ground beyond, when the growingdaylight discovered large numbers of Afghan troops in regularformation crowning the hills that I ought to have been in a positionto occupy the preceding evening. No hurry, no confusion was apparentin their movements; positions were taken up and guns placed with suchcoolness and deliberation that it was evident regularly trained troopswere employed. Very soon I received reports of our Cavalry patrolshaving been fired upon, and of their having been obliged to retire. 

Immediate action was imperatively necessary; the Afghans had to bedislodged from their strong position at any cost, or we should havebeen surrounded by overwhelming numbers. Their occupation of theheights was, I felt, a warning that must not be disregarded, and amenace that could not be brooked. 

Behind this range of hills lay the densely-crowded city of Kabul, with the scarcely less crowded suburbs of Chardeh, Deh-i-Afghan, andnumberless villages thickly studded over the Kabul valley, all ofwhich were contributing their quota of warriors to assist the Regulartroops in disputing the advance of the British. It did not requiremuch experience of Asiatics to understand that, if the enemy wereallowed to remain undisturbed for a single night in the position theyhad taken up, their numbers would increase to an extraordinary extent. 

I now received a report from the rear that the road was blocked, andthat the progress of Macpherson's brigade would certainly be opposed;while, on the crests of the hills to the right and left of my camp, bodies of men began to assemble, who, I surmised (which surmise Iafterwards learnt was correct), were only waiting for the sun to godown to make a general attack upon the camp under cover of dusk. 

The situation was one of great anxiety. The whole force with me wasnot more than 4, 000 men and eighteen guns. The treacherous Amir andhis equally treacherous Ministers had, of course, kept the AfghanCommander fully informed as to the manner in which my troops wereperforce divided; the position of every man and every gun with me wasknown; and I feared that, as soon as we were engaged with the enemy, the opportunity would be taken to attack my weakly-defended camp andto engage Macpherson's small brigade, encumbered as it was with itslarge convoy of stores and ammunition. 

The numbers of the enemy were momentarily increasing, so delay wouldassuredly make matters worse; the only chance of success, therefore, was to take the initiative, and attack the Afghan main position atonce. Accordingly, I sent an officer with orders to the troops whowere moving towards the gorge not to commence work, but to take upa defensive position until my plans were further developed. I sentanother messenger to Macpherson, informing him of my intention to takeimmediate action, and telling him to keep a good look-out, and push onto Charasia with all possible speed, and at the same time I reinforcedhim by a squadron of Cavalry. 

The Afghan position formed the arc of a circle, extending from the_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge to the heights above Chardeh. Both sides ofthe gorge were occupied by the enemy, as was a semi-detached hill tothe south of it, and sixteen guns were observed in position. The linethey had taken up occupied nearly three miles of country; and theirmain position was the ridge, which, close to the gorge, rose 1, 000feet above the plain, running up at its western extremity to a peak2, 200 feet high. Thence the line stretched along the edge of somelower heights to a rugged hill, the summit of which was about 1, 800feet above Charasia. In front of this formidable position were asuccession of sandy hills, forming a series of easily defensibleposts, and at the foot of these hills ran a bare stony belt, slopingdown to the cultivated land surrounding Charasia and the hamlet ofKhairabad. 

My movements and reconnaissances up till now having led the enemy tobelieve that I intended to deliver my attack on their left at the_sang-i-nawishta_, they were seen to be concentrating their forces inthat direction. But this position could only have been carried withsuch damaging loss to us that I determined to make the real attack byan outflanking movement to their right. 

The men having made a hasty breakfast, I despatched General Baker inthis direction, and placing at his disposal the troops noted below, [2]I entrusted to him the difficult task of dislodging the enemy, whileI continued to distract their attention towards the gorge by making afeint to their left. 

Baker's little column assembled in a wooded enclosure close toCharasia, where he left his field hospital and reserve ammunition, forthe safe guarding of which I sent him the 5th Punjab Infantry, whilehe was further reinforced by 450 men of the 23rd Pioneers and threeField Artillery guns. I was thus left with only six Horse Artilleryguns, 450 Cavalry, and between 600 and 700 Infantry for the protectionof the camp, where I was still handicapped by the presence of the Amirand his untrustworthy following. 

While Baker advanced to the left, the party near the _sang-i-nawishta_gorge, commanded by Major White, of the 92nd Highlanders, was orderedto threaten the pass and to prevent the enemy occupying any portion ofthe Charasia village, to advance within Artillery range of the enemy'smain position above the gorge, and when the outflanking movement hadbeen thoroughly developed and the enemy were in full retreat, but notbefore, to push the Cavalry through the gorge and pursue. 

At about 11. 30 a. M. Baker's leading troops emerged into the open, andwere immediately engaged with a crowd of armed Afghans, supported by aconsiderable body of Regular troops. The General now sent one companyof the 72nd, under Captain Hunt, to turn the Afghans off a successionof peaks situated at right angles to the ridge they were occupying ontheir extreme right. Running along this ridge, and stretching acrossthe Indiki road to the sandhills, the Afghan right wing held aline considerably in advance of their left on the hill above the_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, and one which could not easily be turned, forthe peaks the 72nd were sent to occupy were almost inaccessible, andthe fire from them swept the slopes up which our troops must advance. These peaks, therefore, formed the key of the position, and theirdefenders had to be dislodged from them at all hazards before anythingelse could be attempted. The company of the 72nd with much difficultyfought their way up, and gained a footing on the first peak, wherethey were obliged to pause, until reinforced by two companies of the5th Gurkhas under Captain Cook, V. C. , when they advanced all together, clearing the enemy from each successive point, while the remainder ofthe 72nd breasted the hill, and, under cover of the Mountain guns, attacked the position in front. But the enemy were obstinate, and theextremely difficult nature of the ground somewhat checked the gallantHighlanders. Seeing their dilemma, Baker despatched two companies ofthe 5th Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh, and 200 men ofthe 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Hall, to their assistance;while the 23rd Pioneers were brought up on the right, in support, anda detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry echeloned in rear, on the leftof the line. 

The engagement now became hot, and the firing fast and furious. My readers will, I am sure, be able to realize with what intenseexcitement and anxiety I watched the proceedings. It was evident tome that little progress could be made so long as the enemy retainedpossession of the ridge, which the Afghan Commander apparently hadjust begun to appreciate was the real point of attack, for his troopscould now be seen hurrying to this point, and it became more urgentlynecessary than ever to carry the position before it could bereinforced. At 2 p. M. It was seized; the Highlanders and Gurkhas couldno longer be resisted; the Afghans wavered, and then began to retreat, exposed to a cross-fire that effectually prevented their rallying. 

The brunt of this affair was borne by the 72nd, admirably led by theircompany officers, under the skilful direction of Lieutenant-ColonelClarke and his Adjutant, Lieutenant Murray. I closely watchedtheir movements, and particularly observed one man pushing up theprecipitous hillside considerably in advance of everyone else, andapparently utterly regardless of the shower of bullets falling roundhim. I inquired about him later on, and found that he was a youngIrish private of the 72nd, named MacMahon, to whose coolness anddaring was in a great measure due the capture of this very strongpost. Her Majesty, I am glad to be able to relate, subsequentlyrewarded this intrepid soldier by bestowing on him the Victoria Cross. 

The general advance was now sounded, and gallantly was it respondedto. The main position was stormed by the Highlanders, Gurkhas, andPunjab Infantry, each trying hard to be the first to close with itsdefenders. The enemy fought desperately, charging down on the Gurkhas, by whom, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh and hisAdjutant, Lieutenant Martin, they were repulsed and driven over thecrest with heavy loss. 

The Afghans now took up a position some 600 yards in the rear of thatfrom which they had just been dislodged, where they made an obstinatestand for half an hour, but they were again forced back on theattacking party being strengthened by the arrival of two companies ofthe 92nd Highlanders, sent to their assistance by Major White, whohad already successfully engaged the Afghan left above the_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge. As the enemy's advanced posts on the hill tothe south, and directly in front of the gorge, prevented our guns fromcoming within range of their position on the heights above, theseposts had to be disposed of as a preliminary to effective co-operationwith Baker; accordingly, about noon the hill was captured by twocompanies of the 92nd, under Captain Cotton, and half a battery ofField Artillery was advanced to a point whence Major Parry was able toengage the Afghan guns posted above the gorge. 

It was at this juncture, when Baker's troops, having carried themain position, were proceeding to attack that to which the enemy hadretreated, that White despatched two companies of the 92nd, underCaptain Oxley, by whose timely aid the determined foe were at lengthdriven from this point of vantage also. The troops followed up theirsuccess and advanced at the double, while our guns shelled the shakenmasses. 

The Afghan right and centre now gave way completely; the enemy broke, and fled down the slopes on the further side in a north-westerlydirection, eventually taking refuge in the Chardeh villages. 

By 3. 45 we were in possession of the whole of the main ridge. Thefirst objective having been thus gained, the troops, pivoting on theirright, brought round their left and advanced against the now exposedflanks of the enemy's left wing, and simultaneously with this movementWhite advanced from his position by the hill in front of the gorge, and a little after four o'clock had gained possession of the pass andtwelve Afghan guns. 

Completely outflanked and enfiladed by Baker's fire, the left wing ofthe Afghan force made but little resistance; they rapidly abandonedthe height, and retired across the river toward the north-east, pursued by the small body of Cavalry attached to White's force, underMajor Hammond, and a party of the 92nd, under Major Hay. 

Baker now paused to allow of the Infantry's ammunition beingreplenished, and then advanced along the ridge towards the pass, whichhe reached in time to help the Cavalry who were engaged with theenemy's rear guard at the river; the latter were driven off and forcedto retreat; but by this time the growing darkness made further pursuitimpossible. We were therefore compelled to rest satisfied with holdingthe ground in advance by piquets and occupying both ends of the_sang-i-nawishta_ defile, where the troops bivouacked for the night. Iwas able to supply them with food from Charasia, and they were made ascomfortable as they could be under the circumstances. 

While the fighting was taking place on the heights in front ofCharasia, the hills on both flanks of my camp were crowded with theenemy, anxiously watching the result; they did not approach within theCavalry patrols, but one party caused so much annoyance to a picquetby firing into it that it became necessary to dislodge it, a servicewhich was performed in a very daring manner by a few of the 92nd, under Lieutenant Grant and Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald, the samenon-commissioned officer who had a few days before so distinguishedhimself in the Hazardarakht defile. 

Our casualties were wonderfully few, only 18 killed and 70 wounded, [3]while the enemy left 300 dead behind them, and as they succeeded incarrying numbers of their killed and wounded off the field, their lossmust have been heavy. I subsequently ascertained that we had opposedto us, besides thirteen Regular regiments, between eight and tenthousand Afghans. Ghilzais from Tezin and Hisarak had hurried up inlarge numbers to join the enemy, but, luckily for us, arrived toolate. Of these some returned to their homes when they found the Afghanarmy had been beaten, but the greater number waited about Kabul toassist in any further stand that might be made by the Regular troops. 

The heliograph, worked by Captain Stratton, of the 22nd Foot, had beenof the greatest use during the day, and kept me fully informed of alldetails. The last message as the sun was sinking behind the hills, confirming my own observations, was a most satisfactory one, to theeffect that the whole of the enemy's position was in our possession, and that our victory was complete. 

Throughout the day my friend (!) the Amir, surrounded by his Sirdars, remained seated on a knoll in the centre of the camp watching theprogress of the fight with intense eagerness, and questioning everyonewho appeared as to his interpretation of what he had observed. So soonas I felt absolutely assured of our victory, I sent an Aide-de-camp toHis Highness to convey the joyful intelligence of our success. It was, without doubt, a trying moment for him, and a terrible disappointmentafter the plans which I subsequently ascertained he and his adherentsat Kabul had carefully laid for our annihilation. But he receivedthe news with Asiatic calmness, and without the smallest sign ofmortification, merely requesting my Aide-de-camp to assure me that, asmy enemies were his enemies, he rejoiced at my victory. 

Macpherson's brigade, with its impedimenta, arrived before it wasquite dark, so altogether I had reason to feel satisfied with theday's results. But the fact still remained that not more than twelvemiles beyond stood the city of Kabul, with its armed thousands readyto oppose us should an assault prove necessary. I had besides receivedinformation of a further gathering of Ghilzais bent upon anotherattack on the Shutargardan, and that reinforcements of Regular troopsand guns were hastening to Kabul from Ghazni. Prompt action was theone and only means of meeting these threatened difficulties. My troopshad had more than enough for one day, and required rest, but needsmust when the devil (in the shape of Afghan hordes) drives. I resolvedto push on, and issued orders for tents to be struck at once and anadvance to be made at break of day. 

At the first streak of dawn on the 7th I started, leaving Macphersonto come on with the heavy baggage as quickly as he could. I marched bythe _sang-i-nawishta_ defile, where Major White met me and explainedto me his part in the victory of the previous day. From my inspectionof the ground, I had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion thatmuch of the success which attended the operations on this side was dueto White's military instincts and, at one supreme moment, his extremepersonal gallantry. It afforded me, therefore, very great pleasure torecommend this officer for the Victoria Cross, an honour of whichmore than one incident in his subsequent career proved him to be wellworthy. 

Our rapid advance, following on the defeat of the previous day, hadthe effect I hoped it would have. On arriving at Beni Hissar, aconsiderable village, surrounded by orchards and gardens, only twomiles south of the far-famed citadel of the Bala Hissar, I sent outCavalry patrols to reconnoitre, who brought me the pleasing news thatthe Bala Hissar had been evacuated, and the only part of the cityvisible seemed to be deserted. 

During the day I received visits from some of the chief merchants ofKabul, who each told a different tale regarding the movements of thedefeated Afghan army and the intentions of the Afghan Commander. Fromtheir conflicting accounts, however, I gathered that, fresh troopshaving arrived from Kohistan, the remnants of the Charasia army hadjoined them, and that the combined forces were then occupyingthe range of hills immediately above Kabul, to the west, and haddetermined to make another stand. 

Having received intelligence that the enemy, if again defeated, intended to retire towards Turkestan, I directed Brigadier-GeneralMassy, on the morning of the 8th October, to move out with the Cavalrybrigade and place himself across their line of retreat. [4] The brigadestarted at 11 a. M. , and, in order to avoid the city and adjacentheights, made a considerable detour by Siah Sang and Sherpur, the newAfghan cantonment. On reaching the latter place, Massy heliographedto me that he had found it deserted, the magazine blown up, andseventy-five guns[5] abandoned inside the enclosure, and that theenemy were now occupying a ridge[6] which seemed to him to bea prolongation of the Shahr-i-Darwaza range above Kabul; then, continuing his march, he crossed a depression in this ridge calledthe Nanachi Kotal, and wheeling to his left, and skirting the Asmaiheights on the western side, he soon came in sight of the Afghan camp, pitched on the slope of the hills about a mile from Deh-i-Mazang. 

Brigadier-General Massy was informed, in reply to his heliogram, that Baker would be despatched at once to drive the enemy from theirposition and force them to fall back upon the Cavalry, upon whichMassy immediately made the arrangements which appeared to him mostadvisable for blocking, with the limited number of sabres at hisdisposal, the several roads by which the enemy might attempt toescape. 

I could only spare to Baker a very small force (1, 044 rifles, twoMountain guns and one Gatling), for Macpherson's and White's troopshad not yet come up. He started off without a moment's delay, and, driving the enemy's scouts before him, worked his way along theShahr-i-Darwaza heights to the west; but his progress was very slow, owing to the extreme difficulty of the ground, and the day was farspent before he found himself near enough to the enemy to use hisArtillery. To his delight, Baker perceived that he commanded theAfghan camp and the rear of their main position; but his satisfactionwas considerably allayed when he discovered that between him and themlay a deep gorge[7] with precipitous sides, through which ran theKabul river, and that before he could attack he would have to descend1, 600 feet, and then climb up the opposite side, which was nearly ashigh and quite as steep. 

Anxious as Baker was that there should be no delay in delivering theassault, by the time his dispositions were made it had become too darkto attempt it, and most reluctantly he had to postpone the movementtill daybreak the next day. He had ascertained that the Kabul riverwas not fordable for Infantry except at a point which was commandedby the enemy's camp, and was too far from support to warrant piquetsbeing pushed across at night. Nothing whatever could be seen, buta very slight noise as of stealthy movement in the Afghan camp washeard, and the fear seized Baker that the enemy might escape him. Soonafter 11 p. M. , therefore, when the rising moon began in a measureto dispel the darkness, Baker sent a strong patrol under a Britishofficer to feel for the enemy. The patrol came into contact with theAfghan scouts on the river-bank, from some of whom, taken prisoners inthe struggle, they learned that the enemy had crept away under coverof the night, and the greater number had dispersed to their own homes;but about 800, mounted on Artillery horses, were reported to haveaccompanied their Commander, Mahomed Jan, and to have escaped in thedirection of Bamian. 

Meanwhile, Brigadier-General Massy, from his point of observationbeneath the Asmai heights, had perceived that it was impossible forBaker to carry the enemy's main position by daylight; he triedto communicate with Baker and ascertain his plans, but the partydespatched on this service were unable to get through the villages andwoods, which were all held by the enemy, and returned unsuccessful. Massy then collected his scattered squadrons and bivouacked for thenight, being anxious that his men and horses should have food andrest, and it not having struck him that the enemy might attempt toescape during the hours of darkness. 

The information that in very truth they had escaped was brought toBaker at 4. 30 a. M. He at once communicated it to Massy, telling himat the same time that any movement the Cavalry might make in pursuitwould be supported by the troops under his immediate command, andalso by a brigade under Brigadier-General Macpherson, which I haddespatched to reinforce Baker; Macpherson and White, with theirrespective troops, having arrived at Beni Hissar shortly after Bakerhad started. 

I joined Baker at this time, and great was my disappointment at beingtold that the Afghans had given us the slip. I went carefully over theground, however, and satisfied myself that Baker had done all that waspossible under the circumstances, and that the enemy having eluded uscould not in any way be attributed to want of care or skill on hispart. 

Massy scoured the country until nightfall on the 9th, but with verylittle success, only one small party of fugitives being overtakenabout four-and-twenty miles on the road to Ghazni. Numbers, doubtless, found shelter in the city of Kabul, others in the numerous villageswith which the richly-cultivated Chardeh valley was thickly studded, and whose inhabitants were hostile to a man; others escaped to thehills; and the remainder, having had ten hours' start, could not beovertaken. 

The enemy's camp was left standing, and twelve guns, some elephants, camels, mules, and ponies, fell into our possession. 

During that day our camp was moved nearer the city to Siah Sang, acommanding plateau between the Kabul and Logar rivers, close to theirconfluence, and less than a mile east of the Bala Hissar. The 5thGurkhas and two Mountain guns were left to hold the heights on whichBrigadier-General Baker had been operating, and the rest of the forcewas concentrated on Siah Sang. 

[Footnote 1: Twenty sabres, 9th Lancers, one squadron 5th PunjabCavalry, two guns, No. 2 Mountain battery, 284 rifles, 92ndHighlanders, and 450 rifles, 23rd Pioneers. ]

[Footnote 2: Two guns, No. 2 Mountain battery, two Gatling guns, detachment 12th Bengal Cavalry, 72nd Highlanders, 5th Gurkhas (300rifles), 5th Punjab Infantry (200 rifles), No. 7 Company Sappers andMiners. ]

[Footnote 3: During the fight the Infantry expended 41, 090 rounds, ofwhich over 20, 000 were fired by the 72nd Highlanders. The half-batteryG/3 R. A. Fired 6 common shell (percussion fuses) and 71 shrapnel (timefuses); total, 77 rounds. No. 2 Mountain Battery fired 10 common shelland 94 shrapnel, total, 104 rounds. The two Gatlings fired 150 rounds. 

At the tenth round one of the Gatlings jammed, and had to be taken topieces. This was the first occasion on which Gatling guns were used inaction. They were not of the present improved make, and, being foundunsatisfactory, were made but little use of. ]

[Footnote 4: The troops available for this purpose were: One squadron9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, 12th Bengal Cavalry, and 14th BengalLancers; total, 720 of all ranks. ]

[Footnote 5: The guns included four English 18-pounders, one English8-inch howitzer and two Afghan imitations of this weapon, andforty-two bronze Mountain guns. ]

[Footnote 6: The Asmai heights. ]

[Footnote 7: The Deh-i-Mazang gorge. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LII. 1879

 Guiding instructions--Visit to the Bala Hissar--Yakub Khan abdicates --The Proclamation--Administrative measures --Explosions in the Bala Hissar

At last I was at Kabul, the place I had heard so much of from myboy-hood, and had so often wished to see! The city lay beneath me, with its mud-coloured buildings and its 50, 000 inhabitants, coveringa considerable extent of ground. To the south-east corner of the cityappeared the Bala Hissar, picturesquely perched on a saddle justbeneath the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights, along the top of which rana fortified wall, enclosing the upper portion of the citadel andextending to the Deh-i-Mazang gorge. 

Kabul was reported to be perfectly quiet, and numbers of traders cameinto our camp to dispose of their wares; but I forbade anyone toenter the city until I had been able to decide upon the best means ofmaintaining order amongst a population for the most part extremelyfanatical, treacherous, and vindictive. 

So far our success had been complete: all opposition had beenovercome, Kabul was at our mercy, the Amir was in my camp ready toagree to whatever I might propose, and it had been all done withextraordinarily little loss to ourselves. Nevertheless, I felt mydifficulties were very far from being at an end--indeed, the part ofmy duty still remaining to be accomplished was surrounded with fargreater difficulty, and was a source of much more anxiety to me thanthe military task I had undertaken; for, with regard to the latter, Ipossessed confidence in myself and my ability to perform it, whereas, with respect to the political and diplomatic side of the question, actual personal experience I had none, and I could only hope thatcommon-sense and a sense of justice would carry me through. 

The instructions I had received from the Government of India were verygeneral in their character, for the Viceroy felt that any proceedingsmust necessarily depend on the state of affairs obtaining at Kabul, the acts and attitude of the Amir and his people, and the variousconditions impossible to foresee when the Foreign Office letter waswritten to me on the 29th September. But, though general, they werevery comprehensive. 

The troops were to be placed in strong and secure positions, such aswould give me complete control over the Amir's capital; any Afghansoldiers remaining at Kabul, and the whole of the city population, were to be disarmed; supplies were to be collected in sufficientquantities to render my force independent in case of interruptionalong the line of communication; Yakub Khan's personal safety was tobe secured, and adequate supervision maintained over his movementsand actions; a close investigation was to be instituted into all thecauses and circumstances connected with the 'totally unprovoked andmost barbarous attack by the Amir's soldiery and the people of hiscapital upon the representative of an allied State, who was residingunder the Amir's protection in the Amir's fortress, in very closeproximity to the Amir himself, and whose personal safety andhonourable treatment had been solemnly guaranteed by the Ruler ofAfghanistan. '

The retribution to be exacted was to be adapted to the twofoldcharacter of the offence, and was to be imposed upon the Afghan nationin proportion as the offence was proved to be national, and as theresponsibility should be brought home to any particular community. Further, the imposition of a fine, it was suggested upon the city ofKabul 'would be in accordance with justice and precedent, ' and thedemolition of fortifications and removal of buildings within range ofmy defences, or which might interfere with my control over the city, might be 'necessary as a military precaution. '

In forming my plans for the removal of obstructive buildings, I was toconsider 'whether they can be combined with any measures compatiblewith justice and humanity for leaving a memorial of the retributionexacted from the city in some manner and by some mark that will not beeasily obliterated. '

I was told that 'in regard to the punishment of individuals, it shouldbe swift, stern, and impressive, without being indiscriminate orimmoderate; its infliction must not be delegated to subordinateofficers of minor responsibility acting independently of yourinstructions or supervision; and you cannot too vigilantly maintainthe discipline of the troops under your orders, or superintend theirtreatment of the unarmed population, so long as your orders are obeyedand your authority is unresisted. You will deal summarily in themajority of cases with persons whose share in the murder of anyonebelonging to the British Embassy shall have been proved by yourinvestigations, but while the execution of justice should be as publicand striking as possible, it should be completed with all possibleexpedition, since the indefinite prolongation of your proceedingsmight spread abroad unfounded alarm. '

The despatch concluded with the words: 'It will probably be essential, not only for the protection of your own camp from annoyance, but alsofor the security of the well-affected population and for the generalmaintenance of order, that you should assume and exercise supremeauthority in Kabul, since events have unfortunately proved that theAmir has lost that authority, or that he has conspicuously failed tomake use of it. '

On the 10th I visited Sherpur, and the next day I went to the BalaHissar, and wandered over the scene of the Embassy's brave defenceand cruel end. The walls of the Residency, closely pitted withbullet-holes, gave proof of the determined nature of the attackand the length of the resistance. The floors were covered withblood-stains, and amidst the embers of a fire were found a heap ofhuman bones. It may be imagined how British soldiers' hearts burnedwithin them at such a sight, and how difficult it was to suppressfeelings of hatred and animosity towards the perpetrators of such adastardly crime. I had a careful but unsuccessful search made for thebodies of our ill-fated friends. 

[Illustration: ENTRANCE TO THE BALA HISSAR, KABUL. _From a photograph. _]

The Bala Hissar, at one time of great strength, was now in a somewhatdilapidated condition. It contained eighty-five guns, mortars andhowitzers, some of them of English manufacture, upwards of 250 tons ofgunpowder, stowed away in earthen vessels, many millions of Enfieldand Snider cartridges, and a large number of arms, besides quantitiesof saddlery, clothing for troops, musical instruments, shot, shell, caps, and accoutrements, and a vast amount of lead, copper and tin. Itwould not have given us much trouble to storm the Bala Hissar, had webeen obliged to do so, for Artillery could have opened on it withineasy range, and there was cover for Infantry close up to the walls. 

The reading of the Proclamation announcing the intentions of theBritish Government with regard to the punishment of the city wasto take place in the Bala Hissar next day. The Amir had agreed toaccompany me. The leading people were invited to attend, and I hadgiven orders that all the troops were to take part in the procession, so as to render as impressive as possible the ceremony, at which wereto be made known to the inhabitants of Kabul the terms imposed uponthem by the British Government. The object of my visit was to decidehow the troops might best be disposed so as to make the most imposingdisplay on the occasion. 

I decided to detain in custody two Sirdars, Yahia Khan[1] and hisbrother Zakariah Khan, the Mustaufi, and the Wazir, as these fourwere Yakub Khan's principal advisers, and I was satisfied that theirinfluence was being used against us, and that so long as they were atlarge a mine might be sprung upon me at any moment. 

The Commander-in-Chief, Daud Shah, was also in the Amir's confidence;but I determined to leave him at liberty, for, from what I couldlearn, he had made an effort (not a very strong one, perhaps) to helpour unfortunate countrymen, and he had on several occasions since hehad been in my camp given me useful information; moreover, I hopedto obtain further help from him, in which hope I was not altogetherdisappointed. 

As to what I ought to do with the Amir I was considerably puzzled. Lord Lytton had urged upon me the necessity for weighing well theadvisability of prematurely breaking with him, as it was very possiblehe might become a useful instrument in our hands, an eventuality whichI thoroughly understood; but I was not at all sure that Yakub Khanwould not break with me when he learnt my decision with regard to hisMinisters, and I had received more than one warning that, if he failedto keep me from entering Kabul, he contemplated flight and a supremeeffort to raise the country against me. 

Yakub Khan certainly did not deserve much consideration from us; for, though no absolute proof was forthcoming of his having instigated theattack upon the Embassy, he most certainly made not the slightesteffort to stop it or to save the lives of those entrusted to hiscare, and throughout that terrible day showed himself to be, if nota deliberate traitor, a despicable coward. Again, his endeavours todelay the march of my force for the sole purpose of gaining sufficienttime to organize the destruction of the army to whose protection hehad appealed deprived him, to my mind, of the smallest claim to betreated as an honourable ally. 

My doubts as to what policy I ought to pursue with regard to YakubKhan were all solved by his own action on the morning of the 12thOctober. He came to my tent before I was dressed, and asked for aninterview, which was, of course, accorded. The only chair I possessedI offered to my Royal visitor, who seated himself, and then and thereannounced that he had come to resign the Amirship, and that he wasonly carrying out a determination made before he came to Kushi; he hadthen allowed himself to be over-persuaded, but now his resolution wasfixed. His life, he said, had been most miserable, and he would ratherbe a grass-cutter in the English camp than Ruler of Afghanistan; heconcluded by entreating me to allow his tent to be pitched close tomine until he could go to India, to London, or wherever the Viceroymight desire to send him. I placed a tent at his disposal, orderedbreakfast to be prepared for him, and begged him not to decide atonce, but think the matter over for some hours, adding that I wouldsee him again at ten o'clock, the hour appointed for him to accompanyme to the Bala Hissar in order that he might be present at the readingof the Proclamation. At this time, it must be remembered, the Amir didnot know what the terms of the Proclamation were, and was entirelyignorant of my intentions regarding his Ministers. 

As arranged, I had another interview with Yakub Khan at ten o'clock, when I found him unshaken in his resolve to abdicate, and unwilling, under the circumstances, to be present at the ceremony which was aboutto take place. He said, however, that he would send his eldest son, and that all his Ministers should attend me. I begged him again toreconsider the decision he had come to, and to think well over theresults to himself; but finding that he had finally[2] made up hismind, I told His Highness I would telegraph his determination to theViceroy and ask for instructions; that he would not, of course, beforced to continue to reign at Kabul against his will, but that Iwould ask him to retain his title until I could receive a reply fromSimla. 

At noon I proceeded to the Bala Hissar, accompanied by my staff, theHeir-Apparent, the Ministers, and a large gathering of the chiefSirdars of Kabul. Both sides of the road were lined with troops, ofwhom I felt not a little proud that day. Notwithstanding that the dutyrequired of them had been severe and continuous, now that they wererequired to take part in a ceremonial parade, they turned out as cleanand smart as one could wish to see them. 

As the head of the procession entered the main gateway, the Britishflag was run up, the bands played the National Anthem, and a salute ofthirty-one guns was fired. 

On arriving at the public Hall of Audience, I dismounted, andascending the steps leading to it, I addressed the assembledmultitude, and read to them the following Proclamation, containing theorders of the British Government:

 'In my Proclamation dated the 3rd October, I informed the people of Kabul that a British army was advancing to take possession of the city, and I warned them against offering any resistance to the entry of the troops and the authority of His Highness the Amir. That warning has been disregarded. The force under my command has now reached Kabul and occupied the Bala Hissar, but its advance has been pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a conspicuous part in the opposition offered. They have therefore become rebels against His Highness the Amir, and have added to the guilt already incurred by them in abetting the murder of the British Envoy and his companions--a treacherous and cowardly crime which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people. It would be but a just and fitting reward for such misdeeds if the city of Kabul were now totally destroyed and its very name blotted out; but the great British Government ever desires to temper justice with mercy, and I now announce to the inhabitants of Kabul that the full retribution for their offence will not be exacted, and that the city will be spared. 

 'Nevertheless, it is necessary that they should not escape all penalty, and, further, that the punishment inflicted should be such as will be felt and remembered. Therefore, such portions of the city buildings as now interfere with the proper military occupation of the Bala Hissar, and the safety and comfort of the British troops to be quartered in it, will be at once levelled with the ground; and, further, a heavy fine, the amount of which will be notified hereafter, will be imposed upon the inhabitants of Kabul, to be paid according to their several capacities. I further give notice to all, that, in order to provide for the restoration and maintenance of order, the city of Kabul and the surrounding country, to a distance of ten miles, are placed under martial law. With the consent of His Highness the Amir, a military Governor of Kabul will be appointed, to administer justice and punish with a strong hand all evil-doers. The inhabitants of Kabul and of the neighbouring villages are hereby warned to submit to his authority. 

 'This punishment, inflicted upon the whole city, will not, of course, absolve from further penalties those whose individual guilt may be hereafter proved. A full and searching inquiry into the circumstances of the late outbreak will be held, and all persons convicted of having taken part in it will be dealt with according to their deserts. 

 'With the view of providing effectually for the prevention of crime and disorder, and the safety of all well-disposed persons in Kabul, it is hereby notified that for the future the carrying of dangerous weapons, whether swords, knives, or firearms, within the streets of the city or within a distance of five miles from the city gates, is forbidden. After a week from the date of this Proclamation, any person found armed within those limits will be liable to the penalty of death. Persons having in their possession any articles whatsoever which formerly belonged to members of the British Embassy are required to bring them forthwith to the British camp. Anyone neglecting this warning will, if found hereafter in possession of any such articles, be subject to the severest penalties. 

 'Further, all persons who may have in their possession any firearms or ammunition formerly issued to or seized by the Afghan troops, are required to produce them. For every country-made rifle, whether breech or muzzle loading, the sum of Rs. 3 will be given on delivery, and for every rifle of European manufacture Rs. 5. Anyone found hereafter in possession of such weapons will be severely punished. Finally, I notify that I will give a reward of Rs. 50 for the surrender of any person, whether soldier or civilian, concerned in the attack on the British Embassy, or for such information as may lead directly to his capture. A similar sum will be given in the case of any person who may have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September (Shawal) last, and therefore become a rebel against His Highness the Amir. If any such person so surrendered or captured be a captain or subaltern officer of the Afghan army, the reward will be increased to Rs. 75, and if a field officer to Rs. 120. '

The Afghans were evidently much relieved at the leniency of theProclamation, to which they listened with the greatest attention. When I had finished reading it, I dismissed the assembly, with theexception of the Ministers whom I had decided to make prisoners. Tothem I explained that I felt it to be my duty to place them underrestraint, pending investigation into the part they had taken in themassacre of the Embassy. 

The following day I made a formal entry into the city, traversing allits main streets, that the people might understand that it and theywere at our mercy. The Cavalry brigade headed the procession; Ifollowed with my staff and escort, and five battalions of Infantrybrought up the rear; there were no Artillery, for in some places thestreets were so narrow and tortuous that two men could hardly rideabreast. 

It was scarcely to be expected the citizens would give us a warmwelcome; but they were perfectly respectful, and I hoped the martialand workmanlike appearance of the troops would have a salutary effect. 

I now appointed Major-General James Hills, V. C. , to be Governor ofKabul for the time being, associating with him the able and respectedMahomedan gentleman, Nawab Ghulam Hussein Khan, as the most likelymeans of securing for the present order and good government in thecity. I further instituted two Courts--one political, consisting ofColonel Macgregor, Surgeon-Major Bellew, [3] and Mahomed Hyat Khan, aMahomedan member of the Punjab Commission, and an excellent Persianand Pushtu scholar, to inquire into the complicated circumstanceswhich led to the attack on the Residency, and to ascertain, ifpossible, how far the Amir and his Ministers were implicated. Theother, a military Court, with Brigadier-General Massy as president, for the trial of those Chiefs and soldiers accused of having takenpart in the actual massacre. [4]

Up to this time (the middle of October) communication with India hadbeen kept up by way of the Shutargardan, and I had heard nothing ofthe approach of the Khyber column. It was so very necessary to open upthe Khyber route, in view of early snow on the Shutargardan, that Iarranged to send a small force towards Jalalabad, and to move theShutargardan garrison to Kabul, thus breaking off communication withKuram. 

Colonel Money had beaten off another attack made by the tribesmenon his position, but as they still threatened him in considerablenumbers, I despatched Brigadier-General Hugh Gough with some troops toenable him to withdraw. This reinforcement arrived at a most opportunemoment, when the augmented tribal combination, imagining that thegarrison was completely at its mercy, had sent a message to Moneyoffering to spare their lives if they laid down their arms! So surewere the Afghans of their triumph that they had brought 200 oftheir women to witness it. On Gough's arrival, Money dispersed thegathering, and his force left the Shutargardan, together with theHead-Quarters and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, which had beenordered to join me from Sialkot, and afterwards proved a most valuableaddition to the Kabul Field Force. 

I was sitting in my tent on the morning of the 16th October, when Iwas startled by a most terrific explosion in the upper part of theBala Hissar, which was occupied by the 5th Gurkhas, while the 67thFoot were pitched in the garden below. The gunpowder, stored in adetached building, had somehow--we never could discover how--becomeignited, and I trembled at the thought of what would be theconsequences if the main magazine caught fire, which, with its 250tons of gunpowder, was dangerously near to the scene of the explosion. I at once sent orders to the Gurkhas and the 67th to clear out, andnot to wait even to bring away their tents, or anything but theirammunition, and I did not breathe freely till they were all safe onSiah Sang. The results of this disaster, as it was, were bad enough, for Captain Shafto, R. A. (a very promising officer), a private of the67th, the Subadar-Major of the 5th Gurkhas, and nineteen Natives, mostof them soldiers, lost their lives. 

A second and more violent explosion took place two hours and a halfafter the first, but there was no loss of life amongst the troops, though several Afghans were killed at a distance of 400 yards from thefort. 

There was given on this occasion a very practical exemplificationof the good feeling existing between the European soldiers and theGurkhas. The 72nd and the 5th Gurkhas had been much associated fromthe commencement of the campaign, and a spirit of _camaraderie_ hadsprung up between them, resulting in the Highlanders now comingforward and insisting on making over their greatcoats to the littleGurkhas for the night--a very strong proof of their friendship, for atKabul in October the nights are bitterly cold. 

Two telegrams received about this time caused the greatestgratification throughout the force. One was from theCommander-in-Chief, conveying Her Majesty's expression of 'warmsatisfaction' at the conduct of the troops; the other was from theViceroy, expressing his 'cordial congratulations' and His Excellency's'high appreciation of the ability with which the action was directed, and the courage with which it was so successfully carried out. ' I wasinformed at the same time by Lord Lytton that, on the recommendationof the Commander-in-Chief, I was given the local rank ofLieutenant-General, to enable me to be placed in command of all thetroops in eastern Afghanistan, a force of 20, 000 men and 46 guns, intwo divisions. The first division remained under my own immediatecommand, and Major-General R. O. Bright, C. B. , [5] was appointed to thecommand of the other. I was, of course very much pleased at this proofof the confidence reposed in me. 

[Footnote 1: Yahia Khan was Yakub Khan's father-in-law. ]

[Footnote 2: At an interview which Major Hastings, the PoliticalOfficer, and Mr. Durand, my Political Secretary, had with His Highnessat my request on the 23rd October, he said, referring to the subjectof the Amirship: 'I call God and the Koran to witness, and everythinga Mussulman holds sacred, that my only desire is to be set free, andend my days in liberty. I have conceived an utter aversion for thesepeople. I always treated them well, and you see how they have rewardedme. So long as I was fighting in one place or another, they liked mewell enough. Directly I became Amir, and consulted their own good bymaking peace with you, they turned on me. Now I detest them all, andlong to be out of Afghanistan for ever. It is not that I am unable tohold the country; I have held it before and could hold it again, but Ihave no further wish to rule such a people, and I beg of you to let mego. If the British Government wish me to stay, I will stay, as theirservant or as the Amir, if you like to call me so, until my son is ofan age to succeed me, or even without that condition; but it willbe wholly against my own inclination, and I earnestly beg to be setfree. ']

[Footnote 3: Dr. Bellew was with the brothers Lumsden at Kandahar in1857. ]

[Footnote 4: My action in endorsing the proceedings of this court, and my treatment of Afghans generally, were so adversely and severelycriticized by party newspapers and periodicals, and by members of theOpposition in the House of Commons, that I was called upon for anexplanation of my conduct, which was submitted and read in both Housesof Parliament by the Secretary of State for India, Viscount Cranbrook, and the Under-Secretary of State for India, the Hon. E. Stanhope. Inthe Parliamentary records of February, 1880, can be seen my reply tothe accusations, as well as an abstract statement of the executionscarried out at Kabul in accordance with the findings of the militaryCourt. ]

[Footnote 5: Afterwards General Sir Robert Bright, G. C. B. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LIII. 1879

 Afghans afraid to befriend us--Kabul Russianized --Yakub Khan's abdication accepted--State treasury taken over

I had given much thought to the question of housing the troops duringthe winter, which was now fast approaching. Some of the seniorofficers were in favour of quartering them in the Bala Hissar, asbeing the place with most prestige attached to it; but the fact thatthere was not accommodation in it for the whole force, and that, therefore, the troops would have to be separated, as well as thedangerous proximity of the huge store of gunpowder, which could onlybe got rid of by degrees, decided me to occupy in preference thepartly-fortified cantonment of Sherpur, about a mile north-east of thecity, and close to the ruins of the old British entrenchment. It wasenclosed on three sides by a high and massive loop-holed wall, and onthe fourth by the Bimaru heights, while it possessed the advantage ofhaving within its walls sufficient shelter in long ranges of brickbuildings for the British troops, and good hospital accommodation, and there was ample space for the erection of huts for the Nativesoldiers. 

The drawback was that the great extent of its perimeter, more thanfour and a half miles, made it a very difficult place to defend; but, remembering the grievous results of General Elphinstone's force beingscattered in 1841, I thought the advantage of being able to keep mytroops together outweighed the disadvantage of having to defend solong a line. 

Materials for the Native soldiers' huts were brought from the BalaHissar, the demolition of which, as an act of retributive justice, Ihad recommended to the Government of India, as it appeared to me thatthe destruction of the fortified palace in which the massacre hadtaken place, and which was the symbol of the power of the Afghans andtheir boasted military strength, would be a more fitting punishmentfor treachery and insult than any other we could inflict, and a morelasting memorial of our ability to avenge our countrymen than any wecould raise. The tidings that their ancient citadel had been levelledto the ground would, I felt sure, spread throughout the length andbreadth of Afghanistan, bearing with them a political significancethat could hardly be over-estimated. 

I now set to work to collect supplies for the winter. A1 _khalsa_, or State grain, we took as our right, the justice of this beingrecognized both by the Amir and the people, but what was the propertyof private individuals was purchased at a price the avaricious Afghancould not resist. There had been a good harvest, and supplies wereabundant; but the people from the outlying districts were chary ofassisting us, for they knew from experience that all who befriendedthe British would be sure to suffer when we took our departure. 

I had repeated complaints brought to me of the harshness and injusticewith which those who had shown themselves well disposed towards uswere treated by the Amir on his return from signing the Treaty atGandamak, and most of the Afghans were so afraid of the Amir'svengeance when they should again be left to his tender mercies, thatthey held aloof, except those who, like Wali Mahomed Khan and hisfollowing, were in open opposition to Yakub Khan, and some few whowere still smarting from recent injury and oppression. 

I was frequently asked by the Afghans, when requiring some service tobe rendered, 'Are you going to remain?' Could I have replied in theaffirmative, or could I have said that we should continue to exercisesufficient control over the Government of the country to prevent theirbeing punished for helping us, they would have served us willingly. Not that I could flatter myself they altogether liked us, butthey would have felt it wise in their own interests to meet ourrequirements; and, besides, the great mass of the people were heartilysick and tired of a long continuance of oppression and misrule, andwere ready to submit (for a time, at least) to any strong and justGovernment. 

Lord Lytton, in the hope of saving from the resentment of the Amirthose who had been of use to us in the early part of the war, hadexpressly stipulated in Article II. Of the Gandamak Treaty that 'afull and complete amnesty should be published, absolving all Afghansfrom any responsibility on account of intercourse with the BritishForces during the campaign, and that the Amir should guaranteeto protect all persons, of whatever degree, from punishment ormolestation on that account. '

But this stipulation was not adhered to. Yakub Khan more than oncespoke to me about it, and declared that it was impossible to controlthe turbulent spirits in Afghanistan without being supreme, and thatthis amnesty, had it been published, would have tied his hands withregard to those who had proved themselves his enemies. 

His neglect to carry out this Article of the treaty added considerablyto my difficulty, as will be seen from the following letter fromAsmatula Khan, a Ghilzai Chief, to whom I wrote, asking him to meet meat Kabul. 

 'I received your kind letter on the 8th of Shawal [28th September], and understood its contents, and also those of the enclosed Proclamation to the people of Kabul. I informed all whom I thought fit of the contents of the Proclamation. 

 'Some time ago I went to Gandamak to Major Cavagnari. He instructed me to obey the orders of the Amir, and made me over to His Highness. When Major Cavagnari returned to India, the Amir's officials confiscated my property, and gave the Chiefship to my cousin[1] [or enemy], Bakram Khan. 

 'The oppression I suffered on your account is beyond description. They ruined and disgraced every friend and adherent of mine. On the return of Major Cavagnari to Kabul, I sent my Naib [deputy] to him, who informed him of my state. Major Cavagnari sent a message to me to the effect that I should recover my property by force if I could, otherwise I should go to the hills, and not come to Kabul until I heard from him. In the meantime I received news of the murder of the Envoy, and I am still in the hills. '

The thought of what might be in store for those who were now aiding metroubled me a good deal. No doubt their help was not disinterested, but they were 'friends in need, ' and I could not be quite indifferentto their future. 

I had several interesting conversations with Yakub Khan, and indiscussing with him Sher Ali's reasons for breaking with us, he dwelton the fact that his father, although he did not get all he wished outof Lord Mayo, was fairly satisfied and content with what had been donefor him, but when Saiyad Nur Mahomed returned from Simla in 1873, he became thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures to theRussians, with whom constant intercourse had since been kept up. 

Yakub Khan's statements were verified by the fact that we found Kabulmuch more Russian than English. The Afghan Sirdars and officers werearrayed in Russian pattern uniforms, Russian money was found in thetreasury, Russian wares were sold in the bazaars, and although theroads leading to Central Asia were certainly no better than thoseleading to India, Russia had taken more advantage of them than we hadto carry on commercial dealings with Afghanistan. [2]

When I inquired of Yakub Khan what had become of the correspondencewhich must have been carried on between his father and the Russians, he declared that he had destroyed it all when on his way to Gandamak;nevertheless, a certain number of letters[3] from Generals Kauffmannand Stoliatoff came into my possession, and a draft of the treaty thelatter officer brought from Tashkent was made for me from memory bythe man who had copied it for Sher Ali, aided by the Afghan officialwho was told off to be in attendance on Stoliatoff, and who hadfrequently read the treaty. 

In one of my last conversations with Yakub Khan, he advised me 'not tolose sight of Herat and Turkestan. ' On my asking him whether he hadany reason to suppose that his representatives in those places meantto give trouble, he replied: 'I cannot say what they may do; but, remember, I have warned you. ' He, no doubt, knew more than he toldme, and I think it quite possible that he had some inkling of hisbrother's[4] (Ayub Khan's) intentions, in regard to Kandahar, and heprobably foresaw that Abdur Rahman Khan would appear on the scene fromthe direction of Turkestan. 

I duly received an answer to my telegram regarding the abdication ofYakub Khan, in which I was informed that His Highness's resignationwas accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and I was directed toannounce the fact to the people of Afghanistan in the following terms:

 'I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby proclaim that the Amir, having by his own free will abdicated, has left Afghanistan without a Government. In consequence of the shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital, and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan. 

 'The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities, Chiefs, and Sirdars do continue their functions in maintaining order, referring to me whenever necessary. 

 'The British Government desire that the people shall be treated with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings and customs be respected. 

 'The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as assist in preserving order will be duly recognized, but all disturbers of the peace and persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet with condign punishment. 

 'The British Government, after consultation with the principal Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of the people. '

This manifesto was issued on the 28th October, and the same dayI informed Yakub Khan that his abdication had been accepted, andacquainted him with the orders passed by the British Government inconnexion with this fact. [5]

Yakub Khan showed no interest either in the Proclamation, a Persiantranslation of which was read to him, or the Government's decision asto himself, and made no comment beyond a formal '_bisyar khub_' ('verygood') and an inclination of the head. 

I then told Yakub Khan that, as I was now charged with the governmentof the country, it was necessary that I should take possession of thetreasury and all moneys therein. He signified his assent, but demurredto certain sums being considered as public property, contendingthat they formed part of his father's wealth, and that the BritishGovernment might as well take from him his _choga_, [6] thisalso having come from the pockets of the people. 'My father was_Padishah_, ' he said; 'there was no distinction between public andprivate money. However, ' he went on, 'I have given up the crown, and Iam not going to dispute about rupees. You may take all I have, down tomy clothes; but the money was my father's, and is mine by right. '

I replied that it was necessary that all money in his possessionshould be given up, but that his private effects should not betouched; that he would be given a receipt for the money, and that, ifthe Government of India decided it to be his personal property, itshould be returned to him. 

This Yakub Khan at first declined to accept, with some show of temper. Eventually he came round, and said, 'Yes, give me a receipt, so thatno one may say hereafter that I carried off State money to which Ihad no right. It can be easily made sure that I have no money when Igo. '[7]

Spite of all his shortcomings, I could not help feeling sorry for theself-deposed Ruler, and before leaving him I explained that he wouldbe treated with the same consideration that had always been accordedto him, that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan[8] should have a tent nextto his, and that it should be the Nawab's care to look after hiscomfort in every way, and that I should be glad to see him whenever hewished for an interview. That same day, under instructions, I issuedthe following further manifesto:

 'In my Proclamation of yesterday I announced that His Highness the Amir had of his own free will abdicated, and that for the present the government of Afghanistan would be carried on under my supervision. I now proclaim that, in order to provide for the cost of administration, I have taken possession of the State treasury, and that, until the British Government shall declare its will as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the future good government of the country, the collection of revenue and the expenditure of public money will be regulated by me. All persons concerned are hereby informed that they must obey without dispute or delay such orders as may be issued by me in regard to the payment of taxes and other connected matters; and I give plain warning that anyone resisting or obstructing the execution of such orders will be treated with the utmost severity as an enemy to the British Government. '

[Footnote 1: In Pushtu the word _tarbur_ signifies a cousin to anydegree, and is not unfrequently used as 'enemy, ' the inference beingthat in Afghanistan a cousin is necessarily an enemy. ]

[Footnote 2: As I reported at the time, the magnitude of SherAli's military preparations was, in my opinion, a fact of peculiarsignificance. He had raised and equipped with arms of precisionsixteen regiments of Cavalry and sixty-eight of Infantry, while hisArtillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisanswere constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon andbreech-loading small arms. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and otherarticles of military equipment, were stored in proportionatequantities. Upon the construction of the Sherpur cantonment Sher Alihad expended an astonishing amount of labour and money. The size andcost of this work may be judged from the fact that the main line oframpart, with barrack accommodation, extended to a length of nearlytwo miles under the western and southern slopes of the Bimaru hills, while the original design was to carry the wall entirely round thehills, a distance of four and a half miles, and the foundations werelaid for a considerable portion of this length. All these militarypreparations must have been going on for some years, and were quiteunnecessary, except as a provision for contemplated hostilities withourselves. Sher Ali had refused during this time to accept the subsidywe had agreed to pay him, and it is difficult to understand how theirentire cost could have been met from the Afghan treasury, the annualgross revenue of the country at that time amounting only to about 80lakhs of rupees. ]

[Footnote 3: These letters, as well as my report to the Secretary tothe Government of India in the Foreign Department, with an account ofmy conversation with Yakub Khan, are given in the Appendix. ]

[Footnote 4: Sirdar Ayub Khan was Governor of Herat in 1879. ]

[Footnote 5: There were present at the interview, besides myself, Colonel Macgregor, Major Hastings, Surgeon-Major Bellew, Nawab SirGhulam Hussein Khan, and Mr. H. M. Durand. ]

[Footnote 6: A kind of mantle worn by Afghans. ]

[Footnote 7: As Yakub Khan refused under one pretext or another todeliver up any money, Major Moriarty, the officer in charge of theKabul Field Force treasure-chest, and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, accompanied by an escort, searched a house in the city in which aportion of Yakub Khan's money was said to be concealed. Upwards ofeight and a half lakhs of rupees, and a certain amount of jewelleryand gold coins, tillas and Russian five-rouble pieces, in allamounting to nine and a half lakhs, were found. This sum wassubsequently refunded to the Afghan Government. ]

[Footnote 8: The Nawab had been made a K. C. S. I. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LIV. 1879

 The amnesty Proclamation--Strength of the Kabul Field Force --Yakub Khan despatched to India

On the 1st November my Head-Quarters and the 1st division moved intoSherpur, which the Engineers had prepared for winter quarters, andwhere stores of provisions and forage were assuming satisfactoryproportions. The same day Brigadier-General Macpherson left Kabul witha brigade of about 1, 800 men and four guns to join hands with thetroops which I had lately heard were advancing from the Khyber, andhad reached Gandamak. I joined Macpherson the following morning atButkhak, about eleven miles from Kabul, where our first post towardsthe Khyber had already been established. It was very important thatour communication with India should be by a route good enough forwheeled carriages; I was therefore anxious to see for myself if itwere not possible to avoid the Khurd-Kabul Pass, which was said to bevery difficult. I had, besides, a strong wish to visit this pass, asbeing the scene of Sir Robert Sale's fight with the tribesmen in1841, and of the beginning of the massacre of General Elphinstone'sunfortunate troops in 1842. [1] The Afghan Commander-in-Chief, DaudShah, and several Ghilzai Chiefs, accompanied me; from them I learnedthat an easier road did exist, running more to the east, and crossingover the Lataband mountain. Personal inspection of the two linesproved that Daud Shah's estimate of their respective difficultieswas correct; the Lataband route was comparatively easy, there was nodefile as on the Khurd-Kabul side, and the kotal, 8, 000 feet above thesea, was reached by a gradual ascent from Butkhak. However, I foundthe Khurd-Kabul much less difficult than I had imagined it to be; itmight have been made passable for carts, but there was no object inusing it, as the Lataband route possessed the additional advantageof being some miles shorter; accordingly I decided upon adopting thelatter as the line of communication with India. 

Macpherson reported that the country beyond Khurd-Kabul was fairlysettled, and that, on the 7th, he had been able to open communicationwith Brigadier-General Charles Gough, commanding Bright's leadingbrigade. I was thus again brought into communication with India, andin a position to clear my hospitals of those amongst the sick andwounded who were not progressing favourably, and could not soon be fitfor duty. 

By this time the Inquiry Commission had completed its difficult taskof trying to sift the truth concerning the fate of Cavagnari and hiscompanions from the mass of falsehood with which it was enveloped. Theprogress had been slow, particularly when examination touched on thepart Yakub Khan had played in the tragedy; witnesses were afraid togive evidence openly until they were convinced that he would not bere-established in a position to avenge himself. The whole matter hadbeen gone into most fully, and a careful perusal of the proceedingssatisfied me that the Amir could not have been ignorant that an attackon the Residency was contemplated. He may not have foreseen or desiredthe massacre of the Embassy, but there was no room for doubt as to hishaving connived at a demonstration against it, which, had it not endedso fatally, might have served him in good stead as a proof of hisinability to guarantee the safety of foreigners, and thus obtain thewithdrawal of the Mission. 

It was impossible, under these circumstances, that Yakub Khan couldever be reinstated as Ruler of Kabul, and his remaining in his presentequivocal position was irksome to himself and most embarrassing to me. I therefore recommended that he should be deported to India, tobe dealt with as the Government might decide after reviewing theinformation elicited by the political Court of Inquiry, which tome appeared to tell so weightily against the ex-Amir, that, in myopinion, I was no longer justified in treating as rebels to hisauthority Afghans who, it was now evident, had only carried out hissecret, if not his expressed, wishes when opposing our advanceon Kabul. I decided, therefore, to proclaim a free and completeamnesty[2] to all persons not concerned, directly or indirectly, in the attack on the Residency, or who were not found hereafter inpossession of property belonging to our countrymen or their escort, onthe condition that they surrendered their arms and returned to theirhomes. 

At Daud Shah's suggestion, I sent three influential Sirdars to theLogar, Kohistan, and Maidan valleys, to superintend the collection ofthe amount of forage which was to be levied from those districts;and in order to lessen the consumption at Kabul, I sent away allelephants, [3] spare bullocks, and sick transport animals. Infurtherance of the same object, as soon as Macpherson returned, I sentBaker with a brigade into the Maidan district, about twenty miles fromKabul, on the Ghazni road, where the troops could more easily be fed, as it was the district from which a large proportion of our supplieswas expected, and I also despatched to India all time-expired men andinvalids who were no longer fit for service. [4]

Towards the end of November, Mr. Luke, the officer in charge of thetelegraph department, who had done admirable work throughout thecampaign, reported that communication was established with India. As, however, cutting the telegraph-wires was a favourite amusement of thetribesmen, a heliograph was arranged at suitable stations betweenLandi Kotal and Kabul, which was worked with fair success to theend of the war. Had we then possessed the more perfect heliographicapparatus which is now available, it would have made us, in thatland of bright sun, almost independent of the telegraph, so far asconnexion with Landi Kotal was concerned. 

Hearing that Baker was experiencing difficulty in collecting hissupplies, I joined him at Maidan to satisfy myself how matters stood. The headmen in the neighbourhood refused to deliver the _khalsa_ grainthey had been ordered to furnish, and, assisted by a body of Ghilzaisfrom Ghazni and Wardak, they attacked our Cavalry charged withcollecting it, and murdered our agent, Sirdar Mahomed Hussein Khan. For these offences I destroyed the chief _malik's_ fort and confiscatedhis store of grain, after which there was no more trouble, andsupplies came in freely. I returned to Kabul, and Baker, with hisbrigade, followed me on the 1st December. 

That same day Yakub Khan was despatched by double marches to India, careful precautions having been taken to prevent his being rescued onthe way. When saying good-bye to him, he thanked me warmly for thekindness and consideration he had received, and assured me that heleft his wives and children in my hands in the fullest confidence thatthey would be well treated and cared for. 

A week later I sent off the two Sirdars, Yahia Khan and Zakariah Khan, as well as the Wazir, whose guilt had been clearly proved, and whosepowerful influence, I had every reason to believe, was being used tostir up the country against us. The Mustaufi I allowed to remain; hehad been less prominent than the others in opposing us, and, besides, I had an idea that he might prove useful to me in the administrationof the country. 

