ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE: OR, COURSE OF INSTRUCTION INSTRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c. 

EMBRACING THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, ANDENGINEERS. 

ADAPTED TO THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA. 

THIRD EDITION. 

WITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE MEXICAN AND CRIMEAN WARS. 

BY

H. WAGER HALLECK, A. M. , MAJOR GENERAL, U. S. A. 

NEW YORK:

D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 443 & 445 BROADWAY. 

LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN

1862. 

Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, BY D. APPLETON & COMPANY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of theUnited States for the Southern District of New York. 

CONTENTS PAGE PREFACE 5

I. INTRODUCTION. --Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiableness of Warbriefly examined. 7

II. STRATEGY. --General Divisions of the Art. --Rules for planning aCampaign. --Analysis of the Military Operations of Napoleon. 35

III. FORTIFICATIONS. --Their importance in the Defence of States provedby numerous Historical Examples. 61

IV. LOGISTICS. --Subsistence. --Forage. --Marches. --Convoys. --Castrametation. 88

V. TACTICS. --The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples ofeach. --Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, andEngineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of bringing Troops intoaction. 114

VI. MILITARY POLITY. --The Means of National Defence best suited to thecharacter and condition of a Country, with a brief Account of thoseadopted by the several European Powers. 135

VII. DEFENCE OF OUR SEA-COAST. --Brief Description of our MaritimeFortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that havetaken place between Ships and Forts, including the Attack on San Juand'Ulloa, and on St. Jean d'Acre. 155

VIII. OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. --Brief Description of theFortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our NorthernCampaigns. 210

IX. ARMY ORGANIZATION. --Staff and Administrative Corps. --Their History, Duties, Numbers, and Organization. 235

X. ARMY ORGANIZATION. --Infantry and Cavalry. --Their History, Duties, Numbers, and Organization. 256

XI. ARMY ORGANIZATION. --Artillery. --Its History and Organization, with aBrief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture ofProjectiles, &c. 275

XII. ARMY ORGANIZATION. --Engineers. --Their History, Duties, andOrganization, --with a Brief Discussion, showing their importance as apart of a modern Army Organization. 300

XIII. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress ofthis Art. --Description of the several parts of a Fortress, and thevarious Methods of fortifying a Position. 327

XIV. FIELD ENGINEERING. --Field Fortifications. --MilitaryCommunications. --Military Bridges. --Sapping, Mining, and the Attack andDefence of a Fortified Place. 342

XV. MILITARY EDUCATION. --Military Schools of France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, England, &c. --Washington's Reasons for establishing the WestPoint Academy. --Rules of Appointment and Promotion in ForeignServices. --Absurdity and Injustice of our own System. 378

EXPLANATION OF PLATES 409

PREFACE

The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form oflectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the LowellInstitute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intentionof ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard themdelivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire theirpublication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officersnow likely to be called into military service. It is with this viewalone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension ismade to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having beento embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, andto illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and theopinions and practice of the best generals. 

Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have alreadyappeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York andDemocratic Reviews, and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence, "published by order of Congress. 

H. W. H. 

MAY, 1846. 

ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE. 

CHAPTER I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

Our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances inwhich we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the newworld, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacificpolicy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since theacknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more thanfifty-eight of general peace; our Indian border wars have been toolimited and local in their character to seriously affect the other partsof the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. Thisfortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promotecommerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase thegreatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. Under thesecircumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositionsessentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may notsoon be changed. But in all communities opinions sometimes run intoextremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by thebeneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war inany case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that toengage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even _brutish_. 

All modern ethical writers regard _unjust_ war as not only immoral, butas one of the greatest of crimes--murder on a large scale. Such are allwars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regalpower or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on frommercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteousend of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions, whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodoxreligion, " or of "extending the area of freedom. " Such wars are held injust abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believedto be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens. 

But in addition to that respectable denomination of Christians who denyour right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religiousenthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, haveadopted the same theory, and hold _all_ wars, even those inself-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has been, within thelast few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, andmany able pens have been enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular, and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, hasadopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles ofChristian morality. 

It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, tomake a few introductory remarks respecting this question of itsjustifiableness. We know of no better way of doing this than to give onthe one side the objections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's MoralPhilosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethicalwriters have justified a resort to war. We do not select Dr. Wayland'swork for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; butbecause he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates theseviews, and because the main arguments against war are here given inbrief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that usedby most of his followers. I shall give his arguments in his ownlanguage. 

"I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God. "

It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion condemns all wars, no matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we mustexpect to find in the Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at leasta prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. But the Biblenowhere prohibits war: in the Old Testament we find war and evenconquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the worldin the time of Christ and his apostles, still they said not a word ofits unlawfulness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the churchamply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when waris justly declared, the Christian may engage in it either by stratagemor open force. If it be of that highly wicked and immoral characterwhich some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would becondemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal. 

But it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly ortypically forbidden to the Christian, by such passages as "Thou shaltnot kill, " (Deut. V. 17, ) "I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: butwhosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the otheralso, " (Matt. V. 39, ) &c. If these passages are to be taken as literalcommands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe, not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, themagistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence ofindividual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment ofthe guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, we mustinfer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress stronglyon our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, sofar as possible, we over come evil with good. Can any sober-minded mansuppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks ofthe wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on theright, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? Shall weinvite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, byliterally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolentand the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two mileswith him if he bid us to go one?

Again, if the command, "Thou shalt not kill, " is to be taken literally, it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids thetaking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it alsoforbids, says Dr. Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and evenextends to the vegetable kingdom, --for undoubtedly plants have life, andare liable to violent death--to be _killed_. But Dr. Wayland concedes toindividuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to societythe right to punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly means, thou shalt not unjustly kill, --thou shalt do no murder; and so it isrendered in our prayer-books. It cannot have reference to war, for onalmost the next page we find the Israelites commanded to go forth andsmite the heathen nations, --to cast them out of the land, --to utterlydestroy them, --to show them no mercy, &c. If these passages of the Bibleare to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so manycontradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of otherpassages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventingor punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that weshould combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evilmotives. 

II. All wars are unjustifiable, because "God commands us to love everyman, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the actneither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violatethis command. "

It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate anycommand of God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and asforbidding us to engage in just war? Is it not rather intended toimpress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a greatvirtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy, but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? If themeaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation bethe true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civiljustice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections. 

But are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the samedegree? Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On thecontrary, Christ himself had his _beloved_ disciple, --one whom he lovedpre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others nonethe less on that account. We are bound to love our parents, ourbrothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but wedo not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is not onlypermitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, butif he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound toprotect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessaryfor the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of theassailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow thatwe _hate_ him whom we thus destroy. On the contrary, we may feelcompassion, and even love for him. The magistrate sentences the murdererto suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentenceinto execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner:nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindestfeelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life. 

So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and myneighbors do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I doforeigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties offriendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to theforeigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and the enslavedAfrican, and willingly contribute to their relief, although theirsufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen becomeoppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, andpeculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God hasformed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will bemade unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measuresin my power to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argumentto desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens inforcibly resisting his aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by nofeelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; I have in my heart nomalice, no spirit of revenge; I have no desire to harm individuals, except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. But asinstruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do harm. I donot shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight againsthim because the paramount interests of my country cannot be securedwithout destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I amprohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle, or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated withkindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. Allconduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations withdisapprobation. 

That war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on thecontrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on thebattle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the politicalevents of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in allhistory. Soult and Wellington were opposing generals in numerousbattles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he was received byWellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks ofrespect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these twodistinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendlyrelations between the two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemedbrought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by thenortheastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded, through the intervention of General Scott, between the Governors ofMaine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendshipscontracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war withGreat Britain. 

III. "It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if warswere abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. Now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God hascreated man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at anend; for God never places man under circumstances in which it is eitherwise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for theadvantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; orfor one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?"

The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcelynecessary to point out its logical defects. 

My living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing, and certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security ofmy property. My living among murderers would not justify me incommitting murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why Ishould not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law wereunable to protect them. That other nations carry on unjust wars is noreason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why weshould neglect the means of self-defence. 

It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed ina world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God hasseen fit to order it otherwise. Our duties and our relations to ourfellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world aswe would make for ourselves. 

We live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect ourproperty--that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thickand high between the robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact lawsfor his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize theguilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for theprevention of other thefts and robberies. 

We live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physicalprotections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives ofour innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to hisdeath, if need be. Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, weinflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life. 

These relations of individuals and of society are laid down by allethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christianmorality. Even Dr. Wayland considers it not only the right, but the dutyof individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enactthese laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course ofreasoning to the relations of different societies. 

We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregardingthe rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens, in order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fencesand walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, asa nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors, and our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless, unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through orscale them without great effort and personal danger; so our nationalships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fullyarmed and equipped. 

Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers forthe protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm themwith the physical means of executing the laws, even though theemployment of these means should cost human life. The prevention andpunishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the goodof community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So, as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, toprotect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those whoseek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Nationalaggressions are far more terrible in their results than individualcrime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far morestupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greateramount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater_caution_ in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argumentagainst the _moral right_ to use them. 

IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:

"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of itsmeasures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than anything else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment ofevery community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon thejust the kind, and the merciful. "

The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that ofindividuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, sofar as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceasesto be a virtue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? Reason andexperience prove the contrary. Active benevolence and kindness shouldalways attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibitit. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as well as love. "The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injuryinflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact doesnot entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocentpersons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shallbe punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraintsmay be deterred from crime through fear of punishment. 

"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the properappeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be setforth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will theconsciences of men be aroused to justice. "

Argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always beresorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail todeter the wicked, force must be employed. I may reason with the robberand the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob myhouse, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moralappeals, I employ physical force, --I call in the strong arm of the lawto assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent lifethat is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed. 

"If, " says Puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under hisfeet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without thehighest degree of impudence, (impudentissime, ) pretend that after this Ishould consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; inother words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my ownpreservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that hemay act with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, since heshows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself ina position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him theduties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger whichmenaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has toaccuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity. " _DeJure Nat. Et Gent_, lib. Ii. , ch. V. , §1. This same course ofreasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy inrespect to war. 

"3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us suffer the evil. "

This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, besubversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of themost evil and wicked men in the community. Reason with the nation thatinvades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, andshould it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! Reason with themurderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder ourwives and our children! Reason with the robber and the defaulter, and ifthey will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! We cannotappeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, theyemploy _force_ to _compel_ obedience to their mandates. But Dr. Waylandconsiders the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men. He forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards ourfellow-men of the same _society_, and even allows us to punish themurderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greaterforbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if anothernation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by thethousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent orto punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor foran individual act of the same character. The greater the scale of crime, then, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to preventit!

"4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continuedaggression? I answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but themoral principle which God has placed in the bosom of every man. I thinkthat obedience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is thesurest preventive against the repetition of injury. I answer, secondly, suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will notprevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle ofretaliation prevent it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreignnation to be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the law ofbenevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty, in this respect, to each other. So that aggression seems to me in nomanner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call forspecial kindness and good-will. "

This argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable toindividual aggressions. We are bound to regard them as intimations ofour want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for theintimations! Is it true, that in this world the wicked only areoppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? Evensuppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, deserve God's anger, isthis any reason why I should not resist the assassin, and seek to bringhim to punishment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland applieswith much greater force to municipal courts than to war. 

V. "Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and ofdefence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely forself-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and themoral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon theconsciences of men. * * * * How would such a nation be protected fromexternal attack, and entire subjugation? I answer, by adopting the lawof benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highestdegree improbable. The causes of national war are, most commonly, thelove of plunder and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, ifever, sufficient to stimulate men to the _ferocity necessary to war_, unless when assisted by the second. And by adopting as the rule of ourconduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second causeis taken away. There is not a nation in Europe that could be led on towar against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people. "

History teaches us that societies as well as individuals have beenattacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not orcould not defend themselves. Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape hismurderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? Did theQuakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient New Englanders anythe more because of their non-resisting principles? Have the Jewsescaped persecutions throughout Christendom any the more because oftheir imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? Poland wascomparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great Europeanpowers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividingbetween themselves the Polish territory, and enslaving or driving intoexile the Polish people. 

 "Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time, Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!"

We need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filledwith them. 

Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our armyand navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and toour physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimedto the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nationsfor justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the abilityto defend ourselves against aggression. Think you that the African andAsiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vesselstrading to China, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" WouldEngland be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, orbe any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and fromsearching our merchant-ships? Experience shows that an undefended state, known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, andhistory most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words ofWashington--"IF WE DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE AREAT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR. "

But let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be known to-morrowthat the people of Boston or New York have adopted the strictlynon-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on theconsciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout thewhole extent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you havedestroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police andexecutive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will beallowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will nolonger employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property andthe virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solelyfor protection to "the law of active benevolence. " Think you that thethieves, and robbers, and murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, andNew Orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account, refrain from molesting the peace of New York and Boston, and that thewicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely toturn from the evil of their ways?

Assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence, " as Dr. Waylanddenominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations fromattacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely toprevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense isless active in communities than where the responsibility is individualand direct. 

Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that all wars are wars ofaggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory, " or through "hatred" or"revenge, " whereas such is far from being true. He indeed sometimesspeaks of war as being _generally_ of this character; at others hespeaks of it as being _always_ undertaken either from a spirit ofaggression or retaliation. Take either form of his argument, and theveriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz. , _All_ wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;

Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws;--therefore, _All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable. 

Or, Wars are _generally_ undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;

Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws--therefore, _All_ wars are immoral and unjustifiable. 

VI. "Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, andthe awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred yearshave occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident, that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employedin the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, longbefore this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered thecivilized world like the garden of Eden? If this be true, it will followthat the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community, inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passionsof the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correctthe evil itself. "

Much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that thecultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence oncommunity. And members of the clergy and of the bar have notunfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least thecommon courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the militaryprofession an unequal share of immorality and crime. We are declared notonly parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of God'slaws--men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit ofjustice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;"it is said that "murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaitedwith the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice. "[1] It has never beenthe habit of the military to retort these charges upon the otherprofessions. We prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the"stump, " or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth of-Julyaddresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn atale, " we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse. 

[Footnote 1: Sumner's Oration. ]

Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effectsand also in their cause. But just wars and just litigation are notdemoralizing. Suppose all wars and all courts of justice to beabolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be sufferedto commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would notimmorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? Few eventsrouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so muchas a just and patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, anddestroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which sooften result from a long-protracted peace. Such was the Dutch war ofindependence against the Spaniards; such the German war against theaggressions of Louis XIV. , and the French war against the coalition of1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proofin our own history. Can it be said that the wars of the AmericanRevolution and of 1812, were demoralizing in their effects? "Whence doAmericans, " says Dr. Lieber, "habitually take their best and purestexamples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit, devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from thedaring band of their patriots of the Revolution?"

The principal actors in the military events of the Revolution and of1812, held, while living, high political offices in the state, and themoral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by thecharacter stamped on their administration of the government. These menhave passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled bymen who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. To the truebeliever in the efficacy of _non-resistance, _ and in the demoralizinginfluence of all wars, how striking the contrast between thesedifferent periods in our political history! How infinitely inferior tothe rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of theirinfatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender theirlife, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! Let us trace out thiscontrast:--

In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whosemoral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher andwas less pure than at later periods in our history. The object of theprincipal leaders of the great political parties was then to render theopinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is tosustain their own opinions by argument. Then, each party claimed toitself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliensand the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise greatforbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. Then, menobtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramblefor the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universalpolitical proscription on the other, were regarded as the naturalresults of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office hasceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to becalled from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake. Then, in electing men to office the most important social andconstitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have theaugust spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance ofstrict moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were frequentlyfilled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the _small men_ of community:now, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for asrepresentatives. Then, the magnates of party were the mere timid, temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdomof their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneakingtrain of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon thejudgment of the honest and enlightened. Then, the rank and file of partywere mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, whoreviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, justas they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed politicalpatronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers ofLouis XIV. , or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole: now, allpolitical partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times ofpeace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the Roman farmer, take office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as thestate can spare their services. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, andgamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted bymen high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corruptingpartisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no manclothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of communityby receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowingpublic offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society. 

Such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are thelegitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of along-protracted peace on the other. But there are men of less vividimaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal, who fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see thereverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any thing in the lives ofWashington, Hamilton, and Knox, to show that they were the less virtuousbecause they had borne arms in their country's service: they even failto perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a militaryspirit on the military students of West Point, whose graduates, theythink, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates ofYale and Cambridge. Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that ourarmy, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes incivil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots, thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged inother pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moralcharacter to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will comparefavorably with any other class of professional men--with lawyers, forexample. In justification of these opinions--which may, perhaps, bedeemed singularly erroneous--they say, that in the many millions ofpublic money expended during the last forty years, by military officers, for the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, buta single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even to thesmallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of thearmy brought into court for violating the laws. 

But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immoralitythrough community, is it not equally true that habitual submission tothe injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tendstill more to degrade and demoralize any people?

With regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence, many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. Withrespect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the headof war department, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase ofIndian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement ofrivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for thepreservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c. , &c. ; infine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the wardepartment, is put down as "expenses for military defence. " Similarmisstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example, the new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fiftyto seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to berequired to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated costof those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, ortwelve hundred millions of francs! The facts are these: the works, whendone, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the pleasure ofexamining them not long since, in company with several of the engineerofficers employed on the works. They were then three-fourths done, andhad cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these officers thatthe fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than theoriginal estimate of twenty-eight millions. Had we time to enter intodetails, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could begiven. 

But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defencehave cost vast amounts of money. So also have litigation and the meansdeemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. It hasbeen estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirtythousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. Allowing each of theseto cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we havethe annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars. Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for makinglaws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the differentcourts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks, witnesses, &c. , employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; thepersonal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, theindividual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all thesetogether, and I doubt not the result for a single year will somewhatastonish these modern economists. But if all the expenditures of thisnature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual"war of hate, " be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful textmight be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! Butcould any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost ofmaintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should beabolished?

If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to securejustice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that themeans of international justice can be maintained without expenditurescommensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively uponthe "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothersof the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of theworld, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with itsrequisitions?

The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity inthe further discussion of this subject. 

It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contendwith one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes. 

To this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argumentends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution, I apply to the court, --that is, to _legal_ force, --to compel him to dome justice. So nations ought to resort to _military force_ only when allother means fail to prevent aggression and injury. 

But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to preventrepeated and continued aggression. 

So does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the lessproper and just on that account. 

But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while theguilty triumph. 

So it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimespermits the wicked to triumph for a season. 

But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the waris unjust on both sides. 

So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently bothresort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends. 

But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settletheir differences. 

For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character--acongress of nations, as it has been called, --would be more productiveof evil than of good. By such an arrangement the old and powerfulEuropean monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in thedomestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the effects ofestablishing such a tribunal in the so-called Holy Alliance, whoseinfluence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerousthan the Holy Inquisition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not preventwar, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce itsdecisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer torely on the present system of International Law. Under this system, andin this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result ofimpulse and passion, --a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" ofour nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislativepower, --of the representatives of the national mind, convened as thehigh council of the people. It is this power which must determine whenall just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain nationaljustice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. Ifthis decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also, should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the samebody, and under the same circumstances. A declaration of war, in thiscountry, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under thehigh sanction of the constitution. It is true that such a law may beunjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily beso. The distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and"international Lynch-law" is too evident to need comment. 

But it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced bythe evils it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by whichwe repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a militarydespotism at home. "

Much has been said and written about _military_ despotism; but we thinkhe who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a militarydespotism to a despotism of mere politicians. The governments ofAlexander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of thepetty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no oneso blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of Napoleon was nobetter than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other "lawyers" whopreceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned. 

"Cæsar, " says a distinguished senator of our own country, "wasrightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not hethat destroyed the liberties of Rome. That work was done by theprofligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his deathdid not restore the republic. There were no more elections: rottenpoliticians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Cæsar, as heir to hisuncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditarysuccession. "

"And here History appears in her grand and instructive character, asPhilosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to herwarning voice. Superficial readers believe it was the military men whodestroyed the Roman republic! No such thing! It was the politicians whodid it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians--destroying publicvirtue in their mad pursuit after office--destroying their rivals bycrime--deceiving and debauching the people for votes--and bringingelections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they wereconducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no elections thatcould bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and soldthe consulship. Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud, violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasurycommanded votes. The people had no choice; and long before the time ofCæsar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and theabuse. Read Plutarch. In the 'Life of Cæsar, ' and not three pages beforethe crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined state of theelections, --shows that all elective government was gone, --that thehereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of thecorrupt, --and that in choosing between Pompey and Cæsar, many preferredPompey, not because they thought him republican, but because theythought he would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small partof Cæsar's reliance, when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more thanthe sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulatedtreasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into the laps of rottenpoliticians. There was no longer a popular government; and in taking allpower himself, he only took advantage of the state of things whichprofligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and paidthe forfeit with his life. But in contemplating his fate, let us neverforget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic, before he came to seize and to master it. "

We could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war havemore than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not onlyto the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants forlong ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibalwas at her gates, we should now be in the night of African ignorance andbarbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Romancivilization. Had France adopted this principle when the allied armiesinvaded her territories in 1792, her fate had followed that of Poland. Had our ancestors adopted this principle in 1776, what now had been, think you, the character and condition of our country?

Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite. "The continued efforts, " says he, "requisite for a nation to protectthemselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may beinfinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energeticwar, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied, I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage toRome of having conquered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, wasundeniable. But even if it were not so, are there no other advantages tobe secured? No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all theimmeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved tomankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over therolling masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europelike the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over allthe germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that isgood and noble. Think what we should have been had Europe become anAsiatic province, and the Eastern principles of power and stagnationshould have become deeply infused into her population, so that noprocess ever after could have thrown it out again! Has no advantageresulted from the Hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust, and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, and the wars which followed their resolution? The Netherlands war ofindependence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modernhistory, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts andelementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently been, inthe hands of Providence, the means of disseminating civilization, ifcarried on by a civilized people--as in the case of Alexander, whosewars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extensionof civilization--or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen intolethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequentlywe find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made torecover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refinednation. Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, amply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequentexchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, betweentwo otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. War is astruggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only thatstruggling process without which--in proportion to the good to beobtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to thegood that is to be borne--no great and essential good falls ever to theshare of man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Ourreligion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternalrejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor. "

One word more, and we must leave this subject. It has been said by somethat the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon ourancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that arepast the present generation can in no manner bear arms in theircountry's cause, such a course being not only _dishonorable_, but in theeye of the Christian, _wicked_, and even _infamous_! It is believed, however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of thereligious people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires ofReligion and Patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that theirdescendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that bothstill burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame. Our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their God, because they also faithfully served their country. If we are called uponto excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of Christianvirtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue ofpatriotism. [2]

[Footnote 2: For further discussion of this subject the reader isreferred to Lieber's Political Ethics, Part II. , book vii. Chap. 3;Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy; Legare's Report of June 13, 1838, in the House of Representatives; Mackintosh's History of theRevolution of 1688, chap. X. ; Bynkershock; Vatel; Puffendorf;Clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws ofwar. 

Dr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by Dymondin his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles ofChristianity; Jay's Peace and War; Judd's Sermon on Peace and War;Peabody's Address, &c. ; Coue's Tract on What is the Use of the Navy?Sumner's True Grandeur of Nations. ]

CHAPTER II. 

STRATEGY

War has been defined, "A contest between nations and states carried onby force. " But this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuchas it would exclude all civil wars. 

When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called_offensive_, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of anenemy, it is called _defensive_. A war may be essentially defensive evenwhere we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which isunder preparation. Besides this general division of war, militarywriters have made numerous others, such as--

_Wars of intervention_, in which one state interferes in favor ofanother. This intervention may either have respect to the _internal_ orto the _external_ affairs of a nation. The interference of Russia in theaffairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria andthe allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution andunder the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention ofthe Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V. , of King Williamagainst Louis XIV. , in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years'war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and betweenFrance and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head. Mostliberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs ofnations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocatesof the old monarchies of Europe. 

_Wars of insurrection_ to gain or to regain liberty; as was the casewith the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821. 

_Wars of independence_ from foreign dictation and control as the wars ofPoland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of Franceagainst the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the SpanishPeninsula against France and of China and India against England. TheAmerican war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and somejudicious historians have denominated it the war of Independence, asdistinguished from the war of the Revolution. 

_Wars of opinion_, like those which the Vendeans have sustained insupport of the Bourbons, and those France has sustained against theallies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smallerEuropean states by the republican hordes of the French Revolution. Tothis class also belong--

_Religious wars_, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, and of theReformation. 

_Wars of conquest_, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of the English inIndia, of the French in Egypt and Africa, and of the Russians inCircassia. 

_National wars_, in which the great body of the people of a stateengage, like those of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke ofBurgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of the Americans against England, ofthe Dutch against Phillip II. , and of the Poles and Circassians againstRussia. 

_Civil wars_, where one portion of the state fights against the other, as the war of the Roses in England, of the league in France, of theGuelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and SouthAmerica. 

It is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of thesedifferent kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, andto discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to allwars. 

War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a _science_ andan _art_. It is a science so far as it investigates general principlesand institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art whenconsidered with reference to the practical rules for conductingcampaigns, sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so far as itinvestigates the general principles of fortification, and alsoartillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are artswhen considered with reference to the practical rules for theconstruction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon. 

This distinction has not always been observed by writers on thissubject, and some have asserted that strategy is the _science_, andtactics the _art_ of war. This is evidently mistaking the generaldistinction between science, which investigates principles, and art, which forms practical rules. 

In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of _the military art_when we refer to the general subject of war, and of _the militarysciences_ when we wish to call attention more particularly to thescientific principles upon which the art is founded. We shall hereconsider the military art in this general sense, as including the entiresubject of war. 

As thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinctbranches, viz. : 1st. _Strategy_; 2d. Fortification, or _Engineering_;3d. _Logistics_; 4th. _Tactics_. Several general treatises on this artadd another branch, called _The Policy of War_, or the relations of warwith the affairs of state. 

_Strategy_ is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisivepoints, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of eachother's cannon. _Engineering_ embraces all dispositions made to enabletroops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and alsothe means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these materialobstacles. _Logistics_ embraces the practical details of moving andsupplying armies. _Tactics_ is the art of bringing troops into action, or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. All these are most intimatelyconnected. A fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines;the best combined manoeuvres on the field of battle may lead to nodecisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operationis not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, arelost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in hisdispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisitemeans of locomotion and of subsistence. 

1. _Strategy_ regards the theatre of war, rather than the field ofbattle. It selects the important points in this theatre, and the linesof communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan andarranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to theengineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; itleaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them onthe chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions forbattle, when the armies have reached the destined points. It is well tokeep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still moreobvious by a few illustrations. The point where several lines ofcommunications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc whichis occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would rejecta position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanksexposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannae, so placedtheir armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, infront, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: butthe central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminentlysuccessful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a_strategic_ movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's rightfrom Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed acorresponding _tactical_ movement. By the former there had been somechance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was moreuseful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. Thelittle fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating theoperations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army;whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, caused an army of 78, 000 French to be defeated by only 40, 000 men underPrince Eugene of Savoy. 

War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. Ifthe attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a warof _invasion_. If only a province, or a military position, or an army, be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the _initiative_ inoffensive movements. 

_Offensive_ war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral andpolitical influence. It is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore sparesthe country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at thesame time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moralcourage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. A war ofinvasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. Its lines ofoperation may become too _deep_, which is always hazardous in an enemy'scountry. All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains, rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c. , are favorable for defence, butdifficult to be overcome by the invader. The local authorities andinhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and ifpatriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence ofits threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. But if apolitical diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and itsoperations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart, paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his militaryresources, thus promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as theinitiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferableone, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving andconcentrating his masses on the decisive point. 

The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep yourforces as much concentrated as possible. This will not only preventmisfortune, but secure victory, --since, by its necessary operation, youpossess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point ofyour enemy's position. 

To this general rule some writers have laid down the followingexceptions:--

1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act havebeen exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause, unable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; eitheryou must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw fromthem your supplies by _detachments_. The former is rarely compatiblewith your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence thepreference which is generally given to the latter. 

2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only beeffected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostilecorps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the generalrule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which maybe better, ) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplishyour object. 

3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, or probableinsurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of adivision of his army, you must support this inclination by strong_detachments_, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operationsin Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here meant. 

4th. When, by dispatching a _detachment_, you may be able to intercept aconvoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy. 

These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule ofconcentration. This rule does not require that _all the army shouldoccupy the same position_. Far from it. Concentration requires the mainbody to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, fortemporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectlylegitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon'sposition in Spain will serve as an illustration. A hand, placed on themap of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces. When opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrownout on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in, as in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatoryto striking some important blow. 

"If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting onthe offensive principle, to keep its forces _concentrated_, it is, nodoubt, the second, _to keep them fully employed. _ Is it your intentionto seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to hiscapital? or to cut him off from his supplies? Whatever measure benecessary to open your route to these objects must be _promptly_ taken;and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements mustbe more rapid than his. Give him time to _breathe_, --and above all, givehim time to _rest_, and your project is blasted; his forages will becompleted, and his magazines filled and secured. The roads of approachwill be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywheretaken and defended. You will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduceyourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalentor use. "

"Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value ofacting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his firstmovements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy, --who, selecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds hisantagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected, --and who at lastleaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or offlying without resistance. "

The British army, in the war of the American Revolution, must have beenmost wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conductingoffensive war. Instead of concentrating their forces on some decisivepoint, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated andwell-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extentof country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on anyone point. On the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out anddiscipline our scattered and ill-provided forces. 

The main object in _defensive_ war is, to protect the menaced territory, to retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, toguard the vital points of the country, and--at the favorable moment, when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, andfatigue--to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. Thiscombination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. Theenemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of themoral superiority due to successful offensive operations. There arenumerous instances of this kind of war, "the defensive-offensive, " as itis sometimes called, to be found in history. The last four campaigns ofFrederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve as models. Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula. 

To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to theadvances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions orprovinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him somefatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such asystem is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, andcowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian system ofdefensive war. 

"Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habituallyrefusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his marchundisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong bynature or by art;--instead of all this, the true war of defence seeksevery occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoyor defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and neverunprepared for either attack or defence. When not employed in efforts ofcourage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor andscience. In its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; whileit erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raisesbatteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to thesystem of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of_la petite guerre_. Dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies itsown attacks and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a singlepoint, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weekstogether. Does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? Itis but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack ofhis hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, byadopting the maxim, that the _enemy must be made to pay for whatever hegains_, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last ityields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only hissighs. "

In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms areemployed, such as _theatre of war; theatre of operations; base ofoperations_, or the line from which operations start; _objectivepoints_, or points to which the operations are directed; _line ofoperations_, or the line along which an army moves; _key points_, orpoints which it is important for the defensive army to secure; _line ofdefence, _ or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards:and in general, _strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions, &c. _ As these terms are very generally used in military books, it may bewell to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. Afterdefining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it isdeemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known andstriking historical examples. 

_The theatre of a war_ embraces not only the territory of the twobelligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondarypowers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. Withmaritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses toanother continent. Some of the wars between France and England embracedthe two hemispheres. 

_The theatre of operations_, however, is of a more limited character, and should not be confounded with the theatre of war. In general, itincludes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, todefend, and on the other, to invade. If two or more armies be directedtowards the same object, though by different lines, their combinedoperations are included in the same theatre but if each actsindependently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects, each must have its own independent theatre of operations. 

A war between France and Austria may embrace all Italy and Germany, butthe theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of thesecountries. Should the Oregon question lead to hostilities between theUnited States and England, the theatre of war would embrace the greaterpart of North America and the two oceans, but the theatre of operationswould probably be limited to Canada and our northern frontier, withnaval descents upon our maritime cities. 

The first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is toselect a good _base_. Many circumstances influence this selection, suchas mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, militarydépôts, means of subsistence, &c. If the frontier of a state containstrong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a goodbase for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defenceagainst invasion. A single frontier line may, however, be penetrated bythe enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in theinterior becomes indispensable for a good defence. 

A French army carrying on military operations against Germany would makethe Rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a secondbase on the Meuse or Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on theLoire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take othersperpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on Béfortand Besançon, or to the left, on Mézières and Sedan. If actingoffensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main wouldform the first base the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula thethird, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth. 

A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for itsfirst base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on thegulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advanceits left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of theSierra d'Estellas becomes its third base of operations against thecentre of Spain. 

A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line ofoperations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan andsome another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique orperpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not oftenat liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usuallydetermine the selection. 

In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base onthe Main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a lineoblique or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same planof operations in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, basedperpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flankmarch on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularlyon Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's army on the Elbe. 

An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicularon the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if movingfrom the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line ofoperations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier byLake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallelboth to our base and to the enemy's line of defence--an operation, underthe circumstances, exceedingly objectionable. 

Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor anadvantage over his opponent, is regarded as _strategic_. Theirgeographical position and political and military character, give them agreater or less influence in directing the campaign. These points areoccupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on ornear the base, they become the _key_ points for the former, and the_objective_ points for the latter. [3] There are also between these two agreater or less number of strategic points, which have an importantthough inferior influence upon the result of the war. 

[Footnote 3: It may be well to remark that a strategic point is notnecessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerableportion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimesdenominated a _point_. In the same way, strategic lines, instead ofbeing mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width. ]

The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is to gainpossession of the Meuse, as this position would give them a decidedadvantage in any ulterior operations. In attacking southern Germany, thecourse of the Danube offers a series of points which exercise animportant influence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and thecountry bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercelycontested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war betweenthis country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrencebetween Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highestimportance, and their possession would probably determine the result ofthe war. 

The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as itsmilitary influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and itscapture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. Thepossession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c. , in 1796, both fromtheir political and military importance, had a decided influence uponthe results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. IfHannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle ofCannae;, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking ofWashington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for theplace was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominalcapital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, andrequired many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our nationalescutcheon. 

_Lines of defence_ in strategy are either permanent or temporary. Thegreat military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened bynatural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, lines of fortresses, &c. , are regarded as permanent lines of defence. The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes;the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places;the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other;the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier--are allpermanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent lineof defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St. Lawrence, and the lakes, for the United States. 

Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for thecampaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the alliesin Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples oftemporary lines of defence. 

It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are notnecessarily bases of operation. 

_Strategic positions_ are such as are taken up during the operations ofa war, either by a _corps d'armée_ or grand detachment, for the purposeof checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus todistinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. Thepositions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and inSaxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; andMassena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, are examples under this head. 

Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategicrelations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams. 

(Fig. 1. ) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of theline DC perpendicular to the line AB, the position of the enemy being atB. 

(Fig. 2. ) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover every thing in rearof DC. 

(Fig. 3. ) If the army A is obliged to cover the point _a_, the army Bwill cover all the space without the circle whose radius is _a_ B; and ofcourse A continues to cover the point _a_ so long as it remains withinthis circle _a_ B. 

_A line of operations_ embraces that portion of the theatre of war whichan army or _corps d'armée_ passes over in attaining its object; _thefront of operations_ is the front formed by the army as it advances onthis line. 

When an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps, the line it follows is denominated a _simple line of operations_. 

If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the sameopposing force, they are said to follow _double_ or _multiple lines_. 

The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, weredouble lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, although moving in seven distinct _corps d'armée, _ formed but a singleline of operations. 

_Interior lines of operations_ are those followed by an army whichoperates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able toconcentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can bebrought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operationsin 1814, between the Marne and the Seine, where he manoeuvred with somuch skill and success against the immensely superior forces of theallies. 

_Exterior lines_ present the opposite results; they are those which anarmy will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. Forexample, the lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army ofSilesia and the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814. Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and exterior. 

_Concentric lines_ are such as start from distant points, and aredirected towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance oftheir base. 

If a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinctcorps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue _eccentriclines_. 

Lines are said to be _deep_, when the end to be attained is very distantfrom the base. 

The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated_secondary lines_. 

The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and byBagration in 1812, were _secondary lines_, as the former were merelysecondary to the army of the Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay. 

_Accidental lines_ are those which result from a change in the primitiveplan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. Theseare of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results. 

The direction given to a line of operations depends not only on thegeographical situation of the country, but also on the positionsoccupied by the enemy. The general plan of campaign is frequentlydetermined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of linesand positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of thewar, and be made by the general as these events occur. 

As a general rule, _a line of operations should be directed upon thecentre_, or _one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence_;unless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurdto act against the front and extremities at the same time. 

If the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to amovement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, thisdirection maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (Fig. 4. )

In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left ofthe line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by theSt. Bernard and Milan on the extreme right and rear of Melas's line ofdefence: both operations were most eminently successful. (Fig. 5. )

It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain theextremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible forhim to throw himself on our communications and place us in the verydilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this danger it isnecessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that ourarmy shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base. 

Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched byTurin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having firstsecured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat wouldhave been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction whichhe gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, everymeans for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (Fig. 6. ) Again, in1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would havebeen cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Geratowards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but atthe same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, andHoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear. (Fig. 7. )

We have said that the configuration of the ground and the position ofthe hostile forces may _sometimes_ render it advisable to direct ourline of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence;but, _as a general rule_ a central direction will lead to more importantresults. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables theassailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered andpartially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (Fig. 8. )

Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large andsuccessive armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operationswere both interior and central: in 1808 they were most eminentlycentral: in 1809, by the central operations in the vicinity ofRatisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of theArchduke Charles: in 1814, from his central position between the Marneand Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more thantwo hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed ofcomplete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred andtwenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twentythousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained amost decided advantage over the enemy--an advantage lost by theeccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position atDresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not thefaults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulmand the Katzbach. 

For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army;grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used withadvantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far lessfavorable than one simple line. It may however sometimes occur that theposition of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operationthe preferable one. In that case, interior lines should always beadopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. Double exteriorlines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if theenemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantageof his position to concentrate his masses successively against ourisolated forces. The Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius andServilius opposed Hannibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence andArrezzio, and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned theposition of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies separately, gaininga complete and decisive victory. Such also was the character of theoperations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they metwith a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armiesunder Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles, from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposinggenerals, and forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united hadpursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumphto Vienna. 

_Converging_ lines of operation are preferable, under mostcircumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be taken, however, thatthe point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategicposition by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, beforethey can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the Austrians, under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on three separate lines, intending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass;but Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew theenemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way theArchduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan, in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a singlepoint. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces onthe Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleontook an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher andWellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction ofNapoleon and Grouchy. 

_Diverging_ lines may be employed with advantage against an enemyimmediately after a successful battle or strategic manoeuvre; for bythis means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and ifoccasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces byconverging lines. Such was the manoeuvre of Frederick the Great, in1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also wasthe manoeuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and atRatisbon in 1809. 

_Interior_ lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almostinvariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may beclearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to otherextraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be caseswhere it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank;the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of othercollateral forces, &c. , rendering such a direction necessary. But as ageneral rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderateforces, will lead to decisive results. 

Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of theArchduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 againstAustria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 inSpain, his manoeuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and thatof Paris, and his operations previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815, are all brilliant examples under this head. 

To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, andfollow _accidental lines_, is always a delicate affair, and can only beresorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. Insuch a case it may be attended with important results. It was one ofNapoleon's maxims, that "a line of operations, when once chosen, shouldnever be abandoned. " This maxim, however, must sometimes be disregardedby an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entiredestruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is alwaysattended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice ofevils. A regular army can always avoid this result, by changing thedirection of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages inthe new theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the result of agood _coup d'oeil_, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of theoperating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will beleft in doubt respecting its weak points. But such is the uncertainty ofthis manoeuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unlessactually forced upon them. If the army be of incongruous materials, generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than toentirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troopsfor some new plan of operations. (Maxim 20. ) If, however, theundisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the_accidental line of operations_ in the same manner, and with the sameprobability of success, as is done by a regular force. 

We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king ofPrussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, inNew-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest inmilitary history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line ofoperations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victoryrendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned anentire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forcesunder Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, ifproperly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronouncedit one of the most brilliant of his military career. 

Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace outthe successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations. 

We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just enteringupon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the statedetermine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of itsenterprises. The chief selects certain points, on or near the borders ofthe seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his_materiel_ collected. These points, together, form his base ofoperations. He now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, asthe first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operationsmost advantageous for reaching this objective point. The temporarypositions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line inhis rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the vicinity of hisfirst object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he mustforce this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manoeuvres. Forthis purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manoeuvre, which maydeviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior events of thecampaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines, his lines of operations. The approach of hostile forces may cause him todetach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, andpursue double or multiple lines. The primitive object may also berelinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans ofoperations. As he advances far from his primitive base, he forms newdepots and lines of magazines. He may encounter natural and artificialobstacles. To cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardousoperation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructingbridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified placeis to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue hismarch with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover thissiege. Thus Napoleon, in 1796, with an army of only 50, 000 combatants, could not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and itsgarrison of 25, 000 men in his rear, and an Austrian force of 40, 000before him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his army enabled him todetach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and stillto continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of thearmy may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compelhim to give battle. If he should be victorious, the enemy must bepursued and harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he mustform the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. If possible, he must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare toresume the offensive. Lines of intrenchment and temporary works maysometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when theunfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will gointo winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign. 

Such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy mustbe evident, even to the most superficial reader. 

Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon thestrategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained inactual combat. Tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy'scannon, is therefore subordinate to the _choice of positions_: if thefield of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and theloss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected withoutreference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thusdemonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener dueto the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18. )

We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of theDanube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidlythrough Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, "and bythis movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine andDanube without pulling a trigger. "

Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the mainbody forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle ofJena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, in 1808, the manoeuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of theFrench in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, againstvastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of themaxim. 

Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though leastunderstood, of all the branches of the military art. [4]

[Footnote 4: Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from generalmilitary histories. There are very few good elementary works on thisbranch of the military art. The general treatises of the ArchdukeCharles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has beentranslated into French, ) are considered as the best. The discussions ofJomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, areexceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot dePresle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated intoEnglish, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The militaryhistories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner, Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Ségur, Pelet, Koch, Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier'sHistory of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of anyvalue as a _military_ work: it is a most excellent book. Alison's greatHistory of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the authoris ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearlyevery page is filled with the grossest blunders. 

We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, either directly or in connection with military history. 

_Principes de la Stratégie, &c. _, par le Prince Charles, traduit del'Allemand, 3 vols. In 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technicalterms, however, are very loosely employed. 

_Précis de l'Art de la Guerre_, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter onstrategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. 

_Grundsätze der Strategic_, Von Wagner. 

_Cours Elémentaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Rocquancourt. This work contains much valuable information connected with the historyof the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for anelementary book. 

_Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire_, par Jacquinot de Presle. Thiswork is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branchesof military service are but very briefly discussed. 

De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification containsmuch valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the sameobjections as that of Rocquancourt. 

_History of the Seven Years' War_, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The militarywritings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with thehistory of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by thesewriters are now regarded as erroneous. 

_Mémoires de Napoléon_. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himselfto Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It ishardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principlesof military art and science. No military man should fail to study themthoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles areembodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by theordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude. 

_Essai général de Tactique_, par Guibert. A work very popular in itsday, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. 

_Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens_, von Gravert. Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. 

_Mémoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne_. Souchet. 

_Mémoires de Gouvion St. Cyr. _

_Statistique de la Guerre_, par Reveroni St. Cyr. 

_Première Campagnes de la Revolution_, par Grimoard. 

_Victoires et Conquêtes_. Beauvais. 

_Campagnes de Suwarrow_. Laverne. 

_Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule_. Foy. 

_Précis des Evénements Militaires_. Mathieu Dumas. 

_Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée en 1812_. Ségur

_Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809_. Pelet. 

_La Campagne de 1814_. Koch. 

_Vom Kriege--Die Feldzügge, &c. _ Clausewitz. 

_La Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire. _ Thiers. 

_Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1812--sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie, en 1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoiredes Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France_. Vaudoncourt. 

_Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c. _ Carion-Nisas. 

_Histoire de l'Expédition en Russie en 1812_. Chambray. 

_War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France_. John Jones. 

_Peninsular War_. Napier. 

_Notices of the War of 1812_. Armstrong

All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to themilitary man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, withtheir splendid diagrams and maps. ]

CHAPTER III. 

FORTIFICATIONS. 

_Fortifications, or engineering_, may be considered with reference tothe defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or withreference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence offorts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manoeuvres ofarmies. It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as abranch of the military art, without entering into any professionaldiscussion of details. 

The connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under twodistinct heads: 1st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses fordefence; 2d, their influence in offensive operations, and thedetermination of the question whether they can be passed with safety, orwhether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besiegingthem. 

The centre and extremities of _a base of operations_ should always besecured either by natural or artificial obstacles. This base isgenerally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary forstrengthening only a part of the line. But if a frontier, like the sideof France towards Belgium, be destitute of natural obstacles, theartificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. Great careshould be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on suchplaces as may favor military operations. If otherwise, the troopsdetached from the active army for garrisoning them, will only tend toweaken this force without any corresponding advantages. In this way, fortifications may become actually injurious to defence. A number of theEuropean fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy wasproperly understood, are now regarded as utterly useless, from theirill-advised positions. 

Whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading orobserving it, depends very much upon the nature of the war, and thenumbers and position of the defensive army. The allies, in 1814, invading France with a million of soldiers, assisted by the politicaldiversion of factions and Bourbonists within the kingdom, and treason inthe frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, couldconduct their military operations on a very different plan from thatwhich would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly wagingwar with the French. Napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe afortress which threatened his line of operations or of manoeuvre; atothers, he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced. 

"An army, " says Jomini, "may sometimes penetrate between places on anopen frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care atthe same time to _observe_ these places; but no invading army can crossa great river, like the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without reducingat least one of the fortresses on that river, so as to secure a line ofretreat; but being in possession of such a place, it can continue theoffensive, while its _matériel de siège_ successively reduces the otherplaces. "

In case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besiegingcorps, it should take some central position, where it can command allthe avenues of approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should heattempt to raise the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in1796, offer the finest model for imitation. 

The old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation isunsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. In ancient times, and moreparticularly in the middle ages, too much importance was attached totactical positions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. Thisgave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them. From the middle ages down to the period of the French Revolution, warswere carried on mainly by the system of positions--one party confiningtheir operations to the security of certain important places, while theother directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of theseplaces. But Carnot and Napoleon changed this system, at the same timewith the system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old andtrue system of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely at thefact that a _change_ was made, but without examining the _character_ ofthat change, have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortifiedplaces are now utterly useless in war, military success dependingentirely upon a good system of marches. 

On this subject, General Jomini, the great military historian of thewars of the French Revolution, remarks that "we should depend entirelyupon neither organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whethernatural or artificial. To follow exclusively either of these systemswould be equally absurd. The true science of war consists in choosing ajust medium between the two extremes. The wars of Napoleon demonstratedthe great truth, that distance can protect no country from invasion, butthat a state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, and agood system of military reserves and military institutions. "

In all military operations _time_ is of vast importance. If a singledivision of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it notunfrequently decides the fate of the campaign. Had the approach ofBlucher been delayed for a few hours, Napoleon must have been victoriousat the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be sustained formore than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; butin this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements soslow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling theallies to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington. 

Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringingtroops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, Marengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concentrationof forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by thegeneral with any degree of certainty, unless his communications areperfectly secure. And this difficulty is very much increased where thetroops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours is invaded, large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. Notknowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marchesand countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort theoperations must be indecisive and insecure. 

To a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose, upon which the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sickand wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materials, anddraw together a new supply of stores and provisions; and as rallyingpoints, where new troops may be assembled with safety, and the army, ina few days, be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field. Without these defences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, whenonce routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with great losses. Butwhen supported by forts, they can select their opportunity for fighting, and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success; and, having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear inthe actual conflict. 

The enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or_observe_ these works, his army will be separated from its magazines, its strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his wholeforce exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore beenestimated by the best military writers, that an army supported by ajudicious system of fortifications, can repel a land force _six_ timesas large as itself. 

Every government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominentand durable means of defence. By securing in a permanent manner itsimportant points, it will enable a small force to retain possession ofthese places against a greatly superior army, for a considerable lengthof time. This serves the same purpose as a battle gained; for, in thebeginning of a war of invasion, the economy of time is of the utmostimportance to the defensive party, enabling it to organize and preparethe great military resources of the state. 

In all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on largerivers, or chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points bywhich an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country. Let ussuppose that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are _five_passes, or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior. Toeffectually defend these approaches against the invading army willrequire, for each, an army of ten thousand men. Not being able to decidepositively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications must bedefended at the same time. This requires a defending army of fiftythousand men. Let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified insuch a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy incheck, and force him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, atleast, to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in theinterior, and prepared to meet him in the field. We here see that fivethousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish the samedefensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means ofsecurity. 

But let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences, and examine the character of the several systems which have beensuccessively proposed or adopted. Frontiers are divided into fourdistinct classes, according as the state may be open on one or moresides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea. 

An open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while thereexists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importanceof fortifying such a frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinionrespecting the best manner of arranging these works. We shall heremention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of anopen country, each of which has been advocated at different times, andafterwards received various modifications and additions. These threesystems comprise the main features of all others worthy of muchconsideration. They are:--

1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Montalembert. 

2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended byD'Arçon and others. 

3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting oflines of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from eachother and covering large _intrenched camps_. 

The first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and for a timeattracted considerable notice in France, but has long since beendiscarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of themilitary art. A writer, however, of some pretensions in this country, recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the shores ofthe Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with ourpresent system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute intheir place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much likebuilding 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of theOhio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet theenemy on the Atlantic!

In the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placedabout thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and thirdlines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and secondlines, and opposite the intervals. 

In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently byRogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that ofD'Arçon, but the distance between them is to be from seventy to onehundred miles, and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenchedcamp. 

Either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of anopen frontier. The former is applied to the side of France towardsBelgium, and the latter, with certain modifications, to the defence ofWestern Germany. The first line of fortifications on the northernfrontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille, Valenciennes, Condé, Quesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mézières, and Sedan; the second line, ofCalais, Andres, St. Omer, Béthune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai, Landrecies, and Avesnes; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin, Abbeville, Amiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon. 

For mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all theimportant passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defendwith strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which thesecommunications are directed. For a frontier of moderate extent there maybe some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army mightpenetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate ontwo or three points in the great valleys below. Take, for example, thefrontier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes of themountains are secured by the little works of Fort L'Ecluse, FortPierre-châtel, Fort Barraux, Briançon, Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux, and Antibes; while Besançon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line;and Lyons a grand central dépôt. 

Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, thesystem of defence will be much the same as that of an open landfrontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the greatbridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those ofthe second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generallyapproach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the thirdline, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications ofthe country. Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering onthe Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau, Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the severalpassages of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Béfort form asecond line; Thionville, Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun agrand central dépôt. 

The following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished byfortifications on a sea-coast. 

1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to thenavy of the country. 

2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores, from which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce andkeep the whole frontier in continual alarm. 

3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment. 

4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval depots. 

5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interiornavigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance intothe ocean. 

6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade fromthe enemy's ships of war, and our internal communications, which lienear the coast, from maritime descents. 

Let us notice how France has attempted to accomplish this object. TheMediterranean frontier has Fort Quarré, Fort St. Marguérite, St. Tropez, Brigançon, the forts of Point Man, of l'Ertissac, and of Langoustier, Toulon, St. Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, Aigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Château deSalces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and Port Vendre. Toulon isthe great naval dépôt for this frontier, and Marseilles the greatcommercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. TheAtlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, Paté, &c. , on the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix, Oleron, &c. , to cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the forts of theIsle of Ré; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon, with Fort Penthièvre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne;Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cézembre, LaCanchée, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with itsdefensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, andDunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval dépôts; andHavre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of theworks above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in theirconstruction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless, they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the navaldepots and commercial seaports of France against the superior navalforces of her neighbor. 

Omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let usexamine more particularly the character and influence of fortificationson land frontiers. 

All military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted agreat, and frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war. Those of France are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence. But, while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed muchin former times to the defence of states, yet some have said that modernimprovements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuablethan formerly. 

Such, however, is not the case. Improvements in the mode of attack havenot kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, althoughfortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as _many days_ asin former times, still, as compared with the relative lengths ofcampaigns in ancient and modern wars, the _proportional_ length ofsieges is now even _greater_ than formerly. When the same isaccomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a warof seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should holdout a very long time. A place that can sustain a siege of a month is nowdeemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end ofthat time the defensive army will either be destroyed, or be able tocome to its succor. In either case a longer defence would not berequired. 

A reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two willshow that forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege formore than that length of time. Lille, in 1708, held the allies in checkfor a whole year; and again, in 1792, compelled the Austrians to raisethe siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days. 

Antwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatlysuperior forces; in 1814 Carnot defended the citadel of this place forfour months, and until an armistice had been concluded between thecontending parties; in 1832, it sustained, with a garrison of only 4, 500men and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five days, against aforce of 55, 000 men and 223 cannon. 

Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of tenweeks. 

Ismaïl, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two months against theRussians. 

Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again, in 1794, sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months. 

Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of Wallensteinfor seven months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4, 000 men, it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies. 

Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces formore than nine months. 

Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months. 

Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about threemonths. 

Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege ofabout thirty days. 

Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks. 

Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days. 

Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyroland the heart of the Austrian monarchy. 

Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months againstall the efforts of the Archduke Charles. 

St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of opentrench. 

Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month. 

Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days. 

Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in1809 it was again besieged for two months. 

Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days. 

Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearlyfour of them being of open trench. 

Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a siege of more thantwo weeks. 

Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being ofopen trench. 

Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of opentrench. 

Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two months. 

Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a month. 

Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months. 

Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two months. 

Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench. 

Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open trench. 

Saguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month. 

Valencia in 1811-12 sustained a siege of two months

Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of several months, and aclose siege of two weeks. 

Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open trenches. 

Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches. 

St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly threemonths, with fifty-nine days of open trenches. 

Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months. 

Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months. 

This list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show thateven poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on anaverage, for more than a month. These examples, be it remembered, arenearly all taken from a period of history since any materialimprovements have been made in the art of attack. Since the time ofVauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increasedmeans of defence. Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges oftowns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirelyincapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications, with all the modern improvements. 

The value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved byshowing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for alimited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide othermeans of security. But it must not be inferred that forts besieged _enrègle_ will necessarily fall after so many days. Such is far from beingthe case. The besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers;and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of avery inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisitemeans and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken. 

Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621;nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, andagain in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792;nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgosin 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the namesof places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation. 

But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortificationshave become of little comparative importance, under the new system ofwarfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On thissubject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of thepresent century. 

Napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means ofretarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe. "

"The possession of strategic points, " says the Archduke Charles, "isdecisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should, therefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is thecountry's safeguard. This object is accomplished by fortifications, inasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number oftroops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should, therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence. " "Itshould be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in timeof peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so thatthey can be defended by a small number of troops. For the enemy, knowingthe difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twicebefore he involves himself in a war. " "Establishments which can securestrategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require timeand labor. He who has the direction of the military forces of a state, should, in time of peace, prepare for war. " "The proper application orneglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of thestate. " "Fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object, and direct his movements on less important points;--he must either forcethese fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offeronly disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defencestruly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke ofthe enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country onlythrough great trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines offortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses;but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin;for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time forcollecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruelalternative of submission or destruction. "

"Fortifications, " says Jomini, "fulfil two objects of capitalimportance, --1st. The protection of the frontiers; and 2d. Assisting theoperations of the army in the field. " "Every part of the frontiers of astate should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondaryplaces, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations ofthe armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be ofgreat utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, wherestores, magazines, hospitals, &c. , may be sheltered from the incursionsof the enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuablewhere such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army bydetachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces. " It isnot supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close afrontier; "but, although they of themselves can rarely present anabsolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it isindisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction ofits marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, theyafford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protectits marches, favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, andits movements, and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time ofneed. "

These opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period atwhich modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications asinland defences, by men, too, who were not engineers, and consequentlyhad no professional predilections in favor of fortifications. TheArchduke Charles, as a general, knew no rival but Napoleon, and GeneralJomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of theage. The truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fullyconfirmed by the military histories of Germany and France. 

For a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its strong castlesand fortified cities secured the German empire from attacks from abroad, except on its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but noenemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union amongits own princes opened its strongholds to the Swedish conqueror; northen, did the cautious Gustavus Adolphus venture far into itsterritories till he had obtained possession of all the military worksthat might endanger his retreat. 

Again, in the Seven Years' War, when the French neglected to securetheir foothold in Germany, by placing in a state of defence thefortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat renderedtheir ground untenable, and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhineand the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to fortify theirpositions, and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places, and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostilecountry till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency oftheir generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, theskill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with, and theweak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them. 

But this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latterpart of the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the FrenchRevolution, says Jomini, "Germany had too few fortifications; they weregenerally of a poor character, and improperly located. " France, on thecontrary, was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn inpieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the Archduke, )"she sustained herself against all Europe; _and this was because hergovernment, since the reign of Louis XIII_. , _had continually labored toput her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principlesof strategy_; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued everycountry on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reasonalone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying anarmy, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success. "

This may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792, when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competentto her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it istrue, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds ofdiscipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. "It seemed, at this period, " says the historian, "as if the operations of the Frenchgenerals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the momentthey appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned. " But Francehad on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, althoughher miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. Theseveral works of the first and second lines fell, one after another, before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke ofBrunswick was already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, withonly twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by awell-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forcesbehind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplinedarmy nearly four times as numerous as his own. Had no other obstaclethan the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians, all agree that France must have fallen. 

In the campaign, of 1793, the French army in Flanders were beaten inalmost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one halfthe number of the allies. The French general turned traitor to hiscountry, and the National Guards deserted their colors and returned toFrance. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, was Vauban'sline of Flemish fortresses. These alone saved France. The strongholds ofLille, Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Landrecies, &c. , held the Austriansin check till the French could raise new forces and reorganize theirarmy. "The important breathing-time which the sieges of thesefortresses, " says an English historian, "afforded to the French, and theimmense advantage which they derived from the new levies which theyreceived, and fresh organization which they acquired during thatimportant period, is a signal proof of the vital importance offortresses in contributing to national defence. Napoleon has nothesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation ofFrance. It is to be constantly recollected that the Republican armieswere then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the frontierfortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps toreinforce them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital wastaken and the war concluded. "

In the following year, 1794, when France had completed her vastarmaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemyhad no fortified towns to check the progress of the Republican armies;which, based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks overranFlanders, and drove the allies beyond the Rhine. 

In the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau had been forced into aprecipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of theArchduke Charles, the French forces owed their safety to thefortifications on the Rhine. These works arrested the enemy's pursuitand obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges; and thereduction of the French advanced posts alone, Kehl and Huninguen, poorlyas they were defended, employed all the resources of the Austrian army, and the skill of their engineers, from early in October till late inFebruary. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force _four_ times asnumerous as the garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cutoff Moreau's retreat, and destroyed his army. Fortunately the place wasstrong enough to resist all assaults; and Moreau, basing himself on thefortresses of Alsace, his right covered by Huninguen, Neuf-Brisach, andBéfort, and his left by the iron barrier of the Netherlands, effectuallychecked the waves of Austrian success. 

Let us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his first campaign inItaly, 1796, the general was directed "to seize the forts of Savona, compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and tosurrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky heightcommanding the pass of the Bocchetta. " Setting out from Savona, hecrossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps and theApennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. Theking of Sardinia, jealous of Austrian influence, had refused to permitthe Austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon, profiting by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austriaand Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon gainedpossession of these important works. "_These Sardinian fortresses_, " hewrote to the Directory, "_at once put the Republicans in possession ofthe keys of the Peninsula_. " Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Gavi, and Alessandria, with Tortosa as his dépôt of magazines, headvanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on the Adda and Po, withthe fortress of Pizzighettone as the dépôt of his magazines, he advancedupon the line of the Adige. Pechiera became his next dépôt, and he nowhad four fortresses in echelon between him and his first dépôt ofmagazines; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing himself on the Po, headvanced against the States of the Church, making Ferrara and thenAncona, his places of dépôt. 

From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, "he wasenabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of theAustrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career ofconquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions. " In thiscampaign of 1797, after scouring his base, he fortified Palma-Nuova, Osapo, &c. , repaired the old fortifications of Klagenfurth, and, as headvanced, established, to use his own words, "a good _point d'appui_ atevery five or six marches. "

Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weakgrasp of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in thefortress of Genoa and behind the line of the Var, which had beenfortified with care in 1794-5. Numerous attempts were made to force thisline, the advanced post of Fort Montauban being several times assaultedby numerous forces. But the Austrian columns recoiled from its murderousfire of grape and musketry, which swept off great numbers at everydischarge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority ofnumbers, and again "the brave men who headed the column almost perishedat the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, they were compelled to abandon the enterprise. "

While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success, Massena, in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty, and a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as hisown; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almostdictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. These two defences heldin check the _élite_ of the Austrian forces, while the French reservecrossed the Alps, seized the important points of the country, and cutoff the Austrian line of retreat. "But even after the victory ofMarengo, " says Napoleon, "I did not consider the whole of Italyreconquered, until all the fortified places between me and the Mincioshould be occupied by my troops. I gave Melas permission to return toMantua, on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses. "

He now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his engineers to repair andremodel the fortifications of Verona, Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, theline of the Adda, Milan, Alessandria, [5] Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and severalsmaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrianaggression in Italy. These works were of great service to the French in1805, enabling Massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check theArchduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grandarmy, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed Germany andseized upon the capital of Austria. 

[Footnote 5: More than twenty millions of money were appropriated forthis place alone. ]

The neglect of the Prussians to place their country in a state ofmilitary defence, previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806, had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on theother hand, occupied and secured all the important military positionswhich he had captured in the preceding campaign. "The Prussians, " saidhe, "made no preparations for putting into a state of defence thefortifications on their first line, not even those within a few marchesof our cantonments. While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg, nor put in battery a single cannon at Spandau. " The works on the threegreat lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properlyrepaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held incheck the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till thenewly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, couldre-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profitingby the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the greatdefensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readilysurrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals whocommanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately establishedin the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. "Spandau, " said he in the 19th Bulletin, "is aninestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months ofoperations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians hadnot even armed its batteries. " The possession of these fortificationsinclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice theirinfluence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit. 

These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty ofTilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as theyeffectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling theflames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced adecided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy ofAustria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon fromprofiting by the advantages of his position. 

The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsularcampaigns has often been alluded to by historians. Those works which hadbeen given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which hadbeen retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree tofetter and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa, Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c. , with their broken walls anddefective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, bycompelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, didmuch to weaken the French power in the Peninsula. 

The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers infurnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon intothe enemy's territory, has already been noticed. If these fortresses ofFrance, after the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasionitself, rather than any lack of military influence in the Frenchdefences. As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished by the fatal war in Russia, --torn in pieces by politicalfactions, --deserted by its sworn allies, --its fortresses basely betrayedinto the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treasonof generals with their entire armies. Its only hope was in thefortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortressesand retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even aftertheir entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented theoperation. 

Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Waterloo, possessedlines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. But again the want of co-operation on the part of the government atParis, and the treason of his own generals, forced his secondabdication. If he had retained the command of the army, and the nationhad seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached Paris. Butthe new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening theway for the enemies of their country. "France, " said Napoleon, "willeternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people topass under the Caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army thathad for twenty-five years been its country's glory, _and by giving up toour astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses_. "

History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger ofpenetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even whenthat capital is without fortifications. The fatal effects of such anadvance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplifiedby his own campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smolensk, he had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by their position closedthe narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the Dwina, he mightin all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seizeupon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army ofTschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow, and when theconflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of hisartillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awfulfate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which thereis scarcely a parallel in history. This point might be still furtherillustrated by the Russian campaign of Charles XII. , in 1708-9, thefatal advance of the French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, andother examples of the same character. 

Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines offortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus, Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene andMarlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity ofchanging the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France hermonarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V. , and saved France fromdestruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age tothe brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the successfulcareer of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain theascendancy; Strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the French againstGermany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation. 

In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX. , ) If Vienna hadbeen fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided thefate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, itwould have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction withthe forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John. 

If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would haverallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had beenstrongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories ofEspinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marchedtowards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid, boththe English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. IfMoscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have beenavoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoffencamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible. 

Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantinemust have terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of theProphet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was thereforeindebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During thisperiod it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these siegeswas successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a verysevere contest. 

Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normansbesieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besiegedit in vain. In 1359 Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge, devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, andretired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessfulin his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by CharlesV. , it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsedthe armies of Henry III. And Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeedingyears the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If thiscapital had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armieswould not have dared to attempt its investment. 

But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the wholehistory of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance offortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary inoffensive military operations. Our illustrations have been mostly drawnfrom European wars, but our own brief history, as will be shownhereafter, is not without its proofs. 

The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c. , as well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will bediscussed hereafter. [6]

[Footnote 6: The use of fortifications in the defence of states isdiscussed by Ternay, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the ArchdukeCharles, Jomini, Fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the militaryhistorians of the wars of the French Revolution. The names of suchstandard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications willbe mentioned hereafter. ]

CHAPTER IV. 

LOGISTICS. 

III. We have defined _logistics_ to be that branch of the military artwhich embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies. The term is derived from the title of a French general officer, _(major-général des logis, )_ who was formerly charged with directing themarches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. It has been stillfurther extended by recent military writers, and many of them now regardlogistics as a distinct and important branch of the art. 

We shall here consider logistics as including the military dutiesordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical, hospital, and transportation departments; in fine, of all the civil andcivico-military corps of the army. We shall therefore discuss under thishead, the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting outtroops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; the regulating ofmarches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions, hospitals, munitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection ofmagazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thingconnected with preparing, moving, and guarding the _impedimenta_ of anarmy. 

The officers connected with this branch of service must consult with theengineers in every thing relating to the defence of their depots, magazines, camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage ofrivers, and in all that relates to their connection with the attack anddefence of places: but in all that relates to strategy and tactics theymust receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of thearmy, who will have the general direction of every thing connected withlogistics. Before commencing the operations of the campaign, orbeginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of thevarious materials belonging to the different departments of thearmy;--the horses and horse equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton andartillery equipages, siege equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer andartillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds; he must supplywhatever may be wanting, and provide means for the transportation ofevery thing. 

_Subsistence_. --The art of subsisting troops during active operations ina hostile country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected withwar; and it is a question well worthy of study, both for the statesmanand the warrior, how Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in ancienttimes--and the Greek emperors and the barbarians--and, later still, thecrusaders of the middle ages, contrived to support the immense masses ofmen which they led to war. 

Cæsar has said that war should be made to support war; and some moderngenerals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supportingtheir armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over. Othershave adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regularmagazines. 

Louis XIV. And Frederick II. Fought mostly on their own frontiers, andfollowed the system of regular dépôts and supplies. But therevolutionary armies of France made war without magazines, subsisting, sometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on thecountry passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. Napoleonfound little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundredand twenty thousand men in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of theRhine and the Danube; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the subject ofsubsistence became one of extreme embarrassment. 

All depots of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated_magazines_; these are divided into _principal, secondary, _ and_provisional_. The first are usually on the base of operations; thesecond, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediatevicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only. 

The system of _magazines_ is objected to by some, because it fetters themovements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate tothe means of supply. Moreover, as the movements of an army must be soarranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at givenpoints reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign. 

On the other hand, the system of _requisitions_, either for immediatesupplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity andimpetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to represspillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be reliedon with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and lesspopulous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of aprolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great sufferingand loss, if not to total destruction. 

Before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquaintedwith all the resources of the country to be passed over--determine theamount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and theamount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions beinglevied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing localauthorities. 

In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for atime, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regularsystem of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases theirsubsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levycontributions wherever they pass. The inevitable consequences of thissystem are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; theloss of private property and the violation of individual rights, arefollowed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinarypeaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter andimplacable enemies. 

In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy ofstudy. At the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose betweenmethodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregularwarfare, with forced requisitions--war being made to support war. Thequestion was thoroughly discussed. 

On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs fromthe French treasury, he would have been able to support his troopswithout requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline inhis armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poorand interested, he would have made many partisans. He could then haveoffered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. Butthen the drafts upon the French treasury, had the war been a protractedone, would have been enormous for the support of an army of 200, 000 menin Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the localauthorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible;and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantityof stores in an insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachmentscould have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, orto pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. Infine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation ofSpain without its subjugation. 

On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses, living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as hehad done in Italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation andpacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more promptand decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, determined toadopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines andregular requisitions so far as practicable. In favorable parts of thecountry, Soult and Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtainingin this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but theothers lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required. This sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principallythe faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than ofNapoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were knownto him, with great severity. He afterwards declared that, "had hesucceeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish peoplefor their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, whichwould have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more justdivision of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgottenin the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest ofan ambitious and exclusive clergy. "

The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the bestmilitary writers:

1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for thesupplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to onlywhere the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, render these absolutely necessary to success. 

2d. Dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art, defended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions leastliable to attack. 

3d. All great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, railways, or practical roads, _communicating with the line ofoperations_, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, asthe army advances on this line. 

4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed togreat inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in thecampaign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train _bread_for _six_, and _flour_ for _nine days_, and was therefore never at aloss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden anddecisive operation. The Roman soldier usually carried with himprovisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, "Experience has proved thatan army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' foodbeing carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty daysby the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagonswould be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred andforty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty beingobtained by requisition. For this purpose there would be a battalion ofthree companies for the military stores of each division, each companyhaving its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by thecommissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This gives for eachdivision one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundredand eighty. Each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundredand ten men. "

5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources, unless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at theseason of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the newones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this waybe partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it neverthelessfrequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as theFrench at Austerlitz and Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten dayswill therefore be important to subsist the army till a regularcommissariat can be established. 

6th. "Supplies of bread and biscuit, " says Napoleon, "are no moreessential to modern armies than to the Romans; flour, rice, and pulse, may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. Itis an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay greatattention to their magazines; it may be seen in Caesar's Commentaries, how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. Theancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or tobeing obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captainswell understood the art of subsistence. "

_Forage_ is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses orcattle, --as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c. ; and also to the operation ofcollecting such food. Forage is of two kinds, _green_ and _dry_; theformer being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, andthe latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or thestorehouses of the dealers. 

The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regularmagazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized _foraging_ [7] Ashas already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible, to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army duringthe active operations of a campaign. On account of the great expense anddifficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is morefrequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forcedcontributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistenceof his animals, than to provide food for his men. Nor are requisitionsand foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case, being far less likely to produce general want and distress among thenon-combatant inhabitants. 

[Footnote 7: This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to theoperation of forcibly collecting food for the troops. ]

The commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors toobtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions onthe local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, theforaging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies withuniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept of thekinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that itmay be regularly distributed and accounted for. Under no circumstancesshould individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more thantheir _pro rata_ allowance. Foraging parties may sometimes attain theirobject in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants thenature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediatesupplies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offercertificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for theuse of the army. These certificates, even when of no value inthemselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allayinsurrections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it isoften necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to thepublic service: in all such cases the certificates of the foragingofficers become proofs of individual claims against the government. 

No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country hasbeen properly reconnoitred. A good military escort and vanguard shouldalways accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against theenemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops mustbe placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, inorder to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular andunauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff and administrative corpsare sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders, and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case anycorps engage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made tothe inhabitants, and the expense of such restitution deducted from thepay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed. A fewexamples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to thearmy, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied. 

Experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grainthat may be taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, ofcourse, very different for different soils and climates. In distributingthe burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveyingthe forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers toknow the relative weight and bulk of each article. 

 Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average about . 12 lbs. Per cubic foot. Wheat . . . Weighs. . 60 lbs. Per bushel. Rye . . . . " . . . . 56 " " Maize or Indian corn . 56 " " Barley . . . " . . . . 50 " " Oats . . . . " . . . . 35 " " Meal, flour, and ground feed of all kinds, are purchased by the pound. 

As it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular trainof the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foragingparties, the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed intoservice for this purpose. 

Troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows andgrain-fields for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses andcattle may be farmed in the neighborhood, and the grass and grainissued in regular rations, immediately as taken from the field; but inno case should the animals be turned out to pasture. 

In a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forcesare to be suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is importantto establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence;otherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with greatwaste of public and private property, the want of means of subsistence, the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general relaxation ofdiscipline. Regular troops are far less liable to such excesses thaninexperienced and undisciplined forces. 

_Marches_. --Marches are of two kinds: 1st. Route marches, --2d. Marcheswithin reach of the enemy. The former belong to the domain of strategy;the latter to that of tactics; both, however, are connected withlogistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution. 

When an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as manycolumns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the natureof the roads, &c. , may require. Large columns cannot move with the samerapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. But whenan army is within striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomesmore important than celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or atleast within supporting distances of each other. We find only twoinstances in the Seven Years' War, in which Frederick attempted attacksby several columns at considerable distances from each other; and inboth these instances (at Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, duringthe siege of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to bringhis columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form histroops into line at the moment of attack. Such was his order of march atPrague, Kollin, Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. Thefollowing is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, (October 2d, 1760. )

"The army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. The firstcolumn will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line;and the third, of the reserve. The wagons, and hospital wagons, ofregiments, will follow their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre willfollow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On passingwoods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps. "

"Each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and tensquadrons of hussars or dragoons. They will be preceded by three wagonscarrying plank-bridges. The rear-guard is charged with taking up thesebridges after the army has defiled over them. "

"The parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassmentresulting from a great many wagons being together in a body. "

"If any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the kingwill be instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of thefirst column. Should any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will beinstantly communicated to Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be withthe rear-guard of the first column. "

"The officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step, and that they do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselesslyfatigue themselves and lose their distances. "

"When orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of thecolumns to the left, and will march to be parked, " &c. 

The position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on thenature of the march. If the march be to the front, it will be in rear ofthe column; if the march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outerflank, the baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger; ifthe march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance of the army. Ineither case it should be strongly guarded. 

It was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, in thecampaign of 1812, on reaching the Miami of the Lake, (Maumee, ) embarkedhis baggage, stores, sick, convalescent, and "even the instructions ofhis government and the returns of his army, " on board the Cuyahogapacket, and dispatched them for Detroit, while the army, with the samedestination, resumed its march by land. The result of thus sending hisbaggage, stores, official papers, &c. , _without a guard, and on theflank nearest the enemy, _ was just what might have been anticipated:--inattempting to pass the British post of Malden the whole detachment wasattacked and captured, "by a subaltern and six men, in a small and openboat. "

To prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be alwaysthrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column, denominated from their position, _Advanced-Guard, Flankers, _ and_Rear-Guard. _ These scan the country which is to be passed over by thecolumn, watch the enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach intime to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, andto pass from the order of march to that of combat. The strength andcomposition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground, and the character and position of the enemy. In case of an attack theyretire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their assignedposition in the line of battle. 

In an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty;but in a broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, amarch cannot be conducted with too many precautions. Before engaging ina _defile_ it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachmentssent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting thepassage. A neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the mostterrible disasters. 

In military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches. The Roman infantry, in Scipio's campaigns in Africa, frequently marcheda distance of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying fromfifty to eighty pounds of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon states, marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of eight hundred miles, in fortydays. Cæsar marched from Rome to the Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distanceof four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days!

Napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements. Others have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as theFrench, but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivalsin modern history. A few examples of the rapidity of their movements maynot be without interest. 

In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after having fought thebattle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, then marched all nightupon Rivoli, fought in the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua onthe 15th, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of the16th, --thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues, fought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners!Well might he write to the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed themuch vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's legions. 

In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape ofLoudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, andclimbing mountains and glaciers. 

In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in theearly part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted postson the Rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. 

During the same campaign the French infantry, pursuing the ArchdukeFerdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day indreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery. 

Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry pursued thePrussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day. 

In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore'sarmy at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter. Napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from Madrid toAstorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. Theactivity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these tendays' march, are scarcely equalled in history. 

In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clausel was trulyextraordinary. After almost unheard-of efforts at the battle ofSalamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours!

In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. Wishing to form ajunction with other troops, for the succor of Paris, he marched his armythe distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalrymarching night and day, and the infantry travelling _en poste_. 

On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched fifty miles thefirst day after landing; reached Grenoble through a rough andmountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, andreached-Paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twentydays!

The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the FrenchRevolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of Napoleon. Nevertheless, for a single day the English and Spaniards have made someof the most extraordinary marches on record. 

In 1809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General Crawford, fearingthat Wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with threethousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours!

The Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from Jutland to Spain, marched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours. 

Cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry;but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over themost ground. In the Russian campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed tokeep pace with the infantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But in theshort campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of Murat displayed themost wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results thanany mounted troops of modern ages. 

The English cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with arapidity truly extraordinary. 

In 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the distance of sixtymiles in thirty-two hours. 

But the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, before the battleof Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the English accounts, still moreextraordinary than any thing recorded of the Romans or the French--it issaid that he marched _seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!_

As a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will moveat the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. In forced marches, or in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty totwenty-five miles per day. And for only two or three days in succession, with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. Marchesbeyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result ofextraordinary circumstances. 

_Convoy_. --A convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c. , sent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment oftroops, called an _escort_. When regular depots and magazines areestablished, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoysrequiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the positionof the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to bemoved. But in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whoseinhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kindshould always be resorted to. 

The size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature ofthe country and the imminence of the danger. The ground to be passedover should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be takenup only after the most satisfactory reports. When once put in motion, the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warningto the escort of the approach of the enemy. Small parties of cavalry aredetached on all sides, but particularly in advance. The main body of theescort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while theother sides are guarded by subdivisions. In case of an attack by a largeparty, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensivefield-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can inthis way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away theconvoy. 

As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by smallsuccessive convoys than by periodical and large ones. Even should someof the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but alarge periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterpriseof the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture muchto destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of animportant military operation. If the Prussian army, when besiegingOlmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not haveforced them to raise the siege and to retreat. 

Napoleon estimates that an army of 100, 000 men in position will requirethe daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads ofprovisions. 

The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c. , in a retreat, isalways very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed onthis point. Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail, amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an ableand active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of theprovision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the mostterrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: theretreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French fromRussia in 1812. 

When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save hisarmy from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores tobe taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made fortheir preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. But thewant of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of aproper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means forfacilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit, prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Muchsuffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops;a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, andeven the treasure of his army, amounting to some 200, 000 dollars, wasabandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escortingofficer. 

In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirablycombined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, itis said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passedwithout his receiving intelligence from France. When the retreat wasbegun, (after the burning of Moscow, ) he had six lines of magazines inhis rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those ofthe 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk; those ofthe 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line atElbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5thline at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the 6th line at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. When the army left Moscow it carried with itprovisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition, each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fiftyrounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horsesin less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means oftransportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horriblesufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description. 

The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of greatprudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends uponthe safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores whichhe may have in charge. 

_Castrametation_. --Castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art oflaying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp ofan army. The term is sometimes more extensively used to include all themeans for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and allthe arrangements for cooking, &c. , either in the field or in winterquarters. A camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merelyplaces assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such away that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended tobe drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troopscan pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle withoutconfusion. Suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, forbaggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions. 

The extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character ofthe ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it shouldnever exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line ofbattle. The different arms should be encamped in the same order as thatof battle; this order of course depending on the nature of thebattle-ground. A _corps d'armeé_ is composed of battalions of infantry, squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineertroops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of theseelements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions. 

The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 1st, by the generalrules respecting military positions, and, 2d, by other rules peculiar tothemselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or lesssuitable on the same position. 

That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highestconsideration. 

It should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity ofswamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: forthe same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshyby heavy rains, and the melting of snow. 

The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is importantfor furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life. 

The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood, materials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works ofdefence, &c. 

Good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element inthe choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health issoon undermined. The proximity of running streams is also important forthe purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth ofthe camp. 

The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by anypoint within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smallerstream, there should be space enough between them to form in order ofbattle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreatingin case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy tomake his attack on that side. 

If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for_cantonments_ or _winter-quarters_, the greater must be the care inselecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfortof the soldiers. In the latter case, (of winter-quarters, ) theengineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments, lines of abattis, inundations, &c. , to render the position as difficultof access to the enemy as possible. 

A _bivouac_ is the most simple kind of camp. It consists merely of linesof fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. These huts may be madeof straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses andother buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of theirtimbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept in bivouac for a fewdays, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldierin ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorousclimate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads tomuch distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in thedestruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life. If the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the hutsshould be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and madecomfortable for the troops. Such should always be the system adopted incamps of practice or manoeuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or inintrenched positions. 

We have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. Thesemay do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the activeoperations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatlyencumbering the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to resort tobivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct aregular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any lengthof time. This may be regarded as a general rule, but in certaincountries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable. 

Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if notdecisive of the question: "Tents, " says he, "are not wholesome. It isbetter for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feettowards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boardsor a little straw. The ground upon which he lies will be rapidly driedin the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary for the superiorofficers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought tobe ordered never to sleep in a house--a fatal abuse, which has givenrise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followedthe example of the French as to discard their tents; and if they bestill used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree, against the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against therain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the tents for eachbattalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed incarrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the enemies'spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into yournumbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occursevery day, and every instant in the day. An army ranged in two or threelines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. It isimpossible to count the number of fires; it is easy, however, to countthe number of tents, and to trace out the position that they occupy. "

The guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires muchattention. 

The _camp-guard_ consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed aroundthe camp, and relieved at regular intervals. The number of rows ofsentinels, and the distance between each man, will depend upon thecharacter of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended. 

Detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are alsothrown out in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with thecamp-guards, serve to keep good order and discipline in and around thecamp, to prevent desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and togive timely notice of the enemy's approach. 

Still larger detachments, denominated _grand-guards_, are posted in thesurrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which theyoccupy as outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of theenemy, and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. They detachpatrols, videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. They should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in caseof sudden attack. Outposts, when too far advanced, are sometimesdestroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach. 

In encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary toscatter them over a considerable extent of ground, in order tofacilitate their subsistence. In such a case, the arrangement of guardsrequires the utmost care. A chain of advanced posts should be placedseveral miles' distance from the line of camp; these posts should besupported by other and larger detachments in their rear, andconcentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should becontinually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry. 

The manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered his army on thePassarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both inthe matters of encampment and subsistence. An immense army of men werehere quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a notover fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and in the very faceof a most powerful enemy. 

A Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops beingalways drawn up in the same battle array. A Roman staff-officer whomarked out an encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanicaloperation; he had no occasion for much genius or experience. The form ofthe camps was a square. In later times, they sometimes, in imitation ofthe Greeks, made them circular, or adapted them to the ground. The campwas always surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into twoparts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross-streets andalleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a pettyofficer. 

In the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentiallyfrom that of the Romans, the variation consisting principally in theinterior arrangements, these arrangements being made to correspond tothe existing mode of forming a line of battle. The details of thissystem may be found in the military work of Machiavelli. 

The art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a lineof battle on the same position. Of all the projectile machines must bein play and favorably placed. The position must neither be commanded, out-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far aspossible, to command and out-front the enemy's position. But even in thesame position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or offorming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modesrequires great experience, _coup d'oeil_, and genius. In relation tothis point Napoleon makes the following remarks:--

"Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it toform as many as it has corps or divisions? At what distance ought thevanguard and the flankers to be encamped? What frontage and what depthought to be given to the camp? Where should the cavalry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed? Should the army be ranged in battlearray, in several lines? And if it should, what space should there bebetween those lines? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind theinfantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? As every piece hassufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, shouldall the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of theengagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?"

"The solution of these questions depends on the followingcircumstances:--1st. On the number of troops, and the numbers ofinfantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. 2d. Onthe relation subsisting between the two armies. 3d. On the quality ofthe troops. 4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the nature of the field. And 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character ofthe general who commands them. Nothing absolute either can or ought tobe prescribed on this head. In modern warfare there is no natural orderof battle. "

"The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficultin modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. It is alsocertain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. Inthe ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or ahundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he wasconveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing toadvantage all the movements of his forces. In modern armies, ageneral-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, findshimself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is verymuch exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of theenemy escape him. In every engagement he is occasionally obliged toapproach within reach of small-arms. The effect of modern arms is muchinfluenced by the situation in which they are placed. A battery of guns, with a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemyobliquely, may be decisive of a victory. Modern fields of battle aremuch more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomesnecessary to study operations on a large scale. A much greater degree ofexperience and military genius is requisite for the direction of amodern army than was necessary for an ancient one. "

Figure 9 represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a grand-division ofan army, composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry, twelve squadrons of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and threecompanies of engineers. 

Figure 10 represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantrycomposed of eight companies. 

Figure 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. 

Figure 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or twocompanies of foot engineers. 

Figure 13 is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery, or twocompanies of mounted sappers and pontoniers. 

On undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the generalcamp, as well as the details of the encampment of each arm, would admitof much variation. [8]

[Footnote 8: There are many valuable remarks on the various subjectscomprised under the head of logistics, in the works of Jomini, Grimoard, Thiebault, Boutourlin, Guibert, Laroche Amyon, Bousmard, Ternay, Vauchelle, Odier, Audouin, Bardin, Chemevrieres, Daznan, Ballyet, Dremaux, Dupre d'Aulnay, Morin, and in the published regulations andorders of the English army. ]

CHAPTER V. 

TACTICS. 

IV. Tactics. --We have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troopsinto action, or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;--that is, within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. This branch ofthe military art has usually been divided into two parts: 1st. GrandTactics, or the tactics of battles; and 2d. Elementary Tactics, ortactics of instruction. [9]

[Footnote 9: "It does not come within the view of this work to say anything of the merely mechanical part of the art; because it must be takenfor granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army knows atleast the alphabet of his trade. If he does not, (unless his enemy be asignorant as himself, ) defeat and infamy await him. Without understandingperfectly what are called _the evolutions_, how is it possible that ageneral can give to his own army that order of battle which shall bemost provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may beplaced? How know which of these evolutions the enemy employs againsthim? and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may benecessary to secure victory or avoid defeat? The man who shall take thecommand of an army without perfectly understanding this elementarybranch, is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teachGreek without knowing even his letters. If we have such generals, letthem, for their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselvesimmediately to school. "]

A _battle_ is a general action between armies. If only a small portionof the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a _combat_, an_affair_, an _action_, a _skirmish_, &c. , according to the character ofthe conflict. The art of combining and conducting battles of alldescriptions has been designated by the name of Grand Tactics. 

Battles may be arranged into three classes; 1st. _Defensive_ battles, orthose given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of theenemy. 2d. _Offensive_ battles, or those made by an army which attacksthe enemy in position. 3d. The _mixed_ or _unforeseen_ battles, given bytwo armies meeting while on the march. 

I. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms itsline of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposedcharacter and strength of the enemy's forces. Such is usually the casewhen an army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard dépôts ofprovisions and military stores, or some important strategic point. Thegeneral relations of positions with strategy and engineering havealready been considered; we will now discuss merely their relations tobattles. 

The first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that itsdebouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he hasapproached to the desired point, than those which the enemy can have forattacking our line of battle. 2d. The artillery should have its fulleffect upon all the avenues of approach. 3d. We should have good groundfor manoeuvring our own troops unseen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th. We should have a full view of the enemy's manoeuvres as he advances tothe attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our line well protected bynatural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We should have some means ofeffecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction. 

It is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the sametime; and sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in directviolation of another. A river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures aflank of a line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, shouldthe defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. Again, the positionmay be difficult of attack in front or on the wings, and at the sametime unfavorable for retreat. Such was Wellington's position atWaterloo. The park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and themarshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against theattacking force; but the marshy forest of Soignies in rear, with but asingle road, cut off all hope of retreat. 

II. According to the strategic relations of the contending forces in acampaign, will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or toseek him out and attack him wherever he may be found. We may sometimesbe obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose ofpreventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off forces that may beseparated from the main body by a river, &c. As a general rule theattacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but thisadvantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions. 

The main thing in an _offensive_ battle is to seize upon the decisivepoint of the field. This point is determined by the configuration of theground, the position of the contending forces, the strategic object ofthe battle; or, by a combination of these. For example, when one wing ofthe enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line, this would seem the decisive point to be attacked, for its occupationwould secure the greatest advantages; but this point may be so verydifficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as torender its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle ofBautzen: the left of the allies rested on the mountains of Bohemia, which were difficult of attack, but favorable for defence; moreover, their only line of retreat was on the right, which thus became the pointof attack for the French, although the topographical and tactical key ofthe field was on the left. 

III. It frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result fromthe meeting of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive. Indeed, an army that is occupying a defensive position may, on theapproach of the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. Battlesof this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive anddefensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a surprise to botharmies. To this class belong the battles of Rosbach, Eylau, Lutzen, Luzzara, Abensberg, &c. 

Surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for thenoise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts orwings assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover, the division into separate masses, or _corps d'armée, _ will necessarilyconfine the surprise to a part, at most, of the forces employed. Nevertheless, in the change given to military terms, a surprise may nowmean only an unexpected combination of manoeuvres for an attack, ratherthan an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. In this senseMarengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. Are numbered with surprises. Benningsen'sattack on Murat at Zarantin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting fromthe gross negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples. 

An _order of battle_ is the particular disposition given to the troopsfor a determined manoeuvre on the field of battle. A _line of battle_ isthe general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order ofexercise, without any determined manoeuvre; it may apply to defensivepositions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object hasbeen decided on. Military writers lay down twelve orders of battle, viz. : 1st. The simple parallel order; 2d. The parallel order with acrotchet; 3d. The parallel order reinforced on one or both wings; 4th. The parallel order reinforced on the centre; 5th. The simple obliqueorder; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; 7th. Theperpendicular order on one or both wings; 8th. The concave order; 9th. The convex order; 10th. The order by echelon on one or both wings; 11th. The order by echelon on the centre; 12th. The combined orders of attackon the centre and one wing at the same time. 

(Figure 14. )[10] The simple parallel order is the worst possibledisposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight with equalchances, and the combat must continue till accident, superior numbers, or mere physical strength decides the day; skill can have little or noinfluence in such a contest. 

[Footnote 10: In the plans, B is the army in position, and A theattacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle. Tosimplify the drawings, a single line represents the position of an army, whereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. Eachfigure represents a grand division of twelve battalions. ]

(Figure 15. ) The parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, issometimes used in a defensive position, and also in the offensive withthe crotchet thrown forward. Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin, are examples of this order. Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the parallelorder with the retired crotchet on the right flank. 

(Figure 16. ) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if stronglyreinforced on one point, is according to correct principles, and may incertain cases secure the victory; but it has many inconveniences. Theweak part of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstanding itsefforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run the risk of a defeat, and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point. Moreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit byits success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, withoutendangering its connection with the rest of the line. 

(Figure 17) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. Thesame remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding. 

These two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battleof Zama, for example; and sometimes by modern generals. Turenne employedone of them at Ensheim. 

(Figure 18) is the simple oblique order. 

(Figure 19) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced. This last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior, for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point ofthe enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach ofimmediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line incheck by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorablepoint as occasion may require. 

The most distinguished examples under this order are the battles ofLeuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated Epaminondas; Leuthen, underFrederick; the Pyramids, Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon. 

(Figure 20. ) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginningof a battle, as was the army of Frederick at Rosbach, and the Russianarmy at Kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. Anattack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force isvastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a perpendicular attack on onewing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre. 

(Figure 21. ) The concave order may be used with advantage in certaincases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battleof Cannæ, the English at Crecy and Agincourt, and the Austrians atEssling, in 1809. 

(Figure 22. ) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, toattack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after thepassage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle ofCosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, atEssling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813, and at Brienne in 1814. 

(Figure 23. ) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequentlyemployed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, thereis the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on bothwings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; thisis the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and thiswas owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position ofhis troops. 

(Figure 24. ) The echelon order on the centre alone may be employed withsuccess against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle, for it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line. 

The echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. Theseveral corps composing the army may manoeuvre separately, andconsequently with greater ease. Each echelon covers the flank of thatwhich precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, andextended with the necessary _ensemble_. At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. Portions of hisforces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles. 

(Figure 25. ) The combined order in columns on the centre and oneextremity at the same time, is better suited than either of thepreceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed thisorder at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo. 

It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these ordersof battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusivelyfollowed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decided bythe general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may beduly weighed. An order well suited to one position might be the worstpossible in another. Tactics is in this respect the very reverse ofstrategy--the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules. 

But whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek todislodge the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. If it canconceal its real intentions, and deceive him respecting the true pointof attack, success will be more certain and decisive. A turningmanoeuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same timewith the main attack on the line. The operations of Davoust at Wagram, and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. Themanoeuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill, may lead to disasters like the turning manoeuvres of the Austrians atRivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French under Jourdan at Stackach, andunder Marmont at Salamanca. 

We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on theline of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering, however, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction. 

We shall begin with _infantry_, as the most important arm on thebattle-field. 

There are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: 1st, astirailleurs, or light troops; 2d, in deployed lines; 3d, in lines ofbattalions, ployed on the central division of each battalion, or formedin squares; 4th, in deep masses. 

These different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems:1st, the thin formation of two deployed lines; 2d, a line of battalionsin columns of attack on the centre, or in squares by battalions; 3d, acombination of these two, or the first line deployed, and the second incolumns of attack; and 4th, the deep formation of heavy columns ofseveral battalions. The tirailleurs are merely accessories to the mainforces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect the march ofthe columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manoeuvre on the flanks. 

1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally thatof two deployed lines of troops, as shown in Fig. 26. But reason andexperience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order, can only move very slowly; that in attempting rapid movements it breaksand exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be easilypierced through by troops of a deeper order. Hence it is that the lightformation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire, and to remain almost stationary. 

2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack beemployed, the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization orhabitual formation of this arm. 

In our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies, each formed in three ranks. The two flank companies are designed fortirailleurs. This would give a column of four divisions, andconsequently twelve files deep; and as only two of these files couldemploy their fire, there would be much too large a portion ofnon-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice, however, we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies bedetached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which isnot objectionable. If however, the flank companies should be present inthe battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files. 

In the French service, each battalion is composed of four divisions, formed in either two or three ranks. The two-rank formation is the onehabitually employed. If all the companies be present, and the formationin three ranks, the depth of column will be twelve files; if in tworanks the depth will be eight, files. If the flank companies bedetached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine files, andfor two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28. )

In the Russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three rankseach. But the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depthof column of eight files. The employment of the third rank fortirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty ofrallying them on the column. For this reason, the best authoritiesprefer detaching an entire division of two companies. 

The formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country, and against an enemy who is superior in cavalry. Formerly very largesquares were employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or bybattalion. The former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latterfor offensive movements. The manner of arranging these is shown inFigure 29. 

3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, hassometimes been employed with success. Napoleon used this formation atTagliamento, and the Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed ofthree battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the other twoformed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities, as shown in Fig. 30. It may in some cases be better to place the secondand third battalions in line with the first, and on the two extremitiesof this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The centre ofthe line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when thetwo battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which isdeployed. This mixed system of formation has many advocates, and incertain situations may be employed with great advantage. 

4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several battalions isobjectionable as an habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as itexposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery, and diminishesthe mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to itsforce. Macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of Wagram withcomplete success, although he experienced enormous losses. But Ney'sheavy columns of attack at Waterloo failed of success, and sufferedterribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries. 

Whenever deep columns are employed, Jomini recommends that thegrand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on eachflank, (Fig. 31, ) marching by files, in order to protect its flanks fromthe enemy's attacks. Without this defence a column of twelve battalionsdeep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be thrown into disorderor broken, as was the column of Fontenoy, and the Macedonian phalanx byPaulus Emillus. A grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns bybrigade, as is represented in Figure 32. These are less heavy than asingle column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to nearlythe same objections. 

All offensive operations on the field of battle require _mobility, solidity_, and _impulsion_; while, on the other hand, all defensiveoperations should combine _solidity_ with _the greatest possible amountof fire_. 

Troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatevermay be their formation. If in very large masses, they move slower andare more exposed; but the moral effect of these large moveable columnsis such, that they frequently carry positions without ever employingtheir fire. The French columns usually succeeded against the Austrianand Prussian infantry, but the English infantry could not so easily bedriven from their ground; hey also employed their fire to greateradvantage, as was shown at Talavera, Busaco, Fuente de Honore, Albueraand Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed formation were alwaysmost successful against such troops. 

From these remarks we must conclude--1st. That the very thin as well asthe very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances, and can seldom be employed with safety. 

2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best forcarrying a position; the column should, however, be diminished in depthas much as possible, in order both to increase its own fire and todiminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy; moreover, it should bewell covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry. 

3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the secondin columns of battalion by division is the best for defence. 

4th. That either of the last two may be employed in the offensive ordefensive, according to the nature of the ground, the character of thegeneral, and the character and position of the troops. Squares arealways good against cavalry. 

Troops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed topass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. None, however, but disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiorityof regulars on the field of battle, where skilful manoeuvres frequentlyeffect more than the most undaunted courage. 

The arm next in importance on the battle-field is _cavalry_. Theprincipal merit of this arm consists in its _velocity_ and _mobility_. Cavalry has little solidity, and cannot of itself defend any positionagainst infantry; but in connection with the other arms, it isindispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory, and forreaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe. 

There are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as forinfantry: 1st in deployed lines; 2d, a line of regiments in column ofattack on the centre; 3d, the mixed formation; and 4th, the deepformation of several columns. 

1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, onaccount of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry. The same objectiondoes not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but fulllines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise orin echelon. In either case the distance between the lines should besufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with thefirst, in case the latter receives a slight check. This distance neednot be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are full, or in echelon. 

2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attackon the central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry, by regiment. If the regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the columnwill contain four lines, two squadrons forming a division; but ifcomposed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only threelines, and consequently will be six files in depth. In either case thedistance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when thetroops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisionsmay close to a less distance. 

3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixedsystem, two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and threeformed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as isshown in Fig. 33, the sixth being held in reserve. This formation isdeemed a good one. 

4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuitedfor the charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawnup in reserve. 

The flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, andsquadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left, and a little in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanksfrom the attacks of the enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usuallyemployed for this purpose. 

In the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should betaken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals ofbrigade. If the formation be in two lines, neither brigade should forman entire line, but each should form a wing of the division, tworegiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. Thisrule is an important one, and should never be neglected. 

It may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on thebattle-field, that the first line after the charge, even if mostsuccessful, may require reforming in rear of the second line, and thatthis last should be prepared to act in the front line after the firstonset. The success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge ofthe final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged. 

It is on account of this frequent manoeuvring of the cavalry on thebattle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, that great bodiesdeployed in full lines are principally objected to. They cannot behandled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments bydivisions. The attack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on thePrussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, in 1814, is agood proof of this. 

Cavalry may be brought to a charge--1st, in columns; 2d, in line; and3d, in route, or at random, _(à la déban-dade. )_ These may also bevaried by charging either at a trot or a gallop. All these modes havebeen employed with success. In a regular charge in line the lance offersgreat advantages; in the melee the sabre is the best weapon; hence somemilitary writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances, andthe second with sabres, The pistol and the carabine are useless in thecharge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys, outposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, thetroop must be at a halt. In all charges in line, especially againstcavalry, the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account ofthe difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased. Lances are utterly useless in a melée, and in employing troops armed inthis way, it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and inline. In charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop maysometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important thanforce. 

We will now consider the formation and use of _artillery_ on the fieldof battle. It may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fireof artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line whichwe design to pierce; for this fire will not only weaken this point, butwill also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principalefforts are directed towards the intended point. 

In the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout thewhole line, on ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should beso placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where theenemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack. 

Artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front, and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; veryhigh points are unfavorable If possible, the concentric fire should beemployed against the enemy's columns of attack. The position of theEnglish artillery on the field of Waterloo, and the use of theconcentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the dispositionof this arm to be found in modern military history. 

The proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy'sinfantry and cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should beemployed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more thanone third at most can be spared for this object. 

If possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy'sline in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading fire. A direct fireagainst columns of attack, with a few light pieces thrown out to take itin flank at the same time, will always be advantageous. A direct andflank fire was employed with success by Kleist against the column of Neyat the battle of Bautzen; the French marshal was forced to change hisdirection. 

Batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantlysustained by infantry or cavalry. If attacked by cavalry, the artilleryshould keep up its fire as long as possible, first with ball, and thenwith grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. The samerule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire of solidshot at a great distance is much less effective than against mountedtroops. 

The _engineer troops_ are employed on the field of battle principally bydetachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. Each regiment ofinfantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act aspioneers, for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. These sappers are of the utmost importance, for without them an entirecolumn might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which afew sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time. Detachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalryand artillery for the same purpose as above. In establishing thebatteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manoeuvres, and inarranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, andshovels of the sappers are of infinite value. Fieldworks, bridges, andbridge-defences, frequently have a decisive influence upon the result ofa battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the action, theywill be discussed in another place. In the attack and defence of thesefield-works, the engineer troops play a distinguished part. Theconsideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps properlybelonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to anotheroccasion. 

We will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field ofbattle. 

Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments andbrigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. Thecavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributedalong the entire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, twoof cavalry and two of infantry: in moving by a flank, they formed onlytwo very long columns; the cavalry, however, sometimes formed a thirdand separate column in flank movements, but this disposition was rarelymade. 

The French Revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composedof the four arms combined; each division moved separately andindependently of the other. In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon unitedtwo or more of these divisions into a _corps d'armée, _ which formed awing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. In addition to thesedivisions and _corps d'armée, _ he had large reserves of cavalry andartillery, which were employed as distinct and separate arms. 

If the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by _corps d'armée, _ eachcorps should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve ofthe army. Again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisionsonly, each division should then have _its_ separate reserve. 

An army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions, usually forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and areserve. Each corps or division acts by itself, with its infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops. The reserve of cavalry may beformed in rear of the centre or one of the wings. In small forces offifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with advantage on thewings, in the manner of the ancients. If the reserve of this arm belarge enough to form three separate bodies, it may _itself_ veryproperly be formed into a centre and wings. If it be formed into twocolumns only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between thecentre and the wings of the main force. The reserve of artillery isemployed either to reinforce the centre or a wing, and in the defensiveis frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle. Inoffensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire aspossible on the intended point of attack. The mounted artillery eitheracts in concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; thelight-foot acts with the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibreare distributed along the line, or concentrated on some important pointwhere their fire may be most effectual. They reach the enemy's forces ata distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. They may also beemployed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their movements are tooslow and difficult for a reserve. 

The order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in abattle, depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidentalcircumstances, and cannot be determined by any fixed rules. Thefollowing, however, is most frequently employed, and in ordinary casesmay be deemed good. 

The attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forwardto annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. Themain body then advances in two lines: the first displays itself in lineas it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second lineremains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, at adistance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy'smusketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to cover it, ifdriven back. The artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire onsome weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into theopening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. The cavalry charges atthe opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetratesan opening in his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, forces them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this timethe whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to preventfresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point. 

The following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:--1st. _General battles_ are not to be fought but under the occurrence of oneof the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedlysuperior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receivingreinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength;when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies orreinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of youroperations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battlewill be greater than the disadvantage of losing it. 

2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you oughtto regard as indispensable preliminaries, --a thorough knowledge of theground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the mostperfect order in your fire-arms; hospital dépôts regularly established, with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c. , sufficient for the accommodationof the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to thecommanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your ownrear. 

3d. The battle being fought and _won_, the victory must be followed upwith as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained, --amaxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobediencewhich pervades all troops flushed with conquest, ) but with which anable general will never dispense. No one knew better the use of thismaxim than Napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observerof it. 

4th. The battle being fought and _lost_, it is your first duty to doaway the _moral_ effect of defeat, --the want of that self-respect andself-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so longas they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It isscarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object, --to reinspirea beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory, --we must notturn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him ourfront also;--we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adoptsuch measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered, we are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enoughboth of strength and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any. Do you operate in a covered or mountainous country?--avail yourself ofits ridges and woods; for by doing so you will best evade the pressureof his cavalry. Have you defiles or villages to pass?--seize the headsof these, defend them obstinately, and make a show of fighting anotherbattle. In a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorableincident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is by thesemeans that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it wasby these that Frederick balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and thedefeat of his plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own Washington, after losing the battle of Brandywine, was of this character. He hastilyrecrossed the Schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking theenemy and renewing the combat, which was _apparently_ prevented only bya heavy and incessant fall of rain. A rumor was now raised that theenemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly advancing upon hisright, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain possessionof Philadelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew from theGeneral repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position andgiving to his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object toavoid, but to follow and to fight the enemy. This movement, though nobattle ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of thepeople as of the army. [11]

[Footnote 11: There are innumerable works in almost every language onelementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read any thingfurther than the manuals used in our own service. Our system ofinfantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from theFrench; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured, for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French manuals forthe varied duties of this arm. 

On Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historicalwritings of General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions. Napoleon's memoirs, and the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker, Okouneff, Roguiat, Jocquinot-de-Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gassendi, Warnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau, Maiseroy, Miller, and Ternay, areconsidered as being among the best authorities. ]

CHAPTER VI. 

MILITARY POLITY AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 

_Military Polity_. --In deciding upon a resort to arms, statesmen areguided by certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in theintercourse of nations: so also both statesmen and generals are bound byrules similarly adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actuallyengaged in military operations. 

In all differences between nations, each state has a right to decide foritself upon the nature of its means of redress for injuries received. Previous to declaring open and public war, it may resort to some otherforcible means of redress, short of actual war. These are:--

1st. Laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation. 

2d. Taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute. 

3d. Resorting to some direct measure of retaliation. 

4th. Making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offendingnation. 

It is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress, nor even to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of publicwar, when actually declared; it is intended to consider here merely suchmilitary combinations as are resorted to by the state in preparation fordefence, or in carrying on the actual operations of a war. 

In commencing hostilities against any other power, we must evidentlytake into consideration all the political and physical circumstances ofthe people with whom we are to contend: we must regard their generalcharacter for courage and love of country; their attachment to theirgovernment and political institutions; the character of their rulers andtheir generals; the numbers, organization, and discipline of theirarmies; and particularly the relations between the civil and militaryauthorities in the state, for if the latter be made entirelysubordinate, we may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations. Wemust also regard their passive means of resistance, such as their systemof fortifications, their military materials and munitions, theirstatistics of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and especiallythe geographical position and physical features of their country. Nogovernment can neglect, with impunity, these considerations in itspreparations for war, or in its manner of conducting militaryoperations. 

Napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, effeminate, anddisorganized Italians required many modifications when directed againstthe great military power of Russia. Moreover, the combinations of Eylauand Friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddenedguerrillas of Minos, animated by the combined passions of hatred, patriotism, and religious enthusiasm. 

Military power may be regarded either as absolute or relative: theabsolute force of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants andthe extent of its revenues; the relative force, on its geographical andpolitical position, the character of its people, and the nature of itsgovernment. Its military preparations should evidently be in proportionto its resources. Wealth constitutes both the apprehension and theincentive to invasion. Where two or more states have equal means of war, with incentives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist; for dangerand temptation are no longer opposed to each other. The preparation ofstates may, therefore, be equal without being equivalent, and thesmaller of the two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without themeans of sustaining it. 

The numerical relation between the entire population of a state, and thearmed forces which it can maintain, must evidently vary with the wealthand pursuits of the people. Adam Smith thinks that a country purelyagricultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, or evenin case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire population. A commercialor manufacturing country would be unable to furnish any thing like sonumerous a military force. On this account small agricultural states aresometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies than theirmore powerful neighbors. During the Seven Years' War, Fredericksupported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire Prussianpopulation, and at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of themales capable of bearing arms had actually perished on the field ofbattle. 

But the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times ofgreat emergency is, of course, much greater than can be supported duringa long war, or as a part of a permanent military establishment. Montesquieu estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting, without endangering their power, a permanent military force of aboutone-hundredth part of their population. This ratio differs but littlefrom that of the present military establishments of the great Europeanpowers. 

Great Britain, with a population of about twenty-five millions, and ageneral budget of $250, 000, 000, supports a military and naval force ofabout 150, 000 effective and 100, 000 non-effective men, 250, 000 in all, at an annual expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars. 

Russia, with a population of about seventy millions, supports an activearmy of 632, 000 men, with an immense reserve, at an expense of about$65, 000, 000, out of a general budget of $90, 000, 000; that is, theexpense of her military establishment is to her whole budget as 7 to 10. 

Austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organizedpeace establishment of 370, 000, (about 250, 000 in active service, ) anda reserve of 260, 000, at an expense of $36, 000, 000, out of a generalbudget of $100, 000, 000. 

Prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from 100, 000to 120, 000 men in arms, with a reserve of 200, 000, at an annual expenseof more than $18, 000, 000, out of a general budget of about $38, 000, 000. 

France, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports apermanent establishment of about 350, 000 men, at an expense of seventyor eighty millions of dollars, out of a total budget of $280, 000, 000. France has long supported a permanent military force of fromone-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at an expenseof from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget. The followingtable, copied from the "Spectateur Militaire, " shows the state of thearmy at six different periods between 1788 and 1842. It omits, ofcourse, the extraordinary levies of the wars of the Revolution and ofthe Empire. 

_Table_. 

 Budget. Army. Dates. Population. Remarks. 

 Of State. Of the Army. Peace War Estab. Estab. Livres. Livres. Men. Men. 1788 24, 000, 000 500, 000, 000 100, 000, 000 180, 000 360, 000 Francs. Francs. Ordinance of1814 28, 000, 000 800, 000, 000 180, 000, 000 255, 000 340, 000 1814 Report of1823 31, 000, 000 900, 000, 000 200, 000, 000 280, 000 390, 000 Minister of War. Report of1830 32, 000, 000 1, 000, 000, 000 220, 000, 000 312, 000 500, 000 Minister of War. 1840 34, 000, 000 1, 170, 000, 000 242, 000, 000 312, 000 - Budget of 1840. Estimated1842 35, 000, 000 1, 200, 000, 000 285, 000, 000 370, 000 520, 000 Expenses of 1842. 

From these data we see that the great European powers at the present daymaintain, in time of peace, military establishments equal to aboutone-hundredth part of their entire population. 

The geographical position of a country also greatly influences thedegree and character of its military preparation. It may be bordered onone or more sides by mountains and other obstacles calculated todiminish the probability of invasion; or the whole frontier may be wideopen to an attack: the interior may be of such a nature as to furnishsecurity to its own army, and yet be fatal to the enemy should he occupyit; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own country. Itmay be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritimedescents--events of rare occurrence in modern times. 

Again, a nation may be placed between others who are interested in itssecurity, their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weakerneighbor. On the other hand, its political institutions may be such asto compel the others to unite in attacking it in order to securethemselves. The republics of Switzerland could remain unmolested in themidst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary France brought uponherself the armies of all Europe. 

Climate has also some influence upon military character, but thisinfluence is far less than that of education and discipline. Northernnations are said to be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than thoseof warmer climates; and yet the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, CharlesXII. , and Suwarrow, have shown themselves sufficiently active andimpetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and Spaniards, in the times oftheir glory, were patient, disciplined, and indefatigable, notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments. 

For any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till suchtime as they are actually required in defence, is to waste the publicmoney, and endanger the public safety. The closing of an avenue ofapproach, the security of a single road or river, or even the strategicmovement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning, what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and themost formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a well-fortifieddepot on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off allreinforcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country wouldinevitably have fallen into our possession. In the winter of 1806-7, Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and advanced even to the walls ofKönigsberg, with the Austrians in his rear, and the whole power ofRussia before him. If Austria had pushed forward one hundred thousandmen from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in all probability, says thebest of military judges, Jomini, have struck a fatal blow to theoperations of Napoleon, and his army must have been exceedinglyfortunate even to regain the Rhine. But Austria preferred remainingneutral till she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men. She then took the offensive, and was beaten; whereas, with one hundredthousand men brought into action at the favorable moment, she might, most probably, have decided the fate of Europe. 

"Defensive war, " says Napoleon, "does not preclude attack, any morethan offensive war is exclusive of defence, " for frequently the best wayto counteract the enemy's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, atthe very outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. But this cannever be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with the munitions ofwar, and unsupported by fortifications. Such invasions must necessarilyfail. Experience in the wars of the French revolution has demonstratedthis; and even our own short history is not without its proof. In 1812, the conquest of Canada was determined on some time before thedeclaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation orapparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous tothis declaration, for the Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army ofthe same numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed againstthe vital point of the British possessions at a time when the wholemilitary force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men, howdifferent had been the result!

While, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinateto its resources, position, and character, they can in no case bedispensed with. No matter how extensive or important the temporary meansthat may be developed as necessity requires, there must be some forcekept in a constant state of efficiency, in order to impart life andstability to the system. The one can never properly replace the other;for while the former constitutes the basis, the latter must form themain body of the military edifice, which, by its strength anddurability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if thearchitecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in itsfall. 

The permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations, are--

1st. An army; 2d. A navy; 3d. Fortifications. 

The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, toregard their _personnel_; but looking upon them as institutions ororganizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. Theyare sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes; by thehot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they maybecome overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of popular delusion mayoverthrow and apparently sweep them away. But they will immediatelyspring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in theorganization of political institutions. 

Its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation'swants; but pity for the country which reduces them in number or supportso as to degrade their character or endanger their organization. "Agovernment, " says one of the best historians of the age, "which neglectsits army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyesof posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and itscountry, instead of laying the foundation for its glory. "

One of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the historyof our relations with the Indian tribes from the beginning to thepresent hour, is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining anefficient military force in time of peace, and that the treatment wereceived for a long series of years from European powers, was a mosthumiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense withthese means of defence. 

"Twice, " says he, "we were compelled to maintain, by open war, ourquarrel with the principal aggressors. After many years of forbearanceand negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicablysettled; but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not withoutmuch delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treatywas finally enforced. No one acquainted with these portions of ourhistory, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration ofthe wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants ofthe scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force. "

"If, " said Mr. Calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason andexperience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressingcalamities. "

These remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our militaryestablishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand. Nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; andwe were soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report ofhigh authority, that if there had been two regiments available near St. Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk would have been easily avoided;and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savagewarfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years would alsohave been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country, if two regiments had been available at the beginning of thatconflict. [12]

[Footnote 12: We may now add to these remarks, that if our governmenthad occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with awell-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might havebeen avoided; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small force of onlytwo thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican army was holding outto them the strongest inducements to attack us. The temporary economy ofa few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handfulof men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions ofdollars and a large sacrifice of human life. ]

We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason orexperience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and navalforce, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, bythe addition of new troops. 

Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy bythe addition of new forces. The strength thus acquired is sometimes ineven a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must beremembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior tothe old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. No generalcan rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of acampaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the criticalmoment on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect tosailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war. There is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruitsfrom men totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in caseof sudden increase, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine withprofessional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the use ofartillery, &c. , on ship-board, are familiar with all the other duties ofsea life, and not unused to discipline. Moreover, raw seamen andmarines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time ofaction, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better thantroops of the same character on land. If years are requisite to make agood sailor, surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect thesoldier; and no less skill, practice, and professional study arerequired for the proper direction of armies than for the management offleets. 

But some have said that even these skeletons of military and navalforces are entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic peoplewill make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined andexperienced. Such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, and some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples. 

There are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses, animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliantvictories. Here, however, extraordinary circumstances supplied the placeof order, and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwisewould have been very unequal; but in almost every instance of this kind, the loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great, humanlife being substituted for skill and order. But victory, even with sucha drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised anddisorderly forces. If the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothingof navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totallyunacquainted with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross theAtlantic in safety, and reach her destined port? Would we trust ourlives and the honor of our country to their care? Would we not say tothem, "First make yourselves acquainted with the principles of yourprofession, the use of the compass, and the means of determining whetheryou direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor?" Waris not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. Its principlesconstitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the generalwho understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses themeans of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success. 

History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying uponundisciplined forces in the open field. Almost every page of Napier'sclassic History of the Peninsular War contains striking examples of theuseless waste of human life and property by the Spanish militia; while, with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional part of theactual expense, the French might have been expelled at the outset, orhave been driven, at any time afterwards, from the Peninsula. 

At the beginning of the French Revolution the regular army wasabolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the 14th ofJuly, 1789, relied on exclusively for the national defence. "But thesethree millions of national guards, " says Jomini, "though good supportersof the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless forreinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly incapable ofdefending their own firesides. " Yet no one can question their individualbravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and properlydirected, they put to flight the best troops in Europe. At the firstoutbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forthagainst the maddened hordes of French democracy. The popular power, springing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of politicaloppression was removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establishitself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own protection. Ifthe attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also wereher own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. The republican armiesrepelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke ofBrunswick; but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, system, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robberyproduced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed_épaulements_ against the enemy. Yet this was but the strength ofweakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government;and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before thecombined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon, with astrong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, andbinding them together into one consolidated mass, made Francevictorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire. 

No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiasticpatriotism than the Americans during the war of our own Revolution. Andyet our army received, even at that time, but little support fromirregular and militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions onthis subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressionalspeeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers, would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline tomeet the veteran troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurryus, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers ofthe world--so striking is the contrast between the assertions of thesemen and the letters and reports of Washington, that it may be well forthe cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh hismemory by reference to the writings of Washington. The following briefextracts are from his letters to the President of Congress, December, 1776:

"The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand otherthings, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases ofextraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the commoncourse of events, would amply support a large army, which, wellofficered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing adestructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my opinion, if anydependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will bedeceived. When danger is a little removed from them they will not turnout at all. When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead offlying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removingtheir families and effects; while the disaffected are concertingmeasures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay allaround, to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience andabundant proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and amistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all ourmisfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia comein, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannottell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave youat last, at a critical moment. "

These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we rememberthe conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, SavannahRiver, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c. , in the war of the Revolution;the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results;the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines oftheir own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara andsecure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southernmilitia from the field of Bladensburg. 

But there is another side to this picture. If our militia havefrequently failed to maintain their ground _when drawn up in the openfield_, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence ofCharleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia inconnection with fortifications. 

These examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great valueof a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, andought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm ofdefence as utterly useless. In the open field militia cannot in generalbe manoeuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified placestheir superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render themeven more valuable than regulars. And in reading the severe stricturesof Washington, Greene, Morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must beremembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of importantworks of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well asour own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, _inthe open field_, with one subordinate and disciplined. Here _science_must determine the contest. Habits of strict obedience, and ofsimultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what thehigher principles of the military profession require. New andundisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, andstrategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose allconfidence in their leaders and in themselves. But, when placed behind abreastwork, they even overrate their security. They can then coolly lookupon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor andbristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of theirweapons. The superior accuracy of aim which the American has obtained bypractice from his early youth, has enabled our militia to gain, underthe protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the mostveteran troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack behind aparapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where_movements_ generally determine the victory. To watch the approach of anenemy, to see him move up and display his massive columns, his longarray of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, hisinstruments of attack, and the professional skill with which he wieldsthem, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death all around, and to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand outin all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, requires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibitsin the pitched battle. 

But we must not forget that to call this force into the open field, --totake the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, thefarmer from his plough, --will necessarily be attended with an immensesacrifice of human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not theonly ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supplytheir own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases whichoccasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality. 

There is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars andmilitia forces. The cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for acampaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from datain the War-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while thecost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowancefor the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste ofcamp-furniture, equipments, &c. , will be two hundred and fifty dollarsper man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like theexpedition against Black Hawk and his Indians in the Northwest, andduring the hostilities in Florida, "the expenses of the militia, " saysMr. Secretary Spencer, in a report to congress in 1842, "invariablyexceed those of regulars by _at least three hundred per cent_. " It isfurther stated that "_fifty-five thousand militia_ were called intoservice during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that _thirtymillions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts_!" When it isremembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did notexceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult toperceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive. Large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered theslightest service. Again, during our late war with Great Britain, ofless than three years' duration, _two hundred and eighty thousandmuskets were lost, _--the average cost of which is stated at twelvedollars, --making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, _of three millionsand three hundred and sixty thousand dollars_, during a service of abouttwo years and a half;--resulting mainly from that neglect and waste ofpublic property which almost invariably attends the movements ofnewly-raised and inexperienced forces. Facts like these should awaken usto the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia. GeneralKnox, when Secretary of War, General Harrison while in the senate, andMr. Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this purpose, but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect. 

Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either ofthe two preceding elements of national defence. They are passive intheir nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army ornavy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operationsof a campaign. When once constructed they require but very littleexpenditure for their support. In time of peace they withdraw novaluable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of themselvesthey can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, ordangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, andas obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. Whilecontributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, byfurnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c. ; and to its efficiencystill more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia forthat species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of waterfrontiers; they also serve as safe dépôts of arms and the immensequantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modernwarfare. These munitions usually require much time, skill, and expensein their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should bepreserved with the utmost care. 

Maritime arsenals and depots of naval and military stores on thesea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Herean enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blowbefore any effectual resistance can be organized. But in addition tothe security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of thehighest military value, they also serve to protect the merchantshipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercialpeople always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, andthe means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms, and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats ofhostile fleets. Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks uponthe enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directedfire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops toland at some distant and unfavorable position. 

The three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, ofcourse, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has itsdistinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded asantagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, at the expenseof the other two, must necessarily be followed by a correspondingdiminution of national strength. We must not infer, however, that allmust be maintained upon the same footing. The position of the countryand the character of the people must determine this. 

England, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, mustmaintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence ofher own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Hermen-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transporther troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to theacquisition and security of colonial territory. The military forces ofthe British empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war, [13] carryingin all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. France hasless commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great extentof sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents;her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army andnavy, therefore, constitute _her_ principal means of defence. Her armynumbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy aboutthree hundred and fifty vessels, [13] carrying about nine thousand gunsand thirty thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and othercontinental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, whiletheir extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: theirfortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal meansof defence. But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads oftheir powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria support navalestablishments of a limited extent. Russia has, in all, some one hundredand eighty vessels of war, and Austria not quite half that number. [13]

[Footnote 13: These numbers include _all_ vessels of war, whether incommission, building, or in ordinary. ]

The United States possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of morethan three thousand miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigablerivers, which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. Thenorthern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in the westour territory borders upon the British and Mexican possessions for manythousand miles more. Within these limits there are numerous tribes ofIndians, who require the watchful care of armed forces to keep them atpeace among themselves as well as with us. Our authorized militaryestablishment amounts to 7, 590 men, and our naval establishment consistsof seventy-seven vessels of all classes, carrying 2, 345 guns, and 8, 724men. [14] This is certainly a very small military and naval force for thedefence of so extended and populous a country, especially one whosepolitical institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to thedistrust and jealousy of most other nations. 

[Footnote 14: Since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, the above numbers have been nearly doubled, this increase having beenmade with special reference to the present war with Mexico. ]

The fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontierswill be discussed hereafter. [15]

[Footnote 15: Jomini's work on the Military Art contains many valuableremarks on this subject of Military Polity: also the writings ofClausewitz, Dupin, Lloyd, Chambray, Tranchant de Laverne, and Rudtorfer. Several of these questions are also discussed in Rocquancourt, Carion-Nisas, De Vernon, and other writers on military history. Theseveral European Annuaires Militaires, or Army Registers, and the Frenchand German military periodicals, contain much valuable matter connectedwith military statistics. ]

CHAPTER VII. 

SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 

The principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as coloniesor states, from civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies wewere continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the Frenchpossessions. In the war of the Revolution, it being one of nationalemancipation, the military operations were more general throughout theseveral states; but in the war of 1812 the attacks were confined to thenorthern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast. In these twocontests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, being withinreach of the British naval power, and offering the dazzling attractionof rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults. 

Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England. An attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on Canada or aservile insurrection in the southern states. The former project, in amilitary point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but mostprobably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion, if nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injuryby the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, ourseaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This modeof warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a conflictwith any great maritime power. How can we best prepare in time of peaceto repel these attacks?

Immediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission of our mostdistinguished military and naval officers was formed, to devise a systemof defensive works, to be erected in time of peace for the security ofthe most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. It maybe well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions andcharacter of these works, mentioning only such as have been completed, or are now in course of construction, and such as are intended to bebuilt as soon as Congress shall grant the requisite funds. There areother works projected for some future period, but as they do not belongto the class required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to. 

MAINE. 

Beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, forEastport and Wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fiftyguns. Nothing has yet been done to these works. 

Next Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and FortPenobscot and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns. These are only partly built. 

NEW HAMPSHIRE. 

Defences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. Theseworks are also only partly built. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

Projected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty guns. These are notyet commenced. 

Works for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five hundred guns. Theseare nearly three-quarters completed. Those of New Bedford harbor carryfifty guns: not yet begun. 

RHODE ISLAND. 

Newport harbor, --works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed. 

CONNECTICUT. 

New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut river. The first ofthese nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun. 

NEW YORK. 

The works projected for the defence of New York harbor are estimated tocarry about one thousand guns. These works are not yet one-halfconstructed. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

The works projected for the defence of the Delaware Bay and Philadelphiawill carry about one hundred and fifty guns. They are not one-quarterbuilt. 

MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA. 

Baltimore and Annapolis--these works will carry some two hundred andfifty guns. The works for the Chesapeake Bay will carry about sixhundred guns; and those for the Potomac river about eighty guns. Theseare more than one-half completed. 

NORTH CAROLINA. 

The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one hundred and fiftyguns. They are essentially completed. 

SOUTH CAROLINA. 

The works for the defence of Charleston carry some two hundred guns. They are one-half constructed. 

GEORGIA. 

The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearlythree-quarters finished. 

FLORIDA. 

The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, Key West, Tortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns. Those at St. Augustine and Pensacola are essentially completed, butthose at Key West and Tortugas are barely begun. 

ALABAMA. 

The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one hundred andsixty guns. These are nearly constructed. 

LOUISIANA. 

The works for the defence of New Orleans will carry some two hundred andfifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed. 

The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars pergun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. Thisdifference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on whichthe fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in thesouth for materials and workmanship. 

 * * * * *

Having pointed out the character and condition of our system ofsea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may berelied on as a means of security against a maritime descent. 

To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine thethree or four great maritime descents attempted by the English duringthe wars of the French Revolution; a period at which the great navalsuperiority of England over other nations, gave her the title of_mistress of the seas_. Let us notice what have been the results of theseveral attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the meansby which such attacks have been repelled. 

In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at anexpense of eight millions of dollars. This port of the French coast hadthen a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteenhundred guns. Lord Bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hundred guns inall, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to takeshelter under the guns of the fortifications of L'Orient. The Frenchnaval defence being destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon withoutopposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval History, to be "the finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, forlanding an army. " Besides these natural advantages in favor of theEnglish, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in openinsurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. A body often thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms, &c. , furnished toas many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in theirattack upon St. Barbe, and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, withseven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, pennedup, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. Reinforced by a newdebarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soondefeated, and ultimately almost entirely destroyed. 

In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland withfourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about elevenhundred guns and a great number of transports, with an army ofthirty-six thousand men. The Dutch naval defences consisted of eightships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gunships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hundredguns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, andwas soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. The defensive army was atfirst only twelve thousand, but the Republicans afterwards increased itto twenty-two thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. Butnotwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority, and theco-operation of the Orange party in assisting the landing of theirtroops, the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place;and after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate. "Such, " says Alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatestexpedition which had yet sailed from the British harbors during thewar. "

In 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, andthirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor ofBoulogne, but was repulsed with severe loss. 

Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon theScheldt, or as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809. This expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as provingthe expediency of maritime descents. The following is a brief narrativeof this expedition:--

Napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and navalarsenals at Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of a maritime forcein the Scheldt. But no sooner was the execution of this project begun, than the English fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences ofthe Scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. Flushing, at themouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and Antwerp, some sixty orseventy miles further up the river, was entirely defenceless; therampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and itsgarrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits. Napoleon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula. The British attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line, twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-twogunboats, innumerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, andan immense artillery train; making in all, says the English historian, "an hundred thousand combatants. " A landing was made upon the island ofWalcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which place was not reduced tilleighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made byseven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, but produced no effect. The channel at the mouth of the river was toobroad to be defended by the works of Flushing, and the main portion ofthe fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt partway up to Antwerp. But in the mean time, the fortifications of thatplace had been repaired, and, after a fruitless operation of a wholemonth in the river, the English were gradually forced to retreat toWalcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest. 

The cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. Itwas certainly very poorly managed. But we cannot help noticing thesuperior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents. They did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensivearmy could be raised. The works of Flushing were never intended to closeup the Scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage ofshipping; but they were not reduced by the English naval force, as hassometimes been alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says thatthe fleet "kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that theFrench officers who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena declaredthat the cannonade in these battles had been a mere _jeu d'enfans_ incomparison. Yet what was the effect produced on the defences of theplace by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? Thewriter can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along theentire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no partof the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, andonly one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line ofbattle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries. "[16]

[Footnote 16: The batteries constructed in the siege of this place werearmed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars. ]

But it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coastare almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upona single fortified position will be attended with more favorableresults; and that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposedto bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. In other words, that in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have atleast an equal chance of success. 

Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to beproperly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to beused with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commandercapable and brave. The ship is of the very best character, and inperfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commanderskilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea--all as could bedesired. [17] The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more thanrequisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the listsof the slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended withextraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fairtest of their relative strength. 

[Footnote 17: These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, butfor the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to bewholly attained. ]

What result should we anticipate from the nature of the contendingforces? The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can chooseher point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable;but she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are muchconcentrated, and consequently much exposed. But in the fort the gunsand men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of severalacres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gunship. All parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fortoffers but a small mark, --the opening of the embrasures, a small part ofthe carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above theparapet, --the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than _twenty toone_. In the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and theballs go at random; in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveableplatform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. There isalways more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, thoughaccurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirelyaway from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwisenoticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they arepointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent ofa few inches the spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the menand guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vesselthey are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructivewith the shot. The fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily beset on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has many points exposedthat may be called vital points. By losing her rudder, or portions ofher rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable touse her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable tosink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these damages are inaddition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed byshots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers;while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentionedabove--namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may bestruck. 

The opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fullyaccord with these deductions of theory. Some few individuals mistaking, or misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modernimprovements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progressin the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly ableto cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant and superficialpersons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to anaval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era inmilitary science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, hasreceived credit merely from its novelty. Let us examine the severaltrials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts withinthe last fifty years, and see what have been the results. 

In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, whosefortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely todeserve the name of defences. Nevertheless, the French fleet, after abombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged toretire. 

In 1794 two British ships, "the Fortitude of seventy-four, and the Junofrigate of thirty-two guns, " attacked a small town in the bay ofMartello, Corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and agarrison of thirty men. After a bombardment of two and a half hours, these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss oflife. The little tower had received no injury, and its garrison wereunharmed. Here were _one hundred and six guns_ afloat against _one_ onshore; and yet the latter was successful. 

In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of Santa Crux, in Teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. Butnotwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, hewas repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while thegarrison received little or no damage. A single ball from the landbattery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk herwith near a hundred seamen and marines!

In 1798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned withnear seven thousand men, attacked a little English redoubt on the islandof Marcou, which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, twosix-pounders, four four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisonedwith two hundred and fifty men. Notwithstanding this great disparity ofnumbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs andgunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat withgreat loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded. 

In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thousand men, attackedthe poorly-constructed works of Porto Ferrairo, whose defensive forcewas a motley garrison of fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, andEnglish. Here the attacking force was _four_ times as great as that ofthe garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after severalbombardments and a siege of five months. 

In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, with an English fleetof six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all fivehundred and two guns, attacked the Spanish and French defences ofAlgesiras. Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to beequal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for theattacking force, considering the circumstances of the case, ) we have aFrench land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an English floatingforce of one hundred and ninety-six guns. Notwithstanding thisinequality of nearly _seventeen_ to _one_, the little battery compelledthe superior naval force to retreat with great loss. 

Shortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets attacked the sameEnglish squadron with a force of nearly _three_ to _one_, but met with amost signal defeat; whereas with a land-battery of only _one_ to_seventeen_, the same party had been victorious. What proof can be moredecisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat!

In 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near Port Royal Bay, withonly one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a French squadronof two seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a landattack of two hundred troops. There was not a single man killed orwounded in the redoubt, while the French lost fifty men! The place wasafterwards reduced by famine. 

In 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two guns and a garrisonof twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a British eighty-gun shipand two frigates. The carriage of one of the land-guns failed on thesecond shot, so that, in fact, only _one_ of them was available duringthe action. Here was _a single piece of ordnance_ and a garrison of_twenty-five men, _ opposed to a naval force of _over one hundred andfifty guns_ and about _thirteen hundred men. _ And what effects wereproduced by this strange combat? The attacking force lost _thirty-seven_men killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while thefort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! What could not be effectedby force was afterwards obtained by negotiation. 

In 1808 a French land-battery of only _three_ guns, near Fort Trinidad, drove off an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel. 

In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, andwhose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by anEnglish squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and aland force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a perfectfailure. 

"In 1814, when the English advanced against Antwerp, " says ColonelMitchell, an English historian, "Fort Frederick, a small work of onlytwo guns, was established in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distancebelow Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and ahalf inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge theEnglish, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchorednear the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the Britishbattery. By her position she was secured from the fire of theeighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon asevery thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise andsmoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of themoderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not havebeen long doubtful, for the thunder of the French artillery actuallymade the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the singleBritish howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though theartillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to theirgun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet nosooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang totheir post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. Thisextraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till neartwelve at noon, when the French ship, having had forty-one men killedand wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and havingbesides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned toAntwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The howitzer was notdismounted, the fort was not injured, --there being in fact nothing toinjure, --and the British had only one man killed and two wounded. "

It is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of theFrench Revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continuedproof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontierdefence. The sea-coast of France is almost within stone's throw[18] ofthe principal British naval depots; here were large towns and harbors, filled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the dazzlingattraction of rich booty. The French navy was at this time utterlyincompetent to their defence; while England supported a maritime forceat an annual expense of near _ninety millions of dollars. _ Her largestfleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and notunfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. "At this period, "says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of Britain, somultiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimateknowledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks; herofficers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be metwith in every situation. " On the other hand, these harbors and townswere frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities ofdistant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortificationsand militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmedduring the entire contest. They were frequently attacked, and in someinstances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanentlodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with theexpense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was madeon either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. This certainlywas owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of theBritish navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almosttotal annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven. Why then did these places, escape? We know of no other reason, than that_they were fortified_; and that the French knew how to defend theirfortifications. The British maritime expeditions to Quiberon, Holland, Boulogne, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c. , sufficientlyprove the ill-success, and the waste of life and treasure with whichthey must always be attended. But when her naval power was applied tothe destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her landforces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, inPortugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory of theirachievements. 

[Footnote 18: Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at thenarrowest place. ]

Let us now examine the several British naval attacks on our own forts, in the wars of the Revolution and of 1812. 

In 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine vessels, carryingabout two hundred and seventy[19] guns, attacked Fort Moultrie, inCharleston harbor, which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, andgarrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a fewmilitia. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, and lost, in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, while their whole twohundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in thefort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooperin his Naval History, says:--"It goes fully to prove the importantmilitary position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter areproperly armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says onlythirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that thewant of powder alone prevented the Americans from destroying themen-of-war. "

[Footnote 19: These vessels _rated_ two hundred and fifty-four guns, butthe number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred andseventy. ]

In 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns, attacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of landcommanding the passage from the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. Thisredoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants, officers included; and its armament was but twenty small pieces ofcannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of thempoorly mounted "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunnersuncovered from the knee upward, " while the enemy's land force, acting inconcert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a batteryof two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, Indians, and negroes. His ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This immensedisparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the British militaryand naval commanders the slightest apprehension "that four Britishships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force somewhat exceedingseven hundred combatants, could fail in reducing a small work mountingonly twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than ahundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, orcasements to cover themselves from rockets and shells. " Nevertheless, the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirelydestroyed, and 85 men were killed and wounded on board the other; whileour loss was only eight or nine. Here a naval force of _five_ to _one_was repelled by the land-battery. 

Again, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder and twoeighteen-pounder guns at Stonington, repelled a British fleet of onehundred and thirty-four guns. During the engagement the Americansexhausted their ammunition, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and onlyone of them was afterwards used. Two of the enemy's ships, carrying onehundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack, and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyondreach of the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for thefour-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-poundersto have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns ofthe fleet, _one_ eighteen-pounder on land must have been more thanequivalent to _sixty-seven_ guns afloat, for the ships were so muchinjured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The British losswas twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. Ours was only two killedand six wounded. [20]

[Footnote 20: Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says sixwounded, but makes no mention of any killed. ]

The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of fortysail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army ofover six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reachof Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-fivehours. During this attack, the enemy threw "fifteen hundred shells, fourhundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but withoutmaking any impression on either the strength of the work or thegarrison, " and the British were compelled to retire with much loss. 

In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of theMississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as highas Fort St. Philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of onlytwenty guns in all. A heavy fire of shot and shells was continued withbut few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making noimpression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to theirformer position at the mouth of the river. 

There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy'svessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes beenalluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as aproof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks. Even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exceptionbe sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? Weallude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the Britishfleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgracefuland barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying thearchives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficientwork, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only asmall part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet beencompleted. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attackcould not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whateverwas made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying onehundred and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river ashigh as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of abombardment, " approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latterdeserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer wasimmediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer, whowas one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says: "We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. Theposition was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable windand many other chances were in their favor, " &c. The fleet ascended theriver to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries werepreparing at White House and Indian Head to cut off its retreat, itretired, in much haste, but not without injury. 

Some have also pretended to find in modern European history a fewexamples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assignedto ships and forts. Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticatedexamples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament haverepelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the fouror five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) asomewhat doubtful victory over forts. But a careful and criticalexamination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these areno exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore overguns afloat. 

The only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of anynote, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack onCopenhagen in 1801; the passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attackon Algiers, in 1816; the attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838; and theattack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840. 

Let us examine these examples a little in detail:--

_Copenhagen_. --The British fleet sent to attack Copenhagen, in 1801, consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battleships, four frigates, &c. They sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th ofMarch, passed the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated theDanish line on the 2d of April. 

The Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and ahalf miles wide, (vide Fig. 34. ) The batteries of Cronenberg andElsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; butthe Swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only sixguns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the damage hissquadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel, defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a fewof his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned tothe Sound. 

He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, adeclaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must beremembered that at this time England was at peace with both Denmark andSweden, and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the admiralinferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath toinvolve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England, by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. TheDanish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass hispost, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired uponthem, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, andnot as an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on thecontrary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie nearby for several days without firing upon them. Seeing this friendlydisposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed outof the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls andshells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of thefleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man. 

The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have beenimpossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had itbeen possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, forfear that Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the richduties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may havebeen some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for theirconduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with England. Napoleonsays that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficientfor placing a hundred guns in battery, and that Sweden had much moretime than was requisite. And with a hundred guns on each side of thechannel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily havesustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen. 

On this passage, we remark:--

1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Soundamounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried overseventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of morethan _sixteen_ to _one_, the British admiral preferred the dangerouspassage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries. 

2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, hepersuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleetto pass near that shore, out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore. 

3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that ifthe Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with theDanish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render itincapable of any serious attempt on Copenhagen. 

We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack anddefence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to theattack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoalextending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrowapproach to the heart of the city, (Fig. 35) On the most advanced partof this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eightguns. [21] The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthorn, is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, whichis situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on theleft of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channelfour ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in allthree hundred and fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city frombombardment from the King's Channel, (that between the Middle Ground andtown, ) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of theshoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted of oldhulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c. , carrying in all sixhundred and twenty-eight guns--a force strong enough to prevent theapproach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it wasintended, ) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships ofwar; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching bythe difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly verygreat; and Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry himin would most probably not bring out a crippled ship. " Had the Danessupposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, theline of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, theright supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. "In thatcase, " says Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed inhis attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass betweenthe line and shore thus lined with cannon. " As it was, the line was tooextended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receiveassistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as areserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advancedto the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships ofthe line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundredguns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament isnot given. ) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought intoaction, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, "although not inthe situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of greatservice. " This force was concentrated upon _a part_ of the Danish lineof floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it bythree hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond thereach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was whatmight have been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of thisouter Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. The left ofthe line, being supported by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. Adivision of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute forthe ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but"it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, wasobliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off. "

[Footnote 21: Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but theEnglish writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently toincrease the brilliancy of the victory, ) make this number stillgreater. ]

The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads tothe city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest. They are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that theBritish ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advancefar enough to be within their range. 

The Crown-battery was _behind_ the Danish line, and mainly masked by it. A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of thisline, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it didmost effectually. But we now come to a new feature in this battle. Asthe Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the English, the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt. Nelsonsaw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at lastconvinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made uphis mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement. " To retreat, however, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult anddangerous. He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent:

"Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting;but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson mustbe obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without the power to save the brave Danes who have defended them. "

This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, whenthree of the English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was, struck upon the bank. "They were in the jaws of destruction, and wouldnever have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. Theytherefore owed their safety to this armistice. " A convention was soonsigned, by which every thing was left _in statu quo_, and the fleet ofAdmiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic. Edward Baines, theable English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, in speakingof Nelson's request for an armistice, says: "This letter, whichexhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a momentwhen Lord Nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable stateof the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise;that _the principal batteries_ of the enemy, and the ships at the mouthof the harbor, _were yet untouched;_ that two of his own division hadgrounded, and others were likely to share the same fate. " Campbell saysthese batteries and ships "_were still unconquered. _ Two of his[Nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire;others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate, while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizesunder the fire of the batteries. "

With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of thetimes says they were of no service while the action lasted. "They beganto fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but itwas at the same time the parley appeared. " The Danish commander, speaking of the general contest between the two lines, says: "TheCrown-battery did not come at all into action. " An English writer saysdistinctly: "The works (fortifications) of Copenhagen were absolutelyuntouched at the close of the action. " Colonel Mitchel, the Englishhistorian, says: "Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town orfortifications of Copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships, prames, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to thetown; and the Crown Prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing tofinish by armistice a war, the object of which was neither very popularnor well understood. What the result of the action between Copenhagenand the British fleet might ultimately have been, is thereforealtogether uncertain. THE BOMBARDMENT OF COPENHAGEN BY NELSON, as it isgenerally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of theday, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning. "

The British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men;and the loss of the Danes, according to their own account, which isconfirmed by the French, was but very little higher. The English, however, say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let theloss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floatingdefences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim ofthe guns ashore and guns afloat. 

The facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably--

1st. That of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sentby the English to the attack upon Copenhagen, two ships carrying onehundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships ofthe line, and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousandguns, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder wereheld as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity. 

2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly ofhulls, sloops, rafts, &c. , carried only six hundred and twenty-eightguns of all descriptions; that the fixed batteries supporting this linedid not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most; and that both theseland and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by_volunteers_. 

3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either socompletely masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during thecontest between the fleet and floating force. 

4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered availableby the position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or noloss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superiorforce of frigates which attacked them. 

5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostlydestroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured. 

6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were notattacked, and had no part in the contest. 

7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were unmasked and began toact, Nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty ofdoing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy ofthe most barbarous ages, that, _unless the batteries ceased their fireupon his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the Danishprisoners in his possession;_ and that this armistice was concluded justin time to save his own ships from destruction. 

8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot be regarded asa contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts:that, so far as the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vastsuperiority over those afloat--a superiority known and confessed by theEnglish themselves. 

_Constantinople_. --The channel of the Dardanelles is about twelveleagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quartersof a mile at its narrowest point. Its principal defences are the outerand inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos andAbydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entranceinto the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of thissea. The defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; butfew guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. InConstantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defencewere made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks hadnot determined whether to side with the English or the French, and eventhen the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuadingthem to resist the demands of Duckforth. 

The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, twosloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteenguns, (besides those in the bomb-ships. ) Admiral Duckforth sailedthrough the Dardanelles on the 19th of February, 1807, with little or noopposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of thescanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and nonewere left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared fordefence. But while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for theresult of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack uponConstantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, andthe Turks actively employed, under French engineers and artilleryofficers, in repairing the defences of the Straits. Campbell, in hisNaval History, says:--"Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived thecritical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, succeed, should the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; _butunless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcingthe Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would notcompensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. Withthis damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, nowrendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them_. "

Under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the3d of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of thechannel, with a favorable and strong current. "This escape, however, "says Baines, "was only from destruction, but by no means from seriousloss and injury. * * * * In what instance in the whole course of ournaval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as inthis extraordinary enterprise?" In detailing the extent of this damage, we will take the ships in the order they descended. The first had herwheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the lossof only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the poopand quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel, and did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. Two shotstruck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; lossin killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed, with a loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eightinches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. Thesixth, not injured. The seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss ofseventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that, "had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack, she must have gone down:" her loss was eight. The tenth lost twelve. Theeleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight--making a total loss inrepassing the Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in thewhole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundredand fifty men who perished in the burning of the Ajax. 

Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with afavorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-mannedforts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says, that "had he remainedbefore Constantinople much longer--till the forts had been completelyput in order--no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidablesacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence. " Scarcely hadthe fleet cleared the Straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced witheight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the English did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected amost fortunate escape. General Jomini says that if the defence had beenconducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expeditionwould have cost the English their whole squadron. 

Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves wereuninjured. The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot inall probability not even striking their objects--"the rapid change ofposition, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing thecertainty of aim. " The state of the batteries when the fleet firstpassed, is thus described in James's Naval History: "Some of them weredilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned. " AndAlison says: "They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castlesof Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert thedominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but theirramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such asremained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer therapidity and precision of an English broadside. "

Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles didnot hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expectedto accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it isforgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve _Turkish line-of-battle-ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with theirsails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying withinthe line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little ornothing against the invaders. _ It is scarcely ever mentioned, beingregarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the numberof its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardlyhave fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of whichwere as ancient as the reign of Amurath!

_Algiers. _--The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816, is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and otherofficial and authentic English papers. 

The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail ofthe line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides fivebomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about onethousand guns. The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over ninehundred. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been previously surveyedby Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and thenumber of the combined fleet was arranged according to the informationgiven in this survey--just so many ships, and no more, being taken, ascould be employed to advantage against the city, without beingneedlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected andexercised with reference to this particular attack. 

From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appearsthat the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity, counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, wasonly two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions, including mortars. But not near all of these could act upon the fleet asit lay. Other English accounts state the number of guns actually opposedto the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty. Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly allthe fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (Fig. 36. ) Supposingonly one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of theforces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 5 to2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know thatseveral of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, broughtboth broadsides to bear; moreover, at no one time could _all_ the gunsof the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. TheAlgerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including severalvessels of war, but no use was made of them in defence, and nearly allwere burnt. The attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, andalmost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of the casematedworks were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of theAlgerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless afterthe first fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "theyloaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle, " they couldnot possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. Theships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intendedposition, without a shot being fired from the batteries. The actioncommenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease tillhalf-past eleven. The ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and, by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come toanchor beyond reach of the land-batteries. Negotiations were againopened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves and yielded to theterms of the treaty. 

During the contest, the fleet "fired nearly one hundred and eighteentons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than fivehundred tons of iron, ) besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen andten-inch shells, (thrown by the bomb-vessels, ) and the shells androckets from the flotilla. " The vessels were considerably crippled, andtheir loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred andeighty-three. The land batteries were much injured, and a large part oftheir guns dismounted. Their loss is not known; the English confess theycould obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great. This seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed inthe defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witnessthe contest. So great was this curiosity, that, when the actioncommenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at themanoeuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate aslaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing a humanity that does him great credit)motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some placeof safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of thebuildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction oftheir fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in theharbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably didmore than the injuries received by the batteries in securing anhonorable conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that thesebatteries, though much injured, _were not silenced_ when Lord Exmouthtook advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. Theships retired--1st, because they had become much injured, and theirammunition nearly exhausted; 2d, in order to escape from a position sohazardous in case of a storm; and 3d, to get beyond the reach of theAlgerine batteries. Lord Exmouth himself gives these as his reasons forthe retreat, and says, "the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow. "And Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the battle, gives thesame opinion: "_in this retreat_" says he, "which, from want of wind andthe damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, _the ships had stillto suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy'sbatteries_; at last, the land breeze springing up, " &c. An Englishofficer, who took part in this affair, says: "It was well for us thatthe land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and God knowswhat would have been our fate, had we remained all night. "

The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabsset themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a newcontest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruinsof those batteries which had fallen, --in other words, had the works nowbeen placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the English, thecontest would have been far from ended. But (to use the words of theBoard of Defence) Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on thepeople by his dreadful cannonade; and the result proves that he wasright. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows thatthere was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leaveto be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keepin a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was thispower but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?

The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount ofinjury done on the one side or the other--particularly as there was onone side a city to suffer as well as the batteries--as the relativeefficiency of the parties when the battle closed. All politicalagitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result hadthe fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it nextmorning? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture;but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubtswhether, had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, hehad it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if hehad renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. On thewhole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminentas an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument toshake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard. 

We cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect uponall the circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, andbravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number ofguns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated andill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of the Algerineartillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; thesevere execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy'sships, --an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the Frenchor Dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships ofthe same foe, --from these facts, we must think that those who are soready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use ofland-batteries as a means of defence against shipping, know but littleof the nature of the contest. 

An English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, says:--"It is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may beaccomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, and governed. Algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, slopingdown towards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark to thefire of hostile ships. But where is the capital exactly so situated thatwe are ever likely to attack? And as to the destruction of a fewsecond-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy speciesof warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustainedbefore Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflictedby mere Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may beexpected from a contest maintained against batteries manned withsoldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only inworking the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary forkeeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state offormidable efficiency. "

_San Juan d'Ulloa. _--The following facts, relative to the attack on SanJuan d'Ulloa by the French, in 1838, are drawn principally from thereport of a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition. 

The French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred andeighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with fourlarge mortars. The whole number of guns, of whatever description, foundin the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these, however, were for land defence. (Fig. 37. )

When the French vessels were towed into the position selected for theattack, "it was lucky for us, " says the French officer in his report, "that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearlytwo hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire. " "We wereexposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders, seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-poundercarronades--_in all nineteen pieces only_. " If these be converted intoequivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of theballs, the whole nineteen guns will be _less than twelve twenty-fourpounders_. This estimate is much too great, for it allows threeeight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and each of theeighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a longtwenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties wereengaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powdermagazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during theengagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front ofthe castle were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to _anequivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders_. The other sixteen guns werestill effective when abandoned by the Mexicans. The cannonade andbombardment continued about six hours, eight thousand two hundred andfifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the French. Theprincipal injury received by the work was from the explosion of thepowder magazine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of theFrench ships, and only three of these on the water front. The details ofthe condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of theFrench officer, [22] but it is unnecessary to repeat them here. 

[Footnote 22: Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, firstsession]

In general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that thenumber of guns actually brought into action by the floating force, (counting only one broadside of the ship, ) amounted to _ninety-fourguns, besides four heavy sea-mortars_; that the whole number so employedin the fort was only _nineteen, including the smallest calibres_; thatthese guns were generally so small and inefficient, that their ballswould not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; theprincipal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosionof powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured; thatthe castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured bythe French fire; that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of theordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few oftheir guns had been dismounted; that notwithstanding all thecircumstances in favor of the French, their killed and wounded, inproportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of _four times_as great as the loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar!

_St. Jean d'Acre_. --The narratives of the day contained most exaggeratedaccounts of the English attack on St. Jean d'Acre; now, however, theprincipal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. Forthe amount of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, andfor that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-colonelMatuszewiez. These statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives, more recently published, of several English and French eye-witnesses. 

The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in theirplans, and much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only twohundred guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. The water frontswere armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of thesmaller calibre included. (Fig. 38. ) When approached by the Britishfleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, says Commodore Napier, "were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack. "

The British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying sixhundred and forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred andthirty-six guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or threeother vessels, whose force is not given. "Only a few guns, " says Napier, "defended the approach from the northward, " and most of the ships camein from that direction. The western front was armed with about fortycannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carryingabout five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during theengagement, but _no breach was made_ in the walls. The south front wasarmed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. This frontwas attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundredguns. The eastern front was armed only with light artillery; againstthis was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying about twohundred and forty guns. The guns of the works were so poorly mounted, that but few could be used at all; and these, on account of theconstruction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchoredclose by the walls. "Only five of their guns, " says Napier, "placed in aflanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they werepointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only. " The stone wasof so poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, thatthe walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, but they were nowhere seriously injured. In the words of Napier, "_theywere not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secureunder the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without sufferingmuch loss_. " The accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort, containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of sixtythousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of thefortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and woundeda thousand men of the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the Frenchaccount, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners andmalefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison atthe same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on theland side. The uselessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort, the attacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat of thegarrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders. "

We will close this account with the following extract of a speech of theDuke of Wellington, in the House of Lords, Feb. 4, 1841: "He had had, "he said, "a little experience in services of this nature; and he thoughtit his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they mustnot always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallanttheir seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfullywith stone walls. He had no recollection, in all his experience, exceptthe recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken byships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of San Juand'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, thesingle instance that he recollected, though he believed that somethingof the sort had occurred at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The presentachievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. This washis opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performedsuch a service. It was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He wasgreatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board thefleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it wasbecause the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinarydistance. The guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at agreater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over theships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means, they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they wouldotherwise have experienced. Not less than five hundred pieces ofordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with whichthe fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, theblowing up of the large magazine--all aided in achieving this greatvictory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say thus much, because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deedsas this could be effected every day. He would repeat that this was asingular instance, in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skillwas manifested, but which was also connected with peculiarcircumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. It must nottherefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such attemptsmust necessarily succeed. "

Having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries tocope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a fewmoments, the objection which is sometimes made to the use offortifications for the defence of the sea-coast, viz. : _that ourmaritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically securedby a home squadron_. 

We have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one meansof defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no wayenable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troopsin the passage of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, rendercavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. To thenavy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the highseas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of ourharbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns. 

Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city, it isdeemed highly important that the East River should be closed to theapproach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from thecity, so that an army landed there would have to cross the Westchestercreek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of Harlemheights--obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. Throg'sNeck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there notonly command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep itfor a great distance above and below. No other position, even _in_ thechannel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only navalmeans of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to placethe floating defences themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out ofconsideration the question of relative _power, position_ alone wouldgive the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are otherconsiderations no less important than that of position. Fort Schuylercan be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force whichwill be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. On the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen;they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent landoperations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned asto bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of gunsthan can be presented by any hostile squadron against the correspondingportion of the fort. This result can be obtained with little difficultyin narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for thedefence of New York, the works for Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, &c. , and an approximationto it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, like the Chesapeake. 

But we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inletsto our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval forceexclusively. Let us leave out of consideration the security of all ourother harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importanceof having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in theabsence of his fleet. We take the single case of the attack being madeon New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, ifthis fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success maybe regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us--for anattacking force would probably be of picked men and of the bestmaterials. But here the consequences of victory are very unequal: theenemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both oursquadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we suppose our ownnaval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harborwould in all respects be complete, provided this force never left theharbor. But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean mustbe left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensivelyupon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy'sfleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keepinghim there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause theloss of our harbor. 

These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the singleharbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, theDelaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, NewOrleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, andtherefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemywill direct his assaults. If he come to one of these in the absence ofour fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his wholeforce be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve bothfleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged asto meet these enterprises?

"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attackout of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that canindicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity tobe imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of theadvancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising infront of it, shall we sweep its whole length--a distance scarcely lessthan that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast toours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; orshall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southerncities, or give them up also? We must unquestionably do one of twothings--either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining ourcruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chancesof intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question. "

"On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruisingin front of it--or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating anenemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we getno glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footstepson the surface of the ocean--it may be well to consult experience. "

The naval power of Spain under Philip II. Was almost unlimited. With thetreasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of afleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade anothercountry, was no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval forcewas of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency for thispurpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz witha combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the Bayof Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by theSpanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England, passed alonga great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting with theslightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences. 

In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-twothousand men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meetingwith any opposition from the superior British fleet which had been sentout, under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. The landing ofthe troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon thecoast of France to seek shelter. 

In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and manysmaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soonafterwards returned to France, and the others proceeded to the gulf ofSt. Lawrence. An English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and somefrigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passedeach other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels except two reachedQuebec in safety. 

In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a Britishforce under Commodore Bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descentupon Carrickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, withoutmeeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships of the linewere then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and severalof these were actually in pursuit. 

In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche intoIreland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy tointercept the French fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of nearthirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead;Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward;Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of theline; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched theharbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triplefloating bulwark, as it was called--one fleet on the enemy's coast, asecond in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores--the Frenchfleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-fivethousand men, reached Bantry Bay in safety! This fleet was eight days onthe passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of thevessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not been fordisasters by storms, for only _one_ of their whole number wasintercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled for thatexpress object. "The result of this expedition, " says Alison, "waspregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend amaritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the smallnumber of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; andthe unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat thebest concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that _the empireof the seas does not always afford security against invasion;_ that, inthe face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteendays at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of hersailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, savedthem from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. Whilethese considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweeningconfidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that _the only baseupon which certain reliance can be placed_, even by an insular power, _is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects_. "

Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. In the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops, passed the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shippingin the port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coastof Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British naval force failed toprevent the landing of General Humbert's army in the bay of Killala;and, in the latter part of the same year, a French squadron of ninevessels and three thousand men escaped Sir J. B. Warren's squadron, andsafely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration, we quotefrom the report of the Board of National Defence in 1839. 

The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the lineand twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making inall, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of portand sailed to Malta. "It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctlythat they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage;so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding themthere, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing hisadversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found theFrench fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider thenarrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; theactual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hearnothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probabilityof waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic. "

"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them inthe Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the WestIndies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe;his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bayof Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last atTrafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting tothe superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, were willing to try the issue of a battle--these are instances, of themany that might be cited, to show how small is the probability ofencountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, andhow little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the mostexalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adversechances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, whoseems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, andwithout attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. Whenout, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve hadtaken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered bytempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it againput to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz. "

"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands tobelong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string ofchances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving asto the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, andwithout fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy isrequired to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposesare known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before thepurpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport ofstorms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exactspot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite offogs and darkness. "

"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system aresatisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, itsubmits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of thewar, having no hope or reserve beyond. "

"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has amore glorious sphere--that of the _offensive_. In our last war, insteadof lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more ofthe enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number--instead ofleaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, andour commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves overthe wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy'snavigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy'sproperty thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scatteredvessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal--they renderedbenefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory theyacquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than anythat would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors. Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of thenavy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as ithas been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor andadvantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. Inorder, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that activeand energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the sametime so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence. "

A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economyof their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regardthis question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it canseldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. Nomatter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often besubstituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where thismight be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let usendeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city, the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, inthis case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the _outer_ harbor ofNew York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, orthat the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannotreach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repelthem. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as ashelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvouspreparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us itspossession would not be absolutely essential, though very important. Strong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, mightprobably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to theentrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval forcestationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection offorts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps lesscertain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might wellconsider the question of relative cost and economy of support of theproposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effectthe same object, and to be kept continually _at home_ for that specialpurpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of ourcommerce, its character and efficiency as a _harbor_ defence would belost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force--fixed within thelimits of the defence of this particular place--and our estimates mustbe made accordingly. 

The average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has beenvariously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from tento twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his"Brief Inquiry, " published in 1812, estimates the average durability atabout eight years. His calculations seem based upon authenticinformation. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived atthe same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the Board ofAdmiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. Thedata in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for_building_ and _repairing_ having been so expended as to render itimpossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. But, in the returnsnow before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the_timbers_ used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this(the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accuratecomparisons. 

According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21, ) the average cost of timber, for hulls, masts, and yards, in _building_ an English 74 gun ship, is £61, 382. Letus now compare this cost of timber for _building_, with that of the sameitem for _repairs_, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and1820. The list would have been still further enlarged, but the returnsfor other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:

 ============================================================ Name of Ship. |No. Of| When | Repaired from | Cost. |Guns. |built. | | ------------------------------------------------------------ Vengeance, . .. .. .. .. .. | 74 | -- | 1800 to 1807 | £84, 720 Ildefonso, . .. .. .. .. .. | 74 | -- | 1807 to 1808 | 85, 195 Scipio, . .. .. .. .. .. .. . | 74 | -- | 1807 to 1809 | 60, 785 Tremendous, . .. .. .. .. . | 74 | -- | 1807 to 1810 | 135, 397 Elephant, . .. .. .. .. .. . | 74 | -- | 1808 to 1811 | 67, 007 Spencer, . .. .. .. .. .. .. | 74 | 1800 | 1809 to 1813 | 124, 186 Romulus, . .. .. .. .. .. .. | 74 | -- | 1810 to 1812 | 73, 141 Albion, . .. .. .. .. .. .. . | 74 | 1802 | 1810 to 1813 | 102, 295 Donegal, . .. .. .. .. .. .. | 74 | -- | 1812 to 1815 | 101, 367 Implacable, . .. .. .. .. . | 74 | -- | 1813 to 1815 | 59, 865 Illustrious, . .. .. .. .. | 74 | 1803 | 1813 to 1816 | 74, 184 Northumberland, . .. .. . | 74 | -- | 1814 to 1815 | 59, 795 Kent, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . | 74 | -- | 1814 to 1818 | 88, 357 Sultan, . .. .. .. .. .. .. . | 74 | 1807 | 1816 to 1818 | 61, 518 Sterling Castle, . .. .. | 74 | -- | 1816 to 1818 | 65, 280 ------------------------------------------------------------

This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of _timber alone_used in their repair, an average of about $400, 000 each. More timberthan this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paidfor out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in courseof the year to be repaired. " But the amount specifically appropriatedfor timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteenyears, equal the entire _first cost_ of the same items. If we add tothis amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber tothe operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense ofother materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of theships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find thewhole sum _expended_ under these heads to equal the first cost, evenwithin the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timberused for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was£18, 727, 551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear, " £17, 449, 780;making an annual average of $4, 560, 158 for building timber, and$4, 273, 371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels_built_ were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were sodecayed as to be broken up. 

But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for thesea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses inbuilding and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815. 