[Footnote 1: A most thrilling account of Elphinstone's retreat throughthis pass is given in Kaye's 'History of the War in Afghanistan, ' vol. Ii. , p. 229. ]

[Footnote 2: The amnesty Proclamation ran as follows:

 'KABUL, '_12th November, 1879. _

 'To all whom it may concern. On the 12th October a Proclamation was issued in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any person who had fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, and had thereby become a rebel against the Amir Yakub Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that some, at least, of those who shared in the opposition encountered by the British troops during their advance on Kabul, were led to do so by the belief that the Amir was a prisoner in my camp, and had called upon the soldiery and people of Kabul to rise on his behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Government, were not rebels against their own Sovereign, and the great British Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men, but rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to all persons who have fought against the British troops since the 3rd September, provided that they now give up any arms in their possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will not for the future be molested in any way on account of their opposition to the British advance; but it must be clearly understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to anyone, whether soldier or civilian, who was concerned directly or indirectly in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold out no promise of pardon to those who, well knowing the Amir's position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of Kabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been guilty of wilful rebellion against the Amir's authority, and they will be considered and treated as rebels wherever found. ']

[Footnote 3: There was a slight fall of snow on the 11th November, followed by severe frost, and the elephants were beginning to sufferfrom the cold. Three of them succumbed on the Lataband Kotal, muchto the annoyance of the olfactory nerves of all passers-by. It wasimpossible to bury the huge carcasses, as the ground was all rock, andthere was not wood enough to burn them. So intense was the cold thatthe ink froze in my pen, and I was obliged to keep my inkstand undermy pillow at night. ]

[Footnote 4: This party marched towards India on the 14th November, followed by a second convoy of sickly men on the 27th idem. On thislatter date the strength of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, Kabul FieldForce, and the Reserve at Peshawar was as follows:

--------------------------------------------------------------- | British Force. | Native Force. |Total. | |----------------+-----------------| | |Officers. |Rank &| British |Troops. | | | |File. |Officers. | | |--------------------+---------+------+---------+-------+------|1st Division, at | | | | | |and around Kabul .. | 100 | 2, 783| 71 | 5, 060 | 8, 014|2nd Division, on | | | | | |the Khyber line ... | 90 | 2, 385| 118 | 8, 590 |11, 183| |---------+------+---------+-------+------| | 190 | 5, 168| 189 |13, 650 |19, 197|Reserve at Peshawar | 55 | 1, 952| 49 | 4, 654 | 6, 710| |---------+------+---------+-------+------| | 245 | 7, 120| 238 |18, 304 |25, 907|---------------------------------------------------------------

 Total:-- 483 British officers. 7, 120 British troops. 18, 304 Native troops. Grand total:-- 25, 907 with 60 guns, 24 with 1st Division, and 36 with 2nd Division and the Reserve. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LV. 1879

 Political situation at Kabul--Serious trouble ahead --Macpherson attacks the Kohistanis--Combined movements --The uncertainty of war--The fight in the Chardeh valley --Forced to retire--Padre Adams earns the V. C. --Macpherson's column arrives --The captured guns recovered--Melancholy reflections

The general political situation, as it developed itself in theearly part of December, and the causes which appeared to me to havecontributed to produce it, may be briefly summarized as follows. Afterthe outbreak in the previous September and the massacre of our Envoy, the advance of the British force was too rapid to give the Afghans, asa nation, time to oppose us. At Charasia, the troops, aided by largenumbers of the disaffected townspeople, were conspicuously beaten inthe open field; their organization as an armed body was at an end, andtheir leaders all sought personal safety in flight. 

It appears probable that at this period the general expectationamongst the Afghans was that the British Government would exact aheavy retribution from the nation and city, and that, after vengeancehad been satisfied, the army would be withdrawn. 

Thirty-seven years before, a British massacre had been followed by atemporary occupation of the city of Kabul, and just as the troops ofPollock and Nott, on that occasion, had sacked and destroyed the greatbazaar and then retired, so in 1879 the people believed that somesignal punishment would again be succeeded by the withdrawal of ourtroops. Thus a period of doubt and expectation ensued after the battleof Charasia; the Afghans were waiting on events, and the time had notarrived for a general movement. 

This pause, however, was marked by certain occurrences which doubtlesstouched the national pride to the quick, and which were alsosusceptible of being used by the enemies of the British Government toexcite into vivid fanaticism the religious sentiment, which has everformed a prominent trait in the Afghan character. 

The prolonged occupation by foreign troops of the fortified cantonmentwhich had been prepared by the late Amir Sher Ali for his own army;the capture of the large park of Artillery, and of the vast munitionsof war, which had raised the military strength of the Afghans to astandard unequalled among Asiatic nations; the destruction of theirhistoric fortress, the residence of their Kings; and, lastly, thedeportation to India of their Amir and his principal Ministers, were all circumstances which united to increase to a high pitch theantipathy naturally felt towards a foreign invader. 

The temper of the people being in this inflammable condition, it wasclear that only disunion and jealousy amongst their Chiefs preventedtheir combining against us, and that if any impetus could be givento their religious sentiment strong enough to unite the discordantelements in a common cause, a powerful movement would be initiated, having for its object our annihilation or expulsion from theircountry. 

Such an impetus was supplied by the fervent preaching of the agedmulla Mushk-i-Alam, [1] who denounced the English in every mosquethroughout the country. The people were further incited to rise by theappeals of the ladies of Yakub Khan's family to popular sympathy, andbribed to do so by the distribution of the concealed treasure at theircommand. 

The mullas, in short, became masters of the situation, and, havingonce succeeded in subordinating private quarrels to hatred of thecommon foe, the movement rapidly assumed the aspect of a religiouswar. The Afghan successes of 1841-42 were cited as examples of whatmight happen again, and the people were assured that, if they wouldonly act simultaneously, the small British army in Sherpur wouldbe overwhelmed, and the plunder of our camp would be part of theirreward. 

From time to time reports reached me of what was going on, and, fromthe information supplied to me, I gathered that the Afghans intendedto gain possession of the city, and, after occupying the numerousforts and villages in the neighbourhood of Sherpur, to surround thecantonment. 

It was under the stimulating influences of religious enthusiasm, patriotic and military ardour, the prestige of former success, andthe hope of remuneration and plunder, that the Afghans took the fieldagainst us early in December. 

It was arranged that the forces from the south[2] should seize therange of hills extending from Charasia to the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights, including the fortifications of the upper Bala Hissar and the highconical peak called the Takht-i-Shah; that those from the north[3]should occupy the Asmai heights and hills to the north of Kabul; andthose from the west[4] should make direct for the city. 

As it was evident to me that these several bodies, when onceconcentrated at Kabul, would be joined by the thousands in the city, and the inhabitants of the adjoining villages, I determined to tryand deal with the advancing forces in detail, and disperse them, ifpossible, before the concentration could be effected. I had, however, but a very imperfect idea of the extent of the combination, or ofthe enormous numbers arrayed against us. My intelligence was mostdefective; neither the nature of the country nor the attitude of thepeople admitted of extended reconnaissances, and I was almost entirelydependent for information on Afghan sources. Some of the Afghansoldiers in our ranks aided me to the best of their ability, but bythe Sirdars, notably Wali Mahomed Khan, I was, either wilfully or fromignorance, grossly misinformed as to the formidable character of therising. But that there was serious trouble ahead was plain enough whenthe conflicting reports had been carefully sifted, and I thereforethought it only prudent to telegraph to General Bright at Jalalabad topush on the Guide Corps, although I was very much averse to augmentingthe Sherpur garrison, and thereby increasing the drain on oursupplies. 

In the meantime immediate action was necessary to carry out my idea ofpreventing the different sections of the enemy concentrating at Kabul. I accordingly prepared two columns: one under Macpherson, whose orderswere to attack the tribesmen coming from the north before they couldjoin those advancing from the west; the other under Baker, who wasinstructed to place himself across the line by which the enemy wouldhave to retreat when beaten, as I hoped they would be, by Macpherson. 

Macpherson[5] started on the 8th towards Kila Aushar, about threemiles from Sherpur, _en route_ to Arghandeh. And on the followingmorning Baker, with a small force, [6] proceeded to Chihal Dukhteran, giving out that his destination was the Logar valley, and that hewould march by Charasia, as I had directed him to make a feint in thatdirection, and then to turn to the west, and place himself betweenArghandeh and Maidan, on the Ghazni road. 

To give Baker time to carry out this movement, I halted Macpherson atKila Aushar on the 9th, whence he sent out two reconnoitringparties--one in the direction of Kohistan, the other, in charge ofLieutenant-Colonel Lockhart, [7] A. Q. M. G. , towards Arghandeh. 

The intelligence brought in induced me to change my orders toMacpherson. The first party reported that a very considerable force ofKohistanis had collected at Karez-i-Mir, about ten miles north ofKila Aushar, while Lockhart had discovered large numbers of the enemymoving from Arghandeh and Paghman towards Kohistan. Accordingly, Idirected Macpherson to attack the Kohistanis, in the hope of beingable to disperse them before the people from Ghazni could join them;and, as the part of the country through which he had to move wasunsuited to Horse Artillery and Cavalry, I ordered him to leave themounted portion of his column, except one squadron of Cavalry, at KilaAushar. 

Macpherson made a rapid advance on the morning of the 10th December, skirting the fringe of low hills which intervenes between Kohistan andthe Chardeh valley. He reached the Surkh Kotal--which divides westernKohistan from the Arghandeh valley--without opposition. From thispoint, however, the Kohistanis were sighted, occupying a positionabout two miles to his right front, their centre on a steep, conical, isolated hill, at the base of which lay the village of Karez-i-Mir. 

Macpherson was now able to obtain a good view of the Paghman andChardeh valleys on his left and left rear, and the numerous standardsplanted on the different knolls near the villages of Paghman gaveample evidence of the presence of the enemy discovered by Lockhart theprevious day, and showed him that, unless he could quickly succeed inscattering the Kohistanis, he would find himself attacked by an enemyin his rear, in fact, between two fires. 

Macpherson made his disposition for an attack with skill and rapidity. Leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Money with one company of the 67th, fivecompanies of the 3rd Sikhs, and two guns, to hold the ridge, he sentthe remainder of the Sikhs to harass the enemy's left flank andsupport the Cavalry, who were ordered to hover about and threaten theline of retreat, while Macpherson himself went forward with the restof the force. 

The Kohistanis retreated rapidly before our skirmishers, and theattacking party, protected by a well-directed fire from Morgan's guns, advanced with such promptitude that the enemy made no attempt torally until they reached the conical hill, where they made a stubbornresistance. The hill was carried by assault, its defenders were drivenoff, leaving seven standards on the field, and Morgan, bringing up hisArtillery, inflicted severe loss on the flying Kohistanis. On thisoccasion Major Cook, V. C. , of the 5th Gurkhas, was again noticed forhis conspicuous gallantry, and Major Griffiths, of the 3rd Sikhs, greatly distinguished himself. Our casualties were one officer(Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh) and six men wounded. 

It was evident that the tribesmen from the directions of Arghandeh andPaghman intended to ascend the Surkh Kotal, but suddenly they appearedto change their minds, on discovering, probably, that our troopsheld all the commanding positions and that their allies were in fullflight. 

Soon after noon on the 10th I received the report of Macpherson'ssuccess and the enemy's retirement towards Arghandeh. I at once sentoff Lieutenant-Colonel B. Gordon, R. H. A. , with orders to interceptthem with the Horse Artillery and Cavalry at Aushar; but when I rodeover myself later in the day to that place, I was much disappointed tofind that Gordon had not been able to give effect to my instructions, as the enemy, on perceiving his troops, dispersed and took shelter inthe surrounding villages and on the slopes of the hills. 

Macpherson encamped for the night between the Surkh Kotal andKarez-i-Mir, and Baker, who had steadily pursued his march along avery difficult road, halted a short distance west of Maidan and eightmiles only from Arghandeh. 

To Macpherson I sent orders to march very early the next morning--the11th--through Paghman towards Arghandeh and in Baker's direction; atthe same time I informed him that Massy, whom I had placed in commandof the troops at Aushar, would, according to directions from me, leavethat place at nine o'clock to co-operate with him, _viâ_ the Arghandehand Ghazni road. That evening Massy came to my room, and I carefullyexplained to him his part in the next day's proceedings; I told himthat he was to advance cautiously and quietly by the road leadingdirectly from the city of Kabul towards Arghandeh, feeling forthe enemy; that he was to communicate with Macpherson and act inconformity with that officer's movements; and I impressed upon himthat he was on no account to commit himself to an action untilMacpherson had engaged the enemy. 

Up to this time the combination of tribesmen, which later proved soformidable, had not been effected; Macpherson for the time being haddispersed the Kohistanis and checked the force advancing from Ghazniunder the leadership of Mahomed Jan; the Logaris and Ghilzais weremerely watching events, and waiting to see how it fared with theKohistani and Ghazni factions, before committing themselves tohostilities; they had but recently witnessed our successful advancethrough their country; they knew that their homes and property wouldbe at our mercy should we be victorious, and they were uncertain as toBaker's movements. 

On the morning of the 11th December, [8] therefore, only one sectionwas actually in opposition to us, that led by Mahomed Jan, who duringthe night of the 10th had taken up a position near the group ofvillages known as Kila Kazi. 

Further, I felt that Mahomed Jan must be disheartened at our recentsuccess, and at his failure to induce the Logaris to join him, anddoubtless felt that a movement towards Kabul would expose his leftflank to Macpherson, while his rear would be threatened by Baker. 

The strength of Baker's and Macpherson's columns had been carefullyconsidered, as well as the routes they were to take. I was thoroughlywell acquainted with the ground comprised in the theatre of theproposed operations, having frequently ridden over it during thepreceding two months; I was thus able to calculate to a nicety thedifficulties each column would have to encounter and the distancesthey would have to cover, and arrange with the utmost precision thehour at which each Commander should move off to insure a timelyjunction. So that when I left Sherpur at ten o'clock on the 11thDecember to take command of Macpherson's and Massy's columns as soonas they should unite, I had no misgivings, and was sanguine that mycarefully arranged programme would result in the discomfiture ofMahomed Jan; but the events which followed on that day afforded astriking exemplification of the uncertainty of war, and of how even avery slight divergence from a General's orders may upset plans madewith the greatest care and thought, and lead to disastrous results. 

Massy could not have clearly understood the part he was meant to takein co-operation with Macpherson, for instead of following the route Ihad directed him to take, he marched straight across country to theGhazni road, which brought him face to face with the enemy before hecould be joined by Macpherson. In his explanatory report Massy statedthat he had been misled by a memorandum[9] which he received from theAssistant Adjutant-General after his interview with me (although thismemorandum contained nothing contradictory of the orders I had givenhim); that he understood from it that his business was to reach theGhazni road at its nearest point in the direction of Arghandeh, andthat he thought it better, with a thirty miles' march in prospect, totake the most direct line in order to save his horses, to economizetime in a short December day, and to keep as near as he could to thecolumn with which he was to co-operate; further, he stated that he wasunder the impression there was little likelihood of his meeting withany of the enemy nearer than Arghandeh. 

On starting from Aushar Massy detached a troop of the 9th Lancers tocommunicate with Macpherson. This reduced his column to 247 Britishand 44 Native Cavalry, with 4 Horse Artillery guns. 

As the party moved along the Chardeh valley, a loud beating of drumswas heard, and Captain Bloomfield Gough, 9th Lancers, commanding theadvance guard, perceived when he had moved to about a mile north ofKila Kazi, that the enemy were occupying hills on both sides of theGhazni road, about two miles to his left front, and sent back word tothat effect. Massy, not believing that the Afghans had collectedin any considerable numbers, continued to advance; but he was soonundeceived by the crowds of men and waving standards which shortlycame into view moving towards Kila Kazi. He then ordered MajorSmith-Wyndham to open fire, but the range, 2, 900 yards, beingconsidered by Colonel Gordon, the senior Artillery officer, too farfor his six-pounders, after a few rounds the guns were moved acrossthe Ghazni road, and again brought into action at 2, 500 yards; as thisdistance was still found to be too great, they were moved to 2, 000yards. The enemy now pressed forward on Massy's left flank, which wasalso his line of retreat, and the guns had to be retired about a mile, covered on the right and left by the 9th Lancers and the 14th BengalLancers respectively, and followed so closely by the Afghans that whenfire was next opened they were only 1, 700 yards distant. Four HorseArtillery guns could do nothing against such numbers attacking withoutany regular formation, and when the leading men came within carbinerange, Massy tried to stop them by dismounting thirty of the 9thLancers; but their fire 'had no appreciable effect. '

It was at this critical moment that I appeared on the scene. Warned bythe firing that an engagement was taking place, I galloped across theChardeh valley as fast as my horse could carry me, and on gaining theopen ground beyond Bhagwana, an extraordinary spectacle was presentedto my view. An unbroken line, extending for about two miles, andformed of not less than between 9, 000 and 10, 000 men, was movingrapidly towards me, all on foot save a small body of Cavalry on theirleft flank--in fact, the greater part of Mahomed Jan's army. To meetthis formidable array, instead of Macpherson's and Massy's forces, which I hoped I should have found combined, there were but 4 guns, 198of the 9th Lancers under Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland, 40 of the 14thBengal Lancers under Captain Philip Neville, and at some littledistance Gough's troop of the 9th Lancers, who were engaged inwatching the enemy's Cavalry. 

The inequality of the opposing forces was but too painfully apparent. The first glance at the situation showed me the hopelessness ofcontinuing the struggle without Infantry. Up to that moment ourcasualties had not been many, as Afghans seldom play at long bowls, itbeing necessary for them to husband their ammunition, and when, as inthe present instance, they outnumber their adversaries by forty toone, they universally try to come to close quarters and use theirknives. 

My first thought was how to secure the best and shortest line ofretreat; it lay by Deh-i-Mazang, but in order to use it, the gorgeclose by that village had to be held; for if the enemy reached itfirst they would have no difficulty in gaining the heights aboveKabul, which would practically place the city at their mercy. 

I was very anxious also to prevent any panic or disturbance takingplace in Kabul. I therefore told General Hills, who justthen opportunely joined me, to gallop to Sherpur, explain toBrigadier-General Hugh Gough, who had been placed in temporarycommand of that place, how matters stood, and order 200 of the 72ndHighlanders to come to Deh-i-Mazang with the least possible delay. Idirected Hills, after having delivered this message, to make for thecity, shut the gates, and do all in his power to keep the peoplequiet, while warning the Kizilbashes[10] to be prepared to defendtheir quarter. I then despatched my nephew and A. D. C. , Lieutenant JohnSherston, to Macpherson to inform him of what had happened, and desirehim to push on with the utmost speed. 

Having taken these precautionary measures, I sent another A. D. C. , Captain Pole Carew, to Brigadier-General Massy to direct him to tryand find a way by which the guns could retire in case of a necessity, which appeared to me to be only too probable. 

The engagement had now become a question of time. If Mahomed Jan couldclose with and overwhelm our small force, Kabul would be his; but if, by any possibility, his advance could be retarded until Macphersonshould come up, we might hope to retain possession of the city. Itwas, therefore, to the Afghan leader's interest to press on, while itwas to ours to delay him as long as we possibly could. 

Pole Carew presently returned with a message from Massy that the enemywere close upon him, and that he could not keep them in check. Idesired Pole Carew to go back, order Massy to retire the guns, andcover the movement by a charge of Cavalry. 

The charge was led by Lieutenant-Colonel Cleland and Captain Neville, the former of whom fell dangerously wounded; but the ground, terracedfor irrigation purposes and intersected by nullas, so impededour Cavalry that the charge, heroic as it was, made little or noimpression upon the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, now flushedwith the triumph of having forced our guns to retire. The effort, however, was worthy of the best traditions of our British and IndianCavalry, and that it failed in its object was no fault of our gallantsoldiers. To assist them in their extremity, I ordered two ofSmyth-Windham's four guns to halt and come into action while the othertwo continued to retire, but these had not gone far before they gotinto such difficult ground that one had to be spiked and abandoned ina water-cut, where Smyth-Windham found it when he came up afterhaving fired a few rounds at the fast advancing foe. I now orderedSmyth-Windham to make for the village of Bhagwana with his threeremaining guns, as the only chance left of saving them. This he did, and having reached the village, he again opened fire from behind alow wall which enclosed the houses; but the ammunition being nearlyexpended, and the enemy close at hand, there was nothing for it but tolimber up again and continue the retirement through the village. Atthe further side, however, and forming part of its defences, was aformidable obstacle in the shape of a ditch fully twelve feet deep, narrowing towards the bottom; across this Smyth-Windham tried to takehis guns, and the leading horses had just begun to scramble up thefurther bank, when one of the wheelers stumbled and fell, with theresult that the shafts broke and the gun stuck fast, blocking the onlypoint at which there was any possibility of getting the others across. 

With a faint hope of saving the guns, I directed CaptainStewart-Mackenzie, who had assumed command of the 9th Lancers onCleland being disabled, to make a second charge, which he executedwith the utmost gallantry, [11] but to no purpose; and in the meanwhileSmyth-Windham had given the order to unhook and spike the guns. 

By this time the enemy were within a few hundred yards of Bhagwana, and the inhabitants had begun to fire at us from the roofs of theirhouses. I was endeavouring to help some men out of the ditch, when theheadman of the village rushed at me with his knife, seeing which, aMahomedan[12] of the 1st Bengal Cavalry, who was following me on foot, having just had his horse shot under him, sprang at my assailant, and, seizing him round the waist, threw him to the bottom of the ditch, thereby saving my life. [13]

Suddenly the Afghans stayed their advance for a few minutes, thinking, as I afterwards learnt, that our Infantry were in the village--apause which allowed many of our Cavalry who had lost their horses toescape. [14]

Directly we had got clear of the village the Cavalry reformed, andretired slowly by alternate squadrons, in a manner which excited myhighest admiration, and reflected the greatest credit on thesoldierly qualities of Stewart-Mackenzie and Neville. From Bhagwana, Deh-i-Mazang was three miles distant, and it was of vital importanceto keep the enemy back in order to give the Highlanders from Sherpurtime to reach the gorge. 

For a time the Afghans continued to press on as before, but after awhile their advance gradually became slower and their numbers somewhatdecreased. This change in Mahomed Jan's tactics, it afterwards turnedout, was caused by Macpherson's advance guard coming into collisionwith the rear portion of his army; it was of the greatest advantageto us, as it enabled the 72nd to arrive in time to bar the enemy'spassage through the gorge. My relief was great when I beheld them, headed by their eager Commander, Brownlow, doubling through the gapand occupying the village of Deh-i-Mazang and the heights on eitherside. The Cavalry greeted them with hearty cheers, and the volleysdelivered by the Highlanders from the roofs of the houses in thevillage soon checked the Afghans, some of whom turned back, whileothers made for Indiki and the slopes of the Takht-i-Shah. For a time, at any rate, their hopes of getting possession of Kabul had beenfrustrated. 

It will be remembered that the orders I sent to Macpherson on the 10thwere that he was to march very early the next morning, as Massy withthe Horse Artillery and Cavalry would leave Aushar at 9 a. M. , and thathe must join him on the Arghandeh road. Macpherson did not make soearly a start as I had intended; from one cause or another, he said, he was not able to leave Karez-i-Mir before eight o'clock. On reachingthe Surkh Kotal he observed dense bodies of the enemy hurrying fromthe Paghman and Arghandeh directions towards Kila Kazi, and he pushedon, hoping to be able to deal with them individually before they hadtime to concentrate. For the first three miles from the foot of thepass the view was obstructed by a range of hills, and nothing could beseen of the Horse Artillery and Cavalry; but soon after 10 a. M. Thebooming of guns warned Macpherson that fighting was going on, but hecould not tell whether it was Baker's or Massy's troops which wereengaged. He was, however, not left long in doubt, for LieutenantNeville Chamberlain, attached to Macpherson as political officer, andwho had gone on with his advance guard, sent back word that he coulddistinguish British Cavalry charging the Afghans, and as Baker hadonly Native Cavalry with him, Macpherson knew at once that the actionwas being fought by Massy. Suddenly the firing ceased, and he wasinformed that the enemy were advancing on Kabul, and that theirvanguard had already reached the belt of orchards and enclosures, onthe further fringe of which the smoke from our guns and the charge ofour Cavalry had been seen. 

Macpherson, feeling that something serious had occurred, called on hismen to make a further effort. At 12. 30 p. M. , less than an hour afterwe had begun to retire, he reached the ground where the fight hadtaken place. The dead bodies of our officers and men, stripped andhorribly mutilated, proved how fierce had been the struggle, andthe dropping shots which came from the fortified villages in theneighbourhood and from the ravines, warned the Brigadier-General thatsome of the enemy were still in the neighbourhood. But these men, sobold in the confidence of overwhelming numbers when attacking Massy'sCavalry, were not prepared to withstand Macpherson's Infantry; after abrief resistance they broke and fled in confusion, some to Indiki, butthe greater number to the shelter of the hills south of Kila Kazi, towhich place Macpherson followed them, intending to halt there for thenight. This I did not allow him to do, for, seeing the heavy odds wehad opposed to us, and that the enemy were already in possessionof the Takht-i-Shah, thus being in a position to threaten the BalaHissar, I sent orders to him to fall back upon Deh-i-Mazang, where hearrived about 7 p. M. 

Meanwhile, Macpherson's baggage, with a guard of the 5th Gurkhas, commanded by Major Cook, V. C. , was attacked by some Afghans, who hadremained concealed in the Paghman villages, and it would probably havefallen into their hands, as the Gurkhas were enormously outnumbered, but for the timely arrival of four companies of the 3rd Sikhs, underMajor Griffiths, who had been left by Macpherson to see everythingsafely down the pass. Cook himself was knocked over and stunned bya blow, while his brother in the 3rd Sikhs received a severebullet-wound close to his heart. 

During the retirement from Bhagwana, Macgregor, my Chief of the Staff, Durand, Badcock, and one or two other staff officers, got separatedfrom me and were presently overtaken by an officer (Captain GeraldMartin), sent by Macpherson to tell Massy he was coming to hisassistance as fast as his Infantry could travel; Martin informedMacgregor that as he rode by Bhagwana he had come across our abandonedguns, and that there was no enemy anywhere near them. On hearing this, Macgregor retraced his steps, and, assisted by the staff officers withhim and a few Horse Artillerymen and Lancers, and some Gurkhas ofMacpherson's baggage guard picked up on the way, he managed to rescuethe guns and bring them into Sherpur that night. They had beenstripped of all their movable parts, and the ammunition-boxes had beenemptied; otherwise they were intact, and were fit for use the nextday. 

I found assembled at Deh-i-Mazang Wali Mahomed and other Sirdars, whohad been watching with considerable anxiety the issue of the fight, for they knew if the Afghans succeeded in their endeavours to enterKabul, all property belonging to people supposed to be friendly to uswould be plundered and their houses destroyed. I severely upbraidedthese men for having misled me as to the strength and movements ofMahomed Jan's army, and with having failed to fulfil their engagementto keep me in communication with Baker. They declared they had beenmisinformed themselves, and were powerless in the matter. It wasdifficult to believe that this was the case, and I was unwillinglyforced to the conclusion that not a single Afghan could be trusted, however profuse he might be in his assurances of fidelity, and that wemust depend entirely on our own resources for intelligence. 

I waited at Deh-i-Mazang until Macpherson arrived, and thus did notget back to Sherpur till after dark. I was gratified on my arrivalthere to find that Hugh Gough had made every arrangement that could bedesired for the defence of the cantonment, and that by his owncool and confident bearing he had kept the troops calm and steady, notwithstanding the untoward appearance of some fugitives from thefield of battle, whose only too evident state of alarm might otherwisehave caused a panic. 

For the safety of Sherpur I never for one moment had the smallestapprehension during that eventful day. It was, I believe, thought bysome that if Mahomed Jan, instead of trying for the city, had made forthe cantonment, it would have fallen into his hands; but they werealtogether wrong, for there were a sufficient number of men within thewalls to have prevented such a catastrophe had Mahomed Jan been ina position to make an attack; but this, with Macpherson's brigadeimmediately in his rear, he could never have dreamt of attempting. 

The city of Kabul remained perfectly quiet while all the excitementI have described was going on outside. Hills, with a few Sikhs, patrolled the principal streets, and even when the Afghan standardappeared on the Takht-i-Shah there was no sign of disturbance. Nevertheless, I thought it would be wise to withdraw from the city;I could not tell how long the people would remain well disposed, or whether they would assist us to keep the enemy out. I thereforedirected Hills to come away and make over his charge to an influentialKizilbash named Futteh Khan. I also telegraphed to General Bright atJalalabad to reinforce Gandamak by a sufficient number of troopsto hold that post in case it should be necessary to orderBrigadier-General Charles Gough, who was then occupying it, to movehis brigade nearer to Kabul; for I felt sure that, unless I couldsucceed in driving Mahomed Jan out of the neighbourhood of Kabul, excitement would certainly spread along my line of communication. I concluded my message to Bright thus: 'If the wire should be cut, consider it a bad sign, and push on to Gandamak, sending Gough'sBrigade towards Kabul. '

I could not help feeling somewhat depressed at the turn things hadtaken. I had no news from Baker, and we had undoubtedly suffered areverse, which I knew only too well would give confidence to theAfghans, who, from the footing they had now gained on the heightsabove Kabul, threatened the Bala Hissar, which place, stored as it waswith powder and other material of war, I had found it necessary tocontinue to occupy. Nevertheless, reviewing the incidents of the 11thDecember, as I have frequently done since, with all the concomitantcircumstances deeply impressed on my memory, I have failed to discoverthat any disposition of my force different from that I made could havehad better results, or that what did occur could have been avertedby greater forethought or more careful calculation on my part. Twodeviations from my programme (which probably at the time appearedunimportant to the Commanders in question) were the principal factorsin bringing about the unfortunate occurrences of that day. HadMacpherson marched at 7 a. M. Instead of 8, and had Massy followed theroute I had arranged for him to take, Mahomed Jan must have falleninto the trap I had prepared for him. 

Our casualties on the 11th were--killed, 4 British officers, 16British and 9 Native rank and file; wounded, 4 British officers, 1Native officer, 20 British and 10 Native rank and file. 

[Illustration: SKETCH SHOWING THE OPERATIONS IN THE CHARDEH VALLEY ON DECEMBER 10TH AND 11TH, 1879]

[Footnote 1: Fragrance of the universe. ]

[Footnote 2: Viz. , Logar, Zurmat, the Mangal and Jadran districts, andthe intervening Ghilzai country. ]

[Footnote 3: Kohistan. ]

[Footnote 4: Maidan and Ghazni. ]

[Footnote 5: Macpherson had with him the following troops: 4 gunsR. H. A. ; 4 guns Mountain battery; 1 squadron 9th Lancers; 2 squadrons14th Bengal Lancers; 401 rifles 67th Foot; 509 rifles 3rd Sikhs; 393rifles 5th Ghurkas. ]

[Footnote 6: Baker's column consisted of: 4 guns Mountain battery;3 troops 5th Punjab Cavalry; 25 Sappers and Miners; 450 rifles 92ndHighlanders; 450 rifles 5th Punjab Infantry. ]

[Footnote 7: Now Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart, K. C. B. , K. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 8: On the 11th December, the troops at and around Kabulamounted to 6, 352 men and 20 guns, which were thus disposed:

 _Men. _ _Guns. _ Baker's column 1, 325 4 Macpherson's column 1, 492 4 Massy's column 351 4 At Sherpur 3, 184 8 ----- -- 6, 352 20 There were besides at Butkhak and Lataband 1, 343 2 And the Guides Corps, which reached Sherpur} on the evening of the 11th December } 679 ----- -- Total 8, 374 22]

[Footnote 9: The memorandum was as follows:

 'Brigadier-General Massy will start at eight a. M. To-morrow with a squadron of Cavalry, join the Cavalry and Horse Artillery now out under Colonel Gordon, taking command thereof, and operating towards Arghandeh in conjunction with Brigadier-General Macpherson. The troops to return in the evening. ']

[Footnote 10: Kizilbashes are Persians by nationality and ShiahMahomedans by religion. They formed the vanguard of Nadir Shah'sinvading army, and after his death a number of them settled in Kabulwhere they exercise considerable influence. ]

[Footnote 11: Stewart-Mackenzie's horse was shot, and fell on him, andhe was extricated with the greatest difficulty. ]

[Footnote 12: Mazr Ali was given the order of merit for his braveaction, and is now a Native officer in the regiment. ]

[Footnote 13: Our Chaplain (Adams), who had accompanied me throughoutthe day, behaved in this particular place with conspicuous gallantry. Seeing a wounded man of the 9th Lancers staggering towards him, Adams dismounted, and tried to lift the man on to his own charger. Unfortunately, the mare, a very valuable animal, broke loose, and wasnever seen again. Adams, however, managed to support the Lancer untilhe was able to make him over to some of his own comrades. 

Adams rejoined me in time to assist two more of the 9th who werestruggling under their horses at the bottom of the ditch. Without amoment's hesitation, Adams jumped into the ditch. He was an unusuallypowerful man, and by sheer strength dragged the Lancers clear of theirhorses. The Afghans meanwhile had reached Bhagwana, and were so closeto the ditch that I thought my friend the padre could not possiblyescape. I called out to him to look after himself, but he paid noattention to my warnings until he had pulled the almost exhaustedLancers to the top of the slippery bank. Adams received the VictoriaCross for his conduct on this occasion. ]

[Footnote 14: These men were much impeded by their long boots andtheir swords dangling between their legs; the sight, indeed, ofCavalry soldiers trying to defend themselves on foot without a firearmconfirmed the opinion I had formed during the Mutiny, as to thedesirability for the carbine being slung on the man's back when goinginto action. Lieutenant-Colonel Bushman (Colonel Cleland's successor)curiously enough had brought with him from England a sling whichadmitted of this being done, and also of the carbine being carried inthe bucket on all ordinary occasions. This pattern was adopted, andduring the remainder of the campaign the men of the 9th Lancers placedtheir carbines on their backs whenever the enemy were reported tobe in sight. At the same time I authorized the adoption of anarrangement--also brought to my notice by Colonel Bushman--by whichthe sword was fastened to the saddle instead of round the man's body. This mode of wearing the sword was for some time strenuously opposedin this country, but its utility could not fail to be recognized, andin 1891 an order was issued sanctioning its adoption by all mountedtroops. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LVI. 1879

 Attack on the Takht-i-Shah--City people join the tribesmen --Increasing numbers of the enemy--Loss of the conical hill --Captain Vousden's gallantry--The retirement to Sherpur

On the morning of the 12th I was cheered by hearing that the Guideshad arrived during the night under the command of Colonel P. Jenkins--a most welcome reinforcement, for I knew how thoroughly to bedepended upon was every man in that distinguished corps. 

The first thing now to be done was to endeavour to drive the Afghansfrom the crest of the Takht-i-Shah; and I directed Macpherson, as soonas his men had breakfasted, to attack the position from Deh-i-Mazang. Just then my mind was considerably relieved by a heliogram from Bakerinforming me that he was on his way back to Kabul. The message wasdespatched from near Kila Kazi, within four miles of which place Bakerhad encamped on the afternoon of the previous day. 

Macpherson deputed the task of trying to dislodge the enemy toLieutenant-Colonel Money, of the 3rd Sikhs, with a detachmentconsisting of 2 Mountain guns and 560 British and Native Infantry. 

It was a most formidable position to attack. The slopes leading upto it were covered with huge masses of jagged rock, intersected byperpendicular cliffs, and its natural great strength was increased bybreastworks, and stockades thrown up at different points. 

After a gallant and persistent attempt had been made, I ordered theassault to be deferred; for I perceived that the enemy were beingreinforced from their rear, and to ensure success without great loss, it would be necessary to attack them in rear as well as in thefront. The arrival of Baker's brigade made it possible to do this. Itherefore ordered Macpherson to hold the ground of which he had gainedpossession until Baker could co-operate with him next morning from theBeni Hissar side. 

During the night Mahomed Jan, who had been joined by several thousandsfrom Logar and Wardak, occupied the villages situated between BeniHissar and the Bala Hissar and along the _sang-i-nawishta_ road. Baker, who started at 8 a. M. On the 13th, [1] had, therefore, in thefirst place, to gain the high ground above these villages, and, whileholding the point over-looking Beni Hissar, to wheel to his right andmove towards the Takht-i-Shah. 

When he had proceeded some little distance, his advance guard reportedthat large bodies of the enemy were moving up the slope of the ridgefrom the villages near Beni Hissar. To check this movement, andprevent the already very difficult Afghan position being still furtherstrengthened, Major White, who was in command of the leading portionof the attacking party, turned and made for the nearest point on theridge. It was now a race between the Highlanders and the Afghans as towho should gain the crest of the ridge first. The Artillery came intoaction at a range of 1, 200 yards, and under cover of their fire the92nd, supported by the Guides, rushed up the steep slopes. They weremet by a furious onslaught, and a desperate conflict took place. The leading officer, Lieutenant Forbes, a lad of great promise, waskilled, and Colour-Sergeant Drummond fell by his side. For a momenteven the brave Highlanders were staggered by the numbers and fury oftheir antagonists, but only for a moment. Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham[2]sprang forward to cheer them on, and confidence was restored. Witha wild shout the Highlanders threw themselves on the Afghans, andquickly succeeded in driving them down the further side of the ridge. 

By this successful movement the enemy's line was cut in two, and whilethe Cavalry and a party of the 3rd Sikhs prevented their rallying inthe direction of Beni Hissar, the 92nd and Guides, protected by theMountain guns, which had been got on to the ridge, and the FieldArtillery from below, advanced towards the Takht-i-Shah. The Afghansdisputed every inch of the way, but by 11. 30 a. M. White's men hadreached the foot of the craggy eminence which formed the enemy's mainposition. They were here joined by some of the 72nd Highlanders, 3rdSikhs, and 5th Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Money, who had fought their way from the upper Bala Hissar. 

A brilliant charge by the combined troops now took place, the twoHighlands corps vying with each other for the honour of reaching thesummit first. It fell to the 72nd, Colour-Sergeant Yule[3] of thatregiment being the foremost man on the top. The enemy made a mostdetermined stand, and it was only after a severe struggle and heavyloss that they were driven off the heights. 

From my position at Sherpur I had the satisfaction of witnessing thissuccess. This satisfaction, however, was short-lived, for almostimmediately I received a report from the city that the inhabitants hadjoined the tribesmen, and that the cantonment was being threatened;indeed, I could see large bodies of armed men emerging from the cityand moving towards Siah Sang, whence the road between the Bala Hissarand Sherpur would be commanded. 

Having only too evidently lost control over the city, the value ofDeh-i-Mazang was gone, so I ordered Macpherson to abandon it and moveto the Shahr-i-Darwaza heights, taking with him six companies of the67th Foot for the protection of the Bala Hissar, to which it wasdesirable to hold on as long as possible. The remainder of his troopsI ordered to be sent to Sherpur. To Baker I signalled to leave aparty on the Takht-i-Shah under Lieutenant-Colonel Money, and to movehimself towards the cantonment with the rest of his troops, drivingthe enemy off the Siah Sang on the way. 

But from his point of vantage on the heights Baker could see, whatI could not, that the Afghans had occupied two strongly fortifiedvillages between Siah Sang and the Bala Hissar, from which it wasnecessary to dislodge them in the first instance, and for this servicehe detached the 5th Punjab Infantry and a battery of Artillery. Itwas carried out in a masterly manner by Major Pratt, who soon gainedpossession of one village. The other, however, was resolutely held, and the Artillery failing to effect a breach, the gates were set onfire; but even then a satisfactory opening was not made, and the placewas eventually captured by means of scaling-ladders hastily made ofpoles tied together with the Native soldiers' turbans. 

Baker was now able to turn his attention to Siah Sang, so I despatchedthe Cavalry under Massy, to act with him when a signal success wasachieved. The enemy fought stubbornly, but were at last driven off. The 5th Punjab Cavalry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams and MajorHammond, greatly distinguished themselves, and a grand charge was madeby the Guides and 9th Lancers, in which Captain Butson, of the latterregiment, was killed, also the troop Sergeant-Major and 3 men; andCaptain Chisholme, [4] Lieutenant Trower, and 8 men were wounded. 

This ended the operations on the 13th. Our losses during the day were:killed, 2 British officers and 12 men; wounded, 2 British officers and43 men, British and Native. 

I was in great hopes that our successes and the heavy losses the enemyhad sustained would result in the breaking up of the combinationagainst us; but in case these hopes should not be realized, Idecided to do away with some of the smaller posts on the line ofcommunication, and order up more troops. Accordingly, I telegraphed toGeneral Bright to send on Charles Gough's brigade, and I directed thedetachment at Butkhak to return to Kabul, and that at Seh Baba to fallback on Lataband. Having great confidence in its Commander, ColonelHudson, I determined to hold on to Lataband for a time, though byso doing the numbers I might otherwise have had at Sherpur wereconsiderably diminished. Lataband was the most important link in thechain of communication between Kabul and Jalalabad; it was in directheliographic connexion with Kabul; it had sufficient ammunitionand supplies to last over the date on which Gough should arrive atSherpur, and its being held would be a check on the Ghilzais, andprevent his encountering any serious opposition. At the same time, Icould not disguise from myself that there was a certain amount of riskattached to leaving so small a garrison in this somewhat isolatedposition. 

The night of the 13th passed quietly, but when day dawned on the 14thcrowds of armed men, with numerous standards, could be seen occupyinga hill on the Kohistan road; and as day advanced they proceeded invast numbers to the Asmai heights, where they were joined by swarmsfrom the city and the Chardeh valley. It then became apparent that thecombination was much more formidable than I had imagined, and that thenumbers of the enemy now in opposition to us were far greater than Ihad dreamt was possible. Foiled in their attempt to close in upon usfrom the south and west, the tribesmen had concentrated to the north, and it was evident they were preparing to deliver an attack in greatstrength from that quarter. I quickly decided to drive the enemy offthe Asmai heights, to cut their communication with Kohistan, and tooperate towards the north, much as I had operated the previous day tothe south of Sherpur. 

At 9 a. M. I despatched Brigadier General Baker to the eastern slope ofthe Asmai range with the following troops: 4 guns, Field Artillery; 4guns, Mountain Artillery; 14th Bengal Lancers; 72nd Highlanders (192rifles); 92nd Highlanders (100 rifles); Guides Infantry (460 rifles);and 5th Punjab Infantry (470 rifles). 

Covered by the fire of his Artillery, Baker seized the conical hillwhich formed the northern boundary of the Aliabad Kotal, thus placinghimself on the enemy's line of communication, and preventing themfrom being reinforced. He then proceeded to attack the Asmai heights, leaving 2 Mountain guns, 64 men of the 72nd, and 60 Guides, under thecommand of Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Clarke, to hold the hill. 

To aid Baker in his difficult task, I brought four guns into actionnear the north-west corner of the cantonment, and I signalled toMacpherson to give him every possible assistance. Macpherson at oncesent the 67th across the Kabul river to threaten the enemy's leftrear; while the marksmen of the regiment and the Mountain guns openedfire from the northern slope of the Bala Hissar heights. 

The enemy fought with the greatest obstinacy, but eventually ourtroops reached the top of the hill, where, on the highest point, anumber of _ghazis_ had taken their stand, determined to sell theirlives dearly. 

All this I eagerly watched from my place of observation. There was afierce struggle, and then, to my intense relief, I saw our men on thetopmost pinnacle, and I knew the position was gained. 

It was now a little past noon, and I was becoming anxious about theparty left on the conical hill, as Macpherson had heliographed thatvery large bodies of Afghans were moving northwards from Indiki, withthe intention, apparently, of effecting a junction with the tribesmenwho were occupying the hills in the Kohistan direction. I thereforesignalled to Baker to leave the 67th in charge of the Asmai heights, and himself return to the lower ridge, giving him my reasons. 

Baker at once despatched a detachment of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Captain Hall, to reinforce Clarke, who I could see might soon behard pressed, and I sent 200 rifles of the 3rd Sikhs (the only troopsavailable at the moment) to his assistance. 

I watched what was taking place on the conical hill through mytelescope, and was startled to perceive that the enemy were, unnoticedby him, creeping close up to Clarke's position. I could just see along Afghan knife appear above the ridge, steadily mounting higher andhigher, the bearer of which was being concealed by the contour of thehill, and I knew it was only one of the many weapons which were beingcarried by our enemies to the attack. The reinforcements were stillsome distance off, and my heart sank within me, for I felt convincedthat after our recent victories the Afghans would never venture tocross the open and attack British soldiers unless an overwhelmingsuperiority of numbers made success appear to them a certainty. Next Iheard the boom of guns and the rattle of musketry, and a minute or twolater (which, in my anxiety, seemed an eternity to me), I only tooplainly saw our men retreating down the hill, closely followed by theenemy. The retirement was being conducted steadily and slowly, butfrom that moment I realized, what is hard for a British soldier, how much harder for a British commander, to realize, that we wereover-matched, and that we could not hold our ground. 

Clarke, [5] as well as every man with him, fought splendidly; theAfghans by force of numbers alone made themselves masters of theposition and captured two guns. [6]

While all that I have described was going on, the enemy began tocollect again on Siah Sang, and to make their way round the easternflank of the cantonment towards Kohistan. 

I had sent orders in the morning to Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, whowas quartered with his regiment (the 5th Punjab Cavalry) in the King'sGarden, between Sherpur and the city, to be on the look-out, and notto allow any of the enemy to pass in that direction. About 1 p. M. Some400 Afghans were observed moving along the left bank of the river:these were met by Captain Vousden of the same regiment, who with onetroop was employed in reconnoitring; he most gallantly chargedin amongst them with only twelve of his men, the remainder beingeffectually stopped by a heavy fire opened upon them from behind alow wall. Vousden succeeded in dispersing these heavy odds, and ininflicting severe loss upon them--a very brilliant service, for whichhe received the Victoria Cross. 

My object throughout these operations had been, as I hope I havemade clear, to break up the combination by dealing with the enemy indetail, and preventing them getting possession of the city and theBala Hissar. 

Up till noon on the 14th I had no idea of the extraordinary numbersthey were able to bring together, and I had no reason to believe thatit would be possible for them to cope with disciplined troops; butthe manner in which the conical hill had been retaken gave me amore correct idea of their strength and determination, and shook myconfidence in the ability of my comparatively small force to resistthe ever-increasing hordes, on ground which gave every advantage tonumerical superiority. It was a bitter thought that it might be myduty to retire for a time within the defences of Sherpur, a measurewhich would involve the abandonment of the city and the Bala Hissar, and which I knew, moreover, would give heart to the tribesmen. 

I had to decide at once on the course I ought to pursue, for, if Icontinued to act on the defensive, food and ammunition must be sentbefore dark to Macpherson's brigade, occupying the hills above thecity, and arrangements must be made for Baker's retention of the Asmaiheights. I heliographed to Macpherson to inquire the direction inwhich the enemy were moving, and whether their numbers were stillincreasing. He replied that large masses were steadily advancingfrom north, south, and west, and that their numbers were momentarilybecoming greater, to which the young officer in charge of thesignalling station added, 'The crowds of Afghans in the Chardeh valleyremind me of Epsom on the Derby day. '

This decided me; I determined to withdraw from all isolated positions, and concentrate my force at Sherpur, thereby securing the safety ofthe cantonment and avoiding what had now become a useless sacrifice oflife. I only too thoroughly recognized the evils of the measure, but Iconsidered that no other course would be justifiable, and that I mustact for the present entirely on the defensive, and wait until thegrowing confidence of the enemy should afford me a favourableopportunity for attacking them, or until reinforcements could arrive. 

The inevitable order reached the two Generals at 2 p. M. , and theretirement was begun at once. The Afghans speedily discovered theretrograde movement, and no sooner had each post in its turn beenevacuated than it was occupied by the enemy, who pressed our troopsthe whole way back to the cantonment. There was hand-to-hand fighting, and many splendid acts of courage were performed, Major Hammond, ofthe Guides, earning the Victoria Cross; but throughout there was nohurry or confusion, all was conducted with admirable coolness andskill, and shortly after dark the troops and baggage were safe insideSherpur. That night the Afghans occupied the city and the Bala Hissar. 

It is comparatively easy for a small body of well-trained soldiers, such as those of which the army in India is composed, to act on theoffensive against Asiatics, however powerful they may be in point ofnumbers. There is something in the determined advance of a compact, disciplined body of troops which they can seldom resist. But aretirement is a different matter. They become full of confidence andvalour the moment they see any signs of their opponents being unableto resist them, and if there is the smallest symptom of unsteadiness, wavering, or confusion, a disaster is certain to occur. It may beimagined, therefore, with what intense anxiety I watched for hoursthe withdrawal. The ground was all in favour of the Afghans, who, unimpeded by impedimenta of any kind, swarmed down upon the merehandful of men retreating before them, shouting cries of victory andbrandishing their long knives; but our brave men, inspired by theundaunted bearing of their officers, were absolutely steady. They tookup position after position with perfect coolness; every movement wascarried out with as much precision as if they were manoeuvring onan ordinary field-day; and the killed and wounded were brought awaywithout the slightest hurry or confusion. In fact, the whole of thehazardous operation was most successfully and admirably carried out;and as each regiment and detachment filed through the Head-Quartersgateway I was able to offer my warm congratulations and heartfeltthanks to my gallant comrades. 

Our losses during the day were: 19 killed, including Captain Spens andLieutenant Gaisford, 72nd Highlanders, and 88 wounded, amongst whomwere Captain Gordon, 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant Egerton, 72ndHighlanders, and Captain Battye, of the Guides. [7]

[Footnote 1: His force consisted of 4 guns, Field Artillery; 4Mountain guns; 1 squadron 9th Lancers; 5th Punjab Cavalry; 6 companies92nd Highlanders; 7 companies Guides; and 300 3rd Sikhs; andsubsequently it was strengthened by 150 of the 5th Punjab Infantry. ]

[Footnote 2: Dick Cunyngham received the Victoria Cross forconspicuous gallantry and coolness on this occasion. ]

[Footnote 3: This gallant non-commissioned officer was killed thefollowing day. ]

[Footnote 4: Notwithstanding that his wound was most severe, CaptainChisholme remained in the saddle, and brought the regiment out ofaction. ]

[Footnote 5: Clarke never recovered the loss of this post. He and Ihad been cadets together at Sandhurst, and I often visited him whilehe was in hospital at Sherpur. He was apparently suffering from nodisease, but gradually faded away, and died not long after he reachedIndia. ]

[Footnote 6: General Baker, in his despatch, stated that 'No blame forthe loss of these guns is in any way to be attached to the officersand men of No. 2 Mountain Battery.... Every credit is due to CaptainSwinley, the late Lieutenant Montanaro, and Lieutenant Liddell, and the several Native officers, non-commissioned officers and mencomposing the gun detachments, for the gallant manner in which theystood to their guns to the last, and it was only on the sudden rush ofthis overwhelming force of the enemy that they had to retire with theloss of two guns. '

Of the men composing the gun detachments, one was killed and sixwounded, and Surgeon-Major Joshua Duke was specially mentioned for hisattention to the wounded under heavy fire. ]

[Footnote 7: The same officer who so gallantly met his death duringthe recent Chitral campaign, while commanding the regiment of which hewas so justly proud, and in which two brave brothers had been killedbefore him--Quinton at Delhi, and Wigram during the first phase of theAfghan war. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LVII. 1879

 Sherpur--Defence of Sherpur--Arrest of Daud Shah --Rumours of an assault--Attack and counter-attack --Communication with India re-opened--Sherpur made safe

The moment the gates were closed I telegraphed the result of the day'soperations to the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief, for I knew that theenemy's first thought would be to stop communication with Indiaby cutting the telegraph-wires. I reported that I had orderedBrigadier-General Charles Gough's brigade to push on from Gandamak asfast as possible; and I recommended that General Bright should havemore troops sent up to him, to allow of his keeping open the route toKabul, and of his reinforcing me should I find it impossible to clearthe country with the force at my disposal. It was a satisfaction tobe able to assure the authorities in these, to me, otherwise painfultelegrams, that there was no cause for anxiety as to the safety of thetroops; that sufficient supplies for men were stored in Sherpur fornearly four months, and for animals for six weeks; that therewas abundance of firewood, medicines, and hospital comforts, andsufficient ammunition both for guns and rifles to admit of an activeresistance being carried on for between three and four months. 

It was fortunate there was no lack of provisions, for our numbers wereconsiderably increased by the presence of Wali Mahomed Khan and manyother Sirdars, who begged for shelter in Sherpur, on the plea thattheir lives would not be safe were they to return to the city. Theywere far from being welcome guests, for I could not trust them;ostensibly, however, they were our friends, and I could not refusetheir petition. I therefore admitted them, on condition that eachSirdar should only be accompanied by a specified number of followers. 

The stormy occurrences of the 14th were succeeded by a period ofcomparative calm, during which the entrenchments were strengthened, and the heavy guns found in the Kabul arsenal were prepared forservice. 

The great drawback to Sherpur, as I have already mentioned, was itsextent and the impossibility of reducing the line of defences owing tothe length of the Bimaru ridge. The cantonment was in the form of aparallelogram, with the Bimaru heights running along, and protecting, the northern side. Between this range and the hills, which form thesouthern boundary of Kohistan, lay a lake, or rather _jhil_, a barrierbetween which and the commanding Bimaru ridge no enemy would dare toadvance. 

The massive wall on the south and west faces was twenty feet high, covered at a distance of thirty feet by a lower wall fifteen feethigh; the southern wall was pierced at intervals of about 700 yards bygateways, three in number, protected by lofty circular bastions, andbetween these and at the four corners were a series of low bastionswhich gave an admirable flanking fire. The wall on the western flankwas of similar construction, but had been considerably damaged at thenorthern end, evidently by an explosion of gunpowder. 

The weak part of our defence was on the eastern face, where the wall, which had never been completed, was only seven feet high, and did notextend for more than 700 yards from the south-east corner; the linethen ran to the north-west, and, skirting the village of Bimaru, endedat the foot of the ridge. 

From this description it will be seen that, though the perimeter[1]of Sherpur was rather too large for a force of 7, 000 effective men todefend, its powers of resistance, both natural and artificial, wereconsiderable. It was absolutely necessary to hold the Bimaru ridge forits entire length; to have given up any part of it would have been torepeat the mistake which proved so disastrous to Elphinstone's army in1841. In fact, the Bimaru heights were at once the strength and theweakness of the position. So long as we could hold the heights we weresafe from attack from the north; but if we had been forced, eitherfrom the weakness of our own garrison, or from any other cause, torelinquish the command of this natural barrier, the whole of thecantonment must have lain open to the enemy, and must forthwith havebecome untenable. 

The question of how Sherpur could best be defended had been carefullyconsidered by a committee, [2] assembled by my orders soon afterour arrival in Kabul; and a scheme had been drawn up detailing themeasures which should be adopted in case of attack. 

On the recommendation of this committee six towers had beenconstructed on the Bimaru heights, and shelter trenches and gunpitsmade at the points where Infantry and Artillery fire could be usedwith the greatest advantage. These trenches were now deepened andprolonged, so as to form one continuous line of defence, protected byan abattis; and the defences in the depression between the heightswere so arranged that fire could be brought to bear on an enemyadvancing from the north. To strengthen the north-east corner, abattery was thrown up on the slope of the ridge, which was connectedwith the tower above and the village below. The village itself wasloop-holed, the outlying buildings to the front made defensible, and the open space to the north-east secured by abattis and wireentanglements. The Native Field Hospital was strengthened in likemanner, and sand-bag parapets were piled upon the roof, which wassomewhat exposed. 

The unfinished wall on the eastern face was raised by logs of wood, and abattis and wire entanglements were placed in front. In the openspace lying between the Bimaru ridge and the north-west circularbastion, a defence on the _laager_ system was constructed out ofgun-carriages and limbers captured from the enemy; while the villageof Ghulam Hasan Khan, which formed an excellent flanking defence alongthe northern and western faces, was held as an independent post. 

I divided the whole of the defences into five sections, under thesuperintendence of five different commanders: Brigadier-GeneralMacpherson, Colonel Jenkins, Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, Major-General Hills, and Colonel Brownlow. Brigadier-General Massy wasgiven the centre of the cantonment, where were collected the forageand firewood; and Brigadier-General Baker commanded the reserve, whichwas formed up at the depression in the Bimaru heights mentioned above, that he might be able to move rapidly to either end of the ridge, theweakest points in our defences. 

The several sections were connected with each other and with myHead-Quarters by a telegraph-wire, and visual signalling wasestablished at all important points. 

In my arrangements for the defence of Sherpur I relied to a greatextent on the advice of my accomplished Chief Engineer, Colonel ÆneasPerkins, and it was mainly owing to him, and to the exertions ofhis competent staff, that the work was carried on as rapidly andsatisfactorily as it was. 

During these days of preparation the enemy remained comparativelyinactive, being chiefly employed in looting the city and emptying theAmir's arsenal. The gunpowder had been destroyed as far as possible;but a great deal still remained, and many tons of it were carried offby the army of Mahomed Jan, who had now become the practical leader ofthe Afghan combination, and had lately proclaimed Yakub Khan's eldestson, Musa Khan, Amir. 

On the afternoon of the 16th I received the welcome news that ColonelHudson had successfully resisted an attack on his position by theGhilzais--welcome because I could now feel assured that Lataband couldbe depended upon to hold its own. 

For the next five days nothing of much importance was done on eitherside. The enemy took up positions daily in the neighbouring forts andgardens, causing a few casualties, and some of our troops moved out todislodge them from those places from which they could specially annoyus. I destroyed some of the forts, and removed other cover in theimmediate vicinity of the walls; but I did not undertake any largesorties, for to have attempted to drive the enemy out of the outlyingposts, which I could not then have held, would have been a uselesswaste of strength. 

My chief trouble at this time was the presence of the Afghan Sirdarswithin the cantonment. I had good reason to believe that some of them, though full of protestations of friendship, had been in communicationwith Mahomed Jan, the high-priest Mushk-i-Alam, and other Afghanleaders, so that I felt sure that neither they nor their followerswere to be depended upon. I was also somewhat anxious about the Pathansoldiers in our ranks, a feeling which I was unwilling to acknowledgeeven to myself, for they had hitherto behaved with marked loyalty, and done splendid service; but they were now being exposed to a mostsevere trial, in that they were, as I knew, being constantly appealedto by their co-religionists to join in the _jahad_ against us, andbitterly reproached for serving their infidel masters. Whether theywould be strong enough to resist such appeals, it was impossible totell; but it would have been most unwise, as well as most painfulto me, to show the slightest suspicion of these fine soldiers. Ithappened that the Corps of Guides and 5th Punjab Infantry, which hadof all regiments the largest number of Mahomedans amongst them, werelocated at the two extremities of the Bimaru range, the points mostlikely to be attacked; to have made any change in the dispositionwould have been to show that they were suspected, so I determined(after taking their commanding officers, Colonels Jenkins and McQueen, into my confidence) to leave them where they were, and merely tostrengthen each post by a couple of companies of Highlanders. 

I was also considerably exercised about the safety of the large stacksof firewood, grain, and forage, for if anything had happened to themwe could not have continued to hold Sherpur. There were not enoughBritish soldiers to furnish guards for these stacks, so I was obligedto have them watched for a time by officers; an opportune fall ofsnow, however, on the night of the 18th, rendered incendiarismimpossible. 

One other extremely unpleasant precaution I felt it my duty to takewas the placing of Daud Shah, Yakub Khan's Commander-in-Chief, underarrest. I liked the man, and he had mixed freely with us all for morethan two months. He was not, however, absolutely above suspicion: someof his near relatives were the most prominent amongst our enemies; andI had been struck by a change in his manner towards me of late. Intrusting him to the extent I had done, I acted against the opinion ofalmost everyone about me, and now that I had a doubt myself, I felt Iwas not justified in leaving him at liberty, for if he were disposedto make use of his opportunities to our disadvantage, his unrestrainedfreedom of movement and observation would be certainly a source ofgreat danger. 

For three or four days cloudy weather prevented heliographcommunication with Lataband, and messengers sent by Hudson had failedto reach Sherpur, so that we were without any news from the outerworld; but on the afternoon of the 18th I received a letter fromBrigadier-General Charles Gough, conveying the disappointingintelligence that he had only got as far as Jagdalak, twenty-one milesfrom Gandamak, and that he did not consider himself strong enough toadvance on Kabul. 

Gough no doubt felt himself in an awkward position. The line to hisrear was weakly held, the telegraph-wire on both sides of him wascut, his rear guard had been attacked near Jagdalak, there was aconsiderable collection of men on the hills to his front, and, as hereported, 'the whole country was up. ' Moreover, Major-General Bright, under whom Gough was immediately serving, shared his opinion that itwould be wiser for him to wait until reinforcements came up from therear. 

Gough, however, had with him 4 Mountain guns and 125 Artillerymen, 73Sappers and Miners, 222 Native Cavalry, 487 British Infantry, and 474Gurkhas; in all, 1, 381 men, besides 36 officers--not a very largeforce, but composed of excellent material, and large enough, Iconsidered, augmented, as it would be, by the Lataband detachment, tomove safely on Kabul. I had no hesitation, therefore, in sending Goughperemptory orders to advance without delay, thus relieving him of allresponsibility in the event of anything unexpected occurring. 

Hudson, at Lataband, as has already been recorded, was only victualleduntil the 23rd, before which date I had calculated that Gough wouldsurely have relieved the garrison and brought the troops away. But nowall was uncertain, and it was incumbent upon me to send them food. Thedifficulty as to how to get supplies to Lataband was solved bysome Hazaras, who had been working in our camp for several weeks, volunteering to convey what was necessary, and it was arranged thatthe provisions should be sent with two parties, one on the 19th, theother on the 20th. The first got through safely, but the second almostentirely fell into the hands of the enemy. 

On the 21st a heliogram from Hudson informed me that Gough's brigadewas expected the next day; but as it had been found necessary to drophis Cavalry at the several posts he passed on the way for their betterprotection, I deemed it expedient to send him the 12th Bengal Cavalry, for he had to pass through some fairly open country near Butkhak, where they might possibly be of use to him. Accordingly, they startedat 3 a. M. On the 22nd, with instructions to halt at Butkhak shouldthat post be unoccupied, otherwise to push on to Lataband. 

Finding the former place in possession of the Afghans, Major Green, who was in command of the regiment, made for the further post, wherehe arrived with the loss of only three men killed and three wounded. 

It was not easy to get reliable information as to the movements orintentions of the enemy while we were surrounded in Sherpur; but fromspies who managed to pass to and from the city under cover of night, Igathered that plans were being made to attack us. 

It was not, however, until the 21st that there were any very greatsigns of activity. On that and the following day the several posts tothe east of the cantonment were occupied preparatory to an attack fromthat quarter; and I was told that numbers of scaling-ladders werebeing constructed. This looked like business. Next, information wasbrought in that, in all the mosques, mullas were making franticappeals to the people to unite in one final effort to exterminate theinfidel; and that the aged Mushk-i-Alam was doing all in his power tofan the flame of fanaticism, promising to light with his own handat dawn on the 23rd (the last day of the _Moharram_, when religiousexaltation amongst Mahomedans is at its height) the beacon-fire whichwas to be the signal for assault. 

The night of the 22nd was undisturbed, save by the songs and cries ofthe Afghans outside the walls, but just before day the flames of thesignal-fire, shooting upwards from the topmost crag of the Asmairange, were plainly to be seen, followed on the instant by a burst offiring. 

Our troops were already under arms and at their posts, waiting for theassault, which commenced with heavy firing against the eastern andsouthern faces. The most determined attack was directed against thetwo sections commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Gough and ColonelJenkins, who by their able dispositions proved themselves worthy ofthe confidence I had reposed in them. 

It was too dark at first to see anything in front of the walls, andorders were given to reserve fire until the advancing masses of theassailants could be clearly made out. Gough's Mountain guns, underLieutenant Sherries, then fired star-shells, which disclosed theattacking force up to a thousand yards off. The 28th Punjab Infantrywere the first to open fire; then the Guides, the 67th, and 92nd, eachin their turn, greeted by their volleys the _ghazis_ who approachedclose to the walls. Guns from every battery opened on the foe movingforward to the attack, and from 7 to 10 a. M. The fight was carried on. Repeated attempts were made to scale the south-eastern wall, and manytimes the enemy got up as far as the abattis, but were repulsed, heaps of dead marking the spots where these attempts had been mostpersistent. [3]

Soon after 10 a. M. There was a slight lull in the fighting, leading usto believe that the Afghans were recoiling before the breechloaders. An hour later, however, the assault grew hot as ever, and finding wecould not drive the enemy back by any fire which could be broughtagainst them from the defences, I resolved to attack them in flank. Accordingly, I directed Major Craster, with four Field Artillery guns, and Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, with the 5th Punjab Cavalry, to moveout over the hollow in the Bimaru range and open fire on a body of theenemy collected in and around the village of Kurja Kila. This fire hadthe desired effect; the Afghans wavered and broke. 

From that moment the attacking force appeared to lose heart, theassault was no longer prosecuted with the same vigour, and by 1 p. M. It had ceased altogether, and the enemy were in full flight. 

This was the Cavalry's opportunity. I ordered Massy to follow inpursuit with every available man, and before nightfall all the openground in the neighbourhood of Sherpur was cleared of the enemy. Simultaneously with the movement of the Cavalry, a party wasdespatched to destroy some villages near the southern wall which hadcaused us much trouble, and whence it was necessary the enemy shouldbe driven, to facilitate the entrance of Brigadier-General CharlesGough the next day, for that officer had arrived with his brigadewithin about six miles of Sherpur, where I could see his tents, andgathered from the fact of his pitching them that he meant to haltthere for the night. The villages were found to be occupied by_ghazis_, who refused to surrender, preferring to remain and perish inthe buildings, which were then blown up. Two gallant Engineerofficers (Captain Dundas, V. C. , and Lieutenant C. Nugent) were mostunfortunately killed in carrying out this duty. 

The relief I felt when I had gathered my force inside the walls ofSherpur on the evening of the 14th December was small compared to thatwhich I experienced on the morning of the 24th, when I realized thatnot only had the assault been abandoned, but that the great tribalcombination had dissolved, and that not a man of the many thousandswho had been opposed to us the previous day remained in any of thevillages, or on the surrounding hills. It was difficult to form anaccurate estimate of the numbers opposed to us. As the Contingent fromthe more distant districts advanced, they received accessions fromevery place they passed, and as they neared Kabul they were joined bythe inhabitants of the numerous villages, and by the disaffected inthe city. It was calculated by those best able to judge that thecombined forces exceeded 100, 000, and I myself do not think that anexcessive computation. 

[Illustration: PLAN TO ILLUSTRATE THE DEFENCES OF SHERPUR AND THE OPERATIONS ROUND KABUL IN DECEMBER, 1879]

Our casualties between the 15th and the 23rd were remarkably few: 2officers, 9 men, and 7 followers killed, and 5 officers, 41 men, and22 followers wounded; while the enemy lost not less than 3, 000. 

I think I had great reason to be proud of my force. All night andevery night, the ground covered with snow and the thermometer markingsixteen degrees of frost, officers and men were at their posts, andeach day every available man had to be hard at work strengthening thedefences. Native and European soldiers alike bore the hardships andexposure with the utmost cheerfulness, and in perfect confidence that, when the assault should take place, victory would be ours. 

Early on the 24th the fort of Mahomed Sharif was occupied, and a forcemoved out to escort Charles Gough's brigade into Sherpur, a precautionwhich, however, was hardly necessary, as there was no enemy to beseen. 

I next set to work to re-open communication with India, Butkhak wasre-occupied, and the relaying of the telegraph was taken in hand. General Hills resumed his position as military Governor of Kabul; thedispensary and hospital were re-established in the city under theenergetic and intelligent guidance of Surgeon-Captain Owen;[4] andin the hope of reassuring the people, I issued the followingProclamation:

 'At the instigation of some seditious men, the ignorant people, generally not considering the result, raised a rebellion. Now many of the insurgents have received their reward, and as subjects are a trust from God, the British Government, which is just and merciful, as well as strong, has forgiven their guilt. It is now proclaimed that all who come in without delay will be pardoned, excepting only Mahomed Jan of Wardak, Mir Bacha of Kohistan, Samandar Khan of Logar, Ghulam Hyder of Chardeh, and the murderers of Sirdar Mahomed Hassan Khan. Come and make your submission without fear, of whatsoever tribe you may be. You can then remain in your houses in comfort and safety, and no harm will befall you. The British Government has no enmity towards the people. Anyone who rebels again will, of course, be punished. This condition is necessary. But all who come in without delay need have no fear or suspicion. The British Government speaks only that which is in its heart. '

The effect of this Proclamation was most satisfactory: the city andthe surrounding country quieted rapidly, shops were re-opened, andbefore the close of the year the bazaars were as densely thronged asever. Most of the principal men of Logar and Kohistan came to paytheir respects to me; they were treated with due consideration, andthe political officers did all they could to find out what theyreally wanted, so that some basis of an arrangement for the peacefuladministration of the country might be arrived at. 

While taking these measures, which I thought would create confidencein our clemency and justice, I endeavoured in other ways to preventa repetition of further serious troubles. Snow was still deep on theground, but I did not let it prevent my sending General Baker todestroy a fort about twenty miles off, where dwelt an influential_malik_, who was one of the chief ringleaders in the revolt. Allwalled enclosures within 1, 000 yards of the cantonment were razed tothe ground, roads fit for guns were made all round the outside wallsand towards the several gates of the city and Siah Sang, while twobridges, strong enough for Artillery to pass over, were thrown acrossthe Kabul River. 

The increased numbers to be accommodated on the arrival of Gough'sbrigade necessitated the re-occupation of the Bala Hissar, thedefences of which were reconstructed so as to give a continuous lineof fire, and admit of free circulation round the walls; roads weremade through the lower Bala Hissar, and redoubts and towers were builton the Shahr-i-Darwaza range. 

A strong fort--Fort Roberts--was constructed on the south-west pointof Siah Sang, which commanded the Bala Hissar and the city; a smallerone was built at the crossing of the river; and as these two fortswere not within sight of each other, a tower to connect them wasconstructed at the north-west extremity of Siah Sang. 

Sherpur was thus made safe; but for the absolute protection of thecity against an enemy operating from the Chardeh direction, a thirdfort was erected on the Asmai heights, which completed a formidableline of defences most skilfully carried out by Colonel Perkins and hisstaff. 

[Footnote 1: Four and a half miles. ]

[Footnote 2: The committee consisted of Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Æ. Perkins, commanding Royal Engineers, andLieutenant-Colonel B. Gordon, commanding Royal Artillery. ]

[Footnote 3: A curious exemplification of the passive courage andindifference to danger of some Natives was the behaviour of an oldMahomedan servant of mine. At this juncture, just at the time when thefight was hottest, and I was receiving reports every few seconds fromthe officers commanding the several posts, Eli Bux (a brother of theman who had been with me throughout the Mutiny) whispered in my earthat my bath was ready. He was quite unmoved by the din and shots, andwas carrying on his ordinary duties as if nothing at all unusual wasoccurring. ]

[Footnote 4: This hospital was admirably managed, and was attended bya large number of patients, half of whom were women. The disease moatprevalent in Kabul was ophthalmia, caused by dust, dirt, and exposure, while cataract and other affections of the eye were very common. Dr. Owen, amongst his other many qualifications, excelled as an oculist, and his marvellous cures attracted sufferers from all parts ofAfghanistan. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LVIII. 1880

 Two important questions--A Ruler required--News of Abdur Rahman Khan --Abdur Rahman in Afghan-Turkestan--Overtures made to Abdur Rahman

The outlook in Afghanistan on the 1st January, 1880, was fairlysatisfactory; the tidings of the defeat and dispersion of thetribesmen had spread far and wide, and had apparently had the effectof tranquillizing the country even in remote Kandahar, where thepeople had been greatly excited by the news of our retiring fromSherpur, and by the exaggerated reports of their countrymen's success. No complications now existed anywhere, and preparations were commencedfor Sir Donald Stewart's force in southern Afghanistan to movetowards Ghazni, in anticipation of the carrying out of a complete andconnected scheme[1] for the pacification of the country, and an earlywithdrawal from northern Afghanistan. No withdrawal, however, would bepossible until durable foundations had been laid for the futuresafety of the Indian frontier, and reliable guarantees given for thecontinued good behaviour of India's Afghan neighbours. 

The two questions, therefore, which chiefly exercised the minds ofpeople in authority, both in England and in India, with regard toAfghan affairs were, What was to be done with Afghanistan now we hadgot it? and, Who could be set up as Ruler with any chance of beingable to hold his own?

The second question depended a good deal on the decision which mightbe arrived at with regard to the first, for the selection of a Rulercould hardly be considered until it had been determined whether theseveral provinces of Afghanistan were to be again formed into onekingdom, or whether the political scheme for the future government ofthe country should be based on the separation of the several States. 

I myself had come to the conclusion, after much deliberation andanxious thought, that the latter course was the least dangerous for usto adopt. Disintegration had been the normal condition of Afghanistan, except for a short period which ended as far back as 1818. DostMahomed was the first since that time to attempt its unification, andit took him (the strongest Amir of the century) eight years after hisrestoration to establish his supremacy over Afghan-Turkestan, fourteenyears before Kandahar acknowledged his authority, and twenty-one yearsere he got possession of Herat, a consummation which was achieved onlyjust before his death. His successor, Sher Ali, was five years makinghimself master of Afghanistan, and he could never have attained thatposition but for the material assistance he received from us. I feltit would be in the future as it had been in the past, and that therewould always be the danger of a Ruler, made supreme by the aid of ourmoney and our arms, turning against us for some supposed grievance, orat the instigation of a foreign Power, as had happened with Sher Ali. A strong, united Afghanistan was very desirable, no doubt, could webe certain that its interests and ours would always remain identical;but, in addition to the chance of its strength and unity being usedagainst us, there was the certainty that, even if the man we mightchoose as Amir were to remain perfectly loyal, at his death Afghanhistory would repeat itself; the succession to the throne would bedisputed, and the unification would have to begin all over again. Forthese reasons I had no hesitation in giving it as my opinion thatAfghanistan should be disintegrated, and that we should not againattempt to place the whole country under any one Sovereign. 

My views must have commended themselves to the Government of India, for in their despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 7th January, 1880, they indicated them as the line of policy they proposed to adoptin pursuance of the object they had at heart, viz. , the safety of theIndian Empire and the tranquillity of its northern frontier; and inthe communication to myself, conveying their idea of the generalprinciples upon which the permanent settlement of Afghanistan shouldbe based, the Foreign Secretary wrote that all arrangements forthe establishment of a durable Government at Kabul depended on theselection of a suitable Ruler for that province; and that, as it wasessential to clear away any apprehension that the British Governmentcontemplated territorial annexation, which might be caused by aprolonged interregnum, it would be very advantageous if one of theprincipal Sirdars, qualified by his family connexions, his localinfluence, and his personal following, could be selected as the Rulerof the Kabul State. 

There was another very strong reason why the Government of Indiashould wish to find some one to whom the administration of the countrycould safely be made over. The first warning notes of a GeneralElection were heard in India early in January. Afghan affairs werebeing made a party question, and the policy of the BeaconsfieldGovernment with regard to them was being severely and adverselycriticized. Lord Lytton was, therefore, most anxious that a definiteconclusion should be arrived at as to the administration ofAfghanistan, and a period put to our occupation of the northernprovince before the meeting of Parliament should take place. 

The difficulty was to find the right man. Abdur Rahman, who I hadreason to believe would be acceptable to the army, was far away, Icould not find out where, and I could think of no one else at allsuitable. Under the circumstances, I deemed it advisable to opennegotiations with the several leaders of the late combination againstus, who were congregated at Ghazni, and had with them the youngHeir-apparent, Musa Khan. In the middle of January I had received twocommunications from these people, one ostensibly written by Musa Khanhimself, the other signed by seventy of the most influentialchiefs; the tenor of both was the same; they demanded Yakub Khan'srestoration, and asserted his innocence as to the massacre of theEmbassy. I replied that Yakub Khan's return was impossible, and thatthey must consider his abdication final, as he himself had declaredthat he wished it to be, [2] and a few days later I deputed theMustaufi[3] to visit Ghazni, in the hope that he might be able toinduce the leaders to make some more feasible suggestion for thegovernment of the country. 

The Mustaufi had scarcely started, before what seemed to be a reliablereport reached me that Abdur Rahman was at Kanduz, on his way toBadakhshan, and I immediately communicated this news to Lord Lytton. 

A fortnight later Abdur Rahman's mother, who resided at Kandahar, informed Sir Donald Stewart that Ayub Khan had received a letter fromher son, in answer to an offer from Ayub to join him at Balkh andmarch with him against the British. In this letter Abdur Rahman hadreplied that he would have nothing to do with any of Sher Ali'sfamily, who had deceived him and dealt with him in the sametreacherous manner that characterized Sher Ali's dealings with theBritish; further, that he had no intention of opposing the British, knowing full well he was not strong enough to do so; that he could notleave Russian territory without the permission of the Russians, whosepensioner he was; and that, even if he got that permission, he couldnot come either into Turkestan or Kabul without an invitation from us, but that, if he received such an invitation, he would obey it as anorder. He concluded by advising Ayub Khan to make his submission tothe British, as opposition was useless. Sir Donald Stewart telegraphedthe substance of this communication to the Foreign Secretary, addingthat Abdur Rahman's family were well disposed towards us, and thatthere would be no difficulty in communicating with the Sirdar throughthem. 

In the meantime, I had been careful to acquaint the Government ofIndia with my failure to come to any conclusion with the Ghaznifaction as to the future government of the country, and thehopelessness of finding anyone of sufficient strength of character toset up as Ruler of Kabul; and I had suggested, failing a really strongman, the alternative of letting the Afghans choose for themselves someRuler, other than Yakub Khan, and thus leave us free to evacuate thecountry. 

About this time Mr. Lyall, the Foreign Secretary, came to Kabul ona visit to me, and Captain West Ridgeway[4] took the place of myPolitical Secretary, Mr. Durand, who left me to join the ForeignOffice at Simla, Mr. (now Sir) Lepel Griffin, Secretary to the PunjabGovernment, being appointed Chief of the political staff at Kabul. 

Lyall told me that the Indian Government fully appreciated thedifficulty I was in about finding a Ruler for the province, and that, unless Abdur Rahman could be brought within negotiable distance, thealternative I had suggested would have to be acted upon. 

Lord Lytton, however, was very sanguine about Abdur Rahman, and hewarned Mr. Griffin, before he started for Kabul, that the Sirdar'sletter to Ayub Khan indicated possibilities that might have the mostimportant bearing on the solution of the difficult problem to be dealtwith in northern Afghanistan. It was Lord Lytton's wish to place AbdurRahman on the throne of Kabul, or, at least, to afford him the bestopportunity of winning his own way to that position. The difficultywas to get at him, in the first instance, and, in the second, toconvince him of our wish and power to help him; while a not unnaturalhesitation on the Sirdar's part to enter Afghanistan without Russia'spermission had to be considered. 

Lord Lytton impressed upon Mr. Griffin the necessity for overcomingthese difficulties in time to enable us to withdraw from northernAfghanistan in the early autumn at latest; and he desired Sir OliverSt. John (Sir Donald Stewart's political officer, who was at that timein Calcutta), immediately on his return to Kandahar, to communicatewith Abdur Rahman, through his mother, the Viceroy's willingness tomake him Ruler of Kabul and Turkestan, if he would accept the termsoffered to him without delay. 

The Viceroy communicated his views to the Secretary of State in thefollowing telegram:

 'Necessary to find without delay some Native authority to which we can restore northern Afghanistan without risk of immediate anarchy on our evacuation of Kabul not later than next autumn, and if possible earlier. No prospect of finding in the country any man strong enough for this purpose. I therefore advocate early public recognition of Abdur Rahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and open deputation of Sirdars with British concurrence to offer him throne of Afghanistan as sole means of saving the country from anarchy. Do you approve?'

Lord Cranbrook's reply was as follows:

 'Assuming that Abdur Rahman is acceptable to the country, and that he would be content with northern Afghanistan, it is desirable to support him at Kabul; the more spontaneous any advances to him on the part of the Sirdars, and the less appearance of British influence, the better. But where is he? And how do you propose to learn his wishes and intentions? If invited by Chiefs, every inducement to bring him to Kabul should be then held out. Public recognition should not precede, but follow, his adoption by Sirdars, and his acceptance of the position. '

By the end of March authentic intelligence was received thatAbdur Rahman had made himself master of Afghan-Turkestan, and wascorresponding with the representative Sirdars at Kabul. It seemed, therefore, that the time had arrived when distinct overtures mightbe made to Abdur Rahman; accordingly, on the 1st April Mr. Griffinaddressed to him the following letter:

 'It has become known that you have entered Afghanistan, and consequently this letter is sent you by a confidential messenger, in order that you may submit to the British officers at Kabul any representations that you may desire to make to the British Government with regard to your object in entering Afghanistan. '

Abdur Rahman, in his friendly but guarded reply, [5] expressed ingeneral terms his hope of being recognized as Amir. He greatlydesired, he wrote, the friendship of the British, and their assistancein restoring peace and order to Afghanistan; but at the same time, he hinted that his obligations to the Russian Government for thehospitality they had extended to him placed him in some doubt as tothe terms upon which our friendship might be accorded to him, andwhile he expressed a desire for the permanent establishment ofAfghanistan, with our assistance and sympathy, he let it be understoodthat he wished to consider himself under the protection of Russia aswell as of Great Britain. 

In a verbal message, however, he added that he was ready to cross theHindu Kush to discuss matters with our officers, and he begged thathe might be furnished with information as to the 'nature of ourfriendship' and 'its conditions. '

In answer, Mr. Griffin was directed to inform Abdur Rahman that therelations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires was asubject the Government of India must decline to discuss with him, andto explain that their declared determination had been the exclusionof foreign influence and interference from Afghanistan, a cardinalcondition 'which had at all times and under all circumstances beendeemed essential for the permanent security of Her Majesty's IndianEmpire, ' a condition, moreover, which had always been accepted by theGovernment of the Czar, which had repeatedly renewed those assurances, solemnly given to Her Majesty's Ministers, that 'Russia consideredAfghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence. '[6]

Early in April the Mustaufi (whom, it will be remembered, I had sentto Ghazni to communicate with the Chiefs, and ascertain their ideasand desires as to the future government of Kabul) returned withouthaving achieved much success. He had persuaded some of the leading mento accompany him as far as Maidan, whence a few representatives cameon to Kabul as bearers of a document signed by Mahomed Jan, twelveother Sirdars, and 189 influential tribesmen, setting forth theirviews and wishes; but as these were all based upon the restoration ofYakub Khan, their proposals could not be entertained. 

On the 13th April I held a durbar, at which I received thisdeputation; all the Sirdars, Chiefs, and _maliks_ of Kabul and manyHazaras being present. Mr. Griffin, on the part of the Government, told them that Yakub Khan could not be allowed to return toAfghanistan, but that the names of any Sirdars, approved of by a largeproportion of the people for the Amirship, would be laid before theViceroy; that there was no intention of annexing Afghanistan, andthat there would be no occupation of any places except such as werenecessary for the safety of our Indian frontier. They were furtherinformed that the British army would be withdrawn as soon as thecountry had settled down peacefully and an Amir, amicably disposedtowards us, had been selected; but that Kandahar would not again beunited to Kabul. 

The effect produced was good. The deputation was greatly disappointedthat Yakub Khan was not to be permitted to return, but all presentfelt that they had received a definite reply. 

[Footnote 1: In reply to a reference made to me on the subject, I represented that, before operations could be undertaken on soextensive a scale as was proposed, it would be necessary to reinforcethe Kabul garrison and the several posts on the Kyber line by:

 One battery of Horse or Field Artillery. One Heavy battery. One Mountain battery. A detachment of Garrison Artillery. A brigade of Cavalry. Three companies of Sappers and Miners. Two regiments of British Infantry. Six regiments of Native Infantry. Drafts sufficient to raise each Infantry regiment at Kabul to 800 men. 

This was agreed to; the reinforcements were sent up by degrees, anda second division was formed at Kabul, to the command of whichMajor-General J. Ross, [*] C. B. , was appointed. ]

 [Note *: Now General Sir John Ross, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: As the deportation of Yakub Khan was believed to be oneof the chief causes of recent disturbances, and as a powerful party inthe country still looked forward to having him back as their Ruler, Iwas directed to make it clear to his adherents that the ex-Amir wouldnever be allowed to return to Afghanistan, and that his abdicationmust be, as he himself at the time wished it to be, consideredirrevocable. In support of this decision, I was informed that theunanimous verdict of guilty of murder, recorded against Yakub Khanby Colonel Macgregor's Commission, was substantially endorsed by theChief Justice of Calcutta and the Advocate-General; and that, althoughother authorities who had considered the evidence did not quite go sofar as these two high legal functionaries, the general conclusioncome to was that, if the Amir did not connive at the massacre of theMission, he made no attempt whatever to interpose on its behalf, and that his whole conduct on that occasion betrayed a culpableindifference to the fate of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his companions, and a total disregard of the solemn obligation which he had contractedwith the British Government. ]

[Footnote 3: I had released the Mustaufi from confinement when thegeneral amnesty was published on the 26th December, and he hadsubsequently been usefully employed assisting the political officersin revenue matters. I did not suppose that he had any great love forthe British, but he was anxious to see us out of the country, and waswise enough to know that no armed opposition could effect his purpose, and that it could only be accomplished by the establishment of astable government, under a Ruler that we could accept. ]

[Footnote 4: Now Colonel Sir West Ridgeway, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: Abdur Rahman's letter is given in the Appendix. ] (SeeAppendix VIII. )

[Footnote 6: This letter from the Foreign Secretary to Mr. Griffin isgiven in full in the Appendix. (Appendix IX. )]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LIX. 1880

 Jenkins attacked near Charasia--Sir Donald Stewart reaches Kabul --Difficulties with Abdur Rahman--Abdur Rahman proclaimed Amir

Sir Donald Stewart's division, which, I have mentioned, it had beendecided should be sent to Kabul to take part in the pacification ofnorthern Afghanistan, left Kandahar[1] on the 30th March, and wasexpected to arrive at Ghazni about the 21st April. On the 16th Ireceived a letter from Sir Donald, dated six days before, asking me tosend supplies to meet him. I, therefore, that same day despatched asmall column, under the command of Major General Ross, C. B. , with thearticles of food required; and as I thought it likely that my objectin sending this force might be misunderstood, the deputation whichattended the durbar was told to explain matters to the Chiefs atMaidan, and assure them that the advance would be peaceful unlesshostilities should be provoked by their own action. Notwithstandingthis precaution, I thought it quite possible the column would beopposed, for the news concerning Abdur Rahman's advent was causingconsiderable excitement; and whilst the soldiers and a proportion ofthe tribesmen were disposed to welcome him as a deliverer, those fromWardak and Logar resented his appearance on the scene as putting anend to their hopes of having Yakub Khan reinstated. 

With a view, therefore, to prevent the Logaris from joining any attackwhich might be made on General Ross, I sent a party, 1, 200 strong, under Colonel Jenkins, in the direction of Charasia. 

On the 22nd April Ross reached Sar-i-top, forty-one miles from Ghazni;Sir Donald Stewart having arrived that same day at the latter place, heliographic communication was at once opened with him, and thewelcome news was signalled that Sir Donald had fought an engagement atAhmedkhel on the 19th, and had been entirely successful. On receipt ofthis intelligence I ordered a Royal salute to be fired in honour ofthe victory, the announcement of which I hoped might have a quietingeffect on the excitement which prevailed around Kabul. 

In this I was disappointed. On the evening of the 24th, Jenkins, whowas encamped at Charasia, heard that he was about to be attacked bythe Logaris, under Mahomed Hasan Khan. At once striking his tents, and collecting his baggage in a sheltered spot, he ordered a party ofCavalry to reconnoitre up the Logar valley, strengthened his piquets, and sent off an express messenger to inform me of the situation. 

I immediately despatched Brigadier-General Macpherson to Jenkins'sassistance. By 9 a. M. He had started, with four Mountain guns and962 Infantry, followed later by two more guns and a troop of the 3rdPunjab Cavalry; and as a support to Macpherson, Brigadier-General HughGough, with the Cavalry brigade and four Horse Artillery guns, wasordered to take up a position half-way between Kabul and Charasia. 

At 1 p. M. On the 25th Macpherson arrived on the high ground beyond the_sang-i-nawishta_ gorge, whence he obtained a good view of Jenkins'sposition; and seeing that the enemy formed a complete semicircle roundit, he pushed on. Jenkins had stood on the defensive from the earlymorning, and the Afghans, who had advanced to within a couple ofhundred yards, were only kept at bay by the steadiness of his fire. 

Macpherson first sent back the baggage to Sherpur, so as to free allhands for action, and then proceeded to attack the left horn of thesemicircle. The enemy broke, fell back, and were completely scatteredby a well-directed Artillery fire; the surrounding hills were speedilycleared, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery pursued for four miles. By four o'clock not a single living Afghan was to be seen; more than200 had been killed, while our casualties were only four killed andthirty-four wounded. 

I came up just as the fight was over; and being sure from the decisivecharacter of the defeat that a retirement could not be misunderstood, I ordered the troops to return to Kabul. 

In anticipation of Sir Donald Stewart's arrival, and the consequentnecessity for my making over to him, as my senior, the supreme commandof the Kabul Field Force, I prepared a report[2] for his information, which explained the general military situation in northernAfghanistan, and contained a statement of economic details which Ithought would be of use to the Government, and concerning which anexperience of eighteen months in the field enabled me to give anopinion with some confidence. 

The strength of the Kabul Field Force at the end of April amounted tonearly 14, 000 men and thirty-eight guns, with 12, 500 followers;[3]besides 15, 000 men and thirty guns on the Khyber line, under theimmediate command of Major-General Bright. 

Sir Donald reached Kabul on the 5th May. On the same day we heardthat the Beaconsfield Administration had come to an end; that a newMinistry had been formed under Mr. Gladstone; that Lord Lytton hadresigned, and was to be succeeded by the Marquis of Ripon; and thatthe Marquis of Hartington had become Secretary of State for India. 

Notwithstanding the pleasure of meeting an old friend in my newCommander, that 5th of May was altogether not a happy day for me. Lord Lytton's approaching departure was a source of real sorrow. Personally, I felt that I was deeply indebted to him for theconfidence he had reposed in me, and for the warm support he hadinvariably accorded me. I had hoped that he would have had thegratification of seeing, while in office, the campaign in which he wasso much interested satisfactorily concluded, and with the prospect ofpermanent results; and I dreaded that a change of Government mightmean a reversal of the policy which I believed to be the best forthe security of our position in India. Moreover, it was not in humannature to feel absolute satisfaction in yielding up the supremecommand I had so greatly delighted in, into the hands of another, eventhough that other was one for whom I had so great a personal regard, and under whom I had already served in the field. 

The amalgamated troops were now styled the Northern Afghanistan FieldForce, and I retained the command of the two divisions at Kabul, withMajor-General John Ross as second in command; while Major-GeneralHills was given the brigades from Kandahar, which now became the thirddivision of the Force. 

The idea in bringing Stewart away from Kandahar was that he shouldoccupy Ghazni and Kabul; that my divisions should operate in Kohistanand in the direction of Bamian; that General Bright should moveagainst the Ghilzais; and that a column from Kuram should march overthe Shutargardan to Kabul. It was hoped that these operations wouldhave the effect of quieting the country, and, by the time theyhad been carried out, it would be possible to evacuate northernAfghanistan. 

With a view to having my divisions thoroughly efficient and mobile forthe service they were expected to perform, I had largely replenishedthe numbers of my transport animals, which had suffered greatly fromthe strain put upon them in supplying the troops with food and othernecessaries during the winter months; they had been continuously atwork in the most inclement weather, numbers had died, and those thatremained required to be carefully looked after and given completerest to render them fit for the contemplated operations. Major MarkHeathcote, who had taken, at my particular request, the arduous chargeof this department, wished to revert to regimental duty, so I appliedfor, and obtained, the services of Lieutenant Colonel B. Low[4]as Director of Transport, under whose energetic and intelligentmanagement the transport service was rendered as perfect as it waspossible to make it. In the end, circumstances prevented the concertedmovements for which these preparations were made being carried out, but I reaped the benefit of them when later in the year I was requiredto undertake a rapid march to Kandahar, which could not possibly havebeen successfully accomplished had my transport not been in suchadmirable condition. 

In order to relieve the great pressure put upon the CommissariatDepartment by having to provide for the increased number of troops atKabul, and with a view to opening up the roads upon which traffic hadbeen more or less impeded for some months, it was considered desirableto send a strong brigade towards Maidan, which I accompanied, andremained away from Kabul for some weeks. On my return, I found aconsiderable change had taken place in the political situation. TheMustaufi had been deported to India; the correspondence between AbdurRahman and Mr. Griffin had taken rather an unsatisfactory turn, andthe Sirdar's dealings with the leading Chiefs and tribesmen had givencause to fear that, if he came to Kabul during our occupation, itmight be as an enemy rather than a friend. 

The Mustaufi was a firm adherent of the Sher Ali faction, and, findingthere was no hope of Yakub Khan being reinstated, and that we werenegotiating with Abdur Rahman, he had espoused the cause of Yakub'syounger brother, Ayub Khan, and had been proved guilty of inciting theSirdars and Chiefs to oppose us. For this he was very properly sentout of Afghanistan; nevertheless, I looked upon his removal as amisfortune, for it broke up the only party that could possibly beformed to counterbalance Abdur Rahman, who was astute enough to seethat the weaker our position became, the more chance there was of hisbeing able to get his own terms from us. 

From the letters he had written to his friends and relations innorthern Afghanistan (the majority of which had fallen into ourhands), it was evident that he was doing all he could to strengthenhimself, even at our expense, and that he greatly disliked the idea ofKandahar being separated from the kingdom of Kabul. Indeed, in oneof his communications to Mr. Griffin he had made it clear that heexpected the whole inheritance of his grandfather, Dost Mahomed Khan, to be made over to him. 

The uncertainty as to the result of the correspondence with AbdurRahman, the rumours in circulation regarding his real disposition andplans, and the general excitement throughout the country, suggestedsuch grave doubts of the Sirdar's good faith that, in some quarters, the question was seriously discussed whether it might not be necessaryto break off negotiations with him, and reinstate Yakub Khan, or elseset up his brother, Ayub Khan, as Amir. 

I myself was altogether opposed to Yakub Khan's restoration, and asto Ayub Khan, we were in total ignorance of his character andproclivities, even if he had been near enough to treat with. Itappeared to me, moreover, that we had gone too far with Abdur Rahmanto throw him over because, in conformity with Afghan character andtradition, he was not running quite straight. I, therefore, gave it asmy opinion that we should not change our tactics unless it was foundimpossible to come to terms with him, or unless it was made evident onhis nearer approach to Kabul that the majority of his countrymen wereaverse to have him as their Ruler. 

Soon after this the situation began to improve, and early in JulyMr. Griffin was able to inform the Government of India that 'theprobabilities of a settlement with Abdur Rahman appear far morefavourable than they did last week.... ' 'Abdur Rahman has seen thatwe have been fully informed of the game he has been playing, thattrickery and treachery would not be tolerated, and that, if he intendscoming to a settlement with us at all, he must be prepared to acceptour terms rather than dictate his own. '

A few days later a letter was received from Abdur Rahman, announcinghis arrival in Kohistan. His near approach, and the report that hewas willing to accept our terms, excited a keen and hopeful interestthroughout the country, for the Afghans had at length become convincedthat the only chance of getting rid of us was by agreeing to any formof settled government we might establish, and they had grown heartilytired of perpetual fighting and of having to maintain bands of_ghazis_ to oppose us, who were eating them out of house and home. With the exception of the Sher Ali faction, therefore, whose interestswere directly opposed to his, Abdur Rahman's advent was welcomed bythe people, and several of the most influential amongst them went tomeet him. 

Towards the end of July Sir Donald Stewart was empowered to concludeall political and military arrangements preparatory to withdrawingfrom northern Afghanistan. Abdur Rahman was to be recognized as 'Amirof Kabul'; he was to be provided with a sufficient number of guns tostrengthen effectively his occupation of the city, and he was to begiven as much money (within a maximum of ten lakhs) as was thoughtnecessary to meet his present wants. It was to be clearly explained toAbdur Rahman that the Government of India would not engage to give hima regular subsidy, or a continuous supply of arms or money, and thatafter he had taken possession of his capital he would have to relyupon his own resources for holding it. There was to be no treaty, andall questions of reciprocal engagements between the two Governmentswere to be postponed until some settled and responsible administrationhad been consolidated. 

General Stewart was directed to make the best arrangements he couldwith Abdur Rahman for the protection of the tribes and individuals whohad assisted us, and the Sirdar was to be informed that, if hedesired our goodwill, he could give no better proof of his friendlydisposition than by his behaviour towards those of his own nation inwhom the British Government were interested. 

Sir Donald Stewart considered that the best way of giving effect tothese instructions was to publicly proclaim Abdur Rahman as Amir ofKabul; for this purpose he held a durbar on the 22nd July, at whichthe Sirdar's representatives were received. Sir Donald, in a fewwords, gave his reasons for summoning them to meet him, and Mr. Griffin then explained more fully the motives by which the Governmentof India were actuated in acknowledging the claims of Abdur Rahman. Immediately after the durbar orders were issued for an earlyretirement. 

I was to withdraw my column by the Kuram route; but being anxiousto see something of the Khyber line while I had the opportunity, Istarted off the following day to ride through the Jagdalak Pass toGandamak, where I was entertained by General Bright and his staff. The next day I went on to Jalalabad, and was greatly interestedin wandering over the place where Sir Robert Sale in some measureredeemed the lamentable failures of the first Afghan war. 

My intention, when I left Kabul, was to ride as far as the KhyberPass, but suddenly a presentiment, which I have never been able toexplain to myself, made me retrace my steps and hurry back towardsKabul--a presentiment of coming trouble which I can only characterizeas instinctive. 

The feeling was justified when, about half-way between Butkhak andKabul, I was met by Sir Donald Stewart and my Chief of the Staff, [5]who brought me the astounding news of the total defeat by Ayub Khanof Brigadier-General Burrows's brigade at Maiwand, and ofLieutenant-General Primrose, [6] with the remainder of his force, beingbesieged at Kandahar. 

[Footnote 1: Sir Donald Stewart's division was replaced at Kandahar bytroops from Bombay. ]

[Footnote 2: The part of the report which deals with economic detailsis given in the Appendix (see Appendix X. ); the military portion isomitted, as it was only intended for Sir Donald Stewart's informationat the time. ]

[Footnote 3: Of these, more than 3, 000 were doolie-bearers, and nearly8, 000 were _saices_ of Native Cavalry regiments, and men belonging tothe Transport and other Departments. ]

[Footnote 4: Now Major-General Sir Robert Low, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: Colonel Macgregor and Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman hadchanged places, the former joining Sir Donald Stewart as Chief of theStaff, and the latter taking up the same position with me. ]

[Footnote 6: Lieutenant-General Primrose succeeded Sir Donald Stewartin command of the troops at Kandahar. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LX. 1880

 Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster --Relief from Kabul suggested--A force ordered from Kabul --Preparations for the march--The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force --Commissariat and Transport

For more than six months rumours had been afloat of Ayub Khan'sdetermination to advance on Kandahar; but little attention was paid tothem by the authorities at that place until towards the end of May, when a Sirdar, named Sher Ali, [1] who had been a few days beforeformally installed as Wali, or Ruler, of Kandahar, informed thepolitical officer, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, that the Britishoccupation of Kabul had had the effect of bringing about areconciliation between the various chiefs at Herat, who had placedthemselves under the leadership of Ayub Khan and induced him toproclaim a _jahad_. Sher Ali, who evidently considered this newsauthentic, declared his belief that his own troops, [2] who were thenengaged in collecting revenue in Zamindawar, would desert to Ayub Khanas he approached Kandahar, and he begged that a brigade of Britishsoldiers might be sent to Girishk to support him. 

On General Primrose communicating this information to theCommander-in-Chief in India, he recommended to the Government that theBombay reserve division, located at Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi, should be mobilized so soon as it became certain that Ayub Khan reallycontemplated this move, as in his opinion the garrison at Kandaharwould be left dangerously weak after a brigade had been detached forGirishk. 

Ayub Khan's movements, however, were not ascertained until the 27thJune, when he had advanced halfway to the Helmand; it was too latethen to mobilize troops so far off as Jacobabad, Hyderabad, andKarachi with any chance of their being in time to check his onwardmarch. The news of his approach spread rapidly, and had the mostdisturbing effect in Kandahar and its neighbourhood. The Governor'sauthority daily diminished, and many of the inhabitants left the city. 

Ayub Khan had with him, when he started from Herat on the 15th June, 7, 500 men and ten guns as the nucleus of an army, which he calculated, as he moved forward, would be strongly reinforced by tribesmen, levies, and _ghazis_. 

On the 4th July a brigade, under the command of Brigadier-GeneralBurrows, started from Kandahar, and reached the Helmand on the 11th, encamping on the near bank of the river opposite Girishk. On thefurther bank Sirdar Sher Ali's troops were located, having with themsix guns. Two days afterwards these troops deserted in a body to theenemy, but did not succeed in taking their Artillery with them, asBurrows, on perceiving their intention, crossed the river and capturedthe guns. 

Brigadier-General Burrows's position had now entirely changed; insteadof there being a loyal force under the Wali, with which to co-operateand prevent Ayub Khan crossing the Helmand, he found himself with aninadequate number of troops, the Wali's men gone over to the enemy, and the Wali himself a fugitive in the British camp. The Helmand wasfordable everywhere at that season, making it easy for Ayub to cut offBurrows's retreat; the first twenty-five of the eighty miles by whichhe was separated from Kandahar was a desert, and no supplies wereforthcoming owing to the hostile attitude of the people. Burrowstherefore determined to retire to Khushk-i-Nakhud, an importantposition half-way to Kandahar, covering the road from Girishk, andwhere supplies and water were plentiful. 

Burrows reached Khushk-i-Nakhud on the 16th July. On the 22nd theCommander-in-Chief in India, who had been inquiring from GeneralPrimrose whether there were 'any routes from the Helmand passing bythe north to Ghazni, by which Ayub Khan might move with his guns, 'telegraphed to Primrose: 'You will understand that you have fullliberty to attack Ayub, if you consider you are strong enough to doso. Government consider it of the highest political importance thathis force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible meansfrom passing on to Ghazni. '

On the afternoon of the 26th information was received byBrigadier-General Burrows that 2, 000 of the enemy's Cavalry and alarge body of _ghazis_ had arrived at Maiwand, eleven miles off, andthat Ayub Khan was about to follow with the main body of his army. 

To prevent Ayub Khan getting to Ghazni, General Burrows had to do oneof two things, either await him at Khushk-i-Nakhud, or intercept himat Maiwand. After consulting with Colonel St. John, he determined toadopt the latter course, as he hoped thus to be able to deal with the_ghazis_ before they were joined by Ayub Khan. 

The brigade started soon after 6 a. M. On the 27th. It was encumberedby a large number of baggage animals, which Burrows considered couldnot be left behind because of the hostile state of the country, andthe impossibility of detaching any part of his already too small forcefor their protection. 

At 10 a. M. , when about half-way to Maiwand, a spy brought ininformation that Ayub Khan had arrived at that place, and wasoccupying it in force; General Burrows, however, considered it thentoo late to turn back, and decided to advance. At a quarter to twelvethe forces came into collision, and the fight lasted until past threeo'clock. The Afghans, who, Burrows reported, numbered 25, 000, soonoutflanked the British. Our Artillery expended their ammunition, andthe Native portion of the brigade got out of hand, and pressed back onthe few British Infantry, who were unable to hold their own againstthe overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Our troops were completelyrouted, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans in not followingthem up for escaping total annihilation. 

Of the 2, 476 men engaged at Maiwand, 934 were killed and 175 werewounded and missing;[3] the remnant struggled on throughout the nightto Kandahar, where the first of the fugitives arrived early on themorning of the 28th. Brigadier-General Burrows, who had two horsesshot under him during the engagement, was amongst the last to reachKandahar. 

This lamentable story imparted to me by Stewart almost took my breathaway, and we eagerly discussed the situation as we rode back togetherto Sherpur. It was impossible to predict how the news would affectthe recent arrangements entered into with Abdur Rahman, or what theattitude of the tribesmen would be; but we agreed that, whatever mighthappen in our immediate neighbourhood, the only means of affordingspeedy relief to the Kandahar garrison was by sending a force fromKabul. 

It soon, however, became apparent, by telegrams received from Simla, that the Government were in doubt as to the best course to pursue, andlooked to Quetta rather than Kabul as the place from which Kandaharcould be most conveniently and rapidly succoured. This was notaltogether surprising, for the authorities naturally hesitated toweaken Kabul until matters had been finally settled with Abdur Rahman, and it was only to be expected that, after what had occurred atMaiwand, they should be alarmed at the idea of a force being cutoff from all communication with India during the four weeks, orthereabouts, it would take to reach Kandahar. But there was reallyno alternative, for, as Major-General Phayre[4] (commanding inBaluchistan) reported, [5] the troops available for Field Service werebut few in number, it would require at least fifteen days to equipthem, and there was no organized transport at hand, the animals havingbeen sent to distant grazing grounds on account of the scarcity ofwater and forage. 

I knew nothing as to the actual condition of the troops inBaluchistan, except that, as belonging to the Bombay Presidency, theycould not be composed of the best fighting races, and I had a strongfeeling that it would be extremely unwise to make use of any but themost proved Native soldiers against Ayub Khan's superior numbers, elated as his men must be with their victory at Maiwand. 

The disaster to our arms caused, as was to be expected, considerableexcitement all along the border; indeed, throughout India theannouncement produced a certain feeling of uneasiness--a mere surfaceripple--but enough to make those who remembered the days of the Mutinyanxious for better news from the north. 

To me it seemed of such supreme importance that Kandahar should berelieved without delay, and the reverse to our arms retrieved, thatI made up my mind to communicate my views to the Viceroy throughthe Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that, when he realized that athoroughly efficient force was ready and willing to start from Kabul, he would no longer hesitate as to what was best to do. 

On the 30th July, I dined with Stewart, and, leaving his mess-tentat an early hour, I retired to my own quarters, and wrote out thefollowing telegram in cipher, but, before despatching it, I showed itto Stewart, for, although I knew that his views were in accord withmine, I could not with propriety have sent it without his knowledge:

 'To Major-General Greaves, [6] Adjutant-General in India, Simla. 

 'Kabul, '_30th July, _ 1880. 

 'Personal and secret. I strongly recommend that a force be sent from this to Kandahar. Stewart has organized a very complete one consisting of nine regiments of Infantry, three of Cavalry, and three Mountain batteries. This will suffice to overcome all opposition _en route_; it will have the best possible effect on the country, and will be ready to go anywhere on reaching Kandahar, being fully equipped in all respects. He proposes sending me in command. 

 'I am sure that but few Bombay regiments are able to cope with Afghans, and once the Kabul Field Force leaves this country, the chance of sending a thoroughly reliable and well-equipped column will be lost. The movement of the remainder of the Kabul troops towards India should be simultaneous with the advance of my division towards Kandahar, it being most desirable to limit the area of our responsibilities as soon as possible; at the same time, it is imperative that we should now show our strength throughout Afghanistan. The withdrawal, under existing circumstances, of the whole force from Kabul to India would certainly be misunderstood, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. You need have no fears about my division. It can take care of itself, and will reach Kandahar under the month. I will answer for the loyalty and good feeling of the Native portion, and would propose to inform them that, as soon as matters have been satisfactorily settled at Kandahar, they will be sent straight back to India. Show this to Lyall. '

Exaggerated reports of the Maiwand affair being rife in the Kabulbazaars, which were daily becoming crowded with armed Afghans fromAbdur Rahman's camp, and the prospect of troops having to leave atonce for Kandahar, made it more than ever necessary to bring thenegotiations with the new Amir to a speedy conclusion. It wasaccordingly arranged that Mr. Griffin should meet him at Zimma, aboutsixteen miles from Kabul. This interview had the happiest results, and must have been extremely gratifying to Mr. Griffin, whom we allheartily congratulated on the successful ending to the very delicateand difficult negotiations which he had carried on with so much skilland patience. 

In taking leave of His Highness, Mr. Griffin invited him to cometo the British camp the following day to be received by Sir DonaldStewart. Abdur Rahman himself was quite willing to come, and some ofhis supporters were in favour of his doing so, but others vehementlyopposed the idea, and 'swore by their faith they would leave him if hepersisted. ' After a stormy meeting with his Chiefs, the Amir wroteto Mr. Griffin as follows: 'If you really wish me to come to you, irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to doso. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands ofignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. Whatcan I do? I am most anxious to meet you. '

Upon receipt of this note Stewart decided that it would be impoliticto press for an interview, for instead of strengthening the Amir, ashad been the intention, it was evident it would have the oppositeeffect, so the meeting was given up. 

On the morning of the 3rd August the telegram arrived from Lord Ripon, which I had been so anxiously expecting, authorizing the despatch of aforce to Kandahar, and directing that I should be placed in command. 

I heard afterwards that my message to the Adjutant-General wasreceived at Simla at a most opportune moment. Lyall took it withoutdelay to Lord Ripon, who from the first had been in favour of a forcebeing sent from Kabul, but had refrained from ordering the movementin deference to the views held by some members of his Council, whoselonger experience of India, His Excellency considered, entitled theiropinions to be treated with respect. 

I set to work at once to organize the column which I was to have thegreat honour of commanding. In this most congenial duty I receivedevery possible assistance and encouragement from Stewart; he gave mecarte-blanche, and I should only have had myself to blame if everyunit had not been as efficiently equipped as circumstances wouldadmit. 

I wished that the force should be composed, as far as possible, ofthose who had served with me throughout the campaign; but as some ofthe regiments (more especially Native corps) had been away from theirhomes for two years, and had had more than their share of fighting, besides having suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness, Iconsidered it right to consult their commanders before detailing thetroops. With the exception of three, who thought that their regimentshad been long enough away from India, all, to my great delight, eagerly responded to my call, and I took upon myself to promise themen that they should not be left to garrison Kandahar, but should besent back to India as soon as the fighting ceased. 

When the several regiments were decided upon, every man not likely tostand the strain of prolonged forced marches was weeded out, and thescale of baggage, tents, and impedimenta was reduced to a minimum. [7]

I had no fear as to the officers and men ably and cheerfullyperforming their part of the task; we had been long enough together toenable us thoroughly to understand and trust each other, and I feltthat I could depend upon each and all to respond heartily to whatevercall I might make upon them. 

The question of supplies was my greatest anxiety, and I had manyconsultations with my experienced Commissariat officer, Major Badcock, before I could feel satisfied in this respect. 

The transport, as I have already recorded, was in good order; it wasfortunate that the soldiers had been practised in loading, leading, and tending the animals, for the Afghan drivers deserted to a man amarch or two from Kabul, and the Hazaras followed their example onreaching their own country. Sir Donald Stewart's account of thetroubles he had encountered during his march from Kandahar was notvery encouraging, and I should have been glad if I could have taken alarger amount of supplies;[8] but on this point I had to be guided bythe number of animals that could be allotted to the column, which wasnecessarily limited, as carriage had to be provided simultaneously forthe withdrawal of the rest of the army of occupation. 

The strength of the force placed at my disposal consisted of 9, 986men of all ranks and eighteen guns, divided into three brigades ofInfantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and three batteries of MountainArtillery. There were, besides, over 8, 000 followers[9] and 2, 300horses and gun-mules. 

It was designated the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force. 

Major-General J. Ross, C. B. , was given the command of the Infantrydivision, his three Brigadier-Generals being Herbert Macpherson, T. D. Baker, and Charles Macgregor. Brigadier-General Hugh Gough commandedthe Cavalry brigade; Colonel Alured Johnson the Artillery; whileColonel Æ. Perkins held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer;Deputy-Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Principal Medical Officer;and Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Chapman, Chief of the Staff. 

From the detail of the force given below, [10] it will be seen thatthere was no wheeled Artillery, and that the number of guns was notin proportion to the strength of the other branches. This was my owndoing; I was pressed to take more and heavier guns, but, after dueconsideration, I decided that I would only have Mountain batteries. Wecould not tell how long the Kandahar garrison would be able to holdout, so that our first object must be to reach that place with theleast possible delay, and wheeled Artillery would, in a country wherethere were practically no roads, have only prevented our moving asrapidly as we might otherwise have done. 

For the equipment of the force, inclusive of carriage for footsoresoldiers[11] and followers, and allowing ten per cent. Spare, morethan 8, 000[12] animals were required. 

Fortunately, it turned out that a fair amount of Indian corn in theear was almost everywhere procurable, which was so nutritious that alarge majority of the Cavalry horses and transport animals reachedKandahar in excellent condition. 

Throughout the march great difficulties were experienced in procuringfood, but they were always overcome, with the able assistance of MajorHastings and his political staff, [13] and by means of the admirablearrangements made by the Commissariat[14] and Transport[15] officers, who were quite untiring, and after the longest march, and with theprospect of having to start again at an early hour the followingmorning, had often to work far into the night. 

The want of fuel was our chief drawback. We had on many occasions topurchase houses and pull them to pieces for the sake of the wood to begot out of them, and frequently there was nothing to cook with savetiny roots of southernwood, which had to be dug out and collectedafter a long day's march before the men could prepare their food andsatisfy their hunger. 

One day's corn was carried by each animal in addition to the ordinaryload, and as far as Ghazni grain was tolerably plentiful; beyond thatwe had to depend for forage on the crops still standing. At the end ofthe day's march, certain fields were told off to the several brigades;from these all that was required was cut and carried away, the fieldswere then measured and assessed, and compensation was awarded by thepolitical officers, who also adjusted all claims on account of wreckedhouses, and fruit, vegetables, etc. , brought in for the troops. 

On Sunday, the 8th August, the force moved into camp by brigades, myHead-Quarters being with the first and third Infantry brigades atBeni Hissar, on the way to the Logar valley, which route I had choseninstead of the slightly shorter line by Maidan, on account of thegreater facility it afforded for supplies. 

Sir Donald Stewart paid us a farewell visit in the afternoon, and at 6a. M. The following morning we began the march to Kandahar. 

[Footnote 1: Sirdar Sher Ali had been appointed Governor of Kandaharby the Amir Yakub Khan after the treaty of Gandamak, and had sinceassisted Sir Donald Stewart in the civil administration of theprovince. ]

[Footnote 2: Local Native levies. ]

[Footnote 3:

 _Killed_ _Missing_ British officers 20 9 " troops 290 48 Native " 624 118 --- --- 934 175 Total, 1, 109

Of the regimental followers 331 were killed and 7 were missing; 455transport followers and drivers were reported as killed or missing, but a number of these, being Afghans, probably joined the enemy. 

A large quantity of arms and ammunition was lost, including over 1, 000rifles and carbines, and 600 or 700 swords and bayonets. 

201 horses were killed, and 1, 676 camels, 355 ponies, 24 mules, 291donkeys, and 79 bullocks, were not forthcoming. ]

[Footnote 4: Afterwards General Sir Robert Phayre, G. C. B. ]

[Footnote 5: General Phayre reported on the 28th July that therewere only seven Native regiments in Baluchistan, three of which wererequired for the lines of communication, leaving only four availablefor Field Service; and that a battalion of British Infantry and abattery of Field Artillery required for his column were a long wayoff, being still in Sind. ]

[Footnote 6: Now General Sir George Greaves, G. C. B. , G. C. M. C. ]

[Footnote 7:

 Each British soldier was allowed for kit and camp-equipage, including great-coat and waterproof sheet 30 lbs. Each Native soldier 20 " Each public and private follower 10 " Each European officer 1 mule. Every eight officers for mess 1 " Each staff-officer for office purposes 80 lbs. Each Native officer 30 "]

[Footnote 8: The amount of supplies taken with the force was asfollows:

 FOR BRITISH TROOPS. 

 Bread-stuff 5 days. Preserved vegetables 15 " Tea, sugar, salt, and rum 30 "

 FOR NATIVE TROOPS AND FOLLOWERS. 

 Flour 5 days _Dal_ and salt 30 " Rum for spirit-drinking men 8 "

 Sheep, ten days' supply for British troops and four issues for Native troops, with 20 per cent. Spare. Nearly 5, 000 sheep were purchased on the march. N. B. --There are no horned cattle in Afghanistan, except those used for the plough or transport. 

In addition to the above, a small reserve of lime-juice, pea-soup, andtinned meat was taken; these proved most useful, and might have beenincreased with advantage had carriage been available. 