 =============================================================== | | For the wear|Ext. Expenses| For entire | | Year | and tear of |for building, | sea-service. | | | Ships. |repairing, &c. | | |---------------------------------------------------| | 1800 | £4, 350, 000 | £772, 140 | £13, 619, 079 | | 1801 | 5, 850, 000 | 933, 900 | 16, 577, 037 | | 1802 | 3, 684, 000 | 773, 500 | 11, 833, 571 | | 1803 | 3, 120, 000 | 901, 140 | 10, 211, 378 | | 1804 | 3, 900, 000 | 948, 520 | 12, 350, 606 | | 1805 | 4, 680, 000 | 1, 553, 690 | 15, 035, 630 | | 1806 | 4, 680, 000 | 1, 980, 830 | 18, 864, 341 | | 1807 | 5, 070, 000 | 2, 134, 903 | 17, 400, 337 | | 1808 | 5, 070, 000 | 2, 351, 188 | 18, 087, 544 | | 1809 | 3, 295, 500 | 2, 296, 030 | 19, 578, 467 | | 1810 | 3, 295, 500 | 1, 841, 107 | 18, 975, 120 | | 1811 | 3, 675, 750 | 2, 046, 200 | 19, 822, 000 | | 1812 | 3, 675, 750 | 1, 696, 621 | 19, 305, 759 | | 1813 | 3, 549, 000 | 2, 822, 031 | 20, 096, 709 | | 1814 | 3, 268, 000 | 2, 086, 274 | 19, 312, 070 | | 1815 | 2, 386, 500 | 2, 116, 710 | 19, 032, 700 | ---------------------------------------------------------------

It appears from this table that the appropriations for the service, during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to alittle less than _ninety millions_ of dollars per annum; and for thewear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building andrepairing ships, &c. , " the annual appropriations amounted to near_thirty millions_. 

Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible toform any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction andrepairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a reportof the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26thCongress, ) will afford data for an approximate calculation:--

 ====================================================================== Name of No. Total Cost When Cost of Repaired Ship. Of of building, completed. Repairs, between. Guns. Exclusive of exclusive armament, of stores, ordnance, &c. &c. &c. &c. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Delaware, 74 $543, 368 00 1820 $354, 132 56 1827 and 1838 N. Carolina, 74 431, 852 00 1825 317, 628 92 1824 and 1836 Constitution, 44 302, 718 84 1797 266, 878 34 1833 and 1839 United States 44 299, 336 56 1797 571, 972 77 1821 and 1841 Brandywine, 44 [23]299, 218 12 1825 [23]377, 665 95 1826 and 1838 Potomac, 44 [23]231, 013 02 1822 [23] 82, 597 03 1829 and 1835 Concord, 20 115, 325 80 1828 72, 796 22 1832 and 1840 Falmouth, 20 94, 093 27 1827 130, 015 43 1828 and 1837 John Adams, 20 110, 670 69 1829 119, 641 93 1834 and 1837 Boston, 20 91, 973 19 1825 189, 264 37 1826 and 1840 St. Louis, 20 102, 461 95 1828 135, 458 75 1834 and 1839 Vincennes, 20 111, 512 79 1826 178, 094 81 1830 and 1838 Vandalia, 20 90, 977 88 1828 59, 181 34 1832 and 1834 Lexington, 20? 114, 622 35 1826 83, 386 52 1827 and 1837 Warren, 20? 99, 410 01 1826 152, 596 03 1830 and 1838 Fairfield, 20 100, 490 35 1826 65, 918 26 1831 and 1837 Natches, [24] 20? 106, 232 19 1827 129, 969 80 1829 and 1836 Boxer, 10 30, 697 88 1831 28, 780 48 1834 and 1840 Enterprise, 10 27, 938 63 1831 20, 716 59 1834 and 1840 Grampus, 10 23, 627 42 1821 96, 086 36 1825 and 1840 Dolphin, 10 38, 522 62 1836 15, 013 35 1839 and 1840 Shark, 10 23, 627 42 1821 93, 395 84 1824 and 1839 ----------------------------------------------------------------------

[Footnote 23: Returns incomplete. ]

[Footnote 24: Broken up in 1840. ]

It appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships ofthe line is about $6, 600 per gun; of frigates, $6, 500 per gun; ofsmaller vessels of war, a little less than $5, 000 per gun: making anaverage cost of vessels of war to be _more than six thousand dollars pergun. _ And the expense of repairs for these vessels is _more than sevenper cent. Per annum_ on their first cost. 

We have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. TheFulton, four guns, built in 1838-'39, cost three hundred andthirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars andseventy-seven cents; the Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, builtin 1841, cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making anaverage cost for war-steamers of _over sixty thousand dollars per gun. _The cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those forvessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience todetermine the exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by competentjudges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equaltwelve per cent. Of the first cost. The expense of keeping them incommission is enormously great. "Their engines, " says the Secretary ofthe Navy, in his annual report in 1842, "consume so much fuel as to addenormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should returnto port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders itimpossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot be relied onas cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time ofpeace. I have therefore determined to take them out of commission, andsubstitute for them other and less expensive vessels. "

The average cost of permanent fortifications is but _little more thanthree thousand dollars per gun_. And it must be obvious, from the natureof the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense oftheir support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some yearspast a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has beenunder the head of "repairs;" but much of this sum is for alterations andenlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to thewar of 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayedor injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from thenature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials andpoor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. But if we includethe risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn frompast experience, that _one-third of one per cent. Per annum_, of thefirst cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have beenconstructed since the last war. 

But it is unnecessary to further discuss this question We repeat whathas already been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of shipsand forts, the one, as a general thing, cannot be substituted for theother. Each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, inits own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, atthe expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminutionof national power. [25]

[Footnote 25: For further information concerning our system of sea-coastdefences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixthCongress, second session; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, secondsession; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer. ]

CHAPTER VIII. 

OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 

In discussing engineering as a branch of the military art, we spoke ofthe use of fortifications on land frontiers, and their influence on thestrategic operations of a campaign. A brief notice was also given of thedifferent systems that have been proposed for arranging these defensiveworks. Let us now apply this discussion to our northern frontier. 

The principle laid down by Napoleon and Jomini, "that fortificationsshould always be constructed on important strategic points, " isundoubtedly the correct one: but how to determine these points is aquestion that will often perplex the patience and try the skill of theengineer; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will beworse than useless; for a fort improperly located, like a cannon withits fire reversed on its own artillerists, will be sure to effect thedestruction of the very forces it was designed to protect. 

The selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontiermust have reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz. : thesecurity, _first_, of the large frontier towns, where much public andprivate property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, made either on land or by water; _second_, of lake harbors, important asplaces of refuge and security to our own ships, or to the enemy's fleetswhile engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invadingarmy; _third_, of all strategic points on the probable lines ofoffensive or defensive operations. These objects are distinct in theirnature, and would seem to require separate and distinct means for theiraccomplishment; nevertheless, it will generally be found that positionsselected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil theothers, so intimately are they all connected. To determine the strategicpoints of a probable line of military operations is therefore the mainthing to be attended to in locating fortifications. That such points ofmaximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostileintercourse of nations cannot be doubted. 

The _relative_ importance of cities and towns is less varied by thefluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. Theever-changing system of "internal improvements, " by furnishing newhighways and thoroughfares for the transportation of the products ofmanufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies the relativestanding of the seaports already opened, or opens new ones for theexportation of these products, and the importation of foreign articlesreceived in exchange. But these "internal improvements" are seldomcarried so far as to connect together two separate and distinctcountries, and consequently the principal places on the dividing lineusually retain their relative importance, no matter how often they mayhave declined during times of hostility, or again flourished with theincreased commercial intercourse which results from peace. The principalEuropean places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same forages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will benearly the same as at present. This stability of rank among border townsis not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true withrespect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character. Military history teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and thefields upon which the principal battles between any two countries havebeen fought, are nearly the same, no matter how remote the periods ofcomparison. These points and lines, so important in commerce as well asin war, result from the natural features of the ground, and we oughttherefore to expect that they would be as little liable to suddenchanges as the character of the earth itself. 

From these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are threedistinct methods of determining the strategic points between thiscountry and Canada: 1st, by an examination of the topography of the twocountries; 2d, by tracing out the main channels of commercialintercourse; 3d, by reviewing the lines of their military operations. The last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the mosteasily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point outthe precise degree of connection between prospective military lines andthe channels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relationto the physical features of the country. In the present instance, moreover, this method furnishes ample data for the formation of ourdecision, inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and Canada havebeen neither few in number nor unimportant in their character andresults. 

In tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northernfrontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion ofcountry which is now possessed by the English, was then occupied by theFrench, and that the English possessions in North America included thepresent Middle and Northern States. At the period of the Americanrevolution the French and English had completely changed ground, thearmies of the former operating in the "States, " while the English werein possession of Canada. 

The first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country, was conducted by Samuel Argall, who sailed from Virginia in 1613, with afleet of eleven vessels, attacked the French on the Penobscot, andafterwards the St. Croix. 

In 1654, Sedgwick, at the head of a small New England army, attacked theFrench on the Penobscot, and overrun all Arcadia. 

In 1666, during the contest between Charles II. And Louis XIV. , it wasproposed to march the New England troops across the country by theKennebec or Penobscot, and attack Quebec; but the terrors anddifficulties of crossing "over rocky mountains and howling deserts" weresuch as to deter them from undertaking the campaign. 

In 1689, Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, made a descent into NewYork to assist the French fleet in reducing that province. His line ofmarch was by the river Sorrel and Lake Champlain. An attack uponMontreal by the Iroquois soon forced him to return; but in the followingJanuary a party of French and Indians left Montreal in the depth of aCanadian winter, and after wading for two and twenty days, withprovisions on their backs, through snows and swamps and across a widewilderness, reached the unguarded village of Schenectady. Here amidnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either massacred ordriven half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboringtowns. 

In 1690, a congress of the colonies, called to provide means for thegeneral defence, assembled at New York, and resolved to carry war intoCanada: an army was to attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, and afleet to attempt Quebec by the St. Lawrence. The former advanced as faras the lake, when the quarrels of the commanding officers defeated theobjects of the expedition. The Massachusetts fleet of thirty-fourvessels, (the largest carrying forty-four guns each, ) and two thousandmen, failed to reduce Quebec, though the defences of that place werethen of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three guns. 

In 1704, and again in 1707, Port Royal was attacked by costlyexpeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies; and again, in 1709, aland force of fifteen hundred men advanced against Montreal by LakeChamplain; but nothing of importance was effected by either expedition. 

In 1711, Lord Bolingbroke planned the conquest of Canada. The landforces, numbering five thousand men in all, were separated into twodistinct armies, the one sent against Detroit, and the other againstMontreal by Lake Champlain; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, fortytransports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of six thousandfive hundred men, was to attack Quebec. The maritime expedition failedto reach its destination, and after losing a part of the fleet and morethan a thousand men in the St. Lawrence, this part of the project wasabandoned. Nor was any thing important accomplished by either divisionof the land forces. 

The same plan of campaign was followed in 1712. An army of four thousandmen marched against Montreal by Lake Champlain, but on hearing of thefailure of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the Frenchforces on the river Sorel, they retired towards Albany. 

The next expedition of any importance was the naval one of 1745 againstLouisburg. For the attack of this place the colonies raised about fourthousand men, and one hundred small vessels and transports, carryingbetween one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. They were afterwardsjoined by ten other vessels carrying near five hundred guns. Thisattacking force now, according to some of the English writers, consistedof six thousand provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combinednaval force of near seven hundred guns. The troops landed, and laidsiege to the town. The garrison of the fortifications of Louisburgconsisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand Breton militia, or, according to some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. Thearmament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, seventy-sixswivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the main works were anisland-battery of thirty twenty-two-pounders, and a battery on the mainland armed with thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made tostorm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of no avail, manyof the New Englanders being killed and wounded, and their boatsdestroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed. At length, after asiege of forty-nine days, want of provisions and the generaldissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. When the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, and the slightimpression which their efforts had produced, they were not only elatedbut greatly astonished at their success. It should be noticed, that inthe above attack the number of guns in the fleet was almost _three_times as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet the _naval_part of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army was more than_four_ times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the placeheld out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the wantof provisions and the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soonafterwards restored to the French. 

We see that, thus far in these wars, the English were vastly superior instrength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns wasdecidedly in favor of the French, who not only retained theirpossessions in the North, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouthof the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of theAlleghany mountains. This success must be attributed, not to anysuperiority of the Canadians in bravery, but to the higher militarycharacter of their governors, _and more especially to theirfortifications_, which were constructed in situations most judiciouslyselected, to influence the Indians and facilitate incursions into theEnglish colonies. The French pursued interior and central lines, whilethe English followed exterior and divergent lines. The disparity ofnumbers was always very great. At the beginning of the eighteenthcentury, the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of onemillion of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana did not exceedfifty-two thousand. But the French possessions, though situated at theextremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundlesswilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, strong enough to resist the small arms that could then be broughtagainst them. This fort-building propensity of the French became amatter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 1710 the legislature ofNew York especially protested against it in an address to the crown. While the military art was stationary in England, France had producedher four great engineers--Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cormontaigne; andnowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been morestrikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the Canadiancolony, when assailed by such vastly superior British forces. Stillfurther accessions were now made to these English forces by largereinforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians receivedlittle or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the wartill 1760, forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expensiveprocess of reducing all their fortifications. This will be shown in thefollowing outline of the several campaigns. 

Very early in 1755, a considerable body of men was sent from GreatBritain to reinforce their troops in this country. These troops wereagain separated into four distinct armies. The _first_, consisting ofnear two thousand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but wasmet and totally defeated by one-half that number of French and Indians. The _second_ division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack FortNiagara by way of Oswego, but returned without success. The _third_, ofthree thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau's army oftwelve hundred regulars and six hundred Canadians and Indians, in theopen field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works atTiconderoga and Crown Point. The _fourth_, consisting of three thousandthree hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of NovaScotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result. Itwas commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and avast superiority of force; _but this superiority was again more thancounterbalanced by the faulty plans of the English, and by thefortifications which the French had erected, in such positions as togive them a decided advantage in their military operations. _ Washingtonearly recommended the same system of defence for the English on theOhio; and, after Braddock's defeat, advised "the erection of smallfortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which meansthe country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and itwill also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to therout again. "

But this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the campaign of 1756 wasbased upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. The_first_ division, of three thousand men, was to operate against Fort DuQuesne; the _second_, of six thousand men, against Niagara; the _third_, of ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and a _fourth_, of twothousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, destroy the settlementson the Chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about Quebec, produce adiversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the mainarmy, and was directed along the principal line of operations. Theentire French forces at this time consisted of only three thousandregulars and a body of Canadian militia. Nevertheless, the English, withforces nearly _six times_ as numerous, closed the campaign withoutgaining a single advantage. 

We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, still continuedsuccessful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over theirenemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies. By the possession of FortsWilliam Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely commandedLake George and Lake Champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiestline of communication between the British colonies and Canada. By meansof their forts at Montreal, Frontenac, Detroit, &c. , they had entiredominion of the lakes connecting the St. Lawrence with the Mississippi, and Canada with Louisiana; moreover, by means of Fort Du Quesne and aline of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the Indians on the Ohiowas well secured. But experience had at length taught the Englishwherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effortwas now to be made to displace the French from their fortresses, or atleast to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelmingsuperiority of troops. 

In 1757, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteenfrigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousandeffective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortificationsof Louisburg; but they failed to effect their object. 

In 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships ofthe line and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men. The harbor was defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gunship, and five frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth ofthe basin. The fortifications of the town had been much neglected, andin general had fallen into ruins. The garrison consisted of only twothousand five hundred regulars, and six hundred militia. Notwithstandingthat the number of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the armamentsof the French ships and of all the forts, these British ships did notrisk an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockadingsquadron. Even the French naval defence, and the outer works commandingthe harbor, were reduced by the temporary land-batteries which Wolfeerected; and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forcesof nearly _five_ to _one_, held out for two months, and even thensurrendered through the fears and petitions of the non-combatantinhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury fromthe besiegers. The defence, however, had been continued long enough toprevent, for that campaign, any further operations against Canada. Thewhole number of the English land forces in this campaign was computed atfifty thousand men, of which more than forty thousand were in the field. The _first_ division, of nine thousand men, was directed against Fort DuQuesne, whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. The _second_division, of sixteen thousand effective troops, proceeded againstTiconderoga and Crown Point; while a detachment of three thousand mencaptured Fort Frontenac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and tenmen. The whole force of the French amounted to only five thousand; theEnglish attempted to drive them from their works by storm, but wererepulsed with a loss of near two thousand men, while their opponentswere scarcely injured. The _third_ division acted, as has just beenstated, in concert with the naval force against Louisburg. 

In 1759, the _western_ division of the English army, consisting of astrong body of Indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the wholeseason in reducing Fort Niagara, which was garrisoned by only sixhundred men. The _central_ column of thirteen thousand men wassufficiently successful to enable it to winter at Crown Point. The_eastern_ division of eight thousand men under Wolfe ascended the St. Lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, thirteen frigates, andfourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, carrying one thousand nine hundredand ninety guns, and five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. Thenaval defence of Quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying twohundred and ten guns; the land forces numbered about nine thousand, andthe fortifications were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars, only a part of which could be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground. Several attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these works, but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although the English fleet carried_twenty times_ as many guns as the forts, their inability to reducethese works was acknowledged. The siege had continued for two months, and still the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himselfdistinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the place, the"guns of the shipping could not be of much use;" and the chief engineerof the expedition gave it as his opinion, that "the ships would receivegreat damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, withoutmaking the least impression upon them. " Under these circumstances it wasfinally determined to endeavor to decoy Montcalm from his works, andmake him risk a battle in the open field. In an evil hour, the Frenchconsented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and thecontest was finally decided on the plains of Abraham, with forces nearlyequal in number. Both Wolfe and Montcalm fell in this battle, but theformer on the field of victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitantsof Quebec, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered thetown, although its fortifications were still unharmed. 

The French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing theenemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard theadvance of the English till France could send troops to their relief;but no such relief came, and when the campaign of 1760 opened, thelittle French army was concentrated at Montreal. As the Englishdivisions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain, and the thirdby Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine opportunity for thestrategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but thegarrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction, andtherefore awaited the enemy within their works. Montreal, being butslightly fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the Frenchempire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense. 

At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was so obviouslyimportant to get possession of the military works commanding the line ofLake Champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneouslyfitted out by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of theseworks were taken by surprise. This conquest, says Botta, the able andelegant historian of the Revolution, "was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of thewhole war, if these fortresses, _which are the bulwarks of thecolonies_, had been defended in times following, with the same prudenceand valor with which they had been acquired. "

In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand seven hundred andeighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at Albany, crossed the lake and approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1stof September. The work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundredregulars, and some two hundred militia. This was the only obstacle toprevent the advance of our army into the very heart of Canada; to leaveit unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. Allen hadalready made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had beendestroyed, and he himself made prisoner. The reduction of this place wastherefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3dof November, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided thefate of the campaign; for, although Montreal fell immediatelyafterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of ourtroops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their discharge. The eastern division, of one thousand menunder Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and Chaudiere, through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrivedopposite Quebec on the 9th of November. The place was at this timealmost without defence, and, had Arnold possessed a suitable pontoonequipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the timethat the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junctioncould be effected between the two American armies, Quebec was preparedto sustain their attack. The result of that attack is too well known torequire a repetition here. 

Early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the Americanarmy from Canada. This retreat of undisciplined troops, in the presenceof vastly superior numbers of the enemy, would have been extremelyhazardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which were held byour own troops. As it was we sustained no considerable loss. 

Carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with General Howe, who wasnow lying at New York with over one hundred ships and about thirty-fivethousand troops; but he received a decided check from the guns ofTiconderoga, and retired again to Canada. 

By the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire force of theirnorthern army was to concentrate at Albany. One division of fifteenhundred men, including Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and theMohawk; but Fort Stanwix, with a garrison of only six hundred men, arrested their progress and forced them to return. Another, leaving NewYork, ascended the Hudson as far as Esopus; but its progress was so muchretarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river, thatit would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, even if it couldpossibly have reached Albany. The principal division of the enemy'sarmy, numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlainroute. Little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. Theworks of Ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on theflanks. Its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continentaltroops, and about as many militia, over whom the general had no control. Their supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten of themilitia had bayonets to their guns. Under these circumstances it wasdeemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment. Burgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leavehis communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being repulsed by theAmerican forces collected at Saratoga, his line of supplies cut off byour detached forts, his provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, andhis Indian allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, andhis whole army was forced to capitulate. This campaign closed themilitary operations on our northern frontier during the war of theRevolution. 

We now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning of this war the numberof British regulars in the Canadas did not exceed three thousand men, who were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles inextent. In the whole of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred andtwenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on the whole line of theSorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred andthirty men, and the garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachmentcould be made without great inconvenience and danger. The fortificationsof Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the key of central Canada, waswithout a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Underthese circumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two thousandmen marching rapidly from Albany, might readily have broken the enemy'sline of defence, and cut off all Upper Canada from supplies andreinforcements from England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course waspursued. 

On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was collected at Dayton, in Ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of theRevolution, and directed by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. Thedilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of Hull'sarmy to a British force of three hundred regulars and four hundredmilitia, are but too well known. Another American army of about tenthousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division ofthis army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to invadeCanada by way of Malden; but they failed to reach their destination, andwintered behind the river Portage. The Eastern army was collected atAlbany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command ofGeneral Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. Instead ofpushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of LakeChamplain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, andto send one division against the Niagara frontier, a _second_ againstKingston, and a _third_ against Montreal. These orders were dispatchedfrom Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month after Hull had begunhis march from Dayton. Dearborn's army, on the first of September, consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousandmilitia--thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand threehundred for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at SackettsHarbor, and five thousand for Lake Champlain. Even with this absurd planof campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeededif the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were theCanadian means of defence; but instead of taking advantage of hissuperiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time, heentered into an armistice with the British general, and his whole armyof thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the 13th ofOctober, when the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewistonfailed, because the New-York militia had _constitutional scruples_against crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side. The Lake Champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and twothousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected asearly as the first of August, had in four months advanced as far as LaCole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from Albany. Theunimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the armyof the North returned to winter-quarters. 

All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the northern frontier, was spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured FortGeorge and York, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. Inthese operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and theyoung officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. Butnothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superiorforces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a timewhen his opponents were daily increasing in number. This useless war ofoutposts and detachments was continued till July, when General Dearbornwas recalled, and General Wilkinson, another old officer of theRevolution, put in his place. It was now determined to make a push forMontreal, with the combined forces of the Northern army. Wilkinson, with8, 000 men, descended the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott tillthe 6th of November, thus affording to the English plenty of leisure toprepare for his reception. Hampton, another old officer of theRevolution, ascended Lake Champlain with another column of 4, 000 men, but refused to form any co-operation with Wilkinson, and after theunimportant combat of Chrystler's Field, the whole army again retiredto winter-quarters. 

In the mean time the army of the West, under Harrison, who was assistedby the military skill and science of McCrea and Wood, and the bravery ofCroghan and Johnson, held in check the British and Indians; and thebattle of the Thames and the victory of Lake Erie formed a brillianttermination to the campaign in that quarter. Had such victories beengained on the Montreal or eastern portion of the frontier, they wouldhave led to the most important results. 

The plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was of the same diverseand discordant character as before. But the command of the troops hadnow fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers, and Brown, assisted by such men as Wood, McCrea, Scott, Ripley, Miller, soon gainedthe victories of Fort Erie, Chippewa, and Lundy's Lane; while McComb andMcDonough drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. Withthese operations terminated the Northern campaign of 1814, the lastwhich has been conducted on that frontier. 

Let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of thisline. 

The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the western extremityof the line. 

The second works are at Mackinaw. 

The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron. 

The fourth works are near Detroit. 

The fifth works are near Buffalo. 

The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river. 

The seventh works are at Oswego. 

The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor. 

The ninth works are below Ogdensburg. 

The tenth works are at Rouse's Point. 

The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or thePenobscot. 

The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix. 

All these works are small, and simple in their character, wellcalculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, butincapable of resisting a protracted siege. They are entirely differentin their character from those on the coast, the latter being intendedprincipally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of ourseaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries tothe operations of more disciplined troops. 

This system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commentedon by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and variousopinions have been advanced respecting its merits. Some have thoughtthat more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity ofthis line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the centralor Montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach ahigher value to the eastern extremity of the line. 

These last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-watersof the Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, adistance of some 250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, throughthe valley of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but littletravelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness. General Jomini says emphatically, that _a line of operations shouldalways offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in thesphere of its enterprises_, --an insuperable objection to the Kennebecroute, except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are stillstronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for thetransportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed inreaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely withoutmilitary results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced, --acontingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorablecircumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in ouroperations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable lengthof time. It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult lineof operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line ofdefence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon thecontingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongestfortresses in the world. What principle in military science wouldjustify such a plan of campaign? We are fully aware of the greatadvantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are alsoaware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt toaccomplish that object. It may, and probably will ere long, be made tosurrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our militaryoperations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. Byadvancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut offthe Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, ascircumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy inthe field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege ofMantua, accomplish both objects at the same time. 

We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that _an army shouldchoose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which shouldeither pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communicationswith his base_. It is the opinion of men of the best military talent inour army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions atthe same time;--that it is the most direct, most feasible, and mostdecisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against Canada;and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be wellfortified in time of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence aboveQuebec constitutes the _key_ point of the enemy's defence, and the_objective_ point towards which all our operations should be directed. To reach this point, all our Boards of Engineers have deemed it best tocollect our troops at Albany and advance by Lake Champlain, a distanceof only two hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good watercommunication the whole distance for the transportation of militarystores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on thisline within our own territory. It has already been shown by the briefsketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strifeand blood for _fifteen campaigns_. Nature has marked it out as ourshortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, both in peace andwar. Military diversions will always be made on the eastern and westernextremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliaryoperations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until weoverthrow the whole system of military science as established by theRomans, revived by Frederick and practised and improved by Napoleon, the_central and interior line_, under all ordinary circumstances, willfurnish the greatest probabilities of success. 

If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, themost important line in the north; its security by fortifications is amatter of the greatest interest. The works recommended by the Board, consist of a single fort, costing $600, 000, at Rouse's Point, on theextreme frontier, and unfortified dépôts at Plattsburg and Albany. Butis this sufficient to accomplish the object? If the hostile army shouldpass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance, --whatdefensive works are to protect the débouché of the Northern canal, oreven to save the great central dépôt? We know of no foreign engineer whohas recommended less than _three_ lines of fortifications for thesecurity of a land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, andGeneral Jomini, agree in recommending at least this number of lines. There may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to athree-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier;but upon our main line of communication with Canada, --a line of maximumimportance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason forviolating the positive rules of the art, --rules which have beenestablished for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatestgenerals of modern times. 

Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion;and we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of thecountry, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of anintermediate point of support between Albany and the Canadian lines. Indeed it would seem that the connection of the Hudson with the lake bythe northern canal had even increased the value of such a point. 

It would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central dépôt nearAlbany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can beafforded by defensive works. Here we already have one of our largestarsenals of construction; here are to be located magazines for thecollection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time ofwar, is to be formed the grand military dépôt for our whole northernarmies; and here is the point of junction of the lines of communicationof our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying pointwhere troops are to be collected for the defence of our northernfrontier, or for offensive operations against Canada. Such a placeshould never be exposed to the _coup-de-main_ of an enemy. The chanceoperations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security ofso important a position. We do not here pretend to say what its defencesshould be. Perhaps strong _têtes-de-pont_ on the Mohawk and Hudsonrivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, mayaccomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact worksmay be found necessary. But we insist on the importance of securing thisposition by _some_ efficient means. The remarks of Napoleon, (which havealready been given, ) on the advantages to be derived from fortifyingsuch a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can besecured, are strikingly applicable to this case. 

But let us look for a moment at what is called the _western_ plan ofdefence for our northern frontier. 

Certain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans ofmilitary defence, would have the principal fortifications of thenorthern frontier established on Lake Erie, the Detroit river, the St. Clair, and Lake Huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier andcoast works, expended in establishing military and naval dépôts atMemphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a ship-canal from thelower Illinois to Lake Michigan, --for the purpose of obtaining the navalcontrol of the northern lakes. 

It is said that British military and steam naval forces will ascend theSt. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; that to counteract these operations wemust build an opposition steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, andcollect out troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippiand Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Georgian Bay, crossover to the Ottawa by French river and Lake Nipissing, or Moon river andthe Muskago, then descend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as theremight be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over sometwelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay and the Ottawa, andas the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, ithas, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemedpreferable to descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run thegauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend Lake Erie andthe Niagara[26] into Lake Ontario, so as to meet the English as theycome steaming up the St. Lawrence!

[Footnote 26: How they are to pass the Falls was not determined eitherby Harry Bluff or the Memphis Convention. ]

It is agreed upon all sides that the British must first collect theirforces at Quebec, and then pass along the line of the St. Lawrence andLake Ontario to reach the Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards ofengineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the Champlain line, and, by penetrating between Montreal and Quebec, separate the enemy'sforces and cut off all the remainder of Canada from supplies andreinforcements from England. But it has been discovered by certainwestern men that to cut the _trunk_ of a tree is not the proper methodof felling it: we must climb to the _top_ and pinch the buds, or, atmost, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a house, we shouldnot place the mine under the foundation, but attach it to one of theshingles of the roof! We have already shown that troops collected atAlbany may reach the great strategic point on the St. Lawrence by aneasy and direct route of _two hundred miles_; but forces collected atPittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented routeof _two thousand miles_. 

Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority inthat quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities forship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by theenemy. The only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes canbe lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlantic. Thecanals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of smalldimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water. 

How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlantic steamers intoour lakes? Shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march witharmed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blowup the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine atthe very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shallwe build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and Memphis, some twothousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions[27]in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario, after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? Very fewdisinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on thisquestion. [28]

[Footnote 27: The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vesselsof eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; togive the same draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, wouldrequire at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the correspondingdraught around Niagara Falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navyyard at Memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c. , will cost about twomillions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fiftythousand dollars per gun. On the other hand, the military defences whichit is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of theChamplain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun;the whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars!

It is not to be denied that a water communication between theMississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercialadvantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops andmilitary stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi toassist the North and East in preventing any great accessions to theBritish military forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy ofexpending vast sums of money on this _military_ (?) _project_, to theneglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothingto say of its character as a _commercial project_, or of the ultimatemilitary advantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only ofthe present condition and wants of the country, and not of what thatcondition and those wants may be generations hence!]

[Footnote 28: There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjectsembraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on thenorthern frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, incongressional reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2dsession; and Senate Doc. , No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session, ) and innumerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press withinthe last few years. ]

CHAPTER IX. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION--STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS. 

By the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the organization of thepublic force of France, the Army was defined, "A standing force drawnfrom the public force, and designed to act against external enemies. "[_Une force habituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinéeessentiellement à agir contre les ennemis du dehors_. ]

In time of peace, the whole organized military force of the State isintended when we speak of _the army_; but in time of war this force isbroken up into two or more fractions, each of which is called an _army_. These armies are usually named from the particular duty which may beassigned to them--as, _army of invasion, army of occupation, army ofobservation, army of reserve, &c. _; or from the country or direction inwhich they operate--as, _army of the North, of the South, of Mexico, ofCanada, of the Rhine, &c. _; or from the general who commands it--as, the_army of Soult, army of Wellington, army of Blücher, &c. _

All modern armies are organized on the same basis. They are made up of aStaff and Administrative departments, and four distinct arms--Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers; each having distinct duties, but allcombining to form one and the same military body. In the actualoperations of a campaign, these forces are formed into _corps d'armée_, each _corps d'armée_ being composed of two or more _grand-divisions_;each grand-division, of two or more _brigades_; and each brigade, ofseveral _companies, squadrons_, or _batteries_. 

In speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to bedivided into two classes of men--the _Staff_ and _the line_. We hereinclude in the first class--

All officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel;

All officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and

All officers attached to the staff as aides, &c. ;

All officers of the administrative departments;

All officers of artillery and engineer staffs;

The corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and

The guards. 

In the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, whichbelong to the active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, andengineers. All troops on detached service, such as recruiting, guardingposts and depots, escorting convoys, &c. , as well as all sedentarycorps, garrisons of fortified places, &c. , are not regarded in thisclassification as composing any part of the _line_ of the army. 

_Troops of the line_ is a term applied only to such troops as form theprincipal line on the battle-field, viz:--The heavy infantry and heavycavalry. These are technically called _infantry of the line_, and_cavalry of the line_. In this sense of the term, light infantry, lightcavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troopsof the _line_. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen intodisuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Administrativedepartments, and four arms of service--Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, andEngineers--is now regarded as the most convenient, from being preciseand definite in its meaning. 

The _general staff_ of an army includes all general officers of thearmy, and such officers of lower grades as are attached to this generalduty, instead of serving with troops, or on special administrative duty. The general officers are--1st, the _generalissimo_, or commander-in-chief; 2d, _generals_, or marshals, as they are called inFrance, or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as theyare called in England and the northern states of Europe; 3d, _lieutenant-generals_; 4th, _generals of division_, or major-generals, as they are called in England; 5th, _generals of brigade_, orbrigadier-generals, as they are sometimes called;--colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, ensigns, and cornets or cadets, are also eitherattached to the staff, or form a part of the _staff corps_. The titlesof "adjutant-general, " and of "inspector-general, " are given to staffofficers selected for these special services, either in the generalstaff or in the several _corps d'armée_. No special rank is attached tothese offices themselves, and the grade of those who hold them is fixedby some special rule, or by their general rank in the army. 

In the war of the Revolution, Washington held the rank of General, andin 1798 the rank of Lieutenant-general. In the war of 1812, the highestgrade held by any of our officers was that of General of Division, orMajor-general, as it was called. The highest grade in our army at thepresent time is called Major-general--a title that properly belongs, notto the general of an army, but to the chief of staff. Hamilton had thistitle when chief of Washington's staff; Berthier and Soult when chief ofNapoleon's staff, the former till the close of the campaign of 1814, andthe latter in the Waterloo campaign. General Jomini first greatlydistinguished himself as chief of Ney's staff, and afterwards on thestaff of the Emperor of Russia. Other generals have owed much of theirsuccess to the chiefs of their staff:--Pichegru to Regnier, Moreau toDessoles, Kutusof to Toll, Barclay to Diebitsch, and Blücher toSharnharst and Gneisenau. 

The _generalissimo_ or commander-in-chief of an army is the persondesignated by the law of the land to take charge of the organizedmilitary forces of the state. In this country the President, through hisSecretary of War, exercises this general command. In England, Wellingtonacts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the British militaryforces. In France, the Minister of War, under the king, has this generaldirection. In other European services, some prince of the blood, ordistinguished general, exercises the functions of generalissimo. 

An active army in the field should be commanded by a _general_, or, asis done in some European countries, by a marshal. These may be regardedas of assimilated rank. 

A _corps d'armée_ should, be commanded by a _Lieutenant-general_. Thisrule is almost universal in Europe. The number of marshals in Franceunder Napoleon was so great, that officers of this grade were oftenassigned to _corps d'armée_. 

A grand division of an army should be commanded by a _General ofDivision_. In England, the assimilated grade is that of major-general, and in France at the present time, the younger lieutenant-generals, orthe _maréchaux-de-camp_, command divisions. 

A brigade should be commanded by a _Brigadier-general_. At the presenttime in the French service, _maréchaux-de-camp_ act as commanders ofbrigades. 

The several _corps d'armée_ are designated by numbers, 1st, 2d, 3d, &c. , and in the same way the several divisions in each _corps d'armée_, andthe several brigades in each division. 

When the number of troops are placed on a war footing, each _corpsd'armée_ ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men. 

The command of these several _corps d'armée_, divisions, and brigades, is taken by the officers of the corresponding grades according toseniority of rank, and without reference to arms, unless otherwisedirected by the generalissimo, who should always have the power todesignate officers for special commands. 

The _chief of staff_ of an army is usually selected from the grade nextbelow that of the general commanding, and receives the title, for thetime being, which is used to designate this special rank. In someEuropean armies, and formerly in our own service, this officer wascalled major-general. In France, if the generalissimo commands inperson, a marshal is made chief of staff with the temporary title of_major-général_; but if a marshal commands the army, a lieutenant-general or _maréchal-de-camp_ becomes chief of staff with thetitle of _aide-major-général_. The chiefs of staff of _corps d'armée_and of divisions, are selected in precisely the same way. 

The position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of hisstaff, is denominated the _General Head-Quarter of the army_; that of a_corps d'armée_ staff, the _Head-Quarters of_ [1st or 2d, &c. ] _corpsd'armée_; that of a division, the _Head-Quarters of_ [1st or 2d, &c. ]_division_, [1st or 2d, &c. ] _corps d'armée_. 

The petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c. , consisting of anadjutant, sergeant-major, &c. , are especially organized by thecommandants of the regiments, &c. , and have no connection whatever withthe general staff of an army. Of course, then, they are not embraced inthe present discussion. 

The subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time of war, arecharged with important and responsible duties connected with theexecution of the orders of their respective chiefs. But in time ofpeace, they are too apt to degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of theAdjutant-general's department, and mere military dandies, employingtheir time in discussing the most unimportant and really contemptiblepoints of military etiquette, or criticising the letters and dispatchesof superior officers, to see whether the wording of the report or thefolding of the letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulationapplicable to the case. Such was the character given to the first staffof Wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff of the armyof Italy when it was abolished by Napoleon and a new one formed in itsplace. There are also some officers of this stamp in our own service, but they are regarded by the army with universal contempt. The staff ofour army requires a new and different organization, and should beconsiderably enlarged. 

The following is the composition of a regularly organized general staffin the French service, for an army of forty or fifty thousand mendivided into two _corps d'armée_ and a reserve. 

1st. The marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; and one colonel orlieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains and three subalterns, asaides-de-camp. 

2d. A lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title of_major-general_, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, threemajors, five captains, and one subaltern, as aides-de-camp. 

3d. Three lieutenant-generals, commanding the _corps d'armée_ andreserve. Each of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the_major-general_, and each will also have his regularly-organized staffof _corps d'armée_, with a general of division or general of brigade aschief. 

4th. Six or nine generals commanding divisions, each having his owndistinct and separately organized staff. In the French army, the staffof an officer commanding a division is composed of one colonel, twomajors, three captains, and six subalterns. 

5th. Twelve or more generals of brigade, each having one captain, andone subaltern for aides. 

6th. There is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of thearmy, the commandants of artillery and engineers, with severalsubordinates, inspector-generals, and the ranking officers of each ofthe administrative departments, with their assistants. 

The generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps, orfrom either of the four arms of service. 

The troops of these arms may be distributed as follows:

 52 battalions of infantry, 35, 000 men. 42 squadrons of horse, . . 6, 500 " 13 batteries of artillery, (4 mounted and 9 foot, ) . 2, 500 " 5 companies of sappers, 2 of pontoniers, [29] and 1 of artificers, . . . . . 1, 500 " ------ 45, 500 "

[Footnote 29: One bridge-equipage is required for each _corps d'armée_. ]

If we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employés ofthe administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousandmen. 

This, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in thefield; in the entire military organization of a state, the number ofstaff officers will be still higher. 

In 1788, France, with a military organization for about three hundredand twenty thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred andtwenty-five lieutenant-generals, five hundred and thirty-eight_maréchaux-de-camp_, and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. Asimilar organization of the general staff was maintained by Napoleon. Atpresent the general staff of the French army consists of nine marshals, (twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active service, fifty-two in reserve, and sixty two _en retraite_--one hundred andninety-four in all; one hundred and sixty _maréchaux-de-camp_ in activeservice, eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety _enretraite_--four hundred and thirty-six in all. The officers of thestaff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colonels, onehundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred lieutenants. Those of other European armies are organized on the same basis. 

It will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our owngeneral staff is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to theobject for which it is created. We have two brigadier-generals for thecommand of two brigades, and one general of division, with the title ofmajor-general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commandingthe army, lieutenant-general, general of division, and chief of staff ofthe army. But as it is impossible with this number to maintain a properorganization, the President (with the advice and consent of the Senate)has, from time to time, increased this number to three major-generals, and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lowergrades. Nearly all these officers are detached from their severalregiments and corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments andcompanies; and we have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplyingthe defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the anomalyof _officers being generals, and at the same time not generals; ofholding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding these ranks andgrades!_ Let Congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system, andestablish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, andrestore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war of1812, instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase ofthe general staff was required, we merely multiplied the number ofmajor-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment, or byconferring brevet rank. It is now conceded that there never was a moreinefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursedduring the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been asource of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the armymany of its noblest ornaments. 

In the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Congress will notagain resort to the ruinous system of 1812. Possibly it may by some beobjected to the creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c. , that itincreases the expense of the army and the number of its officers. Thisneed not be. The number, pay, &c. , may remain the same, or nearly thesame, as at present. But by increasing the grades you avoid in aconsiderable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevetrank--the principal curses of our present system. If we merely increasethe number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank abovetheir name and office, we merely multiply evils. But we will leave thissubject for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staffduties. 

The following remarks of Jomini on the importance of the staff of anarmy are worthy of attention. "A good staff, " says he, "is, more thanall, indispensable to the constitution of an army; for it must beregarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise hisprincipal supports--as a body of officers whose intelligence can aidhis own. When harmony is wanting between the genius that commands, andthe talents of those who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure;for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution. Moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than thegenius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it maysafely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of allsafeguards. The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplacedegotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man ofreflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth asbeyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what askilful minister is to a monarchy--it seconds the views of the chief, even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; itprevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general bewanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. How manymediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been renderedillustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates!Reynier was the chief cause of the victories of Pichegru, in 1794; andDessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is notGeneral Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof? Diebitsch withthose of Barclay and Witgenstein? Gneisenau and Muffling with those ofBlücher? Numerous other instances might be cited in support of theseassertions. "

"A well-established staff does not always result from a good system ofeducation for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematicianand a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. The staff shouldalways possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought forby the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way, men who are already known by their aptitude for war. Engineer andartillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect thatit will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction, and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers ofthose two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commandinggeneral, and who are the most capable of directing the operations ofwar. "

"At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution, " says this ablehistorian elsewhere, "in the French army the general staff, which isessential for directing the operations of war, had neither instructionnor experience. " The several adjutant-generals attached to the army ofItaly were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became prejudicedagainst the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawinghis staff-officers from the other corps of the army. In his earlierwars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers;but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularlyrequired for the sieges carried on in Germany and Spain, andconsiderable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers forstaff duty. Some of the defects of the first French staff-corps wereremedied in the latter part of Napoleon's career, and in 1818 it wasreorganized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school established forits instruction. 

Some European nations have established regular staff-corps, from whichthe vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all theirstaff-officers from the corps of the army. A combination of the twosystems is preferred by the best judges. Jomini recommends a regularstaff-corps, with special schools for its instruction; but thinks thatits officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the other corps ofthe army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from theirinstruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy ofholding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps ofthe army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by all competentjudges as ruinous to an army, destroying at the same time the characterof the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line. 

The following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers ofan army, made at the beginning of the war of 1812, are from the pen ofone of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced:--

"Generals have been divided into three classes, --_Theorists_, who bystudy and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rulesor maxims of the art they profess; _Martinets_, who have confined theirattention merely to the mechanical part of the trade; and _Practicalmen_, who have no other or better guide than their own experience, ineither branch of it. This last description is in all services, exceptingour own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, viz. , men destitute alike of _theory_ and of _experience_. "

"Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. Without the former, no man ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter, generals have committed great faults. The former is the necessary resultof knowledge; the latter of ignorance. A man acquainted with his dutycan rarely be placed in circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing;a man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to_guess_, and not knowing how to be right by _system_, will often bewrong by _chance_. "

"These remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively tothe science of war. They apply to all other sciences; but in these, errors are comparatively harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself andthe public with false and fanciful theories of the earth; and ametaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matterand spirit, without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous. Their blunders but make us merry; they neither pick pockets, nor breaklegs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after them evilsthe most compounded and mischievous, --the slaughter of an army--thedevastation of a state--the ruin of an empire!"

"In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiringinstruction are multiplied and strengthened. Are you an _honest_ man?You will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledgeof your duty. Are you a man of _honor_? You will be careful to avoidself-reproach. Does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of_patriotism_? You will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing downupon your country either insult or injury. "

"Nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. Has_hunger_ made you a soldier? Will you not take care of your bread! Is_vanity_ your principle of action? Will you not guard those mightyblessings, your epaulets and feathers! Are you impelled by a love of_glory_ or a love of _power_? And can you forget that these coymistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?"

"But the _means_ of instruction, say you, where are they to be found?Our standing army is but a bad and ill-organized militia, and ourmilitia not better than a mob. Nor have the defects in these beensupplied by Lycées, Prytanées, and Polytechnic schools. The morbidpatriotism of some, and the false economy of others, have nearlyobliterated every thing like military knowledge among us. "

"This, reader, is but one motive the more for reinstating it. Thanks tothe noble art of printing! you still have _books_ which, if _studied_, will teach the art of war. "

"_Books_! And what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make aMack, but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Cæsar, a Saxe, a Frederick, or a Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of Athenslecturing Hannibal on the art of war?"

"True; but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobbler. Xenophon, Cæsar, Saxe, Frederick, and Napoleon, have all thought well of books, and have even composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they arebut the depositories of maxims which genius has suggested, andexperience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road ofthe traveller, and render the labor and genius of past ages tributary toour own. _These_ teach most emphatically, that the secret of successfulwar is not to be found in mere _legs_ and _arms_, but in the _head_ thatshall direct them. If this be either ungifted by nature, or uninstructedby study and reflection, the best plans of manoeuvre and campaign availnothing. The two last centuries have presented many revolutions inmilitary character, all of which have turned on this principle. It wouldbe useless to enumerate these. We shall quote only the greatest and thelast--_The troops of Frederick!_ How illustrious under him! Howcontemptible under his successors! Yet his system was there; his doublelines of march at full distance; his oblique order of battle; his simplelines of manoeuvre in the presence of an enemy; his wise conformation ofan _état-major;_--all, in short, that distinguished his practice fromthat of ordinary men, survived him; but the head that truly comprehendedand knew how to apply these, died with Frederick. What an admonitiondoes this fact present for self-instruction, --for unwearieddiligence, --for study and reflection! Nor should the force of this belessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature shouldhave done her part of the work, --unless to a soul not to be shaken byany changes of fortune--cool, collected, and strenuous--she adds a headfertile in expedients, prompt in its decisions, and sound in itsjudgments, no man can ever merit the title of a _general_. "

The celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following remarks on thenecessary qualifications to form a good general. The most indispensableone, according to his idea, is valor, without which all the rest willprove nugatory. The next is a sound understanding with some genius: forhe must not only be courageous, but be extremely fertile in expedients. The third is health and a robust constitution. 

"His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must havean aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, withoutbetraying the slightest trace of his own intentions; he must be, _seemingly_, communicative, in order to encourage others to unbosom, butremain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army; hemust, in a word, possess activity with judgment, be able to make aproper choice of his officers, and never deviate from the strictest lineof military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered wretched andunhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary talents bekept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules andregulations. Great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance andinactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession. "

"In his deportment he must be affable, and always superior topeevishness or ill-humor; he must not know, or at least seem not toknow, what a spirit of resentment is; and when he is under the necessityof inflicting military chastisement, he must see the guilty punishedwithout compromise or foolish humanity; and if the delinquent be fromamong the number of his most intimate friends, he must be doubly severetowards the unfortunate man. For it is better, in instances ofcorrection, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by ordersof the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) thanthat an idea should go forth in the army of public justice beingsacrificed to private sentiments. "

"A modern general should always have before him the example of Manlius;he must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convincedhimself, but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice, and that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. With thesequalifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure theaffections of his followers, instill into their minds all the impulsesof deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed. "

"The resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions forthe exercise of them are multiplied and checkered: he must be perfectlymaster of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstancesand situations; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energyand confidence; how to post all its different component parts, so as notto be forced to give or receive battle in opposition to settled plans. When once engaged, he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all therelative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favorablemoments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinitevicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a readypossession of which its ultimate success depends. These requisites areunquestionably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations andthe chance medley of events that produce their necessity. "

"A general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day ofbattle be divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to everyfeeling, but what immediately regards the business of the day; he mustreconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eyecollects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, andfeels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the disposition of histroops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession, and makeall his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. His order of battlemust be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quickas if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as, _the first line will attack! the second will support it! or, such abattalion will advance and support the line. _"

"The general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant oftheir business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they shouldbe deficient in the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt andready co-operation. So that the general has only to issue out directionsaccording to the growth of circumstances, and to rest satisfied thatevery division will act in conformity to his intentions; but if, on thecontrary, he should so far forget his situation as to become adrill-sergeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the caseof the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishlyimagined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by itssituation. A general, therefore, ought on the day of battle to bethoroughly master of himself, and to have both his mind and his eyeriveted to the immediate scene of action. He will by these means beenabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and hewill instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. Theinstant a favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided, it becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without anyregard to personal safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [By aready conception of this sort, joined to a great courage, GeneralDessaix determined the issue of the battle of Marengo. ] It is, however, impossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify with accuracyall the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. Every thingdepends upon a variety of situations, casualties of events, andintermediate occurrences, which no human foresight can positivelyascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, aready conception, and prompt execution. "

"Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications, particularly with that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutesthe essence of a military character. "

"Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas ofwarfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and tworival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention hasdevolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regulardistance in intervals of columns. They have considered it sufficient togive answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to sendorders in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one quarterto another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, orcalmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. Theyendeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. Theyappear like men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they aretaken out of the beaten track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls byuncommon exertions; and from whence, continues the same sensible writer, do these contradictions arise? from an ignorance of those highqualifications without which the mere routine of duty, methodicalarrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and defeatthemselves. Many officers spend their whole lives in putting a fewregiments through a regular set of manoeuvres; and having done so, theyvainly imagine that all the science of a real military man consists inthat acquirement. When, in process of time, the command of a large armyfalls to their lot, they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of theundertaking, and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they remainsatisfied with doing what they have partially learned. "

"Military knowledge, as far as it regards a general orcommander-in-chief, may be divided into two parts, one comprehendingmere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number ofrules into practice; and the other originating a sublimity of conceptionthat method may assist, but cannot give. "

"If a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to thesituation of a general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinarycasualties of war, he will never rise beyond mediocrity. "

"It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. Perfection ineither art grows out of innate talent, but it never can be acquiredwithout them. Study and perseverance may correct ideas, but noapplication, no assiduity will give the life and energy of action; theseare the works of nature. "

"It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see several veryexcellent colonels become indifferent generals. I have known others, whohave distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutionsof an army, lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of theirprofession, the instant they were taken from that particular line, andbe incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse. Should a man ofthis cast be put at the head of an army, he will confine himself to meredispositions and manoeuvres; to them he will look for safety; and ifonce thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is notcapable of other resources. "

"In order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the innumerabledisasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greateruncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on, some generalrules ought to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, but for the instruction of those who have the command of them. Theprinciples to be observed are: that when the line or the columnsadvance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that whenevera body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the lineshould rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings aremade in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second instantly tofill up the chasms. "

"These instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do notrequire the least elucidation in writing They constitute the A, B, C ofsoldiers. Nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objectsin order to attend to such minutiæ. His functions in the day of battleare confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled towatch the countenance of the enemy; to observe his movements, and to seewith an eagle's or a king of Prussia's eye, all the relative directionsthat his opponents take. It must be his business to create alarms andsuspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter, while his realintention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in hisplans; to take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints haveproduced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable ofplunging with effect upon the weakest part, and carrying the sword ofdeath where its blow is certain of being mortal. But to accomplish theseimportant and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, his mindcollected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted, even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day. "

The _administrative service_ of an army is usually divided into severaldistinct departments, as--

 Pay department. Subsistence " Clothing " Medical "} } These in our service are united. Hospital " Barrack "}These in our service are combined Fuel "}in one, called the Quartermaster's Transportation "}department Recruiting " Military Justice, or Court Martial department. 

It was intended to enter into the history, organization, and use of eachof these civico-military departments of an army; but our limits are suchas to preclude any thing like so detailed a discussion as would benecessary for a proper understanding of the subject. We therefore passfrom the staff directly to the _line_ or rather the four principal armsof an army organization. [30]

[Footnote 30: Of works that treat directly of staff organization andduties, those of Grimoard, Thiébault, Boutourlin, Labaume, are esteemedamong the best. The writings of Jomini, Napoleon, Rocquancourt, Vauchelle, Odier, Scharnhorst, also contain much valuable information onthis subject. The following list of books may be referred to for furtherinformation on the subjects alluded to in this chapter:

_Aide-Mémoire des officiers généraux et supérieurs et des capitaines. _

_Précis de l'art de la guerre. _ Jomini. 

_Mémoires de Napoléon. _ Montholon et Gourgaud. 

_Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. _ Rocquancourt. 

_Cours élémentaire d'administration militaire. _ Vauchelle. 

_Droite élémentaire d'art militaire, &c. _ Gay de Vernon. 

_Annuaire militaire historique, &c. _ Sicard. 

_Cours abrégé d'administration militaire. _ Bernier. 

_Cours d'administration militaire, &c. _ Odier. 

_De l'administration de l'armée d'Espagne. _ Odier. 

_De l'organization de la force armée en France. _ Carion-Nisas. 

_Elémens de l'art militaire, &c. _ Cugnot. 

_Mémoires sur la guerre. _ Feuquiéres. 

_Cours d'art militaire et d'histoire. _ Jacquinot de Presle. 

_Cours d'art militaire. _ Fallot. 

_Théorie de l'officier supérieur. _ Léorier. 

_Histoire de l'administration de la guerre. _ Audouin. 

_Instructions diverses a l'usage de l'école d'application du corps royald'état-major. _

_Handbuch für offiziere, &c. _ Scharnhorst. 

Having omitted all discussion of the several departments of theadministrative service of an army organization, it is not deemednecessary to give the names of books of reference on the subjects ofpay, courts-martial, medicinal and hospital departments, &c. , &c. ]

CHAPTER X

ARMY ORGANIZATION. [31]--INFANTRY AND CAVALRY

_Infantry_. --Infantry constitutes, in active service, by far the mostnumerous portion of an army; in time of peace its duties are simple, and, in most countries, of little comparative importance; but in ourcountry the continually recurring difficulties on the Indian frontiers, render this arm peculiarly necessary and important, even in time ofgeneral peace. From the nature of infantry service--no peculiartechnical knowledge (we speak of the privates and officers of the lowergrades) being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms--thesoldier may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties. Forthis reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarilymuch less than in active service, this arm being always capable of greatexpansion when occasion requires. 