I gave strict orders that the reserve of bread-stuff, flour, and sheepwas never to be used without my sanction, and that whereverpossible food for the day's consumption was to be purchased. We hadoccasionally to trench upon the reserve, but we nearly made it up atother places, and we arrived at Kandahar with three days' supplies inhand. ]

[Footnote 9: The followers consisted of:

 Doolie-bearers 2, 192 Transport and other departments 4, 698 Private servants, and _saices_ of Native Cavalry regiments 1, 244 ----- Total 8, 134]

[Footnote 10: DETAIL OF FORCE. 

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE. 

 _British_. _Native_. 92nd Highlanders 651 -- 23rd Pioneers 701 24th Punjab Native Infantry -- 575 2nd Gurkhas -- 501 --- ----- Total 651 1, 777

2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE. 

 _British_. _Native_. 72nd Highlanders 787 -- 2nd Sikh Infantry -- 612 3rd Sikh Infantry -- 570 5th Gurkhas -- 561 --- ----- Total 787 1, 743

3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE. 

 | | _British_. | _Native_. | |60th Rifles, 2nd Battalion | 616 | -- | |15th Sikhs | -- | 650 | |25th Punjab Native Infantry | -- | 629 | |4th Gurkhas | -- | 637 | | | ___ | ___ | | Total | 616 | 1, 916 |

 |CAVALRY BRIGADE. ---------------------------------------- | | _British_. | _Native_. | |9th Queen's Royal Lancers | 318 | -- | |3rd Bengal Cavalry | -- | 394 | |3rd Punjab Cavalry | -- | 408 | |Central India Horse | -- | 495 | | | ___ | ___ | | Total | 318 | 1, 297 |

 |ARTILLERY DIVISION. ------------------------------------------ | _British. |Native. |Guns_. | |6-8th Royal Artillery--screw guns| 95 | 139 | 6 | |11-9th Royal Artillery | 95 | 139 | 6 | |No. 2 Mountain Battery | -- | 140 | 6 | | | ___ | ___ | ___ | | Total | 190 | 418 | 18 |

 |TOTAL OF FORCE. ----------------------------------------------

 |British troops 2, 562 | |Native " 7, 151 | |British officers 273 | |Guns 18 | |Cavalry horses 1, 779 | |Artillery mules 450 |

 Two hundred rounds of ammunition were taken for each Infantry soldier: seventy rounds were carried by each man, thirty rounds were in reserve with the regiment, and a hundred rounds in the Field Park. 

 Each Mountain battery had:

 Common shell 264 Double shell 60 Shrapnel shell 144 Star shell 24 Case shot 48 ___

 Total 540 rounds. 

 And thirty rounds per gun in the Field Park. ]

[Footnote 11: British troops were allowed ponies at the rate of 2 percent, of strength. Native troops were allowed ponies at the rate of2-1/2 per cent. Of strength. Followers were allowed ponies at the rateof 1-1/2 per cent. Of strength. ]

[Footnote 12:

 ------------------------------------------------------------- | |Yabus, | |Indian | | | | | or |Mules. |ponies. |Donkeys. |Camels. | | |Afghan | | | | | | |ponies. | | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------- |Number of animals | | | | | | | that left Kabul | 1, 589 | 4, 510| 1, 244 | 912 | 6[1*]| |Purchased during | | | | | | | the march[2*] | 35 | 1| -- | 208 | 171 | |Number of animals | | | | | | | that reached | | | | | | | Kandahar | 1, 179 | 4, 293| 1, 138 | 1, 078 | 177 | |Casualties during | | | | | | | the march | 445 | 218| 106 | 42 | | --------------------------------------------------------------

 Note 1*: With hospital equipment. 

 Note 2*: Only twice had animals to be taken against the will of the owners, and on both occasions the matter was amicably settled in the end. ]

[Footnote 13: Major E. Hastings, Captain West Ridgeway, Major EuanSmith, C. S. I. , and Major M. Prothero. ]

[Footnote 14: Major A. Badcock, Captain A. Rind, and LieutenantsC. Fitzgerald, H. Hawkes, and H. Lyons Montgomery, all of the BengalStaff Corps. ]

[Footnote 15: Lieutenant-Colonel R. Low, Bengal Staff Corps; CaptainW. Wynter, 33rd Foot; Captains G. H. Eliot and C. R. Macgregor, BengalStaff Corps; Lieutenants L. Booth, 33rd Foot, H. Elverson, 2nd Foot, R. Fisher, 10th Hussars, R. Wilson, 10th Hussars, and C. Robertson, 8th Foot. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXI. 1880

 The order of marching--Ghazni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai --Food required daily for the force--A letter from General Phayre --Kandahar--Reconnoitring the enemy's position--A turning movement

Before daybreak on the 11th August, as I was starting from camp, Ireceived my last communication from the outside world in the shapeof a telegram from my wife, sent off from a little village inSomersetshire, congratulating me and the force, and wishing us allGod's speed. She had taken our children to England a few monthsbefore, thinking that the war in Afghanistan was over, and that Iwould soon be able to follow. 

Four days brought us to the end of the Logar valley, a distance offorty-six miles. So far the country was easy and supplies plentiful. Ithought it wise, however, not to attempt long distances at first, thatboth men and animals might become gradually hardened before enteringon the difficult and scantily cultivated ground between Ghazni andKelat-i-Ghilzai, where I knew that forced marches were inevitable, andthat their powers of endurance would be sorely taxed. Moreover, itwas necessary to begin quietly, and organize some system by whichconfusion in the crowded camping-grounds might be avoided, and thephysical strain upon everyone lightened as much as possible. 

When it is remembered that the daily supply for over 18, 000 men and11, 000 animals had to be drawn from the country after arrival in camp, that food had to be distributed to every individual, that the fuelwith which it was cooked had often to be brought from long distances, and that a very limited time was available for the preparation ofmeals and for rest, it will readily be understood how essential it wasthat even the stupidest follower should be able to find his place incamp speedily, and that everyone should know exactly what to do andhow to set about doing it. 

On the march and in the formation of the camps the same principleswere, as far as possible, applied each day. The 'rouse' sounded at2. 45 a. M. , and by four o'clock tents had been struck, baggage loadedup, and everything was ready for a start. 

As a general rule, the Cavalry covered the movement at a distance ofabout five miles, two of the four regiments being in front, with theother two on either flank. Two of the Infantry brigades came next, each accompanied by a Mountain battery; then followed the fieldhospitals, Ordnance and Engineer parks, treasure, and the baggage, massed according to the order in which the brigades were moving. Thethird Infantry brigade with its Mountain battery and one or two troopsof Cavalry formed the rear guard. 

A halt of ten minutes was made at the end of each hour, which at eighto'clock was prolonged to twenty minutes to give time for a hastybreakfast. Being able to sleep on the shortest notice, I usually tookadvantage of these intervals to get a nap, awaking greatly refreshedafter a few minutes' sound sleep. 

On arrival at the resting-place for the night, the front face of thecamp was told off to the brigade on rear guard, and this became theleading brigade of the column on the next day's march. Thus everybrigade had its turn of rear guard duty, which was very arduous, moreparticularly after leaving Ghazni, the troops so employed seldomreaching the halting-ground before six or seven o'clock in theevening, and sometimes even later. 

One of the most troublesome duties of the rear guard was to preventthe followers from lagging behind, for it was certain death for anyonewho strayed from the shelter of the column; numbers of Afghans alwayshovered about on the look-out for plunder, or in the hope of beingable to send a Kafir, or an almost equally-detested Hindu, to eternalperdition. Towards the end of the march particularly, this duty becamemost irksome, for the wretched followers were so weary and footsorethat they hid themselves in ravines, making up their minds to die, andentreating, when discovered and urged to make an effort, to be leftwhere they were. Every baggage animal that could possibly be sparedwas used to carry the worn-out followers; but notwithstanding this andthe care taken by officers and men that none should be left behind, twenty of these poor creatures were lost, besides four Nativesoldiers. 

The variation of temperature (at times as much as eighty degreesbetween day and night) was most trying to the troops, who had to carrythe same clothes whether the thermometer was at freezing-point atdawn or at 110° Fahr. At mid-day. Scarcity of water, too, was a greattrouble to them, while constant sand-storms, and the suffocatingdust raised by the column in its progress, added greatly to theirdiscomfort. 

Daily reports regarding the health of the troops, followers, andtransport animals were brought to me each evening, and I made it mybusiness to ascertain how many men had fallen out during the day, andwhat had been the number of casualties amongst the animals. 

On the 12th August the Head-Quarters and main body of the force haltedto allow the Cavalry and the second Infantry brigade to push on andget clear over the Zamburak Kotal (8, 100 feet high) before the restof the column attempted its ascent. This kotal presented a seriousobstacle to our rapid progress, the gradient being in many places onein four, and most difficult for the baggage animals; but by postingstaff officers at intervals to control the flow of traffic, and byopening out fresh paths to relieve the pressure, we got over it muchmore quickly than I had expected. 

On the 15th we reached Ghazni, ninety-eight miles from Kabul, a placeof peculiar interest to me from the fact that it was for his share inits capture, forty-one years before, that my father was given the C. B. 

I was met by the Governor, who handed me the keys of the fortress, andI placed my own guards and sentries in and around the city to preventcollisions between the inhabitants and our troops, and also to makesure that our demands for supplies were complied with. Up to thispoint we had been fairly well off for food, forage, and water. 

Our next march was across a barren, inhospitable track for twentymiles to a place called Yarghati. On the way we passed Ahmedkhel, where Sir Donald Stewart won his victory; the name had been changedby the Natives to 'the Resting-place of Martyrs, ' and the numerousfreshly-covered-in graves testified to the _ghazis'_ heavy losses. Theremains of the few British soldiers, who had been buried where theyhad fallen, had been desecrated, and the bones were exposed to viewand scattered about. 

At Chardeh, our next halting-place, a communication from ColonelTanner, Commanding at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, was brought to me by a Nativemessenger; it was dated the 12th August, and informed me that Kandaharwas closely invested, but that the garrison had supplies for twomonths and forage for fifteen days. 

On the 21st we arrived at a point thirty miles from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, whence we opened heliograph communication with that place, and weretold of an unsuccessful sortie made from Kandahar five days before, inwhich General Brooke and eight other British officers had been killed. 

[Illustration: CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL. _From a painting by the Chevalier Desanges. _]

On the 23rd Kelat-i-Ghilzai was reached. The garrison[1] had been welltaken care of by Colonel Tanner, [2] and a large quantity of food forman and beast had been collected; but I thought it unadvisableat present to continue to hold the place, and have to keep opencommunication between it and Kandahar, and as I could see nocompensating advantage in doing so, I determined to withdraw thetroops and take them along with me. 

Colonel Tanner's report satisfied me there was no immediate danger tobe apprehended at Kandahar, so I decided to halt for one day; both menand animals greatly needed rest after a continuous march of 225 miles. 

I had endeavoured to keep the Government of India informed of myprogress by a message from Ghazni, and one from Oba Karez on the18th August, but neither reached its destination. I now despatched amessage which was more successful, and was delivered at Simla on the30th August. It was as follows:

 'KELAT-I-GHILZAI, '_23rd August, _ 1880. 

 'The force under my command arrived here this morning. The authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until 1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest the troops, and more especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last eight days; the troops are in good health and spirits. From this I purpose moving by regular-stages, so that the men may arrive fresh at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with Kandahar from Robat, distant twenty miles, on the 29th. If General Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the Fort over to Mahomed Sadik Khan, a Toki Chief, who had charge of the place when we arrived in 1879; the present Governor, Sirdar Sherindil Khan, refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful. The Cavalry horses and Artillery mules are in excellent order; our casualties to date are, one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy 23rd Pioneers, one 2nd Sikhs, two sepoys 3rd Sikhs dead; one sepoy 4th Gurkhas, two sepoys 24th Punjab Native Infantry, one Duffadar 3rd Punjab Cavalry missing; six camp-followers dead, five missing. The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from Ghazni on the 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August. '

I wrote also to Major-General Phayre, telling him of the date onwhich I expected to reach Kandahar, and that if I heard of his beinganywhere near I would arrange my movements to suit his, in order thatthe two forces might make a combined attack on Ayub Khan's position. 

As I was afraid the supplies at Kandahar would be insufficient for theadditional troops about to be collected there, I sent General Phayrea memorandum[3] of the amount of food required daily by my force, andbegged him to get pushed up from the rear such articles as were moreparticularly wanted. I pointed out that we were badly off for boots, and that the 92nd Highlanders had only one hundred greatcoats fit forwear, which were used by the men on night duties. 

On the 25th we marched to Jaldak, seventeen miles, and the samedistance the next day to Tirandaz, where I received a letter fromLieutenant-General Primrose, informing me that Ayub Khan had raisedthe siege on the 23rd, and was entrenching himself at Mazra, beyondthe Baba Wali Kotal, in the valley of the Arghandab. 

I awoke on the morning of the 27th feeling very unwell, and soon foundI was in for an attack of fever. The heat during the day was becomingmore and more overpowering as we proceeded south, and I had latelybeen feeling somewhat knocked up by it and by exposure to the sun. Ihad now to give in for the time being, and was compelled to performthe march in a doolie, a most ignominious mode of conveyance for aGeneral on service; but there was no help for it, for I could not sita horse. 

That day the 3rd Bengal and 3rd Punjab Cavalry marched thirty-fourmiles to Robat, in order to establish direct heliographiccommunication with Kandahar. The main body halted about half-way, whenI again reported progress as follows:

 SHAHR-I-SAFA, '_27th August, 1880. _

 'My force arrived here to-day. I received a letter yesterday, dated 25th, from Colonel St. John. He writes: "The rumours of the approach of your force have been sufficient to relieve the city from investment. On Monday night the villages on the east and south were abandoned by their mixed garrisons of _ghazis_ and regulars. Yesterday morning Ayub struck his camp, and marched to a position on the Arghandab, between Baba Wali and Sheikh Chela, due north of the city, and separated from it by a range of rocky hills. He has about 4, 000 Infantry regulars, six 12-pounders and two 9-pounders rifled, four 6-pounder smooth-bore batteries, and one 4-pounder battery, 2, 000 sowars, and perhaps twice that number of _ghazis_, of whom a third have firearms. The Kizilbashes and Kohistanis in his army, about 1, 200 Infantry and 300 Cavalry, offered to desert and join us directly we made a show of attack. They are at last aware of Abdur Rahman's succession, but I think Ayub will remain unmolested until the arrival of the Kabul force, provided he waits, which is unlikely. He will, I expect, strike away north into Khakrez, on which line a vigorous pursuit will give us his guns. Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, is still a prisoner; I am making every effort to obtain his release, but I am not very hopeful of success. This morning, the 25th, I went to the field of the unlucky sortie of the 16th, and found the bodies of the poor fellows who fell there, some forty in number; they will be buried this afternoon. All the wounded are doing well. No signs or tidings of Phayre. " General Gough, with two regiments of Cavalry, is at Robat; they are in heliographic communication with Kandahar. General Primrose heliographs that Ayub Khan has entrenched his camp at Baba Wali. The force marches for Robat to-morrow, seventeen miles distant from Kandahar. '

The following day the column joined the two Cavalry regiments atRobat, where I was met by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, from whom Iheard that Ayub Khan was likely to make a stand. I thought it prudent, therefore, to halt on Sunday, the 29th, and divide the last twentymiles into two short marches, in order that the men and animals mightarrive as fresh as possible, and fit for any work which might berequired of them; for should Ayub Khan retire towards Herat, he wouldhave to be followed up, and his army attacked and defeated wherever wemight overtake him. 

Before leaving Robat, a letter arrived from General Phayre, which putan end to all hope of his force being able to co-operate with mine, for his leading brigade, he wrote, had only just got to the KohjakPass. This was to be regretted, but it was unavoidable. I was wellaware of the strenuous efforts the gallant Commander had made torelieve the beleaguered garrison, and I knew if co-operation had beenpossible it would have been effected. 

We encamped at Momund on the 30th, whence I sent the followingtelegram to Simla:

 'My force arrived here to-day; we march to Kandahar to-morrow. General Primrose heliographs that a letter from Ayub's camp brings information that the mother of the late Heir-Apparent, Abdulla Jan, with other ladies, has been sent to Zamindawar. Arrival of the young Musa Jan in Ayub's camp is confirmed. Hashim Khan is also there. The position is being strengthened, especially on the Pir Paimal side, where two guns have been placed with two regiments. From further information, I learn that the Baba Wali Kotal is occupied by three regiments and two guns. The Kotal-i-Murcha is held by the Kabul regiments, and Ayub's own camp is at Mazra, where it is said that the majority of his guns are parked. I propose to encamp the Infantry to the west of Kandahar immediately under the walls, and the Cavalry under the walls to the south. Should I hear that Ayub contemplates flight, I shall attack without delay. If, on the contrary, he intends to resist, I shall take my own time. The country he is occupying is, from description and map, extremely difficult and easily defensible, and each separate advance will require careful study and reconnaissance to prevent unnecessary loss of life. '

On the morning of the 31st we marched into Kandahar, just over 313miles from Kabul. The fever, which had attacked me rather sharply, hadleft me extremely weak, and I was unable to ride the whole way. I goton my horse, however, some distance from Kandahar to meet GeneralsPrimrose, Burrows, and Nuttall, who came out to receive the column. Aswe approached the city, the whole garrison turned out and gave us ahearty welcome; officers and men, Native and British, crowded roundus, loud in their expressions of gratitude for our having come soquickly to their assistance. We, on our side, were all anxietyto learn the particulars about Maiwand, how they had fared whileinvested, and all they could tell us of Ayub Khan, his position, strength of his army, etc. 

I confess to being very greatly surprised, not to use a strongerexpression, at the demoralized condition of the greater part of thegarrison;[4] there were notable exceptions, [5] but the general bearingof the troops reminded me of the people at Agra in 1857. Theyseemed to consider themselves hopelessly defeated, and were utterlydespondent; they never even hoisted the Union Jack until the relievingforce was close at hand. The same excuses could not, however, be madefor them, who were all soldiers by profession, as we had felt inclinedto make for the residents at Agra, a great majority of whom werewomen, children, and civilians. The walls[6] which completelysurrounded Kandahar were so high and thick as to render the cityabsolutely impregnable to any army not equipped with a regularsiege-train. Scaling-ladders had been prepared by the enemy, andthere was an idea that an assault would be attempted; but for Britishsoldiers to have contemplated the possibility of Kandahar being takenby an Afghan army showed what a miserable state of depression anddemoralization they were in. 

[Illustration: Map: SKETCH OF THE ROUTE TAKEN ON THE MARCH FROM KABULTO KANDAHAR. AUGUST. 1880. ]

I halted the column for two hours outside the south wall of the city, where it was sheltered from the enemy's fire, Ayub Khan's positionbeing within long range directly north of Kandahar. While the menrested and breakfasted, and the baggage animals were being unloaded, fed, and watered, I went into the citadel to talk matters over withGeneral Primrose and Colonel St. John, and inquire whether there wassufficient accommodation for the sick men of my force, numbering 940, who needed to be taken into hospital. The thermometer now registered105° Fahr. In tents during the day, but the nights were still bitterlycold, and the sudden changes of temperature were extremely trying topeople in bad health. 

On the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, whose intimateacquaintance with the neighbourhood of Kandahar, gained while servingon Sir Donald Stewart's staff, was now most valuable to me, Idetermined to take up a position to the west of the city, with myright on the cantonment and my left touching Old Kandahar. Thisenabled me to cover the city, gave me command of a good supply ofwater, and placed me within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp. 

At 10 a. M. The first and third brigades moved off and occupied PiquetHill, Karez Hill, and the north-east spur of the hill above OldKandahar. A few shots were fired at the advance guard from distantorchards, and the ground proved to be within range of some of theenemy's Field-pieces on the Baba Wali Kotal, but it was a case ofHobson's choice, as water was not to be found anywhere else at acome-at-able distance. 

Large numbers of men were to be seen crowning the Baba Wali Kotal, andconstructing shelter-trenches along the crest of the low black ridge, which jutted out in a south-easterly direction from the more loftyrange on which the kotal is situated. Piquets were immediately sent tooccupy the northern spur of the Kohkeran Hill commanding the road toGundigan, the village of Abbasabad, the Karez Hill, the village ofChihal Dukhtaran, the greater and lesser Piquet Hills, and the villageof Kalachi, all of which were found to be deserted. 

From a cursory examination of the ground, I satisfied myself that anyattempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by direct attack must result invery severe loss, and I determined to turn it. But before I coulddecide how this could best be done, it was necessary to ascertainthe strength and precise extent of the Afghan position. I thereforedetailed a small party, [7] under the command of Brigadier-General HughGough, to make as complete a reconnaissance as time would allow. Inthe meantime I despatched the following telegram to the authorities atSimla:

 'KANDAHAR, _31st August, _ 1880. 

 'The force under my command arrived here this morning without opposition. Enemy are said to be in considerable strength at Mazra, but the ridge of hills which divides Kandahar from the Arghandab completely covers their position, and at present I have only been able to ascertain that the Baba Wali Kotal and one or two other points on this ridge are held in great strength, and that the enemy are busily engaged in defensive works. Reconnaissances are now being conducted, and I shall soon, I hope, be sufficiently acquainted with affairs generally to enable me to arrange for an attack. The Kandahar garrison are in good health; the horses and transport animals appear to be in good condition. Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, has died of his wounds; the remainder of the wounded, both officers and men, are generally doing well. The troops from Kabul are in famous health and spirits. The assurance of the safety of this garrison enabled comparatively short marches to be made from Kelat-i-Ghilzai, which much benefited both men and animals. The Cavalry horses and Artillery mules are in excellent condition, and the transport animals are, as a rule, in very fair order. General Primrose has arranged for the sick of the force from Kabul being accommodated inside the city; many of the cases are sore feet; none are serious. To-morrow the telegraph line towards India will commence to be re-constructed, and as General Phayre is probably on this side of the Kohjak to-day, through communication should soon be restored. '

The reconnaissance, which started at 1 p. M. , proceeded towards thehigh ground immediately above the villages of Gundigan and Murghan. Here the Infantry and guns were halted, while the Cavalry advancedbetween two or three miles, avoiding the numerous orchards andenclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal, which was found tobe strongly entrenched. 

As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the 3rdBengal Cavalry fell back, admirably handled by their Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Mackenzie. In the meantime, two guns of No. 11 Battery 9th Brigade were brought into action, partly to test therange, and partly to check the enemy, who were passing rapidly intothe gardens near Gundigan. The Infantry and Artillery then retiredwithin the line of piquets, and the moment they began to fall back theAfghans came after them in great strength; they were so persistentthat I ordered the whole of the 3rd Brigade and part of the 1stBrigade under arms. The enemy, however, were unable to come to closequarters owing to the bold front shown by the 15th Sikhs, under thecommand of Lieutenant-Colonel Hennessy, and before dark the troopswere all back in camp, with a loss of five men killed and fifteenwounded. 

From the information obtained by this reconnaissance, I found that itwas quite practicable to turn the Afghan right, and thus place myselfin rear of the Baba Wali range; I decided, therefore, to attack theposition the following morning. It was too close to our camp to riskdelay. Moreover, I knew that the retrograde movement of Gough's smallbody would be construed into a defeat by the enemy, who, if we did notmove at once, would assuredly think that we were afraid to take theinitiative, and would become correspondingly bold. 

I accordingly issued orders for the troops to breakfast at 7 a. M. , andfor one day's cooked rations to be carried by the Infantry and twodays by the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. Brigades were to be inposition by eight o'clock, tents being previously struck and thebaggage stored in a walled enclosure. 

The night passed quietly except for occasional bursts of musketryalong the line of piquets to the west, showing that the Afghans wereholding the villages they had occupied the previous evening. 

[Footnote 1: The garrison consisted of 2 guns of C/2, Royal Artillery, 145 rifles of the 66th Foot, 100 of the 3nd Sind Horse, and the 2ndBaluch Regiment, 639 strong. ]

[Footnote 2: Now Lieutenant-General Sir Oriel Tanner, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 3: Estimate of daily requirements for the Kabul-KandaharField Force and the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison:

 Europeans 3, 200 Native troops 8, 000 Followers 8, 500 Horses 2, 300 Transport --yabus 1, 592, mules and ponies 5, 926, camels 400, donkeys 400. 

 Meat 4, 000 lbs. Bread-stuff 40 maunds. [*] Vegetables 4, 000 lbs. Rice 800 " Salt 133 " Sugar 600 " Tea 150 " Rum, 25 per cent. 80 gallons. Atta 320 maunds. Dall 51-1/2 " Ghee 19-1/4 " Salt 8-1/2 " Grain 700 "

 A. R. BADCOCK, Major, Deputy Commissary-General. 

 KELAT-I-GHILZAI, _24th August, _ 1880. 

 [Note *: A maund is equivalent to 80 lbs. ]]

[Footnote 4: The effective garrison consisted of 1, 000 Britishsoldiers, 3, 000 Native soldiers, and fifteen Field guns. ]

[Footnote 5: One and all bore testimony to the unfailing goodbehaviour and creditable bearing of the Royal Artillery and the BombaySappers and Miners, not only during the investment, but in the verytrying time of the retreat from Maiwand. ]

[Footnote 6: The walls had an average height of 30 feet, and breadthof 15 feet on the north and east fronts. ]

[Footnote 7: Two Royal Artillery guns, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, and 15thSikhs. Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman accompanied the party, and was ofgreat assistance to Brigadier-General Gough. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXII. 1880

 Commencement of the fight--72nd Highlanders and 2nd Sikhs --92nd Highlanders and 2nd Gurkhas--Ayub Khan's camp --Difficulties about supplies--Parting with the troops --A pleasing memory

The next morning, the 1st September, in accordance with instructionsfrom Simla, I assumed command of the army in southern Afghanistan. There was no return to show the strength or composition of GeneralPhayre's column, but the troops at Kandahar all told now amounted inround numbers to 3, 800 British and 11, 000 Native soldiers, with 36guns. 

An hour before daybreak the whole of the troops were under arms, andat 6 a. M. I explained to Generals Primrose and Ross and the officerscommanding brigades the plan of operations. Briefly, it was tothreaten the enemy's left (the Baba Wali Kotal), and to attack inforce by the village of Pir Paimal. 

The Infantry belonging to the Kabul column, upon whom devolved theduty of carrying the enemy's position, were formed up in rear of thelow hills which covered the front of our camp, their right being atPiquet Hill and their left resting on Chitral Zina. The Cavalry of theKabul column were drawn up in rear of the left, ready to operate byGundigan towards the head of the Arghandab, so as to threaten therear of Ayub Khan's camp and his line of retreat in the direction ofGirishk. Four guns of E Battery Royal Horse Artillery, two companiesof the 2-7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th BombayInfantry, were placed at the disposal of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, whose orders were to occupy with these troops the position aboveGundigan, which had been so useful during the previous day'sreconnaissance, and to push his Cavalry on to the Arghandab. 

Guards having been detailed for the protection of the city, theremainder of Lieutenant-General Primrose's troops were ordered to bedisposed as follows: Brigadier-General Daubeny's brigade to occupy theground between Piquet Hill and Chitral Zina as soon as the Infantry ofthe Kabul-Kandahar Field Force advanced to the attack. The remnant ofBrigadier-General Burrows's brigade, with No. 5 Battery, 11th BrigadeRoyal Artillery, under Captain Hornsby, and the Cavalry underBrigadier-General Nuttall, to take up a position north of thecantonment, from which the 40-pounders could be brought to bear onthe Baba Wali Kotal, while the Cavalry could watch the pass, calledKotal-i-Murcha, and cover the city. 

From an early hour it was clear that the enemy contemplated anoffensive movement; the villages of Gundigan and Gundi Mulla Sahibdabwere being held in strength, and a desultory fire was brought to bearon the British front from the orchards connecting these two villagesand from the Baba Wali Kotal. 

The Bombay Cavalry moved out at 7. 30 a. M. , and Daubeny's brigade ateight o'clock. Burrows's troops followed, and shortly after 9 a. M. , their disposition being completed, Captain Hornsby opened fire uponthe kotal, which was one mass of _ghazis_. 

This feint, made by General Primrose's troops, having had the effect Ihad hoped, of attracting the enemy's attention, I gave the orderfor Major-General Ross to make the real attack with the 1st and 2ndBrigades of his division. The 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-GeneralMacgregor, I placed in front of the village of Abbasabad, with thedouble object of being a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Brigades and ofmeeting a possible counter-attack from the Baba Wali Kotal. 

Ross's orders were to advance against Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, capturethe village, and then drive the enemy from the enclosures which laybetween it and the low spur of Pir Paimal hill. This duty he entrustedto Brigadier-General Macpherson, and he directed Brigadier-GeneralBaker to advance to the west, to keep touch with the 1st Brigade, andto clear the gardens and orchards in his immediate front. 

Greig's 9-pounder and Robinson's 7-pounder (screw gun) batteriescovered the attack on Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, which was made by the2nd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Battye, and the 92ndHighlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Parker, supported by the 23rdPioneers, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett, and the 24th PunjabInfantry, under Colonel F. Norman. The village was carried with theutmost gallantry, Highlanders and Gurkhas, always friendly rivals inthe race for glory, by turns outstripping each other in their effortsto be first within its walls. The enemy sullenly and slowly withdrew, a goodly number of _ghazis_ remaining to the very last to receivea bayonet charge of the 92nd. Meanwhile, Baker's troops had beenthreading their way through the narrow lanes and loop-holed enclosureswhich lay in the line of their spirited attack; the resistance theyencountered was most stubborn, and it was during this advance that the72nd lost their dashing Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow, [1]Captain Frome, and Lance-Sergeant Cameron, the latter a grand specimenof a Highland soldier. 

In the 2nd Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs borethe brunt of the fighting; they were the leading battalions, andfrequently had to fix bayonets to carry different positions or tocheck the desperate rushes of the Afghans. 

After continued and severe fighting, both leading brigades emergedat the point of the hill close to Pir Paimal, and, wheeling to theirright, they pressed rapidly on, sweeping the enemy through thethickly-wooded gardens which covered the western slopes, until noon, when the whole of Pir Paimal was in our possession. [2]

During the early part of the advance the Afghans collected in greatstrength on the low hills beneath the Baba Wali Kotal, evidentlypreparing for a rush on our guns; their leaders could be seen urgingthem on, and a portion of them came down the hill, but the main bodyapparently refused to follow, and remained on the crest until theposition was turned, when they at once retreated. 

Having become assured of General Ross's complete success, and seeingthat there was now no necessity for detaining Macgregor's (the 3rd)brigade to meet a counter-attack, I pushed on with it to join Ross, who, however, knowing how thoroughly he could depend upon his troops, without waiting to be reinforced, followed up the retreating foe, until he reached an entrenched position at the other side of the BabaWali Kotal, where the Afghans made another most determined stand. _Ghazis_ in large numbers flocked to this spot from the rear, whilethe guns on the kotal were turned round and brought to bear on ourmen, already exposed to a heavy Artillery fire from behind theentrenched camp. 

It now became necessary to take this position by storm, andrecognizing the fact with true soldierly instinct, Major White, whowas leading the advanced companies of the 92nd, called upon the menfor just one charge more 'to close the business. ' The battery of screwguns had been shelling the position, and, under cover of its fireand supported by a portion of the 2nd Gurkhas and 23rd Pioneers, theHighlanders, responding with alacrity to their leader's call, dashedforward and drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point ofthe bayonet. [3]

Major White was the first to reach the guns, being closely followedby Sepoy Inderbir Lama, who, placing his rifle upon one of them, exclaimed, 'Captured in the name of the 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own)Gurkhas!'

Whilst the 1st Brigade was advancing towards the last position, ahalf-battalion of the 3rd Sikhs (belonging to the 2nd Brigade), underLieutenant-Colonel G. Money, charged a body of Afghans and capturedthree guns. 

The enemy were now absolutely routed, but, owing to the nature of theground, it was impossible for General Ross to realize how complete hadbeen his victory, and he fully expected that the enemy would take upa fresh position further on; he therefore ordered the 1st and 2ndBrigades to halt while they replenished their ammunition, and thenproceeded for about a mile, when they suddenly came in sight of AyubKhan's enormous camp. It was entirely deserted, and apparently stoodas it had been left in the morning when the Afghans moved out to theattack. With his camp was captured the whole of Ayub Khan's Artillery, thirty-two pieces, including our two Horse Artillery guns[4] which hadbeen taken at Maiwand on the 27th July. 

Further pursuit by the Infantry being valueless, the 1st and 2ndBrigades halted on the far side of Mazra, where I with the 3rd Brigadeshortly afterwards joined them. 

Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, having satisfied himself as to thesecurity of our left flank, scouted as far as Kohkeran, and thenproceeded with the Cavalry of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force toexecute the extended movement entrusted to him. He crossed theArghandab, and pushed round to get in front of the line of the enemy'sretreat towards Khakrez. Some _ghazis_ and Irregular Afghan troopswere overtaken, but no Regular regiments were met with, the soldiershaving, as is their custom, quickly divested themselves of theiruniform and assumed the garb of harmless agriculturists. 

Ayub Khan himself had fled early in the day with his principalSirdars. 

As I rode into the abandoned camp, I was horrified to hear that thebody of Maclaine, the Horse Artillery officer who had been takenprisoner at Maiwand, was lying with the throat cut about forty yardsfrom Ayub Khan's own tent. From what I could learn, the latter hadnot actually ordered the murder, but as a word from him would haveprevented it, he must be held responsible for the assassination of anofficer who had fallen into his hands as a prisoner of war. 

Our losses during the day comprised: killed, 3 British officers, [5]1 Native officer, and 36 men; wounded, 11 British officers, 4 Nativeofficers, and 195 men, 18 of whom succumbed to their wounds. It wasdifficult to estimate the loss of the enemy, but it must have beenheavy, as between Kandahar and the village of Pir Paimal alone 600bodies were buried by us. 

With the exception of the 1st Brigade, which remained at Mazra for thenight to protect the captured guns and stores, the troops all returnedto camp before 9 p. M. [6]

Utterly exhausted as I was from the hard day's work and the weakeningeffects of my late illness, the cheers with which I was greeted by thetroops as I rode into Ayub Khan's camp and viewed the dead bodies ofmy gallant soldiers nearly unmanned me, and it was with a very biglump in my throat that I managed to say a few words of thanks to eachcorps in turn. When I returned to Kandahar, and threw myself on thebed in the little room prepared for me, I was dead-beat and quiteunequal to the effort of reporting our success to the Queen or to theViceroy. After an hour's rest, however, knowing how anxiously newsfrom Kandahar was looked for both in England and India, I managedto pull myself together sufficiently to write out and despatch thefollowing telegram:

 'KANDAHAR, '_1st September, 1880_ (6 p. M. ). 

 'Ayub Khan's army was to-day defeated and completely dispersed with, I hope, comparatively slight loss on our side; his camp was captured, the two lost guns of E Battery, B Brigade Royal Horse Artillery were recovered, and several wheeled guns of various calibre fell to the splendid Infantry of this force; the Cavalry are still in pursuit. Our casualties are: 22nd Foot, Captain Straton, killed; 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow, Captain Frome, killed, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Monro, wounded, 7 men killed, 18 wounded; 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenants Menzies and Donald Stewart wounded, 11 men killed and 39 wounded; 2nd Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, and 2nd Sikhs, Major Slater wounded. It is at present impossible to ascertain the casualties amongst the Native troops, but I have no reason to believe they are excessive; full details will be telegraphed to-morrow. The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, were found on the arrival of the British troops in Ayub Khan's camp. Ayub Khan is supposed to have fled towards Herat. '

It can easily be imagined with what an intense sense of relief I awokeon the morning of the 2nd September--the march had ended, Kandahar hadbeen relieved, Ayub Khan's army had been beaten and dispersed, andthere was an adequate force in southern Afghanistan to prevent furtherdisturbances. 

Amongst the innumerable questions of detail which now confronted mewas the all-important one, and that which caused me greatest anxiety, of how the large body of troops hastily concentrated at Kandahar, andfor which the produce of the country was quite inadequate, were to befed. 

No supplies and very little forage were procurable between Quetta andKandahar, and in the neighbourhood of the latter place there was nowhardly anything in the shape of food for man or beast to be had forlove or money, the resources of this part of the country having beenquite exhausted. Relief could only be obtained by reducing the numberof mouths to be fed, and with this object I scattered the troops indifferent directions, to posts as far distant from each other aspossible, consistent with safety; and in accordance with my promise tothe Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, that they should not be required togarrison Kandahar when the fighting was at an end, I arranged todespatch without delay to India the corps which had come with me fromnorthern Afghanistan. 

[Illustration: SKETCH OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF KANDAHAR]

One column proceeded to Maiwand to inter the bodies of our soldierswho fell on the 27th July. The Cavalry brigade moved with a numberof sick men and transport animals to Kohkeran. Macgregor's brigadestarted for Quetta on the 8th, and was followed soon after by Baker'sand Macpherson's brigades. I accompanied Macgregor in the hope thatthe change to Quetta (where I remained about a month) would pick meup, and enable me to meet Lord Ripon's wish that I should retain thecommand in southern Afghanistan until some satisfactory settlementcould be arrived at. 

Before leaving Kandahar I issued an order thanking all ranks of theKabul-Kandahar Field Force for the work they had so nobly performed, and I had the gratification of acknowledging, on their behalf and myown, congratulatory messages from the Queen, the Duke of Cambridge, the Marquis of Ripon, and many others. On the way to Quetta I hadthe further gratification of being informed by the Viceroy that HerMajesty had been graciously pleased to make me a G. C. B. , and toappoint me Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army. 

I now heard that Abdur Rahman had been finally nominated Amir ofKabul on the 10th August, and that immediately after the ceremony ofinstallation Sir Donald Stewart had marched the whole British forceof 6, 678 men of all arms out of Kabul on their return to India. SirDonald left Peshawar to take up his appointment of Military Member ofCouncil at Simla on the 31st August, and by the 7th September the lastof his troops had arrived at the former place, except one brigade leftas a temporary measure in the Khyber Pass. 

At Quetta I stayed with Sir Robert Sandeman, the capable Resident, who by his great personal influence had done much to allay excitementamongst the tribes, and to prevent serious trouble in Baluchistanand along the border. I had never before been to that part of thefrontier, and I was greatly impressed by the hold Sandeman hadobtained over the country; he was intimately acquainted with everyleading man, and there was not a village, however out of the way, which he had not visited. 'Sinniman _sahib_, ' as the Natives calledhim, had gained the confidence of the lawless Baluchis in a veryremarkable manner, and it was mainly owing to his power over them thatI was able to arrange with camel contractors to transport to Quettaand Kandahar the huge stocks of winter clothing, medical comforts, grain, and the various requirements of an army in the field, whichhad been brought by rail to Sibi, and had there remained for want oftransport to take them further on. 

As the change to Quetta did not benefit me, and as I found that, owing to indifferent health, I was unable to carry on my duty withsatisfaction to myself, I applied to be relieved. My request wasacceded to, and I started on the 12th October for India. 

Riding through the Bolan Pass I overtook most of the regiments of theKabul-Kandahar Field Force marching towards Sibi, thence to disperseto their respective destinations. As I parted with each corps in turnits band played 'Auld Lang Syne, ' and I have never since heard thatmemory-stirring air without its bringing before my mind's eye the lastview I had of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force. I fancy myself crossingand re-crossing the river which winds through the pass; I hear themartial beat of drums and plaintive music of the pipes; and I seeRiflemen and Gurkhas, Highlanders and Sikhs, guns and horses, camelsand mules, with the endless following of an Indian army, windingthrough the narrow gorges, or over the interminable boulders whichmade the passage of the Bolan so difficult and wearisome to man andbeast. 

I shall never forget the feeling of sadness with which I said good-byeto the men who had done so much for me. I looked upon them all, Nativeas well as British, as my valued friends. And well I might, for neverhad a Commander been better served. From first to last a grand spiritof _camaraderie_[7] pervaded all ranks. At the Peiwar Kotal, atCharasia, and during the fighting round Kabul, all were eager to closewith the enemy, no matter how great the odds against them. Throughoutthe march from Kabul all seemed to be animated with but one desire, toeffect, cost what it might in personal risk, fatigue, or discomfort, the speedy release of their beleaguered fellow-soldiers in Kandahar;and the unflagging energy and perseverance of my splendid troopsseemed to reach their full height, when they realized they were aboutto put forth their strength against a hitherto successful enemy. Theirexemplary conduct, too, under circumstances often of the mosttrying nature, cannot be praised in terms too strong or too full. Notwithstanding the provocation caused by the cruel murder of anystragglers who fell into the hands of the Afghans, not one actinfringing the rules of civilized warfare was committed by my troops. The persons and property of the Natives were respected, and fullcompensation for supplies was everywhere given. In short, theinhabitants of the district through which we passed could not havebeen treated with greater consideration nor with a lighter hand, hadthey proved themselves friendly allies, and the conduct of the troopswill ever be to me as pleasing a memory as are the results which theyachieved. 

[Footnote 1: Brownlow's death was a great loss, for throughout thewar he had frequently distinguished himself as a leader--at the PeiwarKotal, during the operations round Kabul, and notably on the 14thDecember, when he won the admiration of the whole force by hisbrilliant conduct in the attack on the Asmai heights. ]

[Footnote 2: The following Native officers, British and Nativenon-commissioned officers, and Native soldiers were brought forward ashaving been very conspicuous during this part of the fight:

 Colour-Sergeant G. Jacobs 72nd Highlanders. Colour-Sergeant R. Lauder " " Lance-Corporal J. Gordon " " Subadar-Major Gurbaj Sing 2nd Sikhs. Jemadar Alla Sing " " Naick Dir Sing " " Sepoy Hakim " " Sepoy Taj Sing " " Sepoy Pertap Sing " " Sepoy Bir Sing " "]

[Footnote 3: During this engagement the following officers and menwere specially remarked for their gallantry:

 Major G. White 92nd Highlanders. Lieutenant C. Douglas " " Corporal William McGillvray " " Private Peter Grieve " " Private D. Grey " " Major Sullivan Becher 2nd Gurkhas. Havildar Gopal Borah " " Sepoy Inderbir Lama " " Sepoy Tikaram Kwas " "]

[Footnote 4: These guns were presented to me by the Indian Government, and are now at the Royal Hospital Dublin. ]

[Footnote 5: The third British officer killed was Captain Straton, 22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling, a most accomplishedofficer, under whose direction signalling as applied to FieldService reached a wonderful pitch of perfection. His energy knew nodifficulties, and his enthusiasm was beyond praise. ]

[Footnote 6: The ammunition expended by the Kabul-Kandahar Field Forceon the 31st August and 1st September was:

 _Rounds_. 

 Gun 102 /Shrapnel shell 78 \Common " 24 Rifle 57, 705 /Martini-Henry 15, 129 \Snider 42, 576

and in addition 313 rounds were fired by the Artillery, and 4, 971rounds by the Infantry of the Kandahar Garrison. ]

[Footnote 7: The 72nd Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas were brigadedtogether throughout the campaign, and at their return to India thelatter regiment presented the former with a shield bearing thefollowing inscription:

 FROM THE

 MEN OF THE 5TH GURKHAS

 TO THE

 MEN OF THE 72ND (DUKE OF ALBANY'S OWN) HIGHLANDERS, IN REMEMBRANCE OF

 THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN, 1878 TO 1880. 

The gift was entirely spontaneous, and was subscribed for by theNative officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. 

In return, the non-commissioned officers and men of the 72nd gave the5th Gurkhas a very handsome ebony, silver-mounted Drum-Major's staff. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXIII. 1880-1884

 Reception in England--A fruitless journey--Andaman Isles and Burma --The Madras Army--Measures for improving the Madras Army --Memories of Madras--An allegory

On the 15th October I handed over my command to Major-General Phayre, and started for England, making, by the desire of the Viceroy, adiversion to Simla, where Lord Ripon received me most kindly, and, to my great pride and pleasure, delivered to me a letter from theQueen-Empress, written by Her Majesty's own hand, which conveyed inthe most gracious terms the Queen's satisfaction at the manner inwhich the service entrusted to me had been performed, thanks to 'thebrave officers and men under my command, ' sorrow 'for those of hergallant soldiers who fell for Queen and country, ' and anxiety for thewounded. Her Majesty also wrote of 'the thrill of horror' with whichthe news of the fate of Lieutenant Maclaine had been received, andconcluded with words of hope that my own health and that of thetroops would remain good, and that success might attend us 'till theblessings of peace are restored. '

A gracious letter, truly! And to me a deeply appreciated reward forwhat I had been able to do. 

I landed at Dover on the 17th November. The reception I met with frommy countrymen was as enthusiastic as it was unexpected and gratifying. After an absence of twelve years there must almost always be more orless of sadness mingled with the pleasure of the home-coming, and twovacant places in my family circle--those of my father and sister--casta deep shadow upon what would otherwise have been a most joyousreturn, for my mother was alive to welcome me, and I found my childrenflourishing and my wife well, notwithstanding all the anxiety she hadundergone. 

I was fêted and feasted to almost an alarming extent, considering thatfor nearly two years I had been restricted to campaigning diet; but itsurprised me very much to find that the kind people, by whom I was sogreatly honoured, invariably appeared to think the march from Kabul toKandahar was a much greater performance than the advance on Kabul theprevious autumn, while, to my mind, the latter operation was in everyparticular more difficult, more dangerous, and placed upon me as theCommander infinitely more responsibility. The force with which Istarted from Kuram to avenge the massacre of our fellow-countrymen waslittle more than half the strength of that with which I marched toKandahar. Immediately on crossing the Shutargardan I found myself inthe midst of a hostile and warlike people, entirely dependent on thecountry for supplies, heavily handicapped by want of transport, andpractically as completely cut off from communication with India asI was a year later on the march to Kandahar. The Afghans' fanaticalhatred of Europeans had been augmented by their defeats the yearbefore, and by the occurrences at Kabul, and they looked upon my smallcolumn as a certain prey delivered into their hands by a sympathizingand all-powerful Allah. 

Before me was Kabul, with its large and well-equipped arsenal, defended by an army better organized and more highly trained than thatpossessed by any former Ruler of Afghanistan. On all sides of me weretribesmen hurrying up to defend the approaches to their capital, andhad there been on our part the smallest hesitation or delay, we shouldhave found ourselves opposed by as formidable a combination as we hadto deal with two months later at Sherpur. Nothing could then havesaved the force, not one man of which I firmly believe would have everreturned to tell the tale in India. Worse than all, I had in my owncamp a traitor, in the form of the Amir, posing as a friend to theBritish Government and a refugee seeking our protection, while he wasat heart our bitterest enemy, and was doing everything in his power tomake my task more difficult and ensure our defeat. 

The march to Kandahar was certainly much longer, the country wasequally unfriendly, and the feeding of so large a number of men andanimals was a continual source of anxiety. But I had a force capableof holding its own against any Afghan army that could possibly beopposed to it, and good and sufficient transport to admit of itsbeing kept together, with the definite object in view of rescuing ourbesieged countrymen and defeating Ayub Khan; instead of, as at Kabul, having to begin to unravel a difficult political problem afteraccomplishing the defeat of the tribesmen and the Afghan army. 

I could only account to myself for the greater amount of interestdisplayed in the march to Kandahar, and the larger amount of creditgiven to me for that undertaking, by the glamour of romance thrownaround an army of 10, 000 men lost to view, as it were, for nearly amonth, about the fate of which uninformed speculation was rife andpessimistic rumours were spread, until the tension became extreme, and the corresponding relief proportionably great when that armyreappeared to dispose at once of Ayub and his hitherto victorioustroops. 

I did not return to India until the end of 1881, six weeks out ofthese precious months of leave having been spent in a wild-goose chaseto the Cape of Good Hope and back, upon my being nominated by Mr. Gladstone's Government Governor of Natal and Commander of the Forcesin South Africa, on the death of Sir George Colley and the receipt ofthe news of the disaster at Majuba Hill. While I was on my way outto take up my command, peace was made with the Boers in the mostmarvellously rapid and unexpected manner, A peace, alas! 'withouthonour, ' to which may be attributed the recent regrettable state ofaffairs in the Transvaal--a state of affairs which was foreseen andpredicted by many at the time. My stay at Cape Town was limited totwenty-four hours, the Government being apparently as anxious to getme away from Africa as they had been to hurry me out there. 

In August I spent three very enjoyable and instructive weeks as theguest of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Germany, while themanoeuvres at Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein were taking place. 

Shortly before leaving England for Madras, I was asked by Mr. Childers, the then Secretary of State for War, whether I would acceptthe appointment of Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards, insuccession to Sir Garnet Wolseley. The offer, in some ways, wasrather a temptation to me, for I had a great wish to take part in theadministration of our army; and had it been made sooner, before myarrangements for going to Madras had been completed, I think I shouldhave accepted it at once; as it was, I begged to be allowed to join mynew command, and leave the question of the Quartermaster-Generalshipin abeyance until it was about to become vacant. This was agreed to, and I started for Madras, taking my wife and two little daughters withme, the boy being left at school in England. 

On arriving in Madras, on the 27th November, I had the pleasureto find myself associated as a colleague in Council with Mr. Grant-Duff, [1] who had recently been appointed Governor of thePresidency. We spent a few pleasant days with him and Mrs. Grant-Duffat Government House, before proceeding to deposit our children atOotacamund, that Queen of Indian Hill-stations, which was to be ourhome for four years. We spent Christmas there, and then went to Burma, visiting the Andaman Islands on the way. We had on board our ship someprisoners destined for that convict settlement, amongst whom choleraunfortunately broke out a few hours after we left Madras. They wereaccommodated just outside my wife's cabin, and their cries and groanswere most distressing. Very little could be done for them on board, for the Native Doctor accompanying us possessed no remedy but castoroil! and as the disease was spreading rapidly, I took upon myself tohave the party landed at Vizagapatam. 

The cholera patients were put into tents on the sea-shore, under thecharge of a medical officer, and every arrangement possible for theircomfort and relief was made before we proceeded on our journey. 

During our stay at Port Blair, the Head-Quarters of the AndamanAdministration, we were the guests of the hospitable Superintendent, Lieutenant-Colonel Protheroe, who had been one of the politicalofficers on my staff in Afghanistan. The group of islands forming thesettlement are extremely beautiful, but it is tropical beauty, and onepays the penalty for the luxuriant vegetation in the climate, which isvery much like a Turkish bath, hot and damp. While going through theprisons, I came across some of the sepoys of the 29th Punjab Infantrywho deserted during the advance on the Peiwar Kotal. I was told thatthey were behaving well, and might in time be allowed some remissionof their sentences. 

A voyage of thirty-six hours brought us to Rangoon, where we had thepleasure of meeting and being entertained by our old friends, Mr. Bernard, [2] the Chief Commissioner of Burma, and his wife. 

In 1882 Thyetmyo and Tonghu were the two frontier stations of Burma, and I had been asked to consider the question of the defence of theproposed railway termini at these places. I accordingly visited themboth, and as I thought I foresaw that the lines of railway could notend as then contemplated, I recommended that the absolutely necessaryworks only should be attempted, and that these should be asinexpensive as possible. Ere many years had passed, the line, as Ianticipated, was completed to Mandalay. 

The defences of Rangoon had also to be arranged for. An examinationof the approaches, however, satisfied me that no elaborate system offortification was necessary, and that Rangoon's best security lay inher winding, dangerous river; so I gave it as my opinion that, withtwo small batteries at Monkey Point and King's Point, and a couple oftorpedo-boats, Rangoon would be reasonably safe against attack. 

Before leaving Burma I received letters from H. R. H. The Duke ofCambridge and Mr. Childers, in which were repeated the offer of theQuartermaster-Generalship at the Horse Guards. But I had by thistime begun to like my new work, and had no desire to leave Madras; Itherefore definitely declined the appointment. 

From Burma we returned to Ootacamund, viâ Calcutta, where we spent afew days with Lord and Lady Ripon and Sir Donald and Lady Stewart. 

Life at 'Ooty' was very pleasant; such peace and repose I had neverbefore experienced; I thoroughly enjoyed the rest after the turmoil ofthe preceding years, and I quite recovered my health, which had beensomewhat shattered. Unlike other hill-stations, Ootacamund rests on anundulating tableland, 7, 400 feet above the sea, with plenty of room inthe neighbourhood for riding, driving, and hunting; and, althoughthe scenery is nothing like as grand as in the Himalayas, there areexquisite views to be had, and it is more restful and homelike. Wemade many warm friends and agreeable acquaintances, who when our timein Madras came to an end presented my wife with a very beautifulclock 'as a token of esteem and affection'; we were very sorry to bidfarewell to our friends and to our Nilgiri home. 

Each cold season I made long tours in order to acquaint myself withthe needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hardto discover in them those fighting qualities which had distinguishedtheir forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning ofthe present century. But long years of peace, and the security andprosperity attending it, had evidently had upon them, as they alwaysseem to have on Asiatics, a softening and deteriorating effect; and Iwas forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had diedin them, as it had died in the ordinary Hindustani of Bengal and theMahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safety bepitted against warlike races, or employed outside the limits ofsouthern India. 

It was with extreme reluctance that I formed this opinion with regardto the successors of the old Coast Army, for which I had alwaysentertained a great admiration. For the sake of the British officersbelonging to the Madras Army, too, I was very loath to be convinced ofits inferiority, for many of them were devoted to their regiments, andwere justly proud of their traditions. 

However, there was the army, and it was my business as itsCommander-in-Chief to do all that I possibly could towards renderingit an efficient part of the war establishment of India. 

Madrassies, as a rule, are more intelligent and better educated thanthe fighting races of northern India, and I therefore thought it couldnot be difficult to teach them the value of musketry, and make themexcel in it. To this end, I encouraged rifle meetings and endeavouredto get General Officers to take an interest in musketry inspections, and to make those inspections instructive and entertaining to the men. I took to rifle-shooting myself, as did the officers on my personalstaff, [3] who were all good shots, and our team held its own in manyexciting matches at the different rifle meetings. 

At that time the importance of musketry training was not so generallyrecognized as it is now, especially by the senior officers, who hadall entered the service in the days of 'Brown Bess. ' Some of them hadfailed to note the remarkable alteration which the change fromthe musket to the rifle necessitated in the system of musketryinstruction, or to study the very different conditions under whichwe could hope to win battles in the present day, compared with thoseunder which some of our most celebrated victories had been won. Itrequired time and patience to inspire officers with a belief in thewonderful shooting power of the Martini-Henry rifle, and it was evenmore difficult to make them realize that the better the weapon, thegreater the necessity for its being intelligently used. 

I had great faith in the value of Camps of Exercise, andnotwithstanding the difficulty of obtaining an annual grant to defraytheir cost, I managed each year, by taking advantage of the movementof troops in course of relief, to form small camps at the moreimportant stations, and on one occasion was able to collect 9, 000men together in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, where theCommanders-in-Chief in India and of Bombay (Sir Donald Stewart and theHon. Arthur Hardinge) were present--the first and last time thatthe 'three Chiefs' in India met together at a Camp of Exercise. TheSappers and Miners were a brilliant exception to the rest of theMadras Army, being indeed a most useful, efficient body of men, butas no increase to that branch was considered necessary, I obtainedpermission to convert two Infantry regiments into Pioneers on themodel of the Pioneer Corps of the Bengal Army, which had alwaysproved themselves so useful on service. Promotion amongst the Britishofficers was accelerated, recruits were not allowed to marry, or, ifmarried, to have their wives with them, and many other minor changeswere made which did much towards improving the efficiency of theNative portion of the Madras Army; and I hope I was able to increasethe comfort and well-being of the British portion also by relaxingirksome and useless restrictions, and by impressing upon commandingofficers the advisability of not punishing young soldiers with theextreme severity which had hitherto been considered necessary. 

I had been unpleasantly struck by the frequent Courts-Martial on theyounger soldiers, and by the disproportionate number of these lads tobe met with in the military prisons. Even when the prisoners happenedto be of some length of service, I usually found that they hadundergone previous imprisonments, and had been severely punishedwithin a short time of their enlistment. I urged that, in the firsttwo or three years of a soldier's service, every allowance should bemade for youth and inexperience, and that during that time faultsshould, whenever practicable, be dealt with summarily, and not visitedwith the heavier punishment which a Court-Martial sentence necessarilycarries with it, and I pointed out that this procedure might receive awider application, and become a guiding principle in the treatmentof soldiers generally. I suggested that all men in possession of agood-conduct badge, or who had had no entry in their company defaultersheets for one year, should be granted certain privileges, such asreceiving the fullest indulgence in the grant of passes, consistentwith the requirements of health, duty, and discipline, and beingexcused attendance at all roll-calls (including meals), except perhapsat tattoo. I had often remarked that those corps in which indulgenceswere most freely given contained the largest number of well-behavedmen, and I had been assured that such indulgences were seldom abused, and that, while they were greatly appreciated by those who receivedthem, they acted as an incentive to less well conducted men to try andredeem their characters. 

[Illustration: THE THREE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF IN INDIA. GENERAL SIR FREDERICK SLEIGH ROBERTS. GENERAL SIR ARTHUR E. HARDINGE. GENERAL SIR DONALD MARTIN STEWART. ]

The reports of commanding officers, on the results of these smallameliorations, after a six months' trial, were so favourable that Iwas able to authorize still further concessions as a premium on goodbehaviour. 

The Madras Presidency abounds in places of interest connected with ourearlier struggles in India, and it was possible to combine pleasurewith duty in a very delightful manner while travelling about thecountry. My wife frequently accompanied me in my tours, and enjoyed asmuch as I did our visits to many famous and beautiful places. Madrasitself recalled the struggles for supremacy between the English andFrench in the middle of the eighteenth century. Arcot reminded onethat it was in the brilliant capture and still more brilliant defenceof the fort at that place that Clive's soldierly genius first becameconspicuous. Trichinopoly and Wandewash made one think of StringerLawrence's and Eyre Coote's splendid services, and while standing onthe breach at Seringapatam, one was reminded of Wellington's earlylife in India, and marvelled how heavily-armed men could have venturedto cross the single plank which alone spanned the deep, broad ditch ofthe inner defences. 

I should like to dwell on the architectural wonders of Tanjore andthe Caves of Ellora; the magnificent entertainments and Princelyhospitality accorded to us by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the lateMaharajas of Mysore and Travancore, the Maharaja of Vizianagram, theRaja of Cochin, and many other Rulers of Native States; the delightsof a trip along the west coast by the beautiful 'back-water, ' and thereturn journey through the glorious forests of Cannara and Mysore;the pleasure of visiting the lovely 'White Lady'[4] and the wonderfulKaveri falls; but to give my readers any idea of their marvels wouldbe to put too great a strain upon their patience, which I fear hasalready been severely taxed. 

The late Maharaja of Travancore was an unusually enlightened Native. He spoke and wrote English fluently; his appearance was distinguished, and his manners those of a well-bred, courteous English gentleman ofthe old school. His speech on proposing the Queen's health was a modelof fine feeling and fine expression, and yet this man was steepedin superstition. His Highness sat, slightly retired from the table, between my wife and myself while dinner was going on; he partook ofno food or wine, but his close contact with us (he led my wife in todinner and took her out on his arm) necessitated his undergoing asevere course of purification at the hands of the Brahmins as soonas the entertainment was over; he dared not do anything without thesanction of the priests, and he spent enormous sums in propitiatingthem. 

Notwithstanding the high civilization, luxury, and refinement tobe found in these Native States, my visits to them strengthened myopinion that, however capable and enlightened the Ruler, he could haveno chance of holding his country if deprived of the guiding hand ofthe British Government as embodied in the Resident. It is just thatcontrol, so light in ordinary times as to be hardly perceptible, butfirm enough when occasion demands, which saves the State from beingrent by factions and internal intrigue, or swallowed up by a morepowerful neighbour, for, owing to the influence of the Brahmins andthe practical seclusion which caste prejudices entail, involvingignorance of what is taking place immediately outside their ownpalaces, the Native Princes of the less warlike peoples would haveno chance amidst the anarchy and confusion that would follow thewithdrawal of British influence. 

A remark made to me by the late Sir Madhava Rao, ex-Minister of theBaroda State, which exemplifies my meaning, comes back to me at thismoment. Sir Madhava was one of the most astute Hindu gentlemen inIndia, and when discussing with him the excitement produced by the'Ilbert Bill, ' he said: 'Why do you English raise these unnecessaryquestions? It is your doing, not ours. We have heard of the cry, "India for the Indians, " which some of your philanthropists haveraised in England; but you have only to go to the Zoological Gardensand open the doors of the cages, and you will very soon see what wouldbe the result of putting that theory into practice. There would bea terrific fight amongst the animals, which would end in the tigerwalking proudly over the dead bodies of the rest. ' 'Whom, ' I inquired, 'do you consider to be the tiger?' 'The Mahomedan from the North, ' washis reply. 

[Illustration: THE MARQUIS OF DUFFERIN, K. P. , G. C. B. , G. C. M. G. , G. M. S. I. , G. M. I. E. , VICEROY OF INDIA. 

_From, an engraving by the Fine Art Society of a portrait by the lateFrank Holl, R. A. _]

[Footnote 1: Now Sir Mount-Stuart Grant-Duff, G. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 2: Now Sir Charles Bernard, K. C. S. I. ]

[Footnote 3: Lieutenant-Colonel G. T. Pretyman, R. A. , wasAssistant Military Secretary until 1884, when he was succeeded byLieutenant-Colonel R. Pole-Carew, Coldstream Guards. LieutenantNeville Chamberlain, Central India Horse, and Captain Ian Hamilton, the Gordon Highlanders, were Aides-de-camp. ]

[Footnote 4: The finest of the Gassapa falls. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXIV. 1885

 Disturbing action of Russia--Abdur Rahman Khan--The Rawal Pindi Durbar --Unmistakable loyalty of the Natives

In March, 1885, we again visited Calcutta. The Marquis of Ripon haddeparted, and the Earl of Dufferin reigned in his stead. 

Affairs on our north-west and south-east frontiers were at this timein a very unsettled state. Indeed, the political outlook altogetherhad assumed rather a gloomy aspect. Our relations with the French hadbecome somewhat strained in consequence of their interference withUpper Burma and our occupation of Egypt; while Russia's activity inthe valley of the Oxus necessitated our looking after our interests inAfghanistan. These considerations rendered it advisable to increasethe army in India by 11, 000 British and 12, 000 Native troops, bringingthe strength of the former up to nearly 70, 000, with 414 guns, andthat of the latter to 128, 636. 

Russia's movements could not be regarded with indifference, for, whilewe had retreated from our dominating position at Kandahar, she hadapproached considerably nearer to Afghanistan, and in a directioninfinitely more advantageous than before for a further onward move. Up to 1881 a Russian army advancing on Afghanistan would have had tosolve the difficult problem of the formidable Hindu Kush barrier, orif it took the Herat line it must have faced the deserts of Khiva andBokhara. But all this was changed by Skobeloff's victories over theTekke Turkomans, which gave Merv and Sarakhs to Russia, and enabledher to transfer her base from Orenburg to the Caspian--by far the mostimportant step ever made by Russia in her advance towards India. Ihad some years before pointed out to the Government of India howimmeasurably Russia would gain, if by the conquest of Merv--a conquestwhich I then looked upon as certain to be accomplished in the nearfuture--she should be able to make this transfer. My words wereunheeded or ridiculed at the time, and I, like others who thought asI did, was supposed to be suffering from a disease diagnosed by adistinguished politician as 'Mervousness. ' But a little later thosewords were verified. Merv had become a Russian possession, andTurkestan was in direct communication by rail and steamer with St. Petersburg. And can it be denied that this fact, which would haveenabled the army in the Caucasus to be rapidly transported to thescene of operations, made it possible for General Komaroff practicallyto dictate terms to the Boundary Commission which was sent to definethe northern limits of Afghanistan, and to forcibly eject an Afghangarrison from Panjdeh under the eyes of British officers?

Lord Dufferin took up the reins of the Government of India at a timewhen things had come to such a pass that a personal conference withthe Amir was considered necessary to arrange for the defence anddemarcation of His Highness's frontier, the strengthening of Herat, the extension of the Sakkur-Sibi railway to Quetta, and thediscussion of the general situation. Abdur Rahman was thereforeinvited to meet the Viceroy at Rawal Pindi, where a large standingcamp was prepared, and my wife and I were bidden amongst a numerouscompany, including Their Royal Highnesses the Duke and Duchessof Connaught, the Ruling Punjab Chiefs, and the high officers ofGovernment from various parts of India, to be the guests of HisExcellency and Lady Dufferin on the interesting occasion. 

The meeting was fixed for the end of March, and as there was scarcelytime for us to return to Madras and get back again before then, weproceeded leisurely up country, visiting different places and one ortwo old friends on the way. 

At Multan I received a cipher telegram from Sir Donald Stewartinforming me that it had been decided to mobilize two Army Corps, andthat I was to have command of the first. This was exciting news, andwe lost no time in making our way to Rawal Pindi, where we should bein direct communication with Head-Quarters, and hoped to hear what hadtaken place since we left Calcutta to make it necessary to prepare forwar. 

I soon found out that this action on the part of the Government wasforced on them by the representatives of Russia on the BoundaryCommission, who were persistent in their attempts to encroach onAfghan territory, in order that they might be in a position to controlthe approaches to Herat, a Russian occupation of which fortress wecould not permit. 

Abdur Rahman arrived at Rawal Pindi on the last day of March; he wasabout forty-five years of age, and although he required a stickto walk with, being a martyr to rheumatism, and very stout, hisappearance was decidedly dignified and imposing. He had a manly, clever, and rather handsome face, marred only by the cruel expressionof the mouth, and his manner was sufficiently courteous thoughsomewhat abrupt. 

Several semi-private meetings took place between the Viceroy andthe Amir, at the first of which His Highness, after expressing hisappreciation of the flattering and cordial reception he had met with, reminded Lord Dufferin that he had consistently warned the BritishGovernment of the approach of the Russians towards Afghanistan and ofthe unsettling effect their advance was producing on the minds ofhis countrymen; and he advocated the necessity for timely action. Noattention, he said, had been paid to his warnings, owing, probably, tothe strife of parties in England, and to the excessive caution of theBritish Government. 

Lord Dufferin, in reply, pointed out that the Amir had been advisedto strengthen northern Afghanistan, and that the services of Engineerofficers had been offered to him for the purpose of putting Herat intoa satisfactory state of defence. His Excellency declared that Englandwas resolved that a Russian advance on Herat should be met by adeclaration of war; that preparations were then being made to giveeffect to that resolve; and that it was now absolutely necessary forHis Highness to make up his mind which of his two powerful neighbourshe would elect to choose as his ally. 

[Illustration: HIS HIGHNESS ABDUR RAHMAN, AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN. ]

Abdur Rahman thanked the Viceroy for his offer of help, but showedplainly that he had no intention of availing himself of the servicesof our Engineers. He vowed that his own personal wishes were entirelyin favour of a close and practical alliance with the British, but thathis subjects did not share his feelings towards us. They were 'rude, uneducated, and suspicious. ' He hoped that in time they might becomemore disposed to be friendly, but at present he could not pretendto rely upon them. He then disclosed the real reason for his readyresponse to the Viceroy's invitation by saying that he wouldgratefully receive the assistance of the British Government in theshape of money, arms, and munitions of war. 

At a later visit the conversation turned upon the difficulty of theposition in which the British members of the Boundary Commission wereplaced, and the impossibility of the Afghan posts being able to holdtheir own in the face of a Russian advance was explained to the Amir. A map was produced, on which the country to the north of Herat wascarefully examined, and Russia's claims were made known to him. AbdurRahman's ideas of topography were not very accurate, but he displayedconsiderable intelligence in his questions and perception of themeaning of the answers, and eventually expressed his willingness toleave the question of the delimitation of his northern frontier in thehands of the British Government. 

On the 6th April there was a parade of the troops, 17, 000 in number, and that evening the Amir was present at a state banquet, at which, after the usual loyal toasts, the Viceroy proposed the Amir's health. His Highness, in reply, expressed a fervent hope that the prosperityof the British Empire might long endure, as with it the welfare ofAfghanistan was bound up. He had watched, he said, the progress ofIndia under British rule, and he hoped that Afghanistan might flourishin like manner; and he ended with a prayer that the Almighty wouldpreserve Her Majesty's troops in safety, honour, and efficiency. 

Two days later the Amir was publicly received in durbar by theViceroy, on whose right hand he was placed, while the Duke ofConnaught occupied the seat on his left. After a few words had beenexchanged, Abdur Rahman rose, and spoke as follows: 'I am deeplysensible of the kindness which I have received from His Excellency theViceroy, and of the favour shown me by Her Majesty the Queen-Empress. In return for this kindness and favour, I am ready with my army andpeople to render any services that may be required of me or of theAfghan nation. As the British Government has declared that it willassist me in repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and properthat Afghanistan should unite in the firmest manner, and side by sideby the British Government. '

On being presented, amongst other gifts, with a sword of honour, hesaid in a loud and determined voice: 'With this sword I hope to smiteany enemy of the British Government. '

That same evening the Viceroy received news of the Russian attackon Panjdeh, and communicated it to the Amir, who heard it withextraordinary equanimity, not appearing to attach any great importanceto the matter, and attributing the defeat of his troops to theinferiority of their weapons. He observed that the excuse given by theRussians, that the Afghans intended to attack them, was a frivolouspretext, and declared all that his men had done was very properly tomake preparations to defend themselves. 

Abdur Rahman had expressed a desire for a British decoration, soshortly before his departure from India he was invested, informally, with the G. C. S. I. As the train was moving off, he said to the Britishofficers assembled on the platform: 'I wish you all farewell, andcommend you to the care of God. May your Government endure and yourhonour increase. I have been greatly pleased and gratified by thesight of the British Army. I hope and am certain that the friendshipnow existing between us will last for ever. '

Abdur Rahman had, indeed, every reason to be satisfied with the resultof his visit, for not only was Lord Ripon's promise that Englandwould defend his kingdom against foreign aggression ratified by LordDufferin, but the Amir was given, in addition to the large sums ofmoney and the considerable amount of munitions of war already receivedby him, ten lakhs of rupees, 20, 000 breech-loading rifles, a Heavybattery of four guns and two howitzers, a Mountain battery, and aliberal supply of ammunition for both guns and rifles. 

On the Amir's departure the great camp was broken up, and the troopsreturned to their respective stations, all prepared to move towardsthe Quetta frontier at a moment's notice. The Native Chiefs, in takingtheir leave of the Viceroy, were profuse in their offers and promisesof help should a recourse to arms be found necessary; and Lord andLady Dufferin's numerous guests, who, like my wife and myself, had formore than a fortnight been recipients of the most profuse hospitality, wished their generous host and hostess a hearty good-bye. 

Interesting as the whole proceeding had been, by far the mostgratifying result of the gathering was the unmistakable loyaltydisplayed by the Native Rulers who were present, as well as by thosein distant parts of India, on hearing of the unprovoked attack madeby the Russians on the Afghan troops at Panjdeh, and our consequentpreparations for war. The greatest enthusiasm prevailed, and thevarious military camps at Rawal Pindi were crowded with men desirousof joining the ranks of our army. I was literally besieged by oldsoldiers, begging that they might be allowed to return to the coloursand fight once more for the _Sirkar_; and one Native officer, whohad been with me in Afghanistan, came to me and said: 'I am afraid, _sahib_, I am too old and infirm to do more work myself; but youmust take my two sons with you--they are ready to die for the_Angrese_. '[1]

[Illustration: MAP OF CENTRAL ASIA (THE RUSSIAN FRONTIERS). ]

We hastened back to Madras, and reached Ootacamund after sevenconsecutive nights in the train, with a thermometer at 104° in thedaytime, the only pause in our journey being at Poona, where we spenta few hours with our friend General Sir John Ross. 

I left my horses at Lahore, and for some weeks lived in dailyexpectation of being ordered back to the Punjab to take command of the1st Army Corps. A change of Government, however, took place justin time to prevent the war. Lord Salisbury's determined attitudeconvinced Russia that no further encroachments on the Afghan frontierwould be permitted; she ceased the 'game of brag' she had been allowedto play, and the Boundary Commission were enabled to proceed with thework of delimitation. 

[Footnote 1: A Native corruption of the word 'English. ']

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXV. 1885-1886

 The Burma expedition--The Camp of Exercise at Delhi --Defence of the North-West Frontier--Quetta and Peshawar --Communications _versus_ fortifications--Sir George Chesney

We only remained three months at 'Ooty, ' for on the 8th July atelegram arrived from Lord Dufferin announcing the Queen's approval ofmy being appointed to succeed Sir Donald Stewart as Commander-in-Chiefin India, and granting me leave to visit England before taking up theappointment. 

At the end of a fortnight all our preparations for departure had beenmade, and on the 18th August we left Bombay, in the teeth of themonsoon. 

Our boy, whose holidays had just commenced, met us at Venice, and weloitered in Italy and Switzerland on our way home. I spent but sixweeks in England, returning to the East at the end of November, tojoin my new command. I met Lord Dufferin at Agra, and accompanied himto Gwalior, whither his Excellency went for the purpose of formallyrestoring to the Maharaja Sindhia the much coveted fortress ofGwalior, which had been occupied by us since 1858--an act of soundpolicy, enabling us to withdraw a brigade which could be far moreusefully employed elsewhere. 

At Gwalior we received the news of the capture of Mandalay, and I senta telegram to Lieutenant-General Prendergast, [1] to congratulate himon the successful conduct of the Burma Expedition. 

Affairs in Burma had been going from bad to worse from the time KingThebaw came to the throne in 1878. Wholesale murders were of constantoccurrence within the precincts of the palace; dacoity was rifethroughout the country, and British officers were insulted to suchan extent that the Resident had to be withdrawn. In 1883 a specialMission was sent by the King of Burma to Paris, with a view to makingsuch a treaty with the French Government as would enable him to appealto France for assistance, in the event of his being involved indifficulties with England. The Mission remained eighteen months inParis, and succeeded in ratifying what the French called a 'CommercialConvention, ' under the terms of which a French Consul was located atMandalay, who soon gained sufficient ascendancy over King Thebawto enable him to arrange for the construction of a railway betweenMandalay and Tonghu, and the establishment of a French bank atMandalay, by means of which France would speedily have gained fullcontrol over the principal sources of Burmese revenue, and power toexclude British trade from the valley of the Irrawaddy. In furtheranceof these designs, the King picked a quarrel with a British tradingcompany, threatened to cancel their leases for cutting timber, anddemanded a fine of ten lakhs of rupees. 

The Chief Commissioner proposed arbitration, but this was declined, and the King refusing to modify his action with regard to the tradingcompany, the Viceroy proposed to the Secretary of State for India thatan ultimatum[2] should be sent to King Thebaw. 

In approving of the ultimatum, Lord Randolph Churchill expressed hisopinion that its despatch should be concurrent with the movement oftroops and ships to Rangoon, that an answer should be demandedwithin a specified time, and that if the ultimatum were rejected, animmediate advance on Mandalay should be made. 

A force[3] of nearly 10, 000 men and 77 guns, under the command ofLieutenant-General Prendergast, was accordingly ordered to be inreadiness at Thyetmyo by the 14th November, and as the reply of theBurmese Government was tantamount to a refusal, Prendergast wasinstructed to advance on Mandalay, with the result which it wasmy pleasant duty to congratulate him upon in my capacity ofCommander-in-Chief of the Army in India. 

From Gwalior I went to Delhi to prepare for a Camp of Exercise on amuch larger scale than had ever before been held. Many weak pointsin the Commissariat and Transport Department having become only tooapparent when the mobilization of the two Army Corps had been imminentthe previous spring, it was considered necessary to test our readinessfor war, and orders for the strength and composition of the force tobe manoeuvred had been issued before Sir Donald Stewart left India. 

The troops were divided into two Army Corps. The northern assembled atUmballa, and the southern at Gurgaon, 25 miles from Delhi, the pointsof concentration being 150 miles apart. 

After a fortnight passed in brigade and divisional movements, theopposing forces advanced, and on the 7th January they came intocontact on the historic battlefield of Panipat. [4]

Lord Dufferin, whose interest in the efficiency of the army inducedhim to come all the way from Calcutta to witness the last two days'manoeuvres, was present--with the twelve 'foreign officers'[5] fromthe principal armies of Europe and America, who had been invited toattend the camp--at a march-past of the whole force of 35, 000 men onthe 18th. It was a fine sight, though marred by a heavy thunderstormand a perfect deluge of rain, and was really a greater test of whatthe troops could do than if we had had the perfect weather we hadhoped for. The 'foreign officers' were, apparently, somewhat surprisedat the fine physique and efficiency of our Native soldiers, but theyall remarked on the paucity of British officers with the Indianregiments, which I could not but acknowledge was, as it still is, aweak point in our military organization. 

When the camp was broken up, I accompanied the Viceroy to Burma, wherewe arrived early in February, 1886. Lord Dufferin must, I think, havebeen pleased at the reception he met with at Rangoon. The peoplegenerally tried in every possible way to show their gratitude to theViceroy, under whose auspices the annexation of Upper Burma had beencarried out, and each nationality had erected a triumphal arch in itsown particular quarter of the town. 

From Rangoon we went to Mandalay, where Lord Dufferin formallyannounced the annexation by England of all that part of Upper Burmaover which King Thebaw had held sway. We then proceeded to Madras, where I parted from the Viceregal party and travelled to Bombay tomeet my wife. Leaving her at Simla to arrange our house, which hadbeen considerably altered and added to, I proceeded to the North-WestFrontier, for the question of its defence was one which interestedme very deeply, and I hoped that, from the position I now held as amember of the Government of India, I should be able to get my ideas onthis, to India, all-important subject listened to, if not altogethercarried out. 

The defence of the frontier had been considered under the orders of mypredecessor by a Committee, the members of which had recorded theirseveral opinions as to the means which should be adopted to makeIndia secure. But Sir Donald Stewart relinquished his command beforeanything could be done to give effect to the measures they advised. 

The matter had therefore to be taken up afresh by me, and I carefullystudied the recommendations of the 'Defence Committee' before visitingthe frontier to refresh my memory by personal inspection as to thepoints to be defended. 

It seemed to me that none of the members, with the exception of SirCharles Macgregor and the secretary, Major W. G. Nicholson, at allappreciated the great change which had taken place in our positionsince the near approach of Russia, and our consequent promise to theAmir to preserve the integrity of his kingdom, had widened the limitof our responsibilities from the southern to the northern boundary ofAfghanistan. 

Less than a year before we had been on the point of declaring war withRussia because of her active interference with 'the authority of asovereign--our protected ally--who had committed no offence[6];' andeven now it was not certain that peace could be preserved, by reasonof the outrageous demands made by the Russian members of the BoundaryCommission as to the direction which the line of delimitation betweenRussian and Afghan territory should take. 

It was this widening of our responsibilities which prevented me fromagreeing with the recommendations of the Defence Committee, for themajority of the members laid greater stress on the necessityfor constructing numerous fortifications, than upon lines ofcommunication, which I conceived to be of infinitely greaterimportance, as affording the means of bringing all the strategicalpoints on the frontier into direct communication with the railwaysystem of India, and enabling us to mass our troops rapidly, should webe called upon to aid Afghanistan in repelling attack from a foreignPower. 

Fortifications, of the nature of entrenched positions, were nodoubt, to some extent, necessary, not to guard against our immediateneighbours, for experience had taught us that without outsideassistance they are incapable of a combined movement, but for theprotection of such depots and storehouses as would have to beconstructed, and as a support to the army in the field. 

The line chosen at that time for an advance was by Quetta andKandahar. In the first instance, therefore, I wended my way toBaluchistan, where I met and consulted with the Governor-General'sAgent, Sir Robert Sandeman, and the Chief Engineer of the Sind-PishinRailway, Brigadier-General Browne. [7]

We together inspected the Kwaja-Amran range, through which theKohjak tunnel now runs, and I decided that the best position for anentrenched camp was to the rear of that range, in the space betweenthe Takatu and Mashalik mountains. This open ground was less than fourmiles broad; nature had made its flanks perfectly secure, and in frontwas a network of ravines capable of being made quite impassable bysimply flooding them. It was unfortunate that the railway had beenmarked out in front instead of in rear of the Takatu range, and thatits construction was too far advanced before the question of defencecame to be considered to admit of its being altered, otherwise thisposition would have been a complete protection for the line of railalso. 

Having come to a definite conclusion as to the measures to be takenfor meeting the offensive and defensive requirements of Quetta and theBolan Pass, I turned my attention to Peshawar and the Khyber Pass, which were infinitely more difficult to deal with, because of thepolitical considerations involved. 

Over the whole of Baluchistan we had entire control, so that in theevent of an army moving in that direction we could depend upon theresources of the country being at our disposal, and the peopleremaining, at least, neutral. But on the Peshawar side thecircumstances were altogether different: the tribes were hostile to adegree, and no European's life was safe across the frontier. Except inthe Khyber itself (where the policy of establishing friendly relationswith the Afridis, and utilizing them to keep open the pass, hadbeen most successfully practised by the political officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Warburton), we could not depend on the tribesmenremaining passive, much less helping us if we advanced intoAfghanistan. While, should an army attempt to invade India from thatdirection, we should to a certainty have every man of the 200, 000warlike people who inhabit the mountainous district from Chitral toBaluchistan combining against us, and pouring into India from everyoutlet. 

For these reasons I recorded a strong opinion in opposition to theproposals of the Defence Committee, which were in favour of theconstruction of a large magazine at Peshawar and extensive entrenchedworks at the mouth of the Khyber. I pointed out the extreme danger ofa position communication with which could be cut off, and which couldbe more or less easily turned, for it was clear to me that until wehad succeeded in inducing the border tribes to be on friendly termswith us, and to believe that their interests were identical withours, the Peshawar valley would become untenable should any generaldisturbance take place; and that, instead of entrenchments close tothe Khyber Pass, we required a position upon which the garrisonsof Peshawar and Nowshera could fall back and await the arrival ofreinforcements. 

For this position I selected a spot on the right bank of the Kabulriver, between Khairabad and the Indus; it commanded the passage ofthe latter river, and could easily be strengthened by defensive worksoutside the old fort of Attock. 

It will be readily understood by those of my readers who have anyknowledge of our North-West Frontier, or are interested in thequestion of the defence of India, that other routes exist between theBolan and the Khyber Passes which might be made use of either by anarmy invading India, or by a force sent from India to the assistanceof Afghanistan; and by such it will probably be asked, as was the casewhen my recommendations were being discussed, why I did not advisethese lines to be similarly guarded. My reply was, and is, that thereare no arsenals or depots near these passes to be protected, as atQuetta and Rawul Pindi; that we should not be likely to use them foran army moving into Afghanistan; that, although small parties of theenemy might come by them, the main body of a force operating towardsIndia is bound to advance by the Khyber, for the reason that it woulddebouch directly on highly cultivated country and good roads leadingto all the great cities of the Punjab; and finally that, even if ourfinances would admit of the construction of such a long line of forts, it would be impossible for our limited army to supply the garrisonsfor them. 

Having completed my inspection of the frontier, I returned to Simlaand drew up a memorandum declaring the conviction I had arrived atafter careful deliberation, that the improvement of our communicationswas of far greater importance than the immediate construction offorts and entrenchments, and that, while I would not spare money instrengthening well-defined positions, the strategical value of whichwas unmistakable, I would not trouble about those places the primaryimportance of fortifying which was open to argument, and which mightnever be required to be defended; these, I contended, might be leftalone, except so far as to make a careful study of their localitiesand determine how they could best be taken advantage of shouldoccasion require. My note ended with the following words: 'Meanwhile Iwould push on our communications with all possible speed; we must haveroads, and we must have railways; they cannot be made on short notice, and every rupee spent upon them now will repay us tenfold hereafter. Nothing will tend to secure the safety of the frontier so much as thepower of rapidly concentrating troops on any threatened point, andnothing will strengthen our military position more than to open outthe country and improve our relations with the frontier tribes. Thereare no better civilizers than roads and railways; and although someof those recommended to be made may never be required for militarypurposes, they will be of the greatest assistance to the civil powerin the administration of the country. '

Accompanying this paper was a statement of the defensive works which, in my opinion, should be taken in hand without delay; also of thepositions which required careful study, and the roads and railwayswhich should be constructed, to make the scheme of defence complete. 

Seven years later, when I gave up my command of the Army in India, Ihad the supreme satisfaction of knowing that I left our North-WestFrontier secure, so far as it was possible to make it so, hamperedas we were by want of money. The necessary fortifications had beencompleted, schemes for the defence of the various less importantpositions had been prepared, and the roads and railways, in myestimation of such vast importance, had either been finished or werewell advanced. 

Moreover, our position with regard to the border tribes had graduallycome to be better understood, and it had been realized that they wouldbe a powerful support to whichever side might be able to count upontheir aid; the policy of keeping them at arm's length had beenabandoned, and the advantages of reciprocal communication werebecoming more appreciated by them and by us. 

It was not to be expected that these results could be achieved withouta considerable amount of opposition, owing partly to the majority ofour countrymen (even amongst those who had spent the greater part oftheir lives in India) failing to recognize the change that had takenplace in the relative positions of Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and to their disbelief in the steady advance of Russia towardsAfghanistan being in any way connected with India, or in Russia's wishor power to threaten our Eastern Empire. [8] The idea was very common, too, amongst people who had not deeply considered the subject, thatall proposals for gaining control over our troublesome neighbourson the border, or for facilitating the massing of troops, meant anaggressive policy, and were made with the idea of annexing moreterritory, instead of for the purpose of securing the safety of India, and enabling us to fulfil our engagements. 

Happily, the Viceroys who governed India while I wasCommander-in-Chief were not amongst those who held these opinions;and while they had no expectation of India being invaded in the nearfuture, they realized that we could not unconcernedly look on while agreat Power was, step by step, creeping closer to our possessions. Itwas a fortunate circumstance, too, that, for the first five years Iwas at the head of the Army in India, I had as my militarycolleague in Council the late General Sir George Chesney, a man ofunquestionable talent and sound judgment, to whose cordial support, not only in frontier affairs, but in all my efforts to promote theefficiency and welfare of the soldier, I was very greatly indebted. 

[Footnote 1: Now General Sir Harry Prendergast, V. C. , K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: The ultimatum informed King Thebaw that the BritishGovernment insisted upon an Envoy being received at Mandalay, withfree access to the King, without having to submit to any humiliatingceremony; that proceedings against the trading company would not bepermitted; that a British Agent, with a suitable guard of honour andsteamer for his personal protection, must be permanently stationed atthe Burmese capital; that the Burmese Government must regulate theirexternal relations in accordance with British advice; and that properfacilities must be granted for the opening up of British trade withChina viâ Bhamo. ]

[Footnote 3: The force consisted of 364 seamen and 69 Marines formedinto a Naval Brigade, with 49 guns, including 27 machine guns, and3, 029 British and 6, 005 Native soldiers, with 28 guns. ]

[Footnote 4: Panipat is famous for three great battles fought in itsimmediate neighbourhood: one in 1526, by the Emperor Baber againstSultan Ibrahim, which resulted in the establishment of the Moguldynasty; the second in 1556, when the Emperor Akbar beat the HinduGeneral of the Afghan usurper, and re-established the Moguls in power;and the third in 1761, when Ahmed Shah Durani defeated the Mahrattas. ]

[Footnote 5: I was much gratified at receiving subsequently from HisImperial Majesty the Emperor William I. And from the Crown Princess ofPrussia autograph letters of acknowledgment of, and thanks for, thereception accorded and the attention paid to Majors von Huene and vonHagenau, the two representatives of the German army who attended thesemanoeuvres. ]

[Footnote 6: Words used by Mr. Gladstone when asking for a vote ofcredit for £6, 500, 000 for special preparations in connection with theAfghan difficulty. ]

[Footnote 7: The late Major-General Sir James Browne, K. C. S. I. , C. B. , who, like Sir Robert Sandeman, died while holding the important andresponsible position of Governor-General's Agent in Baluchistan. ]

[Footnote 8: A Statesman of high reputation in England was so strongin his disbelief of the necessity for making any preparations inIndia, that he publicly stated that if the only barrier between Russiain Asia and Britain in Asia were a mountain ridge, or a stream, or afence, there would be no difficulty in preserving peace between Russiaand the United Kingdom. --Speech delivered by the Right Hon. JohnBright, M. P. , at Birmingham on the 16th April, 1879. ]

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CHAPTER LXVI. 1886

 Nursing for the soldier--Pacification of Burma considered --Measures recommended--The Buddhist priesthood --The Regimental Institute--The Army Temperance Association

Many interesting and important questions had to be dealt with duringthis my first year as a member of the Viceroy's Council, and it waspleasant to me to be able to bring before the Government of India ascheme which my wife had had very much at heart for many years--forsupplying skilled nursing to the military hospitals in India. Thatour sick soldiers (officers and men) should be entirely dependent fornursing, even in times of the most dangerous illness, on the tendermercies of 'the orderly on duty, ' who, whether kind-hearted or thereverse, was necessarily utterly untrained and ignorant of therequirements of sickness, was a source of unhappiness to her, and hadbeen felt as a cruel want by many; but whenever she had discussedthe subject with those who might have helped her, she was told thatproposals for supplying this want had already been made, that theGovernment could not, nor would they ever be able to, act on suchproposals, on account of the prohibitory expense, so she felt therewas no use in making any appeal until I might be in a position tosee that any suggestions made by her would be certain to receive thecareful consideration of Government. This time had now arrived, andalmost directly Lady Roberts returned to India in 1886 she drew up ascheme for supplying lady nurses to the military hospitals throughoutIndia, and set to work to try and get the support of some of theprincipal Medical officers. To her great joy, her recommendationswere accepted by Lord Dufferin and his Council, and her note upon thesubject was sent home to the Secretary of State, strongly backed upby the Government of India. Lord Cross happily viewed the matter ina favourable light, and consented, not only to a certain number ofnurses being sent out the following year as an experiment, but to thewhole of the cost of the movement being borne by the State, with theexception of the provision of 'Homes in the Hills' for the nursingsisters as health resorts, and to prevent the expense to Governmentof their having to be sent home on sick-leave when worn out by theirtrying work in the plains. The Secretary of State, however, declaredthese Homes to be 'an important part' of the nursing scheme, 'andindispensable to its practical working, ' but considered that theyshould be provided by private subscription, a condition my wifeundertook to carry out. She appealed to the Army in India to help her, and with scarcely an exception every regiment and battery generouslyresponded--even the private soldiers subscribed largely in proportionto their small means--so that by the beginning of the following yearmy wife was able to set about purchasing and building suitable houses. 

[Illustration: LADY ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR. _From a photograph by Messrs. Johnson and Hoffmann. _]

'Homes' were established at Murree, Kasauli and Quetta, in Bengal, and at Wellington[1] in Madras, and by making a further appeal to theofficers of the army, and with the assistance of kind and liberalfriends in England and India, and the proceeds of variousentertainments, Lady Roberts was able to supply, in connexion withthe 'Homes' at Murree and Kasauli, wards for the reception of sickofficers, with a staff of nurses[2] in attendance, whose salaries, passages, etc. , are all paid out of 'Lady Roberts's Fund. ' My wife wasinduced to do this from having known many young officers succumb owingto want of care and improper food at hotels or clubs on being sent tothe Hills after a hard fight for life in the plains, if they were notfortunate enough to have personal friends to look after them. Althoughit is anticipating events, I may as well say here that the nursingexperiment proved a complete success, and now every large militaryhospital in India has its staff of nurses, and there are altogether 4superintendents, 9 deputy superintendents, and 39 nursing sisters, inIndia. There are many more wanted in the smaller stations, where thereis often great loss of life from lack of proper nursing, and surely, as my wife pointed out in her first appeal, 'when one considers whatan expensive article the British soldier is, costing, as he does, £100before landing in India, it seems certain that on the score of economyalone, altogether setting aside the humane aspect of the question, it is well worth the State's while to provide him with the skillednursing care' which has up to now saved so many lives. 

That officers as well as men might benefit by the devotion of the'nursing sister, ' I was able to arrange in all the large hospitalsfor some room, or rooms, used until then for other purposes, to beappropriated for an officers' ward or wards, and these have proveda great boon to the younger officers whose income does not admit oftheir obtaining the expensive care of a nurse from one of the largecivil hospitals in the Presidency towns. 

The next most interesting question, and also the most pressing, whichhad to be considered by the Viceroy's Council during the summer of1886, was the pacification of Upper Burma. People in England hadexpressed surprise at this being so long delayed. It is extremelyeasy, however, to sit at home and talk of what should be done, butvery difficult to say how to do it, and more difficult still to carryit out. To establish law and order in a country nearly as large asFrance, in which dacoity is looked upon as an honourable profession, would be no light task even in Europe: but when the country to besettled has a deadly climate for several months in the year, iscovered to a great extent with jungle, and is without a vestige ofa road, the task assumes gigantic proportions. In Upper Burma thegarrison was only sufficient to keep open communication along the lineof the Irrawaddy, and, to add to the embarrassment of the situation, disaffection had spread to Lower Burma, and disturbances had brokenout in the almost unknown district between Upper Burma and Assam. 

It was arranged to send strong reinforcements to Burma so soon as theunhealthy season should be over and it would be safe for the troopsto go there, and Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson (who hadsucceeded me as Commander-in-Chief in Madras) was directed to proceedthither. 

In October my wife and I, with some of my staff, started from Simla ona trip across the Hills, with the object of inspecting the stations ofDhurmsala and Dalhousie before it was cool enough to begin my wintertour in the plains. We crossed the Jalaurie Pass, between 11, 000 and12, 000 feet high, and travelling through the beautiful Kulu valley andover the Bubbu mountain, we finally arrived at Palampur, the centreof the tea industry in the Kangra valley. Having been cut off fromtelegraphic communication for some time, we went straight to thetelegraph-office for news, and found at the moment a message beingdeciphered which brought me the terribly sad information that GeneralMacpherson had died of fever in Burma. In him the country had lost agood soldier, and I a friend and comrade for whom I had a greatregard and admiration. We were discussing his untimely end, and I wasconsidering who should replace him, when a second message arrived. This was from Lord Dufferin, telling me that he wished me to transfermy Head-Quarters to Burma, and arrange to remain there until 'the neckof the business was broken. '

I hurried to Calcutta, embarked in the first mail-steamer, and landedat Rangoon on the 9th November. 

Sir Charles Bernard (the Chief Commissioner) and General White haddone well under very difficult circumstances; but owing partly tolarge districts being impassable from months of heavy rain, and partlyto the change in Commanders, unavoidable inaction had been forced uponour troops, and the dacoits had in consequence made head against us. 

Having been in constant correspondence with General White, I had beenkept informed of his plans, and, as his responsible Chief, I hadapproved of them; I therefore had the somewhat complicated militarysituation at my fingers' ends, and did not need to lose a single dayin arranging for a series of combined movements being carried on allover the country. 

It was hoped that the recently arrived reinforcements would besufficient for all requirements, but it soon became apparent thatthe difficulties connected with the pacification of Burma had beenunder-rated, and that, in addition to more troops, an efficientcivil administration would have to be provided, to take the place ofmilitary authority so soon as anything like organized resistance hadbeen crushed; for to deal with ordinary robbers I conceived to bework more suited to police than to soldiers. Upwards of thirty years'experience had proved that the Burmese could not be relied upon forthis kind of service; I therefore recommended that a large bodyof police should be raised in India without delay, and given asemi-military organization, and in the meantime I asked for, and wasgiven, five additional regiments. 

I felt very confident of success, for I had taken great care in theselection of the brigade commanders and staff officers, and I knewthe troops could be depended upon in any emergency that was likely toarise. Nevertheless, as the work they would have to perform was ofrather an unusual character, irksome as well as difficult, I thoughtit advisable to issue some general instructions for the guidanceof the officers in command of the different columns. [3] Theseinstructions were carried out so intelligently, and the troops didsuch good service, especially a very fine body of Mounted Infantryraised and organized by Major Symons, of the South Wales Borderers, that before I returned to India in February, 1887, I was able toreport that the country was gradually becoming quiet and the Burmesereconciled to our rule. Most of the principal dacoit leaders had beenkilled or captured, and villages which had been in their hands formonths were being reoccupied by their legitimate inhabitants; caravanswere coming into Mandalay almost daily from districts on the Chineseborders; contracts for making roads were readily taken up, and therewas no difficulty in obtaining labour for the railway then beingconstructed between Lower Burma and Mandalay, the first sod of whichwas turned within a month of my arrival at that place. 

In achieving these satisfactory results I was materially aided by thehearty co-operation of Sir Charles Bernard and the civil officersserving under him; while the entire absence of fanaticism amongstthe Burmese, and their cheerful, happy natures, facilitated ourintercourse with them. I received, besides, most valuable assistancefrom the Buddhist _Poonghies_, or monks, with many of whom I madefriends. From the fact that education, secular and religious, isimparted by these monks, and that every male, from the King to thehumblest peasant, was obliged to enter a monastery and wear thesaffron garb of a monk for a certain period, the priesthood hadenormous influence with the Burmese. There are no hereditary Chiefs orNobles in Burma, the _Poonghies_ being the advisers of the people andthe centre round which Native society revolves. 

Our occupation of Upper Burma was necessarily a great blow to theBuddhist priesthood, for many of the monasteries[4] were kept upentirely by the King, Queen, and Ministers of State; and, as it wasmost advisable to have the influence of the monks in our favour, Irecommended that a monthly stipend should be paid to the Archbishopand two senior Bishops of Mandalay. They showed their gratitude bydoing all they could to help me, and when I was leaving the countrythe old _Thathanabain_ (Archbishop) accompanied me as far as Rangoon. We corresponded till his death, and I still hear occasionally from oneor other of my _Poonghie_ friends. 

I remained only a short time in Calcutta on my return to India, andthen started off again for the North-West Frontier, in company withGeneral Chesney, who had previously expressed his general concurrencein my defence proposals, but was anxious to see the several positionsand judge for himself, from an Engineer's point of view, of theirsuitability to be treated as I suggested. It was a great source ofcontentment to me to find that the sites chosen and the style ofentrenchments I had advocated commended themselves to my expertcompanion. 

Simla was more than usually gay during the summer of 1887, inconsequence of the numerous entertainments given in celebration of HerMajesty's Jubilee. We had just added a ballroom to 'Snowdon, ' and weinaugurated its opening by a fancy ball on the 21st June, in honour ofthe auspicious anniversary. 

My name appeared in the Jubilee _Gazette_ as having been given theGrand Cross of the Indian Empire, but what I valued still more was theacceptance by the Government of India of my strong recommendation forthe establishment of a Club or Institute in every British regiment andbattery in India. In urging that this measure should be favourablyconsidered, I had said that the British Army in India could have nobetter or more generally beneficial memorial of the Queen's Jubileethan the abolition of that relic of barbarism, the canteen, and itssupersession by an Institute, in which the soldier would have underthe same roof a reading-room, recreation room, and a decently-managedrefreshment-room. 

Lord Dufferin's Government met my views in the most liberal spirit, and with the sanction of Lord Cross 'The Regimental Institute' becamea recognized establishment, a fact which my colleagues in Councilreferred to as a second Jubilee honour for me!

At a time when nearly every soldier could read and write, and whenwe hoped to attract to the army men of a better stamp and morerespectable antecedents than those of which it was composed in 'thegood old days, ' it appeared to me a humiliating anachronism that thedegrading system of the canteen should still prevail, and that it wasimpossible for any man to retain his self-respect if he were driven totake his glass of beer under the rules by which regimental canteenswere governed. I believed, too, that the more the status of the rankand file could be raised, and the greater the efforts made to providethem with rational recreation and occupation in their leisure hours, the less there would be of drunkenness, and consequently of crime, theless immorality and the greater the number of efficient soldiers inthe army. Funds having been granted, a scheme was drawn up for theerection of buildings and for the management of the Institutes. Canteens were reduced in size, and such attractions as musicalinstruments were removed to the recreation-rooms; the name 'liquorbar' was substituted for that of 'canteen, ' and, that there should beno excuse for frequenting the 'liquor bar, ' I authorized a moderateand limited amount of beer to be served, if required, with the men'ssuppers in the refreshment-room--an arrangement which has beenfollowed by the happiest results. 

At first it was thought that these changes would cause a great fallingoff in regimental funds, but experience has proved the reverse. Withgood management, the profits from the coffee-shop and the soda-watermanufactory far exceed those to be derived from the canteen, and thiswithout permitting anyone outside the regiment to purchase from thecoffee-shop and without interfering at all with local tradesmen. 

Another measure which I succeeded in carrying through the same yearwas the amalgamation of the various sectarian societies that existedin India for the prevention of drunkenness in the army into oneundenominational society, under the name of the Army TemperanceAssociation, which I hoped would admit of more united action and amore advantageous use of funds, besides making it easier for theGovernment to assist the movement. The different religious and 'totalabstinence' associations had no doubt done much towards the objectthey had in view, but their work was necessarily spasmodic, and beingcarried on independently of regimental authority, it was not alwayslooked upon with favour by officers. 

There was of necessity at first a good deal of opposition on the partof the promoters of the older societies, but those who were loudest indenouncing my proposals soon came to understand that there was nothingin the constitution of the Army Temperance Association which could inany way interfere with total abstinence, and that the only differencebetween their systems and mine consisted in mine being regimental inits character, and including men for whom it was not necessary orexpedient to forego stimulants altogether, but who earnestly desiredto lead temperate lives, and to be strengthened in their resolve bybeing allowed to share in the advantages of the new Institution. 

To make the movement a complete success, it was above all thingsimportant to secure the active co-operation of the ministers of thevarious religions. To this end I addressed the heads of the differentchurches, explaining my reasons and the results I hoped to attainin establishing the amalgamated association, and I invited them totestify their approval of the scheme by becoming patrons of it. With two exceptions, the dignitaries to whom I appealed acceptedmy invitation, and expressed sympathy with my aims and efforts, an encouragement I had hardly dared to hope for, and a proof ofliberal-mindedness on the part of the prelates which was extremelyrefreshing. 

The Government of India were good enough to sanction the allotment ofa separate room in each soldiers' Institute for the exclusive use ofthe Association, where alcohol in any shape was not admitted, and tothe grant of this room I attribute, in a great measure, the success ofthe undertaking. The success was proved by the fact that, when I leftIndia, nearly one third of the 70, 000 British soldiers in that countrywere members or honorary members of the Army Temperance Association. 

[Footnote 1: The homes at Quetta and Wellington were eventually takenover by Government, and Lady Roberts' nurses, who worked in themilitary hospitals at these stations, were replaced by Governmentnurses when the increase to the Army Nursing Service admitted of thisbeing done. ]

[Footnote 2: When the 'Homes in the Hills' are closed during the coldmonths, these nurses attend sick officers in their own houses in theplains, free of charge except travelling expenses. ]

[Footnote 3: These instructions are given in the Appendix. (SeeAppendix XI. )]

[Footnote 4: Monasteries in Burma are not merely dwelling-places forthe monks, but are the schools where all education is carried on. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXVII. 1887-1888

 Defence and Mobilization Committees--The Transport Department --Utilization of Native States' armies --Marquis of Lansdowne becomes Viceroy--Rajputana and Kashmir --Musketry instruction--Artillery and Cavalry training

In December I made a prolonged tour along the North-West Frontier, accompanied by my wife, who was greatly delighted at being able atlast to see many places and meet many people of whom she had oftenheard me speak. Part of this trip was made in company with the Viceroyand Lady Dufferin, who visited all the principal stations on thefrontier, including Quetta. I rode with Lord Dufferin through theKhyber Pass, and to the top of the Kwaja Amran range, our visit tothis latter point resulting, as I earnestly hoped it would, in HisExcellency being convinced by personal inspection of the advantage tobe gained by making the Kohjak tunnel, and of the necessity for ourendeavouring to cultivate more friendly relations with the bordertribes. We ended this very enjoyable tour at Rawal Pindi in order tobe present at the winding-up of a Cavalry Camp of Exercise in theneighbourhood. There were assembled together under the direction ofMajor-General Luck one regiment of British and eight regiments ofNative Cavalry, with two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery, and itwas a pretty sight, their advance at full gallop, and the halt, asof one man, of that long line of Cavalry within a few yards of theViceroy, for the Royal salute. The spectators were much impressed withLord Dufferin's nerve in being able to remain perfectly calm and stillon his horse in the face of such an onslaught, and it certainly didseem rather close quarters; but General Luck knew his regiments, andhad confidence in his men, and we knew General Luck. 

In the early part of 1888 I visited all the chief military stations inthe Bengal Presidency, and attended Camps of Exercise for all arms, held at Rawal Pindi, Umballa, Meerut, and Lucknow, before going toCalcutta for the usual discussion on the Budget; after which theGovernment generally breaks up for the hot weather, and assembles inSimla two or three weeks later. 

During 1887 and 1888 much useful work was got through by the DefenceCommittee, and by another Committee which was assembled for theconsideration of all questions bearing upon the mobilization of thearmy. As Commander-in-Chief I presided over both, and was fortunatein being able to secure as my secretaries two officers of exceptionalability, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Nicholson, R. E. , for defence, andLieutenant-Colonel E. Elles, R. A. , for mobilisation. It was in a greatmeasure due to Colonel Nicholson's clear-sighted judgment on the manyknotty questions which came before us, and to his technical knowledge, that the schemes for the defence of the frontier, and for the portsof Bombay, Karachi, Calcutta, Rangoon and Madras, were carried out sorapidly, thoroughly and economically as they were;[1] and with regardto measures for rendering the army mobile, Colonel Elles provedhimself equally capable and practical. The Secretary to Governmentin the Military Department, Major-General Edwin Collen, was aparticularly helpful member of the Committees[2] from his intimateacquaintance with the various subjects which had to be discussed. 

If my readers have had the patience to follow in detail the severalcampaigns in which I took part, they will have grasped the fact thatour greatest difficulties on all occasions arose from the want of aproperly organized Transport Department, and they will understandthat I was able to make this very apparent when the necessityfor mobilizing rapidly only one Army Corps came to be seriouslyconsidered. We were able to demonstrate conclusively the impossibilityof putting a force into the field, sufficiently strong to cope with aEuropean enemy, without a considerable increase to the existing numberof transport animals, and without some description of light cartstrong enough to stand the rough work of a campaign in a countrywithout roads; for it is no exaggeration to say that in the autumn of1880, when I left Kandahar, it would have been possible to have pickedout the road thence to Quetta, and onward to Sibi, a distance of 250miles, with no other guide than that of the line of dead animals andbroken-down carts left behind by the several columns and convoys thathad marched into Afghanistan by that route. 

Soon after I took over the command of the Army in India, whilevoyaging to Burma, I had brought this most pressing question oftransport to the notice of Lord Dufferin, who, with his usual quickappreciation of a situation, at once fully recognized its urgency, andpromised to give me all possible help in my endeavour to render thearmy mobile--a promise which he amply fulfilled by taking a keenpersonal interest in the proceedings of the Committee, and giving hishearty support to our various recommendations. [3]

Our labours resulted in several thousand good pack animals (chieflymules) being purchased, and information collected and recorded asto the districts where others could be rapidly procured in case ofemergency. A transport service was established, for which officers hadto go through a regular course of instruction, and pass an examinationin the loading and general management of the animals. A prize wasoffered for a strong, useful light cart; and when the most suitablehad been selected, large numbers were made up of the same pattern. [4]The constitution of two Army Corps, to be in readiness for taking thefield on short notice, was decided upon, and the units to form theseveral divisions and brigades were told off and provided with thenecessary equipment. A railway time-table was prepared, giving thehours at which the troops should leave their stations so as to avoidany block _en route_. Special platforms were constructed for trainingand detraining Cavalry and Artillery, and storehouses were erected andstocked at those stations where road marching would probably commence. Finally the conclusions we had arrived at were embodied in a manualentitled 'General Regulations for Mobilization. ' It was extremelygratifying to me to learn from India that this manual, with suchadditions and alterations as our subsequent experience in Burma andvarious frontier expeditions proved would be advantageous, wasthe guide by which the Chitral relieving force was last year soexpeditiously and completely equipped and despatched. 

Of the many subjects discussed and measures adopted during this thelast year of Lord Dufferin's Viceroyalty, I think the scheme forutilizing the armies of Native States, as an auxiliary force for theservice of the Empire, was the most important both from a politicaland military point of view. 

The idea was, in the first instance, propounded by Lord Lytton, whoappointed a committee to consider the pros and cons of the question. I was a member of that committee, but at that time I, in common withmany others, was doubtful as to the wisdom of encouraging a high stateof efficiency amongst the troops of independent States; the excellentwork, however, done by the Native Contingent I had with me in Kuram, and the genuine desire of all ranks to be allowed to serve side byside with our own soldiers, together with the unmistakable spirit ofloyalty displayed by Native Rulers when war with Russia was imminentin 1885, convinced me that the time had arrived for us to prove tothe people of India that we had faith in their loyalty, and in theirrecognition of the fact that their concern in the defence of theEmpire was at least as great as ours, and that we looked to them totake their part in strengthening our rule and in keeping out allintruders. I believed, too, that we had now little to fear frominternal trouble so long as our Government continued just andsympathetic, but that, on the other hand, we could not expect toremain free from outside interference, and that it would be wise toprepare ourselves for a struggle which, as my readers must be aware, Iconsider to be inevitable in the end. We have done much, and maystill do more, to delay it, but when that struggle comes it will beincumbent upon us, both for political and military reasons, to makeuse of all the troops and war material that the Native States canplace at our disposal, and it is therefore to our advantage to renderboth as efficient and useful as possible. 

The subject was, of course, most delicate and complex, and had tobe treated with the greatest caution, for not only was the measureadapted to materially strengthen our military position in India, butI was convinced it was politically sound, and likely to be generallyacceptable to the Native Rulers, provided we studied their wishes, andwere careful not to offend their prejudices and susceptibilities byunnecessary interference. 

It was very satisfactory to find how cordially the Chiefs respondedto Lord Dufferin's proposals, and extremely interesting to watch thesteady improvement in their armies under the guidance of carefullyselected British officers. Substantial results have been alreadyobtained, valuable help having been afforded to the Chitral expeditionby the transport trains organized by the Maharajas of Gwalior andJaipur, and by the gallantry of the Imperial Service Troops belongingto His Highness the Maharaja of Kashmir at Hunza-Naga and during thesiege and relief of Chitral. 

Two minor expeditions took place this year: one against the Thibetansin retaliation for their having invaded the territory of our ally, theRaja of Sikim; the other to punish the Black Mountain tribes for themurder of two British officers. Both were a success from a militarypoint of view, but in the Black Mountain the determination of thePunjab Government to limit the sphere of action of the troops, andto hurry out of the country, prevented our reaping any politicaladvantage. We lost a grand opportunity for gaining control over thislawless and troublesome district; no survey was made, no roads openedout, the tribesmen were not made to feel our power, and, consequently, very soon another costly expedition had to be undertaken. 

In November, 1888, Lord Dufferin left India amidst a storm of regretfrom all classes of Her Majesty's subjects. He was succeeded by LordLansdowne, one of whose earliest communications to me rejoiced myheart, for in it His Excellency inquired whether anything could bedone towards improving our relations with the frontier tribes. Thisaugured well for the abandonment of the traditional, selfish, and, to my mind, short-sighted policy of keeping aloof, and I hoped thatendeavours would at last be made to turn the tribesmen into friendlyneighbours, to their advantage and ours, instead of being obligedto have recourse to useless blockades or constant and expensiveexpeditions for their punishment, or else to induce them to refrainfrom troubling us by the payment of a heavy blackmail. 

[Illustration: THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, K. G. , G. C. M. G. , G. M. S. I. , G. M. I. E.. VICEROY OF INDIA. _From a photograph by Cowell, Simla_. ]

After a visit to the frontier in the autumn to see how the defenceswere advancing, I attended a Cavalry Camp of Exercise at Delhi, andan Artillery Practice Camp at Gurgaon, and then went to Meerut tobe present at the first meeting of the Bengal Presidency RifleAssociation, which was most interesting and successful. We spentChristmas in camp--the first Christmas we had all been together forten years. Our boy, having left Eton, came out in the early partof the year with a tutor, to be with us for eighteen months beforeentering Sandhurst. 

At the end of December I proceeded to Calcutta rather earlier thanusual, to pay my respects to the new Viceroy, and in January of thefollowing year, accompanied by my wife and daughter, I started offon a long tour to inspect the local regiments in Central India andRajputana, and to ascertain what progress had been made in organizingthe Imperial Service Troops in that part of India. 

Did space permit, I should like to tell my readers of the beauties ofUdaipur and the magnificent hospitality accorded to us there, as wellas at Bhopal, Jodhpur, Jaipur, and Ulwar, but, if I once began, it would be difficult to stop, and I feel I have already made anunconscionably heavy demand on the interest of the public in thingsIndian, and must soon cease my 'labour of love. ' I must thereforeconfine myself to those subjects which I am desirous should be betterunderstood in England than they generally are. 

Upon seeing the troops of the Begum of Bhopal and the Maharana ofUdaipur, I recommended that Their Highnesses should be invited toallow their share of Imperial defence to take the form of paying forthe services of an increased number of officers with their respectivelocal corps, [5] for I did not think it would be possible to make anyuseful addition to our strength out of the material of which theirsmall armies were composed. The men were relics of a past age, fitonly for police purposes, and it would have been a waste of time andmoney to give them any special training. My recommendation, however, was not accepted, and neither of these States takes any part in thedefence scheme. 

At Jodhpur, on the contrary, there was splendid material, and amost useful force was being organized by the Maharaja's brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Pertap Sing, himself a Rajput, and of thebluest blood of India. The Cavalry were specially fine. The gallantRajput horsemen of Jodhpur had always been famous for their chivalrousbravery, unswerving fidelity, and fearless self-devotion in their warswith the Mahrattas and the armies of the Mogul Emperors, and I felt, as the superbly mounted squadrons passed before me, that they had lostnone of their characteristics, and that blood and breeding must tell, and would, if put to the test, achieve the same results now as ofold. There could be but one opinion as to the value of the 'SirdarRissala, '[6] so named after the Maharaja's son and heir, SirdarSing, a lad of only nine years old, who led the little army past thesaluting flag mounted on a beautiful thorough-bred Arab. 

The Jaipur troops were much on a par with those of Bhopal and Udaipur. I was glad, therefore, that in lieu of troops, the Maharaja had agreedto organize, as his contribution to the Imperial service, a transportcorps of 1, 000 fully-equipped animals. 

At Ulwar I found the 600 Cavalry and 1, 000 Infantry (all Rajputs) welladvanced in their drill and training; this was evidently owing to thepersonal interest taken in them by the Maharaja, who seldom allowed aday to pass without visiting the parade grounds. 

By the end of March I had finished my tour in Central India andRajputana, and as the heat was every day becoming more intense, I wasnot sorry to turn my steps northwards towards Kashmir, the army ofwhich State still remained to be inspected, and the measures mostsuitable for its re-organization determined upon. 

Our whole family party re-assembled at Murree early in April, and weall went into the 'Happy Valley' together, where between business andpleasure we spent a most delightful six weeks. The Maharaja personallysuperintended the arrangements for our comfort. Our travelling wasmade easy--indeed luxurious--and everything that the greatest care andforethought and the most lavish hospitality could accomplish to makeour visit happy was done by the Maharaja and by the popular Resident, Colonel Nisbet. 

The Kashmir army was much larger than any of those belonging to theNative States I had lately visited; it consisted of 18, 000 men and 66guns--more than was needed, even with the Gilgit frontier to guard. Some of the regiments were composed of excellent material, chieflyDogras; but as the cost of such a force was a heavy drain upon theState, and as many of the men were old and decrepit, I recommendedthat the Maharaja should be invited to get rid of all who werephysically unfit, and to reduce his army to a total of 10, 000thoroughly reliable men and 30 guns. I knew this would be a verydifficult, and perhaps distasteful, task for the Commander-in-Chief(who was also the Maharaja's brother), Raja Ram Sing, to perform, soI recommended that a British officer should be appointed militaryadviser to the Kashmir Government, under whose supervision the work ofreformation should be carried out. 