[Footnote 31: In discussing our own organization, it may be well tocompare it with the armies of some of the principal nations of Europe. Our limits will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make acomparison with more than a single European power. We shall selectFrance, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model for therest of Europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to mostothers. ]

In the early periods of society, and in countries where horses abounded, men have usually preferred fighting on horseback; but civilization and amore thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importanceof infantry. 

The Hebrews, and also the Egyptians, employed this arm almostexclusively. The Asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry, but with the Greeks the _infantry_ was the favorite arm. Even theirkings and generals usually fought on foot. The Romans conquered theworld mainly with their infantry. This arm was also considered of thegreatest importance by the ancient Germans and Gauls; but the migrationof the Huns and other Mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses, and the acquaintance formed by the Franks of northern Spain with theMoors, who were mounted on beautiful horses from Arabia and the plateauof Asia, introduced a taste for cavalry in western Europe. This tastewas still further cultivated under the feudal system, for the knightspreferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. During the crusadesthe infantry fell into disrepute. But the invention of gunpowder changedthe whole system of warfare, and restored to infantry its formerimportance. 

"The Romans, " says Napoleon in his Memoirs, "had two infantries; thefirst, lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second, heavily armed, bore a short sword. After the invention of powder twospecies of infantry were still continued: the arquebusiers, who werelightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the enemy; and thepikemen, who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry. During thehundred and fifty years which have elapsed since Vauban banished lancesand pikes from all the infantry of Europe, substituting for them thefirelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly armed. .. .. . There has been since that time, properly speaking, only one kind ofinfantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it wasby way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion beingcomposed of nine companies, one picked company did not appearsufficient. If the Emperor Napoleon created companies of voltigeursarmed like dragoons, it was to substitute them for those companies ofchasseurs. He composed them of men under five feet in height, in orderto bring into use that class of the conscription which measured fromfour feet ten inches to five feet; and having been until that timeexempt, made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the otherclasses. This arrangement served to reward a great number of oldsoldiers, who, being under five feet in height, could not enter into thecompanies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, deserved toenter into a picked company: it was a powerful incentive to emulation tobring the giants and pigmies into competition. Had there been men ofdifferent colors in the armies of the emperor, he would have composedcompanies of blacks and companies of whites: in a country where therewere cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might be made of companies ofcyclops, and others of hunchbacks. "

"In 1789, the French army as composed of regiments of the line andbattalions of chasseurs; the chasseurs of the Cevennes, the Vivarais, the Alps, of Corsica, and the Pyrenees, who at the Revolution formedhalf brigades of light infantry; but the object was not to have twodifferent sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructedalike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited bythe men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of thegarde-chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiersof the Alps and Pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the North, they were always detached, in preference, for climbing heights orscouring a forest; when these men were placed in line, in a battle, theyserved very well as a battalion of the line, because they had receivedthe same instructions, and were armed and disciplined in the samemanner. Every power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps, under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of foreigndeserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction;but that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. There is and can bebut one. If the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it isnot light-armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armedsoldiers, or battalions armed with swords; for all the infantry ofEurope serve at times as light troops. "

Most European nations, for reasons probably similar to those ofNapoleon, keep up this nominal division of _infantry of the line_ and_light infantry_; but both are usually armed and equipped alike, andboth receive the same organization and instruction. The light infantryare usually made up from the class of men, or district of country, whichfurnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharpshooters. In France, the light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the Ardennes, theVosges, and the Jura districts; in Austria, by the Croates and Tyrolese;in Prussia, by the "försters, " or woodsmen; and in Russia, by theCossacks. Our own western hunters, with proper discipline, make the besttirailleurs in the world. 

Light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the mainarmy, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the ground, secure avenues ofapproach, deceive the enemy by demonstrations, and secure the repose ofthe other troops by patrolling parties. They usually begin a battle, andafterwards take their places in the line, either on the flanks, or inthe intervals between the larger bodies. The battle of Jena furnishes agood example of the use of French light infantry; and at the battle ofWaterloo, the Prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective inclearing the ground for the advance of Blücher's heavy columns. Theattack of Floh-hug by Augereau, of Vierzehn Heilegen by Suchet, ofIserstaedt by Desjardins, are models well worthy of study. 

The infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the field of battle, constitutes the principal fighting force. Its formations and the mannerof engaging it have already been discussed under the head of tactics. 

The importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, to the factthat it can be used everywhere--in mountains or on plains, in woody oropen countries, in cities or in fields, on rivers or at sea, in theredoubt or in the attack of the breach; the infantry depends only onitself, whereas the other arms must depend in a considerable degree onthe efficiency of their materials and the will and strength of bruteforce; and when the snows of Russia or the deserts of Egypt deprivetheir animals of the means of sustenance, they become perfectly useless. 

Foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear and sometimeswith a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. At present they are armed witha gun and bayonet, and sometimes with a sword. In some Europeanservices, a few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. Some of thelight troops used as sharpshooters carry the rifle, but this weapon isuseless for the great body of infantry. The short-sword is more usefulas an instrument for cutting branches, wood, &c. , than for actualfighting. The infantry have no defensive covering, or at least verylittle. The helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the shouldersare somewhat defended by epaulets. It has often been proposed in moderntimes to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier; butthis would be worse than useless against fire-arms, and moreover woulddestroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements. Thestrength of this arm depends greatly upon its discipline; for if calmand firm, a mass of infantry in column or in square is almostimpenetrable. 

The bayonet was introduced by Vauban in the wars of Louis XIV. , andafter the years 1703 and '4, the pike was totally suppressed in theFrench army. This measure was warmly opposed by Marshal Montesquieu, andthe question was discussed by him and Marshal Vauban with an ability andlearning worthy of these great men. The arguments of Vauban were deemedmost conclusive, and his project was adopted by the king. 

This question has been agitated by military writers in more recenttimes, Puységur advocating the musket, and Folard and Lloyd contendingin favor of restoring the pike. Even in our own service, so late as thewar of 1812, a distinguished general of the army strongly urged the useof the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) was armedand equipped in part as _pikemen_; but experience soon proved theabsurdity of the project. 

Napoleon calls the infantry the _arm of battles_ and the _sinews of thearmy_. But if it be acknowledged, that, next to the talent of thegeneral-in-chief, the infantry is the first instrument of victory, itmust also be confessed that it finds a powerful support in the cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and that without these it would often becompromised, and could gain but a half success. 

The French infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of threebattalions each, a battalion being composed of seven companies. Thereare also several other battalions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c. , beingorganized especially for service in Africa, and composed in part ofnative troops. 

In our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, each regimentforming a single battalion of ten companies. The flank companies areintended for light infantry. 

In all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes fromthree-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in the field, and from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about seven-tenths of theentire military establishment. In time of peace this proportion may beslightly diminished. 

_Cavalry. _--The use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself. The Egyptians had cavalry before the time of Moses, and the Israelitesoften encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors, thoughthey made no use of this arm themselves until the time of Solomon. 

The Greeks borrowed their cavalry from the Asiatics, and especially fromthe Persians, who, according to Xenophon, held this arm in greatconsideration. After the battle of Platea, it was agreed by assembledGreece that each power should furnish one horseman to every tenfoot-soldiers. In Sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, and thecavalry marched to combat without any previous training. At Athens thecavalry service was more popular, and they formed a well-organized corpsof twelve hundred horsemen. At Thebes also this arm had consideration inthe time of Epaminondas. But the cavalry of Thessaly was the mostrenowned, and both Philip and Alexander drew their mounted troops fromthat country. 

The Romans had made but little progress in this arm when theyencountered the Thessalians, who fought in the army of Pyrrhus. Theythen increased their cavalry, but it was not numerous till after theirwars with the Carthaginians. Scipio organized and disciplined the Romancavalry like that of the Numidians. This arm was supplied from the ranksof the richest citizens, and afterwards formed an order intermediarybetween the Senate and the people, under the name of _knights_. 

At a later period, the cavalry of the Gauls was particularly good. TheFranks were without cavalry when they made their first irruption intoGaul. Under the reign of Childeric I. We see for the first time the"cavaliers francs" figure as a part of the national forces. At thebattle of Tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of oneto five, and under Pepin and Charlemagne their numbers were nearlyequal. Under Charles the Bald armies were composed entirely of cavalry, and during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service, andfought only on horseback. 

After the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still employed, thoughto little advantage. Gustavus Adolphus was the first to perceive thereal importance of this arm in modern warfare, and he used it with greatsuccess. But it was left for Seidlitz to perfect it under the directionof Frederick the Great. 

Marshal Saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the "_arme dumoment, _" for in almost every battle there are moments when a decisivecharge of cavalry will gain the victory, but if not made at the instantit may be too late. The efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moralimpression which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in proportion tothe size of the mass, and the rapidity of its motion. This last qualityenables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive moment, when the enemy exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in hisranks. But this requires a bold and active spirit, which shrinks notfrom responsibility, and is able to avail itself with quickness anddecision of every opportunity. If it be remembered that it is essentialthat this _coup d'oeil_, so rare and so difficult to acquire, beaccompanied by a courage and vigor of execution which nothing can shake, we shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cavalrygenerals, and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it didunder Frederick and Napoleon, with Seidlitz and Murat as commanders. 

The soldier gains great _velocity_ by the use of the horse in war; butin other respects he is the loser. The great expense and care requiredof the cavalier to support his horse; the difficulty experienced insurmounting ordinary obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage, are all prejudicial to success. 

The unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strengthand breed, have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into _light_and _heavy_ cavalry, and a mixed class called _dragoons_. The heavycavalry is commonly used in masses where _force_ is mainly requisite;the lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments, whererapidity of movement is most desired. 

The _heavy_ cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, andsometimes lancers. The two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiersbeing armed with the lance. These troops are seldom used for scouts, vanguards, and convoys; but are frequently employed to sustain the lightcavalry. Their main duty is "_to appear on the field of battle and makethe decisive charges_. "

The _light_ cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, andlancers. The latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavyhorses, are attached to the heavy cavalry. 

The _dragoons_ were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but itbeing found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and theattempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in eithercapacity, the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between theheavy and the light horse. In more recent wars they have also beeninstructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, till horses couldbe found in the enemy's country with which to mount them. But we believethere is no instance in more modern wars in which they have beenemployed at the same time in both capacities. 

This term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some ofthe congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of ourso-called regiments of _dragoons_, by dismounting it one year, sellingits horses at auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again, the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equipments forremounting it; and all this for _economy!_

The Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest oftheir body being nearly uncovered. Their arms were a sword and long thinjavelin, or lance, with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shieldto a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance was greatlyincreased in size and length, and armed at both ends. In other respectsthey were armed in the same way as infantry. The use of the lance andthe shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly worthless. The Roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies, except, perhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians. 

The heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the _gensd'armes_ of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantryin a close engagement. Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of onehundred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the Romangeneral Lucullus, who had only about six thousand horse and fifteenthousand foot. But the Armenian cavalry, called _cataphratti_ were sooverburdened with armor, that when they fell from their horses theycould scarcely move or make any use of their arms. They were routed by amere handful of Roman infantry. 

The modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor, shields, &c. , it can move with much greater rapidity. A modern cavalryhorse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundredpounds, viz. :

 Heavy Light cavalry. Cavalry. 

 The rider, . . . . 160 140 lbs. His arms and equipments, . . . 55 40 His horse equipments, . . . 60 45 Two days' rations of provisions and grain, 25 25 ----------------- 300 250

The horse moves per minute--

 At a walk, from 110 yards to 120 At a trot, 220 240 At a gallop, 330 360

But on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalrywill walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, twohundred. 

An ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on aforced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-fourhours. A single horseman, or a small detachment, can easily exceed thisdistance. 

"Light cavalry, " says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, "ought to reconnoitreand watch the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army;it is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained andprotected especially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulationhave always existed between the infantry and cavalry: light cavalry isindispensable to the vanguard, the rearguard, and the wings of the army;it, therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow themovements of any particular corps of infantry. It would be more naturalto attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependenceupon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should beindependent of both. "

"If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized intosquadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manoeuvring; forthat is all vanguards and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat byplatoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, orchange their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting awhole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a vanguard, of inferiornumbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delaysthe enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for theinfantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions, and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. The art of ageneral of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding adefeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him tospend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point outthe methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessaryfor cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, than in any other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we saw in1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the light troops of MariaTheresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellentorganization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine thatsuch troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoonsof Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideasof things; but neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, everformed the vanguards of the Austrian and Russian armies; because tospeak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops whichmanoeuvre. The Russians considered a regiment of Cossacks who had beentrained worth three regiments untrained. Every thing about these troopsis despicable, except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable; he is bornon horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the field, what theBedouin is in the desert, or the Barbet in the Alps; he never enters ahouse, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset, that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possiblyhave observed him. "

"Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because they were betterarmed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs ofpistols, a _tromblon_, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, several horses, and several men on foot to attend them. But a hundredFrench did not fear a hundred Mamelukes; three hundred were more than amatch for an equal number; and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred:so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Murat, Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to theMamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point ofoutfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on theright and left; the Mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn thewings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them;they were always broken. "

"The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancingor retiring, but in manoeuvring. It should be composed of a good lightcavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, byexcellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: thetroops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each accordingto his station. An undisciplined troop would only embarrass theadvanced guard. "

"It is admitted that for facility in manoeuvring, the squadron shouldconsist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadronsshould have a superior officer. "

"It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses:dragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armedwith straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of theheavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, withbayonets: should have the _shakot_ of the infantry, pantaloons coveringthe half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enoughto be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry ofall descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know howto manoeuvre on foot. Three thousand light cavalry, or three thousandcuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousandinfantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry; andthree thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousandinfantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stopthem. 

"Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, attached great importanceto dragoons, and used them successfully. The dragoons gained great gloryin Italy, in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the campaignsof 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. Thedivisions of dragoons had been mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to beembarked without horses for the expedition of England, in order to serveon foot until they should be mounted in that country. General Baraguayd'Hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equippedwith gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number ofrecruits, whom he exercised in infantry manoeuvres alone. These were nolonger cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of 1806 on foot, until after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on horses takenfrom the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. These combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in 1813 and 1814their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoonsare necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, therear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted forvan and rearguards: they should never be employed in this service butwhen it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war. "

Napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into twokinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to becomposed of dragoons and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted onhorses of 4 ft 6 in. ; light cavalry on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in. ;dragoons on horses of 4 ft. 9 in. ; and cuirassiers on horses of 4 ft. 10or 11 in. ; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops. 

All cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should becapable, in case of need, of performing any of the duties of mountedtroops. The shock is the principal effect produced by this arm;therefore, the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect, provided the troops can be kept in mass. But it is found, by experience, that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height oftheir speed. The best authorities therefore prefer, as we have saidelsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should notbe taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy. The chargeof a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering oneat a gallop. 

On the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the armof the shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; butit is unable of itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on noaccount wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. Itwas on this account that Frederick directed his cavalry officers, underthe severest penalties, never to receive a charge, but always to meetthe attacking force half way. This is the only mode of preventingdefeat. 

A good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges ofcavalry. At the battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, Davoust ordered thedivisions of Gudin to form squares to resist the Prussian cavalry, which, by means of a fog, had gained a most advantageous position. Blücher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all wasin vain; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At the combat ofKrasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, Nansonty, and Bordesoult, attacked and overthrew the dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantryunder Neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges ofvastly superior numbers of these French horse. At the battle of Molwitz, the grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, althoughthe cavalry of the great Frederick had already been completelyoverthrown. 

But when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, thecharges of cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide thefate of the battle, as was the case at Rosbach, Zornsdorf, Wurtsburg, Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, &c. 

Cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather, when the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to usetheir fire-arms to advantage, as was the case with the corps ofAugereau, at Eylau, and with the Austrian left, at the battle ofDresden. Again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown intodisorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the Russian cavalry atHohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remarkable example of this kind. 

Cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either byinfantry or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made, the strength of this arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediatelyattacked, defeat becomes inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney onPrince Hohenlohe at the battle of Jena, and of the French horse on Gossaat Leipsic, are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry whenproperly sustained. Kunnersdorf and Waterloo are examples of thedisastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support. 

The choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalryalmost useless. Such was the case at the battle of Cassano, between theDuke of Vendome and the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by theAdda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince Eugene couldmake no use of his horse. If, when master of the bridge of Rittorto, hehad been able to charge the French with a body of cavalry, there hadbeen no doubt of his complete success. 

After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry isinvaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mountedtroops, with an able commander, at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, theresults of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were reallywithout consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian army in 1806, afterthe battle of Jena, and Napoleon's army in 1815 at Waterloo, werecompletely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit ofa defeated and dispirited foe. 

The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the AmericanRevolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, hissurprise and defeat in the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss ofNew York, had never taken place. The efficient employment of a few goodsquadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat atBladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in 1814. 

In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth toone-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war. [32]

[Footnote 32: To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected withthe two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer shouldmake himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of InfantryTactics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with MajorCooper's abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system ofCavalry Tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions for theuse of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on thebattle-field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff, Rocquancourt, and Jacquinot de Presle. ]

The following books may be referred to for further informationrespecting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantryand cavalry:--

_Essai général de tactique. _ Guibert. 

_Considérations générales sur l'infanterie française, _ par un général enrétraite. A work of merit. 

_De l'infanterie, _ par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expédition de Russie. 

_Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule. _ Foy. This work contains manyinteresting and valuable remarks on the French and English systems oftactics, and particularly on the tactics of Infantry. 

_Cours d'art et d'histoire militaires. _ Jacquinot de Presle. 

_Art de la guerre. _ Rogniat. 

_Instruction destinée aux troupes légères, _ &c. , redigée sur uneinstruction de Frederick II. à ses officiers. 

_English Infantry Regulations. _

_Ordonnance_ (French) _pour l'exercice et les manoeuvres del'infanterie, _ par le commission de manoeuvres. 

_Aide-mémoires des officiers généraux et supérieurs, et des capitaines. _

_Essai sur l'histoire générale de l'art militaire. _ Carion-Nisas. 

_Histoire de la milice française. _ Daniel. 

_Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires. _ Rocquancourt. 

_Traité élémentaire d'art militaire, _ &c. Gay de Vernon. 

_Introduction à l'étude de l'art de la guerre. _ La Roche-Amyou. 

_Tactique des trois armes. _ Decker. 

_Examen raisonné des trois armes, _ &c. Okouneff. 

The last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff, however, are very diffuse. 

_Instruction pour le service de l'infanterie légère. _ Guyard. 

_Instruction de l'infanterie, _ &c. Schauenbourg. 

_Traité de tactique. _ Ternay et Koch. 

_Mécanism des manoeuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise. _Vroniecki. 

_Traité sur l'infanterie légère. _ Beurmann. 

_English Cavalry Regulations. _

_Ordonnance_ (French) _sur l'exercice et les évolutions de lacavalerie. _

_Les troupes à cheval de France, _ &c. De Bourge. 

_Avant-postes de cavalerie légère. _ Brack. The author served withdistinction under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans. 

_Réflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie, _ &c. Caraman. 

_Observations sur l'ordonnance, &c. , de la cavalerie. _ Dejean. 

_Tactique de la cavalerie. _ Itier. 

_Eléments de tactique pour la cavalerie, _ par Mottin de la Balme. A workof rare merit. 

_De l'emploi de la cavalerie à la guerre. _ Schauenbourg. 

_Rémarques sur la cavalerie. _ Warnery. This work has long enjoyed a highreputation among the cavalry officers of the European services. TheParis edition is enriched with notes by a French general officer. 

_Nachrichten und Betrachtungen über die Thaten und Schicksale derReiterei, _ &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in thecampaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the battle ofLutzen in 1813. 

_Examen du livret provisoire, _ &c. Marbot. 

_Le Spectateur Militaire, _ contains many essays by cavalry officers onthe various questions connected with the organization and use of thisarm. 

_Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie undreitenden Artillerie. _ Decker. 

_Manuel de l'officier. _ Ruhle de Lilienstern. 

_Aide-mémoire, à l'usage des officiers de cavalerie. _

_Journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie. _

_Traité de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie. _

_Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne. _Coutz. 

CHAPTER XI. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION. --ARTILLERY. 

_Artillery_. --Previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenthcentury, the machines of war were divided between two classes ofmilitary men, the engineers (_engignours_, as they were called in themiddle ages) and the artillery, (_artilliers_, as they were formerlycalled, ) the latter being particularly charged with the management ofthe lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the balistasand arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds ofarrows--_flêches, viretons, carreaux, matras_, &c. , while the formermanaged the battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for along time after the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was keptup, and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectilemachines, while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderousweapons of attack and defence. But the new artillery was graduallyintroduced, without, however, immediately displacing the old, and therewere for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, _two_ artilleries, the one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those ofthe new invention. The latter were called _canoniers_, to distinguishthem from the former, who still retained the name of _artilliers_. 

The first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenthcentury, or, perhaps, among the Arabs as early as the middle of thethirteenth century, but they were not much known in Europe till about1350. Cannon are said to have been employed by the Moors as early as1249, and by the French in 1338. The English used artillery at thebattle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancient projectile machineswere employed at the siege of Aiguillon in 1339, at Zara in 1345, atRennes in 1357, and at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancientbalista was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels ofinfectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. We read ofthe same thing being done in Spain at a later period. 

Cannon in France were at first called _bombards_ and _couleuverines_, but were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as_serpentines, basilisks, scorpions, _&c. In the infancy of the art theywere made small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and weremounted on small moveable carriages. This species of fire-arms becamequite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century. They werefollowed by heavier pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns. This siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till, towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such anenormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. Louis XI. Had an immense piece constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said, carried a ball from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles!) Itscaliber was that of five hundred pounds. It was intended for experiment, and burst on the second discharge. The famous culverin of Bolduc wassaid to carry a ball from that city to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy, made in 1598, was more than twenty-three feet in length. There is now anancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz of about this length, whichcarries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. Cannon balls were foundat Paris as late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and fromtwelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of Constantinople in1453, there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of anincredible size; at the siege of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was usedwhich, it was said, threw stone balls "of the size of mill-stones. " TheGantois, under Arteville, made a bombard fifty feet in length, whosereport was heard at a distance of ten leagues!

The first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, orembraced by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwardssubstituted for the wooden form. Towards the end of the fourteenthcentury, brass, tin, copper, wrought and cast iron, were successivelyused for this purpose. The bores of the pieces were first made in aconical shape, and it was not until a much later period that thecylindrical form was introduced. 

In the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the latter part of thefifteenth century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges andbattles. Ferdinand the Catholic had at this time, probably, a largerartillery train than any other European power. The Spanish cannon, generally very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches inbreadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same metal. The pieceswere firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of eitherhorizontal or vertical movement. The balls thrown by them were usuallyof marble, though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at thesiege of Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, and also thecannon balls then in use. Some of the latter are fourteen inches indiameter, and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds. The length ofthe cannon was about twelve feet. These dimensions are a proof of aslight improvement in this branch of military science, which was, nevertheless, still in its infancy. The awkwardness of artillery at thisperiod may be judged of by its slowness of fire. At the siege ofZeteuel, in 1407, five "bombards, " as the heavy pieces of ordnance werethen called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of aday; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege ofAlbahar, that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls inthe course of the twenty-four hours!

In the Italian wars between France and Spain, in the beginning of thesixteenth century, the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in usewas so great that only a very small number of pieces were brought uponthe battle-field. At the battle of Cerignola, in 1503, the number ofcannon in the French army was only thirteen. Indeed, during the greaterpart of this century, four or five pieces were considered sufficient foran ordinary army in the field, and many agreed to the doctrine ofMachiavelli, that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attackand defence of places. But in the wars of Henry IV. Of France, this armof service was again increased, and the troops which this king destinedagainst the house of Austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces. Great improvements were also made about this period in the manufactureof powder, and all kinds of fire-arms. Sully gave greater developmentto this arm of service, improving its materials, and increasing itsefficiency. Then, as at most other periods, the French were in advanceof most other nations in artillery. 

It was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of theseventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began togive place to more wieldy and useful pieces. A certain M. De Linardemonstrated, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, that cannontwelve feet in length would give a greater range than those seventeenfeet in length, the calibre being the same; but some years elapsedbefore advantage was taken of this discovery. In 1624, Gustavus Adolphuscaused experiments to be made to verify this point, and, on beingconvinced of its truth, caused his batteries to be furnished withshorter and lighter pieces. This great king introduced, about the sametime, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet iron andleather. Each piece had its chamber formed of thin metal and embraced bystrong iron rings; over these was placed a form of hardened leather, which was again encircled with rings and held compactly together. Thesepieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two men could easilymanoeuvre them. It was said that they would fire from eight to tenrounds without requiring repairs. Gustavus made use of them in all hismilitary operations from 1628 to the time of his death. They did himexcellent service on numerous occasions; being so very light they couldbe easily transported, and, on the field of battle, their movementscould be made to conform to the movements of his troops. 

As cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use, various inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced fromtime to time. Cannon were constructed with two or more barrels; somewere arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others at the mouth ofthe piece; two pieces were sometimes connected by horizontal timbers, which revolved about a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piecewould bring the other into battery; and various other arrangements ofthis description, which have recently been revived and some of thempatented as new inventions. The small arms employed at this period weremuch the same as those used at the present day, except the matchlock, which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. Arms of this descriptionwere sometimes made to be loaded at the breach, and guns with two, three, and even as many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. In the _Musée de l'Artillerie_ at Paris may be found many arms of thiskind, which have been reproduced in this country and England as newinventions. In this Museum are two ancient pieces, invented near the endof the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, which verynearly correspond with _Colt's patent_, with the single exception of thelock![33]

[Footnote 33: It is not to be inferred that the modern _improvements_(as they are called) are copied from the more ancient _inventions_. Twomen of different ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon thesame identical discovery, without either's borrowing from the other. ]

The _materiel_ of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided intotwo general classes: 1st. _Siege Artillery_, or such as is employed inthe attack and defence of places. 2d. _Field Artillery_, or such as isused in battle, or in the field-operations of an army. 

1. _Siege Artillery_ is composed of _mortars, large howitzers, Paixhanguns_ or _Columbiads_, [34] and _all cannon_ of _a large calibre. _ In ourservice this class of ordnance includes the twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, andthirteen-inch mortars, the sixteen-inch stone mortar, thetwenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carronade, and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers. 

[Footnote 34: These pieces were first invented by Colonel Bomford, ofthe U. S. Army, and used in the war of 1812. The dimensions of these gunswere first taken to Europe by a young French officer, and thus fell intothe hands of General Paixhan, who immediately introduced them into theFrench service. They were by this means first made known to the rest ofEurope, and received the name of the person who introduced them into theEuropean services, rather than that of the original inventor. All thesefacts are so fully susceptible of proof, that Europeans now acknowledgethemselves indebted to us for the invention; even General Paixhan givesup all claim to originality in his gun, and limits himself to certainimprovements which he introduced. The original gun, which was inventedby Colonel Bomford, and whose dimensions were carried to General Paixhanin France, is now lying at the ordnance dépôt, in New York harbor. ]

All these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast iron. Thissubstance is less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze, and the cannonmade of it are, on this account, much heavier than of the othermaterials; but for the naval service, and the attack and defence offortifications, the weight required to secure the necessary strength isnot very objectionable. Wrought iron and bronze are much more expensiveand less durable. Moreover, the difficulty of forging wrought iron inmasses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being broughtinto general use for artillery. Numerous attempts have been made, atdifferent periods, to construct large guns of this material, but nonehave yet been successful. Improvements which are now making in themanufacture of wrought iron, may render this the preferable material forthe smaller pieces of artillery; but the best informed military men deemit objectionable for the heavier cannon, both on account of its cost andthe imperfection of its manufacture. Even should the latter objection beremoved, its cost must prevent its general application to theconstruction of siege artillery. Charlatans in military science, both inthis country and in Europe, bring this subject up every fifteen ortwenty years as a new _invention_, and flaming notices of the_improvement_, and predictions of the revolution it is to effect in theart of war, are circulated in the newspapers to "gull" a credulouspublic; and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have beensquandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter ends in theexplosion of the "_improvement_, " and probably the destruction of the"_inventor_, " and perhaps also of his spectators. Let us be distinctlyunderstood on this subject. There may be _inventions_ and _improvements_in the manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing _new_ in its_application_ to the construction of cannon, for it has been used forthis purpose as long ago as the first invention of the art. 

2. _Field Artillery_ is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers. Inour service this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounderguns, and the twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. All these arenow made of bronze. This material is more expensive than cast-iron, butits superior tenacity renders it more useful where great weight isobjectionable. Improvements in the manufacture of cast iron may renderit safe to employ this metal in the construction of field-pieces. It isalso possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large enough, andthe cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-pieces. It ishere important to combine strength with lightness, and additionalexpense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object. 

The _projectiles_ now in use are solid shot, shells, strap-shot, case orcanister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, carcasses, grenades, and rockets. 

_Solid shot_ are now almost invariably made of cast iron, [35] formed inmoulds of sand or iron. This projectile is used under almost everycircumstance, whether in the battle-field or in the attack and defenceof places, and is the only one that is effectual against the stone wallsof forts. _Hot shot_ are used against shipping and wooden structures ofevery description. Red-hot balls were first employed by the king ofPoland, in 1575, but, on account of the difficulty of heating them withrapidity, and the danger of loading the piece with them, this kind ofprojectile was not in general use till a much later period. It was atfirst supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so great, whenheated to a red or white heat, as to prevent the ball from entering thepiece; it is found, however, that the windage is still sufficient forloading with facility. These red-hot balls are principally used to firewooden buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. They aretherefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and allfortifications on the seaboard should be provided with furnaces andgrates, arranged so as to heat them with facility and rapidity. 

[Footnote 35: In Mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shotand shells; but it is a poor substitute. ]

There are several kinds of _hollow-shot_ and _shells_, called _bombs, howitzes, grenades_, &c. They are made of cast iron, and usually in aspherical shape, the cavity being concentric with the exterior surface. The cavity was formerly made eccentric with the exterior, under thebelief that the heavier side would always strike first. The rotarymotion of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of nouse. Fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the shell bymeans of a fuse, which is so regulated that the explosion shall takeplace at the desired moment. Hollow-shot are used with advantage todestroy ordinary buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry;they, however, are of little avail in breaking the massive walls ofwell-constructed forts. Howitzes and grenades are particularly effectiveagainst cavalry and columns of infantry, and are much employed on thebattle-field; they are also much used in the attack and defence ofplaces. 

We find that as early as 1486 the Spaniards made use of a projectilesimilar to the modern bomb. "They threw from their engines largeglobular masses, composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed withgunpowder, which, scattering long trains of light, " says an eye-witness, "in their passage through the air, filled the beholders with dismay, anddescending on the roofs of edifices, frequently occasioned extensiveconflagration. " In the siege of Constantinople by Mahomet II. , shellswere used, and also mortars of enormous size. In 1572 Valturus proposedto throw, with a kind of mortar, "globes of copper filled with powder. "In 1588, an artificer of Venloo burned Wachtendeck by throwing bombsinto the place. A similar attempt had just been made at Berg-op-Zoom. The use of this projectile became quite common in France under LouisXIII. Howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century. They areof German origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of _hausmitz_. 

The _strap-shot_ consists of a round ball attached to a _sabot_ of thesame calibre, by means of two strips of tin passing over the shot atright angles, and fastened to a third, which is soldered around thesabot. One end of the sabot is arranged for attaching it to thecartridge, the other being hollowed out to receive the shot. Thesupposed advantages of this arrangement are, 1st, a diminution of thewindage; 2d, the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity; and, 3d, thecartridge is transported with greater safety. 

The _case_ or _canister-shot_ is prepared by filling a tin canister withgrape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to the cartridge by meansof a sabot. There being two sizes of grape-shot, and one ofmusket-balls, we have three kinds of canister-shot calculated to reachat different distances. The three sizes of shot are frequently mixed inthe same canister. This projectile is particularly effective againstlines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short. 

The _grape-shot_ is composed of small balls arranged round an uprightpin attached to a plate of wood or iron. The concave cast-iron plate ispreferable, as it increases the range of the shot. The balls are coveredwith canvass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. This shot is used for the same purposes as the canister. 

_Light_ and _fire-balls_ are formed of an oval case of sacking, filledwith combustible matter, and attached to a culot of cast-iron. The wholeis covered with a net of spun-yarn. Light-balls are used to light up ourown works, and are not armed; fire-balls being employed to light up theworks or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them withpistol-barrels, in order to prevent, any one from extinguishing them. When made of very combustible materials, and used for setting fire towooden structures, they are denominated _incendiary balls_. 

_Carcasses_ are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls; theyare of two kinds: 1st, the _shell-carcass_; and, 2d, the _ribbed-carcass_. The first is composed of a spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, onebeing at the top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this andat right angles with each other; the shell is filled with matter highlycombustible. The second is formed of iron ribs connected by iron straps, and attached at the ends to culots of the same material, the whole beingfilled with combustible composition. This is more expensive than the shellcarcass, and cannot be fired with as great accuracy; it is now seldom used. Carcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls. 

_Smoke_ and _suffocating balls_ are used to drive an enemy fromgalleries and mines. They are thrown by hand. 

The _personnel_ of the French artillery was for a long time retained, together with the engineers, under the general direction of the "GrandMaster of Cross-bows. " In 1420 the master-general of artillery was madeindependent of the grand-master of cross-bows; but previous to the reignof Louis XIV. , the artillery troops had no organization as a separatecorps. In 1668 six companies of _canoniers_ were created, and soon aftertwo companies of _bombardiers_. In 1693 the first regiment of fusilierswas changed into a _royal regiment of artillery_, and both the canoniersand bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it. The staff ofartillery, towards the close of this reign, was composed of onegrand-master, sixty lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty_officiers-pointeurs_. In 1721 the artillery was divided into fivebattalions and stationed at Metz, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Perpignan, andLa Fère, where they established schools of theory and practice. In 1756the artillery was organized into seven regiments, each regiment havingits own separate school. This organization continued without anyremarkable change till the Revolution. 

During the earlier campaigns of the French Revolution it is impossibleto trace out the changes that took place in army organization, everything was then so irregular and confused, the troops of different armsbeing frequently united together. In the campaign of 1792 there weresome six or seven regiments of foot artillery, and ten companies ofhorse. This arm was greatly increased during the subsequent campaigns, and its organization was completely remodelled by Napoleon on hiselevation to the head of the government. The _personnel_ of theartillery was then composed of a general staff, nine regiments of footand six of horse. In 1815 it was reduced to eight regiments of foot andfour of horse. 

The _personnel_ of artillery in modern army organization is divided intofour classes: the _staff, guards, artificers, _ and _troops_. 

I. The _Staff_, or _Ordnance_, as it is called in our service, ischarged with the construction of all the materials of artillery, and thecollection of powder and military stores. As the lives of persons usingthese materials, and, in a considerable degree, the success of war, depend upon the nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured andcollected, it is obvious that the members of this branch of theartillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications. Inthe French army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred andeighty-three officers of different grades: also twenty-four officers ofthe general staff are attached to this service. In our army the_ordnance_ is composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades. 

II. _Artillery-guards. _--These in our service are divided into twoclasses: 1st. _Military Store-keepers. _ 2d. _Ordnance Sergeants. _ Bothare alike charged with the care and preservation of the artilleryproperty and stores at the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines. In our army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz: fifteencommissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ordnance sergeants. We seldom have more than this number of permanent posts; each one cantherefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of theartillery stores. In the French service there are three hundred andfifteen of these artillery guards; they are divided into three classes. 

III. _Artificers. _--This class of men are employed in the constructionand repairs of military materials. In most of our arsenals and armoriesit is thought to be best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece orcontract. Nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of thisdescription are found to be both useful and necessary. We have threehundred and thirty of these in our army, viz: two hundred and fiftyenlisted "ordnance men, " and eighty "artificers" attached to theregiments. In the French army they have for the service of the arsenalsand establishments, one hundred and forty-nine "ouvriers, " and twelve"artificers;" there are also three hundred and sixty "ouvriers" andseventeen "armuriers" attached to the corps of artillery, making in allfive hundred and thirty-eight. 

IV. _Artillery Troops. _--Artillery, as an arm of service, is divided inthe same manner as its _materiel_; the _field_-artillery being intendedfor field service, and the garrison or _siege_-artillery, for the attackand defence of places. The troops of the artillery corps of a modernarmy usually do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, asoccasion may require. When employed in the service of a campaign, artillery is usually divided into two classes: 1st. _Foot_ Artillery;and 2d. _Horse_ Artillery. 

In the early history of artillery, as has already been shown, but fewpieces were ever brought upon the battle-field. Charles VIII. Crossedthe Alps with a pretty large train; but a part of these were hand-guns, and but very few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle;indeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little use exceptin sieges. At the battle of Gravelines the army of Philip II. Had onlyseventeen pieces of artillery; and at the battle of Ivry the French hadonly four pieces of cannon, and two culverins: the army of the Leaguehad also only four pieces. At the battle of Moncontour the opposingarmies had but eight pieces each. 

Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden not only improved the character ofartillery, but also gave to it great development as an arm of service. At the battle of Bréetenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery, great and small, and at the camp of Nuremberg he numbered about threehundred. This king also made a more skilful use of his cannon by unitingthem more in mass than had been done by his predecessors; his system wasnevertheless very imperfect. In the disposition of this arm on the fieldof battle, a vast improvement was made by Condé, Turenne, and PrinceEugene of Savoy. Frederick the Great also made great use of this arm, and was the first to introduce horse artillery. This mode of usingfield-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances renderit an invaluable arm. The promptness and rapidity of its movementsenable it to act with other troops without embarrassing them. The Frenchsoon introduced into their army the improvements made by the king ofPrussia, and in 1763 the celebrated Gribeauval appeared. He improved theform of the cannon and greatly diminished the weight of field artillery, giving it an organization which has been but slightly changed since histime. 

The successive improvements in artillery have for a long timeconstituted a prominent feature in war. The power of this arm to throwprojectiles to a great distance, and to overturn and destroy opposingobstacles, renders it a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strongbarrier and safeguard of states. It is an essential element in all armyorganization. 

In our army we have four regiments of artillery, forming the basis offorty batteries. In the French service there are fourteen regiments, forming the basis of two hundred and six field batteries. 

The term _battery_, when applied to artillery as an arm of service, refers to a permanent organization of a certain number of cannon, withthe men and other accessaries required to serve them. This is the unitof force in this arm. The regimental organization is a mere nominalarrangement, for in actual service artillery acts by batteries, andnever by regiments. Its strength is therefore invariably estimated bythe number of its batteries. 

A battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of them beinghowitzers. The lighter batteries would, in our service, be formed ofsix-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers; and the heavier oftwelve-pounder guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. These heavybatteries would usually form the reserve. Each piece being attended byits caisson, this formation would give twelve carriages to each battery, six for the guns and six for the caissons. The extra caissons form apart of the reserve, and move with the train. In some foreign services abattery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons. 

This arm admits of three formations--_in column, in battle_, and _inbattery_. In column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces, eachpiece being followed or preceded by its caisson. Columns ofhalf-batteries are sometimes formed, and also columns of single pieces;but the latter ought never to be employed except in cases of necessityin passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the enemy. 

In order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their caissonsforming a second line, at the distance of a few paces. 

When in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the same way as forbattle, except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and preparedfor firing. 

The movements and manoeuvres of foot artillery correspond with those ofinfantry, and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry, a batterybeing regarded as a battalion or squadron, of which the pieces form theplatoons. Mounted batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity thanthe trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the gallop can bekept up only for a very short time; but this is of no great importance, as the batteries never accompany cavalry in the charge. 

The French and German writers discuss artillery as employed in battle, under two distinct heads--1st, as an arm of preparation, and 2d, as anarm of succor. 

I. As an arm of preparation it serves, 1st, to protect the deploying ofthe other troops; 2d, to disorganize the enemy's masses, and tofacilitate the action of infantry and cavalry, by weakening the intendedpoints of attack; 3d, to force an enemy to evacuate a position byoverthrowing obstacles with which he has covered himself; 4th, to keepup the action till the other troops can be prepared to strike thedecisive blow. 

The force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of itsfire; rash valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery thanskill, patience, and cool courage. Artillery always acts at a distance, and in mass; single pieces are seldom employed, except to coverreconnoitring parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish. Mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or three hundred yardsof the enemy's infantry; but this is only done with a strong support ofother troops, and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. Thebatteries do not accompany the charge, but they should always follow upand complete the success; mounted batteries are particularly useful inpursuit. If Murat, in 1812, had accompanied his attacks uponNeveroffskoi's retreating columns of sixty thousand infantry by two orthree batteries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have beencaptured or destroyed. 

Artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow its fire tobe drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the enemy is at too great adistance to be reached. It is a very common thing in a battle, to employtwo or three pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, inorder to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire before theproper time. The waste of material is not the only loss attending thiserror; the troops are fatigued and disheartened, while the courage andconfidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak andinaccurate fire. To avoid such an error the commanding officer of abattery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the effectiveranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a correct estimate ofdistances. For this purpose the eye should be frequently practised intime of peace in estimating the ranges for different calibres. 

The effective range of a 12-pounder field-piece

 is about . . . . . . 1000 yds. " " " " 6 " " 800 " " " " " 24 " howitzer, 600 " " " " " 12 " " 500 " " " " " grape and case shot is from . . . . . . 300 to 500 "

Even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a largeportion of the projectiles are lost. In the attack on Spires, a wholecolumn of artillery expended its fire while at a distance of 900 yardsfrom the enemy, who, of course, received little or no injury. In firingfrom fortifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery maytherefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy comes within thelongest range. 

II. As an arm of succor, the artillery serves, 1st, to give impulsiveforce to the attacking columns; 2d, to assist in arresting, or at leastin retarding, the offensive movements of an enemy; 3d, to protect theavenues of approach, and to defend obstacles that cover a position; and, 4th, to cover a retrograde movement. 

Mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effective in attack;but batteries of foot are better calculated for defence. The cannoniersare so armed as to be capable of defending their pieces to the lastextremity; they therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columnsof infantry. "As to pretending to rush upon the guns, " says Napoleon, "and carry them by the bayonet, or to pick off the gunners by musketry, these are chimerical ideas. Such things do sometimes happen; but have wenot examples of still more extraordinary captures by a _coup de main?_As a general rule, there is no infantry, however intrepid it may be, that can, without artillery, march with impunity the distance of five orsix hundred toises, against two well-placed batteries (16 pieces) ofcannon, served by good gunners; before they could pass over two-thirdsof the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed. * * * * Agood infantry forms, no doubt, the sinews of an army; but if it wererequired to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, itsgood quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. In thefirst campaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France had in thegreatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance inwhich twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, wereever carried by the bayonet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles ofJemmapes, Nordlingen, and Fleurus, the French had an artillery superiorto that of the enemy, although they had often only two guns to onethousand men; but that was because their armies were very numerous. Itmay happen that a general, more skilful in manoeuvring, more expert thanhis adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain successesduring a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferiorto that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a generalengagement, his inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt. "

History furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery inprotecting avenues of approach:--such as the defile of Köesen at thebattle of Auerstedt; the avenues between the redoubts of Pultowa, &c. , &c. 

When an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by that portion ofits cavalry and mounted artillery which has suffered least during thebattle. By placing the squadrons of horse and the light batteries inechelon, the retiring column may be well protected. The artillery, byusing the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in battery andfiring. It was in this way that at the battle of Albuera, in 1811, theFrench artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre ofthe Anglo-Spaniards till the army effected its retreat; the artillerythen retired in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, underthe protection of the cavalry. 

We have already discussed, under the general head of tactics, theposition and use of artillery on the battle-field a few additionalremarks must suffice. 

As a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions from whichthey can employ their fire to advantage, and also be free to move in anydirection that the progress of the battle may require. Advantage shouldalways be taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c. , to cover and conceal theguns till the moment they open their fire. Elevated positions are, contrary to the common opinion, generally unfavorable, for artillerycannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression. Theslopes in front should be of considerable length, otherwise the ballswould do very little execution upon that portion of the column of attackwhich occupied the valley. The ground should also be smooth, for ifrough the balls will either bury themselves in the earth, or ricochet ata high angle of deflection, thus destroying a considerable part of theeffect of the fire. The counterforts or spurs of hills are favorable forartillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading fire, the slopesof the principal range. Batteries should seldom be placed so as to fireover other troops, for they will not only be intimidated by this fire, but also exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. A largenumber of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, but aninterval should be left between the guns of forty or fifty feet, according to the locality. The most favorable position for this arm inordinary ground, is in the intervals between the regiments or brigadesof the line, and far enough in advance of this line not to draw upon theother troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of the lineare also favorable for the action of this arm. 

Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line ofbattle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised ingeneral rules. Whenever this disposition has been made, it has resultedfrom the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiarcircumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander todeviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. Such was the case withNapoleon at Wagram. In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged tosubstitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms. 

In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, artillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomesan auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts inconcert with that arm. 

The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of theinfantry. [36]

[Footnote 36: To qualify himself for the duties connected with his armof service, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughlyacquainted with--. 

_The Instruction for United States Field Artillery, horse and foot;

Capt. Anderson's Instruction for Garrison Artillery;

Kinsley's Notes on Pyrotechny;

Knowlton's Notes on Gunpowder_, &c. ; and

The writings of Thiroux and Piobert on theoretical and practicalinstruction, and the writings of Jomini, Decker, and Okotmeff, on theuse of this arm on the field of battle. 

The following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wishto make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches ofartillery. 

_Histoire général de l'artillerie_. Brunet. 

_L'artillerie à cheval dans les combats de cavalerie_. Par un officierde l'artillerie Prussienne. 

_Considérations et experiences sur le tir des obus à bulles_. Bormann. _Essai sur les obusiers_. Dusaert. 

_Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie_. Le Bourg. 

_Traité sur l'artillerie_, (traduit de l'Allemand. ) Rouvroy. 

_Bombardier Français_. Bélidor. 

_Mémoires d'artillerie_. St. Rémy. 

_Essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et cellede siége_. Dupuget. 

_Mémoires sur les nouveaux systèmes d'artillerie_. St. Aubin. 

_Treatise on Artillery_. Müller. 

_Artificial Fire-Works_. Jones. 

_Table de tir les canons et obusiers_. Lombard. 

_On Gunpowder_. Antoni. 

_Recherches sur l'artillerie en général_. Texier de Norbec. 

_Déscription de l'art de fabriquer les canons_. Monge. 

_Procédés de la fabrication des armes blanches_. Vandermonde. 

_Manuel de l'artilleur_. Durtubie. 

_Traité du mouvement des projectiles_. Lombard. 

_Treatise on Artillery_. Scheel. (Translated from the German. )

_Traité pratique des feux d'artifice_. Morel. 

_Manuel du canonnier marin_. Cornibert. 

_New Principles of Gunnery_. Robins. 

_Mémoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives_. Cotty. 

_Recherches sur la poudre_. Cossigny. 

_Supplement_. Cossigny. 

_Fabrication de la poudre_. Renaud. 

_American Artillerist's Companion_. Toussard. 

_Tables des portées des canons et canonades de la marine_. Cornilwert. 

_Traité d'artifices de guerre_. Bigot. 

_Traité élémentaire de la fabrication des bouches à feu_. Dartein. 

_Traité de l'art de fabriquer la poudre à canon_. Bottée et Riffault. 

_L'art du salpétrier_. Bottée et Riffault. 

_Dictionary of Artillery_. Hoyer. (German. )

_New Experiments on Gunnery_. Hutton--(Hutton's Tracts. )

_Des bois propres au service des Arsenaux_. Herbin de Halles. 

_Instruction sur le service de l'artillerie_. Hulot. 

_Manoeuvres de force_. Bigot. 

_Balistique_. Obenheim. 

_Treatise on Artillery_. German. Scharnhorst. (Translated into French, 1840. )

_Essai sur l'art de pointer_. Poumet. 

_Réflexions sur la fabrication des bouches à feu_. Lamartillière. 

_Mémoire sur la planchette du canonnier_. Obenheim. 

_Aide-Mémoire_. Gassendi. 

_Observations on the use of Artillery at the sieges of Badajos, St. Sebastian, &c_. 

_Treatise on Artillery_. Lallemand. 

_Elémens de pyrotechnie_. Ruggieri. 

_Nouvelle force maritime_. Paixhans. 

_Dictionnaire d'artillerie_. Cotty. 

_Recherches balistiques_. Coste. 

_Poudres fulminantes_. Vergnaud. 

_Manuel de la métallurgie du fer_. Culman. 

_Pyrotechnic militaire, _ (traduit de l'Allemand, par R. De Peretsdorff. )

_Journal des Sciences Militaires_. 

_Pyrotechny_. Cutbush. 

_Traité élémentaire d'artillerie_. Decker. 

_Fusées de guerre_. Montgery. 

_Documens sur la matière à canons_. Hervé. 

_Observations sur le nouveau système d'artillerie_. Allix. 

_Système d'artillerie de campagne_. Allix. 

_Pocket Gunner_. Adye. 

_On the Rocket System_. Congreve. 

_Essai sur l'art des fontes_. Serres. 

_Receuil de Mémoires sur la poudre à canon_. Proust. 

_Mémorial de l'artilleur marin_. Michel. 

_Observations sur le nouveau système de l'artillerie_. Poumet. 

_Mémorial d'artillerie_. 

_British Gunner_. Spearman. 

_Régles de pointage à bord des vaisseaux_. Montgery. 

_Manuel du maître de forges_. Landrin. 

_Naval Gunnery_. Douglass. 

_Métallurgie du fer_ (traduit de l'Allemand, par Culman. ) Karsten. 

_Aide-Mémoire à l'usage des officers d'artillerie_. (Strasbourg. )

_Traité de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie, _ (traduitde l'Allemand par Peretsdorff. ) Grewenitz. 

_Supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie_. Cotty. 

_Memoir on Gunpowder_. Braddock. 

_Manuel de l'armurier_. Paulin-Desormeaux. 

_Journal des armes spéciales_. 

_Cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies_. Serres. 

_Expériences sur la fabrication et la durée des bouches à feu en fer etbronze, _ (traduit de l'Allemand par Peretsdorff. ) Meyer. 

_Applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie_. Thierry. 

_Aide-Mémoire d'art militaire_. Lebas. 

_Mémorial à l'usage de l'armée Belge_. 

_Instructions and Regulations for the service and management of heavyordnance in the British service_. 

_Experiences sur les principes du tir, _ faites à Metz, en 1834. 

_Traité d'artillerie théorique et pratique_. Piobert. 

_Aide-Mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie, _ (avec approbationdu comité d'artillerie. )

_Manuel d'artillerie à l'usage des officiers de la RépubliqueHelvétique. _ Bonaparte, (Napoleon Louis. )

_Expériences comparatives entre des bouches à feu en fonte de fer, d'origine Franzaise, Anglaise et Suédoise, _ faites à Gavres, en 1836. 

_Expériences faites à Brest en_ 1831, _sur les canons. _ Paixhans. 

_Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie. _ Le Bourg. 

_Expériences sur des projectiles creux, _ faites en 1829, '30, '31. 

_Instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles, _ (traduit del'Allemand par Peretsdorff. ) Decker. 

_Effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war. _ Simmons. 

_Expériences sur les poudres de guerre, _ faites à Esquerdes, en 1832, '33, '34, and '35. Maguin. 

_Cours d'artillerie à l'usage des sous-officiers. _ De Crépy. 

_Instruction théorique et pratique d'artillerie, _ à l'usage des élèvesde St. Cyr. Thiroux. 

_Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges. _

_Manuel historique de la technologie des armes à feu, _ (traduit del'Allemand par M. Rieffel. ) Meyer. 

_Formules rélatives aux effets du tir sur affût. _ Poisson. 

_Manuel de l'artificer. _ Vergnaud. 

_Etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances del'Europe, _ (traduit par Mazé; Ire partie, Artillerie Anglaise. ) Jacobi. (Six other parts have been published in German, containing descriptionsof the French, Belgian, Hessian, Wirtemburg, Nassau, and Swedishsystems. )

_Introduction à l'étude de l'artillerie. _ Madelaine. 

_Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. Description de la fabrication des bouches ù feu à la fonderie royale deLiège. _ Huguenin. 

_Poudre ù canon. _ Timmerhans. 

_Procédés de fabrication dans les forges, _ (extrait du cours sur leservice des officiers dans les forges. )

_Renseignements sur le matériel de l'artillerie navale de la GrandeBretagne. _ Zeni et des Hays. 

_Théorie des affûts et des voitures de l'artillerie. _ Migout et Bergery

_Artillerist's Manual. _ Griffith. 

_Handbuch für die K. K. Oesterreichische Artillerie Offiziere, _ (manualfor the Austrian artillery officers. )

_Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der Preussischen Artillerie, _ _mitErläuterungen_, (collection of plates of the Prussian artillery, withexplanatory text. )

_Histoire des fusées de guerre. _

_Ordnance Manual_, for the use of the officers of the United StatesArmy. 

_Experiments on Gunpowder_. Capt. Mordecai. 

_Pyrotechny_, for the use of the Cadets at the United States MilitaryAcademy. Kinsley. 

_Notes on Gunpowder, Percussion Powder, Cannon, and Projectiles_. Lt. Knowlton. ]

CHAPTER XII. 

ARMY ORGANIZATION--ENGINEERS. 

_Engineers_. --The term _engineer_ is derived from the unclassical Latinword _ingenium_, which was applied both to a _machine_ and the _mind_ or_skill_ of the person who devised or constructed it. 

It was Philip Augustus, say the French writers, who first introducedengineers (_engigneurs_, or _engignours_, as they were called) intoFrance, and restored the art of sieges. The engineers of that age wereseldom charged with the construction of works of military defence, but, like Archimedes at Syracuse, and Longinus at Palmyra, they directedtheir attention principally to devising implements of war and the mosteffective manner of using them. Engines of war were at that time dividedbetween the _engigneurs_ and the _artilliers_; the former being chargedwith the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller weapons usedfor throwing projectiles. After the invention of gunpowder, the oldbattering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. , disappeared, and with them the_engigneurs_, or masters of engines. The new inventions were united withthe few old projectile machines that remained in the artillery, and theengineers were for a time left almost without employment. The revival ofthe art of fortification was very slow, and the modern system scarcelybegan to be developed till near the sixteenth century. 