At that time we had none of our own troops in the neighbourhood ofGilgit, and as I thought it advisable, in case of disturbance, thatthe Kashmir troops should be speedily put into such a state ofefficiency as would enable us to depend upon them to hold the passesuntil help could arrive from India, I urged that the military advisershould be given three British officers to assist him in carrying outhis difficult and troublesome duty; and at the same time I pointedout that it was absolutely essential to construct at an early date aserviceable road between Kashmir and Gilgit, as the sole approach tothat strategic position was not only difficult, but very dangerous. 

All these proposals commended themselves to, and were acted upon by, the Viceroy. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Neville Chamberlain--a _persona grata_ to theKashmir authorities--was appointed Military Secretary to the KashmirState, and by his ability, tact, and happy way of dealing withNatives, quickly overcame all obstacles. The Maharaja and his twobrothers, Rajas Ram Sing and Amar Sing, entered heartily into thescheme; the army was remodelled and rendered fit for service; and anexcellent road was made to Gilgit. 

During the summer of 1889 I was able to introduce several much neededreforms in the annual course of musketry for the Native Army. The necessity for these reforms had not been overlooked by mydistinguished predecessors, nor by the able officers who served underthem in the Musketry Department, but it had not been possible to domuch with a system which dated from a period when fire discipline wasnot thought of, and when the whole object of the course was to makesoldiers individually good shots. After the Delhi Camp of Exercisein 1885-86, when the want of fire control was almost the only pointunfavourably criticized by the foreign officers, the Army in Indiamade a great advance in this important branch of musketry training;nevertheless, I felt that further progress was possible, and that thecourse of instruction was not altogether as practical as it might be. I therefore gave over the work of improvement in this respect toan enthusiast in the matter of rifle-shooting and an officer ofexceptional energy and intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hamilton, and directed him, as Assistant Adjutant-General of Musketry, toarrange a course of instruction, in which the conditions shouldresemble as nearly as possible those of field service, and in whichfire discipline should be developed to the utmost extent. He was mostsuccessful in carrying out my wishes, and the results from the firstyear's trial of the new system were infinitely better than even I hadanticipated. 

Simultaneously with the improvement in musketry, a great advance wasmade in gunnery. Artillery, like Infantry officers, had failed torealize the value of the new weapon, and it required the teaching ofa man who himself thoroughly believed in and understood thebreech-loading gun to arouse Artillerymen to a sense of the tremendouspower placed in their hands, and to the importance of devoting muchmore care and attention to practice than had hitherto been thoughtnecessary. Such a man was Major-General Nairne, and I was happilyable to induce the Government to revive in him the appointment ofInspector-General of Artillery. 

Under the unwearying supervision of this officer, there was quite asremarkable an improvement in Artillery shooting as Colonel Hamiltonhad effected in musketry. Practice camps were annually formed atconvenient localities, and all ranks began to take as much pride inbelonging to the 'best shooting battery' as they had hitherto takenin belonging to the 'smartest, ' the 'best-horsed, ' or the'best-turned-out' battery. I impressed upon officers and men that thetwo things were quite compatible; that, according to my experience, the smartest and best turned-out men made the best soldiers; and whileI urged every detail being most carefully attended to which couldenable them to become proficient gunners and take their proper placeon a field of battle, I expressed my earnest hope that the RoyalArtillery would always maintain its hitherto high reputation forturn-out and smartness. The improvement in the Cavalry was equallyapparent. For this arm of the service also the Government consented toan Inspector-General being appointed, and I was fortunate enough tobe able to secure for the post the services of Major-General Luck, anofficer as eminently fitted for this position as was General Nairnefor his. 

Just at first the British officers belonging to Native Cavalry wereapprehensive that their sowars would be turned into dragoons, butthey soon found that there was no intention of changing any of theirtraditional characteristics, and that the only object of giving theman Inspector-General was to make them even better in their own waythan they had been before, the finest Irregular Cavalry in the world, as I have not the slightest doubt they will always prove themselves tobe. Towards the end of the Simla season of 1889, Lord Lansdowne, to mygreat satisfaction, announced his intention of visiting the frontier, and asked me to accompany him. 

We rode through the Khyber and Gomal Passes, visited Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Quetta, looked into the Kohjak tunnel, and attended some interesting manoeuvres, carried out with a view oftesting, in as practical a manner as possible, the defensive powerof the recently-finished Takatu-Mashalik entrenchment. The principalworks were fired upon by Artillery and Infantry, and, notwithstandingthe excellent practice made, infinitesimal damage was done, whichproved the suitability of the particular design adopted for thedefences. 

Lord Lansdowne expressed himself greatly interested, and muchimpressed by all he saw of the frontier; and he was confirmed in hisopinion as to the desirability of establishing British influenceamongst the border tribes. With this object in view, His Excellencyauthorized Sir Robert Sandeman (the Governor-General's Agent atQuetta) to establish a series of police posts in the Gomal Pass, andencourage intercourse between the people of the Zhob district andourselves. 

It was high time that something should be done in this direction, for the Amir's attitude towards us was becoming day by day moreunaccountably antagonistic. He was gradually encroaching on territoryand occupying places altogether outside the limits of Afghan control;and every movement of ours--made quite as much in His Highness'sinterest as in our own--for strengthening the frontier and improvingthe communications, evidently aroused in him distrust and suspicion asto our motives. 

[Footnote 1: The total coat of the coast and frontier defencesamounted to the very moderate sum of five crores of rupees, or aboutthree and a half millions sterling. ]

[Footnote 2: The Committees consisted, besides the Military Member ofCouncil and myself, of the heads of Departments with the Government ofIndia and at Army Head-Quarters. ]

[Footnote 3: When the report of the Mobilization Committee wassubmitted to the Viceroy, he recorded a minute expressing his'warm admiration of the manner in which the arduous duty had beenconducted, ' and 'his belief that no scheme of a similar descriptionhad ever been worked out with greater thoroughness, in more detail, and with clearer apprehension of the ends to be accomplished. ' Heconcluded by conveying to the members an expression of his greatsatisfaction at what had been done, and recording that 'the resultof the Committee's labours is a magnificent monument of industry andprofessional ability. ']

[Footnote 4: Statement of transport carriage maintained in India inthe years 1878 and 1893 for military purposes, exclusive of animalsregistered by the civil authorities on the latter date, and liable tobe requisitioned in time of war:

 -------------------------------------------- | | | | |Date | September, 1878 | April, 1893 | | | | | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Elephants. | 733 | 359 | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Camels. | 6, 353 | 3, 175 | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Mules. | 1, 536 | 16, 825 | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Ponies. | ... | 782 | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Bullocks. | 1, 424 | 7, 211 | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Donkeys. | ... | 31 | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Army | | | |Transport | ... | 5, 316 | |Carts. | | | |----------+-----------------+-------------| |Field | | | |Ambulance | ... | 799 | |Carts. | | | |-------------------------------------------]

[Footnote 5: According to treaty, the Bhopal State pays nearly twolakhs of rupees a year towards the cost of the local battalionmaintained by the British Government for the purpose of keeping orderwithin the State itself. The battalion, however, has only four, instead of eight, British officers, and it appeared to me onlyreasonable that the Begum should be invited to pay the additionalamount necessary to make the battalion as efficient as the rest of theNative army, as a 'premium of insurance' for the peace and prosperitywhich Her Highness's State enjoys under our protection, and as herquota towards the general scheme for the defence of the Empire. ]

[Footnote 6: Rissala is a body of Cavalry. ]

 * * * * *

CHAPTER LXVIII. 1890-1893

 Extension of command--Efficiency of the Native Army --Concessions to the Native Army--Officering of the Native Army --The Hunza-Naga campaign--Visit to Nepal--A Nepalese entertainment --Proposed mission to the Amir--A last tour--Farewell entertainments --Last days in India

New Year's Day, 1890, found me in Calcutta, where I went to meetPrince Albert Victor on his arrival in India. On my way thither Ireceived a letter from Mr. Edward Stanhope, Secretary of State forWar, telling me that he had heard from Lord Cross, the Secretary ofState for India, that there was a proposal to ask me to retain myappointment of Commander-in-Chief in India for some time after theexpiration of the usual term of office; but that, while such anarrangement would have his hearty approval, he thought the questionshould be considered from another point of view, and that it would beextremely agreeable to himself, and he felt to the Duke of Cambridgealso, if he could secure me for the post of Adjutant-General insuccession to Lord Wolseley. Mr. Stanhope went on to say he wouldlike to know whether I would be willing to accept the appointment, orwhatever position Lord Wolseley's successor would fill, should thereport of Lord Hartington's Commission cause a change to be made inthe staff at the Horse Guards. 

I was pleased, though somewhat surprised, at this communication, and Ireplied to the Right Honourable gentleman that I would gladly acceptthe offer, and that I could arrange to join on the 1st October, whenthe appointment would become vacant, but that, as Lord Lansdowne hadexpressed a wish that I should remain in India over the next coldseason, I hoped, if it were possible, some arrangement might be madeto admit of my doing so. The idea of employment in England, now that Iallowed myself to dwell upon it, was very attractive, for dearly asI loved my Indian command, and bitterly as I knew I should grieve atleaving the country, the peoples, and the grand army, which were allsources of such intense interest to me, I felt that the evil day atlongest could only be postponed for a few years, and that there is alimit to the time that even the strongest European can with impunitylive in an eastern climate, while I was glad to think I should stillbe in a position to work for my country and for the benefit of thearmy. 

From Calcutta I travelled north to Muridki, where a large force ofHorse Artillery and Cavalry was assembled for practice, and where wehad a standing camp, at which Prince Albert Victor did us the honourof being our guest for the final manoeuvres. I think His RoyalHighness enjoyed the novelty of camp life, and was greatly attractedby the picturesque and soldier-like appearance of the Native troops. The Native officers were very proud at being presented to the grandsonof their Empress, and at His Royal Highness being appointed HonoraryColonel of the 1st Punjab Cavalry. 

Towards the end of April I returned to Simla for what I thought was tobe our last season in that place; and shortly after I got up there, atelegram from Mr. Stanhope informed me that my appointment had beenaccepted by the Cabinet, and that my presence in England was stronglydesired in the autumn. It was therefore with very great surprise thatI received a second telegram three weeks later from the Secretaryof State, telling me that, as it was then found to be impossible tochoose my successor, and as the exigencies of the public serviceurgently required my presence in India, the Cabinet, with the approvalof Her Majesty and the concurrence of the Duke of Cambridge, haddecided to ask me to retain my command for two more years. 

I felt it my duty to obey the wishes of the Queen, Her Majesty'sGovernment, and the Commander-in-Chief; but I fully realized that indoing so I was forfeiting my chance of employment in England, and thata long and irksome term of enforced idleness would in all probabilityfollow on my return home, and I did not attempt to conceal from Mr. Stanhope that I was disappointed. 

At the latter end of this year, and in the early part of 1891, it wasfound necessary to undertake three small expeditions: one to Zhob, under the leadership of Sir George White, for the protection of ournewly-acquired subjects in that valley; one on the Kohat border, commanded by Sir William Lockhart, to punish the people of theMiranzai valley for repeated acts of hostility; and the third, underMajor-General Elles, [1] against the Black Mountain tribes, who, quiteunsubdued by the fruitless expedition of 1888, had given troublealmost immediately afterwards. All these were as completely successfulin their political results as in their military conduct. The columnswere not withdrawn until the tribesmen had become convinced that theywere powerless to sustain a hostile attitude towards us, and that itwas their interest, as it was our wish, that they should henceforth beon amicable terms with us. 

[Illustration: FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS ON HIS ARAB CHARGER'VONOLEL. '_From an oil-painting by Charles Furse. _]

While a considerable number of troops were thus employed, a fourthexpedition had to be hurriedly equipped and despatched in quite theopposite direction to punish the Raja of Manipur, a petty State onthe confines of Assam, for the treacherous murder of Mr. Quinton, theChief Commissioner of Assam, and four other British officers. 

Notwithstanding its inaccessibility, two columns, one from Burma, theother from Cachar, quickly and simultaneously reached Manipur, ourcountrymen were avenged, and the administration of the State was takenover for a time by the Government of India. [2]

Towards the end of January the Cesarewitch came to Calcutta, whereI had the honour of being introduced to our august visitor, whoexpressed himself as pleased with what he had seen of the country andthe arrangements made for His Imperial Highness's somewhat hurriedjourney through India. 

In April my military colleague in the Viceroy's Council for fiveyears, and my personal friend, General Sir George Chesney, left India, to my great regret. We had worked together most harmoniously, and, ashe wrote in his farewell letter, there was scarcely a point in regardto the Army in India about which he and I did not agree. 

Sir George was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Brackenbury, who hadbeen Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. I wasrelieved to find that, although in some particulars my new coadjutor'sviews differed from mine, we were in accord upon all essential points, particularly as to the value of the Indian Army and the necessity forits being maintained in a state of preparedness for war. 

From the time I became Commander-in-Chief in Madras until I left Indiathe question of how to render the army in that country as perfect afighting machine as it was possible to make it, was the one whichcaused me the most anxious thought, and to its solution my mostearnest efforts had been at all times directed. 

The first step to be taken towards this end was, it seemed to me, tosubstitute men of the more warlike and hardy races for the Hindustanisepoys of Bengal, the Tamils and Telagus of Madras, and the so-calledMahrattas of Bombay; but I found it difficult to get my viewsaccepted, because of the theory which prevailed that it wasnecessary to maintain an equilibrium between the armies of the threePresidencies, and because of the ignorance that was only too universalwith respect to the characteristics of the different races, whichencouraged the erroneous belief that one Native was as good as anotherfor purposes of war. 

In former days, when the Native Army in India was so much stronger inpoint of numbers than the British Army, and there existed no meansof rapid communication, it was only prudent to guard against apredominance of soldiers of any one creed or nationality; but withBritish troops nearly doubled and the Native Army reduced by more thanone-third, with all the forts and arsenals protected, and nearly thewhole of the Artillery manned by British soldiers, with railway andtelegraph communication from one end of India to the other, with therisk of internal trouble greatly diminished, and the possibility ofexternal complications becoming daily more apparent, circumstances andour requirements were completely altered, and it had become essentialto have in the ranks of our Native Army men who might confidently betrusted to take their share of fighting against a European foe. 

In the British Army the superiority of one regiment over another ismainly a matter of training; the same courage and military instinctare inherent in English, Scotch, and Irish alike, but no comparisoncan be made between the martial value of a regiment recruited amongstthe Gurkhas of Nepal or the warlike races of northern India, and ofone recruited from the effeminate peoples of the south. 

How little this was understood, even by those who had spent a greatpart of their service in India, was a marvel to me; but, then, Ihad had peculiar opportunities of judging of the relative fightingqualities of Natives, and I was in despair at not being able to getpeople to see the matter with my eyes, for I knew that nothing wasmore sure to lead to disaster than to imagine that the whole IndianArmy, as it was then constituted, could be relied on in time of war. 

General Chesney fortunately shared my opinions, and as Lords Dufferinand Lansdowne trusted us, we were able to do a great deal towardsincreasing the efficiency of the Native Army and improving the statusand prospects of the Native soldier. Several companies and regimentscomposed of doubtful material were disbanded, and men of well-knownfighting castes entertained instead. Class regiments were formed, as being more congenial to the men and more conducive to _espritde corps_; recruiting was made the business of carefully selectedofficers who understood Native character, and whose duty it was tobecome acquainted with the various tribes inhabiting the districtsfrom which the recruits for their own regiments were drawn; andspecial arrangements were made with the Nepalese Government by which asufficient number of the best class of men could be obtained for ourthirteen Gurkha regiments. 

The pay of Cavalry soldiers was improved, and it was pointed out tothe Government that an increase to the Infantry soldiers' paycould not be long deferred;[3] the issue of good-conduct pay wasaccelerated; _jagirs_[4] were sanctioned annually for a limited numberof specially distinguished Native officers; full pay was authorizedfor recruits from date of enlistment instead of from the date ofjoining their regiments; field _batta_[5] was sanctioned whenevertroops should be employed beyond sea or on service; pensions weregranted after a shorter period of service than heretofore; medals formeritorious service and good conduct were given in commemoration ofHer Majesty's Jubilee; bronze war medals were sanctioned for allauthorized Government followers; a reserve, which it was arrangedshould undergo an annual course of training, was formed for theArtillery and Infantry; and a system of linked battalions wasorganized, three battalions being grouped together, and the men beinginterchangeable during war-time. 

While the tendency of these alterations and concessions was to makeall ranks happy and contented, their training was carefully attendedto, and, as I have before mentioned, musketry particularly reached avery high standard. 

The one thing left undone, and which I should like to have been ableto accomplish before leaving India, was to induce the Government toarrange for more British officers to be given to the Native regimentsin time of war. Nine to a Cavalry and eight to an Infantry corps maybe sufficient in time of peace, but that number is quite too smallto stand the strain of war. Indian soldiers, like soldiers of everynationality, require to be led; and history and experience teach usthat eastern races (fortunately for us), however brave and accustomedto war, do not possess the qualities that go to make leaders of men, and that Native officers in this respect can never take the placeof British officers. I have known many Natives whose gallantry anddevotion could not be surpassed, but I have never known one who wouldnot have looked to the youngest British officer for support in timeof difficulty and danger. It is therefore most unwise to allow Nativeregiments to enter upon a war with so much smaller a proportion ofBritish officers than is considered necessary for European regiments. I have no doubt whatever of the fighting powers of our best Indiantroops; I have a thorough belief in, and admiration for, Gurkhas, Sikhs, Dogras, Rajputs, Jats, and selected Mahomedans; I thoroughlyappreciate their soldierly qualities; brigaded with British troops, Iwould be proud to lead them against any European enemy; but we cannotexpect them to do with less leading than our own soldiers require, andit is, I maintain, trying them too highly to send them into actionwith the present establishment of British officers. [6]

In the late autumn of 1891 our latest acquisition, the Zhob Valley, was included in my frontier tour, which I had the pleasure ofmaking, for the greater part of the way, in the company of GeneralBrackenbury. He was prevented from getting as far as Quetta by anaccident which laid him up for some time, but not, as he told me, before he had seen enough of the frontier to satisfy him that thetribes were a factor in our system of defence which could not beignored, and that I had not exaggerated the importance of having themon our side. 

During this winter the brilliant little Hunza-Naga campaign tookplace, which has been so graphically described in Mr. Knight's 'WhereThree Empires Meet. ' It was brought about by Russia's intrigues withthe Rulers of the petty States on the northern boundary of Kashmir;and our attention was first roused to the necessity for action by twoBritish officers, who were journeying to India by way of the Pamirsand Gilgit, being forced by Russian soldiers to leave what the leaderof the party called 'newly-acquired Russian territory '[7]--territoryto which Russia had not the shadow of a claim. 

In addition to this unjustifiable treatment of Captain Younghusbandand Lieutenant Davison, Colonel Yanoff crossed the Hindu Kush with hisCossacks by the Korabhut Pass, and, after reconnoitring the country onthe borders of Kashmir, re-crossed the range by the Baroghil Pass. As this was a distinct breach of the promises made by the RussianGovernment, and an infringement of the boundary line as agreed tobetween England and Russia in 1873, it was necessary to take steps toprevent any recurrence of such interference, and a small force wasaccordingly sent against the Chief of Hunza, who had openly declaredhimself in favour of Russia. He made a desperate stand, but waseventually driven from his almost inaccessible position by thedetermined gallantry of our Indian troops, assisted by a Contingentfrom Kashmir. Three Victoria Crosses were given for this business, andmany more were earned, but of necessity there must be a limit to thedisposal of decorations; and in an affair of this kind, in which allproved themselves heroes, each individual must have felt himselfhonoured by the small force being awarded such a large number of thecoveted reward, in proportion to its size. 

We reaped the benefit of having taken this district under our owncontrol when Chitral required to be relieved, and the Hunza-Nagapeople afforded Colonel Kelly such valuable help. 

On the 1st January, 1892, I received an intimation that Her Majestyhad been graciously pleased to bestow a peerage upon me, and the sameday the Secretary of State for India offered me a further extensionof my appointment as Commander-in-Chief--an offer I would gladly haveaccepted, as I knew it had been made with the concurrence of theViceroy, if I could have taken even a few months' leave to England. But during a quarter of a century I had only been able to spendeighteen months out of India, and I felt the need of change of climateand a little rest after so many years of continued hard work. Underthe existing regulations a Commander-in-Chief could have no leave. Lord Cross had tried to remedy this hard rule by bringing in the'Officers' Leave Bill'; but as he informed Lord Lansdowne it wasimpossible to get it through the House of Commons that session, I wasobliged very reluctantly to beg to be allowed to resign my command inthe spring of 1893. 

Before returning to Simla for really the last time, my wife and I madeanother trip to Burma as far as Mandalay, and after this was overwe paid a most interesting visit to Nepal, having received the veryunusual honour of an invitation to Khatmandu from Maharaja BirShumsher Jung Rana Bahadur. 

Khatmandu is about a hundred miles from our frontier station ofSegowli, by a very rough road over a succession of steep, high hillsand along deep, narrow valleys, which would have been quite impossiblefor a lady to travel by but for the excellent arrangements made bythe Nepalese officials; the last descent was the worst of all; weliterally dropped from one rock to the next in some places. But onreaching the base of the mountain all was changed. A beautifullycultivated valley spread itself out before us; comfortable tents wereprepared for our reception, where we were met by some of the Stateofficials; and a perfectly appointed carriage-and-four was waitingto carry us on to Khatmandu, where we were received by the Resident, Lieutenant-Colonel Wylie, and his wife, old friends of ours. Thatafternoon the Maharaja paid me a private visit. 

The next morning the official call was made, which I returned soonafterwards; and in the evening the Maharaja, accompanied by his eldestson and eight of his brothers, all high officers of state, werepresent at Mrs. Wylie's reception, wearing military frock-coats andforage-caps. They all spoke English fluently; their manners were thoseof well-bred gentlemen, easy and quiet, as free from awkwardness asfrom forwardness; each, coming up in turn, talked very pleasantlyto Lady Roberts for a time, and then made way for someone else. TheMaharaja is extremely musical, and has several well-trained bands, taught by an English bandmaster; three of them were in attendance, andwere directed to play selections from our favourite operas, and then anumber of the beautiful plaintive Nepalese airs. Altogether, we passeda most agreeable evening. 

The following day a review of all the troops (18, 000 men and 78guns)[8] was held on a ground one mile in length by half a mile inbreadth, perfectly level and well turfed. It would be considered afine parade-ground for the plains of India, and must have entailed aconsiderable expenditure of time, labour, and money to make in such ahilly place as Khatmandu. 

On reaching the ground, I was received by the Maharaja and DebShamsher Jung, the eldest of his many brothers, and the nominalCommander-in-Chief of the army; we rode along the line together, and the march past then began. Everything was done with the utmostprecision; there was no fuss or talking, and from first to last not asingle bugle sound was heard, showing how carefully officers and menhad been drilled. I was told that the executive Commander-in-Chief, the third brother, by name Chandra Shamsher, had almost lived on theparade-ground for weeks before my arrival. The Maharaja's sonsand brothers, who all knew their work, and were evidently fond ofsoldiering, commanded the several divisions and brigades. 

The troops were not, perhaps, turned out quite so smartly as thosein our service, and several of the officers were old and feeble; butthese were the only faults perceptible, and I came to the conclusionthat the great majority of the 18, 000 men were quite as good as theGurkhas we enlist; and I could not help thinking that they would be avaluable addition to our strength in the event of war. 

General Chandra Shamsher is a very red-hot soldier. He said to mywife: 'Lady Roberts, when are the Russians coming? I wish they wouldmake haste. We have 40, 000 soldiers in Nepal ready for war, and thereis no one to fight!'

The next day a grand durbar was held, at which the King (the MaharajaDhiraj, as he is called) presided; he was an unusually handsome ladof about eighteen years of age, fairer than most Nepalese, and veryrefined looking. As on all previous occasions, everyone wore uniformexcept the King, who had on a perfectly plain dress of spotless white. Great deference is outwardly paid to the Dhiraj, but he has no power, and is never consulted in matters of State, being considered toosacred to be troubled with mundane affairs. Although a mere boy, hehad four wives, two of them daughters of the Maharaja Bir ShamsherJung. 

After the durbar, I was shown over the principal school and hospital;both appeared to be well conducted, and evidently no expense wasspared upon them. I was then taken to a magazine, in which were anumber of guns of various calibre and any amount of ammunition. I wastold there were several other magazines, which I had not time to see, and a few miles from Khatmandu extensive workshops, where all kinds ofmunitions of war were manufactured. 

That evening, accompanied by Colonel and Mrs. Wylie, we attended areception at the Maharaja's palace. The durbar hall, which was filledwith men in uniform, was of beautiful proportions, and very handsomelydecorated and furnished. After the usual introductions and someconversation with the chief officers, we were invited to visit theMaharani in her own apartments, and having ascended a flight of stepsand passed through numerous corridors and luxuriously furnished rooms, we were shown into a spacious apartment, the prevailing colour ofwhich was rose, lighted by lamps of the same colour. The Maharaniwas sitting on a sofa at the further end of the room, gorgeouslyapparelled in rose-coloured gauze dotted over with golden spangles;her skirts were very voluminous, and she wore magnificent jewels onher head and about her person. Two Maids of Honour stood behind her, holding fans, and dressed in the same colour as their mistress, butwithout jewels. On each side of her, forming a semicircle, weregrouped the ladies of the Court, all arrayed in artisticallycontrasting colours; they were more or less pretty and refinedlooking, and the Maharani herself was extremely handsome. My wife wasplaced by her side on the sofa, and carried on a long conversationwith her through one of the ladies who spoke Hindustani and acted asInterpreter. The Maharani presented Lady Roberts with a beautifullittle Chinese pug-dog, and the Maharaja gave me a gold-mounted_kookri_ (Gurkha knife). After this little ceremony there was a granddisplay of fireworks, and we took our leave. 

Nothing could exceed the kindness we met with during our stay inNepal. The Maharaja endeavoured in every way to make our visitenjoyable, and his brothers vied with each other in their efforts todo us honour. It was impressed upon me that the Nepalese army was atthe disposal of the Queen-Empress, and hopes were repeatedly expressedthat we would make use of it in the event of war. 

Notwithstanding the occasional differences which have occurred betweenour Government and the Nepal Durbar, I believe that, ever since 1817, when the Nepal war was brought to a successful conclusion by Sir DavidOchterlony, the Gurkhas have had a great respect and liking for us:but they are in perpetual dread of our taking their country, and theythink the only way to prevent this is not to allow anyone to enterit except by invitation, and to insist upon the few thus favouredtravelling by the difficult route that we traversed. Nepal can neverbe required by us for defensive purposes, and as we get our best classof Native soldiers thence, everything should, I think, be done to showour confidence in the Nepalese alliance, and convince them that wehave no ulterior designs on the independence of their kingdom. 

On leaving Nepal we made a short tour in the Punjab, and then went toSimla for the season. 

One of the subjects which chiefly occupied the attention of theGovernment at this time was the unfriendly attitude of the Ruler ofAfghanistan towards us. Abdur Rahman Khan appeared to have entirelyforgotten that he owed everything to us, and that, but for our supportand lavish aid in money and munitions of war, he could neither havegained nor held the throne of Kabul. We refused to Sher Ali much thatwe could have gracefully granted and that would have made him a firmfriend, but in our dealings with Abdur Rahman we rushed into the otherextreme, and showered favours upon him; in fact, we made too muchof him, and allowed him to get out of hand. The result was that hemistook the patience and forbearance with which we bore his fitsof temper for weakness, and was encouraged in an overweening andaltogether unjustifiable idea of his own importance; he consideredthat he ought to be treated as the equal of the Shah of Persia, andkeenly resented not being allowed to communicate direct with HerMajesty's Ministers. 

In the hope of being able to establish more satisfactory relationswith the Amir, Lord Lansdowne invited him to come to India, and, on His Highness pleading that his country was in too disturbed acondition to admit of his leaving it, the Viceroy expressed hiswillingness to meet him on the frontier, but Abdur Rahman evaded thisarrangement also under one pretext or another. It was at last proposedto send me with a Mission as far as Jalalabad, a proposal I gladlyaccepted, for I was sanguine enough to hope that, by personalexplanation, I should be able to remove the suspicions which theAmir evidently entertained as to the motives for our action on thefrontier, and to convince him that our help in the time of his needmust depend upon our mutually agreeing in what manner that help shouldbe given, and on arrangements being completed beforehand to enable ourtroops to be rapidly transported to the threatened points. 

Abdur Rahman agreed to receive me in the autumn, and expressedpleasure at the prospect of meeting me, but eventually he apparentlybecame alarmed at the size of the escort by which the Governmentthought it necessary that I, as Commander-in-Chief, should beaccompanied; and, as the time approached for the Mission to start, he informed Lord Lansdowne that his health would not permit of hisundertaking the journey to Jalalabad. 

Thus the opportunity was lost to which I had looked forward as achance for settling many vexed questions, and I am afraid that therehas been very little improvement in our relations with Abdur Rahmansince then, and that we are no nearer the completion of our plans forthe defence of his kingdom than we were four years ago[9]--a defencewhich (and this cannot be too strongly impressed upon the Amir) itwould be impossible for us to aid him to carry through unless Kabuland Kandahar are brought into connexion with the railway system ofIndia. 

In the autumn, just before we left Simla, our friends bestowed upon mywife a farewell gift in the shape of a very beautiful diamond braceletand a sum of money for her fund for 'Homes in the Hills, and Officers'Hospitals, ' made doubly acceptable by the kind words with which LordLansdowne, on behalf of the donors, presented it. Shortly afterwardswe bade a regretful adieu to our happy home of so many years, and madeour way to the Punjab for a final visit. 

We spent a few days at Peshawar, and then went to Rawal Pindi tobe present at a Camp of Exercise, and see how the works underconstruction for the protection of the arsenal were progressing. These works had been put in hand in 1890, when, according to myrecommendation, it had been decided not to fortify Multan. No place inthe Punjab appeared to my mind to possess the same military value asRawal Pindi, its strategical importance with regard to the rightflank of the frontier line being hardly inferior to that of Quetta inrelation to the left flank; but of late the advisability of completingthe works had been questioned by my colleagues in Council, greatlyto my concern, for I felt that it would be unwise to leave theelaboration of the defences of such a position until war should beimminent. [10]

In January, 1893, a series of farewell entertainments were organizedfor me at Lahore by the people of the Punjab, as touching as theywere highly appreciated, and intensely gratifying. Amongst the crowdsassembled in the Town Hall to bid me good-bye, I was greatly pleasedto see, besides the Maharaja of Kashmir, Chiefs and men from beyondour frontier, from Kuram, from the confines of Baluchistan, even fromthe wilds of Waziristan; for their presence on this occasion I felt tobe, not only a proof of their kindly feeling towards me personally, and of their approval of the measures for their safety and welfarethat I had always advocated, but a very distinct sign of the muchto be desired change that was taking place in the sentiments of theborder tribes towards us as a nation. 

Four addresses were presented to me, from the Sikh*, Hindu*, Mahomedan*, and European* communities of the Punjab, respectively, which I willventure to give in the Appendix, as I feel sure that the spirit ofloyalty which pervades them will be a revelation to many, and a sourceof satisfaction to all who are interested in the country to which weowe so much of our present greatness, and which I conceive to be thebrightest jewel in England's crown. 

(See Appendices XII, XIII, XIV, AND XV. )

It was a wonderful and moving scene upon which we looked from theplatform of the Town Hall on this memorable occasion, made up asit was of such different elements, each race and creed easilyrecognizable from their different costumes and characteristics, butall united by the same kindly desire to do honour to their departingfriend, or comrade, for there were a great number of old soldierspresent. 

At each place that we visited on our way to Calcutta there was thesame display of kindly regret at our departure; friends assembled tosee us off at the railway-stations, bands played 'Auld lang syne, ' andhearty cheers speeded us on our way. 

In February we went to Lucknow for a few days, when the Talukdars ofOudh gave my wife and me an entertainment on a very splendid scale inthe Wingfield Park, and presented me with an address[11] and a swordof honour. 

On our return to Calcutta, just before we left for England, theEuropean community entertained me at a dinner, at which more than twohundred were present, presided over by Sir James Mackay, K. C. I. E. , Chairman of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. Sir James was fartoo kind and eulogistic in speaking of my services, but for hisappreciative allusion to my wife I could only feel deeply gratifiedand thankful. After dinner a reception was given to Lady Roberts andmyself, at which the Viceroy and Lady Lansdowne and all the principalNative and European residents of Calcutta were assembled. Anaddress[12] was presented to me on this never-to be-forgottenoccasion, in which, to my supreme satisfaction, the Native noblemenand gentlemen expressed their hearty approval of what had been doneduring my tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief to strengthen thedefences of the frontier and render the army in India efficient, and declared that 'we cheerfully bear our share of the cost, as inpossession of these protections against aggressions from without webelieve all who dwell within the borders of the land will find theirbest guarantee for peace, and in peace the best safeguard they andtheir children can possess to enable them to pass their lives inhappiness and prosperity, and escape the misery and ruin which followwar and invasion. '

We travelled to Bombay _viâ_ Jeypur and Jodhpur. At both places wewere royally entertained by the Rulers of those states, and my staffand I were given excellent sport amongst the wild boar, which was muchenjoyed by all, particularly by my son, who, having joined the King'sRoyal Rifles at Rawal Pindi, was attached to me as A. D. C. During mylast six months in India, and had not before had an opportunity oftasting the joys of pig-sticking. 

At Jodhpur my friend the Maharaja Sir Pertap Sing gave us a signalproof that the ancient valour of the Rajputs had not deteriorated inthe present day. I had wounded a fine boar, and on his making for somerocky ground, where I could hardly have followed him on horseback, Ishouted to Sir Pertap to get between him and the rocks, and turn himin my direction. The Maharaja promptly responded, but just as he cameface-to-face with the boar, his horse put his foot into a hole andfell; the infuriated animal rushed on the fallen rider, and, beforethe latter could extricate himself, gave him a severe wound in the legwith his formidable tushes. On going to his assistance, I found SirPertap bleeding profusely, but standing erect, facing the boar andholding the creature (who was upright on his hind-legs) at arms'length by his mouth. The spear without the impetus given by the horseat full speed is not a very effective weapon against the tough hideof a boar's back, and on realizing that mine did not make muchimpression, Pertap Sing, letting go his hold of the boar's mouth, quickly seized his hind-legs, and turned him over on his back, crying:'_Maro, sahib, maro!_' ('Strike, sir, strike!') which I instantly did, and killed him. Anyone who is able to realize the strength and weightof a wild boar will appreciate the pluck and presence of mind of SirPertap Sing in this performance. Fortunately, my wife and daughter, who had been following the pig-stickers in a light cart, were close athand, and we were able to drive my friend home at once. The wound wasfound to be rather a bad one, but it did not prevent Sir Pertap fromattending some tent-pegging and other amusements in the afternoon, though he had to be carried to the scene. 

A few months after my return to England the boar's head arrived, set up, and with a silver plate attached to it, on which was aninscription commemorating the adventure. 

At Ahmedabad, where the train stopped while we lunched, I waspresented with an address by the President and members of theMunicipality, who, 'with loyal devotion to Her Imperial Majesty theQueen and Empress of India, to whose glorious reign we sincerely wisha continuance of brilliant prosperity, ' expressed their hope that LadyRoberts and I would have 'a happy voyage home and enjoyment of perfecthealth and prosperity in future. '

The day before we left Bombay for England, the members of the BycullaClub gave me a parting dinner. It was with great difficulty I couldget through my speech in response to the toast of my health on thatoccasion, for, pleased and grateful as I was at this last mark offriendship and approval from my countrymen, I could not help feelinginexpressibly sad and deeply depressed at the thought uppermost inmy mind, that the time had come to separate myself from India and mygallant comrades and friends, British and Native. 

In dwelling on the long list of farewell addresses and entertainmentswith which I was honoured on leaving India, I feel that I may belaying myself open to the charge of egotism; but in writing of one'sown experiences it is difficult to avoid being egotistical, anddistasteful as it is to me to think that I may be considered so, I would rather that, than that those who treated me so kindly andgenerously should deem me unmindful or ungrateful. 

Thus ended forty-one years in India. No one can, I think, wonder thatI left the country with heartfelt regret. The greater number of mymost valued friendships had been formed there; from almost everyonewith whom I had been associated, whether European or Native, civilianor soldier, I had experienced unfailing kindness, sympathy, andsupport; and to the discipline, bravery, and devotion to duty of theArmy in India, in peace and war, I felt that I owed whatever successit was my good fortune to achieve. 

[Footnote 1: The late Lieutenant-General Sir W. K. Elles, K. C. B. ]

[Footnote 2: A detachment of the Calcutta Volunteer Rifles, at theparticular request of the regiment, took part in the expedition, anddid good service. ]

[Footnote 3: The pay of the Native Infantry has been suitablyincreased since I left India. ]

[Footnote 4: _Jagirs_ are grants of land. ]

[Footnote 5: _Batta_, extra allowances given to Native soldiers whenproceeding on field service. ]

[Footnote 6: During the Mutiny the casualties amongst the Britishofficers with the six Punjab regiments which saw the most fightingamounted to 60 per cent. ! Luckily, these were able to be replaced byofficers belonging to corps which had mutinied. This supply, however, has long since been used up, and it behoves the Government eitherto provide an adequate reserve of officers, or to arrange for asufficient number being sent out from England whenever India is likelyto be engaged in a serious war. 

+---------------------------------------------------------------------+| | Number of | CASUALTIES || | Officers +------------------------------------------+| CORPS. | who did |Killed | Died | | | || | Duty with | in | of |Died of | | In- || | each Corps. |Action. |Wounds. |Disease. |Wounded. |valided. |+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+| 1st Punjab | | | | | | || Cavalry (1 | | | | | | || squadron) | 12 | 1 | ... | ... | 6 | 7 || 2nd Punjab | | | | | || Cavalry | 20 | 1 | ... | ... | 5 | 4 || 5th Punjab | | | | | | || Cavalry (1 | | | | | | || squadron) | 7 | 1 | 1 | ... | ... | ... || 1st Punjab | | | | | | || Infantry | 15 | 3 | ... | ... | 6 | ... || 2nd Punjab | | | | | | || Infantry | 22 | 3 | ... | ... | 4 | 3 || 4th Punjab | | | | | | || Infantry | 24 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 8 | ... |+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+| Total | 100 | 11 | 4 | 2 | 29 | 14 |+-------------+------------+-------+-------+--------+--------+--------+]

[Footnote 7: Captain Younghushand was at Bozai-Gumbaz, and LieutenantDavison on the Alichur Pamirs, both places being south of the Aksubranch of the Oxus, flowing from the Little Pamir Lake. ]

[Footnote 8: The Infantry comprised twenty-four battalions drawn up inline of quarter columns. The Artillery consisted of one battery (six7-pounders) carried on elephants, six batteries (six guns each, 5-pounders and 7-pounders) dragged by soldiers, and six batteries (sixguns each, 3-pounders and 5-pounders) carried by Bhutia coolies. ]

[Footnote 9: I am not unmindful of the visit which Sir Mortimer Durandpaid to Kabul after I had left India, but on that occasion, I believe, the question of the defence of Afghanistan was not discussed. ]

[Footnote 10: The works were stopped after I left India, but not, Iwas glad to think, before the redoubts had been finished, with thecommunications thereto. The reasons given were that a change ofplans was necessary for economy's sake, and that the construction offortifications might induce the Natives to think we were doubtful ofthe continuance of our supremacy. As regarded the first, I explainedthat the total outlay for works and armaments was estimated at only£332, 274--considerably less than one half the cost of a Britishline-of-battle ship; and as to the second, I urged that an argumentof this sort against frontier defences would hardly bear examination;that the possibility of external attack was freely discussed in everynewspaper; that Russian movements and frontier difficulties wereknown and commented on in every bazaar; that the construction offortifications in support of the Ruling Power had been an Orientalpractice from time immemorial; that our action in this respect was atleast as likely to instil the idea that we meant to retain our easternpossessions at any cost, as to give an impression of weakness; thatthe progressive re-organization and mobilization of our army were wellknown to have reference to service beyond the frontier; and that wehad extended our confidence in this respect to Native Princes byencouraging them to train their own troops and fit them to take theirplace in line with ours. ]

[Footnote 11: Given in the Appendix. (Appendix XVI. )]

[Footnote 12: _Ibid. _ (Appendix XVII. )]

 * * * * *

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I. 

(See Chapter XIV, Footnote 4. )

The 9th Native Infantry, to which Captain Donald Stewart belonged, wasdivided between Aligarh, Mainpuri, Bulandshahr, and Etawa, Stewartbeing with the Head-Quarters of the regiment at Aligarh. 

The news from Meerut and Delhi had caused a certain amount of alarmamongst the residents at Aligarh, and arrangements had been made forsending away the ladies and children, but, owing to the confidenceplaced in the men of the 9th, none of them had left the station. Happen what might in other regiments, the officers were certain thatthe 9th could never be faithless to their salt! The Native officersand men were profuse in their expressions of loyalty, and as a proofof their sincerity they arrested and disarmed several rebel sepoys, who were making for their homes in Oudh and the adjoining districts. As a further proof, they gave up the regimental pandit forendeavouring to persuade them to mutiny. He was tried by aCourt-Martial composed of European and Native officers, found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried out that sameafternoon. It was intended that the regiment should witness theexecution, but it did not reach the gaol in time; the men weretherefore marched back to their lines, and Stewart, in his capacity ofInterpreter, was ordered to explain to them the purpose for whichthey had been paraded. While he was speaking a man of his own companyshouted out something. Stewart did not hear the words, and no onewould repeat them. The parade was then dismissed, when the same man, tearing off his uniform, called upon his comrades not to serve aGovernment which had hanged a Brahmin. A general uproar ensued. TheCommanding Officer ordered the few Sikhs in the regiment to seize theringleader; they did so, but not being supported by the rest theyreleased him. The Subadar Major was then told to arrest the mutineer, but he took no notice whatever of the order. This Native officer hadbeen upwards of forty years in the regiment and was entitled to hisfull pension. He had been a member of the Court-Martial which triedthe pandit, and, though a Brahmin himself, had given his vote infavour of the prisoner being hanged; moreover he was a personal friendof all the officers. Stewart, who had been for many years Adjutant, knew him intimately, and believed implicitly in his loyalty. The manhad constantly discussed the situation with Stewart and others, andhad been mainly instrumental in disarming the sepoys who had passedthrough Aligarh; and yet when the hour of trial came he failed ascompletely as the last-joined recruit. 

The British officers went amongst their men and tried to keep order, but the excitement rapidly spread; some of the young soldiers began toload, and the older ones warned the officers that it was time for themto be off. The sepoys then plundered the treasury, broke open the gaoldoors, released the prisoners, and marched in a body towards Delhi. [1]

Stewart, being thus left without a regiment, attached himself tothe magistrate of the district, and took command of a small body ofvolunteers sent from Agra by the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-WestProvinces, to aid the civil authorities in restoring order. Not caringfor this work, and thinking he might be more usefully employed, Stewart made up his mind to find his way to Delhi; his idea was to tryand get there _viâ_ Meerut, but before deciding on the route, he wentto Agra, where he had been invited by the Lieutenant-Governor. At theinterview, Mr. Colvin advised Stewart to travel _viâ_ Muttra, asthe safer of the two routes, and told him that despatches had beenreceived from the Government in Calcutta for the Commander-in-Chief, then understood to be with the army before Delhi. At the same time theLieutenant-Governor impressed upon Stewart that he was not giving himany order to go, and that if he undertook to carry the despatches itmust be a voluntary act on his part, entailing no responsibility onthe Government of the North-West Provinces. 

Stewart accepted the duty, and took his leave of Mr. Colvin as the sunwas setting on the 18th June, delighted at the chance of being ableto join the army before Delhi. He reached Muttra, thirty-five milesdistant, without mishap. The streets of this city were crowdedwith men, all carrying arms of some sort; they showed no signs ofhostility, however, and even pointed out to Stewart the house of whichhe was in search. The owner of this house, to whose care he had beencommended by the Agra authorities, was a Brahmin holding an officialposition in the town. This Native gentleman behaved with civility, but did not attempt to conceal his embarrassment at the presence of aBritish officer, or his relief when Stewart announced his intention ofresuming his journey an hour or so before daybreak. 

The Brahmin provided him with two sowars belonging to the Raja ofBhartpur with orders to accompany him as far as Kosi. They werecut-throat-looking individuals, and Stewart felt rather inclined todispense with their services, but, thinking it unwise to show anysigns of distrust, he accepted them with the best grace he could. 

After riding fifteen or sixteen miles, Stewart's horse fell fromexhaustion, on which his so-called escort laughed uproariously, andgalloped off, leaving our poor traveller to his own devices. 

Believing the horse could not recover, Stewart took off the saddle andbridle and tramped to the nearest village, where he hoped to beable to buy or hire an animal of some kind on which to continue hisjourney. No one, however, would help him, and he was forced to seizea donkey which he found grazing in a field hard by. About sunset hereached Kosi, thirty-seven miles from Muttra. The _tehsildar_[2]received him courteously, and gave him some bread and milk, but wouldnot hear of his staying for the night. He told him that his appearancein the town was causing considerable excitement, and that he could notbe responsible for his safety. Stewart was much exhausted after hishot ride, but as the _tehsildar_ stood firm there was nothing for himto do but to continue his journey, and he consented to start if hewere provided with a horse. The _tehsildar_ promptly offered his ownpony, and as soon as it was dark Stewart set out for the Jaipur camp. His progress during the night was slow, and it was not until eighto'clock the next morning that he reached his destination, where he washospitably received by the Political Agent, Major Eden, who introducedhim to the Maharaja's Wazir. This official at first promised to giveStewart a small escort as far as Delhi, but on various pretexts he puthim off from day to day. At the end of a week Stewart saw that theWazir either could not or would not give him an escort, and thinkingit useless to delay any longer, he made up his mind to start withoutone. 

There were several refugees in the camp, and one of them, Mr. Ford, collector and magistrate of Gurgaon, offered to join Stewart in hisventure. 

Stewart and his companion left the Jaipur camp on the afternoon ofthe 27th June, and reached Palwal soon after dark. Ford sent for the_kotwal_, [3] who was one of his own district officials, and asked himfor food. This was produced, but the _kotwal_ besought the _sahibs_ tomove on without delay, telling them that their lives were in imminentdanger, as there was a rebel regiment in the town, and he was quiteunable to protect them. So they continued their journey, and, escapingfrom one or two threatened attacks by robbers, reached Badshahpur inthe morning. Here they rested during the heat of the day, being kindlytreated by the villagers, who were mostly Hindus. 

The travellers were now not far from Delhi, but could hardly proceedfurther without a guide, and the people of Badshahpur declined toprovide one. They pleaded that they were men of peace, and could notpossibly leave their village in such evil times. Suddenly a man fromthe crowd, offered his services. His appearance was against him, andthe villagers declared that he was a notorious cattle-lifter, who wasstrongly suspected of having set fire to the collector's (Mr. Ford's)office at Gurgaon, in order that the evidences of his offences mightbe destroyed. Not a pleasant _compagnon de voyage_, but there wasnothing for it but to accept his offer. 

As soon as it was dark a start was made, and at daybreak on the29th the minarets of Delhi rose out of the morning mist, while anoccasional shell might be seen bursting near the city. 

On reaching the Hansi road, the guide, by name Jumna Das, who, inspite of appearances, had proved true to his word, stopped and said hecould go no further. He would not take any reward that it was then inthe power of Stewart or Ford to offer him, but he expressed a hopethat, when the country became settled, the slight service he hadperformed would not be forgotten. They gratefully assured him on thispoint, and thanked him cordially, giving him at the same time a lettertestifying to his valuable service. Stewart then went to the nearestvillage, and for a small reward found a man who undertook to conductthem safely to one of our piquets. 

One curious circumstance remarked by Stewart throughout the ride wasthat the peasants and villagers, though not generally hostile to him, had evidently made up their minds that the British _raj_ was at anend, and were busily engaged in rendering their villages defensible, to meet the troubles and disturbances which they considered wouldsurely follow on the resumption of Native rule. 

It is difficult to over-estimate the pluck and enterprise displayedby Stewart during this most adventurous ride. It was a marvel that heever reached Delhi. His coming there turned out to be the best thingthat ever happened to him, for the qualities which prompted him toundertake and carried him through his dangerous journey, marked him asa man worthy of advancement and likely to do well. 

[Footnote 1: While the regiment was in the act of mutinying one of thesepoys left the parade-ground, and running round to all the civilians'houses, told the occupants what had happened, and warned them to maketheir escape. He asked for no reward, and was never seen again. ]

[Footnote 2: Native magistrate. ]

[Footnote 3: City magistrate. ]

 * * * * *

APPENDIX II. 

(These two memoranda are referred to in the note in Chapter XXV, Footnote 6. )

_Memorandum by Lieutenant McLeod Innes. _

'1. Sir H. Lawrence joined at Lucknow about the end of March, 1857, succeeding Mr. Coverley Jackson in the Chief Commissionership. 

'2. On his arrival he found himself in the midst of troubles, of whichthe most important were these:

 I. A general agitation of the empire, from the discontent of the soldiery. 

 II. A weak European force at Oudh, with all the military arrangements defective. 

 III. Grievous discontent among several classes of the population of Oudh, viz. , the nobility of Lucknow and the members and retainers of the Royal Family, the official classes, the old soldiery, and the entire country population, noble and peasant alike. 

'3. This third was due to disobedience of, or departure from, theinstructions laid down by Government at the annexation, as veryclearly shown in Lord Stanley's letter of October 13, 1858. Thepromised pensions had either been entirely withheld or very sparinglydoled out; the old officials were entirely without employment;three-quarters of the army the same; while the country Barons had, byforced interpretation of rules, been deprived of the mass of theirestates, which had been parcelled out among their followers, who, forclannish reasons, were more indignant at the spoliation and loss ofpower and place of their Chiefs than they were glad for their ownindividual acquisitions. 

'4. The weakness of the European force could not be helped; it wasdeemed politic to show the country that the annexation did not requireforce. 

'5. But the inefficiency of the military arrangements arose from merewant of skill, and was serious, under the threatening aspect of thepolitical horizon. 

'6. The discontent of the province, and the coming general storm, hadalready found vent in the brigandage of Fuzl Ali, and the seditions ofthe Fyzabad Moulvie. 

'7. And with all these Sir H. Lawrence had to grapple immediately onhis arrival. 

'8. But I may safely say that ten days saw the mass of them disappear. The Fyzabad Moulvie had been seized and imprisoned. Fuzl Ali had beensurrounded and slain. The promised pensions had been paid, by Sir H. Lawrence's peremptory orders, to the members and retainers of theRoyal Family. A recognition had been published of the fair rights ofthe old Oudh officials to employment in preference to immigrants fromour old provinces, and instructions had been issued for giving iteffect. The disbanded soldiers of the Royal Army of Oudh were promisedpreference in enlistment in the local corps and the police, anda reorganization and increase to the latter, which were almostimmediately sanctioned, gave instant opportunities for the fulfilmentof the first instalment of these promises. While last, but not least, durbars were held, in which Sir Henry Lawrence was able to proclaimhis views and policy, by which the landholders should be reinstated inthe possessions which they held at the annexation, the basis on whichthe instructions had been originally issued, which had been hithertopractically ignored, but to which he pledged himself to give effect. 

'9. To strengthen his military position, he placed Artillery with theEuropean Infantry; he distributed his Irregular Cavalry; he examinedthe city, decided on taking possession of the Muchee Bawn andgarrisoning it as a fort; and summoned in Colonel Fisher and CaptainGeorge Hardinge; and with them, Brigadier Handscombe and MajorAnderson, consulted and arranged for future plans against the stormswhich he saw to be impending. 

'10. Much of this, and his policy for remaining in Oudh, and theconduct of the defence of Lucknow, I know from recollections of whathe occasionally let drop to me in his confidential conversations whileinspecting the Muchee Bawn. He told me that nearly the whole armywould go; that he did not think the Sikhs would go; that in everyregiment there were men that, with proper management, would remainentirely on our side; and that, therefore, he meant to segregate fromthe rest of the troops the Sikhs and selected men, and to do hisbest to keep them faithful allies when the rest should go; that, ifCawnpore should hold out, we would not be attacked; but that if itshould fall, we would be invested, and more or less closely besieged;that no troops could come to our relief before the middle of August;that the besieging forces would, he thought, be confined to thesepoys, for the people of the country had always liked our Europeanofficers, whom they had frequently had to bless for the safety oftheir lives and the honour of their families; and the whole Hindupopulation had a lively recollection of our friendly line of conductin the late quarrel with the Mussulmans regarding the HunnoomanGurhee; that to hold out where we were was necessary, for theslightest appearance of yielding, or of not showing a bold front, would result in annihilation; that to hold out we must get provisions;that to got provisions and prepare for an efficient defence we mustkeep open our communication with the country, and keep the city quiet;that to the former end the retention of the cantonment was necessary, and of the Muchee Bawn to the latter, while the site of the permanentdefences, in case of the need of concentration, should be theResidency. 

'11. All this I know, as before said, from Sir Henry Lawrence's owncasual and hurried remarks to me. Whether they are officially recordedanywhere I do not know; but they must have been written in lettersto various persons, and repeated to others of his subordinates atLucknow. I mention these matters thus early, as although the facts onwhich they bear did not immediately occur, still, Sir Henry Lawrencehad prescience of them, and had decided on his line of policy. 

'12. I understand, further, but not on authentic grounds, that SirHenry wrote at a very early stage to Sir H. Wheeler, urging him toconstruct entrenchments at the magazine at Cawnpore, and to ensure hiscommand of the boats, whatever might happen; that he wrote earlyto the Government, entreating them to divert one of the Europeanregiments in the course of relief, and divide it between Cawnpore andAllahabad; and that subsequently he urged on Government to employ thetroops of the Persian expedition in Bengal, and to stop the Chineseforce for the same end, and to subsidize some of the Nepal troops forthe protection of our older provinces east of Oudh. 

'13. To revert to the narrative, the measures already mentionedso entirely pacified the province, that, in spite of the previousdiscontent, the previous troubles, the proverbial turbulence of itsinhabitants, and the increasing agitation throughout the empire, therewas no difficulty experienced in collecting the revenue by the closeof April. And the subsequent disturbances were, as will be shown, entirely due to the soldiery, and, till long after Sir Henry's death, participated in only by them, by the city ruffians, and by a few ofthe Mussulman families of the country population. The mass of the citypeople and the entire Hindu population held aloof, and would havenothing to say to the outbreak; and, with one single exception, everyTalookdar, to whom the chance offered itself, aided, more or lessactively, in the protection of European fugitives. This phase in thecharacter of the disturbances in Oudh is not generally known; but itis nevertheless true, and is due emphatically and solely, under DivineProvidence, to the benignant personal character and the popular policyof Sir Henry Lawrence. 

'14. The 1st of May saw our disturbances commence with the mutiny ofthe 7th Oudh Irregular Infantry. This, its suppression, and the durbarin which he distributed rewards and delivered a speech on the aspectof affairs, have been fully described elsewhere, and need not berepeated by me. 

'15. The durbar was held on the twelfth. I am not aware whether he hadany intelligence at that time of the Meerut outbreak. The telegrams, when they did arrive, were vague; but he indubitably kept on his guardimmediately on receiving them. The Cavalry were piqueted between thecantonments and the Residency, and the Infantry and Artillery werekept prepared for movement. His plans were evidently already decided;but they were to be effected simultaneously and not successively, and the movements of the Europeans were somewhat dependent on thearrangements of the Quarter-master-General's Department. It was notuntil the sixteenth that the tents required for the 32nd were ready;and the morning of the 17th May saw an entirely new and effectivedisposition of the troops. Half the Europeans were at the Residency, commanding the Iron Bridge; half, with the Artillery, were at thesouth end of the cantonments; the bridge of boats was moved and undercontrol, while the Muchee Bawn, not yet sufficiently cleansed fromits old conglomeration of filth, was garrisoned by a selected body ofNative troops. The whole of these dispositions could not have beeneffected at an earlier date, and Sir Henry would not do them piecemealor successively. Simultaneous, they were effective, and tended toparalyze any seditious plots that may have been hatching. Successiveand piecemeal, they would have incited the sepoys to mutiny and theturbulent to insurrection. '

_Memorandum, 18th May, inserted in Sir Henry's own hand in his ledgerbook. _

'Time is everything just now. Time, firmness, promptness, conciliation, and prudence; every officer, each individual European, high and low, may at this crisis prove most useful, or even dangerous. A firm and cheerful aspect must be maintained--there must be nobustle, no appearance of alarm, still less of panic; but, at the sametime, there must be the utmost watchfulness and promptness; everywherethe first germ of insurrection must be put down instantly. Ten men mayin an hour quell a row which, after a day's delay, may take weeksto put down. I wish this point to be well understood. In preservinginternal tranquillity, the Chiefs and people of substance may be mostusefully employed at this juncture; many of them have as much to loseas we have. Their property, at least, is at stake. Many of them havearmed retainers--some few are good shots and have double-barrelledguns. For instance [name illegible], can hit a bottle at 100 yards. Heis with the ordinary soldiers. I want a dozen such men, European orNative, to arm their own people and to make _thannahs_ of their ownhouses, or some near position, and preserve tranquillity within acircuit around them. '

 * * * * *

APPENDIX III. 

(Referred to in Chapter XLVI, Footnote 1. )

The column was composed as follows:

 _Men. _ _Guns. _

F Battery, A Brigade, R. H. A. , commanded by Colonel W. Sterling 135 6

One squadron 10th Hussars, commanded by Major Bulkeley 102

G Battery, 3rd Brigade, R. A. , commanded by Major Sydney Parry 83 3

2nd Battalion 8th Foot, commanded by Colonel Barry Drew 620

Wing 72nd Highlanders, commandedby Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow 405 ----- --Total British troops 1, 345 9

12th Bengal Cavalry, commandedby Colonel Hugh Gough, V. C. 337

No. 1 Mountain Battery, commanded by Captain Kelso 136 4

7th Company Bengal Sappers and Miners 113

2nd (Punjab Frontier Force) Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-ColonelTyndall 647

5th (Punjab Frontier Force) Infantry, commanded by Major McQueen 502

5th (Punjab Frontier Force) Gurkhas, commanded by Major Fitz-Hugh 438

21st Punjab Infantry, commanded by Major Collis 496

23rd Pioneers, commanded by Colonel Currie 650

29th Punjab Infantry, commanded by Colonel J. J. Gordon 671 ----- --Total Natives 3, 990 4 ----- --Grand total 5, 335 13

Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Lindsay commanded the Artillery, ColonelÆneas Perkins was Commanding Royal Engineer. Colonel Hugh Goughcommanded the Cavalry, Brigadier-Generals Cobbe (17th Foot) andThelwall (21st Punjab Infantry) the two Infantry brigades. MajorW. Galbraith (85th Foot) was Assistant-Adjutant-General; MajorH. Collett, Assistant, and Captains 'Dick' Kennedy and F. Carr, Deputy-Assistant-Quartermasters-General. Captains G. De C. Morton andA. Scott, V. C. , Brigade-Majors. Captain A. Badcock, Chief Commissariatofficer; Captain J. Colquhoun, R. A. , Commissary of Ordnance; MajorMoriarty, Captain Goad, and Lieutenant F. Maisey, Transport officers;Captain A. Wynne (51st Foot), Superintendent of Field Telegraphs;Captain R. Woodthorpe, R. E. , Superintendent of Surveys;Deputy-Surgeon-General F. Allen, Principal Medical officer; Rev. J. W. Adams, Chaplain. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX IV. 

(Referred to in Chapter XLIX, Footnote 15. )

_Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS _toHis Highness_ THE AMIR OF KABUL. 

 ALIKHEL, _18th September_, 1879. 

 (After the usual compliments. ) Your Highness's letter of the 28th Ramazan, with the enclosures from Herat and Turkestan, reached me last night. I have acquainted myself with the contents. I am glad to find your Highness is in good health, but sorry to hear of the unfortunate disturbances in your Highness's dominions. Your Highness's letter, in original, has been sent with enclosures to His Excellency the Viceroy. I have already informed your Highness of the wishes of His Excellency the Viceroy, and the reasons for the movements of the British troops, and I have requested your Highness to send a confidential representative to my camp. I am awaiting a reply to that letter, and the arrival of your Highness's confidential representative. 

 In the meantime I have sent a Proclamation to the tribes, and letters to some of the Logar _maliks_, your Highness's subjects, to assure those not concerned in the hateful massacre, and asking them for assistance in carriage and supplies on payment. As it appears to me proper I should inform your Highness of what I have done, I enclose copies of the Proclamation to the tribes and of my letter to the Logar _maliks_, and hope that your Highness may also issue necessary orders for the furtherance of our plans. Rest assured of the support of the Government of India. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX V. 

(Referred to in Chapter XLIV, Note *. )

_Notes of an interview between GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS andthe AMIR'S AGENTS, MUSTAUFI HABIBULLA KHAN and WAZIR SHAH MAHOMEDKHAN. Dated ALIKHEL, 23rd September, 1879. _

After compliments, General Roberts intimated to the Agents that attheir desire he had granted them a second interview. He now requestedthem to be good enough to speak freely all that they wished him toknow. 

The MUSTAUFI then spoke in the following sense: The interests ofEngland and Afghanistan are the same, and the Amir and his officialsare deeply grieved at the late occurrences in Kabul. Moreover, theAmir is anxious to do whatever the British Government wishes, andmost desirous that the dignity of the British Government should bemaintained by any means which may seem proper to the Viceroy. But HisHighness cannot conceal from himself that the mutinous troops andhis people in general, ryots as well as soldiers, are in fear ofan indiscriminate revenge, which will fall alike upon innocent andguilty. He hopes, therefore, that measures will be taken to guardagainst the possibility of a general rising consequent on fear. 

The Mustaufi was here reminded of the tenor of General Roberts'sProclamation on 15th September. He answered that the people were tooignorant to be acted upon by a Proclamation, and then went on asfollows:

Of course, it is possible that no such combination may take place. TheAfghans are selfish, and divided against themselves. Still, lest heshould be blamed if it should occur, the Amir thinks it rightto express his opinion, and give the British Government all theinformation in his power. On the whole, his advice, as an earnestfriend, is that the advance of a British force on Kabul should bedelayed for a short time ('_Panjroz_'). In the interval he willendeavour to disarm the Regular troops, raise new levies, and, bythe aid of the latter, punish all concerned in the late abominableoutrage. His idea is to get rid of Sher Ali's soldiery--always asource of danger--and keep only 15, 000 men for the future. It wouldbe very desirable to delay the advance until he could establish hispower. The Amir does not mean to imply that any Afghan army, were it50, 000 strong, could resist the British. The mutinous troops haveneither organization nor leaders. But the mutinous troops are of alltribes; and if the British army destroys them, as it would undoubtedlydo in case of resistance, the whole country may combine against theBritish and the Amir. It is for this reason that he advises delay, andthat the punishment of the guilty be left to him. The Viceroy may restassured that he will show no mercy. He will make an example which willbe conspicuous in the eyes of the world as the sun at noonday. Alreadyeveryone in Kabul regards the Amir as an infidel, because of theway in which he and his have thrown in their lot with the BritishGovernment. 

Notwithstanding all that has been said, however, things might go rightif the mutinous troops would keep together and attempt a stand. Butthe Amir fears they will not do so. They are more likely to scatterhere and there, and raise the country. In that case there will beconstant attacks on the communications of the force, and the gatheringof supplies will be difficult. They would come chiefly from thedirection of Ghazni, partly also from Logar. If the tribes rise itwould be hard to collect them. Only one month remains before thesetting in of winter. Of course, it is impossible to say what mayhappen. There may be no opposition, and the Amir is in any case readyto do what the British Government desires. But he feels it is his dutyto express his strong opinion that the present season is unsuited fora forward movement. 

General Roberts replied that on behalf of the Viceroy he thanked theAmir for his kind advice, which he was confident was the advice ofa friend. He said the matter was important, and required carefulconsideration, and asked whether the Agents had anything more to bringforward. 

The Mustaufi then spoke as follows: The Amir's advice to delay theadvance is that of a sincere friend, and it is the best he can give. But if the British Army is to march on Kabul, there is one thing morewhich I am desired to say: let it march in such strength as to crushall hopes of mischief, and put down all rebellion throughout thecountry. You cannot wait for reinforcements. If you come, you mustcome in full strength--in sufficient strength to put down allopposition. There may be no opposition, but you cannot count on this. 

General Roberts replied: The Amir's advice is of great importance, and must be carefully considered. When His Highness first wrote, announcing the outbreak at Kabul and asking for help, the first desireof the Viceroy was to send British forces without delay. I was orderedto Kuram at once to lead the force here. Simultaneously the Kandaharforce was ordered by telegram to return to Kandahar, which it was thenleaving, and to advance towards Kelat-i-Ghilzai, and instructions wereissued to collect a third force at Peshawar; all this was to help theAmir. The Viceroy from the first contemplated the possibility of sucha general rising as the Amir now fears, and the several armies were, therefore, by His Excellency's order, made up to such strength thatall Afghanistan combined could not stand against them for a moment. The Kandahar troops were ready in a very short time, and are nowbeyond Kandahar, on the road to Kabul. [1] The Peshawar force wasrapidly collected and pushed on; and the Amir may rest assured thatthe British army is advancing in ample strength. I will think over theAmir's advice, nevertheless, for it is important. But His Highnessmust remember that the late occurrences at Kabul do not affect onlythe English officers and the fifty or sixty men who were treacherouslykilled--the honour of the English Government is concerned; and so longas the bodies of these officers and men remain unburied or uncared forin Kabul, I do not believe the English people will ever be satisfied. They will require the advance of a British force, and the adequatepunishment of the crime. Still, the Amir's advice, which I amconvinced is that of a friend, must be carefully considered, and Iwill think over it and give an answer later. 

The MUSTAUFI then said: We quite understand what has been said aboutthe strength of the British army. Doubtless it is sufficient, andall Afghanistan could not stand against it. But the Amir asked us tomention, what I have hitherto forgotten, that there are in Turkestan24 regiments of Infantry, 6 of Cavalry, and 56 guns. These troops werethe first to show a disaffected spirit at Mazar-i-Sharif; and puttingaside external enemies, there are Abdur Rahman and the sons of AzimKhan waiting their chance. Herat again is doubtful; when the troopsthere hear what has occurred at Kabul, there is no saying what theymay do. If Abdur Rahman ingratiates himself with these people, Heratand Turkestan will be permanently severed from the Afghan dominions. This is another reason why the advance of the British force should bedelayed, in order that the Amir may have time to gain over the Heratand Turkestan troops. 

GENERAL ROBERTS replied: All these reasons will have fullconsideration. The Viceroy's first order was to push on at once tohelp the Amir; but I am sure His Highness's advice is friendly, andthat in any case he will do his utmost to co-operate with the BritishGovernment. Therefore every consideration will be given to what HisHighness has desired you to say. 

The MUSTAUFI: The Viceroy may be sure the Amir will do what hepleases. 

The WAZIR: When the Amir learnt from General Roberts's letter that theViceroy had given General Roberts power to deal with the whole matter, he was very pleased, knowing General Roberts's character as a soldierand his kindness of heart. 

GENERAL ROBERTS replied that he would carefully consider the proposalsbrought forward, and give an answer later on. Meanwhile, he mustrequest the Agents to stay a day or two in camp until he shouldhave thoroughly weighed the Amir's advice, which was of the utmostimportance to both the British and Afghan Governments. 

The interview then came to an end. 

 (Signed) H. M. DURAND, Political Secretary to General Roberts, K. C. B. , V. C. , Commanding Kabul Field Force. 

[Footnote 1: The Agents here seemed surprised and anxious. --H. M. D. ]

 * * * * *

APPENDIX VI. 

(Referred to in Chapter LIII, Footnote 3. )

_From LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR F. ROBERTS, K. C. B. , V. C. , CommandingKabul Field Force, to A. C. LYALL, ESQ. , C. B. , Secretary to theGovernment of India, Foreign Department. _

 KABUL, _22nd November, _ 1879. 

 1. I Have the honour to submit a brief account of an interview which took place between the Amir Yakub Khan and myself on the 22nd October. The interview was a private and informal one; but recent events have lent some interest to what passed on the occasion, and I have, therefore, thought it desirable that a report should be prepared for the information of the Governor-General in Council. 

 2. After some conversation upon matters of no special importance, the Amir introduced his father's name, and thus gave me the opportunity I had often wished to have of leading him on to speak naturally and unconstrainedly about Sher Ali Khan's feelings and policy during the last ten years. I was most careful to avoid any expression of my own views upon the subject in order that I might, if possible, obtain from the Amir a perfectly spontaneous and truthful account of the circumstances which led, in his opinion, to Sher Ali's estrangement from ourselves and _rapprochement_ to Russia. In this I think I succeeded. Yakub Khan spoke readily and freely of all that had passed, and needed no question or suggestion from me to declare his conviction regarding the cause of his father's unfriendly attitude towards us during the past few years. 

 3. The substance of the Amir's statement was as follows:

 'In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. He had suffered many reverses before making himself secure on the throne of Afghanistan; and he had come to the conclusion that his best chance of holding what he had won lay in an alliance with the British Government. He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but, nevertheless, he returned to Kabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Saiyad Nur Muhammud to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Saiyad Nur Mahomed during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted; and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended. 

 'When my father received from the Government of India the letter informing him that a British Mission was about to proceed to Kabul, he read it out in durbar. The members of the Russian Embassy were present. After the reading was finished, Colonel Stolietoff rose, saluted the Amir and asked permission to leave Kabul. If permitted, he would, he said, travel without delay to Tashkent, and report the state of affairs to General Kauffmann, who would inform the Czar, and thus bring pressure to bear on England. He promised to return in six weeks or two months, and urged the Amir to do everything in his power meanwhile to prevent the British Mission from reaching Kabul. 

 'Colonel Stolietoff never returned to Kabul. He lost no time in reaching Tashkent, where he remained for a few weeks, and he then started for Russia. 

 'The Afghan official, Mirza Mahomed Hassan Khan, generally known as the "Dabir-ul-Mulk, " who had travelled with Colonel Stolietoff from the Oxus to Kabul, accompanied him on his return journey to Tashkent. Here the Mirza was detained under pretence that orders would shortly be received from the Emperor, until the news of my father's flight from Kabul reached General Kauffmann. He was then permitted to leave. Two Aides-de-Camp were sent with him, one a European, the other a Native of Bokhara. 

 'My father was strongly urged by General Kauffmann not to leave Kabul. At the same time the members of the Embassy were ordered to return to Tashkent, the Doctor being permitted to remain with my father if his services were required. 

 'Throughout, the Russian Embassy was treated with great honour, ' and at all stations between Mazar-i-Shariff and Kabul, orders were given for the troops to turn out, and for a salute to be fired on their arrival and departure. '

 4. I cannot, of course, vouch for the exact words used by Yakub Khan, but I am confident that the foregoing paragraph, which is written from notes taken at the time, contains a substantially accurate record of the conversation. 

 5. It would be superfluous for me to advance any proof of the fact that for one reason or another Sher Ali did during the latter part of his reign fall away from us and incline towards an alliance with Russia. But I think the closeness of the connection between Russia and Kabul, and the extent of the Amir's hostility towards ourselves, has not hitherto been fully recognized. Yakub Khan's statements throw some light upon this question, and they are confirmed by various circumstances which have lately come to my knowledge. The prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul, and the extensive military preparations made by Sher Ali of late years, appear to me to afford an instructive comment upon Yakub Khan's assertions. Our recent rupture with Sher Ali has, in fact, been the means of unmasking and checking a very serious conspiracy against the peace and security of our Indian Empire. 

 6. The magnitude of Sher Ali's military preparations is, in my opinion, a fact of peculiar significance. I have already touched upon this point in a former letter, but I shall perhaps be excused for noticing it again. Before the outbreak of hostilities last year the Amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision 68 regiments of Infantry and 16 of Cavalry. The Afghan Artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artizans were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and breach-loading small arms. More than a million pounds of powder, and I believe several million rounds of home-made Snider ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar at the time of the late explosion. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities. Finally, Sher Ali had expended upon the construction of the Sherpur cantonments an astonishing amount of labour and money. The extent and cost of this work may be judged of from the fact that the whole of the troops under my command will find cover during the winter within the cantonment, and the bulk of them in the main line of rampart itself, which extends to a length of nearly two miles under the southern and western slopes of the Bimaru hills. Sher Ali's original design was apparently to carry the wall entirely round the hills, a distance of nearly five miles, and the foundations were already laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military preparations were quite unnecessary except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with ourselves, and it is difficult to understand how their entire cost could have been met from the Afghan treasury, the gross revenue of the country amounting only to about eighty lakhs of rupees per annum. 

 7. I have referred to the prevalence of Russian coin and wares in Kabul as evidence of the growing connexion between Russia and Afghanistan. I am unable to find proof that the Czar's coin was introduced in any other way than by the usual channels of trade. It is quite possible that the bulk of it, if not the whole, came in gradually by this means, the accumulation of foreign gold in particular being considerable in this country, where little gold is coined. Nevertheless, it seems to me a curious fact that the amount of Russian money in circulation should be so large. No less than 13, 000 gold pieces were found among the Amir's treasure alone; similar coins are exceedingly common in the city bazaar; and great numbers of them are known to be in possession of the Sirdars. Of course English goods of all kinds are plentiful here--that is inevitable, particularly with a considerable body of Hindu merchants settled in the city, but Russian goods also abound. Glass, crockery, silks, tea, and many other things which would seem to be far more easily procurable from India than from Russian territory, are to be found in great quantities. A habit, too, seems to have been growing up among the Sirdars and others of wearing uniforms of Russian cut, Russian buttons, Russian boots, and the like. Russian goods and Russian ways seem, in fact, to have become the fashion in Afghanistan. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX VII. 

(Referred to in Chapter LIII, Footnote 3. )

_Translations of letters from _GENERAL-ADJUTANT VON KAUFFMANN, _Governor-General of Turkestan, to the address of the_ AMIR OFAFGHANISTAN, _received on 10th, Shaban, 1295, through_ GENERALSTOLIETOFF, _9th August, 1878. _

 Be it known to you that in these days the relations between the British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require deep consideration. As I am unable to communicate my opinion verbally to you, I have deputed my agent, Major-General Stolietoff. This gentleman is a near friend of mine, and performed excellent services in the Russo-Turkish war, by which he earned favour of the Emperor. The Emperor has always had a regard for him. He will inform you of all that is hidden in my mind. I hope you will pay great attention to what he says, and believe him as you would myself, and, after due consideration, you will give him your reply. Meanwhile, be it known to you that your union and friendship with the Russian Government will be beneficial to the latter, and still more so to you. The advantages of a close alliance with the Russian Government will be permanently evident. 

 This friendly letter is written by the Governor-General of Turkestan and Adjutant-General to the Emperor, Von Kauffmann, Tashkent, Jamadial Akbar, 1295 ( = June, 1878). 

_To the_ AMIR _of the whole of Afghanistan_, SHER ALI KHAN. 

 (After compliments. ) Be it known to you that our relations with the British Government are of great importance to Afghanistan and its dependencies. As I am unable to see you, I have deputed my trustworthy (official) General Stolietoff to you. The General is an old friend of mine, and during the late Russo-Turkish war earned the favour of the Emperor by his spirit and bravery. He has become well known to the Emperor. This trustworthy person will communicate to you what he thinks best. I hope you will pay attention to what he says, and repose as much confidence in his words as if they were my own; and that you will give your answer in this matter through him. In the meantime, be it known to you that if a friendly treaty will be of benefit to us, it will be of far greater benefit to yourself. 

GENERAL STOLIETOFF _sent the following letter, on his return toTashkent from Kabul, to the address of the Foreign Minister, _WAZIRSHAH MAHOMED KHAN, _dated 23rd of the holy month of Ramazan, 1295 ( =21st September, 1878). _

 Thank God, I reached Tashkent safely, and at an auspicious moment paid my respects to the Viceroy (Yaroni Padishah means 'half king'). I am trying day and night to gain our objects, and hope I shall be successful. I am starting to see the Emperor to-day, in order to inform His Majesty personally of our affairs. If God pleases, everything that is necessary will be done and affirmed. _I hope that those who want to enter the gate of Kabul from the east will see that the door is closed; then, please God, they will tremble. _ I hope you will give my respects to His Highness the Amir. May God make his life long and increase his wealth! May you remain in good health, and know that the protection of God will arrange our affairs!

 (Signed) GENERAL STOLIETOFF. 

_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR, _dated Tashkent, 8th Zekada, 1295 ( = 22nd October, 1878). _

 (After compliments. ) Be it known to you that your letter, dated 12th Shawal, reached me at Tashkent on the 16th October, _i. E. _, 3rd Zekada, and I understood its contents. I have telegraphed an abstract of your letter to the address of the Emperor, and have sent the letter itself, as also that addressed to General Stolietoff, by post to Livadia, where the Emperor now is. I am informed on good authority that the English want to come to terms with you; and, as a friend, I advise you to make peace with them if they offer it. 

_From_ GENERAL STOLIETOFF _to_ WAZIR SHAH MAHOMED KHAN, _dated 8thOctober 1878. _

 First of all, I hope you will be kind enough to give my respects to the Amir. May God make his life long and increase his wealth! I shall always remember his royal hospitality. I am busy day and night in his affairs, and, thank God, my labours have not been without result. The great Emperor is a true friend of the Amir's and of Afghanistan, and His Majesty will do whatever he may think necessary. Of course, you have not forgotten what I told you, that the affairs of kingdoms are like a country which has many mountains, valleys, and rivers. One who sits on a high mountain can see things well. By the power and order of God, there is no empire equal to that of our great Emperor. May God make his life long! Therefore, whatever our Government advises you, you should give ear to it. I tell you the truth that our Government is wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove. There are many things which you cannot understand, but our Government understands them well. It often happens that a thing which is unpleasant at first is regarded as a blessing afterwards. Now, my kind friend, I inform you that the enemy of your famous religion wants to make peace with you through the Kaisar (Sultan) of Turkey. Therefore you should look to your brothers who live on the other side of the river. If God stirs them up, and gives the sword of fight into their hands, then go on, in the name of God (Bismilla), otherwise you should be as a serpent; make peace openly, and in secret prepare for war, and when God reveals His order to you, declare yourself. It will be well, when the Envoy of your enemy wants to enter the country, if you send an able emissary, possessing the tongue of a serpent and full of deceit, to the enemy's country, so that he may with sweet words perplex the enemy's mind, and induce him to give up the intention of fighting with you. 

 My kind friend, I entrust you to the protection of God. May God be the protector of the Amir's kingdom, and may trembling fall upon the limbs of your enemies! Amen. 

 Write to me soon, and send the letter to the capital. Please write in Arabic characters, so that I may be able to read your letter. 

_From_, GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _dated 30thZekada (=26th November, _ 1878). 

 (After compliments. ) I was much pleased to receive your letter, dated 24th Zekada, 1295 (=18th November, 1878), and to hear of your good health. I have also received a copy of the letter which you sent to the Governor-General. May God be pleased with you. The British Ministers have given a pledge to our Ambassador in London that they will not interfere with the independence of Afghanistan. I am directed by His Majesty the Emperor to communicate this news to you, and then, after forming friendship, to go to His Majesty. I intend to go to the Russian capital after I have arranged the affairs of this country (Turkestan). As I do not consider it advisable to keep your trusted officials, whom you are in want of, here any more, I send Mahomed Hassan Khan, Kamuah (Deputy-Governor), and Gholam Haidar Khan, with two officers, back to you. I hope you will consider me a well-wisher of your kingdom, and write to me now and then. I have given instructions that, until my return, every letter of yours which they receive at Turkestan should be forwarded to the capital. Your good fortune is a cause of happiness to me, and if any troubles come upon you, I also shall be grieved. Some presents have been sent by me through Mirza Mahomed Hassan, Kamuah; perhaps they may be accepted. 

_Translation of a letter from, _ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to_ GENERALVOZGONOFF, _dated Zel Hijja, _ 1295 _(=December, _ 1878). 

 The Amir knows perfectly well that it is impossible for me to assist him with troops in winter. Therefore it is necessary that war should not be commenced at this unseasonable time. If the English, in spite of the Amir's exertions to avoid the war, commence it, you must then take leave of the Amir and start for Tashkent, because your presence in Afghanistan in winter is useless. Moreover, at such a juncture as the commencement of war in Afghanistan, you ought to come here and explain the whole thing to me, so that I may communicate it to the Emperor. This will be of great benefit to Afghanistan and to Russia. 

_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, dated _25thDecember, _ 1878 _(Russian, 13th Muharram, _ 1296). 

 Your letter, dated 27th Zel Hijja (=20th November), 1878, has reached me. I was pleased to hear tidings of your good health. The Emperor has caused the British Government to agree to the continuance of Afghan independence. The English Ministers have promised this. I earnestly request you not to leave your kingdom. As far as possible, consider your own interests, and do not lose your independence. For the present come to terms with the British Government. If you do not want to go back to Kabul for this purpose, you can write to your son, Mahomed Yakub Khan, to make peace with the English as you may direct him. Do not leave the soil of Afghanistan at this time, because it will be of benefit to you. My words are not without truth, because your arrival in Russian territory will make things worse. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX VII (cont. )

_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN, _received atMazir-i-Sharif on the 17th January, 1879_. 

 I have received your friendly letter, dated 13th Zel Hijja (=8th December, 1878). In that letter you asked me to send you as many troops as could be got ready. I have written to you a letter to the effect that the Emperor, on account of your troubles, had communicated with the British Government, and that the Russian Ambassador at London had obtained a promise from the British Ministers to the effect that they would not injure the independence of Afghanistan. Perhaps you sent your letter before you got mine. Now, I have heard that you have appointed your son, Mahomed Yakub, as your Regent, and have come out of Kabul with some troops. I have received an order from the Emperor to the effect that it is impossible to assist you with troops now. I hope you will be fortunate. It all depends on the decree of God. Believe me, that the friendship which I made with you will be perpetual. It is necessary to send back General Vozgonoff and his companions. You can keep Dr. Yuralski with you if you please. No doubt the doctor will be of use to you and to your dependents. I hope our friendship will continue to be strengthened, and that intercourse will be carried on between us. 

_From_ GENERAL KAUFFMANN _to the_ AMIR SHER ALI, _dated 29th December, 1878 (=17th Muharram, 1296)_. 

 (After compliments. ) The Foreign Minister, General Gortchakoff, has informed me by telegraph that the Emperor has directed me to trouble you to come to Tashkent for the present. I therefore communicate this news to you with great pleasure; at the same time, I may mention that I have received no instructions about your journey to St. Petersburg. My personal interview with you will increase our friendship greatly. 

 _Translation of a letter from_ MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF, _Governor of Zarafshan, to the Heir-Apparent, _MAHOMED MUSA KHAN, _and others_. 

 On the 26th of Rabi-ul-Awul, at an auspicious moment, I received your letter which you sent me, and understood its contents. I was very much pleased, and at once communicated it to General Kauffmann, the Governor-General. With regard to what you wrote about the friendly relations between the Russian and Afghan Governments, and your own desire for friendship, I have the honour to state that we are also desirous of being friends. The friendship between the two Governments existed in the time of the late Amir, and I hope that it will be increased and strengthened by Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan. 

 May God change the wars in your country to happiness; may peace reign in it; and may your Government be strengthened! I have been forwarding all your letters to the Governor-General, General Kauffmann. May God keep you safe!

 The Zarafshan Province Governor, MAJOR-GENERAL IVANOFF. 

 Written and sealed by the General. Written on 29th Mart (March), 1879 (=5th Rabi-ul-Saui, 1296). 

_Treaty between the RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT and AMIR SHER ALI KHAN;_written from memory by MIRZA MAHOMED NABBI. _

1. The Russian Government engages that the friendship of the RussianGovernment with the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, Amir of allAfghanistan, will be a permanent and perpetual one. 

2. The Russian Government engages that, as Sirdar Abdulla Khan, son ofthe Amir, is dead, the friendship of the Russian Government withany person whom the Amir may appoint Heir-Apparent to the throne ofAfghanistan, and with the heir of the Heir-Apparent, will remain firmand perpetual. 

3. The Russian Government engages that if any foreign enemy attacksAfghanistan, and the Amir is unable to drive him out, and asks theassistance of the Russian Government, the Russian Government willrepel the enemy, either by means of advice, or by such other means asit may consider proper. 

4. The Amir of Afghanistan will not wage war with any foreign powerwithout consulting the Russian Government, and without its permission. 

5. The Amir of Afghanistan engages that he will always report in afriendly manner to the Russian Government what goes on in his kingdom. 

6. The Amir of Afghanistan will communicate every wish and importantaffair of his to General Kauffmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, andthe Governor-General will be authorized by the Russian Government tofulfil the wishes of the Amir. 

7. The Russian Government engages that the Afghan merchants who maytrade and sojourn in Russian territory will be safe from wrong, andthat they will be allowed to carry away their profits. 

8. The Amir of Afghanistan will have the power to send his servants toRussia to learn arts and trades, and the Russian officers will treatthem with consideration and respect as men of rank. 

9. (Does not remember. )

10. I, Major-General Stolietoff Nicholas, being a trusted Agent of theRussian Government, have made the above-mentioned Articles between theRussian Government and the Government of Amir Sher Ali Khan, and haveput my seal to them. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX VIII. 

(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 5. )

_Letter from SIRDAR ABDUR RAHMAN KHAN to LEPEL GRIFFIN, ESQ. , dated 15th April, 1880. _

 Whereas at this happy time I have received your kind letter. In a spirit of justice and friendship you wrote to inquire what I wished in Afghanistan. My honoured friend, the servants of the great [British] Government know well that, throughout these twelve years of exile in the territories of the Emperor of Russia, night and day I have cherished the hope of revisiting my native land. When the late Amir Sher Ali Khan died, and there was no one to rule our tribes, I proposed to return to Afghanistan, but it was not fated [that I should do so]; then I went to Tashkent. Consequently, Amir Mahomed Yakub Khan, having come to terms and made peace with the British Government, was appointed Amir of Afghanistan; but since, after he had left you, he listened to the advice of every interested [dishonest] person, and raised fools to power, until the ignorant men directed the affairs of Afghanistan, which during the reign of my grandfather, who had eighteen able sons, was so managed that night was bright like day, Afghanistan was, in consequence, disgraced before all States, and ruined. Now, therefore, that you seek to learn my hopes and wishes, they are these: that as long as your Empire and that of Russia exist, my countrymen, the tribes of Afghanistan, should live quietly in ease and peace; that these two States should find us true and faithful, and that we should rest at peace between them [England and Russia], for my tribesmen are unable to struggle with Empires, and are ruined by want of commerce; and we hope of your friendship that, sympathizing with and assisting the people of Afghanistan, you will place them under the honourable protection of the two Powers. This would redound to the credit of both, would give peace to Afghanistan, and quiet and comfort to God's people. This is my wish; for the rest, it is yours to decide. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX IX. 

(Referred to in Chapter LVIII, Footnote 6. )

_Letter from A. C. LYALL, ESQ. , C. B. , Secretary to the Government ofIndia, Foreign Department, to LEPEL H. GRIFFIN, Esq. , C. S. I. , ChiefPolitical Officer, Kabul, dated Simla, April, 1880. _

 I have the honour to inform you that the Governor-General has received and considered in council your telegrams of the 22nd and 23rd instant, forwarding the translation of a letter received by you from Sirdar Abdur Rahman on the 21st instant, together with a summary of certain oral explanations which accompanied that letter, and a statement of the recommendations suggested by it to Lieutenaut-General Sir Frederick Roberts and yourself. 

 In conveying to you its instructions on the subject of this important communication, the Government of India considers it expedient to recapitulate the principles on which it has hitherto been acting in northern Afghanistan, and clearly to define the point of view from which it contemplates the present situation of affairs in that country. The single object to which, as you are well aware, the Afghan policy of this Government has at all times been directed and limited, is the security of the North-West frontier of India. The Government of India has, however, no less invariably held and acted on the conviction that the security of this frontier is incompatible with the intrusion of any foreign influence into the great border State of Afghanistan. To exclude or eject such influence the Government of India has frequently subsidized and otherwise assisted the Amirs of Kabul. It has also, more than once, taken up arms against them. But it has never interfered, for any other purpose, in the affairs of their kingdom. Regulating on this principle and limiting to this object the conduct of our relations with the rulers of Kabul, it was our long-continued endeavour to find in their friendship and their strength the requisite guarantees for the security of our own frontier. Failing in that endeavour, we were compelled to seek the attainment of the object to which our Afghan policy was, and is still, exclusively directed, by rendering the permanent security of our frontier as much as possible independent of such conditions. 

 This obligation was not accepted without reluctance. Not even when forced into hostilities by the late Amir Sher Ali Khan's espousal of a Russian alliance, proposed by Russia in contemplation of a rupture with the British Government, did we relinquish our desire for the renewal of relations with a strong and friendly Afghan Power, and, when the son of Sher Ali subsequently sought our alliance and protection, they were at once accorded to him, on conditions of which His Highness professed to appreciate the generosity. The crime, however, which dissolved the Treaty of Gandamak, and the disclosures which followed that event, finally convinced the Government of India that the interests committed to its care could not but be gravely imperilled by further adhesion to a policy dependent for its fruition on the gratitude, the good faith, the assumed self-interest, or the personal character of any Afghan Prince. 

 When, therefore, Her Majesty's troops re-entered Afghanistan in September last, it was with two well-defined and plainly-avowed objects. The first was to avenge the treacherous massacre of the British Mission at Kabul; the second was to maintain the safeguards sought through the Treaty of Gandamak, by providing for their maintenance guarantees of a more substantial and less precarious character. 

 These two objects have been maintained: the first by the capture of Kabul and the punishment of the crime committed there, the second by the severance of Kandahar from the Kabul power. 

 Satisfied with their attainment, the Government of India has no longer any motive or desire to enter into fresh treaty engagements with the Rulers of Kabul. The arrangements and exchange of friendly assurances with the Amir Sher Ali, though supplemented on the part of the Government of India by subsidies and favours of various kinds, wholly failed to secure the object of them, which was, nevertheless, a thoroughly friendly one, and no less conducive to the security and advantage of the Afghan than to those of the British Power. The treaty with Yakub Khan, which secured to him our friendship and material support, was equally ineffectual. Moreover, recent events and arrangements have fundamentally changed the situation to which our correspondence and engagements with the Amir of Afghanistan formally applied. Our advance frontier positions at Kandahar and Kuram have materially diminished the political importance of Kabul in relation to India, and although we shall always appreciate the friendship of its Ruler, our relations with him are now of so little importance to the paramount objects of our policy that we no longer require to maintain British agents in any part of his dominions. 

 Our only reasons, therefore, for not immediately withdrawing our forces from northern Afghanistan have hitherto been--_first_, the excited and unsettled condition of the country round Kabul, with the attitude of hostility assumed by some leaders of armed gatherings near Ghazni; and, _secondly_, the inability of the Kabul Sirdars to agree among themselves on the selection of a Ruler strong enough to maintain order after our evacuation of the country. 

 The first-named of these reasons has now ceased to exist. In a minute dated the 30th ultimo the Viceroy and Governor-General stated that 'the Government is anxious to withdraw as soon as possible the troops from Kabul and from all points beyond those to be occupied under the Treaty of Gandamak, except Kandahar. In order that this may be done, it is desirable to find a Ruler for Kabul, which will be separated from Kandahar. Steps, ' continued His Excellency, 'are being taken for this purpose. Meanwhile, it is essential that we should make such a display of strength in Afghanistan as will show that we are masters of the situation, and will overawe disaffection. '... 'All that is necessary, from a political point of view, is for General Stewart to march to Ghazni, break up any opposition he may find there or in the neighbourhood, and open up direct communication with General Sir Frederick Roberts at Kabul. ' The military operations thus defined have been accomplished by General Stewart's successful action before Ghazni. 

 With regard to the second reason mentioned for the retention of our troops in northern Afghanistan, the appearance of Abdur Rahman as a candidate for the throne of Kabul, whose claims the Government of India has no cause to oppose, and who seems to be approved, and likely to be supported, by at least a majority of the population, affords fair ground for anticipating that our wishes in regard to the restoration, before our departure, of order in that part of the country will now be fulfilled. 

 The Governor-General in Council has consequently decided that the evacuation of Kabul shall be effected not later than October next, and it is with special reference to this decision that the letter and message addressed to you by Sirdar Abdur Rahman have been carefully considered by His Excellency in Council. 

 What first claims notice in the consideration of that letter is the desire that it expresses for the permanent establishment of Afghanistan with our assistance and sympathy under the joint protection of the British and Russian Empires. This suggestion, which is more fully developed in the Sirdar's unwritten message, cannot be entertained or discussed. 

 As already stated, the primary object and declared determination of the Government of India have been the exclusion of foreign influence or interference from Afghanistan. This cardinal condition of amicable relations with Afghanistan has, at all times and in all circumstances, been deemed essential for the permanent security of Her Majesty's Indian Empire. As such, it has hitherto been firmly maintained by successive Governors-General of India under the explicit instructions of Her Majesty's Government. Nor has it ever been ignored, or officially contested, by the Russian Government. That Government, on the contrary, has repeatedly, and under every recent change of circumstances in Afghanistan, renewed the assurances solemnly given to the British Government that 'Russia considers Afghanistan as entirely beyond the sphere of her influence. '

 It is true that negotiations at one time passed between the two Governments with a view to the mutual recognition of certain territories as constituting a neutral zone between their respective spheres of legitimate influence and action, and that at one time it was proposed by Russia to treat Afghanistan itself as a neutral territory. Those negotiations, however, having proved fruitless, the northern frontier of Afghanistan was finally determined by mutual agreement, and in 1876 the Russian Government formally reiterated its adherence to the conclusion that, 'while maintaining on either side the arrangement come to as regards the limits of Afghanistan, which is to remain outside the sphere of Russian action, the two Cabinets should regard as terminated the discussions relative to the intermediate zone, which promised no practical result. '

 The position of Afghanistan as defined and settled by these engagements was again distinctly affirmed on behalf of the Queen's Government by the Marquis of Salisbury in 1879, and the Government of India unreservedly maintains it in the fullest conviction of its essential necessity for the peaceable protection of Her Majesty's Indian dominions. It is therefore desirable that you should take occasion to inform Abdur Rahman that the relations of Afghanistan to the British and Russian Empires are matters which the Government of India must decline to bring into discussion with the Sirdar. The Afghan states and tribes are too contiguous with India, whose North-Western frontier they surround, for the Government of India ever willingly to accept partnership with any other Power in the exercise of its legitimate and recognized influence over those tribes and States. 

 The Governor-General in Council is, nevertheless, most anxious that the Sirdar should not misunderstand the light in which his personal sentiments and obligations towards Russia are regarded by the Government of India. So long as the Rulers of Kabul were amenable to its advice, this Government has never ceased to impress on them the international duty of scrupulously respecting all the recognized rights and interests of their Russian neighbour, refraining from every act calculated to afford the Russian authorities in Central Asia any just cause of umbrage or complaint. The intelligence and good sense which are conspicuous in the Sirdar's letter and messages to you will enable him to appreciate the difference between conduct regulated on these principles and that which cost Sher Ali the loss of his throne. This Government does not desire, nor has it ever desired, to impose on any Ruler of Kabul conditions incompatible with that behaviour which Russia, as a powerful and neighbouring Empire, is entitled to expect from him; least of all can we desire to impose such conditions on a Prince who has received hospitality and protection in Russian territory. I am therefore to observe that, in the natural repugnance expressed by Abdur Rahman to conditions which 'might make him appear ungrateful' to those 'whose salt he has eaten, ' the Governor-General in Council recognizes a sentiment altogether honourable to the Sirdar, and perfectly consistent with the sincerity of his professed goodwill towards ourselves. 

 These observations will furnish you with a sufficient answer to the question asked by Abdur Rahman as to the 'nature of our friendship' and 'its conditions. '

 The frankness with which he has explained his position entitles him to receive from us a no less unreserved statement of our own. The Government of India cordially shares the wish expressed by Abdur Rahman that, between the British and Russian Empires, his 'tribes and countrymen may live quietly in ease and peace. ' We do not desire to place them in a position of unfriendliness towards a Power which is pledged to us to regard their country as 'entirely beyond the sphere of its action. ' The injury to Afghan commerce caused by the present condition of Afghanistan, to which the Sirdar has alluded, is fully appreciated by the Government of India, and on the restoration of peace between the two countries the revival and development of trade intercourse need present no difficulty. As regards our own friendship, it will, if sincerely sought, be freely given, and fully continued so long as it is loyally reciprocated. But we attach to it no other condition. We have no concessions to ask or make, and the Sirdar will therefore perceive that there is really no matter for negotiation or bargain between him and us. 

 On this point your reply to Abdur Rahman cannot be too explicit. Previous to the Sirdar's arrival in Turkestan, the hostility and treachery of those whose misconduct he admits and deplores had compelled the Government of India to make territorial arrangements of a material and permanent character for the better protection of our frontier. The maintenance of these arrangements is in no wise dependent on the assent or dissent, on the good will or ill-will, of any Chief at Kabul. The character of them has been so fully explained by you to all the other Kabul Sirdars that it is probably well known to Abdur Rahman. But in order that our present intercourse and future relations with the Sirdar may be perfectly clear of doubt on a point affecting the position he aspires to fill, the Governor-General in Council authorizes you, if necessary, to make him plainly understand that neither the district assigned to us by the Treaty of Gandamak, nor any part of the province of Kandahar, will ever be restored to the Kabul Power. 

 As regards this last-mentioned province, the Government of India has been authorized by that of Her Majesty to give to Sher Ali Khan, the present Wali of Kandahar, a distinct assurance that he will be not only recognized, but maintained, by the British Government as the Ruler of that province. Sher Ali Khan is one of the Native nobles of Kandahar. He is administering the province with ability, good sense, and complete loyalty to the British Government, which has promised him the support of a British garrison so long as he requires such support. The Governor-General in Council cannot doubt that Sirdar Abdur Rahman will readily recognize the obligation incumbent on the honour of the British Government to keep faith with all who, whether at Kandahar or elsewhere, have proved themselves true and loyal adherents. Yakub Khan forfeited our alliance, and with it his throne, by mistrusting the assurances we gave him, and falsifying those which he had given to us. If, misled by his example, Yakub Khan's successor attempts to injure or oppress the friends of the British Government, its power will again be put forth to protect or avenge them. Similarly, if the next Kabul Ruler reintroduces into his Court or country foreign influences adverse to our own, the Government of India will again take such steps as it may deem expedient to deal with such a case. These contingencies, however, cannot occur if the sentiments of Abdur Rahman are such as he represents them to be. Meanwhile, the territorial and administrative arrangements already completed by us for the permanent protection of our own interests are not susceptible of negotiation or discussion with Abdur Rahman or any other claimant to the throne of Kabul. 

 To the settlement of Herat, which is not included in these completed arrangements, the Governor-General in Council cannot authorize you to make or invite any reference in your reply to Abdur Rahman. The settlement of the future administration of Herat has been undertaken by Her Majesty's Government; with those present views in regard to this important question, the Government of India is not yet acquainted. 

 Nor can our evacuation of Kabul constitute any subject for proposals in your correspondence with the Sirdar. This measure was determined on by the Government of India long before the appearance of Abdur Rahman as a candidate for the government of the country we are about to evacuate. It has not been caused by the hostility, and is not, therefore, conditional on the goodwill, of any Afghan Power. 

 The Government of India is, however, very willing to carry out the evacuation of Kabul in the manner most conducive to the personal advantage of Abdur Rahman, whose interests we believe to be, more than those of any other Sirdar, in accordance with the general interests of the Afghan people. For this reason it is desirable that you should inform Abdur Rahman of our intention to evacuate Kabul, and our desire to take that opportunity of unconditionally transferring to his authority the whole of the country from which our troops will be withdrawn. You are authorized to add that our military and political officers at Kabul will be empowered to facilitate any practical arrangement suggested by the Sirdar for promptly and peaceably effecting, in co-operation with him, the transfer thus contemplated on his behalf. Such arrangement must, however, be consistent with our obligations towards those who have served and aided the British Government during our occupation of those territories. 

 For this purpose, it appears to the Governor-General in Council desirable that the Sirdar should lose no time in proceeding to Kabul, and there settling, in conference with General Stewart and yourself, such preliminary arrangements as may best promote the undisturbed establishment of his future government. 

 The Governor-General in Council has, however, no desire to press this suggestion, should it appear to the Sirdar that his presence at Kabul, previous to the withdrawal of our troops for the purpose of personal conference with the British authorities, might have the effect of weakening his popularity, or compromising his position in the eyes of his future subjects. 

 The point is one which must be left entirely to the Sirdar's own judgment and inclination. 

 But Abdur Rahman is doubtless aware that there are at present, in and around Kabul, personages not destitute of influence, who themselves aspire to the sovereignty he seeks, and that the family of Yakub has still numerous personal adherents, who may possibly take advantage of the withdrawal of our troops to oppose the Sirdar's authority if he is not personally present to assert it. 

 It should on both sides he remembered and understood that it is not the policy of this Government to impose upon the Afghan people an unpopular Ruler or to interfere uninvited in the administration of a friendly one. If Abdur Rahman proves able and disposed to conciliate the confidence of his countrymen, without forfeiting the good understanding which he seeks with us, he will assuredly find his best support in our political appreciation of that fact. Our reason for unconditionally transferring to him the government of the country, from which our forces will in any case be withdrawn a few months hence, is that, on the whole, he appears to be the Chief best able to restore order in that country, and also best entitled to undertake such a task. In his performance of it he will receive, if he requires it, our assistance. But we neither need nor wish to hamper, by preliminary stipulations or provisoes, his independent exercise of a sovereignty which he declares himself anxious to maintain on a footing of peace and friendship with the British Government. 

 The present statement of the views and intentions of His Excellency the Governor-General in Council respecting Abdur Rahman will enable you to represent them with adequate accuracy in your reply to the Sirdar's friendly overtures, and it will now be your duty to convey to Abdur Rahman, without any avoidable delay, the answer of the Government of India to the letter and message received from him. His Excellency feels assured that you will give full expression to the spirit of candour and goodwill in which these communications have been received and are reciprocated. 

 But I am to impress on your attention the importance of avoiding any expression which might appear to suggest or admit matter for negotiation or discussion in reference to the relative positions of the Sirdar and the Government of India. 

 In conclusion, I am to request that on receipt of this letter you will be so good as to lose no time in submitting its contents to General Sir Donald Stewart, should he then have reached Kabul. In any case, you will, of course, communicate them to General Roberts, and act upon them in consultation with the chief military authority on the spot. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX X. 

(Referred to in Chapter LIX, Footnote 2. )

_Extract from a Report by LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, V. C. , K. C. B. , to the QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL IN INDIA, dated Kabul, 17th April, 1880. _

25. I think I have now dealt with all the points of militaryimportance connected with the military position in northernAfghanistan, but there are a few questions of more general interestwhich I desire to bring to the notice of His Excellency theCommander-in-Chief and the Government of India. 

26. First with regard to rations. The daily scale of issue to Nativetroops is given in the margin. 

[Sidenote: _Daily ration of Native soldiers_:

 Atta[1] 12 chittacks [2] Dall[3] 2 chittacks Ghi[4] 1 chittack Salt 1/3 chittack Meat 1 lb. Bi-weekly Rum 1 dram " ]

It has been found throughout the campaign, even when the men wereemployed upon hard work, that '12 chittacks' of 'atta' daily are amplysufficient for the Native troops, supplemented, as of late, throughthe liberality of Government, by a bi-weekly issue of 1 lb. Ofmeat. In a climate like Afghanistan, where the inhabitants are allmeat-eaters, this liberality has been most wise. Every endeavour wasmade, before this sanction was granted, to supply the Native portionof the force with meat on payment, and I attribute to this in greatmeasure the sound health and excellent stamina which they now exhibit. 

With regard to the issue of rum, I would suggest that it should not beissued free to Native troops, except under exceptional circumstancesof fatigue and weather, but that the Commissariat Department shouldbe authorized to have in store a sufficiency of rum to admit of abi-weekly issue to such troops as drink the spirit, _on payment_, andthen only on the recommendation of the Medical Officer, and under thesanction of the General Officer commanding. On all occasions when rumis sanctioned, either free or on payment, those who do not partakeof spirits should he allowed a ration of tea and sugar under similarconditions. 

27. The scale of rations for Native followers requires no alteration. 

[Sidenote: _Daily ration of European soldiers_:

 Meat 1-1/4 lb. Bread 1-1/4 lb. Vegetables 1-1/4 lb. Rice 4 oz. Salt 2/3 oz. Tea 3/4 oz. Sugar 3 oz. Rum 1 dr. ]

28. The European rations now under issue in Kabul are as per margin, and with reference to them I would make the following remarks:The increase of 1/4 lb. In bread and meat is, in my opinion, verydesirable, for not only is the meat, as a rule, on service inferior tothat served in cantonments, but the extras which can be procured fromthe coffee-shop are not here forthcoming. When the vegetable rationconsists of potatoes, 1 lb. Is sufficient, but when it is made ofmixed vegetables 1-1/4 lb. Is necessary. The substitution of _dall_for any portion of the vegetable ration I consider undesirable. 

Tinned soups and meats and biscuits are most valuable, and should beliberally supplied to every force in the field. They are portable andliked by the men, to whom they furnish a very welcome change of diet. I would very strongly recommend that a much larger issue of thesearticles than has hitherto been sanctioned should be provided. 

[Sidenote: Firewood. ]

29. A question which has arisen during this campaign, and which maycrop up again, has been the provision of firewood for cooking toNative troops and followers. Throughout the winter firewood could notbe purchased at Kabul, and it was absolutely necessary to issue it tothese men. This was done at the rate of one _seer_[5] per man, butthis amount is not arbitrary, and might, under certain circumstances, be diminished. Since roads were re-opened and markets re-establishedthe issue of wood has been discontinued. In framing any future rulesfor the guidance of a force in the field, the question of providingfirewood through the Commissariat Department for Native troops andfollowers, free or on payment, should be vested in the GeneralOfficers commanding. 

[Sidenote: Shoes. ]

30. The scale of clothing authorized by Government for Native troopsand followers was found, even in the rigorous climate of Afghanistan, to be most liberal, except that during the very coldest weather asecond blanket was required. This want I was able to meet from stockin hand, and as the weather became milder these extra blankets werewithdrawn and returned into store. Warm stockings, too, are verynecessary in a climate where frostbite is not uncommon; fortunately, some thousands were procured locally and issued to followers. Theordinary Native shoe of India, as provided by the CommissariatDepartment, is utterly unfitted for a country such as Afghanistan. Major Badcock will send to Peshawar (where they can easily be made up)a pattern Kabali shoe, which I am convinced would be found admirablysuited for Native troops and followers crossing the frontier. We arenow almost entirely dependent on the local market for our shoes. 

[Sidenote: Ammunition boots. ]

A large supply of English-made ammunition boots should alwaysaccompany a force in the field, in order to allow those Natives whouse them, and who are often crippled by wearing other descriptions ofshoe, to obtain them on payment at the moderate rate now fixed, viz. , Rs. 4 per pair. 

[Sidenote: Waterproof sheets. ]

The country-made waterproof sheets, though slightly heavier, haveproved themselves quite as serviceable, if not more so, than theEnglish-made ones. 

At the close of the campaign, I would very strongly recommend that anintelligent committee should be required to go thoroughly intothese questions of clothing for troops, British and Native, and forfollowers. I would also suggest that when a decision is arrived at, sealed patterns of every article approved should be deposited at allmanufacturing centres and in all the large jails, so that when certainarticles are required they need only be called for, and precious time(often wasted in reference and correspondence) saved. 

[Sidenote: Doolie-bearers. ]

31. The number of doolie-bearers with the two divisions of the KabulField Force now at Kabul is 3, 536, with the very moderate sick reportof 35, or 1 per cent. Of strength. 

 Doolies and dandies are distributed as follows:

 British troops {doolies, 3 per cent. {dandies, 2 per cent. 

 Native troops {doolies, 2 per cent. {dandies, 3 per cent. 

--a percentage which I consider sufficient for field-service, as, inthe event of any unusual number of casualties, transport animals couldand would be made use of, and it is most undesirable to increase thenumber of followers. 

[Sidenote: The Lushai dandy. ]

The Lushai dandy for this sort of warfare is much preferable to thecarpet or dhurrie dandy, as it can be made into a bed, and men are notso liable to fall out of it. 

[Sidenote: Bourke's doolie. ]

Bourke's doolie is very good, but liable to get out of order, anddifficult to repair when broken; the ordinary kind is fairly good andserviceable. 

[Sidenote: Field-service tents. ]

32. I would urge that in future all field-service tents should bemade after the pattern of the Mountain Battery tent, single flyfor Natives, double for Europeans, and that the poles should beconstructed on the telescopic principle: that is, that no thinningof the wood where it enters the socket should be allowed either onuprights or ridge-pole, and that the old system of paring away shouldbe abandoned. Instead, the upper section should sit flat on the lower. Doubtless the sockets will have to be longer and stronger than thosenow in use, but this is the only means by which tents can be adaptedto mule and pony carriage, which will no doubt in future wars be ourchief means of transport. 

[Sidenote: Waler horses. ]

33. The Waler horses of the Cavalry and Artillery have stood thestrain remarkably well, considering the hard work and great exposurethey have had to bear, and also that for a considerable time they wereentirely deprived of green food. I feel sure this information willbe most satisfactory, seeing that, for the future, the Artillery andCavalry in India must mainly depend upon the Australian market fortheir remounts. 

[Sidenote: Committee to record suggestions on equipment. ]

34. As there are some minor points of detail which mightadvantageously be considered by those who have had the experience ofrecent service, I have convened a committee, with Colonel MacGregor, C. B. , as President, which will take suggestions and record opinionsregarding packing transport animals, equipment, kit, dress, etc. , ofboth officers and men of the several branches of the service. Fromthe constitution of the committee, I feel certain that theirrecommendations cannot but be valuable, and I hope to have the honourof submitting them shortly for the consideration of His Excellency theCommander-in-Chief. 

[Footnote 1: Flour. ]

[Footnote 2: A chittack = 2 ounces. ]

[Footnote 3: A kind of pea. ]

[Footnote 4: Clarified butter. ]

[Footnote 5: A seer = 2 lb. ]

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XI. (Referred to in Chapter LXVI, Footnote 3. )

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GUIDANCE OF GENERAL AND OTHER OFFICERS COMMANDINGCOLUMNS IN BURMA. 

MANDALAY, _20th. November, 1886. _

The following general instructions for the guidance ofBrigadier-Generals and Officers in command of columns are published byorder of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India:

_1st_. --Columns sent out for the pacification of a district, or inpursuit of a particular gang of dacoits, must be amply provided andable to keep the field for ten days at least. To enable this to bedone without employing an undue number of transport animals, it isnecessary that every endeavour be made to obtain grain for Cavalryhorses and Transport ponies from the villages passed through; carefulinquiry must be made as to where supplies can be obtained locally, andthe line of advance determined accordingly. Arrangements must be madefor replenishing the supply when necessary from depots which must beformed at convenient centres when the nature of the operations maynecessitate it. These depots should be pushed forward from time totime as the troops advance. The work of a column obliged to return toits base of supply before it has had an opportunity of completing theobject of the expedition must be more harmful than beneficial, as itsfailure emboldens the enemy and weakens the confidence of the peoplein our power to protect them and to reach the offenders. 

_2nd_. --Where two or more columns are acting in concert, the detailsof time and place of movement should be settled beforehand with thegreatest nicety, and the commanding officers of all such columnsshould be provided with the same maps, or tracings from them, so thatsubsequent changes of plan, rendered necessary by later information, may be understood and conformed to by all. Officers commanding columnsmust do their utmost to get into, and keep up, communication with oneanother. This can be effected by:

 Visual signalling, Spies and scouts, Patrolling. 

_3rd_. --Movements to be executed in concert with the troops in otherbrigades or commands, or likely to tell directly or indirectly on thedistricts commanded by other officers, will be fully communicated tothose officers, both beforehand and when in progress. 

_4th_. --Brigadier-Generals are empowered to give very liberalremuneration for the effective service of guides and for informationinvolving danger to those who give it. They may delegate this power toselected officers in detached commands, but a close watch must be kepton expenditure under this head. Opportunities should be afforded totimid informers who are afraid to compromise themselves by enteringcamp to interview officers at some distance out and in secrecy. 

_5th_. --Cavalry horses and Mounted Infantry ponies must be saved asmuch as is compatible with occasional forced and rapid marches. Onordinary occasions the riders should dismount, from time to time, andmarch alongside of their horses or ponies. 

_6th_. --The special attention of all officers is called to the carefultreatment of pack-animals, and officers in command of columns andparties will be held strictly responsible that the animals areproperly loaded for the march, saved as much as possible during it, and carefully attended to and fed after it. Officers in command willascertain by daily personal supervision and inspection that theseorders are carried out. 

_7th_. --It must be remembered that the chief object of traversingthe country with columns is to cultivate friendly relations with theinhabitants, and at the same time to put before them evidences ofour power, thus gaining their good-will and their confidence. It istherefore the bounden duty of commanding officers to ascertain thatthe troops under their command are not permitted to injure theproperty of the people or to wound their susceptibilities. 

_8th_. --The most injurious accounts of our intentions have beencirculated amongst, and believed by, the people, and too much painscannot be taken to eradicate this impression, and to assure the peopleboth by act and word of our good-will towards the law-abiding. Chiefmen of districts should he treated with consideration and distinction. The success of the present operations will much depend on the tactwith which the inhabitants are treated. 

_9th_. --When there is an enemy in arms against British rule, allarrangements must be made not only to drive him from his position, but also to surround the position so as to inflict the heaviest losspossible. Resistance overcome without inflicting punishment on theenemy only emboldens him to repeat the game, and thus, by protractingoperations, costs more lives than a severe lesson promptlyadministered, even though that lesson may cause some casualties onour side. Arrangements should be made to surround villages and jungleretreats with Cavalry, and afterwards to hunt them closely withInfantry. In the pursuit the broadest margin possible will be drawnbetween leaders of rebellion and the professional dacoit on the onepart, and the villagers who have been forced into combinations againstus. _Bohs_ and leaders will generally be found heading the column offugitives, and a portion of the Cavalry should be directed to pursuethem without wasting time over the rank and file of the enemy. 

_10th_. --Unless otherwise ordered, columns of occupation should movein short marches, halting at the principal towns and villages. Thiswill give civil officers opportunities for becoming thoroughlyacquainted with their districts, and give military officers time toreconnoitre and sketch the country. 

_11th_. --Where troops are likely to be quartered for some time, bambooplatforms should be erected to keep the men off the ground. Tents, ifafterwards provided, can be pitched on the platforms. 

_12th_. --The greatest latitude will be allowed to Brigadier-Generalsand officers in local command in ordering and carrying out movementsfor the pacification of their districts. They will, however, report asfully as possible all movements intended and in progress, throughthe regular channel, for the information of His Excellency theCommander-in-Chief. 

_13th_. --Civil officers will be detailed under the orders of the ChiefCommissioner to accompany columns. As they are in a position to rewardloyalty and good service, they will be able to obtain more reliableguides and intelligence than the military officers can hope to get. The Chief Commissioner has authorized selected Burmans, men ofposition who may look for official appointments, being employed asscouts by the civil officers of districts and being attached tocolumns. These scouts should wear some distinguishing and conspicuousmark or badge to prevent them being fired on by the troops. Theyshould not be called upon to take the front when approaching anunbroken enemy, or where ambuscades may be expected, but theirservices will be most valuable in gaining information, and later inhunting down the individuals of a broken-up gang. 

_14th_. --Absolute secrecy must be maintained regarding movementsagainst the enemy and every device resorted to to mislead him. 

_15th_. --When civil officers accompany columns, all prisoners will behanded over to them for disposal. When no civil officer is present, the officer commanding the column will, _ex officio_, have magisterialpowers to inflict punishment up to two years' imprisonment, or 30lashes. Offenders deserving heavier punishment must be reserved fordisposal by the civil officers. 