We must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history ofmilitary engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, asconstituting an essential element of an army organization. The subjectof fortification, and the history of its various changes, will beexamined in the next chapter. 

The engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm ofservice, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are aboutas two to three. They are divided in the same manner as the artillery, viz. :--1st, the staff; 2d, guards, or fort-keepers; 3d, artificers; and4th, the troops. 

I. The officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in timeof peace with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortificationsand other defensive works; the construction and preparation of allmilitary materials, and stores connected with this arm; and (in ourservice) with the disbursements of money connected with theseoperations: in time of war they are charged with the attack and defenceof military works, the laying out and construction of field defences, redoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c. ; in the attack they form a part ofthe vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a partof the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c. , soas to retard an enemy's pursuit. 

From the important character of these duties as connected with the meansessential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expendedin these operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirementsshould be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of amilitary engineer. This officer requires a knowledge of chemistry, toguide his choice of materials for mortars, cements, and mastics; ofmineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany, for timber andthe means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out hiswork and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls, embankments, &c. ; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing hismachinery; of military engineering, in his plans of fortifications; andof all the higher branches of military science, in selecting positionsfor these works, such that they shall have the proper relations to themeans of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies in thefield. The avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in mostEuropean armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money, politics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specifiedby law of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from themost distinguished graduates of the military academy. Formerly ourservice suffered most severely from the employment of incompetentpersons, introduced through political influence from civil life, andforeign charlatans, the refuse of European armies. Many of our earliermilitary works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were modelled uponsystems for a long time discarded by the profession in Europe, and evensome of those which have been constructed within the last thirty yearsare made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they arealready crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws and regulationsseem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses anderrors, it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this armof our service requires modifications and extensions to give it therequisite degree of efficiency, and to economize the publicexpenditures. 

The wars of Louis XIV. First led to a regular military organization, anda regular system of defence. In these wars the engineers received greatdevelopment, and have ever since occupied a prominent position as partsof an army organization. We therefore find in all the great sieges andbattles of this era a large and continually increasing number ofengineers and engineer troops, this force being gradually augmented asthe true principles of war became better understood, and as the wants ofthe service required. Even in the earliest of these battles we find theengineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war of 1688, twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege ofPhilipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at Huy, ten at Charleroi, eightat Ath, thirty at Barcelona, &c. Such losses were good proofs of theusefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, theirnumber was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army containedeight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners. 

The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of theFrench Revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing itand in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had beendriven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy andactivity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skillin the other arms, but the science of the engineer could not be acquiredin a day. 

In 1799, the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred andforty-nine officers, without including the general officers, commandingdepartments, or those connected with the engineer troops. The sameorganization was continued in 1804. The engineer staff of the Frencharmy now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. We have in ourservice forty-three engineer officers, for staff duty, who are nowengaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventyfortifications, and other works of a civil and military character. 

II. _Engineer Guards_, or _Fort-Keepers_, are a class of men chargedwith the general care of forts, and all public property deposited in theseveral engineer dépôts and garrisons, and in the public works duringtheir construction. 

There are five hundred and fifty of these "_gardes du Genie_" in theFrench army, who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and areassimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals, marches, &c. _In our service we have no engineer guards orfort-keepers. _

This defect in our organization has been the cause of seriousinconvenience, and the consequent waste of public property. The expenseof hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the costof supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintainthe good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence of engineerofficers, and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements andstores connected with this department of the army. It has already beenshown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artilleryservice, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, witha much greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed noassistants of this kind. 

III. _Engineer artificers_ are a class of men employed in the practicaloperations of constructing forts and other military defences, and inmaking and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops inthe operations of sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, inconstructing field-defences, and in the attack and defence offieldworks. 

As very few new fortifications are now required in France, the servicesof engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in ourservice, where large sums of money are annually expended upon militarydefences, There are, however, in the French army a corps of engineerartificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-fournon-commissioned officers, with a variable number of privates, organizedinto two companies. _But in our army we have no regular engineerartificers!_ In our artillery service we have three hundred and thirtyenlisted artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary to theartillery service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons wouldit be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equalnumber of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications; for theannual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in thecorresponding branch of the artillery service. 

IV. _Engineer troops_ are divided into three classes--1st, _sappers andpioneers_; 2d, _miners_; and 3d, _pontoniers_. 

In the French army of 1799, there were four battalions of sappers, consisting of 120 officers and 7, 092 men. In 1804, Napoleon organizedfive battalions of these troops, consisting of 165 officers and 8, 865men. Even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in Germanyand Spain, and he was obliged to organize an additional number ofsappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries. The pioneers were thenpartly attached to other branches of the service. There is, at present, in the French army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detachedfor the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of_sapeurs-conducteurs_, and forty-two companies of _sapeurs_. In theFrench army of 1799, there were six companies of miners, consisting of24 officers and 576 men. In 1804, Napoleon increased these troops tonine companies, containing 36 officers and 864 men. The present Frenchpeace establishment contains six companies of miners, organized much thesame as under Napoleon. In the French army of 1799 there were tworegiments of pontoniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But this number wasfound too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency wastemporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. In thepresent French army organization, there are eleven companies ofpontoniers, forming a regiment of sixty-three officers. 

_We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers_, and, in caseof war, would be found without the means of executing any militaryworks, or performing any military operation which would require engineertroops. 

In the preliminary stages of army organization under Louis XIV. , infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these dutiesby the engineers. This irregularity of service soon caused difficultiesand losses, and the evils springing from it were so great, that Vaubanurged the propriety of a separate organization. In 1670 he officiallyrecommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundredsappers and _ouvriers_, and in a subsequent report on the value of thesetroops, used the following language: "They would be useful in peace aswell as in war, and would be the means of saving much in allfortifications where they should be employed. In fact, I have not theleast doubt that they would save annually to the king much more thantheir pay. I assert all I have said on this subject with as muchconfidence as if I had seen the result; and I can, with the samecertainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving largenumbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from thestern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, thelaborers and those who support them; which necessity would not arisehad we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen wellinstructed. To such a degree have I felt the necessity of sappers, atevery siege at which I have been present, that I have always had reasonto repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of thiscompany. "

Such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man whofought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, andbuilt or repaired three hundred fortifications. His anticipations of theusefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have eversince received the most careful attention, and now form, as has justbeen shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the Frenchservice. The fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organizedby Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements ofthe French military power. 

In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustrationof the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies notsupplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantagesresulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. Wehave already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in thehands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatalconsequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of nationaldefence. Every student of military history will immediately call to mindthe influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria, Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Osopo, Klagenfurth, &c. , in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Port Bard, thefortifications of the Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c. , in 1800; of Milan, Turin, Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c. , in 1805; theimportance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c. , to the French in 1806, and thefatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign, of their totaland culpable neglect of their own fortifications. 

All military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in thePeninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previousto the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success ofhis arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her allies, contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa and Tarragona, with their broken walls anddefective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, anddid much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula. 

Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here. The lines of Torres-Vedras, the field-works of Ronda, the intrenchedcamps of the Pyrenees, Bayonne, Toulouse, &c. , are examples under thishead. In fact, field-works played a most important part in all ofNapoleon's wars. We might mention the redoubt of Montenotte, theintrenchments at Milesimo, the batteries of Lobau, the field-defences ofHougomont, La Haye-Sainte, and Papelotte at Waterloo, and numerous othercases equally striking. Just before the battle of Waterloo, Wellingtonemployed some eighteen thousand peasants and two thousand horses, underthe direction of British officers of engineers. In speaking of thesedefences, Colonel Pasley says: "It may be easily conceived that to havedirected such a great body of workmen to proper advantage, by means of afew officers of engineers, would have been impossible, but for thesystem adopted of subdividing the various works among thenon-commissioned officers and privates of the engineer troops, each ofwhom was made responsible for laying out the details of his own portion, and for the direction of a party of from twenty to one hundred men, oreven more, according to circumstances. "

But to return to the Peninsular war. These campaigns exhibit in strongcolors the advantages derived, on the one side, from a well-organizedengineer corps, and the losses, delays, and defects suffered on theother, until the defects of the organization were remedied. Napoleonentered Spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through strategy andwell-directed force, gained possession of the important fortresses ofthe Peninsula; seizing in this way the strategic routes and importantgeographical points, he was enabled to retain possession of the countryfor eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him, the absence of himself and his best generals in Germany, and the greatinefficiency of Joseph and of many of his generals. These fortificationswere old, and of strength inferior to modern works of defence, but itrequired years and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure toexpel from the country those who had possession of them. 

For the first five years of this war the English struggled with a mostimperfect army organization. [37] When "the first serious siege, " saysNapier, was undertaken by the British army, "to the discredit of theEnglish government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means ofprosecuting such an enterprise. The engineer officers were exceedinglyzealous; and many of them were well versed in the theory of theirbusiness. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utterdestitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps ofsappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on anapproach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defendedby the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age. "

[Footnote 37: In a letter dated February 11th, 1812, Wellington wroteto the Secretary of State as follows:--"I would beg leave to suggest toyour lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment acorps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantageswe undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of thisdescription. There is no French _corps d'armée_ which has not abattalion of sappers and a company of miners; but we are obliged todepend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of theline; and although the men are brave and willing, they want theknowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among themconsequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most criticalperiod of the siege. "]

"The best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrificethemselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence andincapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. Thesieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession ofbutcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary totheir art, were denied the engineers. " Colonel J. T. Jones writes innearly the same terms of the early sieges in the Peninsula, and withrespect to the siege of Badajos, adds in express terms, that "a body ofsappers and miners, and the necessary fascines and gabions, would haverendered the reduction of the work certain. "[38] Soon after this siege abody of engineer troops arrived from England, but their number wasinsufficient, and Wellington, having learned by sad experience theimportance of engineer troops, ordered a body of two hundred volunteersto be detached from the line, "and daily instructed in the practice ofsapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the construction ofbatteries, &c. " The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which immediately followedthis organization, was conducted with greater skill and success than anyother till nearly the close of the war; and all military writers haveattributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer forceengaged in the siege. This arm was now gradually increased, and the lastyear of the war the engineer force with the English army in the fieldconsisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engineers andsurveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one thousand six hundred andforty-six sappers, miners, artificers, &c. , one thousand three hundredand forty horses and one hundred and sixty carriages. 

[Footnote 38: Colonel Pasley states that only _one and a half yards ofexcavation_, per man, was executed _in a whole night_, by the untrainedtroops in the Peninsular war; whereas an instructed sapper can easilyaccomplish this _in twenty minutes_, and that it has been done by one ofhis most skilful sappers, at Chatham, _in seven minutes!_]

During all this time the French furnished their armies in Spain withwell-organized engineer forces. We have endeavored to form a comparisonof the number of French engineers and artillerists employed on thesepeninsular sieges. But from the loose manner in which these details areusually given by historians, it is almost impossible to distinguishbetween the two. Both are not unfrequently given under the same head, and when a distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer _staff_is mentioned under the head of engineers--the sappers, miners, artificers, the train, &c. , all being put down as artillery. In thefollowing table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our ownarmy. The trains of both arms are left out, for frequently that of onearm performed the duties of the other. Moreover, in our service aportion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is performed bythe quartermaster's department. For those who wish to know the exactorganization of the French engineer train, we give it as it existed in1811, viz. :--seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, onehundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates, twohundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, conveying five thousand twohundred and seventy intrenching tools, one thousand seven hundredcutting tools, one thousand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, twohundred and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hundredand eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and stores, each articlebeing made to a particular pattern. The pioneers in Spain actedsometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other, and we haveassigned them accordingly in the table. The pontoniers, however, in ourservice are included with the engineers; we have therefore put them, inour table, in the same column with the engineers. 

_____________________________________________________________________ | Engineer |Artillery staff, | Total | Total of |staff, sappers, | horse and foot | of | artillery | miners, | artillery, |engineers, |staff, horse | pontoniers, | ouvriers, and | sappers, | and foot |and pioneers. | pioneers. | miners, |artillery, Name of Siege. |________________________________|pontoniers, |ouvriers, | | | | | and | and |Offic. | Men. |Offic. | Men. | pioneers. | pioneers. _______________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________Saragossa, | 86 | 1189 | 90 | 1276 | 1275 | 1360Rosas, | 21 | 211 | -- | -- | 232 | 461Girona, | 54 | 603 | 62 | 1299 | 657 | 1361Astorga, | 7 | 91 | 17 | 427 | 98 | 444Lerida, | 15 | 316 | 11 | 208 | 331 | 219Meguinenza, | 31 | 278 | -- | -- | 312 | 1361st Ciudad | | | | | |Rodrigo, | 34 | 441 | -- | -- | 475 | 1019Almeida, | 34 | 489 | -- | -- | 523 | 1019Tortosa, | 43 | 429 | 32 | 381 | 472 | 413Tarragona, | 50 | 681 | 46 | 701 | 731 | 747Olivensa, | 10 | 106 | -- | -- | 116 | 1861st Badajos, | 25 | 707 | 41 | 699 | 732 | 740Tarifa, | 12 | 235 | 17 | 148 | 247 | 165Peniscola, | 13 | 138 | 9 | 183 | 151 | 1922d Ciudad | | | | | |Rodrigo, | 3 | 12 | 8 | 160 | 15 | 1682d Badajos, | 9 | 256 | -- | -- | 265 | 268Burgos, | 4 | 124 | 3 | 126 | 128 | 129Castio Udiales, | 5 | 68 | 8 | 197 | 73 | 205St. Sebastian, | 13 | 248 | 7 | 166 | 261 | 173________________|_______|_______|_______|________|___________|____________

From this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at thesesieges, making the comparison on the basis of our own organization, isabout the same as for the present French army in Algeria, or a littlemore than five of engineers to six of artillery. 

Thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops inconnection with fortifications, alluding only incidentally to the use ofmilitary bridges and the passage of rivers. In the early wars of theFrench Revolution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from thedeficiency of this branch of service, the operations of the Frenchgenerals were on several occasions very much restricted. The evil wasafterwards remedied in a great degree by the introduction of severalbattalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization. On manyoccasions, during his wars, did Napoleon feel and acknowledge theimportance of these troops; but on none, perhaps, was this importancemore clearly shown than in the passage of the Beresina during hisretreat from Moscow with the wreck of his army. The Russians had cut thebridge of Borisow and taken position in great strength on the right bankof the river, both at this point and below; the French, wearied withlong and difficult marches, destitute of artillery, provisions, andmilitary stores, with a wide and deep river in front, and a powerfulenemy on their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a mercilessclimate, and dispirited by defeat--every thing seemed to promise theirtotal destruction. "General Eblé, " says an English general officer, inhis remarks on this retreat, "who, from the beginning of the campaign, had made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction ofmilitary bridges, was specially charged with the important duty ofproviding for the passage of this river; and he discharged that dutywith a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly Napoleon owedhis escape and the wreck of his army its safety. General Eblé had begunto prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in thisoperation. He formed, with every care, a train sufficient for thetransport of all the tools and stores that might be required; and, further to provide against casualties and accidents, every man belongingto the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from Smolensko atool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of nails: and fortunatewas it for the army that he did so; for such was the difficulty ingetting through the carriages containing stores, that only twoforge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved. Tothese the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels ofcarriages that were abandoned on the march. Much was sacrificed to bringoff these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, asSegur observes, that exertion '_sauva l'armée_. '"

But it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are mostlikely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resultingfrom the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with itsimportance and the advantages to be derived from its possession. A fewexamples of this nature, drawn from military history, may beinstructive. We need not go back to the disastrous passage of theVistula by Charles XII. , the failure of Marlborough to pass the Dyle, and Eugene to cross the Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessfulattempts of Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The warsfollowing the French Revolution are sufficiently replete with usefulinstruction on this subject. [39]

[Footnote 39: Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give oneexample, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It wasdeemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince ofBaden in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrownacross the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victorygained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all forwant of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a _single_ bridge, thepassage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequentlyinterrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorderensued, and the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only asmall part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of thebattle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the wholeoperation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroythis bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers saved it. We hereremark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important victory; 2d, from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed ingreat peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince ofBaden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, thissingle bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces;4th, the skill of the little corps of French pontoniers saved thebridge, and of consequence, the army. ]

In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that theboats of the bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of forcommercial purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, "theconquerors of Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at atime too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the meansof crossing a river. " A few boats were procured from the Wahal and theMeuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the Moselle; but "theseoperations consumed precious time, and _four months_ thus passed away inpreparations. " Even after other things were all ready, the army wasobliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges;during this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and withvery little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage. 

In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the Frenchcollected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed theRhine at Neuweid and Kehl without loss or delay. The latter of thesepassages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, andcertainly does credit to the general who directed it. But Moreau'sbridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign, his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparinga new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing allprivate boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty ofcollecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great asentirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the oppositebank of the river. The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted ofno further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in theopen day, and in face of the enemy. Undertaken under such circumstances, "the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time verydoubtful;" and had it failed, "Moreau's army would have been ruined forthe campaign. "

Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly howimportant it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers. "I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allowthe enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide anddeep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. We had nomeans of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselveswith the means of embarkation found at Placentia and its environs. Lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advancedguard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and thesewere easily overcome. The passage was now continued withoutinterruption, but very slowly. _If I had had a good ponton-equipage, thefate of the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passingthe river by successive embarkations saved it. "_

In the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to pass the Aar, andattacked the French on the opposite side, but for want of suitableequipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collectedsufficient forces to intercept the passage; he was now obliged to enterinto a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to withdraw hisbridges. 

The operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, led to the mostglorious results, but their execution was attended with the greatestdifficulties. The passage of the Alps was greatly facilitated by theability of the chief engineer, Marescot, and the skill of the troopsunder his command; and the facility of passing rivers afforded Napoleonby his pontoniers, had an important influence upon the success of thecampaign. "The army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers andsappers; the pontons of course could not be taken across the St. Bernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and Tesin forconstructing bridge equipages. " Moreau's army in the same year profitedwell by his pontoniers, in the passages of the Inn, the Salza, theTraun, the Alza, &c. , and in the pursuit of the Austrian army--a pursuitthat has but a single parallel example in modern history. 

The facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches, constructed redoubts, fortified depots, and grasped the great strategicpoints of the enemy in the campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilfulorganization of his army, and the efficiency given to the forcesemployed in these important operations. The engineer staff of the Frencharmy at this period, consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, and there were four battalions of sappers, of one hundred and twentyofficers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six companies of miners, of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men; and tworegiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred andsixty men. On the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is oneof the most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directedefforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the Danube, and thesuccessful operations of the French sappers in securing it, formed oneof the principal turning points in the campaign. 

The same organization enabled the French to perform their wonderfullyrapid and decisive movements in the Prussian campaign of 1806, and thenorthern operations of 1807. 

In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, theInn, the Salza, the Traun, and other rivers emptying into the Danube, and reached Vienna before the wonder-stricken Austrians could preparefor its defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect apassage of the Danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and themelting snow of the mountains. Considering the depth and width of theriver, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose apassage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to theFrench from any failure in its execution; taking all these things intoconsideration, Jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous anddifficult of all the operations of War. " Here the fate of the armydepended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers andpontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. Whenthe pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and evenfifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. So skilfully werethese operations conducted, that Napoleon's immense army crossed over insafety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same dayfought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire before numbersvastly superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on theisland of Lobau, and intrenched his position. Surrounded by the broadand deep channel of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilfulenemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest goodfortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and efficiency of theengineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown acrossthe river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almostinsurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put thefinishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So high an estimate didNapoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when thepassage was completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructingengineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the French_corps du genie_. 

On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina tothe left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, theElbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country, the French derived vast advantages from the experience and skill oftheir engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escapingthrough their means from the grasp of their pursuers. When, however, thedisasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army, and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, theysustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses. Of this character we may mention the passage of the Elster by the bridgeof Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of thosecharged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridgearrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters ofthis small river. So sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridgeequipages, in the winter of 1813-14, that he addressed to his ministerof war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: "If I had hadpontons, I should have already annihilated the army of Schwartzenberg, and closed the war; I should have taken from him eight or ten thousandwagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper meansI could not pass the Seine. " Again, on the 2d of March he wrote: "If Ihad had a bridge equipage this morning, Blücher's army had been lost. "Whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, will be convinced of the full force of these remarks. 

In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces, had penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat becameexceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of beinglost. The English army was at this time very deficient in engineertroops, and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges, and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order to cover his retreat andimpede the advance of the French, the commander-in-chief, says Napier, "directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for wantof miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt. "

In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, anddestroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington. Butwhile Soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guardthe river with proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at differentpoints, crossed over his army, surprised the French, and, had it notbeen for the singular delay and indecision of General Murray, would mostcertainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, hisoperation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected thesafety of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and baggage, and hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army wasagain arrested at the river Cavado, and placed on the very brink ofdestruction, when the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting apassage at the Ponte Nova; the same daring officer opened, on the sameday, a way for the further escape of the French across the Misarella bythe Saltador. 

In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English tocross the Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put ina state of defence. Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass thisriver at Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish pontons;but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to waittill Capt. Squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, couldconstruct other means for effecting a passage. Every thing was donethat genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, theoperations of the army were greatly delayed--"_a delay, _" says thehistorian, "_that may be considered as the principal cause of those longand bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington morethan a year on the frontiers of Portugal. _"

We might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceiraand Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington'spassage of the Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812; the passageof the Adour and Garonne in 1814; and the failure of the mines to blowup the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c. ; but a sufficient number ofexamples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantageof maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers, miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of suchtroops, as a component part of an army organization. 

It has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must alwaysform the basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid downby military writers, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixthof the infantry, according to the character of the war; the artilleryabout two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry; and theengineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery, --say abouttwo-thirds. The staff and administrative corps must vary according tothe nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of war. The former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latterfrom twenty-five to seventy-five, [40] as a general rule. These ratioswould give for a good army organization;

 Staff, about . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5 Administrative service--pay, medical, commissary, quarter-master, &c. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 65 Infantry, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 650 Cavalry, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 130 Artillery, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 90 Engineers, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 60 ----- Total, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 1, 000

In a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like theIndians in this country, the natives opposed to the English in India, tothe French in Algeria, or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry, artillery, and engineers would be diminished, and the infantry andadministrative corps proportionably increased; the former because lighttroops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe, and thelatter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in newand uncultivated countries. The French forces in Algeria, in 1844, amounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following proportion:--

 Staff, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4. 7 Administrative, &c. , . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 112. 3 Infantry, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 687. 3 Cavalry, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 86. 6 Artillery, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 61. 2 Engineers, . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . 47. 9 --------- 1000 men. 

[Footnote 40: This supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters, hospital-servants, &c. , to be enlisted men, and not persons hired forthe occasion as is done in our army. ]

In small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry andcavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field, becausetroops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case ofemergency, than for those which require more scientific information, andtechnical skill and instruction. The staff and engineers are evidentlythe most difficult to be formed in case of war, and next to these theartillery and administrative corps. 

In this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework ofan army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, thegreat mass of our military force. This is the starting point in ourmilitary system, and the basis of our army organization. Let us seewhether this principle is carried out in practice. 

For every thousand men in our present organization[41] we have, For the staff, 2 Administrative, 20[42] Infantry, 513 Cavalry, 150 Artillery, 310 Engineers, 5 ---- 1000

[Footnote 41: These numbers are the real rather than the _nominal_proportions, many of our officers being called _staff_, who properlybelong to one of the other classes. ]

[Footnote 42: Much of the administrative duty in our army is done byunenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. Where suchis the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be nohigher than is represented above. ]

We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times asnumerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and ourengineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in awar establishment. To this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalryin our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as thelatter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery. But for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also beproportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as isactually the case. 

Experience in the first campaigns of the American Revolution stronglyimpressed on the mind of Washington the absolute necessity of forming aregular and systematic army organization. But so difficult was it toobtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek hisengineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to makedrafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularlyinstructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by theofficers of this corps. An order, in his own handwriting, giving thedetails of this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779. Untilmen are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shallbe formed by drafts from the line. "The duties of the companies ofsappers and miners, " he continues, "shall be under the direction of theengineers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all worksnecessary for the attack or defence of places, as circumstances mayrequire. On a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of thecompanies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of thecolumn, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening andmending the roads, and removing obstructions, " &c. &c. 

The great difficulties encountered by Washington in instructing hisinexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made himthe more earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it wasfor us _In peace to prepare for war. _ The preparation here meant is notthe keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing army, ever readyto take the field; but rather the formation of a small body, educatedand practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of theprofession; a body which shall serve as the _cadre_ or framework of alarge army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiersof the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired bypractice. How far have we accomplished this object, and what will be theprobable operations in case of another contest with a European power?New and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose aveteran and disciplined army. From these troops we shall expect all thebravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiasticlove of liberty. But we cannot here expect much discipline, militaryskill, or knowledge of the several branches of the military art. Thepeaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation ofthe military character. How, then, are we to oppose the hostile force?Must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and deadbodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of theenemy? To some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so, for government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for suchan event. Fortifications have been planned or erected on the mostimportant and exposed positions; military materials and munitions havebeen collected in the public arsenals; a military school has beenorganized to instruct in the military sciences; there are regularly keptup small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but capable ofsoon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is inthe use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionallymuch larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number ofmen and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizensalready partially acquainted with the use of the cannon. But anacquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not theonly practical knowledge requisite in war. In the practical operationsof an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges suddenlyerected and suddenly destroyed, fieldworks constructed and defended, batteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in orderand defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened, mines sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed;trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous othermilitary implements and machinery are to be constructed. Have ourcitizens a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in ourmilitary establishment for a body of men instructed and practised inthis branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an army thenecessary efficiency for this service? Unfortunately this question mustbe answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that thefuture historian will have to say of us, as Napier has said of theEnglish:--"_The best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrificethemselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence andincapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war, without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. Their sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the commonestmaterials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied theengineers_. "[43]

[Footnote 43: The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated bymost authors on Military Organization and Military History, and by theseveral writers on Military Engineering. Allent, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Rocquancourt, Pasley, Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay de Vernon, maybe referred to with advantage. Pasley, Douglas, Jones, and Napier, speakin the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in theactive operations of a war, and of the absolute necessity of organizingthis force in time of peace. A list of books of reference on MilitaryEngineering will be given at the close of the following chapters. 

While these pages are passing through the press, Congress has authorizedthe President to raise _one company_ of engineer troops! This number isaltogether too small to be of any use in time of war. ]

CHAPTER XIII. 

PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 

_Fortification_ is defined, --the art of disposing the ground in such amanner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army thelongest time possible. If the work be placed in a position of muchimportance, and its materials be of a durable character, it is calledpermanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of _field_, or_temporary_. Fieldworks are properly confined to operations of a singlecampaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupiedonly for a short period. Generally these works are of earth, thrown upby the troops in a single day. They are intimately connected with asystem of permanent fortifications, but from the facility of theirconstruction, no provision need be made for them before the actualbreaking out of war. Indeed, they could not well be built beforehostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determinedby the position of the hostile forces. 

Having already described the general influence of permanentfortifications as a means of national defence, we shall here speakmerely of the principles of their construction. It is not proposed toenter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belongto the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclatureand use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word, suchgeneral information as should belong to officers of every grade andcorps of an army. 

The first species of fortification among the ancients was of course verysimple, consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. A wall wasafterwards used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. It was foundthat a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy'sbattering-rams; to remedy this evil, towers were built at shortintervals from each other, forming a broken line of salient andre-entering parts. These towers or salient points gradually assumed ashape approximating to the modern bastion. 

After the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to theattack and defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthenramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works, for the receptionof the new artillery. Moreover these walls were soon found inadequate toresist the missiles of the besiegers, and it became necessary to replacethem by parapets of earth. In order to cover the retaining walls ofthese parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also found to benecessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise thecounterscarps. The traces or plans of the works, however, received nomaterial change till about the close of the fifteenth century. 

It is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. Someattribute it to an Italian, and with considerable show of reason, for abastion was built at Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said, fortified Otranto in this way, in 1480, but whether the system waspreviously known among the Turks cannot be determined. Others attributethe invention to Ziska, the celebrated leader of the Hussites. It ismost probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was avery gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several countriesat about the same time. 

Fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished inItaly under the Medicis, and that country furnished Europe with its mostskilful engineers. Catharine of Medicis introduced into France many ofher countrymen, distinguished in this profession; among these may benamed Bellamat, Bephano, Costritio, Relogio, Vorganno, the two Marini, Campi, and Hieronimo, who built several important places and directedthe sieges of others. These able foreigners were rivalled by somedistinguished French engineers, who laid the foundation of the "_corpsdu Genie_" which has since become a school of military instruction forthe world. Among the early French engineers may be distinguishedLafontaine De Serré, Feuquières, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had beenappointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more speciallydirected to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself inthe construction of any fortification. 

In Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Albert Durerdistinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book isremarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements whichwere made by those who followed him. This is the more to be wondered atas he was not a professed engineer. After him followed Spekel, a nativeof Strasburg, who died in 1589. His writings are valuable as showing thestate of the art at that time, and the changes which he himselfintroduced. He was an engineer of much practical knowledge andexperience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Golletta, Vienna, Jula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c. 

The first French engineer who wrote on fortification was Errard deBar-le-Duc, who published near the close of the sixteenth century. As anengineer, he was rivalled by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. Errard fortified Amiens, built a part of the castle of Sedan, and aportion of the defences of Calais. Under the reign of Louis XIII. , Desnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were greatly distinguished. Devillepublished in 1628. He was a man of much learning and experience; but heis said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the principlesof the Italian school, with most of its errors. Pagan began his militarycareer while young, and became _maréchal de champ_ at the age of 38, when, having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled torelinquish his brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his age, and was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science. In hisplans he inclined to the Dutch rather than the Italian school offortification. He published in 1645. 

At the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had been forced toresort to military defences to protect themselves against theaggressions of the Spaniards. As the Dutch were inferior in othermilitary means, fortification became one of the vital resources of thecountry. Their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were in manyrespects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies of the time. Freytag, their principal engineer, wrote in 1630. Some of hisimprovements were introduced into France by Pagan. He was preceded byMarolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan, ) who published in 1613. 

In Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, wrote on fortification in 1671. He was aman of great experience, having served at the sieges of Candia, Phillipsburg, Bonn, Riga, Bremen, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at thesiege of Vienna in 1683. His writings are said to contain the groundworkof Montalembert's system. 

In Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, &c. , we find nogreat improvement in this art. Several Italians, however, distinguishedthemselves as engineers under the Spaniards. The fortifications ofBadajos are a good example of the state of the art in Italy and Spain athat epoch. The citadel of Antwerp, built by two Italian engineers, Pacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become celebrated for the siegeit sustained in 1832. 

The age of Louis XIV. Effected a great revolution in the art offortification, and carried it to such a degree of perfection, that ithas since received but slight improvement. The years 1633 and 1634 areinteresting dates in the history of this art, as having given birthrespectively to Vauban and Coehorn. The former was chief engineer ofFrance under Louis XIV. , and the latter held a corresponding positionunder the Dutch republic. Coehorn's ideas upon fortification areconceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country, and, although well suited to the object in view, are consequently ofless general application than those of his more distinguishedcotemporary and rival. The best specimens of his mode of constructionthat exist at the present day, are the fortresses of Manheim, Bergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and Breda. 

Coehorn was followed in Holland by Landsberg, an able and practicalengineer, who to much reading added extensive experience, having himselfserved at sixteen sieges. His system was in many respects peculiar, bothin trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all revertmentsof masonry. His plans could be applied only to marshy soils. The firstedition of his work was published in 1685. 

But the career of Vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in thehistory of fortification; it constitutes the connecting link between therude sketches of the earlier engineers, and the well-established formwhich the art has since assumed. In his earlier works we find many ofthe errors of his predecessors; but a gradual change seems to have beenwrought in his mind by reflection and experience, and these faults weresoon remedied and a new and distinct system developed. Vauban has leftno treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortification havebeen deduced from his constructions, and from detached memoirs leftamong his papers. The nature of his labors, and the extent of hisactivity and industry, may be imagined from the fact that he fought onehundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built orrepaired three hundred fortifications. His memoirs, found among hismanuscript papers, on various military and political subjects, arenumerous, and highly praised even at the present day. But his beautifuland numerous constructions, both of a civil and military character, arereal monuments to his genius. The best illustrations of his principlesof fortification occur at Lille, Strasbourg, Landau, Givet, andNeuf-Brisack. His writings on mines, and the attack and defence ofplaces, are, by the profession, regarded as classic. His improvements inthe existing method of attack gave great superiority to the arms of hiscountrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and capture his rivalCoehorn, in his own works. He died in 1707, and was soon succeeded byCormontaigne. 

The latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system, butlimited himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustriouspredecessors. His improvements, however, were both extensive andjudicious, and are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds asone of the ablest military engineers the world has ever produced. Hisworks on the subject of fortification, besides being elegantly written, contain the most valuable information of any works we have. His mostadmired constructions are to be found at Metz, Thionville, and Bitche. The beautiful crown works of Billecroix, at Metz, are perfect models oftheir kind. Cormontaigne died in 1750. 

Cotemporary with him were Sturin and Glasser. The former deviated butslightly from the systems of his predecessors, but the latter inventedseveral ingenious improvements which gave him great reputation. 

Next follows Rosard, a Bavarian engineer; and Frederick Augustus, kingof Poland, who devoted himself particularly to this art. The formercasemated only the flanks of his works, but the latter introducedcasemate fire more extensively than any one who had preceded him. 

In France, Belidor and De Filey published about the middle of the lastcentury. They were both able engineers but their systems were inferiorto that of Cormontaigne. 

In 1767 De la Chiche introduced a system of fortification in manyrespects original. He raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all hismasonry, and casemated a great portion of his _enceinte_. For exteriordefence, he employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated firefrom his casemates; the direct fire of the latter secured his ditches. 

Next to De la Chiche follows Montalembert, who published in 1776. He wasa man of much experience and considerable originality, but of no greatability as an engineer. Most of his ideas were derived from De la Chicheand the German school of Rimpler. His plans have generally been rejectedby his own countrymen, but they still have advocates among the Germans. 

General Virgin, a distinguished Swedish engineer, wrote in 1781. Hisidea of strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglectof the larger cities, constitutes one of the principal novelties in hissystem. 

In 1794, Reveroni devised a system in which the casemates ofMontalembert were employed, but his guns were so arranged as to beemployed in barbette while the besiegers were at a distance, andafterwards to be used for casemated fire. The casemate gun-carriage, which formed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never muchemployed in practice. 

Bousmard, a French emigrant, published in 1790. He adopted the generaltrace of Vauban, but introduced modifications in the details essentiallydifferent from those of Cormontaigne. Some of these modifications arevery valuable improvements, while others are of a more doubtfulcharacter. Bousmard is, on the whole, a very able writer, and his worksshould be found in the library of every military engineer. 

Carnot's celebrated treatise was published in 1810. He was evidently aman of genius, and during his career at the head of the War Departmentof France, numerous and very important improvements were made in theseveral branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. Hiswork on fortification exhibits much originality and genius, but it isdoubtful whether it has very much contributed to the improvement of thisart. His ideas have been very severely, and rather unfairly criticisedby the English, and particularly by Sir Howard Douglas. 

Chasseloup de Laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of muchcapacity and talent. He followed Napoleon in nearly all his campaigns, and conducted many of his sieges. He remodelled the fortifications ofNorthern Italy and of the Lower Rhine. He published in 1811. Theimprovements which he introduced are numerous and valuable, and heprobably contributed more to advance his art, and to restore theequilibrium between attack and defence, than any other engineer sinceCormontaigne. After the fall of Napoleon and the partition of hisempire, the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions ofChasseloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his systemremains. 

The cotemporaries of Chasseloup were mostly engaged in active fieldservice and sieges, and few had either leisure or opportunity to devotethemselves to improvements in permanent fortification. 

Choumara published in 1827. His system contains much originality, andhis writings give proof of talent and genius. He has very evidently moreoriginality than judgment, and it is hardly probable that his systemwill ever be generally adopted in practice. 

The Metz system, as arranged by Noizet, as a theoretical study, isundoubtedly the very best that is now known. It, however, requires greatmodifications to suit it to different localities. For a horizontal site, it is probably the most perfect system ever devised. It is based on thesystem of Vauban as improved by Cormontaigne, and contains several ofthe modifications suggested by modern engineers. It is applied in amodified form to the new fortifications of Paris. 

Baron Rohault de Fleury has introduced many modifications of theordinary French system in his new defences of Lyons. We have seen nowritten account of these works, but from a hasty examination in 1844, they struck us as being too complicated and expensive. 

The new fortifications of Western Germany are modifications of Rempler'ssystem, as improved by De la Chiche and Montalembert. It is said thatGeneral Aster, the directing engineer, has also introduced some of theleading principles of Chasseloup and Carnot. 

The English engineers have satisfied themselves with following in thetrack of their continental neighbors, and can offer no claims tooriginality. 

Of the system of fortification now followed in our service we mustdecline expressing any opinion; the time has not yet arrived forsubjecting it to a severe and judicious criticism. But of the systempursued previous to 1820, we may say, without much fear ofcontradiction, that a worse one could scarcely have been devised. Instead of men of talent and attainments in military science, most ofour engineers were then either foreigners, or civilians who owed theircommissions to mere political influence. The qualifications of theformer were probably limited to their recollection of some casual visitto two or three of the old European fortresses; and the latter probablyderived all their military science from some old military book, which, having become useless in Europe, had found its way into this country, and which they had read without understanding, and probably without evenlooking at its date. The result was what might have been anticipated--atotal waste of the public money. We might illustrate this by numerousexamples. A single one, however, must suffice. About the period of thelast war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of New Yorkharbor, at an expense of some two millions of dollars. Six of these were_circular_, and the other two were _star forts_--systems which had beendiscarded in Europe for nearly two thousand years! Three of these worksare now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and large sums ofmoney have recently been expended on the other three in an attempt toremedy their faults, and render them susceptible of a good defence. Moreover, a number of the works which were constructed by our engineersbefore that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientificeducation introduced through the medium of the Military Academy--we say, a considerable number of our fortifications, constructed by engineerswho owed their appointment to political influence, are not only wrongin their plans, but have been made of such wretched materials andworkmanship that they are already crumbling into ruins. 

A fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a mound of earth, termed, the _rampart_, which encloses the space fortified; a _parapet_, surmounting the rampart and covering the men and guns from the enemy'sprojectiles; a _scarp wall, _ which sustains the pressure of the earth ofthe rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable obstacle to anassault by storm; a wide and deep _ditch_, which prevents the enemy fromapproaching near the body of the place; a _counterscarp wall_, whichsustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch; a _covered way_, whichoccupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth calleda _glacis_, thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purposeof covering the scarp of the main work. 

The work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped, iscalled the _enceinte_, or _body of the place_. Other works are usuallyadded to the enceinte to strengthen the weak points of thefortification, or to lengthen the siege by forcing the enemy to gainpossession of them before he can breach the body of the place: these aretermed _outworks_, when enveloped by the covered way, and _advancedworks_, when placed exterior to the covered way, but in some wayconnected with the main work; but if entirely beyond the glacis, and notwithin supporting distance of the fortress, they are called _detachedworks_. 

In a bastioned front the principal outwork is the _demi-lune_, which isplaced in front of the curtain; it serves to cover the main entrance tothe work, and to place the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings. 

The _tenaille_ is a small low work placed in the ditch, to cover thescarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger'sbatteries erected along the crest of the glacis. 

The _places of arms_, are points where troops are assembled in order toact on the exterior of the work. The _re-entering places of arms_, aresmall redans arranged at the points of junction of the covered ways ofthe bastion and demi-lune. The _salient places of arms_ are the parts ofthe covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and demi-lune. 

Small permanent works, termed _redoubts_, are placed within thedemi-lune and re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works. Works of this character constructed within the bastion are termed_interior retrenchments;_ when sufficiently elevated to command theexterior ground, they are called _cavaliers. _

_Caponniers_ are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditchfrom the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, and also from thedemi-lune to the covered way, by which communication may be maintainedbetween the enceinte and outworks. 

_Posterns_ are underground communications made through the body of theplace or some of the outworks. 

_Sortie-passages_ are narrow openings made through the crest of theglacis, which usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way, by means of which communication may be kept up with the exterior. Thesepassages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the fire of theenemy. The other communications above ground are called _ramps, stairs, _&c. 

_Traverses_ are small works erected on the covered way to intercept thefire of the besieger's batteries. 

_Scarp_ and _counterscarp_ galleries are sometimes constructed for thedefence of the ditch. They are arranged with loop-holes, through whichthe troops of the garrison fire on the besiegers when they have enteredthe ditch, without being themselves exposed to the batteries of theenemy. 

In sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for the defence ofthe ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire ofartillery; the whole being protected from shells by a bomb-proofcovering over head: this arrangement is termed a _casemate_. 

Sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so that the interiorone shall fire over the more advanced; the latter in this case is called_a faussebraie_. 

If the inner work be separated from the other it is called a_retrenchment_[44] and if in addition it has a commanding fire, it istermed, as was just remarked, a _cavalier_. 

[Footnote 44: The term _retrenchment_ implies an interior work, which isconstructed within or in rear of another, for the purpose ofstrengthening it; the term _intrenchment_, on the contrary, implies anindependent work, constructed in the open field, without reference toany other adjoining work. ]

The _capital_ of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle. Allthe works comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions istermed a _front_: it is taken as the unit in permanent fortification. 

Fig. 39 represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front, of aregular and simple form, on a horizontal site. 

 _A, A, A_--Is the enceinte, or body of the place. _B_--The bastions. _C_--The main ditch. _D_--The covered ways. _E_--The re-entering places of arms. _F_--The salient places of arms. _G_--The demi-lune. _H_--The demi-lune ditch. _J_--The demi-lune redoubt. _L_--The ditch of the demi-lune redoubt. _M_--The redoubt of the re-entering places of arms. _N_--The ditches of the redoubts. _O_--The tenaille. _P_--The double caponier. _a_--The traverses. _b_--The sortie-passages. _c_--Stairs. _d_--Cut in the demi-lune to flank the redoubt of the re-entering place of arms. 

Fig. 40 represents a section through the line _mn'_ of the precedingfigure. 

 _A_--Is the rampart. _B_--The parapet. _C_--The ditch. _D_--The scarp wall. _E_--The counterscarp wall. _F_--The glacis. _G_--The covered way. _H_--The terre-plain. _J_--The parade. 

Sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort, soas to sink the gun below the crest, and thus more effectually cover themen from the enemy's fire. 

But guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than whenmounted in barbette; moreover, the embrasures present openings throughwhich an enemy may penetrate in an assault. Owing to these objections, they are employed only for the protection of particular points; that is, where it is important to cover the artillerists from the enemy's fire, or where the guns are to be used merely to protect a ditch, or toenfilade a road, &c. The bottom of the embrasure is called the _sole_, the sides are called _cheeks_, and the mass of earth between twoembrasures, the _merlon_. Embrasures may be made either direct oroblique, according as the fire is required to be perpendicular oroblique to the parapet. 

A _coverport_ is a small outwork of any convenient form, erectedimmediately in front of a gateway, to screen it from the enemy's fire. 

A _counterguard_ is a more extensive work, constructed in front of apart of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork of greaterimportance, which it is intended to cover. These are sometimes called_coverfaces_, from their situation and object; but the former term ismost commonly used. 

Sometimes outworks, called _tenaillons_, consisting of one long and oneshort face, are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front offortification, for the purpose of prolonging the siege. (Fig. 41. )

Small, or _demi_-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as to cover onlyone-half of the demi-lune, and then a _bonnet_ constructed in front ofthe salient of the demi-lune. (Fig. 42. ) In this case the bonnet isflanked by the short faces of the demi-tenaillons; these short faces arethemselves flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the longfaces. 

A _horn-work_ consists of a front of fortification, and two wingsresting on the faces of bastions of a front of the fortress. Itsometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet, as in the case ofdemi-tenaillons. (Fig. 43. )

A _crown-work_ consists of two fronts of fortification, and two wings. (Fig. 44. ) It is sometimes made _double_, and even _triple_. 

These works are also employed as advanced works, and placed entirely infront of the glacis. They have generally been added to a fortress forthe purpose of occupying some important piece of ground not includedwithin the limits of the main work. They may be constructed with coveredways, and sometimes it may be found advantageous to secure them byretrenchments. 

A _detached work_ may be made in any form deemed best suited to thesite. Being but remotely connected with the fortress, the latter willexercise but slight influence on the character of its plan orconstruction. They are usually of limited extent and slight relief, partaking much of the nature of field-works. [45]

[Footnote 45: The general principles of permanent fortification may bebest learned from the writings of Cormontaigne, St. Paul de Noizet, andLaurillard-Fallot. A list of valuable books of reference on the severalbranches of military engineering will be given at the close of the nextchapter. ]

CHAPTER XIV. 

FIELD-ENGINEERING. 

_Field-Engineering_ includes the making of military reconnaissances, temporary fortifications, and military roads; the planning andconstruction of military bridges; the attack and defence of militaryworks;--in fine, all the various duties of engineer troops, either inthe operations of a campaign, or in the dispositions on thebattle-field. 

_Military reconnaissance. _--By this term is meant an examination of aportion of the theatre of war, to ascertain its military character andresources. If the examination be made of a large district of country, and for an entire campaign, the reconnaissance is _general_; if made forcollecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of march, thepassage of a river, the position of an enemy, &c. , it is termed_special_. 

In making a general reconnaissance, great care should be taken tocollect accurate information respecting the general topography of thecountry; the character of the mountains, forests, and water-courses; thenature of the roads, canals, and railways; the quality of the soil, andthe amount of provisions and forage it produces; the population andcharacter of the cities, towns, and villages, the commercial andmanufacturing resources of every part of the country, and the means oftransportation to be found in each district. The plan of militaryoperations will be based on the information thus obtained, and anyserious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of thecampaign, and even the fate of the war. 

In a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but minute informationwill be required: the character of the roads must be given in detail;the nature of the water-courses, their depth and velocity; the positionand character of bridges, and fords;--in fine, a full description of allobstacles to be encountered, and the means that can be made availablefor overcoming these obstacles. 

A reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable informationfrom the published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined;additional matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, andfishermen; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities of thedistrict. But the officer should always verify this information, so faras practical, by personal examination. In making a reconnaissance in thevicinity of an enemy, he must be supported by a strong escort of mountedtroops, and in all his operations the greatest precaution will berequisite to ensure success. 

Some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or compass, will besufficient to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure, withconsiderable accuracy, the height of mountains, the width of streams, &c. , and an ordinary scale and dividers will enable him to make asuitable military sketch. 

_Temporary Fortification. _--It has been stated in the preceding chapterthat temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations ofa single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to beoccupied only for a short period; and that they are usually made ofearth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. Temporaryfortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may therefore beregarded rather as an _arm_ than an _art_. The principles of theirconstruction are derived, of course, from the theory of permanentfortification, but in applying these principles to practice in thefield, much greater latitude is allowed than in the exact scientificarrangement of permanent works. 

The purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they are commonlycalled) is to arrest, or at least to impede, the march of the attackingfoe; to shelter the defensive troops from the missive weapons of theassailants, and to detain them in a position where they will be exposedto the fire of the defensive force. The numerical and positive strengthof the assailed may be much less than that of the assailant, and yet anequilibrium exist; the material obstacles compensating for thedifference in numbers. Intrenchments, though inert masses, musttherefore be regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in thedefence of a position. 

Intrenchments consist either of _lines_ of works made to cover extendedpositions, or of _detached_ works designed simply to defend the groundthey occupy. The former generally present a front against the enemy inbut one direction, while the latter are usually closed on all theirsides. 

The following figures have been employed for the plan of simpleintrenchments, viz. : the polygon, redan, lunette, mitre, star-fort, andbastion. 

_Square_ or _polygonal redoubts_ are the most common forms given tofield-works, on account of the ease of their construction. But they havemany defects. There is a sector without fire in front of each salient, and the ditches are without protection. The latter objection also holdsgood against all circular works. 

The _redan_ (Fig. 45) is frequently used to cover a point in rear, as abridge, a ford, or a defile. When used alone, its gorge should be closedby palisades. Its ditches are unprotected. 

The _lunette_ (Fig. 46) has nearly the same defects as the redan. 

The _mitre_, or _priest-cap, _ (Fig. 47, ) may be employed with advantagewhen a cross-fire is required on the capital of the work. The_star-fort_ has all the defects, without the merit of simplicity, whichbelong to the polygonal redoubt. 

The _bastion-fort_ (Fig. 48) more fully satisfies the conditions of agood defence than any other plan; but it is less simple and easy ofexecution. It is usually composed of four or five fronts, but it may beapplied to a polygon of any number of sides. 

For the details of the construction of these several works, we mustrefer to the special treatises on field-fortification. 

Lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals. In adopting either plan, the engineer should avail himself of all thenatural obstacles presented by the position, so as to diminish the laborof erecting artificial means of defence. 

The simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the_cremaillière_ or indented line. When applied to an irregular site, orused to connect together distant and detached works, the indented linemay be regarded as a good disposition. Mitres and redans, connected bystraight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a combination oflarge and small redans, forming alternate salient and re-enteringangles. A continuous line of bastions is preferable to any otherarrangement, when there is plenty of time for their construction. 

Lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes andsquare redoubts. Other detached works may be employed in the same way. This manner of intrenching a position has several advantages, withdisciplined troops. The first shock of the assailant is sustained by thedetached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in the intervals, hisflanks become exposed to a deadly cross fire. These intervals also allowthe assailed to act on the offensive, by charging the enemy at theopportune moment. But with raw and militia forces it will be safer toresort to continuous lines. If cavalry form any part of the defensiveforce, it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through whichthese troops may charge. 

A vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form; thedimensions will, of course, vary with the nature of the soil, and thetime and means employed in their construction. The minimum dimensionsthat can be used with any considerable advantage are given in Fig. 49. 

In laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all availableartificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, houses, outbuildings, &c. Athickset hedge may be rendered defensible by throwing up against it aslight parapet of earth. Stone fences may be employed in the same way. Walls of masonry may be pierced with loop-holes and arranged for one ortwo tiers of fire. The walls of houses are pierced in the same manner, and a projecting wooden structure, termed a _machicoulis gallery_, issometimes made from the floor of the second story, to enable theassailed to fire down upon their opponents. This arrangement isfrequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savagefoe; but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery. Some have proposed galleries of this description in permanent works ofmasonry, but the project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion. 

In addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good engineer willalways find time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles, such as trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, stockades, fraises, chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, mines, &c. 

_Trous-de-loup_ are pits dug in the earth in the form of an invertedtruncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and about the same number offeet in depth. They are usually placed a few yards in front of theditch, and concealed by some slight covering. 

_Abattis_ are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis ofa work; the ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened. 

_Palisades_ are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with one endfastened in the ground and the other made sharp. They are placed injuxtaposition and connected together by horizontal riband-pieces. Thisarrangement is frequently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. Whenthe timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a primarydefence, it is called a _stockade_; when the stakes are placed at thefoot of the scarp, either horizontally or inclined, they receive thename of _fraises_. 

A _cheval-de-frise_ consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed withwooden or iron lances, which project some eight or ten feet. It is muchemployed against cavalry, and on rocky soils serves as a substitute forpalisades. 

_Crows'-feet_ are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes. They are thrown, with their points upward, on ground which is to bepassed over by cavalry. 

_Mines_ are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments, but morecommonly in the attack and defence of permanent works. They will benoticed further on. 

Fieldworks which are to be occupied for a considerable length of timewill usually have their steeper slopes revetted, and be arranged withscarp and counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such workshold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification. 

As examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the mannerof organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle ofFontenoy, in 1745, where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of MarshalSaxe enabled the French to repel, with immense destruction, the attacksof greatly superior numbers; to the battle of Fleurus, in 1690, wherethe Prince of Waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat "byneglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensableprecautions;" to the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where MarshalVillars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed thepassage between the woods of Sars and Lanière, exposed himself to adisastrous defeat; to the operations of 1792, where General Custine, byneglecting to intrench the heights that covered Bingen, as the engineershad recommended, exposed himself to those terrible disasters whichforced him to a precipitate retreat; to the works of Wervike, which, bya vigorous resistance on the 10th of September, 1793, saved the Dutcharmy from total destruction; to the intrenched camp of Ulm, in 1800, which for six weeks held in check the victorious army of Moreau; to theintrenched lines of Torres Vedras, in 1810, which saved from destructionthe English army of Wellington; to the field-defences of Hougomont, which contributed so much to the victory of Waterloo, &c. 

_Military communications. _--The movements of armies are always muchembarrassed by forests, marshes, and water-courses, and nothingcontributes more to the dispatch of military operations than the meansof opening practical and easy communication through these variousobstacles. 

It is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of themanner of constructing military communications through forests ormarshes. In a new country like ours, where almost every one has had someexperience in road-making, no very great technical knowledge is requiredfor the construction of temporary works of this character; but muchprofessional skill and experience will be requisite for the engineerswho make the preliminary reconnaissances, and fix the location of theseroads. 

Water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on the ice, or byferries and bridges. When temporary bridges or ferries are constructedby the army in the field, they are classed under the general head of_military bridges_, or more properly, _pontoniering_. 

Where the depth of the stream is not great, the current slight, and thebottom smooth and hard, the passage may be effected by _fording_. If thebottom be of mud, or large stones, the passage will be difficult anddangerous, even where the depth and current are favorable. Underfavorable circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the depth isnot greater than four feet; cavalry to a depth of four or five feet; butartillery, and engineer trains, cannot go to a depth of more than twoand a half feet, without greatly exposing their ammunition and militarystores The fords should be accurately staked out before the passage isattempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream, or cavalryand small boats stationed below, to prevent the loss of life. 

Ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. Its strength maybe increased by covering it with boards, or straw, so as to distributethe weight over a greater surface. By sprinkling water over the straw, and allowing it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. Butlarge bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot venture on the iceunless it be of great thickness and strength. An army can never trust, for any length of time, to either fords or ice; if it did a freshet or athaw would place it in a most critical state. Military bridges will, therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping open itscommunications. 

Military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and otherfloating bodies. Rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troopsfor passing rivers. 