_16th_. --Officers commanding columns will be held responsible that thetroops are not kept in unhealthy districts, and that, when a localityhas proved itself unhealthy, the troops are removed at the earliestpossible opportunity. Military officers are responsible for thelocation of the troops. The requisitions of civil officers will becomplied with, whenever practicable, but military officers are tojudge in all matters involving the military or sanitary suitability ofa position. 

_17th_. --In the class of warfare in which we are now engaged, wherenight surprises and ambuscades are the only formidable tactics of theenemy, the greatest care must be taken to ensure the safety of thecamp at night. To meet ambuscades, which usually take the form of avolley followed by flight, and which, in very dense jungle, it maybe impossible to discover or guard against by means of flankers, HisExcellency the Commander-in-Chief would wish the following plan to betried: Supposing, for instance, the fire of the enemy to be deliveredfrom the right, a portion of the force in front should be ready todash along the road for 100 yards, or so, or until some opening inthe jungle offers itself. The party should then turn to the right andsweep round with a view to intercepting the enemy in his flight. Aparty in rear should similarly enter the jungle to their right withthe same object. The centre of the column would hold the ground andprotect the baggage or any wounded men. The different parties must bepreviously told off, put under the command of selected leaders, andmust act with promptitude and dash. Each party must be kept in compactorder, and individual firing must be prohibited, except when there isa clear prospect. Past experience suggests the adoption of some suchplan as the above, but in guerilla warfare officers must suit theirtactics to the peculiar and ever-varying circumstances in which theymay find themselves engaged. 

_18th_. --The Government have ordered a general disarmament of thecountry, as soon as the large bands of rebels and dacoits aredispersed. The orders for this disarmament direct that all firearmsare to be taken from the people, but that a moderate number may bereturned to responsible villagers who are loyal and are able todefend themselves. No firearms will be returned save under registeredlicenses; and licenses will be given only for villages which canproduce a certain number (5 to 10) guns, and are either stockaded orfenced against sudden attack. The duty of disarming lies on civilofficers and the police; but as it is desirable that the disarmamentshould be effected as quickly as possible, officers commanding postsand columns will give such assistance as may be in their power incarrying it out. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XII. 

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *. )

_To His EXCELLENCY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARON ROBERTSOF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART. , V. C. , G. C. B. , G. C. I. E. , R. A. , Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India. _

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY, We, the undersigned, representing the Sikhs of the Punjab, mostrespectfully beg to approach Your Excellency with this humble addressof farewell on Your Lordship's approaching departure from thiscountry. We cannot give adequate expression to the various ideas whichare agitating our minds at this juncture, relating as they do to thepast, present, and future, making us feel, at one and the same time, grateful, happy, and sorrowful. The success which Your Excellency hasachieved in Asia is such as makes India and England proud of it. Thehistory of the British Empire in India has not, at least for the lastthirty years, produced a hero like Your Lordship, whose soldier-likequalities are fully known to the world. The country which had been thecradle of Indian invasions came to realize the extent of your powerand recognized your generalship. The victories gained by Sale, Nott, and Pollock in the plains of Afghanistan have been shadowed by thosegained by Your Excellency. The occupation of Kabul and the gloriousbattle of Kandahar are among the brightest jewels in the diadem ofYour Lordship's Baronage. Your Excellency's achievements checkedthe aggressive advance of the Great Northern Bear, whose ambitiousprogress received a check from the roar of a lion in the person ofYour Lordship; and a zone of neutral ground has now been fixed, and aline of peace marked by the Boundary Commission. The strong defenceswhich Your Excellency has provided on the frontier add another brightstone to the building of your fame, and constitute in themselves alasting memorial of Your Excellency's martial skill. Never had anyBritish General to face more arduous tasks, and none has proved morecompletely successful in overcoming them than Your Lordship. Theresult is that India has been rendered safe from the fear of invasionfrom without. Your Excellency is not only adorned with heroicqualifications, but the love and affection with which the people ofIndia regard Your Lordship show what admirable qualities are exhibitedin the person of Your Excellency. Terrible in war and merciful inpeace, Your Excellency's name has become a dread to the enemies ofEngland and lovely to your friends. The interest which Your Lordshiphas always taken in the welfare of those with whom you have worked inIndia is well known to everybody. The Sikhs in particular are, morethan any other community in India, indebted to Your Lordship. We findin Your Excellency a true friend of the Sikh community--a communitywhich is always devoted heart and soul to the service of Her MostGracious Majesty the Empress of India. No one understands better thanYour Excellency the value of a Sikh soldier, and we feel very gratefulthat the military authorities recognize the necessity of requiringevery Sikh recruit to be baptized according to the Sikh religionbefore admission to the Army--a practice which makes the Sikhs moretrue and faithful, and which preserves the existence of a veryuseful community. The Sikhs are said to be born soldiers, butthey undoubtedly make very good citizens in time of peace also. Unfortunately, however, they have had no opportunity of fullydeveloping their mental powers, so as to enable them to advance withthe spirit of the age. We thank God that Your Excellency was amongthose who most desired to see the Sikhs refined and educated byestablishing a Central College in the Punjab for the use of the Sikhpeople, and we confidently hope that the Sikhs, of whom a largeportion is under Your Excellency's command, will give their mite insupport of this national seminary. The subscriptions given by YourLordship, His Excellency the Viceroy, and His Honour the lateLieutenant-Governor, were very valuable to the Institution, and theSikhs are highly gratified by the honour Your Excellency has latelygiven to the Khalsa Diwan by becoming its honorary patron. Inconclusion, we beg only to repeat that it is quite beyond our power tostate how much we are indebted to Your Excellency, and how much we areaffected by the news that Your Lordship will shortly leave this land. The very idea of our separation from the direct contact of so strongand affectionate a leader, as Your Excellency undoubtedly is, makes usfeel very sorrowful; but as our hearts and prayers will always be withyou and Lady Roberts, we shall be consoled if Your Excellency wouldonly keep us in your memory, and on arrival in England assure Her MostGracious Majesty, the Mother-Empress, that all Sikhs, whether high orlow, strong or weak, old or young, are heartily devoted to her Crownand her representatives in this country. Before retiring, we thankYour Excellency for the very great honour that has been done to thepeople of Lahore by Your Lordship's visit to this city. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XIII. 

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *. )

_To HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARONROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART. , V. C. , G. C. B. , G. C. I. E. , R. A. , Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India. _

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY, We are proud to stand in Your Lordship's presence to-day on behalf ofthe Hindus of the Punjab, the loyal subjects of the Queen-Empress, whoappreciate the countless blessings which British Rule has conferredupon this country, to give expression to the feelings of gratitudewhich are uppermost in their hearts. We feel it really an honour thatwe are able to show our appreciation of British Rule in the presenceof the eminent soldier and statesman who has taken an importantpart in making the India of to-day what it is--contented withinand strengthened against aggression from abroad. The Punjab isthe province where the military strength of the Empire is beingconcentrated, and the bravery of the warlike races inhabiting it, which furnish the flower of Her Gracious Majesty's forces of the Armyin India, has been conspicuously displayed on several occasions duringthe last thirty years. We Hindus have availed ourselves the most ofthe facilities which British Rule has provided for the progress of thepeople in commercial enterprise, educational advance, and politicalprogress. We are, therefore, all the more proud that we have beenallowed to-day to greet in person the mighty soldier, the sympatheticCommander, and the sagacious Statesman, the record of whosedistinguished career in the East is virtually the history of nearlyhalf a century of glorious victories--victories both of peace andwar--achieved by the British Power in Asia, to show how intense isour gratitude towards the Queen-Empress and one of her eminentrepresentatives in India, who have striven to do their duty by thepeople of this country, and done it to the satisfaction of the peopleand of their Gracious Sovereign. The interests of India and Englandare identical, and the Hindus of the Punjab regard British Rule as aProvidential gift to this country--an agency sent to raise the peoplein the scale of civilization. Anything that is done to guaranteethe continuance of the present profoundly peaceful condition of thecountry is highly appreciated by us, and we are, therefore, all themore grateful to Your Lordship for all that your courage, foresight, sagacity, and high statesmanship have been able to achieve. At a timewhen all the races and communities inhabiting this frontier province, which has been truly described as the sword-hand in India, are vyingwith each other in showing their high appreciation of the good workdone by Your Excellency, of which not the least significant proof liesin the arrangement for the defence of the country at all vulnerablepoints of the frontier, the Hindus are anxious to show that they yieldto none in the enthusiasm which marks the demonstrations held in yourhonour. But Your Excellency commands our esteem and regard on othergrounds also. The deep interest that you have throughout your careerfelt in the welfare of the sepoy, and the closest ties of genuinefriendship which you have established with many a notable of ourcommunity, have laid us under deep obligations to Your Excellency. Theencouragement that you have given to the organization of the ImperialService Troops of the Native States is also gratefully appreciated byus; and only the other day we were gratified to learn the high opinionYour Excellency entertained of the appearance and military equipmentof the Imperial Service Troops of Jammu and Kashmir, the mostimportant Hindu State in this part of India. We should be wanting induty, we feel, did we not on this occasion give expression to thegreat regret which the news of your approaching departure from Indiahas caused among the Hindus of the Punjab, who feel that they areparting from a kind friend and a sympathetic Ruler. At the same time, we feel that the country will not lose the benefit of your matureexperience and wise counsel for long; for we are hopeful that you maysome day be called upon to guide the helm of the State in India, awork for which you are so specially fitted. In conclusion, we haveonly to pray to the Father of All Good that He may shower His choicestblessings upon you and your consort--that noble lady who has, inaddition to cheering you in your hard and onerous work in India, herself done a great deal for the comfort of the soldier and thesepoy, and that He may grant you many years of happy life--a lifewhich has done so much for the Queen-Empress's dominions, and whichmay yet do much more. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XIV. 

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *. )

_To HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARONROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART. , V. C. , G. C. B. , G. C. I. E. , R. A. , Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India. _

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY, We, the Mahomedans of the Punjab, have dared to approach YourExcellency with this address with eyes tear-bedimmed, but a facesmiling. The departure of a noble and well-beloved General likeyourself from our country is in itself a fact that naturally fills oureyes with tears. What could be more sorrowful than this, our farewellto an old officer and patron of ours, who has passed the prominentportion of his life in our country, developed our young progeny tobravery and regular soldiery, decorated them with honours, and createdthem to high titles? Your Excellency's separation is the harder tobear for the men of the Punjab because it is our Punjab that is proudof the fact that about forty years ago the foundation stone of allyour famous and noble achievements, which not only India, but England, rightly boasts of, was laid down in one of its frontier cities, andthat the greater part of your indomitable energies was spent in thePunjab frontier defence. If, therefore, we are sad at separating fromYour Excellency, it will not in any way be looked upon as strange. But these feelings of sorrow are mixed with joy when we see that theuseful officer whom in 1852 we had welcomed at Peshawar, when the starof his merits was beginning to rise, departs from us in splendour andglory in the capacity of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of avast Empire like India, and is an example of the highest type toall soldiers. This address is too brief for a detail of all themeritorious services rendered by your Excellency in the Punjab, Indiaand other foreign countries from that early epoch to this date. Yourzeal in the Mutiny of 1857, your heroic achievements in the Abyssinianand Afghan wars, your repeated victories of Kandahar, and yourstatesmanlike conduct of the Burma wars--all these are facts whichdeserve to be written in golden characters in the annals of Indianhistory. Your appointment as legislative and executive member of theSupreme Council of the Government of India for a considerable periodhas proved a source of blessings to the whole of India, and YourExcellency deserves an ample share of the credit due to the Councilfor all its useful regulations and reforms. The great liking thatmen of noble birth in India have been showing for some time towardsmilitary service is a clear demonstration of the excellent treatmentreceived at your hands by military officers, as in the reforms madeby you in the military pay and pension and other regulations. Anotherboon for which the Natives of India will always remember your namewith gratitude, is that you have fully relied upon, and placed yourconfidence in, the Natives, thus uniting them the more firmly to theBritish Crown, making them more loyal, and establishing the goodrelations between the Rulers and the ruled on a firmer footing totheir mutual good. Especially as Mussalmans of the Punjab are we proudthat before Your Excellency's departure you have had the opportunityof reviewing the Imperial Service Troops of the Mahomedan State ofBhawalpur, one of the leading Native States of the Punjab, whoseRuler's efforts to make his troops worthy to take their place by theside of British troops for the defence of India is only one instanceof the spirit of active loyalty which we are glad to say animates theentire Mussalman community of the Punjab. Disturbances arising fromforeign intrusions are not unknown to us, and we have not sufficientwords to thank your Lordship for the admirable management of thefrontier defence work carried on to protect our country from allpossible encroachments. The greatest pleasure and satisfaction, however, that we Mahomedans feel in presenting this address to YourLordship emanates from the idea that you go on your way home to yournative country with a high and favourable opinion of the Mahomedans ofIndia, true and loyal subjects to Her Majesty the Queen-Empress, whosenumber exceeds six crores, and who are rapidly growing. During theMutiny of 1857 the Chieftains and soldiers of our nation sparedneither money nor arms in the reduction and submission of the rebels. Your Lordship is also aware what loyalty was displayed by theMahomedans of India during the Afghan and Egyptian wars, waged againsttheir own co-religionists, and the cheerfulness shown by them infollowing your Lordship in all your victories. Frontier services, suchas the Kabul Embassy and the Delimitation Commission, rendered by theofficers of our creed are also well known to you. We are thereforesanguine that Your Lordship's own observation will enable all themembers of the Ruling race in India to form an opinion of therelations that exist between us and the British Crown. The Mahomedansof India and the Punjab are proud of being the devoted subjects of theQueen-Empress. In so acting we perform our religious duties, for oursacred religion enjoins upon us faithfulness and obedience towards ourRuling monarch, and teaches us to regard the Christians as our ownbrethren. The regard and esteem which we should have, therefore, fora Christian Government, as that of our kind mother the Queen-Empress, needs no demonstration. Although, for certain reasons which we neednot detail here, our nation has been deficient in education, and wehave been left much behind in obtaining civil employment, we hope thatyour long experience of our service will prove a good testimonial infavour of the warlike spirit, military genius, and loyalty ofour nation, and if the circle of civil employment has become toostraitened for us, the military line will be generously opened to us. We do not want to encroach upon Your Lordship's valuable time anyfurther. We therefore finish our address, offering our heartfeltthanks to your Lordship for all those kindnesses you have been wont toshow during your time towards India and Indians in general, and thePunjab and Punjabis in particular, and take leave of Your Lordshipwith the following prayer: 'May God bless thee wherever thou mayestbe, and may thy generosities continue to prevail upon us for a longtime. ' While actuated by these feelings, we are not the less awarethat our country owes a great deal to Lady Roberts, to whom we begthat Your Excellency will convey our heartfelt thanks for her livelyinterest in the welfare of Indian soldiers in particular and thepeople generally. In conclusion, we wish Your Excellencies God-speedand a pleasant and safe voyage. That Your Excellencies may havelong, happy, and prosperous lives, and achieve ever so many moredistinctions and honours, and return to us very shortly in a stillhigher position, to confer upon the Empire the blessings of abeneficent Rule, is our heartfelt and most sincere prayer. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XV. 

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Note *. )

_To His EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARONROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART. , V. C. , G. C. B. , G. C. I. E. , R. A. , Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India. _

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY, We, the representatives of the European community in the Punjab, arethe prouder to-day of our British blood, in that it links us in closekinship, to one who has so bravely maintained the honour of theBritish Empire alike in the years of peace and storm that India hasseen during the last three decades. During the Mutiny Your Excellencyperformed feats of gallantry that are historic. Since then yourcareer has been one of brilliant success and growing military renown. Whenever, in the histories of war, men speak of famous marches, thatfrom Kabul to Kandahar comes straightway to the lips. When our mindturns to military administration, we remember the unqualifiedsuccess of Your Excellency's career as Quartermaster-General and asCommander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Forces in India, in both of whichhigh offices you have added honour and glory to your great name, whichwill never be forgotten in India. When the private soldier, rightly orwrongly, thinks he has a grievance, his desire is only that somehow itmay be brought to the notice of Your Excellency, from whom, throughexperience, he expects full justice and generous sympathy. When welook towards our frontier and see the strategic railways and roads, and the strong places of arms that threaten the invader, we know thatfor those safeguards the Empire is in no small degree indebted tothe resolute wisdom of Your Excellency as military adviser to theGovernment of India. Last, but not least, as a Statesman, YourExcellency ranks second to none in the Empire in the opinion of yourcountrymen in this North-West frontier province; and we should gladlywelcome the day, if it might ever arrive, when Your Excellencyreturned to India. It is here that we see most clearly the passage ofevents beyond our borders and mark the signs of brooding trouble; andour hope has always been that, when that trouble should break forth, yours might be the hand to guide England's flag to victory again. ThePunjab is the sword of India, and Your Excellency has had the courageto lean most strongly upon that sword. It is here that the pulse ofthe army beats in India; it is hence that the enemies of our countryshall feel the downright blow; and it is here that the greatestgrief is felt in parting from so true a soldier and so far-seeing aStatesman as Your Excellency. It is meet, therefore, that here weshould assemble upon this occasion of farewell to express the greatsorrow which we, the representatives of the Europeans in the Punjab, feel at the prospect of losing so soon the clear brain and strong handthat Your Excellency has always brought to the control of the Army inIndia and to the solution of all questions of political or militarymoment. In doing so, we mourn for the loss of one of the beststatesmen, the best general, and the best friend to the soldier inIndia. We say nothing of the kindly relations Your Excellency hasalways been able to establish with the other races in India; ourfellow-subjects here will doubtless do so in their turn. We saynothing of Your Excellency's and Lady Roberts' charming socialqualities, nor Her Ladyship's philanthropic work in India. We are hereonly to express our grief at parting with one whom we value so highlyfor the sake of our common country, and our hope that as your past hasbeen full of glory to the Empire and honour to yourself, so may yourfuture be; and that you may be spared for many years to wield thesword and guide the counsels of our country. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XVI. 

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Footnote 11. )

_To His EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE FREDERICK BARONROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART. , V. C. , G. C. B. , G. C. I. E. , R. A. , Commander-in-Chief of Her Imperial Majesty's Army in India. _

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY, We, the Talukdars of Oudh, as loyal and faithful subjects of theEmpress of India, avail ourselves of the present opportunity ofoffering Your Excellency a most cordial and respectful welcome to theCapital of Oudh. 

The long and valuable services rendered by Your Excellency to theCrown and the country are well known to, and are deeply appreciatedby, us. Your Excellency's wise and vigorous administration of HerMajesty's Army in India has won for you our respectful admiration;while your prowess in the battlefield, and your wisdom in Councilduring the eventful period of your supreme command of Her Majesty'sIndian Forces, have inspired us with confidence in your great militarytalents and your single-minded and earnest devotion to duty. In manya battle you have led the British Army to victory, and the brilliantsuccess which has invariably attended the British Arms under YourExcellency's command has added to the glory of the British Empire. 

But the pride and pleasure we feel at being honoured by YourExcellency's presence in our capital town give place to sorrow andregret at the approaching retirement of Your Excellency from the greatservice of which you are an ornament. 

In grateful acknowledgment of the most important services rendered byYour Excellency to our Empress and our country, we beg to be allowedthe privilege of presenting you with a Sword of Indian manufacture, which will, we hope, from time to time, remind you of us and of Oudh. 

Wishing Your Lordship a safe and pleasant voyage home, and a long andhappy life, We subscribe ourselves, Your Lordship's most humble and obedient servants, THE TALUKDARS OF OUDH. 

 * * * * *

APPENDIX XVII. 

(Referred to in Chapter LXVIII, Footnote 12. )

_To His EXCELLENCY GENERAL THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR FREDERICKSLEIGH, BARON ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR AND WATERFORD, BART. , V. C. , G. C. B. , G. C. I. E. , D. C. L. , LL. D. , R. A. , Commander-in-Chief in India. _

YOUR EXCELLENCY, Viewing with concern and regret your approaching departure from India, we beg--in bidding you farewell--to express our admiration of yourlife and work as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces in India, and to request you to permit your portrait to be placed in the TownHall of Calcutta, in token for the present generation of their highappreciation of your eminent services, and in witness to afuture generation of the esteem in which you were held by yourcontemporaries. 

With foresight denoting wise statesmanship, Governments which you haveserved have initiated and maintained a policy of Frontier Defence, andencouraged the increased efficiency of the Forces. 

In the furtherance of these objects we recognize the salient pointsof your career and character whilst holding the high rank ofCommander-in-Chief. 

In your continued efforts to ameliorate the condition of the privatesoldier we recognize broad humanity. In the increasing efficiency ofthe Army, which, in our belief, characterizes your tenure of command, we recognize high soldierly qualities. In the state of strength whichthe Frontier Defences have attained, mainly due, we believe, to you, we recognize practical sagacity, conspicuous ability in discernment ofrequirements, and in pursuit of your aims an unwearying industry, aresolute persistence, and a determination that no difficulty can turn, in which a noble example for all true workers may be found. 

In a word, your life and work are to us identified with FrontierDefence and Efficient Forces. We cheerfully bear our share of thecost, as in possession of these protections against aggression fromwithout, we believe all who dwell within the borders of the land willfind their best guarantee for peace, and in peace the best safeguardthey and their children can possess to enable them to pass their livesin happiness and prosperity, and escape the misery and ruin whichfollow war and invasion. For all that you have done to give them suchsecurity, we feel you deserve, and we freely give, our heartfeltthanks. 

Within the limitations of a farewell address, we hardly feel justifiedin personal allusions trenching on your private life, but we cannotrefrain from noticing with responsive sympathy the feeling of personalattachment to yourself which is widespread throughout India, andassuring you that we share in it to the fullest extent that privatefeeling can be affected by public services. We endorse our assurancewith an expression of the wish that, in whatever part of the BritishEmpire your future life may be spent, it may be attended, as in thepast, with honour, and, by the blessing of God, with health andhappiness for yourself and all those you hold dear. 

It is the prerogative of the Crown alone to bestow honours on thosewho have served their country well, and none have been better meritedthan those which you enjoy, and to which, we trust, additions may bemade. It is the privilege of a community to make public professionof merit in a fellow-citizen where they consider it is due, and inavailing ourselves of the privilege to make this public recognition ofthe great services which, in our opinion, you have rendered to India, we beg with all sincerity to add a hearty God-speed and a regretfulFarewell. 

 We have the honour to be, Your Excellency, Your obedient servants. 

 CALCUTTA, _11th March, 1893. _

INDEX

PERSONS. 

Abbott, General Sir James, K. C. B. Abdulla JanAbdur RahmanAdams, Rev. W. J. Adye, General Sir JohnAfzal KhanAhmed Shah DuraniAitken, MajorAkbar, The EmperorAkram KhanAlbert Victor, H. R. H. PrinceAliAli KhanAlison, Sir ArchibaldAlla Sing, JemadarAllen, Surgeon-GeneralAllgood, CaptainAmar Sing, RajaAnderson, CaptainAnderson, MajorAnson, Major AugustusAnson, General the Hon. G. Aslam Khan, Lieutenant-Colonel, C. I. E. Asmatulla KhanAta Mahomed Khan, NawabAuckland, LordAyub KhanAzim KhanAzimulla KhanAziz Khan, Subadar Major

Baber, The EmperorBadcock, MajorBadshah KhanBahadur ShahBaigrie, ColonelBaird, Sir DavidBaird-Smith, ColonelBaker, Brigadier-General Sir ThomasBaker, Colonel ValentineBakram KhanBannatyne, CaptainBarnard, Major-General Sir HenryBarnston, Major RogerBarr, CaptainBarter, Major Richard Mrs. Battye, Captain Wigram Colonel Arthur Frederick, Captain Quintin, LieutenantBeaconsfield, The Earl ofBeadon, Sir CecilBecher, Captain Major-General Arthur Major SullivanBellew, Dr. Benares, Maharaja ofBentinck, Lord WilliamBernard, Sir CharlesBertrand, FatherBhartpur, Raja ofBhopal, Begum ofBiddulph, Brigadier-General M. Biddulph, ColonelBirbulBirsing, SepoyBlackwood, MajorBlanc, Dr. Blunt, ColonelBogle, CaptainBooth, LieutenantBourchier, General Sir George, K. C. B. Bowring, Mr. LewinBrabazon, LieutenantBrackenbury, GeneralBradshaw, Dr. Brasyer, ColonelBridge, CaptainBright, John, The Right Hon. General Sir Robert, G. C. B. Brind, Brigadier Frederick General Sir James, G. C. B. Broadfoot, CaptainBrooke, Brigadier-GeneralBrown, Major-General Rodney Major TodBrowne, Dr. John Campbell Sir James General Sir Samuel, V. C. , G. C. B. , K. C. S. I. Brownlow, Colonel F. Brownlow, General Sir Charles, G. C. B. Bruce, Major-General H. Legeyt, C. B. Brunow, BaronBudgen, LieutenantBukhtiar Khan, 377Bulkeley, MajorBunny, Lieutenant ArthurBurgess, CorporalBurn-Murdoch, LieutenantBurnes, Sir AlexanderBurroughs, CaptainBurrows, BrigadierBushman, ColonelButler, Colonel Thomas. V. C. Butson, Captain

Cambridge, H. R. H. The Duke ofCameron, Captain Lance-SergeantCampbell, Colonel (Bays)Campbell, ColonelCampbell, Lady Major Sir Colin. _See_ Clyde Sir Edward Sir GeorgeCanning, LadyCanning, Viscount, Governor-General and Viceroy, succeeds Lord Dalhousie; condemns action of Meerut authorities; praises General Wilson and the Army of Delhi; advised by Sir Henry Lawrence; not in accord with Sir Colin Campbell; insists on employment of Nepalese troops; proposals regarding native recruits; Viceregal progress; passes the income tax against much opposition; marches through Central India; durbar at Jubbulpore; durbar at Lucknow; durbar at Allahabad; third durbar at Lucknow; loses his wife; leaves India; unjustly criticized; his characterCareyCarmichaelCarr, CaptainCase Mrs. Cavagnari, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Louis, K. C. B. Cavagnari, LadyCesarewitch, H. I. H. TheChalmers, Major HenryChamberlain, General Crawford, C. S. I. Chamberlain, General Sir NevilleChamberlain, Colonel NevilleChamberlain, Mrs. Chandra ShamsherChanner, Major-General, V. C. , C. B. Chapman, Lieutenant-ColonelChelmsford, General Lord, G. C. B. Chesney, Sir GeorgeChester, ColonelChilders, The Right Hon. HughChisholme, CaptainChristie, Mr. Churchill, Lord RandolphClarendon, The Earl ofClarke, Lieutenant-ColonelCleland, Lieutenant-ColonelClerk, Sir GeorgeClive, LordClyde, Lord (Sir Colin Campbell) lays out cantonment of Peshawar; substituted helmets for cocked hats; orders to his men at the Alma; appointed Commander-in-Chief in India; starts for relief of Lucknow; takes command of relieving force; plans and preparations for the relief; his personal attention to details; fixes his Head-Quarters in the Martinière; makes a feint; orders more ammunition; wounded; selects point for breach; orders assault of Sikandarbagh; leads the 93rd to the attack his aide-de-camp wounded; quartered in the Shah Najaf; his prudence; orders second assault; orders colours to be planted on mess-house; meeting with Havelock and Outram; his soldierly instincts; evacuation of the Residency; thanks the troops for their services; march to Cawnpore, 200-203; defeats Nana Sahib and Tantia Topi at Cawnpore; high opinion of Hope Grant; favoured Highlanders unduly; action at Khudaganj; invidious selection of commanders; prepares for siege of Lucknow; adopts Napier's plan of attack; interview with Jung Bahadur; makes an error of judgment; his good use of artillery; kindness of heart; accompanies Lord Canning to Peshawar; succeeded by Sir Hugh RoseCobbe, BrigadierCochin, Raja ofCoke, General Sir John, G. C. B. Collen, Major-General Sir Edwin, K. C. I. E. Collett, ColonelColley, Major-General Sir George, K. C. B. Collis, MajorColquhoun, CaptainColvin, Mr. Combe, Major-General, C. B. Congreve, ColonelConnaught, H. R. H. The Duchess ofConnaught, H. R. H. The Duke ofConolly, CaptainCook, MajorCooper, Lieutenant Sir GeorgeCoote, Sir EyreCorbett, BrigadierCosserat, CaptainCotton, Captain General Sir Sydney, G. C. B. Lieutenant-ColonelCourtney, Mr. Cowie, Rev. W. G. Cracklow, LieutenantCranbrook, Earl ofCraster, MajorCross, The ViscountCrosse, CaptainCrutchley, CaptainCunnyngham, Lieutenant DickCurrie, Colonel

D'Aguilar, MajorDalhousie, The Marquess of (Governor-General of India), his epitaph on Colonel Mackeson; his Afghan policy; treaty with Dost Mahomed; resignsDal Sing, JemadarDaly, General Sir Henry, G. C. B. Daubeny, Brigadier-GeneralDaud ShahDavidson, ColonelDavison, LieutenantDawes, MajorDeb Shamsher JungDelafosse, LieutenantDelhi, King ofDenison, Sir WilliamDenniss, ColonelDholpur, Raja ofDinkar Rao, 154Dir Sing, NaickDisney, LieutenantDost Mahomed KhanDouglas, Brigadier Lieutenant C. Drew, Colonel BarryDrummond, Colour-Sergeant Mr. Drysdale, General Sir William, K. C. B. Dufferin, The Marchioness ofDufferin, The Marquess ofDuke, Dr. JoshuaDunbar, CaptainDundas, Captain, V. C. , Dundu Pant. _See_ Nana SahibDupuis, Major-GeneralDurand, Sir Henry Marion, K. C. S. I. , C. B. Sir Mortimer, K. C. S. I. , K. C. I. E. 

Earle, CaptainEden, Major Sir AshleyEdgar, Sir John, K. C. S. I. Edwardes, Sir Herbert, Commissioner of Peshawar; his remarkable character; advocates friendly relations with Kabul; strongly supported by Lord Dalhousie; his magnanimity; Lawrence's counsellor; John Nicholson's dearest friend;Egerton, LieutenantElgin, The Earl of, Viceroy of IndiaEli BuxEliot, CaptainEllenborough, LordElles, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Lieutenant-General Sir W. K. , K. C. B. Elphinstone, General Lord MountstuartElverson, LieutenantEnglish, ColonelEwart, General Sir John, K. C. B. 

Faiz Mahomed KhanFarakabad, Nawab ofFarwell, MajorFinnis, ColonelFisher, Colonel LieutenantFitzgerald, LieutenantFitzgerald, Lieutenant Mordaunt Lieutenant C. MajorFitz-Hugh, Lieutenant-ColonelForbes, LieutenantFord, Mr. Forrest, Mr. GeorgeForsyth, Sir Douglas, C. B. , K. C. S. I. Franks, Major-GeneralFraser, ColonelFraser-Tytler, ColonelFrench, CaptainFrere, Sir Bartle, Bart. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. Frome, CaptainFutteh KhanFuzl AliFyzabad, Moulvie of

Gaisford, LieutenantGalbraith, MajorGanda Sing, Captain BakshiGarvock, General Sir John, G. C. B. Gawler, Colonel Mrs. Ghazi-ud-din HaidarGhulam Haidar Khan, SardarGhulam Hussein Khan, Nawab Sir, K. C. S. I. Ghulam HyderGibbon, MajorGladstone, The Right Hon. W. E. Goad, CaptainGokal Sing, JemadarGoldsmid, General Sir Frederick, K. C. M. G. Gomm, Sir WilliamGopal Borah, HavildarGordon, Captain Captain Colonel B. General John Brigadier-General T. Lance-Corporal Lieutenant-ColonelGortchakoff, PrinceGough, Brigadier-General CharlesGough, Captain Bloomfield Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh, V. C. , G. C. B. Lord Sir JohnGrant, Lieutenant General Sir Hope, G. C. B. Field-Marshal Sir Patrick, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. Grant-Duff, Lady Sir Mount Stewart, G. C. S. I. Grantham, Captain FrankGraves, BrigadierGreathed, Brigadier-GeneralGreathed, LieutenantGreaves, General Sir George, G. C. B. , G. C. M. G. Green, Major Major-General Sir George, K. C. B. Greensill, CaptainGreer, SergeantGreig, LieutenantGrey, Sir George PrivateGrieve, PrivateGriffin, Sir LepelGriffiths, MajorGuise, CaptainGurbaj Sing, Subadar-MajorGwalior, Maharaja of

Habibulla Khan, Mirza MustaufiHagenau, Major vonHaines, Sir FrederickHakim, SepoyHale, BrigadierHall, CaptainHallifax, BrigadierHammick, Captain St. V. Hamilton, Lieutenant Colonel IanHammond, MajorHanbury, Surgeon-GeneralHandscombe, BrigadierHardinge, Captain George General the Hon. A. E. The ViscountHardy, CaptainHarness, ColonelHarris, Rev. J. Hartington, The Marquis ofHashim KhanHastings, MajorHavelock, General Sir Henry, K. C. B. Letter from; fails to force his way to Lucknow; note from, in Greek character; made K. C. B. ; meeting with Sir Colin Campbell; his deathHawkes, LieutenantHawthorne, BuglerHay, Lord William. _See_ Tweeddale MajorHayes, Captain Fletcher Mrs. Haythorne, General Sir Edmund, K. C. B. Hearsay, GeneralHeath, Admiral Sir Leopold, K. C. B. Heathcote, Lieutenant A. Major MarkHennessy, ColonelHewitt, GeneralHills-Johnes, Lieutenant-General Sir James, V. C. , G. C. B. Hinde, MajorHodson, MajorHolkar, MaharajaHome, LieutenantHood, General CockburnHope, Colonel the Hon. AdrianHopkins, CaptainHornsby, CaptainHovenden, LieutenantHudson, Lieutenant-General Sir John, K. C. B. Huene, Major vonHughes, General Sir W. T. , K. C. B. Hughes, Major-General T. E. , C. B. Hunt, CaptainHyderabad, Nizam of

Ibrahim Khan SultanInderbir Lama, SepoyInge, CaptainInglis, BrigadierInglis, LadyInnes, Lieutenant-General McLeod, V. C. Ivanoff, General

Jacob, MajorJacobs, Colour-SergeantJackson, Mr. CoverleyJaipur, Maharaja ofJames, Captain MajorJaora, Nawab ofJelaladin GhilzaiJenkins, Colonel F. Jenkins, Mr. WilliamJervis, EnsignJhansi, Rani ofJhind, Raja ofJodhpur, Maharaja ofJohnson, Colonel Alured Major Charles General Sir Edwin, G. C. B. Johnstone, BrigadierJones, Captain OliverJones, Lieutenant Lieutenant-Colonel John BrigadierJumna DasJung Bahadur Sir Salar

Kapurthala, Raja ofKaraoli, RajaKashmir, Maharaja ofKauffmann, GeneralKavanagh, Mr. Kaye, MajorKaye, Sir JohnKeen, Major-General, C. B. Kelly, Dr. ColonelKelso, CaptainKennedy, Captain 'Dick'Keyes, General Sir Charles, G. C. B. Khan Sing RosaKhelat, Khan ofKinleside, MajorKiunthal, Raja ofKnight, Mr. Knowles, ColonelKnox, CaptainKomaroff, General

Lafont, A. , Lake, Colonel Edward LordLalbura, ChiefLalla Joti PersâdLally, Count deLang, ColonelLansdowne, The Marquis ofLansdowne, The Marchioness ofLauder, Colour-SergeantLaw, CaptainLawrence, Lord, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab; made K. C. B. ; opposed to Edwardes' frontier policy; meets Dost Mahomed; hopeful of affairs in Punjab; urges advance on Delhi; trusts the Phulkian Rajas; his wise measures for preserving order in the Punjab; gratitude of Army of Delhi to; begs for return of troops to Punjab; favours a retirement cis-Indus; appointed Viceroy; leaves India for good; his unique career; neutrality towards rival Amirs; his policy of 'masterly inaction'; subsidizes Sher Ali; farewell letter to the Amir;Lawrence, Sir Henry, K. C. B. Corps of Guides raised under his auspices; first British ruler of the Punjab; foresight in provisioning the Lucknow Residency; his admirable arrangements for its defence; predicted the Mutiny fourteen years before its occurrence; his character as a Statesman and Ruler; friendliness for Natives; suggests employment of Nepalese troops; opposed to annexation of Oudh; letter to Lord Canning; his dispositions for coping with the Mutiny; memorandum in his ledger-book;Lawrence, Captain Samuel, V. C. Major StringerLennox, General Sir Wilbraham, V. C. , K. C. B. Liddell, LieutenantLindsay, ColonelLittle, BrigadierLockhart, Lieutenant-General Sir William, K. C. B. , K. C. S. I. Longden, CaptainLongfield, BrigadierLonghurst, Dr. Loughman, CaptainLow, ColonelLow, GeneralLow, Major-General Sir Robert, G. C. B. Lowther, CommissionerLuck, GeneralLugard, General the Right Hon. Sir Edward, G. C. B. Luke, Mr. Lumsden, Captain General Sir Harry, K. C. S. I. , K. C. B. General Sir Peter, G. C. B. LadyLyall, Sir Alfred, G. C. I. E. , K. C. B. Lyons-Montgomery, LieutenantLytton, The Earl ofLytton, The Countess of

Macdonald, Colour-SergeantMacdonnell, CaptainMacdonnell, Major-GeneralMacGregor, Captain C. RMacGregor, Sir Charles, K. C. B. Mackay, Sir James, K. C. I. E. Mackenzie, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Mackeson, ColonelMackinnon, MajorMaclaine, LieutenantMacMahon, PrivateMacnabb, Sir Donald, K. C. S. I. Macpherson, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert, V. C. , K. C. B. Macqueen, ColonelMadhoo, HavildarMahomed, The Prophet Hussein Khan, Mirza Nabbi, Mirza Hyat Khan JanMahomed, Sadik Khan Usman KhanMainpuri, Raja ofMaisey, LieutenantMalcolm, Sir JohnMangal PandyManipur, Raja ofManners-Smith, LieutenantMansfield, Sir William. _See_ SandhurstMartin, Claude Captain Gerald LieutenantMartindale, MissMassy, Brigadier-GeneralMatthew, Bishop Mrs. Maxwell, Major Henry HamiltonMayne, Lieutenant OtwayMayo, LordMazr Ali, JemadarMcGillivray, CorporalMcQueen, Sir JohnMedley, LieutenantMehtab Sing, GeneralMenzies, LieutenantMerewether, ColonelMetcalfe, Sir Charles Sir TheophilusMiddleton, MajorMir Bacha Mubarak Shah JaffirMoir, CaptainMoney, Colonel G. N. Monro, LieutenantMontanaro, LieutenantMontgomery, Sir Robert, G. C. B. Moore, Major Henry Rev. Thomas Mrs. Moresby, CaptainMorgan, CaptainMoriarty, MajorMorton, Captain G. De C. Mowatt, ColonelMukarrab Khan, SepoyMunro, Sir ThomasMurphy, PrivateMurray, LieutenantMusa KhanMushk-i-AlamMysore, Maharaja of

Nabha, Raja ofNadir ShahNairne, Major-GeneralNana SahibNapier, EnsignNapier (of Magd[=a]la), Field-Marshal Lord, G. C. B. , K. C. S. I. Napier, Lord (of Murchiston) Sir CharlesNek Mahomed KhanNepal, Maharaja ofNepal, Maharani ofNeville, Captain PhilipNicholson, Lieutenant Charles Colonel W. G. Brigadier-General John, C. B. A name to conjure with in the Punjab; the beau-ideal of a soldier and a gentleman; takes command of Movable Column; punishment of Mehtab Sing; his soldierly instincts; defeats the rebels at Najafgarh; his masterful spirit; the man to do a desperate deed; the first to ascend the breach; mortally wounded; the author's last sight of him; his anger at the suggestion of retreat; his death; his funeral Lieutenant-General Sir Lothian, K. C. B. Nisbet, ColonelNorman, Colonel F. General Sir Henry, G. C. B. , G. C. M. G. Northbrook, The Earl ofNorthcote, Lady Sir StaffordNott, GeneralNugent, LieutenantNur JehanNuttall, General

Obed Ulla Khan, SirdarOchterlony, Sir DavidOldfield, LieutenantOlpherts, General Sir William, V. C. , K. C. B. Omar PashaOnslow, CaptainOudh, Begum of King ofOutram, General Sir James, G. C. B. The Bayard of the East; his military acumen; his courage and chivalry; differs with Sir Colin Campbell; interview with the author; commands an Infantry division at siege of Lucknow; preparation for the siege; maintains his high reputation; captures the Chakar Kothi; accomplished all that was expected of him; overruled by Sir Colin Campbell; completes the occupation of Lucknow; his views on the administration of Oudh; leaves India on account of failing health;Ouvry, MajorOwen, Dr. Oxley, Captain

Packe, LieutenantPalmer, Brigadier-General Major-General Sir Arthur, K. C. B. Parker, ColonelParry, MajorPatiala, Maharaja ofPaton, ColonelPaul, LieutenantPayn, General Sir William, K. C. B. Peacock, Sir BarnesPeel, Sir WilliamPelly, Sir LewisPerkins, General Sir Æneas, K. C. B. Persia, Shah ofPertap Sing, MaharajaPertap Sing, sepoyPeshwa, ThePhayre, General Sir Robert, G. C. B. Picot, LieutenantPole-Carew, Lieutenant-Colonel, C. B. Pollock, General Sir George Major-General Sir Frederick, K. C. S. I. Polwhele, BrigadierPorter, GeneralPowell, Captain CaptainPowlett, CaptainPratt, MajorPrendergast, General Sir Harry, V. C. , K. C. B. Pretyman, Lieutenant-Colonel, C. B. Prideaux, LieutenantPrimrose, GeneralProbyn, General Sir Dighton, V. C. , G. C. V. O. , K. C. B. Protheroe, ColonelPrussia, Crown Princess ofPursoo Khatri, Jemadar

Quinton, Mr. 

Ragobir Nagarkoti, SubadarRam Sing, RajaRampur, Nawab ofRao, Sir MadhavaRassam, Mr. Rawlinson, Sir HenryReade, Mr. Reed, GeneralReegan, PrivateReid, General Sir Charles, G. C. B. Remmington, CaptainRennick, CaptainRewa, Maharaja ofRich, CaptainRicketts, George, C. B. Ridgeway, Colonel Sir West K. C. B. Rind, CaptainRipon, The Marchioness ofRipon, The Marquis ofRoberts, General Sir AbrahamRoberts, Hon. Frederick Hugh SherstonRoberts, Lady (widow of Sir Abraham)Roberts, The Hon. Aileen MaryRoberts, The Hon. Ada EdwinaRoberts, MissRoberts, LadyRoberts, Field-Marshal Lord, V. C. , K. P. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. , G. C. I. E. , leaves England; arrives in India; life in Calcutta; journey to Peshawar; at Peshawar; visits Kashmir; joins Horse Artillery; at Umballa; revisits Kashmir; first visit to Simla; returns to Peshawar; at Mian Mir; first Staff appointment; studies native languages; passes examination; rides a hundred miles in one day; tour with General Reed; witnesses meeting between Dost Mahomed and Sir John Lawrence; second Staff appointment; second tour with General Reed; refuses appointment in P. W. D. ; reports on sanatorium of Cherat; first meeting with Nicholson; returns to Peshawar; hears first tidings of Mutiny; at a Council of War; Staff Officer to Brigadier Chamberlain; at the mercy of a sentry; starts for Rawal Pindi; with Sir John Lawrence at Rawal Pindi; joins Movable Column at Wazirabad; _en route_ to Delhi; at Lahore; arrives at Delhi; before Delhi; appointed D. A. Q. M. G. With Artillery; first under fire; fidelity of his servants; wounded; intimacy with Nicholson; knocked over by a round shot; last sight of Nicholson; charger killed; takes part in storming of the palace; leaves Delhi with Greathed's column for Cawnpore; in action at Bulandshahr; narrow escape; in fight at Aligarh; in fight at Agra; first sight of Taj Mahal; leaves Agra; arrives at Cawnpore; meets Sir Colin Campbell; marches to Lucknow; meets with a night adventure; in the storming of the Sikandarbagh; in the attack on the Shah Najaf; plants the colours on the mess-house; accompanies Outram and Havelock to the Residency; meets the 'hero of the Redan'; in fight at Cawnpore; in fight at Khudaganj; wins the V. C. ; at the siege of Lucknow; with Outram at capture of the Chakar Kothi; meets Jung Bahadur; complimented by the Commander-in-Chief; his views on the Mutiny; on our present position in India; takes furlough; marries; receives the V. C. From the hands of the Queen; returns to India; refuses post in Revenue Survey; accompanies Lord Canning on his Viceregal progress; loses chance of service in China; visits Simla; accompanies Lord Canning through Central India; returns to Simla; ordered to Allahabad; accompanies Commander-in-Chief on tour; returns to Simla; again on tour with Commander-in-Chief; has a sunstroke; made A. Q. M. G. ; serves with Umbeyla expedition; too junior to be a Lieutenant-Colonel; voyage round the Cape; at home again; returns to India; serves with Abyssinian Expedition; bearer of the Abyssinian despatches; first A. Q. M. G. ; returns to India; birth of daughter; serves with Lushai Expedition; receives the C. B. ; officiating Q. M. G. ; with the Prince of Wales at Delhi; first meeting with Lord Lytton; takes part in the Imperial Assemblage at Delhi; accepts command of Punjab Frontier Force; assumes command of Kuram Field Force; shortcomings of his column; his able staff; advances into the Kuram valley; takes the Peiwar Kotal; devotion of his orderlies; congratulated by the Queen; hampered by want of transport; punishment of treachery; action at Khost; misrepresented in the House of Commons; dismisses a war correspondent; holds a Queen's birthday parade; farewell to Cavagnari; serves on the Army Commission; his recommendations gradually carried out; appointed Commander of Kabul Field Force; starts for Kabul; correspondence with Yakub Khan; issues a Proclamation to the people of Kabul; meeting with Yakub Khan; issues a Proclamation and an order; takes the Shutargardan; defeats the Afghans at Charasia; advances on Kabul; instructions from the Government of India; inspects the Embassy and the Bala Hissar; receives abdication of Yakub Khan; issues a Proclamation; makes a formal entry into Kabul; adopts measures for carrying on administration; misrepresented in House of Commons; congratulated by the Queen and the Viceroy; wintering at Kabul; attacked by the tribesmen on all sides; life saved by Mazr Ali; storming of the Takht-i-Shah; further attacks; concentrates his forces at Sherpur; strengthens his defences; arrests Daud Shah; defeats and disperses the tribesmen; reopens communication with India; issues a Proclamation; fortifies Sherpur; negotiations at Kabul; holds a durbar; hands over supreme command to Sir Donald Stewart; visits Jalalabad; hears news of Maiwand; telegram to Adjutant-General; appointed Commander of Kabul-Kandahar Field Force; preparations for the march; details of the Force; commissariat and transport; starts for Kandahar; order of marching; reaches Ghazni; reaches Kelat-i-Ghilzai; telegraphs progress to Government; food required daily for the force; down with fever; reports progress; letter from General Phayre; telegraphs to Simla; reaches Kandahar; demoralized condition of the garrison; encamps to the west of the city; reconnoitres the enemy's position; assumes command of the Army of Southern Afghanistan; defeats Ayub Khan; and captures his camp; telegraphs the news; difficulties about supplies; congratulated by the Queen and the Duke of Cambridge; made G. C. B. ; appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army; proceeds to Quetta; parting with the troops; pleasant memories; receives autograph letter from the Queen; reception in England; appointed Governor of Natal and Commander of the Forces in South Africa; witnesses the manoeuvres of the German Army; offered the Quartermaster-Generalship; proceeds to Madras; visits the Andaman Islands; proceeds to Burma; declines the Quartermaster-Generalship; measures for improving the Madras Army; memories of Madras; visits Calcutta; meeting with Abdur Rahman at Rawal Pindi; returns to Madras; appointed Commander-in-Chief in India; brief visit to England; accompanies Lord Dufferin to Gwalior; proceeds to Delhi; Camp of Exercise at Delhi; accompanies Lord Dufferin to Burma; proceeds to the North-West Frontier; makes a tour of inspection; draws up a memorandum on frontier defence; Lady Roberts's Homes; sends reinforcements to Burma; lands at Rangoon; measures for pacification of Upper Burma; inspects North-West Frontier with General Chesney; receives Grand Cross of the Indian Empire; establishes 'Regimental Institutes'; establishes the Army Temperance Association; makes a tour with Lord Dufferin along the North-West Frontier; official inspections; presides over Defence and Mobilization Committees; supports Lord Dufferin's scheme for the utilization of Native States' armies; visits the frontier; spends Christmas in camp; visits Calcutta; makes a tour of inspection in Central India and Rajputana; and in Kashmir; remodels the system of musketry instruction for the Native Army; improvements in Artillery and Cavalry; visits the frontier with Lord Lansdowne; offered the post of Adjutant-General; meets Prince Albert Victor in Calcutta; entertains the Prince at Muridki; extension of command; meets the Cesarewitch in Calcutta; views on the Native Army; steps taken to increase its efficiency; concession to the Native Army; unable to remedy the under-officering of Native regiments; inspects the Zhob valley with General Brackenbury; raised to the peerage; visits Burma; visits Nepal; review of the Maharaja's troops; a grand durbar; an evening reception at the palace; a short tour in the Punjab; proposed Mission to the Amir; the Mission abandoned; adieu to Simla; final tour in the Punjab; farewell entertainments at Lahore; at Lucknow; and at Calcutta; pig-sticking at Jaipur and Jodhpur; address from the municipality of Ahmedabad; parting dinner at the Byculla Club; the end of forty-one years in India; letter to Yakub Khan; interview with Yakub Khan's agents; official report on interview with Yakub Khan; extract from Report on Commissariat; instructions to officers commanding Column in Burma; farewell address from Sikhs of the Punjab; from Hindus of the Punjab; from Mahomedans of the Punjab; from the European community of the Punjab; from the Talukdars of Oudh; from the citizens of CalcuttaRobertson, LieutenantRobinson, LieutenantRomanofski, GeneralRose, Sir Hugh. _See_ StrathnairnRoss, General Sir John, G. C. B. Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel Dr. Tyrrell Mrs. TyrrellRothney, CaptainRunjit SingRussell, Brigadier D. Russell, General Sir Edward Lechmere, K. C. S. I. Russell, LieutenantRussia, Czar ofRuttun Sing, Subadar

St. John, Sir OliverSaiyad Nur MahomedSale, Sir RobertSalisbury, The Marquis ofSalkeld, LieutenantSalmon, Sir NowellSalmond, LieutenantSamandar KhanSandeman, Colonel Sir RobertSandford, MajorSandhurst, General Lord, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. (Sir William Mansfield)Sandhurst, LadySankar Dass, Native DoctorSarel, CaptainSchouvaloff, CountScott, Captain A. MajorSeaton, BrigadierShafto, CaptainShah JehanShah Mahomed KhanShah ShujaShaidad Khan, ResaidarSher Ali, AmirSher Ali, SirdarSherindil Khan, SirdarSher Mahomed, JemadarSherries, LieutenantSherston, Lieutenant JohnShore, Sir John. _See_ TeignmouthShowers, BrigadierSikim, Raja ofSindhia, MaharajaSirdar SingSkinner, JamesSkobeleff, GeneralSladen, Mrs. Slater, MajorSleeman, ColonelSmith, Captain Major Euan Major PercySmyth, ColonelSmyth-Windham, MajorSomerset, Sir HenrySpens, CaptainSpottiswoode, ColonelSpratt, LieutenantStanhope, The Hon. E. Stanley, LordStaveley, Lady Sir CharlesSterling, ColonelStewart, John Patrick Field-Marshal Sir Donald Martin, Bart. , G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. , C. I. E. Lieutenant Donald Lady Sir HerbertStewart-Mackenzie, CaptainStillman, LieutenantStolietoff, GeneralStrathnairn, Field-Marshal Lord, G. C. B. , G. C. S. I. (Sir Hugh Rose)Stratton, CaptainSullivan, GunnerSultan Jan, ShahzadaSwat, Akhund ofSwinley, CaptainSyad Ahmed ShahSymons, MajorSynge, Captain

Taj Sing, SepoyTamerlaneTanner, Lieutenant-General Sir Oriel, K. C. B. Tantia TopiTaylor, Corporal Colonel Reynell General Sir Alexander, G. C. B. Teignmouth, LordTemple, Sir RichardThebaw, KingThelwall, BrigadierTheodore, KingThesiger, General. _See_ ChelmsfordThomson, Lieutenant LieutenantThornhill, M. Thornton, Thomas, C. S. I. Tikaram Kwas, SepoyTombs, Major-General Sir Harry, V. C. , K. C. B. Tonk, Nawab ofTownsend, Dr. Travancore, Maharaja ofTravers, Lieutenant EatonTrevelyan, Sir CharlesTrower, LieutenantTryon, Admiral Sir George, K. C. B. Turner, Colonel F. Brigadier-General Sir W. W. , K. C. B. Tweeddale, William Hay, Marquess ofTyndall, ColonelTytler, Captain Mrs. 

Udaipur, Maharana ofUlwar, Maharaja ofUnjur Tiwari

Vandeleur, MajorVaughan, Lieutenant General Sir T. L. , K. C. B. Victoria, H. M. QueenVilliers, ColonelVitkievitch, CaptainVizianagram, Maharaja ofVonolel, ChiefVousden, CaptainVozgonoff, General

Wakhan, Mir ofWale, CaptainWales, H. R. H. The Prince ofWales, H. R. H. The Princess ofWalidad KhanWali Mahomed KhanWalker, General James, C. B. Waller, Major RobertWalpole, BrigadierWalton, CaptainWarburton, ColonelWaterfield, Colonel GarrowWaterford, The Marchioness of The Marquess ofWatson, General Sir John, V. C. , K. C. B. Welchman, ColonelWellesley, The MarquessWellington, Duke ofWheeler, Sir Hugh TalboysWhite, Sir GeorgeWilde, Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred, K. C. B. , K. C. S. I. William I. , The EmperorWilliams, Lieutenant ColonelWilloughby, LieutenantWilson, Sir ArchdaleWilson, Colonel James LieutenantWinchester, MaryWindham, Sir CharlesWolseley, Field-Marshal Viscount, K. P. Commander-in-ChiefWoodthorpe, CaptainWright, MajorWylie, Colonel Mrs. Wynne, CaptainWynter, Captain

Yahia KhanYakub KhanYanoff, ColonelYorke, LieutenantYounghusband, Captain F. Lieutenant George MajorYule, Colour-SergeantYuralski, Doctor

Zakariah Khan

INDEX

CHIEF PUBLIC EVENTS. 

Abdul Rahman proclaimed AmirAbolition of offices of Commanders-in-Chief, Bombay and MadrasAbyssinian ExpeditionAfghan War, firstAgra, Fight atAhmedkhel, Battle ofAligarh, Fight atAlipur, Attack onArmy Commission Temperance Association, Establishment ofAssassination of Colonel Mackeson of Lord MayoAssaye, Battle of

Barrackpore, Outbreak atBerhampur, Outbreak atBerlin TreatyBlack Mountain ExpeditionsBulandshahr, Action atBurma Expedition

Cawnpore, Fight at Massacre atCesarewitch visits IndiaCharasia, Fights atChardeh Valley, Fight in theChitral Expedition

Delhi, Camp of Exercise at Siege of; the first victory; enthusiasm of the troops; Barnard's success; the Flagstaff Tower; attacking force placed in position; the weak point of our defence; defences; death of Quintin Battye; the besiegers besieged; hard fighting; arrival of reinforcements; death of Barnard; Reed takes command; treachery in camp; more hard fighting; sufferings of sick and wounded; Wilson takes command; Nicholson and the Movable Column arrive; Baird-Smith plans attack; breaching batteries at work; the assault; Nicholson wounded; storming of the palace; Hodson captures the King; Hodson shoots the Princes; Nicholson dies; the siege endedDost Mahomed, Treaty with Death of

European Forces, Amalgamation of the

Ferozepore, Outbreak at

Gandamak, Treaty ofGatling Guns, First use ofGwalior fortress, Rendition of

Homes in the Hills, Establishment ofHunza-Naga CampaignHurdwar Fair, closing of

Imperial assemblage of 1877

Jowaki Expedition

Kabul, Cavagnari's Mission to Expedition Massacre of Embassy at Repulse of British Mission to Russian Mission toKandahar, Defeat of Ayub Khan at March toKhost, Action atKhudaganj, Fight atKohat, Expedition nearKuram Expedition

Lucknow, Relief of; Sir Colin's preparations; the advance begun; reinforcements arrive; attack by the enemy; ammunition wanting; the advance; Sir Colin wounded; attack on the Sikandarbagh; the Shah Najaf; the relief effected; meeting of the Generals; the evacuation Siege of; Napier's plan adopted; capture of the Chakar Kothi; capture of the iron bridge; visit from Jung Bahadur; Hodson mortally wounded; Sir Colin's mistake; the city takenLushai Expedition

Maiwand, Disaster atMajuba Hill, Disaster atMandalay, Capture ofManipur ExpeditionMeerut, Mutiny atMerv, Russian Occupation ofMianganj, Taking ofMian Mir, Disarmament atMultan, Disarmament atMutiny, The, of 1857-1858; Causes of; Chances of its recurrence; First tidings of; New light on; Predicted by Sir Henry Lawrence; and by Sir John Malcolm

Oudh, Annexation of

Panipat, Three Battles ofPanjdeh, Incident atPeiwar Kotal, Taking ofPersia, War withPlassy, Battle of Centenary ofPrince Albert Victor visits IndiaPrince of Wales visits India

Regimental Institutes, Establishment ofRoyal Proclamation of 1859

Sheorajpur, Fight atSher Ali, Death of Russian Treaty withShutargardan, Attack on theSikandarbagh, Attack on theSikim ExpeditionStaff-Corps, Introduction of the

Takht-i-Shah, Taking of the

Umbeyla ExpeditionUpper Burma, Annexation of

Zhob Expedition

THE END.