_Trestle bridges_ are principally used for crossing small streams notmore than seven or eight feet in depth: they also serve to connectfloating bridges with the shore, in shallow water. The form of thetrestle is much the same as that of an ordinary _carpenter's horse, _i. E. , a horizontal beam supported by four inclined legs. These trestlesare placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, andconnected by string-pieces, (or _balks_ as they are termed in technicallanguage, ) which are covered over with plank. The action of the currentagainst the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables, or bymeans of boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, andfilled with stones. A more substantial form may be given to the bridgeby substituting for the trestles, piles, or the ordinary framed supportsso much used in the newer parts of our country. 

For examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer toCaesar's celebrated bridge across the Rhine; the passage of the Scheldtin 1588 by the Spaniards; the passage of the Lech in 1631 by GustavusAdolphus; the passage of the Danube in 1740 by Marshal Saxe; the greatbridge across the Var during Napoleon's Italian campaigns; the passageof the Lech in 1800 by Lecourbe; the bridges across the Piava, theIsonso, &c. , in the subsequent operations of the army in Italy; thecelebrated passage of the Danube at the island of Lobau in 1809; thepassage of the Agueda in 1811 by the English; the passages of the Dwina, the Moscowa, the Dneiper, the Beresina, &c. , in the campaign of 1812;the repairing of the bridge near Dresden, and the passage of the Elbe in1813, &c. 

_Rafts_ formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c. , are frequently used asmilitary bridges. They may be made to bear almost any weight, and willanswer for the passage of rivers of any depth and width, provided thecurrent be not rapid. 

Where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers, these timbers should be first placed in the water, to ascertain theirnatural position of stability, and then the larger ends cut away on theunder side, so as to present the least possible resistance to the actionof the current. They are afterwards lashed together by strong rope orwithe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into the timbers, andheld firm by bolts, or wooden pins. These rafts are kept in place byanchors and cables placed up and down stream. The roadway is formed innearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles. Emptycasks, and other floating bodies, may be substituted in place of logs inthe construction of rafts. 

For examples of the use of rafts in the construction of militarybridges, we would refer to the passage of the Seine in 1465 by CountCharolais; the passage of the Meuse in 1579, by Alexander Farnése; thepassage of the Vistula in 1704, the Borysthenese in 1709, and the Soundin 1718, by Charles XII. ; the passage of the Adige in 1796; the passageof the Po in 1807; and the subsequent military operations in the SpanishPeninsula. 

Military bridges are frequently made of _boats_, and the ordinaryriver-craft found in the vicinity of the intended passage. Flat-bottomedboats are the most suitable for this purpose, but if these cannot beobtained, keel boats will serve as a substitute. When these water-craftare of very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case, ) two smallerones may be lashed together to form a single support; they can bebrought to the same level by means of stone ballast. The gunwales mustbe suitably arranged for supporting the balks, or else frameworks shouldbe erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat. The arrangementof the roadway, anchors, &c. , is the same as before. 

A _bridge-equipage_ made to follow an army in its movements in thefield, is generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux, and thenecessary timbers, planks, anchors, &c. , for forming the roadway, andkeeping the bridge in its position. All these articles are constructedespecially for this purpose. All the wood-work should be of tough andwell-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary weight on the wagontrains. The bateaux should also be made of strong and light materials. For convenience in transportation, these boats are sometimes made withhinges so as to fold up. The ribs are usually of oak, and the sides andbottom of pine. Instead of plank, a covering of tin, copper, India-rubber, &c. , has sometimes been substituted. Floating supports ofthis character are often made in compartments, so as to prevent theirsinking when injured by the enemy's projectiles. Indian-rubber pontonsmay be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight rendersthem convenient for transportation. 

On navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateauxshould be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place, forming a_draw_ for the passage of river-craft. Indeed, it would be well, evenwhere the river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage oftrees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy against thebridge. 

An ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, for crossing ariver of from three to four hundred yards in width, and of moderatecurrent, will require a train of from sixty to eighty wagons. [46] Underfavorable circumstances, and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, the bridge may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the passageof an army in a few hours at most. [47] After the troops have passedover, the bridge may be taken up, and replaced on the wagons in from aquarter to half an hour. 

[Footnote 46: The number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatlydiminished if it be found that Indian-rubber boats may be used assupports for the bridge. The engineer department of our army are makingexperiments to determine this point. ]

[Footnote 47: In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across thePo, near Placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirelycompleted in eight hours. In 1757, two bridges of bateaux were thrownacross the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour; again, in the same year, athird bridge was thrown across this river near Dusseldorf, in six hours. In 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on the bank of theWeisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a round trot, and immediately began the construction of his bridge, without anyprevious preparation or examination. In less than three-quarters of anhour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four-horse wagons passedover on a trot, followed by a column of infantry. ]

The following examples will serve to illustrate the use of differentkinds of boat-bridges in military operations:--the passage of the Rhine, in 1702, by Villars; the passage of the Dnieper and the Bog, in 1739, bythe Russians; the passage of the Danube, in 1740, by Marshal Saxe; thepassage of the Rhine, near Cologne, in 1758, by the Prince of Clermont;the passage of the Rhine, in 1795, by Jourdan; the passage of the Rhine, at Kehl, in 1796, by Moreau; and again the same year, at Weissenthurn, and at Neuwied, by Jourdan; the bridges across the Rhine, at the siegesof Kehl and Huninguen, in 1797; the passage of the Limmat, in 1799, byMassena; the passages of the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piava, &c. , in 1800; the passages of these rivers again in 1805; the passagesof the Narew, in 1807, by the Russians; the several passages of theDanube, in 1809, by the French and Austrian armies; the passages of theTagus and Douro, in 1810, by the English; the passages of the Niemen, the Dwina, the Moskwa, and the Beresina, in 1812, by the French; and ofthe great rivers of Germany and France, in 1813 and 1814. 

A floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by the current ofthe stream, is termed a _flying-bridge. _ The usual mode of establishinga ferry of this kind, is to attach the head of the boat by means of acable and anchor to some point near the middle of the stream. Bysteering obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross andrecross at the same point. A single passage may be made in the same way, by the action of the current without the cable and anchor, but the boatin this case will be carried some distance down the stream. Rowboats areemployed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations; but thisprocess is too slow for the passage of a large force; it may very wellbe resorted to as auxiliary to other means. 

Steam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams, that an army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself ofthis means of passing the larger rivers. But, in a hostile country, orin one already passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to relywith confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. A well-organizedarmy will always carry in its train the means of effecting a certain andspeedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its line ofmarch. 

Flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the Dwina, in1701, by the Swedes; the passage of the Po, in 1701, by Prince Eugene;the passage of the Rhine, at Huninguen, in 1704; Jourdan's passage ofthe Rhine in 1795; Moreau's passage in 1796; the sieges of Kehl andHuninguen in 1797; Massena's passage of the Limmat, and Soult's passageof the Linth, in 1799; the passage of the Rhine, at Lucisteig in 1800;the passage of the Po, by the French, just before the battle of Marengo;and others in Italy, Germany, and Spain, in the subsequent campaigns ofNapoleon. 

Military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, cables stretchedacross the stream, and firmly attached at each end to trees, or postslet into the earth. If the shore is of rock, rings with staples let intothe stone form the best means for securing the ends of the main ropes. Plank are laid on these cables to form the roadway. The ropes formingthe "side-rail" of the bridge are passed over trestles at each shore, and then fastened as before. Short vertical ropes attach the mainsupports to these side ropes, in order that they may sustain a part ofthe weight passing over the bridge. Constructions of this character arefully described in Douglas's Essay on Military Bridges. For example, seethe passage of the Po, near Casal, in 1515, by the Swiss; the bridgethrown over the Clain by Admiral Coligni, at the siege of Poitiers, in1569; the operations of the Prince of Orange against Ghent and Bruges, in 1631; the passage of the Tagus, at Alcantara, in 1810, by theEnglish; the bridge constructed across the Zezere, by the French, in1810; the bridge thrown across the Scarpe, near Douai, in 1820; theexperiments made at Fêre in 1823, &c. 

The passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, whether actingoffensively or in retreat, is an operation of great delicacy and danger. In either case the army is called upon to show the coolest and mostdetermined courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining thestrictest discipline and good order. 

In the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by fieldintrenchments, called a _tête de pont_, and defended by a strong guard. If the river be of moderate width, the enemy may be kept at a distanceby heavy batteries on the opposite shore. As soon as the passage iseffected by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown up, or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, will be swunground to the other shore. The rear-guard will pass over in rowboats, orthe end pontons detached for that purpose. An army retreating in theface of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no matterwhat may be its character: for the slightest accident happening to itmight expose the whole army to inevitable destruction. 

The passage of a river by main force, against an enterprising and activeenemy on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatestdifficulty, and not unfrequently accompanied with the most bloodyresults. 

The most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem. Demonstrations are made at several points at the same time: bodies oftroops are thrown across, after nightfall, in rowboats or byflying-bridges, to get possession of the opposite bank. The vanguard oflight cavalry may cross by swimming. The pontoniers should have theirbridge equipage in readiness near the intended point of passage, so thatit can be thrown across with the greatest possible rapidity, while theadvanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. Underfavorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readinessfor the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops uponthe threatened point. 

Cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroyingan enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach. Whenthis cannot be done, we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c. , to accomplish our object. Operations of this kind carried on in thenight, are most likely to succeed. 

To protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies, stockades, or floating chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at somedistance above the bridge; strong cables, or chains stretched directlyacross the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in place ofstockades, or in conjunction with them. Guards should be stationed abovethe bridge, with boats, ropes, grapnels, &c. , for the purpose ofarresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore, or directingthem safely through the _draw_ in the bridge arrangement. 

The troops especially charged with the construction and management ofthe various kinds of military bridges, are denominated _pontoniers_. Theduties of these troops are arduous and important, and, in a country likeours, intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a campaignwill often depend upon their skill and efficiency. 

_Sapping_. --This is a general term applied to the operations of formingtrenches, along which troops may approach a work without being exposedto the fire of the besieged. 

In addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shovels, picks, gabion-forks, &c. , used in constructing trenches, there will also berequired a considerable amount of sapping materials, such as gabions, fascines, sap-fagots, sandbags, &c. 

The _gabion_ is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two feet indiameter, and some three feet in length, and without a bottom. It ismade by driving into the ground, in a circular form, a number of smallpickets about an inch in diameter, and of the length required for thegabion. Twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary basket-work, and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. Gabions are used informing saps, batteries, blindages, powder-magazines, and in revettingthe steep slopes of field-works. 

The _fascine_ is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from nine to twelveinches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length. The largest are sometimes called _saucissons_. In making a fascine, straight twigs about the thickness of a man's finger are laid side byside, and firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain attachedto the extremities of two levers. While held in this position the twigsare firmly bound together by withs or cords. Fascines are used inconstructing trenches, batteries, &c. , and for filling up wet ditches. 

The _sap-fagot_ is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and twofeet in length, with a picket inserted through the middle. It is used inthe double sap in connection with gabions. 

_Sand-bags_ are usually made of coarse canvass. When filled with earththey are some six or eight inches in diameter, and from eighteen inchesto two feet in length. From their perishable nature, they are used onlywhen other materials cannot be procured, and where it is important toplace the troops speedily under cover from the enemy's fire. 

Bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c. , may be employed in sapping forthe same purposes as the above materials, when they can be procured insufficient quantity. Pork and flour barrels, which are usually inabundance in a camp, are frequently filled with sand and used forforming magazines, blindages, &c. , in field-works. 

A trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy'sgrape, is called a _simple sap_, or ordinary trench. The earth is thrownup on the side towards the place besieged, so as to form a kind ofparapet to cover the men in the trench. The labor is here executed underthe supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties detached fromthe other arms. Fig. 50 represents a vertical section of a simple sap. 

When within range of the enemy's grape, the _flying sap_ is resorted toin order to place the workmen speedily under cover. In this operation, gabions are placed in juxtaposition on the side towards the besiegedwork, and filled with all possible speed by the workmen. Three rows offascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to increase theheight. The most difficult part of the flying sap is executed byengineer troops, and the trench is completed by the ordinary workingparties. Fig. 51 represents a section of this sap. 

The _full-sap_ is employed when the works of the besiegers are withinrange of musketry, or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadlythat the flying sap can no longer be used. This is a difficultoperation, and unless executed with great care and by well-instructedengineer troops, the construction of the trench will be attended with animmense loss of life. The work must be executed under cover of a_sap-roller, _ which is a cylindrical mass of fascines, wool, or cotton, some two feet in diameter. On very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter onwheels might be used as a substitute. The sap-roller being placed alongthe line of the trench so as to cover the sapper in front, who is armedwith a musket-proof headpiece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sapby placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and fills it withearth, working on his hands and knees. Having filled the first gabion, he pushes forward the sap-roller and places a second one next the first, stopping the open joint between the two with a stop-fagot. The secondgabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others aresuccessively established. When the first sapper has advanced a few feet, he is followed by a second, also in defensive armor, who increases theexcavation and embankment; this sapper is then followed in the same wayby a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be sufficientlyadvanced to be turned over to the ordinary workmen. The sap-fagots maybe removed when the embankment becomes thick enough to resist grape. Fig. 52 represents a plan and section of a full-sap. 

When the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed onboth sides, it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to theright and left. This operation is called the _double sap, _ and isexecuted by two parties of sappers, working side by side. In this sap itwill be necessary to frequently change the direction of the trench, orto throw up traverses, in order to cover the men at a distance from thesap-roller. Wing-traverses, on the side of the trench which is leastexposed, some times serve the same purpose as a double sap. 

_Mines_. --By _mining_, as a military term, we understand the operationsresorted to for the demolition, with powder, of a military structure ofany description. The term _mine_ is applied both to the excavationcharged with powder for the purpose of producing an explosion, and tothe communications which lead to this excavation. 

The place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the_chamber_, the communication by which this place is reached the_gallery_, and the excavation made by the explosion is termed the_crater_. 

The form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils isassumed to be a truncated cone, the diameter, _c d_, (Fig. 53, ) of thelower circle being one-half the diameter, _a b_, of the upper circle. This form has never been ascertained to be exactly correct, but thetheoretical results deduced from a mathematical discussion of thisfigure have been fully verified in practice. The radius, _p b_, of theupper circle is termed the _crater radius_; the line _o p_, drawn fromthe centre of the charge perpendicular to the surface where theexplosion takes place, is termed the _line of least resistance_; theline _o b_, drawn from the centre of the powder to any point in thecircumference of the upper circle, is termed the _radius of explosion_. 

When the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance, themine is termed _common_; when this radius is greater than the line ofleast resistance, the mine is termed _overcharged_; and when the radiusis less, _undercharged_. A mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking ashaft in the ground, is termed a _fougasse_. The term _camouflet_ isapplied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner, without producingan explosion. Small mines made in rock or masonry, merely for thepurpose of excavation, without any considerable external explosion, arecalled _blasts_. 

From experiments made on common mines, whose line of least resistancedid not exceed fifteen feet, it has been ascertained that the tenacityof the earth is completely destroyed around the crater to a distanceequal to the crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken inat once and a half that distance. It has also been proved by experiment, that the crater radius in overcharged mines may be increased to sixtimes the line of least resistance, but not much beyond this; thatwithin this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in theratio of the square roots of the charge; and that empty galleries may bedestroyed by overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line ofleast resistance. 

By means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory, and theresults of experiments, rules have been determined by which the minercan calculate, with much accuracy, the charge necessary to produce arequired result in any given soil. 

In the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines were only usedto open breaches and demolish masses of masonry; but in later times theyhave been employed as important elements in the attack and defence ofplaces. 

An isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may readily bedemolished by exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contactwith its base. If the wall be five or six feet thick, the charges shouldbe placed under the foundation. For walls of still greater thickness itwill be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a foot or twoabove its base, and place the powder in chambers thus excavated. Revetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the back ofthe wall, about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base. Ifplaced too near the base, a breach will be made in the wall withoutoverturning it. 

To demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambersexcavated in the centre of the piers. When there is not time forexcavating these chambers in the piers, a trench may be cut over the keyof the arch, in which the powder is placed and exploded; or, the casksof powder may be suspended immediately under the arch, with the sameresults. Where a saving of powder is of consequence, small chambers maybe excavated in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully_tamped_ before firing it. 

Bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under theprincipal timbers, or attaching them to the supports. 

Palisading, gates, doors, &c. , may be destroyed in the same way, bysuspending casks or bags of powder against their sides; or still moreeffectually, by burying the charges just beneath their base. 

To demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, place charges ofpowder under the piers and principal walls of the building. In woodenstructures the powder should be placed under, or attached to theprincipal supports. Where time is wanting to effect these arrangements, a building may be blown down by placing a large mass of powder in theinterior. The powder may be economized, in this case, by putting it in astrong case, which should be connected with the walls of the building onall sides by wooden props. 

Special treatises on military mining contain full instructions forregulating the size and position of the charge for the various casesthat may be met with in the practical operations of field-engineering. 

As applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, mines aredivided into two general classes--_offensive_ and _defensive_ mines. Theformer are employed by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps andcounterscarps of the place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, andother temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of thebesieged. The latter are employed by the opposite party to blow up thebesiegers' works of attack, and to defend the passage of ditches againstan assault. Small mines called _fougasses_ may be employed for the lastnamed object. The _shell-fougasse_ is composed of a wooden box filledwith one or more tiers of shells, and buried just below the surface ofthe earth. Sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells, soas to project them into the air previous to their explosion. The _stonefougasse_ is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, some five orsix feet deep, and placing at the bottom a charge of powder enclosed ina box, and covered with a strong wooden shield; several cubic yards ofpebbles, broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, andearth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from taking place inthe wrong direction. These mines are fired by means of powder hose, orby wires connected with a galvanic battery. 

The defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works, aregenerally common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greaterthan fifteen feet. All the main galleries and principal branches ofmines for a permanent fortification are constructed at the same timewith the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondarybranches, chambers, &c. , to be made during the siege. For the generalarrangement of these galleries, and the precautions necessary for theirprotection from the operations of the besiegers, reference must be madeto treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject. 

Mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief, and liable to an assault. But if judiciously arranged in the plan oftheir construction, and well managed during the operations of the siege, they contribute very materially to the length of the defence. 

_Attack and defence_. --This subject admits of two natural divisions:1st, of intrenchments, and 2d, of permanent works. 

I. Intrenchments maybe attacked either by _surprise_, or by _openforce_. In either case the operations should be based on exactinformation of the strength of the works and the number and character ofthe garrison--information that can be obtained from spies, deserters, and prisoners, and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made byofficers of engineers. By these means a pretty accurate knowledge may beobtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the works;their weak and strong points; and their interior arrangements fordefence. 

In an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a storming partyand a reserve of picked men. The attacking column is preceded by acompany of sappers armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c. ; bagsof powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, &c. All theoperations must be carried on with the utmost dispatch. The time mostfavorable for a surprise is an hour or two before day, as at this momentthe sentinels are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in aprofound sleep; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the firstsurprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. Under certaincircumstances, it may be advisable to make false attacks at the sametime with the true one, in order to distract the attention of thegarrison from the true point of danger. But false attacks have, ingeneral, the objection of dividing the forces of the assailants as wellas of the assailed. In all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the soul ofthe enterprise. 

In an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops should be drawnup in a sheltered position, until the fire of the works is silenced, andbreaches effected in the parapet. But if the bayonet alone be resortedto, the troops are immediately brought forward at the beginning of theassault. The attack is begun by a storming party of picked men: they arepreceded, as before, by a body of sappers, provided with necessary meansfor removing obstacles, and followed by a second detachment ofengineers, who will widen the passages, and render them more accessibleto the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of thestorming party. If the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarpby obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can bemade, the infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire uponthe assailed, in order to divert their fire from the sappers. A fewpieces of light artillery, on the flanks of the column, may sometimes beemployed for this purpose with great advantage. 

The storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders, planks, fascines, &c. , for crossing the ditch, and mounting the scarp. If the counterscarp be revetted with masonry, the troops must eitherdescend by ladders, or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, bundles of wool, &c. : if not revetted, a passage for the troops into theditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sappers. When the ditchis gained, shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means are preparedfor mounting the scarp, and storming the work. If the scarp be of earthonly, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade; but ifrevetted with masonry, the walls must be breached with hollow shot, orscaled by means of ladders. 

In the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all times exertedto guard against a surprise: sentinels are posted on all the mostcommanding points of the work; all the avenues of approach are mostthoroughly guarded; and patroles are constantly scouring the ground inall directions. At night all these precautions are redoubled. Light andfire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up the ground, and discover the movements and approach of the enemy. Each man shouldhave his particular post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructedin the duties he will have to perform. All auxiliary arrangements, suchas palisades, abattis, &c. , should be defended with the utmostobstinacy; the longer the enemy is held in check by these obstacles, thelonger will he be exposed to the grape and musketry of the main work. When he assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in frontand a well-aimed fire in flank. While in the ditch, or as he mounts thescarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary preparations, stones, logs, &c. , will be rolled down upon his head. But when the assaulting column hasgained the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective meansof resistance. 

The measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger classof field-works, will necessarily partake much of the nature of theoperations employed in the attack and defence of permanentfortifications. 

II. The attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by aregular siege, or by irregular operations and an assault. The latterplan has sometimes been adopted when the works of the place were weakand improperly defended; where the time and means were wanting forconducting a regular siege; or where the assailants were ignorant of themeans proper to be resorted to for the reduction of the fortress. Suchoperations, however, are usually attended by an immense sacrifice ofhuman life, and the general who neglects to employ all the resources ofthe engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is justly chargeable with thelives of his men. In the siege of Cambrai, Louis XIV. , on thesolicitation of Du Metz, but contrary to the advice of Vauban, orderedthe demi-lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the resultof a regular siege. The assault was made, but it was unsuccessful, andthe French sustained great losses. The king now directed Vauban to takethe demi-lune by regular approaches, which was done in a very shorttime, and with a loss of _only five men!_ Again, at the siege of Ypres, the generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready. "Youwill gain a day by the assault, " said Vauban, "but you will lose athousand men. " The king directed the regular works to be continued, andthe next day the place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers. 

But a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary toresort to all the works of attack which would be required for thereduction of a regular bastioned fort, on a horizontal site. Forexample: the nature of the ground may be such as to enable the troops toapproach to the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works whatever;of course, all the works up to the third parallel may in this case bedispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege. Again, thepoint of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will notflank the works of approach; here a single line of _boyaux_ and shortparallels may be all-sufficient. 

But for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose the placebesieged to be a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site, (Fig. 54. )

The operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods. 

1st. The preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous tothe opening of the trenches. 

2d. The operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenchesto the establishment of the third parallel. 

3d. From the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of theplace. 

_First period. _ The object of the _investment of the place_ is to cutoff all communication between the work and the exterior, thus preventingit from receiving succors, provisions, and military munitions, and alsoto facilitate a close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, whoshould always accompany the investing corps, and pursue their laborsunder its protection. This corps should be composed chiefly of lighttroops--cavalry, light infantry, horse artillery, "brigades of engineersand mounted sappers, "--who march in advance of the besieging army, and, by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all the avenues ofapproach, and carry off every thing without the work that can be ofservice either to the garrison or to the besiegers. To effect thisobject, the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch. 

The investing corps is now distributed around the work in the mostfavorable positions for cutting off all access to it, and also toprevent any communication with the exterior by detachments from thegarrison, and even single individuals are sent out to give intelligenceto a succoring army or to reconnoitre the operations of the besiegingcorps. These posts and sentinels, called the _daily cordon_, are placedsome mile or mile and a half from the work, and beyond the reach of theguns. But in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplishtheir object, and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move upas close to the work as possible without being exposed to the fire ofmusketry. This arrangement constitutes the _nightly cordon_. 

By the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will besufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before thegeneral the outline of his plan of attack, so as to establish theposition of his depots and camp. These will be placed some two milesfrom the work, according to the nature of the ground. As they occupy aconsiderable extent of ground around the work, it will generally benecessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors oftroops, provisions, &c. , from being thrown into the place, and also torestrain the excursions of the garrison. The works thrown up between thecamp and besieged place are termed the _line of countervallation_, andthose on the exterior side of the camp form the _line ofcircumvallation_. These lines are generally about six hundred yardsapart. It is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with lines ofcircumvallation, (except a few detached works for covering the parks ofthe engineers and artillery, ) and to hold the succoring army in check bymeans of an opposing force, called the _army of observation_. 

The measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will, of course, besubordinate, in some degree, to those of attack. As soon as any dangerof an investment is apprehended, the commanding general should collectinto the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military munitions, &c. , to be found in the surrounding country; all useless persons shouldbe expelled from the garrison; a supply of timber for the works of theengineers and artillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c. , prepared;all ground within cannon range around the work levelled; hedges andtrees cut down; holes filled up; temporary buildings demolished orburnt; and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and interruptingthe fire of the work, removed. 

During this period the engineer troops and working parties detached fromthe other arms will be most actively employed. As soon as the investingcorps makes its appearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cutoff reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy intoambush. To facilitate these exterior operations, and to prevent asurprise, several guns of long range are placed on the salients of thebastions and demi-lunes, and others, loaded with grape, in theembrasures of the flanks, so as to sweep the ditches. About one-third ofthe garrison may be employed in exterior operations, and the othertwo-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior. 

_Second period. _--As soon as the engineers have completed theirreconnaissances and determined on the front of attack, and all the otherpreparations are made, the general will direct the opening of thetrenches. The ground being previously marked out, battalions of lighttroops, termed _guards of the trenches_, as soon as it is dark, areplaced about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, (A. Fig. 54, )with smaller sections, and sentinels about the same distance further inadvance. These guards lie down, or otherwise conceal themselves from thefire of the work. The engineer troops and detachments of workmen beingfirst marched to the dépôts and supplied with all the necessary toolsfor carrying on the work, now commence their labors under the protectionof these guards. By daybreak the construction of the first parallel, andthe trenches connecting it with the dépôts, will be sufficientlyadvanced to cover the men from the fire of the place; the guards willtherefore be withdrawn, and the workmen continue their labors during theday to give the trenches the proper size and form. 

The _parallels_ are the long lines of trench which envelop the besiegedwork, and serve both as covered ways for the circulation of thebesiegers, and as means of defence against sorties from the garrison;they are therefore arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. Theboyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals of thefront of attack, and are intended exclusively for the circulation of thetroops; they have no banquettes. The first parallel is about six hundredyards from the place, and consequently beyond the reach of grape. It isconstructed by the _simple sap_. After the first night, the guards, instead of advancing in front of the work, are placed in the trenches. 

The second parallel (B) is made some three hundred or three hundred andfifty yards from the place, and being much exposed to grape, the_flying-sap_ is employed in its construction. Batteries (H) areestablished between the first and second parallels to silence the fireof the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (I) near thesecond parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of attack. These arearmed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces. 

The works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel, (C), which is constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place. As the operations of the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketryfire, the trenches are constructed by the _full-sap_. The thirdparallel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being ofless development than the two preceding, is made much wider. The secondparallel now contains the reserve, and the first parallel becomes thedépôt of materials. _Demi-parallels_ (G) are frequently establishedbetween the second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards. 

The operations of defence during this period are so directed as toharass the workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the worksof attack. Garrison pieces of long range and large howitzers are broughtforward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of attack, so asto fire in ricochet along the capitals on which the boyaux must bepushed: light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon as it becomes dark, to light up the ground occupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them tothe fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. Theseparties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compelthe workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence. They are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel, as the guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand toprotect the workmen. When the sortie detachment has driven these workmenfrom the trenches, instead of pursuing them into the first parallel, itwill display itself in battle order to cover the engineer troops, (whoshould always accompany the detachment in this enterprise, ) while theyfill up the trenches and destroy the implements of the besiegers. Whenthe guards of the trenches appear in force, the detachment will retirein such a way, if possible, as to draw the enemy within range of thegrape and musketry of the collateral works. These sorties, ifsuccessful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very much toprolong the siege. The best time for making them is an hour or twobefore day, when the workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors ofthe night. While the besiegers are establishing their enfiladingbatteries, a strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentratedon the points selected for their construction. The garrison will alsolabor during this period to put the work into a complete state ofdefence: constructing all necessary palisadings, traverses, blindages, barriers; and strengthening, if necessary, the covering of themagazines. 

_Third period. _--After the completion of the third parallel, thecrowning of the covered way may be effected by storm, by regularapproaches, or (if the work is secured by defensive mines) by asubterranean warfare. 

In the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of thethird parallel, which, on a given signal, will open their fire inconcert with all the enfilading and mortar batteries. When this fire hasproduced its effect in clearing the outworks, picked troops will sallyforth and carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering themselvesbehind the traverses until the sappers throw up a trench some four orfive yards from the crest of the glacis, high enough to protect thetroops from the fire of the besieged. It may afterwards be connectedwith the third parallel by boyaux. 

When the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches, a _doublesap_ is pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards ofthe salient of the covered way; the trench is then extended some fifteenor twenty yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up highenough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire into thecovered way, and thus prevent the enemy from occupying it. This mound ofearth is termed a _trench cavalier_, (O). Boyaux are now pushed forwardto the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of breachbatteries, (J). Descents are then constructed into the ditches, and assoon as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of thebastions and outworks, the boyaux are pushed across the ditches andlodgments effected in the breaches. The demi-lune is first carried; nextthe demi-lune redoubt and bastion; and lastly, the interiorretrenchments and citadel. In some cases the breaches are carried byassault, but the same objection is applicable here as in the storming ofthe covered way; _time is gained, but at an immense expense of humanlife. _

If the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for thebesiegers to counteract the effects of these works by resorting to theslow and tedious operations of a subterranean warfare. In this case afourth trench is formed in front of the third parallel; shafts are sunkin this, about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines; assoon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by the explosion ofthese mines, the covered way is attacked by storm; other mines areestablished on the _terre-plain_ of the covered way to destroy theentrance to the galleries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use oftheir entire system of mines. 

The measures of defence during this period must embrace every thingcalculated to retard the works of the besiegers. This may be mosteffectually accomplished by maintaining a constant fire of grape andmusketry on the heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &c. , into the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. As the musketryfire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to the artilleristsat the guns, strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the mouthsof the embrasures when the guns are not in battery, and also slopingblindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. The possession ofthe outworks should be disputed inch by inch, and when the besiegershave reached the ditch of the body of the place, sorties, and everyspecies of projectile, should be employed to drive off the sappers, andto retard the construction of their works. In fine, all the resources ofthe engineer's art should be put in requisition for the defence of thebreach, and the final assault should be vigorously resisted by thebayonet, and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works. 

With respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may bewell to remark, that if the fortress is properly constructed thegarrison will be able to resist a besieging army _six times_ as numerousas itself. Such is the estimate of the best engineers. [48]

[Footnote 48: A good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in thischapter may be derived from the writings of Vauban, Cormontaigne, andNoizet de St. Paul, on the attack and defence of places and fieldfortification; the several _manuels_ used in the French service onsapping, mining, and pontoniering; Col. Pasley's experiments on theoperations of a siege, sapping, mining, &c. ; Douglas's work on militarybridges; Macauley's work on field fortification; and Professor Mahan's_Treatise on Field Fortification. _ This last is undoubtedly the verybest work that has ever been written on field fortification, and everyofficer going into the field should supply himself with a copy. 

The following are recommended as books of reference on subjectsdiscussed in the three preceding chapters. 

_Mémorial pour la fortification permanente et passagère. _ Cormontaigne. 

_Défense des places. _ Cormontaigne. 

_Attaque des places. _ Cormontaigne. 

_Attaque des places. _ Vauban. 

_Traité des mines. _ Vauban. 

_Mémorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagère. _Lafitte-Clavé. 

_Exercice sur les fortifications. _ Davigneau. 

_Mémorial de l'officier du genie. _ A periodical of rare merit, containing most valuable military and scientific matter. It is conductedby officers of the French corps of engineers. It has already reached itsfourteenth number, each number forming a volume. 

_Traité complet de fortification. _ Noizet de St. Paul. 

_Traité d'art militaire et de la fortification. _ Gay de Vernon. 

_Art de la guerre. _ Rogniat. 

_Essai général de fortification, &c. _ Bousmard. 

_Aide-mémoire portatif à l'usage des officiers du génie. _ Laisné. A veryvaluable and useful book. 

_Aide-mémoire de l'ingénieur militaire. _ Grivet. 

_Cours d'art militaire. _ Laurillard Fallot. 

_Cours de fortification, &c. _ Lavart. 

_Le livre de la guerre. _ Perrot. 

_Journaux des siéges dans la péninsule. _ Belmas. 

_Journal of Sieges in Spain. _ John Jones. 

Both of the above are works of great value. 

_Cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire. _ François. 

_Architettura militare. _ Marchi. 

_Essai sur la fortification. _ Baltard. 

_La fortification. _ Bar-le-Duc. 

_Elémens de fortification. _ Bellaire. 

_La science des ingénieurs. _ Bélidor. 

_L'art universel des fortifications. _ Bitainvieu. 

_Nouvelle manière de fortifier les places. _ Blondel. 

_Les sept siéges de Lille. _ Brun Lavaine. 

_Défense des places fortes. _ Carnot. 

_Mémoire sur la fortification. _ Carnot. 

_Défense de Saragosse. _ Cavallero. 

_Mémoires sur la fortification. _ Choumara. 

_Nouvelle fortification. _ Coehorn. 

_Théorie de la fortification. _ Cugnot. 

_Des fortifications, _ &c. &c. Darçon. 

_Relation de la defense de Dantzik. _ D'Artois. 

_Les fortifications. _ Deville. 

_Péribologie. _ Dilich. 

_De la fortification permanente. _ Dufour. A work of merit. 

_Essai sur la défense des états par les fortifications. _ Duviviet. 

_Attaque et défense des places du camp de St. Omer. 

_L'école de la fortification. _ Fallois. 

_Introduction à la fortification. _ De Fer. 

_Précis de la défense de Valenciennes. _ Ferrand. 

_Traité théorique, _ &c. Foissac-Latour. 

_Examen detaillé, _ &c. Foissac-Latour. 

_Les ouvrages militaires de Fosse. 

_Instruction sur la fortification, _ &c. Gaillard. 

_Mémoires pour l'attaque et défense d'une place. _ Goulon. 

_Siége of Peschiera. _ Henin. 

_Journal du siége de Philisbourg. 

_Précis du siége de Dantzick. _ Kirgener. 

_Deuxième défense de Badajos. _ Lamare. 

_Fortification, et l'attaque et défense des places. _ Lebloud. 

_OEuvres de Lefebvre. 

_L'architecture des forteresses. _ Mandar. 

_Traité sur l'art des siéges. _ Mazeroy. 

_La sûreté des états par le moyen des forteresses. _ Maigret. 

_Défense d'Ancone. _ Mangourit. 

_Fortification. _ Marolois. 

_Siege de Turin. _ Mengin. 

_Recherches sur l'art défensif, _ &c. Michaloz. 

_La fortification de campagne, _ &c. Miller. 

_L'art défensif, _ &c. Montalembert. 

_Journaux des siéges de Flandre. 

_Relations des siéges en Europe, _ &c, Musset-Fathay. A very valuable andinteresting work. 

_Relation du siége de Metz. 

_Relation du siége d'Anvers. 

_Les siéges de Jaffa et de St. Jean d'Acre. 

_Les siéges de Saragosse et de Tortose. _ Rogniat. 

_Siége de Dantzick. _ Sainte-Susanne. 

_Mémoire sur la fortification permanente. --_Séa. 

_Le siége de Constantine. _

_Elémens de fortification. _ Trincano. 

_Des places fortes. _ Valazé. 

_Essay on Military Bridges. _Douglas. A valuable work. 

_Guide du pontonier. _ Drieu. 

_Mémoire sur la guerre souterraine. _ Contèle. 

_Traité des mines. _ Etienne. 

_Traité de l'art du mineur. _ Geuss. 

_Traité de fortification souterraine. _ Gillot. 

_Traité pratique et théorique des mines. _ Lebrun. 

_Nouveau traité des mines, _ &c. Prudhomme. 

_Manuel du sapeur. _ Used in the French service. 

_Manuel du mineur. _ " ""

_Manuel du pontonier. " ""

_Essay on Field Fortifications. _ Pleydell. 

_Elements of Field Fortifications. _ Lochee. 

_Rélation du siége de Grave et Mayence. _

_Siéges de Génes. _ Thiébault. 

_Traité de fortification souterraine. _ Mouze. 

_Militairische Mittheilungen. _ Xilander. 

_Die Befestigung der Statten. _ Hauser. 

_Abhandlung über die Befestigungskunst, _&c. Hauser

_Versuch über die Verschanzungskunst. _ Muller. 

_Course of Elementary Fortification. _Pasley. This is a work of muchdetail--useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but to anofficer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridiculouslyminute. 

To the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch ofthe engineer's art called _constructions_; but as this part of theprofession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and militaryengineer, it is not deemed necessary to include works of this characterin a list of books strictly military. ]

CHAPTER XV. 

MILITARY EDUCATION APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION. 

With the Romans, six years' instruction was required to make a soldier;and so great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attachto military education and discipline, that the very name of their armywas derived from the verb _to practise. _

Modern nations, learning from experience that military success dependsmore upon skill and discipline than upon numbers, have generally adoptedthe same rule as the Romans; and nearly all of the European powers haveestablished military schools for the education of their officers and theinstruction of their soldiers. 

France, which has long taken the lead in military science, has sixmilitary schools for the instruction of officers, containing in all morethan one thousand pupils, and numerous division and regimental schoolsfor the sub-officers and soldiers. 

Prussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education, which contain about three thousand pupils, and also numerous division, brigade, garrison, and company schools for practical instruction. 

Austria has some fifty military schools, which contain in all about fourthousand pupils. 

Russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools, withabout two thousand pupils; twenty-five military schools for thenoblesse, containing eight thousand seven hundred pupils; _corpsd'armee_ schools, with several thousand pupils; regimental schools, witheleven thousand pupils; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one hundredand fifty-six thousand scholars;--making in all about two hundredthousand pupils in her military schools!

England has five military schools of instruction for officers, number ofpupils not known; a military orphan school, with about twelve thousandpupils; and numerous dépôt and regimental schools of practice. 

The smaller European powers--Belgium, Sardinia, Naples, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden, have each several militaryschools, with a large number of pupils. 

It is seen from these statistics, that the European powers are not sonegligent in educating their officers, and in instructing anddisciplining their soldiers, as some in this country would have usbelieve. 

Washington, Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, and others, learning, by theirown experience in the war of the American revolution, the greatnecessity of military education, urged upon our government, as early as1783, the importance of establishing a military academy in this country, but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year till 1802. In 1794, the subaltern grade of _cadet_ was created by an act ofCongress, the officers of this grade being attached to their regiments, and "furnished at the public expense with the necessary books, instruments, and apparatus" for their instruction. But this plan ofeducating young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and inhis last annual message, Dec. 7th, 1796, Washington urged again, instrong language, the establishment of a military academy, where aregular course of military instruction could be given. "Whateverargument, " said he, "may be drawn from particular examples, superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evincethat the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; that itdemands much previous study; and that the possession of it in its mostimproved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security ofa nation. "

The subject was however postponed from time to time, till March, 1802, when a bill was passed establishing the _Military Academy_. It was atfirst on a small scale, and its course of instruction meager anddeficient. It gradually became enlarged, but lingered along, with nogreat improvement, till 1817, when Capt. Patridge was dismissed from thesuperintendency, and Col. Thayer put in charge. From this period we datethe commencement of the success and reputation which the MilitaryAcademy has since enjoyed. 

This institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet from eachcongressional district, and a few at large, making an average of twohundred and thirty-seven. The course of instruction is four years, afterwhich time the cadet is sent to his regiment or corps, with higher rankif there are vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as acadet, with the brevet rank of the next higher grade. 

The examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one, being confined to the elementary branches of an English education. 

The annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods, the first extending from June till September, and the second fromSeptember to the following June. During the first period, the cadetsleave their barracks and encamp in tents, and are made subject to thepolice and discipline of an army in time of war. In addition to thethorough and severe course of practical exercises and drills in thedifferent arms during these three summer months of each year, they aremade to perform the same tours of guard-duty, night and day, as isrequired of the common soldier in time of actual war. This continuestill the first of September of each year, when the cadets return totheir barracks, and for the remaining nine months devote themselves tothe prescribed course of scientific and military studies, intermixedwith military exercises and practical operations in the laboratory andon the field. 

To test the progress of the cadets in their studies, there are heldsemi-annual public examinations. These examinations are strict andsevere, and all who fail to come up to the fixed standard are obliged towithdraw from the institution, to allow some one else from the samedistrict to make the trial. 

During their course of studies the cadets, as warrant-officers of thearmy, draw pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses. Theallowance to each is twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this ispaid to the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel, lights, clothing, board, &c. 

This institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subalternofficers, thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practicalduties of their profession. After completing this course, the cadet isusually promoted from the grade of warrant-officer to that of acommissioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his regimentor corps. 

This system of appointment to the army has produced the mostsatisfactory results, and has received the commendation of our bestmilitary men, and the approbation of all our presidents and most ablestatesmen. Nevertheless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition;this opposition springing in part from a want of proper informationrespecting the character and working of the system, and in part from thecombined efforts of those who from negligence or incapacity have failedto pass their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from aconscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured that they cannotobtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit, as fixedby examination, shall exist. Hence the effort to destroy the MilitaryAcademy and to throw the army entirely open to _political_ appointment. 

Several legislative bodies, acting under these combined influences, havepassed resolutions, giving various objections to the Military Academy, and recommending that it be abolished. The objections made by thelegislatures of Tennessee, Ohio, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine, are mostly founded on false information, and may be readily answered byreference to the official records of the War-office. But it is not thepresent object to enter into a general discussion of the charges againstthat institution, except so far as they are connected with theimportance of military education, and the rules of military appointmentand promotion. 

It has been alleged by many of the opponents of the West Point Academy, that military instruction is of little or no advantage to ageneral;--that in the wars of Napoleon, and in the American Revolution, and the American war of 1812, armies were generally led to victory bymen without a military education, and unacquainted with militaryscience;--and that in the event of another war in this country, we mustseek our generals in the ranks of civil life, rather than among thegraduates of our Military Academy. 

The objection here made to military education will hold with equalforce against education in any other profession. We sometimes find menwho have become eminent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine andthe sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of an educationin academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps even without thatpreliminary instruction usually deemed necessary for professionalpursuits. Shall we therefore abolish all our colleges, theologicalseminaries, schools of law and medicine, our academies and primaryschools, and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and theignorant? If professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals, why not also in our lawyers and our surgeons? If we deem professionalinstruction requisite for the care of our individual property andhealth, shall we require less for guarding the honor and safety of ourcountry, the reputation of our arms, and the lives of thousands of ourcitizens?

But in reality, were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent intheir several professions _in spite of, _ rather than _by means of_ theirwant of a professional education? And have not such men, feeling thedisadvantages under which they were forced to labor, been almost withoutexception the advocates of education in others?

But is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the morerecent wars were men destitute of military education, --men who rose fromthe ranks to the pinnacle of military glory, through the combinedinfluence of ignorance of military science and contempt for militaryinstruction? Let us glance at the lives of the most distinguished of thegenerals of the French Revolution, for these are the men to whomreference is continually made to prove that the Military Academy is anunnecessary and useless institution, the best generals being invariablyfound in the ranks of an army, and _not_ in the ranks of militaryschools. Facts may serve to convince, where reasoning is of no avail. 

Napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of Brienne andParis, and had all the advantages of the best military and scientificinstruction given in France. 

Dessaix was a pupil of the military school of Effiat, with all theadvantages which wealth and nobility could procure. Davoust was a pupilof the military school of Auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with Napoleon inthe military school of Paris. Kleber was educated at the military schoolof Bavaria. Eugene Beauharnais was a pupil of St. Germain-en-Loye, andhad for his military instructor the great captain of the age. His wholelife was devoted to the military art. Berthier and Marmont were bothsons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, they receivedmilitary educations. Lecourbe had also the advantages of a militaryeducation before entering the army. Pichegru and Duroc were pupils ofthe military school of Brienne. Drouet was a pupil of the artilleryschool. Foy was first educated in the college of Soissons, andafterwards in the military schools of La Fère and Chalons. Carnot, called the "Organizer of French victory, " received a good earlyeducation, and was also a pupil of the engineer school of Mézières. 

Several of the distinguished French generals at first received goodscientific and literary educations in the colleges of France, and thenacquired their military instruction in the subordinate grades of thearmy; and by this means, before their promotion to responsible offices, acquired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis of athorough preliminary education. Such was Suchet, a pupil of the collegeof Lisle-Barbe; Lannes, a pupil of the college of Lectoure; and Mortier, who was most carefully educated at Cambrai; Lefebvré and Murat were botheducated for the church, though the latter profited but little by hisinstruction; Moreau and Joubert were educated for the bar; Massena wasnot a college graduate, but he received a good preliminary education, and for several years before he entered the army as an officer, he hadenjoyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluentcircumstances; Ney, though poor, received a good preliminary education, and entered a notary's office to study a profession. Hoche was destituteof the advantages of early education, but, anxious to supply thisdeficiency, he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procurebooks, and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. By severalyears devoted in this way to professional studies and the practicalduties of a subordinate grade in the army, Hoche acquired a militaryknowledge which early distinguished him among the generals of the FrenchRevolution. Soult and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, being of parents in limitedcircumstances, had not the advantages of extensive education, but closeand diligent application, an ardent ambition, and strong and powerfulintellect, combined with long years of service in the practicaloperations of the field, at length enabled these men to overcome allobstacles, and force their way to the higher walks of their professions. But both knew from experience the advantages of military instruction, and the importance of professional education in the army, and they haveconsequently both been the warmest friends and strongest advocates ofthe military schools of France. 

The Polytechnic School was established too late to furnish officers forany of the earlier wars of Napoleon; but in his last campaigns he beganto reap the advantages of an institution which had been under hisfostering care, and Bertrand, Dode, Duponthon, Haxo, Rogniat, Fleury, Valazé, Gourgaud, Chamberry, and a host of other distinguished younggenerals, fully justified the praises which the emperor lavished on his"_poulet aux oeufs d'or"_--the hen that laid him golden eggs!

In our own revolutionary war, Generals Washington, Hamilton, Gates, Schuyler, Knox, Alexander, (Lord Stirling, ) the two Clintons, the Lees, and others, were men of fine education, and a part of them of highliterary and scientific attainments; Washington, Gates, Charles Lee, theClintons, and some others, had considerable military experience evenbefore the war: nevertheless, so destitute was the army, generally, ofmilitary science, that the government was under the necessity of seekingit in foreigners--in the La Fayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Steubens, theDe Kalbs, the Pulaskis, the Duportails--who were immediately promoted tothe highest ranks in our army. In fact the officers of our scientificcorps were then nearly all foreigners. 

But, say the opponents of the Academy, military knowledge and educationare not the only requisites for military success; youthful enterpriseand efficiency are far more important than a mere acquaintance withmilitary science and the military art: long service in garrison, combined with the indolent habits acquired by officers of apeace-establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older officers ofthe army, that it must inevitably result, in case of war, that militaryenergy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life. 

We are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in thecommander of an army, and we readily admit that while seeking to secureto our service a due degree of military knowledge, we should also bevery careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down with thedead weights of effete seniority. But we do question the wisdom of themeans proposed for supplying our army with this desired efficiency. Minds stored with vast funds of professional knowledge, and the richlore of past history; judgments ripened by long study and experience;with passions extinguished, or at least softened by the mellowinginfluence of age--these may be best suited for judges and statesmen, forhere there is time for deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment ofyears. But for a general in the field, other qualities are alsorequired. Not only is military knowledge requisite for _directing_ theblow, but he must also have the military energy necessary for _striking_that blow, and the military activity necessary for parrying the attacksof the enemy. A rapid _coup d'oeil_ prompt decision, active movements, are as indispensable as sound judgment; for the general must _see_, and_decide_, and _act_, all in the same instant. Accordingly we find thatmost great generals of ancient and modern times have gained theirlaurels while still young. 

Philip of Macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two, and soondistinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states. At theage of forty-five he had conquered all Greece. He died at forty-seven. 

Alexander the Great had defeated the celebrated Theban band at thebattle of Cheronea, and gained a military reputation at the age ofeighteen. He ascended the throne of his father Philip before twenty, andat twenty-five had reached the zenith of his military glory, havingalready conquered the world. He died before the age of thirty-two. 

Julius Caesar commanded the fleet sent to blockade Mitylene, where hegreatly distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two. He soonafter held the important offices of tribune, quæstor, and edile. He hadcompleted his first war in Spain, and was made consul at Rome before theage of forty. He twice crossed the Rhine, and conquered all Gaul, andhad twice passed over to Britain, before the age of forty-five; atfifty-two he had won the field of Pharsalia, and attained the supremepower. He died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of fivehundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities. 

Hannibal joined the Carthaginian army in Spain at twenty-two, and wasmade commander-in-chief at twenty-six. Victorious in Spain and France, he crossed the Alps and won the battle of Cannæ before the age ofthirty-one. 

Scipio Africanus, (the elder, ) at the age of sixteen distinguishedhimself at the battle of Ticinus; at twenty was made edile, and soonafter pro-consul in Spain; at twenty-nine he won the great battle ofZama, and closed his military career. Scipio Africanus (the younger)also distinguished himself in early life; at the age of thirty six hehad conquered the Carthaginian armies and completed the destruction ofCarthage. 

Gengis-Khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age ofthirteen, and almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men, with which he defeated a numerous force of rebels, who had thought totake advantage of his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. Hesoon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, and beforethe age of forty had made himself emperor of Mogul. 

Charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, conquered Aquitania attwenty-eight, made himself master of France and the greater part ofGermany at twenty-nine, placed on his brows the iron crown of Italy atthirty-two, and conquered Spain at thirty-six. 

Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "great captain, " entered the army at fifteen, and before the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant militaryreputation, and was knighted by the king himself on the field of battle;at forty-one he was promoted over the heads of older veterans and madecommander-in-chief of the army in Italy. 

Henry IV. Of France was placed at the head of the Huguenot army at theage of sixteen, at nineteen he became king of Navarre; at forty he hadoverthrown all his enemies, placed himself on the throne of France, andbecome the founder of a new dynasty. 

Montecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand horse, attackedten thousand Swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery; atthirty-two he gained the victory of Triebel, at forty-nine defeated theSwedes and saved Denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the Turks at thegreat battle of St. Gothard. In his campaigns against the French at alater age, he made it his chief merit, "not that he conquered, but thathe was not conquered. "

Saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and soon obtained thecommand of a regiment of horse; at twenty-four he became_maréchal-de-camp_, at forty-four marshal of France, and at forty-ninegained the celebrated victory of Fontenoy. He died at the age offifty-four. 

Vauban entered the army of Condé as a cadet at the age of seventeen, attwenty was made a lieutenant, at twenty-four he commanded two companies, at forty-one was a brigadier, at forty-three a _maréchal-de-camp_, andat forty-five commissaire-général of all the fortifications of France. At the age of twenty-five he had himself conducted several sieges, andhad assisted at many others. 

Turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen; he served one yearas a volunteer, four years as a captain, four years as a colonel, threeyears as a major-general, five years as a lieutenant-general, and becamea marshal of France at thirty-two. He had won all his militaryreputation by the age of forty. 

Prince Maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen, and acquired hismilitary reputation in very early life. He died at fifty-eight. 

The great Condé immortalized his name at the battle of Rocroi, in which, at the age of twenty-two, he defeated the Spaniards. He had won all hisgreat military fame before the age of twenty-five. 

Prince Eugene of Savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, alieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, ageneral-field-marshal. He gained the battle of Zenta at thirty-four, andof Blenheim at forty-one. At the opening of the war of 1733, he againappeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, buthaving lost the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing ofimportance. 

Peter the Great of Russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age; attwenty he organized a large army and built several ships; at twenty-fourhe fought the Turks and captured Asoph; at twenty-eight he made war withSweden; at thirty he entered Moscow in triumph after the victory ofEmbach, and the capture of Noteburg and Marienburg; at thirty-one hebegan the city of St. Petersburg; at thirty-nine he was defeated by theTurks and forced to ransom himself and army. His latter years weremostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. He died at the age offifty-five. 

Charles the XII. Of Sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, completed his first successful campaign against Denmark at eighteen, overthrew eighty thousand Russians at Narva before nineteen, conqueredPoland and Saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six. 

Frederick the Great of Prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight, andalmost immediately entered on that career of military glory which hasimmortalized his name. He established his reputation in the firstSilesian war, which he terminated at the age of thirty. The secondSilesian war was terminated at thirty-three; and at forty-three, with apopulation of five millions, he successfully opposed a league of morethan one hundred millions of people. 

Prince Henry of Prussia served his first campaign as colonel of aregiment at sixteen; at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory ofPrague, and the same year was promoted to the command of a separatearmy. The military reputation he acquired in the Seven Years' War wassecond only to that of Frederick. 

Cortes had effected the conquest of Mexico, and completed his militarycareer, at the age of thirty-six. 

Sandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died at the age ofthirty-one. He had earned his great renown, and closed his militaryachievements, before the age of twenty-five. 

Pizarro completed the conquest of Peru at thirty-five, and died aboutforty. 

Lord Clive began his military career at twenty-two, and had reached thezenith of his military fame at thirty-five; he was raised to the peerageat thirty-six, and died at fifty. 

Hastings began his military service at about twenty-five, and becamegovernor of Bengal at forty. 

Napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain at twenty, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and commander-in-chief of the army of Italy at twenty-six. All his mostdistinguished generals were, like him, young men, and they seconded himin his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of youthfulvalor and enthusiasm. 

Dessaix entered the army at fifteen; at the opening of the war hequickly passed through the lower grades, and became a general of brigadebefore the age of twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-six;he died before the age of thirty-two, with a reputation second only tothat of Napoleon. 

Kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he quickly passedthrough the subordinate grades, and was made a general of brigade atthirty-eight, a general of division at forty, and general-in-chief ofan army at forty-one: he died at forty-six. On his death, and inNapoleon's absence, Ménau, aged and inefficient, succeeded by right ofseniority to the command of the army of Egypt. Its utter ruin was thealmost immediate consequence. 

Massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon married a richwife, and retired to civil life. He returned to the army at the openingof the revolution, and in two years, before the age of thirty-five, waspromoted to the rank of general of division. He immediately acquiredthat high reputation which he sustained through a long career ofmilitary glory. 

Soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a captain at twenty-four;the following year he passed through the several grades of_chef-de-bataillon_, colonel, and general of brigade, and became generalof division at twenty-nine. 

Davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of brigade attwenty-three, and general of division at twenty-five. 

Eugene Beauharnais entered the army at a very early age. He became_chef-de-bataillon_ at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general ofbrigade at twenty-three, and Viceroy of Italy at twenty-five. He soonproved himself one of Napoleon's ablest generals. At twenty-eight hecommanded the army of Italy, and at thirty-one gained great glory in theRussian campaign, at the head of the fourth _corps d'armée. _

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr enured the army at the beginning of the Revolution, and passing rapidly through the lower grades, became a general ofbrigade at twenty-nine, and a general of division at thirty. 

Suchet became a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty, general of brigade attwenty-five, major-general of Brune's army at twenty-seven, and generalof division and of a _corps d'armée_ at twenty-eight. 

Oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ attwenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and general of divisionat twenty-eight. 

Ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-six, general of brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division attwenty-nine. 

Lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of brigade attwenty-eight, and very soon after general of division. 

Joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade attwenty-six, general of division at twenty-eight, and general-in-chief ofthe army of Italy at twenty-nine. He died at thirty. 

Victor was a _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-seven, general of brigade attwenty-nine, and general of division at thirty-two. 

Murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly through the lowergrades, he became a general of brigade at twenty-five, and a general ofdivision at twenty-seven. 

Mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one. 

Macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade attwenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty. 

Marmont was a captain at twenty-one, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-two, general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector general at twenty-seven, and general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two. 

Bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade attwenty-nine, and general of division at thirty. 

Lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in 1793; hebecame a general of brigade at thirty-eight, and general of division atthirty-nine. 

Bessières entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty, general of brigade at thirty-two, and general of division atthirty-four. He died at forty-seven. 

Duroc was a captain at twenty-three, _chef-de-bataillon_ at twenty-six, colonel and _chef-de-brigade_ at twenty-seven, and general of divisionat thirty. He died at forty-one. 

This list might be still further extended with the same results, butnames enough have been given to show that the generals who assistedNapoleon in his immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception, _young men_, still burning with the fires of youthful ardor andenthusiasm. The grade of marshal was not created till after Napoleonbecame emperor. On ascending the throne of the empire, he nominated tothis rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of France. Some ofthese were generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and had neverserved under him. Others were younger men, several being onlythirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. The mean age ofall was forty-four. He afterwards made seven more marshals, whose meanage was forty-three. These appointments, however, were regarded asrewards for _past_ services, rather than as a grade from which servicewas expected, for several of the older marshals were never called intothe field after their promotion. 

Having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in thearmies of Napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him. In the campaign of 1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu, then nearly eighty years of age; Wurmser, also an octogenarian, andAlvinzi, then over seventy: these had all three distinguished themselvesin earlier life, but had now lost that youthful energy and activity soessential for a military commander. 

In the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Austrian forces wasMelas, an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; hehad distinguished himself so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but hehad now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy. 

In the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by Kutusof, then sixty, and Mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by stillmore aged generals of the Aulic council. 

In the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by the Duke ofBrunswick, then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, then sixty, and Mollendorf, Kleist, and Massenbach, old generals, who had served under the greatFrederick, --men, says Jomini, "exhumed from the Seven Years'War, "--"whose faculties were frozen by age, "--"who had been buried forthe last ten years in a lethargic sleep. "

In the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by Kamenski, then eightyyears of age, Benningsen, then sixty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. TheAllies now began to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrianarmy was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic ArchdukeCharles; and this campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhatfettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the Auliccouncil, and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, wasnevertheless the most glorious in the Austrian annals of the wars of theRevolution. 

At the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor Alexander, young, (only thirty-five, ) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelledhis army, and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love ofglory. He was himself at its head, and directed its operations. Kutusofwas for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and exhibited anactivity unusual at his age, but he was surrounded by youngergenerals--Barclay-de-Tolley, and Miloradowich, then forty-nine, Wintzengerode, then forty-three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and theArchduke Constantine, then thirty-three, --generals who, at the heads oftheir corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of youngofficers, in the two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves ofFrench conquest, and finally overthrew the French empire. Wellington, who led the English in these campaigns, was of the same age as Napoleon, and had been educated at the same time with him in the military schoolsof France. The Austrians were led by Schwartzenburg, then only aboutthirty, and the Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and Blücher. The last ofthese was then well advanced in life, but all his movements beingdirected by younger men, --Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, --his operationspartook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff. 

In the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the combinations ofWellington and Gneisenau, both younger men than most of his owngenerals, who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less thanin former ones, the ardent energy and restless activity which hadcharacterized their younger days. Never were Napoleon's, plans betterconceived, never did his troops fight with greater bravery; but thedilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parrythe blow intended for their destruction. 

In the American war of 1812, we pursued the same course as Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in their earlier contests with Napoleon, _i. E. _, tosupply our armies with generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers, the Alvinzis, the Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the Kamenskisof our revolutionary war; but after we had suffered sufficiently fromthe Hulls, the Armstrongs, the Winchesters, the Dearborns, theWilkinsons, the Hamptons, and other veterans of the Revolution, we alsochanged our policy, and permitted younger men--the Jacksons, theHarrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts, [49] the Ripleys, theWoods, the McCombs, the Wools, and the Millers--to lead our forces tovictory and to glory. In the event of another war, with any nationcapable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall weagain exhume the veterans of former days, and again place at the head ofour armies respectable and aged inefficiency; or shall we seek outyouthful enterprise and activity combined with military science andinstruction? The results of the war, the honor of the country, the gloryof our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will begiven to this question. 

[Footnote 49: Scott had acquired his military reputation, and attainedthe rank of major-general at twenty-eight. ]

But it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of militaryinstruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades ofour army with young and active men possessing due military instructionand talent? The question is not a difficult one, and our government caneasily attain the desired object, if it will only set at work honestly, disregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfishinterests of its own members and advisers. Other governments havepointed out to us the way. It is this: let _merit_ be the main test forall appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or more of thesubordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country, without distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them bekept on probation in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughlyinstructed in all that relates to the military profession; after strictexamination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher gradesas rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties ofthose grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests. 

The first part of this rule is already accomplished by the MilitaryAcademy. One young man is selected from each congressional district, onan average, once in about two years, the selection being made by therepresentative of the district; these young men are made warrantofficers in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction;frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine theircapacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of acertain length of time, the _best_ are selected for commission in thearmy, relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly withreference to merit; birth, wealth, influence of political friends--allextraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration. What can bemore truly and thoroughly democratic than this? What scheme can bebetter devised to supply our army with good officers, and to excludefrom the military establishment the corrupting influence of partypolitics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to"the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusionof the sons of the poor and less influential men, regardless alike ofqualifications and of merit?"

Unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here, and all further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executivefavoritism, the claims of merit having but little or no furtherinfluence. Indeed, executive patronage is not infrequently permitted toencroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and to placerelatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissionedofficers directly from civil life, "regardless alike of qualificationsand of merit, " while numbers "of sons of the poor and less influentialmen, " who have served a probation of four or five years in militarystudies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirtyexaminations made by competent boards of military officers, to be mosteminently qualified for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! Ourarmy is much more open to this kind of favoritism and politicalpartiality, than that of almost any of the governments of Europe, whichwe have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendlyto real merit. 

In the Prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint noone, even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed thecourses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, andhas passed a satisfactory examination. And, "no ensign can be promotedto a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by thesuperior board or commission of examiners at Berlin, and his name hasbeen placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements(_connaissances_) render them qualified (_aptes_) for the responsibleduties of their profession. The nomination to the grade ofsecond-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled, left to the choice of the government. When a vacancy occurs in thisgrade, the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regimenta list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study; thecommandant, after taking the advice of the superior officers of theregiment, nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king, whomakes the appointment. " The government can appoint to the engineers andartillery only those who have been instructed as _élèves_ in the Berlinschool of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and theseappointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passedtheir final examination. In these corps the lieutenants and secondcaptains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed asatisfactory examination. No political influence, nor even royalpartiality, can interfere with this rule. 

Even in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Russia it is deemednecessary to subject all military appointments and promotions, in thepeace establishments, to certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army allsub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools, or thespecially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards; from thisgrade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants ofregiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers. Abovethe grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to theemperor by the Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, exceptthe claims of superior merit interfere. "In the Russian army, " saysHaillot, "no one, not even a prince of the imperial family, can reachthe grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his severalexaminations, or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets inthe corps are subjected. " Promotion below the grade of colonel is madepartly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by selectionalone. 

In the British service, rank in the line of the army is obtained bypurchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men ofenergy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to thepoor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. In some respectsit is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority andexecutive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based onmerit. Wellington has recently said that the system of exclusiveseniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, bypreventing young men from reaching the higher grades. "At first, " saysan officer of some distinction in the British navy, in speaking ofpromotions in that arm of service, "it certainly looks very hard to seeold stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yetthere can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country atlarge, are essentially better served by the present system of employingactive, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be byany imaginable system by seniority. It must not be forgotten, indeed, that at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by whichofficers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has longbeen so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operationbefore the rank of post-captain be attained. Antecedent to this point, there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who, if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrassthe navy list. " We fully agree with this writer respecting the evils ofa system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means ofremedying these evils. In England, where the wealthy and aristocraticclasses govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of militaryappointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and politicalinfluence; but in this country we are taught to consider _merit_ as aclaim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege. 

The various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in theFrench service, and the various results of these changes, both on thecharacter of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructivethat we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a fulldiscussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline. 

Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and promotion werewholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the armybelonging of right to certain grades of the _noblesse_; merit andservice being excluded from consideration. But the constituent assemblychanged this order of things, and established the rule thatthree-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, _after aconcours_, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers, alternately by seniority and selection, without _concours_; the captainsand lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonelstwo-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; _maréchaux-de-camp_and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. In 1793 the grades were still further opened to selection, and in theturbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open toelection by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system of merit andseniority, with certain improvements, was restored. In 1796 and the warsthat followed, _merit_ was the only qualification required, andBonaparte, Moreau, and other young generals were actually placed incommand of their seniors in rank. Military talent and military services, not rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the _baptism ofblood_, as it was called, having equalized all grades. Bonaparte, inleaving Egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave thecommand to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while Menouwas a general of division. Everybody knows that on the death of Kleber, General Menou succeeded in the command; and that Egypt, saved by the_selection_ of Kleber, was lost by the _seniority_ of Menou. 

Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based onmerit. His peace regulations were much the same as the system of 1795;his field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, were almost the only ones used. The following extract from the_Reglement de Campagne_ of 1809, (title XX. , ) gives the spirit of thissystem:--"The next day after an action the generals of brigade willpresent to the generals of division the names of all such as havedistinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals ofdivision will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, andalso the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct hascontributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief mayimmediately inform his majesty. "

On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also restored many of theancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the _maisonmilitaire du roi, _ and court favoritism was substituted for merit andservice. But the revolution of 1830 produced a different order ofthings. "The laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appointor promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in theexercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself bycertain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from theobsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians. " Wouldthat the same could always be said of the executive of this country inmaking appointments and promotions in the army. 

The existing laws and regulations of the French service differ slightlyfor different corps, but the general rule is as follows: No one can beappointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated atone of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as asub-officer in a _corps d'armée_. In time of peace, no one can bepromoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (_chef-d'escadron_and _chef-de-bataillon_, ) till he has served two years in the nextlower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served fouryears, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the nextlower grade; no one can be made _maréchal-de-camp_, lieutenant-general, or marshal of France, till he has served two years in the next lowergrade. These numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. For thegrades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions areby seniority, and one-third by selection; for the _chef-de-bataillon_and _chef-d'escadron_, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection;for all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of thepromotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled byselection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. Forpromotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for eachgrade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examinersappointed _ad hoc_, and the name, qualifications, and particular claimare given of each officer admitted to the _concours_. Therecommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariablyfollowed by the government in its selections. This combined system ofseniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the sametime enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain thehigher grades while still young and efficient. Merit need not, therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be heldsubordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to beendowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover, government isprecluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, andplacing them over the heads of abler and better men. 

If such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixedby legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commissiontill he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed anexamination before a board of competent officers, we are confident thatbetter selections would be made in the appointments from civil life thanhave been within the last ten years by the present system of politicalinfluence. It would scarcely be possible to make worse selections. [50]And if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued inpromoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produceless injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than thepresent one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained throughintrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowedas a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim, _secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; excludefavoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competentofficers, totally independent of party politics_. Such a system has beenfor some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it hasproduced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and agedinefficiency have been _overslaughed_, and will soon entirely disappearfrom that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is itless important to have competent military officers to command where thelives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the countrydepend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competentsurgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?

[Footnote 50: To show the working of this system of politicalappointments, we would call attention to a single fact. On the formationof an additional regiment of dragoons in 1836, _thirty_ of its officerswere appointed from civil life, and only _four_ from the graduates ofthe Military Academy. Of those appointed to that regiment from civillife, _twenty-two_ have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of thelatter to save themselves from being dismissed, ) and only _eight_ of thewhole _thirty_ political appointments are now left, their places havingbeen mainly supplied by graduates of the Military Academy. 

In case of another increase of our military establishment, what coursewill our government pursue? Will it again pass by the meritorious youngofficers of our army, --graduates of the Military Academy, --who havespent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifyingthemselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place overtheir heads civilians of less education and inferior character--mentotally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and thebase hirelings of party, --those who screech the loudest in favor ofparty measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve partyends?--and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house andpost-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vastpatronage of the executive which is already debasing individualmorality, and destroying the national character? Should anyadministration of the government be so unmindful of the interests andhonor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hopedthat the sword of political justice will not long slumber in itsscabbard. ]

We wish to call particular attention to this subject. It deservesattention at all times, but at the present moment it more especiallydemands a close and candid consideration. The higher grades of our peaceestablishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that, incase of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubtedly beeither passed over, or put on a retired list. Sooner or later somechange of this kind will undoubtedly be made. It is demanded by the goodof service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will beabsolutely necessary to the success of our arms. [51] But the greatdanger is that the change may be made for the worse--that all theappointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made throughpolitical influence, thus converting the army and navy into politicalengines. Let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result;let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws, likethose in France and Prussia; and let military merit and services, asdetermined by boards of competent military officers, be the onlyrecognised claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poorand meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and thebase hireling of party. In actual service the system of exclusiveseniority cannot exist; it would deaden and paralyze all our energies. Taking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to the oppositeextreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws, based on the just principles of _merit_ and _service_. 

[Footnote 51: Even at the present moment, in ordering troops to Texas, where immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessaryto break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officersinto the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind with merenominal commands. Very many of the officers now in Texas are acting incapacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiving therank, pay, and emoluments due to their services. ]

But the importance of maintaining in our military organization asuitable system of military instruction is not confined to theexigencies of our actual condition. It mainly rests upon the absolutenecessity of having in the country a body of men who shall devotethemselves to the cultivation of military science, so as to be able tocompete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. It is notto be expected that our citizen soldiery, however intelligent, patriotic, and brave they may be, can make any very great progress inmilitary studies. They have neither the time nor opportunities for suchpursuits, and if they can acquire a practical acquaintance withelementary tactics--the mere alphabet of the military art--it is as muchas can reasonably be expected of them. As a general rule, the militiaare individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose aregular army. But they must of necessity be inferior in practicalprofessional knowledge. 

Technical education is necessary in every pursuit of life. It ispossible that the lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without aknowledge of law, but he will probably have few clients if he remainignorant of the laws and precedents that govern the courts. Theunlearned chemist may succeed in performing some single experiment, buthis progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to make himselffamiliar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors. 

Learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a mere mechanicaldrudgery to the dignity of a science. By analyzing the composition ofthe soil we cultivate, we learn its capacity for improvement, and gainthe power to stimulate the earth to the most bountiful production. Howdifferent the results attending the labors of the intelligentagriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those of theignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts!As applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts, learning developsnew powers of labor, and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. Personal comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed withinthe reach of the humbler classes; while at the same time the "appliancesof art are made to minister to the demands of elegant taste, and ahigher moral culture. " As applied to commerce, it not only greatlyincreases the facilities for the more general diffusion of civilizationand knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing theconflicting interests of nations. 

Nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence whenapplied to the military art. "During the dark ages which followed thewreck of the Roman power, the military science by which that power hadbeen reared, was lost with other branches of learning. When learningrevived, the military art revived with it, and contributed not a littleto the restoration of the empire of mind over that of brute force. Then, too, every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving andpeace-promoting influence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder area familiar proof of this remark; and the same principle applies to thediscoveries of modern times. By perfecting ourselves in militaryscience, paradoxical as it may seem, we are therefore assisting in thediffusion of peace, and hastening on the approach of that period whenswords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks. "

APPENDIX. 

Since the first edition of this work was published, two important warshave been commenced and terminated--that between the United States andthe Republic of Mexico, and that between Russia and the Western Powersof Europe--and another is now being waged between France and Austria, upon the old battle fields of Northern Italy. In issuing a new editionof these Elements of Military Art and Science, it is deemed proper torefer to these wars, and to apply the principles here discussed to themilitary operations carried on in Mexico and in the Crimea. It isproposed to do this in the form of Notes to the several Chapters. Thewar in Italy being still undetermined, and the details of the severalbattles which have already been fought being but imperfectly known, itis obviously improper to attempt to criticize their strategic characteror tactical arrangement. 

H. W. H. 

NEW YORK, _July_, 1859. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER II. --STRATEGY. 

In the invasion of Mexico, the United States formed four separatearmies, moving on _four distinct lines of operation:_ 1st. The "Army ofthe West, " under General Kearny, moving from St. Louis on New Mexico andCalifornia; 2d. The "Army of the Centre, " under General Wool, movingfrom San Antonio de Bexar on Chihuahua; 3d. The "Army of Occupation, " onthe Rio Grande, under General Taylor, moving from Corpus Christi onMatamoras, Monterey, and Saltillo; and 4th. The "Main Army, " underGeneral Scott, moving from Vera Cruz on the capital of Mexico. 

The Army of the West, under General Kearny, moved upon a separate anddistinct line of operations, having no strategic relations to the otherthree; its objects were the conquest and occupation of New Mexico andUpper California. The first was readily accomplished; but the generalthen detached so large a force to operate on Chihuahua after thediversion of Wool's column, that his expedition to California must haveutterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in thePacific. 

The lines of Taylor and Wool were evidently ill chosen, being so distantas to afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position betweenthem. Fortunately Wool proceeded no further than Monclova, and thenturned off to occupy Parras, thus coming under the immediate command ofGeneral Taylor. The latter fought the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca dela Palma, and sustained the siege of Fort Brown; then crossing the RioGrande at Matamoras, he captured Monterey, and, forming a junction withWool, defeated the army of Santa Anna at Buena Vista. This battle endedthe campaign, which, however brilliantly conducted, was entirely withoutstrategic results. 

Scott landed his army near the Island of Sacrificios without opposition, and immediately invested Vera Cruz, which surrendered after a shortsiege and bombardment. Having thus secured his base, he immediatelyadvanced to the city of Puebla, meeting and defeating the army of SantaAnna at Cerro Gordo. Remaining some time at Puebla to reinforce hisarmy, he advanced into the valley of Mexico, and after the brilliantvictories of Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, captured the city and terminated the war. 

With respect to the double line of operations of Taylor and Scott it maybe sufficient to remark, that Santa Anna, from his central position, fought, with the same troops, the battles of Buena Vista and CerroGordo. It should also be remarked, that the line of operations of thearmy of the Rio Grande was not approved by either Scott or Taylor, nor, it is believed, by any other officer of our army. Scott's line ofoperations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the Mexicanflank by Lake Chalco and the Pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a greatgeneral. 

The war in the Crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre ofoperations, afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategicskill on either side. Nevertheless, the movements of both parties, priorto the investment and siege of Sebastopol, are fair subjects formilitary criticism with respect to the plans of operation. 

When the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three plans wereopen for the consideration of the Russian general: 1st. To destroy orclose the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and, garrisoning Sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest ofhis army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the alliesto besiege the strong works on the north. 2d. Having closed the harborson the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the assaultof any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank, annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them manydays in the difficult and precarious position which they would haveoccupied. 3d. To advance with his whole force and offer them battle atthe Alma. The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of onlyfour battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering theweakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of theallied forces. 

For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves: 1st. To turnthe Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city inforce. 2d. To turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back uponSebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. Neither plan was fullycarried out. The column of General Bosquet turned the Russian left anddecided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of thevictory. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon ofthe 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a distance of alittle more than ten miles in six days! On the 27th they regained theircommunication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupySebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by anill-conducted flank march. Fortunately for the allies, the Russiansfailed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thusgratuitously afforded. The fleet having entered the open harbor ofBalaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving uptheir siege material and of opening their trenches, while the Russiansprepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resistingthe operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel inhistory. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER III. --FORTIFICATIONS. 

In the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter had nofortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception ofVera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. TheAmericans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on threeof their lines of operation; and, when Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, hisline of march was open to the capital. Moreover, nearly every seaport onthe Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. Had thelanding of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera Cruz been stronglyfortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a longand difficult siege. Moreover, had the invading army encountered strongand well-defended fortifications on the line of march to Mexico, the warwould, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a differentresult. 

The Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies fromattempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in theBlack Sea confined the war to a single point of the HeracleidanChersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent amaritime descent, and left Sebastopol entirely undefended byfortifications, how different had been the result of the Crimean war. 

This subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea-coastDefences, and Permanent Fortifications. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER IV. --LOGISTICS. 

The war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority overthe enemy in this branch of the military art. No army was bettersupplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical andhospital stores, and in means of transportation. Two points, however, are worthy of remark in this connection: 1st. The great waste ofmaterial, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under shortenlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, whowere without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, 2d. The immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to theabove cause and in part to the employment, in the administrativedepartments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules androutine of military service. This war was conducted on the system ofmagazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchasedof the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions beingseldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. The wisdom ofthis plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of ourtroops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants ofthe country which was passed over or occupied by the army. 

The war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority ofthe French administrative system over that of the English--of themilitary over a civil organization of the administrative corps of anarmy. The French troops before Sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, andabundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions, clothing, munitions, medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and campequipages; while the English army, notwithstanding an immenseexpenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the wantof proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of eventhe necessaries of life. 

Instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our owngovernment has been (especially in supplying the army in Utah) toimitate the sad example of the English, and to convert the supplying ofour armies into a system of political patronage to be used for partypurposes. If fully carried out, it must necessarily result in the ruinof the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption ofthe government. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER V. --TACTICS. 

The war in Mexico, from the small number of troops engaged, and thepeculiar character of the ground in most cases, afforded but fewopportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics of battlewhich has so often determined the victory upon the great fields ofEurope. Nevertheless, the history of that war is not without usefullessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in the attackand defence of positions. The limit assigned to these Notes will admitof only a few brief remarks upon these battles. 

The affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma properly constitute onlya single battle. In the first, which was virtually a cannonade, thelines were nearly parallel, and Arista's change of front to an obliqueposition during the engagement, was followed by a corresponding movementon the part of General Taylor. Being made sensible of the superiority ofthe American artillery, the Mexican general fell back upon the Ravine ofResaca de la Palma, drawing up his troops in a concave line to suit thephysical character of the ground. The Americans attacked the whole linewith skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, andthe charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory. GeneralTaylor's operations at Monterey partook more of the nature of an attackupon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field. Nodoubt Worth's movement to the right had an important influence indeciding the contest, but the separation of his column from the mainbody, by a distance of some five miles, was, to say the least, a mosthazardous operation. The Mexicans, however, took no advantage of theopening to operate between the separate masses into which the Americanarmy was divided. The loss which the Mexicans inflicted upon us resultedmore from the strength of their position than from any skilful use oftheir defensive works. In the battle of Buena Vista, the efforts ofSanta Anna were principally directed to turning the American left. If hehad concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau, thesuccess gained in the early part of the contest would probably have beendecisive. The American right at La Angostura was made almostinaccessible by the deep ravines in its front, and the skilful use madeof the artillery from this point enabled General Taylor to gain thevictory, even after his left had been completely turned, and a portionof the volunteers had actually fled from the field. 

The manner in which Scott handled his troops in the various battles onhis line of march from Vera Cruz to the capital, proved him to be one ofthe best generals of the age. At Cerro Gordo he so completely turnedSanta Anna's left as to cut off his line of retreat, and nearlydestroyed his army, the general himself barely escaping capture. Theturning of Valencia's position by the village of San Geronimo, at thebattle of Contreras, and the charge by Riley's columns of infantry, weremovements well planned and admirably executed, as were also the rapidpursuit of Santa Anna to Churubusco, and the flank and rear attacks bythe brigades of Pierce and Shields. The victory of Molino del Rey wasmostly won with the musket, without very material assistance from heavyartillery, and was one of the most brilliant but dearly boughtachievements of the war. The assault upon Chapultepec was preceded by along and heavy cannonade, which produced a decided moral effect upon theenemy and greatly facilitated the assault. 

With respect to the battles of the Crimean war, only that of the Alma issubject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles; those ofBalaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya, were of the nature of sortiesmade to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defence, and toprolong the operations of the siege. They must therefore be judged assuch, and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests inthe open field. At the battle of the Alma the Russians were attacked inposition, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. According tothe original plan of attack, the Turks and Bosquet's division was toturn the Russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre. But, on account of the division of command in the allied army, there wasno concert of action. The heavy column of Bosquet probably decided thevictory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line. TheEnglish army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances, itsright connected with the French, and its left protected by a line ofskirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. With respect to theformation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarkedthat the charge of the English light cavalry at Balaklava was apparentlywithout necessity or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. Inthe battle of Inkerman the Russians directed their main attack upon theEnglish right and centre, with false attacks upon the French left andtowards Balaklava. But these false attacks, as is usual in such cases, were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and Bosquet wasthus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon theEnglish portion of the line and move to its assistance. Moreover, themain body of the Russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, whichexposed them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid andeffective deployment of their numerical force. The same criticism isapplicable to their formation at the battle of the Tehernaya. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER VI. --MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. 

On the invasion of Mexico by the United States, the former republic hada large army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, stillworse equipped, and almost destitute of proper military stores; but shewas entirely wanting in two important elements of nationaldefence--fortifications and a navy. Her weakness was shown by the rapidand easy conquest of almost the entire country. 

We have already remarked that the fortifications of Russia confined thetheatre of war to a single point of the Crimea, and limited the militaryoperations of the allies to the prolonged and only partially successfulsiege of Sebastopol. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER VII. --SEA-COAST DEFENCES. 

Allusion has already been made to the weakness of Mexico, resulting fromher want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between thatrepublic and the United States. This would have been still more manifesthad she possessed any thing like a commercial marine, exposed to captureby our naval forces. As it was, the Mexican war afforded not a singlecontest between ships and forts, no opposition being made to theoccupation of Mexican ports by our naval force. The only coast defence, the castle of San Juan d'Ulica was not attacked, but after thebombardment and capture of Vera Cruz, it surrendered without a blow. 

The Crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree theimportance of a well-fortified sea-coast. Notwithstanding the immenseforce of the combined fleets of England and France, no naval attack wasmade upon either Cronstadt or Sebastopol, and the large naval force ofRussia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent. There was, indeed, a simulachre of a "naval cannonade" on the latterplace on the 17th of October, 1854, intended as a diversion of theattention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where thereal struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and thebesiegers. The inutility of this attempt was so manifest that noserious naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allieswere ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed Russianworks the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen. 

The results of this "simulachre of a naval cannonade, " as it has beencalled, is worthy of note. The details are taken from Major Barnard'sable pamphlet on "The Dangers and Defences of New York, " and CommanderDahlgren's interesting and valuable work on "Shells and Shell Guns. "

"The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkishships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and anumber of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about2, 500 guns. It was opposed by about 280 guns from the works. The fleetkept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from 1500 to 2000yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament(32-pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon theworks;--too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of theRussian works. "

"The only exception to this remark applies to the detached Englishsquadron under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the _Agamemnon_, _Sanspareil_, _London_, _Arethusa_, and _Albion_, the first-named ofwhich vessels took a position at 750 or 800 yards from Fort Constantine, while the others stretched along at about the same distance from FortConstantine, the 'Wasp Tower, ' and 'Telegraph Battery. ' Dahlgren describesthe result as follows:--"

"The _Agamemnon_ was very seriously maltreated, though not to such anextent as to impair her power of battery or engine. She was on fireseveral times; was struck by 240 shot or shells; and, singular to say, only lost 29, while her second, just by, lost 70 men. The _Albion_suffered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on firein more than one place, with a loss of 81 men. The crews of the _London_and _Arethusa_, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill; andthey too remained in station but a little time after the _Albion_. The_Queen_ was driven off soon after she got into her new position, ingreat danger; and the _Rodney_ had the bare satisfaction of gettingaground and afloat after experiencing some damage. "

"The value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearlydefined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke thatenveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with aninconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and thenbut dimly and briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-battle ships anda frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourthbadly cut up; while the _Agamemnon_ lay opposed to one of the heaviestsea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours cameoff with comparatively little loss. "

"Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may havehad (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw nosure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received bythe vessels), it evidently was not for want of being _hit_ often enough(smoke or no smoke), that the _Agamemnon_ escaped with so little injury. She 'was struck by 240 shot and shells;' and it is only due to theinefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she wasnot destroyed. "

"With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantine, Dahlgrensays:--"

"The distance of the _Agamemnon_ and _Sanspareil_ from FortConstantine (17th October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 yards;Lord Raglan states it to have been rather less. These two ships couldbring to bear about 87 guns, and the firing from them probably lastedsome four hours. There can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage, for the Russian Commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report; butnot sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short ofeffecting a breach in it. "

"At Bomarsund, the results were rather different:--Three 32-pounders of42 cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck, and placed in battery at 950 yards from the North Tower--the masonry ofgood quality and 6-1/2 feet thick. In eight hours, the wall between twoembrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering a practicablebreach, to effect which 487 shot and 45 shells were fired, being at therate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute; or, from each gun, one in 2-3/4 minutes. The Tower surrendered. "

"It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able toaccomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the distances from the object being alike--particularly when it isconsidered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most ofthem employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. Theguns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery, which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourthminutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shotand shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; anumber which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results ofthree guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort infourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which isabundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either have beendispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether, and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which wasattained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion inthe ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonadingSebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were toolarge to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. Thatthe fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them, proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and thecalibres too low. It is said that the _Agamemnon_ was struck in the hullby two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but asmall portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, as already observed, the calibre had been heavier. "

Here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which weresufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to theresult at Bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failednot only to produce a single breach, but even "to impair the strength ofthe masonry. "

The reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of fire by whicha breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from afloating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmestdays, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at adistance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards. 

With respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the _Agamemnon_, it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the powerof the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteriesagainst ships of war. The Russians had some of them in their fleet, andat Sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two Turkish frigates _infifteen minutes_. It does not appear that in the Crimean war they hadyet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for whereshells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in everyinstance of inferior calibre. 

With respect to the naval attack upon Kinburn, which has been referredto as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary toships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of theRussians from which to derive accurate information of the strength ofthe works attacked. Dahlgren, drawing his information from the officialaccounts of the "English and French admirals, " describes the works andtheir location is follows:--

"The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly bythe projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip ofSand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly directionuntil it passes the promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, andfrom which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of theestuary empty into the Black Sea. "

"The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and thePoint of Otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; butthe water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and itsnorthern shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works designed tocommand the entrance. They are three in number. Near the extreme pointof the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in andoverlaid with sand, --pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten. "

"Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connectedwith the spit battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, andriveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of thethree; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot. "

"Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is FortKinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, andto the waters of the estuary on the north. It is casemated in part, though but few of these embrasures were armed, --its chief force being inthe pieces _en barbette, _and some nine or ten mortars. The masonry, though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, andso dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from theinterstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space wasoccupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed andplastered over. "

"This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English admiralstates, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars. The calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters tobe 18-pounders and 32-pounders. "

"The above description will quite justify the further remark as tothese works:--"

"They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable ofwithstanding any serious operation by sea or land. The main fort wasparticularly weak in design, and dilapidated; all of them wereindifferently armed and garrisoned. "

"So much for the works. As to the character of the armament brought tothe assault, the same authority says:--"

"The allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracingevery description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and allpropelled by steam. There were screw-liners, and like vessels ofinferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries, mortar-vessels, etc. , each armed in what was considered the mostapproved manner. And this truly formidable naval force carried_besides_ 'some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these'dilapidated' works of Kinburn. "

"Without going into the particulars, we simply give Dahlgren's accountof the affair:--"

"The French floating-batteries (_Devastation, Lave_, and _Tonnante_)steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or sevenhundred yards off the S. E. Bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9. 20 openedfire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were English, by thegunboats, five French and six English, and by the steamer _Odin_, 16. "

"The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve50-pounders on the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of thefort; and the vertical fire was so good that the French admiralattributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. Thegunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to besevere on the barbette batteries. "

"The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, pliedtheir guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to thefloating-batteries, which were nearest. "

"Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the _Royal Albert _, 121, _Algiers_, 91, _Agamemnon_, 90, and _Princess Royal_, 90, with the fourFrench liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging N. W. AndS. E. , about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water. "

"At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under Rear-AdmiralsStewart and Pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, openingfire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and anchoring wellinside of Fort Nicholaiev and Otchakov. The attack seaward was completedby the _Acre_, 100, _Curaçoa_, 30, _Tribune_, 30, and _Sphynx_, 6, opening on the central battery; while the _Hannibal_, 91, _Dauntless_, 24, and _Terrible_, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm of shotand shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit battery, thesand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells, choked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. In the fort, the lightwooden buildings were in flames at an early hour; then the walls beganto crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, front, flank, and rear; and as the guns were disabled successively, the return becamefeeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central redoubtalone discharging single guns at long intervals. The Russian commander, however, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that hisfire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the whiteflag at 1. 35 P. M. , upon which the works were given up on honorableterms. "

"The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss isdifferently stated, --the French admiral says eighty wounded, --another, forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded. "

"The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besidestwo killed and two wounded in the _Arrow_, by the bursting of her two68-pounder Lancaster guns. "

"The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre ofordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred andfifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with afair proportion of 68-pounders and mortars, besides the 50-pounders ofthe French floating batteries. To which the Russians could only replywith eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than32-pounders, while many were lower. The great disparity in offensivepower was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commandingposition, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same levelwith the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength. On the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners toapproach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means sointense as it would have been at shorter range. "

"This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had anopportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of mostimportance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, or68-pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, andable to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire. "

"No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, forthough the English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, yet thedistance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and theconcentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from thepublished statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six50-pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in closeorder. "

"They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the _Devastation_), it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stoutiron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a halfinches, --still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery byshot and shell which entered the ports, --and the majority of damage tothe French personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the threefloating-batteries. "

Major Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "provesnothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, andill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contendagainst such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * *The Fort of Kinburn surrendered, _not because_ it was breached--notbecause the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to beunable to protract the contest, --but simply because the guns andgunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and thecalibres (of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing any greatdamage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed. "

The guns in the low _open_ batteries were exposed to a ricochet andvertical fire, to which latter the French admiral attributed, in goodpart, the surrender of the place. The buildings behind the batteries, built of wood, "slightly constructed and plastered over, " were set onfire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the gunsalmost impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of 1, 400, only 157were killed and wounded--a very small loss under all the circumstances. If the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men fromthe ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops whoinvested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been stillless; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greaterdamage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force. 

With respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, CommanderDahlgren very judiciously remarks:--

 "The use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn. Still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide against its employment. "

The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of _land-batteries_, whichbreached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. An auxiliaryfire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced verylittle effect. But after the work had been reduced, an experimentalfiring was made by the _Edinburgh_, armed with the largest and mostpowerful guns in the British navy. 

In speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls ofBomarsund, and the experimental fire of the _Edinburgh_, Sir HowardDouglas remarks:--

 "This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally, but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships, and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and ought to attempt elsewhere. "

 "But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like the _Edinburgh_, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500 yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without being fired at! The firing of the _Edinburgh_, at 1, 060 yards, was unsatisfactory. 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and most powerful guns in the British navy (viz. , from the Lancaster gun of 95 cwt. , with an elongated shell of 100 lbs. ;--from 68-pounders of 95 cwt. , and 32-pounders of 56 cwt. , solid shot guns;--from 10-inch shell guns of 84 cwt. , with hollow shot of 84 lbs. ;--from 8-inch shell guns of 65 and 60 cwt. , with hollow shot of 56 lbs. ), and did but little injury to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired. A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained--no practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted, taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40, 000 lbs. Of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1, 060, and then at 480 yards. "

Surely, this "naval attack, " taken in connection with the true facts ofthe capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in thePacific upon the Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated toaffect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resistmaritime attacks. 

Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashoreover guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable ofresisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought againstit by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the areaof the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns inbarbette. This conclusion they form from the results of the maritimeattack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund. 

Major Barnard, in his valuable work on "The Dangers and Defences of NewYork, " draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, andcontends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructedstone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if thelatter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that theyproved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, withguns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of avertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at Bomarsund waspoorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced verylittle effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Wastaken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of verticaland ricochet fires. 

With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may beremarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentionedtherein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towardscompletion, and that the acquisition of Texas and California, and thesettlement of Oregon and Washington Territory, by greatly extending ourline of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification ofother points. It should also be noted that while the value and necessityof these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline ofthe system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion thatthe increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power ofmodern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render itnecessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial portsof New York and San Francisco--one the _key point_ of the Atlantic, andthe other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by our Boardsof Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted _toomany_ points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to ourgreat seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coastdefence. However this may have been _at the time the system wasadopted_, there can be no question that the relative strength of theworks designed for the different points of our coast does not correspondto _the present_ relative importance of the places to be defended, andthe relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizingthe means of maritime attack. On this subject we quote from the work ofMajor Barnard:--

 "While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive system was planned, and our country has so increased in population, wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any impression by an invasion of our territory, --our great maritime places like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack. "

 "The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at the present day. "

 "The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of these nations to wage war against the United States. "

 "No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive results may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn, Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first named became, indeed, the true seats of war. "

 "Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources, and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided _there_, Cronstadt would have been the next field of combat, --for which, indeed, the allies had made the most enormous preparations. "

 "Is it not _certain_ that in future all war of maritime powers against the United States, will take a similar course? All territorial invasion being out of the question, it is against our _great_ seaports and strategic points of coast defence--such as New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco--pre-eminently New York, --that an enemy will concentrate his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments, --against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack, which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall _insure_ success. "

 "The mere defense of the city against _ordinary fleets_, is no longer the question; but _through the defensive works to be here erected, the nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can bring against them_; in short, in fortifying New York, _we are really preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous contests is to be decided_. "

A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the groundthat casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships andfloating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longerland fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege. 

It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are moreexposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunnersto be picked off by sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a verylimited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. On the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works, when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectuallyresist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. Theresults of recent wars, and of the West Point experiments by GeneralTotten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this. Against such proofs the mere _ad captandum_ assertion of theirincapacity can have but little weight--certainly not enough to justifythe abandonment of a system approved by the best military authoritiesof this country and Europe, and sanctioned by long experience. 

Major Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts toresist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety ofabandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of Coast Defences, uses the following forcible language:--"When we bear in mind that thehostile 'floating batteries, ' of whatever description, will themselvesbe exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown fromshore batteries, --that when they choose to come to 'close quarters, ' toattempt to breach, _their_ 'embrasures' present openings through whichdeluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon thegunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason hastaught us, with regard to the casemate, --we need not be underapprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubtthat they will, as they did in Russia, answer the important purposes forwhich they were designed. "

"It only remains to show the _necessity_ of such works. It, in general, costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to builda masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mountit. All authorities agree that an open barbette battery (Grivel's veryforcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vesselscan approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It maysafely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnishthe efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly ofthis character; and indeed it very often happens that there are _noothers_. "

"When such sites _are_ found, it rarely happens that they afford roomfor sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity ofputting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casematedstructure. Such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, rakingfire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes, offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and affordto their gunners a degree of security quite as great as _can_ be givento men thus engaged. "

"On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is nodanger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real andintense practical importance as the security against hostile aggressionof the great city and port of New York, it is not admissible to setaside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds whohave devoted themselves to such subjects. A means of defence, sanctionedby its being confided in to protect the great ports of Europe--which_has_ protected the great ports of Russia against the most formidablenaval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon ourconfidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to beadhered to in place of all new 'systems, ' until time and trial shallhave _necessitated_ (not merely justified) the change. "

"If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what hasbeen judged necessary for the defence of important ports, --toexperience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test ofactual trial, --we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is nowrequired to defend New York. We shall find at _Sebastopol_--a narrowharbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval dépôt ofRussia on the Black Sea--an array of 700 guns, about 500 of which wereplaced in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of greatsize), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive worksfulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, onthe 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage. "

"The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets--the enormouspreparations required--the great risks encountered in landing abesieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protectionagainst the _former_ species of attack, costly works are necessary, andagainst the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, affordprotection), naturally caused the Russians to make these water defencestheir _first_ object. Yet, though almost unprotected on the land side, Sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; andillustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic andeffectual _land defence_ may be improvised, where the _sea defence_ isprovided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place. "

"Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance of itsdefence to Russia, it was not greater, --it was by no means _as great_, as that of New York to our own country. This port, and military andnaval dépôt, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of 600 guns, 500 of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; theremainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel. This number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in NewYork harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence aswas found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line ofapproach, compared with the latter. "

"_These works fulfilled their object. _ They protected the great port anddépôt of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. For twosuccessive years did the mighty armaments of France and Englandthreaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casematedcastles' which presented itself, and declined the contest. "

"Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of France. After thealmost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facingthe shores of her great rival, England, and an equally profuseexpenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dépôt, wemay suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which thescience of man could devise, would be employed here to make this greatseat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attackpossessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant. The means there employed are (so far as regards mere _harbor_ defence)precisely the same (viz. , casemated works in several tiers, combinedwith open batteries where the locations are favorable); and theapplication of means is the same as we have found so successful inRussia, --the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of NewYork. "

Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on thesiege of Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:--

 "The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water, although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the strongest fleet. "

 "It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:"

 "1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least possible delay. "

 "2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, and by long habit. "

 "In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege. "

 "This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists. To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15, 000 or 20, 000 men could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers; but when it comes to the case of more than 100, 000 disciplined veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow campaign. "

 "Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase; and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all possible means taken to spread sound military information among them. In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular artillery for instructors. "

On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use ofsea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard'spamphlet:--

 "One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even _attacked_ with impunity, I conceive to be the want of _skill_ and _care_ in the use of the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been, however, by no means a _peculiarity_ of coast defences. The same system of random firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred apparently to even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air. "

 "But this question is _now_ asked, both in the use of the soldier's rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of artillery of all kinds. "

 "It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval science, and is a _necessary_ result of the recent great improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing, though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien magnifique, _n'est pas la guerre_. '"

 "It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical effect. The _volunteers_ of our cities will constitute _mainly_, in time of war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns. In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. But it is most desirable that we should have at _all times_ a body of gunners, practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to give to our _citizens_, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences provided for their security, but it would disseminate military knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a sufficient garrison of _artillery_ troops to aid in the instruction of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army _this_ cannot be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail an artillery officer or two for the purpose. "

NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII. --OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES. 

The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce himto change the views therein expressed with respect to the superiorstrategic importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line ofmilitary operations, and as a line of defence. The mutual commercialinterests of the United States and the Canadas render a war between thetwo countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an eventis by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us toprepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency. 

NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX. , X. , XI. AND XII. --ARMY ORGANIZATION. 

Since these chapters were written, several important changes have beenmade in our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (atleast, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps, infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineertroops organized. But this company is mainly employed at West Point forinstruction of the cadets in the several branches of militaryengineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in thesystem of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, oftroops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of ourpermanent fortifications, and for the general duties of fieldengineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the arms of militaryorganization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; itcannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared. 

In speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those ofthe different European powers which he was sent to examine and reportupon, Captain McClelland says:--

 "Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the works of attack. This change, " he says, "will require to be introduced into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working parties, etc. "

With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient toremark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equallyas great and equally as objectionable. The defect in our present armyorganization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which, from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belongto it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanentlytransfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well might it besaid, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" inproportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries shouldbe permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillerytactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals. 

There are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shownto properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of anarmy organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform theappropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiencyfor either service. Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously andshamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall ourpaymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the useof the scalpel and amputating instruments! This is, perhaps, an extremecase, but it serves to illustrate the principle. 

The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so oftenbeen pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by anytransfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of theappropriate duties of one corps to another. Indeed, such a measure wouldonly tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary intoa lasting evil. It can readily be remedied by legislative action, but inno other way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by all. Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, thatthere can be little doubt that Congress will soon perceive theimportance of applying the only proper and effective remedy. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII. --PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. 

Although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of apermanent fortification, as established by the great masters of thisbranch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vastimprovements which have, within the last few years, been made inprojectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works ofthis character. These changes consist mainly in an increased thicknessof stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in thearrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from anenemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and ofheavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled bysteam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence ofharbors. In the Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distantbombardment which left her fortifications intact. These modifications inthe arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary inorder to restore the relative power of defence against the improvementsmade in the means of attack. They can very easily be introduced withoutchanging the form or general character of the works, and they are reallyso very essential that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 yearsago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art, will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siegebatteries or well organized maritime attacks. 

Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced bythe increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assertthat masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that theincreased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastionedfront, with lines more extended. 

With respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it isvery natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion thatthis improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of adefensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probablylead to a different conclusion. Such at least is the opinion of theablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned frontnow generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with thearms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampartgun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. But this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is bettersupplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. The latterweapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanentwork. 

With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, ithas long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to thefire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect ofthis rule caused the fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, fromthe results of that siege, the inference that the present mode offortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance ofmilitary engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions. 

With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, the case is very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, notmasked by earthen works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectilesthrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this modeof protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is aquestion well worthy of discussion. This subject has already beenalluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there shown thatno facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any changein our present system. 

NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV. --FIELD ENGINEERING. 

As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war inthat country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineeringwhich is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, particularly sapping and mining. The only operation resembling a siegewas the investment and bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy ofremark that if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, hemust have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches andbatteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life. 

Nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in theattack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read thehistory of the war without appreciating the important influence whichFort Brown had upon General Taylor's defence of the left bank of the RioGrande. Again if we compare our loss in other Mexican battles with thatwhich the Americans sustained in their attacks upon Monterey, Churubusco, Molino del Key, and Chapultepec, --places partially securedby field works--we shall be still more convinced of the value oftemporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, althoughit was manifest that the Mexicans neither knew how to construct nor howto defend them. 

Nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges, for, with the exception of the Rio Grande, our armies had no importantrivers to cross. We must not, however, omit to note the important factthat General Taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories ofPalo Alto and Resacade La Palma to pursue and destroy the army ofArista, _because_ he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to followthem across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked that even a verysmall bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossingother streams and ravines during the operations of this war. One of ourcavalry officers writes:--

 "On our march from Matamaras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846 and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks; a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity than they were. "

With regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of Leeand others connected with the operations of General Scott, proved thevalue and importance of this particular branch of field engineering. 

But field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service, received its greatest development and most brilliant application in theCrimean war, particularly in the siege of Sebastopol, and the measuresresorted to by General Todtleben to defend that place against the attackof superior forces. 

A brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to thereader:--

When the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended on the southside only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, andfrom eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with twostories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. These works would haveafforded some protection against a _coup-de-main_ by infantry andcavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to acombined attack of these arms with artillery. 

The Russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening thisposition by occupying the most important points in his line of defencewith detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, andgenerally closed at the gorge. These works were afterwards connected byre-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade theravines and to flank the advanced works. The old wall was strengthenedwith earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at aconsiderable distance in front. 

The most important points of the main line of defence were: 1st. TheFlag-staff Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. The Malakoff. 4th. TheRedan. 5th. The little Redan. The command of the first was about fifteenfeet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. Aportion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. Theconstruction of the Central Bastion was similar to that of theFlag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other works wasstill less. The command of the Malakoff was about fourteen feet, itsditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. The thickness of parapetin these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofswere covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. The loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampartand parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. Many of theembrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanksfilled with earth. The same material was sometimes used for traverses. Rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces fromrifle balls and small grape. Great attention was given to theconstruction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. Thesewere sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (wherethere was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground, and occasionally excavated in the solid rock. Some had fireplaces andchimneys, and were well ventilated. Interior slopes were revetted withgabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. Gabions were also employedto repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. Abattis, militarypits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machineswere employed in front of different parts of the defences. Mines wereresorted to in front of the Flag-staff Bastion to retard the Frenchapproaches. They were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve tofifteen feet deep. The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted offleches, united by a simple trench. 

Captain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, from whosevaluable Report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds thefollowing remarks upon these works of defence:--

 "From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new principle of engineering was developed. It is true, that there were several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of iron tanks, etc. , but the whole merit consisted in the admirable adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans of the various works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing that if Todtleben were called upon to do the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close flanking arrangements. "

 "These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can be no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has ever yet occurred. "

We will now pass to the works of attack. When the allies decided thatthe works of Sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade andassault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to beconsidered was to secure the forces covering the siege works fromlateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. The field worksplanned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many ofthem "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminentdanger had demonstrated their necessity. " The French line of defenceconsisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantryparapet. The English seemed to attach but little importance to fieldworks for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter atInkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect. 

In describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege. Captain McClelland says:--

 "In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet in the solid rock! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bombproofs were provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc. They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller was placed in position--some thirty guns would be brought to bear upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps of engineers. "

 "With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and perfected with so much care at Chatham. Whenever the ground was difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front, appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as they ought to have been before giving the assault. In too many cases the expression '_tâtonnement_ of the French would seem to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however, were very well constructed. The magazines, platforms, etc. , were usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but generally the flying-sap were employed. "

It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the Frenchapproaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of thecounterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reachedwithin two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan. 

This description of the operations of the English at the siege ofSebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their siegesin the Spanish Peninsula. It certainly is very strange that a greatnation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineerofficers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar anddifficult duties of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered forsubstituting human life for professional skill in the operations of asiege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, andis always so necessary an element of a good military organization!

While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immenseimportance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude fromthe operations of that siege that good earthen works of a largedevelopment are better suited for the defence of a large city thanpermanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which willnecessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for menand military stores. We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on thispoint, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journalof the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel. 

Captain McClelland says:--

 "This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy, which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen) fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as field works never were before, and were defended as field works never had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an assault. "

 "Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the siege remained to be undertaken, viz. , the crowning of the covered way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced coming into play. "

 "Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September, would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the southside. "

General Neil remarks:--

 "Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not of incontestable utility in fortified places. "

 "Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a large army which always preserved its free communications with the interior of Russia. "

 "If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps; if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the heads of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have been an impregnable fortress. "

 "When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of September, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed, after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the sequel has proved. "

 "The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification. "

 "Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute, behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army. "

 "The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence; for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault, which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of the siege. "

 "Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly invaded by the greater part of the Russian army. "

 "Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from insult by good masonry scarps. '" (Note to page 443. )

And again, page 423, the same authority remarks:

 "Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the concentric fires of our batteries; for, _not being protected by masonry scarps_, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced'"

NOTE TO CHAPTER XV. --MILITARY EDUCATION, &C. 

With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps, be sufficient to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved thevalue of the West Point Military Academy; for the superior efficiency ofproperly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civillife without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon topractice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of thatinstitution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to beconvinced. 

The recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of aretired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes ofintroducing this very necessary measure into our military service;although it is very certain that without this we can never have oursystem of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis, which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while itprevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism. 

The Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to thesystem of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped thatthe more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to thenecessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferredfor partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as theefficiency of our army. 

EXPLANATION OF PLATES

Figs. 1, 2, 3. --Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armiesA and B. 

Fig. 4. --Line of operations directed against the extremity of theenemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the Marengocampaign. 

Fig. 5. --Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the Rhine, and the army of reserve. 

Fig. 6 shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 1800, topreserve his communications. 

Fig. 7 illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806. 

Fig. 8. --Interior and central line of operations. 

Fig. 9 represents a camp of a grand division of an army. The distancefrom the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from350 to 400 feet; thence to the line of posts, from 150 to 200 feet;thence to the line of sentinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases, the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensedwith. The distance between battalions will be from 50 to 100 feet; andthe same between squadrons and batteries. 

Fig. 10. --Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The widthof company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and willbe so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length ofthe battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each row will be 2 or3 feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those ofanother, from 4 to 6 feet. 

Fig. 11 is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company encampingalone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. Thehorses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at adistance from them of about 12 feet. The forage is placed between thetents. A squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180feet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 or 60 feet in rear ofthe non-commissioned officers' tents. 

Fig 12 is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companiesof foot engineers. 

[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "Instruction ofU. S. Field Artillery, horse and foot, " may be employed where a singlebattery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies ismaintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a fullbattery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops. The plan we have given is that which is employed in most Europeanservices. ]

Fig. 13. --In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the firesare so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to thesparks from the kitchens. 

Fig. 14. --Simple parallel order of battle. 

15. --Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank. 

16. --Parallel order, reinforced on a wing. 

17. --Parallel order, reinforced on the centre. 

18. --Simple oblique order. 

19. --Oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing. 

20. --Perpendicular order. 

21. --Concave order. 

22. --Convex order. 

23. --Order by echelon on a wing. 

24. --Order by echelon on the centre. 

25. --Combined order of attack. 

26. --Formation of infantry by two deployed lines. 

27, 28. --- Arrangements corresponding to depth of column. 

29. --Formation by squares. 

30. --Mixed formation of three battalions. 

31. --Deep formation of heavy columns. 

32. --Formation in columns by brigade. 

33. --Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system. 

34. --Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807. 

35. --Attack on Copenhagen. 

36. --Attack on Algiers. 

37. --Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa. 

38. --Attack on St. Jean d'Acre. 

39. --Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification. 

40. --Section of do. Do. 

41. --Tenaillons. 

Fig. 42. --Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet. 

43. --A horn-work. 

44. --A crown-work. 

45. --A redan. 

46. --A lunette. 

47. --A mitre or priest-cap. 

48. --A bastioned fort. 

49. --Vertical section of a field intrenchment. 

50. --Simple sap. 

51. --Flying sap. 

52. --Full sap. 

53. --Crater of a military mine. 

54. --Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work. 

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